Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad

Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

Author(s): Zainab Ahmed
Source: Strategic Studies , Winter 2021, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Winter 2021), pp. 56-75
Published by: Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48732339

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific:
Implications for Pakistan

Zainab Ahmed*

Abstract

The term of Indo Pacific delineates a conceptual evolution in the US

strategic community to contain and encircle China by countering it in the
area of its influence. The underlined policy priority is to counter Belt and
Road Initiative to contain China. While China’s strict adherence to the
previous geographical connotation of Asia Pacific establishes that it sticks
to its policy of leading world by economic interdependence approach in
Asia. This great power competition in the Indo Pacific region has wide
ranging strategic and economic implications for Pakistan. This paper aims
to discern into the factors which are making the strategic environment
tensed thinning out the options for Pakistan. The two basic questions which
this study addresses are: a. How does conceptual shift from Asia Pacific to
Indo Pacific transform the strategic environment of this region? b. Why is
this transformation so significant for Pakistan’s geostrategic interests?

Keywords: Indo Pacific, Asia Pacific, QUAD, AUKUS, Indo-US alliance.

Introduction

Geostrategic transformations at the global level implicate the states at

different degrees with the magnitude of their regional surroundings.
Pakistan happens to be at a strategically determining location which absorbs
and ripples a myriad of changes in the regional strategic environment.
Pakistan‟s position in South Asia, connecting it with the Middle East,
Central Asia, and a crucially important geographical position in the Indian
Ocean, multiplies its opportunities and challenges. This region has been

*
The author is Senior Research Fellow, Golden Ring Economic Forum.
Email: [email protected]

@2021 by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

Strategic Studies Volume 41, Issue No 4, 2021: 56-75
https://doi.org/10.53532/ss.041.04.0037

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

significant for global politics always but now the rapidly transforming
global dynamics implicate it considerably. Geopolitical and geo-economic
shifts have far-reaching impacts. But at the core of this now stands the
power competition between China and the US.
Pakistan is not just affected by the regional changes, transformations
surrounding it rather also from evolving maritime environment in the Indian
Ocean. The most important factor currently at play is contesting relationship
of China and the US. China‟s rapid rise, the US policies to encircle and
contain China and efforts to curtail Russia‟s influence are setting the stage
of entire global politics. India is the most important US partner in the policy
of containing China. Along with crucially significant defence agreements
with the US, India is enjoying the status of „Net Security Provider‟ in the
Indo-Pacific region. The US-Iran tensed relations always narrowed
Pakistan‟s options to diversify its relations. The US policy of Free and Open
Indo Pacific which theoretically upholds the right of all rim states of
sovereignty and free navigation and trade actually surrounds China. After
the hiatus of ten years the rejuvenation of Quadrilateral Security Agreement
(QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the US and its further
development to the trilateral defence agreement between Australia, UK and
US are the plausible manifestations of US‟s active involvement in Asia.
QUAD has a broad spectrum and policy outlook to encircle China and
limiting its increasing influence within Asia rather AUKUS is narrowly
aimed at military cooperation in the Indian Ocean. On the western end of
the Indian Ocean, Israel is another important actor entering into the region
through Abraham Accords, the deal through which the UAE, Morocco,
Bahrain and Sudan recognize the former and established diplomatic
relations. The détente of Israel with the Arab world provides it with the
opportunity to get involved in the Persian Gulf and confront Iran at the time
of its choosing and sustainability.

The regional stability in South Asia is deeply knitted with security of

Afghanistan. With the recent takeover of Taliban regime in Afghanistan
Pakistan‟s security is deeply implicated. Currently, Pakistan‟s all major
challenges and opportunities are regional. Its security dilemma with India is
multiplying and as latter gets more significance concomitant to Indo-US
alliance, former‟s security apprehensions augment. Similarly, Afghanistan‟s
conundrum has been Pakistan‟s biggest security challenges which resurges.
Pakistan‟s biggest opportunity lies in the region, too, CPEC. The relation
with China is the major strength of foreign policy coming under the shadow

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 Strategic Studies

of China-US power competition. In the Indian Ocean Pakistan‟s stake and

involvement increases with Gwadar Port, extended Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The
alliances such as QUAD, AUKUS, Abraham Accords, Indo-US strategic
partnership and much feared instability in Afghanistan brews a tough
environment. This paper aims at analysing these presumably discrete
developments but their cumulative implications for Pakistan.

