People v.

Sanchez GR 131116
DOCTRINE:
Facts: On April 13, 1991, State witness Vivencio Malabanan was the team leader of a group of
policemen that went to Bishop Compound in Calauan, Laguna as part of the security force of Mayor
Antonio Sanchez. He alleged that Ding Peradillas arrived later that day and asked for the mayor and
informed him that there would be a party that night at Dr. Virvillo Velecina’s house. He assured the
mayor that Nelson Penalosa would be there to which the mayor replied, “Bahala na kayo mga anak.
Ayusin lang ninyo ang trabaho.” Dr. Velecina was a political opponent of Mayor Sanchez and Penalosa
was one of the political leaders of Dr. Velecina.
Afterwards, Peradillas, Corcolon, and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-way radios and a
vehicle for the operation. At around 2:30pm, Malabanan and the three went their separate ways and
agreed to meet at mayor Sanchez’ house at 6pm. At around 7pm, they went to Marpori Poultry Farm
near Dr. Velecina’s house. Peradillas walked towards his own house, which is near Dr. Velecina’s
house, to check whether Nelson Penalosa was at the party. He, then, informed the others that
Penalosa’s jeep was leaving the compound. Averion immediately drove the car and they pursued the
said jeep. When they were passing Victoria Farms, Corcolon ordered Averion to overtake the jeep,
and as they did, Peradillas and Corcolon fired at the jeep using M-16 and baby armalite rifles. Nelson
Penalosa and his son, Rickson, died. After the shooting, they proceeded to the mayor’s house and
reported.
Alibis:
Luis Corcolon stated that he spent the whole day supervising the poultry farm of his employers. He
claimed that the murder charges were concocted against them for his refusal to testify against Mayor
Sanchez.
Artemio Averion, the godson of Mayor Sanchez, claimed that he was in Lucena City, attending to his
ailing father.
Crime charged: double murder
RTC Ruling - considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder punishable under Art. 48 of
the RPC
Issue:
Whether or not the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic firing mode constitutes a
single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are considered as complex crimes?
Ruling:
Although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger, in view of its special
mechanism the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing
the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. Malabanan testified that
he heard three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites used by Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus,
accused are liable for two counts of murder instead of the complex crime of double murder.
Evidently, treachery was present in the execution of the crimes which qualifies the crime to murder.
The attack was sudden, catching them unaware and giving them no opportunity to defend themselves.
Conspiracy was likewise adequately established. The trial court also properly appreciated the
existence of evident premeditation and the use of motor vehicle to execute the crime.

People v. Valdez GR 127663

DOCTRINE:
It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a
single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there
was more than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It
cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also several
empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several shots
were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative position of the gunmen and their victims, some of
whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof,
it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act
by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at
different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of
multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple
murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same manner,
accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
Crime Charged:Complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder
Facts:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule
(17 years old), Jean Maria Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. were at the
house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding party
of Jean Marie's cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind
Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano
(TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN June 18, 1996. pp. 23-25).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan they met appellant Rolando
Valdez and his companions who were armed with guns. The tricycle's headlight flashed on their faces.
Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montano's group. Thereafter, after uttering the
words, "nataydan, mapan tayon" (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and companions left (TSN
June 11, 1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead
(TSN June 11, 1991, pp. 14-16). On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the
attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries that could have caused their death were it not for the
timely medical attention given them.
RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER

Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of a complex crime of multiple murder
Ruling:
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating circumstances, if we were to uphold the trial courts'
premises on the complex nature of the crime committed, the death sentence, being the maximum
penalty for murder, would still have been the impossible penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Court however, finds compelling reasons to reduce the sentence from one death penalty
(for the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder) and one reclusion perpetua
(for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions) to four counts of reclusion perpetua
(for 4 murders) and two indeterminate sentences of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the 2
frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the People's brief that accused-appellant should
instead be convicted of four counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder is well taken. The
trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the erroneous Information filed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple murder and
double frustrated murder (p. 1, Records: Crim. Case No. U-8747). It may be noted that in his Resolution
dated September 26, 1995, the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan,
found a prima facie case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101-102, Ibid.) Too, the same
investigating judge in his Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found prima facie for two counts of
frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder
was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act
No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is clear from
the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single act but from
several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than one
gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It cannot be said
therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also several empty bullet
shell recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several shots were fired.
Furthermore, considering the relative position of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were
riding the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was
absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple
murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder,
but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-
appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for the crime of murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. In
the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty
should be four sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts of frustrated
murder, accusedappellant must be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of
6 years and 1 day of prison mayor to maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion perpetua for each
offense.
People v. Nelmida GR 184500
DOCTRINE: Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to
a complex crime.
Appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts
in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it
speaks only of a "single act."
Crime Charged: double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
This Court believes, however, that appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder
Facts:
Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his security escorts composed of
some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1)
T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7)
Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. The group went home
to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan
driven by Juanito. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-
accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed. Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused
to stay in the said waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides
of the road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-
accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. A few minutes later,
Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching.
The moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid waiting
shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-
powered firearms. Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto,
who was then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant
Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at them. On the occasion of the ambush, two security
escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered
injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on
his shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and left sides of his
body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right
point finger, right head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured. Subsequently,
SPO4 Medrano and the rest of the troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints
believed to be from the culprits.
They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao
del Norte, where appellants and their co-accused were believed to have fled. Samuel executed his
sworn statement identifying appellants and their co-accused as the persons responsible for the
ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months
after the ambush, appellant Wenceslao was arrested Appellant Ricardo was also arrested. Appellant
Wenceslao, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15 minute-vehicle ride from his residence,
to the site of the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position
in Salvador, Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998
elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan but he lost.
On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same political party. Similarly,
during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son
were charged with illegal possession of firearm. RTC: appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Court of Appeals: affirming appellants’ conviction of the crime
charged.
Issue:
whether the conviction of appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and
seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder.
Ruling:
As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted appellants of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. This Court believes, however,
that appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this
case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.
Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-
tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan,
i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco. Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the
commission of the crime.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, although they
were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not mentioned
that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely medical assistance
accorded to them, they would have died. However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes
committed against the aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even
though Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not mean
that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough not to have
sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants were motivated by the same intent to
kill, thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun,
appellants should be held guilty of attempted murder.
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for the separate
crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime
of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and
in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first
kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where
separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case
do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.
The killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the
appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained
bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts
died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in
different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the
victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v.
Valdez, each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime. Appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and
distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not
apply for it speaks only of a "single act." There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in
the commission of the crime. In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of
their leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons
died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the
part of the accused to fire at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each other. If the act
or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However,
"single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 because there was
therein no evidence at all showing the identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There
was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be
imputed upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each
of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide
instead of holding each of them responsible for 50 deaths. Significantly, there was no conspiracy in
People v. Lawas. The Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule. The Information
filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy, among others. Although the trial
court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the concerted actions
of the appellants (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the
left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both
sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the
moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-
accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4)
immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt to get their bags
and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-
accused fled. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawantawan and his group. They were motivated by a single criminal impulse ─ to kill the
victims. With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had
assumed joint criminal responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The Lawas doctrine, premised
on the impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot be applied. Our repeated ruling is that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act of each one of
the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the
several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of
Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies." In People v. Hon. Pineda, the Court already recognized the
"deeply rooted doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes." To apply the first half of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal
act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." With all the foregoing, this Court holds
appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted
murder. As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count. Appellants are also
guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion
perpetua to death, should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code, such a penalty is prision mayor.

