LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour Full 0
LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour Full 0
LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour Full 0
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Australian Army
Employment of Armour
2016
11 November 2016
Issued by command of
Chief of Army
MJ Constable
Colonel
Commandant
Combined Arms Training Centre
Contents
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Preface
Aim
Level
This publication is written for new members of the Army. It provides corps
non-specialists with an understanding of the capabilities of the organisation and
its raise, train and sustain role. This publication is a useful reference for
government and non-government agencies working with the Army.
Scope
Contents
Contents
Introduction .........................................................................................................11
Role ....................................................................................................................12
Principles of employment....................................................................................15
Limitations...........................................................................................................16
Introduction .........................................................................................................23
Staff ....................................................................................................................25
Introduction .........................................................................................................29
Planning ..............................................................................................................32
Information actions..............................................................................................34
Threats................................................................................................................35
Coordination measures.......................................................................................35
Chapter 4. Armour in offensive activities .................................................... 37
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 37
Advance ............................................................................................................. 37
Attack ................................................................................................................. 41
Pursuit ................................................................................................................ 44
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 51
Area defence...................................................................................................... 52
Mobile defence................................................................................................... 54
Delay .................................................................................................................. 57
Withdrawal ......................................................................................................... 59
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 65
Control................................................................................................................ 66
Reform ............................................................................................................... 69
Restore............................................................................................................... 70
Assist.................................................................................................................. 71
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 75
Introduction .........................................................................................................79
Organisation........................................................................................................79
Functions ............................................................................................................80
Application ..........................................................................................................82
Introduction .........................................................................................................85
Tropical ...............................................................................................................85
Desert .................................................................................................................87
Urban ..................................................................................................................90
Endmatter ..........................................................................................................93
Illustrations..........................................................................................................94
Tables .................................................................................................................95
Glossary..............................................................................................................96
Abbreviations ....................................................................................................102
Chapter 1
Introduction
Armour is a term given to describe any armoured fighting vehicle (AFV), including
main battle tanks (MBTs), infantry fighting vehicles, cavalry reconnaissance
vehicles (CRVs) and APCs, and the military organisations that employ such
systems, but does not include the protected mobility fleet of vehicles (ie, the
protected mobility vehicle – medium and the protected mobility vehicle – light).
Generally, armour has the following characteristics:
• shock action
• versatility
• adaptability.
Shock action. Shock is the paralysing effect created by rapid and simultaneous
actions that render an enemy incapable of making an effective response. Armour
achieves shock by combining surprise, a concentration of force and aggression
(both physical and psychological). Shock action disrupts the enemy’s plans,
destroys their cohesion, saps morale and weakens their will to resist. Shock action
is most effective when directly targeted at the enemy’s centre of gravity and critical
vulnerabilities.
Versatility. Versatility is the ability to perform a range of tasks. The inherent
versatility of land forces enable them to adapt to the constantly changing conflict
environment. Armour can be employed throughout the spectrum of conflict and
across the range of military activities. Armour gains its versatility from its ethos, its
equipment and its organisation. The versatile ethos is instilled through collective
training and the consistent application of mission command. The variety and type
of technology inherent in the vehicles and ancillary equipment amplifies this
versatility.
Adaptability. Adaptability is the ability to embrace new or unforeseen tasks. The
ability to understand constantly evolving and complex environments can only be
achieved through a physical interaction with the population and the enemy.
Armour achieves adaptability through its ability to learn from experience and
evolve behaviour to deal with changing circumstances. Armour can tailor their
procedures rapidly because of their training, procedures, equipment and inherent
flexibility.
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Spectrum of conflict
Armour is capable of readily meeting tasks throughout the spectrum of conflict.
Armour can support disaster relief as part of peacetime military engagement,
monitor a ceasefire as part of a UN-mandated operation, conduct cordon and
search tasks as part of counterinsurgency, and participate in major combat (see
Figure 1–1).
Level of
effort
Offensive activities
Defensive activities
Stability activities
Interagency cooperation
Enabling activites
Peacetime military
Peace support COIN Major combat
engagement
Armour has made significant contributions to Australian deployments over the last
40 years, including in Vietnam, Somalia, Timor Leste, Iraq and Afghanistan.
This chapter describes the role, capabilities, principles of employment and
limitations of armour, and the contribution of armour to land warfare.
Annex A contains current Australian A vehicle data (see Table 1–1 and
Table 1–2).
Role
Role of armour
The role of armour is to locate, identify and destroy or capture the enemy, by day
or night, in combination with other arms, using fire and manoeuvre.
Role of the armoured cavalry regiment
The role of the armoured cavalry regiment (ACR) is to train, equip and deploy a
battlegroup (BG) HQ and armoured combat teams (CTs) in accordance with raise,
train, sustain procedures.
Role of tanks
The role of tanks is, in coordination with other arms, to close with and destroy the
enemy using fire, manoeuvre and shock action.
Tanks provide Army the best protected land platform that is discriminatory, lethal
and adds complexity to the enemy’s predicament in close fighting.
Role of cavalry
The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate and disrupt the enemy through the
conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.
Cavalry provides mounted reconnaissance to the combat brigade and ACR
commander, in coordination with other arms and brigade reconnaissance assets.
Light cavalry. The role and tasks of light cavalry is the same as for cavalry,
but are enabled through non-AFV platforms. Light cavalry are more likely to
conduct security, stability and enabling activities in lower threat environments or
in rear echelon areas. Light cavalry operate predominantly mounted in the
conduct of their tasks using similar TTP to CRV-based cavalry units and are
enabled by a range of protected and unprotected mobility platforms.
Cavalry scouts. The cavalry scout is an integrated and habitual element of the
cavalry organisation. Scouts facilitate all dismounted reconnaissance and
surveillance tasks, and limited offensive and defensive tasks. They provide
intimate security to vehicles while on the move and at the halt, and enhance both
endurance task coverage of the cavalry element. Scouts are capable of
being employed independent of the vehicles for short durations and can be used
to trigger vehicle reaction.
Role of armoured personnel carriers
The role of APCs is to provide an armoured mobility to dismounted combat forces
as part of the combined arms team.
APCs provide the mounted infantry the mobility and protection to the objective,
where they may dismount in relative safety and from where they can assault on
foot. The APC squadron is designed to lift a single standard infantry battalion (ie,
battalion HQ, three infantry companies and one support company).
Capabilities of armour
Throughout history, all armour has been based on the three key capabilities of
firepower, mobility and protection, and the trading of one to increase another. In
the 21st century, this combination has become a capability quintet through the
addition of networked communications and sensors.
Firepower. Armoured vehicles mount a range of weapon types including large
calibre quick-firing guns or automatic cannons, and light to heavy calibre machine
guns. A variety of ammunition natures can be used according to the target type
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and the mission. Individual moving or stationary targets can be engaged with
pinpoint accuracy using direct fire, by day and night, from static or moving
platforms.
Mobility. The crew utilises the speed and mobility of armour to close within
weapon range without permitting effective engagement by the enemy. Successful
manoeuvre by armour requires a sound understanding of vehicle capability,
enemy tactics and capabilities, and the impact of terrain. Armour is highly mobile
across country, although steep terrain and heavy vegetation will influence the rate
of movement. Armoured mobility and speed enables the development of tempo,
which is a key to success in battle.
Protection. Armour generates protection directly and indirectly. Figure 1–2
depicts how armour generates indirect protection through a series of protective
measures.
Prevent enemies
and reduce threats
Win friends and influence people
Information Human
operations dimension
Deter/prevent attacks
Preparedness, security
Prevent
Counter and prevention measures Public
recruiting Computer Preventive affairs
network attack medicine
defence
Civil
See – understand – act first affairs
Assured Electronic
Situation awareness, manoeuvre and engagement
mobility warfare
Acoustic
Signature management and Infra-red
countermeasures
Combat
Obscurants
identification
Radar Avoid hit Visible
Decoys Countermeasures and Jammers
active protection Close-in
Long-range
armour
armour
protection
protection Avoid penetration
Pre-
Indirect Hardening and access control detonation
fire
Mitigate
Principles of employment
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• sustainment
• manoeuvre space.
Mission command. Mission command is an organisational culture and a
philosophy of command in which subordinates are given a clear indication of the
commander’s intent, the mission, and the assets and resources to achieve that
mission. Tempo in complex terrain demands decisive and orchestrated action.
Mission command assists armoured commanders to make decisions where there
is little time for reflection or for consultation with superiors. Orders to armour must
detail the commander’s intent for achieving the immediate mission and the way in
which armour contributes to the overall plan. They will include a clear statement of
tasks and purposes. LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power contains more
information on mission command.
Combined arms. Armour provides a valuable offensive and defensive capability,
but with some limitations as described in the Limitations section. Combining
armour with other combat arms can enhance the capabilities of armour and
reduce the impact of its limitations.
Sustainment. Any deployed force requires sustainment. Armour uses large
quantities of fuel, ammunition and spares. The logistics train must support
continuous sustainment under combat conditions. Sustainment requirements for
the force will be governed by a number of factors, such as the type of activity, the
force being deployed, the terrain, the climactic conditions and enemy activity. If
working as part of a CT or BG, armour must come with its own logistic support.
Manoeuvre space. Tanks, CRVs and APCs can move quickly and cover large
distances in a short time. The cross-country mobility of the armoured vehicles
allows them to range freely. Armoured weapons can be employed at significant
ranges and they require room to manoeuvre into firing positions. When
manoeuvring in the open, armoured vehicles will achieve dispersion while
remaining within visual and weapon range. Support between armoured vehicles is
maintained on the principle of half visual range to half weapon effective range;
whichever is the least distance. The distance between vehicles in this situation
could be up to 2 km for tanks due to their greater effective weapons range. Even
in a relatively static direct fire role a tank will require more than 1 km of frontage in
which to select their primary, secondary and alternate fire positions. Armoured
forces must therefore be given room in which to manoeuvre and apply their
offensive capabilities.
Limitations
Commanders and staff who plan to work with and employ armour need to
understand the limitations of this force. Armour limitations include:
• vulnerability to air attack
• difficulty in holding ground
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through screening, reconnaissance, and attack by fire (ABF) and support by fire
(SBF) tasks. At the tactical level, the tanks and APCs as part of the combined arms
team are also able to conduct battlespace shaping actions through the seizure of
critical points, the holding and denial of key and decisive terrain, and in the
conduct of holding attacks and feints. Tanks and APCs grouped together have the
capability to support the shaping actions of other force elements (FEs) in blocking,
turning, fixing and disrupting threat forces.
Cavalry is able to engage in close combat actions, and may also shape through
screening, guarding and conducting reconnaissance tasks. Cavalry also shapes
the enemy by conducting counter-reconnaissance tasks, deception missions,
raids, attacks and mobile defensive operations. Cavalry can also shape
operations through the destruction, denial or delay of the enemy forces while
avoiding decisive engagement. The combination of mounted and dismounted
elements of cavalry fixes the enemy by the denial of freedom of movement across
broad areas, even in complex terrain.
Strike. Striking is the timely application of tailored effects to destroy enemy forces.
Tanks remain one of the primary land FE with which the commander may strike
threat forces with maximum physical and psychological shock effect. Such strikes
could take the form of direct assault, counterattack, penetration and
counterpenetration, raids, and the rapid pursuit of withdrawing enemy forces. The
employment of tanks in other types of operations may also be used to gain
significant psychological effects, demonstrating the ability to strike rather than the
action itself.
