Growing Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean:

Prospects and Challenges

Khalid Manzoor Butt* and Sadaf Jan Siddiqui**

Abstract

The ‘String of Pearls’ strategy attributed to China for growing its relations
with the states situated around the Indian Ocean (IO) in order to neutralise
Indian influence. Furthermore, protecting economic and strategic interests
are also the key factors that China is maintaining its presence in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR). After the completion of the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), it is predicted that Gwadar Port will be the most
precious pearl of the string. With the increased Chinese influence, the
United States (US) will not fall behind and will have to revise strategy to
maintain its supremacy in the IO and keep Chinese influence under check.
However, Chinese presence will enhance economic prospects in the IO but
may also pose some challenges for regional peace and security. In this
paper, an analytical study would be undertaken on such questions.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, Sino-US Relations, China, US, PLA Navy,

String of Pearls.

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region IOR has turned into a strategic hotspot since
2010. Ever a great oceanic expanse of geo-strategic significance due to its
centrality in continental trade and a conduit of energy supply to the Asiatic
powers, this region has found added salience as a medium to the fulfillment
of the ‘Chinese Dream’ as transmitted by the PRC (People’s Republic of
China).1 China has launched a massive programme to enhance its presence

*
The author is Dean of Arts and Social Sciences and Director of Centre of Excellence
China Studies, GC University, Lahore.
**
The author is a Research Assistant, Centre of Excellence China Studies, GC
University, Lahore.
1
Saji Abraham, China’s Role in the Indian Ocean: Its Implications on India’s
National Security, (Vij Books India 2015).

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 Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean

and position in this region. In the normal course of nation-building effort,

the PRC’s venture into this economic theatre is quite understandable. The
concern, however, that caused India to be worried about China’s Indian
Ocean aims is about the means and methods that China has adopted in
materialising its ‘presence’ in the expanse of Asiatic lifeline. China sees the
IOR as its domain of strategic importance in which her economic
relationships, based on military and economic power projection.
Accordingly, the Indian Ocean (IO) is a top priority in China’s political and
economic road map towards its achievement as a global power status. In this
process, a competition with other stakeholders of the IO like; the US,
Britain, India, Australia, France and Japan has started.2 Of course, these
powers will not like to give a free hand to China to flex its muscles and such
confrontation would not be conducive for regional peace, coherence and for
maintaining the balance of power. India’s geographical position in the IOR
is an obstacle for the strategic objectives of China. Meanwhile, China has
featured the IO as it is strategically ‘beat’ which combined with its planned
military bases around the Indian peninsula and would disturb traditional
neighborhoods of India. This paper is a description of the PRC’s conceived
and adopted strategies to materialise her renewed ‘position’ in the IO.

It is a descriptive research based on analytical approach. The data

collection for the research is based on secondary resources. Various books,
articles and websites were consulted to gather relevant information. Views
and statements given by the social scientists and leaders in this region are
included to critically analyse the situation.

Mackinder’s Heartland Theory and the Indian Ocean Region

The ‘Heartland’ theory put forward by Halford Mackinder and he put

emphasis on the ‘pivot area.’ He described, the increased attention was put
through the concept of geopolitics. In addition, Mackinder’s concepts
revolving around geopolitics and sea power (significance of navy) are
opposite the idea put forward by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mackinder’s theory
assumed the incorporation of a huge empire into existence at the Heartland.
This Heartland would be independent of the coastal areas and
intercontinental transportation and will not need to use the seas for keeping

2
Suhasini Haidar, “Quad-The Confluence of Four Powers and Two Seas,” Hindu,
July 25, 2020.

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herself intact. Mackinder considered the geography of Earth divided into the
core (world island consisting of Eurasia and Africa) and border (America,
British Isles, and Oceana). The border or periphery was much smaller than
the core and would rely mostly on sea transport to cope with the
technological level of the core. The core would be in control of sufficient
natural resources in contrast to the periphery which would have a broadly
divided industrial base. The Heartland could use its navy to destroy each of
them in turn and establish its own industries further than the reach of the
periphery thus gave it the much-needed strategic advantage. The Core
addressed by Mackinder as the Heartland because it was at the center of the
world. Moreover, he also gave credit to the tactical advantage provided by
the coastal areas and oceanic regions.3

