Nelson Goodman - Ways of Worldmaking (1978) Page 51
Nelson Goodman - Ways of Worldmaking (1978) Page 51
Nelson Goodman - Ways of Worldmaking (1978) Page 51
[VI,2]
but two of the vast variety in the several sciences, in the arts, in propagation of entities out of any chosen basis of individuals,
perception, and in daily discourse. Worlds are made by making but leaves the choice of that basis quite free. Nominalism of it
such versions with words, numerals, pictures, sounds, or other self thus authorizes an abundance of alternative versions based
symbols of any kind in any medium; and the comparative study on physical particles or phenomenal elements or ordinary things
of these versions and visions and of their making is what I call a or whatever else one is willing to take as individuals.1 Nothing
critique of worldmaking. I began such a study in Chapter I, and I here prevents any given nominalist from preferring on other
shall now have to summarize and clarify some points in that grounds some among the systems thus recognized as legitimate.
chapter very briefly before going on to the further problems In contrast, the typical physicalism, for example, while prodigal
that are the main concern of the present chapter. in the platonistic instruments it supplies for endless generation
of entities, admits of only one correct (even if yet unidentified)
2. Means and Matter basis.
Thus while the physicalist's doctrine "no difference without a
What I have said so far plainly points to a radical relativism; but
physical difference" and the nominalist's doctrine "no difference
severe restraints are imposed. Willingness to accept countless al
without a difference of individuals" sound alike, they differ
ternative true or right world-versions does not mean that every
notably in this respect.2
thing goes, that tall stories are as good as short ones, that truths
All the same, in this general discussion of worldmaking I do
are no longer distinguished from falsehoods, but only that
not impose nominalistic restrictions, for I want to allow for
truth must be otherwise conceived than as correspondence with
some difference of opinion as to what actual worlds there are.3
a ready-made world. Though we make worlds by making ver
That falls far short of countenancing merely possible worlds.
sions, we no more make a world by putting symbols together at
The platonist and I may disagree about what makes an actual
random than a carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces of
world while we agree in rejecting all else. We may disagree in
wood together at random. The multiple worlds I countenance
what we take to be true while we agree that nothing answers to
are just the actual worlds made by and answering to true or
what we take to be false.
right versions. Worlds possible or impossible supposedly an
swering to false versions have no place in my philosophy.
Just what worlds are to be recognized as actual is quite 1 See SA, pp. 26-28; PP, pp. 157-161.
another question. Although some aspects of a philosophical
2 And in others, especially in that the nominalist's doctrine requires construc
position have a bearing, even what seem severely restrictive tional interpretation of every difference in terms of differences between indivi
views may recognize countless versions as equally right. For duals, while the physicalist's doctrine is less explicit, often requiring only some
unspecified or at best causal connection between physical and other differences.
example, I am sometimes asked how my relativism can be
reconciled with my nominalism. The answer is easy. Although a 3 In the same spirit, although SA is committed to nominalism, its criterion for
constructional definitions and its measurement of simplicity were, for compara
nominalistic system speaks only of individuals, banning all talk tive purposes, made broad enough to apply to platonistic systems as well. On
of classes, it may take anything whatever as an individual; that the other hand, neither there nor here is any allowance made for departures
from extensionalism.
is, the nominalistic prohibition is against the profligate