APCs (with or without mounted troops) can be used in much the same way that
tanks can be used to strike threat forces. They will often be grouped with tanks to
achieve the same range of tasks.
Cavalry uses its inherent adaptability to seize fleeting opportunities; cavalry can
destroy critical enemy elements and in doing so dislocate and disrupt the enemy
in all phases of war. CRVs employed thoughtfully in a combined arms environment
are able to effectively fix and destroy superior enemy forces.
Shield. Shielding protects friendly forces and infrastructure and is achieved by
measures that include protection against physical or electronic attack and
avoiding detection.
Tanks and APCs contribute to the shielding and protection of friendly forces and
key infrastructure through:
• conducting ground reconnaissance
• forming part of screens
• providing guards and early warning for FEs
• participating in protective operations
• participating in the defence and denial of physical locations to enemy
interdiction.
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Annex:
A. Armoured fighting vehicle data
Annex A to Chapter 1
Armoured fighting vehicle data
APC (M113AS4-APC) 12.7 mm QCB MG 250 (ready) 2 + 10 20 Yes Yes 440 550 APC Sqn, Tank Sqn,
Support Sqn
2500 (stowed)
AM (M125AS4) 81 mm mortar 114 (mortar) 2+3 20 Yes Yes 440 550 APC Sqn
12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready)
900 (stowed)
AF (M113AS4-AF) 12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready) 2+3 20 Yes Yes 440 550 APC Sqn, Tank Sqn,
Support Sqn
1000 (stowed)
AA (M113AS4-AA) 12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready) 2 + medic 20 Yes Yes 440 550 APC Sqn, Tank Sqn,
Support Sqn
800 (stowed) 2 litters or 1 litter with
3 passengers
ACV (M113AS4-ACV) 12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready) 2+3 20 Yes Yes 440 550 APC Sqn, Tank Sqn,
Support Sqn
600 (stowed)
ARVL (M806AS4) 12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready) 2+2 20 Yes Yes 340 450 APC Sqn, Tank Sqn,
Support Sqn
2000 (stowed)
ALV (M113AS4-ALV) 12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready) 2+1 20 Yes Yes 410 550 APC Sqn, Tank Sqn,
Support Sqn
1600 (stowed)
M1A1 AIM(D) 120 mm 40 (main gun) 4 70 No Yes 1907 480 Tank Sqn
7.62 mm MG 11 400 (7.62 mm)
12.7 mm QCB MG 1000 (12.7 mm)
M88A2 12.7 mm QCB MG 1000 (stowed) 2+2 68 No Yes 1563 500 Tank Sqn, Support Sqn
ASLAV type 1 2 x 7.62 mm 1410 (7.62 mm) 3+2 13 Yes Yes 260 660 Cavalry Sqn, RHQ
1 x 25 mm 210 (ready)
chain gun 510 (stowed 25 mm)
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ASLAV type 2 12.7 mm QCB MG 100 (ready) PC: 2 + 9 13 Yes Yes 270 660 Cavalry Sqn, RHQ
1600 (stowed) ACV: 2 + 4
Surveillance: 2 + 3
Ambulance: 2 + medic
2 litters with 3 passengers
ASLAV type 3 fitters, 7.62 mm MG 235 (ready) Fitter: 2 + 3 13 Yes Yes 270 660 Cavalry Sqn, Support Sqn
recovery
2350 (stowed) Recovery: 2 + 2
M1A1 AIM(D) M256 smoothbore 120 mm APFSDS-T 4000 M88A2 is armed with same CWS
12.7 mm QCB MG as M1A1 AIM(D)
MG coaxial 7.62 mm, MAG 58 HEAT 4000
MG flex 7.62 mm, MAG 58 on skate mount MPAT 1600
MG CWS 0.50 calibre, M48 QCB, on 4B1T 900
powered rotary platform
4B1T 1500
4B1T
Chapter 2
Armour organisation
Introduction
The regiment is armour’s primary structure for raising, training and sustaining the
armoured capability. In peacetime, armoured assets are grouped into ACRs, with
a squadron each of CRVs, APCs and tanks. When deployed, the armoured
capability is best task-organised in a combined arms force.
This chapter describes the units and sub-units, C2, staff, and levels and types of
support that contribute to the armoured capability in the Australian Army.
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type 1s, two type 2s) combat troops and one six-vehicle (ie, two type 1s, four
type 2s surveillance) surveillance troop.
The primary equipment of the Armoured mobility squadron is the M113AS4 and
its variants. Personnel in a lift squadron total approximately 254. The lift squadron
can deploy three 20-vehicle combat troops capable of lifting an infantry company,
and one support troop capable of lifting support elements integral to the battalion
(mortars or direct fire support weapons) and attachments (joint fire teams and
engineers).
The primary equipment of the tank squadron is the M1A1 AIM(D) Abrams MBT.
Other principal equipment includes the M88A2 heavy recovery vehicle, the
M113AS4 and the related variants for C2 and other tasks, and a significant
refueling capacity based on TTFs1. Personnel in a tank squadron total
approximately 89. The tank squadron can deploy three four-vehicle tank troops.
The primary equipment of the support squadron is the B vehicle, augmented by
support variants of each AFV type. Personnel in the support squadron total
approximately 110.
Light cavalry regiment
Light cavalry regiment consists of an RHQ, two light cavalry squadrons and limited
administrative sub-unit elements. A light cavalry regiment can deploy a total of four
light cavalry troops.
The current primary equipment of the light cavalry unit is the protected mobility
vehicle, or G-Wagon surveillance and reconnaissance vehicle, which provide the
force a protected lift capability and communications equipment.
Personnel in a light cavalry regiment total approximately 231 and include limited
specialist personnel from a variety of corps.
Armour does not have any specialist or unique degrees of authority or command
terminology. The standard degrees of authority are detailed in ADDP 00.1,
Command and Control. These apply to armour as follows:
• Full command. Full command gives full authority and responsibility to the
superior officer to issue any orders to the armoured unit. It makes the
superior officer responsible for every aspect of the employment and
administration of armoured forces. Armoured units have significant CSS
requirements that few other HQs will be able to provide under this status of
command.
• Operational command. Operational command is the authority granted to a
commander to assign missions or tasks to armour, to reassign armoured
Staff
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CO
PERS INT
OPS TECH
LOG QM
PLANS SIGS
CHAP RMO
The BG plan is controlled by the unit staff from RHQ, coordinated by the OPSO.
At squadron level, the squadron staff coordinates the plan. RHQ is the central
element through which orders and information are passed. RHQ provides the CO
with the staff and communications facilities required to command the unit in peace
and a BG on deployment. The staff functions are required to accomplish the
following:
• conduct daily tasks within a CO’s tactical HQ
• command the BG; including logistic, technical and intelligence staff
• coordinate supporting units
• enable liaison at unit level and to the task force (TF) or formation HQ.
The coordinating staff is responsible for staff planning. The special staff are those
non-organic staff habitually attached to coordinate external support. The personal
staff supports the CO.
Each regiment has a designated regimental LO to represent the CO at formation
or flanking unit HQ. Each regimental LO is responsible for keeping their HQ and
other units to which they are attached fully informed. However, the regimental LOs
may also convey or amplify the CO’s orders at SHQ, and may also be required to
be positioned at key coordination points or to assist in regrouping or other tactical
functions (eg, with a covering force).
Armoured BGs will not routinely have a staff officer located on the TFs or formation
HQ. TF and formation HQs must ensure that armoured units are advised when
liaison staff are required to assist in planning or other tasks.
Armoured units are based on ACRs in peacetime but are employed in BGs and
CTs when deployed. Armour is employed as part of a combined arms team, and
while the grouping is dependent on the task, synergies are achieved by combining
the three manoeuvre combat arms of infantry, armour and aviation. The proportion
and capabilities of the armoured capability are balanced to meet the needs of the
task.
A BG is defined as a combined arms grouping task-organised for a specific
mission based on a manoeuvre unit HQ. Task organisation is the regrouping of
forces for specific missions and phases within actions to produce a range of
capabilities in a single organisation. In short, the force is tailored for the specific
task. The ACR is able to form a BG HQ and up to three CT HQs with integral
support, but it may require specialist equipment, such as infantry, engineers or
offensive support (OS). Armoured CTs may also be attached to a BG formed by
another combat arm.
While any manoeuvre unit HQ can command other manoeuvre sub-units, the
ability to communicate effectively with sub-units is a consideration. All armoured
regiments and sub-units can task-organise effectively with all other combat,
combat support and CSS elements as required by the task, the threat and the
terrain.
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Chapter 3
Armour planning
Introduction
The time to prepare and plan for a mission is often limited. Commanders and staff
must follow well-developed planning procedures; enhanced by sound training and
clear SOP; and well-developed tactics, techniques and procedures. Extensive use
of the staff MAP and the individual MAP will in turn be supported by the combat
MAP at lower levels.
There is no special planning process for armour. However, the timely involvement
of armour advice in the MAP and armoured involvement in any combined arms
planning team, are essential if armour is to fully realise its potential. The key to
planning for armour is to ensure that all commanders fully understand their
superiors’ intent and are able to act within this intent.
This chapter details the FE options, C2, planning, information action effects,
threats and coordination measures for the employment of armour.
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A troop group deployed independently of its parent sub-unit must have a specialist
repair and recovery vehicle and personnel included. Even with this support, there
are limitations to how long such a group can operate without regimental support.
Squadron or combat team
An armoured squadron consists of the vehicles, equipment and personnel needed
to form a CT or as part of a BG or TF. To deploy independently, the logistic
elements of the squadron will need to be supplemented by its parent regiment.
There will still be limitations to how long such a group can operate without
regimental support. Typically, a squadron might be assigned operational control
to a manoeuvre BG.
Regiment or battlegroup
An ACR consists of the vehicles, equipment and personnel needed to form a BG.
The deployment of a regiment provides a BG HQ, three armoured CTs and the
necessary logistics to support the regiment. CSS must be available to all elements
of the regiment, regardless of their task organisation. A regiment, possibly a
task-organised composite regiment, might be assigned under command to a joint
TF.
As explained in Chapter 2, armour benefits from being combined with other arms
so that the limitations of one arm can be balanced or negated by the capabilities
of the other arms. For fast moving activities involving large distances, where
seizing and holding ground are not important, armour and aviation provide an
excellent mix of speed and mobility. For activities which require areas to be
cleared or involve seizing and holding ground, armour and infantry mounted in
APCs are a good combination. The combination of armour, aviation and
APC-mounted infantry into a single BG creates a powerful and flexible
organisation that can be assigned almost any task, but it also creates a demanding
logistic support situation. When combining multiple sub-units into a single
organisation, C2 and span of command are key considerations.
Groupings
Armour is task-organised by grouping into combined arms BGs and CTs. As these
groupings involve other combat, combat support and CSS elements, C2 must be
clear and simple. Complicated groupings take time to enact and are difficult to
coordinate in the chaos of battle. Accordingly, groupings must be kept simple and
regrouping must be minimised. Wherever possible, affiliations built in training
should be maintained on deployment.
Regrouping. Regrouping reduces tempo, complicates the supporting plan and
puts the organisation temporarily into an unbalanced state. It is not undertaken
lightly and requires all units involved to be given clear and simple regrouping
orders. As groupings must be related to the task, regrouping should only occur
when the primary task has changed.