Indo Pacific or Asia Pacific: US-China Power Competition

Indo Pacific is the term now more commonly used to refer to the areas in
Asia making the rim of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. This term has
geographical connotation more than geopolitical insinuation. For the last
seven decades, this term retained its relevance in the context of the US
influence in the region but now as the strategic environment changes the
conceptual connotations also readjust. Indo Pacific is the term which is used
more to refer to this region which implicates that it is not just the region
encompassing the confluence of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean rather
alludes to the geostrategic realignment. It plausibly manifests the fast
brewing rivalry between the US and China. The US policies of Pivot to Asia
and Rebalancing to Asia now have transformed into a clear framework of
the encirclement of China. In the official documents of the US-Indo Pacific
Policy, it is now presented as the geopolitical and geo economic space
central to its interests.1

Indian Ocean is the hub of mineral wealth and global commercial

maritime traffic with its eleven significant choke points. Annually, about
100,000 commercial vessels traverse this water body. The littoral states of
the Indian Ocean Region have 35 per cent of global natural gas reserves,
around 67 per cent of identified global oil reserves, 40 per cent of gold
reserves and 60 per cent of uranium. Additionally, almost 80 per cent of all
diamond deposited reserves.2

1
“From Asia Pacific to Indo Pacific Significance: Implementation and Challenges,”
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 9, 2020
2
Muhammad Umer Hayat, Syeda Aqsa Sajad and Farrukh Shahzad, “Great Power
Play in Indian Ocean: Implications for the Region,” Global Political Review, V (IV)
(2020): 65-74.

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

The US approach to reevaluate its position in this region on the basis of

its core and enduring interests is manifested in its most recent policy of
“Free and Open Indo Pacific” (FOIP) in 2019. While India was pursuing its
policy of “Look East” for two decades which under the Modi government
was re-conceptualised into “Act East.”3

According to the Indo Pacific Strategy Report of the US Department of

Defence the “Indo Pacific is the single most consequential region for
America‟s future.” The US has two-way annual trade of USD 2.3 trillion
with this region and its foreign direct investment is USD 1.3 trillion. The US
presence in this region is vital to secure the sea trade routes on this part of
the world as 60 per cent of GDP comes from this region. The principles of
Free and Open Indo Pacific are the respect of sovereignty and
independence, peaceful resolution of disputes, and free, fair, and reciprocal
trade based on open investment, transparent agreements and connectivity. It
also encapsulates the idea that adherence to international rules, norms,
including those of freedom of navigation and over flights. By the word
“free” it is associated that there must be freedom of sovereignty without
coercion of other countries and by “open” it entails sustainable growth and
connectivity.4 This clearly implicates that the freedom and openness this
report advocates are from the China‟s rise as it is mentioned here that
“China‟s economic, political and military rise is one of the defining
elements of the 21st century.”5China‟s capability of Anti access/area denial
(A2/AD) capability denying operations around its periphery, militarisation
of Spartly Island in 2015, Chinese investment and its negative impacts for
host country‟s sovereignty, lack of transparency in “One Belt One Road”
Initiative, and “Polar Silk Road” near the Arctic since 2018 are of particular
concern for the US according to this report. The revitalised role of Russia
with the military, economic and diplomatic rejuvenation is a “malign factor”
for the US. Russia‟s outreach to Asia for energy exports is alarming for the

3
Keynote Address by India‟s External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid, in Indo-
Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects, eds., Rajiv K Bhatia and Vijay
Sakhuja (New Delhi: Vij Book, 2014): xi–xii.
4
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region,” Department of Defense, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf
5
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region.”

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 Strategic Studies

US interests in the region. Russia has also claimed for extended continental
shelf in the Arctic Region.6

The Pacific Command of the US was renamed as the Indo Pacific

Command in 2018. Currently this command holds the power of 2,000
aircrafts, 200 ships and submarines and more than 370, 000 soldiers, sailors,
marines, airmen, Department of Defence civilians and assigned contractors.
In order to confront the perceived joint threat of China and Russia the
strategy of promoting networked regions is proposed. The focus is also to
enjoin the trilateral mechanism among the US, Japan, Republic of Korea,
then US, Australia and Japan and US, India, and Japan. It also advocates the
promotion and development of regional institutions.7

China‟s apprehensions about the super power involvement in Asia

Pacific have been quite unequivocal since the time of Mao Zedong. It
believed that the security architecture of the region must not be spoiled by
the power games of the two rival super powers i.e. the US and the USSR.
After the disintegration of the USSR, the regional security architecture is the
outgrowth of the Cold War arrangement which should be altered in favour
of the regional stakeholders. China‟s rise after 2010 and the increasing
influence in the region threatens the US interests considerably despite
China‟s defensive posture insinuated through the academic rhetoric
emerging out of the strategic community of the country.8

China‟s first defence white paper underlined a limited role for the navy
which evolved since then. President Hu Jintao expanded this role in 2004 by
charging the PLAN (People‟s Liberation Army Navy) with safeguarding the
national interests and global peace. About 85 per cent of China bound oil
passes through the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca.9 The next white
paper in 2006 underlined extending of the naval operations to deal with the
rising security issues and international shipping routes. This role was further
6
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region.”
7
“Indo Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting
Networked Region.”
8
Zhang Zhexin, “China‟s Pursuit of a New Asia-a Pacific Security Architecture:
Underlying Rationale, Ongoing Actions and Future Prospects,” China Quarterly of
International Strategic Studies 1, no. 4 (2015): 573-578.
9
Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power
(Random House Trade Paperbacks: September 13, 2011).

