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Managing technology development projects

Article  in  IEEE Engineering Management Review · February 2007

DOI: 10.1109/EMR.2007.329141 · Source: IEEE Xplore

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Managing Technology Development Projects – Stage-Gate®-TD

R.G. Cooper

Summary: Technology development projects are not the same as product development projects,
nor should they be managed the same way. Cooper outlines a unique gating system designed for
technology development and technology platform projects – including the right criteria to use for
making the Go/Kill decisions.

Citation: This article appeared as: R.G. Cooper, “Managing technology development projects –
Different than traditional development projects,” Research-Technology Management, 49, 6,
Nov-Dec 2006, pp 23-31.

© Cooper & IRI

 
 MANAGING TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Because these growth engines provide the platforms for the next generation
of products and processes, companies have to manage them better!

Robert G. Cooper

OVERVIEW: Technology development projects are the new knowledge, new technology, a technical capability,
foundation or platform for new products and new or a technological platform. These projects, which
processes and thus are vital to the prosperity of the include fundamental research projects, science projects,
modern corporation. But these basic research or funda- basic research, and often technology platform projects,
mental knowledge-build projects are often mismanaged often lead to multiple commercial projects—new
because companies employ the wrong process to manage product or new process development.
them or apply inappropriate financial criteria for project
Technology development projects are a special breed:
selection. The result is that technology developments
although they represent a small proportion of effort in the
have become increasingly rare in the typical company’s
typical company’s development portfolio, they are vital
development portfolio. To better manage such projects,
to the company’s long-term growth, prosperity and
leading companies have adopted a unique Stage-Gate威
sometimes even survival. These projects also stand out
process specially tailored to the needs of technology
because they are often mismanaged or mishandled,
development projects. This process consists of three
resulting in few benefits to the company. The chronicles
stages and four gates, and feeds the front end of the
of many, if not most, large corporations are replete with
typical new product process. Scorecards and the use of
horrific stories about huge technology projects that led to
tailored success criteria are used to rate and rank these
nothing after spending millions of dollars, or worse yet,
technology projects, while the “strategic buckets”
were cancelled prematurely, thus forgoing millions in
approach to portfolio management ensures that
potential profits.
dedicated resources are deployed for these higher-risk
projects. This article outlines proven approaches to selecting and
managing such venturesome projects—approaches that
KEY CONCEPTS: technology development, Stage-
recognize that traditional management techniques, such
Gate, scorecard, portfolio management.
as phase-review, Stage-Gate威 or PACE威 with their
elaborate checklists, scorecards, deliverables lists, and
The term “technology development” refers to a special financially-based Go/Kill criteria, are inappropriate for
class of development projects where the deliverable is such projects (1–3).

What’s So Special?
Robert Cooper is professor of marketing at McMaster
Technology development (TD) projects are indeed a
University’s M.G. DeGroote School of Business,
very different type of development project. First, they
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada; ISBM Distinguished
are increasingly rare—the average business’s R&D
Research Fellow at Penn State University’s Smeal
portfolio has shifted dramatically to smaller, shorter-
College of Business Administration; and president of the
term projects such as product updates, modifications and
Product Development Institute. He is the developer of the
fixes over the last 15 years (4). With the exception of a
Stage-Gate® idea-to-launch process, and author of six
handful of best-practice companies, gone are the days
books on product innovation management. He has won two
when portfolios were replete with advanced technology,
Maurice Holland awards for the best paper published in
technology breakthrough and true innovation develop-
Research-Technology Management in 1990 (“New
ment projects (5).
Products: What Distinguishes the Winners?”) and 1994
(“Debunking the Myths of New Product Development”). This dearth of innovative projects is in part due to
www.stage-gate.com management’s preoccupation with the short term and

November—December 2006 23
0895-6308/06/$5.00 © 2006 Industrial Research Institute, Inc.
immediate financial results, which usually precludes
undertaking venturesome development projects (6).
When resources are tight, managers take few chances— Much damage is
they elect the “sure bets,” which are typically the smaller,
closer-to-home projects. Here’s a typical comment (7): done by applying
My business has a limited R&D budget. I can’t afford to risk a major
percentage of that budget on a handful of big projects. I’ve got to
hedge my bets here, and pick the smaller and lower risk ones. If I had
traditional
a larger R&D budget, then I might tackle some more venturesome
projects. . . . Senior R&D executive in a $300 million business unit of management
a major manufacturing conglomerate.