The IO geopolitics holds great significance among China, the US, and
India in the 21st century. This significance is attributed because the rim-land
as described by Mackinder consists of states sharing shore by the sea (also
described as Upland or Tributary region). India and South Africa began an
Indian Ocean rim initiative which was later on joined by Australia and
Mauritius. Subsequently, it lured other littorals states and the initiative was
joined by Malaysia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Yemen and
Indonesia. Keeping the rim-land initiative in mind, one can say that
Nicholas John Spykman’s assumption becomes quite relevant to the
contemporary world, as whoever controls the Indian Ocean subsequently
controls the world. The ‘geographic’ world refers the land, sea, air, space
and most possibly cyberspace and it cannot be avoided. Today’s strategic
significance of the IO is the same as four decades back in history. When
Great Britain withdrew its forces from the Suez Canal, the biggest concern
was the power-vacuum and who would fill it. This fact draws the IO back
into the spotlight as the impact of geopolitical scenario is observed on both
intentional behaviours and military co-operations among different states.
“When the transition of power occurred from the Great Britain in the late
60s, no one was in doubt of who will be filling the gap, the only question
then was how the United States (US) was planning to organise and control
the Indian Ocean.”4 It was a quick and smooth change of guard at the IO
between the two Anglo-Saxon powers. This swift shift of burden also put a

3
Mackinder, H. J. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal,
vol. 23, no. 4 ( 1904):421-37, https://. doi.org/10.2307/1775498
4
Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in
the Cold War and After, Second Edition, (JHU press, 1995).

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quick end to the debate about the Indian Ocean and its strategic future.
Furthermore, “The geopolitical arena will be reconfigured as China and
India move towards intensifying their economic growth thus producing a
gravitational pull that will transform the shape of Asia Pacific, Indian Ocean
and the littoral. The result would be a reformed state of relations between
both major world powers and their regional allies. This shift will transform
into a ‘strategic triangle’ both in the Maritimes and littoral world between
India, China, and the US.”5

Growing Presence of China in Indian Ocean

India has stakes and been exerting its influence among the island states in
the IO as a big economy and military power in the region. Therefore, India
always looks upon the IO as its domain of influence.6 This is the reason that
soon after taking office, the then newly elected Prime Minister of India,
Narendra Modi in May 2014 announced that his first and foremost task
would be to extend and enhance its bilateral trade relations with the
neighbouring states of India. This was a time when China, too, was
gradually overshadowing India in the region, by extending its own
economic growth, and Modi was well aware of the danger India would face
as a consequence of being overshadowed by its immediate regional
economic rival.7 What worried Modi was that China’s One Belt One Road
(OBOR) project through which China was extending its influence by
building in-roads into South Asia? These in-roads shifted the inclination in
relationships of its neighbour states from India to China and deepened her
relations with the states that were already on friendly terms and ultimately
this is not only putting India at risk of lagging behind China but also would
make it relatively less important in South Asia.

To add to it, China also has an established military base in Djibouti and
is in talks with Myanmar for managing the Kyaukphyu port. Moreover,

5
Dilip Das, “Regionalism In A Globalising World: An Asia-Pacific Perspective,”
CSGR Working Paper No. 80/01, 2001, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and
Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom,
http://www.csgr.org
6
Priyanjoli Ghosh, “India’s Indian Ocean Region Strategy,” Journal of Indo-Pacific
Affairs, Air University Press, August 31, 2020.
7
Sreeram Chaulia, Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister,
(Bloomsbury Publishing : September 14, 2016, 1 st Edition ) ,

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“China has persuaded the Thai authorities to re-consider the idea of building
a canal at the Kra-Isthmus which would put the significance of Strait of
Malacca at risk by allowing ships to pass from the Bay of Bengal to the
South China Sea without having to pass through the Malacca.”8