People v. Tabaco GR 100382

DOCTRINE:
The firing of several bullets, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several
acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. Where the death
of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders,
and not a complex crime, are committed. Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst
of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant
must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused.
Facts:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to
death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton
(Criminal Case No. 10-317). In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in an information with
the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and
the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
From the evidence for the prosecution:
In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James
Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace
and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from
the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in
civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify
the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his
M-14 issued firearm. Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano
Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda,
Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton
(deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman
Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of
Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario
Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and
were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of
the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront
and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th
row of seats upper portion). At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was
seated as described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge
Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to
death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton,
although the latter managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was
chased by accused Tabaco.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out
rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th
PC. heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he
saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — "Mario
relax ka lang" — "Mario keep calm." They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco
pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm
Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who
happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his
legs due to adequate medical treatment.
From the evidence for the defense:
Accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went
to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena arriving thereat at about
12:00 o'clock noon, more or less.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost
seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head.
his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the air and directed
to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was
answered by burst of gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which
reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards.
As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito
Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused however, insisted to go out, but
in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun
from accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito
Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident, accused had to run away,
out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The
following morning, accused surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo.
RTC: The Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes
charged against him:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284
(Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared
to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law.
2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one (1) day Prision
Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM.
Article 48 provides for two clauses of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when
the offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (delito complejo) and/or complex proper
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four
murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more
grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto). Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme
Court, we say — as the deaths of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo
Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single
act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty — is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with
Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito
Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for
all four murder cases.
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four
murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows
that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun
fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet
which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in
a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more
grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the
accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that
Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He fired the weapon, which
contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from
Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the
scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied.
On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs.
Desierto. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an
automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable
because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant
and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured
were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as
provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots
were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must
be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries
inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the
accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as
those resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although
apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the
victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide.
Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated
homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally
speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion
offenses.
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced
them.
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition
of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied
in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides
committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme
Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate
shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article
48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the
law." The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of
murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims.
The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo we held that:
Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex
crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and
every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated Homicide,
the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four
sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed
People v. Punzalan GR 199892
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
In August 2002, members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training
Command, after training went to the “All-in-One Canteen” to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00
in the evening, they transferred to a nearby videoke bar, “Aquarius” where they continued their drinking
session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding
a flickering light bulb inside Aquarius. When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off
(“Patayin ang ilaw”), appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s
statement belligerently reacted asking, “Sinong papatayin?” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was
directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized
to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible
words and pounding his fist on the table.
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave. Soon after the navy personnel passed
by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala flagged down a rushing and zigzagging
maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and recognized
appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel,
causing injuries and death.
The RTC of Iba, Zambales found appellant guilty of the complex crime of Double Murder qualified by
treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle.
On appeal, the appellant in his brief, claimed that the trial court erred in not finding that he may not be
held criminally liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance
under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. His act of increasing his vehicle’s speed
was reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men whose four companions were also
approaching. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder. (YES)
Ruling:
The use of motor vehicle was properly considered as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant
deliberately used the van he was driving to pursue the victims. Upon catching up with them, appellant
ran over them and mowed them down with the van, resulting to the death of SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna and injuries to the others. Thereafter, he continued to speed away from the scene of the
incident. Without doubt, appellant used the van both as a means to commit a crime and to flee the
scene of the crime after he committed the felonious act.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of
stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel,
causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to
kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. The felony committed by appellant as
correctly found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder,
is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code are both grave felonies.

People v. Guillen GR L-1477

DOCTRINE:
Facts: The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.
During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidate of Manuel Roxas.
According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to redeem and fulfill promises
made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the accused determined to assassinate
the President and found the oppoturnity to do so on the night of March 10, 1947 when the President
attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first
intended to use a revolver to accomplish his goal but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so
he thought of using two hand grenades which were given to him by an American soldier in exchange
for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade
at the President when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform saw
the smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space where he thought
the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons
standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died the
next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was arrested and he
readily admitted his responsibility.
Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify
the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Issue:
WON Art. 49 Sec. 1 of the RPC should be applied in determining the penalty of the accused

