Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña, 620 SCRA 106, May 05, 2010

2/20/22, 2:13 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 620
G.R. No. 143591. May 5, 2010.*
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA,

ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H.
DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES,
JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO
M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as
Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bago City, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Judge’s Personal Examination; Warrants

of Arrest; The judge’s personal examination depends on the
circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the
bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the
warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification
standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.—
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that “[n]o x x x warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized.”
Interpreting the words “personal determination,” we said in
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988), that it does not
thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To
require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary
examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them.
Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the
existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor’s
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is
never allowed to do is to follow blindly the prosecutor’s bare
certification as to the
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017f15c3eac849e8db3f000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/27
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña
existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the

constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report,
the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any,
and other documents supporting the prosecutor’s
certification. Although the extent of the judge’s personal
examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be
sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but
must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues
not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because
of the records which sustain it. He should even call for the
complainant and the witnesses to answer the court’s probing
questions when the circumstances warrant.
Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Evidence
Rule; A witness may not testify as what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what he has learned.—The reason for the
requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge
is to guard against hearsay evidence. A witness, therefore, may
not testify as what he merely learned from others either because
he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth
of what he has learned. Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony
or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence
applies to written, as well as oral statements.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioners Teodoro C.
Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr.
Poblador, Bautista, Reyes for petitioners P. Siervo H.
Dizon, Ben Yu Lim, Jr.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
petitioners Eric L. Lee, Benjamin De Leon, Delfin C.
Gonzales, Jr.
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court
of Appeals, in its Decision1 dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr.,
Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de
Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L.
Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
reinvestigation and recall of the warrants of arrest in
Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña (Atty. Peña)
instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation
and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees2 against Urban
Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was
raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No.
754. Atty. Peña anchored his claim for compensation on the
Contract of Agency3 allegedly entered into with the
petitioners, wherein
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate

Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., concurring;
Rollo, pp. 50-60.
2 Id., at pp. 61-66.
3 The contract was allegedly confirmed in a letter addressed to the
respondent, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
This is to confirm the engagement of your services as the authorized
representative of Urban Bank, specifically to hold and maintain
possession of our above [-]captioned property and to protect the same from
former tenants, occupants or any other person who are threatening to
return to the said property and/or interfere with your possession of the
said property for and in our behalf.
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 109
the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to

prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully
occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent
as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the
following documents: 1) a Letter5 dated 19 December 1994
signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of
the subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter6 dated 7
December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn
G. Ong; 3) a Letter7 dated 9 December 1994 addressed to
Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and
4) a Memorandum8 dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique
Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt
to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by
ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned
documents, Atty. Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit9 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed
that said documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the
signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI.11 Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.
_______________
You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court

action that you may institute to carry out your aforementioned duties, and
to prevent any intruder, squatter or any other person not otherwise
authorized in writing by Urban Bank from entering or staying in the
premises. Id., at p. 69.
4 Id., at pp. 72-87.
5 Id., at p. 96.
6 Id., at p. 97.
7 Id., at p. 98.
8 Id., at p. 99. Also at CA Rollo, p. 304.
9 Id., at pp. 106-109.
10 The case was docketed as I.S. Case No. 9248.
11 Rollo, p. 108.
110

In a Resolution12 dated 24 September 1998, the City

Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of
petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing
Falsified Documents, penalized by the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor
concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the
principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the
documents were falsified considering that the signatories
were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part
of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by
petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to
dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their Pre-
Trial Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding
14
Informations were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684,
6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued
the warrants15 for the arrest of the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion
to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners insisted that they were
denied due process because of the non-observance of the
proper procedure on
_______________
12 The dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, In view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable
cause that the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents in evidence
under par. 2, Article 172, Revised Penal Code (4 counts) had been
committed and that respondents Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzalez,
Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon
Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel are probably guilty.
Let Information be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City
of Bago, Philippines.
SO RESOLVED. (Id., at pp. 110-114).
13 Id., at pp. 113-114.
14 Id., at pp. 115-122.
15 Id., at pp. 123-126.
16 Id., at pp. 127-142.
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 111

preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.

Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the
right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued
that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting
documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial
judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and
attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of
arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed
for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused,
i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank,
contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners
posited that the criminal cases should have been suspended
on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil
case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order17 dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC
denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that
preliminary investigation was not available in the instant
case—which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level
court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the
warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added,
petitioners could no longer question the validity of the
warrant since they already posted bail. The court also
believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a
prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for
suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court
was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
_______________
17 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For reinvestigation is hereby denied.
Set arraignment of the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in
the morning.
SO ORDERED. (Id., at pp. 143-150.)
112

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action

for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants
of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus
motion.18 They, likewise, questioned the court’s conclusion
that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right
to assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.On 20 June
2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.19 Thus,
petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following
issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause
required for the filing of an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish
probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss
the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to
submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not
within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient
basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary
investiga-
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18 Id., at pp. 151-186.

19 Id., at pp. 50-60.
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 113

tion does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the
judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal
case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his
counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the
existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of

probable cause?20
On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues

raised by the petitioners had already become moot and
academic when the latter posted bail and were already
arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO21 enjoining
the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any manner
with Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the
entire period that the case is pending before, or until
further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been
mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were
already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as
they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the
officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a
plea, the court a quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for
them.
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 13-14.

21 Id., at pp. 518-522.
114

The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of

bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is
true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto.22
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:23
“It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify
previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the
admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of

his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to
the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative
in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and
curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative
statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence
retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general
rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that
effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other
words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in
effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in
resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for
partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after
posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she
waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to
assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent
judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to
question the existence of probable
_______________
22 People v. Vallejo, 461 Phil. 672, 686; 416 SCRA 193, 203 (2003); People v.
Palijon, 397 Phil. 545, 556; 343 SCRA 486, 496 (2000).
23 473 Phil. 758, 776-777; 429 SCRA 685, 703-704 (2004).
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 115

cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party

does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally
relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible. x x x.”
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash,

Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on
the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds
likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were
not waiving their right to question the validity of their
arrest.24 On the date of their arraignment, petitioners
refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on
the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court.
Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for
them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude
them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or
this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should
not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their
arrest. The ruling to which we have returned in People v.
Red25 stated:
“x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of

January, 1929, on the Island and Province of Marinduque by
order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena,
Tayabas, at a time when there were no court sessions being held
in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the number of
the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the
bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in
detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such
as the summary examination of the case before their detention.
That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear from
their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they
furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on
February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of
the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the
court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8),
_______________
24 CA Rollo, pp. 902-903.

25 55 Phil. 706, 711 (1931).
116

and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it

presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived
the right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as
amended by Act No. 3042.”
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be

grouped into two, which are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e.,
whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly
observed the required procedure in the instant case, and,
(2) the substantive aspect, which is whether there was
probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
The Procedural Aspect:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as

they were unable to submit their counter-affidavits and
were not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation.
Considering that the complaint of Atty. Peña was filed in
September 1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
relevant to the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule
112, to wit:
“Section 1. Definition.—Preliminary investigation is an

inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.
Sec. 3. Procedure.—Except as provided for in Section 7
hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following
manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the
respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such
number
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 117

of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer
oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he
is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal.—If the complaint is filed
directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined
in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal shall take
appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant.” (underscoring
supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was

defined and penalized under second paragraph of Article
172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
“Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of

falsified documents.—The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind
of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with
the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any
judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the
intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing
subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next
lower in degree.”
118

Prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods translates to imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day.26 The next lower in degree to prision
correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period which
translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months27
of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered
by the Rules of Summary Procedure,28 the case falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but
applying the ordinary rules. In such instance, preliminary
investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such
section covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That
which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be
determined before an information may be filed in court, the
prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to
submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In
the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may
solely
_______________
26 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Fourteenth