For much of its history, China’s focus was on South East Asia but since
2014, a steady shift has been observed in her policy towards the South
Asian region. South Asia ─ home to one fourth of the global population and
the world’s third largest economic region in terms of Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP).9 This all combined produces a lucrative and more profitable
market with a diverse base for Chinese products. Due to political conditions
and infrastructural challenges, accessing the Indian markets directly through
Arunachal Pradesh, Afghanistan or Pakistan — the only way left for China
to access the Indian markets is via Bangladesh due to the friendly relations
these two states maintain. The Chinese plan in Bangladesh through its check
book diplomacy10 initiating massive infrastructural development projects.
Given the central location of Bangladesh in the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar (BCIM) which holds a strategically important Chittagong port
along with the contemporary Maritime Silk Road is a very important factor
in the realisation of both economic and maritime Belt and Road Initiatives
(BRI). If the Chinese succeed in passing their naval ships through the Bay
of Bengal, India could find itself struggling on three fronts at the same time
against Chinese forces. This would include the Arunachal Pradesh, India’s
Northeast, the Bay of Bengal at its east and Pakistan at its west which are
both China’s ally at the same time. The Chinese government is using
political and military tactics combined with expanding economic assistance
to the countries in South Asian region for having strong footholds. China
undertaking all these steps in the region, meanwhile India is unable to match
her naval, strategic or economic power to China. Table no. 1 shows the
procurement of Chinese vessels by the South Asian naval powers in
extraordinary numbers, most of the time, a result of joint Research and
Development for developing new combat vessels and submarines. In

8
A. Morsy, “The Impact of “The Belt Road Initiative,”, Egypt Economy and
Foreign Policy, 2019
9
Lee Jong-Wha, “Is the Asian Century Really Here?” Project Syndicate, April 01,
2021. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asian-century-requires-
unified-regional-leadership-by-lee-jong-wha-2021-04
10
Check book diplomacy is used to describe a foreign policy which openly uses
economic aid and investment between countries to carry diplomatic favor.

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addition, these countries are heavily relying on China in terms of Maritimes

commercial operations due to her heavy investments in deep seaports and
other related infrastructural projects.

Table No. 1
Economic and Strategic Relationships
of Selected South Asian Countries with China

Country Active Ports Chinese Status of Free

Naval Infrastructure and Investments Trade
Vessels of developed by 2005-2017 Agreement
China China (US$ billion) with China

Bangladesh 46 Chittagong port 24.1 Biggest trading

partner (2016)

Maldives 0 iHavan project NA Signed 2017

Myanmar 17 Kyaukpyu port 7.4 ASEAN-China

2010
Pakistan 15 Gwadar port 50.6 Signed 2007

Sri Lanka 17 Hambantota port 14.7 Signed 2014

Source: Belt and Road Portal: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/

India has somehow succeeded in attaining its strategic alliance with

Maldives, though it is a tiny state, yet it will give India a little edge over
China as China’s most energy imports travel from the Middle East and
Africa and pass by near Maldives. In case of any conflict between the
two countries, China would be disadvantaged from this point as India’s
base at the Andaman Islands could interrupt the transportation of
Chinese ships via Strait of Malacca along with to disrupt Pakistani
maritime activities at the same time in the Arabian Sea by using its naval
power. It is understood that such developments have made the IO
strategically more important regionally as well as globally. With the
passage of time, as the size of economies of the South Asian countries
and China further grow, the IO will have more vitality.