Control measures
Armoured movement on the battlefield is rapid and must be carefully controlled to
maximise shock action, and minimise confusion or disorganisation. Fratricide is
also a risk that must be avoided. There are numerous control measures designed
to coordinate movement; the key of which are boundaries, phase lines, report
lines, feature numbers and timings. Control measures must be issued in sufficient
quantity to be adequate for the activity without being overly restrictive.
Location of commanders
The BG or CT commander must make the choice of exercising control from the CP
or from their own fighting vehicle. It is easier to process imagery and data in the
CP vehicle because of the staff and facilities designed to assist in C2 activities.
However, it is difficult to lead a force or to fully understand or influence the
armoured battle from a CP. The commander’s own fighting vehicle enables them
to influence the battle personally and directly when the situation demands. The
choice of location will depend on the nature of the activity, and the type and
amount of information to be processed. Commanders should be with their
sub-units as often as possible, particularly during critical periods when their
presence could affect the outcome of an activity.
Communications
The following are the communications facilities in armoured units:
• BMS
• radio
• line (in static locations)
• telephone (satellite communications)
• LOs.
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Intelligence
Timely accurate intelligence is essential for effective C2; however, commanders
will rarely have all the information they require. The norm in complex warfighting
will be for land forces to fight for and not necessarily with information. As a result,
armoured commanders must use the adaption cycle (ie,
act–sense–decide–adapt) to gain the information they need.
Standard operating procedures
Well-practiced and widely understood SOP are essential for both coordination and
speed. BG HQ should provide armoured sub-units with copies of their SOP as
soon as practical after regrouping.
Battle procedures
The purpose of battle procedure is to ensure that a BG or CT deploys and
prepares for battle quickly and efficiently. It is the process by which an armoured
commander directs reconnaissance, makes plans, issues orders and prepares the
force for battle.
Some armoured elements will be required to deploy earlier than the remainder of
the unit or formation. Well-practiced battle procedures must be employed so that
a minimum of time is lost before commencing the task. Armoured regimental and
squadron commanders should be released by supported commanders, as early
as possible, to maximise time for reconnaissance and other preparations.
Armour must always be given a notice-to-move time which allows for battle
procedure. This enables the vital routine servicing and rest to occur as a part of
the cycle of battle, and for the BG or CT to maintain tempo.
Planning
Planning factors
The MAP, used correctly, will ensure that all the necessary planning factors for
armour are given due consideration. During the planning process advice must be
provided by armoured personnel to avoid inappropriate employment.
Some planning factors that affect armour include:
• audacity
• concentration
• logistics and servicing
• vulnerability to air attack
• difficulty holding ground
• ground and obstacles
• noise
• reserved areas
• use of infrastructure.
Audacity. Armour planning must be bold and aggressive. It is only when the
quintet of firepower, mobility, protection, networked communications and sensors
are employed aggressively that armour realises its full potential. To do this
requires bold plans and the ability to identify opportunities and measure risks.
Armour must be used aggressively in defensive as well as offensive actions. It
cannot be tied down by plans that require armoured vehicles to fight from fixed,
static positions.
Concentration. Every opportunity must be taken to concentrate the firepower of
armour. Planning will emphasise dispersion until the critical moment.
Logistics and servicing. Armour needs to consider the requirement for
ammunition, fuel and spare parts as a significant issue. The bulk and weight of
these items will influence resupply. An indication of requirements is given in LWP-
G 0-5-1, Staff Officers Guide. Armour also requires regular servicing of
approximately 24 hours every 72 hours. Commanders at all levels must plan time
for replenishment and servicing based on armour’s advice to ensure the
availability of armour for combat.
Vulnerability to air attack. Specialist GBAD elements should be deployed with
all armoured elements to enable freedom of manoeuvre in a hostile air
environment.
Difficulty holding ground. In close or broken country or if ground is to be held or
defended, dismounted troops will be required to provide close protection to the
armour.
Ground and obstacles. Steep or very close country and difficult terrain may limit
the movement of armour. Armoured advice must be sought before declaring
terrain impassable to armour.
Noise. Noise can prejudice surprise but a considered deception plan will reduce
this limitation. The resonance effect of a number of armoured platforms moving
makes estimating numbers and direction difficult.
Reserved areas. Armour requires space to disperse and to conduct maintenance
and replenishment. The amount of space depends on many variables including
the size and type of unit, the threat, the nature of the terrain and the vegetation.
Armoured advice must be sought before allocating areas for administrative
activities.
Use of infrastructure. The following infrastructure considerations will be taken
into account:
• Roads. All forms of armour move most quickly on roads however roads are
often the most dangerous route. Planning must balance tactical risk, the
need for speed, and the potential damage that multiple AFV movements
may cause to roads.
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• Bridges. Not all bridges will support the weight of an AFV. Planning must
ensure that expedient bridging or crossing points are available to armour,
particularly on administrative marches.
• Hard ground. Armour requires hard ground for maintenance.
• Rail, port and airfield. While tanks and APCs can self-deploy anywhere by
land, travel over long distances is best accomplished by rail, sea or air.
Armour is deployable by air. When using rail transport tanks require specific
railcars but light armour can travel on standard rolling stock. Armour can
disembark from naval landing assets.
Information actions
Threats
Armour has always been concerned with anti-armour mines and anti-armour
weaponry. Technological advances such as spaced armour, advanced hull
shapes, improved detectors, and the use of active and passive countermeasures,
can increase armoured survivability against these threats. Complex warfighting
introduces an expanded range of threats. The availability of military off-the-shelf
anti-armoured weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades introduces the need
for protective features such as bar armour. IEDs are becoming more prevalent and
deadly. As this threat has evolved, so too have the tactics to counter it. Procedural
measures such as changing routes and timetables regularly, conducting detailed
route reconnaissance, using an advance party for convoys, providing an
unmanned aerial vehicle overwatch for convoys, and using electronic warfare
intervention are all examples of the flexibility required in such situations. Suicide
bombers, both personnel and vehicles, are another common threat for which
tactics are continually being developed and adapted to counter.
Coordination measures
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Chapter 4
Introduction
The offensive is decisive in war. For armour, bold manoeuvre, shock action, and
maintaining tempo are the keys to success. In offensive activities, armour’s ability
to manoeuvre rapidly and engage targets accurately on the move makes it
essential in the combined arms team.
There are three main types of offensive activities as follows:
• advance
• attack
• pursuit.
The basic considerations for each action are explained in LWD 3-0-3, Formation
Tactics.
This chapter describes the employment of armour in offensive activities. It will
detail the concept of offensive manoeuvre; and the various offensive activities
including the advance, the attack, the pursuit and other offensive activities.
Advance
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• Flank and rear guards. APCs with mounted infantry may be used as flank
guards, specifically anti-armour forces. Rear guards need to be able to
protect echelons to the rear.
APC with reconnaissance platoons can be used for the conduct of close
reconnaissance for the main body’s axis of advance.
Cavalry in the advance
Cavalry is well suited to flank security tasks, and to screening ahead of the
advance guard.
The advance to contact ends when the cavalry force reaches an assigned
objective, a designated objective or when contact is gained. A cavalry force may
then perform a sector search, or it may advance in contact and attempt to defeat
the enemy force within its capabilities. The task organisation of the cavalry force
will determine the size of the enemy force that can be defeated.
Should the enemy prove too strong, the cavalry force may picket the location until
a larger force can deal with it. The cavalry force may be permitted to bypass
enemy forces to maintain momentum. Bypass may be necessary if contact is lost
with a moving enemy main force and the enemy security forces are blocking the
friendly advance.
Light cavalry. Light cavalry can contribute to the advance through the following:
• undertaking area/sector reconnaissance to obtain topographical
information (eg, roads and bridges, river crossings, and defiles) and
marking preferred advance routes
• conducting mounted reconnaissance to locate enemy positions and enemy
security elements forward of the advance guard
• reconnoitring selected areas of operations/areas of interest to either flank
of the axis of advance
• conducting mounted reconnaissance to identify specific areas which may
be occupied by the enemy.
Command and control
Mission command is paramount for the employment of armour in the advance.
Armour is able to change axes quickly and move cross-country to maintain tempo.
Commanders at all levels must understand the intent and push to build tempo.
Control measures in the advance must enable manoeuvre without stifling initiative.
Armour requires room to manoeuvre during the advance. Narrow corridors will
restrict the ability to manoeuvre.
Tempo
Outflanking and bypassing. Armour is suited to rapid outflanking and bypassing,
particularly in the covering force and advance guard. Armour’s networked
communication enables handover without collocation. The aim of bypassing is to
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outflank the enemy, picket the location and then handover responsibility for the
bypassed position to the advance guard. Outflanking or bypass forces should be
armour-heavy to cater for enemy reserves and counterattacks. The armoured
force should not be allocated piecemeal to different activities so that the size of
individual elements is vulnerable or ineffective. This is commonly referred to as
‘penny packeting’.
Road or cross-country movement. The basic factors to be considered when
deciding whether to move cross-country are as follows:
• the tempo needed
• the bypass policy and whether a cleared route is required
• the ‘going’ of the cross-country in relation to the rate of advance required
• the opportunities for finding weaknesses and gaps, and outflanking the
enemy by using cross-country movement and minor tracks
• the impact on the following forces’ B vehicles of the preceding AFV
movement.
It will be necessary to continue the advance 24 hours a day in order to maintain
and build tempo. Armour can advance at night, particularly if there are sufficient
resources to rotate through a 24-hour cycle. In this case, a proportion of the
armour rests and replenishes by day in preparation for night activities. If there is
insufficient armour, the commander must consider the advantages of advancing
continuously by day and night against the need for crew rest and vehicle repair,
resupply and maintenance. Movement along roads and tracks in exchange for
speed and control may sacrifice security. Cross-country movement may present
considerable navigation and control problems by night.
The technology suites of Australian armoured vehicles provide excellent ability to
fight at night. Against some enemy forces, the opportunities at night in the advance
may be increased compared to daytime movements. However, commanders must
balance the opportunities and the security and tempo gained from continuous
action, against the limitations of operating at night including:
• slower battle procedure
• difficult situational awareness
• reduced speed
• the likelihood of increased vehicle casualties if moving cross-country.
Combat service support
As tempo must be maintained in the advance, CSS planning must be detailed and
may include reserves of ammunition; POL; and repair and recovery assets as well
as medical resources to be used to exploit success or to mitigate against
unforeseen contingencies.
All vehicles in the armour advance should commence with a full load of fuel and
ammunition. If an approach march precedes the actual advance, replenishment
must be conducted prior to the troops crossing the line of departure.
The balance between the need for ammunition and POL produces a constant
tonnage requirement. When ammunition expenditure is high, POL requirements
will often be low. The rate of advance of the force must not be slowed by
replenishment. If necessary, commanders should arrange for depth elements to
be replenished and move forward to take over the lead.
Replenishment and casevac of the covering force is a difficult task. Use of air
assets must be considered, dependent on the air and GBAD threat.
Aggressive movement in the face of the enemy over rough terrain will substantially
increase the need for repair capabilities. Individual vehicles may need to fend for
themselves until administrative support can reach them in the advance. Armoured
units will have specific SOP for this.
Attack
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Pursuit
The pursuit and the advance to contact are similar in the tactical handling and
grouping, but differ fundamentally in the enemy situation. In the advance to
contact, the enemy will be implementing a coordinated and well-considered plan,
with troops of high morale. However, the pursuit follows the defeat of an enemy
whose degree of cohesive resistance and morale has been reduced considerably.