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

increased in the white paper of 2008 which underlined “cooperation in

distant water” initiating PLAN‟s counterpiracy deployments in the Gulf of
Aden. The white papers of 2010, 2013 and 2015 sequentially augmented the
ambitions to develop the blue water navy.10 The latest of the series is the
white paper issued in 2019, “Chinese National Defense in the New Era,” it
considers the Asia-Pacific region as largely stable and highlights the role of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to enhance cooperation through
non-confrontation and non-alliance basis.11 However, this policy considers
the installation of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in the
Republic of Korea by the US as an act undermining the regional strategic
balance and security because through this act of the US is strengthening
military alliances in the Asia Pacific. This document explicitly mentions the
military outlook of Japan and Australia in the context of the Indian Ocean
thus encrypting the Chinese response as “China‟s Defensive National
Defence in the New Era.”12

The US National Security Strategy in 2017 describes the situation in the

Indo-Pacific region as the “geopolitical competition between the free and
repressive visions of the world order.” The Chinese infrastructure and trade
development in the Indo-Pacific, the area from the western coast of Africa
to the eastern shores of the US, poses a threat to the US interests. The US
counter strategy resorts to the partnerships and the alliances with all the
nations in the region which could join it to undermine the Chinese growing
influence.13 According to the US National Defence Strategy of 2018, China
is the strategic competitor. This report declares that the military advantage
of the US is eroding and if not addressed adequately it will undermine their
ability to deter, “China‟s aggression and coercion” which it terms the

10
Joshua T. White, China’s Indian Ocean Ambitions: Investment, Influence and
Military Advantage, China Global: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World
(Washington: Brookings Institution,2020): 3-4,
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_chinas_india
n_ocean_ambitions_white-1.pdf
11
“China‟s National Defence in the New Era,” Beijing: State Council of Republic of
China, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_
WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html
12
China‟s Defence in the New Era.
13
“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House,
Washington: 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf

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 Strategic Studies

“revisionist power.”14 China and Russia are recognised to be the basic and
defining elements of the US rebalancing strategies. The Indo Pacific is
deterministically important in this wake. The future posture required in Indo
Pacific is proposed to achieve the strategic objective through evolving
posture and balancing the key capabilities in South Asia, South East Asia
and Oceania.

The US never had this much interest in the Indian Ocean as it had in the
Pacific Ocean. It inherited the position and involvement after the
withdrawal of the Great Britain from the Suez Canal in 1967. Later this
involvement increased with oil crisis in the 1970s and the Iranian
Revolution in 1979. In 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‟s
proposal of naming this region as “Indo-Pacific” plausibly explains the US
strategic preoccupation with the Pacific and the protection of the interests in
it, too. The US had been dealing with the Indian Ocean through CENTCOM
and PACOM dividing it under these two.15

QUAD

The approach of containing China gave new life and blood to the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) after the hiatus of ten years. The
ideas of FOIP and QUAD were conceived by the Prime Minister of Japan,
Shinzo Abe. He presented the idea of FOIP as its concerns of China‟s
aggressive connectivity across continents through the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) enhanced. He believes that this region needs open and free
navigation amid good governance ensured through an alliance with
Australia, India, and the US; the states sharing the core interest to counter
China‟s rise. Shinzo Abe reinvigorated the idea in 2012 in “Asia‟s
Democratic Security Diamond.” In 2007, he gave the idea of FOIP while
speaking in Indian Parliament that the peace, stability and freedom of
navigation in Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean were inseparable. Japan as
14
Summary of National Defence Strategy of the United States of America Sharpening
the American Military‟s Competitive Edge, 2018, Department of Defence, 2-4,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf
15
Deepa M. Ollapally, “The United States and the Indian Ocean: Power Shifts and
Uncertain Leadership, in Maritime Governance and South Asia,” in Maritime
Security and South Asia: Trade, Security Sustainable Development in the Indian
Ocean, ed., Jivanta Schottli (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, 2018), 99-
105.

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

one of the oldest sea-faring democracies was in position to play more

important role.16 Japan‟s major concern was the dispute with China in South
China Sea at that time which according to Shinzo Abe that China was
making into “Lake Beijing.”17 QUAD after rejuvenation in its first summit
level dialogue in February, 2021 also now clearly shows the same idea
behind its objectives as of FOIP.18The group of four nations which formed
in 2004 to steer rescue and rehabilitation work in wake of Tsunami has
merged to be an alliance with increasing military outlook.

The recent developments further complicate the strategic environment

of this region. QUAD is emerging to be a stronger quadrilateral alliance
with plausible outlook. The first ever in-person summit meeting of
Australia, India, Japan, and the US was held in White House on September
24, 2021. President Biden hosted these leaders on the sidelines of the United
Nations General Assembly meeting. Though the focal points of the meeting
were to disseminate Covid-19 vaccine and infrastructure development on
the basis of G7‟s Build Back Better World (B3W) agenda19 yet it clearly
manifested the design to dominate Asia and challenge China‟s acceptance
across the continent. This followed the US‟s complete withdrawal from
Afghanistan and takeover of Taliban of almost entire Afghanistan‟s territory
which has produced another question of regional security and stability in the
region.

