Ahmed GreatPowerRivalry 2021
Ahmed GreatPowerRivalry 2021
Ahmed GreatPowerRivalry 2021
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Zainab Ahmed*
Abstract
Introduction
*
The author is Senior Research Fellow, Golden Ring Economic Forum.
Email: [email protected]
56
significant for global politics always but now the rapidly transforming
global dynamics implicate it considerably. Geopolitical and geo-economic
shifts have far-reaching impacts. But at the core of this now stands the
power competition between China and the US.
Pakistan is not just affected by the regional changes, transformations
surrounding it rather also from evolving maritime environment in the Indian
Ocean. The most important factor currently at play is contesting relationship
of China and the US. China‟s rapid rise, the US policies to encircle and
contain China and efforts to curtail Russia‟s influence are setting the stage
of entire global politics. India is the most important US partner in the policy
of containing China. Along with crucially significant defence agreements
with the US, India is enjoying the status of „Net Security Provider‟ in the
Indo-Pacific region. The US-Iran tensed relations always narrowed
Pakistan‟s options to diversify its relations. The US policy of Free and Open
Indo Pacific which theoretically upholds the right of all rim states of
sovereignty and free navigation and trade actually surrounds China. After
the hiatus of ten years the rejuvenation of Quadrilateral Security Agreement
(QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the US and its further
development to the trilateral defence agreement between Australia, UK and
US are the plausible manifestations of US‟s active involvement in Asia.
QUAD has a broad spectrum and policy outlook to encircle China and
limiting its increasing influence within Asia rather AUKUS is narrowly
aimed at military cooperation in the Indian Ocean. On the western end of
the Indian Ocean, Israel is another important actor entering into the region
through Abraham Accords, the deal through which the UAE, Morocco,
Bahrain and Sudan recognize the former and established diplomatic
relations. The détente of Israel with the Arab world provides it with the
opportunity to get involved in the Persian Gulf and confront Iran at the time
of its choosing and sustainability.
57
Indo Pacific is the term now more commonly used to refer to the areas in
Asia making the rim of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. This term has
geographical connotation more than geopolitical insinuation. For the last
seven decades, this term retained its relevance in the context of the US
influence in the region but now as the strategic environment changes the
conceptual connotations also readjust. Indo Pacific is the term which is used
more to refer to this region which implicates that it is not just the region
encompassing the confluence of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean rather
alludes to the geostrategic realignment. It plausibly manifests the fast
brewing rivalry between the US and China. The US policies of Pivot to Asia
and Rebalancing to Asia now have transformed into a clear framework of
the encirclement of China. In the official documents of the US-Indo Pacific
Policy, it is now presented as the geopolitical and geo economic space
central to its interests.1
1
“From Asia Pacific to Indo Pacific Significance: Implementation and Challenges,”
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 9, 2020
2
Muhammad Umer Hayat, Syeda Aqsa Sajad and Farrukh Shahzad, “Great Power
Play in Indian Ocean: Implications for the Region,” Global Political Review, V (IV)
(2020): 65-74.
58
3
Keynote Address by India‟s External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid, in Indo-
Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects, eds., Rajiv K Bhatia and Vijay
Sakhuja (New Delhi: Vij Book, 2014): xi–xii.
4
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region,” Department of Defense, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf
5
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region.”
59
US interests in the region. Russia has also claimed for extended continental
shelf in the Arctic Region.6
China‟s first defence white paper underlined a limited role for the navy
which evolved since then. President Hu Jintao expanded this role in 2004 by
charging the PLAN (People‟s Liberation Army Navy) with safeguarding the
national interests and global peace. About 85 per cent of China bound oil
passes through the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca.9 The next white
paper in 2006 underlined extending of the naval operations to deal with the
rising security issues and international shipping routes. This role was further
6
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region.”
7
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region.”