Additionally, the business’s inability to handle these techniques to

projects effectively also contributes to a reluctance to
undertake more of them. In short, because these projects
are mismanaged, the results are often negative, which
non-traditional
creates a real fear of ever undertaking such a project
again! Management becomes risk averse. projects.
A second factor that makes these TD projects so special
is that they are often the foundation or platform for a new The fact is that traditional systems simply do not work
product line or an entirely new business. In short, TD for these special TD projects. Why? Traditional new-
projects are important to profitability in that they help to product processes are designed for fairly well-defined
de-commoditize the business’s product offerings. They and predictable projects; technology developments,
are the breakthroughs, disruptive technologies and however, are by their nature high-risk projects with many
radical innovations that create the huge growth opportu- unknowns and great technical uncertainties. For
nities and superlative profits (8). example, early in the life of such projects, the likelihood
Exxon Chemical’s Metallocene project is a classic of technical success may be quite low, and a probable
example. Here, a fundamental research study into a new technical solution often cannot be envisioned. It may
polymerization catalyst yielded some early but “interest- take months or years of lab work to see a technical
ing research results,” namely polyolefin materials with solution and to gain confidence in a positive technical
unusual technical properties. What started out as a outcome.
early-stage research project in the 1980s ultimately Similarly, the traditional new-product process requires a
resulted in an entirely new class of polymers with engi- full business case and financial analysis before heavy
neering properties and a billion-dollar business for commitments are made. But in a TD project, the com-
Exxon Chemical. mercial prospects for the new technology are often
unclear, especially near the beginning of the project
Don’t Use Traditional Methods for when these commitment decisions are required.
Non-Traditional Projects
In the Exxon Chemical Metallocene project, for example,
A final reason that TD projects are so special is that they when experimental work first began, it wasn’t clear
are fragile. If one applies traditional management tech- whether this would lead to a new plastic, or perhaps a
niques to non-traditional projects, much damage is done. new fuel additive—all the researchers had in the early
For example, force-fitting a TD project through your days was “some gummy stuff with interesting proper-
normal new-product system will create considerable ties”; the precise direction of the project would not
frustration on the part of the project team, will result in become clear until the researchers had done more work
unnecessary or irrelevant work, and could even kill an at considerable expense. This is not exactly the reassur-
otherwise high-profit-potential initiative. ance that a short-term, financially-driven executive
wants to hear!
Exxon Chemical was one of the first companies in the
United States to recognize that such research or technol- Many of the activities required of most companies’ new-
ogy development projects required special treatment, product processes simply don’t fit the TD project.
and that ramming them through their traditional man- Review any company’s new-product process and invari-
agement processes would do much harm. Thus, by the ably there is a list of required tasks such as “undertake a
1990s, Exxon Chemical had designed and implemented a competitive analysis,” “do voice of customer work” and
special methodology based on stage-and-gate tech- “define the product benefits to the user.” That’s fine
niques to handle such high-risk technology projects (9). when one knows what the market and product are. But