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 Strategic Studies

China’s Power Projection in Indian Ocean

The massive volume of trade has compelled China to secure strategic

position in the IO for protection of her interests. China’s growing economic
stature at global level necessitates its power projection in IO. Chinese
maritime aims also call for a worldwide ‘PLAN.’ “The father of the
contemporary Chinese navy, Liu Huaqing, projected People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLA Navy) to become a global force by 2050.”11 China’s
aspirations of becoming a maritime power as stated in its White Paper of
2013 is in line with this thought process. Chinese analysts also feel necessity
of using the PLA Navy for the protection of China’s international ambitions
and interests. Rear Admiral Y. Zhou, a nationalist political adviser stated,
“The paramount importance is safeguarding Chinese nationals abroad by
taking care of their political, economic and occupational safety. He notes
that safeguarding them would ensure steady development on the domestic
level. Thus, to do this, China needs naval power and advanced technological
infrastructures like aircraft carriers.”12

China gained support from certain states of the IOR, particularly in East
Africa; and its financial investments grew there, as some of them were
politically unstable and had difficulties for the foreign business as well.
According to Director of the College of African Studies at
Zhejiang Traditional University, Liu Hongwu, “The key aspects in the
future development of cooperation between the African Union and Chinese
government are security and co-operation. Now, for the last few years,
many African states are asking the Chinese government to develop and
update their security protocols.”13

China has also entered into strategic partnerships with a number of

countries like South Africa, Egypt, Pakistan and the ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) which intended for shaping an
11
Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon and Cortez A. Cooper, “ China’s Aircraft
Carrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications,” Naval War College
Review, vol. 68, no. 4 (2015): 64-79, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26397884.
12
William A. Callahan and EBSCO host, China Dreams: 20 Visions of The
Future(Oxford University Press Oxford 2013).
13
Chris Alden, “China’s and Africa’s Natural Resources: The Challenges and
Implications for Development and Governance,” Africa Portal, 2009,
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/china-and-africas-natural-resources-the-
challenges-and-implications-for-development-and-governance/

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international order competitive with its long-term interests. The ongoing

modernisation of the Chinese armed forces is also aimed at emerging a
limited power projection competence to “develop strategic data based on
a favourable and emphasised employment of the military forces.”14
Furthermore, it can be noted that Chinese power projection in the region
through diplomatic and military initiatives coupled with an outreach to
various countries, amidst ever-increasing economic engagement will
remain a basis of its foreign policy as China graduates to big power
status.15

Implications of Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean

One should not forget that ever since the Cold War, the US had supremacy
over the Indian Ocean and was playing a monitoring role to oversee the
trade routes. It seems obvious that the US would not compromise the role
and position that could be challenged by the growing Chinese influence.The
significance of the IO will draw special attention from the US strategists
because of its pivotal location and being a trade hub of global trade and
energy supplies.

Due to the importance of the IO, certain world powers also have their
naval presence in the IOR. Such can be seen in the case of the US where in
addition to its forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, “it’s 5th Fleet is in Bahrain and
regularly using the Diego Garcia Island as its naval and air-based operations
in addition to providing logistical support to its operations in the IOR. The
US Task Force 152 is also having a significant presence in the area tasked
for ensuring the safe and secure flow of energy resources through the
Persian Gulf. In addition, Task Force 150 is assigned for combating piracy
throughout the Gulf of Oman and Kenya. The US also maintains a
significant presence throughout the Indian Ocean and has an established
military base in Djibouti which is the largest base of such significance on

14
Stephen Hoadley and Jian Yang, “China’s Cross-Regional FTA Initiatives:
Towards Comprehensive National Power,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no.2 (2007):
327-348.
15
Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, “Building a More “Democratic” and
“Multipolar” World: China’s Strategic Engagement with Developing Countries,”
The China Review, vol. 19, no. 4 (November 2019): 55-84.

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the whole of the African Continent.”16 The purpose of the Djibouti base is
to ensure safe passages through Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal which is
known as the world’s busiest shipping routes. “A major function of this base
is to counter the Somali piracy which is attracted to the region due to the
frequency of passing ships and size of cargo passing through. In recent
years, given its significant location due to Somalia in South and Yemen
lying approximately 30 km from the strait, China has also started
establishing a base in the region.”17

In the case of Europe, however, France is the only country that has a
considerable presence in the IOR quadrants facing the south west and north,
maintaining bases in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti. Recently, the US has
declared an infrastructural development fund of 113 million dollars for
development in digital economies, energy, and infrastructural projects to
counter the increased Chinese presence in the region as the Chinese are
rapidly investing in Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Pakistan ports and African
developmental projects.

The IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) which aims to develop

considerable economic growth, security and liberal trade practices have 21
border member states along with Australia. “The white paper, published in
the 2017 edition of Australian Foreign Policy, registers its maritime aims as
such, to support and assist the IORA in pertaining to International law and
maritime trade and security.”18 The security of maritime trade routes holds
vital importance to Australia’s economic wellbeing and energy supplies to
the region. Of more importance to Australia in the South East Asian
strategic depth for her security that is provided by the FPDA (Five Power
Defense Agreement). Initially, this alliance was formed by Singapore,
Malaysia, the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand and Australia which
provided security assurance to the Australia’s proneness to extremist attacks
carried out in the aspect of its western perspective propagated globally. Due
to the FPDA, any attack on any of the five states would obligate other states
16
Lord Jopling, “Maritime Security: Nato and EU Roles and Co-ordination,”
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2010.
17
Theo Notteboom, “Towards a New Intermediate Hub Region in Container
Shipping? Relay and Interlining Via Cape Route vs The Suiz Route,” The Journal of
Transport Geography (2012): 164-178.
18
Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s Maritime-Strategic Presence in IOR: Geopolitical,
Geo economic and Security Import,” Maritime Affairs: The Journal of The National
Maritimes Foundation of India, 1-15, 2014.

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 Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean

to consult and carry out a single or distributed response towards tackling the
immediate threat. Because of Australia’s western character, “it is susceptible
to attacks and maritime security both on naval and trade grounds hold
pivotal significance for combating non-state sea bound threats in the IOR
and Southeast Asia.”19

Notwithstanding “After the Chinese government established a naval

base in Sanya at the Southern edge of Hainan, it deployed its Jin submarines
in the Indian Ocean in 2008. This base is just 1200 nautical miles from the
Malacca Strait and holds the closest accessibility route to the Indian Ocean.
This move raised eyebrows of Indian leaders, as it is the closest access route
for India towards the Indian Ocean. The Sanya base holds an underground
facility that serves the function of hiding the movement of the Jins and
makes it difficult to be detected.”20 These tunnels and underground facilities
at the tip of deep-water worry India as this facility can have strategic
implications for her in the IOR. “This facility serves as a chokepoint for the
Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz and Malacca straits and facilitates the ‘String of
Pearls’ strategy that China is gradually adapting to increase its strategic
impact on the region and also is a strategic threat to India.”21

String of Pearls Strategy

This term was used by the American and Indian defense and strategic
analysts to refer to the major plan of China to surround India by establishing
seaports and airports in countries situated around India. The term ‘String of
Pearls’ was first used in 2005, “in a report entitled ‘Energy Futures in Asia’
provided to the US Defence Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld by defence
contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.22 It alleged that China was following the
strategy of ‘string of pearls’ making bases from the Middle East to the
Southern China. These ‘pearls’ were naval bases or electronic spying posts
19
Chris Rahman, “The Rise Of China As A Regional Maritime Power: Strategic
Implications For A New Century,” University Of Wollongong Thesis Collection
1954-2016, 2003.
20
Harsh V Pant, “Rising China In India’s Vicinity: A Rivalry Takes Shape In Asia,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2016): 364-381.
21
Mari Izuyama, Masahiro Kurita, “Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Regional
Responses to China’s Growing Influence,” Chapter 2, East Asian Strategic Review
2017, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan.
22
Zhou Bo, “The String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road,” China Daily,
February 12, 2014.