AUKUS

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America Security
Pact (AUKUS) announced by the heads of government of three states is a
security alliance sharply transforming strategic environment of the Indo-
Pacific. Through this pact Australia will be provided with nuclear propelled
submarines. The agreement cements the US security alliances in the region

16
Shinzo Abe, “Asia‟s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate,
December 27, 2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-
for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog
17
Shinzo Abe, “Asia‟s Democratic Security Diamond.”
18
From Asia Pacific to Indo Pacific Significance, Implementation and Challenges,
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Research paper 9 (July
2020) Berlin, 16.
19
Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders‟ Summit, Briefing Room The White House, September
24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/

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 Strategic Studies

competing China.20 For Australia, it is the strategic arrangement it could

have sought in generations. Australia cancelled the diesel propelled
submarines deal with France it signed in 2016. Undoubtedly, this pact
provides a direct front against China in South China Sea as it creates
considerable strategic and military advantage. It is the first time after the
UK that the US is sharing its nuclear technology with any ally. One major
implication is also that France considered it “stab in the back” on the
cancellation of the submarine deal.21 France can be considered as one of the
basic actors in the region as its holds large territories in the Oceania. It‟s
strong military and economic ties with India and Japan and its Indo-Pacific
policy highlighting its aim to remain an active actor in the region insinuates
towards another alliance to rival China. In September 2020, France
inaugurated the “Paris-Delhi-Canberra Axis”; an effort seems to adjust into
an arrangement like QUAD.22

Indo-US Alliance

The US conceptualisation of this region had been confined to “Asia Pacific”

until 2011, though then Foreign Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton used the
term “Indo-Pacific” in 2010. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates had
pronounced the notion of „net security provider‟ for India in 2009 at
Shangri-La Dialogue. The conceptual underpinning in the US
administration evolved to rename this region as “Indo-Asia-Pacific” to
finally “Indo-Pacific” in 2017 as the earlier geographical term “Asia
Pacific” did not converge with the US strategic objectives here. Until then
the foreign policy orientation of the Obama administration in Asia remained
“Rebalancing Asia.” In 2017, President Trump finally altered the conceptual
geographical term to “Indo pacific” contextualising it with India. 23 This
term not only delineates the geostrategic adjustment of the US in the Indian
Oceana and Pacific Ocean giving India elevated position. Rather it
insinuates that Asia is now considered from the lens i.e. India.
20
Louisia Brooke Holland, John Curtis and Claire Mills, “The AUKUS
Agreement,” House of Commons Library, October 11, 2021,
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9335/CBP-9335.pdf
21
The AUKUS Agreement,” House of Commons Library,
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9335/CBP-9335.pdf
22
Cleo Paskal, “Indo Pacific Strategies, Perceptions and Partnerships: A View from
Seven Countries,” Chatham House, March 2021.
23
Axel Berkofsky, Sergio Miracola and Paolo Magri, eds., “Geopolitical by Other
Means: The Indo Pacific Reality,” Report, ISPI, 2019, , 24-26.

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

The interests of the US and India converge greatly now in the Indian
Ocean in the context of the rise of China.24 The US and India just signed a
pact in October 2020 to share sensitive satellite and map data on accounts of
the perceived threat posed by China. The strategic dialogue took place in
New Delhi where the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence
Secretary Mark Esper arrived to sign the pact; Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) and to discuss
“the threat China posed to their security and freedom.” The pact will enable
India to have access to a range of topographical, nautical, and aeronautical
data vital for targeting of missiles and drones. 25 This agreement is the
second of the three foundational agreements the US has with various
countries with which it has close military ties. The foundational agreements
enable the signing states to build the basic groundwork and promote
interoperability between militaries through common standards and systems.
In 2016, the US and India signed the foundational agreement; Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Understanding (LEMOA) after a decade of
negotiations. This agreement enabled India to access the string of the US
military facilities around the globe and the US would in return benefit from
the Indian facilities as beingthe biggest player in the Asia-Pacific. 26 The
second of the series, Communication Capability and Security Agreement,
was signed in 2018.27 Dr. Khuraana, the Executive Director of National
Maritime Foundation of India, commented after the signing of LEMOA that
the agreement was fructified with India at a crucial geopolitical and strategic
environment in Asia where the Indo-US interests converged most though
the proposal was floated in 2002. In 2002, India and the US entered into an
agreement according to which India would provide naval escort to the high
value US ships travelling through the Straits of Malacca.28
24
Author‟s interview with Shahid Kayani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan, on
October 22, 2020 (via telephonic communication.)
25
Neha Arora and Sanjeev Miglani, “US Warns of Threat Posed by China, Signs
Military Pact with India,” Retuers, October 27, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-asia-india-idUSKBN27C0OF
26
Dinakar Peri, “What Is Lemoa?,” Hindu, August 30, 2016,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/What-is-LEMOA/article15604647.ece
27
Snehesh Alex Philip, “The Three Foundational Agreements with US and What
They Mean for India‟s Military Growth,” The Print, October 27, 2020
https://theprint.in/defence/the-3-foundational-agreements-with-us-and-what-they-
mean-for-indias-military-growth/531795/
28
Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Indo-US Logistics Agreement LEMOA: An Assessment, “
Maritime Foundation, September,2016,
https://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636089093519640938.pdf