24 Research 䡠 Technology Management

how does one undertake such mandatory activities when
the market is unknown and the product not even defined?
Moreover, most companies new product processes Some type of
require a list of deliverables at the completion of each
stage, deliverables such as “a business case” or a “com-
mercialization plan.” Again, these are relatively mean-
rigorous
ingless concepts when the product and market have not
yet been defined. As one frustrated project leader put it: stage-and-gate
How can I be expected to do a market analysis when I haven’t even
defined the product, let alone the market yet. I’m not even sure what
process is desirable
this technology is capable of in terms of delivering improved
technical performance. but it must be
Finally, the Go/Kill criteria used to rate and prioritize
development projects as found in most company’s stage-
and-gate development processes again assume projects
custom-designed.
that are fairly well-defined. For example, an Industrial
Research Institute study revealed that 78 percent of busi- • The stages are shown as boxes in Figure 1. Each stage
nesses rely heavily on financial criteria to select projects: consists of a set of best-practice activities to be under-
criteria such as projected annual profits, NPV (net taken by the project team. These activities are designed
present value) and expected sales (10). When qualitative to acquire vital information and thereby reduce the
criteria are employed, according to the same study, the unknowns and hence the risk of the project from stage to
most popular are leveraging core competencies (for stage. The outcome of each stage is a specified set of
example, the project’s fit with the plant, and fit with the deliverables.
firm’s base technology), the expected payoff, and the
perceived risk level. These quantitative and qualitative • The gates, designated by diamonds, are the Go/Kill
criteria are fine for the majority of development projects, decision points. Here, management meets with the
but not so good for technology developments. A project team to decide whether the project merits addi-
seasoned R&D executive in a major corporation summa- tional funding and resources to move to the next stage. If
rized the situation this way: Go, resources are committed at the gate and the project
and team move forward.
Using traditional Go/Kill criteria—NPV, ROI (return on investment)
and the like—will almost guarantee that new technology projects are
Here is a quick walk through the typical TD process (see
killed in our company simply because of the unknowns, uncertainties, Figures 1 and 2):
risks and the step-out nature of such projects. Our selection rules are Discovery.—The trigger for the process is the first stage,
very risk averse and geared towards short-term projects.
involving discovery or idea generation. Quality ideas are
essential to a successful technology program and thus
Use a Process Designed for TD Projects technology ideas from multiple sources must be sought
for consideration at Gate 1. While idea generation is
For some years, leading product developers have relied often done by scientists or technical people, it can also be
on idea-to-launch processes, such as Stage-Gate威, to the result of other activities, such as:
drive new-product projects to market (11). The con-
clusion at a conference of the Product Development • A strategic planning exercise, where strategic arenas
Management Association (PDMA) that focused on tech- are identified, and possible TD research directions are
nology developments and fuzzy front-end projects was mapped.
that “many companies have dramatically improved • Technology forecasting and technology roadmapping.
development cycle time and efficiency by implementing
formal Stage-Gate™ “systems” but that the front end • Brainstorming or group creativity sessions focusing
remained a mystery (12). The consensus is that some on what might be.
type of rigorous stage-and-gate process is desirable for
TD projects, but the process must be custom designed for • Scenario generation about future market and techno-
these types of projects (13). logical possibilities.
• Customer visitation programs and voice-of-customer
Figure 1 illustrates a typical TD process, which has been initiatives.
adopted in leading companies that undertake fundamen-
tal research projects; it consists of three stages and four • Active idea solicitation campaigns within the organi-
gates (14). zation.

November—December 2006 25
Gate 1: Idea Screen.—This first gate is the idea screen, The Gate 1 gatekeeper or decision-making group is
the initial decision to commit a limited amount of time typically composed of senior R&D people, such as the
and money to the research project. This gate should be a corporate head of technology (VP R&D or CTO), other
gentle screen, which poses the question: Does the idea senior R&D people, along with representatives from
merit expending any effort at all? Criteria for Go are corporate marketing and business development to ensure
largely qualitative, are scored at the gate review by the commercial input.
gatekeepers, and should include such items as:
• Strategic fit and impact. Stage 1: Project Scoping.—The purpose of this Scoping
stage is to build the foundation for the research project,
• Strategic leverage. define the scope of the project, and map the forward plan.
• Likelihood of technical success. The effort is limited, typically to not much more than two
weeks. Stage 1 activities are conceptual and preparation
• Likelihood of commercial success. work (see Figure 2), and include a technical literature
• Reward or the “size of the prize” if successful. search, patent and IP search, competitive alternatives

Figure 1.—The technology development Stage-Gate威 process is specially designed for TD projects—three stages
and four gates up to an Applications Path Gate.