8
Zhang Zhexin, “China‟s Pursuit of a New Asia-a Pacific Security Architecture:
Underlying Rationale, Ongoing Actions and Future Prospects,” China Quarterly of
International Strategic Studies 1, no. 4 (2015): 573-578.
9
Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power
(Random House Trade Paperbacks: September 13, 2011).
60
10
Joshua T. White, China’s Indian Ocean Ambitions: Investment, Influence and
Military Advantage, China Global: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World
(Washington: Brookings Institution,2020): 3-4,
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_chinas_india
n_ocean_ambitions_white-1.pdf
11
“China‟s National Defence in the New Era,” Beijing: State Council of Republic of
China, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_
WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html
12
China‟s Defence in the New Era.
13
“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House,
Washington: 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf
61
“revisionist power.”14 China and Russia are recognised to be the basic and
defining elements of the US rebalancing strategies. The Indo Pacific is
deterministically important in this wake. The future posture required in Indo
Pacific is proposed to achieve the strategic objective through evolving
posture and balancing the key capabilities in South Asia, South East Asia
and Oceania.
The US never had this much interest in the Indian Ocean as it had in the
Pacific Ocean. It inherited the position and involvement after the
withdrawal of the Great Britain from the Suez Canal in 1967. Later this
involvement increased with oil crisis in the 1970s and the Iranian
Revolution in 1979. In 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‟s
proposal of naming this region as “Indo-Pacific” plausibly explains the US
strategic preoccupation with the Pacific and the protection of the interests in
it, too. The US had been dealing with the Indian Ocean through CENTCOM
and PACOM dividing it under these two.15
QUAD
The approach of containing China gave new life and blood to the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) after the hiatus of ten years. The
ideas of FOIP and QUAD were conceived by the Prime Minister of Japan,
Shinzo Abe. He presented the idea of FOIP as its concerns of China‟s
aggressive connectivity across continents through the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) enhanced. He believes that this region needs open and free
navigation amid good governance ensured through an alliance with
Australia, India, and the US; the states sharing the core interest to counter
China‟s rise. Shinzo Abe reinvigorated the idea in 2012 in “Asia‟s
Democratic Security Diamond.” In 2007, he gave the idea of FOIP while
speaking in Indian Parliament that the peace, stability and freedom of
navigation in Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean were inseparable. Japan as
14
Summary of National Defence Strategy of the United States of America Sharpening
the American Military‟s Competitive Edge, 2018, Department of Defence, 2-4,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf
15
Deepa M. Ollapally, “The United States and the Indian Ocean: Power Shifts and
Uncertain Leadership, in Maritime Governance and South Asia,” in Maritime
Security and South Asia: Trade, Security Sustainable Development in the Indian
Ocean, ed., Jivanta Schottli (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, 2018), 99-
105.
62
AUKUS
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America Security
Pact (AUKUS) announced by the heads of government of three states is a
security alliance sharply transforming strategic environment of the Indo-
Pacific. Through this pact Australia will be provided with nuclear propelled
submarines. The agreement cements the US security alliances in the region
16
Shinzo Abe, “Asia‟s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate,
December 27, 2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-
for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog
17
Shinzo Abe, “Asia‟s Democratic Security Diamond.”
18
From Asia Pacific to Indo Pacific Significance, Implementation and Challenges,
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Research paper 9 (July
2020) Berlin, 16.
19
Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders‟ Summit, Briefing Room The White House, September
24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/
63
Indo-US Alliance
64
The interests of the US and India converge greatly now in the Indian
Ocean in the context of the rise of China.24 The US and India just signed a
pact in October 2020 to share sensitive satellite and map data on accounts of
the perceived threat posed by China. The strategic dialogue took place in
New Delhi where the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence
Secretary Mark Esper arrived to sign the pact; Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) and to discuss
“the threat China posed to their security and freedom.” The pact will enable
India to have access to a range of topographical, nautical, and aeronautical
data vital for targeting of missiles and drones. 25 This agreement is the
second of the three foundational agreements the US has with various
countries with which it has close military ties. The foundational agreements
enable the signing states to build the basic groundwork and promote
interoperability between militaries through common standards and systems.