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 Strategic Studies

built by the Chinese in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The
basic purpose was to protect its overseas power and protect its trade
shipments.”23

Figure No.1
String of Pearls Routes

Source: https://www.quora.com/Why-is-String-of-Pearls-strategy-of-China-a-threat-to-
Indias-economy-and-security

The Gwadar deep seaport in Balochistan (Pakistan) also serves as an

important component of the Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. Apart from
this, “the Chinese base in Burma and Chinese intelligence activities and
established facilities at the Bay of Bengal, the Kra Isthmus proposal towards
the Thai authorities and military pacts with the Cambodian authorities have
helped China to build substantial presence throughout the South China sea
and IOR.”24 China’s 80 per cent of fuel passes through the Malacca Strait

23
D. G., Dwivedi, “Indian Ocean Region (IOR) : India as a Net Security Provider-
The Way Ahead, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/indian-ocean-region-
ior-india-as-a-net-security-provider-the-way-ahead/
24
Chandana Priyantha Arangalla, “Nonalignment To Balance China’ss Influeance
On Sri Lanka: Negotiating Chinas String Of Pearl Strategy For The Pearl Of The
Indian Ocean,” Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, 2017.

74
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and she is not likely to rely on the US naval power for its security because
of strained relations between the two. China, therefore, is establishing its
own naval bases at eastern choke points along the South China Sea and
Persian Gulf region for self-reliance. Apart from the naval bases, China is
also establishing container ports at Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Chittagong
(Bangladesh) to consolidate its position at the IOR. China has already
agreed with the Sri Lankan government to establish and finance the
Hambantota Development Zone and build a bunker system, oil refinery and
container ports.

Figure No.2
String of Pearls: Sea Routes in the Indian Ocean

Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/97816112@N02/14090911884

“The Gwadar Port at the Southwest of Pakistan has generated lots of

curiosity due to its strategic location lying around 70 km from Iran and 400
kilometers east to the Hormuz which is a vital energy resource supply route
to the world. The Gwadar deep seaport will provide the Chinese with a
‘attending post’ which can use to keep an eye on the American and Indian

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 Strategic Studies

activities at the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.”25 Although the potential
of Pakistani naval forces doesn’t have a serious threat for India yet, a
combination of Chinese and Pakistan naval forces at Gawadar can be a
problem for India and it will be hard to counter the joint Sino-Pak forces.

It cannot be ruled out that China has followed a policy of neutrality for
economic gains throughout the world without involving in alliance or
military coalitions. According to Chinese government statements, “The
strategy of ‘mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity’ is a
centerpiece of Chinese strategy, as stated in numerous PRC White Papers
on National Defense.”26 It is debatable whether China is pursuing
hegemonic interests through’ String of Pearls’ strategy, or simply
following the policy for economic growth and peacefully rising to the
global stage as a major actor. Whatsoever is the reason, Hence India
perceives that China is encircling her for strategic advantages.

Interests of Other Stakeholders in Indian Ocean

The IOR has huge economic and strategic value even to the European states
despite the distance. Most of the European trade routes from Asia pass
through IOR. “The IOR also provides the only gateway to Europe towards
Southeast Asian and Asia-Pacific markets. Europe maintains almost 35 per
cent of its exports to Asia and has 4 out of its 10 major trade partners in the
IOR.27” It goes without saying that “The IOR’s chokepoints at the Strait of
Hormuz and Malacca have most of Europe’s energy supply passing through
it on a daily basis. An almost 34m barrel of oil is carried through these
chokepoints every day.”28 Therefore, it is heavily dependent on smooth
SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) and swift passage throughout their
trade routes.

25
Sajid Shahzad, “Maritime Affairs in Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone in
Indian Ocean,” University Of Punjab, Lahore, 2017,
http://173.208.131.244:9060/xmlui/handle/123456789/6041
26
Anthony Cordesman, Steve Colley and Micheal Wang, “Chinese Strategy And
Military Modernization In 2015: A Comparative Analysis,” Center for Strategic &
International Studies, Rowman & Little Field, 2016.
27
Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating A Monster? The Rise Of China
And US Policy Toward East Asia,” International Security, 31(1), 81-126, 2006.
28
Geoffrey Till, Sea Power: A Guide For The 21st Century, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

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Similarly, for the United Kingdom (UK) importance of stability in IOR

as its maritime interests align with the smooth transportation of its cargo
from South Asia, the Middle East, China and Africa. After the Brexit, it is a
fact that “UK adopted austerity measures among its public departments, its
presence on diplomatic fronts have decreased globally. There is a smooth
reorientation towards streamlining its economic interests to become an
economic powerhouse in the EU.”29 These policies are directed towards
many IOR economies including Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Indonesia.
These markets are targeted, as high growth rate environments for Britain’s
products. Even after, it is no longer an Empire; the UK still has stakes in the
IOR.