The commander in the pursuit can take greater risks. In execution, a pursuit can
be either direct or parallel.
Tanks in the pursuit. Tanks will be required in the pursuit to drive in the enemy’s
rearguards, generate fear and maintain the momentum. The ability of tanks to fight
and move concurrently makes them uniquely suited for this task. A force required
for parallel pursuit (eg, on an alternate axis) will require a greater number of tanks.
A force required for parallel pursuit (eg, on the alternate axis) will require a greater
number of tanks.
Armoured personnel carriers in the pursuit. APCs with mounted infantry,
grouped with tanks, should be used in the pursuing and cut-off forces. The pursuit
should be conducted with minimal regrouping of the advancing force in order to
minimise reaction time and exploit the withdrawing enemy.
Cavalry in the pursuit. In the pursuit, cavalry will exploit success. Cavalry is well
suited to exploit the opportunities gained from offensive activities. In the pursuit,
cavalry forces will rapidly follow the withdrawing enemy on a number of axes,
continuing to harass and shape the enemy for further offensive actions.
Combat service support for the pursuit. CSS for armour in the pursuit is similar
to the advance. However, the tactics of the pursuing and cut-off forces may require
allocating dedicated logistic support units under command. Maximum
consideration should be given to alternative methods of resupply; for example,
using air to resupply POL and ammunition, and for casevac. The location of depth
objectives is influenced by the logistic system’s capability to respond to greater
demands for the supply of fuel and ammunition. The repair and recovery,
replacement, and reinforcement procedures are similar to the advance. Extended
lines of communication, the rate of advance and poor communications often
exacerbate CSS procedures in the pursuit.
Tactical techniques
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early stage with the airborne forces commander or with the joint TF HQ
controlling the activity.
Ambush
Armour’s ability to concentrate fire is well suited to ambush.
Although discussed here as offensive action, armour conducts ambushes in all
types of activities. Ambush is a common offensive technique in defensive or
protective activities. The usual technique for an armoured ambush is an ABF, and
it should be combined with aviation and OS to maximise results.
Cavalry, with cavalry scouts, can conduct ambushes without infantry support.
Usually, tanks and APCs will require infantry support.
Armour is capable of both quick and deliberate ambushes, using terrain to provide
cover and concealment. Protection from observation and surveillance is essential
in any ambush. The vehicles must be hidden, routes must be camouflaged and
concealed from the air, and any enemy night fighting equipment and electronic
detection devices considered.
In any ambush, swift movement from the ambush site ensures that the
participating vehicles are not subjected to retaliatory air or OS fire. Routes in and
out must be carefully planned and camouflaged.
Amphibious
The armoured contribution to amphibious operations includes:
• Preparatory phase. Cavalry may contribute through its normal information
gathering or specified tasking to the preparatory phase of amphibious
assault. This will include input to planning for the amphibious assault force.
• Beach and coastal information and reconnaissance. Cavalry forces may
provide beach and coastal reconnaissance information, and early warning
of enemy activities and locations in those areas where amphibious
lodgements may be planned.
• Guides. Cavalry may provide guides for beach landing zones.
• Assault force. Tanks and APCs may be employed in the assault force. The
availability of landing craft and the suitability of the beach for
disembarkation will be key determinants.
• Disruption. Armoured elements may be used to disrupt enemy forces during
amphibious operations.
Attack by fire
ABF is generally a tank task due to the longer range and heavier weight of fire, but
this does not prevent cavalry or APCs from contributing. The ABF may be
conducted with armed reconnaissance helicopter (ARH) support. The CT or BG
commander will need to provide flank and rear security to those elements
providing the direct fire.
Cordon
The force conducting the cordon may be armoured or mounted depending on the
threat, the speed and the security required.
The cordon force is a combined arms grouping. The key groupings are as follows:
• Inner cordon. An inner cordon, if required, contains targeted suspects and
prevents outward movement. Its composition is determined by the nature of
the threat but will usually comprise dismounted or infantry mounted in
APCs, possibly supported by cavalry.
• Outer cordon. An outer cordon prevents inward movement and normally
consists of movement control measures such as the deployment of vehicle
checkpoints (VCPs), patrols, checkpoints and OPs. Tanks, cavalry and
APCs can contribute to the outer cordon, supported by aviation. Both tanks
and cavalry have the sensors to detect movement through the cordon and
the firepower to defeat it. Tanks could anchor the VCPs and strong points,
while cavalry or APC patrols could cover the gaps in the outer ring.
• Traffic control posts. Traffic control posts (TCPs) should be joint teams with
local police/law enforcement bodies. Armour sited at a TCP can provide
immediate firepower and acts as a strong deterrent.
• Reserve(s). The reserve(s) are ideally mobile either in the form of armour
or mounted infantry.
• Flank security. Flank security is formed on an ‘as required’ basis but is
another task that is well suited to cavalry or APCs.
Corridor thrust
Armour may contribute to a corridor thrust as part of one of two main forces, the
thrust force and the security and support force. They are as follows:
• Thrust force. The thrust force consists of:
• enabling force
• overwatch force – cavalry would be well suited to contribute to the
overwatch force, possibly operating to the flanks
• assault force – armour would be well suited to contribute to the
assault force, with its armament able to cover along the axis and out
to the flanks.
• Security and support force. This force is tasked to secure cleared ground
and ensure CSS to the thrust force. It may also be tasked to secure the
initial lodgement. This task is better suited to infantry mounted in APCs.
Coup de main
Coup de main activities may be achieved with either airborne or ground forces.
Tanks would provide the shock action and firepower to a ground thrust. Airborne
forces will require rapid reinforcement by ground forces in order to provide weight
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of fire and longevity. Tanks and APCs would be a key component of any force to
break through and link-up. Cavalry would provide security in either case. Whether
the coup de main is accomplished by air or land forces, the use of all forms of
armour is essential to its success.
In a coup de main, cavalry provides the reconnaissance, flank security and rear
security necessary for the tanks and infantry mounted in APCs to arrive at the
objective and either seize it or reinforce a force inserted by airmobile. Holding the
objective may require considerable fighting power and the physical holding of
ground. Accordingly, the force must be as large as possible and capable of moving
rapidly to the objective.
Diversionary attack
Armour can conduct diversionary attacks, as either an ABF or SBF. The show of
force must be large enough to simulate the main effort but not so large as to
weaken the real main effort. The use of armour in the diversion can add to the
realism and coincidentally achieve attrition of the enemy force.
Raid
Operating deep often exposes those high-value targets which are deliberately
kept to the rear of the enemy’s forward line of own troops; engineering assets, C2
nodes, CSS and so on, provide perfect raid opportunities. When timed to coincide
with a broader assault elsewhere, raids provide multiple dilemma for enemy forces
and significant disruption. With their inherent mobility and speed coupled with
intensive firepower, the cavalry squadron is ideally suited to conduct raids. For this
type of mission, cavalry is usually supported by combat aviation. It is possible that
tanks and APCs will also perform raids.
Raids require significant planning and should be conducted over as short a
distance as possible, and in circumstances where there is sufficient knowledge of
the enemy. The raid requires detailed preparation, including rehearsals, and the
flawless synchronisation of all forces is essential. Failure could entail the
destruction in detail of the raiding force. A lightly equipped raiding force, operating
at long distances from its home base with limited support, is not capable of a
sustained engagement with conventional manoeuvre forces. The inclusion of
armour in a raiding force will increase its ability to withstand engagements.
Reconnaissance in force
The less that is known about the threat, the stronger the force conducting the
reconnaissance in force must be. Because of the lack of threat information, a
commander normally conducts a reconnaissance in force as an advance to
contact, or as a series of attacks across a broad frontage. Armoured and mounted
infantry combined arms teams together with ARHs are ideal for this purpose.
Cavalry may either support the ground units conducting the reconnaissance in
force or may operate independently by conducting fighting patrols. Tanks will be
central to the reconnaissance in force and will provide much of the firepower.
Search
Search techniques are generally based on two levels. The first level involves an
area search of any type of terrain by dismounted and mounted patrols and by
airmobile forces as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. This form of
search would normally be conducted by cavalry, either with or without support
from other arms. However, a combined arms grouping with aviation would be most
appropriate. The second, and lowest level of search, is undertaken by foot patrols.
Light infantry are best suited for patrol searches and the size of the force will be
tailored to suit the task and the threat.
Support by fire
SBF is generally provided by cavalry in order to free tanks for the assault force.
The SBF force may have to fight through some opposition to gain the most
advantageous position to support the main effort and cavalry is able to do that.
Sweep
The forces used in a sweep can be cavalry, mounted infantry or ARHs depending
on the terrain, threat and requirements for speed. The risk of ambush is high in this
situation. Security would normally be achieved by cavalry and aviation working in
cooperation, each clearing the next bound for the other.
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Chapter 5
Introduction
Military activities undertaken when the initiative lies with the enemy are essentially
defensive in nature. Defensive activities range from those designed to retain
terrain with the intention of engaging in battle under favourable circumstances, to
those that provide a safe environment for civilian populations receiving HA. Land
force defensive activities consist of two types of tactical actions:
• Defence. Defensive actions include the tactical tasks of:
• area defence
• mobile defence.
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Area defence
Area defence involves the planned occupation of ground of the commander’s own
choosing. Generally, there are two specific aims, the first is to draw or channel the
enemy into selected engagement areas (EAs) to destroy them by firepower, and
the second is to resume offensive activities as soon as possible.
Armour in all forms will be heavily committed to the covering force battle as well
as being tasked in the main defensive position. The critical task for armour, in area
defence, is countering the enemy’s actions and providing high volumes of
accurate direct fire into EAs from battle positions.
Siting options in defence
The timing of the commitment of armour remains crucial during the defensive
battle. Prior to deploying armour to its battle positions, it is usually best held in
depth in hide locations. However, there are some occasions when it may be
located on the position.
Siting in hide locations. Siting in hide locations conceals vehicles from both
direct and indirect fire, and enables deception. It usually means that the AFVs will
not contribute to the available firepower in the main position, although the hide
may be sited on a likely enemy approach. Hides may, however, be sited with
nearby planned battle positions to block likely infiltration or penetration routes. If
allocated under command of dug-in infantry, armour is sited as close as possible
to the supported element. They then provide a firm base to the rear of the
defending force through which withdrawal may take place, or a counterattack may
be launched.
Siting within defensive areas. Siting within the defensive perimeter adds
considerable firepower, but means that AFVs may not be moved as easily if they
are deployed separately, particularly at night. Armour is capable of providing a
heavy volume of direct fire that can be concentrated to the flank of an enemy
assault. Such firepower could break up or disrupt an assault. Movement between
fire positions, which is the normal drill after an engagement, may not be possible
due to the siting of weapon pits. Additionally, consideration must be given to the
siting of weapons pits or personnel in front of armoured vehicles dependent on the
types of ammunition to be used. An example being the armour-piercing
fin-stabilised discarding sabot which, when fired, produces a large amount of spall
from the muzzle out to approximately 300 m, which can be lethal to unprotected
personnel. The security of the position may be jeopardised by normal vehicle
noises, and the requirement for servicing and replenishment.
The reserve
It is crucial to maintain a reserve in defence which is separate to the
counterpenetration and counterattack force. Tanks and infantry mounted in APCs
would usually contribute to the make-up of the force not committed to defending a
particular area or task. It is the only ground force which, supplemented with OS,
can manoeuvre freely offensively to exploit enemy weaknesses but also assault
to regain the initiative.