Figure 2.—The TD project moves from the Scoping Stage—a relatively simple stage—through to the Detailed
Investigation Stage, which can entail person-years of experimental work.

26 Research 䡠 Technology Management

assessment, resource gaps identification, and a prelimi- thus a more rigorous evaluation than at Gate 2, and is
nary technical assessment. based on new information from Stage 2. Gate criteria
resemble those listed for Gate 1 previously, but with
Gate 2: Go To Technical Assessment.—This second more and tougher sub-questions, and answered with
screen is the decision to begin limited experimental or benefit of better data.
technical work in Stage 2. Like Gate 1, this gate is also a
relatively gentle screen, and poses the question: Does the The Gate 3 gatekeepers usually include the corporate
idea merit undertaking limited experimental work? Gate head of technology (VP R&D or CTO), other senior tech-
2 is again largely qualitative, and does not require nology or R&D people, corporate marketing or business
financial analysis (because the resulting product, process development, and the heads of the involved businesses
or impact of TD are still largely unknown). The gate- (e.g., general managers). Because Gate 3 is a heavy com-
keepers are the same as at Gate 1. mitment gate, senior managers of the business units that
Stage 2: Technical Assessment.—The purpose of Stage 2 will take ownership of the resulting technology should be
is to demonstrate the technical or laboratory feasibility of the Gate 3 gatekeepers. Their insights into the commer-
the idea under ideal conditions. This stage entails initial cial viability of the project are essential at Gate 3; further,
or preliminary experimental work, but should not take more early engagement ensures a smoother transition to
more than 1–2 person-months, and last no longer than the business unit once the commercial phase of the
3–4 months. Activities here typically include undertak- project gets underway.
ing a thorough conceptual technological analysis,
executing feasibility experiments, developing a partner- Stage 3: Detailed Investigation.—The purpose of Stage 3
ship network, identifying resource needs and solutions to is to implement the full experimental plan, to prove tech-
resource gaps, and assessing the potential impact of the nological feasibility, and to define the scope of the tech-
technology on the company. nology and its value to the company. This stage could
entail significant expenditures, potentially person-years
Gate 3: Go to Detailed Technical Investigation.—Gate 3 of work. Besides the extensive technical work, other
is the decision to deploy resources beyond 1–2 person- activities focus on defining commercial product or
months, and opens the door to a more extensive and process possibilities, undertaking market, manufacturing
expensive investigation, Stage 3. This gate decision is and impact assessments on these possibilities, and

Figure 3.—The typical technology development (TD) process spawns multiple “commercial projects” that can feed
the new-product process at Gates 1, 2 or 3.

November—December 2006 27
preparing an implementation business case. Sound keepers are typically the senior corporate R&D people,
project management methods are employed during this corporate marketing or business development, plus the
lengthy stage, including periodic milestone checks and leadership team from the relevant business that will
project reviews. If the TD project veers significantly off assume ownership of the resulting commercial develop-
course, or encounters serious barriers to completion ment projects.
during Stage 3, the project is red-flagged and cycled back
to Gate 3 for another Go/Kill decision. How TD Process Feeds the Traditional Process
Gate 4: The Applications Path Gate.—This is the final The final gate of the TD process is the Applications Path
gate in the TD process and is the “door opener” to one or Gate, which marks the end of the TD project but poten-
more new-product or process development projects (see tially the beginning of multiple commercial projects. It is
Figure 3). Here the results of technical work are reviewed here that the project team presents their conclusions
to determine the applicability, scope and value of the about the commercial prospects for the technology,
technology to the company, and the next steps are based on technical work to date and several quick com-
decided. Note that this Gate 4 is often combined with an mercial scoping exercises. At this point, multiple new-
early gate in the usual product development process (for product projects could be initiated and feed the typical
example, with Gate 1, 2 or 3 as shown in Figure 3). Gate- new-product process, as shown in Figure 3. The start