Japan, Australia and other stakeholders are also perturbed about the
Chinese rising investments in the region. These economies have proposed to
establish a global order based on a set of pre-defined rules in the Indo-
Pacific regions to counter the growing Chinese presence particularly at
important strategic chokepoints. Most IOR countries have their own navies
in the Indian Ocean which are now coupled with naval alliances with China,
the US and the European States. Similarly, Japan, the US and Australia see
Beijing’s acquisition of lands along the shores of IOR as a threat to their
interests and are worried that with the passage of time, China will adopt a
relatively stronger approach towards the IOR by undercutting the
collaborative practices and norms established in the Indo-Pacific water.

The US defence department has strategic interest in safeguarding and

streamlining the SLOCs for their energy imports and protecting trade
routes from any adventure or interference by maintaining a strong naval
presence in the Indian Ocean. Since the Cold War, the US has
established this order in the IOR and is still doing so by having
established military bases in Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf. At the
same time, Japan holds its own economic interests in the Southeast Asian
region, serves as a lifeline for her energy supplies. Despite having naval
forces, Japan is unable to secure the naval routes due to the limits
imposed by its own constitution. Therefore, it seems obvious that, Japan
would re-visit her security options in order to protect its strategic and
economic interests in the South China Sea and the IOR.
29
Richard Pomfret, “Regionalism In East Asia: Why Has It Flourish Since 2000
And How Far It Will Go?,” Asia Pacific Economic Literature, vol. 25, issue no.2
(2011).

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For the time being, European states have been observing the rapid
developments in the IOR from the sidelines. However, in case of security
threat or instability in the region, Europe’s trade and energy supplies
would be at risk. Any instability in the region will have far-reaching
implications on Europe’s economic and strategic security. The EU
member states have been discussing a single principle-based order in the
IOR to protect their interests in the Indian Ocean. The EU can achieve
these goals by engaging with the IOR countries on diplomatic channels
and draw a mechanism by using presence of French naval fleets in the
region.

Russia as part of its ‘Pivot to the East’ strategy, she is developing

stronger diversified ties with regional players in the IOR. “The Russian
MoD on October 16, 2018 announced Friendship 2018 which were joint
military exercises carried out in the Northern region of Pakistan
involving more than 200 troops from both countries signifying towards a
new step towards bilateral relations between the two countries.”30 They
are now exacerbated by the emergence of new means of communication
and/or attacks linked to the technological revolution, for example,
artificial intelligence and robotics technologies. Ensuring digital security
in the IO is no less important now, with regional states increasingly
susceptible to cyber-attacks. In this context, the need for security and
safety of deep-water cables are also worth mentioning.31

Cooperation or Confrontation in the IOR

China’s BRI has attracted great media attention and generated heated
discussions globally since it announced. It is a combination of huge
infrastructural development projects and steps towards the reduction of
non-tariff barriers establishment of trade connections in Asian, African
and Eurasian regions. These projects will increase connectivity and
commerce activity by establishing new land and sea lines, connecting
China with other regions of the world. The BRI is split into 2 parts: the
revival of the historic Silk route on land and the revitalisation of the
Maritime Silk route to cover around 60 countries that are currently

30
Chuanlu Feng, “An Analysis On The Geopolitical Pattern And Regional Situation
In South Asia,” Springer, Singapore, 2018.
31
Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting,
Prevention, and Mitigation (Oxford University Press, February, 2018).