Ruling:
No. Art. 48 of the RPC should be applied. It states that when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The Court
finds that Art. 48 is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48
because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the
accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim;
and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo
and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
Batulanon v. People GR 139857
DOCTRINE: As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is
important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or
with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of
falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
Facts:
Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from
May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans
to the members of the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities
concerning the release of loans were discovered. Thereafter, four (4) information for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon.
Version of the Prosecution:
According to witness, Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation
of cash vouchers testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers
representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher
No. 30A for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No.
237A for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda Oracion; P3,500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A was
released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to
Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan
because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative. Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was
a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982.
She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983. Medallo stated that pursuant to the cooperative's
by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans. Medallo
categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective
cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the amount
stated therein. As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same
was actually the handwriting of appellant.
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He
corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors. Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its
Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis
Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for
screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's
handwriting. Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in Arroyo's name was
settled.
Version of the Defense:
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the
names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her
presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to them; that the three were
members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of
directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries
in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans
and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; that she signed the loan
application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that
she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity; that
contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided
they are children of regular members. Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name
because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she
had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the
cases were filed in court. She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he
deposits money with the cooperative. When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982,
the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.
RTC: Convicted Leonila Batulan of four (4) counts of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents.
CA: Modified RTC decision and convicted accused of Falsification of Private Documents under Par.
2, Art. 172, RPC.
SC: Convicted accused of three (3) counts of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Art.
172, RPC and (1) count of estafa under Art. 171 of the RPC.
Issue:
Is there a compound crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents? NO
Ruling:
The CA correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial
documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or
other commercial law. Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or
instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. In all
criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein.
The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden completely. As there is no complex
crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to ascertain whether the
offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is
falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper
crime to be charged is estafa.
Thus, in People v. Reyes, the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate
that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had
worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of
the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work
for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante, the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn
ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified
ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He
was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao, the accused presented a
document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the
value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the
sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document. In view of the foregoing, we
find that the CA correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453. However, in Criminal Case No.
3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name
of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner
Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate
that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the
modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used
the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from
PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not
attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to
PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was
an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private
document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.
Thus, in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla, the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation.
The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds
of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of
the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to
deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month.
When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the
accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in
his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB
sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element
of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion
of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious:
Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of
defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the
defalcation is discovered.
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements
of estafa. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for
safekeeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer
of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-
keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and
custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates,
the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might also have
misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa. Neither can there be any
doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and
substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by the
cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The
checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under
his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his
pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently
misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases
of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities
have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods
does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to cases
where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this
case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction
between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case
why it should not be applied in its literal sense. The third element of the crime with which the appellant
is charged is injury to another.
The appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well
settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the
misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of
paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.) In the instant
case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in
trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name
of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount
she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal
use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables
of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have
been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the
disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute
injury within the meaning of Article 315.
People v. Salvilla GR 86163
DOCTRINE:
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other." The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense
as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would
be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed
to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.
Information: ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION
Facts:
A robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard. The accused were armed
with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the establishment, they met Rodita
Habiero, an employee there who was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her that it
was a hold-up.
She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner,
Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie, and told the former that all they needed was
money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed
P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter,
Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they
paid no heed.
Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after , his two
daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
Appellant told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released.
Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
Major Melquiades B. Sequio, negotiated with the accused and appealed to them to surrender but they
refused.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, joined the negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a
coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising
more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita to be
accompanied by Mary Choco in going out of the office.
When they were out of the door, one of the accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave
a key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita
the P50,000.00, which the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary
was herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the
accused to surrender peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums were given but the accused did not
budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place.
This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and
Reynaldo Canasares.
RULING OF THE RTC
It found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with Serious Physical
Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and that a
complex crime under Article 48 was committed (not an assigned error but was tackled by the Court).
Held:
Yes, the Trial Court was correct. The appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information
with "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
The Supreme Court agree with the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code has been committed such that the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal
Detention "reclusion perpetua to death," is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery
with Serious Physical Injuries which is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other." The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense
as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would
be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed
to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.
In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected
by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a
robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. where the accused were convicted of
Robbery but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held that "the detention
is absorbed in the crime of robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed,
one for Robbery and another for Serious Illegal Detention.
In the present case, only one Information was filed charging the complex offense.
For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been consummated and the detention was merely to
forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where the detention was availed
of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery.
Further, in Astor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery.
The detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to
commit the same.
After the amount of P20,000.00 was handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused
to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages and the demand to produce an additional
P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release.
The detention was not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims held as
security against the latter.
The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate
as a means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and other authorities arrived only much
later after several hours of detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his
co-accused to surrender, they adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded
could be turned over to them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them,
as inadequate robbery. llcd
The elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The victims were
illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie), and a minor (Minnie), a specified
circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained. The continuing detention was also for the
purpose of extorting ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.), not only from the
detained persons themselves but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
Therefore, it follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but
a necessary means employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.
Santiago v. Garchitorena GR L-109266
DOCTRINE:
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
Facts:
Petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. She filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena,
which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M.
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan, of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set
the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. Petitioner moved to defer the
arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended
to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to defer the arraignment.
Thus. prompting petitioner to file for a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion stated that while the
information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave
them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner,
unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and
prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R. No. 107598 the SC directed the
Sandiganbayan to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
before it. At the hearing on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that
they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations.
The Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations
and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice. Petitioner's
arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set for April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M.
Issue:
Whether the filing of 32 amended informations was proper? NO.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's
case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her. The 32 Amended
Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred
to as "continuous crime."
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or
resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution
(Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54). The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the
Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown
by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases. The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-
called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or
different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned
the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim.
Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or
one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims. The American courts following the
"single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion". An American court held that a
contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the
same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane
rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the
penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). In the case at bench, the original
information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving
the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act:
(i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988,
(ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and
(iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations
reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens"
in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would
file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. The 32 Amended
Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval
was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the
motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. Thus, the 32
amended informations should be consolidated to one information
People v. Mallari GR L-58886
DOCTRINE:
That there were two (2) victims, however, did not accordingly convert the crime into two separate
offenses, as the determinative factor is the unity or multiplicity of the criminal intent or of the
transactions for "the fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the public which a criminal
action seeks to redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to individuals."
Crime Charged: Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document
Facts:
According to Remegio Tapawan (Tapawan), witness for the prosecution, Consuelo E. Mallari (Mallari),
whom he had known since childhood came to his house, bringing two (2) land titles both in the name
of Leonora Balderas and told him that she wanted to mortgage the titles for P1,500 each because she
and her cousin Leonora Balderas were in great need of money to pay some taxes with the Bureau of
Customs where they have some goods impounded. Not having enough money, Tapawan refused.
However, after few days, Mallari returned with two titles and pleaded anew with Tapawan and his wife
for assistance because of her and Balderas great need of money. Tapawan gave in but because he
had only P1,500 while Mallari needed P3,000 he took her to his mother-in-law, Julia Saclolo (Saclolo)
and was able to secure the amount of P1,500. On the information given by Mallari that the deed of
mortgage would be prepared in the office of Atty. Celestino Hallazgo where the mortgagor Leonora
Balderas would show up, Tapawan proceeded to the place indicated. Immediately upon Tapawan's
arrival, Atty. Hallazgo phoned someone and within 20 minutes the person arrived whom Consuelo
Mallari and Atty. Hallazgo introduced to Tapawan as Leonora Balderas.
Thereafter, the mortgage deeds where prepared in favor of Saclolo and the other in favor of Tapawan
for P1,500 each. The mortgage loan of P3,000 was accordingly delivered to the person who posed as
Leonora Balderas. Mallari and Domingo Espinelli signed as witnesses to the said documents.
Later, during the preliminary investigation at the Fiscal's Office, Tapawan learned that he was deceived
because the person who posed as Leonora Balderas was a man by the name of Carlos Sunga, who,
at the time the mortgage was constituted, was dressed in a woman's attire. Neither Tapawan nor
Saclolo were able to recover a portion of the mortgage loan.
Mallari, with three (3) others (who are still at large), was accused of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification
of Public Document before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. Trial ensued and the trial court
found Mallari guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. Appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA G.R. No. 19849-CR (Tapawan as victim), resulted in the affirmance of the trial court's
decision. In her motion for reconsideration, Mallari contended that the decision in CA-G.R. No. 19849-
CR placed her twice in jeopardy of being punished for the same offense as she had previously been
convicted, sentenced and probationed for the same offense in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR (Saclolo as
victim). The appellate court said that considering that there were separate acts of deceit, there are
therefore two separate crimes.
Issue:
Did Mallari commit two separate crimes of estafa thru falsification of public document?
Ruling:
NO. The information per CA-GR No. 20817 and CA-GR No. 19849-CR refer to the same series of acts
which is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing offense. A continued crime is a single
crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. It is a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of acts, there is only one crime
committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
The crime of estafa thru falsification of public document committed by Mallari, although consummated
through a series of acts, was 'set on foot' by the single intent or impulse to defraud Tapawan of a total
amount of P3,000. And contrary to the appellate court's observation, there was only one deceit
practiced by Mallari on the two (2) victims, i.e. that being in need of money, Leonora Balderas was
willing to mortgage two (2) lots as security for a loan of P3,000. It was in fact, by mere play of fate that
the second victim, Saclolo, should be dragged into the swindle by reason of Tapawan having only
P1,500. at that time. That there were two (2) victims, however, did not accordingly convert the crime
into two separate offenses, as the determinative factor is the unity or multiplicity of the criminal intent
or of the transactions for "the fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the public which a
criminal action seeks to redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to
individuals."
The singularity of the offense committed by Mallari is further demonstrated by the fact that the
falsification of the two (2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the
same date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same occasion. In the case of People v.
de Leon, the Court held that the act of taking two or more roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and therefore, there is only one crime of theft even if
the roosters are owned by different persons. It has also been ruled that when two informations refer to
the same transaction, the second charge cannot prosper because the accused will thereby be placed
in jeopardy for the second time for the same offense.
Mallari, having already been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
document in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, it stands to reason that she can no longer be held liable for the
same crime in this case. The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril
of second punishment but against being tried for the same offense.
NEMO BIS PUNITUR PRO EODEM DELICTO. No man is punished twice for the same fault or offense.