Cavalry may also be used to constitute the reserve, but are limited in their ability
to hold ground and are unable to fight on equal terms with enemy tanks.
Tanks in area defence
Tanks are best employed in tasks requiring manoeuvre. The best use of tanks in
area defence is in the covering force, and then in counterpenetration and
counterattack tasks. This does not prevent them from being used on the defensive
position.
In area defence, each tank requires primary, secondary and alternate positions to
occupy at each battle position, and room to manoeuvre in between. Accordingly,
tank commanders at all levels must be involved in the initial defensive plan.
The tank offers the following advantages over APC-mounted anti-armour teams
when firing from battle positions:
• it is less vulnerable to neutralisation and can continue to engage under
enemy artillery fire
• it is able to fire through any fleeting gaps in the obscuration provided by the
enemy’s barrage
• it has a large and varied load of ammunition
• it can be redeployed quickly to threatened areas of the battlefield and can
fight on the move
• it is able to switch targets quickly and has a high rate of fire
• it is not restricted by vegetation
• it requires less time to acquire and engage targets.
Command arrangements need to consider the ability of the tank commander to
respond to changing circumstances and to pursue fleeting opportunities. The
options for deploying tanks are to remain under command of the BG HQ with a
series of tasks allocated throughout the area or to be under direct command of a
CT. Allocating tanks piecemeal to CTs will reduce the flexibility of both the tank
commander and the BG commander to concentrate fire. Tanks should not be
allocated in a single platform and as a minimum should operate in a section (two
tanks).
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Mobile defence
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holding force. If time permits, tanks allocated to the holding force must prepare
battle positions and rehearse counterpenetration and counterattack plans.
Armoured personnel carriers in mobile defence
APC-mounted infantry will likely form the blocking force, or support tanks in the
attack force. The tactics used by the infantry and their supporting APCs are similar
to those in area defence. A heavy emphasis would be placed on the infantry
battalion integral anti-armour weapons to destroy enemy armour.
Cavalry in mobile defence
The cavalry must conduct a genuine counter-reconnaissance task and
simultaneously ensure that the enemy is deceived into taking the correct routes,
without the cavalry being decisively engaged by the enemy. If the covering force
becomes decisively engaged, the entire mobile defence is at risk.
The cavalry provides information on enemy movements and, if possible, should be
grouped and tasked to channel the enemy’s lead elements into designated EAs.
If the covering force has a screening task it should be based on a cavalry unit. It
may require some augmentation with tanks and APC-mounted infantry to control
the enemy’s arrival in the EAs.
In the subsequent stages, cavalry is essential to provide flank and rear protection
for the holding force and the attack force. They may also be required to reconnoitre
the routes for the attack force. The cavalry must be given time to regroup and
reorganise in order to make and maintain contact with the enemy, enabling the
attack force to break clean and retire to the next position.
Command and control
A clear statement of intent, a simple plan and the selection of terrain are essential
in avoiding regrouping in the fast, high-risk climate of mobile defence.
For mobile defence, control measures are designed to enhance the rapid
movement of forces and the execution of tasks. The control measures with respect
to each of the deployment groups include:
• EAs
• break-clean lines
• attack objectives
• hides and assembly areas
• phase lines
• ABFs
• SBFs.
Armour combat service support in mobile defence
Mobile defence places greater than normal pressures on the administrative
system because of the uncertainties concerning administrative requirements,
Delay
The intent of a delay is to trade space for time while preserving the delaying force.
It is conducted in contact with the advancing enemy, but decisive engagement is
to be avoided. In the delay, the destruction of the enemy force is secondary to
slowing their advance. The delay is normally a series of defensive activities over
successive positions in depth, which trade space for time while retaining freedom
of action.
The delay may be conducted by armoured forces under the following
circumstances:
• during reconnaissance after making contact with a large attacking force
• during a guard task for a moving or stationary force
• as an economy-of-force for a larger force when inadequate fighting power
is available for a defence.
Delay is a task frequently assigned to cavalry who are practiced in maintaining
contact, avoiding decisive engagement and providing an unbroken flow of
information. A BG may participate in a delay as part of a larger force, or cavalry
may be tasked to conduct the delay while a formation prepares for defence or
mobile defence.
The higher commander can direct a delay as part of their intent. As such, the delay
may proceed despite apparent success achieved against the enemy and the
natural desire to retain terrain. The cavalry will normally require reinforcement by
tanks, engineers and artillery to perform a delay.
An armoured BG may conduct delaying activities during the conduct of covering
force or in an economy-of-force role for a force or formation. It is possible that
some CTs may delay while others perform missions such as ambushes.
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Types of delay
There are two basic types of delay that differ in the intent of the assigning
commander and the degree of decisive engagement that may be required, they
are:
• delay in sector
• delay forward of a specified line for a specified time or event.
Delay in sector. A delay in sector mission requires the BG to slow and defeat as
much of the enemy as possible without sacrificing tactical integrity. This mission,
when assigned to armoured forces, enables maximum freedom of manoeuvre to
the force.
Delay forward of a specified line. A delay forward of a specified line for a
specified time or event entails significantly more risk. The BG is required to
prevent enemy forces from reaching the specified area or penetrating a specified
line earlier than the specified time or event, regardless of the cost. Decisive
engagement may be required.
The delay planning is similar to that of a defence in sector and is characterised by
requirements that make this mission extremely demanding. The armoured forces
must repeatedly fight the enemy, disengage a part of the force, conduct an internal
battle handover, and move rapidly to reposition and resume the fight. The
commander must perform multiple tasks in a fast-paced environment while being
engaged by direct and indirect fire, which places a premium on decentralised
execution.
Mobility
The aim of armour in delay is to maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy to
accomplish the frequent repositioning required. Mobility advantage is a tactical
mobility that is greater than the enemy. The larger this advantage becomes, the
greater the chance for success and the ability to dictate terms of the battle to the
enemy. Mobility advantage is achieved by enhancing the mobility of the CT and
degrading the mobility of the enemy. Knowledge of the terrain, preparation of
positions, reconnaissance of routes, rehearsals and improving existing routes, all
contribute to increased mobility.
Methods of delay
The method of executing the delay is determined by the nature of the terrain, the
threat and the degree of delay required. The following are the two methods:
• delay from successive positions or phase lines
• delay from alternate positions or phase lines.
Delay from successive positions or phase lines is normally employed when
squadrons are committed on a wide front. All subordinate troops are committed on
each of the delay battle positions or across the sector on the same phase line. The
delay from one phase line to the next is dictated by the mission and is normally
staggered. This technique has the advantage of concentrating fire, but the
disadvantage of providing limited depth.
When operating on a narrower front, commanders may elect to delay from
alternate positions or phase lines. When using this technique, the BG or squadron
is divided into two elements. The first element occupies the initial battle position or
phase line and engages the enemy. The second element occupies and improves
the second delay position or phase line. This technique enables considerable
depth, but requires continuous coordination.
Tanks in delay
The use of tanks in the delay simplifies the task as they are capable of holding
ground on suitable terrain. Tanks may be augmented by infantry mounted in
APCs. When tanks are used to conduct the delay, the flank and security tasks
must be allocated to a separate force to avoid weakening the fighting power of the
main defensive position.
Armoured personnel carriers in delay
APCs employed in a delay would, with the infantry they support, engage the
enemy and withdraw through a firm base. They will often be grouped with tanks,
but if not will need more terrain to trade for time than a tank-heavy force. A heavy
emphasis would be placed on the infantry battalion’s integral anti-armour weapons
to destroy enemy armour.
Cavalry in delay
Delay is a common task assigned to cavalry. Cavalry will usually have a significant
mobility advantage in most terrain. Cavalry must avoid being decisively engaged
and will therefore need more terrain to trade for time than a tank-heavy force.
Cavalry, ARHs and appropriate combat support are an effective delay force.
Combat support and combat service support in delay
The ACR BG conducting delay should include tanks, cavalry, and infantry
mounted in APCs, augmented by engineers, aviation, electronic warfare, and OS
in its grouping. The CSS team must be structured to support assigned assets.
The fluid nature of the delay requires combat support units to monitor the situation
closely and remain mobile. CSS assets and CPs must also remain mobile.
Passage of lines through a force to the rear may begin early for CSS and should
be staggered throughout the battle. AFVs must not mass at passage points late in
the battle as this provides the enemy with a lucrative target. This may lead to a
breakdown in C2 at a critical point of the delay.
Withdrawal
The intent of a withdrawal is to disengage the withdrawing force to free them for
other activities. It normally starts with the withdrawing unit in contact but contact is
broken as quickly as possible. If it is the result of a local defeat it is likely to be
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Tactical techniques
• counterattack
• counterpenetration
• defend a battle position
• defend a strong point
• defend in sector
• reserved demolition
• route security
• spoiling attack.
Battle handover
The purpose of the battle handover is to ensure a smooth handover of
responsibility to another force at the battle handover line. As such, they are
considered control measures to armoured forces.
Breakout from encirclement
There are two types of breakout:
• the deliberate breakout
• the breakout by stealth.
Deliberate breakout. The encircled force should be organised as for an advance.
Guards may be required to undertake shaping tasks such as diversionary attacks
or feints. Tanks, APCs and cavalry can conduct a deliberate breakout, however
tanks will generate greater firepower and be better able to resist enemy fire. If
tanks, APCs and cavalry are in an encircled force, the cavalry is best used to find
the weakest point in the encirclement, the tanks with APCs supporting are best
used in the breakout, and the cavalry can hold open the sides of the penetration
while the remainder of the force escapes.
Breakout by stealth. Cavalry forces may choose to breakout by stealth but this
technique involves great risk.
Convoy escort
Road convoys require protection in tactical situations. The purpose of a convoy
escort is to act as a security force which is task-organised to provide support to a
convoy. It is likely to be a combined arms team and include forces such as cavalry,
tanks, infantry mounted in APCs and aviation. High priority moves will most
certainly warrant the use of armour to provide early warning, enhance firepower
and enhance quick reaction forces.
The composition of a convoy escort will be based on the nature of the threat, but
APCs or CRVs are ideally suited for this role because of their speed and
manoeuvrability. A convoy escort task requires the following groupings:
• forward security
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Route security
Protection of lines of communication and the friendly forces moving along them
should be provided by a combination of techniques including: fixed strong points,
patrolling, route reconnaissance, the establishment of vulnerable point checks and
VCPs, cordon security, convoy protection, and convoy escorts. Armour,
particularly CRVs and APCs, can play a key role in most of these techniques. A
combination of CRVs, tanks, APCs and ARHs should be the preferred method of
convoy escort in high-threat environments due to the speed and flexibility of this
combination.
Spoiling attack
Armour, supported by APC-mounted infantry, aviation and OS, is preferred for
spoiling attacks if space and terrain will allow.
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Chapter 6
Introduction
Stability activities are conducted to create and maintain stable conditions and are
designed to maintain or establish a secure environment thus creating the
conditions for the provision of essential government services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief. Stability activities may or
may not involve the use or threat of force. Tasks range from HA, to training
indigenous forces and the transition to a satisfactory endstate after major combat.
Conducted throughout all campaigns, in conjunction with offensive and defensive
activities, they may be the main effort to achieve a campaign objective.
Stability activities are usually conducted in complex physical terrain, with mixed
populations and within a complex information environment. They are manpower
and time intensive and incidents at the tactical level can have significant
higher-level consequences.
This chapter describes the role of armour in stability activities.