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generating a total of 55 per cent of the world’s Gross National Product.

The BRI will encompass around 70 per cent of the world population and
will provide a transport route for more than 75 per cent of the discovered
natural energy reserves.

The seaborne BRI focuses on developing relatively short and smooth

routes by constructing a chain of deep seaports and controlling vital
chokepoints along the Maritime route to the economic and
manufacturing hubs in China. It includes not only port projects, but also
cross-land connections such as railway and pipeline constructions. As
enormous as the projects in BRI are, the obstacles, costs, potential
energy and rewards are all huge. Therefore, the plan of BRI will bring
great opportunity for international trading companies and logistics
service providers to expand their business and for the countries involved,
to develop their economies.32 To achieve these goals, it is important to
first understand the current trading situation and transportation network
and foresee the changes that the projects will bring.

As an emerging power, China needs oil and for that matter, she has
to import it from energy rich IOR and Caspian Region. “China has not
been involved in an offensive strike for the last two centuries. Although
China has influence over a vital economic and military route, the
Wakhan Corridor, it has not yet been used or provided for the
deployment of the western forces for combat in Afghanistan. The
Wakhan Corridor serves as a trade route between the Indian Ocean
Region and the Caspian Sea. China wants to secure its economic routes
passing through Afghanistan and even Pakistan leading to much wanted
Gwadar Port at the choke point energy-rich Hurmoz in IOR.”33 The
presence of the US in Afghanistan is making China compromised;
however, analysts and economists are of the view that “China is an
emerging economic power and can wait for the right moment. Each actor
in international arena acts to its own interests an every regional and
global power knows that peace in Afghanistan is vital for stability in
region. As per China, the point of concern is not only the US but also the

32
Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”
Council on Foreign Relations, Updated, January 28, 2020.
33
HasanYaser Malik, “The Emerging Strategic Rivalries In Indian Ocean Region:
An Analysis Of Indo- Ameican Ambitions And Implications For China,” Journal of
Contemporary Studies, vol. III, no.2 (Winter 2014).

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aspirant India that is eager to occupy the gap in power vacuum at the
IOR created by ouster of the US forces.”34

Conclusion

This paper mainly focuses on the analysis and the implications of

regional and extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean. The IOR’s
strategic location and importance compel every stakeholder to secure
maximum advantages for its national economic and strategic interests.
The US along with other countries aspires to utilise the SLOCs for
smoother trade conduction. Therefore, India and the US also hold
reservations over the growing presence and influence of China in the
IOR. India seems that in future, perhaps compromise on sharing its
power and writ on the IOR with China for its own economic interests.
Pakistan, shares border with some of the key regional players in the IOR
but have little implications when it comes to the IOR. For China, peace
and stability would be the first priority in the IOR for ensuring smooth,
swift and safe trade and the US would play its part in promoting regional
peace and stability instead of pursuing domination in the IOR for its own
gains which can undermine international trade and stability.

The US wishes to keep its ‘traditional role’ for its supremacy and to
monitor the Indian Ocean for the protection of its political interest which
is already under threat in the Asian countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and
Iran. Therefore, to deal with such challenges, the US needs to keep its
supremacy and grip in the Indian Ocean.

China traditionally is known, as a non-expansionist state does not seem

to have political supremacy in the IO thus will avoid involving herself in
international conflicts. However, she will prefer smooth trade and growing
economy instead of involving herself in conflict with the US and other
Western powers because that may undermine its BRI plan. It is likely that
China would find a peaceful and moderate way and will create a win-win
situation for major stakeholders with her soft diplomacy. It is presumed that
China would manage to keep major stakeholders quiet and use the String of
Pearls strategy to secure the economic benefits of the region rather would go

34
S.K. Chakrabarty, “Aspects of Modern International Relation,” Mittal
Publications, 1995.

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for any naval supremacy and hegemony in the Indian Ocean. In case, China
is unable to manage this then its BRI multibillion-dollar plan for economic
gains will be compromised.

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