People vs. Macalindong

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FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 248202


PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

GESMUNDO, CJ,
Chairperson,
CAGUIOA,
-versus- LAZARO-JAVIER,
LOPEZ, M., * and
LOPEZ, J., JJ.

Promulgated:
LEONARDO
MACALINDONG y
AND ALLON, OCT 1 3 2021
Accused-Appellant.
x--------------------------------------------------------d------x

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This appeal assails the Decision I dated April 4, 2019 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09196 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Leonardo Macalindong y Andallon which affirmed appellant's conviction for
murder, thus:

* On official leave.
1 Penned by Assodak Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Henri Jean Paul B. lnting (now a member of the Court), all members
of the Special Second Division, rollo, pp. 3-18.

If
Decision 2 G.R. No. 248202

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby


DENIED.

Accordingly, the Decision dated 10 December 2015 of the Regional


Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, City of Calapan, in Criminal
Case No. CR-07-8753, finding accused-appellant Leonardo Macalindong
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that treachery and abuse of superior strength
qualified the murder, that accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, and that the awards of moral and
exemplary da.'llages are increased in the amount of Pl00,000.00 each.

Pursuant to the pronouncement in Nacar v. Gallery Frames and


Felipe Bordey, Jr., appellant is further ORDERED to pay legal interest on
all awarded damages at 6% per annum from the filing of the Information on
12 Febrna.ry 2007 until the finality of this Decision, and another 6% per
annum from such finality until full payment.

SO ORDERED. 2

Antecedents

The Charge

Appellant Leonardo Macalindong (appellant) was charged with the


murder of his live-in partner Jovelia Malinao y Panot (Jovelia), viz.:

That on or about the 10th day ofFebrnary 2007, at around [sic] 8:00
o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Riverside, Barangay Pakyas, Municipality
of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with a decided purpose to kill and
while armed with a bladed instrnment, attack, assault[,] and stab one
JO VELIA MALINAO y PANOT, his live-in partner while the latter was
unaware, unarmed[,] and defenseless, inflicting upon the latter multiple stab
wounds at the different parts of the body causing her instantaneous death.

That in the commission of the offense, the qualifying circumstances


of superior strength and evident premeditation are attendant.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 3

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 40,
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not
guilty. 4 Trial ensued.

Proceedings before the Trial Court

Version of the Prosecution

2
Id. at 16-17.
3
CA rollo, p. 53.
'Id. at 54.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 248202

Seven (7)-year old Lyn Joy Macalindong (Lyn Joy) testified that in the
evening of February 10, 2007, she heard her father, herein appellant, and her
mother, Jovelia, quarreling inside their home in Barangay Pakyas, Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro. At that time, her brother Jonard was sound asleep. She cried
when she saw appellant stab Jovelia. She approached J ovelia but the latter was
already dead. Appellant then went out of the house. 5

Her grandfather Ofring and several policemen arrived. The police


investigated her and took photos of the crime scene. She was shown a photo
of a knife which she recognized to be the same knife appellant used to stab
Jovelia. 6

On cross, she stated that she saw appellant stab Jovelia many times. She
later heard her grandmother Nanay Nina saying that Jovelia was stabbed
twenty-two (22) times. 7

The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following matters:

1) The proposed testimony of Senior Police Officer 4 Henry Malitao


(SPO4 Malitao) regarding the sworn statement he and Police Officer 3
Rhoda Macabata (PO3 Macabata) had jointly executed stating that they
received information that a woman was killed by her live-in partner;
they recorded the incident in the police blotter; they proceeded to Sitio
Riverside, Barangay Pakyas, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro; there they
saw appellant embracing his two (2) children; they were able to talk to
appellant's daughter Lyn Joy, who informed them that it was appellant
who killed her mother, Jovelia, and they arrested appellant and
informed him of his Miranda rights. 8

2) The proposed testimony of another daughter of appellant and Jovelia


named Jealavia Malinao pertaining to the execution and contents of her
sworn affidavit that around three o'clock in the morning of February
10, 2007, inside their home, her sister Lyn Joy told her that while their
parents were fighting, appellant stabbed their mother in different parts
of her body. 9