In 2016, the US and India signed the foundational agreement; Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Understanding (LEMOA) after a decade of
negotiations. This agreement enabled India to access the string of the US
military facilities around the globe and the US would in return benefit from
the Indian facilities as beingthe biggest player in the Asia-Pacific. 26 The
second of the series, Communication Capability and Security Agreement,
was signed in 2018.27 Dr. Khuraana, the Executive Director of National
Maritime Foundation of India, commented after the signing of LEMOA that
the agreement was fructified with India at a crucial geopolitical and strategic
environment in Asia where the Indo-US interests converged most though
the proposal was floated in 2002. In 2002, India and the US entered into an
agreement according to which India would provide naval escort to the high
value US ships travelling through the Straits of Malacca.28
24
Author‟s interview with Shahid Kayani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan, on
October 22, 2020 (via telephonic communication.)
25
Neha Arora and Sanjeev Miglani, “US Warns of Threat Posed by China, Signs
Military Pact with India,” Retuers, October 27, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-asia-india-idUSKBN27C0OF
26
Dinakar Peri, “What Is Lemoa?,” Hindu, August 30, 2016,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/What-is-LEMOA/article15604647.ece
27
Snehesh Alex Philip, “The Three Foundational Agreements with US and What
They Mean for India‟s Military Growth,” The Print, October 27, 2020
https://theprint.in/defence/the-3-foundational-agreements-with-us-and-what-they-
mean-for-indias-military-growth/531795/
28
Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Indo-US Logistics Agreement LEMOA: An Assessment, “
Maritime Foundation, September,2016,
https://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636089093519640938.pdf
65
66
revoke Article 370 regarding the disputed Jammu and Kashmir territory and
declaring the Ladakh region as part of the union, in spite of the fact China
had claim on it clearly delineates its efforts to restrain China and Pakistan
from CPEC. This territorial move has direct impact on the security of Indian
Ocean.
analysis/story/beyond-kashmir-status-of-gilgit-baltistan-is-a-case-in-contrast-
1580373-2019-08-13
35
Yasir Hussain, “Arihant and Deterrence Stability: Why Pakistan Needs to
Strengthen Its Sea-Based Deterrent,” Pakistan Politico, December 12, 2018,
http://pakistanpolitico.com/arihant-and-deterrence-stability-why-pakistan-needs-to-
strengthen-its-sea-based-deterrent/
36
Muhammad Abbas Hassan, “Indian Access to Chabahar and Duqm, Challenges
for Pakistan,” Issue Brief, Institute of Strategic Studies, March 16, 2018,
http://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-indian-access-to-chabahar-and-duqm-challenges-
for-pakistan/
37
Author‟s interview with Commander (R) Azam Khan, Senior Research Fellow
Naval War College of Pakistan, Lahore, October 18, 2020 (via email).
67
Various experts are of the opinion that currently the Indian Ocean is the
most militarized water body as the centre of gravity of the global politics
has shifted from Europe to the Asia Pacific. Though the signs are that the
rise of China will be collaborative and peaceful as China wants a peaceful
rise, yet the US defence policy now categorically mentions that China is a
threat and also there is a contest between the regionalism and nationalism.