Edition, Revised 1998, Appendix “A,” Table No. 15, p. 1010.
27 Id., at p. 1008.
28 (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine
not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of
other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage
to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the
imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff’s cause of
action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action
subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense
charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the
ordinary procedure.
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 119

rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting

documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not
find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright
the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient
reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution
and file the corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT – AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at
Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City entitled “Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña v. Urban
Bank, et al.” Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the bank,
namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P.
Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.
(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “bank”) in ridding a certain parcel of
land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy of the
Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex “A”.
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true

copy of which is attached as Annex “B”), Answer dated 28 October 1996
(Annex “C”), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex “D”) filed
by the bank and the respondent members of the board, the said
respondents used as evidence the following documents:
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain
Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a copy
of which is attached as Annex “E”), which states:
120

December 19, 1994

Urban Bank

Urban Avenue, Makati

Metro Manila
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City which you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company under a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994.
In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our
undertaking to deliver to you the full and actual possession and control of
said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from any
obstruction or impediment to the free use and occupancy of the property
and to prevent the former tenants or occupants from entering or
returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of ownership of the
property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint
Atty. Peña likewise as its authorized representative for purposes of
holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property and to
represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.
It is understood that any attorney’s fees, cost of litigation and any other
charges or expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty.
Peña of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela
Sugar Company and any loss or damage that may be incurred to third
parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar Company.
Very truly yours,
Isabela Sugar Company
By:
HERMAN PONCE
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a
certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto attached
as annex “F,” which states:
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VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 121

December 7, 1994
To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
From: MARILYN G. ONG
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar
Company inc. to take charge of inspecting the tenants would like to
request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners. Can
you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable) this.
b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same
Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “G”, which
states:
December 9, 1994
Atty. Ted Borlongan
URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA
Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan
Dear Mr. Borlongan
I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached
immediately – as the tenants are questioning authority of the people who
are helping us to take possession of the property.
Marilyn Ong
c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached
as annex “H”, which states:
MEMORANDUM
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Peña
Director
From: Enrique C. Montilla III
President
Date: 20 November 1994
122

You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of
the corporation situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of
the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon the expiration of
the contract of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994. For
this purpose, you are authorized to engage the services of security guards
to protect the property against intruders. You may also engage the
services of a lawyer in case there is a need to go to court to protect the
said property of the corporation. In addition, you may take whatever
steps or measures are necessary to ensure our continued possession of
the property.
ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III

President
4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and
introduced the aforestated documents as evidence in the civil case
knowing that the same are falsified. They used the said documents
to justify their refusal to pay my agent’s fees, to my damage and
prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex “E”) is a falsified document,
in that the person who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of
ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix
their signatures on the document. The execution of the letter was
merely simulated by making it appear that Ponce and Abad
executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do
so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were
ever stockholders, officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In
the letter, Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of
ISC and Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19
December 1994, the real President of plaintiff was Enrique
Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A
copy of the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year
1994, during which Montilla, et al. were elected is hereto attached
as Annex “I.” On the otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on
or about the time of the transaction is attached as Annex “J.”
123
VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 123

7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7
December 1994 and letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly
written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was
ever a stockholder of ISC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by
Enrique Montilla, III his signature thereon was merely forged by
respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on
any such document.
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro
C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C.
Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric
Lee, with the crime of use of falsified documents under Artilce 172,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.(underlining ours)
10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose
it may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically

in paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and
identified “the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro
Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P.
Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and
Arturo Manuel, Sr.” However, in the accusatory portion of
the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim,
Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime
of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that
respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of
the board. And there was no explanation in the Resolution
and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim,
Jr. was included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the
body of the complaint and the specific averments therein,
Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was never mentioned.
124

The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the

complaint to determine whether there were inconsistencies
which ought to have been brought to the attention of the
respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It
is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did
not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order
that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the
administration of justice. It should be realized, however,
that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it
brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for
his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to
weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to
determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing
the information in court. Anything less would be a
dereliction of duty.29
Atty. Peña, in his Second Manifestation30 dated 16 June
1999, averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.,
were already estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board of directors of
Urban Bank, as the latter participated and appeared
through counsel in Civil Case No. 754 without raising any
opposition. However, this does not detract from the fact
that the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not
carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Peña, which did

not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge
issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners, including,
Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion
to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr., was not
_______________
29 Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, 16 November 2001, 369