3) The proposed testimony of PO3 Macabata pertaining to the sworn


statement she jointly executed with SPO4 Malitao. 10

4) The proposed testimony of Dr. Ma. Virginia Valdez (Dr. Valdez),


Municipal Health Officer of Victoria, Oriental Mindoro pertaining to
her examination of Jovelia's body, her findings, and her issuance of
J ovelia' s death certificate. 11

5
Id.
6
Id
7 Id.

'Id. at 54-55.
9
Id. at 56.
w Id
II Id.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 248202

Version of the Accused

Appellant testified that he could not remember what happened in the


morning of February 10, 2007 because he blacked out and when he woke up,
he was already inside the provincial jail. Before that, the only thing he could
remember was that he, Jovelia, and their two (2) children were inside their
family home. He could not tell with certainty whether he was responsible for
J ovelia' s death. 12

He submitted in evidence the Initial Report dated March 10, 2008 from
the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) and a Medical Certificate
dated November 9, 2007 issued by Dr. Florecita Lindo (Dr. Lindo), both
certifying that he was suffering from schizophrenia. 13

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision 14 dated December 10, 2015, the trial court found appellant
guilty of the murder of Jovelia. It gave credence to Lyn Joy's positive
identification of appellant as the person who stabbed Jovelia multiple times.
Treachery attended the killing because appellant suddenly attacked Jovelia
who was unaware of the impending attack and was utterly defenseless. The
trial court, however, did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation for lack of evidence. Thus:

ACCORDINGLY, finding herein accused Leonardo Macalindong y


Andallon guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation
of the crime of Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, with t.li.e attending qualifying circumstance of treachery, said accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
with all the accessory penalties as provided by law. Said accused Leonardo
Macalindong y Andallon is hereby directed to indemnify the heirs of the
victim Jovelia Malinao y Panot the amount of Php!00,000.00 as civil
indemnity, . Php75,000.00 as moral damages and PhpS0,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

so ORDERED. 15
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for: a) appreciating the


qualifying circumstance of treachery despite the alleged absence of evidence
that the attack was sudden and that Jovelia was unaware of the impending
attack, thus, rendering lier defenseless; and b) not giving credence to his claim
that he had been afflicted with a mental illness notwithstanding that the trial
court itself had deferred his arraignment, referred him to the Oriental Mindoro
Provincial Hospital, received Dr. Lindo's finding that he had been afflicted

12
/d. at 57.
13 Jd.
14 Penned by Judge Romas C. Leynes, id. at 53-60.
15 Id. at 59-60.

If
Decision 5 G.R. No. 248202

with schizophrenia, and referred him to the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) whose initial finding confirmed his schizophrenia. 16

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor


General Bernard Hernandez and Associate Solicitor Jasmine Logrono,
countered: Lyn Joy's testimony was sufficient to convict appellant of murder;
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the fact that appellant
stabbed Jovelia with a knife multiple times and the killing was committed in
their home and in the presence of their children; and the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength could also be appreciated in this
case. 17

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision 18 dated April 4, 2019, the Court of Appeals


affirmed with modification. In addition to treachery, it also appreciated abuse
of superior strength on account of appellant being an adult male armed with a
knife, increased the awards of moral and exemplary damages to i'l00,000.00
each, directed appellant to pay interest on all monetary awards at six percent
(6%)per annum from the filing of the Information on February 12, 2007 until
the finality of its decision, and another six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of its decision until full payment.

The Present Appeal

Appellant now seeks anew a verdict of acquittal. Both appellant 19 and


the OSG 20 manifested that, in lieu of their supplemental briefs, they were
adopting their respective briefs in the Court of Appeals.

Issues

1) Can appellant be credited with the exempting circumstance of


insanity?

2) Was appellant properly convicted of murder?