The US also wants to engage China militarily as the military industrial
complex requires such contestation. The permanent presence of the extra
regional forces is also a major challenge. Though Indian Ocean is controlled
by the eleven choke points, but the absence of regional security mechanism
further complicates the situation.38 The pace of the Chinese rise is actually
alarming for the West in particular for the US. 39
68
is one of the leading buyers of the Iranian oil through Chahbahar Port,
but it wanted to develop a link to Central Asia was widely dependent on
the security situation in Afghanistan.41 Iran could not capitalise on its
strategic partnership with India because of its economy is under
sanctions. However, India was outmaneuvered recently by China-Iran
Strategic partnership agreement for 25 years. The salient feature of this
agreement is that both China and Iran agreed to cooperate against the US
containment efforts and the attempts at damaging Iranian theocratic
regime through economic sanctions.42
India is also increasing its presence and maritime interests in the East
Asia as it signed an agreement with Indonesia to acquire the strategic port of
Sabang as the latter is also looking for the naval choke point like the
Malacca Strait. Indonesia is also looking for options to escape the Belt and
Road Initiative. India is also eying the rim of Africa in the Indian Ocean. In
2017, it announced Asia-Africa growth Corridor with Japan. This corridor
will presumably be developed at a cost of USD 40 billion to enable the
African countries to develop infrastructure and human resource. This project
aims at targeting the Chinese investment in Africa. This may also enable
India and Japan to use rich uranium resources in Africa for their nuclear
needs. In the United Nations General Assembly, Africa has 54 votes which
can enable India to play assertively in the UN. This investment will give
India also an excuse to establish military presence in Africa and keep a
check on Bab el Mandeb.43 India also had tried to acquire two islands in
Seychelles under its policy: Security of Growth for All in Region
(SAGAR). 44 The deal fell apart as the very shocking details of the
agreement surfaced on the internet.45 India established its listening post in
41
Hassan, “Indian Access to Chabahar and Duqm, Challenges for Pakistan.”
42
Alam Saleh and ZakiyehYazdanshenas, “Iran‟s Pact with China Is Bad News for the
West,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/09/irans-pact-
with-china-is-bad-news-for-the-west/
43
Devirupa Mitra, “Details of Top-Secret India-Seychelles Military Agreement
Leaked Online,” The Wire, March 08, 2018, https://thewire.in/external-affairs/in-
embarrassing-leak-details-of-top-secret-india-seychelles-military-agreement-made-
public
44
Sushma Swaraj, “Sagar ─ India‟s Vision for the Indian Ocean Region,” India
Foundation, 2016, https://www.indiafoundation.in/sagar-indias-vision-for-the-
indianocean-region/
45
Mitra, “Details of Top-Secret India-Seychelles Military Agreement Leaked
Online,” https://thewire.in/external-affairs/in-embarrassing-leak-details-of-top-
secret-india-seychelles-military-agreement-made-public
69
Abraham Accords
Abraham Accord: between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and UAE is
a recent development in the region which may not only affect in the short
term but can have significant long term implications if it transforms in to a
military engagement47 as it would bring Israel right on the other end of the
Strait of Hormuz. From August to October, 2020 Israel signed these deals
with the above mentioned four countries. Still the bilateral cooperation rests
on cultural and economic relations which can enhance to other important
states in the Middle East which would implicate the strategic environment
significantly as Iran will not be much tolerant to such developments if these
engagements turn to the point where strategic blockage of Strait of Hormuz
would be possible. Same threat extends to Pakistan. These developments
further entangle Pakistan and Iran with China, and Russia for strategic
interests in the broader Indo Pacific.