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 Strategic Studies

India developed quite fast economically and surpassed France in

becoming the sixth largest economy and has started asserting itself in the
region and beyond.29 India has 7,500 KM coastline30 and is deeply in the
Indian Ocean as a large part of its territory makes a rim in the Indian Ocean.
India‟s hegemonic ambition in the region directly aims at containing the
Chinese rise and threatens Pakistan‟s strategic and economic stability in the
Indian Ocean Region. India has developed 12 major ports and 200 minor
ports. It has started a plan to double its maritime capability, the name of the
project is Sagarmala.31 The US is actively supporting and facilitating the
Indian hegemonic and aggressive role in the region against China. During a
briefing on the Indo-Pacific strategy, Alex N. Wong the US Deputy
Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs stated that
actually „India‟s weighty play of politics was in the best interest of the
region and the US as India was a nation invested in the free order.‟32 The
US has given India the status of “Net Security Provider” in the Indian
Ocean. This term is the umbrella term which describes the most important
strategic role India has been delegated with under the US plan to influence
the region and encircle China. The term implies that India is in position to
ensure its security and rather provide security to the states of Indian Ocean
Region and also enhance their capability and capacity through capacity
building, military diplomacy, military assistance, and direct deployment as a
responsible strategic actor.33

India categorically rejected CPEC due to the reason that it is passing

through the allegedly disputed territory of Gilgit Baltistan which it considers
to be a part of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region.34 India‟s move to
29
“India Muscles Past France to Become World‟s Sixth Biggest Economy,” News
18, July 12, 2018, https://www.news18.com/news/business/india-muscles-past-
france-to-become-worlds-sixth-biggest-economy-1807957.html
30
“Length of Indian Coastline,” Statista, 2019,
http://www.statista.com/statista734258/lenght-of-coastline-by-state-India
31
Ministry of Shipping, “Sagarmala: Concept and Objectives,” Government of India,
2018, http://sagarmala.gov.in/about-sagarmala/vision-objectives
32
US Department of State, “Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy by Alex N Wong, US
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” US Department
of State, April 2, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm
33
Suffian Ullah and Zeeshan Hayat, “India as a Net Security Provider in the Indo
Pacific and Implications for the Region,” NUST Journal of International Peace and
Stability, vol. 4 (1) (2021):26-39.
34
Prabash K. Dutta, “Beyond Kashmir: Status of Gilgit-Baltistan Is a Case in
Contrast, “ India Today, August 13, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/news-

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

revoke Article 370 regarding the disputed Jammu and Kashmir territory and
declaring the Ladakh region as part of the union, in spite of the fact China
had claim on it clearly delineates its efforts to restrain China and Pakistan
from CPEC. This territorial move has direct impact on the security of Indian
Ocean.

From the security perspective, India‟s nuclearisation of the Indian

Ocean following the completion of the operational deployment of INS
Arihant: an SSBN (Ballistic Missile Armed Nuclear Submarine) clear
danger to the strategic stability in the Indian Ocean region. In fact, India‟s
Indian Ocean policy under Modi has seen a major shift. It is far more
aggressive and proactive than at any other time in the country‟s history.
India has established a lot of surveillance and monitoring centres on the
islands in the Indian Ocean. Arihant is the first step in India‟s plan to deploy
five SSBNs in the Indian Ocean in the coming half century. These are
meant to monitor important sea lanes of communication in the region
creating a serious deterrence to Islamabad in favor of New Delhi.35 New
Delhi has also set up a naval base at Duqm (Oman) which will provide her
easy access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This naval base will also
provide repair and logistic support to the military. 36 India also signed
strategic agreements like LEMOA which will provide Indian navy (along
with the US navy) far more flexibility to conduct operations in the Indian
Ocean as compared to its previous capacity. Under Modi, India has
bolstered ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE whose navies were the
traditional partners of Pakistan/Pakistan navy. Indian navy plans to have a
fleet of 200 warships by 2027 duly centered around three aircraft carriers
and a number of SSBNs (nuclear submarines). This poses significant
challenge to the security interests of Pakistan.37

analysis/story/beyond-kashmir-status-of-gilgit-baltistan-is-a-case-in-contrast-
1580373-2019-08-13
35
Yasir Hussain, “Arihant and Deterrence Stability: Why Pakistan Needs to
Strengthen Its Sea-Based Deterrent,” Pakistan Politico, December 12, 2018,
http://pakistanpolitico.com/arihant-and-deterrence-stability-why-pakistan-needs-to-
strengthen-its-sea-based-deterrent/
36
Muhammad Abbas Hassan, “Indian Access to Chabahar and Duqm, Challenges
for Pakistan,” Issue Brief, Institute of Strategic Studies, March 16, 2018,
http://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-indian-access-to-chabahar-and-duqm-challenges-
for-pakistan/
37
Author‟s interview with Commander (R) Azam Khan, Senior Research Fellow
Naval War College of Pakistan, Lahore, October 18, 2020 (via email).