Ruling

Appellant's defense of
insanity must fail

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that insanity can
exempt one from criminal liability, thus:

16 Id. at 32-51.
17
Id. at 74-82.
18
Supra note 1.
19
Rollo, pp. 60-6 I.
20 Id. at 34-36.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 248202

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -


the following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during


a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act


which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

xxxx

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence


while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he or
she acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. The legal
teaching consistently maintained in our jurisprudence is that the plea of
insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, if the accused is
found to be sane at the time he or she perpetrated the offense, a judgment of
conviction is inevitable because he or she had already admitted that he or she
committed the offense. 21 People v. Madarang2- 2 elucidates:

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent


criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition


of the mind, not susceptible [of] the usual means of proof. As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony
which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must
relate to the time preceding or coetaueous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. (Emphases supplied)

Verily, the exempting circumstance of insanity requires two (2)


elements: (1) the insanity of the accused constitutes a complete deprivation of
intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) such insanity existed at the time
of, or i1mnediately preceding, the commission of the crime. 23

21 People v. Salvador, 834 Phil. 632, 645 (2018).


22
387 Phil. 846, 859 (2000).
23 People v. Pantoja, 821 Phil. 1052, 1061-1062 (2017).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 248202

Here, appellant's plea of insanity - that he was suffering from


schizophrenia - at the time he killed Jovelia was unsubstantiated. More
specifically, though he claimed to have blacked out on the day in question,
there was no showing that the same happened at the time of, or immediately
preceding, the killing of Jovelia. All he said was he blacked out and was not
sure whether it was he who killed the victim. True, there was an Initial Report
dated March 10, 2008 from the NCMH and a Medical Certificate dated
November 9, 2007 issued by Dr. Lindo. Yet, Dr. Lindo was not even called to
identify the medical certificate, let alone, expound on the contents of the
NCMH initial report specifically the extent and the specific time frame of
appellant's illness. Consequently, appellant's defense of insanity cannot be
credited as an exempting circumstance.

Appellant is guilty of
homicide only

Seven (7)-year old Lyn Joy positively testified that it was her father,
herein appellant, who stabbed her mother Jovelia to death with a knife on
February 10, 2007, thus:

PROS. DOLOR:

Q. You live in Pakyas, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, right?


A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who is your mother?


A. Jovy, sir.

Q. Do you have siblings?


A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many? Tell us who are your siblings?


A. Jonard, only J onard, sir.

Q. Who is your father?


A. Joel, sir.

Q. Where is your father now?


A. He is there. He killed my mom, sir.

Q. When your father killed your mom where were you?


A. I was in the house, sir.

COURT:

Q. Did you see your father actually killed [sic] your mother?
A. Yes, [y]our Honor.

Q. What kind of instrument did your father use in killing your mother?
A. A knife, [y]our Honor.

Q. Now, what is again the name of your father?


A. Joel, [y]our Honor.

Q. And that Joel is Leonardo Macalindong who is the accused in this case?
A. Yes, [y]our Honor.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 248202

Q. Ifhe is inside the courtroom, can you point at him?


A. Yes, [y]our Honor.

Q. Will you please stand up and point to the accused where is be now?

INTERPRETER:

Witness points at a person inside the courtroom who ideutified his


name as Leonardo Macalindong.

COURT:

Proceed now.

PROS. DOLOR:

Q. Where in the house were you?


A. I was in the room, sir.

Q. How far were you from your mother when she was stabbed by your father?
A. I was on a cemented part of the house, sir.

COURT:

Q. Do you know how many times did (sic) your father stab (sic) your mother
with a knife?
A. Yes, [y]our Honor.

Q. How many times?


A. Twenty-two (22) times, [y]our Honor.

Q. Do you know why your father stabbed to death your mother?


A. Because they quarreled, [y]our Honor.

Q. And did you hear what your father was saying before he stabbed your mother?
A. Yes, [y]our Honor.

Q. Now, after your father stabbed your mother, what did you do?
A. I just looked at them, [y]our Honor.

Q. And did you cry?


A. Yes, [y ]our Honor.

Q. Did you go to your mother after she was already stabbed to death?
A. Yes, [y]our Honor.

Q. And you were able to talk to your mother at the time that you approached
her or she was already dead?
A. She was already dead, [y]our Honor.

PROS. DOLOR:

We put on record that the witness is crying.

COURT:

Q. After your father repeatedly stabbed your mother which[,] according to


you, you saw 22 times, where did your father go after that?
A. He was able to escape, [y)our Houor.

Q. So your father went out of your house at that time?


A. Yes, [y]our Honor. (Emphases supplied)

I
Decision 9 G.R. No. 248202

Lyn Joy narrated that she was with appellant and Jovelia in a room
inside their house. Appellant and Jovelia were quarreling when appellant
suddenly stabbed Jovelia with a knife twenty-two (22) times. After stabbing
J ovelia, appellant just left the house.