SCRA 293, 305 citing Bernardo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-37876, 25 May
1979, 90 SCRA 214, 220; Vda. De Jacob v. Puno, G.R. Nos. L-61554-55, 31
July 1984, 131 SCRA 144, 149.
30 Rollo, pp. 368-372.
125
VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 125

even a member of the board of directors. With the filing of

the motion, the judge is put on alert that an innocent
person may have been included in the complaint. In the
Order31 dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to
quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
“Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts

contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information because said motion is
hypothethical admission of the facts alleged in the information x
x x.” (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of

respondent judge since it was at the expense of liberty.
This cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of
the Constitution is for the judge to personally determine
the existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
“Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
(a) x x x.
_______________
31 Id., at p. 148.
126

(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court.—If the
complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial
Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall
likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or
information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after
personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers.”
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that “[n]o x x x

warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x x x
the persons x x x to be seized.”32 Interpreting the words
“personal determination,” we said in Soliven v. Makasiar33
that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to
conduct the personal examination of the complainant and
his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to
unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and
investigations of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end,
he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis

thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is
to follow blindly the prosecutor’s bare certification
as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is
required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to
go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of
steno
_______________
32 Article III, Section 2, Philippine Constitution.

33 G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406.
127
VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 127

graphic notes if any, and other documents

supporting the prosecutor’s certification. Although
the extent of the judge’s personal examination depends on
the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just
rely on the bare certification alone but must go
beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not
on the strength of the certification standing alone but
because of the records which sustain it.34 He should even
call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the
court’s probing questions when the circumstances
warrant.35
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable
seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons
which ought not to be intruded by the State.36
Measured against the constitutional mandate and
established rulings, there was here a clear abdication of the
judicial function and a clear indication that the judge
blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners. The
careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of
arrest gives flesh to the bone of contention of petitioners
that the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than
prosecution.37 On this ground, this Court may enjoin the
criminal cases against petitioners. As a general rule,
criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there
are recognized exceptions which, as summarized in Brocka

v. Enrile,38 are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of

the accused;39
_______________
34 Lim, Sr. v. Felix, G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 305.
35 Id., at p. 306.
36 Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, 146-147 (1940).
37 Rollo, pp. 41-42.
38 G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188.
39 Hernandez v. Albano, 125 Phil. 513; 19 SCRA 95 (1967).
128

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of

justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;40
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;41
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;42
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation;43
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;44
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;45
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;46
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;47 and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.48
The Substantive Aspect:

Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified
_______________
40 Dimayuga v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304, 306-307 (1922); Hernandez v.

Albano, id.; Fortun v. Labang, 192 Phil. 125, 133; 104 SCRA 607, 614
(1981).
41 De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 (1940).
42 Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 75 (1939).
43 Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556, 562 (1916); Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389 (1925).
44 Sangalang v. People, 109 Phil. 1140, 1142 (1960).
45 Lopez v. City Judge, G.R. No. L-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA

616, 620-621.
46 Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, 25 March 1960.
47 Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rano v. Alvenia, CA-G.R.
No. 30720-R, 8 October 1962; Guingona, Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 213
Phil. 516, 524-525; 128 SCRA 577 (1984).
48 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, G.R. No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134
SCRA 438, 448-450.
129
VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 129

Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the

offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by

another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in
any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any
judicial proceeding.49
The falsity of the document and the defendants’

knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the
offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the
Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the
Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Peña, attached to
which were the documents contained in the Motion to
Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also
included as attachments to the complaint were the
Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged falsified documents,
copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the election of
the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders.50
Based on these documents and the complaint-affidavit of
Atty. Peña, the City Prosecutor concluded that probable
cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the
strength of the same documents, the trial court issued the
warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents
sufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that the offense charged in the Information or any
offense included therein has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs the facts and circumstances without
restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of

which he has no techni-
_______________
49 JBL Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Criminal Book Two, Fourteenth