People v. Madigal-Gonzales GR L-16688

DOCTRINE: Motive is not an element of a felony; it is merely a prospectant circumstantial evidence.
Criminal intent renders an act a felony. Motive is a state of the mind of the accused, and it is he who
can state his real motive in committing a crime
Facts: On or about August 23, 1956, Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was charged with malversation of
public funds, in the amount of P104,000.00. Allegedly, the said accused, while administrator of the
Social Welfare Administration (SWA), appropriated, took and misappropriated the said amount on five
different occasions comprised within the period from February, 1954 to September, 1955, in the City
of Manila. Simultaneously on the same date, Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was charged together with
Angelita Centeno, Anita Paggabao, Lourdes Alburo, Remedios Serrano, Julia Carpio, Calixto Hermosa
and Crispula R. Pagaran alias 'Pula', with the crime of falsification of public documents under 27
separate informations filed before the same Court of First Instance of Manila.
In said 27 separate informations, the eight accused were alleged to have conspired in the commission
of said offense in or about and during the period comprised between December, 1954 and September,
1955, by having allegedly caused it to appear: that cash aids were given when no such aids were
indeed distributed to the persons named and at the time and place and in such amounts specified, or
by making and/or causing it to appear that certain relief supplies or merchandise were purchased by
the accused Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales when in truth and in fact no such relief supplies were
purchased, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of fact in said public and official
documents. The aforesaid separate informations for falsification were couched in the same form and
language, alleged the same period of time of the commission of the felonious acts, i.e., between
December, 1954, and September, 1955, and invariably described only two different modes of
commission of the alleged falsifications.
On the same date, the prosecution filed ex parte petition for the consolidation of all said 27 falsification
cases and one malversation case. This was granted by the trial court. After the Court of First Instance
of Manila granted the ex-parte petition consolidating the said cases before Branch II of the Manila
Court. The prosecution suddenly reversed its stand and sought a reconsideration of said order of
consolidation and prayed instead for the distribution or farming out of said 27 falsification cases before
all branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila., as a consequence of which, and over the repeated
objections of the defense, said 27 cases for falsification were ordered distributed among the 18
different branches of said Court. After protracted quibbling on various procedural and technical aspects
of the distribution of said 27 falsification cases in the manner above described before the 18 branches
of the lower court, the accused appellees filed, a motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 36878 and
36883 to 36884, inclusive, assigned to Branch XVIII of the lower court, on the ground of double
jeopardy, said motion having been filed also in each of the other 16 salas or branches of the lower
court before which the said cases were docketed, accused-appellees predicating the aforesaid motion
on the ground that said 27 separate informations for falsification indeed constitute only one indictable
offense of falsification considering that the falsifications allegedly committed separately as described
under said separate informations were but the result or product of one single criminal impulse or intent,
and the same are therefore in the nature of a continuing offense which should be alleged and
prosecuted only under one information.
RTC: Order of Dismissal issued by Judge Ruperto Kapunan (Branch XVIII) dated January 19, 1960,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904; Order of Judge Macadaeg, dated March 23, 1960
(Branch X) dismissing Criminal Case No. 36882; and the decision of Judge Tan (Branch XIII) dated
March 24, 1960, in Criminal Case No. 36885, acquitting the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the twenty-seven (27) falsifications were the product of only one criminal intent and
hence, the remaining falsification charges should be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
Ruling:
NO. It is argued that since all the falsifications were supposedly committed within a specific period
(from December, 1954 to September, 1955), and that the allegations in the different informations for
falsification are the same, said acts were but the product or result of a singular criminal intent. One
reason advanced by the trial court and the Solicitor General in holding that the falsifications constituted
a continuing offense, proceeding from a single criminal intent is that, according to the manifestation of
the City Fiscal and Special Prosecutor, the motive for these falsifications, was to conceal the
malversation. The appellees seem to confuse motive with criminal intent.
Motive is not an element of a felony; it is merely a prospectant circumstantial evidence. Criminal intent
renders an act a felony. Motive is a state of the mind of the accused, and it is he who can state his real
motive in committing a crime. Whatever the fiscal had manifested, as to the motive which had impelled
the accused to transgress the law, was but a speculation gathered in the process of investigation. The
existence of the motive to conceal malversation, in the cases at bar, is a question of fact which should
be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the defense of double jeopardy.
The Court cannot assume that the purpose of committing the twenty-seven (27) falsifications was to
conceal the malversation. This is so because there is no showing that for every particular amount they
had malversed on a certain period, they had purposedly perpetrated the corresponding falsification to
cover up such amount, until the whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall have been completely
misappropriated.
In the absence of such showing, it is to be presumed that in the falsification of each document, the
criminal intent was separated and distinct. Although all the informations in the 27 falsification cases
were uniformly worded, the numbers of the vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts
thereof are different.
The undeniable facts, alleged in the informations, evidently show that different acts of falsification were
committed on different vouchers and covering distinct amounts. Each information did not refer to all
said acts of falsification. Neither is there merit in the argument that said acts of falsification constituted
a continuing offense, so as to have them all prosecuted in only one information. WHEREFORE, the
Order of the lower court (Branch XVIII) dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904 on
the ground of double jeopardy is set aside and another entered remanding the said case for further
proceedings. The Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appeal, presented by the Solicitor General should be,
as it is hereby denied. No special pronouncement as to costs