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 Strategic Studies

Various experts are of the opinion that currently the Indian Ocean is the
most militarized water body as the centre of gravity of the global politics
has shifted from Europe to the Asia Pacific. Though the signs are that the
rise of China will be collaborative and peaceful as China wants a peaceful
rise, yet the US defence policy now categorically mentions that China is a
threat and also there is a contest between the regionalism and nationalism.
The US also wants to engage China militarily as the military industrial
complex requires such contestation. The permanent presence of the extra
regional forces is also a major challenge. Though Indian Ocean is controlled
by the eleven choke points, but the absence of regional security mechanism
further complicates the situation.38 The pace of the Chinese rise is actually
alarming for the West in particular for the US. 39

The current maritime environment can best be described as volatile,

disruptive and unpredictable. On the one hand, the US and India are
increasing strategic naval and military cooperation as well as signing the
ominous bilateral agreements like LEMOA, on the other hand is the US-
Iran rivalry and an unraveling the Middle East. Geopolitical realignments
are too underway. To compound the matters, China is entering the Indian
Ocean in a big way. Apart from CPEC, China has recently signed
multibillion dollar agreements with Iran involving long term infrastructure
development and oil facilities in return. Tehran has meanwhile expelled
India from Chahbahar project. There is also a contest for influence over
Islands in the Indian Ocean besides efforts by various powers to establish
bases in littoral states. Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Djibouti, Duqm
(Oman) are few that are in spotlight. The factor of buildup of naval forces
from regional and extra-regional powers amidst military nuclearization
cannot be ignored either.40

India‟s strategic partnership with Iran and its logistic and

infrastructural involvement in the construction and development of
Chabahar Port was aimed at checking China‟s trade through CPEC. India
38
Author‟s interview with Admiral (R) Hisham Bin Siddiqui, Former Ambassador
of Pakistan to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Head Islamabad Policy Research
Institute, October 16, 2020, Islamabad (in person).
39
Author‟s interview with Naghmana Hashmi, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to
China, October 16, 2020, (Islamabad) and Author‟s interview with Shahid Kayani,
Former Diplomat of Pakistan, October 23, 2020 (via Telephonic communication).
40
Author‟s interview with Commander (R) Azam Khan, Senior Research Fellow
Naval War College of Pakistan, Lahore, October 18, 2020 (via email).

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

is one of the leading buyers of the Iranian oil through Chahbahar Port,
but it wanted to develop a link to Central Asia was widely dependent on
the security situation in Afghanistan.41 Iran could not capitalise on its
strategic partnership with India because of its economy is under
sanctions. However, India was outmaneuvered recently by China-Iran
Strategic partnership agreement for 25 years. The salient feature of this
agreement is that both China and Iran agreed to cooperate against the US
containment efforts and the attempts at damaging Iranian theocratic
regime through economic sanctions.42

India is also increasing its presence and maritime interests in the East
Asia as it signed an agreement with Indonesia to acquire the strategic port of
Sabang as the latter is also looking for the naval choke point like the
Malacca Strait. Indonesia is also looking for options to escape the Belt and
Road Initiative. India is also eying the rim of Africa in the Indian Ocean. In
2017, it announced Asia-Africa growth Corridor with Japan. This corridor
will presumably be developed at a cost of USD 40 billion to enable the
African countries to develop infrastructure and human resource. This project
aims at targeting the Chinese investment in Africa. This may also enable
India and Japan to use rich uranium resources in Africa for their nuclear
needs. In the United Nations General Assembly, Africa has 54 votes which
can enable India to play assertively in the UN. This investment will give
India also an excuse to establish military presence in Africa and keep a
check on Bab el Mandeb.43 India also had tried to acquire two islands in
Seychelles under its policy: Security of Growth for All in Region
(SAGAR). 44 The deal fell apart as the very shocking details of the
agreement surfaced on the internet.45 India established its listening post in
41
Hassan, “Indian Access to Chabahar and Duqm, Challenges for Pakistan.”
42
Alam Saleh and ZakiyehYazdanshenas, “Iran‟s Pact with China Is Bad News for the
West,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/09/irans-pact-
with-china-is-bad-news-for-the-west/
43
Devirupa Mitra, “Details of Top-Secret India-Seychelles Military Agreement
Leaked Online,” The Wire, March 08, 2018, https://thewire.in/external-affairs/in-
embarrassing-leak-details-of-top-secret-india-seychelles-military-agreement-made-
public
44
Sushma Swaraj, “Sagar ─ India‟s Vision for the Indian Ocean Region,” India
Foundation, 2016, https://www.indiafoundation.in/sagar-indias-vision-for-the-
indianocean-region/
45
Mitra, “Details of Top-Secret India-Seychelles Military Agreement Leaked
Online,” https://thewire.in/external-affairs/in-embarrassing-leak-details-of-top-
secret-india-seychelles-military-agreement-made-public

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 Strategic Studies

Madagascar which is serving as the early reconnaissance system providing

India with the maritime traffic updates in Africa46.