Score = Zero Score = Ten Out of Ten

1. Business Strategy Fit
Congruence Only peripheral fit with our business’s Strong fit with several key elements of
strategy. strategy.
Impact Minimal impact; no noticeable harm The business’s future depends on this
if project is dropped. project.
2. Strategic Leverage
Proprietary position Easily copied; no protection. Position protected through patents,
trade secrets, raw material access, etc.
Platform for growth Dead end; one-of-a-kind; one-off. Opens up many new product possibilities.
Durability (technical and marketing) No distinctive advantage; Long life cycle with opportunity for
quickly leapfrogged by others. incremental spin-offs.
Synergy with corporate units Limited to a single business unit. Could be applied widely across the
corporation.
3. Probability of Technical Success
Technical gap Large gap between solution and current Incremental improvement; easy to do;
practice; must invent new science. existing science.
Project complexity Difficult to envision the solution; Can already see a solution;
many hurdles along the way. straightforward to do.
Technology skill base Technology new to company; Technology widely practiced
almost no skills internally. within the company.
Availability of people and facilities Must hire and build. People and facilities immediately
available.
4. Probability of Commercial Success
(in the case of a TD project with
potential for new products)
Market need Extensive market development required; Product immediately responsive to a
no apparent market exists at present. customer need; a large market exists.
Market maturity Declining markets. Rapid-growth markets.
Competitive intensity High; many tough competitors in this field. Low; few competitors; weak competition.
Commercial applications New to company; we have no/few Commercial applications skills and
development skills commercial applications skills here; people already in place in the
must develop. company.
Commercial assumptions Low probability of occurring; Highly predictable assumptions;
very speculative assumptions. high probability of occurring.
Regulatory and political impact Negative. Positive impact on a high-profile issue.
5. Reward
Contribution to profitability Rough estimate: less than $10M Rough estimate: more than $250M.
cumulative over 5 years.
Payback period Rough estimate: greater than 10 years. Rough estimate: less than 3 years.
Time to commercial start-up Greater than 7 years. Less than 1 year.

Figure 4.—Use a scorecard (0-10 scale) to rate and prioritize TD projects.

28 Research 䡠 Technology Management

points are usually Gates 1, 2 or 3 of the new-product
process, depending on how well defined the proposed
new projects are. Alternatively, if the commercial result Businesses that rely
is a new or improved production process, then the appro-
priate process-development projects are defined here and
routed accordingly.
strictly on financial
The TD project may also result in a licensing opportunity
or perhaps even a joint venture with another corporation.
tools end up with the
The point is that the Applications Path Gate determines
the direction for the commercialization of the technology lowest-value
from this point onward.

Picking the Right Projects

development
Making the resource commitment decisions for TD
projects, especially in the early stages, is problematic for
portfolios.
many companies. Clearly, traditional tools, such as
financial analysis and profit criteria, are not too useful. In
TD projects with much undefined, the level of uncer- to-ten scales, as in Figure 4. The resulting scores are then
tainty is so great that numerical estimates of expected combined to yield an overall project attractiveness
sales, costs, investment, and profits are likely to be score. This scoring exercise and final score become key
grossly in error. There exist many uncertainties in the inputs to the Go/Kill decision (although many users of
typical TD project, but the one thing you can be certain this approach claim that it is the process—a senior
about is that your numbers are always wrong. Indeed decision-making group going through a set of key
there is considerable evidence that businesses that rely questions, debating their scores, and reaching closure on
strictly on financial tools and criteria to select projects each—that provides the real value, and not so much the
end up with the lowest-value development portfolios final score itself). Although the sample scorecard in
(15). As one executive declared, in noting the deficien- Figure 4 is for Gate 3, note that most businesses use the
cies of his company’s sophisticated financial-analysis same high-level criteria from gate to gate for consis-
methods for project selection: tency, with the detailed or sub-questions becoming pro-
gressively tougher at successive gates.
It’s like trying to measure a soft banana with a micrometer! Our
evaluation tools assume a level of precision far beyond the quality of
the data available!
In addition to a gate scorecard, consider the use of
success criteria as employed at Proctor & Gamble (19).
Not surprisingly, this executive’s financial evaluation Here the project team declares what they hope to achieve
tool tended to favor predictable and close-to-home in order for the project to be considered “a success.”
projects at the expense of technology development Success criteria for TD projects include the achievement
projects. of certain technical results (e.g., positive lab test results)
by a given date, attaining a certain technical performance
Best performers adopt a combination of evaluation tech-
improvement (e.g., a certain level of absorption in a new
niques and criteria for making Go/Kill decisions on TD
fiber technology), or the expected sales potential to be
projects (16). The research suggests that no one method
generated by the new technology (e.g., the size of the
works best across the board and can do it all! First
market that this technology might see potential in, if suc-
consider using a scorecard approach, which looks at
cessful).
multiple facets of TD projects, from strategic to technical
issues. Note that this TD scorecard is different than the
Success criteria are declared relatively early in the
one that should be used for new product projects; a best-
project, and on this basis, gatekeepers approve the
practice model for Gate 3 for TD projects is shown in
project at the early gates. These criteria are reviewed and
Figure 4 (17). Scorecards are highly rated by users as a
updated at each successive gate; if the project falls short
solid decision-making method, and tend to yield more
of these success criteria at the next gate, it may be
efficient and more effective Go/Kill choices, higher-
killed—for example, if certain technical results were not
value projects and a portfolio of strategically aligned
achieved by a given date or gate. The use of success
projects (18).
criteria allows the project team to develop customized
In the scorecard approach, the project in question is criteria to suit their project; it forces the team to submit
presented by the project team at each gate meeting in realistic rather than grandiose expectations, and it creates
Figure 1, and a thorough and facilitated gate discussion accountability for the project team—something to
ensues. Next, the gatekeepers score the project on zero- measure the team against.