Petron & People v. William GR 243328

DOCTRINE:
Facts:
Respondents, as Directors and Officers of Masagana Gas Corporation, were charged on February 21,
2011 in the RTC of Makati the crime of unfair competition for their alleged acts of selling and offering
for sale liquefied petroleum gas in steel cylinders belonging to Petron, it influenced purchasers to
believe that the goods are those of Petron which deceived the public and defraud Petron of its
legitimate trade. Earlier, on July 2, 2010, respondents were already charged with unfair competition
for the same act committed in Cavite on February 13, 2003. Respondents filed with the RTC of Makati
City a Motion to Quash Information which was denied, and later, a Motion to Dismiss, which was also
denied. However, on motion for reconsideration, the RTC of Makati City quashed the information
finding that the crime of unfair competition is a transitory offense, and since the RTC of Trece Martirez
City, Cavite had taken prior cognizance of the case, it has no more jurisdiction to entertain the same.
The CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in quashing the Information.
RTC: Motion to Quash Granted
CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.

Defense: Two information filed in Makati and Trece Martires contain the same set of facts and acts,
producing one continuing offense, one single crime which only needs one information. The first
information was filed in Trece Martires, hence it acquired exclusive jurisdiction. What is being punished
in the UNFAIR COMPETITION is the act of deceiving or maneuvering to deceive buyers. The selling
of the products is the means to carry out the intention to deceive and an instrument to violate Petron’s
intellectual property rights.

Prosecution: the acts were committed 14 days apart and in two cities with a 50 km distance. The
distinct acts of selling counterfeit goods on different dates and locations is not a single criminal
impulse. The act of fraud and deception only materialized in the selling of the good. Each sale is an
independent unlawful act, thus the cases lodged are all separate.

Issue:
W/N CA the crime of UNFAIR COMPETITION is a continuing crime (Delito continuado), thus, the
quashing of information in the Makati RTC is correct?
Ruling:
CA Decision AFFIRMED.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material and
essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that
the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has
jurisdiction to try the case. There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its
consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense
committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing, and this is called continued crime.
For a crime to be considered as delito continuado (continued or continuous crime), there must be
plurality of acts committed by the actor against different parties on the same occasion with the same
criminal intent or purpose of violating the same penal provision. A delito continuado is a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an non intermittent force,
however long a time it may occupy.
Respondents only continued or repeated the alleged singular crime committed in Cavite and all the
way up to Makati. Hence, unfair competition does not fall under the criterion of a delito continuado.
There are no two separate crimes of unfair competition allegedly committed by respondents.
Both the RTC of Cavite and Makati City have jurisdiction to try the case for unfair competition filed
against respondents. However, it has been held that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts. Since it is the RTC of Trece Martires City, Cavite which
had earlier acquired jurisdiction over the case of unfair competition filed against respondents, the RTC
of Makati City correctly quashed the Information filed with it for lack of jurisdiction. The crime of unfair
competition is a continuing crime and cannot be considered as delito continuado.

Moreno v. COMELEC GR 168550

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec
en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of
Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties,
was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976
(Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides
that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation on
December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The
grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only
to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes
an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE:
Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate
to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno
was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers
offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from
running for a local elective office. Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies
only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and
not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.
Colinares v. People GR 182748
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
The accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur. On June 25, 2000, Rufino on their way to the store together
with his wife, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone and suffered
two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries
were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were
all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply,
Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back.
Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck
Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him
with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled
and hid in his sister’s house.
The RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking
conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not, Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty
and may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide.With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC. Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed
on him denied him that choice.
Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished
penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for
that privilege. Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty
imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty.
In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the
law would allow him to apply for probation. In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty,
not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first
time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.