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Control
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Internment and detention. The ADF may be required to assist law enforcement
agencies with internment and detention tasks. This is a generic term that
encompasses all persons, other than ADF members, captured or otherwise taken
into custody by a deployed force. All such persons in the custody of the ADF are
referred to as captured persons until they have been classified. Internment and
detention control tactical tasks comprise all actions which ensure the safe and
secure movement, and the humane treatment of captured persons from the point
of capture through to exploitation and classification, to internment or detention,
and ultimately release or repatriation. Armour can be used for all these duties,
however this would most likely be in support of law enforcement agencies.
Key point protection. Important buildings and installations may be targeted for
hostile action because they are vital to the functioning of the government or
economy, or because their damage or disruption is likely to be politically
embarrassing. Additionally, key points and vital assets may include buildings or
areas of cultural and religious significance. Armour may be tasked with key point
protection and vital asset protection. This includes the requirement for security at
the key point and all actions that are associated with its protection: routes in and
out; movement of persons and vehicles to, through and from it; and the checking
of all transits through it.
Population protection. Control involves the protection of civilians and general
populations from conflict apart from the other control measures as described in
this section. These measures include activity to provide immediate security to
threatened populations in order to control residence, identity, movement,
assembly and the distribution of commodities, therefore setting the conditions for
the re-establishment of law and order and the rule of law. Armour supports
population protection by ensuring that the secure environment exists in which
other agencies can operate.
Refugee and internally displaced persons movement. The purpose of refugee
and internally displaced persons movement control is to provide military
assistance to specialist agencies for the movement and protection of refugees.
Refugee protection and security can mean the requirement for designated safe
areas and camps as a temporary measure. CRVs and APCs can transport
refugees and internally displaced persons if necessary and can act as guides for
non-government organisations.
Separation of hostile forces. Military forces conduct separation of hostile forces
tasks to support the administration, monitoring and enforcement of agreed
ceasefire lines. Armour can only assist with marking separation lines and ensuring
that the separated forces remain within their own areas.
Supervision of ceasefire. Military forces may be deployed to supervise any
commitments agreed to by the parties as part of a truce, ceasefire or other peace
plan. The purpose of ceasefire supervision is to prevent further conflict, through a
suitable structure and organisation. AFVs are able to supervise ceasefires directly
through patrolling.
Reform
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effective and capable military and security force that has a culture grounded in
national laws. Armour would normally only transport selection teams to
inaccessible places.
Training, mentoring and the transfer of responsibility. Following the vetting
process, Army training teams can facilitate the selection, recruitment and
subsequent training of indigenous forces as part of the disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration program. Armour is unlikely to contribute to this
action, however armoured crewmen can be employed in this role.
Restore
stretchers and medical staff, the vehicles would assist medical staff with accessing
remote areas and transporting critical cases to medical facilities.
Restoration of essential public utilities. Military forces help to re-establish
essential public utilities in order to improve the standard of living for the affected
community. Armoured support vehicles may be able to provide a lift capability to
install key equipment in difficult locations.
Restoration of essential public services. Essential public services are those
institutions that support the continued survival of the community. They depend on
the availability of trained staff and specialist equipment, but do not necessarily
require specialist infrastructure. They include such things as police, fire and
rescue, waste management, and education. Armour can do little to assist other
than for CRVs or APCs to transport vital stores when road and rail infrastructure
may be compromised, or to provide unskilled labour.
Restoration of essential facilities and infrastructure. Military forces help to
restore essential facilities and national infrastructure in order to enable restoration
efforts to reach all corners of the affected area, provide for economic recovery, and
provide freedom of movement to the population. Armour can do little to assist other
than for CRVs or APCs to transport vital stores when road and rail infrastructure
may be compromised, or to provide unskilled labour.
Restoration of post-conflict special services. The purpose of providing
post-conflict special services is to remove the direct and immediately damaging
residual effects of the conflict. Post-conflict special services are those functions
unique to post-conflict or confrontation periods that facilitate the restoration
process; for example, clearing unexploded ordnance and booby traps. Armour can
do little to assist other than for CRVs or APCs to transport key personnel when
roads may be compromised, or to provide unskilled labour.
Restoration of intellectual and institutional infrastructure. Military forces and
supporting agencies help to restore intellectual and institutional infrastructure in
order to enable the development of independence and cultural development in
accordance with nation-building and political objectives. Restore tasks involve
significant interagency work and cooperation. Armour will generally provide the
secure environment in which the restoration can take place or supply unskilled
labour to assist other agencies with the restoration.
Assist
Assist aims to preserve the rule of law, enable the conduct of elections, and
provide HA and environmental assistance (in the form of selected services).
Examples of assist conducted abroad include Australian assistance to elections in
Cambodia, and HA to Somalia which involved armour providing route security,
convoy escorts, armoured transportation, establishment of security points and
checkpoints, and patrolling.
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Tactical techniques
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Chapter 7
Introduction
Enabling activities are never conducted in isolation. Their purpose is to link and
create the conditions for the conduct of offensive, defensive and stability actions,
ensuring continuity and maintaining tempo. They do not have any associated
specific tactical actions.
Enabling activities are as follows:
• link-up
• march
• obstacle crossing and breaching
• passage of lines
• relief in place
• patrol
• reconnaissance
• surveillance.
Enabling activities may be conducted as missions in their own right. For example,
a march followed by an obstacle crossing may be required before a force arrives
at the start point for a reconnaissance patrol. This chapter describes armour in
enabling activities.
Enabling activities include those intended to make or break contact with the threat,
and those that can be conducted out of contact. Enabling activities may be
conducted as missions in their own right.
Link-up
Armour support could be in the form of information on the location of the two forces
to be linked, in the application of firepower to destroy any threat between the
linking forces or in the provision of flank security during the link-up. Detailed
planning considerations for a link-up are contained in LWD 3-0-3, Formation
Tactics.
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March
Armoured and mounted-infantry BGs must often travel long distances in order to
position themselves to perform their next task. The primary consideration of the
march is rapid movement, but security is required even when contact with enemy
ground forces is not expected. The primary consideration is the rapid but secure
movement of units. Cavalry will provide the screen, route clearance and security
functions it provides for any other tactical activity.
Obstacle crossing and breaching
A crossing or breaching action can be either hasty or deliberate as follows:
• Hasty. Hasty crossings are executed from the line of march. Armour’s
characteristics are ideal for hasty crossings.
• Deliberate. A deliberate crossing is conducted when a hasty crossing fails
or is inappropriate. Armour may be employed for deliberate crossings in
much the same manner as hasty crossings.
The crossing or breaching action will be either quiet or noisy as follows:
• Quiet. Armour is not generally suited to quiet breaching or crossing
activities because of its associated noise and dust. However, it can be
employed in a deception plan or on prearranged tasks once the breach
becomes noisy. Direct fire support and mechanical breaching, once the
breach becomes noisy, are examples of prearranged tasks.
• Noisy. Armour can provide the breaching force, and elements to reconnoitre
the obstacle and to provide direct fire support and far bank security and
disruption; after finding alternate crossing points which may not be suitable
for the main FEs.
To undertake breaching, armoured forces should be grouped with appropriate
specialist equipment. Breaching activities conducted without specialist equipment
increases operational risk and therefore, armour is reliant on external mobility
support.
In order to retain the initiative and regain momentum once across, it is preferable
to avoid using the only armour available to breach or cross obstacles.
Armour can contribute significantly to a breach or crossing activities. Cavalry can
reconnoitre the obstacle in detail and participate in or provide a deception plan.
Tanks provide large calibre accurate fire in either an SBF or ABF role as well as
the best means of exploiting the breach. APCs can lift those engineers or infantry
required and then provide intimate protection and fire support.
Passage of lines
Passage of lines for armour is an SOP activity, at unit or BG level, as such
activities happen routinely in the course of an advance or during a phased attack.
Conduct. Extensive use of LOs and designated routes enable armour to quickly
conduct the passage of lines. The following two forces conduct the passage of
lines:
• The in-place force. Armour in the in-place force can support an in-transit
force primarily by SBF and advice on suitable vehicle routes. Armoured
elements, with their integral communications and mobility, can assist with
route selection and traffic control. Tanks may provide effective fire support
as the in-transit force leaves the friendly forward edge of the battle area.
The in-place joint force commander assumes control over the in-transit
force while it is within their boundary. The higher formation HQ must
indicate a clear time or point of relinquishment of this control, which
normally includes support.
• The in-transit force. In the case of an advance, cavalry elements usually
precede the main body of the in-transit force. Armour’s mobility will enable
an expedient passage if sufficient planning and liaison has occurred.
Armour, in this force, should expect to be guided through the in-place force
and to be provided with fire support as it breaks out of the friendly forward
edge of the battle area. Space needs to be allocated for the lead elements
to regroup before breaking out. Combat aviation and other OS reinforce
this.
Armour in the in-transit force should be fully administered prior to deployment and,
preferably, prior to entering the TAOR of the in-place force. The in-transit force
normally has its echelon move with it. If there is a suitable armoured echelon in
the in-place force, armour in the in-transit force may take further or final
replenishment in-transit or just prior to the transit. This requires careful planning,
particularly if it is to be conducted at night.
Relief in place
Armour uses relief in place to relieve surveillance teams or patrols on extended
missions, or to withdraw forces that have been in contact in order to rest and
restore them. Strict control measures are required to avoid fratricide and prevent
the adversary from learning the nature of the action and seeking to disrupt it during
a time of vulnerability.
Patrol
Patrolling is a core business of armoured units in the provision of security and
protection, and in the gathering of information through reconnaissance or
surveillance. Armoured security forces can advise other forces on issues such as
terrain, weather, surface conditions, going, routes, obstacles, infrastructure, flora
and fauna, and communities and people likely to be encountered.
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance patrols are a primary cavalry task. Cavalry forces frequently
undertake reconnaissance missions in their own right or in cooperation with other
forces such as combat aviation, SF or regional force surveillance units.
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Chapter 8
Introduction
An AFV without fuel or ammunition is a soft target and leaves the supported force
with a capability deficiency. The mission of armoured CSS is to sustain the fighting
power of armour on a continuous basis as far forward as possible.
Armour consumes combat supplies at higher rates than most other elements of
the land force. One measure of effectiveness of CSS is that it is capable of
generating sufficient fighting power at the decisive time and place on a continuous
basis. The armoured CSS system must enable the generation of fighting power
and enable the freedom to manoeuvre.
Armoured CSS involved in high tempo large-scale actions, will need large
quantities of POL and ammunition. All resupply and services must be planned to
support armour in the face of a non-linear battlespace, a hostile air threat, rapid
transition from one activity to another and extended lines of support.
In grouping for battle, the support systems for a variety of platforms and vehicles
(ground and air) must be streamlined and made available as soon as needed while
being capable of redeploying themselves. This chapter describes the provision of
CSS to armour and within armoured units.
Organisation
Like most other arms and services, armour uses an echelon system to describe
its fighting and CSS elements. The echelon classification used by armoured units
is as follows:
• F echelon. F echelon consists of the personnel, vehicles and equipment
required to fight the battle.
• A echelon. A echelon consists of the personnel, vehicles and equipment
which must be readily available to replenish the F echelon at any time. In
armoured units, A echelon is split into:
• A1 echelon. A1 echelon provides the immediate battlefield
administrative support to the F echelon at CT level. The A1 echelon
is the squadron commander’s CSS asset and includes, but is not
limited to, combat supplies, repair and recovery, and medical aid and
evacuation teams. The A1 echelon moves immediately behind the
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Functions
effort and the high demand for fuel, and is likely to be a daily requirement.