Indeed, the testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible,


is sufficient to support a conviction even for murder. 24 More so because
Filipino children have great respect and reverence for their elders and would
not casually point to one of their parents as the killer of the other, if it were
not true. For this reason, great weight is given to an accusation children direct
against a close relative, especially their father or mother. 25

Against such positive and categorical identification made by his own


seven (7)-year old daughter, appellant merely interposed denial - specifically
that he blacked out and could not tell whether he killed Jovelia. The defense
of denial itself is ambivalent compared to the positive identification of
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving
of weight in law. 26 Further, People v. Domingo 27 disregarded an accused's
claim that he had no recollection of the crime because of schizophrenia, thus:

Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that


he was insane at the time he committed the crime. He testified that nine days
before he committed the crime, he suffered from lack of appetite,
sleeplessness, and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering
him to kill bad people. He claims that he does not remember anything that
happened on 29 March 2000, when the crimes were committed, and that he
was already detained when he became conscious of his surroundings.

The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated,


the law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to
presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately
before or at the moment the crime was committed.

xxxx

It is also remarkable that appellant's testimony is not supported


by his family's or intimate friends' accounts of his purported insanity.
Appellant testified that he had been suffering from symptoms of
insanity nine days before the incident. Insanity may be shown by the
surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the allegedly deranged person's general conduct and
appearance, his conduct consistent with his previous character and
habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident
bargains. It is difficult to believe that appellant's behavior, conduct and
appearance, which would denote mental disturbance, escaped the
notice of his family and friends. (Emphasis supplied)

24 People v. Avila, 787 Phil. 346,358 (2016).


25 People v. Marmol, 800 Phil. 813,827 (2016).
26 People v. Golidan, 823 Phil. 548, 577-578 (2018).
27 599 Phil. 589, 605-607 (2009).

I/
Decision 10 G.R. No. 248202

As in Domingo, appellant here did not offer corroborating evidence that


he indeed blacked out or was not himself before, during, and after the killing
of Jovelia. Verily, his claim, which amounts to a denial, deserves scant
consideration.

Since it had been established beyond any shadow of doubt that


appellant did kill Jovelia, the next question hinges on whether the killing is
murder or homicide.

The elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 28 of the RPC; and (4) the killing is
not parricide or infanticide. 29

Here, we focus on whether the killing was attended by treachery and/or


by abuse of superior strength.

Treachery requires the following elements: 1) the employment of


means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the
malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or herself or to retaliate;
and 2) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of
execution.

A finding of treachery should be based on clear and convincing


evidence. The same ought to be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its
existence cannot be presumed. As with the finding of guilt of the accused, any
doubt as to the existence of treachery should be resolved in favor of the
accused. The fact that the attack was unexpected cannot be the sole basis of a
finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another so long as
the victim's position was merely accidental. The means adopted must have
been the result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. 30

Here, based on Lyn Joy's testimony, while appellant and Jovelia were
fighting, appellant got caught in the heat of the moment, and suddenly
attacked Jovelia with a knife and stabbed her multiple times. Everything

28 Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defe.nse or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding ofa vessel, derailment or assault
upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destnictive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
29 People v. Maron, G.R. No. 232339, November 20, 2019.
3
°Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 45 (2014).
Decision 11 G.R. No. 248202

happened so fast indicating that appellant acted impulsively and on a spur of


the moment, rather than with logic, cunning, deliberateness, or strategy.
Surely, the suddenness of the attack, standing alone, did not immediately
equate to treachery. We, therefore, hold that treachery did not attend the
killing of Jovelia.

As for abuse of superior strength, it must be proved that there was a


notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that was
plainly and obviously advantageous to the latter who purposely selected or
took advantage of such inequality in order to facilitate the commission of the
crime. The assailant must be shown to have consciously sought the advantage,
or to have the deliberate intent to use his or her superior advantage. In this
context, to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force
excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The appreciation of the attendance of this qualifying or aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 31

Here, Lyn Joy testified that while appellant and Jovelia were fighting,
appellant suddenly grabbed a knife which he used to stab Jovelia several times
in different parts of her body. Even though appellant is an adult male who was
armed with a knife, he cannot be automatically said to have abused his
superior strength. In People v. Mirafla, 32 the difference in age and sex of the
victim (73-year-old female) and the accused (male in early 20s) was
considered insufficient to conclude the presence of abuse of superior strength.
Further, the fact that an assailant was armed with a knife does not ipso facto
indicate abuse of superior strength. 33 To repeat, appellant acted impulsively
and on a spur of the moment, not with logic, cunning, deliberateness, or
strategy. Thus, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated in this case.

