(Will polish this later; may tatapusin lng sa work)

United Special Watchman Agency vs. CA, 405 SCRAS 432 [08 July 2003]

Topic: Liability of principal for unpaid wages of the employees of job contractor – Solidary liability as to
wages

FACTS:

Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for
security services with respondent University of the Philippines (UP).

In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for
payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond,
refund of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31,
1998, and attorney’s fees.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision as follows: Respondents Lockheed Detective and Watchman
Agency, Inc. and UP as job contractor and principal, respectively, are hereby declared to be solidarily
liable to complainants for the following claims of the latter which are found meritorious.

Third party respondent University of the Philippines is hereby declared to be liable to Third Party
Complainant and cross claimant Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency for the unpaid legislated
salary increases of the latter’s security guards for the years 1996 to 1998, in the total amount of
P13,066,794.14, out of which amount the amounts due complainants here shall be paid.

The other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit (night shift differential and13th month pay) or
for having been paid in the course of this proceedings (salaries for December 15-31, 1997 in the amount
of P40,140.44).-

Both Lockheed and UP appealed the Labor

Arbiter’s decision.

By Decision, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC held:

1. Complainants’ claims for premium pay for work on rest day and special holiday, and 5

days service incentive leave pay, are hereby dismissed for lack of basis.2. The respondent University of
the Philippines is still solidarily liable with Lockheed in the payment of the rest of the claims covering the
period of their service contract.

The complaining security guards and UP filed their respective motions for reconsideration however, the
NLRC denied said motions.

As the parties did not appeal the NLRC decision, the same became final and executory on October 26,
2002.
The Labor Arbiter is directed to issue a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of the judgment award in
favor of Third-Party complainants.-

A Notice of Garnishment was issued to Philippine National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch for the
satisfaction of the award of P12,142,522.69 (inclusive of execution fee).-

PNB informed UP that it has received an order of release dated August 8, 2005 issued bythe Labor
Arbiter directing PNB UP Diliman Branch to release to the NLRC Cashier, through the assigned NLRC
Sheriff Max L. Lago, the judgment award/amount of P12,142,522.69.

UP filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Garnishment. UP contended that the funds beingsubje cted to
garnishment at PNB are government/public funds.-

The Labor Arbiter, however, dismissed the urgent motion for lack of merit -

UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA-

Citing Republic v. COCOFED, which defines public funds as moneys belonging to the State or to any
political subdivisions of the State, more specifically taxes, customs, duties and moneys raised by
operation of law for the support of the government or the discharge of its obligations, the appellate
court ruled that the funds sought to be garnished do not seem to fall within the stated definition.-

The CA issued the assailed Amended Decision. It held that without departing from its findings that the
funds covered in the savings account sought to be garnished do not fall within the classification of public
funds, it reconsiders the dismissal of the petition in which mandates that all money claims against the
government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit (COA).-

Lockheed moved to reconsider the amended decision but the same was denied in the assailed CA
Resolution dated December 23, 2008. The CA cited Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals which held that UP ranks with MIAA.

FULL TEXT

G.R. No. 152476             July 8, 2003

UNITED SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR PAMA, BENJAMIN PEREZ, JOSE ABRIAD,
EDUARDO ALARBA, ANTONIO AVILA, OSCAR BERNARDO, JAIME COLUMBRES, MARIO
COLUMBRES, RONNIE DESCUTODO, CONDORDIO EMPINO, NOEL FLAVIA, ANDRES
GEDUCOS, PANFILO IHALAS, JUAN MIJARES, MARCELO MIJARES, CANESIO OMBAJIN,
ANTONIO PAMA, CRISPULO PAMA, JR., DANILO PAMA, ESTAFANO PAMA, PEPITO PAMA,
JR., ROMY PAMPOSA, JESUS PANIALES, DOMING PANIZALES, ARNALDO PEREZ, FIDEL
PILOTON, CONCORDIO DE LOS REYES, VICENTE ROBLES, ALEJANDRO ROTAO, GERARDO
SUMANGHID, NOEL SUPLIDO, MONICO TIEMPO, ALFREDO VELENZUELA, ARTURO
VALENZUELA, ROMY VELARDE, ELISEO VILLAFLOR, and ARTEMIO VILLALOBOS, and the
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
PUNO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the decision of
the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner, United Special
Watchman Agency ("USWA").

A complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims was filed by respondent employees
against USWA and Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank ("BF"). It stemmed from the
termination of the Contract for Security Services1 entered into between USWA and BF. The parties
agreed that "the party terminating the CONTRACT shall give (a) THIRTY (30)-day notice prior to the
date of termination to the other party."2

The contract took effect on 1 June 1994. However, on 3 June 1994, or two (2) days later, BF
terminated the contract. The termination letter dated 3 June 1994, but received on June 17, advised
USWA of the termination to take effect 30 days from receipt thereof.3

USWA alleged that, upon receipt of the letter, Mr. Angel Baliwag, its Operations Manager,
immediately notified all the affected employees stationed at the BF branches about the termination
of their contract. He advised them to report to the office for reassignment. Only thirty (30) out of the
sixty-seven (67) guards reported and they were given new assignments. Out of the remaining thirty-
seven (37), twenty-one (21) filed, on 4 August 1994, a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
money claims against USWA and BF with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC"). On 29 August 1994, the complaint was amended to include all
thirty-seven (37) employees. In the course of the proceedings, five (5) of the thirty-seven employees
reported to the office and were given new posts.4

The employees claimed that they were put on a floating status. They denied that USWA,
represented by Mr. Baliwag, notified them of the standing offer of the agency to reassign them to
other clients after the termination of the contract with BF. Due to their dismissal, they prayed for
separation pay.

On 8 January 1998, the Labor Arbiter ordered USWA to pay the employees separation pay, and
both USWA and BF to pay the salary differential and attorney's fees.5 On appeal, the NLRC, on 23
July 1998, remanded the case, finding the conclusions on the issues of illegal dismissal and wage
differential by the Arbiter without sufficient basis.6 However, on 2 March 2000, a compromise
settlement was reached between BF and the employees.7 The Arbiter approved the settlement in its
decision dated 15 March 2000, and dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of
merit.8 Aggrieved, the employees filed an appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC ordered USWA to pay
the employees their separation pay in light of its conclusion that there was no proof that the
employees were notified to report for reassignment after the termination of the contract.9 The motion
for reconsideration was denied on 14 September 2001.10 Thus, on 16 November 2001, USWA filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was dismissed outright in a resolution by the appellate court11 because Gen. Rodrigo
Ordoyo, the Managing Director who signed the certification of non-forum shopping, was not
authorized by a board resolution of USWA and its co-petitioner BF. USWA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to which was attached its board resolution authorizing Ordoyo to sign the
certification. The motion was likewise denied because only USWA gave the authorization although
there were other petitioners.12 The denial was received by USWA on 15 March 2002. On 18 March
2002, USWA filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court. It alleged that it was
only USWA which intended to file the Petition for Certiorari, but the title included petitioner BF
because they merely copied the title of the case from the NLRC decision.13 While the second motion
for reconsideration was pending before the Court of Appeals, USWA filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.14 It was only on 27 June 2002 when the
Court of Appeals dismissed the second motion for reconsideration on the ground that it is a
prohibited pleading.15

USWA contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it did not give due course to its petition and
prayed that the aforementioned resolutions of the appellate court dismissing the petition be annulled
and the case be remanded to the same court.16

The respondent employees, in their comment, prayed that the petition be dismissed due to forum
shopping and for lack of merit.17

We shall first resolve the procedural issue. The question is whether USWA is guilty of forum
shopping when it filed the present petition with this Court while its second motion for reconsideration
was pending before the Court of Appeals.

Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another.18 There is forum shopping when there is an: (1)
identity of the parties, or at least such parties as to represent the same interest in both actions; (2)
identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts;
and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration, or will constitute litis pendentia.19

USWA contends that it did not resort to forum shopping because the issues involved in the pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and before this Court are different, viz:

The motion for reconsideration and the subsequent motion for reconsideration with "Leave of
Court" filed by the petitioner with the Honorable Court of Appeals sought the reconsideration
of its earlier resolutions to give due course to the petition in the interest of justice and fair
play since petitioner believed that it has strictly complied with its directives and that the
dismissal was based on the caption of the pleading and not on the allegations therein(,)
(w)hile the instant petition sought the remand of the case to the Honorable Court of
Appeals for appropriate action.20 (emphases and underscoring in the original)

We disagree. We cannot countenance the over stretched argument of USWA. Its two motions for
reconsideration pray that the Court of Appeals give due course to the petition for certiorari filed
before it. The petition before this Court seeks the remand of the case to the Court of Appeals "for
appropriate action." It is obvious however, that if we grant the petition and remand the case, we will
be ordering the Court of Appeals to give due course to USWA's petition. This is precisely the object
of its motion for reconsideration, as well as its second motion for reconsideration. To be sure, a
second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 But this cannot save USWA from a
blatant violation of the rule on forum shopping. The rule explicitly prohibits a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum from seeking another forum in the hope of
obtaining a favorable disposition in the latter.22 Forum shopping is not only "contumacious"23 but also
"deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts."24

It matters not that USWA admitted the existence of the second motion for reconsideration pending
with the Court of Appeals in the certification of non-forum shopping attached to its petition. In the
case of Request for Consolidation of Civil Case No. 1169, RTC Br. 45, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro with Civil Case No. 3640, RTC Br. 49, Cabanatuan City,25 we held that even if a party
admits in the certification of non-forum shopping the existence of other related cases pending before
another body, this does not exculpate such party who is obviously and deliberately seeking a more
friendly forum for his case. For resorting to forum shopping, the petition of USWA should be
dismissed with prejudice.26

But even on its merits, the petition of USWA cannot prosper. It is the contention of USWA that the
respondents were not illegally dismissed, but that they refused to report to the office after the
termination of the contract with BF. Allegedly, it was the fault of the respondents that they did not
have any work assignment. There being no illegal dismissal, they argue that the NLRC erred in
awarding separation pay to the employees.

Again, we do not subscribe to this argument. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court where only questions of law are allowed. It is fundamental that
"(f)indings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded
great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made
from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of
stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed."27 The NLRC, in its decision dated 30
March 2001,28 held:

x x x In the case at bar, it is not shown that complainants were given new assignments six
(6) months after termination of the contract between respondents bank and security agency.
Records further do not show that complainants were informed, verbally or in writing(,) that
they will be given new guarding assignments. Respondent security agency, through Mr.
Angel Baliwag, Operations Officer, testified that he sent a letter dated 22 May 1995 to Atty.
Loste, complainants' counsel, requesting addresses of the complainants but the latter stated
that he does (sic) not know the addresses of complainants. We cannot give due merit to
respondent's statement since the letter request was made beyond the six (6) months
allowable period to place complainants on a floating status (pp. 6–10, TSN, taken on 30 May
1996). Moreover, we find unbelievable that respondent agency does not have any record of
the complainants' addresses being their employees.29

These findings of the NLRC are supported by the evidence on record. It was established that the
respondents were put on a temporary off-detail, which exceeded the allowable period of six (6)
months, amounting to constructive dismissal.30 There is thus no further need to dwell on the
questions of fact raised in this petition.

Proceeding from the fact that the dismissal of the employees was illegal, we next rule on the liability
of USWA. Pursuant to a legitimate job contracting, USWA and BF are jointly and severally liable in
the payment of the wages of the employees, and for violation of any provision of the Labor
Code.31 We note that a compromise agreement of the employees was executed between BF and the
employees.32 However, the compromise agreement dealt only with salary differential. It did not
include nor does it preclude the award of separation pay. In light of the illegal dismissal of the
respondents, USWA is liable to pay the respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay
for every year of service.33

WHEREFORE, the petition of USWA is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.