Abraham Accords

Abraham Accord: between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and UAE is
a recent development in the region which may not only affect in the short
term but can have significant long term implications if it transforms in to a
military engagement47 as it would bring Israel right on the other end of the
Strait of Hormuz. From August to October, 2020 Israel signed these deals
with the above mentioned four countries. Still the bilateral cooperation rests
on cultural and economic relations which can enhance to other important
states in the Middle East which would implicate the strategic environment
significantly as Iran will not be much tolerant to such developments if these
engagements turn to the point where strategic blockage of Strait of Hormuz
would be possible. Same threat extends to Pakistan. These developments
further entangle Pakistan and Iran with China, and Russia for strategic
interests in the broader Indo Pacific.

Israel has the adequate capability to become a direct actor in the Indian
Ocean and the sufficient support of allies, too, i.e. the US, India and now the
Arab countries. Iran-Israel rivalry was already a major factor in the security
and political dynamics of the Middle East which has now extended to South
Asia. In case of any military standoff or tensions between Iran and Israel in
Strait of Hormuz or nearby, Pakistan has direct as its major engagement in
the Indian Ocean remains Gwadar Port and sea lines of communication
traversing its coastal line. Pakistan‟s primary and fundamental threat, India
also converges here as having already deep strategic, military and economic
relations and technology partnership with Israel which now has plausible
tendency to increase in wake of renewed Indo-US alliance. Recently, Israeli
Foreign Minister hinted at Free Trade Agreement between India and Israel

46
“India Activates First Listening Post on Foreign Soil: Radars in Madagascar,”
Indian Express, July 18, 2007,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/indiaactivates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-
soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/
47
Patsy Widakuswara, “How the Abraham Accord might Impact the Middle East,”
Voice of America, August 1, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/how-
abraham-accord-might-impact-middle-east

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

which they aim to finalise by mid-2022. 48 The US already holds most

powerful position in Indian Ocean too as the headquarter of the Fifth Fleet is
in Bahrain. Furthermore, the US led Counter terrorism Maritime Task
forces are in this region which will provide potential support and security to
Israel if it considers entering into this region directly.

Afghanistan — A Renewed Conundrum

For at least one hundred years Afghanistan is theatre of conflict and

instability. It was the buffer zone during the classical great game between
the Great Britain and Russia. Later it became the decisive battleground of
the Cold War but led to much regional instability. Since 9/11, the US and
NATO troops had established a temporary system to control chaos. But the
abrupt withdrawal of the US now in 2021 without reaching a
comprehensive power sharing agreement with the stakeholders led to the
speedy take over of Taliban in Afghanistan.

The Taliban government and control over Afghanistan raises various

questions of international concern on the international acceptance of the
regime. There are various legal and political questions which until resolved
will not open the way for Afghanistan‟s development. In this situation there
is heightened fear of humanitarian crisis. Afghanistan‟s 40 per cent GDP
comes from foreign aid which makes it aid dependent and with stoppage of
it the economy is approaching terrible catastrophe. World Food Program
warned in September, 2021 that only 5 per cent of the families had
sufficient food.49 Any such crisis increases the likelihood of terrorism. The
global community is already wary of the presence of Daesh elements in
Afghanistan 50 which may get bold in absence of international support of the
regime.

48
“India, Israel to Start Talks on Free Trade Agreement Next Month,” October 19,
2021, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/india-israel-start-talks-free-trade-
agreement-next-month-2021-10-18/
49
“Afghanistan Facing Desperate Food Crisis, UN Warns,” BBC News, October 25,
2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59011501
50
“UN Warns of Expanding Threat from Deash and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,” July
25, 2021, Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/un-
warns-of-expanding-threat-from-daesh-al-qaeda-in-
afghanistan/articleshow/84731386.cms

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 Strategic Studies

This evolving situation involves China, Central Asian Republics,

Pakistan and Russia as direct stakeholders of this scenario. The US-China
competition in Indo-Pacific may replicate in this conflict zone too. China
requires amicable situation in Afghanistan because of the threat it may pose
to BRI and prospects of Afghanistan chaos affecting the security situation in
Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Russia, too, requires stable environment in
this region as its interests here are increasing. This region provides a strong
potential energy and trade market for Russia via Afghanistan.

The interim government of Taliban is Pashtun dominant which has not

widened to other ethnic groups yet. Majorly all leading members of Taliban
cabinet are still on US‟s terrorist list which hinders further the chances of
cooperation. 51 However, the regime has been successful in harboring
diplomatic relations with China, Pakistan, and Russia. The interdependence
of security makes these states vulnerable towards each other‟s security
environment. Pakistan‟s focus on Afghanistan depended on its concern
against Indian involvement with the former since its inception. The current
regime at least favours Pakistan‟s security interests in Afghanistan against
India. The other major challenge Pakistan faces is of terrorism by Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan on which the Afghan Taliban has the capacity to exert
influence to reach at peace with Pakistan.

Implications for Pakistan

South Asia is one of the largest growing regions in the world but least
integrated and one of the least developed. Inhabiting almost a quarter of the
global population it also hosts a myriad of traditional and nontraditional
threats making the strategic environment highly ambiguous, vulnerable, and
complex. A gamut of traditional threats and concomitant struggle for
balance of power, and highly volatile surrounding environment penetrating
into the region as to the porous nature of the regional structure have wide
ranging implications for Pakistan, the regional power. The security
dependence of Pakistan on various regional and extra regional factors is its
major challenge.