November—December 2006 29
 Figure 5.—Resources are strategically allocated by project type into strategic buckets by senior management.

Ensuring Resources Are In Place bucket, such as sales and marketing requests. If they did,
in the short term, simple and inexpensive projects would
How does one ensure that resources will be available to always win out, as they do in many businesses. Instead,
undertake TD projects, especially with today’s emphasis strategic buckets build firewalls between buckets. Thus,
on short-term projects? Managements in a number of by earmarking specific amounts for technology develop-
companies have recognized that significant resources ments, the portfolio becomes much more balanced. Note
have shifted from venturesome projects to small, lower- also that different criteria should be used to rate and
impact efforts. In order to correct this imbalance, they select projects in each bucket. For example the relatively
employ strategic buckets as a tool to ensure the right mix qualitative criteria in Figure 4 work well in order to rank
of projects—short-term versus longer-term or TD projects in the TD bucket, but for modifications and
projects—in their portfolios (10). improvements or sales requests, clearly financial
criteria—profits, savings or expected sales increase—are
Strategic buckets is a portfolio management method that the best way to rank these projects.
defines where management desires the development
dollars to go, broken down by project type, market,
geography, or product area (20). Strategic buckets is Make Your TD Projects Pay Off
based on the notion that strategy becomes real when you
start spending money; thus, translating strategy from Technology developments are the engines of growth for
theory to reality is about making decisions on where the many corporations and industries, providing the
resources should be spent—strategic buckets. In the platforms for the next generation of new products and
example in Figure 5, management begins with the busi- new processes. With most companies facing constrained
ness’s strategy and then makes strategic choices about resources and having a short-term focus, it is imperative
resource allocation: how many resources go to new that such projects be managed more effectively than in
products or to improvements or to technology develop- the past so that they truly do achieve their promised
ments? With resource allocation now firmly established results. Adopting a TD Stage-Gate process, using
and driven by strategy, projects within each bucket are custom-tailored Go/Kill scorecards and success criteria,
then ranked against one another to establish priorities. and employing strategic buckets to ensure resource
availability, are but some of the approaches that leading
Note that projects in one bucket—such as technology companies are adopting to handle these vital TD pro-
developments—do not compete against those in another jects. 䡩
䊱