Armoured units should take every opportunity to replenish combat supplies as this
enables flexibility.
The replenishment system within armour is divided into the following two
compartments:
• Combat supplies. Combat supplies of Class 1, Class 3 and Class 5 are
normally supplied automatically in the daily maintenance cycle covering
consumption periods of 24 hours. Combat supplies held in A1 echelon are
available on an ‘as required’ basis to armoured troops. A2 echelon will
provide other stocks of urgent items such as ammunition.
• Other classes of supply. Supply items of Class 2, Class 8 and Class 9 are
demand items, of which only limited stocks are held in the A1 echelon area
and would normally be brought forward by the A2 echelon. Class 4, Class
6 and Class 7 will need to be requested through the A2 echelon as they are
not held within the A1 echelon. Depending on the urgency of demand, they
will be provided during the daily maintenance cycle or brought forward
immediately if transport is available and clearances are arranged.
When grouped for battle, squadrons will be detached from their parent regiment
for an extended period and will bring their A1 echelons with them. Except when
specifically detailed otherwise in orders, the supported BG becomes responsible
for all the administration of its attached armour, and should seek the advice of the
squadron 2IC as to the requirements and possible synergies.
It will usually be necessary for the parent regiment A2 echelon to supplement the
A1 echelon, including additional technical support to the receiving BG. The
squadron A1 echelon then works with the administrative system of the BG or
formation it is supporting. The A1 echelon should have an element, including
personnel and logistics representatives, located with the supported BG
A2 echelon. However, as the A1 echelon remains under the command of the
squadron commander this is not always possible.
Replenishment methods. Armoured vehicles may be replenished using a
number of methods which are determined largely by the likelihood of enemy
contact. Replenishment can be conducted as follows:
• in harbours, leaguers or individual troop hides
• curbside
• in a rendezvous established by the A1 echelon or A2 echelon
• air delivered; or
• in certain situations, immediate battlefield replenishment may take place
well forward, even in individual AFV battle positions.
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Maintenance
Maintenance support to armoured elements is integrated at the squadron level
and maintained in the field within the A1 echelon. Servicing is the key to armoured
maintenance support. Adequate time for daily, weekly and other servicing must be
factored into all plans; approximately 24 hours every 72 hours. Commanders must
balance the risks of missing servicing with any temporary advantage gained in
tempo.
Transport
Armour relies heavily on support from second-line transport, particularly for the
provision of bulk fuel and ammunition.
Engineering sustainability
There are no specific CSS tasks for engineer sustainability support to armour.
Armour does benefit from any engineer improvements to roads, water supplies,
obstacle crossings and defensive locations.
Combat health
Armoured units have an integral tracked or wheeled ambulance variant at
squadron level.
Personnel support
There are no unique implications for armour.
Application
Lines of support
Lines of support describe from where the type of CSS support has been provided
and the command authority. The four lines of support for armoured units are as
follows:
• First line. First-line support pertains to resources and activities under the
control of a BG commander to provide CSS to that BG. The support
available to an armoured BG is found in the A echelon and B echelon.
A echelon is divided into the A1 and A2 as discussed previously.
• Second line. Armour requires substantial second-line support, including
transport to move significant quantities of fuel and ammunition, and
extensive holdings of repair parts stores.
• Third line. The range and depth of third-line support will be tailored
according to the mission.
• Fourth line. National support base logistic organisations or contractors
outside the theatre provide fourth-line support. In many cases for armour, it
will be in the form of contracted specialist civilian mechanical support.
Host nation support. Support from the HN will be extremely valuable during
coalition operations. Therefore, the coalition command must analyse the physical
infrastructure in the HN. This analysis should reveal what facilities and services
are available to support the command and how they can reduce the logistic
footprint. The coalition may establish a coalition contracting centre to facilitate
coalition procurement of scarce resources. However, the very involvement of
coalition forces often means that local resources will require supplementation.
Contractor logistic support. Contractor logistic support is the use of pre-planned
and opportunistic civilian contracting to perform selected logistic support services.
Care must be taken to balance the convenience of holding contractors forward
with the resource burden of providing protection and the legal and moral obligation
to keep civilians out of combat areas. In a coalition, contractor logistic support is a
national responsibility. However, nations should share vendor information,
lessons learned, and contacts with the coalition command and other nations.
At troop level, CSS is the role of the troop leader and troop sergeant. At squadron
level the 2IC has a staff responsibility and works with the squadron commander,
the A1 echelon commander and others to deliver CSS. At regimental level the S4
logistics staff officer has the responsibility and works with the CO, OPSO, S4
technical, OC support squadron and others to deliver CSS outcomes.
The HQ of the BG A2 echelon monitors progress, forecasts sub-unit requirements
for combat supplies and attempts to anticipate the more urgent requests. This
involves selecting rendezvous (which are normally suggested by sub-units),
routes, communication arrangements, and the issue of resupply orders and
information to sub-units.
Vehicles from the A2 echelon normally collect supplies from distribution points.
These supplies are held as either commodity loads or composite loads until they
are dispatched forward to sub-units. Empty or partially depleted vehicles returning
from sub-units may be refilled from supplies held in the A2 echelon, replaced by
full vehicles or sent directly to the distribution point. When dispersed, such as
when acting as a screen, combat supplies and stores may be delivered directly to
the F echelon.
Within the F echelon, troop requirements of all supply items are collated by
sub-unit HQ. For urgent supply needs this information is usually passed by radio.
Demands for non-urgent items are normally made in writing and passed back by
hand or data transmission. There is no fixed rule for the system of replenishment.
The aim is to provide a flexible system capable of providing what is needed in the
quickest and most economical and effective way. Second-line or air transport may
deliver directly to A echelons or even to forward troops.
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Chapter 9
Introduction
Tropical
Impact on capability
The following are the impacts on armour:
• Limited observation. The degree of visibility is dependent on terrain and the
time of year, with visibility being reduced to as little as 5 to 10 m. This may
make it difficult to identify friend from foe or detect the enemy. This may also
degrade situational awareness. Armoured vehicles equipped with TI sights
are able to overcome some but not all of these observation limitations.
Crews in closed down vehicles have their observation further restricted.
• Concealment. It is difficult to locate the enemy in close country and to
estimate strengths, deployments, and intentions. However, armour is easily
concealed for ambushes or reconnaissance tasks. The potential for shock
and destruction generated from armoured vehicles ambushing at close
range is good.
• Suppressing fire. The combination of trees, broken ground and natural
features will generally result in restricted fields of fire. Mutual support may
be difficult to achieve. AFVs can generate high volumes of suppressing fire.
Tank gunfire and heavy machine gunfire has a devastating effect in this
environment, as it will easily penetrate most trees and foliage.
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• Restricted space. Close country consisting of mature trees and thick jungle
will limit the movement of vehicles and restrict the employment of support
weapons. Where vehicle movement is possible it may be forced to operate
in narrow manoeuvre corridors, making it vulnerable to ambush if operating
without combined arms support.
• Rainfall. High rainfall that typifies this environment may reduce the ability to
manoeuvre armoured vehicles. However, Centurion tanks weighing more
than 50 t were able to operate effectively all year round in Vietnam 40 years
ago. Tracked vehicles will manoeuvre more freely than wheeled vehicles,
but may degrade the roads leaving them impassable to wheeled vehicles
and even cause problems to dismounted troops.
• Night activities. All environmental impacts are increased at night. Effective
movement off tracks by armour at night is almost impossible to achieve.
This limits the effectiveness of patrols and renders night movement
hazardous and prone to ambush, and also to vehicles becoming bogged.
Under thick canopy, ambient light is almost reduced to zero, making
image-intensifying devices ineffective but does not impact on TI or
unattended ground sensors. Night activities should be planned carefully
and should focus on ambushing and reconnaissance which usually allows
deployment at last light.
• Signature. Close country is an aid to reducing an AFV’s signature, with less
dust and noise. At night, noise from an AFV travels further but is harder to
accurately locate.
• Value of the tank. In close country, tactical opportunities are fleeting and
engagement occurs initially at close range. In the tropical environment, the
more firepower a small element can bring to bear on the enemy the greater
the likelihood of fixing or destroying that enemy will be. The tank, with its
protection and firepower is a particularly useful system; it is capable of
rapid, accurate direct fire and has excellent ballistic protection.
• Reduced tempo. The close vegetation and terrain features slow vehicle
movement. Planning and the smart use of vehicles helps mitigate this, as
does working closely with combat aviation. In the dry season armour can
maintain a high tempo, but during the wet season the tactical advantage will
come from surprise and firepower rather than speed and mobility.
• Vehicle servicing. Vehicle servicing in tropical environments is made
difficult by the rainfall and the lack of hardstanding. Periodic servicing
should be increased to ensure vehicle reliability in combat. Sufficient
hardstanding must be located and available.
Planning factors
The following factors need to be emphasised when planning for missions in
tropical terrain:
• the effects of adverse weather and particularly the effects of monsoonal
conditions
• possible reduced tempo
• degraded vehicle performance due to slopes and vegetation
• difficulty of combat identification
• reduced sensor footprint and effectiveness due to vegetation and weather
• reduced air support due to reduced aircraft performance, dense canopy and
poor weather conditions
• potential for ambush or canalisation
• need for combined arms support, particularly infantry and engineers
• possible lower vehicle serviceability rates and a changed maintenance
regimen necessary to ensure vehicle availability
• the requirement for combined arms team synchronisation and training
• the requirement for acclimatisation and in-theatre training.
Desert
Impact on capability
Significant factors that impact on the capability of armour in desert environments
include:
• Heat. The extreme heat has a particularly debilitating effect on AFV crews.
Operating temperatures in AFVs may exceed the outside temperature.
When combined with the noise and stress of the operation, crew endurance
can be dramatically reduced.
• Cold. Cold night temperatures are also a factor of desert operations. See
the section in this chapter on cold conditions for its implications.
• Signature. Dust and tracks are easily visible, particularly from the air, and
the thermal signature is more distinct, particularly at night. The vehicle
signature in the desert means extensive deception is required.
• Wind, dust and sandstorms. Desert environments may experience winds of
up to hurricane force. Suspended dust and sand can make movement and
maintenance difficult, and can severely restrict visibility. Wind aggravates
this problem. While satellite navigation systems and TI will usually work
through dust, other optical systems do not and exposed communications
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Cold conditions
Impact on capability
Significant factors that impact on the capability of armour in cold weather
environments include:
• Low temperatures, wind, ice and snow can impact the use of vehicles,
serviceability rates, maintenance practices, ground support and personnel
capability. Additional time is required to complete all tasks.
• Poor visibility and strong winds may prohibit flying, and contingency plans
are required for the event that combat aviation is not available.
• Operating in snow can be difficult due to glare, a reduced or no horizon, and
a limited or no depth perception. Additionally, glare can also reduce the
effectiveness of optical sensor systems.
• Preheating of key vehicle components may be required in temperatures
below 0 °C.
• During cold weather, vehicles develop increased static electricity. High
levels of static electricity increase the level of risk during refuelling and
re-arming. Additionally, static electricity can adversely affect electrical
systems and sensor performance.
• A thick layer of snow alters the appearance of the landscape terrain, making
features more difficult to locate or interpret and navigation more difficult.