Pakistan happens to be at the strategic choke point of various regions

and at one of the very important locations of the Indo Pacific. Its major
51
“The Taliban in Afghanistan” Council on Foreign Relations, September 15, 2021,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

interest in the Indian Ocean lies along the coastline where the SLOCs
traverse which is imperative for the global oil trade. Pakistan‟s another
interest is its EEZ which is now 290,000 square kilometers after the
extension. Pakistan‟s maritime border with India is still undecided which is
its security concern. Beyond that though Pakistan has not developed any
direct stake in the Indo Pacific, yet the broader maritime environment
implicates the strategic environment of South Asia. Pakistan thus is most
affected by this transforming strategic competition between the US and
China. Pakistan is the undoubtedly significant state of BRI due CPEC;
flagship project connecting SLOCs of Indo pacific (Road) with the roads
and railway networks (Belt). US‟s policy of competing China in this region
and containing its increasing impact through the connectivity BRI is
creating in Asia. As India‟s status is elevated by the US in the region as its
closest ally, China‟s rival and net security provider, Pakistan‟s strategic
challenges multiply. India‟s important role in Quad make is strategically
bold further. Though this quadrilateral alliance apparently focuses on soft
power, to influence entire Asia in order to dispel the augmenting effect of
Chinese rise but has now military outlook too. After the first summit level
meeting of QUAD member countries in March 2021, Australia joined the
Malabar naval exercises led by India in the Bay of Bengal. The trend of
militarisation in Indo pacific is further elevated by the AUKUS agreement
which will provide Australia with nuclear submarines. In wake of this
increasing, the Indo US alliance directly counters Pakistan‟s strategic and
economic interests with China through CPEC. Unequivocally, the
developments during 2020 and 2021 trigger a tensed environment in Indo
Pacific which is also cultivating territorial implications. The US and NATO
withdrawal from Afghanistan without a strongly supported power sharing
agreement and freezing of Afghan financial assets of USD 9.5 billion to
pressurize Taliban regime leaves a huge security vacuum. Pakistan‟s stake
in Afghanistan lies in its territorial proximity with border issues, social and
cultural linkages which also may support Pakistan‟s looming threat of
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan if Da‟esh or Al Qaeda elements reinforce there.
This security vacuum will have strategic threats for BRI putting pressure on
CPEC which Pakistan cannot afford to hinder. Additionally, any tension
between the US and Iran or after the Abraham Accords between Israel and
Iran, will directly affect the northern Arabian Sea which is the area of
maximum interest of Pakistan. This entire situation requires that Pakistan‟s
foreign policy must focus on a separate policy for Indo Pacific to address all
these rapidly transforming realities. In case of China‟s encirclement by the

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 Strategic Studies

US and allies Pakistan at least provides a quick alternative route for Chinese
oil imports from Iran. This reality further brings Pakistan on the forefront in
this picture of great power competition.

Conclusion

The dawn of twenty first century proved to be a geo political upheaval.

The turning point of 9/11 diverted the super power axis towards the East.
Though the Asia Pacific was significantly focused throughout the
twentieth century yet the new geo strategic goals set a new direction. The
region which was important because of strategic interests around the
confluence of Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean became more important
with the oil trade through the region. But the rapidly changing realities
and great power competition has elevated this to be the most significant
and part of the world. The conceptual transformation from Asia Pacific
to Indo Pacific is not just an academic approach in evolution rather it
delineates the geo strategic interests of this century which is at the base
of evolution of the maritime environment in the Indian Ocean. The
unipolar world after the demise of Soviet Union is being challenged by
the rise of China which certainly is transforming into a multi polar
world. Indo Pacific now denotes the strategic interests of the US in the
region with the primary objective of competing China. The structural
evolution puts Australia, India and Japan very close to the US interests in
the form of rejuvenated QUAD, creation of AUKUS and Indo US
strategic alliance aim at encircling China. The same structural approach
triggers an evolving geo strategic engagement among China, Iran,
Pakistan and Russia which needs to be given a policy approach. Though
the strategic outlook is the prominent feature yet the geo economy in the
region is the bedrock of this transforming strategic environment in the
region determining the future course of global politics. In wake of this
discussion formulation on Indo Pacific and its implications for Pakistan
the author recommends few policy options which are as follows: a.)
Pakistan requires formulation of an independent Indian Ocean Policy
apart from the National Maritime policy with focus on its strategic
interests and foreign policy options in Indian Ocean as now the strategic
environment of the Northern Arabian Sea is more tightly dependent on
the entire Indo Pacific region. b.) Pakistan should reconsider its geo
economic engagements with China, Central Asian Republics, Iran,
Russia, and Turkey and augment its trade relations to cement strategic

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 Great Power Rivalry in Indo Pacific

interests with these nations. c.) The diversification of foreign policy

options and trade ties with regional countries will enable Pakistan to
balance the relationship pressure it has to bear from the US. Then
Pakistan can reconsider its ties with the US on balanced approach on
long term basis.

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