Israel has the adequate capability to become a direct actor in the Indian
Ocean and the sufficient support of allies, too, i.e. the US, India and now the
Arab countries. Iran-Israel rivalry was already a major factor in the security
and political dynamics of the Middle East which has now extended to South
Asia. In case of any military standoff or tensions between Iran and Israel in
Strait of Hormuz or nearby, Pakistan has direct as its major engagement in
the Indian Ocean remains Gwadar Port and sea lines of communication
traversing its coastal line. Pakistan‟s primary and fundamental threat, India
also converges here as having already deep strategic, military and economic
relations and technology partnership with Israel which now has plausible
tendency to increase in wake of renewed Indo-US alliance. Recently, Israeli
Foreign Minister hinted at Free Trade Agreement between India and Israel
46
“India Activates First Listening Post on Foreign Soil: Radars in Madagascar,”
Indian Express, July 18, 2007,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/indiaactivates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-
soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/
47
Patsy Widakuswara, “How the Abraham Accord might Impact the Middle East,”
Voice of America, August 1, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/how-
abraham-accord-might-impact-middle-east
70
48
“India, Israel to Start Talks on Free Trade Agreement Next Month,” October 19,
2021, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/india-israel-start-talks-free-trade-
agreement-next-month-2021-10-18/
49
“Afghanistan Facing Desperate Food Crisis, UN Warns,” BBC News, October 25,
2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59011501
50
“UN Warns of Expanding Threat from Deash and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,” July
25, 2021, Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/un-
warns-of-expanding-threat-from-daesh-al-qaeda-in-
afghanistan/articleshow/84731386.cms
71
South Asia is one of the largest growing regions in the world but least
integrated and one of the least developed. Inhabiting almost a quarter of the
global population it also hosts a myriad of traditional and nontraditional
threats making the strategic environment highly ambiguous, vulnerable, and
complex. A gamut of traditional threats and concomitant struggle for
balance of power, and highly volatile surrounding environment penetrating
into the region as to the porous nature of the regional structure have wide
ranging implications for Pakistan, the regional power. The security
dependence of Pakistan on various regional and extra regional factors is its
major challenge.
72
interest in the Indian Ocean lies along the coastline where the SLOCs
traverse which is imperative for the global oil trade. Pakistan‟s another
interest is its EEZ which is now 290,000 square kilometers after the
extension. Pakistan‟s maritime border with India is still undecided which is
its security concern. Beyond that though Pakistan has not developed any
direct stake in the Indo Pacific, yet the broader maritime environment
implicates the strategic environment of South Asia. Pakistan thus is most
affected by this transforming strategic competition between the US and
China. Pakistan is the undoubtedly significant state of BRI due CPEC;
flagship project connecting SLOCs of Indo pacific (Road) with the roads
and railway networks (Belt). US‟s policy of competing China in this region
and containing its increasing impact through the connectivity BRI is
creating in Asia. As India‟s status is elevated by the US in the region as its
closest ally, China‟s rival and net security provider, Pakistan‟s strategic
challenges multiply. India‟s important role in Quad make is strategically
bold further. Though this quadrilateral alliance apparently focuses on soft
power, to influence entire Asia in order to dispel the augmenting effect of
Chinese rise but has now military outlook too. After the first summit level
meeting of QUAD member countries in March 2021, Australia joined the
Malabar naval exercises led by India in the Bay of Bengal. The trend of
militarisation in Indo pacific is further elevated by the AUKUS agreement
which will provide Australia with nuclear submarines. In wake of this
increasing, the Indo US alliance directly counters Pakistan‟s strategic and
economic interests with China through CPEC. Unequivocally, the
developments during 2020 and 2021 trigger a tensed environment in Indo
Pacific which is also cultivating territorial implications. The US and NATO
withdrawal from Afghanistan without a strongly supported power sharing
agreement and freezing of Afghan financial assets of USD 9.5 billion to
pressurize Taliban regime leaves a huge security vacuum. Pakistan‟s stake
in Afghanistan lies in its territorial proximity with border issues, social and
cultural linkages which also may support Pakistan‟s looming threat of
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan if Da‟esh or Al Qaeda elements reinforce there.
This security vacuum will have strategic threats for BRI putting pressure on
CPEC which Pakistan cannot afford to hinder. Additionally, any tension
between the US and Iran or after the Abraham Accords between Israel and
Iran, will directly affect the northern Arabian Sea which is the area of
maximum interest of Pakistan. This entire situation requires that Pakistan‟s
foreign policy must focus on a separate policy for Indo Pacific to address all
these rapidly transforming realities. In case of China‟s encirclement by the
73
US and allies Pakistan at least provides a quick alternative route for Chinese
oil imports from Iran. This reality further brings Pakistan on the forefront in
this picture of great power competition.
Conclusion
74
75