30 Research 䡠 Technology Management

 E. J. 1998. Best Practices For Managing R&D Portfolios. Research-
References and Notes Technology Management, 41, 4 (July–Aug), pp. 20–33; and summa-
1. Stage-Gate威 is a registered trademark of Product Development rized in: Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Kleinschmidt, E. J. 2002.
Institute Inc.; PACE威 is a registered trademark of PRTM. Portfolio Management for New Products, 2nd edition. New York,
2. The argument that technology projects require a special version of NY: Perseus Books.
Stage-Gate威 has been voiced previously; see Koen, P. 2003. Tools 11. See: PDMA studies: Adams, M. and Boike, D. 2004. PDMA
and Techniques for Managing the Front End of Innovation: High- Foundation CPAS Study Reveals New Trends. Visions XXVIII, 3
lights from the May 2003 Cambridge Conference. Visions XXVII, 4 (July), pp. 26–29; and 2004. Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Klein-
(October). schmidt, E. J. Benchmarking Best NPD practices—III: Driving New-
3. Ajamian, G. and Koen, P. A. 2002. Technology Stage Gate: A Product Projects To Market Success. Research-Technology
Structured Process for Managing High Risk, New Technology Management 47, 6 (Nov–Dec): pp. 43–55.
Projects. In The PDMA Toolbox for New Product Development, 12. Source: Koen, P. in (2).
edited by P. Beliveau, A. Griffin and S. Somermeyer, New York: John 13. An early version of a technology model is described in: Eldred,
Wiley & Sons, pp. 267–295. E. W. and McGrath, M. E. 1997. Commercializing New
4. Cooper, R. G. 2005. Your NPD Portfolio May Be Harmful to Your Technology—I. Research-Technology Management 40, 1 (Jan–Feb)
Business’s Health. PDMA Visions XXIX, 2 (April), pp. 22–26. pp. 41–47; see also the model outlined in (2) and (3).
5. Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Kleinschmidt, E. J., 2004. Bench- 14. An earlier version of this model is outlined in Cooper, R. G.
marking Best NPD practices—II: Strategy, Resource Allocation and 2005. Product Leadership: Pathways to Profitable Innovation 2nd
Portfolio Management. Research-Technology Management 47, 3 edition. New York, NY: Perseus Books, Chapter 7.
(May–June), pp. 50–59, Exhibit 2. 15. See (10) and Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Kleinschmidt, E. J.
6. The reasons for the shift in portfolios are explored in (4). 1999. New Product Portfolio Management: Practices and Perfor-
7. Quotations are from over 100 problem-detection sessions held in mance. Journal of Product Innovation Management 16, 4 (July), pp.
companies, and from several studies by the author and co-workers; 333–351.
see for example the three-part RTM series beginning with: Cooper,
R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Kleinschmidt, E. J. 2004. Benchmarking Best 16. See (10) and Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Kleinschmidt, E. J.
NPD Practices—I: Culture, Climate, Teams and Senior Management 2002. Portfolio Management: Fundamental to New Product Success.
Roles. Research-Technology Management 47, 1 (Jan–Feb), pp. In The PDMA Toolbox for New Product Development, edited by P.
31–43; also (5) and (11). Beliveau, A. Griffin and Somermeyer, S. New York: John Wiley &
8. See for example: Christensen, C. M. 1997. The Innovator’s Sons, pp. 331–364.
Dilemma. Harper Business, Harper Collins Publishers; and Foster, 17. See Chapter 5 and Exhibit 5.6 in Portfolio Management for New
R. N. and Waterman, R. H. 1998. Innovation: The Attacker’s Products (10).
Advantage, Summit Books. 18. See IRI study and (10, 15, 16).
9. Cohen, L. Y., Kamienski, P. W. and Espino, R. L. 1998. Gate 19. Cooper, R. G. and Mills, M. 2005. Succeeding At New Products
System Focuses Industrial Basic Research. Research-Technology the P&G Way: A Key Element Is Using the Innovation Diamond.
Management 41, 4 (July–August), pp. 34–37. PDMA Visions XXIX, 4 (Oct.), pp. 9–13.
10. The IRI study on portfolio management methods employed by 20. This section is based on (4); strategic buckets are explained in
industry is reported in: Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J. and Kleinschmidt, Portfolio Management for New Products (10).

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