Consequently, since Jovelia's killing was not attended by any


qualifying circumstance that would elevate the crime to murder, appellant is
only guilty of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
RPC, viz.:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246, shall kill another, without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

The elements of homicide are: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( d) the killing was not attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide. 34

31 People v. Evasco, G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018, 881 SCRA 79, 91.
32
831 Phil. 215,226 (2018).
33 People v. Beduya, 641 Phil."399, 411 (2010).
34 Wacoyv. People, 761 Phil. 570,578 (2015).

I
Decision 12 G.R. No. 248202

Here, as previously discussed, appellant's defense of insanity was not


sufficiently substantiated by credible expert testimony. Additionally, he was
positively identified by his own seven (7)-year old daughter as the one who
stabbed Jovelia to death. Intent to kill was sufficiently proved. People v.
Espina35 elucidates on the external manifestations of intent to kill, viz.:

Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only


through external manifestations. In Rivera v. People, We held that intent to
kill must be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence which may
consist of: (1) the means used by the malefactor; (2) the nature, location,
and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed. We have also
considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words
he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.

There is certainly no doubt that appellant intended to kill Jovelia when


he stabbed her about twenty-two (22) times.

Imposable Penalty and


Damages

The crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal under


Article 249 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 36 in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, appellant should be
sentenced to eight (8) years ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 37

On the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence38 ordains the grant


of r'S0,000.00 as civil indemnity and PS0,000.00 as moral damages to the
heirs of Jovelia. Additionally, the heirs of Jovelia are entitled to PS0,000.00

35 G.R. No. 219614, July 10, 2019.


36 Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
37 People v. Galam, G.R. No. 224222, October 09, 2019.
38 Peoplev. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806,852 (2016).

xxxx
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties,
i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender,[127]
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abo1tion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity -1'50,000.00
b. Moral damages - !'50,000.00
xxxx
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information,[128] in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the
amount ofl"S0,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; l"30,000.00 for frustrated; and f'20,000.00
for attempted, shall be awarded.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 248202

as temperate damages for burial or funeral expenses. 39 Exemplary damages


though are not warranted in the absence of aggravating circumstances.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that "[pjursuant to the
pronouncement in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, appellant is further ORDERED
to pay legal interest on all awarded damages at 6% per annum from the filing
ofthe Information on 12 February 2007 until the finality ofthis Decision, and
another 6% per annum from such finality until full payment."

The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate


damages are in the form ofunliquidated damages, thus, the six percent (6%)
interest shall begin to run from finality of the judgment. Nacar v. Gallery
Frames 40 is very clear on this:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of


actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:

xxxx

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of


money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may
be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on uniiquidated claims or
damages, except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. I 169, Civil Code), but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3.When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money


becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case
falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed
to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. (Emphasis
supplied)

In fine, the monetary awards here shall earn six percent (6%) legal
interest per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

39 Id. at 853-854.
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is
presented in court, the amount ofl.'50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. . _
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of c1v1l
indemnity is !'3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be
chanoed
b ,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when
the present circumstance warrants it.
40 716 Phil. 267, 278-279 (2013).
Decision 14 G.R. No. 248202

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision


dated April 4, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09196 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

Appellant LEONARDO MACALINDONG y ANDALLON is found


GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to eight (8) years ofprision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is directed TO PAY the HEIRS OF
JOVELIAMALINAO y PANOT P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.

All monetary awards are subject to six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

J;v.f ~RO-.TAVIER
Associate Justice
Decision 15 G.R. No. 248202

WE CONCUR:

ALE,,A.f-\,;t")l'V".1'"-K G. GESMUNDO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

(On official leave)


MARIO V. LOPEZ
Associate Justice

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that


the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division .

. GESMUNDO
..

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