Planning factors
The additional planning considerations for using armour in cold weather include:
• Movement. Wheeled vehicle mobility will be restricted to formed roads.
They will be forced by ice to operate at reduced speeds. Tracked vehicles
have the potential to provide greater mobility over rough terrain and on
formed roads, even when the roads are affected by adverse weather. To
achieve this potential, snow tyres or winter tracks must be fitted to the
vehicle, as appropriate, prior to initial deployment.
• Vehicle running. The impact of extreme cold weather on vehicles depends
on the vehicle type. Manufacturers’ specifications for cold weather
operation must be followed. Vehicle battery life will be reduced and,
therefore, vehicles will need to be run more frequently. Vehicles may have
to be run in order to prevent cooling systems freezing. Vehicle running will
have an impact on signature, increasing both noise and thermal output.
• Maintenance. Repairs and major maintenance should be carried out in
shelters, preferably heated. Forward repair teams should be equipped with
their own shelter and heater, and will require protection while working in the
shelter. Hardstanding required for repairs and maintenance is rarely difficult
to find.
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Urban
Impact on capability
Significant factors that impact on armour in urban environments include:
• limited fields of fire and observation
• manoeuvre and firepower will be limited by the civilian population, as in
most cases the civilian population or elements of it will remain
• difficulty in estimating the strength of the enemy
• many of armour’s more sophisticated and long-range weapons and sensors
cannot be employed to their full capacity and weapon effects may be
attenuated
• reduced possibilities for manoeuvre by armour, but increased possibilities
for infiltration and bypassing by dismounted elements
• close quarter combat increases the vulnerability of AFVs as they remain
within the effective engagement envelope of short-range anti-armour
weapons
• non-linear threats become more likely, including IEDs such as roadside
bombs
• difficulty in resupplying ammunition and other combat supplies.
Planning factors
The additional planning considerations for using armour in urban environments
include:
• Firepower. The use of direct fire support to assist movement must be
maximised in this environment. The collateral damage caused and the
problem of clearing damaged building or areas must be considered, and
depends on the rules of engagement. HE and AP rounds are effective
against enemy hiding behind solid structures.
• Infantry support. All armoured vehicle crews have reduced visibility in urban
environments. This impact means all armour must operate with dedicated
infantry support. Within existing command structures and standard
groupings, infantry need to be assigned to work with individual vehicles.
The vehicles afford the infantry some protection while providing substantial
volumes of direct fire in close proximity to infantry movement.
• Main armament elevation and depression. Commanders must be
conscious when working in the urban environment of the limitations of an
armoured vehicle’s main armament elevation and depression limits at
close-range targets. Equally affected will be the traverse arc of the turret.
• Briefings and rehearsal. For infantry and armour to work effectively in this
environment, detailed briefings on vehicle and weapon effects need to
precede rehearsals. All infantry must practice directing vehicle weapon fire
and movement. Failure to rehearse may result in high friendly casualties.
• Movement. The ability to move is generally very limited. Progress will be
slow due to rubble, narrow streets and limited visibility. Techniques for
clearing a path through or over obstacles should be rehearsed, as some
armoured vehicles may expose their lightly armoured aspects as a result of
crossing or attempting to cross obstacles.
• Coordination of fire. Short-range weapons and grenades will be used
extensively and there may be difficulty in firing weapons with a back blast.
Mutually supporting fire will also be difficult to achieve. The damaging
effects and penetration of targets by the armoured vehicles main armament
requires the careful planning and coordination of fire.
Impact on capability
Effects on armour of operating in a CBRN hazard environment include:
• Restricted operations. Even with functioning vehicle protective systems,
crews will wear protective equipment and keep their respirators close by. If
the vehicle system fails or needs to be breached, crews should be capable
of continuing in a contaminated environment.
• Difficulty in operating the armoured fighting vehicle. Operating AFVs in the
CBRN environment means that function and task is difficult to perform.
Specific consideration should be given to the following:
• radio communications are more difficult as voices and hearing are
restricted
• although respirators are designed to be compatible with sights, vision
will be inhibited.
• Crew fatigue. The expected operational stresses are enhanced by the
physical discomfort and mental stress associated with working in a CBRN
environment.
• Dismounted activity. Activity outside the vehicle in contaminated environs
should be limited. Where possible, troops should be removed to a safe area
to conduct servicing and personnel administration.
• Decontamination. Operational decontamination takes time and
considerable effort.
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Planning factors
The following factors need to be emphasised when planning for missions in a
CBRN environment:
• the threat, type of agent and the extent of the contamination
• the level of training and extent of equipment allocation
• vehicle modifications and personal protective equipment for crews
• the availability of detection and decontamination equipment
• time for the qualification of personnel
• planning and rehearsals for the redeployment of ground elements
• the tempo of operations
• the requirement to continue to provide CSS.
Mountainous areas
Impact on capability
Generally, mountainous terrain forces armoured vehicles to operate along the
valley floor or along ridgelines above it. The steep and often rocky terrain on the
sides of the valley severely limits the movement of wheeled vehicles and is too
restricted for tracked vehicles.
AFVs are generally limited to movement in valleys and existing trail networks at
lower elevations. Even at these levels, the trails may require extensive engineer
work to allow tracked vehicles to pass over them. AFVs can provide SBF if
accessible firing positions are available; however, it will rarely be possible for them
to accompany dismounted infantry in the assault. Low atmospheric pressure
considerably increases the evaporation of water in storage batteries and vehicle
cooling systems, and impairs cylinder breathing. Consequently, vehicles expend
more fuel and lubricant, and engine power is reduced by 4 to 6 per cent for every
1000 m (3300 ft) increase in elevation above sea level. This translates to a fuel
and oil increase of 30 per cent or more.
Planning factors
Some additional planning considerations for using armour in mountainous areas
includes:
• Recovery vehicles must always accompany mounted forces in
mountainous terrain to rapidly remove disabled vehicles from the limited
and narrow trail network.
• Although antitank weapons employed from higher elevations can easily
penetrate the top of armoured vehicles, in many situations the inability to
elevate the weapon system’s main gun sufficiently to return fire may further
increase its vulnerability.
Endmatter
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Illustrations
Tables
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Glossary
The principal source for Australian Defence Force terms and definitions is the
Australian Defence Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms.
Terms and definitions contained within this publication are in accordance with the
business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary at
the time of its release.
administration
The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and
strategy, primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management.
battlegroup
A combined arms grouping based on the headquarters of an aviation, tank,
cavalry or infantry unit.
battlespace
Those geographical, physical and virtual areas; that includes the traditional
domains of land, air and sea, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and
cyberspace, which are of concern to a commander.
capability
The power to achieve a desired operational effect in a nominated environment
within a specified time and to sustain that effect for a designated period.
Note: It is delivered by systems that incorporate people, organisation, doctrine,
collective training, platforms, materiel, facilities, in-service support, and command
and management.
combat supplies
A term applied to ammunition, rations and petroleum, oils and lubricants.
combat team
A combined-arms grouping based upon a manoeuvre sub-unit headquarters.
command
The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
Notes:
1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using
available resources and for planning the employment of, organising,
directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of
assigned personnel.
control
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which
encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.
Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.
desert
Regions of the earth that are characterised by less than 254 millimetres of annual
rainfall and an evaporation rate that exceeds rainfall and have high average daily
temperatures and low humidity.
effect
The adverse physical, physiological, psychological or functional impact on the
enemy as a result, or consequence of, own military or non-military actions.
equipment
All non-expendable items needed to outfit/equip an individual or organisation.
Note: May be qualified by referring to items as major or minor capital equipment.
fighting power
The result of the integration of three interdependent components:
a. the intellectual component provides the knowledge to fight
b. the moral component provides the will to fight
c. the physical component provides the means to fight.
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host nation
A nation which, by arrangement:
a. receives forces and materiel of other nations operating on/from or transiting
through its territory
b. allows materiel and/or organisations to be located on its territory; and/or
c. provides support for these purposes.
intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or
potential operations.
Note: Also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the
organisations engaged in such activity.
joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which
elements of at least two Services participate.
light cavalry
A standing organisation of armour that does not have integral armoured vehicles,
which is trained in mounted and dismounted cavalry tactics and is capable of
forming combined arms teams.
logistics
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of
forces.
Note: In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which
deal with:
a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel
b. transport of personnel
c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of
facilities
d. acquisition or furnishing of services
manoeuvre
Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with
fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in
order to accomplish the mission.
movement
The activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or stocks
as part of a military operation and requires the supporting capabilities of mobility,
transportation, infrastructure, movement control and support functions.
networked communications
An organisation of stations capable of direct communications on common
channels and/or frequencies that utilise a spread of electronic devices and
systems for the acquisition or acceptance, processing, storage, display, analysis,
protection and transfer of information. It provides an ‘all informed’ network of
information for decision making and action.
offensive support
Offensive measures taken to support a commander in pursuing this mission, and
may be organic to the Service of the supported unit or be provided by another
Service, and includes naval surface fire support, fire support from any
ground-based weapons system other than small arms, and offensive air support,
including air reconnaissance and maritime strike.
platform
A combination of technologies and capabilities that, together, form a complex
piece of equipment (for example, self-propelled guns, tanks and ships).
reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an adversary or potential
adversary, or to secure data concerning meteorological, hydrographic or
geographic characteristics of a particular area.
recovery
In battlefield maintenance, the extrication of an abandoned, disabled or
immobilised vehicle and, if necessary, its removal to a maintenance point.
reorganisation
The reallocation of personnel and materiel resources within a unit or formation to
increase its combat effectiveness to an acceptable level.
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repair
The restoration of an item to serviceable condition through correction of a specific
failure or unserviceable condition.
replenishment
The positioning of stock to meet a periodic resupply requirement.
shock action
The physical and psychological assault upon enemy troops and their
commanders, employing both firepower and mobility of tanks to apply maximum
combat power.
supplies
All materiel and items used in the equipment, support and maintenance of military
forces.
support
The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements or
sustains any other force.
surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas, places,
persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means.
sustainability
The ability of Defence to maintain its elements to meet government expectations,
over time.
Note: From an operational and tactical perspective, it is the ability of a force to
conduct operations for the duration required to achieve its assigned operational
tasks, measured in terms of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables.
sustainment
The enduring provision of the appropriate goods and services required to achieve
readiness and sustainability goals for the life of a Defence element.
synchronisation
The arrangement of related and mutually supporting actions in time, space and
purpose to maximise their combined intended effects.
tempo
The relative measure of the abilities of opponents to understand, decide and
implement appropriate adaptations to plans, dispositions or postures.
transport
The means of conveyance to move forces, equipment, personnel and stocks.
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Abbreviations
The principal source for Australian Defence Force abbreviations is the Australian
Defence Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms. Abbreviations
contained within this publication are in accordance with the business rules,
guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary at the time of its
release. The following abbreviations are used throughout this publication;
however, commonly used terms have been presented in their abbreviated format
throughout the publication and have not been included in this list.
The following abbreviations appear in tables and figures within the publication.
AA armoured ambulance
ACV armoured command vehicle
AF armoured fitter
ALV armoured logistic vehicle
AM armoured mortar
ARVL armoured recovery vehicle – light
C4ISR command, control, communications and computers, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance
COIN counterinsurgency
t tonne
The following are common shortened forms or symbols for names of explosives
used throughout this publication.
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Amendment certificate
Amendment list
Publication Date
Produced by
Date of amended by amended
Number
endorsement
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.