Edition, Revised, 1998 ed., p. 246.
50 Rollo, pp. 110-114.
130

cal knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of

probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that
it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that
would justify conviction.51
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,52 the task of the
presiding judge when the Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to
insulate from the very start those falsely charged with
crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial.53
We do not see how it can be concluded that the
documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-
affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Peña stated
that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the
alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not
actually affix their signatures therein; and that they were
not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.54 He further
claimed that Enrique Montilla’s signature appearing in
another memorandum addressed to respondent was
forged.55 These averments are mere assertions which are
insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse
the issuance of warrants of arrest. These averments cannot
be considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge of
herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he
was present at the time of the execution of the documents.
Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit
that
_______________
51 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880; 288 SCRA 626, 638 (1998).
52 G.R. No. 174016, 28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 278, 293-294.
53 Baltazar v. People, supra note 52 at 294 citing Okabe v. Gutierrez,
supra note 23 at p. 781; p. 706.
54 Rollo, pp. 108-109.
55 Id., at p. 109.
131
VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 131

herein respondent was familiar with the signatures of the

mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were
forged. What Atty. Peña actually stated were but sweeping
assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of ISCI
and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or
representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no
indication that the assertion was based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be
based on personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay
evidence. A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he
merely learned from others either because he was told or
read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of
what he has learned.56 Hearsay is not limited to oral
testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements.57
The requirement of personal knowledge should have
been strictly applied considering that herein petitioners
were not given the opportunity to rebut the complainant’s
allegation through counter-affidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19
December 1994 of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad, neither
of the two made the representation that they were the
president or secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Peña who
asserted that the two made such representation. He alleged
that Marilyn Ong was never a stockholder of ISCI but he
did not present the stock and transfer book of ISCI. And,
there was neither allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong
was not connected to
_______________
56 Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence. See also D.M. Consunji, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 275, 285; 357 SCRA 249, 254 (2001).
57 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 194. See also Philippine Home Assurance
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 255, 267-268; 257 SCRA 468, 479
(1996) cited in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id., at p. 285; p.
254.
132

ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong was

not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the
documents she signed were falsified.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the
correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutor’s
function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion
or manifest error in his findings.58 Considering, however,
that the prosecution and the court a quo committed
manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this
Court therefore annuls their findings.Our pronouncement
in Jimenez v. Jimenez59 as reiterated in Baltazar v. People
is apropos:
“It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may
be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial
once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before
the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons. The
judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in
the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which
the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to
be so.”
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of

Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the prosecutor as
well as the court a quo as to the existence of probable
cause. The criminal complaint against the petitioners

should be dismissed.
_______________
58 Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157,
168.
59 G.R. No. 158148, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 516, 528-529.
133
VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 133

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is
hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City, is hereby
DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684,
6685 and 6686.
SO ORDERED.
Brion (Actg. Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama,

Jr.** and Mendoza,*** JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.—A motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the

truth of the facts alleged in the complaint—it is not for the
trial court to inquire into the truth or falsity of a
complaint’s allegations before a hearing on its merits. (St.
Michael School of Cavite, Inc. vs. Masaito Development
Corporation, 547 SCRA 263 [2008])
——o0o——
_______________
** Per Raffle dated 27 April 2010, Associate Justice Martin S.

Villarama, Jr., is designated an additional member in place of Associate
Justice Roberto A. Abad who inhibited himself due to close association
with one of the parties.
*** Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno was originally designated as an
additional member per raffle dated 15 February 2010 in lieu of Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio who inhibited himself due to a related case.
However, per Special Order No. 836 dated 12 April 2010, Associate Justice
Jose Catral Mendoza is designated an additional member of the Second
Division, whether Regular or Special, relative to cases wherein Chief

Justice Reynato S. Puno was designated as additional member in view of
the Chief Justice’s forthcoming retirement.
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2/20/22, 2:13 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 620

G.R. No. 143591. May 5, 2010.*

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA,

Criminal Procedure; Judge’s Personal Examination; Warrants

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 107

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 109

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to

You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

In a Resolution12 dated 24 September 1998, the City

12 The dispositive portion of which reads:

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 111

preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.

17 The dispositive portion reads:

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

18 Id., at pp. 151-186.

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 113

Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of

On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues

20 Id., at pp. 13-14.

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of

admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 115

cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party

Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash,

“x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of

24 CA Rollo, pp. 902-903.

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it

The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be

Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as

“Section 1. Definition.—Preliminary investigation is an

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 117

The crime to which petitioners were charged was

“Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Prision correccional in its medium and maximum

26 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Fourteenth

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 119

rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting

3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

December 19, 1994

Urban Avenue, Makati

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 121

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III

VOL. 620, MAY 5, 2010 123

It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED