Wounds That Will Not Heal

VISIT…
(continued from front flap)

Nieli POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Social
Policy SOCIAL SCIENCE / Discrimination &
indispensable survival value over the millennia Race Relations
of human evolution. Ethnic rage at breaches in “Wounds That Will Not Heal is a superb book on an important area of public policy. US $29.95 / CAN $34.50
reciprocity norms is thus built into our genome, Nieli Indeed, supporters and opponents of racial preferences in higher education will
contends, and wise public policy must adapt to this. find much food for thought in this compelling analysis of affirmative action policy. Racial preference policies came on the national
Wounds That Will Not Heal

Drawing on decades of social science research, Dr. Nieli presents a powerful analysis scene as a response to the urban riots of the late
Nieli concludes with an impassioned plea to refocus 1960s. Many influential policy planners concluded
of the effects that affirmative action policies have had on their intended beneficiaries,
public attention on the “truly disadvantaged”: the that more had to be done to address the problem
and he considers the harm that it poses to unprotected groups. I highly recom-
urban African American poor, for whom affirmative of black poverty and alienation than could be
action policies were created but whose interests were
mend Wounds That Will Not Heal for course adoptions in graduate and undergraduate achieved through the color-blind theory of justice
quickly forgotten as the fruits of the policies were courses on public policy.” that had done so much to inspire the earlier Civil
effectively hijacked by members of the black and —Carol M. Swain, Professor of Political Science and Law, Rights Movement. In the more than forty years that
Hispanic middle class. Few will be able to read this Vanderbilt University controversial preference policies have been with us,
book without at least questioning the wisdom of our however, they continue to provoke resentment and
current race-based preference policies, which Nieli grievance, particularly among poor whites, Asians,
analyzes with a penetrating gaze and ruthlessly honest and so-called “white ethnics.”
assessment.
In Wounds That Will Not Heal, political theorist
Russell K. Nieli Russell K. Nieli surveys some of the more important
did his undergraduate social science research on racial preference policies
work at Duke University conducted over the past two decades, much of which,
during the tumultuous he says, undermines key claims of preference policy
years of the late 1960s.
After graduating summa
Wounds That Will Not Heal supporters. The mere fact that preference policies
must be referred to by means of euphemism and
cum laude, he received a code words—”affirmative action,” “diversity,” “race
Ph.D. in political science
from Princeton and spent
Affirmative Action sensitive admissions,” “goals and timetables”—tells
us something, Nieli argues, about their widespread
a post-doc year in Yale’s Religion Department. Nieli and Our Continuing unpopularity, their tendency to reinforce negative
racial stereotypes, and their incompatibility with
Racial Divide
is currently a Senior Preceptor in Princeton’s James
Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions core principles of American justice. Around the
and Lecturer in Princeton’s Politics Department. world, policies of racial and ethnic favoritism
Much of his published work in recent years focuses on provoke outrage on the part of groups not favored,
issues of race in America, which he approaches from which Nieli explains using theories of contemporary
the perspective of classical liberalism and what he calls evolutionary psychology. We are all genetically
“theocentric humanism.” inclined to favor our own kind—and to be suspicious
of outsiders—Nieli argues, so to reach greater
concord in multi-ethnic societies, we are enjoined
Cover design by Nick Collier in the civic realm to give up our in-group favoritism
Cover image © sirius-sdz.deviantart.com
as long as all other groups do the same. We are
powerfully predisposed for genetic reasons to meet
breaches of this reciprocity norm with outrage and
Encounter Books
900 Broadway, Suite 601
even violence as such responses would have had
New York, New York 10003-1239
www.encounterbooks.com
Russ e l l K . N i e l i (contin ued on bac k flap )
Wounds That Will Not
Heal
WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 1 9/25/12 8:48 AM

Wounds
That Will
Not Heal
Affirmative Action and
Our Continuing Racial
Divide
russell k. nieli
Encounter Books New York • London
WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v7.indd 3 10/1/12 3:56 PM

© 2012 by Russell K. Nieli
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise, without the prior written permission of
Encounter Books, 900 Broadway, Suite 601,
New York, New York, 10003.
First American edition published in 2012 by Encounter Books,

an activity of Encounter for Culture and Education, Inc.,
a nonprofit, tax exempt corporation.
Encounter Books website address: www.encounterbooks.com
Manufactured in the United States and printed on

acid-free paper. The paper used in this publication meets
the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48 1992
(R 1997) (Permanence of Paper).
FIRST AMERICAN EDITION
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Nieli, Russell, 1948–
Wounds that will not heal: affirmative action and our continuing racial divide/
by Russell K. Nieli.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-582-1 (hardcover: alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 1-59403-582-2 (hardcover: alk. paper) 1. Affirmative action programs—
United States. 2. Affirmative action programs in education--
United States. 3. Discrimination in employment—United States.
4. Racism—United States. I. Title.
HF5549.5.A34N54 2012
331.13’30973—dc23
2011025538

To the memory of Mohandas K. Gandhi and
Martin Luther King, Jr., who spoke to
our common humanity and taught us
the dignity and worth of all
God’s children regardless
of race or class.

conte n t s
introductionâ•…9
I
a nation of individual citizens or a
confederation of contending tribes?â•… 31
II
are racial preferences an antidote to racism?â•… 97
III
the changing shape of the river: affirmative
action and some recent social science
researchâ•…133
IV
diversity and its discontents: the contact
hypothesis under fireâ•… 241
V
selling merit down the riverâ•… 275
VI
still america’s continuing dilemmaâ•… 383
Indexâ•…481

Not only has the politics of rights spread to increasing num-
bers of groups in American society since the 1960s, it has also
expanded its goal. The relatively narrow goal of equalizing
opportunity by eliminating discriminatory barriers developed
toward the far broader goal of affirmative action—govern-
ment policies or programs that seek to address past injus-
tices against specified groups by making special efforts to
provide members of these groups with access to educational
and employment opportunities. An affirmative action policy
tends to involve two novel approaches: (1) positive or benign
discrimination in which race or some other status is actually
taken into account as a positive rather than negative factor;
and (2) compensatory action to favor members of the disad-
vantaged groups who themselves may never have been the vic-
tims of discrimination.
—benjamin ginsberg et al., we the people:
an introduction to american politics,
seventh essentials edition (new york:
w. w. norton & company, 2009), pp. 128–30.

i ntrodu c t i on
R acial preferences in the U.S. first arose in response to the

widespread rioting in the urban black ghettos of America
during the late 1960s. As a result of these urban upheavals, con-
cerned elites in the federal bureaucracy and federal courts, as
well as in the top universities and law schools, concluded that
much more had to be done to deal with the pressing problem of
black poverty and alienation in America than could be achieved
through the prevailing ideal of color-blind justice, which had
done so much to inspire the 1950s and 1960s era civil rights
movement.1
1. On racial preference policy as a response to urban rioting, see John David Skrentny,
The Ironies of Affirmative Action (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); and
Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: The Origins and Development of National
Policy, 1960–1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Many would trace the
transition from the color-blind civil rights ideal to color-conscious preferences to an
address by President Johnson at Howard University in June 1965: “You do not take a
man who, for years, has been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to the starting
line of a race saying, ‘You are free to compete with all the others,’ and still believe
you have been fair. This is the next and more profound state of the battle for civil
rights. We seek not just freedom of opportunity, not just legal equity, but human ability;
not just equality as a right and theory, but equality as a right and result.” Although
Johnson himself at this time was probably thinking of a huge expansion of Great Society
training and other programs rather than racial preferences—two years after this speech
he issued Executive Order 11375 reaffirming in unmistakably clear and forceful terms
the requirement for color-blind, nondiscriminatory, merit-focused hiring for all federal
contractors—the speech was interpreted by many supporters of racial preferences and
racial quotas as an endorsement of their ideas.

10â•…introduction
From the very beginning, however, racial preference policy

was anathema to large segments of the American public, includ-
ing many of those who had fought the good fight to end segre-
gation and racial oppression in the Jim Crow South. For them,
racial preferences were a shameful betrayal of the highest ideals
of the civil rights movement, and of Justice Harlan’s magiste-
rial pronouncement in the Plessy case that “our Constitution
is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.” And today, more than four decades after their intro-
duction, preferentialist policies continue to be a source of loath-
ing and offense to their many critics, despite the notable shift
in their supporters’ preferred justifications from “compensatory
justice” and “pressing social needs” to the sweeter sounding
note of “diversity.”
In Wounds That Will Not Heal, I address the continuing
controversy over racial preference policies in America, par-
ticularly those in university admissions and in employment.
Reworking a series of essays compiled over a period of more
than three decades, I offer a no-holds-barred critique of race-
based employment and university admissions policies, whose
consequences for the social harmony and well-being of America,
I believe, are almost wholly negative. Until they are removed,
racial preferences, I contend, will continue to gnaw at the inter-
ethnic norm of reciprocity and fairness, which is the very linch-
pin holding together racially and ethnicly diverse societies like
the United States.
The fact that their supporters must continue to refer to racial
preferences through an elaborate double-speak of euphemisms
and code words—“affirmative action,” “diversity,” “goals and
timetables,” “race-sensitive admissions”—should tell us some-
thing. The need to speak in such euphemisms and code words
indirectly acknowledges the fact that preferences based on race
run counter to deeply ingrained ideals of justice and fair play in

wounds that will not heAlâ•… 11
America and require verbal dodges and prettifying obfuscations

to be defended before the general public.
In his insightful study, The Ironies of Affirmative Action,
political scientist John David Skrentny makes the telling point
that toward the end of both world wars bills were introduced
in Congress granting preferences in government employment to
those who had recently served in the military. Without euphe-
misms or verbal dodges they were simply called “veterans pref-
erence bills.” And they passed overwhelmingly.
Although one can dispute the wisdom of granting job pref-
erences to veterans, even to those who have taken time out of
their personal careers to serve their country in time of war (wise
voices argue compellingly that there are more appropriate ways
to reward veterans than through means compromising the wor-
thy principle of merit-based selection),2 it is clear that for many
Americans granting job preferences for the right reasons breaches
no generalized principle of justice. This is why job preferences
for veterans can be called by their proper name—“preferences.”
But simply being a member of an “underrepresented” racial or
ethnic minority group is not seen by most people in America
as one of these “right reasons”—hence the need for deceit and
deception by their defenders when racial preferences are pub-
licly discussed. Does anyone have the slightest doubt about the
legislative fate or the level of public support for an honestly
labeled “Underrepresented Minorities Preference Bill”? For a
“Racial Quota Employment Bill”? A “Minorities First Act”?
But advocates for racial preferences have other reasons
for employing deceit and deception in the packaging of their
wares than the perceived unfairness of such preferences and
their lack of public support. Social philosopher Michael Wal-
zer explained this all very well long ago in his book Spheres of
2. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 154 n.

Justice. “In our culture,” Walzer wrote, “careers are supposed

to be open to talents; and people chosen for an office will want
to be assured that they were chosen because they really do pos-
sess, to a greater degree than other candidates, the talents that
the search committee thinks necessary to the office. The other
candidates will want to be assured that their talents were seri-
ously considered. And all the rest of us will want to know that
both assurances are true. That’s why reserved offices [i.e., racial
preferences and racial quotas in jobs and university admissions]
in the United States today have been the subject not only of
controversy but also of deception. Self-esteem and self-respect,
mutual confidence and trust, are at stake as well as social and
economic status.”3
Does anyone really want to be told, “Congratulations, Ms.
Jones, you’re our newest affirmative action hire!”? Or presented
with an equivalent announcement of acceptance to a presti-
gious college? The answer, of course, is no, and because no one
wants to be told such things, no one is. And so a hiatus devel-
ops between what is actually going on—which must be hidden,
suppressed, distorted, or denied—and open public discussion.
Self-esteem and self-respect are on the line, as Walzer says, as
well as the overall group image of those targeted for the prefer-
ences both in their own minds and in the minds of those in the
nonbeneficiary categories. Despite the elaborate concealment
and deception, however, most people come to understand pretty
well exactly what is going on with all the harmful consequences
that follow. One could hardly create a more devilish system than
our current policies of racial preferences for reinforcing in the
minds of all parties concerned the belief that blacks and other
beneficiaries of affirmative action are intellectually inferior to
whites and Asians.
3. Ibid., pp. 152–3.

Economist and social critic Thomas Sowell, a long-time

preference opponent, explains the matter this way in his book
Black Education: Myths and Tragedies:
The actual harm done by quotas is far greater than having a

few incompetent people here and there—and the harm that
will actually be done will be harm primarily to the black
population. What all the arguments and campaigns for quo-
tas are really saying, loud and clear, is that black people just
don’t have it, and that they will have to be given something
in order to have something. The devastating impact of this
message on black people—particularly black young people—
will outweigh any few extra jobs that may result from this
strategy. Those black people who are already competent, and
who could be instrumental in producing more competence
among this rising generation, will be completely undermined
as black becomes synonymous—in the minds of black and
white alike—with incompetence, and black achievement
becomes synonymous with charity and payoffs.4
Having debated the issue of racial preferences in many

forums, I can attest from personal experience that preference
proponents have no answer to the charge that preference poli-
cies reinforce negative stigmas and negative stereotypes about
the competence of their intended beneficiaries. Proponents will
sometimes point out in this context that preference policies did
not create the negative stigmas and negative stereotypes about
the abilities of blacks and other oppressed minorities. Such
debilitating stigmas and stereotypes, they will say, existed long
before compensatory preferences came around and have deep
4. Thomas Sowell, Black Education: Myths and Tragedies (New York: David McKay,
1972), p. 292 (emphasis in original).

roots in our racist culture. So don’t blame racial preference poli-

cies for American racism, they say.
Much of what is claimed in this context is true, of course,
since negative stigmas and negative stereotypes existed long
before the late 1960s and early 1970s, when racial preference
policies first came on the scene. But while racial preferences
usually do not create negative stigmas and negative stereotypes
(although they can), they most certainly reinforce and perpetu-
ate existing stigmas and stereotypes about the abilities of blacks
and other denigrated minorities, and they do so in a powerful
way. And this surely must be considered an overwhelming strike
against them. Preference proponents, I have found, typically
sink into silence in the face of such unanswerable criticisms.
Some will feel that in the following material I have been
much too harsh on preference policies and their supporters, that
I look only at the downside of the policies, and that I ignore all
the good that they have done. In response to such criticisms, I
will just say that on balance not only have 40+ years of racial
preference policies had overwhelmingly negative consequences,
but that if one looks closely enough at the various “goods” they
are supposed to have achieved, these “goods” almost always
turn out to be so intimately tied to countervailing “bads” that
their supposedly positive value cannot be unambiguously placed
in any plus column.
It is said, for instance, that preference policies create greater
diversity and an enriched cultural environment on competitive
college campuses. But whatever truth such claims may con-
tain, the cold fact is that one school’s diversity gain is always
purchased at the expense of another’s diversity loss. Stanford
siphons off black and Latino students who otherwise would
have enrolled at UCLA or UC Riverside, thus depriving such
schools of the diversity-enhancement value of these students.

And by upwardly ratcheting visible minorities into institutions

one, two, or three degrees of selectivity above the level in which
they would have enrolled in the absence of racial preferences,
a stigma- and stereotype-reinforcement factor enters the equa-
tion that means good diversity is always being replaced by bad.
The healthy kind of equal-status mixing is replaced by a very
unhealthy mixing of people of very divergent talents and accom-
plishments. And these divergent talents and accomplishments
differ by the readily visible factor of race. Negative stigmas and
negative stereotypes are inevitably confirmed.
The same picture emerges from the employment arena. Pref-
erence policies, their supporters say, have been the major fac-
tor in creating a large and stable black middle class and a large
number of successful black professionals who can serve as role
models for black youth. The greatest growth in the black middle
class, however, occurred in the 1940s and 1950s—long before
the institution of racial preferences—as a result of the greater
returns to formal education and the move of upwardly mobile
Southern blacks into the more industrialized and less prejudiced
regions of the North and Midwest. The best research by labor
economists shows that very little of the growth in the black mid-
dle class since the 1940s can be attributed to racial preferences.5
And while racial preferences in more recent years have no doubt
made it easier for many blacks to become doctors, lawyers,
MBAs, and other high-status professionals, they have done so by
dramatically lowering the standards and expectations for black
5. On the issue of black economic progress since the 1940s, see Finnis Welch and
James P. Smith, Closing the Gap: Forty Years of Economic Progress for Blacks (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1986; and Ronald Ferguson, “Shifting Challenges:
Fifty Years of Economic Change Toward Black-White Earnings Equality,” Daedalus 124
(1995): 37–76.

entrants into medical schools, law schools, business schools, and

other professional schools in America.6
The message sent out is that those in the beneficiary cat-
egories don’t need to achieve at the same level required of their
white and Asian classmates to gain entry to the prestige pro-
fessions, and as a result they have less need to compete with
such students and less incentive to do their best. They know
that their race will count as a huge “plus factor” in applying
to graduate and professional schools and corporate-sector jobs.
Not surprisingly, black undergraduates achieve much lower
grades and rank-in-class standings when matched with white
and Asian classmates who have the same entering SAT scores
and high school grade-point averages (GPAs). This “underper-
formance problem” has been well documented since the very
beginning of racial preference policies in the 1970s, yet prefer-
ence supporters claim to be baffled by it. “We don’t know why
black college students underperform their SAT scores and high
school grades,” they say, unwilling to acknowledge the obvious.
To lay the blame for black underperformance on the disincen-
tive effects of policies they have long championed would require
a level of honesty and integrity that few possess.
This same disincentive dynamic is at work, studies suggest,
among college-bound, black high school students, even those
attending the highest-quality public schools in communities like
Shaker Heights, Ohio, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina. These
6. This statement must be qualified in the case of lawyers. While racial preference
policies have made it much easier for blacks to get into American law schools, UCLA
law professor Richard Sander has made a powerful statistical case for his claim that
the upward ratcheting of black students into competitive law schools that proceed at
a pace too advanced for their individual needs leads to high drop-out rates, less law
learned, and high rates of failure on state bar exams. Many more black lawyers would
be produced, his statistical models indicate, if there were no racial preferences in law
school admissions and blacks attended law schools where the white and Asian students
had academic qualifications more similar to their own. Pedagogically it is a very unwise
strategy, Sander believes, to place a student in a law school environment where the vast
majority of the other students are better prepared or more academically talented. See the
treatment of Sander’s research in Chapter III.

students and their parents both know, as essayist Shelby Steele

once put it, that mediocre performance can win for them what
only excellent performance wins for their white and Asian class-
mates. And in virtually any mixed-race public school system
in the country, when black students from middle- and upper-
middle-class backgrounds are matched with whites from similar
backgrounds, the black students do substantially worse on aver-
age in their grades and rank in class. It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that racial preference policies have lulled substan-
tial segments of the black middle class into complacency and
half-hearted performance in our increasingly education-focused
world.
If I had to suggest an historical parallel to what I describe
here as the overall disaster of post-60s racial preference poli-
cies it would be the high-rise public housing craze of the 1940s
and 1950s. Like racial preference supporters in the late 1960s,
the urban planners who sought to improve the lot of the inner-
city poor by creating high-rise housing projects were not moti-
vated by evil or depraved designs. On the contrary, they wanted
to help the urban poor and believed that creating structurally
sound, fire-safe modern high-rises was the way to do this. And
no doubt the high-rises had some important advantages over
the dwellings they replaced, which were often poorly ventilated,
unsound firetraps, frequently lacking in the amenities of mod-
ern plumbing and modern heating. But “the projects,” as they
came to be called, often turned into urban nightmares, as high
concentrations of delinquent youth, in combination with vast
expanses of difficult-to-patrol vertical space, often turned the
high-rises into scenes of deadly shoot-outs, gang wars, vandal-
ism, and an all-pervasive climate of violence and fear. The final
acknowledgment of their failure came when officials in cities
like St. Louis and Chicago moved people out of some of the
worst crime-infested projects to lower-density housing and had
the high-rise buildings themselves demolished. Like prohibition,

the high-rise craze was a noble experiment that failed—and at

considerable cost in human suffering. Racial preferences, I con-
tend, constitute a similar policy failure.
The material presented in this book draws on extensive
social science research, including in some cases research going
back to the 1930s. But the work as a whole is intended more
as an exercise in social policy criticism than a new addition to
social research more narrowly conceived. In this sense it stands
in a venerable tradition of public policy critique that includes
such spirited classics as Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serf-
dom, Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cit-
ies, Edward Banfield’s The Unheavenly City, Nathan Glazer’s
Affirmative Discrimination, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s The
Disuniting of America. To all those of goodwill who sincerely
believe that America’s embrace of racial preferences over the
past four decades has been a wholesome and healthy national
project, I ask only that they confront the arguments and ideas
presented in these pages with an open mind.
I ask them, too, to consider the material in the final chapter,
which is the only one that does not deal directly with racial
preference policy, but with the origin and development in the
decades following the Second World War of a large black under-
class in America’s major cities. Part of the purpose of this chap-
ter is to show the continuing relevance of the older theories of E.
Franklin Frazier and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, which stressed
the enormous difficulties of adjusting to a bewildering urban
environment by involuntarily dispossessed rural peasants who
lacked strong traditions of education, entrepreneurship, and
self-improvement. Another purpose of this chapter is to draw
attention to the extreme oppression and depravity of the Jim
Crow system and to suggest that this might have something to
do with why its victims were so ill-equipped to meet the task of
preparing their offspring for the challenges of urban life.

The last chapter is in many ways the most important in the

book, because it draws attention to the continuing dilemma of
the very people—those “hobbled by chains,” as Lyndon John-
son called them in his famous Howard University address—
whose suffering and disadvantage provided much of the initial
impetus in the late 1960s for white liberals and others to aban-
don Justice Harlan’s commanding call for a color-blind justice
and replace it with the racial quota and racial preference regime
that has become so familiar to us today. The sympathy, pity, and
guilt that privileged whites felt over the plight of the black urban
poor were effectively hijacked by elements of the black middle
class—and subsequently the Latino middle class as well—to
serve their own middle-class ends, while the more pressing con-
cerns of “the truly disadvantaged” were ignored.7 For the latter,
the worst consequence of this development was a general “civil
rights fatigue,” and a “we gave at the office” mentality. “We’ve
given the blacks their quotas and preferences as compensation
for their past mistreatment,” the common thinking goes, and so
our nation’s debt to them is done.
It is hoped that the final chapter will explain better than most
other accounts how past oppression, negative conditioning, and
the involuntary nature of the black sharecropper exodus out of
the rural South combined to produce in the second half of the
twentieth century the explosive growth in America’s cities of a
downwardly mobile and painfully disoriented black underclass.
And it is hoped that this will create some renewed sympathy
toward, and better understanding for, today’s Southern-origin
7. The claim that racial preference policies have largely served to enhance the position
of the black middle class, while having little or no effect upon the “truly disadvantaged”
black poor, is made by William Julius Wilson in his influential—and now classic—study,
The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner-City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987). Wilson writes from a social democratic perspective,
although much of what he says on this matter is strongly endorsed by libertarian and
conservative critics of current racial preference policies.

black poor—for those to whom history, fate, and human malice

have dealt such a terrible hand.
The black underclass today continues to be, despite intense
initial engagement by public and private agencies—and subse-
quent “benign neglect”—a second wound that will not heal, with
all the attendant pain and suffering for those directly involved.
As we direct our sympathy toward real sufferers and the truly
lost, it is hoped that readers will come to reject even more force-
fully the 40-year-old bait-and-switch game of racial preferences
for the black and Latino middle class, which has done so little
to help the truly disadvantaged while exacting such tremendous
costs in terms of public generosity and racial goodwill. We need
to do with our middle-class preferences what St. Louis and Chi-
cago did to their crime infested high-rises—get rid of them and
acknowledge that something better must be done.
The book seeks to achieve three main goals. First, it seeks

to explain the continuing sense of outrage and betrayal that is
felt by so many Americans—especially Asians, poor whites, and
those “white ethnics” whose forbears often immigrated to the
U.S. from many of the poorest regions of Southern and Eastern
Europe—over policies of ethno-racial preferences from which
their own kind have been systematically excluded. And not
only excluded, but implicitly treated as if they were members
of a historically privileged, discriminating, and oppressing class.
This is the subject of the first chapter, which is a reworking of
my first reflections on racial preference policies formulated not
long after the policies were first introduced in the early 1970s.
I know from extensive exposure of readers to an earlier version
of the material presented in this chapter that it strikes a deep
chord in many, with some standing and cheering—while oth-
ers want to throw bricks and missiles at its author. The brick-
and missile-throwers, I believe, are usually angered about the

no-punches-pulled approach to revealing the corruption and

hypocrisy of those wealthy whites who are eager to give away
other people’s education and job opportunities while retaining
their own wealthy-white economic and social privileges.
The second major goal of the book is to direct attention
to some of the most revealing social science research over the
past 15 years that critically evaluates the claims of racial prefer-
ence supporters. Much of this research is addressed to refuting
the contentions of the three pro-affirmative action River Books
sponsored by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Additional
weight is added to these critical studies by the fact that some
of the most important of them were sponsored by the Mellon
Foundation itself and written by people otherwise predisposed
to favor racial preferences.
The book’s most original input into this controversy, I
believe, is the use of contemporary evolutionary biology and
evolutionary psychology to explain why policies of racial pref-
erences have so often reduced social harmony, intensified ethno-
racial tensions, and ended in violence and murderous rage in the
many countries where they have been introduced. The key to
understanding these tendencies, I try to show, involves the sense
among aggrieved parties that when ethno-racial preferences are
introduced, a basic principle of inter-ethnic reciprocity and fair-
ness is breached, with dire consequences for the public peace.
This reciprocity and fairness principle, as I have said above, is
the very linchpin holding together fragile, multiracial, multieth-
nic societies like our own.
We humans are by nature tribal in the sense that we have a
powerful natural inclination toward ethnocentrism, xenopho-
bia, and the favoring of those whom we consider “our own
kind.” The anthropologist Pierre van den Berghe, who first
popularized the term “ethnic nepotism” in his study The Ethnic
Phenomenon, states the matter in its simplest terms: “all social

organisms are biologically programmed to be nepotistic, i.e. to

behave favourably (or ‘altruistically’) to others in proportion
to their real or perceived degree of common ancestry.”8 Along
the same lines, the sociologist Stephen Sanderson writes: “Just
as people behave more altruistically towards kin than non-kin,
they behave more altruistically towards the members of their
own tribe, nation, or ethnic group. People favour their own eth-
nic group and tend to look with disdain on the members of other
groups.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Ethnic attachments seem to be universal, primordial
human sentiments. Ethnocentrism—the view that one’s own
group is superior to all others and the focal point from which
other groups should be judged—seems to have been implanted
in the human biogram [genome] long ago, and may even have
been inherited, to some extent, from our primate ancestors.”9
I argue in this book that it is just because of this ingrained
human tendency toward ethnic nepotism and xenophobia that
the interethnic reciprocity and fairness norm of which I speak,
which demands within the civic realm the abandonment of
ethno-racial favoritism and partiality toward one’s own group,
is so crucial for expanding the circle of empathy and identity
beyond one’s parochial attachments. To achieve cooperative
goals within the civic sphere we must each agree to give up
the natural partiality we feel toward our own kin and clan and
expand the “we-group” to which we identify to encompass all
the participants in a larger, cooperative, reciprocity- and fair-
ness-honoring civic community.
Human beings, I believe, are genetically predisposed to
respond to the perceived mistreatment or derogation of their
own ethno-racial group by outsider groups with a kin-and-clan
8. Pierre van den Berghe, “Does Race Matter?” Nations and Nationalism, 1 (1995):
360.
9. Stephen Sanderson, “Ethnic Heterogeneity and Public Spending,” in Frank Kemp
Salter, Welfare, Ethnicity, and Altruism: New Findings and Evolutionary Theory
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 74.

sensitivity and protectiveness that history shows often escalates

into violence, ethnic riot, and outright civil war. Such violent
and protective genetic predispositions would have had consid-
erable survival value over the millennia of human evolutionary
history when there were no organized governments or indepen-
dent courts to protect against unfair treatment or to settle con-
tentious disputes. Each tribe or ethnic group was on its own
and had to fend for itself against the mistreatment by others.
In-group loyalty and cooperativeness, combined with a willing-
ness to fight against out-group aggressors and defectors from
reciprocal agreements, would have had great survival value in
the past for the tribe and its members.
Harmful breaches in reciprocity by an out-group would be
deterred if they were automatically met by the murderous rage
of the in-group. . For individuals and groups a capacity for eth-
nic rage and retaliation in the face of reciprocity defaults and
assaults by rival tribes would have aided the group members in
the Darwinian struggle for survival and enhanced the possibility
that their genes passed into future generations. More pacifistic
or indulgent tribes would have been endlessly exploited by their
rivals and as a result would not have been reproductively suc-
cessful enough to be the ancestors of those humans living today.
In the intergenerational struggle for survival, the dupes and
saps would not even have had the consolation of finishing last.
They wouldn’t have finished the race at all as their genes would
have come to a biological dead end. We today are the descen-
dants of those who carried the genes for ethnic rage and moral
opprobrium in the face of ethnic slights, not those who met the
breaches of fairness and reciprocity directed against their tribe
with moral indifference or apathy.
The violence and anger that racial preference programs
have evoked around the world among those in the nonpreferred
groups (and particularly their less-privileged members) are
well known to us through the work of scholars such as Myron

Weiner, Thomas Sowell, and Donald Horowitz. Evolutionary

psychology, I believe, helps us to understand at least some of the
ethnic rage that these writers have so extensively documented,
and why ethnic preferences tend to generate so much more heat
and hostility than, say, college preferences for athletes or the
children of wealthy donors (which, of course, also provoke con-
troversy). This newer brand of psychology has certainly helped
me personally, as a third generation Italian-American from the
ranks of what Marxists used to call the “petty bourgeoisie”
(shopkeeper class), with Sicilian grandparents who spent their
earliest years in America as factory hands and garment workers,
to understand better my own ethnic rage at affirmative action
and that of so many other “white ethnics” whom I have known
from similar backgrounds (including many Irish Catholics,
Jews, Poles, and Germans).
The third purpose of the book is to draw attention to what
I have called above the “second wound that will not heal”—
the problem of the inner-city black underclass. The last chap-
ter in the book stresses the brutality and inhumanity of the
Southern segregation system—which I try to show was nothing
short of a protracted white terror regime—and suggests that
this fact, in combination with the rapid, push-driven, rural-to-
urban migration out of the agricultural South in the 1950s and
early 1960s, is largely responsible for the inability of so many
Southern-origin rural blacks to adapt to the challenges of an
achievement-oriented urban environment. The view presented
here draws mostly from earlier, now “classic writers,” whose
works, I believe, still illuminate best this long-term problem. The
insights of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, John Dollard, E. Franklin
Frazier, William Julius Wilson, Charles Murray, and Christo-
pher Jencks are drawn upon heavily. This last chapter seeks to
gain sympathy for the plight of the black underclass with the
same compelling logic and emotional force with which the first
chapter tries to evoke loathing and contempt for the hypocrisy

and corruption of white elites, who long ago lost interest in the
black underclass but continue to support racial preferences in
education and employment that mainly benefit—if they benefit
at all—the black and Latino middle class.
This final chapter strives to combine appropriate moral feel-
ings with clarity of understanding and vision, while bringing
these together under the umbrella of an overarching theocentric
humanism and dedication to the kinds of liberal principles that
undermined slavery and Jim Crow. I do not offer in the book—
and do not consider it appropriate to offer—a sanitized, value-
neutral account of the topics under discussion. No punches are
pulled in identifying those I see as the heroes and villains in the
story. There are situations where moral anger and outrage are
the proper responses to bad public policies and the evils and
corruptions that sustain them. And I believe that the continuing
support for racial preferences by so many wealthy white liberals
and prominent black leaders, combined with their continued
neglect of the situation of the underclass in our inner cities, are
prime examples of two of them. The reader must decide the
legitimacy and fairness of the many controversial claims I make
in the book.
I have deliberately refrained from offering policy prescrip-
tions for addressing the black underclass problem, knowing full
well the fierce criticism made for such an absence when Dan-
iel Moynihan submitted his famous report, The Negro Family:
The Case for National Action. To suggest that Southern-origin
blacks had been given a bad deal in America, that a significant
portion of their contemporary problems stemmed from that
bad deal, and that expanded public and private initiatives were
needed to alleviate their current distress was not enough to pre-
vent charges against the Moynihan Report that it failed to offer
practical solutions, or even, more perversely, that it “blamed
the victim”—a thoroughly ludicrous charge that ran against
the entire thrust of the report. But I hesitate to offer policy

prescriptions, believing, among other reasons, that they would

inevitably be controversial and that I have already engaged in
enough controversy for one book.
Which doesn’t mean that I don’t have my own ideas on the
subject. I would like to see, for instance, a massive federal pro-
gram to create a Civilian Infrastructure Corps on the lines of
the New Deal-era Civilian Conservation Corps, by all accounts
among the most successful of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal
initiatives. Such a new CCC-type organization would enroll
hundreds of thousands of young men and women (over a
million passed through the old CCC camps), teach them the
importance of self-discipline, regularized work, and the man-
ner of following the direction of supervisors, and like its New
Deal counterpart, would undertake an urgent and important
national task. That task, however, would not be conserva-
tion of natural resources, but the rebuilding of our collapsing
bridges and decaying infrastructures. I would also like to see
school vouchers universally available to the poor, and the black
church become the builders of a nationwide Christian school
system that would have a cultural impact among poor black
youth at least as great as that engendered by the school sys-
tem established by the Roman Catholic Church to deal with the
children of Catholic immigrants in the period from the 1850s
through the 1950s. The Rev. Eugene Rivers, Boston’s dynamic
black preacher and a paragon of down-to-earth common sense,
perhaps summed up the situation best to me in a private dinner
conversation. For many young black men and women in our
Boston neighborhoods, Rivers explained, the choice is simple:
“Crack or Church?”
But elaborating and defending such policy initiatives would
require another book. Since this one has reached the limit in size
that I think seemly for a policy critique, I resist the temptation
to add further material on the crucial topic of “what is to be
done?” And I reject most vehemently the view that “you can’t

criticize affirmative action unless you have something concrete

with which to replace it!” Affirmative action has been a disas-
ter on multiple levels. Like the excising of a deadly tumor, one
need not “replace it” by anything to do a world of good. Much
more may be necessary to achieve the ends we desire, but get-
ting rid of racial preference policy and its poisonous effects on
social harmony is a sine qua non for restoring the American
body politic to sound health. The need to eliminate one debili-
tating wound that has not healed must not be confused with,
or linked to, the need to address other festering sores. They are
independent social evils that should be dealt with on their own
terms.
As a final note, I should say something about the legiti-
macy of racial, ethnic, and sectarian-religious identities in
our national life. America, as foreign observers often note,
has been much more successful than many of the countries
of Eastern Europe and Africa in integrating people of diverse
identity-group backgrounds into a reasonably decent and
humane society. This, in my view, is due in part to the wide-
spread acceptance of the biblical view that “we are all chil-
dren of God,” and of the Jeffersonian ideal that, regardless
of race or class, “all men are created equal” and endowed by
their Creator with inalienable human rights. In addition to
this ideological support, integration has been furthered by the
fact that America, unlike, say, France, has allowed its people
within the private and social realms to have hybrid identities,
such as Irish-American, Polish-American, Chinese-American
and the like, without imputing to such people disloyalty or
lack of proper patriotic feeling.10 In our racial, ethnic, and sec-
tarian-religious identities we form our private and social plu-
10. A more elaborate treatment of the question “what holds America’s diverse peoples
together?” can be found in the long introductory essay, “Forging a Common Identity,”
in the volume edited by Carol Swain and myself, Contemporary Voices of White
Nationalism in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 3–83.

ribus, while in the civic realm we are all unum—participants

in the one same body politic. Our identities are thus multiple,
or as the lucid theorist of assimilation Milton Gordon used
to say, “layered,” with an “inner layer” of an ethno-racial or
sectarian-religious identity in the private and social realms co-
existing quite comfortably with an outer layer of civic identity,
where we are all equally citizens of the same nation state.
We have gotten it right in the past, in my view—and con-
tinue to get it right in the present—when we refuse to classify
our population in the civic realm according to sectarian religious
affiliations or religious identities, or to distribute government
burdens and benefits according to such classifications. Even if
such a policy were constitutionally permissible, it would be an
invitation to unending civil strife to adopt it.
But while we have gotten it right with regard to the sepa-
ration of church and state, we have not done the same with
regard to the separation of race and state. In this area we have
gone down the dangerous path of officially recognizing people
in the civic realm, not as equal citizens of the United States,
but as members of often contending and contentious ethno-
racial tribes. Quota thinking and affirmative-action preferences
within the civic and government-mandated realms reinforce this
tribal mind-set within arenas where it has no place. The U.S. is
a citizen republic, not a confederation of tribes. If there is one
overarching purpose to the work that follows, it is to warn of
the harm that this disastrous rejection of the color-blind ideal
of the civil rights movement continues to do to our civic unity
and our overall national health—including our willingness as a
civic community to help those members of formerly oppressed
ethno-racial groups that are genuinely in distress.
With this in mind I’ll let the eloquent words and trenchant
warnings of three very different U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
from three very different eras, end this introduction. The first
comes from John Marshall Harlan’s lonely dissent in the Plessy

case protesting the segregation of blacks from whites in Loui-

siana’s public transportation system. The second is from Wil-
liam O. Douglas’s dissent in the Defunis case dealing with racial
preferences at the law school of the University of Washington.
The final comes from Antonin Scalia’s concurring opinion in the
Adarand case, which overturned a federal set-aside law that had
granted preferential treatment in federal contracting based on
the racial identity of the contractors.
Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tol-

erates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer
of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The destinies of the two races in this country are
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require
that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds
of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The
sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the
clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments,
National and State, of every right that inheres in civil free-
dom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the
United States without regard to race.
—plessy v. ferguson, 1896, 163 u.s. 537, harlan in dissent
The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of

racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory
as to how society ought to be organized. The purpose of the
University of Washington cannot be to produce black lawyers
for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews,
Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers
for Americans and not to place First Amendment barriers
against anyone.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€A segregated admissions process creates

suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated class-

room, and in the end it may produce that result despite its
contrary intentions.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It may well be that racial strains, racial
susceptibility to certain diseases, racial sensitiveness to envi-
ronmental conditions that other races do not experience may
in an extreme situation justify differences in racial treatment
that no fair-minded person would call “invidious” discrimina-
tion. Mental ability is not in this category. All races can com-
pete fairly at all professional levels. So far as race is concerned,
any state-sponsored preference of one race over another in
that competition is in my view “invidious” and violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
—defunis v. odegaard, 1974, 416 u.s. 312,
douglas, dissenting the decision to moot
In my view, Government can never have a “compelling inter-

est” in discriminating on the basis of race in order to “make
up” for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial dis-
crimination should be made whole; but under our Constitu-
tion there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor
race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon
the individual, and its rejection of dispositions based on race
or blood. To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even
for the most admirable and benign of purposes—is to enforce
and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that pro-
duced race slavery, race privilege, and race hatred. In the eyes
of government, we are just one race here. It is American.
—adarand v. pena, 1995, 515 u.s. 200, scalia concurring

I
a natio n of i n d i v i d u al
citizen s o r a
co nfederat i o n o f
co ntendi ng t r i b e s ?
This first chapter represents my earliest attempt to come to grips

with the reality of racial preferences. It focuses on the dramatic
shift that took place in the early 1970s away from the civil rights
era vision of a color-blind society to color-conscious “quota”
thinking and other group-based understandings of human
rights and government entitlements. For me this momentous
change, coinciding with the very beginning of my graduate stu-
dent days in Princeton’s Politics Department, came as a great
shock and a great betrayal.
At first I simply could not believe that overtly race-based
preferences would ever find expression in our official national
policy. Our government would never consent to classifying the
American public according to racial and ethnic categories and
distributing burdens and benefits on the basis of such classifica-
tions. That would stand the whole civil rights movement on its
head. Perhaps a few guilt-ridden limousine liberals in Manhat-
tan might support such a policy, I thought, but the entire white
working class and white poor would rise up against it. And the
black clergy and black civil rights leaders would never stand for
it. They are Christians—most of them—and their foundational
belief is that we are all children of God. They believe that we are
all created in the image of God and must be respected because
of this. They hold that categories like Jew or Greek have no

32â•… a nation of individual citizens or a confederation of contending tribes
meaning in the mind of our Creator and should have no place

in public policy. This biblical understanding of human nature is
the reason they fought so nobly in the ’50s and ’60s against rac-
ism, discrimination, and all manner of inter-tribal enmities and
hostilities. One simply cannot imagine the black civil rights lead-
ers—and black Christians more generally—abandoning their
high principles for a few extra points on a civil service exam.
Ah, the callowness of youth! When reality finally did sink
in by the mid-1970s, like many descendants of what were once
called the New Immigrants—those mainly of Catholic and Jew-
ish backgrounds who came to the United States before the
First World War from many of the poorest areas of Eastern and
Southern Europe—my response was one of shock and rage. In
time the shock would diminish, but not the rage. My anger had
the special moral intensity to it that only betrayed innocence
can understand. Troubling questions arose: Was the civil rights
movement really intended all along just as a cynical bait-and-
switch game—a confidence trick by wily schemers to prey on
the goodwill of decent Americans and swindle the naïve (as
its segregationist critics had always charged)? Were my Sicil-
ian grandparents, who came from Italy’s poorest class of land-
less farm workers, somehow responsible for Southern slavery
and Jim Crow? Must they—and their descendants—atone for
all those “white-skin privileges” they enjoyed as garment work-
ers and factory hands in Brooklyn? Does my Italian-American
tribe—or the tribes to which the Irish, Polish, Jewish, and dozens
of other European immigrants and their descendants belong—
owe some kind of collective tribal debt to African-Americans
and Latinos? And if so, who should pay whom, how much, and
in what form?
These were the kinds of questions—mostly personal and
rhetorical—that I asked myself in the mid-1970s, a time for me
of still unjaded youth, when I first began to think systematically
about racial preference policies and the radical transformation

that had taken place in elite thinking on these issues since the
days of the civil rights movement. The following essay, only
slightly modified from the original, was my first attempt at an
answer.11
Deeply rooted in our religious heritage is the conviction that

every man is an heir to a legacy of dignity and worth. Our
Judeo-Christian tradition refers to this inherent dignity of
man in the biblical term “the image of God.”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Every human
being has etched in his personality the indelible stamp of the
Creator. Every man must be respected because God loves him.
The worth of an individual does not lie in the measure of his
intellect, his racial origin, or his social position. Human worth
lies in relatedness to God. An individual has value because he
has value to God. Whenever this is recognized, “whiteness”
and “blackness” pass away as determinants in a relationship
and “son” and “brother” are substituted.
—martin luther king, jr. (1967)
You guys have been practicing discrimination for years. Now

it is our turn.
—justice thurgood marshall (1974),
discussing the defunis case with william o. douglas.
Civil rights laws were not passed to protect the rights of white
men and do not apply to them.
—mary frances berry (1985)
11. This chapter represents my first attempt to come to terms with the reality of racial-
preference policies, particularly those in the employment arena. Its core ideas were
conceived in the mid- and late 1970s, although they were first published later and went
through subsequent revisions. In its present form the chapter is a revised version of
the fourth chapter in my anthology, Racial Preference and Racial Justice—The New
Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center,
1991), which was titled “Ethnic Tribalism and Human Personhood.”

D uring the lengthy debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Bill
(HR 7192), a number of Southern opponents of the bill, in
an attempt to raise public fears, claimed that the section of the
bill outlawing discrimination in employment would lead to the
imposition by federal enforcement agencies of racial “quota”
hiring in order to achieve a desirable “racial balance.” The
term “discrimination,” it was pointed out, was not specifically
defined in the bill, and so, it was held, might be interpreted by
federal authorities to mean the lack of proportional representa-
tion of the members of various racial and ethnic groups in a
given employer’s workforce. This contention of the Southern
opponents was, of course, nothing more than a scare tactic, as
the clear wording of the bill precluded any such interpretation
and made hiring based on racial or ethnic criteria of any kind,
quota or otherwise, clearly illegal. Relevant sections of what
were to become Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
read as follows:
Section 601
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
Section 703
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any

individual of employment opportunities or otherwise

adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to clas-
sify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of
his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a
labor organization:
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership,
or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin;
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any
employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committeeÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€to discriminate against any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admis-
sion to, or employment in, any program established to pro-
vide apprenticeship or other training. [all emphasis added]
The language of the bill was clearly the language of persons

and of individuals, and guaranteed to each and every one of them
the right to be considered for employment and promotion on

a strictly race-, ethnicity-, gender-, and religion-neutral basis.

Here, of course, the law was continuing in the tradition of the
14th Amendment to the federal Constitution, which had also
spoken of persons (“No State shallÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws”), as well as of the many state fair employment practice
laws (FEP) after which Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
was patterned.
In order to counter the scare tactics of the Southern sena-
tors, the supporters of the bill, led by Majority Whip Hubert
Humphrey, and the two floor captains of Title VII, Senators
Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, went on record again and
again to reassure their colleagues that Title VII’s guarantees
against hiring discrimination applied to all people equally and
not just to blacks or members of any particular racial or ethnic
group. They also went on to stress the fact that any attempt
to maintain a racial balance would not only not be required
by the bill, but would be clearly illegal according to its provi-
sions. Senator Humphrey was particularly forceful in speaking
out against what he called at one point the “uninterrupted flow
of nightmarish propaganda” and “wholesale distortions” that
were attempting to mislead the public concerning the nature of
the proposed bill and were responsible, in Humphrey’s view,
for the strong showing Alabama segregationist George Wallace
had recently made in the Wisconsin presidential primary. (110
Cong. Rec., pp. 11846–7)
In order to counter these distortions, Humphrey had his
staff draft a carefully worded interpretive statement dealing
with all the major provisions of the bill, and had the statement
read and approved by all of the bill’s floor managers in both
houses of Congress. On the question of Title VII, the statement
addressed itself specifically to the Southern charge that the bill
would require the preferential hiring of Negroes:

[Title VII] does not provide that any preferential treatment

in employment shall be given to Negroes or to any other
persons or groups. It does not provide that any quota system
may be established to maintain racial balance in employ-
ment. In fact, the title would prohibit preferential treatment
for any particular group, and any person, whether or not a
member of any minority group, would be permitted to file
a complaint of discriminatory employment practices. (110
Cong. Rec., p. 11848, emphasis added)
Senators Clark and Case had stressed earlier that Title VII
would prohibit any attempt to maintain a racial balance, since
this would involve hiring on the basis of race and would thus
discriminate against individuals:
There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer main-

tain a racial balance in his workforce. On the contrary, any
deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever
such a balance may be, would involve a violation of Title
VII because maintaining such a balance would require an
employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It
must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to
any individual. (110 Cong. Rec., p. 7213, emphasis added)
Senator Clark also had the Justice Department draw up a

statement specifically addressing itself to a number of charges
that had been made against Titles VI and VII of the bill by Sena-
tor Lister Hill of Alabama. In regard to the charge that the pro-
posed law would require employees to maintain a racial balance,
the Justice Department’s interpretive memorandum offered the
following rebuttal:
Finally it has been asserted Title VII would impose a

requirement for “racial balance.” This is incorrect.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€No

employer is required to hire an individual because that indi-

vidual is a Negro. No employer is required to maintain any
ratio of Negroes to whites, Jews to Gentiles, Italians to Eng-
lish, or women to men.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€On the contrary, any deliberate
attempt to maintain a given balance would almost certainly
run afoul of Title VII because it would involve a failure or
refusal to hire some individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. (110 Cong. Rec., p. 7207,
emphasis added)
Senator Clark also had read into the Congressional Record a

letter rebutting Senator Hill’s arguments by Walter Reuther, the
president of the United Auto Workers Union, who was one of
organized labor’s most outspoken supporters of the Civil Rights
Bill. “Under the pending law,” Reuther explained, “every Negro
worker will have a fair opportunity for a job if he is qualified,
and every white worker will know that he cannot be laid off or
refused employment for a racial reason because discrimination
against a white worker is just as forbidden as discrimination
against the Negro.” (110 Cong. Rec., p. 7206)
While the criticisms of the Southern senators lacked all sub-
stance, and were essentially a tactical maneuver designed to
instill fear and doubt into the public mind, they nevertheless
reflected a peculiarly Southern way of thinking—or at least a
way of thinking that was much more deeply ingrained in the
American South than elsewhere—which was both incompatible
with, and hostile to, the mode of thinking that had come to
dominate American society under the impact of the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. These two contrasting
modes of thought might be characterized by the terms “tribal-
ism” and “personalism.”
Tribalism can be defined as that mode of human conscious-
ness that tends to view human beings not as unique persons but
as depersonalized representatives of larger racial or ethnic col-

lectives, with the collectives themselves being seen as singular

or homogeneous entities rather than plural or diverse ones. It is
a group-representation and group-identity principle that in all
intergroup relationships is characterized by a stereotyping and
deindividuating cast of mind. Personalism, on the other hand,
is a mode of consciousness that seeks to view human beings as
distinct and unique individuals (“persons”), who are capable
of relating to, and communing with, all others of their kind on
the basis of a group-unmediated, soul-to-soul relationship of
mutual equality and respect. The early-twentieth-century Jewish
philosopher Martin Buber famously called these latter “I-Thou
relationships.” The personalistic consciousness can engage in
such relationships, the tribalistic cannot.
The two modes of consciousness are existentially and con-
ceptually incompatible, with the latter, personalistic mode rep-
resenting a higher, more differentiated type of thinking than
the former, insofar as its terms and conceptual structures can
be used to understand and to criticize the tribalistic mode of
thought but the reverse is not the case. The personalistic mental-
ity can understand—and criticize—the tribalistic, but the tribal-
istic cannot understand the personalistic.
It is something like the relationship between John Stuart
Mill’s higher and lower pleasures: a Socrates can comprehend
the pleasures of the pig and the fool, but the reverse is not so.
For people who had grown up, as the Southern opponents of
the Civil Rights Act had, in a legally segregated and highly race-
conscious society, where across the color line people tended to
be viewed less as individual persons than as representatives of
racial or ethnic tribes, it was not easy to comprehend a law in
which individual persons were each respected as such, and racial
and ethnic tribal associations were given no recognition what-
ever. When one views what has transpired in America since the
late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly with regard to the gov-
ernment policy known as “affirmative action,” it must certainly

be seen as one of the grim ironies of modern American history

that the Southern tribalistic mode of consciousness would not
only come to dominate much of the country but would do so
under the leadership of a national elite that claimed to be fur-
thering the cause of “civil rights.”
Personalism Explained
According to the personalistic philosophy human beings are
each individually centers of Meaning and Mystery. They are
not Hegelian moments in a collective group history, nor are
they faceless, depersonalized abstractions upon which to proj-
ect one’s stereotyped image of a group, be this image positive,
negative, or some nuanced combination of the two. In claim-
ing that each human being is a center of Meaning, personalism
contends that human societies are not to be viewed as single,
unified, collective worlds but as pluralities of many separate
personal worlds, each interacting with, and communing with,
other separate personal worlds in an ongoing drama of human
history. While one can speak meaningfully of many collective
and communal activities that these personal worlds engage
in, each world remains in and of itself a separate and distinct
unit of meaning, each with its own unique experiences, its own
unique struggles, and its own personal time-frame of reference.
Human persons according to the personalistic philosophy have
an indissolvable unity to their being, to their life and thoughts,
their actions and feelings, which groups of human beings simply
cannot have, not even the most intimate group of the family.12
12. The view of human personhood developed here, which closely parallels both the
thinking of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the spiritual universalism of early Quakerism,
is similar in its philosophical and social implications to that developed by the British
political philosopher Ernest Barker: “Now we may admire the nation moving and
heaving: we may admire the surge of its thought: we may admire the philosophy of
super-personal Group-persons—the Folk; the Fellowship; the Verband, in all its forms.
It is, indeed, a philosophy which can ennoble the individual, and lift him above self-

When personalism contends that human beings are centers

of Mystery, what is meant is that every person has a dimension
of Depth to his being, and a private relationship to this dimen-
sion of Depth, which has about it something that is sacred. It is
this dimension of Depth in each person and the special relation-
ship that each person has to this dimension that form the basis
of our public claims to a respect for personal privacy, a respect
for conscience, and a respect for personal religious beliefs. The
Depth in each person enters into a region that is mysterious and
unfathomable, which the public has no right to enter.
It is sometimes charged that the personalistic outlook is
“atomistic” or “antisocial,” but this criticism is based on a
complete misunderstanding. Persons are centers of Meaning
and Mystery, and they are also centers of creativity and energy.
From their vital centers outward then, persons engage other per-
sons in society on various levels of intimacy and concern. Such
centered concern in his own immediate life. But it may also be a philosophy which
engulfs his life, and absorbs his individuality; and it may end, in practice, in little more
than the brute and instinctive automatism of the hive. We have to admit, after all, the
justice of [Ernst] Troeltsch’s saying, that the end of the idealization of Groups may be
‘to brutalize romance, and to romanticize cynicism.’ We have to confess that the cult
of super-personal Beings has had some tragic results.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€While it has grandeur and
flame, it has also a cloud of smoke. Individualism is often used as a word of reproach;
but it is good to see simple shapes of ‘men as trees, walking’ and to think in simple
terms of human persons. Persons—individual persons—have a finitude or limit which
can satisfy our intelligence, and an infinity or extension which can satisfy our faith.
They have finitude or limit in the sense that, in any and every scheme of social order,
each of them occupies a definite position, with its definite sphere of rights and duties,
under the system of law which necessarily regulates their external relations with one
another. They have infinity or extension in the sense that, sub specie aeternitatis, each
of them is a ‘living soul’ (as nothing but the individual person is or can be) with an
inner spring of spiritual life which rises beyond our knowledge and ends beyond our
ken. If we look at Groups from this angle, we shall not call them persons. We shall call
them organizations of persons, or schemes of personal relations, in all their successive
phases, from the village or club to the State or the League of Nations. And because
they are organizations or schemes, made by the mind of man, we shall regard them as
constructed by the thought of persons, consisting in the thought of persons, sustained
by the thought of persons, and revised or even destroyed by the thought of persons—
but never as persons themselves, in the sense in which individuals are persons.” Ernest
Barker, from his Introduction to Otto Gierke’s Natural Law and the Theory of Society
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1934).

social engagements can range anywhere from mutually self-

interested business relationships up to the most intimate rela-
tionships of interpersonal love. Various social virtues, including
charity, civic-mindedness, brotherly love, and certain forms of
patriotism, are in no way antithetical to the personalistic per-
spective. The personalistic perspective, however, is incompatible
with any kind of group-think that attempts to wrench the center
of Meaning and Mystery out of individual persons and transfer
it to a nation, a tribe, a class, or any other collective entity con-
ceived of as a mysterious Super-Person. Personalism holds that
whenever Meaning and Mystery are wrenched out of the Depth
of individual souls and transferred to a collective entity of any
kind, an ultimate violation is committed, with absurdity and
mystification being the inevitable result, as one can readily dis-
cern from all the claptrap that has been written about a Volks-
geist, a Race-Soul, the General Will, the National Destiny, and
the like. The personalistic philosophy is hostile to any type of
collective self-worship, to any type of group-deification, and to
any and all types of political and social movements that demand
of their adherents that they rate their nationality, their ethnicity,
or their class affiliations higher than their individual humanity.13
Personalism, at least of the type outlined here, is thus the
very opposite of “atomistic individualism.” Atomized individu-
als are not persons, they are not centers of Meaning and Mys-
13. The tendency for racial, ethnic, and nationalistic loyalties to override basic human
decency was the major theme of Reinhold Niebuhr’s classic Moral Man and Immoral
Society, a book that influenced a whole generation of social reformers, including Martin
Luther King, Jr. Here are King’s views on the matter: “Man’s sinfulness sinks to such
devastating depths in his collective life that Reinhold Niebuhr could write a book titled
Moral Man and Immoral Society. Man collectivized in the group, the tribe, the race,
and the nation often sinks to levels of barbarity unthinkable even among lower animals.
We see the tragic expression of Immoral Society in the doctrine of white supremacy
that plunges millions of black men into the abyss of exploitation, and in the horrors of
two world wars that have left battlefields drenched with blood, national debts higher
than mountains of gold, men psychologically deranged and physically handicapped,
and nations of widows and orphans.” From Strength to Love (New York: Simon and
Schuster 1964), p. 111.

tery; rather, they are people who for one reason or another have
been cut off from the deepest sources of their own unique per-
sonhood and, as a result, lack all sense of individual wholeness
and human worth. In fact, atomized individuals are the very
sorts of people who tend to become ethnic tribalists. Lacking
all sense of their own personal meaning and worth, cut off from
the Depth of their own being, atomized individuals will often
try to fill the existential vacuum that they experience in their
lives through the desperate appropriation of a group identity.
This group identity then comes to take the place of the missing
Depth in themselves and is worshipped as if it were a divinity.14
American Personalism: Liberal and Christian

Roots
The type of personalistic thinking embodied in the 1964 Civil
Rights Act grew out of two complementary strains in American
thought, the first being the Christian religious tradition (and the
related offshoots of Unitarianism and New England transcen-
dentalism), the second being the liberal Jeffersonian tradition,
especially as this was embodied in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. From the Christian religious tradition, personalism took
over the idea that each human being is loved by God and has
a separate inner relationship to God irrespective of whatever
14. The process by which the spiritually empty and forlorn seek desperately to
overcome their emptiness through fanatical identification with a larger social group and
its interests is a process that has perhaps nowhere been more profoundly analyzed than
in the great novel of the Austrian writer Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities.
For a valuable psychoanalytic treatment of the same phenomenon, with Italian and
German fascism in the background, see the classic work of Erich Fromm, Escape from
Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1941). Fromm’s own view is well captured in one of
the opening epigraphs to his book, a quotation from a work on human dignity by the
Christian neo-Platonist Pico della Mirandola: “Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither
mortal nor immortal have we created thee, so that thou mightest be free according
to thy own will and honor, to be thy own creator and builder. To thee alone we gave
growth and development depending on thy own free will. Thou bearest in thee the
germs of a universal life” (from Mirandola’s Oratio de Hominis Dignitate).

social relationships such a person may have. God, according to

the Christian tradition, judges all men on the basis of their indi-
vidual moral excellences and personal qualities, and this is the
way all human beings are to view one another. Personalism also
took over from the Judeo-Christian religious tradition the idea
that each human being is created in the “image of God” and
thus manifests in some way a godlike nature that commands the
respect of all people. A final idea taken over from the religious
tradition was the metaphor that all human beings are children
of God and members of a single human family.
From the Declaration of Independence and the liberal tradi-
tion, personalism took over the notion that all human beings
have individual human rights conferred equally upon all and
that it is the responsibility of government to protect these rights.
The key passage in the Declaration, of course, comes after the
words “we hold these truths” (“We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rightsÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€that to secure
these rights governments are instituted among menÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€”). The
liberal tradition also provided personalism with the impor-
tant idea of the citizen and the equality of rights of all citizens
regardless of their ethnic or religious background. As sociolo-
gist Nathan Glazer explains, the United States became “the first
great nation that defines itself not in terms of ethnic origin but
in terms of adherence to common rules of citizenship.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The
American polity hasÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€been defined by a steady expansion of
the definition of those who may be included in it to the point
where it now includes all humanity.”15
The influence of both of these traditions, the Judeo-Chris-
tian and the liberal-Jeffersonian, on the personalistic outlook
of many of the supporters of the Civil Rights Act can be well
15. Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 1975), p. 7.

illustrated by remarks taken from three key figures in the strug-

gle for the law’s passage: President Lyndon Johnson, Senator
Joseph Clark, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. Shortly
before signing the Civil Rights Bill into law on July 2, 1964,
President Johnson went on national television to explain to the
American public the nature and purpose of the new law. His
remarks began with an allusion to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence: “One hundred and eighty-eight years ago this week [i.e.,
July 4, 1776],” he stated, “a small band of valiant men began
a long struggle for freedom. They pledged their lives, their for-
tunes, and their sacred honorÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€not only for political indepen-
dence but for personal liberty.” A few paragraphs later, Johnson
drew attention to the great discrepancy that existed between the
principles of the American founding and the actual status of the
dispossessed in America, particularly the American Negro:
We believe that all men are created equal, yet many are denied
equal treatment. We believe that all men have certain unalien-
able rights, yet many Americans do not enjoy these rights. We
believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of liberty, yet
millions are being deprived of those blessings, not because of
their own failures but because of the color of their skin.
Further on in the speech, Johnson invoked important tenets

of the common religious tradition, suggesting that those who
are equal before God should also be equal before the law and
have an equal access to public accommodations and jobs:
The purpose of this law [the Civil Rights Act] is simple.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It

does not give special treatment to any citizen.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It does say
that those who are equal before God shall now also be equal
in the polling booths, in the classrooms, in the factories,
and in hotels and restaurants, and movie theatres, and other
places that provide service to the public.

Finally, at the close of his address, Johnson again invoked

the biblical religious tradition, offering as a counter to the racial
hatred in the land the ideal that all human beings are children of
God and members of the same human family:
Let us close the springs of racial poison.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Let us hasten

that day when our unmeasured strength and our unbounded
spirit will be free to do the great works ordained to this
nation by the just and wise God who is the Father of us all.
Senator Joseph Clark, like many other supporters of the

Civil Rights Bill, saw the bill as involving one of the key moral
issues of the day. He went on the floor of the Senate in early
April 1964 to explain to his colleagues just how central the
moral issue was to him personally, especially in regard to Title
VII, the fair employment practices section of the bill:
The primary reason why I support it [the Civil Rights Bill]

and why a majority of the Senate, I am confident, supports
it, is that it raises as clearly as any piece of legislation which
has come before the Senate since I have joined itÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€the
clear issue of right and wrong. This is particularly true with
respect to Title VII. (110 Cong. Rec., p. 7203)
To support his view concerning the preeminence of the

moral issue, Clark went on to quote from a statement made on
behalf of over 30 different church and synagogue groups con-
cerning the immorality of racial segregation and discrimination.
The statement he quoted drew heavily from the personalistic
strains in the religious tradition:
The religious conscience of America condemns racism as

blasphemy against God. It recognizes that the racial segre-
gation and discrimination that flow from it are a denial of
the worth which God has given to all persons. We hold that

God is the father of all men. Consequently in every person

there is an innate dignity which is the basis of human rights.
These rights constitute a moral claim which must be honored
both by all persons and by the state. Denial of such rights is
immoral. (110 Cong. Rec., p. 7203)
Clark also quoted in this context an additional statement by a

rabbinic group that had testified previously before his committee:
The major points of our statement, Mr. Chairman, have to

do with [our] concern for the immorality of discrimination
in the area of employment.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€We believe that this kind of
discrimination is blasphemous; it is an affront to our reli-
gious commitment and to our religious convictions, believ-
ing as we do that man is created in the image of God. (110
Cong. Rec., pp. 7203–4)
Immediately following the above quotation, Clark explained

how his own support of the Civil Rights Bill was intimately
linked to his commitment to the national ideals of liberty and
justice for all (i.e., the liberal-Jeffersonian ideal), and to a nation
of one people, under God:
I speak only for myself when I say that if I opposed this bill,
I would find it very difficult indeed at the next public meet-
ing I attended to pledge allegiance to the flag of the United
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands,
one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice
for all. (110 Cong. Rec., p. 7204)
“By the Content of Their Character”

In the case of Martin Luther King, Jr., we have someone who
was not only the most important public figure in the 1950s
and early 1960s civil rights movement, but also perhaps more

self-consciously committed than any other leading figure in

the movement to the basic tenets of the personalistic philoso-
phy and the personalistic mode of thought. In his book on the
Montgomery bus boycott, for instance, Dr. King explained how
he had first come to adopt the personalistic philosophy while
a student at Boston University’s School of Theology. Speaking
of the impact upon his thought of two of his teachers, Edgar S.
Brightman and L. Harold DeWolf, he wrote:
It was mainly under these teachers that I studied personal-

istic philosophy—the theory that the clue to the meaning of
ultimate reality is found in personality. This personal ideal-
ism remains today my basic philosophical position. Personal-
ism’s insistence that only personality—finite and infinite—is
ultimately real strengthened me in two convictions: it gave
me metaphysical and philosophical grounding for the idea of
a personal God, and it gave me a metaphysical basis for the
dignity and worth of all human personality.16
Throughout his life King invoked the rhetoric of the Dec-

laration of Independence to weaken the forces of all racial,
religious, and national attachments, at least insofar as they
impeded the recognition of our individual personhood and uni-
versal rights as human beings. For instance, in a commence-
ment address at Lincoln University he said the following of the
American Dream:
16. Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), p. 82. King explains shortly after this passage that he was also influenced by his
reading of Hegel’s works. Although there were serious shortcomings in the Hegelian
dialectic, he says, it “helped me to see that growth comes through struggle.” But, he
adds, “there were points in Hegel’s philosophy that I strongly disagreed with. For
instance, his absolute idealism was rationally unsound to me because it tended to
swallow up the many in the one.” (p. 82) One could perhaps find no better phrase to
describe the spiritual and existential violation of human personhood involved in racial
quota thinking, and the stereotyping mentality endemic to racially divided societies,
than this last locution—“to swallow up the many in the one.”

[The American Dream] is a dream of a land where men of all

races, of all nationalities, and of all creeds can live together
as brothers. The substance of the dream is expressed in these
sublime words, words lifted to cosmic proportions: We hold
these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.17
And with specific regard to race, the principles of the Dec-

laration were invoked with equal force in his telling account of
the Montgomery bus boycott, Stride Toward Freedom:
Ever since the signing of the Declaration of Independence,

America has manifested a schizophrenic personality on the
question of race. She has been torn between selves—a self
in which she has proudly professed democracy and a self
in which she has sadly practiced the antithesis of democ-
racy.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Indeed, segregation and discrimination are strange
paradoxes in a nation founded on the principle that all men
are created equal.18
Although Dr. King drew extensively in his political thought

from the Declaration and the liberal-Jeffersonian tradition, it is
clear that the most powerful source of his personalistic philoso-
phy was that provided by the universalistic and personalistic
strains in the biblical religion. In Where Do We Go from Here:
Chaos or Community, which was published just a year before
his tragic death, the Jewish and Christian roots of his thought
were made unmistakably clear:
17. Martin Luther King, Jr., quoted in Kenneth L. Smith and Ira G. Zepp, Search for
the Beloved Community (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 127.
18. King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom, pp. 190–1.

Deeply rooted in our religious heritage is the conviction

that every man is an heir to a legacy of dignity and worth.
Our Judeo-Christian tradition refers to this inherent dig-
nity of man in the biblical term “the image of God.” The
image of God is universally shared in equal portions by all
men.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Every human being has etched in his personal-
ity the indelible stamp of the Creator. Every man must be
respected because God loves him. The worth of an individual
does not lie in the measure of his intellect, his racial origin,
or his social position. Human worth lies in relatedness to
God. An individual has value because he has value to God.
Whenever this is recognized, “whiteness” and “blackness”
pass away as determinants in a relationship and “son” and
“brother” are substituted.19
One could hardly find a more succinct statement of the reli-

giously grounded personalistic outlook or one more out of tune
with the type of ethnic tribalism that sees the ethnic group itself
as God and one’s relatedness to this God as the major source
of one’s being and worth. The God of the biblical religion is
seen as a force destructive to all racial and ethnic tribalism, a
force that breaks down all racial and social barriers between
human beings, and unites all men in a universal brotherhood of
mankind in which each human being is respected as a person of
individual dignity and worth.
Dr. King went on to explain shortly after the quoted passage
the special obligation of the Christian churches to proclaim the
sinfulness and injustice of the system of race subordination and
segregation in the Jim Crow South—a system, he claimed, that
denied the possibility of a shared communion in God between
people of different races, and thus denied the possibility of estab-
19. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 97.

lishing a true community of equals. “The church has an oppor-

tunity and a duty to lift up its voice like a trumpet and declare
unto the people the immorality of segregation,” he wrote. “It
must affirm that every human life is a reflection of divinity, and
that every act of injustice mars and defaces the image of God in
man.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€A religion true to its mission knows that segregation is
morally wrong and sinful.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It is unbrotherly and impersonal.
Two segregated souls never meet in God. Segregation denies the
sacredness of human personality.”20
While King believed strongly that human laws were needed
prohibiting segregation and discrimination, at the same time
he believed that a change of heart was necessary for any genu-
ine racial reconciliation to take place and that legislation alone
could not achieve this. Such a change of heart could only come
about, he believed, through the voluntary adoption of a religion
of love such as that proclaimed by Jesus in the Bible.21 Such a
religion of love, rooted in the idea that all human beings are cre-
ated in the image of God and ought to be treated accordingly,
was the foundational belief of his personalistic philosophy and
the driving force behind his entire life’s mission.
Biblical religious themes as the basis of Dr. King’s personalis-
tic philosophy can also be seen in the famous “I Have a Dream”
speech of August 1963. The magnificent climax to that speech
draws upon the Genesis creation story and its depiction of all
human beings as ultimately children of the same universal God:
“When we allow freedom to ring, when we let it ring from every
village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will
20. Ibid., pp. 97, 99.

21. “The ultimate solution to the race problem lies in the willingness of men to obey the
unenforceable.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€A vigorous enforcement of civil rights will bring an end to segregated
public facilities, but it cannot bring an end to fears, prejudice, pride and irrationality,
which are the barriers to a truly integrated society. These dark and demonic responses
will be removed only as men are possessed by the invisible inner law which etches on
their hearts the conviction that all men are brothers and that love is mankind’s most
potent weapon for personal and social transformation.” Martin Luther King, Jr., Where
Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 100–1.

be able to speed up that day when all of God’s children—black

men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catho-
lics—will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the Old
Negro spiritual, ‘Free at last, free at last; thank God almighty,
we are free at last.’”
The most often quoted lines from that speech also drew
heavily upon the biblical theme of judgment: “I have a dream
that my four little children will one day live in a nation where
they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the con-
tent of their character.” Human beings, it is wished here, will
someday be able to view one another, not in terms of artificial
differences such as skin color or race, but in terms of personal
moral worth, the same criterion that God uses in his judgment
of people.
King had many times before this historic speech invoked the
same biblical themes in his church sermons. Here, for instance,
is what he had to say about the lesson of the Good Samaritan
story in a sermon titled “On Being a Good Neighbor”:
Too seldom do we see people in their true humanness. A

spiritual myopia limits our vision to external accidents.
We see men as Jews or Gentiles, Catholics or Protestants,
Chinese or American, Negroes or whites. We fail to think
of them as fellow human beings made from the same basic
stuff as we, molded in the same divine image. The priest and
the Levite saw only a bleeding body, not a human being like
themselves. But the Good Samaritan will always remind us
to remove the cataracts of provincialism from our spiritual
eyes and see men as men. If the Samaritan had considered
the wounded man as a Jew first, he would not have stopped,
for the Jews and the Samaritans had no dealings. He saw
him as a human being first, who was a Jew only by accident.
The good neighbor looks beyond the external accidents and

discerns those inner qualities that make all men human, and
therefore, brothers.22
Abolitionist Personalism
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and early 1960s did not,
of course, invent the personalistic mode of thought, nor was it
original in applying biblical and liberal-Jeffersonian themes to
a struggle for personal rights. Both of these ideas and practices
had been taken over from the earlier antislavery movement, and
it is probably safe to say that nothing did more to weaken the
influence of ethnic and tribalistic modes of thought in America
than New England abolitionism and the Christian and transcen-
dentalist philosophy that often undergirded it.
Two antislavery writers can be taken to illustrate some of the
themes discussed so far. The first, Samuel Sewall, was a Puritan
merchant whose “The Selling of Joseph,” first published in 1700,
was one of the first antislavery tracts to appear in America. The
biblical teaching that all human beings are of the same blood—
the doctrine derived from both the creation story in Genesis and
chapter seventeen of the Book of Acts—was seen by Sewall as
incompatible with the manner in which black Africans were
being treated in America. Although he apparently believed Afri-
cans to be physically quite ugly in appearance, and doubted that
they could be integrated into white New England society, Sewall
nevertheless held that they were children of God and should be
treated with a respect commensurate with their status as such:
It is most certain that all men, as they are the sons of Adam,
are co-heirs, and have equal right unto liberty, and all other
22. Martin Luther King, Jr., Strength to Love (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964),
p. 23.

outward comforts of life. God “hath given the earthÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€unto

the sons of Adam” (Psalm 115). “And hath made of one
blood, all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the
earthÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€that they should seek the Lord. Forasmuch then as
we are offspring of God” (Acts 17: 26–7). These Ethiopians,
as black as they are, seeing they are the Sons and Daughters
of the First Adam, the Brethren and sisters of the Last Adam,
and the offspring of God. They ought to be treated with a
respect agreeable [i.e., a respect commensurate with their
divine dignity].23
The second example is that of William Lloyd Garrison, who

developed further the biblical and religious argument against
slavery, although he went much further than Sewall in carrying
out its implications. The fact that all men are of one blood (i.e.,
that they constitute a single human race), that they have all been
created by a loving God, and that what counts in the eyes of
this God is an individual’s moral virtue rather than his wealth
or skin color—all these were seen by Garrison as facts incom-
patible not only with the institution of slavery,but also with the
many laws in free states prohibiting interracial marriage. The
standard of matrimony Garrison believed should be the degree
of moral worth and mutual affection of the people involved, not
their race or ancestry:
If [the Creator] has made “of one blood all nations of men
for to dwell on all the face of the earth,” then they are one
species, and stand on a perfect equality; their intermarriage
is neither unnatural or repugnant to nature, but obviously
proper and salutary, it being designed to unite people of dif-
ferent tribes and nations. As civilization, and knowledge, and
23. Quoted in Louis Ruchames, ed., Racial Thought in America, vol. 1 (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1969), pp. 47, 51.

republican feelings, and Christianity prevail in the world, the

wider will matrimonial connections extend.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€An unnatu-
ral alliance is not that which joins in wedlock an African
descendant with an American, or an Indian with a European,
who are equal in moral worth.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The standard or matri-
mony is erected by affection and purity, and does not depend
upon the height, or bulk, or color, or wealth, or poverty, of
individuals.24
Garrison also quotes from the famous passage in Saint Paul’s

Letter to the Galatians, the passage often quoted in recent times
by feminist writers, where all human beings are said to be one
in Christ:
I call upon the spirits of the just made perfect in heaven,

upon all who have experienced the love of God in their souls
here below, upon the Christian converts in India and the
islands of the sea, to sustain me in the assertion that there is
power in the religion of Jesus Christ to melt down the most
stubborn prejudice, to overthrow the highest walls of parti-
tion, to break the strongest caste, to improve and elevate
the most degraded, to unite in fellowship the most hos-
tile.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€“In Christ Jesus, all are one: there is neither Jew nor
Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male
nor female”(Galatians 3:28).25
Because of his great faith in the power of the Christian religion

to transform people’s attitudes and behavior, Garrison, unlike
Sewall, believed that black Africans, once freed from slavery,
could eventually be assimilated into American society.
24. Ibid., pp. 308–9.

25. Ibid., pp. 312–13.

The liberal-Jeffersonian tradition and the themes of the

American Revolution are also prominent in Garrison’s writings,
and can be seen, for instance, in the very first issue of the Lib-
erator, where the aims and purposes of the periodical were set
forth to the public:
I determined, at every hazard, to lift up the standard of

emancipation in the eyes of the nation, within sight of Bun-
ker Hill, and the birthplace of liberty. That standard is now
unfurled. Assenting to the “self-evident truth” maintained
in the American Declaration of Independence, “that all men
are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights—among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness,” I shall strenuously contend for the
immediate enfranchisement of our slave population.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€On
this subject, I do not wish to think, or speak or write, with
moderation.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I
will not retreat a single inch—AND I WILL BE HEARD.
The mixture of biblical religious themes with the spirit of

’76 was, in Garrison’s case, of course, a very volatile combi-
nation, and both traditions would eventually go on to inspire
the Northern armies in the American Civil War. The civil rights
movement of the 1950s and early 1960s absorbed much of the
driving spirit of this earlier abolitionism, but it was to add to
it the important additional element of Gandhi-inspired nonvio-
lence. It was this third element, most prominently displayed in
the figures of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the early members of
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that
lent to the civil rights movement of this period much of its high
moral tone and ultimately elevated it to a moral level consider-
ably above that of most of the earlier abolitionism.
It was this moral elevation, and the genuine Christian com-
mitment of several of its leaders, that enabled the 1950s and

1960s era civil rights movement to draw into its fold people
from many different racial, ethnic, religious, and ideological
backgrounds. Indeed, the moral elevation of the movement
sometimes rose to the level of the saintly and heroic. One can
get a good sense of the high moral tone and basic Christian ori-
entation of many in the movement from the following “Com-
mitment Blank,” which Martin Luther King, Jr., and his aides
required all demonstrators to sign before participating in the
marches in Birmingham, Alabama:
COMMANDMENTS FOR THE VOLUNTEERS

I hereby pledge myself—my person and body—to the
nonviolent movement. Therefore I will keep the following
ten commandments:
1) Meditate daily on the teachings and life of Jesus.
2) Remember always that the nonviolent movement
in Birmingham seeks justice and reconciliation—not
victory.
3) Walk and talk in the manner of love, for God is
love.
4) Pray daily to be used by God in order that all
men might be free.
5) Sacrifice personal wishes in order that all men
might be free.
6) Observe with both friend and foe the ordinary
rules of courtesy.
7) Seek to perform regular service for others and for
the world.
8) Refrain from the violence of fist, tongue, or heart.
9) Strive to be in good spiritual and bodily health.
10) Follow the directions of the movement and of
the captain on a demonstration.
I sign this pledge, having seriously considered what I do
and with the determination and will to persevere.

It was the genius of Martin Luther King, Jr., that was able
to bring together the noblest strains in the biblical and liberal
traditions and inspire millions in their lofty promises through
the power of his magnificent oratory. Subsequent revelations of
great personal flaws in the man cannot detract from the cour-
age he showed in the face of incessant threats of racist violence,
nor from the truth and goodwill of the message he preached of
racial reconciliation and universal Christian love.
Detribalization and the Immigrant Experience

The American experience after the Civil War was marked by
the influx of successive waves of immigrants from many diverse
lands. The immigrants generally shared the hope of advancing
economically and being accepted into the larger society on an
equal footing with the descendants of the older immigrants of
English, Scottish, Welsh, and German origin. The open-market
economy and the corresponding opportunities it offered for per-
sonal advancement gave birth to a peculiarly American work
and achievement ethic that shared with the earlier Christian
and liberal traditions the idea that individuals should be judged
by what they individually do in life, rather than by what their
ancestors did or by what ethnic group they belonged to.
There were counterforces at work, of course, ranging from
the mild genealogical snootiness of the Daughters of the Ameri-
can Revolution to the terrorist-prone WASP racism of the Ku
Klux Klan. But the personalistic mode of thought had taken
strong root in America, and as the children of the first-generation
immigrants learned to speak the English language and to adopt
the ways of the American culture, they came to be accepted more
and more into the general society and to be judged individually,
rather than as representatives of their respective ethnic groups.
This process was never complete, of course, and ethnic-tribalis-
tic modes of consciousness always retained a considerable hold,

sometimes harmlessly and with genuine social benefits.26 But the

personalistic viewpoint—the view that human beings are to be
judged by their own characteristics and their own achievements,
and not by their ethnic-tribal affiliations—was a powerful ideal
that generally had a least some effect in shaping people’s atti-
tudes and actions.
The personalistic mode of thought, as it relates to the work
and achievement ethic, can be well illustrated by the comments
of a prominent black journalist in the early 1940s. The writer in
question, a feisty and gifted columnist for the Pittsburgh Cou-
rier, was objecting to the fact that while individuals in the press
were generally respected as such and not seen as representa-
tives of their respective racial, ethnic, or religious groups, in
the case of the Negro this was not the case. Only in the case of
Negro individuals, the writer protested, was it thought relevant
or appropriate to identify a person according to race, ethnicity,
or ancestry:
This [sinister policy of identifying individual Negroes as

such] is a subtle form of discrimination designed to segregate
these individuals in the mind of the public and thus bolster
the national policy of biracialism. Thus, Paul Robeson is not
a great baritone, he is a great “Negro” baritone. Dr. Carver
is not just a great scientist, he is a great “Negro” scientist.
Anne Brown is not merely a great soprano, she is a great
26. Ethnic-tribal affiliations, when properly integrated into, and counterbalanced by,
a more encompassing or more universal understanding of humanity, can promote many
salutary benefits to both individuals and the larger social order. Chief among these
is a sense of rootedness and belonging to a shared history and culture, which, like
our membership in the “little platoons” of our family, can be instrumental in helping
us expand the circle of our empathy and identity beyond the narrow confines of our
individual interests and predatory selves. It is when ethnic-tribal affiliations lose their
sensitivity for ever expanded circles of empathy and identity—and place the tribe itself
in the position of Supreme Being and Ultimate Concern—that a devilish distortion in
consciousness takes place that leads to the kind of murderous aggression and distorted
patriotism that produced the devastation of the First World War and the instigation by
fascist nationalists of the Second.

“Negro” soprano. Langston Hughes is not a poet merely,

he is a “Negro” poet. Augusta Savage is a “Negro” sculp-
tor, C.C. Spaulding is a “Negro” insurance executive, R.R.
Wright, Sr., is a “Negro” banker, J.A. Rogers is a “Negro”
historian, Willard Townsend is a “Negro” labor leader,
etc., etc., ad infinitum. No other group in this country is so
singled out for racial identification, and no one can tell me
that there is not a very definite reason for it. No daily news-
paper refers to Mr. Morgenthau as “Jewish” secretary of the
treasury, or New York’s Herbert H. Lehman as the “Jewish”
governor, or Isador Lubin as a “Jewish” New Dealer. Mayor
Rossi is never identified as the “Italian-American” execu-
tive of San Francisco, nor is the millionaire Giannini called
an “Italian” banker. There would be considerable uproar
if Senator Robert F. Wagner were termed “New York’s able
German-American solon,” or Representative Tenerowicz
dubbed “Detroit’s prominent Pole.” When has a Utah legis-
lator in Washington been labeled “Mormon”?
One could go on and on, but the point is that “our”
daily newspapers carefully avoid such designations except
in the case of so-called Negroes. I cannot recall when I have
seen a criminal referred to as a Jew, an Italian, a German or
a Catholic, but it is commonplace for colored lawbreakers or
suspects to be labeled “Negro.”
Personally, I shall not be convinced of the sincerity of
these white editors and columnists who shape America’s
thinking unless they begin treating the Negro in the news as
they do other Americans. Those who continue this type of
journalism are the worst sort of hypocrites when they write
about democracy and national unity.27
27. George S. Schuyler, in Pittsburgh Courier, 13 June 1942, as cited in Gunnar

Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Row, 1944, 1962), p. 1184.
Schuyler is a much underappreciated black writer who held what today might be called

The writer was expressing here, of course, the same aspira-

tion that many Jews, Italians, Poles, and others had previously
expressed of being accepted as equals into a multiracial, mul-
tiethnic, and multireligious culture that was respectful of indi-
vidual differences and individual achievements. This seems to
have been the dominant aspiration of the vast majority of black
Americans, along with the vast majority of other Americans, at
least up until the late 1960s, although a minority of black sepa-
ratists and black nationalists, it is true, never accepted it.
A very similar point to that of the Pittsburgh Courier jour-
nalist was made a few years later by the distinguished historian
Frank Tannenbaum. In his influential study of slavery in the
Western hemisphere, Slave and Citizen, Tannenbaum wrote:
It is not enough to say, as we often do [in the U.S.], that

there are so many Negro doctors, lawyers, politicians, busi-
nessmen, and scholars. It is requisite that there should not
be Negro doctors, Negro lawyers, or Negro scholars. Their
professional standing must overshadow their racial origin. It
is only when we can say he is a great actor, a great scholar,
a great lawyer, a great citizen, that the step has been taken
which endows the Negro with the moral worth as a man
which obliterates the invidious distinction and sweeps away
the condescending fawning of the better-than-thou attitude.
When the time does come that a Negro judge on the bench
is a judge and not a Negro judge, when a Negro scholar is a
scholar and not a Negro scholarÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€the gap between legal
equality and moral acceptance will be obliterated.28
“socially conservative” views on a number of prominent social and political issues of his
day.
28. Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp.
113–14. We have clearly come to the point in the arena of professional sports where
the hopes of Tannenbaum and the Pittsburgh Courier journalist have largely been
met. Managers, players, and sports fans alike look today primarily to the merit and
achievement of professional athletes and rarely place blacks, whites, Latinos, and

The Great Contraction

The early and mid-1960s marked a high point in post-Recon-
struction American history in the public understanding of, and
respect for, the dignity and worth of individual human persons.
It is often hard for people today to remember just what this
period was like, so far have we strayed from its motivating
spirit. It was a period in which progress was being made on
several fronts by many black Americans, and for the vast major-
ity of people of all races and ethnicities this progress was cause
for rejoicing. Black faces seen in banks and business enterprises
where they had never been seen before gave to all people of
goodwill, black and white alike, the feeling that they lived in
a society that was at least a little more just and humane than
the society that had existed before. A very similar feeling had
been unleashed two decades previously by President Truman’s
order abolishing segregation in the military, and by Jackie Rob-
inson’s breaking of the color barrier in professional baseball.
These were developments about which all fair-minded Ameri-
cans could feel a genuine satisfaction and pride. The early and
mid-1960s was also a period when questions regarding a per-
son’s race, ethnicity, and national origin were often deleted from
government questionnaires, as such questions were generally
viewed as irrelevant to any legitimate government purpose, and
the mere solicitation of such information was frequently held to
be an affront to the dignity of human persons and a threat to the
principle of equality before the law.
members of other races and ethnicities in separate mental categories, at least not when
their status as athletic professionals is at issue. Unfortunately, one cannot say the same
for people in occupations where racial preferences have been in play. Regrettably,
for many whites and Asians terms like “black doctor,” “black lawyer,” and “black
accountant” do connote a better-than-thou attitude, one suggesting that the doctor
in question may be a racial-preference recipient—“an affirmative-ation hire”—and
perhaps not up to meeting the white and Asian standards. Worse still, there is rationality
to this better-than-thou attitude perhaps most tellingly revealed in anecdotal reports of
black patients in municipal hospitals requesting to be treated by white doctors.

All this, however, was to change in the late 1960s and early
1970s with the emergence of the policy known as “affirmative
action.” It was at this time that a radical change in conscious-
ness was taking place, both inside and outside the government,
which could be seen in the very terms and conceptual structures
that were thought legitimate to interpret human reality. One
might characterize this change as a shift from the personalistic
language and personalistic mode of thought that had character-
ized the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the black protest movement
that had preceded it to the depersonalizing logic of racial and
ethnic tribalism. The death of Martin Luther King, Jr., who in
many ways epitomized the personalistic ideal in its Christian
form and who, at the time of his assassination in April 1968,
was organizing a march on behalf of the poor of all races, might
be taken as symbolic of the passing of this older ideal of a uni-
versal citizenship and universal personhood. By the late 1960s,
a new militant spirit, one often combined with a strong anti-
white animus, had taken hold of many black, Hispanic, and
American Indian spokesmen, and it became clear to all by this
time that the days when Italian housewives, Jewish college stu-
dents, and Irish priests would walk arm in arm with Southern
blacks in defense of universal principles of justice and individual
rights were now a thing of the past.
In the 1950s and early 1960s the black protest movement
was a genuine civil rights movement, and represented the con-
vergence of an ethnic-parochial interest (i.e., the social and
economic interest of black people), with a universal-human
ideal (i.e., equal rights for all, regardless of race or ethnicity). A
decade later this was no longer the case, as black groups, often
joined in coalition with Hispanic groups and women’s groups,
sought favored treatment for the members of their own particu-
lar groups, regardless of what deleterious effect this might have
on other people and regardless of how unjust or unfair these
other people might perceive this favored treatment to be. The

attitude of many of the black and Hispanic militants was essen-

tially this: “Look, you white folks [or ‘white Anglos’] have been
screwing us for three hundred years now. It’s about time we
started screwing you for awhile.” Militant feminists often took
a similar attitude with regard to white males. The universal-
human ideal, it seems, had lost most of its appeal and increas-
ingly gave way to self-seeking power politics, ruthlessly pursued
by well-organized racial, ethnic, and gender interest groups,
which cared little for those they had to step on in the pursuit of
their goals.
The period of the very late 1960s and early 1970s proved to
be a period of unprecedented ethnicization and tribalization in
the American public consciousness. It was a period when many
Americans desperately sought their “roots,” not in a common
humanity or in a universal God, nor in a common national heri-
tage (from which many had become estranged as a result of the
unpopularity of the Vietnam War), but in their respective gene-
alogies and ethnicities. This was true not only of Americans of
African, Spanish, and Asian ancestry but also of many people of
white European and Mideastern backgrounds as well.
With the liberal tradition in abeyance and the universalistic
strains in the Judeo-Christian religion ceasing to have any signif-
icant influence over people’s minds, the net effect of the increas-
ing interest in genealogy and ethnicity was to erect new barriers
between people where previously such barriers had been greatly
weakened or in some cases had not existed at all. Ethnic-tribal
modes of thought, unmodified by any wider identity or com-
mitment, were to be given a new legitimacy and preeminence in
America, and the practice of classifying the whole population
according to racial and ethnic criteria, at one time viewed in
most places outside the South with near universal horror, and
identified in the minds of many with South Africa and Nazi
Germany, was to become the order of the day.

There was, of course, a counterattack, led both by individu-

als and by the organizations of those ethnic groups who found
themselves placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis those groups that
were officially favored. A new convergence of ethnic-parochial
interest and universal-human ideal came to be represented by
Polish-American organizations, Italian-American organiza-
tions, and Jewish-American organizations, plus a number of
other groups, with the Jewish groups being the most active
and influential, owing in part to bad historical memories of the
effect of racial classifications and quota systems in both Europe
and America. None of these groups, however, either individu-
ally or collectively, could stem the tide of racial and ethnic clas-
sification or the preferential treatment of persons based on such
classifications.
The actual policy of affirmative action in employment, it
should be understood, had nothing to do—at least in its incep-
tion—with any laws passed by Congress, and indeed was in clear
violation of federal statues. What happened was that the federal
bureaucracy, led by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(OFCC), aided and abetted along the way by the federal courts,
simply rewrote through “interpretation” Titles VI and VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as President Johnson’s antidiscrim-
ination Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, substituting ethnic-
tribal categories (e.g., “Hispanic,” “Oriental,” “black,” etc.) for
the personalistic language of the documents in questions. Terms
such as “person,” “individual,” “any employee,” “all qualified
applicants,” and the like, were cynically reinterpreted to mean
in effect only those persons, individuals, or employees who were
members of officially designated racial and ethnic “minority
groups” as such groups were defined by the EEOC. It was only
as members of certain racial and ethnic groups that individuals
could claim the right of protection under legislation that was

originally written to insure to all Americans that they would be

treated in all employment situations, in the language of President
Johnson’s Executive Order 11246, “without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national origin.”29
The federal bureaucrats, using such euphemisms and code
words as “underutilization,” “goals,” “timetables,” and the
like, began to pressure employers into giving special preference
to people who fit into certain racial, ethnic, and gender catego-
ries, at the expense of people who did not and who were denied
all manner of redress for such action. The approach of the fed-
eral courts was even more direct, insofar as a finding that an
employer had discriminated in the past was seen as a justifica-
tion, under a blatantly dishonest reading of Section 703(g) of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, for the hiring of new people on a racial or
ethnic quota basis. One might have supposed that being guilty
of discriminating against people in the past was even more rea-
son not to discriminate against people in the future—that, for
instance, discriminating against two people in the past because
they were black and then discriminating against two people in
the present because they were white would mean that a total of
four people had been discriminated against. And this is exactly
what critics of affirmative action, including such black critics as
29. The cynicism, dishonesty, and blatant disregard for public law that federal
bureaucrats have displayed in their efforts to transform the meaning of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act is well captured in the following remark by a staff member of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Speaking in 1970 to representatives of the
Harvard Law Review, the staffer boasted: “The anti-preferential hiring provisions [of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act] are a big zero, a nothing, a nullity. They don’t mean anything
at all to us.” Quoted in Elliot Abrams, “The Quota Commission,” Commentary, Oct.
1972, p. 54. When one considers that the EEOC was explicitly set up by the Civil
Rights Act to enforce the provisions of its hiring section, one gets a sense of the truly
frightening lengths to which affirmative-action supporters have gone in the pursuit of
their policies. For an excellent account of the radical transition from the color-blind
understanding of antidiscrimination law to the highly color-conscious policies of racial
preferences, see Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination (New York: Basic Books,
1975).

Bayard Rustin, have strenuously argued. But within the logic of

affirmative action, two plus two equaled zero. It is the logic of
tribal warfare.
Consider, for instance, the following, scenario:
A small Southern town is polarized along racial lines. Early

on a Friday evening, members of the local Ku Klux Klan
go down to the local shopping mall, abduct the first black
person they see, steal his wallet, and give all his money away
to the first white person to come along. Upon hearing this,
members of the local black community are incensed, and
many among the more militant youth vow to get even. Con-
sequently, on the following week members of the local Black
Defense League go down to the same shopping mall, abduct
the first white person they see, steal his wallet, and give all
his money away to the first black person to walk by.
One has in the above account an exact parallel to the logic

and underlying mentality of affirmative action. What most
affirmative action programs in employment are really saying is
this: Because of the discrimination in the past against person A,
which worked to the unmerited benefit of person B, it is now
necessary to give special preference to person C at the expense
of person D. Person A and person C are not the same person,
nor are they necessarily related to each other in any way at all
except for the fact that they both have the same black, brown,
or yellow skin color, or both have ancestors who were born in
foreign countries where the official language spoken is Spanish.
Similarly, person B and person D are not the same person, nor
are they necessarily related to each other in any way at all except
for the fact that they both have the same white skin color—and
their ancestors were born in foreign countries where the official
language spoken is not Spanish.

Put in such terms, the policy sounds clearly absurd,30 and

indeed it is absurd, although an impression to the contrary
seems to have been created in the minds of the federal judges
and federal bureaucrats who initially developed the policy by
their tendency to view all black and Hispanic people as poor
and underprivileged and all white people, by contrast, as rich
and privileged. (On this latter point, it would seem the judges
and bureaucrats generalized from their own circumstances and
apparently assumed white people were all more or less like
themselves and their friends). The tradition of giving a break to
the underdog is in many contexts a praiseworthy one, and on
grounds of justice, at least, many would not object to a hiring
30. Even this characterization does not capture fully the arbitrariness and absurdity
of the policy. According to the guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission—America’s official race classification board—an Arab American with the
complexion of, say, an Anwar Sadat, would be considered “white,” as would the very
darkest-skinned Turk, Sicilian, or Sephardic Jew. Steven Plaut, an economics professor
at Oberlin, has well captured the arbitrariness and injustice of the current system when
he writes:
I have always been disturbed by the fact that many ethnic groups
who have been the victims of discrimination in the past because they were
minorities (e.g., Jews, Italians, etc.) are now the victims of discrimination
because they have been designated by some bureaucrat as belonging to the
“majority.”
Plaut, however, has successfully outfoxed the affirmative-action bureaucrats, for
although he himself is of Jewish origin, he has been able to turn their Nuremberg-like
laws to his own advantage. As he explains:
For years, I have been listing myself as an Asian American or Oriental
American on “affirmative-action” questionnaires. I am a Jew, whose
ancestors, culture, and “roots” originated in the Middle East, i.e., Asia. The
fact that I and my immediate ancestors were not born in Asia should be
irrelevant; the same holds true for many Japanese and Chinese Americans.
And I defy anyone to prove that Asia ends at the Himalayas. Ethnic identity,
as pointed out above, is subjective, and only the worst racist would deny
me my self-definition because of the pigmentation of my skin (a rather pale,
insipid shade). I urge all other potential Asian Americans to follow my
example.
If I should ever be pressed about this, I am prepared to alter my self-
definition. It seems that my ancestors on my father’s side (hence my surname)
lived in Spain until they were forcibly expelled in the fifteenth century,
migrating to central Europe. So, you see, I am also a “Spanish surnamed”
American, an Ibero American, or—if you will—an Hispanic. Steven Plaut,
article title in quotes with comma after Midstream Feb. 1980, p. 49.

policy that gave some degree of preference to poor and under-

privileged people over rich and privileged ones (some call this
“class-based affirmative action”). But the great socioeconomic
diversity in America, of course, does not conform to any simple
ethnic or racial stereotype. According to the Census Bureau, for
instance, there are two and a half times as many white people in
America below the poverty line as black people, and a full 25%
of all black families have family incomes above the national
average for whites.
One can say in their favor that some of the federal judges
and bureaucrats who favored affirmative action harbored a
genuine sympathy for the plight of the poor and disadvantaged,
especially for those who had been victims of racial and ethnic
discrimination. Where they went wrong was in abandoning the
suffering person as the unit of concern and transferring their
sympathy to a very heterogeneous group of people, whom they
saw only in terms of a stereotyped image. Indeed, the rhetoric of
affirmative action is one in which language has cut loose from
flesh-and-blood reality and gone on to create its own fantasy
world of images, symbols, and depersonalized mental abstrac-
tions. Terms such as the “black,” the “white,” the “Mexican
American,” the “Oriental,” the “Puerto Rican,” etc.—terms
meaning everyone in the group and yet no one—were to become
the basis for a general mystification that was to desensitize peo-
ple to the personal-discrete nature of all human reality and all
human suffering.
Feeble Defenses
Supporters of preferential hiring on the basis of race and eth-
nicity will sometimes pay lip service to the older, personalistic
ideal of a color-blind society but will then try to defend race-
and ethnic-conscious hiring policies as an interim or tempo-
rary measure that is supposedly necessary to bring about such

a society. This idea, for instance, was expressed in a federal cir-

cuit court decision in 1973: “Our society cannot be completely
color-blind in the short run if we are to have a color-blind soci-
ety in the long run.” It is never explained, however, just how
race-conscious policies in the short run can bring about color
blindness in the long run. Why, for instance, should people
who have been encouraged—or, indeed, required by law—to
see other people not as persons, but as group representatives,
suddenly at some future date begin seeing them as individu-
als? The idea is absurd on its very face. Institutionalizing eth-
nic and color consciousness only habituates the practice, and
ingrains it that much more deeply in the public mind. The idea
that you can get human beings to think of other human beings
as persons in the long run by having them think of them as
group representatives in the short run is akin to the idea that
you can get young males to view young females as persons,
not as sex objects, by subjecting them in their formative years
to heavy does of government-sponsored porn films. As Miro
Todorovich, a leading critic of affirmative action in education,
has remarked, it is a policy of prescribing whiskey to cure
alcoholism.
The inevitable effect of race- and ethnic-conscious hiring
policies is to legitimate ethnic and racial stereotyping both as
a way of thinking and as a manner of human beings relating to
one another. Such policies only serve to undermine that ongo-
ing openness to new experience and new encounters, which
alone is an antidote to a prejudicial frame of mind. In addition,
such policies provoke deep resentment in those persons not of
the favored race or ethnicity, and they will frequently take out
their very legitimate anger, not on the federal judges and federal
bureaucrats who instituted the policies, or on the various black,
Hispanic, and feminist leaders who support them, but on the
individual blacks, Hispanics, and women they encounter daily,

many of whom, according to opinion polls, are opponents of

affirmative action.31
Many people try to justify preferential hiring based on race
and ethnicity as a mode of rectifying the “present effects of
past discrimination.” This, however, is a rather feeble defense,
as preferential hiring programs are rarely, if ever, means-tested,
and it is not quite clear just what “effects” are being rectified.
Very often it is the best-off among the targeted racial and eth-
nic minority groups who take advantage of such programs.
In some cases, the actual beneficiaries of preferential pro-
grams would seem to have been the victims of nothing more
serious than affluence.32 But even if preferential hiring were
31. A June 1977 Gallup Opinion Index survey revealed that 64% of the “nonwhites”
and 82% of the females questioned believed that “ability as determined by test scores”
should be the main consideration in hiring and university admission decisions rather
than preferential treatment based on ethnicity or gender.
32. This is probably most common in the area of preferential admissions to prestige
universities. Joseph Adelson, for instance, describes the following case of preferential
treatment in graduate school admissions in his own department of psychology at
the University of Michigan: “One afternoon several years ago, while serving on our
admissions committee, I came across the applications of two young women. One was
an ambassador’s daughter who has been educated in private secondary schools, and
was attending a most prestigious Ivy League university. The other might have stepped
out of a Harriet Arnow novel. She had been born in Appalachia, the daughter of a poor
farmer. The farm failed, the family moved north, her father died, the family survived on
welfare and odd jobs, she married young, bore a child, was divorced, began attending a
municipal university and ultimately was graduated with an excellent record. With respect
to objective measurements—test scores and the like—these two young women were more
or less evenly matched. It was the ambassador’s daughter who, being black, was offered
an invitation.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The welfare child, being white, was not admitted, did not come close.”
Adelson goes on to describe what the admissions committee found when it began
to take a closer look at the individual economic backgrounds of the so-called minority
applicants: “This past year our admissions committee decided to give some attention to
the socioeconomic status of all plausible candidates. What we found was startling: of
the five minority finalists, three were attending elite private colleges, and two were at
selective state universities. Only one had received scholarship help. Three of the five came
from affluent—not merely comfortable—families, and one of these gave every evidence
of being rich. The committee member who interviewed most of them reported back
to our faculty, somewhat ruefully, that their average family income was considerably
higher than that enjoyed by the faculty itself.” (Joseph Adelson, Commentary, May
1978, p. 27)

means-tested and, say, the income and educational level of a

job applicant’s parents were taken into account in an attempt
to favor the disadvantaged, it is not at all clear why such a
program should be limited to those of only certain racial and
ethnic backgrounds but not others. Does socioeconomic disad-
vantage that may arguably be attributed to racial and ethnic
discrimination against one’s ancestors have any greater claim
to public concern than socioeconomic disadvantage that is not
so attributable? Many would answer no, but even if this were
not the case, it would seem that many poor Irish Americans,
poor Polish Americans, poor Jewish Americans, poor Greek
Americans, poor Italian Americans, poor Portuguese Ameri-
cans, poor Slavic Americans, poor Hungarian Americans,
poor Czech Americans, poor Ukrainian Americans, poor Arab
Americans, poor Turkish Americans, poor Armenian Ameri-
cans, poor Gypsy Americans, and indeed virtually every poor
person in America who is of Southern European, Eastern Euro-
pean, North African, or Middle Eastern ethnic background
would have a legitimate claim to preferential treatment, since
their socioeconomic deprivation could arguably be attributed
to past discrimination against their ancestors.
Perhaps the most common defense of preferential hiring in
recent years is the so-called role-model argument. Women, His-
panics, and particularly black people, it is said, need same-race
(or same-gender) role models in various occupations in order
to be convinced that they can succeed in a competitive employ-
ment world where most important positions in the past have
been held by white males. It is necessary, the argument goes, to
weigh the injustice done to the better-qualified applicants who
are not hired because of affirmative action programs against all
the good that is done by the additional minority and women
role models that are created.
Such an argument may enjoy a superficial appeal at first
glance, but the appeal evaporates once one reflects that affirma-

tive-action role models are not genuine and are soon recognized
as such by all concerned. The role actually modeled by affirma-
tive-action recipients is that of a patronized black, Hispanic, or
female who is of inferior qualifications in comparison to the best
qualified applicant for a job or promotion, and who would not
have gotten to where he or she is except for the existence of an
official policy of government favoritism. Affirmative-action role
models, it would seem, serve only to perpetuate the prejudiced
view that blacks, Hispanics, and women are grossly inferior to
Caucasian males and incapable of competing with them on an
equal plane. Affirmative-action role models also undermine all
the positive influences of those genuine role models—i.e., those
blacks, Hispanics, and women who really have competed suc-
cessfully with white males—because of the inevitable tendency
of observers to lump the two types of achievers together.
The situation, it would seem, is particularly damaging for
many young blacks, who often lack self-confidence in unfamil-
iar arenas where they must compete with whites because of the
long-time dominance of white-supremacy thinking. Support-
ers of affirmative action apparently believed that such negative
effects of affirmative-action role models could be significantly
offset by keeping preferential hiring policies secret. People, they
believed, would be given preference on the basis of their race,
ethnicity, or gender, but this would not be publicly admitted,
and indeed, would be officially denied. Dissimulation and denial
have, in fact, been a characteristic feature of most affirmative-
action programs, but they do not seem to have had much of
their intended effect. Most people, both those in the preferred
groups and those in the non-preferred groups, have generally
understood quite well exactly what is going on. What propo-
nents of the role-model argument have failed to grasp is that,
with regard to any positive inspirational value, quality counts
much more than quantity. A large quantity of low-quality role
models has distinctly negative value. Affirmative-action role

models negatively affect public perceptions of the competence

of their intended beneficiaries and reinforce stereotypes of black
and Hispanic inferiority and incompetence. They also nega-
tively affect incentives for those in the beneficiary categories to
achieve at their maximum since they know that standards will
be lowered for them.
Mythologies and Pathologies

Since affirmative action in employment is in blatant contradic-
tion to the plain meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and con-
trary to certain moral and ethical precepts that have deep roots
in America’s liberal and Christian past, it became necessary
for supporters and defenders of the program to devise certain
legitimizing social and legal mythologies, which seem to have
had considerable success in confusing a good number of people.
The legal myth holds that affirmative action, in the sense of
preferential hiring based on racial, ethnic, and gender criteria,
was mandated by President Johnson in 1965 in his Executive
Order 11246 and is provided for in Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. This, of course, is the exact opposite of the truth.
What is true in the myth is that President Johnson did indeed
use the words “affirmative action”33 in his executive order,
but the term was used in a sense directly opposite the meaning
the term would take on in the 1970s. By “affirmative action”
Johnson meant that contractors doing business with the federal
33. The term “affirmative action” is also used in the 1964 Civil Rights Act in
Section 706(g), where it refers to forms of redress for acts of discrimination against
individuals—redress such as hiring or reinstatement, the granting of back pay, or similar
acts of “affirmative action.” The usage of the term here was apparently taken over from
the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), where employers could similarly
be required to reinstate employees, grant back pay, and take other such “affirmative
action” to compensate union members who had been fired or otherwise adversely
treated because of union activities. Needless to say, the racial and ethnic quota hiring
often mandated by courts under this section is inconsistent with the explicit letter, spirit,
and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act.

government would make a special effort both to advertise their

nondiscrimination policies more broadly and to ensure that all
employees and applicants for employment were treated on a
strictly race-, ethnicity-, and religion-neutral basis. “Affirmative
action,” in other words, meant affirmative nondiscrimination,
i.e., scrupulous ethnic neutrality and color-blindness. The rel-
evant section of the executive order reads:
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee

or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color or
national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action
to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees
are treated during employment, without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national origin. (Section 201.1; emphasis
added)
Executive Order 11246 did not include a ban on the use

of gender in the making of employment decisions, so to rectify
this oversight, Johnson two years later issued another executive
order, No. 11375, which reaffirmed the merit-based impera-
tive of both the 1964 Civil Rights Act and his earlier executive
order, and extended the scope of his earlier order to include a
ban on sex discrimination as well:
It is the policy of the United States government to provide

equal opportunity in federal employment and in employment
by federal contractors on the basis of merit and without dis-
crimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
The Congress, by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, enunciated a national policy of equal employ-
ment opportunity in private employment, without dis-
crimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.

Executive Order 11246 of September 24, 1965, carried

forward a program of equal employment opportunity in
government employment, employment by federal contractors
and subcontractors, and employment under federally assisted
construction contracts regardless of race, creed, color, or
national origin.
It is desirable that the equal employment opportunity
programs provided for in Executive Order 11246 expressly
embrace discrimination on account of sex. (Executive Order
No. 11375; emphasis added)
Supporters of preferential hiring in the federal bureaucracy

realized, however, that few people ever read presidential execu-
tive orders, and they guessed—and guessed correctly—that if
they simply set down their own laws mandating preferential
or quota-like hiring, the federal courts would eventually back
them up and would act as though a policy that was explicitly
prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was actually required
by it.34 They also suspected—again correctly—that neither Con-
gress nor the president would do anything to interfere out of fear
of being denounced in the media by the so-called “civil rights
groups” either as racist bigots or, at the very least, as insensitive
to the plight of “minorities.” And so, in 1971, the policy of affir-
mative action in employment was given birth by bureaucratic
34. A number of federal court decisions effectively rewrote Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the most important being United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
(decided June 27, 1979). The majority opinion in this case, written by Justice William
Brennan, must surely rank as one of the most blatantly dishonest judicial decisions ever
handed down by an American court. It has been the subject of numerous commentaries
and of at least three elaborate and devastating refutations, one by Justice Rehnquist
in his impassioned 37-page dissent, another by Carl Cohen in Commentary (“Justice
Debased: The Weber Decision,” Sept. 1979, pp. 43–53), and a third by Bernard D.
Meltzer in The University of Chicago Law Review (“The Weber Case: The Judicial
Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,” Spring 1980, pp. 423–
66). These three critiques contain valuable information on the legislative history of the
1964 Civil Rights Act as well as on the personalistic mode of thought embodied in that
act.

fiat, the key document in question being Revised Order No. 4

of the Labor Department’s Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance. This was the document that spoke of “goals,” “timeta-
bles,” “deficiencies,” “good-faith efforts,” “underutilization,”
“result-oriented” policies, and the like, and helped set the style
for the mystification and double talk that would become the
stock-in-trade of most affirmative-action programs.35
The social mythology that affirmative-action supporters
created has also been touched upon previously. It consists of at
least four interrelated mythic elements, each of which is usually
presented as the unspoken premise of various arguments and
moral appeals rather than as explicitly stated facts. The first
element might be described as the myth of the socioeconomi-
cally homogeneous white majority. If one is going to place a
person at an employment disadvantage because of that person’s
race, then it is certainly easier on one’s conscience if the person
put at a disadvantage is from a rich and privileged background
35 Revised Order No. 4 was issued in December 1971. It summarized and clarified a
policy that the OFCC had been gradually developing, though without clarification as to
its true intentions, since May 1968. The ultimate intentions of the OFCC’s affirmative-
action policy first became clear in early 1970 with the issuance of its Order No. 4, which
stated that federal contractors must devise affirmative-action plans that included:
an analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the
utilization of minority groups and further, goals and timetables to which the
contractor’s good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and
thus to achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities at all levels and in all
segments of his work force where deficiencies exist.
Regarding Order No. 4 (1970) and its 1971 elaboration and revision, Kenneth
C. McGuiness and his colleagues write: “These revisions significantly altered both the
direction and the purpose of the compliance program. What was at first an effort to
provide equal employment opportunity for all groups had become a program to provide
minorities and women with a share of the existing jobs, commensurate with their
representation in the work force and/or the population. Success was to be measured
in the number of jobs won for minorities and women, and not by the establishment of
nondiscriminatory employment practices.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The purpose of the program had become,
not equal employment opportunity, but simply equal employment. Equal opportunity
was considered a distant, although worthy goal. For the present, the program had
become the vehicle for establishing and monitoring preferential treatment.” See Kenneth
C. McGuiness, ed., Preferential Treatment in Employment (Washington, D.C.: Equal
Employment Advisory Council, 1977), p. 21.

rather than from a poor and underprivileged one. Hence, to

justify a policy of discriminating against white people, white
people must be identified with wealth and privilege. The fact
that there are 25 million white people in America who are
below the official poverty level and many more in very humble,
lower-middle-income circumstances, and the fact that many of
these people must also apply for jobs in competitive job mar-
kets were facts that the myth propagators sought to eliminate
from public awareness.
The second mythic element complements the first, and
might be described as the myth of the socioeconomically homo-
geneous black and Hispanic minorities. To justify preferential
treatment in favor of black people, Hispanic people, and certain
other people officially designated as constituting a “minority
group,” the people in these groups naturally had to be con-
ceived of as economically and culturally deprived. The fact that
there is a sizable black and Hispanic middle and upper-middle
class in America and the fact that the members of these groups
are much more likely than their poorer brethren to be the ones
applying for the most competitive and high-prestige jobs where
the greatest degree of racial and ethnic preference is generally
given, were once again facts that the myth propagators sought
to shield from public awareness.
The third element in the mythology was what might be called
the myth of the ethnicly homogeneous white majority. All white
people, according to this myth, are ethnicly more or less the
same and can be adequately viewed in terms of the White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant model. Since WASPs were never discriminated
against in America to any significant degree, and since WASPs
in the past have enjoyed social and economic privileges that,
in some cases at least, were purchased at the expense of racial
and ethnic discrimination against others, the more white people
could be viewed as WASPs, the easier it would be to justify the
withdrawl of certain of their rights and privileges. The myth, of

course, deliberately tried to obscure the fact that many present-

day WASPs are quite poor, that in any event WASPs constitute
a distinct minority among white people in America (less than
a third according to some definitions and estimates), and that
America is a nation whose “white” people come from literally
dozens of different ethnic and national-origin backgrounds.
The myth also, of course, tried to obscure the fact that, unlike
most WASPs, most white immigrants to America from the vari-
ous nations and regions of Eastern and Southern Europe, North
Africa, and the Middle East, often experienced widespread eth-
nic discrimination in employment and other areas of life, dis-
crimination that was widespread roughly up until the end of the
Second World War.
The fourth element in the social mythology is what might be
termed the myth of the ethnicly homogeneous Hispanic minority.
In reality, of course, as Nathan Glazer and others have stressed,
Spanish-speaking people and their descendants in America do
not constitute a single ethnic group, but a whole host of ethnic
groups, with widely varying group histories and group tradi-
tions. Historically speaking, the amount of ethnic discrimina-
tion that was typically experienced by the members of these
different groups varied considerably from group to group, with
the members of the better-off groups, such as the Spaniards,
probably experiencing less discrimination on average than the
members of many of the Eastern European, North African, and
Middle Eastern ethnic groups. But since the public image of
Hispanics in America, at least among many non-Hispanics, is
largely conditioned by the history of Mexican Americans (who
on average experienced perhaps the greatest degree of ethnic
discrimination), as well as by the recent history of Puerto Ricans
(who, in aggregate per capita terms, are among the poorer His-
panic groups in America), it apparently served the interest of the
propagators of the myth to lump all Spanish-speaking people
and their descendants under a single term.

Each element in the social mythology of affirmative action

was consciously or unconsciously intended to desensitize the
mind of the observer to the vast diversity of people in America
and to the individual personal nature of every human being and
every human life. The social mythology also sought to inject
into public consciousness what is perhaps the most perverse
idea of the many perverse ideas that the ethnic-tribal mind-set
has bequeathed to mankind—the idea of collective and congeni-
tal blood guilt. Given the history of this idea, with its use, for
instance, to justify black slavery as just punishment for the bib-
lical sin of Ham and to persecute Jews throughout the centuries
for their alleged collective and congenital responsibility in the
murder of Christ, one might have thought such an idea would
have had little appeal to those who had been victims of racial
and ethnic prejudice. Its success within a modern American con-
text is something truly alarming.
According to this way of thinking, all people who have white
skin partake of a collective blood guilt for all the heinous crimes
committed in the past by white people against blacks, Hispanics,
and the members of various American Indian tribes. The guilt
for such crimes, according to this view, is not only transmitted
along genealogical lines but has a peculiar race-specific infec-
tiousness about it that contaminates all people with white skin.
Even descendants of white abolitionists, for instance, would be
seen to share in this blood guilt, as would the descendants of
the many millions of post-Civil War white immigrants, despite
the fact that most of their ancestors had to cope with ethnic
discrimination of their own, had little or nothing to do with
Southern slavery, Jim Crow laws, or the persecution of Mexi-
cans or Indians, and generally settled in the industrial areas of
the country outside the South, where few Mexicans, Indians, or
blacks resided. The collective and congenital guilt idea, like the
various other elements in the affirmative-action social mythol-
ogy, was rarely stated in explicit terms but assumed a promi-

nent background existence, usually as an unarticulated premise

or assumption of various proaffirmative-action arguments and
appeals.
Some of the elements in the social mythology can be well
illustrated by a few quotations from the famous Kerner Commis-
sion report on the causes of the urban rioting of the late 1960s.
This report was written at the very beginning of the period
when influential intellectuals and government bureaucrats were
considering the desirability of abandoning the national policy
of racial and ethnic neutrality in hiring, substituting instead
one of racial and ethnic favoritism. The document is invalu-
able for understanding the psychology and motivation of the
type of upper-middle-class, guilt-ridden, white “liberal”36 of the
late 1960s era, who helped to institute the policy of affirma-
tive action, and it contains one of the earliest uses of the actual
phrase “affirmative action” in a sense that seems to be at least
approaching the meaning it would later acquire.37
36. The term “liberal” is set in quotation marks here and throughout this chapter
to stress the fact that affirmative action is anything but a liberal policy and those who
support it, regardless of how they classify themselves, have ceased to be liberals in any
meaningful sense of the term. From the British Levellers of the seventeenth century to
the American welfarists of the New Deal, Fair Deal, and Great Society, liberals have
always endeavored to view human beings as individual persons with individual human
rights and individual human needs, rather than as members of classes, castes, or ethnic
groups whose rights and privileges are contingent upon their membership in such
groups. One cannot be both a liberal in any of its many past meanings and a supporter
of race-based classifications and the allocation of government benefits and burdens on
the basis of those classifications (just as one cannot be a liberal and a supporter of a
regime that classifies people as aristocrats, commoners, and clergy and allocates rights
and obligations according to these class distinctions). Liberalism is incompatible with
ethnic tribalism and tribal-based categorization schemes just as it is with class-based
systems of hierarchy and hierarchical privilege.
37. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York:
New York Times Company/Bantam Books,1968). The phrase “affirmative action”
appears in a subsection of chapter 17 titled “Opening the Existing Job Structure”:
“Federal, state and local efforts to ensure equal opportunity to employment should
be strengthened byÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€linking enforcement efforts with training and other aids to
employers and unions, so that affirmative action to hire and promote may be
encouraged in connection with investigations of both individual complaints and charges
of broad patterns of discrimination.” (p. 419). It is not clear in this statement whether
“affirmative action” means simple redress for people who have actually been the

The conclusion of the Kerner Commission was set forth in a

famous sentence in the introduction to its report, in a line alleg-
edly penned by commission vice-chairman John Lindsay, which
stated:
Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one

white—separate and unequal.
Here, of course, one can see the tendency toward the racial
stereotyping of the population that would become a character-
istic feature of affirmative-action programs. One ethnicly and
socioeconomically homogeneous white group, which is thought
of as rich and privileged, is pictured as standing over an equally
socioeconomically and ethnicly homogeneous black group,
which is thought of as uniformly poor and underprivileged.
Social status and economic well-being are seen to run along
strict racial lines, with little consciousness of the vast diversity
to be found among the enormous black and white populations
actually found in America.
The commission also set forth its view regarding the collec-
tive guilt of “white society” for the deplorable conditions in the
victims of racial discrimination—where the redress takes the form of “make-whole”

efforts on the part of the institutions that have victimized them through specific acts of
employment discrimination (and where the discrimination itself is not simply alleged
but substantiated in a formal fact-finding process) or whether “affirmative action”
refers to special consideration in the awarding of jobs based on racial identity where the
special consideration is not related to specific discriminatory acts by specific employers
in relation to their individual past victims. The first meaning of “affirmation action”
would parallel its use in the National Labor Relations Act (where employees fired for
antiunion activities were entitled to being reinstated and their employers subject to
other acts of “affirmative action” to bring about redress). The redress required is always
victim- and violation-specific and does not permit racial proxies for actual victims. If
this is the meaning, the Kerner Commission’s recommendation would be consistent with
the both the spirit and letter of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But it is the second meaning
that seems to be aimed at, where the special hiring and promoting under affirmative-
action plans is not victim- or violation-specific and sweeps into its fold whoever meets
certain racial criteria.

inner-city ghettos where many black Americans were forced to

live:
What white Americans have never fully understood—but

what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is
deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it,
white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.
Now if one asks in this context just who is white society, the
answer, of course, is all white people. All white people are seen
as collectively responsible for the degradation and despair in the
black urban ghetto, and they are supposed to feel guilty for their
past sins in having created it. The sin and guilt is not personal,
but collective and congenital. It is a racial guilt. The commis-
sion fully realized, as indicated in the first line of the quotation,
that many “white Americans” were rather far removed from the
situation in the inner-city ghetto and had little understanding of
its problems. But in the commission’s view this fact served only
to heighten their guilt, as it rendered them less concerned about
the evil conditions that lurked there, for which all white people
were seen as collectively responsible.
When we try to understand the motivations of the support-
ers of affirmative action, certainly the easiest motive to grasp
is that of the leaders of various black, Hispanic, and women’s
groups. These groups, in their support for preferential hiring,
were simply playing the typical American game of interest-
group politics. They sought special favors for the members of
their respective clienteles, with little regard for the rights of
those who would have to be shoved aside, much as labor unions
and business associations do when attempting to promote the
self-interest of their respective members. Other ethnic groups in
the past had acted in a similar manner (the Irish, for instance,
in many northern cities during the age of machine politics), and
however regrettable this may have been—however sickening the

fact that these ethnic and gender interest groups often spoke
in the exalted name of “civil rights”38—the motivation of their
members was certainly transparent enough for all to see.
The situation is much more complicated, however, when we
consider the motivation of the high-ranking federal bureaucrats
and judges who instituted the affirmative action policy, as well
as their supporters among the intellectual elite in the universi-
ties and the news media, the great majority of whom are white
males. It is the psychology of the contemporary upper-middle-
class white male “liberal” that is so complicated, yet an under-
standing of it is crucial in order to grasp how a policy such as
affirmative action could have come into being.
The upper-middle-class white “liberal” who supported affir-
mative action seems to have been stirred initially by two very
different passions. The first of these was a genuine sympathy
and compassion for the plight of the black poor in America—
for those who were at the very bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder and who had often suffered in their own lifetimes from
38. The understanding of this term has been so corrupted by recent history that
it’s worthwhile to introduce here a simple dictionary definition. The term “civil” in
“civil rights” comes from the Latin civilis and French civil and means “of or belonging
to citizens,” “of or pertaining to the whole body or community of citizens,” “of or
pertaining to the individual citizen,” or “becoming or befitting a citizen” (Oxford
English Dictionary). A civil right is a right that each citizen has solely by virtue of
his citizenship, whether in a republic, commonwealth, or other political body. It is
not a right conferred on the basis of ethnic, tribal, or genealogical relationships. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution laid the foundation for the modern
American understanding of civil rights by granting to “all persons born or naturalized
in the United States” equal status as citizens and the full and equal political rights
citizenship confers. Much confusion has been created by the common use of the term
“civil rights group” to describe a number of groups that have little interest in promoting
the rights of citizens. To speak of the NAACP or La Raza as a “civil rights group” is no
more accurate than to confer such a label upon the Polish American Congress or the
Sons of Italy. Calling such a group a “civil rights group” is akin to describing the Sheet
Metal Workers Union or the National Association of Realtors as a “distributive justice
group.” The fact that such groups are still routinely called by such an honorific title is an
indication of the deep moral and spiritual confusion that reigns within large segments of
our population in the post-civil rights era.

the meanest of prejudices and the vilest of social practices. This

sympathy and compassion was then extended by the white
“liberal” to cover black people in general and subsequently the
members of certain other ethnic groups as well, particularly
Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and American Indians.
The second force at work in the mind of the upper-middle-
class white “liberal” was a deeply rooted sense of guilt. This
sense of guilt in most cases had nothing to do with any aware-
ness of any specific wrong that either the white “liberal” himself
or any of his ancestors had actually committed against black
people or the members of any other ethnic group. In many
cases, of course, no such specific wrong existed. The source of
the white “liberal’s” sense of guilt, rather, was something much
more immediate, having to do with the moral uneasiness he
felt about his own privileged position in society. Growing up
amid relative wealth and privilege and discovering so many in
radically different circumstances, the upper-middle-class white
“liberal,” like many privileged people, felt a sense of guilt and
uneasiness over his own personal circumstances and the realiza-
tion of the fact that he may have been no more deserving of his
relative wealth and privilege than the poor and degraded were
deserving of their poverty and degradation. Even people from
very modest circumstances will sometimes have similar feelings
when confronting, for instance, a wretched beggar on a city
street.
This combination of guilt about one’s own privileged socio-
economic position and compassion for the plight of the poor
and downtrodden can often lead to morally praiseworthy activ-
ities of great benefit to society. A person motivated by such feel-
ings, for instance, might decide that it was his obligation to give
away much of his wealth and earnings to those more in need
of them than himself, or he might decide to dedicate his spare
time and energy to any number of charitable activities. With

regard to underprivileged blacks, for instance, he might choose

to make large contributions to the United Negro College Fund
or to other black charities; he might decide to adopt a black
orphan, or at least spend time as a tutor or a Big Brother to a
fatherless black child in need of personal attention; he might
lend large sums of money to a promising black enterprise in
need of start-up capital; or he might reach out in any number of
ways to help individual black people in distress.
But the compassion and concern for the downtrodden of
the typical affirmative-action-supporting white “liberal” was to
stop at that very point where any significant degree of his own
personal sacrifice was called for. It was at this point that he
was seized by what can only be described as a kind of demonic
self-righteousness and hypocrisy, which induced him to try to
expiate his own sense of guilt, not by giving up any of his own
wealth or privilege—not, for instance, by giving up his own job
or promotion entitlement and recruiting a poor black or His-
panic person to take his place—but by using government power
to force other people, usually people considerably less well off
than himself, to sacrifice their jobs, their lives, and their pro-
motion entitlements. And when these other people then com-
plained about such treatment—when the Brian Webers, that is,
the Stuart Marshes, the Wendy Wygants, the Memphis fire fight-
ers, and the like, complained about the discrimination against
them—they were denounced by the affirmative-action-support-
ing white “liberals” for their insensitivity to the plight of the
poor and oppressed.
In the 53rd chapter of the Book of Isaiah, we read of a Suf-
fering Servant who takes upon himself the burden of the entire
world’s sin and guilt in order that man might be restored to God
through his great personal suffering and sacrifice. The affirma-
tive-action-supporting white “liberal,” one might say, took

upon himself the sin and guilt, if not the “world,” at least that
of “white society,” but when it came to the question of personal
suffering and sacrifice, he delegated that task to others, whom
he would then confront as his moral inferiors.39
In addition to the three forces of guilt, compassion, and
self-righteous hypocrisy, two other forces come into play in the
motivation of the upper-middle-class white “liberal,” which
might be designated as “romanticism” and “fear.” Both forces
are intimately related and proceed from the peculiar manner in
which poor and oppressed people have frequently been viewed
in Western society, particularly by those on the left side of the
political spectrum. Poor and oppressed people are, of course,
exactly that—they are poor and oppressed. They are not neces-
sarily noble people, or virtuous people, or wise people. Indeed,
they are sometimes the very opposite, as the effect of poverty
and oppression is frequently to brutalize people, to keep them in
ignorance, and to fill them with hatreds and animosities, which
they not infrequently take out both on fellow sufferers and upon
innocent third parties who did them no wrong.
But the upper-middle-class white “liberal” tends to roman-
ticize the victims of poverty and oppression and to see them as
possessing a certain inner moral purity that elevates them in his
mind above the general lot of better-off people, almost endow-
ing them with a kind of secular holiness. The culmination of this
type of thinking is found in Marxism, where the masses of poor
39. Consider in this context the biting remark of Mike Fontham, the attorney for the
plaintiff Brian Weber, the white factory worker passed over for a job promotion to a
lower-seniority black because of a racial preference program at a Kaiser Aluminum
plant in Gramercy, Louisiana: “Look what’s happening. A bunch of bureaucrats in
Washington and a bunch of high-level corporate executives all decided to achieve some
social goal. But how many of them are saying, ‘I’m giving up my job?’ That would be
affirmative action! But instead they’re saying some schmoe in the plant has to give up his
job.” (Cited in Steven V. Roberts, “The Bakke Case Moves to the Factory,” New York
Times Magazine, 25 Feb. 1979, p. 101).

and oppressed factory workers are seen as nothing less than the
saviors and redeemers of mankind. The idea that something said
by such people could be mean-spirited, or misinformed, or sim-
ply nonsense is seen by the white “liberal,” and even more so by
his compatriots on the far left, as bordering on a profanation.
What is said by the poor and oppressed—or more typically, by
those not-so-poor-and-oppressed people who claim to be their
spokesmen—is treated with a special deference and generally
exempted from the moral and intellectual scrutiny that would
be accorded to statements made by almost anyone else. Indeed,
many a white “liberal” and his far left brethren are so lacking in
any cultivation of their own inner faculties of moral and spiri-
tual discernment that morality and justice will not infrequently
come to be associated in their minds with whatever spokesmen
for poor and oppressed people demand.
The upper-middle-class white “liberal,” one might say,
views the poor and oppressed much the way medieval Catho-
lic peasants sometimes viewed the holy orders of priests and
monks. In just thinking about them, he can experience a sense
of his own unworthiness and guilt, and he fears nothing more
than being outside their good graces. This fear is particularly
strong when attention is turned to black people, whose dis-
approval the white “liberal” fears with an intensity border-
ing on horror. The thought of black people conjures up in his
mind all the imagery and symbolism of the Civil War crusade
against slavery and the subsequent struggles against the Ku
Klux Klan and Jim Crow. Opposition to what black people or
their spokesmen demand is thus closely associated in the white
“liberal’s” mind with evil and the forces of extreme deprav-
ity. The thought that black people or their spokesmen might
disapprove of him, that they might think of him, for instance,
as a racist or a bigot—or merely as lacking sufficient concern
to extirpate racism and bigotry—is enough to shake the white

“liberal” to his foundations and instill terror in his soul.40 It
40. Consider in this context the following account of a gathering of left-liberal student
leaders at Rutgers University in the winter of 1988. The class origin of the students isn’t
mentioned, but given the fact that they were able to fly around the country to attend a
college conference and were politically on the left suggests that most came from middle-
to upper-middle-class backgrounds.
Encouraged by the rebirth of campus activism, students from a
score of institutions began in January, 1987, at Hampshire College, to lay
the foundation for a national student organization designed to radically
transform American society. Eventually the National Student Convention ’88
(NSC) was planned and held at Rutgers University, Feb. 5–7, 1988.
The organizers had expected about 200 activists at Rutgers.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Contrary
to these expectations, Rutgers was swamped by almost 700 registrants
representing approximately 130 institutions.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Overall, the assembled
multitude was over 95 per cent white, geographically diverse, a mixture of
the modish and those expressing reverence for the sixties through dress and
hairstyle.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In addition to students, a host of New Left elder statesmen
attended.
On the convention’s last day, when the campus delegates were supposed
to debate and vote on a constitution and various workshop-generated
proposals, a twenty-five member Students of Color Caucus declared that
insufficient care and skill had been devoted to assuring the presence of greater
numbers of nonwhite students. The caucusÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€demanded that the convention
postpone any vote on a proposed constitution until new outreach efforts were
undertaken. If this were not acceptable to the delegates, Students of Color
would disassociate itself from the organization.
Pandemonium ensued. Privately, the conveners said their considerable
outreach efforts had aroused little enthusiasm among black and Hispanic
student groups about the prospect of joining a multiracial, multi-issue
organization in which their interests might frequently be subordinated to
other pressing concerns. Publicly, they remained mute on the issue. Some
students spoke against the caucus’s proposal. Nevertheless, with widespread
white guilt clearly evident, a voice vote of those assembledÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€easily carried
the day for the caucus’s demands. Regional delegates were chosen to conduct
the outreach.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€But there was no adequate attempt to create a temporary
national organizing committee to whom outreach efforts should be reported
and which in turn would plan the demonstrations or the next convention.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Finally, since the assembly just voted itself insufficiently representative
of student radicalism, there was no logical rationale to vote on the myriad
positions and proposed actions that had been discussed at workshops earlier.
Students drifted aimlessly about the gym and eventually began to leave for
home. (Milton Mankoff, “Rutgers, DSA, and the Revival of the New Left,”
Tikkun, May/June 1988, pp. 85–6)
“Pandemonium” is the correct term to describe the phenomenon under observation
here. Pandemonium, a Miltonian coinage (literally: “place of all evil demons”), is the
capital of hell in Milton’s great epic literary myth, Paradise Lost (I, 756; X, 424), and
it symbolizes the moral depravity and social chaos that result when mankind is cut off

is roughly equivalent to the medieval Christian’s fear of being

denounced by the clergy as a heretic, excommunicated from
the church, and denied access to the holy sacraments. It was
the successful exploitation of this fear, it would seem, that was
at least partially responsible for the incredible success of black
and Hispanic groups, both in muting opposition to affirmative
action and in gaining such tremendous leverage over important
segments of the federal bureaucracy and federal judiciary.
To the five forces of compassion, guilt, self-righteous hypoc-
risy, romanticism, and fear, a sixth would have to be added in
the case of federal bureaucrats, which is simply a desire for
power. A vast bureaucratic empire has been built up to enforce
the policy of affirmative action, with the mandarins who rule
over this empire wielding a degree of power and influence that
would be the envy of many a petty prince. Almost every major
corporation and university in the country has been brought
under the control of this empire, which successfully intimidates
employers into maintaining in their workforces whatever racial,
ethnic, or gender balance the government bureaucrats deem
appropriate. When the human will-to-power, the libido domi-
nandi, combines with the other five forces mentioned, the result
can be a potent mixture indeed.41
from the redeeming power of God’s grace. For Marxists, leftists, and left-liberals of
various persuasions, the poor and oppressed of society—the wretched of the earth—
are seen as the carriers of a moral purity and a secular power of redemption closely
paralleling the redemptive power that traditional Christians derive from the death and
resurrection of Jesus and the sacraments of the Christian church. To be estranged from
these is to fall into sin, and when this ensues on a mass scale, all manner of guilt,
confusion, and chaos break out.
41. It would take a writer of genius with the consummate skill and psychological
acumen of a Tolstoy, a Dostoyevsky, or a Shakespeare—or possibly a northern version
of William Faulkner—to adequately plumb the depths of the soul of the contemporary,
guilt-ridden, white “liberal” in its confrontation with issues of race in America. I
have offered here only the crudest outline of some of its more salient and more easily
recognizable tendencies in their most blatant waywardness, hypocrisies, and distortions.

Personalism and Public Policy

When discussing the issue of preferential hiring, both support-
ers and opponents of affirmative action almost invariably wind
up in a position of appearing to give at least tacit approval to
the materialist-careerist ethic that exerts so powerful a force in
modern American life. One might characterize this ethic as one
in which higher- and better-paying jobs are sought, not merely
for the increases they provide in the ease and conveniences of
life, or for the more challenging and fulfilling nature of the tasks
they offer, but as ends in themselves and for the status and social
prestige that go along with them. In premodern times in the
West, materialist and careerist attitudes were at least partially
kept in check by the counter-pressures of the dominant Chris-
tian religious ethic, which always condemned the pursuit of
wealth as an end in itself and viewed status-seeking as a form of
vanity that constituted both a moral and social evil. Part of the
reason the affirmative-action debate over jobs has generated so
much heat in American society is precisely because these older
religio-ethical restraints have largely been abandoned in mod-
ern times, allowing questions of material and career advance-
ment to assume a hypertrophic significance in many people’s
lives totally out of proportion to the actual importance of such
questions in the overall scheme of things.
There are, to be sure, numerous criticisms that can and
should be made of modern Western careerism and materialism,
particularly in their tendency to equate the value and worth
of human beings with their degree of economic and careerist
“success.” But having made such criticisms, it is still neces-
sary to have guidelines for a fair employment policy once one
accepts the basic proposition that there is something radically
wrong with any policy, such as the current policy of affirmative
action, that encourages hiring on the basis of race and ethnic-
ity. I would like to suggest three fundamental principles, each

closely related, that can serve as a guide to evaluating any future

government policy in the area of employment, or indeed, in any
number of other areas as well. All three principles are closely
in tune with the basic thrust of the 1950s and early 1960s civil
rights movement and are based on the key idea of the human
person as the inviolable unit of public policy concern. The three
principles might be designated: 1) the Self-Representation Only
Principle; 2) the Underdog Equality Principle; and 3) the Ethnic-
ity Indifference Principle.
The Self-Representation Only principle holds that in the
eyes of government each person is to be seen as representing
only himself and his own personal history rather than anyone
else or anyone else’s history—or any group of people or any
group’s history. What this means apropos any government ame-
liorative or compensatory program is that no one who is himself
privileged is to be considered underprivileged merely because
many other people of the same race or ethnicity are underprivi-
leged; nor is any person who is genuinely underprivileged to
be considered privileged merely because many other people of
the same race or ethnicity are privileged. The Self-Represen-
tation Only Principle holds that the only human deprivation
that public policy has any business concerning itself with is that
deprivation, in terms of economic, educational, or cultural dis-
advantage, which is actually borne by actually deprived human
beings. (The Self-Representation Only Principle could also be
called the No Proxy Principle)
The second principle, the Underdog Equality Principle,
holds that all involuntarily disadvantaged people, commensu-
rate with their degree of disadvantage, have an equal claim to
government compassion and concern, and an equal right to the
benefits of any government program designed either to improve
their life opportunities or alleviate their individual distress. The
Underdog Equality Principle also holds that the historical rea-

son or reasons for a person’s involuntary deprivation—whether,

for instance, it can arguably be attributed to racial or ethnic
discrimination rather than class discrimination, regional pov-
erty, abusive family situations, bad luck, or some other cause or
causes—is not a relevant consideration. The Underdog Equality
Principle explicitly rejects racial and ethnic criteria as a basis for
determining underdog status, on the grounds that all such cri-
teria are both overinclusive and underinclusive, allowing many
top dogs to claim status as underdogs, while denying to many
genuine underdogs the right to claim title as such.
The third principle, the Ethnicity Indifference Principle,
holds that racial and ethnic identities, in the same manner as
religious identities, are strictly private affairs, to be accorded no
official status in American public law. The principle holds that
all persons born or naturalized in the United States are to be
viewed by the government equally as citizens thereof, and are
to enjoy all rights and benefits under public law without regard
to race or ethnicity. Racial and ethnic affiliations—like religious
affiliations—may be very important in peoples’ personal lives
and conducive to their general welfare, but they are to be given
no official recognition by the state.
All of the three enumerated principles, as applied to a pref-
erential government hiring program, can be seen at work in the
various programs that have existed in the past on state and local
levels to encourage the hiring of the physically handicapped.
Such programs might be taken as models for any government
policy designed to improve the life situation of the economi-
cally and culturally deprived. One obviously has no claim to
special consideration because one’s grandfather was physically
handicapped, or because one belongs to the same ethnic group
as someone else who is physically handicapped, or because the
ethnic group to which one belongs has a substantially higher
proportion of physically handicapped persons than the public at

large. And so it might be with a government policy to encour-

age employers to give special breaks to economic and cultural
underdogs. While competency and ability should certainly be
the main consideration for most job hiring, it would not be
inconsistent with our sense of justice or with the demands of
economic efficiency for government policy to encourage, on a
voluntary basis, small deviations from the meritocratic principle
in order to give a slight preference to those most in need of a
job, or to those for whom a given employment position would
represent the greatest step up the economic ladder. Such prefer-
ence, however, would have to be given strictly on the basis of
deprivation, not on the basis of race.
Conclusion
It is important to keep in mind in discussing the affirmative-
action debate that the issues go much deeper than the simple
question of employment policy, touching the very roots of the
American political order. And that political order, like all politi-
cal orders, is inherently precarious. The poison of ethnic tribal-
ism brought chaos to the Balkans and to other areas of Eastern
Europe in the early decades of the twentieth century; it has led
to bloodbaths in Armenia, India, Nigeria, Burundi, Uganda,
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and many other nations of Asia and Africa;
it has periodically convulsed such otherwise stable nations as
Belgium and Canada; and in the form of German National
Socialism it was to lead to one of the most brutal and genocidal
regimes the world has ever known. America must not think that
it is automatically immune to the fate of these other lands. One
simple fact can be extracted from all these tragic histories, and
that simple fact is this: the principle of ethnic tribalism, if not
counter-balanced by, and integrated into, a more encompass-

ing human vision—such as that all men are created equal, that
we are all part of the same human race, that in the eyes of God
there is no Jew or Greek—is a principle of social chaos42 and,
ultimately, a formula for civil war.43
42. Consider in this context a remark by the ever-wise Thomas Sowell:

A multi-ethnic society like the United States can ill-afford continually
to build up stores of inter-group resentments about such powerful concerns
as one’s livelihood and one’s children [i.e., employment quotas and
busing].Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€We must never think that the disintegration and disaster that has
hit other multi-ethnic societies ‘can’t happen here.’ The mass internment of
Japanese Americans just a generation ago is a sobering reminder of the tragic
idiocy that stress can bring on. We are not made of different clay from the
Germans, who were historically more enlightened and humane toward Jews
than many other Europeans—until the generation of Hitler and the Holocaust.
The situation in America today is, of course, not like that of the Weimar
Republic. History does not literally repeat, but it can warn us of what people
are capable of, when the stage has been set for tragedy. We certainly do not
need to let emotionally combustible materials accumulate from ill-conceived
social experiments. (Thomas Sowell, Commentary, June 1978, p. 43)
43. As explained in the chapter introduction, the ideas presented here, although
they did not appear in a published form until much later, were first developed in the
early and mid-1970s during my graduate student days at Princeton. They were greatly
influenced by the theocentric humanism and spiritual universalism of thinkers such
as William James, Henri Bergson, Martin Buber, Rudolf Otto, Reinhold Niebuhr,
Paul Tillich, Jacques Maritain, Karl Jaspers, Eric Voegelin, Ram Dass, Simone Weil,
Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Looking back, from the vantage point
of four decades of elapsed time, there is little here that I would wish to change, though
my arguments for and against racial preferences would be much more detailed and
analytically sophisticated were I writing on this topic today. I am also less convinced
than I once was that class-based affirmative action in employment is a good idea or
that it could be administered with any degree of honesty or integrity. The most valuable
and enduring feature of this essay, in my view, is its analysis of the corruption of soul
in those privileged whites who continue to support racial preferences—the guilt-ridden,
“limousine liberals” as they are derisively called by critics—a topic I take up again in
Chapters II and III of this book, where the focus shifts to assessing racial-preference
policies at elite educational institutions rather than in the employment arena.

II
a re racial pre f e r e n c e s a n
a ntidote to r a c i s m ?
Andrew Koppelman is a distinguished legal scholar and pro-

fessor of law who currently teaches at Northwest Law, the law
school of Northwestern University. His area of specialty is anti-
discrimination law, particularly as it applies to issues of race,
gender, and sexual orientation. I got to know Andy during the
early 1990s, when he taught in Princeton’s Politics Department.
Though holding widely divergent views on the issue of racial
preferences, we came to respect each other’s intellect and depth
of conviction, and if not coming to agreement on the issues
dividing us, we at least came to understand better why each side
thinks as it does.
While at Princeton, Professor Koppelman circulated a chap-
ter-length manuscript for comments among colleagues and
friends titled “What Anti-Discrimination Law is Against.” Much
of the substance of this manuscript was later incorporated into
his book Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality, which was
published by Yale University Press. I was one of those honored
to offer reader comments. The letter I present below contains my
extended remarks.
The main issue I address in the letter is the claim that racial
preference policies serve to combat the racist understanding
that certain types of jobs are mainly for whites and not suit-
able for black capacities or interests. This was one of the major

98â•… are racial preferences an antidote to racism?
claims in Koppelman’s circulated manuscript. Affirmative action

preferences, and the more aggressive recruitment and favor-
ing of blacks for occupations from which they have previously
been excluded, are seen according to this view as striking a blow
against racism and the exclusive association in the public mind
of high-status and high-paying positions with whites. In addi-
tion to serving as a form of compensation for past acts of racial
exclusion, preferences are said to help undermine the view that
blacks should occupy a subordinate “place” in the American
income and occupational hierarchy.
Offering two definitions of the highly charged word “rac-
ism,” I try to show in my reply to Koppelman that racial-prefer-
ence policies serve to heighten rather than reduce racist ideas
and racist understandings. Insofar as affirmative-action policies
bring into the workplace blacks who have been hired under
lower standards than those applied to others, or encourage the
admission to competitive colleges of black candidates who are
less qualified or less academically accomplished than compet-
ing white or Asian candidates, such policies almost certainly
strengthen racism. This is the case, at least, if we define racism
either as a) the negative stereotyping of the members of any
racial or ethnic group, or b) the harboring of intense hatred or
hostility that is directed toward any such group.
Besides the racism issue, I also contest the claim, implicit in
many of Koppelman’s arguments, that racial-preference policies
have had a great impact in reducing black/white income dispar-
ities. Most labor economists, I point out, believe the effects of
preference policies have been very modest in terms of expand-
ing the growth of the black middle class and in reducing black/
white income differences. Blacks began to catch up with whites
in terms of income and job status long before such policies
came on the scene, in part because of features inherent in a
competitive market economy. Statistical models show no jump

in overcoming the black/white wage gap that can be attributed

to policies in the post-1960s preference era.
I conclude with the wise counsel of social philosopher
Michael Walzer, who stresses the importance in addressing past
racial exclusion of building upon, rather than challenging, the
understandings of social justice that are widely shared by mem-
bers of all races in America.
A Reply to Professor Andrew Koppelman

Dear Andy,
I have now had time to look over again the manuscript you
were kind enough to share with me, “What Antidiscrimination
Law is Against,” and offer the following comments, for what-
ever they may be worth (probably not much). I will naturally be
critical of what you say, but as you know pretty well my general
views on these issues, I’m sure this will not come as any great
surprise.
Racial Preferences as Weapons Against

Racism: The Need for Clear Definitions
The weakest part of your presentation, it seems to me, is your
failure to specify adequately the meaning of the term “racism.”
The term as you use it combines such a high level of moral
affect with such a low level of intellectual or definitional preci-
sion that the net effect is to diminish both your own and the
reader’s capacity for rational and humane reflection on the criti-
cal issues which are involved here. I am, of course, not a value-
neutralist, and by itself have no objection to the use of morally
charged language (as you know, I use it myself, though perhaps
not always with the greatest wisdom). Indeed, I would say that
people who do not have a well-developed moral, aesthetic, and

spiritual sense, which is only cultivated by our use of evaluative

terminology, are in some sense less that fully human. However,
as the term “racism” is used in this manuscript I think the effect
is to create considerably more heat than light (or perhaps a bet-
ter metaphor is a nuclear explosion—the blast is so intense that
it temporally blinds all who look at it too directly and prevents
people from seeing what is going on). Some clear definitions are
called for here, particularly when you make the claim, which I
find highly dubious, that race-conscious policies will somehow
help to overcome racism.
If I might supply a definition that I think captures at least
one meaning of the term as it is used in your manuscript, I
would say that racism is a type of thinking that imputes to many
or all of the members of a diverse racial, ethnic, kinship, clan,
or tribal group certain very negative characteristics—character-
istics which are most often attributed to innate, biogenetically
determined factors rather than to environmentally supplied
ones—which in point of fact are only possessed by a much
smaller subset of that group’s population. The essence of rac-
ism in this sense is what we might call “negative stereotyping,”
“negative imaging,” or “negative associating.” So understood
racism is at once a moral failing (because it does not distinguish
human beings on the basis of individual merit or culpability,
but in a truly tyrannical fashion, lumps the good with the bad,
the innocent with the guilty); an intellectual failing (because it
overgeneralizes and fails to make relevant and important dis-
tinctions); and a formula for social disharmony and political
disaster (because it undermines the sense of open-minded fair-
ness, and mutual respect across ethnic divides that is needed to
maintain the peace in any multi-racial, multi-ethnic society).
Now if this is your prime meaning of racism—and I think
it is—then it seems to me that you have failed to make the case
that racial preferentialism can reduce racism, and you offer only
the flimsiest of rebuttals to the standard stigma-reinforcement

argument on this issue such as that which [Supreme Court

Justice William O.] Douglas presents in DeFunis and Antonin
Scalia in his article on “The Disease as Cure.” Since stigma-
reinforcement arguments against preferentialism are also made
by virtually every black critic of affirmative action (e.g., Stephen
Carter, Thomas Sowell, Shelby Steele, Carol Swain, Alan Keys,
Glenn Loury, Walter Williams, etc.), I think this is a topic that
calls for a great deal of reflection. Yet insofar as I can extract
any kind of reasoning on this matter from your manuscript, you
seem to be saying that black people are already negatively stig-
matized by racist whites in America (and most white Americans
appear in your account to be racists—i.e., they are strongly pre-
disposed to stereotype blacks negatively), so that given this state
of affairs, preferentialist policies cannot be blamed for an evil
which would surely exist with or without them. “If blacks,” you
write, “will be stigmatized whether or not they are the benefi-
ciaries of preferential treatment, either for being in those posi-
tions or for not being in them, then the stigma factor may be a
wash rather than an argument against preferential treatment.”
ms. 45
I may well have misunderstood or misstated your argument
here as it appears to me so obviously fallacious. It assumes that
social stigma is an all-or-nothing affair when in fact the degree
of social stigma in any given society (i.e., the pervasiveness and
intensity of the negative images and negative stereotypes of any
particular group) can display virtually any level of development
from the most mild to the most extreme depending upon such
factors as the percentage of the population that harbors nega-
tive views of a given ethnic group; how negative these negative
views are; and how deeply ingrained the negative views are in
each person. The claim made by opponents of preferentialist
policies is that regardless of their supposedly benign intentions,
within the context of contemporary American society such
policies inevitably strengthen the belief in black inferiority in

the minds of those who already assume or suspect that blacks

are inferior, and just as inevitably create doubts and suspicions
regarding black inferiority in the minds of those who are pre-
disposed to think otherwise. I don’t believe you have really
addressed this kind of stigma argument at all.
In saying that preferentialist policies encourage and reinforce
negative assessments of black ability (i.e., that they encourage
racism), one is not, of course, saying that such policies are the
only factor influencing such assessments. But that they are a
factor—and a very important one—seems to me almost self-
evidently true. Consider, for instance, what [Yale Law profes-
sor] Stephen Carter—certainly a very moderate and thoughtful
observer—has to say about existing policies of preferentialist
admissions to colleges and professional schools and the effects
such policies have on the public images of college athletes and
blacks:
When a person admitted because of membership in a special

category does not succeed, that lack of success is often
attributed to others in the same category. The stereotype of
the dumb jock exists because of the widespread perception
(a correct one) that athletes are frequently admitted on paper
records for which other students would be rejected. When
people of color are admitted in the same fashion, the damage
is worse, because the double standard reinforces an already
existing stereotype, and because the stereotype, like the pro-
gram, sorts explicitly according to race. Consequently, if our
success rate at elite colleges turns out to be lower than that
of white students (as, thus far, it is) we can scarcely avoid
having the fact noticed and, in our racially conscious society,
remembered as well. This risk is a predictable consequence
of double standards and cannot be avoided. Stephen Carter,
Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (New York: Basic
Books, 1991), p. 86, emphasis added.

Carter himself goes on to defend a very modified and highly

restricted form of preferences, though he acknowledges that
even in the restricted form he recommends there will be some
unavoidable stigmatization created by such policies. His reason-
ing in this matter as far as I can see is unassailable. William O.
Douglas makes a similar point about preferential admissions to
law schools:
A segregated admissions process creates suggestions of

stigma and caste no less than a segregated classroom and
in the end it may produce that result despite its contrary
intentions. One other assumption must be clearly disap-
proved, that blacks or browns cannot make it on their
individual merit. That is a stamp of inferiority that a state
is not permitted to place on any lawyer.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€So far as race is
concerned, any state-sponsored preference of one race over
another in that competition is in my view “invidious” and
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
—Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 1974.
The only way I can imagine getting around the stigma prob-
lem is if preferences were restricted exclusively to toss-up situa-
tions where two or more applicants are equally qualified, none
being noticeably better than the other. We know, however, that
this is not how affirmative action works in the real world, nor
is it ever likely to work in this way (and if it could be made
to work in this way, preferentialist policies would have only
marginal social effects, certainly not the socially transformative
ones you wish for them).
That current preferentialist policies in hiring, promotions
and other employment settings, as well as in college, univer-
sity, and professional school admissions, increase racism (in the
sense of negative stereotyping) rather than simply leaving the
amount of existing racism unaffected seems to many of us a

fact so obvious and elementary that what is really needed is

an explanation of how anyone could fail to grasp it. If I may
venture a speculation here, I would say that those who fail to
comprehend this elementary fact do so because they have trans-
formed in their own minds the empirical question of whether or
not blacks are cognitively and intellectually inferior to whites—
a question that can obviously only be determined by facts and
evidence—into a question that is somehow determinable on a
priori moral and philosophical grounds. As such people are not
open to the possibility that the inferiority doctrine may be true,
they cannot appreciate how much personal experience plays
with others in determining their attitudes towards black com-
petence and black intellectual ability. They cannot see that for
many people the existence on the job or in school of blacks
who are on average significantly less qualified than the whites
or Asians they meet will start them thinking that the inferiority
doctrine may well be correct, while exposure to blacks on the
job or in school who are as competent as the whites or Asians
they come in contact with will have the opposite effect (i.e., it
will help to disconfirm and discredit such beliefs).
Stephen Carter makes a similar point (he quotes a black
friend to the effect that blacks on the job who are as good or
better than their white colleagues have a powerful disconfirm-
ing effect on negative images of blacks, while those who are
less qualified have a powerful effect in reinforcing and sustain-
ing such images). In this context, the greatest harm of current
preferentialist policies, as Charles Murray puts it, is “[that they
segment the] whites and blacks who come in contact with each
other so as to maximize the likelihood that whites have the
advantage in experience and ability.”
Glenn Loury makes a related point about the “rational-
ity” of discrimination in employment situations where dual
standards of selection have been applied. “If, in an employ-
ment situation,” Loury writes, “it is known that differential

selection criteria are used for different races, and if it is further

known that the quality of performance on the job depends on
how one did on the criteria of selection, then in the absence of
other information it is a rational statistical inference to impute
a lower perceived quality of performance to persons of the race
that was preferentially favored in selection. Using race as a
criterion of selection in employment, in other words, creates
objective incentives for customers, co-workers, etc., to take race
into account after the employment decision has been made”
(“Beyond Civil Rights,” The New Republic, October 7, 1985).
I think there is very considerable anecdotal evidence that the
process Loury describes here is actually taking place, and that
in many situations in the business and professional worlds not
only whites and Asians, but blacks as well avoid dealing with
black people whose competence has not yet been established.
My mother’s stories [which I related to you earlier] about how
many of the black patients in the Florida hospital in which she
worked would actively request to be treated by white doctors
is only one manifestation of this perverse-but-rational logic at
work.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the points that the critics
of preferentialism are making here is with a few simple statis-
tics. The table below gives the mean SAT test scores for incom-
ing freshmen at Berkeley over the eleven year period 1978–1988
subdivided into racial and ethnic categories. The scores repre-
sent the means on a 1600 point scale adding the math and ver-
bal scores together. For present purposes I limit the discussion
only to the preferential admissions of blacks setting aside the
equally important issue of Hispanic preferences. I don’t know
how typical Berkeley’s policies of preferential admissions are,
though I suspect they are not dramatically different from those
one would find at comparable schools like Rice, Duke, Brown,
Tufts, etc.—i.e., schools that are just one small step below the
most competitive elite institutions (Harvard, Princeton, Yale,

Stanford). The very top quality black students, who are in very
short supply, are inevitably siphoned off by the upper elite insti-
tutions leaving very few such students available for the next tier
of schools to recruit.
You will notice that from 1978 to 1983, the average Asian
and the average white scores on the SAT were separated by
a modest gap of between 54 and 91 points (the white scores
always being higher), but that a rapid convergence began in
1984 such that by 1986 the Asian average was actually slightly
higher than the white average, and this pattern continued in the
two following years. At the beginning of this 11 year period,
both white and Asian students who attended Berkeley would
probably have noticed that the white students on average were
better prepared academically than the Asians, though the differ-
ence was quite small (indeed all of the measured test score dif-
ference was probably the result of the lower English verbal skills
SAT Scores for Berkeley Entering Freshmen by Race/Ethnicity,

1978–1988
Year Blacks Asians Whites
1978 878 1080 1155
1979 898 1087 1162
1980 879 1125 1179
1981 902 1098 1189
1982 910 1122 1180
1983 933 1119 1183
1984 923 1189 1204
1985 936 1204 1227
1986 952 1254 1232
1987 938 1281 1261
1988 979 1269 1267
(Source: Office of Student Research, University of California)

of the Asians resulting from the disproportionate percentage of

Asians reared in families where English was not spoken in the
home), and although we cannot conclude definitively from the
data given, a reasonable hypothesis as to the distribution of test
scores would suggest that both Asians and whites who attended
Berkeley during this period would have come in contact with
many Asian students who were at least as good if not better aca-
demically than was the average white student at Berkeley. In the
last few years that are represented in the table, both Asians and
whites who attended Berkeley would very likely notice that nei-
ther group was statistically superior or statistically inferior to
the other (again we are making a reasonable assumption about
distributions based on the simple averages given in the table),
and the possession of Asian or Caucasian racial features would
thus come to be seen as of little predictive value in determining
who were the weaker and who the stronger Berkeley students.
Any negative images about Asian intellectual competence that a
white student might have brought to Berkeley would quickly be
dispelled.
When we look at the data regarding black/white differences,
however, the situation is radically different. Over the entire 11
year period represented in the table the entering black fresh-
men at Berkeley have had SAT scores that on average ranged
from 250 to 323 points below the average score for entering
white freshmen. The situation has changed little from 1978, the
first year represented in the table, when the black/white gap in
SAT averages was 277 points. Now as you know a 250 to 300
point gap in the math-plus-verbal SAT score represents a huge
difference in terms of intellectual preparation and intellectual
development. Put in terms of high school performance, a typical
student scoring a 1250 on the SAT (roughly the average score
for an Asian or white entering Berkeley in the late 1980s) would
be the kind of student who during his high school career took
almost all honors-level courses, received mainly A-level grades

in those courses, and graduated in the top 5% of his high school

graduating class.44 A typical student scoring 950 on the SAT, on
the other hand (roughly the average score for a black freshman
entering Berkeley in the late 1980s) would be the kind of stu-
dent who took many middle-track rather than honors-track or
Advanced Placement courses in high school, probably received
as many B-level grades as A-level grades, and wound up in the
middle-to-upper-middle level of his high school graduating class
(but not the top level). I am envisioning here a large, mixed-
race, predominantly middle-class public high school, which is
the sort of institution from which universities like Berkeley typi-
cally recruit their students whether white, black, Asian, or His-
panic (contrary to a widely shared belief, few black high school
graduates who have gone to inner-city ghetto schools can meet
even the drastically lowered standards of admissions that are
applied to blacks at the more competitive colleges, and insofar
as they go on to college, even the better among such students
usually wind up going either to community colleges or to the
less competitive four year schools).
Now what do you think is going to be the effect of a situ-
ation such as that at Berkeley on a) the image of blacks in the
minds of the white and Asian students; and b) the self-image of
the black students in their own minds? The answer is obvious:
the white and Asian students cannot help but notice that while
there are some good black students at Berkeley, the bulk of the
blacks who attend Berkeley are grossly inferior academically
to the average Asian or white. The possession of black racial
features under such circumstances becomes a highly significant
44. Note: In 1995 the College Board recentered SAT scores, raising the mean of each
test to 500 from the much lower mean that had prevailed in years immediately previous
to 1995. Converting pre-1995 scores to the higher scores after the 1995 recentering
requires the use of the College Board conversion tables, but a rough rule of thumb is to
add 70–100 points to the older math-plus-verbal score to get its newer equivalent (e.g.,
a 1220 on the older SAT might be equivalent to about a 1300 on the newer scoring
system).

marker insofar as it says that the bearer of such features has

gotten into Berkeley under a much lower standard of admission
than is applied to whites and Asians, and that there is a good
chance such a person will wind up near the bottom of the class.
(Studies show that SAT scores actually overpredict somewhat
black performance in colleges, no doubt due in part to the fact
that so many blacks are in institutions where the bulk of whites
and Asians are better prepared than they are, and under such
circumstances, there is little incentive to working very hard in
order to graduate, let us say, in the bottom 30% of the class,
when you can do a minimal amount of work in most colleges
nowadays and still manage to graduate, say, in the bottom 10%.
Under such circumstances subcultures of lower-achieving blacks
might well be expected to develop on campus that place lesser
value on academic excellence—just as such subcultures develop
among the recruited athletes.)
The stories one reads about white students at competitive
colleges passing over black students when they seek lab part-
ners or when they seek help on homework assignments are fully
comprehensible once one understands this perverse-but-rational
logic that preferentialist policies must inevitably create. Just as
athletes will be associated with intellectual inferiority and stu-
pidity at institutions where they are admitted under significantly
lowered academic standards than those applied to non-athletes,
so blacks or any other ethnic group so favored will be associ-
ated with like deficiencies. There is no getting around this. It is
an iron law of dual standards.
As far as the black self-image is concerned, I simply cannot
imagine how the experience of being at an institution where
80% of the white and Asian students do better than the aver-
age black can have an impact other than a negative one. Black
people themselves often internalize the image of intellectual
inferiority projected by the larger society (cf. the Howard and
Hammond article in my anthology), and spending four years

in various classroom situations where most of the smart kids

are either white or Asian, and most of the really dumb kids
black, can hardly contribute to the creation of a positive atti-
tude toward black intellectual abilities. On the contrary, it may
lead many black students to thinking, perhaps subconsciously,
that there may be something to the claims that blacks are much
less intelligent than whites.
In his article in The New Republic on “Affirmative Rac-
ism,” Charles Murray has described a similarly perverse pro-
cess going on among his affirmative action supporting white
liberal friends, who he calls (without rancor) “the new racists.”
Such people have an impeccable record on civil rights, Mur-
ray assures us, and they genuinely want to see blacks integrated
into the mainstream of American life. Nevertheless, these “new
racists,” he explains, display a critical feature of the old racism:
they think about blacks very differently than they do whites. He
writes:
Among the new racists, lawyers have gotten used to the idea
that the brief a black colleague turns in will be a little less
well rehearsed and argued than the one they would have
done. Businessmen expect that a black colleague will not
read a balance sheet as subtly as they do. Teachers expect
black students to wind up toward the bottom of the class.
Murray then goes on to explain the inevitable results that pref-

erentialist policies will produce in time even among many of
the liberals who support such policies given the fact that most
people eventually come to develop an image of a group that
depends upon the members of that group whom they actually
know and with whom they have come into contact.
In years past virtually every ethnic group in America has at

one time or another lagged behind as a population, and has

eventually caught up. In the process, the ones who breached

the barriers were evidence of the success of that group. Now
blacks who breach the barriers tend to be seen as evidence of
the inferiority of that group. And that is the evil of prefer-
ential treatment. It perpetuates an impression of inferior-
ity.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[And] it is here that the new racism links up with the
old. The old racism has always openly held that blacks are
permanently less competent than whites. The new racism
tacitly accepts that, in the course of overcoming the legacy
of the old racism, blacks are temporarily less competent than
whites. It is an extremely fine distinction. As time goes on,
fine distinctions tend to be lost.
I think what Murray says here is already happening, and

that those with the sociological and historical knowledge, the
patience, and the high level of motivation needed to make the
“fine distinctions” he talks about in this area are a rapidly
diminishing breed.45
45. Note: After extensive discussions with Harvard psychologist Richard Herrnstein,
Murray in the early 1990s came to modify the culture-and-history interpretation of
black intellectual deficiencies that he had adopted when he wrote these words in 1984.
He came to believe that along with such environmental factors as past racism, genes
probably play some kind of role in explaining poor black academic performance,
though he was noncommittal and uncertain as to the relative weights of genetic and
nongenetic factors: “It seems highly likely to us,” he and Herrnstein wrote in their book
The Bell Curve, “that both genes and the environment have something to do with racial
differences [in IQ scores]. What might the mix be? We are resolutely agnostic on that
issue; as far as we can determine, the evidence does not yet justify an estimate.” The
Bell Curve (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 311. It is important to get the exact
wording here because, contrary to a widespread understanding, nowhere in Murray
and Herrnstein’s controversial book is it suggested that the environmental factors are
unimportant in explaining black/white IQ differences or that they are any less important
than genetic factors (although it is stated that many specific environmental factors that
are thought to be important are not really as important as generally believed). Regardless
of his changing view on the genes vs. environment controversy, Murray never seems
to have altered his conviction that racial-preference policy has had—and continues to
have—a harmful effect on interracial relations and that it encourages the belief among
all parties concerned that blacks are less capable than whites.

Breaching the Reciprocity and Fairness Norm

Defining “racism” in terms of negative imaging, negative asso-
ciating, and negative stereotyping, etc., is certainly useful for
many purposes, but I think that in trying to understand certain
types of racial and ethnic clashes in the United States and else-
where such a definition is perhaps too narrow (because “too
intellectual, or “too cognitive”). When the European settlers in
the West in the nineteenth century claimed that the only good
Indian was a dead one—and the Indians reciprocated by express-
ing similar feelings toward white Europeans—or when we sur-
vey all the inter-ethnic violence and mayhem around the world
in this century we soon see that the racism-as-overgeneralization
model doesn’t really get to the historical and emotional core of
many racial and ethnic conflicts. For instance, if we look at the
relationships that exist (either currently or in the recent past)
between the Ibos and the Hausas in Nigeria, between the Serbs
and the Croats in the former Yugoslavia, between the Kurds
and the Arabs in Iraq, between the Greeks and the Turks in
Cyprus, between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in Western
Asia, between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, in each
of these cases (and the list, unfortunately, could be expanded
manyfold) we see that the members of different ethnic or tribal
groups are fully capable of hating the members of rival groups,
often with a murderous or genocidal passion, even though they
probably have developed no elaborate inferiority doctrine and
are probably well aware of the fact that all sorts of personal
differences exist among the members of their ethnic enemies.
For certain purposes, therefore, I would propose a second defi-
nition of racism: racism, I would say, refers to any of a variety
of enmities, hostilities, or hatreds of people of a different race,
ethnicity, or tribe, regardless of the extent to which such enmi-
ties, hostilities, or hatreds are related to any ideology of inferi-
ority or any cognitively deficient process of overgeneralization
or stereotyping.

The reason I propose this second definition of racism is

because of my strong belief that in trying to formulate public
policies that will lessen that bad thing which we call racism, and
in trying to articulate principles and ideas that can further the
common good, we want to make absolutely certain that the pol-
icies we formulate will not only not increase racism in the sense
of increasing negative stereotyping and negative imaging, but
that they will also not increase racism in the sense of increasing
inter-ethnic or inter-racial tension, hostility, or bitterness. Put
in more positive terms, I would say that it is imperative that we
seek policies that will help to promote cooperation, understand-
ing, and friendship among people of all the diverse racial, eth-
nic, and religious groups that are to be found in America. And
preferentialist policies, I contend, must, by their very nature,
undermine efforts to further such cooperation, understanding
and mutual friendship because they breach a widely shared
inter-ethnic, inter-racial, and inter-religious norm of reciprocity
and fairness that has evolved over time in America, and because
the breach of this norm inevitably produces a deeply felt hostil-
ity and sense of grievance and wrong on the part of many of
the people in the non-preferred groups (particularly the poorer
and less fortunate members of these non-preferred groups) that
can only serve to poison race relations and to sap the moral
and spiritual vitality of any people so racially, ethnicly, and reli-
giously diverse as our own.
While the fairness and reciprocity norm of which I speak
is widely understood and has become very deeply ingrained in
America, it seems clear to me that you yourself do not under-
stand it—or more precisely stated, do not understand the moti-
vation and thought processes behind it—and as a result of this
lack of understanding, you tend to attribute to base and sinister
motives in others their opposition to the various preferential-
ist schemes which you support. (If I may speculate here once
again, I would suggest that your lack of understanding of this

commonly accepted norm is intimately tied to your relatively

privileged socio-economic position in life as a member of the
more comfortable and secure segment of the middle class, as
well as to your diminished level of ethnic consciousness and
ethnic loyalty. Poor and lower-middle-class whites, as well as
whites of whatever socio-economic class who display high levels
of ethnic identity and ethnic loyalty, almost without exception
understand this norm very well.) Let me take a little time, there-
fore, to explain how this norm works in America, and why a
breach of it is so bitterly resented even by people who harbor no
special animus or ill-will toward the members of those groups
on behalf of whom a breach of the norm is demanded.
The reciprocity and fairness norm I am talking about has
evolved over time in America as a highly functional and creative
response to a simple fact of human nature, namely, the fact that
we all tend to show a natural human partiality toward those
whom we regard as our “own kind”—i.e., toward our own fam-
ily, our own close relatives, our own friends, our own extended
kinship group, our own ethnic group, our own race, etc. This
natural partiality, to be sure, has some beneficial aspects to it
(as you correctly remark at one point in your manuscript in
your discussion of partiality toward the members of one’s fam-
ily), but it just as certainly harbors the potential for great dan-
ger when systems of cooperation must be worked out within
the polity that will lead to harmonious relationships between
people who belong to many different (and potentially rivalrous)
kinship groups, friendship groups, tribal groups, racial groups,
and religions.
Most people are naturally inclined to show partiality or
preference to those with whom they identify closely and whom
they see as members of their own kind rather than members of
any outsider group. In employment situations, for instance, the
practice of showing special consideration toward one’s relatives,
one’s close friends, one’s co-religionists, or the members of one’s

tribal or ethnic group is probably universal, and can certainly be

seen today in America, either where fair employment practice
laws are successfully evaded or where such laws, as in the case
of very small businesses, do not apply. To give just one example
(which I may or may not have related to you in conversation),
a friend of mine who worked for many years in the sales divi-
sion of a large Fortune 500 company explained to me the hir-
ing situation that existed in the various sales offices in the New
York City area with which he was familiar. In the district offices
where the district manager was Irish, he explained, a majority
of the people hired were Irish; in district offices where the dis-
trict manager was a Jew, the majority of people hired were Jews;
in the district offices where the district manager was Italian, a
majority of the people hired were Italian. My friend explained
this situation as a simple case of preferentialist hiring (it was
not simply due to word-of-mouth transmissions of job open-
ings): the district managers simply gave preference to members
of their own ethnic group even though better qualified members
of out-groups had sought employment.
Now, as I say, most people, given the chance, would hire in
this kind of preferentialist manner, just as most nation-states,
given the opportunity, tend to favor the products of their own
manufacturers (i.e., through subsidies and tariff protections)
over goods produced by foreign peoples. Government employ-
ment in this regard is no different from private-sector employ-
ment: whenever it was legal to do so (and even in many cases
where it was not), those in control of government in America,
whether at a local, state, or national level, have generally sought
to give special preference to their “own kind,” whether family,
friends, co-religionists, members of the same ethnic group, peo-
ple from the same geographic region, or members of the same
political party.
This special preference may or may not have been accompa-
nied by high levels of animosity toward the members of various

nonpreferred groups (just as the in-group preferences nation-

states display toward the people in their own manufacturing
industries may or may not be accompanied by high levels of
out-group animosity toward the people of various rival nations).
Such a practice, however, obviously has many disadvantages
both in terms of economic and administrative efficiency, as
well as (and this may be more important), in terms of creating
that sense of common purpose and common humanity among
diverse peoples that is so necessary for social harmony in any
nation as demographically diverse as America. It was, I think,
to combat these disadvantages of preferentialism that the fair-
ness and reciprocity norm to which I have referred developed
among reformers and others in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, and as far as government employment was concerned,
became institutionalized, first in federal, state, and local civil
service laws, and then, beginning in the late 1940s, in the pas-
sage of many state and local “fair employment practice laws,”
which covered both government and private sector employ-
ment. (I think the term “fair employment practice law” cap-
tures a major objective of anti-discrimination legislation which
your own analysis tends to neglect—i.e., that the laws not only
intend to discourage employment practices considered by most
people to be in some sense unfair or bad, but to encourage those
considered by most people to be positively fair or good. This
dual purpose is well reflected in the opening sentence of Lyndon
Johnson’s Executive Order 11375: “It is the policy of the United
States Government to provide equal employment opportunity
in federal employment and in employment by federal contrac-
tors on the basis of merit and without discrimination because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”)
As I say, both the civil service laws dating back to the nine-
teenth century, and the FEP laws which came into vogue in
many states beginning in the late 1940s (Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act being a late instance of an FEP law), reflect this

norm of reciprocity and fairness. This norm has the form of a

social contract and if put into words might be stated something
like the following:
In order to achieve a more perfect harmony and union

among our diverse peoples and achieve certain long-run
economic benefits that will be of advantage to all, within cer-
tain clearly specified contexts I will give up acting upon the
natural partiality which I feel towards my own kind, if—but
only if—you and others give up acting upon the partiality
which you feel toward your own kind. Employment in gov-
ernment and large-scale corporations is one of these speci-
fied contexts. Here the reciprocity principle demands that
we renounce nepotism, amicism, ethnic preferences, racial
preferences, religious preferences, cronyism, and the like in
order that we may further employment practices which we
can all accept as reasonably fair and just, and which we can
all relate to in a positive manner.
Such fair and just employment practices will usually be
based upon merit or seniority, but we may also want to give
special consideration to those among our diverse people who
may be physically handicapped, or who may have taken
time out from their careers to protect us all through active
duty in the military. In promising to give up acting upon our
natural partiality in these clearly specified contexts, it is to
be understood that there will remain many private areas of
our lives where we retain the right to act upon our natural
partiality without hindrance from government or other rule-
enforcing agents. It is also to be understood that if others do
not live up to their part of the reciprocity agreement in those
contexts where we have agreed that the reciprocity principle
is to apply, and seek instead one or another form of preferen-
tial treatment for members of their own group, then I will no
longer feel bound by the nonpreferentialist principle. Under

such circumstances I will consider those who have fraudu-

lently used this principle to further their own selfish ends to
be unscrupulous deceivers whom I will henceforth consider
my hostile rivals if not my outright enemies.
Such, I believe, is the reciprocity principle underlying the

thinking of most Americans with regard to ethnicity-, race-,
and religion-based public benefits, at least most Americans who
occupy the lower, working, or not-so-comfortable section of the
middle class, and who belong to one of the various European-
origin ethnic groups. Many Asians, many Hispanics, and a
not-insignificant number of blacks also feel a kinship with this
norm. (The reciprocity principle, of course, does not accurately
reflect the complex thought processes of the politically influen-
tial, white “limousine liberals,” whose tangled complex of com-
passion, guilt, self-righteous hypocrisy, romanticism, and fear I
have tried to analyze in the article appearing in my affirmative-
action anthology.) The reciprocity principle involved here, you
will note, is structurally very similar to the principle that lies
behind most international trade agreements. It says in effect
that all parties to the agreement will give up whatever in-group
partiality and out-group hostility they may have maintained in
the past in order to join in a process of mutual accommoda-
tion and mutual benefit that will both further good will among
the parties and produce certain important long-term economic
benefits that improve the living standards of most of the people
involved.
To illustrate the fairness and reciprocity principle as it actu-
ally influences people’s thinking, I offer below a few illustrations
drawn from Jonathan Rieder’s important ethnographic study of
the lower-middle class Jews, Italians, and blacks living in the
Canarsie section of Brooklyn (Canarsie: The Jews and Italians
of Brooklyn against Liberalism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1985). The first comes from a Jewish school

teacher who explained to Rieder the sense of betrayal he felt
when national policy in the area of ethnic and racial relations
turned away from strict neutrality to a regime of compensatory
preferences. “Black demands for equality of results rather than
of opportunity began to alienate even fervent supporters of the
black struggle for justice,” Rieder explains. He then goes on to
describe the reaction to this development of many of the lower-
middle-class Jews of Brooklyn (many of whom in the past had
been politically far to the left, having enthusiastically embraced
New Deal welfarism in the 1930s and Debsian-style socialism in
the 1920s):
Their new status as opponents of civil rights measures

pained countless progressive Jews, who felt torn not simply
between cupidity and ethics but between commitment to jus-
tice for blacks and disapproval of specific means of redress.
One Jewish educator specified the visceral universalism that
he felt should guide the good society: “As a Jew, I believed
anything that helped someone getting the short end of the
stick would help the Jews. I couldn’t go to medical school
because of the quotas.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I was pro-civil rights. I supported
the Selma march, and the civil rights movement in its early
phase. But, when someone tries to take something from me
to benefit others, I’ll fight it.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I changed with the notion
of not offering equal rights and opportunities but compensa-
tion. That’s reverse discrimination. It’s a gut reaction with
me.” (pp. 111–12)
While the above statement of the Jewish educator may be

lacking in precision and articulateness, Rieder’s concept of “vis-
ceral universalism,” I think, well captures the man’s feelings.
The man clearly believes that in America people are entitled to

whatever job or whatever place in a professional school they

can attain on the basis of religion-, ethnicity-, and race-neutral
criteria of selection, and that such neutral principles are the way
people of diverse religions, ethnicities, and races can get along
best in America. The man does not want to keep black people
or Hispanic people in any assigned “place,” and indeed, one
could hardly imagine him objecting, let us say, to the great suc-
cess Asian Americans have shown in getting into elite universi-
ties and professional schools through their superior academic
performance even though such success has been gained at the
expense of many aspiring Jews. The man, no doubt, feels strong
loyalty toward his own people, but he is willing to forgo acting
upon this loyalty in the arena of public policy in return for the
application of a neutral principle upon which both Jews and
non-Jews can agree.
Another aspect of this “visceral universalism” (which only
a warped ideologue would confuse with racism) is represented
in Rieder’s book by the comments of an Italian housewife. The
woman in this case is objecting to the fact that while efforts
were being made to set aside a special day in the Canarsie school
system to celebrate Black Solidarity, Italians and Jews, who con-
stituted a majority of the local population, were denied similar
opportunity to set aside their own day for cultural celebration.
Rieder writes on this:
The residents of Canarsie viewed themselves not as abstract

whites but as members of specific ethnic groups. As a result,
they felt blacks were demanding unfair helpings of cultural
dignity. A housewife sketched an elemental ideal of justice.
“If you close schools on Martin Luther King Day, or Black
Solidarity Day, then you must close the schools for Jewish
Solidarity Day and Italian Solidarity Day. It’s all a matter of
fairness. I believe in black pride, but don’t step on my white
Italian pride.”

This woman clearly believes that in the public arena no

single ethnic, racial, or religious group is to be favored over
any other, and that if official public celebration or recognition
is established for any one group it must be established as well
for all other groups that seek such treatment. Here we have a
somewhat different type of reciprocity principle than that oper-
ating in the areas of employment or professional school admis-
sions, but it draws upon many of the same thought processes
and moral intuitions that are operative in the latter areas.
Rieder explains very well in his book the fundamental clash
that took place in Canarsie over the decade of the 1970s between
the neutralist principles that most Canarsie residents adhered to
with regard to the place of race and ethnicity in the public arena
and the alien preferentialist principles supported by New York’s
white, upper- middle-class liberal elite. “A consensus prevailed
in Canarsie,” Rieder writes, “on the rightful place of ethnicity
in a democratic society.” He goes on:
The local theory of pluralism forbade the dominance of

a single group in public life, defined the individual as the
proper unit in affairs of state, and reserved a space in private
life for regional culture, ethnocentric prejudice, and com-
munal lifestyle. But as they nervously watched the twists
and turns of the civil rights movement, Canarsians became
persuaded that a different, and quite dangerous, notion of
race had triumphed in public discourse. The use of explicit
terms of race to allocate goods, assign blame, and apportion
respect threatened to rend the fabric of society with com-
munal passion. Concepts like compensation and restitution
imposed more than financial burdens. By implying that all
whites shared equal liability for past wrongs, racial remedies
bestowed judgments of guilt and innocence, shame and vir-
tue. Canarsians were too close to their own humble origins
to think of themselves as exploiters. (pp. 121–2)

I think Rieder’s remarks here explain very well why there is

a class bias on the preference issue among people who are in the
nonbeneficiary categories. Supporters of preferences, as I have
tried to emphasize in my anthology article, are almost always
drawn from the relatively privileged segments of the white ethnic
groups—most often they are people who feel somewhat ambiv-
alent or guilty about their class privileges and try to expiate
their guilt through their support for help-the-black-underdog
public policies whose costs and burdens are almost always dis-
proportionately borne by poor and lower-middle-class whites.
When these poor and lower-middle-class whites then complain,
as they inevitably do, the privileged white liberals (i.e., the Tom
Wickers, the John Lindsays, the William Hudnuts, the How-
ard Glicksteins, etc.) denounce them in the most uncharitable of
terms for their lack of compassion and their Neanderthal-like
bigotry.
In recent years I have come to believe—reluctantly to be
sure, as I don’t like to accuse people of wrongdoings they have
not committed—that a substantial portion of the privileged
white liberals who support preferentialist policies actually feel
good about the situation that is created when such policies help
to provoke ugly public displays of hostility toward blacks on
the part of poor and lower-middle-class whites (cf. the Bos-
ton busing episode). Just as many among the lower segment of
Southern white society always felt good about public displays of
irresponsibility and immorality on the part of the lowest class of
Southern blacks because such displays helped to reinforce and
confirm their own sense of moral and social superiority over the
group immediately beneath them on the social ladder, so in like
manner many of the more economically privileged and secure
among the white middle-class liberals actually feel good about
the ugly displays of mean-spiritedness and bigotry on the part
of the white ethnic lower-middle class (“the Archie Bunkers”)
because such displays help to reinforce and confirm the sense

of moral and social superiority that they want to feel over the
group immediately beneath them on the social ladder. I know
this is a very harsh judgement, and it certainly doesn’t apply to
all the privileged white liberals who support preferences, but
is seems to me to apply to a very substantial portion of them.
(Indeed, I would suspect very possibly a majority. It is the way, I
think, that most upper-middle-class, liberal Manhattan WASPS,
and most upper-middle-class, liberal Long Island Jews whom I
have known feel toward the lower-middle-class Jews and Ital-
ians of Brooklyn that Rieder describes).
While I am on the issue of “visceral universalism,” I should
say something about the response to preferentialism on the part
of the one white person I have known in my life who displayed
the least bigotry or antipathy toward black people. I am referring
here to my late mother, who was not only committed in prin-
ciple to a policy of nondiscrimination regarding black people
but who had a genuine and heart-felt affection for black people
that was surely unusual for a white person. This unusual affec-
tion, I learned later in life, was the product of two formative
experiences she had in her childhood and adolescence. (In both
instances black people actively befriended her and treated her
with great kindness, once when she was a little girl growing up
on her grandmother’s farm, the other time when she was a teen-
ager attending a new high school on Long Island, where she was
snubbed by most of the other whites in the school.) I suppose
the supreme test of her nonbigoted affection for black people
came some years back when my sister—her only daughter—
was engaged to marry a young black man (a very dark-skinned
black man). I don’t think ninety-nine out of a hundred white
mothers in a similar position would have accepted this situation
with the equanimity and support that my mother did (this was
at a time when black-white marriages were much less common
than they have become over the past several years). My mother
reached out to my sister’s boyfriend and his mother, made all the

preliminary plans for the wedding, and was very much looking
forward to her mulatto grandchildren. (As it turned out, the
wedding and engagement were eventually called off, and my
mother died two years ago never having experienced the joy of
grandchildren).
Regarding the issue of preferences in employment and pro-
fessional schools, my mother had the exact same gut-universal-
ist reaction as the Canarsie teacher that Rieder quotes. “It’s just
not fair” was how she responded to such policies, and I am sure
she would have had the same response regardless of the races,
ethnicities, or religions that were singled out for special treat-
ment. (Like many other white Americans, however, my mother
was a strong supporter of such programs as Head Start even
though she was well aware of the fact that in many areas the
vast majority of the beneficiaries of such programs were blacks
and Hispanics. The difference here, of course, is that programs
like Head Start are applied to the poor of all races, ethnicities,
and religions, and thus respect the norm of inter-racial, inter-
ethnic, and inter-religious reciprocity and fairness.)
At one point in your discussion you seem to me to be so
eager to convict antipreferentialist whites of racism that you
accept not merely an unlikely but a thoroughly impossible inter-
pretation of why many whites can support certain types of devi-
ations from meritocracy but not others. Responding to Michael
Walzer’s observation that “the policy of veteran’s preferences in
civil service employment seems to have been widely accepted,”
you pose the ominous question, “What does it reveal when a
departure from meritocracy stirs outrage and indignation only
when blacks benefit from it?” Two pages later you give us the
answer to your question in the form of a quotation from Der-
rick Bell’s Race, Racism and American Law:
If one recognizes that racism is part of the shared structure

of meaning in the U.S., this anomaly becomes more under-

standable. The singling out of affirmative action among all

the deviations from meritocracy that are institutionalized in
the United States for special opprobrium is best understood
as one manifestation of “the unstated understanding by
the mass of whites that they will accept large disparities in
economic opportunity to other whites as long as they have a
priority over blacks and other people of color for access to
those opportunities.” In short, the norms that racial prefer-
ence violates are, to a certain and perhaps decisive extent,
racist ones.
This is, if I may be pardoned here for my own lack of char-

ity, a completely ludicrous, thoroughly off-the-wall interpreta-
tion of the current racial situation in America. About the best
that can be said for it is that it may accurately reflect the sit-
uation that existed in the Deep South around the turn of the
century when the white alliance between lower-class populists
and middle-class conservatives institutionalized the Jim Crow
system. (cf. C. Vann Woodward’s The Strange Career of Jim
Crow). But where, I am inclined to ask, have you and Bell been
for the last 30 years? I have had a fair amount of experience
with lower-class white people in recent times, from the most
overtly bigoted to those with racial views similar to those of my
mother. This was the result of the fact that for many years I was
out of academics and worked in a number of factories as a night
watchman and security guard, during which time I got to meet
and discuss with them their views on race and related matters
of numerous truck drivers, fork lift operators, janitors, security
guards, boiler operators, electricians, secretaries, manual labor-
ers, hair dressers, packers, waitresses, etc.
In my several years of working as a security guard in a
number of different factories and offices, I never met a single
white person whom I felt needed the assurance that he would
be promoted ahead of blacks before he would be willing “[to]

accept large disparities in economic opportunity.” As a num-

ber of important studies of public attitudes have shown (see
especially Jennifer Hochschild’s What’s Fair?, and a number
of articles by Robert Lane), white Americans in recent years,
including most poor and lower-middle-class white Americans,
simply do not question the desirability of a competitive capital-
ist economic system and the highly variable status order and
opportunity structure that such a system inevitably produces,
and this, I think, you will find to be the case in states and cities
that are essentially all white as it is for regions that have more
substantial black populations.
I never met a white person, no matter how overtly hostile
to black people, who thought it was unfair that black people
should have done so well in areas such as football, basket-
ball, boxing, music, entertainment, or any of the other areas
of American life where black people have been very success-
ful through their competitive efforts. This is a quite remarkable
fact, considering that many working-class people relate much
more readily to sports or entertainment figures than they do,
say, to corporate lawyers, college presidents, CEOs, and the
like, and I certainly have met many working-class people who
regret—but who do not think it unfair—that blacks practically
monopolize such sports as boxing and basketball. As far as
“other people of color” are concerned, I have never met a white
person—again no matter how overtly bigoted—who thought it
unfair that Japanese, Chinese, or Asian Indians have done so
phenomenally well in various scholastic pursuits in America, or
that Koreans and members of other Asian groups have come to
dominate the small-business field in a number of large cities.
What this tells me is that white people, even very bigoted
ones, can accept the advancement of blacks or any other racial,
ethnic, or religious group in America, within virtually any area
of endeavor, so long as that advancement takes place within
the accepted rules of the game—that is, the advancement of

the members of the group respects the conditions set up by the

widely shared norm of racial, ethnic, and religious reciprocity
and fairness.
Your interpretation of the veterans’ exception to the meri-
tocracy principle seems to me to be wrong on its very face. The
U.S. military is one of the most racially, ethnicly, and religiously
integrated institutions in American society, and blacks have been
joining the military in droves since the time of the First World
War. In recent decades blacks have been overrepresented in the
military ranks, and no doubt among the veteran population as
well. Whatever else one may attribute a white person’s support
of veterans’ benefits to, one can hardly explain it as a result of
a pro-white bias, or an anti-black prejudice, for the simple rea-
son that any employment policy that gave special advantages to
veterans would almost certainly have the effect of dispropor-
tionately benefiting blacks. A preference for veterans, however,
does not breach the racial reciprocity norm, which is why, no
doubt, whites can support it in large numbers. (I agree with
Walzer, however, that there are better—and certainly fairer—
ways to show appreciation for veterans than job preferences,
but I would feel this way even if we were a country like Japan,
where almost everyone identifies themselves as belonging to the
same ethnic group). One can make a similar remark with regard
to special preferences for college athletes. Whatever reasons
may be involved, at many institutions white acceptance of such
preferences can hardly be the result of racial bias for the simple
reason that particularly in the more popular college sports like
football and basketball a vastly disproportionate percentage of
the recipients of such preferences are blacks.
The Limits of the Preferentialist Project

I would like to make one final point about the scope and lim-
its of the “anti-discrimination project” that you envision. You

already know my views about the harmful social and psycho-

logical effects that preferentialist policies have both on ben-
eficiaries and on nonbeneficiaries. But I would also like to say
something about the very limited economic effect that such
policies are likely to have based on the experience of such poli-
cies in the past. Although their capacity to do extensive social
and psychological harm is very great, in the economic realm
preferentialist policies have done little more in the 20 years
they have been with us than help a relatively small percentage
of mainly better-off blacks to rise up in the world at a some-
what faster pace than they would have done in the absence of
such policies. As you yourself acknowledge at one point, they
have had very little effect in helping the black underclass (“the
truly disadvantaged”) in the name of whom such policies are
often defended. But such policies have also had very little effect
in furthering the growth of the black middle class, which has
indeed grown by leaps and bounds since the 1940s, but owing
to forces generally unrelated to preferences.
It is well known among labor economists that the great
growth of the black middle class, and the increasing conver-
gence of black incomes and white incomes, occurred in the three
decades before preferentialist policies were instituted in the
early 1970s. Since 1970, blacks have made, in aggregate eco-
nomic terms, comparatively modest progress vis-à-vis whites,
and even those labor economists (such as Jonathan Leonard)
who have taken the most optimistic view of the positive effects
of preferentialist policies on black incomes would concede that
those effects are relatively small compared to other factors. No
labor economist knowledgeable about the relevant research in
this area would endorse the view that preferentialist policies
have either had in the past or are likely to have in the future
a major transformative effect (as opposed to a rather modest
one) on the distribution of jobs and income among the different
racial and ethnic groups in America.

One of the best treatments of this issue is that of economists

Finis Welch and James P. Smith in their Rand Corporation study
Forty Years of Economic Progress for Blacks. Welch and Smith
show in their study tremendous economic progress for blacks in
terms of catching up to white norms over the period 1940–1980
with the bulk of the progress occurring during the decades of the
1940s and 1950s. These were, of course, pre-affirmative action
decades, yet the pace of catch-up Welch and Smith show was
much faster then than in the 1960s and 1970s, when civil rights
policies and then preferences were instituted. Economists like
Welch and Smith who look at the great black economic prog-
ress in the pre-quota era between 1940 and 1970 attribute this
progress to the large movement of blacks out of the low-paying
regions of the agricultural South into the better-paying urban-
industrial regions of the country and to the significant improve-
ment in the black returns on education, which were apparently
due to more meritocratic employment practices. Credit for some
of the convergence of the black/white income distributions over
the 1940–1970 period can probably be attributed to state and
local FEP laws as well as to FEP requirements placed upon fed-
eral contractors by the federal executive (beginning with FDR),
but most of the black improvement probably had little to do
with explicit government policies. State FEP laws were often
more symbolic than rigorously enforced, and in the decade of
the 1940s, when the greatest black progress occurred, few states
had such laws.
Most of the economic progress of blacks from the 1940s
onward, economists like Welsh and Smith argue, came from
improved education for blacks throughout the nation and the
decision of individual blacks to leave the cotton- and tobacco-
growing regions of the South and the low-paying occupations
of maids and janitors in order to take the higher-paying jobs
that offered themselves in the burgeoning Northern, Midwest-
ern, and Western industrial regions. Welch and Smith show how

little convergence of white and black incomes there really was

between 1970 and 1980, when preferentialist policies became
widespread. “Affirmative action,” Welsh and Smith write,
“apparently had no significant long-run impact, whether posi-
tive or negative, on the male racial wage gap. The general pat-
tern is that the narrowing of the racial wage gap was as rapid
in the 20 years prior to 1960 (and before affirmative action)
as during the 20 years afterward. This suggests that the slowly
evolving historical forces we have emphasized in this report
that enhance the labor-market skills of blacks—education and
migration—were the primary determinants of long-term black
economic improvement. At best, affirmative action has margin-
ally altered black wage gains about this long-term trend.” James
P. Smith and Finis Welch, Closing the Gap: Forty Years of Eco-
nomic Progress for Blacks (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corpora-
tion, 1986).
Free-market economists have long told us how market forces
tend to dissolve prejudices insofar as prejudiced employers in
any competitive industry will be at a competitive disadvantage if
they arbitrarily refuse to hire the best available workers because
of racial, ethnic, or other criteria unrelated to productivity and
merit. Unprejudiced employers reap benefits by hiring on purely
economic and efficiency grounds. There are complications to
this rosy picture to be sure, especially if an employer operates
in a climate like the Jim Crow South, where fellow workers or
customers may be prejudiced against persons of certain races or
ethnicities. But there is a good deal of truth in the rosy picture,
especially as it played out in the more competitive and more
industrial regions outside the segregated South.
It seems clear that preferentialist policies, contrary to the
impression many of their supporters have of them, are respon-
sible for very little of the great economic progress blacks have
made over the past 50 years, and what progress can be attrib-
uted to them has been attained at a heavy cost in terms of

harmonious race relations and public goodwill. Even if I were

not against such policies on moral grounds (i.e., because they
breach a widely shared norm of reciprocity and fairness that
I believe is reasonably just and worthy of retaining), I would
have to admit that from a simple cost/benefit perspective such
policies have been a very bad deal. Relatively meager economic
benefits have been achieved at huge costs—moral, psychologi-
cal, and political. The cause of racism, I believe—in both senses
that I have defined the term here—has certainly been furthered
by such policies, and there is really very little to show for them.
Concluding Remarks
Well, this communication has gone on too long. Let me con-
clude with a statement from Michael Walzer. “In general,” Wal-
zer says at the end of his discussion of preferences in Spheres of
Justice, “the struggle against a racist past is more likely to be
won if it is fought in ways that build on, rather than challenge,
understandings of the social world shared by the great majority
of Americans, black and white alike.”
Walzer is a very wise and thoughtful man—he’s my favorite
intellectual on the left—and I can only say to his remarks here,
Amen! As a final word I would add the equally wise injunction
of Hippocrates: “Above all, do no harm!”
PS: Good luck to you, Andy, on your book!

III
the changi n g s h a p e
of the r i v e r :
affirmative a c t i on an d
s o me recent so c i a l s c i e n c e
resea r c h
Racial preferences in college admissions have been at least as

contentious as those in the employment field. William Bowen
and Derek Bok, former presidents of Princeton and Harvard, have
been the figures most influential over the past two decades in
defending admissions preferences at America’s elite institutions
of higher learning. In their enormously influential 1998 study,
The Shape of the River, they tried to convince an often skeptical
public that racial preferences at America’s leading colleges and
universities have few of the drawbacks critics usually attribute
to them and have produced great benefits not only for the stu-
dents receiving the preferences but also for their classmates and
American society more generally.
In the years since the publication of The Shape of the River
a good deal of research has been done relating to affirmative-
action policies at competitive colleges and other institutions
of higher learning, much of it suggesting that Bowen and Bok’s
original conclusions were much too sanguine. At least three
subsequent studies sponsored by the Andrew W. Mellon foun-
dation—the same group that sponsored The Shape of the River
and which until 2009 William Bowen headed—have found evi-
dence regarding academic performance and student attitudes
on college campuses that confirm many of the claims prefer-
ence critics have long been making.

134â•… the changing shape of the river
In this chapter I summarize some of the research since the

publication of The Shape of the River that indicates a huge down-
side to preference policies both at the undergraduate and pro-
fessional-school levels. This research suggests that a) white and
Asian students deeply resent racial preference policies and hold
those who benefit from them at a considerable “social distance”;
b) support for racial preferences among the black and Hispanic
public is much less than generally thought; c) the upward ratch-
eting of black students into more competitive undergraduate
institutions lowers their grade-point average and discourages
many from pursuing careers in the natural sciences and in col-
lege teaching; d) the independent “school effect” of attending
a more prestigious college in terms of future earnings may be
small or nonexistent once one takes into account the motiva-
tion and multiple background factors of the students who
attend them; e) racial-preference policies cause whites to look
down upon blacks as their intellectual inferiors and help pro-
mote racial self-segregation on college campuses; f ) whites
and Asians who have attended colleges with substantial per-
centages of blacks and Hispanics experience no net benefit in
terms of later job market outcomes compared with whites and
Asians who have attended less ethnicly diverse colleges; and g)
the upward-ratcheting system in law school admissions often
results in black students attending institutions too competitive
for their individual needs, leading to high drop-out rates and
high rates of failure on state bar exams.
If racial-preference policies have such harmful conse-
quences, why do they continue to be supported by people like
William Bowen and Derek Bok? To answer this question I draw
heavily on the brilliant analysis of white narcissism and white
guilt by the essayist Shelby Steele, who claims that many privi-
leged whites who support policies ostensibly intended to help
blacks are less concerned with whether those policies actually
achieve their goals than with whether they make their sup-

porters feel good about themselves and morally cleansed and

uplifted in supporting them. They are above all concerned with
protecting themselves against charges of racial insensitivity and
racism. Given the enormous power of this dynamic, meaningful
change in college preference policies, I conclude, is not likely to
come about any time soon regardless of the verdict of social sci-
ence research.46
S ocial science research has not always been kind to supporters

of affirmative action. Though little known outside a narrow
circle of specialists, over the past several years a growing body
of research by sociologists, economists, and political scientists
has been accumulating that seriously calls into question many of
the most cherished assumptions of affirmative-action support-
ers regarding the effects of race-based preferences in university
admissions. The great irony in the matter is that some of the
research that has proved most damaging to the case for racial
preferences in higher education has come from studies spon-
sored by some of the very same organizations that have been the
most active in the past in their support of the affirmative-action
initiatives at our nation’s leading universities and colleges.
Organizations such as the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,
which funded William Bowen and Derek Bok’s The Shape of
the River47 (the academic establishment’s unofficial defense
of affirmative action), the liberal Ford Foundation, the Rus-
sell Sage Foundation, and the Princeton-based Council of Ivy
Group Presidents have been uniformly supportive of affirmative
action in higher education and have often been in the forefront
of efforts to convince a generally skeptical public of the great
46. This chapter is based on an updated and substantially expanded version of an

article bearing the same title that appeared in the journal Academic Questions in the fall
of 2004 (17:4, pp. 7–59).
47. The Shape of the River (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

social and economic benefits of greater “diversity” in univer-

sity admissions. That some of the most important research these
organizations have funded in recent years would turn out to
refute several of the key arguments in favor of the policies they
have long cherished was no doubt something the organizations
themselves never bargained for. And at least in the case of the
deep-pocketed Mellon Foundation, they don’t seem to have
accepted what their own researchers have discovered with any
degree of grace or candor.
To get a sense of the irony of the matter, imagine a situa-
tion in which the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the
Independent Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute all
shelled out big chunks of money to sponsor a number of research
projects on the relationship between tax policy and economic
growth, only to have their researchers discover that countries
with very high marginal tax rates and large public sectors had
much higher growth rates and more lavish living standards than
countries following a low-tax, small-government model. One
would perhaps not be too surprised if they reacted in the same
way that Mellon and the rest have done: keep quiet about the
matter, do little to publicize their researchers’ findings, and hope
that nobody outside a circle of reliable ideological soulmates
ever reads their researchers’ reports.
Attending an Elite University: No Special

Ticket to Ride
One of the more damaging pieces of research to the case for
affirmative action made in The Shape of the River comes from
a study by economists Stacy Berg Dale and Alan Krueger. The
study, which was funded by the Mellon Foundation, bears the
prosaic and disarmingly unsensational title “Estimating the
Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of
Selection on Observables and Unobservables.” It was first pub-

lished as a Working Paper of the prestigious National Bureau of

Economic Research and later, in slightly modified form, as an
article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, a peer-reviewed
economics journal jointly published by MIT and Harvard.48 The
“insider” nature of those writing the article is well reflected in
the fact that Dale was employed at the time as a full-time Mellon
Foundation research associate working out of the organization’s
Princeton office, and by the fact that the College and Beyond
survey used by Dale and Krueger was a “restricted access data-
base” compiled by the Mellon Foundation itself.49 Indeed, the
C&B database formed the basis for most of the analysis in The
Shape of the River. Its prosaic title notwithstanding, the Dale/
Krueger study is a real blockbuster in terms of its authors’ icon-
oclastic conclusions and the sobering implications of these con-
clusions for our understanding of elite universities and their role
as supposedly unique vehicles of upward mobility in America.
What Dale and Krueger set out to determine was the effect
on a student’s post-graduation income that can be attributed to
the level of selectivity of the particular college or university that
a student attends. In terms of future earnings, what difference
does it make, the authors ask, if one attends a first-tier institu-
tion like Yale, Princeton, Duke, or Swarthmore, where the aver-
age SAT scores are the highest, rather than a second-tier school
like Vanderbilt, Northwestern, Kenyon, or Emory, where the
48. NBER Working Paper # 7322 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, Aug. 1999; “Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More
Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 2002, pp. 1491–527. The page numbers in the
text refer to this latter journal article unless otherwise indicated.
49. In a highly unusual move, the Mellon Foundation designated the results of its
College and Beyond survey as a “restricted access database,” and it has been reluctant
to make the data available for reanalysis by scholars known to hold views critical of
affirmative action in higher education. Robert Lerner, a distinguished sociologist who
has written one of the most intelligent scholarly criticisms of The Shape of the River,
was specifically turned down in his request for access to the Mellon database. See
Lerner’s article “The Empire Strikes Back,” available online at www.ceousa.org/bok.
html.

degree of selectivity is considerably less? Are there advantages

to attending these second-tier schools rather than the third-
tier and fourth-tier schools immediately beneath them on the
selectivity scale? It is well known—and well-established in the
economics literature—that attending a more selective college is
positively correlated with at least a moderately greater lifetime
earnings potential, but much of this difference can be easily
attributed to the fact that smarter people with higher grades
and higher standardized test scores—and often with wealthier
and better-connected parents—are the people who attend these
schools. People who already have the highest earning potential
often attend the most selective colleges, and much of their post-
college success can be attributed to the superior talents and spe-
cial personal factors that they bring with them to college rather
than to the superior schooling or superior contacts that they
make while in school. Assuming one attends some four-year
college or other, after controlling for initial input factors, how
much of a difference does it really make whether one attends a
school that warrants a Most Competitive, a Highly Competi-
tive, a Very Competitive, a Competitive, or a Less Competitive
rating in the Barron’s Profiles to American Colleges? These are
the kinds of questions that Dale and Krueger set out to answer,
and their answers clearly undermine the notion that elite uni-
versities provide some sort of unique pathway to wealth, power,
and occupational prestige in America.
A major aim of the analysis presented in The Shape of the
River was to show that for both whites and blacks—but partic-
ularly for blacks—the “school effect” of attending an elite col-
lege was very substantial, even after controlling for SAT scores
and other obviously important input factors like a student’s
high school grades, race, gender, family socioeconomic status,
and the like. At any given SAT level, the Bowen and Bok data
showed, both blacks and whites who attended a more selec-
tive institution incurred a substantial earnings advantage later

in life. “Black students admitted to the most selective of the

[28] C&B schools,”50 Bowen and Bok wrote, “did not pay a
penalty in life after college for having attended such competitive
institutions. On the contrary, the black (and white) matriculants
with academic credentials that were modest by the standards of
these schools appear to have been well advised to go to the most
selective schools to which they were admitted.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€After holding
SATs constant, black students who attended the more selective
schools gained an earnings advantage.” (p. 144)
In addition to this earnings advantage, black students who
attended the more selective colleges among the 28 C&B schools
were also shown in the Bowen and Bok study to incur many
other advantages (after controlling for initial input factors),
including increased graduation rates, increased participation in
certain civic and community affairs, and increased student sat-
isfaction with their college experience. It was these advantages
that were at the heart of the Bowen and Bok defense of racial
preference policies at elite universities, and without these poli-
cies, it was suggested, the black community would have been
deprived of a large segment of its leadership, business, and pro-
fessional class. The message of The Shape of the River was as
stark as it was clear: eliminating affirmative action at elite uni-
versities would decimate the black middle class.
Long before the Dale/Krueger research, critics of the Bowen
and Bok study were quick to point out that only a small seg-
ment of the black middle class and of black political and busi-
ness leaders are the products of Ivy League colleges or other
first-tier universities in America. Many more black congressmen,
50. The C&B database contains information on students entering the following schools
as freshmen in 1976 and 1989. Liberal Arts Colleges: Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Denison,
Hamilton, Kenyon, Oberlin, Smith, Swarthmore, Wellesley, Wesleyan, Williams.
Research Universities: Columbia, Duke, Emory, Miami, Northwestern, Pennsylvania
State, Princeton, Rice, Stanford, Tufts, Tulane, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor),
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt,
Washington University, Yale.

black business leaders, black professionals, black mayors, and

the like are the product of state universities and comparable pri-
vate institutions than the kinds of elite universities with which
William Bowen, former Princeton president, and Derek Bok, for-
mer Harvard president, are most intimately acquainted. It has
been estimated, for instance, that the 100 most selective colleges
and universities in America turn out only about 4 percent of
the approximately 100,000 black B.A.s produced in the United
States annually, the remaining 2,500+ four-year colleges turning
out the other 96 percent.51 The vast majority of black college stu-
dents attend institutions where racial preferences are either very
small or don’t exist at all.52 Bowen and Bok, critics charged, were
employing a British “Oxbridge” model to understand upward
socioeconomic mobility in the United States, although the model
is invalid because of the many diverse avenues to wealth, power,
education, and occupational prestige in America.53
Whatever truth may have remained in the Bowen and Bok
claims after such criticisms (which were never really answered
by the authors of The Shape of the River) has been called into
question by Dale and Krueger’s subsequent inquiry. Dale and
Krueger proposed a simple hypothesis: since admissions com-
mittees seek to admit to their institutions not only students
with the highest grades, highest standardized test scores, and
other easily measurable academic indicators but also those who
most excel in such not-so-easily-measurable personal qualities
as maturity, motivation, self-discipline, and the like, could it be
51. Stephen Cole and Elinor Barber, Increasing Faculty Diversity: The Occupational
Choices of High Achieving Minority Students (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2003), p. 206.
52. See the important article by Thomas J Kane, “Racial and Ethnic Preference in
College Admissions,” in Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, eds., The Black/
White Test Score Gap (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), chap. 12.
53. This is one of the many criticisms of the Bowen and Bok book made by Stephen
and Abigail Thernstrom in “Reflections on the Shape of the River,” U.C.L.A. Law
Review, 46:5, June 1999, pp. 1583–1631. This article presents a wealth of empirical
material critical of the Bowen and Bok position on racial preferences.

that these latter qualities are at least partially responsible for

the positive school effect on future earnings of attending elite
universities that past researchers have found? Common knowl-
edge and common experience show that these personal qualities
play a major role in terms of achieving one’s occupational goals,
and it just might be the case, Dale and Krueger surmised, that
part of the advantage of attending an elite institution was sim-
ply a reflection of the fact that the most selective colleges and
universities, given the huge number of applicants they receive,
were able to choose students with the highest levels of these
difficult-to-measure attributes. Admissions officers have before
them, Dale and Krueger point out, an array of documents,
including essays by applicants, recommendation letters from
teachers and guidance counselors, personal interview material,
etc., by which they try to ascertain these important personal
qualities, but none of this information figures in the regression
models economists and sociologists usually construct to figure
out an independent school effect of attending a more competi-
tive institution. Such analyses may thus seriously overstate the
elite-college advantage. What may appear to be an independent
school effect may really be a simple reflection of the fact that
people who attend the most selective colleges often have quali-
ties that would make them more likely to succeed financially
and occupationally regardless of the institutions they attend.
The Dale/Krueger theory sounds plausible enough, but how
is it to be tested? Here is where Dale and Krueger got creative.
Using two different types of econometric models, they tried
to incorporate as well as possible proxy measures for these
important personal motivational factors, usually not observ-
able by the social scientists looking at a typical database (hence
the designation “unobservables”) but possibly vaguely known
and partially ascertainable by both admissions officers and the
applicants themselves. In what they call the Matched Applicant
Model (which they present in three variants), Dale and Krueger

take advantage of the fact that many students do not attend the
most selective colleges they were admitted to but, for a variety of
reasons, often choose to attend an institution lower on the selec-
tivity list. Whether for financial reasons (“they gave me more
money”), geographic reasons (“it’s much closer to home”), or
a host of personal reasons (“my father went there,” “my two
best friends are going”), some people who are deemed worthy
by admissions officers of attending a first-tier college wind up at
a second- or third-tier institution, just as many deemed worthy
by admissions officers of attending a second- or third-tier insti-
tution often wind up at colleges less selective than these. Why
not, Dale and Krueger ask, match students who were admitted
to, and rejected by, an array of schools of comparable selectivity
but who wound up attending differently ranked schools? Look
at just these matched students, consider all the other factors that
influence future earnings contained in the C&B database, and
see if the positive school effect on future earnings of attending
a more selective institution still holds. Are students who could
have attended a more selective institution but chose not to at a
future-earnings disadvantage over similar students facing simi-
lar choices who went to the most selective school to which they
were accepted?
These are the questions Dale and Krueger address in their
Matched Applicant Model, and their results were startling, prob-
ably to themselves and most certainly to the Mellon Founda-
tion, which funded their work. Although they use three separate
measures for matching school selectivity (SAT-score intervals,
Barron’s rankings, an exact-match model), in none of the three
matched applicant models they developed could they discover
any independent, positive effect on future earnings associated
with attending a more selective school. In fact, the one model
they did construct that showed a statistically significant selectiv-
ity effect—the Exact-Match Model—showed a negative effect
on future earnings of school selectivity. Other things equal,

attending a more selective college was associated with a 10.6 %

lower future income! Dale and Krueger sum up their findings in
the following words:
A major concern with past estimates of the payoff to attend-

ing an elite college is that more selective schools tend to
accept students [who already come] with higher earnings
capacity. This paper adjusts for selection on the part of
schools by comparing earnings and other outcomes among
students who applied to, and were accepted and rejected by,
a comparable set of institutions.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Since college admissions
decisions are made by professional administrators who have
much more information at their disposal than researchers
who later analyze student outcomes, we suspect that our
selection correction addresses a major cause of bias in past
wage equations. After we adjust for students’ unobserved
characteristics, our findings lead us to question the view
that school selectivityÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€is an important determinant of
students’ subsequent incomes.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The effect of school-SAT
score was not significantly greater than zero in any version
of the matched-applicant model that we estimated.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Stu-
dents who attend more selective colleges do not earn more
than other students who were accepted and rejected by com-
parable schools but attended less selective colleges. (Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Nov. 2002, pp. 1523, 1509).
To many these results seem counterintuitive. Others things

being equal, it seems as if attending a more elite institution
should count for something. One would assume that the higher
prestige of a more selective school and the more intense aca-
demic atmosphere provided by such an institution would
impact positively on future earnings, at least to some degree.
Dale and Krueger, however, offer powerful rejoinders to such
conjectures. First of all, they say, most schools have a large

array of student peer groups, ranging from those primarily

focused on studying hard, getting good grades, and advancing
student career potential to those minimally focused on these
things. At whatever institution they attend, students will be
able to seek out their own kind and spend their time encourag-
ing one another to do what they are most inclined to do, be
it working hard or partying. Thus the overall atmosphere of
the school probably doesn’t matter much, Dale and Krueger
conclude. “An able student who attends a lower tier school
can find able students to study with, and, alas, a weak student
who attends an elite school can find other weak students to not
study with.” (p. 1520)
That a degree from a more selective college has more pres-
tige than one from a less selective college is something Dale
and Krueger hardly doubt, nor do they deny that employers
often look at a college’s level of selectivity when making initial
employment decisions. But Dale and Krueger find that students
who attend a more selective college incur a considerable disad-
vantage in terms of their relative grades and final class ranking
because of the increased academic competition in such schools.
In all three of their Matched Applicant Models they found that
students who attended a college whose average SAT score (on
a 1600 point scale) was just 100 points higher than those of
student matches incurred a rank-in-class penalty of between 5
and 8 percentile intervals. And they show clearly that students
who graduate with a higher rank in class earn more money than
those with a lower ranking. Thus students who attend a less
prestigious institution may offset any earnings disadvantage that
derives from this fact by the premium that accrues to the higher
rank in class they are likely to attain in such an institution.
“The improvement in class rank among students who choose to
attend a less selective college,” Dale and Krueger write, “may
partly explain why these students do not incur lower earnings.
Employers and graduate schools may value their higher class

rank by enough to offset any other effect of attending a less

selective college on earnings.” (p. 1512)
As an alternative means of accounting for motivational fac-
tors, Dale and Krueger employ what they call the Self-Revelation
Model. This model assumes that students who are more aggres-
sive in the application process in terms of applying to schools
that are more difficult to gain admission to are more likely to
rate high on any scale of motivation and ambition even if they
don’t get accepted to the most selective schools to which they
apply. The example they give is Steven Spielberg, who attended
the California State Long Beach film school though only after
trying unsuccessfully to gain entry to the more prestigious
UCLA and USC film schools. From an early age Spielberg had
ambition, drive, and a high opinion of his career potential, and
this was clearly reflected in the stretch of his application net.
Whereas the Matched Applicant Model assumes that college
admissions officers may know more than econometricians about
a student’s motivation, ambition, and future potential, the Self-
Revelation Model assumes that the applicants themselves may
reveal important information about these qualities through the
very pattern of their applications. The model takes into account
both the number of applications submitted (assuming the more
applications, the more persistence and drive the student has),
and the average selectivity of the schools applied to.
When the number and selectivity of the schools applied to
are entered into the regression equation as rough proxies for
unmeasured personal qualities, and these are then added to the
other student inputs known to affect future income, Dale and
Krueger find that the advantage of attending a more elite uni-
versity shrinks almost to zero. In terms of future earnings the
more highly motivated and ambitious are no less successful for
having attended a non-elite institution than an elite one. The
result of the Self-Revelation Model thus reinforces the conclu-
sions drawn from the three Matched Applicant Models.

Because of the relatively small numbers of blacks attending

the institutions surveyed, Dale and Krueger were not able to
construct a separate Matched Applicant Model that was lim-
ited to blacks. They were, however, able to construct a sepa-
rate Self-Revelation Model for black students. The results of
this model were similar to those for white applicants: the posi-
tive school effect on future income drops precipitously when a
proxy measure for motivational “unobservables” in the form of
student application behavior is added to the statistical model.
And since admissions officers at selective institutions look for
the same motivational factors in black and Hispanic applicants
as in whites and Asians, there is every reason to believe that the
results of the three Matched Applicant Models would apply to
all races. “There is no evidence,” Dale and Krueger conclude,
“that the relationship between school selectivity and subsequent
earnings is different for black students.” (NBER Working Paper,
p. 28)
The Dale and Krueger study is in one sense very narrow in
scope. It looks almost exclusively at future income as the object
to be explained, and it is not concerned with most of the other
benefits that supporters of affirmative action attribute to racial
preferences in higher education. Nevertheless, their conclusions
cast doubt on one of the most important benefits that affirma-
tive action policy is said to confer. Their bottom line is that
almost all of the differences apropos future income of attending
a more selective college or university are attributable to the ini-
tial differences that entering students bring with them—includ-
ing both the easily quantifiable factors like academic skills,
aptitude test scores, and parental income, as well as the not-so-
easily quantifiable factors like motivation, maturity, ambition,
and self-discipline.
The implication of their findings for affirmative action pol-
icy is clear: if the black and Hispanic students who now get
preferentially admitted to places like Columbia, Princeton, and

Yale wound up instead under a color-blind admissions policy

at schools like Tufts, Vanderbilt, and Tulane, they wouldn’t do
much worse in terms of future earnings than they would at the
top-rated schools. They might even do a little better. And at
the lower-tiered schools most would wind up with substantially
higher grades and class ranks than at the more prestigious insti-
tutions. Although Dale and Krueger do not speculate beyond
earnings outcomes, there is reason to believe that at least some
of the other benefits of attending a more selective university
claimed in the Bowen and Bok study, including certain leader-
ship advantages and increased graduation rates, may also be at
least partially the result of the “unobservables” that entering
students bring with them rather than the independent school
effect of attendance at an elite institution. Although former
presidents of Harvard and Princeton may be loath to admit it,
elite universities offer no special ticket to wealth, power, and
influence in America, although they are, of course, a source of
great social prestige for those attending them.
Dale and Krueger do acknowledge one very important
exception. Students coming from low-income families—defined
as those in the bottom quarter of the national income distribu-
tion—do benefit in terms of future earnings from attending a
highly selective college compared to a less selective one. On this
basis Krueger, in a follow-up article in The New York Times,
suggested that high-end colleges should practice something like
class-based affirmative action and make special efforts to recruit
students based on their socioeconomic disadvantage. “My
advice to elite colleges,” he wrote, is this: “Recognize that the
most disadvantaged students benefit most from your instruc-
tion. Set financial aid and admission policies accordingly.”54
54. Alan B. Krueger, “Students Smart Enough to Get into Elite Schools May Not Need
to Bother,” New York Times, 27 Apr. 2000.

In the same Times article Krueger offered advice to all col-

lege applicants that can be described as nothing less than sage
wisdom: “Don’t believe that the only school worth attending is
one that would not admit you. That you go to college is more
important than where you go. Find a school whose academic
strengths match your interests and which devotes resources to
instruction in those fields. Recognize that your own motivation,
ambition and talents will determine your success more than the
college name on your diploma.”55
Why Do So Few Blacks Become College

Professors?
The Dale and Krueger study touched only briefly on the fact that
students entering elite universities with lower-than-average high
school grades and SAT scores generally wind up with lower-than-
average college grades and class ranks. This issue would attain
greater prominence in another study sponsored by the Mellon
Foundation titled Increasing Faculty Diversity: The Occupa-
tional Choices of High-Achieving Minority Students, which was
published in 2003 by Harvard University Press. Conducted by
sociologists Stephen Cole and Elinor Barber, the study repre-
sented a serious blow to defenders of affirmative action at elite
colleges and universities and immediately touched off efforts by
Mellon and other sponsoring organizations to distance them-
selves from some of its analyses and central conclusions.
The Cole/Barber study owed its inception to conversations
in the early 1990s between Elinor Barber, a research associate
in Columbia University’s Provost Office, and Neil Rudenstine,
then the president of Harvard. Like many academic adminis-
55. Ibid.

trators, Rudenstine and Barber were concerned about the very

small number of blacks in university teaching—at the Ivy League
institutions blacks typically make up only 2 to 3 percent of the
faculty. They agreed that a thorough study of the problem was
in order, and an initial grant of $80,000 was obtained from the
Council of Ivy Group Presidents to review existing literature on
the problem and prepare a formal proposal for a larger study.
Stephen Cole, a seasoned sociologist on the faculty of SUNY-
Stony Brook, who had worked previously in the area of the
sociology of education, was recruited to work with Barber on
the project. The bulk of the funding for the study was provided
by a $400,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation, and a sub-
sequent grant of $75,000 was obtained from the Ford Founda-
tion. The Russell Sage Foundation in New York City also kicked
in by providing Cole with a Visiting Scholar appointment that
allowed him to complete the data analysis and write up the
final report. Barber died unexpectedly in 1999 just as the final
research results were being completed and written up, leaving
Cole to fend for himself in the face of the heated controversy
that the study touched off among affirmative action-supporting
administrators and foundation heads.
A major conclusion of the study—i.e., that affirmative
action policy was contributing to the lower grades received
by black and Hispanic students, which in turn discouraged
many from pursuing careers in academia—was so distasteful to
those who had funded the project that some tried to discredit
its authors and findings. The executive director of the Council
of Ivy Group Presidents, for instance, obliquely suggested to a
reporter for the The Chronicle of Higher Education that Cole
and Barber—both liberal academics—might have some kind of
biased “ideological position” that explains their final antiaf-
firmative-action conclusions. “There are a whole lot of data

in here,” he told the Chronicle’s reporter, “and if one started

out with an ideological position—whatever it was—you could
find a whole lot to support that.”56 Similarly, the vice-president
of the Mellon Foundation warned readers of the report to be
“cautious about putting much weight on certain findings.”
None of the four Ivy League presidents that the Chronicle’s
reporter contacted were willing to comment on the study.
Cole himself told the Chronicle reporter that there was “no
chance” he would ever receive Mellon Foundation funding
again, “and I don’t care.” Despite his attempt to put up a strong
front, however, Cole seems to have been deeply hurt by the criti-
cism of his work from the funding organizations and has come
to see their stance, not that of himself and Barber, as politically
and ideologically driven. “I was trained at a time before social
science became so politicized,” he told the Chronicle, referring
back to his graduate student days in the early 1960s when he was
a student of Robert K. Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia
University. “I believe that social science should be objective and
value-free, and you should design a study to answer a question
and whatever the answer is, that’s what it is.”
The Cole/Barber study was based on the results of an
extensive questionnaire ultimately filled out by 7,612 graduat-
ing seniors at 34 colleges and universities, most of which were
considerably above the national norm in selectivity. The study
focused on the average-to-above-average students at these
institutions since it was known from past research that lower-
achieving students rarely seek careers in university teaching or
research. Four types of institutions were included in the study:
all eight Ivy League institutions; 13 of the most selective liberal
arts colleges (e.g., Amherst, Williams, Swarthmore, Bowden);
nine large state universities (e.g., Rutgers, Stony Brook, Chapel
56. Robin Wilson, “The Unintended Consequences of Affirmative Action,” The

Chronicle of Higher Education, Jan. 31, 2003; available online at http://chronicle.com.

Hill, University of Virginia); and four historically black institu-

tions (Xavier, Howard, Florida A&M, North Carolina A&T).
The questionnaires were given only to arts and science majors
since the purpose of the study was to determine how to increase
faculty diversity in these areas, and in the case of the state uni-
versities and historically black institutions, only those students
with a 2.8 average or higher were included. This latter restric-
tion was intended to conserve scarce project resources and was
based on the sensible assumption that students with grades
lower than this would almost certainly not choose a career in
academics. The response rate—and hence the reliability of the
survey—was high, with seven out of ten students contacted
responding to the questionnaire.
Many of the results and conclusions of the Cole/Barber
study are noncontroversial and involve well-known facts. For
instance, the small number of blacks and Hispanics in academ-
ics is seen primarily as a “pipeline problem” resulting from the
much lower levels of academic performance of black and His-
panic students at every level of the American educational sys-
tem, from elementary school through graduate school. Unless
this situation changes, the authors suggest, we will never see the
black and Hispanic presence in the better colleges approaching
the levels that liberal administrators would like. The pipeline
problem, however, is not one that universities can do much to
fix, at least not in the short run, so Cole and Barber focus much
of their attention on those aspects of current academic prac-
tice that can affect the number of black and Hispanic students
choosing academia as a career. Affirmative-action policy comes
under scrutiny in this context because their research shows that
it makes an inevitably bad situation (given the pipeline prob-
lem) significantly worse.
The Cole/Barber reasoning goes something like this: Peo-
ple who seek to become college professors are overwhelmingly
recruited from those who were excellent students in their under-

graduate institutions in terms of their relative grades. Whereas

students who get mainly Bs and Cs are likely to choose careers
in business or in teaching at the primary or secondary school
level, those who choose careers in academia—like those who
choose careers in medicine—are usually drawn from students
who get mostly As and A-s and outshine in their academic per-
formance a large portion of their peers. The critical factor, Cole
and Barber believe, is the relative standing students have among
their immediate classmates. Among those black and Hispanic
students who expressed an initial freshman-year interest in
becoming a college professor, Cole and Barber found that there
is a much greater persistence with this intention at the some-
what less selective schools in their study than at the Ivy League
institutions and the most highly selective private colleges. The
lower relative grades received by the black and Hispanic stu-
dents at these latter institutions, Cole and Barber contend, con-
vinced many that they were not smart enough for a career in
academics and that they had best choose a less intellectually
demanding occupation. Had these same students—many with
SAT scores in the 90th percentile or higher in terms of national
norms—attended institutions that were somewhat less selective
than the top-rated schools that they actually did attend, they
would have gained more academic self-confidence and would
have been more likely to persist in their desire to become a col-
lege professor. A student with, say, a 1350 SAT score who had a
freshman-year intention to become a college professor is much
more likely to follow through with this intention, Cole and Bar-
ber found, if that student attended an upper-middle-level school
like Rutgers or Stony Brook than a top-ranked school like
Columbia or Yale, where they are more likely to have received a
lower class ranking.
To illustrate with a few numbers: Of black students receiv-
ing 1300 or higher on the SAT, Cole and Barber found that only
28 percent received grade-point averages of A or A- at the Ivy

League universities, and an even lower number—12 percent—

received such averages at the elite liberal arts colleges in their
study. Among this same group of high-SAT blacks, however, fully
44 percent of those attending the state universities in their study
and 55 percent of those attending the historically black colleges
and universities (HBCUs) attained A and A- level grade-point-
averages. The relative grade problem is even greater than that
suggested by these figures since grade inflation has been a stron-
ger trend at the elite colleges and universities than at less selective
institutions. Blacks with 1300+ SAT scores are thus getting fewer
grades of A or A- at the very institutions where A and A- grades
are most prevalent. Cole and Barber show that blacks with high
SAT scores were likely to attain substantially higher grades and
a much higher rank-in-class rating if they attended a university
with students more similar to themselves in terms of past aca-
demic performance than one where most students exceeded them
in this department. For this reason, Cole and Barber found that
of those black students who indicated having a freshman-year
interest in pursuing an academic career more than 30 percent of
those attending the less selective institutions in their study per-
sisted with this interest through senior year, while the comparable
figure for those expressing the same freshman-year interest who
attended the Ivy League universities and elite private colleges was
only half this. The fall-off in interest, in other words, was much
greater for those attending the most elite colleges and universities
than for those attending less selective institutions.
Cole and Barber summarize their findings in the following
words:
The best-prepared African AmericansÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€are most likely to

attend elite schools, especially the Ivy League. Because of
affirmative action, these African Americans (those with the
highest scores on the SAT) are admitted to schools where,
on average, white students’ scores are substantially higher,

exceeding those of African Americans by about 200 points

or more. Not surprisingly, in this kind of competitive situa-
tion, African Americans get relatively low grades. It is a fact
that in virtually all selective schools where racial preferences
in admission is practiced, the majority of African American
students end up in the lower quarter of the class.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Afri-
can American students at the elite schools—the liberal arts
colleges and the Ivy League—get lower grades than [com-
parable] African American students at the non-elite schools
(state universities and HBCUs). Lower grades lead to lower
levels of academic self-confidence, which in turn influence
the extent to which African American students will persist
with a freshman interest in academia as a career. African
American students at elite schools are significantly less likely
to persist with an interest in academia than are their counter-
parts at the non-elite schools. (pp. 124, 212)
Cole and Barber thus found considerable evidence in sup-

port of those who have claimed that affirmative action “mis-
matches” black students in terms of institutions and SAT scores
and that this has a harmful effect on the ability of those students
who expressed a desire to become college professors to persist
with their initial intentions. This was a far different message
from that of The Shape of the River, which had pooh-poohed
the “mismatch” theory and claimed that the effects of placing
black students in institutions where most of the white and Asian
students were academically better prepared was almost wholly
salutary for the black students.
Stereotype Vulnerability and the Black

Underperformance Problem
The “pipeline problem” that Cole and Barber devote many
pages to explaining is generally well known, at least in barest

outline. In terms of scholastic performance, black and Hispanic

students at every level of the educational system do much worse
on average than their white and Asian counterparts, with the
blacks usually doing worse than the Hispanics. The discrepancy
begins even in preschool, where black three- and four-year-olds
score a full standard deviation behind whites on simple word-
recognition tests like the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. The
average black child enters elementary school with significantly
weaker counting, vocabulary, and reading skills than the aver-
age white child. The gap widens throughout the K-12 years,
such that by the age of 17 the average black high school student
achieves scores in math, science, and English on the comprehen-
sive National Assessment of Educational Progress test that are
roughly comparable to those of the average white and Asian
13-year-old. The black/white and black/Asian gap on the SAT
is equally stark, with blacks trailing whites and Asians on each
of the sections of the test by approximately 100 points (1 SD).
Because of these persistent discrepancies between the test
scores of blacks and whites—and more recently blacks and
Asians—many critics of standardized testing have said that
such tests do not measure the true ability of members of the
lower-scoring minority groups. The SATs and other standard-
ized tests, it is frequently charged, are culturally biased and do
not reflect the true potential of those who have not grown up
in a white, middle-class household. The implication of much of
this criticism is that blacks, on average—and probably Hispan-
ics as well—will do better in terms of their college performance
than their lower test scores would indicate.
This question was comprehensively addressed many years
ago by economist Robert Klitgaard in an outstanding study
of affirmative-action policy at elite universities that was pub-
lished in 1985.57 Klitgaard surveyed all the available research
57. Robert Klitgaard, Choosing Elites (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

on the relationship between scores on SAT tests and student

performance in terms of college grades, and he found—what
all subsequent research has confirmed—that the SAT is not pre-
dictively biased against blacks. Blacks do not do any better in
college in terms of their grades and class ranks than whites with
the same SAT scores. On the contrary, Klitgaard found that
when blacks and whites are matched for SAT scores, the blacks
in college actually do significantly worse than whites in terms
of their college grades. The SATs, in other words, overpredict
black performance in college, and in this sense are biased in
favor of blacks, not against them. Put another way, blacks do
not seem to do as well in college as one might expect given their
measured scholastic ability as determined by the SAT. Whites
and Asians substantially outperform blacks with the same SAT
score. “If a black and a white have the same test scores and
prior grades,” Klitgaard found, “the black will on average do
about a third to two thirds of a standard deviation worse in
later academic performance than the white” at the most com-
petitive academic institutions. (p. 161)
Since Klitgaard’s seminal work, which focused primarily on
the most selective of America’s universities and colleges, two
problems have come into focus regarding black college stu-
dents; they have come to be designated the “underpreparation
problem” (i.e., before entering college blacks and Hispanics do
not learn as much in high school or score as high on standard-
ized tests as whites and Asians), and the “underperformance
problem” (i.e., blacks, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, do not
do as well in college as whites and Asians with the same SAT
scores and high school grades). Although many college adminis-
trators are reluctant to admit it, both common sense and recent
research suggest that affirmative-action policy is deeply impli-
cated as a contributing source to both of these problems, par-

ticularly as they affect the higher-scoring blacks who enter our

more competitive universities and colleges.
The underperformance problem was a major concern of
Bowen and Bok in The Shape of the River, and considerable
attention was devoted to it. “At almost every college in our
sample,” Bowen and Bok write, “black students are not only
performing less well academically than whites but also perform-
ing below the levels predicted by their SAT scores. In fact, this
underperformance turns out to be even more important than
lower [entering SAT] scores in explaining the gap in class rank
between blacks and whites.” (p. 88) Bowen and Bok found that
in terms of his/her final grade-point average the average black
student in the 28 selective colleges in their survey graduated
at only the 23rd percentile, while the average Hispanic gradu-
ated at the 36th percentile (the average white graduated at the
52nd percentile). Only about half of this rank-in-class gap they
found could be attributed to the lower SAT scores and lower
high school grades that entering black and Hispanic fresh-
men brought with them to college. The rest was the result of
“underperformance.” If blacks and Hispanics had performed
equally well in college with whites of the same SAT scores, the
average black graduate, their statistical model predicted, would
have wound up at the 38th percentile instead of the 23rd—a
very large difference—while the Hispanic students would have
raised their average percentile ranking from 36th to 44th. For
some reason many of the black and Hispanic students at the
highly selective colleges studied in the C&B survey seemed not
to be living up to their demonstrated potential, and for the
black students especially, the degree of underperformance was
huge.
Just why this underperformance should exist has been the
source of much speculation, though one theory that has gained

wide acceptance in recent years is that propounded by Stan-

ford psychologist Claude Steele. In a series of articles based on
experiments carried out at Stanford and other universities, Steele
and his colleagues have focused on what they call “stereotype
vulnerability” to explain why blacks often do worse in college
courses than their SAT scores would indicate. Steele has shown
that higher-achieving black students at competitive universities
like Stanford are often sensitive to the fact that white students
and faculty sometimes hold negative stereotypes about their
academic competence. This problem, says Steele, is most acute
among those black students who have most closely identified
with the domain of academics—rather than, say, the domain of
sports or social life—and it is for this reason, he says, that ste-
reotype threat and the resulting underperformance it produces
are most acute among the higher-achieving members of the black
cohort at elite universities.
Stereotype vulnerability can negatively impact black stu-
dents, according to Steele, either by causing them to “disiden-
tify” with the domain of academics—that is, to invest less
psychologically in learning and getting good grades and more
in nonacademic activities—or it can lead to heightened anxi-
ety and psychological stress, which have a demonstrated harm-
ful impact on a student’s test performance. Through a series of
ingenious experiments Steele and his colleagues have shown that
when black students at Stanford are given a difficult verbal test
and told that it is designed to measure “your verbal abilities and
limitations,” they do substantially worse than their white class-
mates who have similar SAT scores. When the same test is given
to Stanford blacks and told by the experimenter that the test is
specifically not designed “to evaluate your ability” but merely
to help understand better “the psychological factors involved in
solving verbal problems,” the black students do just as well as
comparable white students. Test anxiety caused by fears of being
negatively stereotyped by whites, Steele concludes, causes many

blacks to “choke” on important exams, and this he believes, is

a major cause of much of the black underperformance seen at
elite institutions of higher learning.58
Steele is reluctant to speculate on whether affirmative-
action policies at competitive institutions exacerbate the “ste-
reotype threat” problem, although the answer would seem
self-evident.59 It is hard to see how lowering the standards of
admission to highly competitive colleges and universities for
a people long thought of as intellectually inferior can fail to
have the effect of reinforcing negative stigmas and negative ste-
reotypes regarding the intellectual competence of those people.
And by its very logic the current system of racial preferences
58. Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Test
Performance of Academically Successful African Americans,” in Jencks and Phillips,
eds., Black-White Test Score Gap, pp. 401–30.
59. Claude Steele is reluctant to acknowledge the obvious antiaffirmative-action
implications of his own research—one suspects out of a desire to maintain good relations
with his affirmative-action-supporting friends and colleagues. In the spring of 2001,
Steele gave a public lecture on the Princeton University campus in which he discussed his
research on stereotype vulnerability. In the question-and-answer period after the lecture
I specifically asked Steele if it was not likely that the negative stigmas and negative
stereotypes that black students must labor under would be “reinforced, strengthened,
and perpetuated” at the elite colleges and universities by the affirmative-action policies
at these institutions. At first Steele tried to evade the question by answering a related but
different question—i.e., whether affirmative-action policies have created the negative
stigmas and stereotypes that exist about blacks in America (answer: they don’t, the
stigmas and stereotypes existed long before affirmative action). I immediately saw
where he was going with his response and quickly interrupted, “Wait a minute! I’m not
asking whether affirmative action creates negative stigmas and stereotypes but whether
it reinforces and perpetuates those which already exist in the culture. Isn’t it likely that
affirmative action policies will have this effect?” Recognizing that he had to give a direct
answer to an obviously disturbing question, he conceded that “some” affirmative-action
policies probably have this harmful effect, although he made no effort to distinguish
which ones would and which ones would not fall into the stereotype-reinforcing
category. On this issue, isn’t it reasonable to speculate that the lower the level of racial
preference at an institution, and the closer that entering black and Hispanic students are
to their white and Asian classmates in terms of test scores and high school grades, the
less stereotype vulnerability the black and Hispanic students will face? The mismatch
hypothesis seems commonsensical here. For those who doubt this, ask yourself this
question: Would a black student with, say, a 1200 SAT score and a 3.5 GPA face the
same level of stereotype vulnerability at a school like Rutgers, where students typically
have SAT scores in the 1100s and GPAs around 3.4, as at Princeton or Yale, where SAT
scores average around 1450 and most students have GPAs of 3.8 or higher?

guarantees that the typical black and Hispanic student on elite

college campuses really will be intellectually inferior to his typi-
cal white and Asian classmates, at least in terms of past aca-
demic performance as measured by factors such as SAT scores
and high school grades. This can hardly be a confidence-builder
for the black and Hispanic students.
Shelby Steele—Claude Steele’s brother and a long-time critic
of affirmative action policy—has no trouble seeing the obvious
here. “The accusation that black Americans have always lived
with,” Shelby Steele writes, “is that they are inferiorÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€and
this accusation has been too uniform, too ingrained in cultural
imagery, too enforced by law, custom, and every form of power
not to have left a mark.” He continues:
So when today’s young black students find themselves on

white campuses, surrounded by those who historically have
claimed superiority, they are also surrounded by the myth of
their inferiority.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€And today this myth is sadly reinforced
for many black students by affirmative action programs,
under which blacks may often enter college with lower test
scores and high-school grade-point- averages than whites.
“They see me as an affirmative action case,” one black student
told me at UCLA.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€A black student at Berkeley told me
that he felt defensive every time he walked into a class and
saw mostly white faces. When I asked why, he said, “Because
I know they’re all racists. They think blacks are stupid.”60
60. Shelby Steele, Second Thoughts about Race in America (New York: Madison
Books, 1991), pp. 87, 89.
Many years before Steele’s remarks, Thomas Sowell had similar comments on
the psychological harm that racial-preference policies would have on their intended
beneficiaries. In his book Black Education: Myths and Tragedies, Sowell gives eloquent
voice to the devastating effect that affirmative-action policies would likely have both on
black self-confidence and on the image of blacks in the minds of whites:
The actual harm done by quotas is far greater than having a few
incompetent people here and there—and the harm that will actually be done
will be harm primarily to the black population. What all the arguments and

Bowen and Bok saw clear evidence of stereotype vulnerabil-

ity at work in their study of blacks at the C&B colleges. The
black/white rank-in-class gap followed the pattern suggested
by Claude Steele whereby those black students with the high-
est SAT scores—and thus presumably most committed to the
domain of academics—showed the poorest performance when
matched with whites of similar SAT scores. A subsequent study
by the Mellon Foundation of 11 of the most selective colleges
and universities in their database, which Bowen co-authored
with researcher Fredrick Vars, showed a similar pattern: as one
moved up the SAT scale black underperformance increased.61
In both The Shape of the River and the Bowen and Vars study
it is suggested that stereotype vulnerability has something to do
with this pattern, but none of the authors of these studies were
willing to acknowledge the obvious—i.e., that across-the-board
racial preferences at America’s most select universities almost
certainly exacerbates this psychological problem and the harm-
ful academic effects that flow from it.
In The Shape of the River, however, Bowen and Bok do
acknowledge that “the academic performance of a number of
black students [in the C&B schools] seemed clearly affected by
difficulties in adjusting to new environments.” They then quote a
statement by a black student in one of these schools—a statement
campaigns for quotas are really saying, loud and clear, is that black people
just don’t have it, and that they will have to be given something in order to
have something. The devastating impact of this message on black people—
particularly black young people—will outweigh any few extra jobs that may
result from this strategy. Those black people who are already competent, and
who could be instrumental in producing more competence among this rising
generation, will be completely undermined as black becomes synonymous—
in the minds of black and white alike—with incompetence, and black
achievement becomes synonymous with charity and payoffs. Thomas Sowell,
Black Education: Myths and Tragedies (New York: David McKay, 1972), p.
242.
61. Frederick E. Vars and William G. Bowen, “Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, Race,
and Academic Performance in Selective Colleges and Universities,” in Jencks and
Phillips, The Black/White Test Score Gap, pp. 457–89.

they say is “similar to many others.” “When I arrived at campus

for the first time,” the student explains, “I was a little bit intimi-
dated. I said, ‘Wow, I wonder if they made a mistake accepting
me; am I going to fit in?’ [I had] those kinds of feelings. And will
I be the dumbest person here?” (pp. 82–3) Bowen and Bok spend
a good deal of effort in their book trying to refute Thomas Sow-
ell’s “fit” hypothesis, but it seems difficult to deny when read-
ing such statements that affirmative-action policy places many
black students in competitive academic environments where they
have doubts about “fitting in” because of the superior academic
credentials of their white and Asian classmates. In Sowell’s ter-
minology, they are severely “mismatched” for the institutions
they attend. If this doesn’t contribute to heightened stereotype
vulnerability it is difficult to imagine what would.
Many years ago, the dean of Harvard College, John B. Fox,
Jr., noted that black students who enrolled in Harvard in the
1970s—the first full decade of affirmative-action preferences—
seemed to suffer much more from self-doubt about their aca-
demic competence than other Harvard students. “In the 1970s,”
he explained,
when [Harvard] College first found itself with a significant

number of minority students, it began to seem that certain
problems of self-confidence—shared to some degree by most
students—afflicted minority students disproportionately.
Minority students reported experiencing even more academic
stress than their non-minority counterparts.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Dr. Jeffrey
Howard has described it as “in the first yearÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€a rapid and
unchecked erosion of their confidence in their capacity to
compete.”62
62. Cited in Klitgaard, Choosing Elites, p. 188.

Things haven’t changed much since the 1970s, but it is at least

clear now through Claude Steele’s work that “a rapid and
unchecked erosion” in minority students’ “confidence in their
capacity to compete” can have severe consequences in terms of
their ability to learn. “Underperformance” is—at least in part—
a direct consequence of institutional mismatch, just as Thomas
Sowell told us it would be more than thirty years ago. The vil-
lain here is clearly affirmative action, however reluctant certain
educators may be to acknowledge this fact.
Recent Research on Stereotype Vulnerability

At least two major studies in recent years—both funded by the
Mellon Foundation—have taken up the issue of stereotype vul-
nerability, and both have concluded that a) at least for a certain
portion of black college students stereotype vulnerability is a
major reason for their relatively poor academic performance in
college compared with similarly qualified whites and Asians;
and that b) affirmative-action policy plays an important role in
intensifying the stereotype vulnerability to which these students
are subjected. The first results come from the Cole/Barber study
already mentioned. Like all other researchers who have looked
into the problem, Cole and Barber found that when black stu-
dents are matched with white students for SAT scores, the black
students wind up with substantially lower grades in most of the
colleges they surveyed. This performance gap persisted pretty
much intact even after controlling statistically for all sorts of
additional background variables such as family socioeconomic
status, field of major, gender, type of high school attended, and
the like. They also found—again consistent with other research-
ers—that the performance gap was greatest for blacks with the
highest SAT scores. As SAT scores rise, so does the black/white
performance gap.

The most interesting finding of the Cole/Barber study, how-

ever, was the huge difference between institutions in terms of
the degree of black underperformance. The underperformance
problem, they found, was most acute at the most elite colleges
and universities in their study, while it was much less severe
at the less selective state universities, and didn’t exist at all at
the historically black colleges and universities.63 For instance,
among white students who had SAT scores in the 1200–1299
range, 33 percent earned grade-point-averages of A or A- at the
predominantly white institutions in their study. Among blacks
with comparable SATs, however, only 14 percent of those
attending the elite institutions earned A or A- level GPAs, while
23 percent of those at the state universities earned grades in this
range. At the HBCUs more than a third—38 percent—of blacks
in the 1200–1299 SAT range achieved A or A- level GPAs (i.e.,
5 percentage points higher than comparable whites at the pre-
dominantly white colleges and universities).
Cole and Barber conclude that something at the predomi-
nantly white institutions was retarding black performance,
and it seemed to be greatest at the most selective schools. After
surveying a variety of possible explanations, they come to the
conclusion that Claude Steele’s stereotype vulnerability dynamic
seemed to be at work, and that the degree of harm done by
63. Since there are not enough white students at the HBCUs with which to compare
black performance, the HBCU “underperformance” figure given by Cole and Barber
is determined by comparing HBCU blacks of a given SAT interval with similar whites
at the predominantly white institutions. That the greater success of high-SAT blacks in
getting A and A- grades at the HBCUs is not an artifact of differing grading policies is
shown by Cole and Barber by the fact that the grades at the HBCUs are much lower
than that at the more grade-inflated state universities and elite institutions. A black
student with a 1200–1299 SAT is more likely to get an A or A- GPA at an HBCU than
will a comparable white at one of the predominantly white institutions in the Cole/
Barber study despite the fact that proportionally there are many more A and A- range
grades given out at the predominantly white institutions. Nevertheless, since the black/
white performance comparisons are not at the same schools, what Cole and Barber say
about the lack of black underperformance at the HBCUs must be viewed with some
caution.

stereotype threat was directly related to a school’s level of selec-

tivity and the corresponding degree of affirmative-action prefer-
ences it accorded to minority students. They write on this:
Just as Claude Steele argues that an unintended consequence

of remedial programs is to trigger a fear of stereotyping,
we believe that an unintended consequence or side effect of
affirmative action programs is also likely to do so.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€One
condition that can contribute to the fear of activation of this
negative stereotype [about the intellectual ability of African
Americans] is the possible belief on the part of minority stu-
dents that they were admitted to a selective school because
of affirmative action programs and that they “don’t really
belong” in these schools. (pp. 209, 249)
Cole and Barber offer a number of possible ways to reduce

the stereotype threat and underperformance problem, includ-
ing better mentoring and advising, closer supervision of stu-
dent progress, more pep talks, additional tutoring, etc. But they
also suggest that high school guidance counselors should direct
black students, like all students, to those institutions where they
are likely to shine academically. “Instead of recommending that
minority students go to the most prestigious school they can get
into,” they write, “high school guidance counselorsÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€should
try to reduce some of the lack of fit between the level of aca-
demic preparation of minority students and the schools where
they enroll.” (p. 249) At least in terms of the underperformance
problem and depressed black grades, they find much to support
Thomas Sowell’s mismatch theory and propose better matching
of students and institutions as a simple remedy to the problem.64
64. A number of studies (including that of Cole and Barber) indicate that blacks do
better both academically and socially at the historically black colleges and universities
than do comparable blacks at predominantly white institutions.

While Cole and Barber do not recommend scrapping affir-

mative-action programs wholesale, they do recommend that,
if they are retained, more successful efforts must be made at
concealment and deceptive labeling lest knowledge of the very
existence of such programs lead to the activation of negative
stigmas and stereotypes about the academic competence of the
intended beneficiaries. “If colleges and universities continue to
practice race-sensitive admissions,” they advise, “they should
try to reduce to a minimum any negative psychological effects
Summarizing the results of many studies of student life at black colleges, educational
researcher Jacqueline Fleming writes: “Previous research makes it clear that Black
students adjust better to Black colleges than to predominantly White colleges. Black
students who attend predominantly Black schools tend to have higher average grades,
a richer learning environment, better relationships with faculty members, exhibit better
cognitive development and display greater effort and engage in more academic activities
than Black students who attend White schools. In Black schools, Black students show
better social adjustment, have more extensive social support networks, show greater
social involvement, and engage in more organizational activities.” Jacqueline Fleming,
“SATs and Black Students,” Review of Higher Education, 25 (2002): 281–96, 287.
UCLA sociologist Walter W. Allen finds similar advantages of the black colleges in
his literature survey: “The salutary effect of Black students attending a historically Black
university speaks volumes about the importance of the social-psychological context
for student outcomes. In this respect, previous research demonstrates unequivocally
the profound difference that historically Black and predominantly White campuses
represent for African-American students. On predominantly White campuses, Black
students emphasize feelings of alienation, sensed hostility, racial discrimination, and
lack of integration. On historically Black campuses, Black students emphasize feelings
of engagement, connection, acceptance, and extensive support and encouragement.
Consistent with accumulated evidence on human development, these students, like
most human beings, develop best in environments where they feel valued, protected,
accepted, and socially connected. The supportive environments of historically Black
colleges communicate to Black students that it is safe to take the risks associated with
intellectual growth and development. Such environments also have more people who
provide Black students with positive feedback, support, and understanding, and who
communicate that they care about students’ welfare.” Walter W. Allen, “The Color
of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and
Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities,” Harvard Educational Review,
62 (1992): 26–44, 39–40. Neither Allen nor Fleming say much about the effects of
racial-preference policies on predominantly white campuses, but it is hard to believe
that they contribute to blacks feeling more “valued, protected, accepted, and socially
connected.” Adjusting to a white-majority campus, difficult under any circumstances, is
almost surely a more daunting task when the white and Asian students look down on
the members of your race for needing affirmative-action preferences to compete with
other groups.

that affirmative action programs may have. We suggest that

scholarships that are earmarked for minorities not be labeled
as such, but rather awarded in the same way as non-affirma-
tive action scholarships are awarded. The idea is to increase the
minority students’ belief that they have been admitted to the
college because of their high academic qualifications and ability,
rather than because of the need of the college to maintain ethnic
diversity among the student body.” (p. 250)
Hearing such recommendations, some may conclude that
Cole and Barber are immoral Machiavellians with little concern
for academic integrity or truth. With regard to affirmative action
they seem to be recommending the academic equivalent of a
false advertising swindle or accounting fraud. It can be argued,
however, that they are merely proposing that elite colleges and
universities carry out more successfully the policies of conceal-
ment and obfuscation apropos racial preferences that almost all
of them have been practicing from the very beginning of their
introduction of affirmative-action programs. Bowen and Bok,
for instance, openly acknowledge that most elite institutions
employing racial preferences have been reluctant to admit what
they are doing out of a concern to avoid controversy and to pre-
vent stigmatizing the intended beneficiaries of their programs.
“The very existence of a process that gives explicit consid-
eration to race,” Bowen and Bok write, “can raise questions
about the true abilities of even the most talented minority stu-
dents (‘stigmatize’ them, some would say). The possibility of
such costs is one reason why selective institutions have been
reluctant to talk about the degree of preference given black
students.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Some of these institutions mayÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€be concerned
that the standing of black students in the eyes of white class-
mates would be lowered if differences in test scores and high
school grades were publicized.”(pp. 264–5) Bowen and Bok,
however, do not say whether they approve of this reluctance on
the part of academic institutions to talk honestly and openly

about their affirmative action policies, but from the general

tone of their comments it would seem that they acquiesce in
the practice. Cole and Barber seem to do likewise, though
apparently with many more misgivings than The Shape of the
River authors.
Evidence confirming stereotype vulnerability theory also
comes from an extensive study carried out by sociologist Doug-
las Massey and his colleagues. The study sets out to solve “the
puzzle of minority underachievement” through a longitudinal
survey of 3,924 students who first began their college careers in
the fall of 1999 as freshmen in one of 28 selective colleges and
universities. Each student was initially interviewed in a face-to-
face format and asked to respond to more than 150 separate
interviewer questions. Topics included the students’ neighbor-
hood background, high school experiences, attitudes toward
people of different races and ethnicities, self-esteem—to name
just a few. A roughly equal number of blacks, Hispanics, whites,
and Asians were included in the survey. The preliminary results,
which extend to the completion of the students’ first semester
of their freshman year, were published in 2003 in a volume by
Princeton University Press titled The Source of the River, the
title reflecting the fact that most of the colleges chosen in the
survey were the same as those included in the Bowen and Bok
study.
Most of the students in the Massey study did reasonably
well during their first semester, with 97 percent passing all their
courses and less than a third having to drop a course. Never-
theless, there were substantial differences in ethnic group per-
formance, with the results repeating a familiar pattern: whites
and Asians did the best, Latinos did significantly worse, and
blacks wound up at the bottom. “During the very first semester
of college,” Massey and his colleagues write, “there are clear
and significant differences in academic performance that emerge

between groups. Whether measured in terms of grade point

average, courses dropped, or courses failed, whites and Asians
perform significantly better than Latinos and blacks. In general,
the grades earned by Latinos in their first college courses aver-
aged about a quarter of a grade point lower than those of whites,
whereas the grades earned by black students were more than a
third of a point lower. Likewise about a quarter of all Latinos
and a third of all blacks ended up dropping a fall-term class,
compared with only a fifth of white and Asian students.” (pp.
193–4) Overall, the average white and Asian student achieved
a B average (roughly 3.3 on a 4.0 scale), the average Latino a
B- (3.05), and the average black a C+ (2.95).
Much of the difference in the grades of the four ethnic
groups, Massey and his colleagues found, could be attributed
to differing levels of entering preparation as measured by such
things as high school GPA, the number of AP courses taken, and
the students’ self-estimate of their academic preparation. The
white and Asian students admitted to the 28 colleges they sur-
veyed were on average more intellectually advanced and simply
better prepared for academic work than the blacks and Latinos.
But these differences in initial preparedness explained only part
of the first-semester grade gap that the Massey team found. Few
of the other factors that they included in their statistical model
to explain the gap seemed to make a big difference, but there
was one exception—a positive score on one of their two indi-
ces of “stereotype threat” showed a substantial and statistically
significant effect in depressing black and Latino grades. Those
students who expressed both a lack of self-assurance regarding
their ability as students as well as a high level of concern about
what their teachers thought of them were found to be most at
risk for the grade-depressing effects of stereotype threat. While
the number of students who fell into this category was small
(only around 9 percent for blacks and an even lower percentage

for Latinos), the effects of stereotype threat for these students

could be severe. The Massey team writes:
We found clear and consistent statistical evidence that

stereotype vulnerability worked to undermine the aca-
demic performance of black and Latino students above and
beyond whatever deficits they experienced with respect to
academic, financial, social, or psychological preparation
for college.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€For those students possessing the relevant
psychological dispositionsÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€the effects on performance can
be profound.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Our analysis suggests that stereotype vul-
nerability has a pronounced influence on the risk of course
failure.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In their first term of college work, those who
[were most predisposed to stereotype vulnerability] earned
significantly lower grades and failed courses at much higher
rates than other minority students. (p. 195)
Although they never criticize affirmative action policy

directly—in the introductory chapter of their study they charac-
terize it as “the great social experiment of affirmative action”—
the Massey team found clear evidence that racial-preference
policies, and the considerable resentment they provoke among
whites and Asians, is a major contributor to the saliency of ste-
reotype threat on campus. Stereotype threat, they say, “may be
particularly salient in selective colleges and universities, where
minority students are widely perceived by white faculty and stu-
dents to have benefited from a ‘bending’ of academic standards
because of affirmative action.” The psychological harm to black
students, they believe, may be particularly strong because of the
negative stereotype of black intellectual ability that is so deeply
ingrained in American culture and history. African Americans,
they explain, “are stereotyped as being intellectually inferior in
U.S. societyÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€[and] every time black students are called upon
to perform academically in the college setting, they are at risk

of confirming this negative valuation, both to themselves and to

others.” (pp. 10–11)
The bottom line for Massey and his colleagues is that the
“puzzlement of minority underachievement” is best explained
by two overarching factors: “To a great extent,” they write,
“early differences in grades earned is explained by different
susceptibilities to stereotype threat and by the different levels
of preparation for college that students in different [racial and
ethnic] groups bring with them when they arrive on campus.”
(p. 191) Blacks and Hispanics lag behind whites and Asians
in their freshman college grades, Massey and his colleagues
contend, primarily because they enter college with lower high
school grades and SAT scores, and because they have debilitat-
ing doubts about their academic competence.
One could, of course, with equal truth say that to a great
extent the freshman year differences in grades earned at selec-
tive colleges by members of different racial and ethnic groups
is a direct result of affirmative-action policy. Abandon affirma-
tive action and everything would change. Replace the racial-
preference regime with a more meritocratic system based on
past academic performance and in one fell swoop the initial-
preparation problem (blacks and Hispanics enter selective col-
leges with much lower grades and test scores than whites and
Asians); the stereotype threat problem (blacks and Hispanics
fear being thought inferior by higher-scoring white and Asian
classmates and by college instructors); the underperformance
problem (blacks and Hispanics choke on exams and don’t put
their all into academic work as a result of their fear of failure
and fear of being negatively stereotyped); and the white and
Asian resentment problem (whites and Asians don’t like affir-
mative action and act condescending toward, if not contemptu-
ous of, its black and Hispanic beneficiaries); all these problems
would disappear in an instant, or at least be greatly mitigated, if
affirmative action policy were abandoned.

And as we shall see, the additional problem of “perverse

incentives” (blacks and Hispanics know they don’t have to
achieve at the same level as whites and Asians to get into good
colleges and professional schools) would disappear as well.
There’s a bonus here, too: abandon affirmative action and col-
lege administrators would no longer feel compelled to tell lies
about what they are doing. With affirmative action ended, the
“pipeline problem” could then come into view as the real 800-
pound gorilla in this show and the problem most worthy of
focusing public attention upon.
Diversity, Yes; Racial Preferences, No! Racial

Attitudes on Campus
One of the most unexpected findings of the study by Massey
and his colleagues was the considerable degree of resentment
that white and Asian students often harbor toward black and
Hispanic beneficiaries of racial preferences. Student respon-
dents were presented with a “social distance” scale. They were
asked to rate how close they felt toward whites, blacks, Latinos,
and Asians “in terms of your ideas and feelings about things.”
Besides giving their closeness ratings to members of “the group
in general,” eight other subcategories for each ethno-racial
group were given, including “the middle class,” “the rich,” “the
poor,” “professionals,” “business owners,” “young women,”
“young men,” and “affirmative-action beneficiaries.” Most stu-
dents, regardless of their own racial or ethnic background, gave
relatively high closeness ratings to the middle class and profes-
sional members of all of the four ethno-racial groupings, and
there was no indication of any “extreme out-group distance”
felt by one ethno-racial group for another when the target being
assessed was “the group in general.”
There was, however, a considerable amount of social dis-
tance expressed by many white and Asian students both to the

black and Latino poor and to blacks and Latinos who had ben-
efited from affirmative action. “Whites and Asians,” Massey
and his colleagues report, “tended to perceive a great deal of
[social] distance between themselves and blacks who benefited
from affirmative action.” (p. 143) They also tended to rank each
group in terms of their academic promise “with Asians on top,
followed by whites, Latinos, and blacks.” (p. 152) Blacks and
Latinos tended to be seen as “academically underqualified,”
while Asians were seen as overqualified.
Massey and his colleagues found these responses deeply
troubling for two reasons. First, they believe that if whites and
Asians think of blacks and Latinos as intellectually inferior to
themselves, the demon of stereotype threat will be fed and nur-
tured in a powerful way. In such an environment, blacks and
Latinos will develop defenses and anxieties that are sure to have
a harmful effect on their academic performance. But beyond
this, the quality of race relations as a whole, Massey and his
colleagues argue, will surely be impacted negatively if such per-
ceptions are widespread. If whites and Asians look upon black
and Latino students on campus as their intellectual inferiors,
and assume an attitude of condescension or resentment, racial
tensions on campus will surely increase. “Such perceptions of
distance from ‘affirmative-action beneficiaries,’” Massey and
his colleagues write, “carry important implications for the gen-
eral tone of race relations on campus because one stereotype
that emergesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€is that without affirmative action most black
and Latino students would not be admitted. To the extent that
such beliefs are widespread among white students at elite insti-
tutions, they will not only increase tensions between whites and
minorities on campus; they will also increase the risk of stereo-
type threat by raising anxiety among minority students about
confirming these negative suspicions.” (pp. 143, 145)
The problem Massey and his colleagues draw attention to
here may be much more serious than they think. This is because

the question asked on their social distance survey was specifi-

cally worded in terms of “affirmative action” rather than “racial
preferences,” “racial quotas,” or other terms more clearly asso-
ciated with special consideration or special privileges based
on race. We know from many years of polling that the phrase
“affirmative action” means different things to different peo-
ple, and for some people, at least, it is not associated with any
kind of controversial policy or with a policy that any reason-
able person would oppose. It is a nice-sounding phrase that is
sometimes responded to positively even by people who indicate
strong opposition to any kind of racial preferences, even the
most modest in scope. For many, “affirmative action” seems
to mean nothing more than outreach or welcoming policies, or
such policies combined with rigorous enforcement of nondis-
crimination norms. A 1996 Roper poll, for instance, asked a
random sample of 1001 University of California faculty mem-
bers the following question:
The term “affirmative action” has different meanings to dif-

ferent people. I’m going to read two definitions of the term
“affirmative action.” Please tell me which one best describes
what you mean by the term. First, affirmative action means
granting preferences to women and certain racial and ethnic
groups. Second, affirmative action means promoting equal
opportunities for all individuals without regard to their race,
sex, or ethnicity.
In the Roper survey, 37 percent of respondents chose the first

statement (the preferentialist understanding) as best describ-
ing what “affirmative action” means to them, while a larger
percentage—43 percent—said the second statement (the color-
blind and gender-blind meaning) was closer to what they under-
stand by the term (14 percent said neither statement captured
what they mean by “affirmative action”). For many of the

respondents “affirmative action” thus meant nothing more con-

troversial than a systematic policy of nondiscrimination, which
was the original meaning of the phrase in the famous executive
order issued by Lyndon Johnson in 1965.65
A June, 2003 Gallup poll captures the dilemma even more
forcefully. Respondents in a representative national sampling of
1,385 adults were asked the following question: “Do you gen-
erally favor or oppose affirmative action programs for racial
minorities?” Almost half of all whites who had an opinion on
the matter expressed support for “affirmative action programs
for minorities”—47 percent favoring, 53 percent opposing—
while a clear majority of all the respondents (whites plus non-
whites) expressed such support.
In the same survey, however, Gallup asked the follow-
ing question about race-based admissions to colleges and
universities:
Which comes closer to your view about evaluating students

for admission into a college or university?
a) An applicant’s racial and ethnic background should
be considered to help promote diversity on college campuses,
even if that means admitting some minority students who
otherwise would not be admitted?
65. Executive Order No. 11246, issued by President Johnson on September 24, 1965,
required all federal contractors to follow a policy of strict nondiscrimination in all areas
of employment. The “affirmative action” section of the executive order reads as follows:
“The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment
because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action
shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or
transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising, layoff or termination, rates of pay or
other forms of compensation, and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The
contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants
for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the
provisions of this nondiscrimination clause” (emphasis added).

b) Applicants should be admitted solely on the basis

of merit, even if that results in few minority students being
admitted.
To this question only 23 percent of whites among those express-

ing an opinion chose alternative “a” (i.e., that racial and eth-
nic background should be given special consideration in college
admissions to help promote diversity), while the remaining 77
percent—a substantial majority—opposed this idea. Although
47 percent of whites with an opinion had said they supported
“affirmative action programs for minorities,” only half this
amount—23 percent—said they favored special consideration
of race to enhance diversity on college campuses. Among His-
panics who had an opinion only 38 percent supported alterna-
tive “a”, although 77 percent had said they favored “affirmative
action programs for minorities.” Here too, among those with
an opinion there were twice as many supporters of “affirmative-
action programs” as those saying they favored special consid-
eration for race in admissions to college. (Only blacks showed
majority support for race-based college admissions, though just
barely, with only 53 percent of those who had an opinion sup-
porting alternative “a”).
What it all adds up to is this: Questions that ask about
“affirmative action” do not capture the full level of public
opposition to racial preferences, whether in college admissions
or elsewhere. Many people who will respond favorably to an
“affirmative-action” question (“Sure, I support it”) are appar-
ently thinking of issues like outreach and aggressive nondis-
crimination—if the phrase conjures up anything at all in their
minds—and do not support even the mildest forms of race-based
preferences. If Massey and his colleagues had asked their student
respondents to express their level of closeness to “beneficiaries
of racial preferences in college admissions” it is almost certain
that they would have gotten responses expressing much greater

social distance than even the very substantial level of such dis-
tance their question did evoke. Indeed, student responses would
probably have indicated a greater level of social distance toward
“racial preference beneficiaries” than that found in any of the
140 response categories listed in Massey’s tables (the current
leader on the social distance scale is that expressed by blacks
toward “rich whites” and “rich Asians,” who are apparently
seen as objects of disdain).
The level of student disapproval of race-based preferences
may be gauged by the results of a survey conducted in 1999 by
the research firm Angus Reid.66 In telephone interviews with a
representative sample of 1,643 students in 140 different Ameri-
can colleges, the study found overwhelming opposition within
this group to racial preferences in employment and college
admissions. To the statement, “No one should be given special
preferences in jobs or college admissions on the basis of their
gender or race,” almost one in five student respondents said they
“moderately agreed” with the statement (18.7 percent), while
fully two out of every three (66.7 percent) said they “strongly
agreed” with the statement. Less than 15 percent said they dis-
agreed with the statement, with more than two out of three
of these saying they disagreed only moderately, not strongly (a
mere 4.6 percent said they “disagreed strongly”). In all, 85 per-
cent of the students in the survey disagreed with granting racial
and gender preferences in employment and college admissions,
with most saying they disagreed strongly.
The high level of student opposition to both racial and gender
preferences is no doubt a reflection of the triumph of the merito-
cratic ideal in America. It gains a special poignancy among stu-
dents in the most selective colleges and universities since most
have gained admissions only after an arduous four-year trial-by-
66. Cited in Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte, “Racial
Diversity Reconsidered,” The Public Interest, spring 2003, online at www.
thepublicinterest.com, p. 4.

ordeal in which they have had to struggle through demanding

high school honors and Advanced Placement courses, countless
hours of study, harrowing exams and standardized tests, and a
senior year of applications and personal essays, to be followed
by months of anxious waiting. The universal expectation is that
if you have academic talent, work hard, and focus your energies
on your school work, you will be appropriately rewarded, and
your reward will be commensurate with your academic perfor-
mance. That’s the basic trust, and many students view it as the
fundamental social contract under which they live.
For many high-achieving students affirmative action in col-
lege admissions dashes this trust, and nowhere does this become
more evident than in the early spring of senior year when high
school students receive final word on whether or not they have
been admitted to the colleges of their choice. It is at this time
that many students first learn of the enormous degree of racial
preference that elite universities often accord to black and His-
panic students. They watch with bewilderment and dismay as
some of their much better qualified white and Asian classmates
get the thin letters of rejection from some of the very same elite
institutions that have sent out the fat letters of acceptance to
some of their much less qualified black and Hispanic peers. “It’s
not fair,” they say, and their resentment can oscillate in its focus
between the individual students who benefit from racial prefer-
ences and the institutional policies that support them.
The great social distance regarding “affirmative-action
beneficiaries” that Massey and his colleagues found among
the entering white and Asian freshmen is no doubt explained
by many individual high school experiences of this kind. The
resentment and perception of unfairness that such experiences
can evoke are well captured in a poignant description by a
Princeton undergraduate of his own experiences in the college
admissions process. The account is taken from the concluding

paragraph of a term paper the student wrote, which was highly

critical of affirmative-action policy in America:
I’ll close with a personal anecdote. In my high school

graduating class, five were admitted into the class of 2005
at Princeton. Of those, one was of a minority. While I was
lucky enough to be one of those five, many others in my
high school with much higher grades and SAT scores than
the admitted minority were passed over. In many ways, the
situation disgusted me. I knew that countless students had
worked much harder than the minority student, but they had
not been admitted only because they were not black. While I
had never fostered any ill will towards that student, I found
that I resented the fact that she could matriculate because
she was black; really, though, my anger could only be
directed at the cause of the problem—race-preference—and
not the minority student. We seek a society where race does
not matter, but affirmative action, as my high school experi-
ence testifies, only intensifies the importance of race. I look
forward to the day when affirmative action ends and race
truly does not matter. In the meantime, society seems vigor-
ously keen on becoming more race-conscious in a misguided
attempt to become less race-conscious.
The conclusion of Massey and his colleagues that white and

Asian students have negative attitudes toward affirmative-action
beneficiaries and that this stance will have negative consequences
for the academic performance of the stereotype-vulnerable stu-
dents and for the quality of race relations on campus has obvi-
ous implications for the affirmative-action debate. One of the
major arguments of those who support “race-sensitive admis-
sions” is that such policies produce an enriching racial diversity
on campus that contributes to the overall educational experience

of students of all races and ethnic backgrounds. A more racially

representative student body, it is maintained, helps to further
tolerance and racial understanding, facilitates interracial friend-
ships, and improves the overall educational environment of all
students on campus, not just the minority students. Students, it
is said, learn from one another, and by working and studying
together students of different races and ethnicities learn impor-
tant lessons that they will carry with them throughout life. If
the findings of Massey and his colleagues are correct, however,
this “diversity” rationale for race-based admissions policies
would be seriously undermined. There are good diversities and
bad diversities, and diversities created artificially through racial
preferences—ones that increase “social distance” and reinforce
negative stereotypes—are obviously in the “bad” category.
One of the early attempts to test the “diversity rationale” for
affirmative-action policies was made by social scientists Stan-
ley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte. Using
the Angus Reid telephone survey previously referred to, the
Rothman group explored the relationship between the degree
of enrollment diversity on college campuses (as measured by
the percentage of black students) and several important out-
come variables, including student satisfaction with their univer-
sity experience, the overall quality of education, the strength
of the work ethic on campus, and the proportion of students
complaining of having personally experienced discrimination.
The survey utilized the random sample of students, faculty, and
administrators at the 140 colleges and universities polled by the
Angus Reid group.
What Rothman and his colleagues found would be deeply
disturbing to affirmative-action supporters. Virtually none of
the promised benefits of larger black enrollments was supported
by their study’s findings. Not only did increased black enroll-
ment not have the intended beneficial outcomes, but it seemed
on balance to have clearly harmful effects:

When student evaluations of the educational and racial

atmosphere were correlated with the percentage of black
students enrolled at a college or university, the predicted
positive associations with educational benefits and interracial
understanding failed to appear. The statistically significant
associations that did appear were the opposite of those pre-
dicted.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€As the proportion of black students rose, student
satisfaction with their university experience dropped, as did
their assessments of the quality of their education and the
work ethic of their peers. In addition, the higher the enroll-
ment diversity, the more likely students were to say that they
personally experienced discrimination. The same pattern
of negative correlations between educational benefits and
increased black enrollment appeared in the responses of fac-
ulty and administrators. Both groups perceived decreases in
educational quality and academic preparation as the number
of black students increased. Faculty members also rated stu-
dents as less hard-working as diversity increased.67
Rothman and his colleagues found more mixed results in

regard to discrimination and minority relations than in regard
to some of the other items surveyed. “Among faculty and
administrators,” they write, “higher minority enrollment was
significantly associated with perceptions of less campus discrim-
ination and among administrators, more positive treatment of
minority students.” These findings, however, were offset, they
say, “by the absence of similar results among students, who
reported more personal victimization as diversity increased.”
Students, Rothman and his colleagues found, were generally
67. Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte, “Does Enrollment
Diversity Improve University Education,” International Journal of Public Opinion
Research, 15: 1, 2003, pp. 8–26. A less technical version of this paper appears as
“Racial Diversity Reconsidered,” in The Public Interest, spring 2003 (available online
at www.thepublicinterest.com). The quotations in the text are taken from the online
version of The Public Interest article.

much less enamored of greater “diversity” on college campuses

(i.e., a higher percentage of black students) than college admin-
istrators, with faculty assessments somewhere between these.
Those in the Rothman group believe that affirmative-action
policy is involved in these negative views of black enrollment
diversity, and they offer as evidence the fact that a very differ-
ent assessment is given of the value of larger Asian enrollments.
Unlike a larger black and Hispanic presence on campus, a larger
Asian presence, they found, was sometimes viewed in a positive
light by college students and others. In terms of the outcome
variables explored in the study, “the increased presence of Asian
Americans seems to have at least some positive impact,” Roth-
man and his colleagues report. They speculate that the differ-
ence lies in the absence of racial preference given to the entering
Asian students. “Since higher percentages of black and Hispanic
students,” they write, “are produced in part by affirmative
action, while the same is not true for Asian-American students,
it may be that affirmative action places students in academic
environments for which they are unsuited, leading to tension
and dissatisfaction all around.” Once again, we see evidence
confirming Sowell’s “mismatch” hypothesis.
Rothman and his colleagues see their study as providing
strong evidence against what they call the “diversity model”
of campus relations put forth by Bowen and Bok and other
defenders of current affirmative-action policy in higher educa-
tion. They criticize much of the previous research in this area
for asking questions that are often too vague to interpret mean-
ingfully (example from a study directed by Harvard researcher
Gary Orfield: “Do you feel that diversity enhances or detracts
from how you and others think about problems and solutions
in classes?”), and for failure to appreciate the effect of political
correctness and socially expected response patterns on the level
of candor with which respondents will answer questions per-

taining to race. They believe their own study overcomes these

problems.
Perhaps the worst shortcoming of the Bowen and Bok study
is its tendency to equate a generalized support for the value of
demographic diversity on college campuses with support for all
elements in that diversity and for all policies intended to achieve
that diversity. “The vast majority [of the respondents in our
study],” Bowen and Bok write, “believe that going to college
with a diverse body of fellow students made a valuable contri-
bution to their education and personal development.” (p. 280)
It is well and good to know all this, of course, but a vague genu-
flection before the value of “diversity” really tells us very little
about what students actually think about the more important
and controversial issues dealing with race and college life.
It is clear from the work of the Massey and Rothman groups
that white students view the presence of Asian students on cam-
pus very differently from the way they view the presence of
black students, and that the difference is almost certainly con-
nected with the lower academic qualifications of many of the
black students and the sense that many blacks have benefited
unfairly from affirmative-action programs. Incredibly, Bowen
and Bok never thought to place on their lengthy questionnaire
any kind of question soliciting the views of their respondents to
affirmative-action policy and its beneficiaries. Their respondents
were never even asked the crucial question of whether or not
they favored “race-sensitive admissions” as a way of increasing
racial diversity on campus. They were never asked how distant
or close they felt to “beneficiaries of racial preferences in college
admissions.” They were never asked whether they believed that
the average black or Hispanic student they met in college was
equally qualified academically with the average white or Asian
student, and if not, whether they thought this situation had any
effect on the quality of race relations on campus. One suspects

that the reason for the omission of such crucially important

questions from Bowen and Bok’s survey was simply a fear of
the answers.
Bowen and Bok, along with most other defenders of the
diversity rationale, proceeded as if no difference existed in
public perceptions between the kind of diversity that a merit
system might produce and the contrived, artificial, end result-
focused diversity that comes about through a process of con-
scious racial engineering, racial preferencing, and racial-quota
thinking. An analogy with professional sports might be help-
ful. Most sports fans appreciate the ethnic diversity existing
nowadays on professional baseball teams, where more His-
panic and Asian players have added to a racial makeup at
one time dominated exclusively by whites, and subsequently
by a mixture of blacks and whites. Many sports fans would
no doubt be pleased if basketball (a black-dominated sport),
ice hockey (a white-dominated sport), and horse-racing (an
Hispanic-dominated sport) became more baseball-like in this
regard. Sports fans seem to appreciate the fact that blacks like
Tiger Woods and the two Williams sisters gained prominence
in such traditionally all-white country club sports as golf and
tennis. Many golf fans also seem to like the fact that more
Europeans, South Americans, and Asians are now seen on the
American golf tour.
But how many sports fans would thrill to the prospect
of greater diversity in any of these sports if it meant lower-
ing entrance standards for the members of underrepresented
racial and ethnic groups or otherwise departing from merito-
cratic standards? What would professional athletes themselves
think of such an arrangement? Would they revel in the greater
“diversity” of their sport? How would white hockey players,
for instance, respond to an affirmative-action program in which
being black or Asian was considered a huge “plus-factor” in

determining who makes the hockey team? Would the situation

be any different if diversity on a college or high school sports
team was at issue rather than diversity in professional sports?
How, for example, would high school athletes react to an
aggressive affirmative-action program that sought to enhance
racial diversity on their high school sports teams? How would
their classmates and parents react? Would it make any differ-
ence whether the target of the affirmative action program was a
varsity or a junior varsity team? Would it make any difference if
the target were an intramural team?
It doesn’t require any special genius to figure out the answers
to any of these questions. In all cases a policy of race-based
preferences would have a disastrous effect on the morale of the
teams involved; those selected under the higher standards would
look down on those who made the team by way of racial prefer-
ences; the beneficiaries of the racial preferences would acquire
an inferiority complex and become vulnerable to “stereotype
threat”; and everywhere disappointed aspirants from the “over-
represented” groups would decry the system as “unfair.” And
for all these reasons those implementing the preference system
would have a powerful incentive to speak in euphemisms and
prettifying obfuscations and lie about what they are actually
doing.
Many years ago political philosopher Allan Bloom gave an
acute description of the pattern of black/white relations on elite
college campuses that he had observed during his many years of
teaching under the affirmative-action plans at Cornell and the
University of Chicago.68 Bloom saw clearly from the very begin-
ning of America’s embrace of racial preferences that the phe-
nomenon that would later be called “stereotype vulnerability”
68. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1987).

or “stereotype threat” unleashed a powerful dynamic on col-

lege campuses that not only had a negative effect on the learn-
ing environment, but also had a chilling effect on the quality
of social relationships between the lower-achieving blacks who
were preferentially admitted to elite colleges and the higher-
achieving whites and Asians.
At the nation’s premier universities, Bloom observed, “white
and black students do not in general become real friends with
one another.” This is a terribly disappointing development, he
says, especially when one considers the great success universities
have had since the Second World War in integrating members of
formerly excluded groups, including the Irish, Jews, Catholics,
Asians, and women. The black/white divide, he says, is “the
one eccentric element in this portrait, the one failure.” (p. 91)
The better universities, he explains, are formally integrated, and
blacks and whites are used to seeing one another on campus and
act politely in each other’s company. “But the substantial con-
tact, indifference to race, soul to soul, that prevails in all other
aspects of student life simply does not usually exist between the
two races.” (pp. 92–3)
Bloom blames the situation on affirmative action. “Affirma-
tive action,” he says, “now institutionalizes the worst aspects
of [racial] separatism.” (p. 96) In the better universities, Bloom
explains, “the fact is that the average black student’s achieve-
ments do not equal those of the average white studentÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€and
everybody knows it.” Those who know it best are the black
students themselves, who react to the situation with defensive-
ness and self-segregation on campus. The black students know
“that everyone doubts their merit, their capacity for equal
achievement,” and, as a result, they “avoid close associations
with whites, who might be better qualified than they are and
who might be looking down on them.” They adopt a simple
defensive strategy: “Better to stick together, so these subtle but
painful difficulties will not arise.” (p. 96) Segregated cafeterias

and eating clubs are but one manifestation of this phenomenon.

Whites too, says Bloom, react to the situation with their own
form of self-segregation and try to avoid intimate black/white
contacts and discussion topics that will be fraught with tension
and uneasiness. The result, he says, is a bad situation all around.
The intimate interracial friendships and better understanding
between the races, which affirmative action is supposed to pro-
duce, do not come about.
Anyone with intimate knowledge of the racial scene at
elite colleges and universities in recent years will detect a pow-
erful ring of truth in what Bloom says. For example, John
McWhorter, who for many years was a professor of linguis-
tics at Berkeley, has described black/white relations on the
Berkeley campus in the late-1990s in terms almost identical
to those of Bloom, although McWhorter, who is black, writes
with an even greater sense of sadness and disappointment than
does Bloom. “At Berkeley,” McWhorter explains, “I have had
occasion to teach large numbers of both black and other stu-
dents. I spent a long time resisting acknowledging something
that ultimately became too consistent and obvious to ignore,
which was that black undergraduates at Berkeley tended to
be among the worst students on campus, by any estimation.”
This, he says, has had horrible consequences for the quality of
black/white and black/Asian relations on campus. He explains
further:
With it widely known among a student body that most

minority students were admitted with test scores and GPAs
which would have barred white and Asian applicants from
consideration, it is difficult for many white students to avoid
beginning to question the basic mental competence of black
people as a race. This is especially true when most black
students are obviously of middle-class backgroundÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€A
white person need not be a racist to start wondering why

black students need affirmative action even when growing up

no poorer than they did.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€This can only leave many young
whites with a private suspicion that blacks simply aren’t as
swift, which will in turn encourage suspicion in black stu-
dents, and thus perpetuate interracial alienation on campus
and undermine the mutual respect that successful integra-
tion requires.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[Alienating racial encounters] like these
subvert the goal of peaceful integration, and importantly,
unexpressed renditions of these encounters lurk underneath
interracial contacts campus-wide all year long.69
There is one arena, however, where the kind of critique

offered by Bloom and McWhorter clearly does not apply and
where true black/white friendships really do flourish on elite
college campuses. These are among the recruited college ath-
letes on the varsity sports teams. In this arena, however, such
contacts flourish precisely because the participants can escape
the harm done by race-based affirmative action programs and
devote much of their energies to activities where strict merito-
cratic principles reign supreme. However negatively one may
view contemporary policies of athletic recruitment on college
campuses, they clearly do produce the rare oases of integration
amid the desert of self-segregated student social groups.
Recruited athletes on college campuses are generally certain of
two things. First, they know a) that they have been recruited to
play a college sport under the same highly relaxed set of aca-
demic standards that applies to all athletic recruits, regardless
of their race or ethnicity (i.e., admissions officers at selective
institutions will reach down just as far academically for a top-
69. John McWhorter, Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America (New York:
The Free Press, 2000,) pp. 89, 229–30. McWhorter’s solution to the problem is the same
as Bloom’s: “Black students often come to a selective campus wary that white students
suspect them of being affirmative-action admits and thus not equally qualified. A simple
solution would be to eliminate the policy that makes the white students’ suspicion—let’s
face it—usually correct.” (p. 236)

quality white or Asian athlete as for a comparable black or His-

panic athlete); and they know b) that both their recruitment to
the team and their subsequent play will be based purely on per-
formance, not on their capacity to contribute to a team’s “diver-
sity.” On the sports teams black and Hispanic athletes work
together with white and Asian athletes in a common project
under a set of standards that all can consider fair. No one has
any reason to look down on the members of any racial or ethnic
group as athletically inferior because all have been judged by a
common set of standards. No one has any reason to experience
“stereotype threat.”
It is perhaps no accident that two of the most prominent
white politicians in the post-civil rights era known to have the
greatest rapport with black people—i.e., Bill Bradley and the
late Jack Kemp—were both products of the college and pro-
fessional sports world. In an earlier generation the intimate
contact between blacks and whites that so many yearn to see
on college campuses and elsewhere was most prominently dis-
played in another arena of strict meritocracy—the world of jazz
musicians (it is partially for this reason that the saxophone-
playing Bill Clinton seems to have such natural rapport with
so many black people). The conclusion seems inescapable here,
and recent social science has confirmed it more and more: if true
friendships—“indifference to race, soul to soul”—are to flour-
ish between blacks and whites on college campuses, they must
be based on mutual respect and a system of race-blind selection
that focuses on genuine talent and performance, not on race.
Why Do So Few Blacks Become Scientists and

Engineers?
Long before the Cole and Barber study looked into the ques-
tion of why so few blacks become college professors, several
researchers had taken up the even more pressing question of

why so few blacks become scientists and engineers. In the past

these professions have often been popular with members of pre-
viously disadvantaged minority groups because of their great
social prestige and financial rewards, plus the greater fairness
that reigns within them in determining objective merit. The small
number of non-Asian minorities in most of these fields has been
an ongoing concern for many college administrators. Although
Asian freshmen are the most likely to say they want to major
in a science or engineering field, numerous studies have shown
that college-bound blacks and Hispanics express an interest in
these fields in at least the same proportion as whites—in some
surveys they show an even greater interest. Yet of the black and
Hispanic freshmen who express an initial interest in majoring in
engineering or a science, an extremely high proportion of them
change their minds after a year or two of study and switch into
a nonscience major.
Many students of all races, of course, fail to carry through
with their freshman-year intention to major in engineering or a
laboratory science once they realize how demanding the course
work in these disciplines usually is and how much easier it is to
get a degree in a nonscience field like business or the humanities.
But the hard-science falloff or “nonpersistence rate” among
blacks and Hispanics is considerably higher than that for whites
or Asians, and college administrators have wanted to know
why.
One of the most important studies looking into this prob-
lem was conducted by a group of researchers led by Dartmouth
psychology professor Rogers Elliott.70 Elliott and his colleagues
surveyed the progression of students from the class of 1992 who
entered as freshmen four Ivy League colleges (Dartmouth, Cor-
nell, Yale, and Brown), and they looked at a host of background
70. Rogers Elliott, A. Christopher Strenta, Russell Adair, Michael Matier, and Jannah
Scott, “The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in Highly Selective
Institutions,” Research in Higher Education, 37 (1996): 681–709.

factors that might predict both the students’ intention to pursue

a natural science major and their propensity to stick with that
intention through graduation. Like other researchers, the Elliott
group found black and Hispanic freshmen having as high an
initial interest in majoring in a natural science as whites, but the
proportion following through with their intention and going on
to get a degree in one of these fields differed greatly among the
various ethno-racial groups. While approximately 70 percent
of Asians and 61 percent of whites initially expressing an inten-
tion to major in a natural science persisted with their intention
through graduation, only 55 percent of Hispanics did and only
34 percent of blacks. The “nonpersistence rate” for blacks (66
percent) was 1.7 times that for whites (39 percent), and more
than twice that for Asians (30 percent). The Elliott group also
found that while relatively few students who initially failed to
express a science-major intention changed their minds later in
their college careers and switched into a science, among those
who did switch and wound up with a hard science degree at
the end of college the usual ethnic pattern was observed: 14.9
percent of Asians not initially intending to be science majors
switched into a science, 8.6 percent of whites, 5.8 percent of
Hispanics, and only 2.5 percent of blacks.
While the Elliott group’s study suggests that there may be
ethnic or cultural factors involved in explaining the differing
falloff rates, the most important factor, their regression equa-
tions showed, is simply the differing levels of preparation and
achievement in math- and science-related fields that students
brought with them from high school. The SAT math score—one
of the best predictors of freshman-year grades in the hard sci-
ences—differed substantially by ethnic group among those ini-
tially expressing a desire to major in a natural science. Among
freshman-year science aspirants the Asians had the highest aver-
age SAT math score (721), followed closely by the whites (714),
while Hispanics (653) and blacks (607) lagged far behind. These

numbers, of course, reflect the huge affirmative-action boosts in

admission given to blacks over whites and Asians and the some-
what lesser boosts given to Hispanics. But regardless of their
race, students with high math SAT scores and other indications
of past math/science achievement in high school (like grades in
high school science courses) were found to be much more likely
to persist in their initial desire to major in a hard science than
those with lower scores. Black and Hispanic falloff rates were
much higher than those for whites and Asians mainly because
of their “entering credentials” deficit—the white and Asian stu-
dents were simply better prepared.
The Elliott group, however, didn’t end its inquiry with this
simple insight. They knew from other studies that at many
colleges less competitive than the four Ivy League institutions
they surveyed blacks seemed to have an easier time sticking
to a major in a laboratory or hard science, and many of the
graduates of these less prestigious institutions often went on to
successful careers in science, engineering, and medicine. Some
even went on to get Ph.D.s in their field from very respect-
able universities. The historically black colleges and universi-
ties (HBCUs)—schools like Morehouse, Fisk, Spellman, and
Howard—were known to turn out as many as 40 percent of all
blacks with science and engineering degrees in the U.S. despite
enrolling only about half that proportion of the country’s black
undergraduates. Elliott and his colleagues suspected that there
was a “mismatch factor” involved in explaining the high black
falloff rate at the Ivy institutions they surveyed, since they knew
that blacks who successfully completed science and engineering
programs at the HBCUs and other colleges less selective than
the Ivies were often no better prepared in terms of their science
and mathematics background than those Ivy-attending blacks
in their study who dropped out of science.
“We think it certain that more of the black students in our
sample,” they wrote, “would have persisted in science had they

been, say, at Howard” and “more of them would also have per-
sisted at any of several majority white institutions.” (pp. 700–1).
They came to this conclusion after looking at a different data set
that examined the relative math SAT scores of the students who
successfully completed a degree in the natural sciences at 11 col-
leges of differing overall selectivity. The pattern they found at
each of the 11 colleges was almost always the same: A majority
of natural science majors were drawn from the students whose
math SAT scores were among those in the top third of their
institution, while very few such majors came from students in
the bottom third of the SAT math range.
However, the SAT math scores of the black students in the
four Ivy League schools, including those of many who either
dropped out of natural science or never intended to major in
it to begin with, were often higher than those earning science
and engineering degrees at other schools. The Elliott group con-
cluded that a student intending to major in a natural science is
more likely to persevere in that intention if the student matricu-
lates at an institution where the student’s entering credentials
(math SAT score, high school grades, etc.) are closer to the
middle or top third of student ranges in the school they attend
rather than at the bottom. A student whose academic creden-
tials place him in the upper part of his college freshman class
is more likely to persist with an intention to major in a hard
science than a student with equal credentials who enrolls in a
more competitive institution where most of the other students
are academically better qualified.
The reason for this mismatch effect, Elliott and his col-
leagues believe, is because natural-science instruction is hierar-
chical, always building on what had to be learned—and learned
well—before. Enrolling in a highly competitive college where
most of the other science students are better prepared and pro-
ceeding at a rapid rate in the acquisition of new knowledge is
not a formula for success for those starting out behind. The

science programs at Ivy League schools are no place to play

catch-up. However, those with a real desire to become scientists
and engineers who may not have reached the top of the charts
by the end of their high school days still have a good chance of
succeeding in their career goals, the Elliott researchers believe, if
they choose a college where the other students are more similar
to themselves academically. The mode of teaching at less selec-
tive colleges will presumably be more geared to students at their
level, and they will not be intimidated by a pace of instruction
that threatens to overwhelm them.
Within this context the Elliott group asked serious ques-
tions about the wisdom of current affirmative-action programs
at America’s most competitive colleges and universities—at least
insofar as they impact black and Hispanic students who intend
to major in the natural sciences and engineering. To the ques-
tion “Why do so few blacks pursue careers in science and engi-
neering?” the Elliott group gave an answer virtually identical to
the answer Cole and Barber would give to the question of why
blacks seldom pursue careers in academia: There is a “pipeline”
and “entering credentials” problem that is made much worse by
the current American system of racial preferences and the skills-
mismatching it creates. As Elliott said in his testimony before
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission (September 2008), where he
explained the results of his team’s research: “Race preferences in
admissions in the service of Affirmative Action are harming the
aspirations particularly of blacks seeking to be scientists by cre-
ating this huge mismatchÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€The differences are largest at the
most elite universities because they have very highÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€admis-
sions standards, levels which minorities, especially blacks, don’t
come close to meeting.”71
71. U.S Commission on Civil Rights, “Encouraging Minority Students to Pursue

Careers in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math,” Sept. 12, 2008, p. 35, www.
nealgross.com.

The mismatch problem as a contributor to the high “non-

persistence” rate of blacks and Hispanics intending to major in
hard sciences has been explored in a number of other studies,
including one that made use of the same College and Beyond
database used by Bowen and Bok in The Shape of the River.
University of Virginia psychologists Frederick Smyth and John
McArdle looked at data from 23 of the competitive colleges and
universities in the College and Beyond survey and combined
the C&B data with additional information about the students
at these 23 institutions compiled by UCLA’s Higher Educa-
tion Research Institute in its ongoing Cooperative Institutional
Research Program survey.72
Smyth and McArdle focused their attention on the 5,047
entering freshmen at these 23 C&B institutions who initially
expressed an interest in majoring in either science, math, or engi-
neering (SME). Not surprisingly, they found important differ-
ences in the average SAT math scores of the SME intenders that
reflected familiar patterns. The Asians who intended to major in
the SME subjects had substantially higher SAT math scores than
the whites, the whites substantially higher than the Hispanics,
and the Hispanics higher than the blacks. Men, too, on average,
had higher scores on their math SATs than women. This fact
alone, combined with parallel differences in high school grades,
accounted for much of the observed differences in the propor-
tion of the SME intenders within each group who persisted in
an SME major until graduation. The combined black and His-
panic persistence-until-graduation rate (38 percent)73 was much
lower than the white (55 percent), and lower still than the Asian
(63 percent).
72. Frederick Smyth and John McArdle, “Ethnic and Gender Differences in Science
Graduation at Selective Colleges with Implications for Admission Policy and College
Choice,” Research in Higher Education, 45 (2004):353–81.
73. This is a combined figure for blacks and Hispanics (plus the very tiny number of
Native Americans in the C&B database).

Like the earlier Elliott study, Smyth and McArdle found

evidence of an “institutional mismatch” effect as well as an
“entering credentials” effect. Those with SAT math scores sub-
stantially below average for the SME intenders at the institu-
tions where they were enrolled were at a heightened risk of
not carrying through with their initial intention to major in a
science, math, or engineering field. This mismatch factor was
shown to affect disproportionately the blacks, Hispanics, and
American Indians in their study. Linking their own results to
the earlier study of the Elliott group, they write: “Elliott and
his colleagues concluded that race-sensitive admission, while
increasing access to elite colleges, was inadvertently causing
disproportionate loss of talented underrepresented minority
students from science majors. Our findings for the College and
Beyond students are consistent with this inference.” (p. 373)
Smyth and McArdle estimated that if all of the black and
Hispanic students in their survey who expressed a freshman-year
intention to major in an SME subject had attended one of the
23 schools where their math test scores and high school grades
equaled the average among the students at that school with simi-
lar SME intentions, there would have been a substantial increase
in the number of blacks and Hispanics sticking with SME sub-
jects until graduation. Their mathematical model predicted that
eliminating the harmful mismatch effect would have produced
45 percent more black and Hispanic females with science, math,
or engineering degrees and 35 percent more males. (p. 373)
Results similar to those of the Smyth/McArdle study and the
Elliott group study were reached by UCLA education professor
Mitchell Chang and his colleagues in their study of students who
intended to major in four biomedical-related fields—biology,
health sciences, psychology, and chemistry.74 The Chang team
74. Mitchell J. Chang, Oscar Cerna, June Han, and Victor Sáenz, “The Contradictory
Roles of Institutional Status in Retaining Underrepresented Minorities in Biomedical
and Behavioral Science Majors,” The Review of Higher Education, 33 (2008):433–64.

looked at data collected in 2004 and 2005 by UCLA’s Higher

Education Research Institute as part of two ongoing longitudi-
nal projects funded by the National Institute of Health. In all,
2,964 students were surveyed from 159 different institutions,
with the institutions spread out among those with a predomi-
nantly white and Asian clientele, those serving mostly Hispan-
ics, and the historically black colleges and universities. Their
main interest was discovering what factors led students with
an initial interest in majoring in a biomedical-related science to
stick with that intention at least until completion of their first
year of college.
Like all other researchers, they found that past preparation
and achievement—as measured by such factors as the number
of math and science courses taken in high school, high school
grade-point average, and SAT scores—played a major role in a
student’s decision to persist with an initial intention to major
in one of the four science fields examined. Other factors that
played a positive role in science-major retention included mem-
bership in a campus preprofessional organization and a stated
desire to find cures for diseases. However, the Chang group
also found a substantial mismatch penalty involved when stu-
dents attended more selective institutions. Students of all ethnic
groups, including whites and Asians, were more likely to aban-
don their initial intention to major in science if they attended a
highly competitive college or university. The falloff was great-
est, however, for blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians (the
“underrepresented minorities” in their study), whose chances of
sticking with their freshman-year intention fell very sharply the
more competitive the institution they attended.
For every 10-point increase in the average SAT score of the
entering freshmen in the institutions surveyed (adding the math
and verbal scores together), the chances of a student from an
underrepresented minority sticking with a projected science
major was reduced by 3 percent. “All things being equal,” they

write, “a URM [underrepresented minority] student has a 30%

higher chance of departing from a biomedical or behavioral sci-
ence major if he or she attends an institution where the average
undergraduate combined SAT score is 1100 versus one with an
average of 1000.” (p. 449)
Chang and his associates, however, found one important
exception to this rule. At the historically black colleges and uni-
versities, the higher the standards of the institution, the greater
the science-retention rate. “Rather than increasing the risk of
departure in the biomedical and behavioral sciences, attending
an HBCU where students have higher average test scores may
improve URM students’ chances of persisting in those majors.”
(p. 449) They do not explain just why this is so, although part
of the reason would seem to be that the HBCUs have devel-
oped over the years a special expertise in educating black stu-
dents with spotty high school records and are more focused on
effectiveness in undergraduate instruction than preeminence in
research. (In this sense they would act like the Catholic schools
in the inner city). Probably there also exists what statisticians
call a “restriction of range” factor, since even the most selective
HBCU institutions have students with typical SAT scores only
modest by national standards (math-plus-verbal SAT scores at
schools like Spellman and Morehouse typically average around
1000). The difference in past achievement and SAT scores
between the better and less prepared students across the various
HBCUs is thus probably much less than that across the more
academically diverse institutions with white or white-plus-Asian
majorities.
The Chang team sums up the most important finding of its
research in the following words:
There does seem to be a mismatch occurring in science

education at the college level. The problem, however, is

not only an issue of poorly prepared URM students failing

among high achieversÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€The problem is that all students,
irrespective of their race, academic preparation, or motiva-
tion, are at greater risk of failing among high achievers at
highly selective institutions where the undergraduate student
body is mostly White and Asian. In other words, even highly
capable and talented White and Asian students—who would
otherwise continue in a biomedical or behavioral science
major at less selective institutions—are leaving the sciences
at higher rates at more selective institutions. (p. 454)
The conclusion of the Chang team thus parallels that of Elliott

and his associates: A student who wishes to succeed as a bio-
medical science major is advised to choose a college or univer-
sity where the student’s entering academic credentials are not
too far below those of the typical science major at the institu-
tion chosen. The lowering of standards for black and Hispanic
students at our more competitive colleges and universities and
the resulting credentials mismatch that ensues almost certainly
reduces the number of these “underrepresented minority” stu-
dents who go on to complete a program in the biomedical and
laboratory science fields.
Perverse Incentives: Rewarding

Underachievement
As previously noted, each year black students typically score
about 100 points lower than whites and Asians on each of
the sections of the SAT exam (a 200-point gap on the math-
plus-verbal score and a 300-point gap when the newer writ-
ing test scores are added). This gap was even greater in the
mid-1970s when data on the matter first became available (the
gap then on the math-plus-verbal score was almost 250 SAT

points), but it began to close after this time until the late 1980s,
when progress in this direction stopped. Hispanics, too, score
substantially lower on the SATs than whites and Asians, with
average Hispanic scores much closer to the black mean than to
that of the whites and Asians. These SAT-gap figures actually
understate the real distance between the achievement levels of
the four ethno-racial groups, since smaller proportions of the
lower-scoring groups actually take the SAT. Compared with
whites and Asians, a larger portion of black and Hispanic stu-
dents either drop out of high school before the period in which
the SAT is normally taken or do not take the SAT because they
do not intend to go to college (or intend to go to a noncompeti-
tive institution that does not require the SAT). Students in these
latter categories, of course, would be among the lowest achiev-
ers. If the same proportion of 17-year-old black and Hispanic
students took the SAT as whites and Asians the existing gap
would be larger.
The racial gap at the highest SAT levels, where the “right-
tail” colleges and universities recruit most of their entering
classes, is even more extreme. In 2006, for instance, while con-
stituting 10.3 percent of all SAT test takers, blacks comprised
only 1.6 percent of those who scored 700 or above on the ver-
bal part of the SAT and only 1.0 percent of those scoring 700
or above on the math. Thirty-nine times as many whites as
blacks scored 700 or above on the verbal SAT and 53 times
as many on the math SAT.75 The racial gap among those scor-
ing 750 or above—where schools like Princeton, MIT, and Yale
recruit many of their students—was even more skewed. Since
the nation’s most selective colleges and universities choose most
75. “A Large Black-White Scoring Gap Persists on the SAT College Admission,”
Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 2006, www.jbhe.com/53_SAT.

of their incoming student body from those who have scored at

these very high levels, college administrators are faced with the
choice of either forming an entering class that is well below the
5–7 percent black representation range they desire, or lower-
ing their standards substantially for black entrants. Virtually all
elite institutions choose the latter option (Caltech may be the
one exception).76
If elite colleges enroll only the most academically talented
and accomplished students, they will be drawing from a pool
that is overwhelmingly white and Asian—and among the whites
disproportionately Jewish.77 If they are unwilling to have an
76. On Caltech as a partial outlier, see Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, America in
Black and White (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 400; and Russell Nieli,
“Why Caltech Is in a Class by Itself,” Minding-the-Campus website, Dec. 9, 2010,
www.mindingthecampus.com.
77. The Asian advance on the SATs since the 1970s has been nothing short of
spectacular, with the Asian/white gap at the high end substantial and the Asian/black
gap enormous. In 1995, for instance, for every thousand Asians taking the SAT, 18
scored 700 or above on the verbal test, as did 13 out of every thousand whites. The
comparable figure for blacks was less than 2 per thousand. The results on the math
portion of the SAT were even more ethnicly skewed. More than 140 out of every
thousand Asian test-takers scored above 700 on the math test, as did 58 out of every
thousand whites, while only 6 out of every thousand black test-takers scored this high.
Although the total number of blacks taking the SAT in 1995 was considerably greater
than the total number of Asians taking the test, among those scoring 700 or above
Asians exceed the number of blacks by a factor of 8 to 1 on the verbal portion (1,476 vs.
184), and on the math by a factor of more than 18 to 1 (11,585 vs. 616). (These figures
are taken from the College Entrance Examination Board, 1995 National Ethnic/ Sex
Data, as tabulated in Thernstrom and Thernstrom, America in Black and White, p. 399,
Table 4.). Asians since this time have continued with their steady advance, producing an
ever-widening ethnic gap especially on the math SAT. Among SAT test-takers in 2010,
approximately 23 percent of Asians scored 700 or above on the math SAT, compared
with only 6 percent of whites and 1 percent of blacks (inferred from the table “SAT
Percentile Ranks, 2010 College-Bound Seniors, College Board, http://professionals.
collegeboard.com).
On Jews: Although the College Board doesn’t routinely publish figures on religious
or ethno-religious demographics, it did publish such figures in one year (2002),
indicating that on average Jews had a combined math-plus-verbal SAT score of 1161,
100 points higher than that of the average white test-taker. This is a very substantial
difference and suggests a huge difference far out on the right tail of scores of the overall
test-taking population, where Jewish overrepresentation is enormous. This largely

entering class that is only 1–3 percent black, they will have to
resort to huge racial preferences, even if they must conceal this
fact from a skeptical public—or lie about it, as they typically
do.78
Tempting as it may be for some to think so, these huge racial
gaps cannot be explained simply by differing levels of family
income or family education. Even after taking all such factors
into consideration, huge gaps remain. For instance, in a study
by the College Board of 1995 test takers, white students whose
parents never went beyond high school outperformed in their
SAT scores black students from families in which at least one
parent had a graduate degree (873 vs. 844). A similar situa-
tion obtained between Asians and blacks with these same fam-
ily characteristics, where the gap was even greater (890 vs.
844). Blacks from relatively affluent families earning more than
$70,000 per year scored 849 on the SAT, while whites from
very poor families earning less than $10,000 per year scored
twenty points higher (869). Not surprisingly, poor Asians,
many of whose parents were immigrants and who often lived
in households where no English was spoken, performed much
more poorly than the affluent blacks on the SAT verbal (343 vs.
407), but they significantly outscored them on the math portion
of the test (482 vs. 442).79 These are old figures, and the College
Board has not published more recent data cross-tabulating SAT
explains why Jews, comprising only 2 percent of the American student-age population,
often comprise as much as 20 percent of the student body at several Ivy League schools
and other elite undergraduate institutions.
78. “A leading educator once remarked to me that there were two issues about which
many university presidents deluded themselves or lied: preferential admissions for
athletes and affirmative action.” Robert Klitgaard, Choosing Elites (New York: Basic
Books, 1985), p. 187.
79. The figures are taken from the College Entrance Examination Board, 1995
National Ethnic/ Sex Data, as tabulated in Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, America
in Black and White, Simon and Schuster, N.Y., 1997, p. 407, Table 7.

scores by household income and race. But this older pattern

almost certainly persists today as black SAT scores continue to
stagnate while high-scoring Asians increase their distance from
both blacks and whites.
It is because of these huge racial gaps, coupled with the
near-universal belief among administrators at elite colleges and
universities that their institutions must have a “decent” rep-
resentation of black and Hispanic students, that the degree of
racial preferences given to members of these groups is so large.
By checking off the box that says “black” on their college appli-
cations, high school students in effect are accorded a “plus
factor” boost equivalent to roughly 100 points on each of the
sections of the SAT, and perhaps half a grade letter on their high
school GPA. Absent affirmative action, the proportion of blacks
at the most elite universities would probably plummet—at least
in the short run—from the current 5–10 percent range to the
1–3 percent range. Hispanic declines would be somewhat less,
though still very steep.80
The reason for these huge differences in group performance
are multiple and controversial, and the theories that are out there
to explain them include in their focus everything from culture,
to genes, to family structure, to group psychology, to child-rear-
ing practices.81 Differences in nutrition, neo-natal care, public
health, the neighborhood crime situation, and the ambient levels
of lead and other toxic environmental pollutants have also been
80. For projections on the effect of doing away with race-based preferences on the
racial composition of highly competitive colleges and universities, see William Bowen
and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
pp. 15–52; and Thomas Espenshade and Alexandria Walton Radford, No Longer
Separate, Not Yet Equal—Race and Class in Elite College Admission and Campus Life
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp.12–13, 339–78.
81. Discussion and evaluation of some of these theories are presented in Christopher
Jencks and Meredith Phillips, eds., The Black/White Test Score Gap (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

suggested by reputable researchers as contributing to these pro-

nounced racial differences in academic performance. Whatever
constellation of factors may be involved, however, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that the racial preference regime that has
been in place now for over 40 years is not only a result of these
persistent racial gaps but also a major contributor to their per-
petuation and seeming intractability. Mention has already been
made of the tendency of racial preferences to reinforce nega-
tive stigmas and stereotypes about the academic competence of
their intended beneficiaries, and about the harm this can have
in terms of heightened “stereotype threat” and similar vulner-
abilities. The harm done by preferences, however, may be much
greater in terms of their tendency to distort the incentive struc-
ture under which black and Hispanic students work for admis-
sion to the more prestigious colleges and graduate schools.
Considering the central importance that incentive structures
have in the analyses of economists and other social scientists, it
is remarkable that so little has been done in this area to illumi-
nate the effects of across-the-board racial “plus-factoring” on
student motivation and work ethic. Bowen and Bok hardly take
up this issue at all—they mention in a single page of their 400-
page book the possibility that “the willingness of leading grad-
uate and professional schools to admit black candidates who
did not rank at the very top of their classes” may reduce the
incentive for black students at the better colleges to strive for
top ranking. But they quickly drop the issue, saying that they
“know of no way to test this hypothesis.” (p. 85) One suspects
that here, too, a fear of the answer drives the reticence of Bowen
and Bok (and others) to face this issue squarely.
It is difficult to see how an across-the-board system of racial
preferences would not have a harmful effect in terms of stu-
dent motivation and work ethic. Affirmative-action supporters
sometimes claim that even with racial preferences in place at
all major universities, colleges, and graduate programs, there is

still a marginal payoff to getting higher grades for the minority

students who receive the racial preferences.82 Whether in high
school or college, black and Hispanic students, it is argued, will
always find that their higher grades are rewarded by acceptance
to more highly rated colleges and graduate/professional schools,
even if they are automatically given a substantial boost in the
admissions process. They will thus have every incentive to strive
to do their best, it is claimed, and thus there is no “perverse
incentives” problem with current affirmative-action practices.
Such arguments would make sense if most high school and
college students were singularly focused on putting all their
efforts and energies into attending the most prestigious col-
leges and graduate programs to which they could gain admis-
sion, with no consideration for alternate uses of their time and
effort. But this is not how most adolescents and young adults,
including many of the most academically gifted, typically con-
duct their lives. For even the most highly motivated of students,
school work is often dull and demanding, and less appealing
certainly, than alternative ways to spend one’s time such as
82 See the Bowen and Vars article, “Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, Race, and
Academic Performance in Selective Colleges and Universities,” p. 475n (footnote #27).
Against those who see racial-preference policy as creating disincentives to work hard
for those in the beneficiary categories, Bowen and Vars respond: “Even if affirmative
action were to shift upward career prospects for black graduates, the marginal payoffs
to academic achievement should remain constant.” This is true, of course, and if typical
black students acted like profit-maximizing business firms in a competitive market—
or like Weber’s inner-worldly Puritan ascetics—one would expect no fall-off in their
efforts to strive relentlessly to gain admission to the most prestigious graduate and
professional schools possible, even ones well out of reach for their equally smart or
smarter Asian and white classmates. However, if the ultimate goals that black students
set for themselves in terms of graduate and professional schools are heavily influenced
by the goals and aspirations of their white and Asian classmates, and if they can attain
these goals with less study and more leisure time than these classmates and peers,
then one would expect a considerable fall-off in black effort in response to the racial
preferences they receive. I’ll let the reader judge whether the typical American teenager
and young twenty-something he/she knows who has academic talent conforms more to
the profit-maximizing-firm model presupposed in the Bowen/Vars response or to the
account of John McWhorter in the text describing his own education. In deciding this
issue, it should be kept in mind that blacks on average receive much less pressure from
home to get top grades than do whites and Asians.

sports activities, socializing with friends, partying, pursuing

a hobby, or watching television or movie videos. If a talented
black or Hispanic student knows that he need not work as hard
or perform as well in the classroom as an equally talented—or
more talented—white or Asian student to get into the same col-
lege or graduate school, the black and Hispanic student will
have every reason to work less and devote more time to fun-
producing activities.
The logic here is simple and commonsensical and is well
laid out by John McWhorter in his reminiscence about his own
days as a student in a Philadelphia private school. “I can attest,”
McWhorter writes,
that in secondary school I quite deliberately refrained from

working to my highest potential because I knew that I
would be accepted to even top universities without doing so.
Almost any black child knows from an early age that there is
something called affirmative action which means that black
students are admitted to schools under lower standards than
white; I was aware of this from at least the age of ten. And so
I was quite satisfied to make B+’s and A-’s rather than the A’s
and A+’s I could have made with a little extra time and effort.
Granted, having the knack for school that I did I was lucky
that my less-than-optimum efforts still put me within reach
of fine schools. However, there is no reason that the same
sentiment would not operate even in black students who
happen to be less nerdy than I wasÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€If every black student
in the country knows that not even the most selective schools
in the country require the very top grades or test scores of
black students, that fine universities just below this level will
readily admit them with even a B+/B dossier by virtue of their
“leadership qualities” or “spark,” and that even just a better-
than-decent application file will grant them admission to
solid second-tier selective schools, then what incentive is there

for any but the occasional highly driven student to devote his
most deeply committed effort to school?83
McWhorter’s final verdict on affirmative action is devastat-

ing: “In general,” he says, “one could think of few better ways
to depress a race’s propensity for pushing itself to do its best
in school than a policy ensuring that less-than-best efforts will
have a disproportionately high yield.” (p. 233) McWhorter does
not believe that affirmative action is the cause of all the prob-
lems that blacks have with academic achievement. At the heart
of these problems, he believes, is what he describes as a “cult of
anti-intellectualism” and a preoccupation with victimhood in
the black community that severely undermines the strivings of
black students to perform to their maximum in the intellectual
arena. He also agrees with Claude Steele’s theory of “stereotype
vulnerability,” but believes it has been greatly exaggerated as a
factor in explaining the poor academic performance of blacks.
Cultural factors are more important, McWhorter contends,
than the psychological factors that Steele stresses.
While affirmative action may not be the underlying cause of
all the difficulties blacks face in the intellectual arena, it neverthe-
less greatly exacerbates these difficulties, McWhorter believes,
by skewing the incentive structure black students face, especially
the more talented black students who aim to go to the more
prestigious colleges and professional schools. Since the degree of
racial preferences given in colleges, universities, and graduate/
professional programs is known to vary directly with the rank-
ing of the institution (i.e., the more prestigious the institution, the
greater the degree of “plus-factoring” preferences), McWhort-
er’s theory here would offer a further explanation (along with
“stereotype threat”) for why the degree of “underperformance”
83. John McWhorter, Losing the Race—Self-Sabotage in Black America (New York:
The Free Press, 2000), p. 233.

among black college students increases as black SAT scores rise.

The better a black student is in relation to his black classmates
the greater the degree of “plus-factoring” bonus he can count on
receiving in relation to his white and Asian classmates, and the
less need he thus has to match those nonpreferentially treated
classmates in terms their academic performance. Since black stu-
dents respond to the incentive structures in which they have been
placed, the performance gap between blacks and the nonprefer-
entially treated whites and Asians—i.e., the degree of “under-
performance”—will increase the higher a black student stands
academically among his black peers.
Outside the affirmative-action context, few have any diffi-
culty understanding the compelling logic of what McWhorter
has to say here. To give a salient example: Nancy Weiss Mal-
kiel, a leading academic dean at Princeton University, has led
a protracted and in many ways courageous effort over many
years to put an end to the continuing grade inflation that has
plagued Princeton, like most other elite universities, since the
early 1970s. Her efforts culminated in late April 2004 when the
faculty senate passed a resolution recommending a limit on A+,
A, and A- grades to 35% of all grades. In a New York Times
interview published shortly after the faculty vote, Dean Malkiel,
who hopes that Princeton will set an example in the national
effort to combat grade inflation, explained the logic behind her
anti-grade inflation stance. Grade inflation and grade compac-
tion, she told the Times, must be seen as “part of inflationary
patterns of evaluation in the larger culture.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€When students
get the same grade for outstanding work that they get for good
work, they are not motivated to do their best.” (New York
Times, 5 June 2004, B-2)
Malkiel explained further to the Times interviewer how her
early experiences as an undergraduate at Smith College at a time
before grade inflation—when As and A-s were very few and Cs
very common—had taught her the value of an honest grading

system in motivating students “to do their best.” The ironic fact

here is that Malkiel has been a leading defender of Princeton’s
affirmative action policy over the years, though one suspects
more out of bureaucratic necessity than passionate conviction.
In any case, the logic of her anti-grade inflation position bears
a close resemblance to the logic of McWhorter and other oppo-
nents of affirmative action. The McWhorter position could be
rephrased as follows: If, because of affirmative action, good
work by black and Hispanic students receives the same level
of reward from undergraduate and graduate school admissions
committees as outstanding work by their white and Asian class-
mates, the black and Hispanic students will not be motivated to
do their best.
Essayist Shelby Steele has made a similar point. “The top
quartile of black American students,” Steele writes, who often
come “from two-parent families with six-figure incomes and
private school educations, is frequently not competitive with
whites and Asians even from lower quartiles. But it is precisely
this top quartile of black students that has been most aggres-
sively pursued for the last thirty years with affirmative-action
preferences. Infusing the atmosphere of their education from
early childhood is not the idea that they will have to steel them-
selves to face stiff competition but that they will receive a racial
preference, that mediocrity will win for them what only excel-
lence wins for others. Out of deference, elite universities have
offered the license not to compete to the most privileged seg-
ment of black youthÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€And because blacks are given spaces
they have not won by competition, whites and especially Asians
have had to compete all the harder for their spots. So we end up
with the effect we always get with deferential reforms: an incen-
tive for black weakness relative to others.”84
84. Shelby Steele, A Dream Deferred (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998),
pp. 126–7.

Another way to think about the problem is this: Imagine

that admissions committees throughout the United States at
both the undergraduate and graduate/professional school level
adopted the strictest of race-blind admissions policies and did
not even know the race or ethnicity of their applicants. Appli-
cants were always judged on the basis of their scores on stan-
dardized tests and their grades in high school or college. Assume
that these policies were generally well-known and understood
by all. But imagine too, that it became the general practice in all
mixed-race secondary schools and colleges for classroom teach-
ers to automatically raise by a substantial degree the grades of
black and Hispanic students on all tests, term papers, and class-
room work. A paper or test that was of a quality that would
earn a B if handed in by a white or Asian student would auto-
matically be given an A- if handed in by a black or Hispanic
student. Similarly, the standard of quality that would garner a
B+ for a white or Asian student would garner a straight A for
a student who was black or Hispanic. Assume that the Educa-
tional Testing Service followed a similar policy. Although ETS
never revealed to colleges and graduate schools the race of their
test takers (and institutions of higher learning were prohibited
from inquiring about the race of their applicants), ETS auto-
matically added to the scores of black and Hispanic test-takers
a 100-point bonus on each of the sections of the SAT and a
comparable boost (about 1 SD) on the other standardized tests
ETS administers (GRE, LSAT, etc.). As in the case of the color-
blind admissions committees, imagine that students everywhere
understood how this “plus-factoring” system worked in both
the classroom and at ETS.
The incentive structure faced by black and Hispanic stu-
dents under this imagined system would be identical to that of
our current affirmative-action regime. At least for those who are
focused on going to a good college or graduate school, it makes
little difference whether the automatic boost one gets for being

black or Hispanic takes place at the classroom level and on the

ETS scoring system or in the admissions offices of the nation’s
undergraduate colleges, graduate schools, and professional
schools. The perversity of the system in terms of undermin-
ing the incentives for blacks and Hispanics “to do their best”
would be the same in both cases. Under both systems all but
the most highly self-motivated black and Hispanic students—
or those receiving the greatest degree of grade pressure from
home—would have good reason to cut themselves a good deal
of slack and leisure time in their academic pursuits and let the
whites and Asians toil away to get their good grades. Under
both systems, a talented black or Hispanic student need not
work as hard or perform as well as a comparably talented white
or Asian student to get into a good college or graduate school.
Under both systems one would expect a substantial black and
Hispanic “performance gap” to develop even if there were no
harmful cultural or psychological factors at work to make mat-
ters worse. And under both systems one would expect the black-
white and black-Asian difference in learning and performance
to increase as one ascended the scale of black talent.
When the perverse incentives of the affirmative-action sys-
tem are added to the “cultural disconnect” that McWhorter and
others have drawn attention to and when to these two factors
are added the “stereotype threat” dynamic that Claude Steele
has explored, the result can be the extreme gaps in learning that
we see among so many black students, even those from eco-
nomically and educationally privileged backgrounds. Berkeley
anthropologist John Ogbu was asked a few years before his
untimely death in 2003 to go to Shaker Heights, an affluent
mixed-race community in suburban Cleveland, to find out why
black students in the Shaker Heights public school system did
so poorly compared with their white counterparts. Ogbu holds
a “cultural impediments” view of black underachievement simi-
lar to that of McWhorter; he is the researcher who first brought

attention to the fact that for many black youngsters in the inner-
city ghetto working hard in school was shunned not only as
nerdy and “uncool” but also as “acting white.” And he saw
much of his cultural impediments theory confirmed even among
the middle-class black students in Shaker Heights whose par-
ents were well-educated and economically quite comfortable.
The title of Ogbu’s study of the situation, Black American
Students in an Affluent Suburb—A Study of Academic Dis-
engagement, well summarizes his findings.85 By all accounts,
including those of several black teachers, black administrators,
and the black students themselves, black students in Shaker
Heights, Ogbu found, take their academic work much less seri-
ously on average than do the whites; they are less focused on
their studies; and they display what Ogbu calls a “low effort
syndrome” or working just hard enough to get by. Ogbu does
not speculate on the effect that the affirmative-action policies at
America’s better colleges may have on these tendencies, but it is
hard to imagine that such policies do not negatively impact the
work ethic of the more academically talented black students in
communities like Shaker Heights and other integrated suburbs.
Ogbu’s findings are also consistent with those of a much
larger research project carried out by developmental psycholo-
gist Laurence Steinberg and his colleagues. The Steinberg team,
which consisted of psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, and
educational researchers from Stanford, Temple, and the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, surveyed more than 20,000 students and their
families in nine largely middle-class high schools in Wisconsin
and Northern California.86 One finding of the Steinberg team,
85. John U. Ogbu, Black American Students in an Affluent Suburb: A Study of

Academic Disengagement (Mayway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003). Ogbu’s
seminal article on the “acting white” phenomenon, co-authored with Signithia Fordham,
is titled “Black Students’ School Success: Coping with the Burden of Acting White,” The
Urban Review, 18:3 (1986), pp. 1–31.
86. Laurence Steinberg, Beyond the Classroom (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1996.)

consistent with much other research, is that the typical Amer-

ican high school student doesn’t work very hard and is only
moderately interested in doing well in school. What Ogbu calls
“low-effort syndrome” and “academic disengagement” were
found to be common in the typical American high school, and
this was true for whites as well as blacks. The typical American
high school student works as hard as need be to avoid academic
trouble, while only a minority strive for academic excellence or
are focused on getting into a highly competitive college.
Of the minority who are academically focused, however,
Steinberg and his colleagues found—much to their surprise—
huge ethnic differences. “Of all the demographic factors we
studied in relation to school performance, ethnicity is the most
important,” they write, with Asian students clearly outshin-
ing all other groups in terms of the amount of time they spend
on homework, how attentive they are in class, how strongly
they value academic success, and how likely they are to have
academically-oriented peers. (pp. 86 ff.) White students stood
considerably behind the Asians on these measures, and the His-
panics and blacks considerably behind the whites.
Paralleling these trends, the Steinberg team found clear dif-
ferences in the level of the demands that parents placed on their
children in terms of acceptable school performance. Asked what
would be the lowest grade they could come home with without
their parents getting angry, the typical Asian said A-, the typi-
cal white somewhere between B and C, and the typical black
or Hispanic C-. (p. 161) Steinberg also found a yawning gap
between the Asian students, on the one hand, and the black and
Hispanic students on the other, in terms of their belief in how
harmful not doing well in school would have on their future.
While members of all groups expressed belief in the value of a
good education, “many Black and Latino students don’t really
believe that doing poorly in school will hurt their chances for
future success.” (p. 91)

Other researchers, including Abigail and Stephen

Thernstrom,87 have found similar patterns distinguishing the four
ethno-racial groups studied by the Steinberg team. Asians seem
to work the hardest in high school and to be the least focused
on social life, partying, sports, and other kinds of diversion that
compete with school work, while Hispanics and blacks display
the opposite pattern (whites usually come out in the middle).
Blacks seem to be particularly enamored of television watching
and spend twice as many hours before the TV screen as whites.
While it is beyond question that there are important cultural,
psychological, and historical factors at work that account for
much of these differences, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the disincentives of the affirmative-action system also come
into play. Asians work harder, in part, because they and their
parents know that to get into a good college they have to work
harder than an equally talented black or Hispanic student. But
like John McWhorter, the more academically talented black and
Hispanic students, along with most of their middle-class par-
ents, know that there is this thing called “affirmative action”
that allows blacks and Hispanics to attend highly rated colleges
and universities with much lower grades and test scores than
those of their white and Asian peers. To repeat McWhorter’s
indictment, “one could think of few better ways to depress a
race’s propensity for pushing itself to do its best in school than
a policy ensuring that less-than-best efforts will have a dispro-
portionately high yield.” Perhaps, too, it is no accident that the
black respondents in the Bowen and Bok study, looking back
many years later on their days as undergraduate students, were
much more likely than their white counterparts to say that they
87. Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom, No Excuses (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2003).

wish they had studied more in college.88 The affirmative action

regime clearly seems to be part of the problem here.
Do Undergraduate Affirmative-Action
Programs Benefit Whites and Asians in the
Post-College Employment Arena?
Defenders of racial-preference policies in college admissions
often claim not only that such policies help white and Asian stu-
dents gain a better understanding of blacks, Latinos, and mem-
bers of other ethno-racial minorities but also that this enhanced
cultural knowledge is a great economic asset in a globalized
economy. Affirmative-action policies, it is said, by furthering
cultural knowledge, have a positive effect on the post-college job
performance of all parties involved, including whites and Asians,
and help to make American businesses more competitive in the
global marketplace. Originally employed in a quite different
form within the medical school context by Justice Lewis Powell
in his Bakke decision, this line of reasoning proved persuasive
88. Bowen and Bok write: “More than half (57 percent) of all black graduates in
the ’76 cohort felt that they didn’t study enough while in college; 40 percent of their
white classmates expressed the same regret.” “The members of the ’89 cohort expressed
essentially the same set of views; an even higher fraction of black graduates wished that
they had studied more [65 percent vs. 41 percent for whites].” “These retrospective
expressions of regret by African American respondents need to be thought about in the
context of the debate over factors affecting their academic performanceÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€especially
the suggestion that peer group pressures discourage studying.” (Bowen and Bok, The
Shape of the River, p. 208). Even more than the issue of peer group pressures, we
need to think about this underperformance within the context of an all-pervasive U.S.
preference regime that makes it much easier for black college graduates to get accepted
to graduate schools, professional schools, and jobs in the corporate and government
sectors than their white and Asian classmates. Blacks in college know that they don’t
have to do as well academically as their white and Asian peers to get accepted to the
same post-graduate programs and same jobs after college. It’s hard to imagine that
this isn’t a factor in the decision some blacks make about how hard they will work in
college.

to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her majority ruling in the

Grutter case (2003), where she claimed that ethno-racial diver-
sity in higher education was a truly “compelling” state interest
that could override the constitution’s otherwise central demand
for a color-blind system of university and professional school
admissions in all state-sponsored institutions.
Summarizing and endorsing the arguments of several of the
amicus briefs that had been submitted to the court, O’Connor
wrote: “Numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes and ‘better prepares students for
an increasingly diverse workforce and society’Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€These ben-
efits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses
have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.” (Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306)
To critics, some of the claims implied in O’Connor’s deci-
sion seemed wrong on their very face since many of the coun-
tries that have been most successful in the globalized economy
in recent years—including Norway, Taiwan, Japan, and South
Korea—are countries with unusually homogeneous workforces
in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, and language, and outside
their companies’ global marketing departments, their work-
forces and corporate management generally consist of people
who have attended schools with others very much like them-
selves. There is an extensive management literature on this topic,
which suggests that racially and ethnicly diverse workforces,
while they may sometimes produce beneficial cross-fertilization
of ideas, often encounter severe problems with communication,
group cohesiveness, lack of common purpose and common
goals, diminished trust, and general difficulties in staff members

getting along. These latter disadvantages often outweigh any

potentially positive effects of diversity.89
Some of the most successful international companies have
been those run by members of a single, homogeneous ethnic
group that can easily avoid such problems—often very cohesive
groups like the Hong Kong Chinese, Ashkenazic and Sephardic
Jews, Lebanese Christians, and Indian Gujaratis that combine
ethnic homogeneity with extensive past experience as middle-
men traders, money lenders, or entrepreneurs. Ethnic homoge-
neity in such groups leads to greater trust, understanding, and
ease of communication, all of which contribute to lower trans-
action costs in conducting business. Racial, ethnic, regional,
linguistic, and religious diversity within a workforce is more
often than not seen by those who run large companies as a
challenge to be managed rather than a source of organizational
strength. The diversity-improves-international- competitiveness
claim is thus highly dubious—the preponderance of evidence
around the world suggests that ethno-racial homogeneity, not
heterogeneity, is more likely to improve local and international
competitiveness.90
89. For a good summary of the extensive management literature see Francis Miliken
and Luis Martins, “Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple
Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups,” Academy of Management Review,
21(1996):402–33.
90. See, for instance, Joel Kotkin, Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine
Success in the New Global Economy (New York: Random House, 1993); Francis
Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The
Free Press, 1995); Janet Landa, “A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman
Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law,” The Journal of Legal Studies,
10 (1981):349–62; Amy Chua, World on Fire (New York: Doubleday, 2003); Ivan
Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972);
Thomas Sowell, Race and Culture: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1994);
Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middlemen Minorities,” American Sociological Review
38 (1972): 583–94; Robert Silin, Leadership and Values: The Organization of Large
Scale Taiwanese Enterprises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Alice

On the more specific issue of whether in America today

whites and Asians benefit in the contemporary labor market
from the greater exposure to blacks and Latinos facilitated
through their college’s affirmative-action programs, there is at
least one important study on this question, and its conclusions
are hardly consistent with the claims made by affirmative-action
supporters. The study, by Duke University economists Peter
Arcidiacono and Jacob Vigdor, carries particular weight since
it is based on an analysis of 30 selective colleges and universi-
ties taken from the same database used by Bowen and Bok to
draw their pro-affirmative-action conclusions in The Shape of
the River—the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation’s College and
Beyond survey.91
Arcidiacono and Vigdor looked at what they call the “lit-
tle-tested hypothesis that increasing minority representation in
elite colleges generates tangible benefits for majority-race stu-
dents”—where “majority-race students” is interpreted to mean
Asians as well as whites and “minority representation” refers
to the proportion of blacks and Hispanics in an undergraduate
college’s student body (Native Americans were also included in
the minority category, but they are almost everywhere an insig-
nificant part of the composite statistic). The “tangible benefits”
Arcidiacono and Vigdor looked at involve four outcome vari-
ables from the College and Beyond dataset: (1) the likelihood
Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989); and Werner Sombart’s classic, The Jews and Modern Capitalism
(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1913).
91. The institutions surveyed were the following: Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Columbia,
Denison, Duke, Emory, Georgetown, Hamilton, Kenyon, Miami University (Ohio);
Northwestern, Oberlin, Penn State, Princeton, Rice, Smith, Stanford, Swarthmore,
Tufts, Tulane, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), University of North Carolina
(Chapel Hill), University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt,
Washington University (Saint Louis), Wellesley, Wesleyan University, Williams, and
Yale. Peter Arcidiacono and Jacob Vigdor, “Does the River Spill Over? Estimating the
Economic Returns to Attending a Racially Diverse College,” Dec. 23, 2008, pp. 1–23,
at http://econ.edu/-psarcidi.

of completing college; (2) the level of income in the post-college

years; (3) satisfaction with one’s job; and (4) the level of general
satisfaction with one’s life after college. Based on the rhetoric
one hears among affirmative-action supporters—including Jus-
tices Powell and O’Connor—one would expect at least some
evidence of a positive effect on one or more of these outcome
variables as colleges enroll greater proportions of minority
students.
But Arcidiacono and Vigdor found almost nothing to con-
firm the optimistic claims that white and Asian students benefit
from having attended colleges with higher percentages of blacks
and Hispanics. “Our empirical results cover a broad range of
outcomes, including earnings, educational attainment, and sat-
isfaction with both one’s life and one’s job,” they write. “Across
these varying specifications, we fail to find any significant evi-
dence that white or Asian students who attend more diverse col-
leges do better later in life.” “In general, we find that the type of
diversity increase brought about by affirmative action policies—
which brings lower-scoring minority students into potential con-
tact with higher-scoring majority-race students—is if anything
detrimental to majority-race students.” While black and His-
panic students may derive some benefit from racial-preference
policies, “the majority-race students do not benefit and may in
fact endure a cost.” (pp. 17–19) Whites and Asians do not earn
more, do not learn more, and show no indication of having
been more satisfied with their life, their college experience, or
their job for having attended a college with a higher percentage
of blacks and Hispanics. Looking across the 30 C&B institu-
tions, they find that higher minority enrollment often leads to
lower scores by whites and Asians on these desirable outcomes.
The result of their analysis, Arcidiacono and Vigdor say,
“strongly suggests that the predominant policy tool designed
to increase the representation of minority groups, affirmative

action, has a negative net impact on students not directly targeted

by the program.” If this is the case, they conclude, preferential
admissions for certain groups “should be understood for what
they are: redistributive mechanisms that create benefits for the
targeted racial groups but costs for others.” (pp. 19–20)
Arcidiacono and Vigdor do not believe that it is simply the
higher percentage of black and Hispanic students on a college
campus that has negative effects for whites and Asians. Rather,
it is the fact that at so many of the nation’s most competitive
colleges the actual black and Hispanic students on campus are
much less academically qualified than other students, and this
fact seems to be decisive in reducing the achievement level—in
college and beyond—for their white and Asian peers. It is the
high numbers of black and Hispanic students in combination
with their lower achievement levels that has the harmful effect.
The lower-scoring blacks and Hispanics, when present in suf-
ficient numbers, seem to have a deleterious spill-over effect on
their higher-scoring white and Asian peers. Although Arcidi-
acono and Vigdor do not speculate on the causal mechanisms
involved, it may be that the lower-scoring minority students
have an adverse effect on the overall intellectual atmosphere
and work ethic on campus that affects a much wider circle of
students. If this is so, the effect would be similar to what many
claim results from large numbers of academically deficient ath-
letes on college campuses. Large numbers of “dumb jocks”
affect the overall campus intellectual environment and nega-
tively impact the campus work ethic. This, in turn, would affect
future job prospects and other developments that affect later life
satisfaction.
Arcidicono and Vigdor show that the negative outcomes
for whites and Asians of having more blacks and Hispanics on
a college campus disappear when the focus is on whites and
Asians attending colleges with weak or non-existent affirma-
tive action programs—a situation often found in those institu-

tions below the highest levels of competitiveness and prestige.92

The researchers conclude that if one of the goals of integration
within the American college and university system is to benefit
majority-race students in tangible ways, it is not being furthered
by a policy of placing black and Hispanic students in institu-
tions where their academic credentials are inferior to those of
their white and Asian peers. “Policies that introduce disparities
between the academic backgrounds of minority and non-minor-
ity students,” they write, “are unlikely to generate benefits for
non-minorities, and may in fact be costly in the aggregate.” (p.
17)
“A policy of maximizing the benefits of diversity accruing
to majority-race students,” Arcidiacono and Vigdor conclude,
“would involve reducing or eliminating cross-race differences
in admission standards”—that is, it would dispense with racial-
preference programs and institute a uniform standard of college
admissions, placing black and Hispanic students in institutions
where they are academically competitive with others. When
“minority students are transferred from campuses where their
academic background is comparable to their peers of other races
92. It is easy to forget in the controversy over affirmative action that the vast majority
of four-year colleges and all community colleges have high rates of acceptance and do
not practice racial preferencing. In a widely cited study, Harvard economist Thomas
Kane found that “the use of race in college admissions appears to be limited to the
most selective 20 percent of four-year institutions.” At these institutions, however,
race was seen to weigh heavily in admissions decisions: “being black or Hispanic has
approximately the same effect on one’s chances of admission as two-thirds of a grade
point performance in high school [e.g., an “A-” vs. a “B” in a student’s grade-point
average] or roughly 400 points [out of 1600] on the SAT test.” Arcidiacono and Vigdor
draw upon the Kane study in formulating their own conclusions. (Thomas Kane,
“Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions,” in Jencks and Phillips, eds., The
Black-White Test Score Gap, pp. 431–56, 451–2.) Similarly, large admissions boosts
at the more highly competitive colleges were found in a more recent study by Thomas
Espenshade and Alexandria Walton Radford, No Longer Separate, Not Yet Equal—
Race and Class in Elite College Admission and Campus Life (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009). On an all-other-things-equal basis, Espenshade and Radford
found that at the eight highly selective colleges they studied, on a 1600-point scale being
black over being white confers a 310 SAT point admissions advantage; the black-over-
Asian advantage was 450 points.

to campuses where their credentials are on average significantly

worse than those of their peers,” Arcidiacono and Vigdor write,
the effect is generally “detrimental to majority-race students.”
While the authors do not believe that this kind of “mismatch-
ing” necessarily hurts black and Hispanic students in terms of
the four outcome variables they explore, they clearly believe
that it harms their white and Asian peers. Justices Powell and
O’Connor are clearly wrong, they believe, to suggest otherwise.
(pp. 17–20)
Mismatching Students in Law School

The affirmative action preference regime doesn’t end, of course,
at the level of the undergraduate college. Law schools, medical
schools, business schools, and many graduate programs in the
arts and sciences pursue goals of racial and ethnic “diversity”
with equal or greater zeal than those championed at the elite
undergraduate institutions. And as at the undergraduate institu-
tions, “diversity” and “affirmative action” at the graduate and
professional school level come to be defined primarily in terms
of blacks and Hispanics. A “diverse” student body according to
an unwritten rule of thumb is one in which black and Hispanic
students each comprise at a minimum 5–7 percent of a school’s
overall enrollment (roughly half, that is, of each group’s share in
the general American population). A school with a substantially
smaller proportion of these two targeted minorities would not
be considered “diverse” by academic administrators, and a dec-
rement involving blacks and Hispanics cannot be made up by
increased enrollment of other underrepresented groups.
Members of many other demographic groups may be grossly
underrepresented at elite graduate and professional schools—
e.g., poor whites from Appalachia, born-again Christians from
the Bible Belt, military veterans, people who have grown up on
farms or ranches, working-class “white ethnics,” non-Hispanic

urban Catholics, Mormons, Muslims, people from small towns,

married students with children, etc.—but they count for little
or nothing in the way most academic administrators set their
“diversity” goals. An increased number of the members of these
other groups will not be seen as offsetting a low black or His-
panic enrollment.
Affirmative-action programs at graduate and professional
schools are like their counterparts at undergraduate institu-
tions in yet another way—such programs have been shrouded
in secrecy and are routinely misrepresented to the general public
by academic administrators. As in the case of undergraduate
programs, supporters of affirmative-action policies at graduate
and professional schools have generally shown little interest in a
fair evaluation of the costs and benefits of the policies, and little
in the way of high-quality research has been done on the effect
they have on those they are intended to help. An exception is the
continuing research of Richard H. Sander.
Sander, an economist and professor of law at UCLA Law
School, published a path-breaking study in the November 2004
issue of the Stanford Law Review on the effect of affirmative-
action policies on blacks seeking to enter the legal profession.
A lifelong Democrat who has been active in the enforcement of
antidiscrimination housing law—and who is also the concerned
parent of an mixed-race black/white child—Sander was troubled
by the unwillingness of most law school administrators to dis-
cuss openly the nature of their affirmative-action programs or
to submit them to honest evaluation by competent researchers.
Sander’s own view on affirmative action is pragmatic, in the
sense that he believes racial-preference policies at law schools
would be fully justified if they can be shown to work in the way
their defenders claim they do and if they actually produce more
and better minority attorneys. He has no objection to racial pref-
erences on moral, legal, or constitutional grounds. His research,
however, has led him to conclude that the conventional wisdom

propounded by affirmative-action supporters is totally mistaken,

and that at least in the case of blacks in law schools, current
affirmative-action policies do great harm to the career prospects
of many of those they are supposed to benefit.
Sander’s research is based on analysis of several large data-
bases, including the huge Bar Passage Study (BPS) compiled in
the period from 1991 to 1997 by the Law School Admission
Council. This study contains extensive information on over
27,000 students who first entered law school in 1991. Almost
95 percent of the nation’s accredited law schools participated
in the study, which tracked the progress of the 1991 cohort of
law students over a six-year period—enough time for most to
graduate, take the bar exam (in some cases multiple times), and
land their first job. Included in the BPS database is information
on the entering students’ race, undergraduate grade-point aver-
age, score on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), grades
and class rank obtained in law school, and performance on state
bar exams. What Sander found in his analysis of the BPS data is
riveting.
For instance, at all but the few historically black law schools,
from the most elite national institutions down to the lowest
state schools, the black/white gap in the academic credentials
of entering students is enormous. Using a 1000-point scale that
gives 400 points for a perfect undergraduate grade-point aver-
age (4.0 x 100) and 600 points for a perfect LSAT score—a
formula Sander says is similar to that used by many law schools
in assessing applicants for admission—Sander shows that enter-
ing black law students are typically two full standard devia-
tions behind their white counterparts in their level of academic
accomplishment. This is an enormous difference, which guar-
antees that there will be almost no overlap between black and
white students—the higher achieving blacks will barely equal
the lowest achieving whites.

This huge “credentials gap,” Sander shows, exists at all lev-

els of the law school hierarchy.93 The most elite law schools,
he says, believe they must all have a certain healthy percentage
of black students—in practice, 6–8 percent—and given the fact
that there are relatively few blacks who score at the same level
as the highest-scoring whites and Asians, to meet their goals
they are willing to accept black students with test scores and
grades that would not meet their normal admissions threshold.
At the 14 most elite schools in his study, whites had a median
academic index of 875 (equivalent to an undergraduate GPA of
3.75 and an LSAT score of 170), while the black median was
only 705 (equivalent to an undergraduate GPA of 3.05 and an
LSAT score of 160). The median black score was 2.3 standard
deviations below the median score achieved by whites.
The preference regime, however, does not stop at the first-tier
institutions, because the law schools below them on the selec-
tivity scale, Sander says, also want 6–8 percent blacks in their
entering classes and fear they will be called racists if they have
substantially fewer blacks. They thus face a dilemma caused by
the fact that almost all of the black students who could have
met their admissions standards without preferences have been
admitted to—and usually wind up enrolling in—the more elite
institutions that lie above them. The first-tier law schools thus
siphon off black students who, in the absence of racial prefer-
ences, would be attending second- and third-tier institutions,
causing a shortage of qualified blacks at these places. The sec-
ond- and third-tier institutions then, likewise fearful of being
called racist, respond to this situation by granting huge racial
preferences of their own, and in the process deprive the fourth-
93. His conclusions on this score are thus different from the studies of affirmative-
action policies at undergraduate institutions where preference polices seem to be
important primarily at the more competitive schools (and unimportant or nonexistent
at the vast majority of schools).

and fifth-tier law schools of students who could meet their own
admissions criteria. This preference-granting process proceeds
to the very bottom of the law school pecking order, where the
lowest-ranked schools feel compelled to admit a significant
number of blacks who have such poor academic qualifications
that were they white or Asian, they would not be admitted to
any of America’s 182 accredited law schools.
There is thus a “cascading effect” at work in which black
applicants are shuffled into law schools that are usually one or
two levels of selectivity above the ones they would have gained
entry into if all law schools had observed race-blind admissions
policies. Sander describes this cascading process in the follow-
ing words:
Affirmative actionÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€has a cascading effect through Ameri-

can legal education. The use of large boosts for black appli-
cants at the top law schools means that the highest-scoring
blacks are almost entirely absorbed by the highest tier.
Schools in the next tier have no choice but to either enroll
very few blacks or use racial boosts or segregated admissions
tracks to the same degree as the top-tier schools. The same
pattern continues all the way down the hierarchy.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€At the
bulk of law schools, the very large preferences granted to
blacks only exist in order to offset the effects of preferences
used by higher-ranked schools.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The use of these prefer-
ences by elite schools give nearly all other law schools little
choice but to follow suit. [The result is that] blacks are con-
sistently bumped up several seats in the law school hierarchy,
producing a large black-white gap at nearly all law schools
in the academic credentials of students. (pp. 149–51)
This upward ratcheting seems unjust to most critics of affir-

mative action, but Sander, who avoids normative controversies
in his study, focuses on what he sees as the great practical harm

that a system-wide policy of racial preferences will have on

black students both in law school and on the state bar exams.
Upward ratcheting results, he says, in a serious mismatch of
blacks with the law schools they attend, such that many find
themselves in academic environments that are too competitive
for their individual abilities and needs. The result, he says, is
that they are frequently overwhelmed by the law school mate-
rial, get very poor grades, wind up graduating at the very bot-
tom of their law school classes (if they don’t drop out or flunk
out before graduation), learn much less law in law school, and
have much greater difficulty passing the state bar exams.
The statistics Sander compiles are stunning: At the most elite
law schools in the BPS database, 52 percent of blacks—more
than half—had first-year grades that placed them in the bot-
tom 10 percent of the grade distribution, while only 8 percent
of blacks did well enough to place in the top half. The median
black student at these elite schools had first-year grades equiva-
lent to those of whites at only the 5–6th percentile of the white
distribution. The situation was much the same throughout the
entire law school system. At the 163 law schools surveyed in the
BPS database the median black grade-point average at the end
of the first year was equivalent to those of whites at the 7–8th
percentile. In terms of grades, the typical black in other words
did more poorly in his first year at most American law schools
than all but the very lowest-achieving white students—92 per-
cent of whites did better than the median black.
And there is no tendency for the black students to catch up
with the whites in the second and third year of law school. A
slight drop in the black/white grade gap does occur between the
first and third year of law school, but Sander says it is mainly
due to the fact that many of the lowest-achieving blacks drop
out of law school before completing their final year, thus raising
the black average among those who remain enrolled. The black
drop-out rate is twice that of whites, with 19.3 percent of blacks

failing to graduate after five years, compared with 8.2 percent

of whites.
Some may view law school grades as unimportant. But
Sander shows that law school grades are in fact closely related
to a student’s chances of passing the bar exam and becoming
a licensed attorney. And the bar failure rate of blacks is very
high. In the BPS study 38.6 percent of black law school gradu-
ates who took the bar exam failed on their first attempt, and
22.4 percent could not pass even after five tries. These numbers,
of course, do not include the 19.3 percent of black law school
matriculants who dropped out of law school and never got to
the point of taking the bar exam. The black failure rate after five
attempts was six times the white rate. And the bar failure rate,
Sander found, was substantially higher among blacks at virtu-
ally every level of entering academic index scores. For instance,
among whites with an index score in the 520–580 range, 26
percent failed to pass the bar exam on their first try. The com-
parable figure for blacks in this range was 47 percent. At the
460–520 range, 34 percent of whites were first-time failures,
but 55 percent of blacks.
One might think that we have another instance here of
“underperformance,” perhaps one caused by “stereotype
threat,” “pernicious incentives,” or some other race-linked fac-
tor. But Sander shows that this is not likely to be the case, since
within a given law school the small number of whites with index
scores just as low as the blacks have roughly the same chance of
failing the bar exam. The real problem, Sander believes, is that
of “institutional mismatch.” Regardless of their race, law stu-
dents with very low index scores relative to their peers do worse
in terms of bar exam performance than those with similar index
scores attending less competitive institutions. The huge differ-
ence shown nationally in bar passage rates between blacks and
whites who enter law school with the same index score, Sander
shows, is entirely a result of the fact that blacks are much more

likely to be mismatched than whites. Whites are more likely to

attend law schools where others have index scores similar to
their own, while the majority of blacks are put in institutions
where their index score places them at or near the very bottom
of the class.
Sander believes that regardless of a student’s race, a student
will learn more at an institution where the other students have
similar levels of academic aptitude and accomplishment than
at one in which almost all of the student’s peers are smarter
or more intellectually accomplished. He gives as an example
of the mismatch process his own encounter with a difficult
introductory German course that he took during his freshman
year at Harvard. Acknowledging that he does not have great
talent for foreign languages, Sander explains that when he got
to Harvard, where most of the introductory language students
had much more aptitude for the subject than he did, the pace
of the course was simply too fast for him to keep up with the
others. As a result, he became overwhelmed after only a few
weeks, fell behind, learned little German, and almost wound up
flunking the course (even though, he says, it is very difficult to
fail a course at Harvard, which is notorious for its grade infla-
tion policies). Had the students not been as good as Harvard
students at language learning, and the pace of the course more
consistent with his own more modest level of foreign language
ability, he would have learned much more German, he believes.
Sander also gives evidence from his many years as a law
school professor, and says that students who begin a course
bewildered by some of the initial concepts often do not catch on
as the semester advances and make little progress. Mismatching
students with their peers is a very harmful pedagogical strategy,
Sander believes, which has a severe effect in terms of reducing
how much blacks learn in law school, increases their chances of
dropping out, lowers the grades they will receive, and substan-
tially decreases their chances of passing the bar exam.

Regardless of race, it is much better, Sander’s study shows,

for a student to attend a law school where the student is nearer
the middle of the class in terms of academic qualifications and
where the student can achieve B range grades, rather than one in
which a student is at the very bottom of the heap and struggles
to get Cs. While more selective institutions offer the allurement
of greater prestige, for many students, Sander contends, this
prestige is purchased at the price of a severe mismatching pen-
alty. “If one is at academic risk of not doing well at a particular
school,” Sander writes, “one is better off attending a less elite
school and getting decent grades.” (p. 176)
Sander sums up the harms of affirmative-action mismatch-
ing in the following statement:
Blacks and whites at the same school with the same grades
perform identically on the bar exam; but since racial prefer-
ences have the effect of boosting blacks’ school quality but
sharply lowering their average grades, blacks have much
higher failure rates on the bar than do whites with similar
LSATs and undergraduate GPAs. Affirmative action thus
artificially depresses, quite substantially, the rate at which
blacks pass the bar. Combined with the effects of law school
attrition [that can also be attributed to affirmative-action
policies], many blacks admitted to law school with the aid
of racial preferences face long odds against ever becoming
lawyers. (p. 107)
The elimination of affirmative-action preferences, says

Sander, would actually increase the total number of blacks who
successfully pass the bar exam each year and go on to become
lawyers. Under a race-blind policy of university admissions,
84 percent of current black law school applicants, he calcu-
lates, would gain entry to at least some law school, where most
would achieve much higher grades and learn more basic law

than under the present system of universal upward ratchet-

ing. While the remaining 16 percent would not be admitted
to any law school, Sander says that these would mainly be
the students whose index scores are so low that they would
be unlikely to become successful lawyers under any circum-
stances and would probably be better off seeking an alternate
occupation. Sander estimates that eliminating all racial prefer-
ences—and the mismatching penalty that goes with them—
would increase the number of blacks who become lawyers by
8 percent.
Sander sees another advantage to this strategy. The higher
grades and greater amount of law learned would not only
decrease the black drop-out rate and increase black passage
rates on state bar exams, but it would also have payoffs in
terms of higher income and greater success of black lawyers
in securing jobs. Using the results of a more recent database
on life after law school that he himself has helped to gather,
Sander concludes that law school grades may be more impor-
tant than law school prestige in determining a law school grad-
uate’s desirability to an employer and the amount of income he
actually earns as a lawyer. “In all schools outside the top ten,”
Sander writes, “there is a large market penalty for being in or
near the bottom of the class.” (p. 190) For example, lawyers
in his study who graduated from a third-tier law school with a
healthy B average (3.25–3.49) earned $80,000 per year, while
those who had attended a more prestigious second-tier school
but received C range grades (averages between 2.50–2.74)
earned only $49,000 per year. Even at the fourth- and fifth-
tier schools those with B averages did much better in terms of
income than the typical C student at the second-tier schools,
earning, respectively, $65,000 and $57,000 per year. (p. 190)
Sander is unequivocal in his condemnation of affirmative-
action policies at America’s law schools: “A growing body of
evidence suggests that students who attend schools where they

are at a significant academic disadvantage suffer a variety of

ill effects, from the erosion of aspirations to a simple failure to
learn as much as they do in an environment where their cre-
dentials match their peers.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Blacks are the victims of law
school programs of affirmative action, not the beneficiaries. The
programs set blacks up for failure in school, aggravate attrition
rates, turn the bar exam into a major hurdle, disadvantage most
blacks in the job market, and depress the overall production of
black lawyers.” (pp. 107, 211)
The solution to the problem, Sander believes, is amazingly
simple: affirmative action policies at law schools must go, with
strict race-blind policies put in their place. “By every means
I have been able to quantify,” he writes, “blacks as a whole
would be unambiguously better off in a system without any
racial preferences at all than they are under the current regime.”
(p. 212) While the proportion of blacks at the most prestigious
schools would drop precipitously under a race-blind system to 1
or 2 percent of the student body, many of the schools below the
top, Sander says, would benefit greatly by having better quali-
fied black students in numbers not dramatically different from
those at present. Even if affirmative-action preferences were not
entirely eliminated but substantially reduced—Sander suggests
the possibility of top schools reducing their black target goals
from the current 6–8 percent range to 4 percent—major benefits
would follow, Sander believes, in terms of producing more and
better-educated black lawyers.
COnclusion
Many years ago, during the acrimonious confrontations over
school busing, economist Thomas Sowell observed that for
many of its supporters busing had become not so much a policy
as a crusade. With a policy, Sowell explained, one asks, “What
are the costs?” “What are the benefits?” “Will it achieve its

goal?” A crusade, however, is different. With a crusade, said

Sowell, the question simply becomes, “Whose side are you on!?
The Lord’s or his enemies?”
There may be a close parallel here to the affirmative action
controversy. For its affluent white supporters—i.e., people like
Derek Bok and William Bowen—affirmative action does indeed
resemble a moral and religious crusade rather than a rationally
considered policy. Its main purpose seems to be the symbolic
cleansing of an evil white society from its racist past, whose real
logic must be sought in a ritual of sin and redemption rather
than an analysis of the actual costs and benefits of the policy.
Seen in this light, affirmative action becomes a form of racial
penance, a public display of racial virtue, whose emotional cen-
ter of gravity lies in the expiatory needs of its guilty white sup-
porters more than the real needs of its intended beneficiaries. For
its guilt-ridden white supporters affirmative action is a public
way of atoning for the past misdeeds of their race. It is a way of
proclaiming to black people: We white people are sorry for our
past sins and are trying to make amends! The actual effect of the
policy in terms of black academic performance, race relations
on campus, incentive structures, stigma reinforcement, cascad-
ing effects, mismatching penalties, “stereotype threat,” “social
distancing”, failure on the bar exams and in science majors,
etc. becomes purely secondary to this overriding symbolic and
cathartic purpose. It is for this reason that affirmative action—
like a crusade—is often impervious to rational criticism.
One can get a good idea of the deep, existential attachment
its affluent white supporters often feel toward the policy from
comments by the former career diplomat and Harvard research
fellow Lawrence Harrison. Harrison is well aware that affirma-
tive action has huge costs in terms of unintended consequences
and widespread hostility on the part of significant segments of
the public. Indeed, in a section on the topic in his book Who
Prospers?, he goes over some of these costs with remarkable

candor and in considerable detail.94 Affirmative action, Harrison

acknowledges, “is discrimination against whites, and no euphe-
mism can change that.” (p. 213) He sees many other problems
with affirmative action and cites several of the criticisms of the
policy by Thomas Sowell with apparent approval: Affirmative
action has very limited public support; it is deeply resented by
many whites; it casts aside the highly worthy principle of merit;
it strengthens racial divisions within American society; and in
the long run it could lead to the re-segregation of America. (pp.
213–14) In addition, Harrison acknowledges that the policy is
not targeted at the worst-off among its black beneficiaries but
often helps those least in need of help; it taints the credentials
not only of all who benefit from it, but of all who are of the
same race as those who benefit from it; it suggests to outsiders
that blacks are inferior and cannot make it on their own with-
out racial favoritism; and once in place, the policy is difficult to
remove even after it has outlived its usefulness. (p. 213)
Acknowledging all these problems, Harrison proposes that
some time limit be set—a kind of sunset law—after which affir-
mative action will cease and America will embrace once again a
meritocratic ideal. The long-range effect of continued affirma-
tive action, Harrison realizes, could be very harmful. Never-
theless, Harrison considers himself to be a loyal supporter of
affirmative action, at least during the interim period when it is
to remain in place. His reasons for this support are given in two
sentences that sum up perhaps more clearly than anything else
ever written on this topic the real reasons that many socially
and economically privileged whites support what they them-
selves acknowledge to be a policy so fraught with mischief. “Its
costs and inequities notwithstanding,” Harrison writes,
94. Lawrence Harrison, Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and
Political Success (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

I continue to believe in affirmative action, defined as prefer-

ential treatment in the education system and the workplace.
I think it has filled a political and psychological need in our
society: as a catharsis for white guilt about slavery, segrega-
tion, and acts of racism; and as a concrete demonstration to
blacks that whites are genuinely committed to the achieve-
ment of racial equality. (p. 212)
Harrison’s remarks are invaluable for the degree of clarity

and insight they offer into the motivations of many affirmative-
action supporters. It is the need of white people—to expiate their
guilt over slavery, segregation, and the racism of the past, and
to show black people how much they care—that is the major
motivating and sustaining force behind the policy for these sup-
porters. And such supporters are the key to its success. It is the
need of the affluent and guilt-ridden among white people that
drives affirmative action and keeps the policy in place despite
ever-mounting evidence that the policy produces almost all of
the harmful effects that its legions of critics predicted it would
have more than 40 years ago.
With great trenchancy, essayist Shelby Steele has described
the kind of backing given to affirmative action by supporters
like Harrison as “iconographic racial reform.”95 Iconographic
reforms, Steele explains, are reforms that exist for what they
symbolize in the minds of the people who support them more
than for what they achieve in the lives of those they are intended
to help. “Iconographic programs and policies function as
icons of the high and honorable motivations that people want
credit for when they support these reforms,” he writes. “The
announced goals of these programs and policies will be very
95. Shelby Steele, Second Thoughts about Race in America (New York: Madison
Books, 1991).

grand, the better to represent their high virtuousness, yet vague

so that their inevitable failures will not be held against them.”
(p. 132) The supporters of iconographic programs, says Steele,
“are primarily concerned that these policies function as icons
of their high motivation, not whether they achieve anything
or whether they mire those they claim to help in terrible unin-
tended consequences.” (pp. 132–3)
Steele believes that iconographic policies came into promi-
nence in the 1960s as a way for white people to fend off the
stigma and shame that came to be associated with being white
as a result of the success of the civil rights and black power
movements of the period. As a result of the civil rights victo-
ries of the 60s, Steele writes, whites “became identified with
the shame of white racism that the nation had finally acknowl-
edged, and they fell under a kind of suspicion that amounted to
a stigma.” (p. 156) Whites underwent during this period a kind
of “archetypical Fall,” Steele explains, as they “were confronted
for more than a decade with their willingness to participate in,
or comply with, the oppression of blacks, their indifference to
human suffering and denigration, their capacity to abide evil for
their own benefit and in the defiance of their own sacred princi-
ples.” 96 (p. 498) This Fall, says Steele, added a new burden to
white life in America—henceforth whites had to prove that they
were not racists “in order to establish their human decency.”
It was this new burden of guilt and the need to prove their
nonracist decency, according to Steele, that marked “the most
powerful, yet unspoken, element in America’s social-policy
making process” of the 1960s and beyond. (p. 498) This guilt-
and-expiation-driven policy process, he says, sometimes wound
up producing genuine advances for African Americans, among
which Steele would include the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But the
96. “White Guilt,” American Scholar, autumn 1990, pp. 497–506. All the subsequent
page numbers in the text refer to this article.

process just as often led to harmful public policies, particularly

in the form of racial preferences and racial entitlements, which
undermined black initiative and reinforced the worst kind of
negative stereotypes concerning black competence and charac-
ter. “White guilt,” says Steele, too often had the effect of “bend-
ing social policies in the wrong direction.” (p. 499) This guilt,
which “springs from a knowledge of ill-gotten advantage,”
helped to shape American social policies with regard to blacks
“in ways that may deliver the look of innocence to society and
its institutions but that do very little actually to uplift blacks.”
(p. 498) The effect of whites’ hidden need for racial redemp-
tion “has been to bend social policy more toward reparation
for black oppression than toward the much harder and more
mundane work of black uplift and development.” (p. 498)
The kind of white guilt that has driven much of American
social policy over the last three decades, Steele believes, must be
seen not only as socially harmful but also as ultimately narcissis-
tic and self-preoccupied. “Guilt makes us afraid for ourselves,”
he writes, “and thus generates as much self-preoccupation as
concern for others. The nature of this preoccupation is always
the redemption of innocence, the reestablishment of good feel-
ings about oneselfÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€. and [it] can lead us to put our own need
for innocence above our concern for the problem that made
us feel guilt in the first place.” (pp. 500–1) The moral corrup-
tion here is to be seen in the fact that when the selfishly guilty
put their own need for a restoration of innocence above the
true needs of those they claim to want to help, they often wind
up doing great harm while feeling good about what they do.
And in their self-preoccupied desire to feel morally cleansed and
uplifted, they develop a willful blindness or indifference to the
actual consequences of their actions.
The elite universities in America, Steele believes, have been
the arenas where this destructive, self-preoccupied white guilt
has had some of its worst and most enduring consequences.

“Black student demands,” he writes, “pull administrators into

the paradigm of self-preoccupied white guilt, whereby they seek
a quick redemption by offering special entitlements that go
beyond fairness.” (p. 503) These special entitlements—above
all affirmative-action preferences—are part of a condescending
white paternalism, Steele believes, “that makes it difficult for
blacks to find their true mettle or to develop a faith in their own
capacity to run as fast as others.” (p. 505) Such policies encour-
age in blacks a dependency both on special entitlements and on
the white guilt that produces them. An arrangement of this kind
is always degrading for all parties involved, though especially
for the blacks, Steele believes, since it encourages whites to see
blacks “exclusively along the dimension of their victimization.”
Blacks become “‘different’ people with whom whites can nego-
tiate entitlements but never fully see as people like themselves.”
(p. 503) “The selfishly guilty white person,” Steele concludes,
“is drawn to what blacks least like in themselves—their suf-
fering, victimization, and dependency. This is no good for any-
one—black or white.” (p. 506)
It is hard to improve on Steele’s analysis here.97 It fails to
address, however, the situation with Hispanics. In a curious
development, Mexican Americans, and later all the Spanish-
language ethic groups, were successfully able to piggyback their
way onto the 60s-era black struggle and acquire in the minds
of privileged whites a similar status as pity- and guilt-evoking
“people of color.” Henceforth all people of Spanish heritage,
97. The late Irving Kristol levels a charge similar to that of Steele’s against many of the
middle-class reformers of the 1960s and early 1970s. “The politics of liberal reform in
recent years,” he wrote in a 1972 Wall Street Journal essay, “has been more concerned
with the kind of symbolic action that gratifies the passions of the reformer rather than
with the efficacy of the reforms themselves. Indeed, the outstanding characteristic
of what we call ‘the New Politics’ is precisely its insistence on the overwhelming
importance of revealing in the public realm one’s intense feelings—we must ‘care,’ we
must ‘be concerned,’ we must be ‘committed.’ Unsurprisingly, this goes along with an
immense indifference to consequences, to positive results or the lack thereof.” (Irving
Kristol, “Symbolic Politics and Liberal Reform,” Wall Street Journal, 15 Dec. 1972).

including millions of recent immigrants, would be viewed

through the lens of the struggle to right the wrongs historically
done to African Americans (a fact that many blacks to this day
deeply resent). In the eyes of the guilt-ridden whites, Hispan-
ics, while they weren’t exactly black, certainly weren’t white,
and they would go on to acquire a position in the iconography
of post-60s white liberalism much like their later position in
the academic arena—i.e., between blacks and whites but much
closer to blacks. In the eyes of the guilty whites, Hispanics
would become a kind of Afro-American Lite.
What happened to the Asians in this post-60s develop-
ment was even more curious. While they certainly weren’t
either white or European, and the older generations had cer-
tainly endured more than a little white hostility and discrimina-
tion, they nevertheless were too successful—too good in school
and at making money—to be eligible for special consideration
within the white-created preference regime. Hence they would
acquire in the minds of the white penitents something of the
status of “honorary whites.” In view of their newly acquired
honorary status, the guilty whites could in good conscience dis-
criminate against Asians in favor of blacks and Hispanics, just
as they discriminated against the members of their own guilty
race. Asians, however, were accorded one modest consolation.
Since their honorary white status did not encompass culpabil-
ity for the whites’ racist past, Asian protests against the prefer-
ence regime were at least treated with a degree of sympathy and
respect by the guilty whites that they would never accord to
similar protests from members of their own race. White protests
against quotas were often seen to partake of an unseemly lack
of shame and contrition (when not motivated by white racism).
Similar protests by Asians were seen by the white penitents as at
least understandable, though not, of course, justified.
If white guilt really is at the heart of much of the enduring
support we see for affirmative action, it suggests that at the elite

universities, where white guilt and fear of the R-word are so

much in evidence, the policy will be with us for many years to
come regardless of the verdict of any social science research. A
“catharsis for white guilt about slavery, segregation, and acts of
racism” is not likely to be undone by a regression analysis.
For those of us who have long argued against affirmative-
action policy, the one hope on the horizon is long term. As gener-
ations pass and those whose views on race relations were forged
by the upheavals of the 1960s increasingly retire and pass from
the academic scene, the experience of the “archetypical Fall”
and the white guilt it produced will fade into ever more distant
memory. Blacks will increasingly be viewed by a new generation
of whites, Asians, Mideasterners, and others simply as people,
not as pitiable victims or objects of expiatory atonement for
guilty white penitents. As Asians and students from Mideastern
backgrounds assume a more prominent place at elite colleges
and universities, the pull of the meritocratic ideal will become
increasingly strong. And in time affirmative action will come to
be viewed as a policy, not a crusade. And as a policy it will be
judged by its merits—and found deeply wanting.

IV
diversit y an d i t s
disco nt en t s :
the contact h y p o t h e s i s
u nder f i r e
Does racial and ethnic diversity on college campuses further

important educational goals? When people of diverse racial and
ethnic backgrounds come together—whether in college, on the
job, or in local residential communities—are stereotypes broken
down? Do horizons broaden? Does greater tolerance and under-
standing ensue? In this chapter I try to show that the answer to
each of these questions is: “It all depends.”
Over the past 50 years sociologists and other social scien-
tists have addressed the question of whether bringing together
people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds is likely to
further important social goals. When people of diverse demo-
graphic backgrounds are brought together in the same location,
is there a marked increase in interpersonal friendships, mutual
trust, the formation of reciprocity norms, and the growth of
social capital? One theory that used to be popular among
reformers of an earlier era and that is still held by many support-
ers of racial preferences today is called the “contact hypothesis.”
According to this theory, prejudice of a racial or ethnic kind and
the negative stereotyping that promotes it are products of social
isolation and ignorance of the alien “other” that such isolation
produces. Bring diverse peoples together, it is said, let them
encounter one another as they really are, and many of the harm-
ful prejudices and misconceptions people have of those in other

242â•… diversity and its discontents
groups will substantially diminish. Better contact furthers better

understanding, according to this view.
Contact theory, however, at least in its “naïve” or unrecon-
structed form, is no longer held by knowledgeable research-
ers—and for good reason. From Central Africa to the Balkans,
from multiethnic Indonesia to multiethnic Ceylon, the mere
contact around the world of people of diverse racial, ethnic, and
religious identity groups seems just as likely to further conflict
and discord as peaceful relationships and mutual understand-
ings. Indeed, conflict and hostility are the more typical outcome.
One has to close one’s eyes to a great deal of what has happened
in the world over the past two centuries to believe in the univer-
sal truth of contact theory, or in the general claim that greater
racial, ethnic, and religious diversity in a population is a source
of collective strength.
A “revised contact hypothesis” will show that only under
very specific—and not very common—circumstances does the
mere bringing together of people of diverse identity groups
have the positive social and life-enhancing results that believers
in the unreconstructed contact hypothesis claim. I try to show in
this chapter just what these circumstances are as they have been
described by social researchers—and why they are unlikely to
be found in situations where diversity is artificially created by
racial-preference policies.
A good deal of the chapter focuses on the research of
Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam. Through a survey of
over 30,000 Americans scattered across 41 varied communities,
Putnam has delivered a stake through the heart of naïve con-
tact theory and the Pollyannaish optimism with which its pro-
ponents believe that ethno-racial diversity easily brings about
desired social goods. The path to fruitful integration is not easy,
Putnam’s research suggests, and, we might add, it is hardly likely
to be furthered by policies such as racial preferences that large
portions of the population openly resent or despise.

The chapter concludes with an explanation of the upward-

ratcheting system currently in place across the American college
system, whereby black students are placed in institutions more
selective than the ones they would have been placed in under a
race-neutral system. Such mismatching, it is suggested, under-
mines whatever positive values racial diversity might achieve.98
They see me as an affirmative-action case.

—african american student at ucla99
The Diversity Dodge

“A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard Col-
lege that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can
usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.” With
these words, Harvard University officials effectively charmed
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, who provided the key
swing vote in the 1978 Bakke decision100 upholding the use of
race as a “plus-factor” to further educational diversity in uni-
versity admissions. Ever since Bakke “diversity” has become the
watchword of the defenders of racial-preference policies both
in the college admissions context and in many other areas of
American life. Diversity is said to bring about a host of educa-
tional benefits. A more diverse student body, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor declared in the 2003 Grutter101 decision reaffirming
Powell’s Bakke holding, helps to promote “cross racial under-
standings,” breaks down “racial stereotypes,” and enables peo-
ple “to better understand persons of different races.”
98. This chapter is adapted from my essay “Diversity’s Discontents: The Contact
Hypothesis Exploded,” Academic Questions, 21(2008): 409–30.
99. Quoted in Steele, Second Thoughts, p. 87.
100. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
101. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

From the very beginning, however, the diversity-produces-

educational-benefits rationale has had something of an ad hoc—
indeed bogus—quality to it. Before Bakke policies of racial
preferences in university admissions were rarely defended by
their supporters on diversity-enhancement grounds, the ratio-
nale of choice usually being either “compensatory justice,” or
“pressing social needs.” African Americans, it was said, deserve
special treatment as simple payback for the grave wrongs visited
upon them throughout the long and sorry history of American
slavery and Jim Crow. Racial preferences were also said to be
urgently needed as a means of jump-starting the growth of a sta-
ble black middle class—a justification that gained great salience
in the late 1960s in the wake of the extensive urban rioting of
the period, much of it carried out by disaffected, lower-class
black youth.102
One can get a good sense of the typical manner of defense
of racial preference policies in the pre-Bakke era from a New
York Times editorial on June 19, 1977. “Reparation, American
Style” was how the Times titled its long, 3,000-word defense of
the racial-preference regime at the U.C. Davis Medical School,
where Allan Bakke had unsuccessfully applied for admission.
While the Times piece spoke at length on the themes of compen-
satory justice and America’s pressing need for more black pro-
fessionals (the editorial was one of the longest and most detailed
in Times history), there was almost nothing said in the editorial
about the great educational value of diversity within the edu-
cational arena itself. The Times commentary in this regard was
typical of liberal journalism in the mid-1970s.
A year before the Times editorial, presidential candidate
Jimmy Carter had similarly focused on compensatory justice
as the reason he supported racial preferences. “[I believe] in
102. See John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996).

insuring that all Americans should have not only equal oppor-
tunity,” Carter remarked at a May, 1976, fund-raising breakfast
in Cincinnati, “but should also have compensatory opportunity,
if, through my influence or yours, they have been deprived of
the opportunity of fully using their talents.” Later, at a news
conference that day, he added: “You can provide equality of
opportunity by law, but quite often that is not adequate.”103
Diversity enhancement was not part of Carter’s affirmative-
action defense during his 1976 presidential campaign, and his
views were emblematic of white liberal thinking at that time.
Only because of Lewis Powell’s subsequent declaration that
compensatory justice and “social needs” arguments are insuf-
ficiently weighty to override the 14th Amendment’s color-blind
imperative but that educational diversity is of sufficient impor-
tance and a “compelling state interest” that can override the
requirement of color-blindness, did the diversity-enhancement
rationale assume its present dominance among supporters of
race-based preferences in college and professional school admis-
sions, as well as in other areas of American life. Before Powell’s
decision, diversity-enhancement arguments were rare to non-
existent. And they were never at the top of anyone’s list of the
most important reasons for justifying racial preferences.104
“The raison d’etre for race-specific affirmative action pro-
grams,” Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz has
trenchantly noted, “has simply never been diversity for the sake
of education. The checkered history of ‘diversity’ demonstrates
that it was designed largely as a cover to achieve other legally,
morally, and politically controversial goals. In recent years, it
has been invoked—especially in the professional schools—as
103. Facts on File (1976), p. 324.

104. On this topic, see the important study by Peter Wood, Diversity—The Invention of
a Concept (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003).

a clever post facto justification for increasing the number of

minority group students in the student body.”105
Dershowitz’s Harvard colleague Randall Kennedy has
made similar comments casting doubt on the sincerity, if not
the goodwill, of academic administrators who invoke “diver-
sity” as their main reason for increasing the black presence in
colleges and professional schools. “Let’s be honest,” Kennedy
writes. “Many who defend affirmative action for the sake of
‘diversity’ are actually motivated by a concern that is consid-
erably more compelling. They are not so much animated by
a commitment to what is, after all, a contingent, pedagogical
hypothesis [i.e., that racial diversity promotes a richer, campus-
wide learning environment]. Rather, they are animated by a
commitment to social justice. They would rightly defend affir-
mative action even if social science demonstrated uncontrovert-
ibly that diversity has no effect (or even a negative effect) on the
learning environment.”106 While Kennedy is generally support-
ive of racial-preference policies, he agrees with critics that the
diversity rationale is a weak foundation on which to base one’s
defense of such policies, and is at best a secondary concern of
many who support and maintain affirmative action policies for
other reasons.107
While the “diversity defense” clearly emerged late in the
game, and while Dershowitz and Kennedy are surely correct
about the insincerity of most academics who invoke it, never-
theless many who support racial preferences in college admis-
sions, including influential decision makers like Sandra Day
105. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, “The Diversity Lie,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy, 27 (2004):395–6.
106. Ibid, p. 396.
107. A similar stance is taken by Peter Schmidt in Color and Money: How Rich White
Kids Are Winning the War over Affirmative Action (New York: Palgrave Macmillian,
2007). Schmidt speaks of a “diversity dodge” designed to obscure the real, compensatory,
and social-justice goals of racial-preference policies—goals that he believes are critically
important and not sufficiently furthered by current affirmative-action practices.

O’Connor, are genuinely convinced by the diversity argument

and accept at face value what diversity proponents claim. If we
just bring together on college campuses or in the workplace peo-
ple of diverse racial, religious, or national-origins backgrounds,
they believe, mutual cultural enrichment will take place, and
a better understanding and cooperation between peoples will
naturally emerge. Above all, diversity—whether on campus or
on the job—is believed by many to be the natural antidote to
racial and ethnic prejudice and to the ignorant stereotyping on
which it feeds.
The Contact Hypothesis

Social science has had a great deal to say about racial and ethnic
diversity, not only in recent years but in research going back
more than half a century. The conclusions of this research, how-
ever, are not always congenial to those who equate greater diver-
sity with the furtherance of better intergroup understanding,
reduced intergroup prejudice, and all the other positive benefits
that are supposed to flow from greater exposure to demographi-
cally diverse populations. However, Randall Kennedy is correct
in his prediction that such research has had little or no effect on
the passion with which academic defenders of racial-preference
policies have continued to support their positions. Disturbing
social science research is simply ignored. This has been particu-
larly true in the case of the large body of research going back
to the 1940s dealing with what sociologists call “the contact
hypothesis.”
The contact hypothesis, which enjoyed its greatest popu-
larity in the years immediately following World War II, views
group prejudice and the negative stereotyping of outsider
groups as largely the product of ignorance, and believes that the
key to dispelling such prejudice and stereotyping is greater con-
tact between people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds.

Increased group contact, the theory claims, brings about more

harmonious relations between people of different social-identity
groups as they come to realize that their prejudices and negative
stereotyping are based on false assumptions and gross overgen-
eralizations. One proponent of school integration in the 1940s,
a prominent educational researcher, put the matter this way:
“Where people of various cultures and races freely and genu-
inely associate, there tensions and difficulties, prejudices and
confusions, dissolve; where they do not associate, where they
are isolated from one another, there prejudice and conflict grow
like a disease.”108
Supporters of the contact hypothesis in the immediate post-
World War II era had two very weighty developments of the
period that seemed to lend a certain plausibility to their views.
The first was the successful integration of the U.S. armed forces
under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman, a white
Southerner who as a young man had seriously considered join-
ing the Ku Klux Klan. Truman no doubt had political reasons
for his integrationist stance, but he was also swayed by the fact
that during the war against Nazi fascism and racism black and
white service personnel who shared common tasks and common
quarters—such as aboard ships in the Navy and the Merchant
Marines—often developed mutual friendships and better under-
standings despite the existence of formal segregation through-
out the U.S. military. Early studies of WWII-era GIs showed
that whites with the most contact with blacks during their mili-
tary service often experienced a reduction in their prejudices.109
The integration of the military that took place during Truman’s
108. Theodore Brameld, Minority Problems in the Public Schools (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1946), p. 245. Brameld was a professor of educational philosophy at the
University of Minnesota and widely respected in his time.
109 H. A. Singer, “The Veteran and Race Relations,” Journal of Educational Sociology,
212 (1948):397–408; S. A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1949).

second term in office would prove to be one of the most success-

ful instances of black/white integration in the nation’s history.
The second development at this time that contact theorists
could point to was the successful integration of professional
baseball in the 1940s—“America’s Pastime,” as it was called in
those days—and the rapid acceptance of black ballplayers on
formerly all-white teams. Despite initial resistance, sports fans
throughout America in 1947 came to appreciate the hitting,
fielding, and base-running prowess of Jackie Robinson when he
became the first Negro to play in the major leagues and a major
reason why the Brooklyn Dodgers won the National League
pennant that year. (Robinson himself was named Rookie of
the Year in 1947). Following the lead of Dodger owner Branch
Rickey, many other major league teams over the next ten years
aggressively recruited black ball players for their organizations.
While the successful integration of professional baseball and
the military lent a modicum of plausibility to the contact theory,
it was clear to more discerning observers from the very start
that the contact hypothesis, at least in its unrevised form, was
untenable and could only be maintained by a focus on selective
and in some ways atypical examples. An obvious and glaring
counterexample in the 1940s and 1950s was the racial situa-
tion in the American South. While white Southerners generally
had much more daily contact with black people than whites in
the Northern and Western states, one could hardly argue that
their enhanced contact diminished their racial prejudices or out-
group stereotyping. Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma,
published in the mid-1940s, had clearly demonstrated other-
wise, if any demonstration was needed for anyone with the least
acquaintance with race relations in the Jim Crow South.
Those knowledgeable of the European scene in the ear-
liest years of the twentieth century had even more reason to
doubt—if not ridicule—the contact hypothesis. In multiethnic
cities of Eastern Europe before the First World War—cities like

Belgrade, Vienna, and Krakow—people of different racial and

ethnic groups often had the opportunity to come into contact
with one another on a daily basis, yet the result was hardly one
of general ethnic harmony. Enmity, suspicion, and distrust were
just as often the result of such ethnic mixing as any positive ben-
efits. The very words “the Balkans” conjured up vivid images of
ethnic diversity producing bitter, protracted, often violent ethnic
strife. And it was not lost on critics of the contact hypothesis in
the immediate aftermath of the Nazi era that Adolf Hitler was
a product of multiethnic, multicultural Vienna, a city in Hit-
ler’s youth that had elected an openly antisemitic mayor (Karl
Lueger) and whose ethnic diversity was more often than not a
breeding ground for prejudice against Jews, Poles, Hungarians,
Russians, and every other resident minority group.
Revising the Contact Hypothesis

If the contact hypothesis was to be rescued, it was clear that it
was in need of some critical pruning—if not drastic reformula-
tion—that specified under what limited range of circumstances
ethnic diversity might be expected to promote rather than
diminish intergroup harmony and understanding. Researchers
from the 1950s onward eventually identified several conditions
that usually had to be met for diversity to have the favorable
outcomes that contact theorists sought. Among these conditions
were
• Equality of status between those making the contact;

• A noncompetitive environment in which one ethnic
group’s gain is not seen to be at the expense of another
group’s welfare;
• The opportunity to encounter sufficient numbers of peo-
ple who counter the negative stereotype one group holds
of the other;

• The challenge of a common goal or common task that

requires some collective or cooperative effort to achieve;
• The lack of artificiality or Potemkin-like quality to the
interaction; and
• The support of wider community norms and those in
authority.110
Using these criteria it is easy to see why the integration of a pro-

fessional sports team like the Brooklyn Dodgers, or of the units
of a national military fighting a popular war, were as successful
as they were, while the prospects for similar success under many
other real-world conditions are much less favorable.
It became clear to the critics of the contact hypothesis that
when conditions for successful integration are not favorable,
more often than not enhanced social contact spells trouble—
often Big Trouble. To the more naïve versions of the contact
hypothesis critics sometimes juxtaposed a “conflict hypothesis,”
which was said to describe more accurately the more typical
relationships between people in the real world of demographi-
cally diverse populations. According to this more pessimistic
view,111 people of differing racial, ethnic, linguistic, and ethno-
religious communities typically, a) harbor innate suspicions and
distrust of one another; b) find it more difficult to engage in
cooperative ventures with one another than with members of
110. See, for instance, Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954); D. Landis, R. O. Hope, and H. R. Day, “Training for
Desegregation in the Military,” in N. Miller and M. B. Brewer, eds., Groups in Conflict:
The Psychology of Desegregation (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1984), pp. 257–78;
M. B. Brewer and N. Miller, “Beyond the Contact Hypothesis: Theoretical Perspectives
on Desegregation,” in Miller and Brewer, eds., Groups in Conflict, pp. 281–302; D. Chu
and D. Griffey, “The Contact Theory of Integration: The Case of Sport,” Sociology of
Sport Journal, 2 (1985):323–33; and J. F. Dovido, S. L. Gaertner, and K. Kawakami,
“Intergroup Contact: The Past, Present, and Future,” Group Processes and Intergroup
Relations 6 (2003): 5–21.
111. What is described here, of course, is an “ideal type.” Writers on ethnic conflict do
not sort themselves so simply into “contact” or “conflict” theorists, and, as explained,
“naïve contact theory” is no longer held by anyone.

their own group; c) find it difficult to understand each other’s

differing customs and folkways; d) tend to see one another more
as stereotyped group representatives than as distinct individu-
als; e) find it difficult to establish ties of friendship or intimacy;
f) display less willingness to support government measures to
benefit the poor and distressed; and, g) display greater hostility
or coldness toward one another if they live close by and regu-
larly interact than if they live more geographically separated
lives.112
One policy implication frequently drawn from the conflict
theory is that identity-group diversity under most circumstances
is something to be avoided, that “good fences make good neigh-
bors,” and that it is usually best to have people of different
racial, ethnic, ethno-religious, or ethno-linguistic groups liv-
ing in geographic areas separated from one another, whether
those separated areas encompass a whole nation-state (Japan,
Norway, Iceland), a region of a larger state (the Kurds in Iraq,
the Basques in Spain), separate halves of an island (Greeks and
Turks on Cyprus), a partitioned territory (India-Pakistan-Ban-
gladesh, Israel-Palestine, Slovakia-Czech Republic), or simply
a local neighborhood of the same city (Russian Jewish immi-
grants in Brooklyn’s Brighton Beach, Chinese immigrants in San
Francisco’s Chinatown). Such arrangements, it is said, reduce
112. See, for instance, R. A. LeVine and D. T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of

Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior (New York: Wiley and Son,, 1972); M.
P. Brewer, “The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?” Journal of
Social Issues 55 (1999): 429–44; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd ed.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Daniel P. Moynihan, Pandemonium:
Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); L.
Quillian, “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition
and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe,” American Sociological Review 60
(1995): 586–611; Carol Swain, The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge
to Integration (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002; and K. Newton and
J. Delhey, “Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic
Exceptionalism?,” European Sociological Review, 21 (2005): 311–27.

inter-group hostilities and allow people to associate with those

with whom they have most in common and with whom they
feel most comfortable. For conflict theorists the contact hypoth-
esis is turned on its head: interethnic contact is seen as a source
of suspicion and distrust. Diversity is a harbinger of tension and
trouble.
But Isn’t the U.S. Different? Robert

Putnam’s Recent Challenge to
Contact-Theory Optimism
Many readers of this chapter will bristle at the conflict theory
and its claims. Aren’t we in the U.S the shining example of its
disconfirmation? Isn’t America the great melting pot where the
ancient tribal enmities of the Old World were left behind and
a new unity forged out of diverse racial, ethnic, and religious
strands? Doesn’t E Pluribus Unum signify not only a high-
minded principle but to some extent an actual reality in Amer-
ica? Outside the Old South hasn’t contact between people of
diverse racial, ethnic, and religious origins led to mutual enrich-
ment and a general reduction in prejudice as contact theory
would predict? Doesn’t contact theory, even in its “naïve” or
unreconstructed form, provide an accurate description of sub-
stantial portions of American racial and ethnic history?
The answers here call for nuance, because the U.S is clearly
not the former Yugoslavia or any of the ethnicly divided states
of post-colonial Africa. Intergroup violence has been much less
pronounced and integration far better achieved in America than
in almost any other large, diverse, multiethnic, multireligious
society. “No other nation has so successfully combined people of
different races and nations within a single culture [as the United
States],” former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once

remarked.113 Surely, to some extent, America can be described

as an integration success story.
Nonetheless, getting people of widely divergent racial and
ethnic identities to live together harmoniously and cooperate
productively is always a daunting task, and while the U.S. has
unquestionably been better at it than many other demographi-
cally diverse nations, it should never be forgotten that the pro-
cess of integration does not flow naturally from mere contact
and propinquity and certainly not through the simplistic mecha-
nisms that contact theorists propose. As the history of ethnic
and other communal conflicts around the world show, in its
naïve or unrevised form the contact hypothesis is mere wishful
thinking, and those who implicitly rely on some version of it to
defend current racial-preference policies in American universi-
ties and elsewhere either delude themselves or knowingly seek
to delude others.
Even in a relatively low-ethnic-conflict country like America
mere contact between people of diverse racial and ethnic iden-
tity groups can hardly be said to reduce prejudice or to increase
intercommunal cooperation and understanding. This truth has
been confirmed in a powerful way by the outstanding scholar-
ship of Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam. From early
on in his professional career Putnam has been interested in the
phenomena of interpersonal trust and the social capital and
social cooperation that flow from such trust. In an early study
of regional differences in modern Italy, Putnam argued that the
vastly different levels of civic engagement and social trust dis-
played by the populations living in the northern and southern
parts of Italy were largely responsible for the very different lev-
els of economic development of those two regions. Like Edward
Banfield before him, Putnam in his Italian journeys found per-
113. Cited in Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America (Knoxville, TN: Whittle
Direct Books, 1991), p. 78.

vasive envy and distrust among southern Italians for all those
outside one’s immediate family and a corresponding inability
to network or cooperate with one another to achieve common
goals such as economic prosperity or a reduction in government
corruption. The low-trust cultures of southern regions like Cal-
abria and Sicily, Putnam argued, were largely responsible for
those regions’ economic backwardness and their inability to
overcome many of the negative political and social elements
which Putnam believed were inheritances from their corrupt,
feudal-authoritarian past.114
In more recent years Putnam has been concerned with the
decline in social connectedness and civic engagement in the
United States, as manifested in well-documented declines in
such organizations as the Red Cross, parent-teachers associa-
tions, the Boy Scouts, fraternal groups (like the Lions, Masons,
Shriners, and Jaycees), labor unions, the League of Women Vot-
ers, as well as organized bowling leagues. This last item inspired
the title for his widely read Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
Revival of American Community, which appeared in 2000.
While certain dues-and-newsletter organizations like the Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and the Sierra Club
have experienced huge growth in recent decades, these organi-
zations, says Putnam, act more like paid lobby groups whose
members rarely know one another or ever come into contact
with one another on a face-to-face basis. They are clearly not
organizations, he says, that have positive spill-over effects in
fostering social capital, human connectedness, or enhanced
human understanding between neighbors and friends. Belong-
ing to them is little different than bowling alone.115
114. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
115. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

In his Bowling Alone study Putnam drew upon the nation-

ally representative General Social Survey, which indicated an
overall decline in the frequency with which Americans spend
social evenings with neighbors and friends and a similar decline
in the belief that people can generally be trusted. The proportion
of Americans agreeing with the statement that “most people”
can be trusted, Putnam points out, declined by a third between
1960 and 1993, from 58 percent to 37 percent. These changes
are all the more striking, he says, because the educational level
of the population was rising over this period, and past research
has shown positive relationships between schooling and levels
of trust and sociability. While Americans were becoming better
educated, they were also becoming more socially isolated and
more distrustful of one another.
In his preliminary work on the “bowling alone” phenom-
enon, Putnam suggested several factors that might be respon-
sible for the loss of social connectedness and the decline in civic
engagement. These included the high incidence of divorce and
family breakup; the entrance of more women into the work-
force (and subsequent decline in organizations like the PTA and
the Red Cross, which traditionally relied on the labor of female
homemakers); and the radical privatizing and individualizing
of entertainment as a result of the growth of television-watch-
ing as America’s foremost pastime. All of these factors Putnam
believed were important in explaining the decline in social con-
nectedness and civic engagement among Americans in the final
third of the twentieth century.
In his more recent studies, Putnam has looked at the fac-
tor of ethnic diversity and its effects on the formation of social
capital (“social capital” being defined simply as the formation
of social networks and “the associated norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness” associated with such networks). What Putnam
found was arresting, and it certainly presents a challenge to all
those who believe that the integration of racially and ethnicly

diverse peoples into a decent, caring, civic-minded society is

anything other than a difficult, long-term task. Ethnic diversity
in contemporary America, Putnam found, has few of the pres-
ent benefits that multiculturalists and contact theorists say it
has, and it has some additional disadvantages that even conflict
theorists have not generally ascribed to it.
Putnam’s study is based on a large nationwide survey, the
Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, that in all sam-
pled approximately 30,000 Americans, including representative
samples of populations drawn from 41 highly varied communi-
ties across the U.S. These 41 separate community surveys form
the heart of Putnam’s research, and they range from large urban
centers with a million or more residents to smaller cities, subur-
ban areas, and rural towns. Four whole states—Montana, Indi-
ana, Delaware, and New Hampshire—were also among the 41
communities surveyed. Consistent with other studies, but con-
trary to the view of many enthusiasts for multiculturalism and
continuing large-scale immigration, Putnam found that inter-
racial trust—that is, the degree to which blacks, whites, Asian
Americans, and Latinos said they trusted members of the three
broad ethno-racial groups they didn’t belong to—varied directly
with the degree of ethno-racial homogeneity, not diversity, in
the area in which they lived. “Inter-racial trust is relatively high
in homogeneous South Dakota and relatively low in heteroge-
neous San Francisco or Los Angeles,” Putnam reports. “The
more ethnically diverse the people we live around,” he says,
“the less we trust them.”116
Those who told researchers that they trusted members of
other races “a lot” were much more common in places like
Lewiston, Maine, Bismarck, New Hampshire, and the state
of Montana, where whites constitute the great majority of the
116. Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first
Century,” Scandinavian Political Studies 30 (2007): 137–74.

population (and nonwhites are not frequently encountered in

most community settings) than in places like San Francisco, Los
Angeles, North Minneapolis, or East Bay, California, where the
populations are much more racially and ethnicly diverse. This
finding is all the more remarkable—and all the more inconsis-
tent with contact theory—when one considers that the lower
levels of interracial trust are often expressed by people living in
some of the more politically liberal areas of the country where
norms of political correctness and socially-acceptable response
patterns might be expected to dampen substantially the level of
ethnic distrust to which respondents (particularly whites) would
freely admit. The social pressures to affirm publicly one’s trust
in members of other ethno-racial groups is almost certainly
greater in places like San Francisco and Los Angeles than in
places like Montana or rural South Dakota, suggesting that the
real trust gap is even greater than that indicated by the Commu-
nity Benchmark Survey data. At least in terms of contemporary
America, the data from this survey seem to confirm the view
that in interracial and interethnic relations, familiarity breeds
distrust.
Having surveyed much of the world literature on these
issues, Putnam was not entirely surprised by these findings.
They were consistent with many other studies, using many
different methodologies, carried out in many different places
around the world. People of different racial and ethnic groups
have a harder time getting along with one another—and trust-
ing one another—than people who are of the same race or eth-
nic group. And the more numerous the members of the outsider
group, and the more contact people have with them, the greater
the interracial suspiciousness and distrust. Putnam’s study, how-
ever, probed further than most earlier studies in asking a key
question rarely posed—i.e., whether increased racial and ethnic
diversity has any effect on the degree of solidarity and social
capital that exists within individual ethno-racial communities.

Although the issue is not often raised, conflict theorists prob-

ably assumed that if increased ethnic heterogeneity has any
within-group effect it is likely to strengthen in-group bonds of
ethnic solidarity and mutual support. Just as populations often
pull together when engaged in conflict with an outside enemy,
the presence of diverse ethnic groups in the same area, it might
be supposed, will increase the level of cooperation and trust
within each of the separate groups.
Whether or not such a relationship exists elsewhere, Put-
nam’s study found that the very opposite relationship obtains
within the United States. Not only do people in the more diverse
communities in the U.S. display lower trust for those who are
members of outsider ethnic and racial groups, they also display
lower trust for members of their own group. The distrust engen-
dered by ethnicly and racially diverse communities, Putnam
believes, seems to have a strong psychological spillover effect
that harms relationships and the formation of social capital
even within one’s own ethnic group. “In more diverse settings,”
Putnam writes, “Americans distrust not merely people who
do not look like them, but even people who do.” The distrust
engendered by ethnic diversity seems to engender distrust for
human beings more generally.
Besides the trust question, respondents in the Community
Benchmark Survey were asked a battery of other questions
designed to assess the relationship between ethnic diversity and
various correlates of social capital, such as participation in com-
munity projects, registering to vote, having positive attitudes
toward the efficacy of social action, etc. As with the trust ques-
tion, these other measures of social cooperation and commu-
nity engagement were found to be negatively correlated with
ethnic heterogeneity (i.e., the greater the ethnic heterogeneity
the less the cooperation). In areas of the country with greater
ethno-racial diversity, Putnam found, respondents tended to dis-
play, a) a lower frequency of registering to vote; b) fewer close

friends and confidants; c) a lower likelihood of working on a

community project; d) less confidence that others would coop-
erate to solve collective-action problems like water and energy
conservation; e) a lower likelihood of giving to charity or doing
volunteer work; f) lower confidence in local leaders, local politi-
cians, and the news media; g) greater frequency of participation
in protest marches combined with a lower sense of efficacy that
one’s actions can make a difference; h) lower perceived qual-
ity of life; i) lower overall happiness; and, j) more time spent
watching television and greater agreement with the statement
that “television is my most important form of entertainment.”117
It’s a long list, and while Putnam found some measures of
social engagement that were not negatively correlated with eth-
nic diversity, including the important factor of religious activ-
ity, the overall pattern, he says, is unmistakable: People in the
more ethnicly diverse communities in America, while they
are not at one another’s throats, tend to become much more
socially isolated and withdrawn than those living in more eth-
nicly homogeneous communities. There is a decline in social
solidarity, community activities, and general neighborliness in
such communities as people tend to withdraw into themselves
and become more isolated and alienated from others nearby
(including members of their own ethnic group). In Putnam’s
words, people under such circumstances “hunker down” and
“pull in like a turtle.” Although Putnam believes that in the long
run racial and ethnic diversity can have positive benefits in an
integration-seeking society, in the short run its effects are over-
whelmingly negative. Social isolation, alienation, and anomie
are its immediate results.118
117. Ibid., pp. 149–50.

118. Putnam’s empirical results and final conclusions are best summed up in his own
words:
One of the most important challenges facing modern societies, and at
the same time one of our most significant opportunities, is the increase in
ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced countries. Ethnic

Putnam’s bleak conclusions about diversity are offset by a

number of important qualifications. To begin with, he believes
that the problems of ethnic and racial diversity can be mitigated
in time presumably as racial and ethnic consciousness gives way,
at least in part, to a more encompassing national or universal-
human consciousness. To date, however, he has said little about
this process. Even in the short run, however, diversity is not all
bad, Putnam holds, as it can often be a spur to greater creativity,
especially in diverse work groups in educational and business
settings when group members work together as a team to solve
a common task or problem.
America has been a magnet for many of the most creative
and industrious people of the world, and this influx of immi-
grants from diverse lands, Putnam says, has clearly been of
great benefit to the U.S. in many ways. Not only have immi-
grants been disproportionately represented as winners of such
high honors as Nobel prizes, Academy Awards, Kennedy Cen-
ter awards, and membership in the National Academy of Sci-
ences, but immigrants from diverse lands have taken over many
critical low-end jobs for which there are not enough Americans
available and have helped to offset the impending fiscal effects
of low birth rates among the native population and the retire-
ment of the Baby Boom generation.
diversity is increasing in most advanced countries, driven mostly by sharp

increases in immigration. In the long run immigration and diversity are likely
to have important cultural, economic, fiscal, and developmental benefits.
In the short run, however, immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce
social solidarity and social capital. New evidence from the U.S. suggests that
in ethnically diverse neighborhoods residents of all races tend to “hunker
down” [i.e., isolate themselves].Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Inhabitants of diverse communities tend
to withdraw from collective life, to distrust neighbors, regardless of the color
of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from
their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and
work on community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate
for social reform more but have less faith that they can actually make a
difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Diversity,
at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us. Ibid., pp.
137, 151.

So immigration and the increase in demographic diversity it

brings about are clearly a mixed bag for Putnam. What is so illu-
minating and refreshing about his work is that he is able to look
at the dark side of these developments without blinking and
report research that runs counter to the uncritical, celebratory
tone of so much of the rhetoric one hears in academic circles
about the unalloyed good that increased racial and ethnic diver-
sity is supposed to bring about. His writing is in the best tradi-
tion of social realism and brings to light what Max Weber used
to call the “inconvenient facts” (unbequeme Tatsachen) that
social science is duty-bound to investigate. Putnam’s research
provides the strongest case to date against the more optimis-
tic claims of those who believe that merely getting people of
diverse races and ethnicities to live and work in close proximity
to one another, or to come together on the same college campus,
will automatically provide beneficial social outcomes. The naïve
contact theory has never been submitted to a more devastating
critique.
Racial Diversity in the Academy

Although the contact hypothesis, at least in its original, naïve
form, has been thoroughly discredited by half a century of
research (including more recently Putnam’s), and is not cur-
rently maintained by any reputable social scientist, it is often
the implicit foundation of the defense of current affirmative-
action policies in American universities and of the educational-
enhancement claims used to justify them. If we just get all those
farm boys from Idaho, those Irish kids from Boston, those Mex-
icans from the barrio, and those black youths from inner-city
Detroit to come together on the same college campus, even if it
requires a good deal of racial “plus-factoring” by the admissions
committee to do so, educational benefits will flow spontane-
ously and enhance the lives of all concerned. Intergroup con-

tacts will abound, college students will learn from one another,
prejudices will diminish, and mutual understanding and good-
will will stamp the overall character of campus life.
Alas, things haven’t exactly worked out that way. While
students of different races and ethnicities coexist peacefully
on most college campuses today and treat one another civilly,
the ubiquity of self-segregated cafeterias and social groups, the
paucity of cross-racial friendships outside of the varsity sports
teams and a few other extracurricular activities, and the perva-
sive suspicion that black and Hispanic students are not as quali-
fied as Asians and whites all clearly indicate that something has
gone radically wrong with the integrationist vision propounded
by supporters of current preference policies. Things on campus
are not the way they are supposed to be or the way defenders of
racial preferences told us they would be.
All this, of course, should come as no surprise, as almost
none of the factors identified by sociologists as preconditions
for beneficial intergroup interactions are met on the contempo-
rary college campuses that indulge in strong affirmative-action
preferences. When huge admission preferences are given to
black and Hispanic students over whites and Asians, one can
hardly speak of members of the ensuing student body as having
“equal status.” Right from the start entering freshmen begin to
think in terms of “regular admits,” who were accepted on the
basis of their past academic performance, and “the affirmative-
action admits,” who would not have been accepted but for the
huge boost given for their race. Resentments inevitably abound,
especially among white and Asian students who remember dis-
appointed high school friends and rejected applicants of their
own race, some of whom were much better qualified than many
of the black and Hispanic students they meet on campus.
Not only do racial preferences run counter to the widely
shared belief that academic merit should be the main criteria
for university admissions, but the pervasiveness of huge racial

boosts at almost all selective institutions creates an upward

ratcheting system in which black and Hispanic students are
typically placed at institutions in which the whites and Asians
have the clear upper hand in terms of academic talent and abili-
ties. The common stereotype of black and Hispanic students as
intellectually inferior to whites, instead of being weakened by
actual contact with many group members who counter the ste-
reotype, is more likely than not to be confirmed. When choosing
a lab partner in a difficult organic chemistry course, or decid-
ing which study group to join when taking an introductory
economics course, it becomes a sensible strategy for incoming
freshmen, without further knowledge of individual students, to
avoid members of those identity groups that have been admitted
under vastly lowered standards. Heightened intergroup tension
and self-segregation along racial lines are the inevitable result,
with true friendships and understandings across racial divides
becoming ever less likely. The terms of the interracial contact on
affirmative-action campuses could hardly be less propitious to
furthering the integrationist goals that affirmative-action sup-
porters say they favor.
Although empirical research on the topic is limited, we know
from what research does exist that all is not well with race rela-
tions on college campuses and that racial-preference policies are
deeply resented by many white and Asian students whose groups
are disfavored by them. In the previous chapter I presented the
findings of Douglas Massey and his colleagues in their study of
student attitudes at the selective colleges surveyed in The Source
of the River. White and Asian students expressed a substantial
degree of “social distance” between themselves and those black
and Hispanic students described as the “beneficiaries of affirma-
tive action,” although they expressed no such distance between
themselves and blacks and Hispanics “as a group.” The admis-
sions processes at the selective universities they surveyed “oper-
ate to produce a freshman class composed of two very distinct

subpopulations. On one hand are whites and Asians, and on

the other are Latinos and blacks.” Not surprisingly, students
quickly come to understand the racial-preference system and to
perceive blacks and Hispanics as academically underqualified,
Asians as academically overqualified.119
Although the Massey researchers harbor no predisposition
against affirmative-action policy, they are forced to conclude
that the widespread perception among white and Asian students
of substantial social distance between themselves and affirma-
tive-action beneficiaries has had a noxious effect on campus
race relations and may undermine the academic self-confidence
of those in the lower-achieving groups. The perception of social
distance from black and Hispanic affirmative action beneficia-
ries, they say, has affected the general tone of race relations on
college campuses and surely has not contributed to furthering
intergroup harmony.
Also in the previous chapter were the reluctant conclusions
of linguist John McWhorter about the effects of preferentialist
policies at Berkeley: “With it widely known among a student
body that most minority students were admitted [to Berkeley]
with test scores and GPAs which would have barred white and
Asian applicants from consideration, it is difficult for many
white students to avoid beginning to question the basic mental
competence of black people as a race.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€This can only leave
many young whites with a private suspicion that blacks simply
aren’t as swift, which will in turn encourage suspicion in black
students, and thus perpetuate interracial alienation on campus
and undermine the mutual respect that successful integration
requires.”120
119. Douglas Massey et al., The Source of the River (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003), p. 198.
120. John McWhorter, Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America (New York:
The Free Press, 2000), pp. 89, 229–230, 236.

Another study we’ve seen is that of Stanley Rothman and his

colleagues. Recall that the question the Rothman group posed
was whether or not enrollment diversity on college campuses
under our reigning affirmative-action regime improves the over-
all educational experience that students feel they receive and
furthers interracial understandings and better relations between
people of diverse racial backgrounds. And recall too the Roth-
man group’s findings after surveying 140 American colleges and
universities: “As the proportion of black students rose, student
satisfaction with their university experience dropped, as did
their assessments of the quality of their education and the work
ethic of their peers. In addition, the higher the enrollment diver-
sity [in terms of blacks], the more likely students were to say
that they personally experienced discrimination. The same pat-
tern of negative correlations between educational benefits and
increased black enrollment appeared in the responses of faculty
and administrators.”121
But remember that Rothman and his colleagues found a
very different outcome when “diversity” was defined in terms
of increased Asian enrollment. The increased presence of Asians
on campus, but not the increased presence of blacks, seemed to
have a number of positive effects in terms of the assessment that
students—the majority presumably white—gave of their over-
all college experience and other outcome variables explored in
the study. Rothman et al. explained the difference in terms of
affirmative action: “It may be that affirmative action places stu-
dents in academic environments for which they are unsuited,
leading to tension and dissatisfaction all around.”122 What the
121 Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte, “Does Enrollment
Diversity Improve University Education,” International Journal of Public Opinion
Research, 15:1 (2003), pp. 8–26. A less technical version of this paper appears as
“Racial Diversity Reconsidered,” in The Public Interest, spring 2003 (available online
at www.thepublicinterest.com). The quotations in the text are taken from the online
version of The Public Interest article.
122 Ibid.

Rothman group says is consistent with the highly modified con-

tact hypothesis but not its naïve form, since unlike the latter,
the revised form insists that harmonious relationships between
different racial and ethnic groups require a sense of equal sta-
tus, something obviously not achieved when high standards of
admission are applied to some groups but not others.
So like McWhorter and the Massey group, Rothman and
his colleagues found that all is not well in terms of race rela-
tions on college campuses and that at least part of the problem
stems from the different admissions standards applied under
affirmative-action programs. Once again we find the Pollyan-
naish optimism of contact theory discredited. Merely getting
people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds together on the
same campus is no guarantee that cross-racial friendships will
flourish or that valuable educational and cultural-enrichment
outcomes will be realized. Under the wrong circumstances the
net effect of such contact is surely harmful. And race-based
admissions standards that are resented by large segments of the
student body clearly constitute “the wrong circumstances.”
Further evidence for the harmful effects of racial preferences
at competitive colleges is provided by studies comparing the out-
come of blacks at majority-white campuses with those attend-
ing the historically black colleges and universities. Sociologist
Jacqueline Fleming has studied this issue more extensively than
anyone else and finds that black students on the typical majority-
white college campus today often face feelings of estrangement
and lack of integration into the white social and academic scene.
The problem, she says, is most acute for black males. African
American males on majority-white campuses, says Fleming, typi-
cally experience “feelings of competitive rejection that have con-
sequences for their capacity to muster intellectual motivation.”123
Fleming doesn’t blame affirmative-action policies directly for this
123 Jacqueline Fleming, Blacks in College (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984), p. 143.

development, but it is hard to imagine that lowering standards

for black entrants to competitive colleges doesn’t play a support-
ing role in this.
Fleming’s research shows that when comparing blacks with
similar background characteristics who attend either predomi-
nantly white colleges or an HBCU, those attending the HBCUs
typically do better on a host of outcome variables. Summing up
much of the research literature on this topic, she writes:
Previous research makes it clear that Black students adjust

better to Black colleges than to predominantly White col-
leges. Black students who attend predominantly Black
schools tend to have higher average grades, a richer learn-
ing environment, better relationships with faculty members,
exhibit better cognitive development and display greater
effort and engage in more academic activities than Black
students who attend White schools. In black schools, Black
students show better social adjustment, have more extensive
social support networks, show greater social involvement,
and engage in more organizational activities.124
Other researchers have confirmed Fleming’s basic findings

and conclusions. Sociologist Walter Allen, for instance, did a
study comparing the adjustment of blacks on eight predomi-
nantly white public universities—most of them highly com-
petitive, where huge affirmative-action preferences are typically
given125—to those attending eight HBCUs. He found that those
at the white institutions often encountered multiple adjustment
problems and did much worse on average on a whole host of
124 Jacqueline Fleming, “SATs and Black Students,” Review of Higher Education 25
(2002):281–96, 287.
125 The eight institutions surveyed were the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; the
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; the University of California, Los Angeles;
Arizona State University, Tempe; Memphis State University; the State University of
New York, Stony Brook; the University of Wisconsin, Madison; and Eastern Michigan
University, Ypsilanti.

measures than blacks of similar background and abilities who

attended the HBCUs. Summarizing the results of his study,
Allen writes that the “students in the sample who attend histori-
cally Black universities reported better academic performance,
greater social involvement, and higher occupational aspirations
than black students who attend predominantly White institu-
tions. In short, the college experience was most successful (mea-
sured by these outcomes) for African-American students on
campuses with Black majority student populations.”126
These conclusions, says Allen, are supported by the research
of many other scholars. Black students today seem to have a
very difficult time adjusting to, and feeling welcomed on, college
campuses where the majority of students are white (or white
and Asian). The problems of social adjustment and alienation
for black students on white campuses, says Allen, lead to a host
of other problems, including lowered self-confidence, disen-
gagement from challenging academic work, and poor scholastic
performance. Summing up both his own and others’ research on
this topic, he writes:
The salutary effect of Black students attending a histori-

cally Black university speaks volumes about the importance
of the social-psychological context for student outcomes.
In this respect, previous research demonstrates unequivo-
cally the profound difference that historically Black and
predominantly White campuses represent for African-Amer-
ican students. On predominantly White campuses, Black
students emphasize feelings of alienation, sense hostility,
racial discrimination, and lack of integration. On histori-
cally Black campuses, Black students emphasize feelings of
engagement, connection, acceptance, and extensive support
and encouragement. Consistent with accumulated evidence
126 Walter Allen, “The Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes
at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities,”
Harvard Educational Review, 62 (1992): 26–44, 39–40.

on human development, these students, like most human

beings, develop best in environments where they feel valued,
protected, accepted, and socially connected. The supportive
environments of historically Black colleges communicate
to Black students that it is safe to take the risks associated
with intellectual growth and development.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Historically
Black universities provide positive social and psychological
environments for African-American students that compare
to those experienced by White students who attend White
universities. In the social aspect, the important ingredients
are an extensive network of friends, numerous social outlets,
and supportive relationships. In the psychological aspect, the
key ingredients are multiple boosts to self-confidence and
self-esteem, feelings of psychological comfort and belonging,
and a sense of empowerment/ownership—a sense that “this
is our campus.” When these social-psychological ingredients
are present in optimal combination, the chances that a stu-
dent will be successful in college increase dramatically.127
Allen, like Fleming, doesn’t speculate on the degree to which

racial-preference policies may contribute to the sense of alienation
and other negative effects that blacks often experience on cam-
puses that are predominantly white and Asian, but once again
it is hard to imagine that the dual-track admissions standards
that effectively reign at many of our most competitive colleges
and universities (whereby blacks are admitted under much lower
standards than those applied to whites and Asians) doesn’t con-
tribute mightily to these negative outcomes. It is difficult to see
how being a member of a visibly identifiable minority group on a
campus in which most of the other students are smarter or more
academically accomplished than you are can fail to produce feel-
ings of intellectual self-doubt and estrangement, as well as fear
127. Ibid.

that these other students may be looking down on you. Contacts

of this kind lack almost all the ingredients previously discussed
that are known to be crucial for breaking down stereotypes and
prejudices and promoting greater harmony and understanding
between people of different races. It is not surprising that black
students on black campuses often do better in terms of the many
outcome variables Allen and other researchers have looked at,
where, in addition to being among people of one’s own race, they
are among those with academic abilities and accomplishments
that are not significantly different from their own.
Some Final Reflections on Mismatching and

the Downward Raiding Problem
Our current upward-ratcheting regime in college admissions
often places black and Hispanic students in institutions one,
two, or three levels of selectivity above the level they would
have been placed in without preferences. The system has many
harmful consequences that critics have long explored, but one
such consequence that is not often mentioned is what might
be called the “downward parasitism” or “downward raiding”
problem.
The problem can be simply stated: When a Tier-1 school
(Harvard, Princeton, Stanford) admits an “underrepresented
minority student” who, in the absence of racial preferences,
would have attended a Tier-2 school (Tufts, Lehigh, UCLA),
or Tier-3 school (Boston University, Rutgers, Tulane), the stu-
dents at these Tier-2 and Tier-3 schools are denied the diver-
sity-enhancement value that these upwardly ratcheted minority
students could have provided. The Tier-2 and Tier-3 schools
then feel pressured to engage in similar “downward raiding”
by admitting black and Hispanic students through their own
preference programs who in the absence of such preferences
would have attended less competitive Tier-4 and Tier-5 schools

(and could have contributed to a healthy kind of demographic

diversity at those schools). One school’s diversity gain is always
another’s diversity loss. Even on its own terms it is not clear
how racial diversity is enhanced by the current upward-ratch-
eting system,128 which does nothing to alter the “pipeline” of
college-eligible blacks and Hispanics coming out of high school
(and is likely to constrict the pipeline because of the negative
incentives to strive for excellence that college preferences based
on race create at the high school level).
One cannot, however, take the diversity-enhancement argu-
ment on its own terms because it is implicitly based on a naïve
version of the contact hypothesis, which fails to understand the
limited sorts of conditions under which racial contact is likely to
further rather than inhibit interracial understanding and inter-
group harmony. There are good diversities and bad diversities,
and diversities brought about artificially through racial pref-
erences—ones that are widely viewed as unfair, that serve to
heighten racial tensions on campus, and that reinforce negative
stigmas and stereotypes about the mental competence of those
in the targeted groups—are clearly in the noxious category. The
upward ratcheting and upward mismatching of the affirmative-
action system insure that good diversity within the American
college system will always be replaced by bad.
Which raises the question of why such destructive policies
persist. This topic was breached briefly in the previous chapter,
and we can add to what was said there the previously quoted
128. It is true that the less selective a college tier, the more colleges there are in it (e.g.,
there are more Tier-2 schools than Tier-1s, and more Tier-3 schools than Tier-2s),
thus downward raiders can probably increase the proportion of black and Hispanic
students in their own institutions without reducing by the same proportion the blacks
and Hispanics in the lower-tiered institutions that they raid. But the fact still remains
that every black and Hispanic student upwardly ratcheted into a more selective college
deprives a less selective college of the (more healthy) diversity-enhancement value that
that student might have provided to the students at the less selective institution. Bad
diversity—stereotype-reinforcing diversity—is always substituted for good.

remarks of Alan Dershowitz and Randall Kennedy to the effect

that “diversity” often serves as a cover for more controversial
concerns—including “social justice,” a perceived need to elevate
more blacks to leadership positions, the need of white people
to protect themselves against charges of racism, etc.—that can-
not be stated publicly either because of Bakke-derived constitu-
tional constraints or fear of public backlash.
What can be said with great certainty, however, is that the
terms of the interracial contact on college campuses today are
highly unfavorable to achieving the integrationist goals that
racial pluralists and diversity advocates claim they support.
The upward ratcheting and mismatching of targeted minority
students creates a campus-wide racial atmosphere at the most
competitive colleges that practically guarantees that the goals of
diversity advocates will never be adequately achieved and that
racial self-segregation on college campuses will be the order of
the day. Those integrationist goals, however, are surely noble
and worthy of being pursued.
But if we really want to create a healthy, dignified, equal-
status kind of diversity on college campuses today—one that
demeans no group, makes no group feel superior, and really does
enrich the educational and cultural experience of all parties con-
cerned—we must move to end affirmative-action mismatching
and return to the simple idea that college admissions decisions
must be race- and ethnicity-neutral. This was the original ideal
enshrined in the 1964 Civil Rights Act before college admin-
istrators so unwisely abandoned it in the early 1970s, with all
the harmful consequences that have since then ensued. Return-
ing to the wisdom that drove the original civil rights move-
ment—including Justice Harlan’s ringing cry in the Plessy case
that “our Constitution is color-blind”—would have a salutary
effect throughout American society and would be of great ben-
efit to all. It would restore the ideal of equal status and provide

the context wherein meaningful integration can take place. The

greatest beneficiaries would be the rising generation of college
students at the more selective colleges and universities.129
129. Here’s a feisty doggerel for a new generation of campus activists:

Hey, Hey, Ho, Ho,
Racial Preference Gotta Go!
So End It, Don’t Defend It,
End It, Don’t Defend It!
We All Gain Superior Traction,
By Ridding Ourselves of Affirmative Action.
Merit Can, Merit Must,
Be the Basis of Our Trust!
So Hey, Hey, Ho, Ho,
Racial Preference Gotta Go!

V
se lling me r i t d o wn
the r i v e r
As previously explained in the introduction to Chapter III, for-

mer Princeton president William Bowen and former Harvard
president Derek Bok published to much acclaim The Shape of the
River, the first of three River Books sponsored by the Andrew W.
Mellon foundation, which dealt with the fate of black students
on some of the nation’s most selective college campuses. The
Bowen and Bok volume soon became the elite-college estab-
lishment’s unofficial defense of racial-preference policies and
was the subject of extensive commentary in the popular media
and elsewhere. In the minds of some, Bowen and Bok had put to
rest arguments against racial preferences by their most outspo-
ken critics and showed the great value to American society of
taking race into account in assembling a college class.
Using a different data set than The Shape of the River, the
two subsequent River Books—The Source of the River (2003)
and Taming the River (2009)—provided the initial results of a
projected long-term longitudinal study of students at many of
the same colleges featured in the Bowen and Bok volume, and
they offered a wealth of statistical material about the students at
those institutions derived from three separate student question-
naires. Like its two predecessors, it was clear where the authors
of River II and River III stood on the hot-button issue of affirma-
tive action. Despite offering much material from their student

276â•… selling merit down the river
surveys that for many would seem to call into question the wis-
dom of racial-preference policies, all of the River Book authors
were clearly in the camp of affirmative action defenders. “Mend
it, don’t end it!” was their collective bottom line.
In this chapter I offer a broadly based critique of the three
River books, with special focus on the last book in the series,
which seems to me to be pervaded by an even greater array of
errors and misunderstandings about the reality of race in America
than either of its two predecessors. The River Pilots, I argue, fail to
grasp the depth and intensity of opposition to racial-preference
policies on the part of large segments of the American public;
they fail to realize the powerful stigma-reinforcement effect of
such policies and their tendency to undermine the incentives of
those in the beneficiary groups to do their best in high school and
college; they fail to come to grips with the reality of dysfunctional
ethnic subcultures in America or to acknowledge their harmful
effects; and they fail to understand the effect preferentialist poli-
cies have had in lulling into indifference large segments of the
black and Latino middle class in the face of egregiously poor
academic performance by so many privileged black and Latino
youth at all levels of the American educational system.
In the final section of the chapter, I draw upon the work of
contemporary evolutionary psychology and evolutionary soci-
ology in trying to explain “why race is different” and why ethno-
racial conflicts around the world often engage such highly
charged human emotions that can so easily spin out of con-
trol into violence and ethnic riot. The River Pilots, I suggest, are
dangerously ignorant of these forces, draw largely on outdated
60s-era sociological paradigms, and fail to realize the fragility
of national unity in a nation as racially, ethnicly, and religiously
diverse as our own.130
130. This chapter is drawn from a long essay by the same title that first appeared on the
website of the National Association of Scholars (www.nas.org) in the early summer of
2009.

T he River Pilots are at it again.131 Their most recent endeavor,

Taming the River (River III, 2009), offers a detailed analy-
sis of the results of two sets of questionnaires given to a repre-
sentative sample of college students at 28 selective colleges and
universities who matriculated as freshmen in the fall of 1999.
Like their earlier work, The Source of the River (River II, 2003),
which concerned itself with the achievement of these same stu-
dents only to the mid-point of their freshman year, this newest
installment looks at a blinding complexity of student charac-
teristics and attitudes and the relationship of these to various
outcome variables (such as school retention and student grades)
traced further on into the students’ college life.
This ongoing longitudinal study was inspired by the first
River book, The Shape of the River (River I, 1998), written by
former Princeton President William Bowen and former Harvard
President Derek Bok, which used a different database (the Col-
lege and Beyond Survey), to analyze the progress of students
who had attended more than two dozen selective U.S. colleges
and universities. River I’s main conclusion was that the racial-
preference policies the two former Ivy League presidents had
done so much to promote were in general a great success and
that their critics were mostly wrong in attacking them. All three
River books have been sponsored by the Andrew W. Mellon
foundation, which William Bowen headed until 2009.
Using a different set of questionnaires to develop a fresh
data set—the National Longitudinal Study of Freshmen—the
River II and River III books look at the social and academic
131. The three River books dealt with in this chapter are The Shape of the River:
Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions,
by William Bowen and Derek Bok, 1998 (designated as River I); The Source of the
River: The Social Origins of Freshmen at America’s Selective Colleges and Universities,
by Douglas Massey, Camille Charles, Garvey Lundy, and Mary Fischer, 2003 (River
II); and Taming the River: Negotiating the Academic, Financial, and Social Currents
in Selective Colleges and Universities, by Camille Charles, Mary Fischer, Margarita
Mooney, and Douglas Massey, 2009 (River III). All three River books were published
by Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.

development of students who in 1999 entered most of the same

institutions surveyed in River I and trace their progress through
the end of their sophomore year. All three River books, although
they have multiple authors and despite the fact that the first
River book specifically claimed not to have any policy agenda
but to be merely gathering facts relevant to a more informed
public debate, are written from the standpoint of those who
passionately, even desperately, want to retain current racial-
preference policies in American universities and to minimize or
refute the claims of the policies’ many critics.
The attempt at refutation is particularly aimed at people like
Thomas Sowell and Shelby Steele, who argue that current racial-
preference policies both stigmatize their intended beneficiaries
as intellectually inferior and create a “mismatch” or “bad fit”
that often places black and Latino students in academic settings
too advanced for their individual talents and needs. Like its two
predecessors, however, River III raises issues and underscores
problems about current preference policies that readers less
committed to racial preferences will find strongly supportive of
their own doubts about such policies and sound reason for their
immediate termination or gradual phase-out.
But Taming the River isn’t only about racial-preference poli-
cies, and when it is not trying to defend “affirmative action,”
River III has genuine merit. Among some of the more intriguing
findings in Taming the River and its predecessors are these:
• Black students at elite colleges come from a much

broader range of socio-economic and educational back-
grounds than whites or Asians. While most blacks
come from what might be considered a broad middle-
class sweep of America, and almost 60 percent of their
fathers (and 54 percent of their mothers) have at least a
four-year college degree, a not-insignificant 17 percent
come from a family that some time in the past was on

welfare. Much more rarely do white and Asian students

come from families that have ever received welfare (4
percent of whites and 9 percent of Asians), and a much
greater majority of white and Asian parents have college
degrees (84 percent of the white fathers and 80 percent
of the Asian fathers) and hold managerial or profes-
sional jobs. Twice as many whites as blacks come from
households earning over $100,000 annually (51 percent
vs. 25 percent). Those from middle- and upper-middle-
class households dominate the white and Asian student
pool, while both Latinos and blacks are more spread out
on the socio-economic continuum, with a more substan-
tial lower-middle and lower-class contingent.132
• In their freshman and sophomore years Asians and
whites typically achieve around a B average in their col-
lege courses, Latinos around a B-, and blacks between
a B- and a C+. These differences seem small, but given
the grade inflation and grade compaction that charac-
terize the more competitive colleges in America (where
C grades are rare and D grades rarer still) the racial dif-
ference in GPAs is very substantial.
• Blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos, “underperform”
their entering academic credentials to the extent that
they do not do as well in terms of their grades in col-
lege as Asians and whites with similar standardized test
132. Although the River Pilots do not acknowledge it, the lower proportion of whites
and Asians from low-income households compared with their black and Latinos
counterparts is at least partially an artifact of race-conscious admissions policies that
accord huge boosts to the black and Latino poor—as well as those from better-off
circumstances—but much less of a boost to the white and Asian poor. Poor whites and
poor Asians generally do much better on the SAT than poor blacks and poor Latinos do,
but they are not what college administrators usually have in mind when they say they
want to increase “diversity.” Were a “class-based” rather than a “race-based” system
of admissions preferences adopted, there would be many more whites and Asians from
socioeconomically deprived backgrounds on elite college campuses than exist now, and
they would surely overwhelm in number their black and Latino counterparts.

scores and high school grades. This is the opposite of

what many people think, especially those who claim that
standardized tests are culturally biased. In predictive
terms such tests are indeed biased—in favor of blacks
and to a lesser extent Latinos, overestimating how well
they actually do in their college courses.
• Blacks of West Indian or African parentage are greatly
overrepresented at the more competitive colleges com-
pared to all blacks. At the Ivy League schools pre-
sented in the NLSF survey blacks with parents born
abroad—mostly those from West Indian and African
backgrounds—constitute 40 percent of all black stu-
dents, an enormous overrepresentation considering the
small percentage (approximately 13 percent) such stu-
dents represent in the total black student age popula-
tion in America. Had the definition of immigrant black
been expanded to include those with grandparents born
abroad—a definition that would include Colin Powell’s
children—the foreign-origin proportion of blacks would
be significantly greater (at the most elite Ivies perhaps
50 percent or more). Immigrant-origin blacks compete
with native-origin blacks for affirmative action slots in
elite universities, a development some native blacks find
objectionable.
• For all ethno-racial groups grades in college are strongly
affected by pre-college academic achievement, as
reflected in high school grade point average (HS-GPA),
scores on the SAT, and self-rated assessment of previous
educational quality. The level of parents’ education also
shows an independent effect on the grades their children
earn.
• When a positive self-esteem index is computed by agree-
ment with statements such as “I feel that I am a person
of worth equal to others” or “I take a positive attitude

toward myself” or by disagreement with statements such

as “I wish I could have more respect for myself” or “I
feel that I do not have much to be proud of,” counterin-
tuitive outcomes result. Using such an index, blacks and
Latinos do not reveal lower self-esteem than whites; in
fact, they have slightly higher self-esteem, although the
index scores of all three groups do not vary much. Black
males have the highest self-esteem of any of the ethno-
gender groupings. Blacks who have attended all-black
or nearly all-black high schools have higher self-esteem
than those who have attended mixed-race or predomi-
nantly white schools. Asians have by far the lowest self-
esteem of the four ethno-racial groups surveyed,showing
that the absence of self-esteem—or self-esteem condi-
tioned upon meeting very high academic goals for one-
self—may be more conducive to academic success than
simply feeling good about oneself regardless of how one
performs in the classroom.133
• Black women outnumber black men on competitive
college campuses by a factor of approximately two to
one, whereas for whites and Asians the gender ratio
is much less skewed. Since most dating and romantic
relationships are intraracial, black women are often left
without boyfriends, dates, or potential mates. Asian
males are even more likely to be without romantic
133. Many other studies have documented the high level of black self-esteem in the
face of very poor academic performance. The usual explanation given is that many
blacks disidentify or disconnect their sense of self-worth from academic achievement
and develop high self-esteem by placing greater emphasis on their success in peer
relationships, sports, partying, social life, stylish dressing, displays of “nerve,” etc. See
for instance Bruce Hare, “Stability and Change in Self-Perception and Achievement
among Black Adolescents: A Longitudinal Study,” Journal of Black Psychology, 11
(1985): 29–42; J. R. Porter and R. W. Washington, “Black Identity and Self-Esteem:
A Review of Studies of Black Self-Concept and Identity,” Annual Review of Sociology,
5 (1979): 53–74; Mary Ann Scheirer and Robert Kraut, “Increasing Educational
Achievement via Self-Concept Change,” Review of Educational Research, 49 (1979):
131–49; and Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

relationships than black women, but this appears to be

due more to their focus on academic pursuits than a
lack of opportunity.
• Those who have grown up in violent, chaotic neigh-
borhoods and households are at significant risk of per-
manent cognitive impairment and difficulty in learning
due to the effects that long-term exposure to stress hor-
mones have on the developing brain. Students coming
from such backgrounds have a diminished chance of
success in college.
• Black and Latino students coming from troubled fam-
ily circumstances often have intervening “family issues”
that interfere with their progress in college. White and
Asian students are much less likely to have family prob-
lems of this kind to deal with.
While River III, like River II, contains a good deal of inter-
esting material about the characteristics of students at America’s
more selective colleges, the book is clearly written with two over-
arching purposes in mind, all the more revealing because they
are rarely acknowledged as such. River III wants to convince the
reader, 1) that race-based preference programs, although they
display at least some of the serious harmful effects that critics
ascribe to them, are on balance of great benefit to all parties
concerned and should be retained in an improved form; and 2)
that the main reason black and Latino youth have such trouble
doing well in high school and college is because American soci-
ety segregates them in ghettos and makes them attend primary
and secondary schools in racially isolated neighborhoods from
which whites have fled.
In trying to promote their central policy prescription (reten-
tion of racial preferences) and major apologetic theme (shifting
responsibility and blame for poor black and Latino school per-
formance to the behavior of the dominant white society rather

than internal cultural deficiencies or dysfunctional family and

neighborhood socialization among the lower-achieving groups
themselves), the authors of the River books are forced to engage
in mental gymnastics that defy both common experience and
common sense. Their main problem, it seems, derives from a
cast of mind that filters social reality through a distorting lens of
60s-era left-liberal ideology and the reigning tenets of academic
political correctness and from a set of background assumptions
about race and ethnicity in America that seem oblivious or
indifferent to the many serious challenges posed to their verac-
ity by scholars who do not abide political correctness or share
left-liberal assumptions.
Simply stated, the River Pilots display an extreme insular-
ity and parochialism that keeps them ignorant of some of the
best writing on race and ethnicity emanating from critics with
perspectives different from their own. Insofar as they have read
works by critics of the policies and perspectives they favor, they
have done so superficially and often missed some of the main
challenges presented to their own left-of-center claims. River III
in particular seems to be written by and for only those sharing
its ideological viewpoint on racial issues, with only the weakest
and most half-hearted attempt to come to grips with the chal-
lenges to its Weltanschauung of those coming from opposing
camps. Again and again as I read this book I posed hypotheti-
cal questions such as, “What would they say to scholars such
asÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€, who against such a view argue thatÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€?” Rarely, if ever,
did the River authors provide an answer to such queries or seem
to be aware that very weighty and informed arguments against
their positions exist.134
134. Among the names of scholars filling in the first blank were (in no particular order):
Donald Horowitz, John McWhorter, John Ogbu, Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom,
Pierre van den Berghe, Thomas Sowell, Daniel Moynihan, Margaret Gibson, James
Flynn, Dinesh D’Souza, Orlando Patterson, Shelby Steele, Edward Banfield, Curtis
Crawford, Amy Wax, Frank Salter, Amy Chua, J. Philippe Rushton, Min Zhou, Michael
Levin, Nathan Caplan, John Derbyshire, Myron Magnet, Charles Murray, Myron

They just don’t get it! is perhaps the simplest way I can sum
up the River Pilots’ understanding of the reality of race and eth-
nicity in America. To be sure, their failing is not due to any lack
of intellectual talent—two of the River authors, William Bowen
and James Shulman, have displayed outstanding research and
critical thinking abilities in their path-breaking study of the cor-
rupting effects on educational values of the professionalization
of sports on college campuses.135 Their failing, rather, is due
entirely to the extreme ideological one-sidedness that dominates
academic sociology and the other academic disciplines from
which they draw and to the general inability of most academic
scholars to address issues of race and ethnicity in America with
any degree of honesty or candor.
In this chapter I discuss seven important truths about pref-
erential policies and race, which, in my view, all three River
books conspicuously fail to understand. While the list is not
exhaustive, it addresses what I think are the most salient and
most serious of the River Pilots’ failings.
The Stigma Harm of Racial Preferences

Let’s begin with the issue of stigma. For more than four decades
now critics of affirmative action—especially black critics—have
contended that by placing black students in institutions where
white and Asian students have the edge in terms of cognitive
development and past performance the image of blacks as intel-
lectually inferior—an image with long-standing cultural reso-
nance in America—is powerfully reinforced. The critics speak of
“stigma-creation” or “stigma-reinforcement,” a development,
they say, that produces a host of problems on college campuses,
Weiner, William Kelso, Byron Roth, Jared Taylor, Richard Herrnstein, and James Q.
Wilson.
135. James Shulman and William Bowen, The Game of Life: College Sports and
Educational Values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

including a) the creation of feelings of intellectual inferiority

and superiority apportioned by racial group membership; b)
a diminished sense of collegial camaraderie and closeness; c)
diminished academic performance and less intellectual engage-
ment by the stigmatized groups; d) resentment and condescen-
sion by the groups (i.e., whites and Asians) not preferentially
treated; and, e) tainted credentials for all those in the group
receiving the preferential treatment. The list is not exhaustive.
Oddly, in view of their strong support for preferentialist
policies, the River Pilots dispute few of these claims. Indeed,
their studies document the truth of many of them. Here, for
instance, is just a sample of what they say about some of the
problems and dilemmas encountered at the various colleges
and universities they studied with those institutions’ policies of
racial preferences:
• “In relative terms we detect a subtle but real tendency

[for the students in our survey] to stereotype groups
in a manner consistent with racist ideology. African
Americans and Latinos, in particular, are more likely
to be viewed as having characteristics that are incon-
sistent with academic success, while the reverse is true
for Asians. There is also widely shared rank ordering of
groups in terms of traits favorable to academic prog-
ress, with Asians on top, followed by whites, Latinos,
and blacks. Whites and Asians feel especially distant
from blacks and Latinos who ‘benefit from affirmative
action.’ The perception of blacks and Latinos as ‘aca-
demically underqualified’ may be exacerbated by the
presence of Asians, who are generally perceived as over-
qualified.” (River II, p. 152)
• “Failure to perform up to institutionally expected aca-
demic standards is psychologically distressing because it
implies that the stereotype may, in fact, be true: a poor

intellectual performance might convince white observ-

ers that black and Latino students indeed are intellec-
tually inferior to whites and Asians.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€. Moreover, if
black and Latino students have internalized the negative
stereotype themselves, they may adapt psychologically
by downplaying the importance of academic success
in determining self-worth and put in less effort toward
academic achievement, essentially disidentifying from
education as a domain of self-evaluation. If they fail,
they can always tell themselves that they really did not
try hard and that academic success is not that important
anyway.” (River III, p. 174)
• “Whites and Asians tended to perceive a great deal of
[social] distance between themselves and blacks who
benefited from affirmative action.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Such percep-
tions of distance from ‘affirmative action beneficiaries’
carry important implications for the general tone of
race relations on campus because one stereotype that
emergesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€is that without affirmative action most
black and Latino students would not be admitted. To
the extent that such beliefs are widespread among white
students at elite institutions, they will not only increase
tensions between whites and minorities on campus; they
will also increase the risk of stereotype threat by rais-
ing anxiety among minority students about confirming
these negative suspicions.” (River II, pp. 143, 145)
• “If white students believe that many of their black peers
would not be there were it not for ‘lowering’ of stan-
dards under affirmative action and, more important,
if black students perceive whites to believe this, then
affirmative action may indeed undermine minorities’
academic performance by heightening the social stigma
they already experience because of race or ethnicity.”
(River III, p. 189)

• “At almost every college in our sample, black students

are not only performing less well academically than
whites but also performing below the levels predicted by
their SAT scores. In fact, this underperformance turns
out to be even more important than lower test scores
in explaining the gap in class rank between blacks and
whites.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Of the overall black-white gap in average
rank in class of 30 points—obtained by subtracting the
average rank in class of black students (23rd percen-
tile) from the average rank in class of white students
(53rd percentile)—only about half of it (14 points) is
accounted for [in our statistical model] by black-white
difference in other measurable variables [like SAT scores
and high school grades].” (River I, pp. 77, 88)
• “We found that internalization of negative stereotypes
has a very strong effect in reducing academic work effort,
assessed both subjectively using self-ratings of scholarly
effort and objectively using reported hours of study,
suggesting a clear process of disidentification.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[We
also found] that externalization of negative stereotypes
is generally associated with a higher subjective perfor-
mance burden. Minority students who expect others to
evaluate them in terms of negative stereotypes feel their
performance reflects not just on themselves but on all
members of their racial or ethnic group.” (River III, p.
186)
• “WeÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€find a significant effect of institutional affir-
mative action136 on the grade performance of black and
136. The River Pilots distinguish institutional affirmative action, measured by the gap
in SAT scores between that of the average black and Latino student at an institution
and the institution’s SAT average, and individual affirmative action, measured by the
gap between an individual black or Latino’s SAT score and that of higher-scoring blacks
and Latinos in the same school who score at the institution’s SAT average or above.
About individual affirmative action they say: “Black and Latino students with relatively
low SAT scores do no better or worse than their counterparts [in terms of college

Latino studentsÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€The greater the discrepancy in SAT

scores between minority students and others on a partic-
ular campus, the lower the grades earned by individual
black and Latino students at the same campus. Thus a
sizable minority-majority test score gap within any insti-
grades] who scored at or above the average for their institution” (River III, p. 199).
They conclude from this that mismatch theory is wrong. But the SAT measure alone is
often an inadequate gauge of affirmative-action preferences in the case of individuals.
While the gap between an institution’s overall SAT average compared with the mean
SAT of all black or Latino students in that school is probably a good indication of how
far down admissions committees are reaching academically to enroll more black and
Latino students, the SAT score of any individual black or Latino, taken by itself, is not
a good indication of how far down the institution has reached academically for that
particular student in relation to other black and Latino students in the school, or how
well that student is likely to do in terms of grades. This is because racial preferencing of
underrepresented minorities involves considering black and Latino students with overall
high school academic records lower than whites and Asians, and such records include,
besides SAT scores, the high school GPA, the number and scores on AP exams, and
the overall rigor of a student’s high school preparation. Many lower-SAT-scoring black
and Latino students are no doubt admitted to an elite college because of compensating
strengths in terms of GPAs, AP course scores, and the greater rigor of the high school
program they took, and may have higher scores on such composite indices than many
of their higher-SAT-scoring black and Latino college classmates, though with overall
performance on such indices still far below the institutional average for whites and
Asians. We would not be too surprised, for instance, if a black student with, say, a 580
average on the SATs and a 3.9 HS-GPA does better in college in terms of grades than a
black classmate in the same institution who has taken similar high school courses and
achieved a 660 average on the SATs but only a 3.3 HS-GPA. For this reason, no matter
how much an institution has reached down to admit more underrepresented minorities,
one would not necessarily expect to find a strong SAT/college-grades correlation among
affirmative-action admits within that institution when SATs are considered alone.
Indeed, all of the regressions in the River studies show HS-GPA and reported rigor of
high school preparation to be a much better predictor of college grades than the SAT
(although the SAT score also counts). Had a composite index been created that included
the SAT, the HS-GPA, and the student’s reported rigor of preparation, there would
almost certainly have been found a strong correlation within an institution between past
indicators of cognitive development in high school and the college grades obtained.
What the River I authors in another context say about the graduation rates of the
lower-SAT matriculants at the more selective colleges in their survey may be relevant
here: “The most selective schools have the best opportunity to ‘pick and choose’
among applicants within every SAT category. Hence, the high graduation rates of
their matriculants in the lower SAT intervals may reflect the success of these schools in
identifying and enrolling students with below average [SAT] test scores who had other
qualities that gave them excellent prospects of graduating” (River I, p. 63). And, one
might add, the lower the SAT interval, the larger the applicant pool will often be from
which admissions deans can selectively “pick and choose” high-GPA, or high-maturity,
or harder-working students.

tution appears to create a social context that makes it

more difficult for minority students to perform academi-
cally, thus lowering the grades they earn, an outcome
consistent with the social stigma hypothesis.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The
extensive use of race-sensitive criteria under affirmative
action, when it produces a large test score gap between
minority and other students on campus, appears to
lower minority achievement in two ways. Directly, a
large test score gap creates a stigmatizing social context
within which black and Latino students find it more dif-
ficult to perform, and indirectly a large test score gap
heightens the subjective performance burden experi-
enced by minority students because of stereotype threat.
We thus confirm both the social stigma hypothesis and
the performance burden version of the stereotype threat
hypothesis.” (River III, pp. 199–200)
• “All students confront common academic, financial,
and social challenges in adapting to collegeÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€but
the pressures are generally more intense for minor-
ity groups.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Most whitesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€are probably blissfully
unaware of the racial and ethnic undercurrents that
bedevil minority students on campus, and few can likely
relate to the onus of stereotype threat or appreciate the
stigma of a heightened performance burden from affir-
mative action programs.” (River III, p. 206)
• “Our results show that students who are likely benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action are less satisfied with col-
lege than others and that those attending schools that
practice more extensive affirmative action earn lower
grades.” (River III, p. 228)
It’s a long and damning list, and the River Pilots at least
deserve credit for looking the devil in the eye and not turn-
ing away from the fact that “race-sensitive admissions” (their

alternative euphemism for racial preferences) has a dark side

that cannot be denied. Two strategies are pursued to come to
terms with this acknowledged fact that racial-preference poli-
cies have many of the serious harmful effects that critics have
long attributed to them. The first strategy, which is dominant in
River I, is to look at the issue in cost-benefit terms, and while
acknowledging considerable stigma and stereotype-threat costs,
the authors claim that these are outweighed by the many ben-
efits of having more underrepresented minorities on elite cam-
puses. Among these benefits are said to be the institution’s
demographic diversity gain and the cultural enrichment said to
flow from this diversity for all students on campus. Another
important benefit is said to be found in the meeting of pressing
social needs. American society, it is argued, needs more black
and Latino leaders, and racial preference policies at the elite
universities, the argument goes, are a major means of increasing
both the number of such leaders and the quality of their educa-
tion. Without the increased presence of blacks and Latinos at
the more competitive institutions of higher learning, America,
it is said, would be deprived of many valuable black and Latino
leaders.
The second strategy, which is dominant in River III (though
not ignored in River I and II), is to propose ways to eliminate
or reduce the stigma harm itself. This is to be accomplished, the
River Pilots say, by admissions officers, college administrators,
and college faculty convincing the specially admitted students
that they have not been admitted under lowered standards, but
rather, that they have been chosen because of important accom-
plishments or abilities that may not be captured by such things
as high school grades or scores on standardized test. “Institu-
tional efforts to maintain racial and ethnic diversity among stu-
dents,” they write, “should never be presented as involving a
lowering of the bar, a bending of rules, a making of exceptions,
or a loosening of standards to accommodate students who are

somehow lacking, deficient, or challenged on some important

dimension.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€With respect to admissions, institutions should
present themselves as looking for manifestations of excellence
and achievement in a variety of domains, of which test-taking
ability is just one, and a narrow one at that. Framed in this way,
each student is presumed to be outstanding and accomplished in
some important way.” (River III, p. 228)
It is hard to take any of these suggestions seriously, and
since the River Pilots are not lacking in normal human intel-
ligence the most charitable interpretation is that they reflect the
desperation with which they try to avoid the obvious conclusion
that the policies they have long supported do serious harm to
race relations on campus—harm that their own studies have
abundantly documented. Against the first strategy, it should be
remarked that not all diversities are good diversities and that a
stigma-reinforcing diversity artificially created by the upward
ratcheting of blacks and Latinos into institutions where they are
guaranteed to do less well on average than whites and Asians
is not a formula for healthy campus race relations. The River
Pilots’ own surveys show that white and Asian students express
a great deal of “social distance” from the black and Latino
“beneficiaries of affirmative action,” and, as explained in Chap-
ter III, their surveys probably understate the social distances
between these groups, since we know from years of polling that
the term “affirmative action” for some people means nothing
more than outreach programs rather than more controversial
preference programs. Had white and Asian students been asked
their opinion of black and Latino “beneficiaries of racial pref-
erences,” their expressed social distance would no doubt have
been much greater. It is difficult to see how more intellectually
substandard black and Latino students on college campuses
improve race relations, enrich the learning environment for the
whites and Asians, or improve the image of blacks and Latinos
in the minds of their classmates. Nor is it easy to see how such

policies will turn out better educated and more self-confident

black and Latino leaders. The studies discussed in Chapter III
by Cole and Barber, Smythe and McArdle, Richard Sander, and
the research teams of Rogers Elliott and Mitchell Chang cer-
tainly suggest otherwise.
The second strategy is even more difficult to take seriously
than the first. What could they possibly mean by “[display-
ing] excellence and achievement in a variety of domains of
which test-taking ability is just one”? And regardless of how
administrators choose to label such programs, “lowering the
bar,” “bending the rules,” “making exceptions,” and “loosen-
ing standards” are exactly what virtually everyone—including
college administrators themselves, who routinely lie about it—
actually believe racial preference programs do. This indeed, is
why there has emerged a reticence to talk about them openly, or
when they are talked about, only through euphemisms and pret-
tifying obfuscations (“race-sensitive admissions,” “affirmative
action,” “diversity”).137 The River Pilots here apparently want
college administrators to give a pep talk to the lower-achieving
black and Latino students and explain to them how valued they
are for their nonacademic accomplishments, although it isn’t
stated exactly what these accomplishments are. One supposes
the accomplishments imagined are the mere fact of coming from
an underrepresented minority group and the educational value
to the campus community that a background in such a minority
culture is believed to have.
But aside from the harmful effects that a glut of low-achiev-
ing black and Latino students will have on the image of their
group among the higher-achieving white and Asian students,
137. The Germans have a wonderful phrase for this: durch die Blumen sprechen—
“to speak through the flowers.” College presidents routinely “speak through the
flowers”—if they don’t outright lie—when talking about racial-preference policies on
their campuses since straight talk would often deeply pain preference beneficiaries and
encourage acrimonious controversy and discord.

there is the problem of the effect that an emphasis on non-

academic qualities will have on the black and Latino students
themselves. Imagine, for instance, an admissions dean, inspired
by advice given in River III, sending out an acceptance letter
something like the following:
Letter of Acceptance
Congratulations Ms. Jones! We are proud to inform you
that you have been accepted for admission to prestigious Ivy
U. as part of our ongoing commitment to racial diversity and
inclusion. We at Ivy are deeply committed to the principles
of affirmative action, and we know that you, as an African
American, will be able to bring to Ivy a distinct perspec-
tive and unique background that will enrich the educational
experience and understanding of all our students. At Ivy we
seek talent across a variety of domains, and we know that
your exceptional life experience will greatly contribute to
the rich mosaic of talented students on our campus. We are
thrilled to be able to extend our admissions offer to you and
we earnestly hope that you will be able to accept our offer
and join our entering freshman class in the fall.
Once again, our heartfelt congratulations!
Very truly yours,
Harold Irvington III
Director of Admissions
Admissions deans are not likely to send out such a letter,

although it would conform to the prescription the River Pilots
offer for making lower-achieving black and Latino students feel
welcomed and valued on highly competitive college campuses
even though they may not be equal to others in terms of narrow
“test-taking ability.” People who gain admission to prestigious
colleges usually want to think they got accepted on some gen-
uine accomplishment—if not top academic performance then

at least some valued nonacademic achievement, as in music

or sports. But being told that one is valued because one is an
African American or member of an “underrepresented minority
group” would be taken by most as both an insult to the group
(“Truth be told, Ms. Jones, without special admissions few from
your group could make it”), and to the individual given pref-
erential acceptance (“You have a pretty good scholastic record
Ms. Jones—for an African American”). Focusing on being val-
ued because of one’s race or ethnicity, or for some other non-
academic reason, would seem to be a prescription for enhancing
the disidentification—or lukewarm identification—with the
realm of learning that the River Pilots themselves believe is
partially responsible for underperformance among many black
and Latino youth. Such valuation is not likely to lead to greater
ease of integration into a white- and Asian-dominated campus
and will surely increase protective self-segregation by black and
Latino students told that their race or ethnicity is what helped
them gain admission to a competitive college.
At one point the authors of River III suggest a comparison
between the lowered standards for underrepresented minori-
ties and those for athletes and legacies, and they conclude that
just as the latter two groups are not stigmatized by lowered
standards and do not display underperformance, so wise policy
should enable the minorities to achieve similar results. But they
are clearly wrong about the stigma issue regarding recruited ath-
letes, at least those in the higher-profile sports, who are probably
even more negatively stigmatized in terms of their intellectual
abilities (“dumb jocks”) than blacks or Latinos, and the most
comprehensive study of the academic performance of recruited
athletes finds a pattern of underperformance (achieving grades
in college below that predicted by one’s SAT scores and high
school grades) very similar to that of blacks. Legacies are a dif-
ferent matter, since they usually have entering credentials better
than recruited athletes or blacks (i.e., admissions officers do not

reach down as far to accept them unless their parents are really
big-bucks donors), and not being visibly recognizable as such,
legacies are presumably less prone to the debilitating effects of
stigma and stereotype threat.138 And they also do not confront
the disincentive effects of an across-the-board system of prefer-
ences such as that in place for blacks and Latinos, which reaches
well beyond college to professional schools, graduate schools,
and jobs in the corporate sector.
The River Pilots are simply wrong to believe that percep-
tions about racial minorities who receive admissions prefer-
ences can be easily manipulated by college administrators and
faculty. Their own study in River III shows that it is their class-
mates, not college officials or faculties, who set the general tone
and determine the nature of the racial atmosphere on campus.
Derogatory comments about race or ethnicity, they report, “were
very infrequently reported from professors, staff, or others on
campus.” “The most frequent source of derogatory comments
was other students.” About a quarter (23 percent) of black and
Latino students reported hearing “derogatory remarks from fel-
low students” about their group. (River III, p. 141)
At one point in River II the authors do get candid and
acknowledge that it may not be in the power of college admin-
istrators to do much about negative stigma and the imputation
of inferiority to groups receiving special admissions preferences.
It is difficult, they say, “to design programs to overcome ‘the
threat in the air’ [of being stigmatized as inferior] that is the
hallmark of stereotype vulnerability, for this involves a manipu-
lation of students’ deepest feelings, which are often unconscious
or unacknowledged” (River II, p. 195). Even if it is possible to
improve the grade performance of those admitted under prefer-
ence programs (the River Pilots cite a successful program along
138. On recruited athletes and legacies, see the relevant sections of Shulman and Bowen,
The Game of Life.

these lines at the University of Michigan), it is still unlikely that

there will be much done to change the negative public images
that abound, particularly about black intellectual abilities,
given the deep roots such images have in the general culture and
the continued claim on the part of college administrators and
black leaders that racial-preference policies are still needed four
decades after their initial introduction. No amount of creative
relabeling, pep talks, consciousness-raising sessions, diversity
appreciation days, or the like will ever change student percep-
tions on campus if members of visibly identifiable ethno-racial
groups are admitted under different academic standards than
apply to others. This is a simple fact that the River Pilots are
hesitant to acknowledge.139
Upward Ratcheting Reinforces Negative

Stereotypes and Replaces Good Diversity
with Bad
The River Pilots, particularly in River I, make much of the
advantages they believe flow from greater racial diversity on
colleges campuses, and suggest that it is “race-sensitive” admis-
sions policies that are responsible for this greater diversity and
its many benefits. They arrive at this conclusion largely from
139. Preference critic Shelby Steele explains the situation in its simplest terms: “The
accusation that black Americans have always lived with is that they are inferiorÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€and
this accusation has been too uniform, too ingrained in cultural imagery, too enforced
by law, custom, and every form of power not to have left a mark. So when today’s
young black students find themselves on white campuses, surrounded by those who
historically have claimed superiority, they are also surrounded by the myth of their
inferiority.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€And today this myth is sadly reinforced for many black students by
affirmative action programs, under which blacks may often enter college with lower test
scores and high-school grade point averages than whites. ‘They see me as an affirmative
action case,’ one black student told me at UCLA.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€A black student at Berkeley told
me that he felt defensive every time he walked into a class and saw white faces. When I
asked why, he said, ‘Because I know they’re all racists. They think blacks are stupid.’”
Shelby Steele, Second Thoughts about Race in America (New York: Madison Books,
1991), pp. 87, 97.

responses to two items on their questionnaire for students: 1)

how much of their college experience has helped them in their
“ability to work effectively and get along well with people of
different races/cultures,” and 2) how much do they think their
institution should emphasize “a racially/ethnically diverse stu-
dent body.” The authors also infer support for racial-preference
policies from the many students who said they had gotten to
“know well” at college (usually through contacts in their dorms
or in class) two or more students of a different race.
The problems with their analysis of this issue, however,
are manifold. First, based on several of the comments from
students in their survey, much of the racial/ethnic and racial/
cultural diversity they seem to prize comes from exposure to
students who generally do not receive the kind of admissions
preferences enjoyed by many black and Latino students. “My
Vietnamese roommate,” “a student who was Muslim,” “a guy
whose family were refugees from the junta in Greece,” “[Asians
from three] different nationalities,” “a third-generation Chinese
American,” “a Saudi woman,” “an orthodox Jew,” “a guy who
had been at Eton,” “people from Tokyo”—these are some of the
people cited by their student respondents in praise of the demo-
graphic diversity they encountered on campus. None of these
people are in categories highly favored by affirmative-action
preferences. And surely some of the black and Latino students
their respondents would have met and believed to have con-
tributed to a culturally enriching campus environment would
not be affirmative-action admits—some portion of the black
and Latino students on any competitive college campus would
have been admitted on their own achievement without the aid
of racial preferences.
The River Pilots falsely assume that a generalized praise of
“diversity” by college students means an approval of all ele-
ments in that diversity and all ways in which that diversity might
be achieved, including overt racial preferences. But what polling

data we have about student opinion on these matters indicate

that this is not the case. And given the substantial degree of
“social distance” expressed by white and Asian students toward
black and Latino “beneficiaries of affirmative action” in the
River II study, it is almost certain that many students, if asked,
would not have agreed that enhancing demographic diversity
through racial preferences creates a positive kind of racial and
cultural enrichment. Incredible as it seems, in all 92 pages of
the four questionnaires that the various students in the River
studies were asked to fill out—questionnaires that contain in
sum over a thousand individual items—there isn’t a single item
asking students their opinion of the use of racial preferences (or
“affirmative action”) as a means of enhancing racial diversity
on campus, or their view on whether knowledge of the existence
of racial-preference policies has any effect on the image of black
and Latino intellectual abilities. As I have suggested in Chapter
III, the most likely explanation for such blinding omission is the
River Pilots’ conscious or unconscious fear of what the answers
might be.
We know from decades of polling that support for strict
meritocratic, race-neutral admissions policies at competitive
colleges and universities is widespread and that racial-prefer-
ence policies enjoy comparatively little support and a great deal
of passionate opposition. Recall from Chapter III the June 2003
Gallup question on this issue: “Which comes closer to your view
about evaluating students for admission into a college or univer-
sity?: a) An applicant’s racial and ethnic background should be
considered to help promote diversity on college campuses, even
if that means admitting some minority students who otherwise
would not be admitted? Or, b) Applicants should be admitted
solely on the basis of merit, even if that results in few minority
students being admitted.”
It is clear how each of the River Pilots would answer this
question as well as most college presidents. The question is

excellently worded and gets to the heart of the controversy over

racial preferences in college admissions. The choice is simple:
strict merit with no racial “plus-factoring” or some degree of
special concern for race and ethnicity to promote diversity.
Recall, however, the polling results: Of respondents express-
ing an opinion, whites favored choice “b” (strict merit even if
little diversity) over choice “a” by an overwhelming 77 percent
to 23 percent, while even among Latinos the merit-only choice
was favored 62 percent to 38 percent. Asian responses were
not reported (probably because their numbers were too small),
but one can assume a response pattern not too far from the
whites’. Only blacks preferred choice “a” (special consideration
of race to promote diversity), but only by a narrow margin—53
percent to 47 percent.140 The meritocratic, race- and ethnicity-
neutral ideal clearly has widespread support in America, at least
among the general public if not among left-leaning sociologists
140. An earlier Gallup question, first posed in March 1977 and repeated many times
in the following years, tried to gauge support for preference programs as a means of
compensatory racial justice. The question asked was this: “Some people say that to
make up for past discrimination, women and members of minority groups should be
given preferential treatment in getting jobs and places in college. Others say that ability,
as determined by test scores, should be the main consideration. Which point comes
closest to how you feel on this matter?” Every time the question was asked more than
three quarters of those who had an opinion chose the “ability as determined by test
scores option” rather than the “give preferential treatment option.” The first time the
question was posed during the Bakke controversy over racial preferences at a California
state medical school, 83 percent of respondents choose the “ability as determined by
test scores option,” while only 10 percent chose the “preferential treatment option”
(7 percent had no opinion). The fact that the question dealt with compensatory justice
rather than diversity is illuminating. In the days before Lewis Powell’s decision in
the Bakke case, which approved of racial preferences only on diversity-enhancement
grounds, compensatory justice and the need to create a stable black middle class were
the most important justifications given by proponents of racial preferences in university
and professional school admissions. Many hold that these are still the most important
reasons administrators support racial-preference programs and that their “diversity-
enhancement” rationale is merely a façade to please the courts and possibly the general
public as well. Others say a fear of being labeled a racist or insensitive to “civil rights” is
what drives support among college presidents and admissions deans for the race-based
preferences they champion.

or former college presidents who write books defending their

past policies.
We don’t have data on student views on these issues by the
students participating in the River studies (as I suggest, this is
most likely a deliberate oversight), but there are at least two
national surveys on these matters of student attitudes more
generally. One has already been cited: In telephone interviews
with a representative sample of students in 140 American col-
leges carried out by the research firm Angus Reid, overwhelm-
ing opposition to racial preferences in employment and college
admissions was found.141 To the statement, “No one should be
given special preferences in jobs or college admissions on the
basis of their gender or race,” 85 percent of students said they
either “strongly agreed” (66.7 percent), or “moderately agreed
(18.7 percent), with the statement.
In another survey by Zogby International (2000) a repre-
sentative national sample of American college students was
asked to indicate their relative agreement or disagreement with
this statement: “Schools should give minority students prefer-
ence in the admissions process.” Although this question for our
purposes wasn’t as good as the Gallup question (since it didn’t
state a reason for the minority preference), the results were
striking. Over half of the student respondents (51 percent) said
they “strongly disagreed,” another quarter (26.1 percent) said
they “somewhat disagreed,” while only 21.3 percent expressed
agreement, the vast majority of these saying they agreed only
somewhat, not strongly. More than three quarters of the college
respondents disapproved of minority-student preferences, with
two out of three of these indicating they strongly disapproved.
A large portion of college students in America clearly do not
support “race-sensitive admissions,” and this has to have an
141. Cited in Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte, “Racial
Diversity Reconsidered,” The Public Interest, spring 2003, online at www.
thepublicinterest.com, p. 4.

effect on the quality of race relations on campuses where such

admission policies have long been in place.
In River I, Bowen and Bok seem to adopt a very naïve
version of the “contact hypothesis” by which mere contact
between people of different races and ethnicities, regardless
of the conditions under which it takes place, is presumed to
enhance learning and reduce intergroup prejudice and hostility.
However, as explained in the previous chapter, the naïve ver-
sion of the contact hypothesis has been refuted by generations
of social science research as well as by the common experience
of ethnicly diverse—and ethnicly divided—societies around the
world. In many contexts contact greatly enhances prejudice and
animosity among groups. The most ethnicly diverse regions of
the world are usually among the most unstable and most vio-
lent, while the most ethnicly homogeneous regions—places like
Denmark, Japan, Barbados, and Norway—are often among the
most stable and peaceful.
Bowen and Bok at one point cite Gordon Allport’s famous
The Nature of Prejudice, first published in 1954, as “the clas-
sic explanation of ‘the contact hypothesis’—i.e., the idea that
interpersonal contact breaks down stereotypes and therefore
reduces prejudice” (River I, p. 219.n.)—and they seem to imply
that Allport adhered to their own version of contact theory.
But Allport was no naïve contact theorist. He explicitly states,
in fact, that contact reduces prejudice only under very explicit
conditions, a key one being that those making the contact are
of “equal status.” Few whites in America had more contact
with blacks than those in towns like Indianola in the Missis-
sippi Delta, which Yale researcher John Dollard studied in the
1930s in his classic Caste and Class in a Southern Town.142 And
few whites in America were as prejudiced against blacks as the
142. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1937).

residents of this Delta town. Middle-class whites in Southern

towns who encountered blacks mainly as maids, janitors, field
hands, shoeshine boys, and prison-release laborers hardly found
much reason to overcome their ingrained stereotypical views
and prejudices.143
In a similar fashion, when whites and Asians matriculate
at highly competitive institutions like those in the River I study
and the average black at those institutions graduates at the
23rd percentile, or when the whites and Asians go on to com-
petitive law schools or medical schools and the median black
has scores on standardized tests that are in the bottom 10 per-
cent of all entering students, one wouldn’t expect stereotypical
views and prejudices to be diminished. Some stereotypes in fact,
especially those involving black intellectual inferiority, will be
powerfully reinforced. What racial-preference policies and the
upward ratcheting that they involve guarantee is that white and
Asians on many college campuses and professional schools will
encounter many blacks who clearly are not of equal academic
status.
Even if one assumed for the sake of argument the truth of
the naïve contact hypothesis, none of the River Pilots comes to
143. Allport writes on this: “The jobs that most Negroes and members of certain
other minority groups hold are at or near the bottom of the occupational ladder. They
carry with them poor pay and low status. Negroes are usually servants, not masters;
doormen, not executives; laborers, not foremen. Evidence is now accumulating that
this differential status in occupation is an active factor in creating and maintaining
prejudice.” He goes on to explain that “occupational contacts with Negroes of equal
status tend to make for lessened prejudice.” “It helps also,” he continues, “if one knows
Negroes of higher occupational status than one’s own” (emphasis in original).Gordon
Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 273, 276.
If we translate this status requirement into the world of students accepted to highly
selective colleges, we might predict that the more white and Asian students encounter
black and Latino students who are equal to or above the academic performance level
typical of whites and Asians, the more their prejudices will be reduced; the more they
encounter blacks and Latinos below the performance level of whites and Asians the
more their prejudices will grow. Yale law professor Stephen Carter makes a similar point
in his autobiographical Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (New York: Basic
Books, 1991).

grips with the simple fact that the placement of black and Latino
students across the more than 3,000 undergraduate institutions
in America is a zero-sum game, whereby one school’s diversity
gain is always another’s diversity loss. This topic was taken up
briefly at the end of the previous chapter, but the story is worth
retelling. Under our current affirmative-action system, a school
like Duke takes black and Latino students away from the stu-
dent body at places like Vanderbilt and UNC, where the Duke
admits would have enrolled absent racial preferences. Similarly
Yale and Princeton take black and Latino students away from
the students at places like Boston University and Tufts, where
the specially admitted black and Latino students would have
enrolled had these higher-tiered schools not had racial prefer-
ence policies.
Tier-1 schools take students who, in the absence of racial
preferences, would be attending Tier-2 or Tier-3 schools, while
these second and third tier schools, to attain what they consider
a “decent” representation of black and Latino students, engage
in the same downward raiding vis-à-vis the schools immediately
beneath them on the selectivity scale. The effect of this upward-
ratcheting/downward-raiding process is to distribute black and
Latino students throughout the American college system in such
a way that it is guaranteed that on average the members of these
groups will be among the lowest academic performers. The very
logic of the system guarantees this result. If we take off the kid
gloves and stop pretending that the naïve contact hypothesis
is valid, what we see is that healthy diversity is always being
replaced by a very unhealthy kind—i.e., stereotype-reinforcing
diversity is put in the place of racial contacts that might genu-
inely have weakened negative stigmas and negative stereotypes.
Indeed, one can hardly think up a more diabolical system, guar-
anteed to reinforce among all parties concerned the association
of black and Latino students with intellectual inferiority, than
our current upward-ratcheting system of racial preferences in

undergraduate admissions.144 Much of the River Pilots’ own

research confirms this, but they are too ideologically and emo-
tionally committed to their past policies to suggest the obvious
remedy—end upward ratcheting and admit all students on a
race-neutral basis.145
144. Many years ago, at the very beginning of the debate over racial preferences, law
professor Clyde Summers described a similar upward-ratcheting/downward-raiding
process at work in the nation’s law schools: “The minority students given [preferences
at Harvard and Yale law schools] would meet the normal admissions standards at
Illinois, Rutgers or Texas. Similarly, minority students given preference at Pennsylvania
would meet normal standards at Pittsburgh; those given preference at Duke would meet
normal standards at North Carolina, and those given preference at Vanderbilt would
meet normal standards at Kentucky, Mississippi and West VirginiaÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€In sum, the
policy of preferential admissions has a pervasive shifting effect, causing large numbers
of minority students to attend law schools whose normal admissions standards they
do not meet, instead of attending other law schools whose normal standards they
do meet.” Clyde Summers, “Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real
Problem,” University of Toledo Law Review, 1970, p. 384, cited in Stephan and Abigail
Thernstrom, “Reflections on The Shape of the River,” U.C.L.A Law Review, June 1999,
pp. 1583 ff, footnote #70.
In this context, I might mention a recent conversation with a law professor at
a state law school in the Deep South, who related to me how, in a typical year, no
more than one black student in the entire entering class of his law school can meet the
normal admissions standards that are applied to every entering white. There are plenty
of black law school applicants in his state who could meet the law school’s higher
“white standard,” he explained, but virtually all of them receive acceptances from more
prestigious out-of-state schools, both public and private, where they invariably wind up
enrolling. Virtually every black law student enters the law school with lower test scores
and grades—often substantially lower—than the very lowest-scoring white. He went on
to explain that the law school felt it imperative to enroll a substantial number of blacks
even though almost none could meet the standards applied to whites because the law
school deans feared they would be charged with racism or “turning the clock back on
civil rights” if they adopted a uniform standard that no blacks could meet. One wonders
in this context how much white contact with the black law students as this school will
reduce white prejudice or the negative stereotyping of black lawyers-to-be.
145. Social theorist Alan Wolfe makes an interesting observation here. White students
at elite colleges, Wolfe argues, who usually come from more affluent and more liberal
households, are usually the least prejudiced against African American students, whereas
many working-class whites, who may not be as unprejudiced and who typically
attend colleges below the highest tiers, are more often in need of healthy interaction
with appropriate blacks to broaden their perspectives and reduce their prejudices. By
siphoning off those black students who could serve this role,and placing them in arenas
where they will have less of a prejudice-reducing effect, the current racial-preference
system does not do a good job of promoting better racial understanding or racial
harmony, he believes. The present system “guarantees diversity where it is needed least
and detracts from diversity where it is needed most.” (Alan Wolfe, “The Rest of the
River: A Sociologist’s Perspective,” University Business, Jan.-Feb. 1999, p. 47, cited in

Ignoring the Obvious: The Disincentive

Effects of the Racial-Preference System
From the very beginning of the affirmative-action debate in the
early 1970s, critics have charged that by granting racial pref-
erences in university and professional school admissions those
in the beneficiary categories will have less incentive to do their
best. Knowing that the bar will be lowered for them, even stu-
dents attending quality secondary schools and colleges, it was
said, will modify their effort, knowing that at the end of the
day when they apply to undergraduate schools or graduate pro-
grams they will receive a huge admissions boost.
Critics of preference policies have been repeating this claim
ever since. Granting racial preferences in college admissions,
Abigail and Stephen Thernstrom write, “is not a process likely
to encourage its beneficiaries to work hard in high school. The
message is clear: color is the equivalent of good grades. If you
don’t have the latter, the former will often do.”146 Similarly Larry
Purdy, an attorney for the plaintiffs in one of the University of
Michigan racial-preference cases, writes that “if a black student
knows that the level of academic achievement expected from
him is demonstrably lower than that demanded from his non-
black classmates, there is very little incentive to put in the work
necessary to achieve at the same level as his competitors.”147
And long before he became a River Pilot, Derek Bok, in a book
published in 1982, accurately summarized the concerns of
many critics of racial preferences (without necessarily agreeing
with them) when he observed that “some observers believe that
leading universities, by awarding a heavy preference to minor-
ity applicants, may actually sap the incentive of these students,
Thernstrom and Thernstrom, “Reflections on The Shape of the River,” pp. 1583ff, n.
165)
146. Thernstrom and Thernstrom, America in Black and White, p. 422.
147. Larry Purdy, Getting Under the Skin of Diversity: Searching for the Color-Blind
Ideal (Minneapolis: Robert Lawrence Press, 2008), p. 57.

since they will know that they do not need to receive the high-
est grades in order to gain admission to the best graduate and
professional schools.”148
Despite the common-sense appeal of such claims, this issue
is taken up in only one of the River books, where the total
treatment accorded to it amounts to less than a single page.
“Some have argued that black students underperform academi-
cally because affirmative action lowers their motivation to do
truly outstanding work,” the River I authors remark, citing the
work of the Thernstroms as an example of this claim. (River I,
p. 85) “The willingness of leading graduate and professional
schools to admit black candidates who did not rank at the very
top of their classes,” they go on, “is alleged to reduce the sense
among black undergraduates that they must get absolutely top
grades to move up academic and professional ladders.” The
River I authors then say that they “know of no way to test this
hypothesis,” but they indicate that they do not believe it is true
because “there isÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€an abundance of anecdotal information
that many black students feel intense pressure to live up to the
standards they and their parents have set for themselves,” and
“it seems unlikely that many of them would suddenly decide to
‘coast’ academically.” (River I, p. 85) At this point the issue of
potential disincentive effects of the racial preference system is
dropped, never to be taken up again, either in River I or its two
successor studies.
One suspects that a “fear of the answer” dynamic is working
on this issue, similar to that operative in the (non-)treatment of
student opinion on preferential admissions. A crucially impor-
tant area of inquiry is completely ignored, and the reasons given
are suspicious. It is certainly no more difficult to devise ques-
tions to test the “preference-system disincentive hypothesis”
148. Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1982), pp. 101–2.

than to do the same for many other hypotheses the River Pilots
test, including stereotype threat, disidentification claims, oppo-
sitional culture theory, etc. One could imagine, for instance, a
simple question like this:
On a simple agree/disagree continuum (from ‘strongly agree’

to ‘strongly disagree’) evaluate the following statement:
Since many top graduate and professional schools,
and many corporate recruiters, admit black and Latino
students who have considerably lower grades and test
scores than whites and Asians, black and Latino students
have much less reason to strive to get As in their college
courses than do their white and Asian classmates.
This would be a question easily comprehended by college

students, and the answers would certainly be revealing. Agree-
ment by a substantial number of blacks and Latinos would
surely be suggestive of some truth in the claim that there is a dis-
incentive effect to the current across-the-board system of racial
preferences, and the degree of agreement with the statement by
black and Latino students could be regressed with the degree to
which these students “underperform” their entering SAT scores
and high school GPAs. A positive correlation would confirm the
“preference-system disincentive hypothesis,” lack of such a cor-
relation would disconfirm it. Such tests using probing questions
are what quantitatively oriented social science is all about, and
the failure of the River Pilots even to take up the issue suggests
a central failing of their work (and this absence, I repeat, is best
explained by a conscious or unconscious fear of the results such
an inquiry would produce).
To the claim of the River Pilots that there is anecdotal evi-
dence that black students are often under intense pressure to
live up to the high standards they and their parents have set for
themselves, one can say this: If the authors are talking about the

pressures on blacks who have gotten into elite colleges, it is a

sure bet that these students have worked harder than their black
high school and black college counterparts who have not gotten
into such competitive institutions, and that together with their
parents they have put considerable pressure on themselves to
achieve. In any within-race comparison, blacks at elite colleges
have no doubt been among the harder-working and harder-
striving of their race. But when the comparison shifts to blacks
vs. whites or blacks vs. Asians, the situation changes—and we
don’t have to go outside the River studies’ universe or rely on
anecdotes to see this.
The River II study asked a number of questions intended
to gauge how the students in their sample rated members of
the four dominant ethno-racial groups on a number of traits,
including being “hard-working” or “lazy.” What they found
was striking. Not only did Asians and whites rate blacks and
Latinos as substantially less hard-working than members of
their own groups, but in those negative assessments blacks and
Latinos clearly agreed with them. “The group that rated blacks
as laziest,” the River Pilots ruefully report, “was blacks them-
selves.” “The stereotype of black laziness,” they explain, “seems
to have been substantially internalized by African Americans
themselves.” All groups, including blacks and Latinos, saw
Asians as the least lazy, a result the River Pilots say is consistent
with “the stereotype of the ‘hard-working Asian.’” (River II, p.
147) Blacks and Latinos were rated least hard-working, with
whites in between these two groups and the Asians.
What the River Pilots don’t acknowledge is that these lazi-
ness stereotypes may have some basis in fact, and that in addition
to the harms of internalized feelings of inferiority (stereotype
threat), strengthened by the upward ratcheting system,149 a
149. There could perhaps be no more damning indictment of the stigma-reinforcement

effect of the current upward-ratcheting system than the self-evaluations offered by
blacks and Latinos in the River II study of the intellectual abilities of the members of

“preference-system disincentive factor” may be at work here,

diminishing the level of effort blacks and Latinos put into aca-
demic achievement. They know they don’t have to do as well
as the Asians and whites among their classmates to get into the
same graduate or professional schools or to get good job offers
from large companies. Knowing the psychology of most adoles-
cents, one might predict a drop-off in work effort by many of
the members of the specially favored groups. Most adolescents,
after all, do not act like Max Weber’s restlessly striving, “inner-
worldly Puritan ascetics,” and they might be more than willing
to exchange study time for greater leisure if they do not thereby
lose out in the academic competition with many of their harder-
working classmates.
Many black critics of racial-preference policies, including
ones with long experience with black college students, have
been saying this for years. Perhaps the most outspoken critic
along these lines is the linguist John McWhorter, who taught
for many years at Berkeley. On average, says McWhorter, the
black students he taught at Berkeley, at least those who were not
of Afro-Caribbean origin, tended to be much less engaged aca-
demically than the white and Asian students in his class, and the
difference was impossible to miss. McWhorter thinks that much
of this has to do with cultural factors, including a diminished
commitment by even middle-class African Americans to an ethic
of academic achievement. Many blacks too, he says, often play
their own group vis-à-vis whites and Asians. Not only did whites and Asians rate blacks
and Latinos to be less intelligent than the members of their own group, but once again
members of the black and Latino groups agreed with this negative assessment —black
and Latino students saw whites and particularly Asians as smarter than the members of
their own group (River II, pp. 145–8; note: the mixed-up labels on Table 7.5 must be
rearranged to bring them into harmony with the results shown on the next page and in
Figure 7.2). There are no doubt many factors that go into such evaluations, including
factors completely unconnected with college admissions policies, but it is hard to believe
that such policies don’t reinforce in a powerful way the image of intellectual inferiority
of the groups receiving preferences by joining together on the same college campus
students from ethno-racial groups that have made it over a lower entrance standard
with those who have made it over a substantially higher one.

a “pitiable victim” game, which does not help their academic

progress, and he thinks there is at least some truth in Claude
Steele’s view of stereotype threat and the harm that internalized
feelings of inferiority can sometimes have on black academic
confidence and performance. But the racial “plus-factoring”
and upward ratcheting of the affirmative action system also has
a huge achievement-retarding effect, McWhorter believes, and
as we have seen in Chapter III, he offers as Exhibit A his own
past behavior in the mixed-race private high school he attended.
Recall McWhorter’s own words: “Almost any black child
knows from an early age that there is something called affir-
mative action which means that black students are admitted to
schools under lower standards than white; I was aware of this
from at least the age of ten. And so I was quite satisfied to make
B+’s and A-’s rather than the A’s and A+’s I could have made
with a little extra time and effort.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In general, one could think
of few better ways to depress a race’s propensity for pushing
itself to do its best in school than a policy ensuring that less-
than-best efforts will have a disproportionately high yield.”150
Anecdotal though it may be, McWhorter’s account here has
the ring of authenticity, at least for anyone with any knowledge
of how typical teenagers act in a typical American high school.
The knowledge that black students, and to a somewhat lesser
150. McWhorter, Losing the Race, p. 233. McWhorter continues along these lines:
“Imagine telling a Martian who expressed an interest in American educational policy:
‘We allow whites in only if they have a GPA of 3.7 or above and an SAT of 1300 or
above. We let blacks in with a GPA of 3.0 and an SAT of 900. Now, what we have been
pondering for years now is why black students continue to submit higher grades and
scores than this so rarely.’ Well, mercy me—what a perplexing problem!” (p. 233). The
huge gap in scores that McWhorter hypothetically suggests here isn’t as exaggerated as
one might suppose. Where racial-preference policies have been pursued with the most
zeal, gaps of this size actually exist. For instance, data from the University of Virginia
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show that in 2003 a black applicant
with a 950–1050 SAT score had a substantially better chance of admission to UVA
than a white applicant with a 1350–1450 SAT (See David Armor, “Affirmative Action
at Three Universities,” paper presented at the Virginia Association of Scholars Annual
Meeting, p. 3, obtainable from www.nas.org).

extent Latino students, don’t need to perform at the same level

as whites and Asians to get into the same colleges as members of
these nonpreferred groups is widely disseminated in contempo-
rary America. And while this may have no harmful effect on the
work ethic of some students, in more typical cases it probably
does. Try to imagine, for instance, how a young, bright black
teenager, with an American teenager’s typical level of maturity
and self-discipline, might react upon hearing, perhaps from an
older student or high school guidance counselor, a message like
the following (taken from the popular Princeton Review Stu-
dent Advantage Guide to College Admissions): 151
Colleges sometimes claim that their admissions departments

are “color-blind”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€but this is never true. The color of
your skinÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€can have a big effect on your chances of being
admitted to the school of your choice. Sometimes these fac-
tors can help you; sometimes they can harm you.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Here
are some important guidelinesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€Most selective colleges
would like to have more African American students than
they do, if for no other reason than that they very much
want to appear to be unprejudiced.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[If you are black]
make sure the admissions committee knows you’re black
(Attach a photograph). Selective colleges generally have less
stringent requirements for black applicants. Take advan-
tage of them. Don’t be afraid to aim high.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€You may
be able to get into schools that wouldn’t accept you if you
were white.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[If you are Asian, however] pay attention
to the following guidelines: If you’re given an option, don’t
attach a photograph to your application and don’t answer
the optional question about your ethnic background. This
is especially important if you don’t have an Asian-sounding
surname. (By the same token, if you do have an Asian-
151. Quoted in Purdy, Getting Under the Skin of Diversity, pp. 222–4.

sounding surname but aren’t Asian, do attach a photo-

graph.)Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[Many Asian students] have been extraordinarily
successful academically, to the point where some colleges
now worry that there are “too many” of these students on
their campuses. Being an Asian can now actually be a dis-
tinct disadvantage in the admissions processes at some of the
most selective schools in the country.
One can’t say for sure, of course, how various individu-

als will react to the knowledge that they will be given a huge
admissions boost because of their race (just as one can’t predict
how students will react to the admissions bar being raised for
their race). Some may see such a bonus the way local govern-
ments often view matching grants—i.e., as an incentive to put
in more effort to achieve at their maximum level. Others may
be indifferent to such admissions boosts and not alter their
effort or behavior in any way. But if one considers the typi-
cal teenager in America today it is probably safe to say that
racial “plus-factoring” will more likely lead to a slackening
of academic effort—and a correspondingly greater investment
in sports, social life, television watching, and other leisure-
time activities—than to more intense engagement with class-
room studies. John McWhorter’s response to the knowledge
that he would receive preferential treatment when he applied
to college doesn’t seem strange, even though McWhorter, a
self-described “nerd,” clearly liked the intellectual challenge
of school better than most other students. Coasting along and
letting the Asians toil away to get the higher grades they need
to get into good colleges may well be a strategy appealing to
many black teenagers even if issues like stereotype threat and
negative cultural forces weren’t at work reducing academic
effort still further.
No doubt the way students respond to admissions boosts
(or their opposite) will depend a great deal on their family and

peer cultures. But what we know about black and Latino family
and peer culture on this score is not encouraging. Recall from
Chapter III the study of nine Wisconsin and California high
schools carried out by adolescent development specialist Law-
rence Steinberg and his colleagues. The Steinberg team found
enormous differences in the degree to which different ethnic cul-
tures support academic achievement, with Asians, as usual, far
out ahead of other groups. Dramatic differences were found in
both family and peer environments in the degree to which they
encouraged mastery of school material. Not only did Asian stu-
dents encourage high achievement among themselves, but their
parents were by far the most demanding of all the groups—
blacks and Latinos lay at the opposite end of the spectrum. The
“trouble threshold” (lowest grade students could come home
with before their parents got angry) averaged A- for Asians, B-
for whites, and C- for blacks and Latinos.152
Not surprisingly, the Steinberg team found blacks and Lati-
nos to achieve the lowest grades in high school, Asians the high-
est, with whites in between. This finding is fully consistent with
the McWhorter claim that certain features of African American
culture interact with the affirmative-action preference system to
retard black academic performance. Better to lay back and take
it easy, a common black response seems to be; let the Asians
and some of the nerdier whites be the hard workers in school
and be the ones who miss out on social life, sports, and having
fun. Most American teenagers, the Steinberg team found, would
greatly prefer to be members of the “popular” crowd, the “par-
tyer” crowd, or the “jock” crowd in their high schools rather
than the “brainy” crowd153—the latter often have very low sta-
tus in many American high schools. And if you are black, you
can often get into some of the same competitive colleges as the
152. Lawrence Steinberg, Beyond the Classroom (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1996), p. 161.
153. Ibid., p. 146.

white or Asian “brains” in your school with much lower grades

and while still retaining your high-end “jock,” “popular” or
“partyer” status among your schoolmates.
Not surprisingly, Steinberg and his associates report that
while “Asian students were more likely than other students to
believe that not doing well in school would have negative con-
sequences for their future,” “black and Latino students don’t
really believe that doing poorly in school will hurt their chances
for future success.”154 And the black and Latino students may
be right. To some extent at least, given the huge racial and eth-
nic boosts they often receive in getting into competitive colleges,
and given the preferential treatment they are likely to receive
after college in graduate schools, professional schools, and the
corporate hiring world, the black and Latino students may have
correctly gauged how far mediocre grades can take them (just
as the Asian students have correctly gauged how much better
they must do than the Latinos and blacks to go as far as them in
college and beyond). If black and Latino students set their goals
on attaining the level of success in their college admittance as
that of whites and Asians of similar academic talent and aspira-
tions for college, they will have good reason to spend less time
hitting the books and taking their classroom activities seriously
than their white and Asian peers. They know, to repeat Shelby
Steele once again, that “mediocrity will win for them what only
excellence wins for others.”155
A similar process, of course, will be at work for black and
Latino students when they attend college. The authors of the
third River book note that black and Latino college students
are more likely than whites or Asians to say that they aspire
to attain a masters, Ph.D., or professional school degree. The
154. Ibid., pp. 90–1.

155. Shelby Steele, A Dream Deferred (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), p.
126.

River Pilots, however, see this as a very “troubling paradox”

because, they say, although blacks and Latinos “are more likely
than whites or Asians to aspire to attend graduate or profes-
sional schoolÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€[they] nonetheless earn significantly lower
grades.” This “probably reduces their odds of admission to top
programs.” (River III, p. 60)
The River Pilots’ concern here may be misplaced, however,
for even if black and Latino students do earn substantially lower
grades than whites and Asians, they may have just as good a
chance as the members of these higher-performing groups of
gaining entrance to competitive graduate and professional
schools. The admissions boost for being black at many of the
most competitive law schools, medical schools, business schools,
and graduate programs is often huge—larger even in standard
deviation terms than the undergraduate college boost—and
black undergraduates all know this. The post-graduate boost
for being Latino is less but still substantial. Mediocre grades for
a black or Latino student is not the same impediment to getting
into a good graduate or professional school as it is for a white
or Asian student.
Consider, for example, medical schools. According to the
American Association of Medical Colleges, the average college
GPA in the pre-med college science courses for all whites who
entered an American medical school in 2007 was 3.63, and for
Asians a near-identical 3.62. For blacks, however, it was only
3.29. This is by itself a very significant difference, given the
grade inflation and grade compaction at many undergraduate
institutions, but the spread of the black scores was much wider
than that of either the whites or Asians (black SD .43, white
and Asian SD each .29), indicating that significant numbers of
blacks with science GPAs as low as 2.9 or 3.0 were accepted
into medical schools, scores that would virtually preclude whites
or Asians. Latino science GPAs were roughly halfway between

those of the blacks and the higher-scoring whites and Asians

(mean: 3.45).156
Scores on the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) tell
a similar story. The median score on the basic science part of the
MCAT for a black admitted to medical school in 2007 was equal
to that of a white at only the 14th percentile of white admits,
and of an Asian at only the 10th percentile of Asian admits.
In other words, 86 percent of whites and 90 percent of Asians
entering medical schools did better on the MCAT basic science
section than the median black. Once again, Latino scores were
roughly halfway between those of the blacks and those of the
higher-scoring Asians and whites.
An identical pattern was shown in much earlier studies of
MCAT scores. For instance, a Rand Corporation study of admis-
sions policies at ten medical schools in the late 1970s found a
black/white gap in MCAT scores well over a standard deviation,
and a Chicano/white gap slightly less than one SD. The Rand
study calculated that a black or Chicano applicant with a bet-
ter than 50 percent chance of admission to these ten medical
schools, had that applicant been held to the same entrance stan-
dards as whites, would have reduced his admissions chances
to only about one in twenty, or 5 percent.157 From a 5 percent
admissions chance up to a 50 percent or better chance as the
bonus for being black or Chicano—can anyone imagine that
this will have no effect on many of those seeking to gain entry
into the medical profession?
The law school story is similar. Consider for instance the
University of Michigan Law School, one of the ten most presti-
gious in the nation. Like virtually all competitive law schools,
156. “MCAT Scores and GPAs for Applicants and Matriculants to U.S. Medical Schools
by Race and Ethnicity, 2007,” AAMC:FACTS, Table 19, available at www.aamc.org/
data/facts/ 2007mcatgparaceeth07.htm.
157. Albert Williams, Wendy Cooper, and Carolyn Lee, Factors Affecting Medical
School Admissions Decisions for Minority and Majority Applicants: A Comparative
Study of Ten Schools (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1979), p. x.

Michigan places a great emphasis on the LSAT, a test of several

kinds of aptitudes needed for the successful completion of a rig-
orous law school curriculum. Scores on the LSAT range from
120 to 180 (much like the 200 to 800 scoring system on the SAT
with the average score of those admitted to the very highest-
ranking schools being around 170 (at the lowest-ranked schools
admits average around 150). In 2004, a year after the Supreme
Court’s Grutter decision approving Michigan Law’s racial pref-
erence program, the median LSAT score for both white and
Asian admits was 169, just under the typical score earned by
whites at top-rated Harvard and Yale. For black admits, how-
ever, the average score was only 160. Now a 160 is certainly a
respectable LSAT score, but for a white or Asian such a score
might gain an entry ticket to a middle-range law school like
Boston University, the University of Washington, or Rutgers,
but never to a top-ten school like Michigan. Blacks essentially
compete only with one another for entry to the nations’ top law
schools, all of which practice a system of de facto race norming
and (slightly flexible) quota admissions (though none of them
will admit this publicly). Black LSAT scores need not be, and
usually are not, competitive with those of whites and Asians.
Indeed, at Michigan in 2004, a 75th percentile black admit had
an LSAT score significantly lower than that of a 25th percentile
white or Asian admit (164 vs. 167). Latino LSAT scores were
much better than those of the blacks (mean 166 vs. the black
mean of 160) but still significantly behind those of the whites
and Asians.158
The lowering of the bar for underrepresented minorities
in law schools extends to the college GPA as well. A study of
Michigan Law School applicants submitted during the litigation
over the Grutter case indicated that in 1995 the average GPA
158. The LSAT data come from Althea Nagai, “Racial and Ethnic Admission Preferences
at the University of Michigan Law School,” Center for Equal Opportunity, Sterling, VA,
2006, p. 10, obtainable at www.ceousa.org.

for white admits was 3.68, that of blacks only 3.33. Of students
with college GPAs in the 3.25 to 3.45 range and LSAT scores
near the 75th percentile of the national distribution, 51 whites
applied to Michigan in 1995, 14 Asians, and 10 blacks. But
only one of the whites in this credential range was admitted to
Michigan’s elite law school that year (1 out of 51), while none
of the Asians were (0 out of 10). Blacks had a much easier time
of it: all of the blacks in this credential range (10 out of 10)
were accepted, although their grades and test scores would have
virtually precluded them from admission had they been white or
Asian.159 How reasonable is it to think that knowledge of such
lowered standards will not filter down to the black sophomores
and juniors at various Michigan colleges who plan on attending
Michigan or some other elite law school? And given the knowl-
edge of such lowered standards, how reasonable is it to think
that this will not negatively affect the behavior of many of those
who know they can get into great law schools like Michigan’s
without having to match the performance of their white and
Asian classmates?160
159. R. Lawrence Purdy, “Prelude: Bakke Revisited,” Texas Review of Law and
Politics, 7 (2003): 323.
160. There is reason to believe that racial preferences at leading graduate and professional
schools may even retard the learning of students who have no realistic hope of gaining
admission to such schools. Vanderbilt Law School professor Carol Swain offers the
following observation about the beliefs of many black students she encountered as an
undergraduate in the 1980s. “As an older undergraduate student in the 1980s, I often
encountered other black college students struggling with grade point averages at or
below a 2.00 on a 4.00 scale who voiced aspirations of wanting to become lawyers and
doctors. If I challenged them directly by responding, ‘But I thought you needed a 3.0
to get into law or medical school’—almost invariably the student would respond, ‘Oh,
they have to let us in. They have to let us in, because of affirmative action.’ Now, I don’t
believe that many of those students were actually admitted to professional schools, but
the misinformation led some genuinely to believe that traditionally white professional
schools were obligated to take them, regardless of their less-than-stellar performance.
This perception, I believe, affected how hard these students trained. The knowledge
of affirmative action’s double standards no doubt caused some to neglect burning the
midnight oil.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Could such beliefs be a factor in the well-documented fact that black
students in college underperform their SAT scores—that is, black students with the same
SAT scores as whites exhibit a considerably lower performance in college than white
students?” (Academic Questions, spring 2006, pp. 48–9)

Why the Best Blacks Underachieve the Most

The disincentive effects of the racial preference system to which
critics like McWhorter draw attention helps to explain a phe-
nomenon that the River Pilots find utterly baffling. It has long
been known, and confirmed by the River studies themselves,
that “in highly selective colleges and universities, it is the black
undergraduates with the highest [standardized] test scores who
tend to perform the furthest below their potential.” (River I,
p. 89, n.) At least at the most selective schools, the authors of
River I write, “underperformance appears to increase as the test
scores of black students (who could be admitted even under a
race-blind policy, and who have the least reason to feel out-
matched intellectually) who perform the furthest below their
potential.” (River I, p. 262) The authors of River I then use
this fact to cast doubt on the claim “that admissions policies
account for underperformance” or have anything to do with
increasing the salience of stereotype threat (“it seems likely that
such stereotypes are less a product of race-sensitive admissions
policies than of deep-seated prejudices that long antedate these
policies”). Clueless in answering the puzzle presented, the River
I authors are forced to conclude that “no one has yet shown
definitely why minority students tend to underperform.” (River
I, p. 262)
The authors of River II and III will later concede (against the
earlier doubts of the River I authors) that admissions policies
do have very significant effects on stigma reinforcement and the
salience of stereotype threat (in Rivers II and III both are shown
to increase at institutions granting the largest racial preferences).
But they agree with the River I authors that preferentialist admis-
sions policies cannot explain the disturbing fact that it is those
black students at elite universities with the highest SAT scores and
high school GPAs—who have the least reason to feel stereotype
threat or inferiority to the average white or Asian student—who
show the greatest gap in their college grade performance when

compared to whites and Asians of similar entering credentials.

They are just as clueless as the River I authors in trying to explain
this mystery.
The mystery, of course, is not difficult to solve once one
considers the effect of system-wide racial preferences, including
those in grad school, professional schools, and corporate hir-
ing. For preferentialist policies do not end at the undergradu-
ate level but proceed through all levels of the current American
educational and occupational system. And the same reasons
for expecting harmful effects on the grade performance of the
higher-end black high school students (like John McWhorter)
apply to their counterparts in college.
Preferentialist policies would seem to have at least two types
of grade-depressing effects in highly selective undergraduate
schools. First, by bringing together on the same college cam-
pus black or Latino students who, however strong within their
own group, are less academically accomplished than the aver-
age white or Asian student, such policies enhance the effect of
stereotype threat (i.e., feelings of intellectual inferiority caus-
ing the less prepared members of traditionally stigmatized
groups to choke on exams and to disidentify with the realm
of academics). But probably more important as a retardant to
grade achievement, particularly for the better-prepared blacks
and Latinos, is the fact that the pervasive system of preferences
beyond the undergraduate college, including that in leading
graduate and professional schools, makes it possible for black
and Latino students to gain entry to those institutions at much
lower grade achievement thresholds than those of their white
and Asian classmates. If they can get into institutions beyond
college equally prestigious as those of their white and Asian
classmates (even those smarter or better prepared than they are)
while doing less work and striving less relentlessly, many will
surely take this easier path to success. Those internally driven
to perform at their maximum, or those who receive intense

achievement pressure from home, might behave otherwise, but

the more typical black and Latino student will not.161
Given this reality, one should not be surprised if the great-
est degree of underperformance comes from the best prepared
black and Latino students at the most selective undergraduate
colleges. This is because as one ascends the selectivity scale in
graduate schools, business schools, and various other profes-
sional schools, the premium given for being black or Latino
rather than white or Asian often increases as the best schools
scramble to enroll the highest-achieving blacks regardless of
how far they may lag behind the highest-achieving whites or the
highest-achieving Asians. The more that Asians and whites tend
to outperform blacks and Latinos at the high end, the greater
the “plus-factoring” boost that those blacks and Latinos who
are better than most of their same-race classmates can count on
receiving. For the very highest black and Latino achievers there
is another factor—a “ceiling effect”—i.e., those blacks nearer
the top of the black national distribution know that even with
substantially lower grades and test scores than the highest-scor-
ing whites or Asians, they will still be able to get into top-end
institutions, and there is no going beyond the top.
The very best blacks and Latinos at the better undergradu-
ate schools will have these two reasons (more generous “plus-
161. In a Working Paper (#11464) of the National Bureau of Economic Research

(available at www.nber.org), economists Roland Fryer and Glenn Loury label as a myth
the claim that “affirmative action undercuts investment incentives” by students in their
schooling (p. 10). But by their own reckoning this statement is unwarranted if by myth
one means (as they clearly do mean) falsehood. On the question of how affirmative-
action preferences influence the incentives of students to strive to do well in school,
the authors correctly note that “economic theory provides little guidance on what is
ultimately a subtle and context-dependent empirical question.” But if this is true—and it
probably is—then calling the preference-disincentive theory a myth is just as unfounded
as calling it a truism. If we look at those empirical studies with some relevance to this
issue, however, with the extensive study of the Steinberg team surely being among the
more important, there is sound reason for asserting the strong likelihood that racial-
preference policies diminish the incentives of many black and Latino youth in America
today—who receive the least peer-group and home pressures to do well in school—to
perform to their maximum.

factoring,” “ceiling effects”) to feel less pressured to do as well

in terms of grades as their white and Asian peers in order to
get admitted to those more prestigious schools to which they
and their lighter-skinned classmates seek admission. Disincen-
tive factors of this kind will work by themselves or in combina-
tion with any black-specific or Latino-specific cultural factors to
lower grade achievement.
To add flesh to these speculations I will conclude this sec-
tion with the story of Annette (not her real name). Annette was
a black student in one of my civil liberties precept classes at
Princeton a number of years ago; she was clearly the best stu-
dent in a nearly all-white class. Whenever Annette spoke, her
remarks were always intelligent, thoughtful, on-topic, and well-
articulated; she was an ideal participant in her student discus-
sion group. Her written work was equally top-shelf, and she
received accordingly the highest grade in the class.
A year later when Annette was applying to law schools she
asked me if I would write a recommendation letter for her, a
request I was more than happy to honor, given her outstand-
ing performance in my class. From the personal resume she
handed me, I learned that Annette had scored 1500 on the SAT
(combined math and verbal scores)—an impressive feat under
any circumstances but doubly impressive for someone who had
attended what I knew to be a decent but not top-rated pub-
lic high school in a lower-middle-income area of Long Island.
(Most Princeton students have attended high-end public high
schools or quality private schools and typically average about
1450 on the SAT).
But Annette’s college GPA, also listed on her resume, was
less impressive—only a very mediocre 3.4, which, given the
grade inflation and grade compaction over the years at Princ-
eton, was surely not an achievement commensurate with her
clearly displayed academic talent. Here was a clear case of what

the social scientists were writing about when they talked of

“underperformance” by blacks at the high end.
The major theories then fashionable at the time flashed
through my mind—was this a case of “stereotype threat”?
“Oppositional culture”? “Fear of acting white”? But in Annette’s
case none of these theories made any sense. Annette was smarter
than the average white or Asian student at Princeton—and she
knew it, as one could readily discern from her deportment and
her self-confidence. There was obviously no stereotype threat
here. Annette liked to say smart things in class, she was not anti-
intellectual, and she exuded an independent-mindedness that
suggested lack of excessive concern with what other students
thought of her. I was completely baffled by her GPA situation.
The theories of John Ogbu and Signithia Fordham seemed as
inapplicable in her case as those of Claude Steele and Joshua
Arenson.
It was only after reading John McWhorter’s account of the
reasons for his more laidback approach to the challenges of his
high school classes that it all came together. “Of course!” I said
to myself, “that’s it! That’s Annette!” Annette knew she was
among the smartest black students at Princeton, that she would
probably do very well on the LSAT, just as she had done out-
standingly well on the SAT, and that top law schools look high
and low for black students of her intellectual caliber. Even with
a 3.4 average, she might reasonably think, she would get into
some top law school. She doesn’t have to do as well as the white
and Asian students at Princeton to achieve this.
And if Annette did think this way, she was hardly proved
wrong—Annette was accepted into Harvard Law School, even
though a 3.4 GPA would virtually preclude acceptance of a
white or Asian student. At last here was a highly plausible the-
ory to explain the underperformance of students like Annette.
But the River Pilots aren’t interested.

A Pernicious Palliative: Fostering Middle-

Class Black Complacency
Middle-class black parents, like all parents, enjoy bragging
when their sons or daughters get accepted to prestigious col-
leges such as those studied in the three River books. In none
of the River books, however, is the question ever raised about
whether substantially lowering the entrance standards for black
students or members of other groups might affect the degree to
which parents push their children to do well in high school to
gain entry to prestigious institutions. Just as the possibility of
a “preference-system disincentive effect” operating on college
students who want to get into good graduate or professional
schools is effectively ignored, so there is no discussion whatever
of possible effects on the behavior of the parents and teach-
ers of college-bound high school students—or the high school
students themselves—of lowering standards for undergraduate
admissions. As will be shown in the next section on The Game
of Life, this omission is in sharp contrast to what the River
Pilots have to say when the topic becomes the professionaliza-
tion of college sports and the pernicious effects they believe this
has on the attitudes and behavior of high school students and
the various adults in their lives.
Although River III gives much attention to that minority of
black students at elite colleges who come from dangerous urban
neighborhoods and suffer from years of exposure to high rates
of crime and disorder, the great majority of the black students in
both the College and Beyond Survey (River I) and the National
Longitudinal Study of Freshmen (River II and III) come from
a broad middle class, with many having attended decent inte-
grated schools in relatively safe suburban neighborhoods. Many
come from households where at least one parent has a four-year
college degree, and significant portions have parents with a grad-
uate or professional degree. “The C&B schools,” the authors of
River I write, “unquestionably continue to contribute to social

mobility. However, they do so today primarily by giving excel-

lent educational opportunities to students from middle-class
backgrounds. The academically competitive environment of
these schools—both private and public—makes it unrealistic to
expect them to serve large numbers of students who come from
truly impoverished backgrounds.” (River I, p. 50)
But what are the effects of granting huge amounts of racial
bonus points to black students who have grown up in commu-
nities like Shaker Heights, Ohio, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
Madison, Wisconsin, Mount Airy, Pennsylvania—or similar
middle- or upper-middle-class towns from which many of the
African Americans attending highly selective colleges in Amer-
ica often come? We can only speculate, but one thing we do
know: African American students growing up in such towns are
not doing well in high school compared with their white and
Asian peers.
Harvard economist Ronald Ferguson has been working
since its founding in 1999 with the Minority Student Achieve-
ment Network (MSAN), a consortium of 15 public school dis-
tricts spread across ten states, each of which has a mixed-race,
middle-to-upper-middle-class student body. These affluent dis-
tricts have come together in the MSAN consortium because of
their common concern about the uniformly low achievement of
black students in their schools in comparison with the whites
and Asians. Ferguson has analyzed a good deal of data from
these 15 districts, and the results are always depressingly the
same: even when black students are matched with whites and
Asians for family-background factors like parental education
or number of books in the home, black students do consider-
ably worse in terms of their grades in school. And the gap in
grades increases as one ascends the socioeconomic (SES) ladder
of parental backgrounds.
In a 2001 survey of over 34,000 seventh to eleventh grad-
ers in these 15 MSAN districts the black/white gaps in overall

grade-point averages were as follows: .14 for the lowest SES

group (2.38 vs. 2.52); .26 for the second SES group (2.65 vs.
2.91); .48 for the third SES group (2.88 vs. 3.36); and .50 for
the highest SES group (3.18 vs. 3.68). The black/Asian gaps
were similar, though greater for the lowest two socioeconomic
groups, where Asians substantially outperformed both blacks
and whites. (No figures for Latinos were given).162
Even at these privileged schools, and even when differences
in many important family background characteristics are statis-
tically controlled, black students continue to lag substantially
behind whites and Asians in terms of the grades they earn in
their high school courses. And Ferguson also found that blacks
were much less likely than Asians or whites to be enrolled in
honors or Advanced Placement courses. In these affluent, low-
crime suburban settings the familiar Asian-white-black hierar-
chy of academic achievement was still observed.
One of the MSAN school districts—Shaker Heights, Ohio—
we have encountered before in John Ogbu’s study described in
Chapter III. Recall Ogbu’s findings: black students at Shaker
Heights high school were much less engaged in the academic
side of school compared with whites (“low-effort syndrome”)
and got much lower grades. Whites were not necessarily aca-
demic work horses, Ogbu discovered, but they were not nearly
as indifferent to their studies as the typical black student. While
Ogbu did not find the overt hostility to academic achievement
among Shaker Heights blacks that he and Signithia Fordham
found in their much-publicized study of an inner-city D.C. high
school—where academic striving was dismissed by many as
“acting white”—there was a discernable difference, he found,
between the white and black school cultures in Shaker Heights,
162. Ronald Ferguson, “What Doesn’t Meet the Eye: Understanding and Addressing
Racial Disparities in High-Achieving Suburban Schools,” Wiener Center for Social
Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002, Table 3b, p.
34.

with the black culture much less supportive of high academic

achievement.
In addition to any black-specific historical and cultural fac-
tors that are probably at work here,163 one suspects something
like a McWhorter Factor produced by the interaction of the
typical fun-loving teenage mentality in America with the gener-
ous bonus-granting system that is subscribed to by almost all
of the most prestigious colleges in America when it comes to
the entrance requirements for blacks. To quote Shelby Steele
again: “elite universities in America have offered the license not
to compete to the most privileged segment of the black youth.
Infusing the atmosphere of their education from early childhood
is not the idea that they will have to steel themselves to face stiff
competition but that they will receive a racial preference.”164
Steele contrasts this you-needn’t-perform-up-to-the-white-
standard message—which he considers condescending, insult-
ing, and ultimately self-defeating—with the proud message he
received in the pre-affirmative action days of his youth. Steele
remembers well the year before he entered college the admoni-
tion of Martin Luther King, Jr., in a speech King delivered in
Chicago:
The summer before I left for college, I heard Martin Luther

King speak in Chicago, and he laid it on the line for black
students everywhere: “When you are behind in a footrace,
the only way to get ahead is to run faster than the man in
front of you. So when your white roommate says he’s tired
163. Besides McWhorter’s Losing the Race, the most important “culturalist”
interpretations of poor black academic performance include Thomas Sowell’s Rednecks
and White Liberals (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2005); Orlando Patterson,
The Ordeal of Integration (Washington, D.C.: Civitas/Counterpoint, 1997); Dinesh
D’Souza, The End of Racism (New York: The Free Press, 1995); John Ogbu, Minority
Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York:
Academic Press, 1978; and Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom, No Excuses: Closing the
Racial Gap in Learning (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).
164. Shelby Steele, A Dream Deferred (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), pp. 126–7.

and goes to sleep, you stay up and burn the midnight oil.”
His statement that we were “behind in a footrace” acknowl-
edged that, because of history, of few opportunities, of rac-
ism, we were, in a sense, “inferior.” But this had to do with
what had been done to our parents and their parents, not
with inherent inferiority. And because it was acknowledged,
it was presented to us as a challenge rather than a mark of
shame.165
There are a number of other groups like the MSAN con-

sortium that are focused on raising the performance level of
the more privileged African American school children, perhaps
following W.E.B. DuBois’s injunction about the importance to
any group of cultivating its Talented Tenth. But it is not clear
that they have had any notable success. Part of the problem is
surely the lack of any sense of crisis. There is a palpable sense of
indifference among the black parents featured in Ogbu’s study
of Shaker Heights, and one suspects this is an all-too-common
phenomenon in a world in which black children do not have
to meet the high entrance standards of their white and Asian
classmates. Racial-preference policies, Abigail and Stephen
Thernstroms trenchantly observe, have served as a “pernicious
palliative,” promoting complacency and indifference among
parents and educators who should be alarmed when even the
most privileged black students fail to reach the highest bar.
“For a generation now,” the Thernstroms write, “prefer-
ences in higher education have served as a pernicious palliative,
deflecting our attention from the real problem: the yawning
racial gap in educational performance among elementary- and
secondary-school pupils. As long as the average black high-
school senior reads at the eighth-grade level, efforts to engineer
165. Shelby Steele, The Content of Our Character (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p.
138.

parity in college, let alone in the legal and medical professions,

are doomed to failure.”166 At the very least, one would like to
have seen the River Pilots discuss this issue with some degree of
seriousness, even if they were to reach very different conclusions
from those of the Thernstroms and other critics of preferential-
ist policies. Surely it is a topic too important to ignore.
Poverty and Segregation or Dysfunctional

Subcultures?
One of the more illuminating sections of River III deals with
the harmful effects on learning of growing up in a low-income,
all-black neighborhood with high rates of crime, disorder, and
delinquency. The harm they show has not only a sociological
and psychological component but also a powerful biological and
endocrinological aspect,which can lead to effects on the brain
that permanently damage those who have been exposed long
term to violent and chaotic neighborhoods. When “someone is
compelled by poverty and discrimination to live in a dangerous
and violent neighborhood,” they write, the body continues to
turn out stress hormones such as adrenaline and cortisol, and
this, over time, “has profound effects on cognition, reducing
long- and short-term memory, lowering frustration thresholds,
limiting attention spans, and interfering with the neural chemis-
try of learning itself.” (River III, p. 152)
In addition to the cognitive impairment that living in such
neighborhoods entails, college students from such backgrounds,
the authors show, have a much greater than average likelihood
of having to deal in their college years with pressing “family
issues” that detract from their college studies. The River Pilots
on this score make a thoroughly convincing case for the multiple
166. Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom, “Racial Preferences: What We Now Know,”
Manhattan Institute for Public Policy website, www.manhattan-institute.org, first
published February, 1999.

disadvantages those who have grown up in black-ghetto-like

circumstances must endure in their college studies, even when
such students are on full scholarships and living in idyllic sur-
roundings on safe college campuses. While the River Pilots tend
at times to treat such cases as modal for blacks—thus drawing
attention away from the much larger contingent of black college
students in their study who have not grown up among the crime-
ridden, ghetto poor167—their discussion of the many impedi-
ments to learning that the ghetto-reared black student must
endure is most illuminating and should teach us to appreciate all
the more the achievements of those who have had to overcome
such great adversities.
167. In giving the impression at times that impoverished blacks are typical of the black
college students surveyed, River III breaks a very wise rule enunciated in River II:
“Picking a black student at randomÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€one would be hard-pressed to make an accurate
guess about his or her background. He or she could be the heir to a sizable fortune, the
child of affluent, married professionals, the son or daughter of high-school-educated,
working-class parents, or the child of a single welfare mother who dropped out of
school in tenth grade. If one were to assume anything about a randomly selected black
student, one would be wrong most of the time, and if one’s behavior toward that student
were conditioned on this assumption, it would be very likely to cause offense. To the
extent that affluent blacks resent being treated like they are poor and poor blacks resent
being treated as if they are rich, all will find plenty of company with whom to share
their resentments.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The obvious lesson for professors, administrators, and students
is to resist making assumptions and attributions about the backgrounds of black or
Latino students. Rather, one should suspend judgment until relevant personal facts can
be gathered. Assumptions made about the class origins of Latino and black students
are very likely to be wrong, creating considerable potential for miscommunication,
misunderstanding, and resentment. The wisest course is to resist the natural human
tendency to make attributions according to group markers, and to treat Latinos and
African Americans as individuals rather than representatives of social categories.
Come to think of it, this is not bad advice for navigating social life in general.” (River
II, p. 200) One might add here, that if we really want “to treat Latinos and African
Americans as individuals rather than representatives of social categories” we should
stop classifying the student population by race and ethnicity, end affirmative action and
all forms of differential treatment according to what ethno-racial categories students fall
under, and return to the color-blind ideal that inspired the 50s- and 60s-era civil rights
movement and the 1964 Civil Rights Act (see Chapter I). The fact that such a call “to
treat everyone as individuals” could be made by the authors of River II suggests how
deeply rooted the individualist perspective is in the American psyche, and how, in their
more lucid moments, not even left-leaning sociologists are immune to its appeal.

Where the River Pilots go wrong is in defining the black

ghetto problem as simply one of “segregation,” or “segrega-
tion and poverty.” For instance, in a chart labeled “The Effects
of Racial Segregation on Academic Achievement,” they draw
simple one-way causal arrows suggesting that “segregation”
leads to “exposure to disorder and violence,” and this disorder
and violence then are seen as producing both “reduced cogni-
tive skills” and various “negative events in family networks”
that have a harmful effect on academic achievement—effects
that carry over beyond the ghetto into the integrated college
campuses where students from such backgrounds must struggle
to learn. Although they offer no recommendation for improv-
ing the ghetto situation, the fact that the problems are all seen
to derive almost entirely from being “segregated” by and from
whites, suggests that their real heart may be in a renewal on a
grand scale of busing initiatives, aggressive fair-housing poli-
cies, and reinvigorated antipoverty programs in order to reduce
the racial and class segregation that they believe has such harm-
ful consequences on long-term cognitive development.
“Because of the pervasiveness of segregation in American
life,” they write, “the interpersonal networks of many African
Americans and Latinos inevitably include friends and relatives
who attend minority-dominant schools, inhabit racially iso-
lated neighborhoods, and thus continue to experience the risks
of life in a poor, segregated setting.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Students who come
of age in segregated schools and neighborhoods experience
higher levels of disorder and violence than those in integrated
settings.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Even if black and Latino students themselves grew
up under conditions of integration, many people within their
extended network of friends and relatives will still live in segre-
gated communities.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Segregation, in combination with high
rates of black and Latino poverty, produces elevated rates of
social stress, which undermines academic performance in sev-
eral ways: by distracting students psychologically from their

studies; by compromising their physical and emotional well-

being; and by necessitating competing investments of time,
money, and energy to attend to family and personal issues.
Through no fault of their own, minority students continue to
be enmeshed in a web of social relationships that, owing to
the pernicious effects of segregation, undermine their academic
performance on campus.” (River III, pp. 153–4)
The problem with their analysis here, which derives largely
from Douglas Massey’s ideas in his influential American Apart-
heid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (co-authored
with Nancy Denton),168 is that as a matter of historical record
racial segregation and the isolation from mainstream American
culture that they produce have not always been bad things in
168. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). The thesis
of American Apartheid is very simple: the major cause of the many problems among
blacks, particularly urban blacks, is a) the white dislike of, discrimination against, and
avoidance of African Americans—in a word, white racism; which, b) leads to the social
isolation of blacks in geographically confined neighborhoods and ghettos; which, in
turn, c) produces all the social pathologies of isolated black communities, including
high rates of crime and delinquency, poor school performance, family disintegration,
prostitution, drug addiction, etc. There is hardly a hint in American Apartheid that the
causal arrows go in the other direction as well, i.e., that the high incidence of social
pathologies in many urban black communities is mainly responsible for the white (and
Asian, and Mideastern, and middle-class black) avoidance of those communities. Nor
is there any serious attempt to come to terms with the fact that groups in the past that
have been at least as socially and geographically isolated as the most isolated of ghetto
blacks today, due to linguistic, cultural, or discriminatory barriers (like the Chinese in
the Chinatowns, the Jews on the Lower East Side of New York, or medieval Jews in
the European ghettos) have not displayed anything like the pattern of maladjustment
to the opportunities of urban life as many urban African Americans in the post-civil
rights era. American Apartheid is written with a transparent and overriding exculpatory
and apologetic purpose that seeks to place the blame for black ghetto pathologies
almost entirely on the shoulders of wicked or unfeeling whites and their ongoing racist
behavior, while ghetto blacks themselves are seen as passive pawns of hostile outside
forces in a game over which they have little if any control. The very terms “segregation”
and “apartheid” in the title of the book are designed to evoke images of the white
supremacist regime in the Jim Crow South and its equivalent in South Africa and to
suggest that in the post-civil rights era little has changed. The black ghetto problem is
really a white oppression problem—a problem of white racist malevolence, hostility,
and indifference. If change is to come, it is white people who need to do the changing.
Ghetto blacks are blameless.

the lives of the segregated and isolated people at least if one is

looking at outcomes like group cohesiveness, family stability,
avoidance of crime and violent behavior, effective socialization
of children, general cognitive development, and academic per-
formance in school. The results of such segregation and isola-
tion clearly depend on the internal strengths and weaknesses
of the group involved, something the River Pilots, with their
apologetic and exculpatory purpose, refuse to acknowledge.
For certain racial and ethnic minorities, segregation and social
isolation have helped them pull together as a people and often
resist the corrupting effects of a surrounding culture much less
self-disciplined and effective in socializing its youth than their
own.
The classic examples here are the Chinese and Japanese on
the West Coast in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Although they were subject to racist white attitudes and dis-
criminatory laws, denied the right to pursue certain professions,
excluded for a time from the California public schools, denied
the right to testify in court, and made the targets of discrimi-
natory immigration laws, the Chinese and Japanese in their
Chinatowns and Japanese neighborhoods in the period before
the Second World War nevertheless managed to maintain high
levels of group cohesiveness and very low levels of crime and
family disruption. Given their linguistic and cultural barriers,
their social isolation must have been at least as great as any
black in the inner-city ghetto today or any Latino in the barrio.
However, the trajectory of their group advancement was very
different from that of blacks or Latinos. Indeed, by the latter
decades of the twentieth century they would be among the best
educated, most law-abiding, least drug-addicted, and most eco-
nomically successful ethno-racial groups in America.
“The experience of the Chinese and Japanese,” write James
Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein in their classic study,Crime
and Human Nature, “suggests that social isolation, substandard

living conditions, and general poverty are not invariably associated

with high rates of crime among racially distinct groups.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Dur-
ing the 1960s, one neighborhood in San Francisco had the lowest
income, the highest unemployment rate, the highest proportion
of families with incomes under $4,000 per year, the least educa-
tional attainment, the highest tuberculosis rate, and the highest
proportion of substandard housing of any area of the city. That
neighborhood was called Chinatown. Yet, in 1965 there were
only five persons of Chinese ancestry committed to prison in the
entire state of California.” 169
Wilson and Herrnstein go on to explain how “the low rate
of crime among Orientals living in the United States was once
a frequent topic of social science investigation. The theme of
many of the reports that emerged was that crime rates were
low not in spite of ghetto life but because of it. Though Orien-
tals were the object of racist opinion and legislation, they were
thought to have low crime rates because they lived in cohesive,
isolated communities.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€When crime rates did rise among Ori-
entals, the rise was typically explained as the result of the failure
of the familial and cultural heritage of the group combined with
‘disorganizing contacts with [white] Americans.’Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€What is
striking is that the argument used by social scientists to explain
low crime rates among Orientals—namely, being separate from
the larger society—has been the same as the argument used to
explain high rates among blacks.”170
Not only did the Chinese and Japanese in California display
low rates of crime and delinquency and high levels of family and
group cohesiveness but their children did outstandingly well in
school. Indeed in the early decades of the twentieth century the
Chinese and Japanese children were often the darlings of their
white school teachers, who found them better-behaved and more
169. James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 473–4.
170. Ibid.

eager to learn than their white American counterparts. “The

new generations of Chinese children born in America,” Thomas
Sowell writes, “encountered many of the language difficulties of
other immigrants and sometimes attended schools explicitly seg-
regated (as in San Francisco at the turn of the century) or with a
concentration of Chinese children due to residential concentra-
tion. The Chinese children did equally well in school whether
concentrated in all-Chinese schools or scattered among other
ethnic groups. Some early studies of Chinese IQs showed them
below the national average, but by the 1930s, Chinese young-
sters’ IQs were at or above the national average—and remained
so. Teachers in New York’s Chinatown rated the Chinese chil-
dren ‘better behaved, more obedient, and more self-reliant’ than
their white classmates.’” An identical pattern was seen among
the Japanese.171
171. Thomas Sowell, Ethnic America (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 147. On the
Japanese, Sowell writes: “Japanese children in the public schools were notable for their
obedience, politeness, and hard work and were welcomed by their teachers. The schools
attended were almost always integrated because of the small number of Japanese
children at any given place, and they were typically treated well by their teachers. These
children’s school achievements were equal to those of white children and so were their
IQ scores, despite the fact that they came from homes where English was not spoken
and where parents’ occupations—and their own occupational prospects, in light of
contemporary discrimination—made formal education of little apparent value. It was
simply regarded as a matter of honor that they do well. Upholding the honor of the
family and the honor of the Japanese people in America were values constantly taught by
the Issei [first-generation immigrants] to their children. Strong family control, pressure,
and influence were supplemented by that of community organizations and by the
informal but pervasive gossip in the small, close-knit Japanese-American communities.
Such social controls extended well beyond children. These American communities were
notable for their lack of crime, juvenile delinquency, or other forms of social pathology.
From the earliest period of immigration, the Japanese-American community had far
fewer crimes than other Americans, and the crimes they did commit were less serious.
This was true both on the mainland of the United States and in Hawaii. Deviant
behavior brought forth pressure not only from the individual’s family but also from
other relatives, neighbors, and members of the Japanese-American community at large.”
(pp. 168–9)
Like Sowell, Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom attribute the outstanding school
performance of the Chinese and Japanese in early twentieth-century America to a
combination of their strong family and cultural traditions coupled with their capacity
to maintain those traditions and pass them on to their children because of their social
isolation from the general American culture. “Chinese and Japanese were almost

Even the Vietnamese boat people have managed to form

cohesive and successful ethnic communities in America, and
they are certainly no strangers to violence or stress in their lives
(estimates range as high as 50 percent for the number of boat
people who perished at sea in their chaotic flight from Viet-
nam in the late 1970s, and many who survived had to live in
squalid refugee camps for long periods before gaining entry
into the U.S.). Compared with the whites, the boat-people com-
munities in America have been characterized by low rates of
crime, delinquency, drug addiction, and divorce, and, like the
Chinese and Japanese, Vietnamese children have often done
extraordinarily well in school. They have achieved these results,
moreover, often working at the lowest-paying unskilled jobs
and living in impoverished sections of inner cities. One study
the only Asians who arrived before World War II, and intense prejudice in that era
isolated them from the dominant culture in many respects,” the Thernstroms write.
“That isolation facilitated the transmission of their distinctive cultural attitudes from
generation to generation, particularly because intermarriage between Asians and whites
was very rare at the time.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Asian-American families have successfully transmitted
to their children a culture conducive to high academic achievement.” (Thernstrom and
Thernstrom, No Excuses, p. 99)
A similar example to the Chinese in the Chinatowns of the West Coast is provided
by the centuries-long ghettoization of Europe’s Jews. The word “ghetto” itself comes
from an Italian word designating a district of a city—a district in which for many
centuries Europe’s “Christ killers” were required to live lest they pollute their Christian
neighbors and turn them from the true faith. For centuries Jews suffered under all
manner of discrimination and oppression, were barred from most professions and often
from owning land, were subject to periodic mob violence and the confiscation of their
property, and in many of Europe’s leading cities had to return at night to a walled ghetto
enclave that had many of the features of a day-release prison. They were certainly no
strangers to poverty or blocked opportunities. Yet during the time of their ghettoization
their sense of solidarity, family cohesiveness, general frugality, sobriety, and sense of
group pride was often the envy of Christian observers—including, famously, Blaise
Pascal. The Jews themselves, particularly in Eastern Europe and Russia, came to see
many of the surrounding Christian population as crude, illiterate, drunken, wife-beating
goyim whom Jews would do well to avoid or keep at arms length. And when Jews were
finally emancipated from the restrictions of the ghetto in the generations following the
French Revolution, their children and grandchildren went on to become the carriers
of a magnificent intellectual and cultural creativity that in its achievements compares
favorably with the best among the achievements of the Elizabethan English, the Italians
of the Renaissance, the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Germans, and the
ancient Greeks of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C.

by University of Michigan researchers during the early 1980s

found that despite the fact that the children of Indochinese refu-
gees had only been in the U.S. for a few short years and almost
none spoke English at home, the average child was just slightly
behind national norms in terms of reading and English language
skills (45 percent were above the national median on standard-
ized tests) but substantially above the national norms in both
spelling (71 percent above the national median—amazing, since
English is insane re spelling) and math (85 percent above the
national median).172
“We have found the economic and educational achievement
of the Indochinese refugees to be stunning in both quantity and
quality,” the researchers concluded. “These refugees came here
with almost no material goods. They arrived with very little
English or transferable job skills just as the United States was
entering its worst recession since the Great Depression [1980–
1982]Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The refugee children spoke almost no English when
they came, and they attend predominantly inner-city schools
whose reputations for good education are poor. Yet by 1982, we
find that the Indochinese had already begun to move ahead of
other minorities on a national basis, and, two years later, their
children are already doing very well on national tests. Little in
their backgrounds prepared us to anticipate the great leaps in
achievement that have given them parity or better with Ameri-
can children in such a brief period.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It is important to note
that these students attained high academic marks in schools that
are in traditionally low-income or inner-city areas. That is, they
succeeded in schools generally considered to be both less fortu-
nate in terms of resources and associated with less motivated or
more disruptive student bodies.”173
172. Nathan Caplan, John Whitmore, and Marcella Choy, The Boat People and
Achievement in America: A Study of Economic and Educational Success (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 71–4.
173. Ibid., pp. 75, 81–2.

The researchers attributed the boat people’s success in school

to an ethnic, neighborhood, and family culture that places
supreme importance on education, achievement, cohesive fami-
lies, and hard work. The typical refugee child, they estimate,
did three hours of homework each night, with such work being
the chief family activity for all children from the completion of
after-school chores until bedtime (the average American does
between 3–4 hours of homework in a typical school week). And
the fact that they were often culturally and linguistically isolated
from other Americans in their neighborhoods was seen by the
researchers as a source of strength, not weakness. Indeed, the
Indochinese seemed to engage in active self-segregation not only
because linguistic and cultural differences make it difficult to
integrate socially with English-speaking American blacks, Lati-
nos, and whites, but also because they wanted to shield their
children from what they perceived as the harmful cultural ways
of mainstream Americans.
The refugees, the researcher write, “share an apprehension
over the possible power and consequences of American cultural
influencesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€and in particular the effects on their children.” “It
has often been assumed,” they go on, “that successful adapta-
tion by refugees was, in large measure, the result of their will-
ingness to adopt the ways of their American neighbors. But
the successes of these refugeesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€may have occurred for the
very opposite reasons.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Perhaps the refugees see not only the
necessity to rely on their own cultural value system for guidance
but also the need to insulate themselves from the behavioral and
value standards of their non-refugee neighbors.”174
Other researchers studying the Vietnamese in New Orleans
have found similar patterns of self-segregating behavior and sim-
ilar patterns of superior performance of refugee school children
in the public schools (where the Vietnamese form a conspicu-
174. Ibid., pp. 47–8, 131–2.

ous minority among a large majority of inner-city blacks). The

social world of the Vietnamese in New Orleans, these research-
ers explain, “is restricted to the closed and highly intercon-
nected circles of the [Vietnamese] ethnic group.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[The group
emphasized] obedience, industriousness, and helping others but
discouraged egoistic values of independent thinking and popu-
larity, which are most commonly associated with contemporary
American society.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€[The Vietnamese children] are pressured
to avoid hanging out too much with non-Vietnamese children
in the neighborhood, dating non-Vietnamese, and becoming too
‘American.’ These Vietnamese family values constitute a source
of direction to guide children to adapt to American society the
Vietnamese way.”175
While the Vietnamese are eager to see their children advance
educationally and occupationally, and thus to become in a sense
“middle-class Americans,” the best way to do this, they believe,
is to rely on their own Buddhist and Confucian values while
keeping their social distance from mainstream Americans and
their values. Rather than being seen as role models or people to
emulate, white Americans are often seen as lazy, undisciplined
people, with disrespectful children whom Vietnamese children
should not try to emulate. Black Americans are held in even
lower regard.
Such self-segregated patterns of achievement, it should be
stressed, are not confined to East Asians or those influenced
by Buddhist or Confucian values. Many immigrant groups
from different cultures have displayed similar patterns. In her
study of Punjabi Sikhs in an agricultural region of California,
for instance, anthropologist Margaret Gibson found the Sikhs
displaying a nearly identical pattern to earlier Chinese and
Japanese immigrants. The Sikh children, whose parents were
175. Min Zhou and Carl Bankston III, “Social Capital and the Adaptations of the
Second Generation: The Case of Vietnamese Youth in New Orleans,” International
Migration Review, 28 (1994): 821–45, 831.

usually uneducated laborers, did outstandingly well in the pre-

dominantly white schools they attended, Gibson shows, largely
because of the close parental monitoring of their school prog-
ress and the focus placed on educational achievement by almost
all the adults in the tight-knit Punjabi community. An important
part of the successful school strategy of the Punjabis involved
avoiding too intimate social integration with whites and main-
taining their social and cultural distance from more mainstream
Americans.
“Punjabi children [were] advised against too much social
contact with non-Punjabi peers,” Gibson explains, and “Ameri-
canize” was not a term of approbation among Punjabi parents.
“Punjabi parents defined ‘becoming Americanized’ as forgetting
one’s roots and adopting the most disparaged traits of the [white]
majority group.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€For the Punjabi Sikh students and their par-
ents, ‘acting white’ meant doing little homework, spending a
lot of time socializing with friends (especially if of the opposite
sex), dancing, dating, working long hours at an outside job,
being indifferent to school work, cutting up in class, and reject-
ing the authority of parents and teachers.”176
The Salience of Cultural Factors

The conclusion to be drawn from facts such as these is that the
River Pilots err when they suggest that the poor school perfor-
mance of black and Latino youth can be adequately explained
by their degree of “segregation” or “racial isolation.” Under
varying circumstances such factors can work to retard educa-
tional progress, but there is no a priori reason for believing that
the effects will be negative or uniform. Family and ethnic group
cohesiveness and the values and cultural patterns of the group
176. Margaret Gibson, “The School Performance of Immigrant Minorities: A

Comparative View,” Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 18 (1987): 262–75, 267,
269.

involved seem to be the real movers and shakers in terms of dif-

ferential academic performance among groups. But the River
Pilots—like left-oriented sociologists in general—are loath to
admit this.
Things weren’t always this way. In the 1950s and early
1960s, for instance, social scientists like Lee Rainwater and
Kenneth Clark could candidly describe certain features of ghetto
culture that were inhibiting to black educational and occupa-
tional advancement without fear of recrimination and with the
belief that the problems they found needed to be confronted
honestly and openly. But all this changed very abruptly between
1965 and 1967 in the wake of the near hysterical response in
left-oriented social science circles to Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han’s study of the black family, when Moynihan was accused
of “blaming the victim.” As a result of the acrimonious con-
troversy that surrounded Moynihan’s report,177 there developed
from the late 1960s onward what Moynihan tellingly described
as “a near-obsessive concern to locate the ‘blame’ for poverty,
especially Negro poverty, on forces and institutions outside the
community concerned.”178
Interpretations of poverty, inferior school performance, and
many other social ills in the black community that drew upon
cultural factors and factors rooted in family structure were
effectively placed off limits as scholars desperately sought ideo-
logically safe alternative explanations, the most common being
ongoing racial discrimination, structural changes in the domes-
tic economy, and segregation from whites. And when Latino
groups effectively “piggybacked” their own drive for solicitous
concern on the previous black struggle, the same taboo against
“blaming the victim” was extended to Latino culture and com-
munity values as well.
177. This topic is discussed in much greater detail in the next chapter.
178. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The Professors and the Poor,” in Moynihan, ed., On
Understanding Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 31.

It is within this context that all three River Books were writ-
ten, and it explains why they avoid any serious discussion of
cultural, familial, or group norms as a source of the huge diver-
gence in educational performance between the black and Latino
students and the higher-achieving Asians. When comparisons
between these groups are made, they are invariably cursory
and superficial—usually restricted to noting that Asian college
students often come from wealthier, better educated, and more
intact families that can afford to live in racially integrated sub-
urbs (with no acknowledgment that cultural and family factors
may be at least partially responsible for why so many Asians
got wealthy so fast and could afford to live in the more affluent
suburbs, and for why whites feel less threatened, and less prone
to move, by an Asian presence in their neighborhoods than an
African American presence).179 A culture phobia and culture
blindness permeate all three River Books.
As the East Indian-born conservative scholar Dinesh
D’Souza explains, “The incredible economic and intellectual
achievements within a single generation not just of middle-class
and professional Japanese and East Indians, but also of poor
immigrants from Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Korea
have called into question the claim that in America one has to be
white and preferably male in order to succeed. By proving that
upward mobility and social acceptance do not depend on the
absence of racially distinguishing features, Asians have unwit-
tingly yet powerfully challenged the attribution of minority fail-
ure to discrimination by the majority. Many liberals are having
179. River III indicates that about 9 percent of Asian students come from households
that have at some time received government assistance payments (welfare), while the
figure for blacks is almost twice as large, at 17 percent. A comparison between the
students in these two subcategories would be illuminating, but it hasn’t been undertaken.
A similarly illuminating comparison might be between Asians and blacks with very
well educated parents living in integrated, low-crime-rate neighborhoods. A showing
of “black underperformance” by students from such backgrounds with comparable
HS-GPAs and SATs would suggest the salience of McWhorter’s “preference system
disincentive factor.”

trouble providing a full answer to the awkward question, ‘Why

can’t an African American be more like an Asian?’”180 For the
River Pilots the awkward question is not awkwardly answered
but more often than not simply ignored.
Again and again in River III and its predecessors the talk
is of “minority students”—or simply “minorities”—when what
the River Pilots really mean is “African Americans and certain
Latino groups.” The choice of locution is revealing. The authors
clearly want to gain sympathy for American blacks and many
Latino groups by contrasting them with the more privileged
“white majority” while avoiding comparison with the “model
minority” Asians. The Asian comparison would be not only
unflattering to members of the lower-achieving minority groups
but also subversive to the implicit underlying theme of River
III that racial minority status and white segregating behavior,
rather than any negative features of American black or Latino
culture itself, are the main reasons for the deficient academic
performance of the lower-achieving ethno-racial groups.
The awkwardness of this terminology becomes apparent
when one considers that on many of the college campuses the
River Pilots survey Asians greatly outnumber both blacks and
Latinos and are by far the demographically dominant minority
group. There is a clear reluctance to acknowledge that Asians,
who have adapted so well to the educational opportunities
offered in America,181 are a racial minority. Most commonly they
180. Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 436.
D’Souza’s “culturalist” perspective is well captured in the following statement: “The
main contemporary obstacle facing African Americans is neither white racismÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€nor
black genetic deficiencyÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€Rather it involves destructive and pathological cultural
patterns of behavior: excessive reliance on government, conspiratorial paranoia about
racism, a resistance to academic achievement as ‘acting white,’ a celebration of the
criminal and outlaw as authentically black, and the normalization of illegitimacy and
dependency. These group patterns arose as a response to past oppression, but they are
now dysfunctional and must be modified.” (Ibid., p. 24.)
181. By the year 2000, 55 percent of Asians aged 18–24 were attending college or
other institution of higher learning compared with only 36 percent of whites in that
age category, 30 percent of African Americans, and 22 percent of Latinos. This “model

are lumped together with the whites, with their racial minority
status obscured and the remaining black and Latino students
simply referred to as “minority students,” never as “non-Asian
minorities” or “members of lower-achieving minorities” (locu-
tions that almost never appear in any of the River books). Better
to contrast the lower-scoring minorities with the racially privi-
leged whites, the strategy seems to be, rather than make them
look bad by contrasting them with the higher-scoring minori-
ties and thus perhaps suggest that their own group attitudes
and group behaviors, not simply white racism or minority sta-
tus itself, may have something to do with their poor academic
performance.
What the River Pilots clearly want to avoid acknowledg-
ing is the simple fact that racial segregation, isolation, and
geographic concentration constitute an educational and crime-
control problem only when the group in question has the inter-
nal characteristics of a “problem minority” (like the Irish in the
nineteenth century)—with weak internal control mechanisms,
diminished social support networks, low levels of family cohe-
siveness, high levels of present-time orientation, high levels of
substance abuse, inability to delay gratifications, poor capacity
to respond to urban challenges, lack of entrepreneurial initia-
tive, etc. When the group in question is internally stronger and
lacks these negative characteristics, it often displays patterns
of adjustment to the challenges of schooling and occupational
advancement in America superior to those of U.S. whites. Such
people do not need to be socially integrated with native whites
in order to advance. And they know how to rear their children
for achievement without having to take lessons from wealthier
minority” was also the model of “overachievers,” with many Asians pushing their
brains to the limit and successfully pursuing careers as professionals and managers at
very modest IQ levels where many whites would have concluded that they didn’t have
the aptitude for such occupations and would have chosen less cognitively demanding
pursuits. See James Flynn, Asian Americans: Achievement beyond IQ (Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum, 1991).

and more assimilated WASP neighbors. The River Pilots avoid

such awkward facts and comparisons, I have suggested, because
they would detract from the overarching apologetic theme of
their work.
In my own experience I have found that the only way to get
left-oriented sociologists to acknowledge the possible salience
of cultural factors in explaining the poor academic performance
of so many black and Latino youth is to bring up the alterna-
tive explanation of genes. “So if it isn’t culture, do you think
the problem is related to genes?” I once impishly asked a dis-
tinguished left-liberal sociologist in the question-and-answer
period to a talk she had just delivered at Princeton pooh-pooh-
ing culture-based explanations for racial differences in academic
achievement. Instantly under such prodding leftist sociologists
become born-again culturalists and eagerly embrace the theo-
ries of people like John Ogbu and Thomas Sowell, whom they
normally would ignore or spend considerable effort trying to
refute.182 Cultural explanations within such circles are accept-
182. On the instant embrace by leftist sociologists of the theories of Ogbu and Sowell,
see the anti-Bell Curve writing of Claude Fischer and his Berkeley colleagues, Inequality
by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996). Sowell’s and Ogbu’s theories are offered in this work as the major alternative
to the emphasis in Murray and Herrnstein’s writings on IQ differences as a major
source of black and Latino achievement gaps in school. Harvard sociologist Orlando
Patterson sums up the situation nicely: Statements by Richard Nisbett and Howard
Gardner pointing to deficiencies in black culture as an alternative to genetic-based
theories of black educational difficulties, says Patterson, are “warmly approved by
Afro-American intellectuals and other liberal ‘racial’ advocates. However, had they
been made in the context of a discussion of the educational problems of Afro-American
youth, both men would almost certainly have been angrily corrected and dismissed as
hopeless racists.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€While Afro-American intellectual leaders, and all those who take
a sympathetic interest in the plight of Afro-Americans, are quick to point to cultural
actors in the defense of Afro-Americans against the onslaught of hereditariansÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€these
very same leaders are equally quick to traduce, in other contexts, anyone who dares to
point to the subcultural problems of the group in trying to explain their condition. It
is now wholly incorrect politically even to utter the word culture as an explanation in
any context other than counterattacks against hereditarians.” Orlando Patterson, The
Ordeal of Integration (Washington, D.C.: Civitas/Counterpoint, 1997), pp. 144–5.
The issue of genetic explanations of racial differences in cognitive achievement
is too big to take up in a discussion of this kind. The strongest case for a genetic

able only as alternatives to genetic-based theories, and even then

they are embraced only with great reluctance for fear of appear-
ing to “blame the victim.” Needless to say, this all has little to
do with honest scholarship, honest social science, or a sincere
effort to find out what is wrong and how to fix it. In perhaps
no other area of American life are strictures of political correct-
ness and ideology-based impediments to honest discussion more
formidable than on the issue of academic achievement and race.
And such impediments characterize almost everything the River
Pilots write.
Recruited Athletes, Recruited Latinos,

Recruited Blacks: The Corruption of
Educational Standards
The River Pilots have produced one outstanding book—The
Game of Life: College Sports and Educational Values.183 That
this (non-River) book should be produced by two of the authors
(William Bowen and James Shulman) who collaborated in pro-
ducing River I (The Shape of the River) tells us something about
how otherwise talented, intelligent, and perceptive researchers,
component to differential academic performance among racial groups is made by

Arthur Jensen, The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1998); J. Philippe Rushton, Race, Evolution and Behavior, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Richard Lynn, The Global Bell Curve (Augusta,
GA: Washington Summit Publishers, 2008); and Michael Levin, Why Race Matters
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). The strongest case against these genetic-based theories
are to be found in Richard Nisbett, Intelligence and How to Get It (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2009); James Flynn, What is Intelligence: Beyond the Flynn Effect
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ulric Neisser, ed., The Rising
Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures (Washington, D.C.: American
Psychological Association, 1998); and more generally the many works of Thomas
Sowell.
183. James Shulman and William Bowen, The Game of Life: College Sports and
Educational Values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Though not listed as
one of the two main authors, Shulman was a major researcher and consultant for the
first River project, The Shape of the River, hence his inclusion as a River Pilot.

who are capable of first-rate scholarship and thoughtful policy

analysis, can have their common sense weakened and judgment
distorted when the issue becomes academic admissions and race.
The Game of Life focuses on the many changes that have
occurred over the past 50 years in college sports programs. It
explains how these programs have greatly expanded in scope,
involving ever larger numbers of individual sports, how even
low-profile sports have become increasingly competitive and
professionalized, and how these changes have negatively affected
the core academic mission of institutions of higher learning. The
more intense recruitment of high school athletes with substan-
dard academic records and their subsequent participation in
competitions that have become more like professional athletics
than the amateur college sports of old are developments deeply
disturbing to the authors, who sound the alarm in a work that
is a model of engaged but fair-minded advocacy scholarship.
The authors document many of the harmful effects of current
sports recruitment policies on college campuses and conclude
that such policies negatively impact the athletes themselves, the
institutions that recruit them, and the wider social matrix in
which professionalized college sports have become accepted
and affirmed. Here are a few of their more salient findings and
conclusions:
• High school athletes are heavily recruited and admit-

ted to even the most academically selective colleges with
substandard academic records that would preclude the
admission of most nonathletes.
• There is “a consistent tendency for athletes to do less
well academically than their classmates—and, even
more troubling, a consistent tendency for athletes to
underperform academically not just relative to other
students, but relative to how they themselves might

have been expected to perform [given their entering SAT

scores and high school grades].” (GOL, p. 271)
• These underperformance tendencies have become more
pervasive over time: “academic underperformance
is now found among women athletes as well as men,
among those who play the Lower Profile sports as well
as those on football and basketball teams, and among
athletes playing at the Division III level of competition
as well as those playing in bowl games and competing
for national championships.” (GOL, p. 271)
• “Stereotype vulnerability” may be part of the reason
for this underperformance. There is a widespread ste-
reotype of recruited athletes as “dumb jocks,” and this
stereotype may lead to a weakening of self-confidence
in the academic arena, a disidentification with the goals
of academic excellence, and a focusing on the one arena
(i.e., sports) where the recruited athletes can excel.
• Whatever the reason, it is clear that recruited athletes
on many campuses have formed their own “culture of
sports” (some would say “jock culture”), which places
less emphasis on the academic side of college life, focuses
on a few (usually easier) majors, and is concerned
mainly with getting by academically and just graduating
rather than pursuing more ambitious academic goals.
There are often team-specific effects that influence how
recruited athletes think and act depending on the sports
team they’re a part of.
• The poor academic performance of recruited athletes
cannot be ascribed to the heavy time commitments in
their sports—musicians and college newspaper editors
with similarly burdensome extracurricular commit-
ments do not underperform their SAT scores or high
school GPAs, and recruited athletes display the same

level of underperformance in the off-season as during

the regular season.
• When schools admit large numbers of people like
recruited athletes with substandard academic records,
and when these people form distinct subcultures within
a college or university that place lesser value on aca-
demic excellence, there occurs a significant change in the
whole ethos of an institution that compromises its basic
educational and intellectual mission.
• When the most academically prestigious institutions in
America dramatically lower their entrance standards
to recruit high school athletes, a message is sent to stu-
dents, their parents, and teachers about what is most
valued in a high school student. This has a corrupting
effect on the intellectual atmosphere of American high
schools, and to many the message it conveys is that it is
better to excel at a sport and be recruited by a college
coach than to do outstanding academic work.
• This corrupting message probably has its greatest impact
among black high school students, who see so many
black athletes on college basketball and football teams.
The message many receive is: If you want to get into a
good college, “Hit the hoops, not the books!”
• “High school students, their parents, and their schools
watch attentively for the signals that colleges and uni-
versities send.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€When a school makes an admissions
decision, it not only offers an opportunity to an indi-
vidual, it also sends a signal to others, including stu-
dents who have not even applied. Through this signaling
effect, the school is saying, in effect, ‘here is what we
value.’” (GOL, pp. 52, 278) And when colleges and uni-
versities admit substandard athletes coming from high
schools in which they have turned down students with

far superior academic records, a message is sent to all

the students in the school about what institutions of
higher learning in America value the most.
• “If we take seriously the notion that students should
take full advantage of what are very scarce educational
opportunities, evidence of high graduation rates [among
recruited athletes at selective institutions] should not
end the conversation. It is not good enough, we believe,
just to get by. Respect for core academic values and
the educational mission of these schools requires more
than that. Otherwise, colleges and universities are fail-
ing to put their most valuable resources—their faculty
and their academic offerings—to their highest and best
use.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€They are not focused on fulfilling their educa-
tional missions.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€We most emphatically do not mean
to suggest that the athletes who are admitted are bad
people, that they will not benefit from attending these
schools, or that attending one of these institutions
will fail to help them achieve their personal goals. The
more difficult, and more relevant, question is whether
admitting other students in their place might not have
done even more to fulfill the educational mission of the
school.” (GOL, pp. 270–1)
In surveying these points, the discerning reader will no

doubt have noticed an eerie parallel between lowering entrance
standards for athletes and lowering standards for members
of underrepresented minority groups. Indeed, substituting for
“recruited athletes” in the above statements “recruited minori-
ties,” for “dumb jocks” “dumb affirmative-action students,”
and for “culture of sports” “culture of stereotype threat and
racial entitlements,” there are disturbing parallels to be observed
between the racial-preference policies at American universities
and the recruited-athlete policies at those same institutions.

Such parallels have not gone unnoticed by the authors of

The Game of Life. Indeed, the parallels are so obvious and so
close that the River Pilots devote a whole section in their study
to exploring them. Here are some of the things they say:
Earlier research using the [College and Beyond] database

found that African American students at these academi-
cally selective schools exhibited many of the same patterns
as the athletes we have been studying [in The Game of
Life].Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€We know that the two groups (which of course
overlap, but only slightly) share an important initial char-
acteristic: both have been recruited actively and have
enjoyed an “admission advantage.”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€On average, African
Americans (like athletes) came to campus with less impres-
sive precollegiate academic credentials than their peers.
Then, once on campus, they earned lower grades than their
classmates. Moreover, the average rank in class of African
Americans, like that of the athletes, was lower than the rank
that would have been predicted for them on the basis of test
scores and high school grades—which is what we mean by
“underperformance.”184 (GOL, pp. 83–4)
184. The River III authors claim that recruited athletes experience no
“underperformance,” and they hold out hope that black and Latino affirmative-action
students may some day display similar positive outcomes. But the more comprehensive
treatment of this issue in The Game of Life shows that recruited athletes at a variety of
colleges and universities very definitely do display “underperformance,” and it is of a
kind very similar to that experienced by the black students showcased in River I. River III
also contends that legacy students do not experience underperformance of their entering
academic credentials, and this may be correct (The Game of Life found this to be true
of the legacies in their database). But legacies are unlike recruited athletes or blacks in
that a) they have entering academic credentials often closer to the institutional norm
than athletes or affirmative-action blacks (and thus have less reason to feel academically
inferior); b) they are not clearly visible as a group that has been admitted under lowered
standards, as black students are; and c) unlike both black students and the recruited
athletes on various sports teams, they do not spend a lot of their time together or form
a distinct subculture on most college campuses. And unlike blacks, they do not face the
disincentive effects of having most graduate and professional schools admit them under
much lower standards than others are admitted.

In both cases [i.e., African Americans and recruited

athletes] part of the explanation [for underperformance]
may be found in what social psychologist Claude Steele has
called “stereotype vulnerability”: the assumption (or col-
lective societal expectation) that a group of students will
not do well academically can cause even high achievers to
experience performance anxiety.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Although Steele did not
conduct similar experiments with athletes, there is certainly
a widespread impression on many campuses that ath-
letesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€are “dumb jocks,” and there is no reason to doubt
that such stereotyping could have similar negative effects on
classroom performance.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€(GOL, p. 84)
Peer group pressures can also afflict both groups.
Anthropologist John Ogbu has suggested that black students
sometimes exert pressure on their peers not to “act white”
and not to identify with “white” academic values. We saw
[in an earlier chapter] that the athletic culture has its own
values, and that team-specific effects can harm the academic
performance of athletes. (GOL, p. 84)
For the recruited-athlete situation the authors of The Game

of Life have a simple solution—one they acknowledge may not
be easy to implement, given the reality of campus politics, but
conceptually very simple: stop recruiting academically substan-
dard athletes. The model they sometimes look toward is MIT,
which has extensive athletic programs and considerable student
participation in these programs but makes no distinction in
admissions between athletes and nonathletes. The jocks at MIT
are not dumb, and one cannot conclude from seeing on cam-
pus a 260-pound male with a highly muscled body build or an
athletic-looking 6’ 3” female that they are intellectually any less
capable than the average MIT student.
Acknowledging the close parallels between the harm-
ful effects of recruiting academically substandard athletes and

recruiting equally substandard blacks or Latinos, The Game of

Life authors try valiantly to distinguish the two cases. For many
the obvious response would be, “Well, if the harmful effects are
so palpable, let’s end recruitment of the academically substan-
dard in all its guises and have one uniformly high entrance stan-
dard that encompasses everyone, including athletes as well as
‘underrepresented minorities.’ In that way we will do away with
stereotype threat, stigma reinforcement, underperformance, the
formation of peer groups that direct attention away from learn-
ing, the corruption of academic standards, and the sending out
of bad messages to high school students and their parents as
to what admissions officers are looking for in America’s most
prestigious colleges. Elite colleges and universities will thereby
make the best use of their top-flight faculties and other scarce
academic resources and will be true to their noble educational
mission.”
If one wanted to add meat to the bones of such a recom-
mendation one might look to MIT’s smaller West Coast sib-
ling, Caltech, which appears to apply the same high academic
standards to all its applicants, including athletes, blacks, and
Latinos, as it focuses on assembling the very best and bright-
est in terms of the likelihood that its graduates will become
world-class leaders in science, technology, mathematics, and
engineering. (The fact that Asians are grossly “overrepresented”
at Caltech, while blacks and Latinos are grossly “underrepre-
sented,” doesn’t seem to phase its merit-focused administration
very much.)185
185. One suspects that Caltech takes as its model the early National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, which put a man on the moon; the Manhattan Project, which
built the atomic bomb; and Britain’s Bletchley Park, which cracked the super-secret
Nazi Enigma Code. Each of these successful organizations recruited large numbers of
“the best and the brightest” from a diversity of disciplines, and although in each case
there was great ethnic and national-origins diversity, it was the diversity produced by
a strict merit system, not one produced by any socially engineered “affirmative action”
or “race-sensitive” admissions program. And no one kept tabs on how many of this or
that group were employed. No doubt some groups—like the Jews on the Manhattan

Alas, this is not how Shulman and Bowen view the mat-
ter. They readily acknowledge that there are grave problems
involved in lowering the admissions bar both for recruited
athletes and for underachieving minorities and that many of
these problems are driven by a similar dynamic. However, as
in River I, they say the benefits of having more blacks and Lati-
nos on elite college campuses, even if many are underqualified
by the high standards of the institutions, overshadow the very
real costs of racial-preference policies. Diversity enhancement
and the need to turn out more black and Latino leaders are
the main benefits they claim in this context, although little is
said to address the downward-parasitism problem (i.e., “Duke’s
diversity gain is UNC’s diversity loss”), the stigma reinforce-
ment issue, the problem of disincentives and “pernicious pal-
liatives,” the mismatch problems, the necessity of lying, or the
myriad other arguments brought against race-based admissions
by critics.
Where The Game of Life authors really missed an opportu-
nity to contribute to the affirmative-action debate was in com-
paring black students at selective colleges under our current
preferences regime and black students in the pre-affirmative
action era. The authors of The Game of Life have access to
a database collected by the Mellon Foundation that contains
information on college students who graduated from several
competitive colleges in 1951. This was long before there was
any special preference program for either blacks or athletes,
and, indeed, the authors report that the athletes from the col-
lege class of 1951 actually did better academically in terms of
college grades than the average student of their day, with half
graduating in the top third of their class. It would be instructive
to see what the record was for the black students of that era.
Project—were greatly overrepresented, other groups greatly underrepresented. But to

speak more properly, no groups were “represented” at all, because individual excellence
rather than the representation of groups was the only criteria of selection.

If I had to make a guess, I would say that they displayed

no underperformance, as today’s athletes and affirmative-action
students do, and I wouldn’t be surprised if they actually over-
performed their entering high school grades and test scores, per-
haps heeding the message delivered to Colin Powell’s generation
of ambitious black men by black leaders of the day that if they
wanted to succeed in a white world they would have to work
harder and do better than the whites to prove themselves.186 The
message today, that if you are black you don’t have to prove
yourself, that you will be pitied and patronized and given a huge
admissions boost over the whites and Asians in your class, may
be more comforting to some blacks and surely reflects a decline
in overt white racial hostility. But it is an unhealthy message
nevertheless, which carries with it substantial psychological and
pragmatic harm to all parties concerned. It would be interest-
ing to see how black graduates of selective colleges did in the
1950s—a time (to quote the black economist and affirmative-
action critic Walter Williams), “when it was not yet fashionable
for white people to like black people.” We are not likely to find
out, however, because the Mellon Foundation restricts access to
its college databases, and no doubt it fears further evidence that
186. “All army men who rise to the top are disciplined, but some seem to be more
disciplined than others. That was especially true of the generation of young black
officers to which Powell belonged, who entered the officer corps when prejudices were
stronger than they would be fifteen years later when he was in midcareer.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€These
young black officersÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€were bonded together by two powerful forces. First, they were
black in a white man’s world, but a white man’s world that seemed to be getting better.
Second, they all had had it drummed into them by their parents that if they intended
to succeed, they had to be better, much better, than any white person. Powell was very
good, always at his best, because the price for not being good, if you were black, was
severe; not only did you not rise quickly, you descended quickly.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€As a military man
working with civilians, [Powell] had no peer.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Powerful civilians in the bureaucracy,
men at the cabinet and immediate subcabinet levels, fought for his services, but not
because they wanted a token black man sitting in their outer office. They did it because
he was very, very good and, they soon began to realize, his talents served to make
them look good.” David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the
Generals (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 235.

affirmative-action policies have many of the harmful effects crit-

ics have long attributed to them.
Playing with Fire: Tribal Loyalties, Tribal

Enmities, and Intergroup Norms of
Reciprocity and Fairness
A number of years ago a Korean American student in one of my
politics precept classes at Princeton described to me with great
passion the hostility and ill-will felt by the Asian and white stu-
dents in the California prep school he attended when the college
acceptance and rejection letters arrived in the spring of their
senior year. A female black student, he explained, had applied
to more than half a dozen of the most prestigious colleges and
universities in the nation and got accepted to every one of them,
deciding eventually to enroll at Stanford.
Why was there such hostility and ill-will among his class-
mates, I wanted to know. “Were there better-qualified Asian and
white students with higher SAT scores than the black student?”
I asked. “Better qualified?” he asked. “There were loads of
Asian and white students who were much better qualified, with
much higher SAT scores, much higher grade-point averages,
and who were more active in student government and a host of
other extracurricular activities than this black student.” To add
further fuel to his classmates’ anger, he went on, this particular
black student had a cold, off-putting, self-centered personality,
which hardly endeared her to her classmates. “She didn’t make
it on charm” was the gist of his further remarks.
Although the quality of her academic performance was not
in the same league as the highest-achieving Asian and white stu-
dents, this black student had apparently received such favor-
able treatment from elite colleges and universities because she
had received a quality education from a first-rate prep school
and was probably able to score substantially above average in

terms of national black norms on standardized tests like the

SAT even if her scores were substantially below those of many
of her white and Asian classmates. It’s what Yale law profes-
sor Stephen Carter has called the “best black” syndrome. Her
classmates’ anger was no doubt triggered by the fact that they
were all in the same boat as she was in terms of opportunity, all
enjoying the benefits of a quality private school education, yet
she, with her less than stellar performance, got acceptance let-
ters to a host of the most prestigious colleges in America while
many far superior students in the same school had to settle for
second-tier institutions because they were of a different race.
Whatever justification admissions officers might give for racial
preferences of this kind, they seemed terribly unfair to the Asian
and white students in this particular high school.
A short time after I heard this story, another student of mine,
this time an Ashkenazic Jew, related in a term paper a similar
situation in the high school he attended. A black female in his
graduating class, he said, was accepted by Princeton despite
much lower grades and SAT scores than many of the “non-
minority” students in his class whom Princeton rejected. “I
knew that countless students had worked much harder than the
minority student,” he wrote, “but they had not been admitted
only because they were not black.” Although this Jewish stu-
dent himself did well in the admissions process and was grateful
for that fact, he harbored a deep sense of grievance and injustice
for many of his less fortunate high school friends, who were
judged by a different standard from that apparently applied to
black students.
Stories of this kind could be multiplied endlessly. One of the
more recent cases that received a fair amount of media cover-
age is that of Jian Li, a New Jersey high school graduate who
lodged a racial-discrimination complaint with the Department
of Education against Princeton University on behalf of himself
and similarly situated Asians. Though gaining admission to

Yale, Li was rejected at Princeton and four other elite universi-

ties (Harvard, MIT, Stanford, and Penn) despite the fact that his
academic and general performance in the competitive suburban
high school he attended can only be described as stellar. Li had
a perfect 2400 on the newer version of the SAT (i.e., three 800s),
achieved near-perfect scores on several of the SAT achievement
tests (SAT IIs), took nine Advanced Placement courses, and had
a near-perfect grade-point-average that placed him in the 99th
percentile of his graduating class. In addition to his top-of-the
line academic performance, Li was active in a number of extra-
curricular activities and was a delegate to the prestigious Boys
State. All these accomplishments would be impressive under any
circumstances, but Li was the son of Chinese immigrants, his
first language was Chinese, and English was not spoken in his
home. Li’s academic achievement was a truly remarkable and
inspiring story of talent, persistence, and the immigrant work
ethic in pursuit of the American Dream.
Li was happy at Yale and lodged his complaint not because
of any animus against Princeton or the other four schools that
rejected his application but because of a general sense that
Asian applicants to elite colleges were being unjustly disfavored
in comparison with the members of other minority groups,
especially blacks and Latinos. They were not, he believed, being
evaluated fairly under the same set of academic standards as
these other groups. And Li’s perceptions were clearly correct.
The simple fact is that a black or Latino student with Li’s cre-
dentials would almost certainly have gained admission to every
elite institution he or she applied to. Indeed, an “underrepre-
sented minority student” would have stood a decent chance of
gaining admission to some of the schools Li was rejected at with
test scores as much as 200 points below each of his 800 scores
on the three-part SAT exam and substantially lower grade-point
averages and rank-in-class standings in high school. Li clearly
felt aggrieved, not just for himself but for the countless Chinese

and other high-achieving Asians who are not blacks or Latinos

but members of less favored racial and ethnic groups.
Why do students like Jian Li, the Korean-American, and
the Ashkenazic Jew perceive racial-preference policy to be so
unfair? And what is the basis of the obvious passion animating
their sense of injury and injustice? The River Pilots, particu-
larly the authors of River III, clearly want to suggest that such
a sense of grievance is unwarranted, that the use of racial pref-
erences is in no way unjust, and they deliberately use the pro-
vocative phrase “affirmative action for athletes and legacies” to
suggest that there is no more harm or injustice in abandoning
the academic-merit criteria in admitting more black and Latino
students to elite colleges and universities than in abandoning it
to admit more athletes or legacies. Since people generally seem
to get much less incensed over the latter types of preference
(even those who disapprove of them), they have little reason,
the River III authors seem to suggest, to get overly upset by
racial preferences. The River Pilots are diplomatic enough—and
sufficiently measured in their prose—not to accuse affirmative-
action opponents of racism or hostility to blacks or other racial
minorities (as leftist scholars often do), although their general
impatience with affirmative-action critics faintly suggests this
may be their hidden belief.
It is clear that in terms of their capacity to provoke impas-
sioned protest, taking race into account and preferencing one
ethno-racial group over another really is different from athlete
or legacy preferences, although the River Pilots fail to grasp
the source of this difference. Though corrupting to intellectual
standards, athletic preferences can at least be defended on the
grounds that there are other forms of merit a college might
acknowledge besides the strictly academic kind and that these
might include, in addition to special musical or dance talent, the
ability of an accomplished athlete. Whether or not one accepts
this rationale, it is hard to see mere membership in an “under-

represented minority group” as a form of nonacademic talent

comparable to that of being an accomplished athlete or musi-
cian—although some have tried valiantly to defend this claim.187
Legacy admissions are more problematic. Like race, being
a legacy or a child of a wealthy donor can’t be justified as a
special form of either academic or nonacademic merit, which is
why so many people see something untoward about preferences
based on these factors. But legacy and wealthy-donor prefer-
ences, even if considered unfair, are rarely opposed with the
vehemence of racial preferences, in part because most people
realize that private colleges and universities are dependent on
private funding to survive and that loyal alumni donors (and
generous nonalumni donors) are often important sources of
such funding. College administrators will often defend donor
and alumni preferences on the grounds that the money they get
through such policies, however questionable in other ways, is
often used for unquestionably worthy purposes, including the
provision of more scholarship aid to students in financial need.
Partially for this reason they do not provoke the visceral hostil-
ity of race-based preferences.
If the black students described by the Korean and Ashke-
nazic Jewish students had come from wealthy families that had
donated millions to the elite institutions to which their daugh-
ters applied, or if the black students had parents, grandparents,
or other close relatives who were graduates of these elite institu-
tions, it is doubtful that the level of hostility to their admissions
success would have been as intense as it actually was. Surely the
187. Although he seems to have changed his position in recent years, Harvard Law
School professor Randall Kennedy once suggested that merit is “a malleable concept,
determined not by immanent, preexisting standards but rather by the perceived needs of
society. In as much as the elevation of blacks addresses pressing social needs, [supporters
of race-conscious admissions] rightly insist that considering a black’s race as part of
the bundle of traits that constitute merit is entirely appropriate.” (Randall Kennedy,
“Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate,” Harvard
Law Review, Apr. 1986, p. 1327)

parents of the Korean and Jewish students would have under-

stood, if not the students themselves. As the old Cabaret tune
has it, “money makes the world go around”—and pragmati-
cally minded people understand this, regrettable though some
of its implications may be.
It is also doubtful that the admissions of either of the two
black students to an elite college would have been the occasion
for the level of anger and sense of injustice provoked among the
whites and Asians had the black students been from poor fami-
lies with uneducated or non-English speaking parents and the
students had distinguished themselves by being among the hard-
est workers in their school. Even if the black students under such
circumstances received grades that were somewhat lower than
those of the highest-scoring students, it is unlikely that there
would have been such a strong sense of grievance among their
classmates since it has always been considered legitimate for
colleges to evaluate high school grades and SAT scores in view
of the hurdles a student has had to overcome in life. Overcom-
ing obstacles legitimately counts as merit. Nor is it likely that
the admissions success of either of the two black students would
have provoked much hostility if the students had been high
school sports stars and actively recruited by college coaches.
Why Race Is Different

There remains something about giving unmerited preference to
ethno-racial status—though not to legacy status, athletic-perfor-
mance status, wealthy-donor status, or underprivileged-family
status—that calls out for explanation. On this matter the River
Pilots are clueless—and dangerously so. I will argue here that the
reason racial preferences evoke such passionate hostility must
be sought in an understanding of our basically tribal nature as
human beings and the ways in which the potentially destruc-
tive tendencies of this tribal nature are mitigated in multiracial,

multiethnic societies like the U.S. Most people of common sense

and worldly experience, I believe, have long understood these
things—at least in a vague sort of way—although much light
has been cast on these issues in recent years by the burgeoning
disciplines of evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology,
and related social science disciplines drawing on Darwin’s path-
breaking insights. I will try to explain why race and ethnicity
are different, and why in supporting racial preferences the River
Pilots are playing with a dangerously explosive sorcerer’s brew
whose nature they do not understand and which continues to
exert a corroding effect on the fragile bonds that hold racially
and ethnicly diverse societies together.
Evolutionary thinkers begin with the assumption that, like
all living organisms, modern humans, Homo sapiens, evolved
over long stretches of time from earlier organic life. Anatomi-
cally modern humans first appeared in Africa, the archeological
evidence suggests, approximately 200,000 years ago, with the
hominid line that preceded them stretching back several million
years. For 95 percent of the time that modern humans have
existed on this planet, human beings lived almost exclusively
as hunter-gatherers in relatively small, intimate, face-to-face
aggregations of clans or tribes confronting overwhelming prob-
lems of survival. Besides the necessities of hunting and gathering
food to avoid starvation, providing shelter against the elements,
and providing defense against animal predators and parasites,
early humans, like their modern counterparts, faced the daunt-
ing task of defending themselves against hostile forces of their
own kind. We humans, like our nearest relatives the chimpan-
zees, are among the very few animals on earth that engage in
coalition warfare against members of our own species. The
ancient saying, homo homini lupus—“man is a wolf to man”—
well captures this reality. Wolves hunt in packs against members
of other species; humans fight in highly organized coalitions
against coalitions of other human beings.

With the greater ability of humans than chimpanzees to

make and use weapons (spears, clubs, darts, etc.), to move over
great distances (bipedalism), to effectively use vocal communi-
cation and language in order to develop successful war-fighting
strategies and counter-strategies, and to organize males into
effective warrior bands, the survival danger of group-against-
group warfare in humans was exponentially raised over that
in chimpanzees. Failure to meet the challenges posed by mur-
derously rival human groups could mean death to many of the
members of one’s clan or tribe as well as the abduction of fertile
women and their incorporation into rival tribes for the use of
their men as secondary wives or concubines.188 Some evolution-
ary thinkers believe that the enormously larger brains that we
humans have compared to those of chimpanzees evolved in part
in response to the intense selective pressure created by coalition
violence, whereby the need arose for ever greater mental capaci-
ties to discern and outwit group rivals in a high-stakes Dar-
winian game of intertribal warfare and intertribal wife capture.
The fact that an estimated 25 percent of males in hunter-gather
societies die violent deaths, usually through tribal raids or other
188. The description given in the Hebrew Bible of the conquest of Canaan by the
ancient Hebrew tribes might be seen as paradigmatic of ancient tribal warfare in the
early herding and primitive agricultural stages of human development (warfare in
hunter-gather times was less organized but its aims quite similar): “When you advance
to the attack on any [far distant] town, first offer it terms of peace. If it accepts these
and opens its gates to you, all the people to be found in it shall do forced labour for
you and be subject to you. But if it refuse peace and offers resistance, you must lay siege
to it. [The Lord] your God shall deliver it into your power and you are to put all its
menfolk to the sword. But the women, the children, the livestock and all that the town
contains, all its spoil, you may take for yourselves as booty. You will devour the spoil of
your enemies which [the Lord] your God has delivered to you.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€When you go to war
against your enemies and [the Lord] your God delivers them into your power and you
take prisoners, if you see a beautiful women among the prisoners and find her desirable,
you may make her your wife and bring her to your home.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€She is to stay inside your
house and must mourn her father and mother for a full month. Then you may go to
her and be a husband to her, and she shall be your wife.” (Deuteronomy 20:10–14;
21:10–13; JB) Many similar descriptions can be found in the Book of Joshua, where
women, children, and even livestock are sometimes not spared the murderous rage of
the victors in tribal warfare.

hostile action by tribal competitors, lends support to such an

interpretation.189
Evolutionary psychologists speak of the 95 percent of the
time that humans lived in hunter-gatherer circumstances as the
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), and they
stress that we carry within our genome many adaptive tenden-
cies that evolved during that long period. But adaptive tenden-
cies that may have been useful in Paleolithic hunter-gatherer
societies, these psychologists stress, may not be useful in the
very different material and social environments that we live
in today. One example evolutionary thinkers often give is the
development of our human food-intake instincts. In the EEA
virtually all of the sweet foods available (mainly berries, fruits,
and honey), as well as most of the high-fat-content foods (wild
game, fish, nuts), had the properties of being both scarce and
highly nutritious. Much of it, too, was perishable, and lack-
ing modern means of refrigeration and preservation it spoiled
and became inedible very quickly. Under such circumstances,
the evolutionists say, our hunter-gather forebears evolved food-
intake instincts that said in effect, “When in the presence of
sweet and high-fat-content foods indulge yourself—eat while
the eating is good!”
189. See Lawrence Keeley, War Before Civilization (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996). For males, bigger brains would not only enhance war-fighting and war-
strategizing capacities that would aid in violent conflicts with hostile outside groups
but also confer considerable within-group advantage for the man with superior
“Machiavellian intelligence” in the struggle for status and power within his own
tribe. Since the Big Man and other tribal leaders in prestate societies often enjoy the
reproductive benefits of having the most wives and the most resources to see to it that
they and their offspring survive, the Darwinian gain to greater intelligence and the
larger brains to support it would thus have both inter-tribal and intra-tribal advantages.
That women have brains that in proportion to body weight are almost as large as men’s
may be a development similar to the existence of nipples in males and would explain
the protest from Plato to modern feminism that women have much greater mental
capacity than that reflected in their traditional evolved social roles. On Machiavellian
intelligence, see Richard Byrne and Andrew Whiten, eds., Machiavellian Intelligence:
Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intelligence in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Those possessing genes predisposing them to adopt this

eating strategy were more likely to survive and pass on their
food-intake proclivities to succeeding generations than those
lacking these genetic tendencies. In hunter-gather days, raven-
ous and ungoverned appetites in the presence of sweet and
fatty foods conferred a substantial survival and reproductive
payoff. In modern, fast-food America, however, our problems
are very different, evolutionary psychologists say, insofar as
our food availability environment is radically out of sync with
our inherited food-intake instincts, which were adapted to an
environment of scarcity when the few sweet and fatty foods
available were generally healthy and nutritious. If we follow
the “whispering within,” which tells us that we should indulge
ourselves and eat as much as we can when in the presence of
sweet and fatty foods, we will not only wind up eating a lot
of non-nutritious junk-food but will also clog our arteries, get
diabetes, and become one of the growing statistics of the mor-
bidly obese.
The lesson learned here is that our evolved tendencies may
be maladaptive under changed circumstances. Perhaps nowhere
in the modern world is the maladaptive nature of our evolved
human propensities more striking, some evolutionary psychol-
ogists believe, than in the all-but-universal human tendency
toward ethnocentrism, xenophobia, clannishness, and racism.
The tendency to divide the human world into an “us” of our
own kin and clan and a “them” of everyone else, to ascribe
a fundamental importance and positive evaluation to the “us”
and a more negative, out-group status to those in the “them,”
appears to be present in almost all hunter-gatherer societies, and
in all modern societies as well. “For millennia,” writes the evo-
lutionary psychologist J. Philippe Rushton, “racism was not a
word, it was a way of life.” “The most fundamental relation-
ship recognized by tribal man,” he explains, “is that of blood,
or descent; in many cases anyone not made a relative becomes

an enemy. Primitive society often seems to be organized on two

major principles: that the only effective bond is a bond of blood,
and that the purpose of society is to unite for wars of offense
and defense.”190
The late-nineteenth-century sociologist William Graham
Sumner first coined the term “ethnocentrism” and defined it as
the “view of things in which one’s own group is the center of
everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference
to it.”191 Closely tied to the ethnocentric attitude that Sumner
describes is “xenophobia,” the fear or suspicion of strangers—
of outsiders to one’s own family, kin, and clan—which, accord-
ing to the learned European ethologist Irenäus Eibl-Ebesfeldt,
“manifests itself in all cultures we have so far studied.”192 Some
ethologists and followers of Sumner speak of a universal human
tendency toward “in-group amity” and “out-group enmity.”
And this tendency seems to begin at the earliest ages. As two
Newsweek science writers reported in summing up recent stud-
ies of infant behavior, “Kids as young as 6 months judge oth-
ers based on skin color”—and those with different skin color
than that of their parents and nurturers are usually judged
negatively.193
The tendencies toward ethnocentrism and xenophobia can
be greatly enhanced culturally through ideological indoctri-
nation, the deliberate use of self-segregating ethnic markers,
participation in distinct ethnic or ethno-religious rituals and ini-
tiations, and the like. But a tendency toward ethnocentrism and
xenophobia, many evolutionary biologists now argue, seems
190. Rushton, Race, Evolution and Behavior, p. 91.

191. William Graham Sumner, Folkways (New York: Ginn, 1906), Section 15; cited in
Joseph Lopreato and Timothy Crippen, Crisis in Sociology: The Need for Darwin (New
Brusnwick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 253.
192. I. Eibl-Ebesfeldt, “Familiality, Xenophobia, and Group Selection,” Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 12 (1989): 523.
193. Po Bronson and Ashley Merryman, “See Baby Discriminate,” Newsweek, Sept. 5,
2009.

clearly hard-wired in our brains and can be observed in infants

who have spent less than a year with their nurturing mothers.
Studies have shown that infants and young children react with
greater fear, suspicion, and disdain when in the presence of
adults or other children who look different, dress differently,
and perhaps smell different than their nurturing parents and the
siblings and close relatives with whom they have been raised.194
A natural imprinting process seems to be at work in which we
are born with a tendency to respond negatively toward people
who do not resemble those with whom we were reared in our
earliest formative years.195
As infants, write the evolutionary sociologists Joseph Lopre-
ato and Timothy Crippen, we develop “a close attachment to
those who provide comfort and sustenance.” But the other side
of this coin is that “we are born with an aversion toward people
who will not readily remind us of those with whom we spent
our earliest years.”196 In other words, to some extent we are all
predisposed to be ethnocentrists and xenophobes; we all have
(in Lopreato and Crippen’s words) a genetically based “inclina-
tion to favor alliancesÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€with others in direct proportion to
[our] degree of kinship and/or phenotypical similarity to these,”
and a “biologically based predisposition to have negative atti-
tudes toward others on the basis of real or perceived differences
that are typically, though not exclusively, of an ethnic nature.”
“The more phenotypically dissimilar [we] are, the more [we]
tend to avoid each other and, as occasion arises, oppose each
other’s aims, moral standards, and the like. The more pheno-
typically (and, by implication, genotypically) similar [we] are
194. See F. Abound, Children and Prejudice (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1988); D.G.
Freedman, Human Infancy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum, 1974); and S. Feinman, “Infant Response to Race, Size, Proximity, and
Movement of Strangers,” Infant Behavior and Development, 3 (1980): 187–204.
195. Lopreato and Crippen, Crisis in Sociology, p. 264.
196. Ibid.

to each other, the more [we] tend to attract each other and to
practice mutual favoritism.”197
In the EEA all this probably made good sense, since those
outside one’s immediate clan or tribe were real potential threats,
there were no organized states or law enforcement agencies
to keep the peace between rival groups, and one had to close
ranks with one’s extended kin to survive against a hostile world.
Groups whose members had a strong sense of in-group loy-
alty and ethnocentric favoritism, combined with a willingness
to respond with lethal violence and rage against members of
any outsider group that threatened the group’s well-being or
survival, would be the ones that survived in a universe where
group-against-group rivalry and violence were the order of the
day. Members of successful groups would thus pass on their
genetic predisposition for in-group loyalty and out-group
enmity to succeeding generations. We today are the descendants
of those groups able to hold their own in this clan-against-clan
struggle for dominance and survival. Groups whose members
lacked a genetic predisposition toward in-group favoritism or
out-group suspiciousness and who allowed their kinsmen to
be picked on or exploited by members of rival groups without
violent retaliation would soon die out and their more pacifist
genetic predispositions along with them. We today are not the
descendants of such people.
As Lopreato and Crippen write further on this: “Human
beings are ethnocentric ultimately because they are the descen-
dants of organisms whose natural selection within a context of
inter-group competition favored the installation of intense nep-
otistic favoritism.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In-group solidarity, [while it] was rooted
in familistic psychological adaptations, was reinforced by the
ever-present threat coming from without. This is another way of
saying that in general the greater the ethnocentrism the greater
197. Ibid, p. 267.

the probability of survival, reproduction, and genetic represen-

tation in subsequent generations.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Equipped with these pri-
meval adaptations, our clan progenitors entered the historical
era and the megasociety with zealous conceptions of ‘us’ and
‘them’. Paleogenetic evidence shows, however, that while soci-
etal organization has changed dramatically, our neurobiology is
still back in the clan. In the continuing struggle for existence, we
are still driven to make common cause with some and to suspect
evil intentions in others.”198
The bottom line for many evolutionary psychologists and
sociologists is that racial, ethnic, and linguistic tensions and dis-
orders will be a constant presence in the modern world wher-
ever people of different racial and ethnic groups intermingle,
and that ways must be developed to deal with the inevitable
tensions and problems created by this fact. Expanding the scope
of human collectivities beyond the hunter-gather tribe, these
social scientists say, has many advantages, especially scientific
and economic, but it is a source of great friction and discord
inevitably arising from our clannish brains, and it must be prop-
erly managed.
One form of proper management, of course, is that imposed
by a centralized, authoritarian state like the former Soviet
Union, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Yugoslav state
under Tito, or the Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein. However
undesirable in other ways, a strong, centralized, authoritar-
ian state can often mitigate ethno-racial, ethno-religious, and
ethno-linguistic conflicts through an iron-fist policy of intimida-
198. Ibid., pp. 266, 276. Besides outward physical appearance, deportment, and dress,
the most salient ethnic marker has always been dialect and language, and the fact that
humans generally lose the ability after their childhood to learn to speak correctly the
sounds of any given language insures that one’s “mother tongue” will forever be a
powerful in-group marker that usually cannot be mistaken by members of one’s own
clan or tribe or counterfeited by outsiders. It is no surprise that conflicts over ethnicity
and language are so often two aspects of the same identity problem and elicit similarly
high-charged emotional responses.

tion and coercive “law and order” measures that maintain at

least an outward semblance of interethnic harmony and peace.
As long as the authoritarian regime is maintained in power, this
outward peace can persist.
We know from recent history, however, that when the
authoritarian state begins to lose its grip on things, ethnic frag-
mentation and Balkanization, sometimes preceded by bloody
ethnic civil wars, are the inevitable outcome. In his book Blood
and Belonging, written shortly after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, Canadian writer Michael Ignatieff observed that at the
close of the twentieth century “multinational, multi-ethnic
nation-states are discovering that their populations are often
more loyal to the ethnic units that compose them than to the
federation and the laws that hold the state together.” Although
liberal reformers and multiculturalists often obscure these facts,
it is difficult to deny Ignatieff’s observations here. Belonging
attaches to blood and can fragment multiethnic nations.199
More democratic societies seek less brutal means than those
of dictatorships to create harmony between rivalrous ethnic
groups, and among the more successful attempts have been
structural arrangements that produce long-range benefits for
all groups concerned. A characteristic feature of such arrange-
ments is that they replace the zero-sum, win-lose games played
out between warring ethnic groups with the potential for posi-
tive-sum, pie-expanding, cooperative outcomes from which, in
the long run, most people or their immediate descendants can
benefit.
In the international arena the model for such long-run, win-
win arrangements is the reciprocal trade agreement. Although
many free-market economists believe that even the unilateral
reduction of import barriers is good for the health of a domestic
199. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1993), p. 13.

economy, most noneconomists (especially people employed in

industries facing foreign competition) believe that it would be
best for the economic health of their country to restrict imports
of foreign-made goods while foreign markets remained opened
to the exported products of their own manufacturers. Realiz-
ing, however, that erecting tariff barriers to foreign goods will
encourage retaliatory barriers by foreign countries, and that
such a situation is much worse for their home economies than a
free-trade regime, manufacturing countries often come together
to cooperate with one another through reciprocal trade agree-
ments. These agreements say in effect, “We will give up our
natural inclination to favor our home manufacturers through
protective tariffs if you do the same vis-à-vis your home manu-
facturers.” Experience shows that insofar as international free
trade is a win-win, positive-sum game, many more people in
the long run will experience benefits from such an arrangement
than from a regime of beggar-thy-neighbor protective tariffs
and trade wars.
I believe there is a similar logic at work domestically in the
plea for a merit-based system of allocating positions in competi-
tive universities as well as in public- and private-sector jobs. A
best-qualified-applicant system for allocating scarce educational
resources and jobs has many of the same benefits—in terms
of competence, efficiency, noncorruption, and technological
advance—as a tariff-free, open-market economic system. And
it also has the great advantage of being a system to which mem-
bers of different ethnic groups can be welcomed on board know-
ing that the sacrifices they are being asked to make in terms of
abandoning their natural tendency toward ethnic favoritism are
being reciprocated by other ethnic groups.
The logic involved in a merit-based system mitigates the
potential harm posed by our clannish brains by an implicit reci-
procity agreement that if put into words would say something
like this: “In order to achieve greater social harmony among

ethnic groups and to establish a more progressive system of

resource allocation that in the long run will have major benefits
for all of us, I will give up acting on the natural human partial-
ity that I feel toward my kin and clan if you are willing to give
up acting on the natural partiality you feel toward your kin and
clan. My ethnic identity group will not use political power or
other influences to promote ethnic favoritism on behalf of our
people; your ethnic identity group must not use political power
or other influences to further ethnic favoritism on behalf of your
people. At least in the public realm, including admissions to
universities heavily subsidized by the government, we will all be
just Americans, not representatives of contending tribes. Merit,
defined in a race-neutral manner, will be our guiding light, which
will ensure that jobs and positions in our nation’s best educa-
tional institutions are staffed by the objectively best-qualified
applicants regardless of racial, ethnic, religious, or other tribal
affiliations. The more successful we are in achieving these goals,
the healthier and more prosperous we will be as a people, and
the greater we will be able to expand our horizon of empathy
and identity so that ‘your people’ and ‘my people’ will become,
for many public purposes, ‘our people.’”
This is the kind of logic—the kind of interethnic reciprocity
norm and empathy-expansion formula—that I believe is at least
implicitly embodied in many of the most progressive develop-
ments that have occurred in America over the past 125 years. It
is embodied in the civil-service exam system of government hir-
ing that began to replace the earlier systems of ethnic nepotism
and political spoils in the waning years of the nineteenth century.
It is embodied even more clearly in the many state Fair Employ-
ment Practice Laws (FEP) passed in the 1940s and 1950s, which
prohibited racial and ethnic discrimination in the jobs market.
It is seen in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited race-
based decision-making in a host of areas, including federally
financed education, corporate employment, and public accom-

modations; in the 1968 Fair Housing Law, which extended the

nonpreferential and nondiscrimination regimes to the sale or
rental of private housing; in Lyndon Johnson’s two executive
orders (Nos. 11246 and 11375)200 barring many different types
of discrimination by government contractors; and, of course,
in Justice Harlan’s ringing dissent in the Plessy case declaring
that “our Constitution is color-blind.” In more recent times this
logic has found perhaps its pithiest formulation in Justice Sca-
lia’s concurrence in the Adarand case striking down race-based
set-asides in government contracting: “In the eyes of govern-
ment, we are just one race here. It is American.” (Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 1995)
When the interethnic reciprocity norm is breached, a sense
of outrage and moral injustice follows that stirs the deepest pas-
sions of our clannish brains, provoking primordial feelings of
in-group solidarity and out-group enmity and a general “cir-
cling of the wagons” response that gets ready to do battle. In the
face of reciprocity defaults and assaults by rival tribes, there is a
triggering of our evolved rage-and-retaliation response that nat-
ural selection has imprinted in our brains. Under such circum-
stances, the range of human empathy dramatically contracts
and the forces of win-win, positive-sum outcomes that had pro-
vided a counterweight to clannish parochialisms give way to
200. The wording of Executive Order 11375, issued by Lyndon Johnson in 1967, is most
explicit in understanding itself as part of a legal regime seeking to substitute merit for a
system of employment based on racial, ethnic, religious, or national origins favoritism
or discrimination, or for differential treatment based on sex: “It is the policy of the
United States Government to provide equal opportunity in federal employment and in
employment by federal contractors on the basis of merit and without discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The Congress, by enacting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enunciated a national policy of equal employment
opportunity in private employment, without discrimination because of race, color
religion, sex, or national origin. Executive Order 11246 of September 24, 1965, carried
forward a program of equal employment opportunity in government employment,
employment by federal contractors and subcontractors, and employment under federally
assisted construction contracts regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin. It is
desirable that the equal employment opportunity programs provided for in Executive
Order 11246 expressly embrace discrimination on account of sex.”

bitter, zero-sum conflicts over racial entitlements, ethnic quotas,

and tribal turf. The promptings of the clannish brain reassert
themselves, and the outcome is usually increased racial hostili-
ties and vastly diminished cooperation between rival clannish
groups.
In many developing countries, including India and Sri Lanka,
this process has often culminated in spontaneous violence and
lethal ethnic riots. Scholars of ethnic conflict, including Donald
Horowitz, Thomas Sowell, Myron Weiner, and Mary Katzen-
stein, have shown on a global scale how frequently preference
policies produce a profound sense of ethnic grievance and eth-
nic outage, especially among the less privileged members of the
nonbeneficiary groups.201 In America the latter would include
poor whites and poor Asians, and it is no surprise that they are
often among the most hostile to policies that favor blacks and
Latinos while disfavoring members of their own kin and clan.
On American college campuses the racial enmity unleashed
by preference programs rarely results in violence or other acts
of racial hostility. But self-segregation and racial color barri-
ers have become a near universal phenomenon on most college
campuses despite the wishes of college administrators, and as
one keen observer of the campus scene (the previously cited
Dinesh D’Souza) explains, “From the moment students arrive
on campus, they know that the rules have somehow been polit-
ically rigged, and their fate as individuals depends on whether
they belong to the favored group or the unfavored group.”
“[The students] think of themselves as ethnic platoons engaged
in a silent struggle in which the gains of one necessarily entail
201. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1985); Myron Weiner and Mary Katzenstein, India’s Preferential Policies
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Thomas Sowell, Preferential Policies: An
International Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

the losses of the other.” And with considerable understatement,

D’Souza adds, “This is not a formula for racial harmony.”202
The River Pilots don’t seem to understand that in dealing
with racial preferences and racial favoritism, they are dealing
with fire, and that the sense of grievance and injustice some-
times felt over legacy preferences, athletic preferences, or
wealthy-donor preferences pales in comparison with that felt
over preferences based on race and ethnicity. When my kin and
clan are disfavored and yours favored, deep feelings of primor-
dial solidarity and protectiveness are evoked that produce a rage
against any policy that would hold members of your racial and
ethnic group to be worthier of concern than members of mine—
and my group thus less valued than yours. Such favoritism is
experienced by many in the disfavored groups as an outright
ethnic assault, which dangerously provokes our evolved tribal
instincts for within-group loyalty and between-group warfare.
People of common sense and worldly experience, as I have said,
have vaguely understood all this, and contemporary evolution-
ary social science helps us to understand these primordial feel-
ings much better.
To state the bottom line once again: Racial-preference poli-
cies provoke among the groups not favored a self-protective
ethnic solidarity and defensive rage that tap into our primor-
dial instincts of ethnocentrism and xenophobia derived from
our evolutionary past—instincts hard-wired in our brains.
They transform the kind of thinking that says “we’re all just
Americans” into a “your people vs. my people” kind of hostile
group rivalry that is thoroughly destructive to the American
commonweal. They are almost always perceived by the dis-
favored groups as an injustice and a breach of the interethnic
social contract calling for reciprocity and fairness. Whatever
202. Dinesh D’Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 50–1.

sense of grievance may be provoked by other nonmeritocratic

forms of selection, they pale in comparison to the deep sense
of ethnic insult and ethnic grievance that racial-preference pol-
icies provoke.
Even if America is spared the fate of those Third World
countries where preference policies have produced violence
and ethnic riot, they are surely a major vehicle promoting what
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., correctly called The Disuniting of Amer-
ica.203 And if the evolutionary thinkers are correct, the fact that
the beneficiaries of racial preferences are phenotypically and
genotypically widely divergent from the nonbeneficiaries makes
the breakdown in comity particularly severe. If it is true that
there is an imprinting process that dictates that the less other
people look like the people we’ve been raised with the more dif-
ficult it is to have feelings of empathy and solidarity with them,
then our current policies of racial preferences will have even
more serious long-term consequences for our continued unity as
a people than even the critics of those policies contend.
Making Whites Hate Blacks: Sniderman and

Piazza’s “Mere Mention” Experiment
One of the best indicators of the potential of preferentialist
policies to increase racial discord in America was provided
by political scientists Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza in
a clever experiment they did a number of years ago using a
simple technique of survey research.204 Sniderman and Piazza
were initially struck by “the intensity of many people’s feelings
about affirmative action,” which in the case of whites, they
discovered, was overwhelmingly hostile. To see if these nega-
203. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America.

204. Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993), pp. 102–9.

tive feelings might have some harmful effects on race relations

or the way whites perceive blacks, they devised an ingenious
way of tapping into white thought processes. In a representa-
tive national sample, respondents were given a list of character
traits—both positive and negative—and asked to what extent
they accurately characterized “blacks as a group.” The respon-
dents were also presented with a made-up story about the gov-
ernment in a neighboring state that, in order to increase the
number of blacks in government jobs, accorded preferential
hiring treatment to blacks who had scored lower than whites
on merit-based employment exams. For half of the respondents
the preferentialist hiring story was presented before asking the
question about black character traits, while for the other half
the hiring story was presented only after asking the character
trait question. The hiring story was worded as follows:
In a nearby state, an effort is being made to increase dra-

matically the number of blacks working in state government.
This means that a large number of jobs will be reserved for
blacks, even if their scores on merit exams are lower than
those of whites who are turned down for the job. Do you
favor or oppose this policy?
Sniderman and Piazza found that in just bringing up (“mere

mentioning”) the hiring preference story, white respondents were
much more likely to rate blacks as “lazy” and “irresponsible.”
While only 26 percent of those presented with the preferential-
ist hiring story after they had already given their assessment of
black character traits rated blacks as “irresponsible,” 46 percent
of those given the hiring story before their opinions about black
character traits were asked rated blacks in this manner. And the
results were similar for “lazy”: the proportion of whites con-
sidering blacks lazy rises from 20 to 31 percent depending on

whether the preferentialist hiring story was given after or before

the character trait question.205
Sniderman and Piazza conclude that racial-preference poli-
cies are so hated by whites that they cause whites to dislike
blacks (or dislike them more intensely) and have a thoroughly
negative effect on American race relations. Their conclusions
are consistent with what has been outlined here about the
“clannish brain” imperative and the importance of establishing
race-neutral fairness and reciprocity as a means of overcom-
ing its potentially hateful and destructive possibilities. Here are
Sniderman and Piazza in their own words:
What we found was that merely asking whites to respond

to the issue of affirmative action increased significantly the
likelihood that they will perceive blacks as irresponsible
and lazy.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Affirmative action, defined to mean preferen-
tial treatmentÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€produces resentment and disaffection not
because it assists blacks—substantial numbers of whites are
prepared to support a range of policies to see blacks bet-
ter off [e.g., spending more on job-training programs]—but
because it is judged to be unfair.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Affirmative action did not create the problem of preju-
dice. But it can aggravate it. Indeed, in reviewing the results
of the “mere mention” experiment and in particular in
gauging the size of the effects, the point to underline is that
any effect at all was observed. The whole of the experimen-
tal manipulation, after all, consisted in asking a question in
an interview—only one question, in a standard form, in an
interview made up of a hundred questions. No effort was
205. It would have been interesting to see what the effects would have been of doing
a similar experiment on white and Asian perceptions of black intelligence with a story
involving preferential admissions to elite colleges and universities. One suspects that a
similar effect would have been shown as in the case of the jobs-preference story with
whites and Asians being much more likely to rate blacks as lacking in intelligence after
hearing a story about preferences in college admissions.

made to whip up feelings about affirmative action. Respon-

dents were not shown the equivalent of a “Willie Horton”
type advertisement. They were not even subjected to a
lengthy discussion of racial quotas or preferential treatment
to arouse latent feelings they might harbor. All that was
done was to ask them a single question about affirmative
action “in a nearby state.” And that was sufficient to excite
a statistically significant response, demonstrating that dislike
of particular racial policies can provoke dislike of blacks, as
well as the other way around.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Politics shapes as well as reflects public opinion, as the
politics of affirmative action painfully demonstrate: whites
have come to think less of blacks, to be more likely to per-
ceive them as irresponsible and lazy merely in consequence
of the issue of affirmative action being brought up. With the
battle to persuade whites that blacks should be treated the
same as whites only partly won, the political agenda raced
on, fashioning a set of policies demanding, as a matter of
principle, that blacks should be treated better than whites—
that a black should be admitted to a school or get a job in
preference to a white even if the white has higher grades or
superior work skills. The new race-conscious agenda has
provoked broad outrage and resentment. Affirmative action
is so intensely disliked that it has led some whites to dis-
like blacks—an ironic example of a policy meant to put the
divide of race behind us in fact further widening it.206
Conclusion
As I have tried to explain in this chapter, the intense opposi-
tion to racial preferences by disfavored groups derives less from
intrinsic or ineradicable racial hostility than from the breach
206. Ibid., pp. 103, 109, 177.

they represent in the norm of interethnic fairness and reciproc-

ity—a norm that is the linchpin holding together nonauthori-
tarian, multiethnic, multiracial societies like the United States.
The River Pilots have never understood these forces and remain
dangerously naïve. They are mostly caught up in 60s-era socio-
logical paradigms, with white guilt much in evidence (especially
in River I and II), and they have a barely concealed exculpatory
agenda that tries to absolve the lower-achieving minorities of
any co-responsibility for their current plight (this is especially
true in River III). They display virtually no interest in the newer,
expanding fields of evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychol-
ogy, or evolutionary sociology and can hardly be said to have
advanced the public conversation.
The River Pilots began their journey almost 15 years ago and
told us then that their goal was to learn more about the twists
and turns in the flow of black students as they moved from
high school to college and beyond. Their goal was to describe
“the shape of the river.” Their more overriding objective, how-
ever, was to defend the admissions policies the two senior River
Pilots (Derek Bok and William Bowen) had previously cham-
pioned as presidents of Harvard and Princeton. Much of their
own research, however, shows just how questionable such poli-
cies have been and the harm they have done in creating social
distance and social discord between the favored and disfavored
groups.
The lessons to be learned here are clear: Racial and eth-
nic preferences have no place in contemporary America, and
regardless of how benign the motives of their supporters, such
policies have proven to be seductive impediments to the quest of
those targeted for the preferences to achieve at high levels and
to obtain the honor and respect of their nonfavored peers. They
have provoked ethnic outrage and a deep sense of personal
and collective grievance among members of the nonpreferred
groups, and they are a bane to healthy and harmonious group

relations on college campuses. Both wisdom and justice—now

supported by a growing body of social science research—cry
out for their repeal.

VI
still am e r i c a ’ s
co ntinui ng d il e m m a
In the introduction to the first chapter of this book I explained

the sense of betrayal and outrage that so many of us felt when
the color-blind principle of equal justice for all—the principle
that had energized the earlier civil rights movement—was cast
aside to make room for the post-60s era regime of race-based
preferences and quotas. That dramatic transition, I explained,
was driven largely by the urban riots of the late 1960s and by
the overriding concern of important policy-planning elites with
the plight of the inner-city black poor. The latter were seen as
victims of grave social injustices that called out for immediate
public redress.
Lost in the ensuing decades in the never-ending controversy
over racial preferences were those whose plight had provided
the initial impetus for special action and concern. While the first
of the national “affirmative-action” initiatives—Richard Nixon’s
Philadelphia Plan for opening up jobs in the urban construction
industry—did focus on the black inner-city poor, it proved to be
the exception as recipients of racial preferences quickly came to
be the better-off, not the truly needy, among the targeted ethno-
racial groups. Those who once occupied the preeminent place
in public policy concern—those “hobbled by chains,” as Lyndon
Johnson called them in his Howard University address, or the
“truly disadvantaged,” as William Julius Wilson later described

384â•… still america’s continuing dilemma
them—fell off the national radar screen. And while there was
considerable academic interest in “the black underclass” in the
1980s and early 1990s, especially in the wake of Charles Murray’s
controversial book indicting Great Society welfare programs for
much of the underclass problem, this interest quickly faded, and
today it has reached a low ebb.
Considerable changes have taken place since the early 90s
in policies directed at the urban poor, the most salient of which
involved the ending of unlimited welfare payments under the
older AFDC program, and a get-tough policy of law enforce-
ment that is at least partially responsible for making lower-class
urban neighborhoods much safer places than they once were.
But some things haven’t changed. And, yes, the urban black
underclass is still with us, and while there are surely great hopes
and points of light on the horizon—Geoffrey Canada’s Harlem
Children’s Zone deserves special mention in this context—the
urban black poor who were the concern of Daniel Moynihan and
Kenneth Clark in 1965 still suffer from many of the same prob-
lems they did back then (including educational failures, failure
to form stable two-parent families, drug and alcohol addiction,
and many more).
In the following chapter, which reworks an essay originally
written in the early 1990s, I try to explain the historical and
demographic circumstances that contributed to the explosive
growth of a downwardly mobile inner-city black underclass in
the period following the mechanization of Southern agriculture
in the 1950s and 1960s. Part of the answer to the underclass
enigma is explained by the valuable contributions of influen-
tial scholars such as William Julius Wilson, Charles Murray, and
Christopher Jencks. But missing from each of their discussions
is what an older social science literature called “the problem
of second-generation maladaption and delinquency.” I take up
this latter issue at great length. Displaced rural peasants, set
adrift in a bewildering new world, have difficulty adjusting to

the challenges and rewards of an urban environment. But it is

their children and grandchildren—the second and subsequent
generations—who suffer the most, and without proper paren-
tal guidance and correction, often wind up in the ranks of the
drop-outs, drug addicts, jailbirds, and delinquents. A better
understanding of a problem, of course, doesn’t solve it, but at
least it should awaken us to the human tragedy involved. The
“affirmative-action response,” focused mainly on the black mid-
dle class, has diverted our gaze from the place it really belongs
and done much to undermine interracial sympathy and good-
will. The sorry plight of a black underclass in our inner cities is
the second major wound that will not heal and cries out for a
renewed private and public policy response. 207
Perhaps never in history has a more utterly unprepared folk

wanted to go to the city.
—richard wright
[Some Negro families] found their way to the North in a move-

ment [sociologist E. Franklin Frazier] aptly describes as “into
the city of destruction.” Illiterate, undisciplined, afraid, and
crushed by want, they were herded into slums. City life then, as
now for migrant groups, has been ruinous for peasant people.
The bewilderment of the complex city undermined the confi-
dence of fathers and mothers, causing them to lose control of
their children whose bewilderment was even more acute.
—martin luther king, jr.
I guess I had an arrogant attitude toward the family. I saw

them all as farmers.
—claude brown (from manchild in the promised land)
207. This chapter is derived from the essay “The Disintegration of the Black Lower
Class Family,” that appeared in Political Science Reviewer, 22 (1991): 44–100.

The full impact of Northern life upon Negro ambitions did not
come until the second and third generations. Although some
migrants became disillusioned with the NorthÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€apparently
most experienced some relief from the more direct and humil-
iating forms of white domination. Although Negroes were at
the bottom of the Northern economy, most of them enjoyed
higher incomes and better living conditions than they had in
the South. Since they measured their situation against their
Southern past, they were fairly well satisfied. In contrast, their
children and grandchildren with little or no experience in the
South measure their situation against the standard of equality
and the condition of Northern whites.
—leonard broom and norval glenn
T he period from 1961 to 1965, that is, the period spanning

the entire Kennedy administration and the first two years
of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, was in many ways a period of
great hope in America with regard to the resolution of what
at the time was called “the Negro problem.” A generation of
liberal reformers who had grown up on Gunnar Myrdal’s An
American Dilemma, and who had witnessed first hand the mur-
derously destructive effect that racial hatred and theories of
racial superiority had recently visited on European civilization,
was determined to eradicate the system of racial subordination
and segregation that had successfully kept the black man “in
his place” since the end of the nineteenth century. The can-do
optimism of the New Frontier and early Great Society periods
found expression in the widespread belief that the vast bulk of
the black population in America would be able to advance socio-
economically and integrate into middle-class life once all artifi-
cial barriers to advancement had been removed. Black progress,
it was hoped, would be sped along not only by the elimination
of discrimination but also by aggressive antipoverty programs

that would provide free education, job training, health care,

business loans, and decent housing to all poor Americans.
With the aid of the federal government, strong leadership at
the presidential level, and the general goodwill of the American
people, the black population of America, it was said at this time,
would be able to advance into mainstream society much the way
the Germans, Italians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Chinese, Japa-
nese, and other immigrant groups had done previously. This
optimism was buoyed by the unprecedented legislative successes
of the period, which, in the form of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, together with President Kenne-
dy’s Executive Order 10925 and President Johnson’s Executive
Order 11246 (both of which banned discrimination from firms
doing business with the federal government), constituted the
most comprehensive legal attack on racial discrimination and
segregation since the era of Reconstruction. The optimism of
the period is well reflected in the title of an article by Irving Kris-
tol that appeared in the September 11, 1966, issue of the New
York Times Magazine, “The Negro Today Is Like the Immigrant
Yesterday.”
Not everyone at this time, of course, was optimistic. The
journalist Charles Silberman, for instance, had written a series
of influential articles for Fortune magazine in the early 1960s,
which were later expanded into his best-selling book, Crisis in
Black and White,208 which questioned the ability of Southern
black migrants to the northern cities to assimilate unaided into
a middle-class white society. Black leaders in general were also
not as sanguine as many of the early Great Society enthusiasts.
The National Urban League Director Whitney M. Young, Jr.,
for instance, spoke for many black leaders when he stated in his
impassioned manifesto To Be Equal that nothing short of an all-
out Marshall Plan for America’s black poor would enable the
208. Charles Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964).

Negro to attain full equality and full participation in the rewards

of American citizenship.209 The optimists, however, were clearly
dominant among the white liberal elite of the country through-
out 1964 and 1965, especially after the landslide victory of Lyn-
don Johnson and his liberal running mate Hubert Humphrey
in November 1964 over the laissez-faire-oriented Barry Gold-
water seemed to establish a strong national consensus behind
liberal-activist civil rights policies. White liberals at this time
generally believed that a great turning point in American history
had occurred as a result of the successes of the nonviolent black
protest movement—a movement that had progressively gained
in strength since the days of the Montgomery bus boycott of
the mid-1950s—and it is probably safe to say that most white
Americans at this time, regardless of their political or ideologi-
cal persuasion, thought the future for blacks in America looked
very promising.
It was during this period that Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
a little-known assistant secretary in the Department of Labor,
began to have grave misgivings about certain disturbing trends
that were taking place at the time in the inner-city black ghettos
of the larger metropolitan areas. Within weeks after Johnson’s
landslide victory, Moynihan had come to the conclusion that
the great battles against segregation and discrimination were
now largely won, and that a new emphasis would be required
on the part of public policy to help reverse the trend toward
black family dissolution, which he saw occurring in central
Harlem and other black urban ghettos throughout America.
The result of Moynihan’s studies and reflections in late 1964
and early 1965 was a 78-page internal DOL memorandum, first
completed in March of 1965, bearing the title The Negro Fam-
ily: The Case for National Action.210 It is no exaggeration to say
209. Whitney M. Young, Jr., To Be Equal (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964).
210. The Moynihan Report itself (MR), together with an extensive monograph
describing the controversy it provoked, is photographically reproduced in Lee

that this modest report, which combined insights culled from

the disciplines of economics, history, sociology, and psychology
and represented a distillation of more than 40 years of scholarly
research on America’s greatest domestic “dilemma,” proved to
be one of the most prescient pieces of social science analysis
ever written. In it Moynihan sought to strike a tone of urgency
in order to convince policy planners in the executive branch in
Washington that the situation in the inner-city ghettos had been
deteriorating rapidly since the Second World War and that it
had now reached a crisis stage and would continue to decline
unless the federal government committed itself to a national
policy that sought to stabilize the disintegrating black family
structure.
“The United States is approaching a new crisis in race
relations,” the report began. Although the old style of segre-
gation and discrimination was doomed, great new challenges
now posed themselves, the report continued, if Negroes were
to compete successfully with other ethnic groups for the desired
benefits of American society. “Three centuries of sometimes
unimaginable mistreatment have taken their toll on the Negro
people,” Moynihan explained, and the result was that without
special efforts on the part of government many Negroes would
not be able to compete on equal terms with the members of
other racial and ethnic groups in America:
The harsh fact is that as a group, at the present time, in

terms of ability to win out in the competitions of American
life, [Negroes] are not equal to most of those groups with
which they will be competing. Individually, Negro Americans
reach the highest peaks of achievement. But collectively, in
the spectrum of American ethnic and religious groups, where
Rainwater and William Yancey, The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967).

some get plenty and some get none, where some send eighty
percent of their children to college and others pull them out
of school at the 8th grade, Negroes are among the weakest.
(Moynihan Report, Introduction)
Moynihan then went on to explain how the situation was

actually getting worse in the urban ghettos and that in terms
of social mobility the Negro population was polarizing into a
middle-class group that was becoming increasingly successful
and a disorganized lower class that was becoming ever more
dysfunctional and pathological:
The most difficult fact for white Americans to understand is

thatÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€the circumstances of the Negro American commu-
nity in recent years has probably been getting worse, not bet-
ter.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The gap between the Negro and most other groups in
American society is widening. The fundamental problem, in
which this is most clearly the case, is that of family struc-
ture. The evidence—not final, but powerfully persuasive—is
that the Negro family in the urban ghettos is crumbling. A
middle-class group has managed to save itself, but for vast
numbers of the unskilled, poorly educated city working class
the fabric of conventional social relations has all but disin-
tegrated. There are indications that the situation may have
been arrested in the past few years, but the general post-war
trend is unmistakable. (MR, Introduction)
The report went on to establish its case through an array

of charts and statistics which highlighted the high incidence
of black divorce and spousal abandonment; the high rates of
black illegitimacy, welfare dependency, unemployment, delin-
quency, crime, and narcotics addiction; as well as the low scores
of black students on standardized tests and other measures of
academic performance. The report also offered an elaborate his-

torical explanation for how this “tangle of pathologies” had

come about, with the emphasis on the various ways that slav-
ery and the brutal Southern system of caste subordination had
undermined the traditional male role of breadwinner and domi-
nant force in the family. The lower-class black family, Moyni-
han said, had a matriarchal structure that was not only out of
line with the patriarchal structure dominant in the rest of the
society, but was dysfunctional in terms of providing the young
with the means for acquiring discipline, respect for authority,
and the products of socialization needed for success in a com-
petitive environment. In one of the more memorable passages of
the report Moynihan wrote:
Segregation and the submissiveness it exacts is surely more

destructive to the male than to the female personality. Keep-
ing the Negro “in his place” can be translated as keeping
the Negro male in his place; the female was not a threat to
anyone. Unquestionably, these events worked against the
emergence of a strong father figure. The very essence of the
male animal, from the bantam rooster to the four-star gen-
eral, is to strut. (MR, p. 16)
In addition to the legacy of slavery and segregation, Moyni-

han also saw the black male’s dominant role in the family being
undermined by the often bewildering transition from the rural
Southern farm to the large Northern city, and by the lack of
well-paying jobs for black men, especially during downturns in
the business cycle. On this latter topic he offered a trenchant
quotation from Whitney Young’s To Be Equal:
The effect on family functioning and role performance of

this historical experience [of economic deprivation] is what
you might predict. Both as a husband and as a father the
Negro male is made to feel inadequate, not because he is

unlovable or unaffectionate, lacks intelligence or even a gray

flannel suit. But in a society that measures a man by the size
of his pay check, he doesn’t stand very tall in a comparison
with his white counterpart. To this situation he may react
with withdrawl, bitterness toward society, aggression both
within the family and racial group, self-hatred, or crime.
(MR, p. 34)
Another quotation from the sociologist Robin M. Williams,

Jr., reporting on a study conducted among the black population
of Elmira, New York, described the alarming incidence of frag-
mentation in black families compared with the families of other
ethnic groups:
Only 57 percent of Negro adults reported themselves as mar-

ried [with] spouse present, as compared with 78 percent of
native white American gentiles, 91 percent of Italian-Ameri-
cans, and 96 percent of Jewish informants. Of the 93 unmar-
ried Negro youths interviewed, 22 percent did not have
their mother living in the home with them, and 42 percent
reported that their father was not living in their home. One
third of the youths did not know their father’s present occu-
pation, and two thirds of a sample of 150 Negro adults did
not know what the occupation of their father’s father had
been. Forty percent of the youths said that they had brothers
and sisters living in other communities. (MR, p. 34)
Moynihan did not in his report offer specific policy pro-

posals, in part, it would seem, because he did not want to dis-
tract from the report’s main purpose, which was to draw official
attention to the seriousness of the problems in the inner-city
ghettos and to focus on the stability of the black family as the
central means of addressing those problems. Moynihan left no

doubt, however, that to deal with the deteriorating situation, a

national effort would be required beyond anything previously
contemplated by public officials. Toward the end of the report
he wrote:
Three centuries of injustice have brought about deep-seated

structural distortions in the life of the Negro American. At
this point, the present tangle of pathology is capable of per-
petuating itself without assistance from the white world. The
cycle can be broken only if these distortions are set right.
In a word, a national effort towards the problems of Negro
Americans must be directed towards the question of family
structure. (MR, p. 47)
Response to the Moynihan Report

The Moynihan Report was intended as a confidential internal
Labor Department memorandum, but in the late summer of
1965 a decision was made at the White House to release it to the
general public. While some prominent liberals greeted the report
with considerable enthusiasm, the more general response among
left-leaning intellectuals, both black and white alike, was one
of impassioned outrage and vituperation, which, even with the
advantage of hindsight, is difficult to comprehend. Moynihan
was frequently attacked, usually in bitter or sarcastic terms, for
placing the blame for the dissolution of the inner-city black family
on the black population itself rather than on the racist practices
of the larger white society, and it was not infrequently suggested
or hinted that Moynihan himself was a racist. Despite the fact
that the charges were complete fabrications, with no founda-
tion whatever in reality—the Moynihan Report had placed the
blame for the disintegration of the lower-class urban black fam-
ily on a combination of economic, sociological, and historical

forces, with white oppression being seen as dominant among the

latter—the view that the report perversely “blamed the victim”
came to dominate liberal intellectual discussion of the matter
especially after a particularly virulent review appeared in The
Nation magazine (November 22, 1965) by psychologist William
Ryan. (It was Ryan who popularized the phrase “blaming the
victim” in a subsequent book by that title).
Why the contents of the report were so distorted is diffi-
cult to say. In part the distortions seem to have resulted from
the intrinsically sensitive nature of the material itself, since the
candid discussions of illegitimacy, male joblessness, and poor
academic performance among blacks addressed issues about
which powerful antiblack stereotypes existed, which some
might see only confirmed by the report’s findings. A more
important factor, however, seems to have been the coincidence
that the report was released during the violent riot in the Watts
section of Los Angeles. The riot produced a major change
among important black intellectuals and civil rights leaders,
many of whom came to feel that in their preoccupation with
dismantling the Jim Crow system and guaranteeing voting
rights in the Deep South they had ignored the deteriorating
plight of the black poor in the inner-city northern and west-
ern ghettos. Moynihan’s characterization of much of ghetto
behavior as “pathological”—a term he had borrowed from
Dr. Kenneth Clark, whose book Dark Ghetto,211 published in
the same year as the Moynihan Report, had conclusions about
inner-city blacks that harmonized well with Moynihan’s own
analysis—produced a new defensiveness among many black
leaders regarding the inner-city black poor that would subse-
quently preclude any candid assessment of the disordered lives
that so many ghetto residents led. A new black pride move-
211. Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

ment was also beginning to gain momentum at this time, and

Moynihan’s report, in its honest though unflattering depiction
of the illegitimacy, delinquency, and black-on-black crime in
the inner-city ghetto, could only appear to many to undermine
the basis of this pride and to provide ammunition for anti-
black racists. Years later Moynihan would explain the hostile
reception his report received:
Hours after the [1965] Voting Rights Act was signed, the
riot broke out in Watts.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In the midst of the crisis, the
White House made public my report. Suddenly the subject of
family structure came to be associated with this painful new
circumstance, which is to say, riotous and self-destructive
behavior on the part of a group previously (and accurately)
depicted as singularly victimized. With the onset of rioting,
black spokesmen were in a defensive position in America,
no matter how much whites were blamed for having made
it possible or inevitable. These spokesmen made it impos-
sible to face up to what was really happening in the ghet-
tos.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Black leaders took every such effort at discussion as
a white, racist attempt at self-exculpation, and evasion of
responsibility for the black condition.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
It is now about a decade since my policy paper and its
analysis. As forecasting goes, it would seem to have held up.
There has been a pronounced “up-and-down” experience
among urban blacks. That is to say, the measures of social
well-being then employed have moved in the two contrary
directions I forecast [i.e., some ascend into the middle class
while others descend into the underclass]. This has been
accompanied by a psychological reaction which I did not
foresee, and for which I may in part be to blame. Allow
equivocation here. I did not know I would prove to be so
correct. Had I known, I might have said nothing, realizing

that the subject would become unbearable, and rational

discussion close to impossible.212
One of the results of the controversy over the Moynihan

Report was that serious research into the problems of family dis-
organization in the inner-city ghetto was effectively terminated.
While a few studies that had been underway at the time the con-
troversy broke were eventually completed and published (the
most important of these were Elliot Liebow’s Tally’s Corner,213
David Schultz’s Coming Up Black,214 Ulf Hannerz’s Soulside,215
and Lee Rainwater’s Behind Ghetto Walls),216 for the most part
white social scientists avoided research into the problems of
black families out of fear of provoking the sorts of reactions
that the Moynihan Report had encountered. From the late 60s
onward the only type of research into lower-class black families
that was generally acceptable in mainline liberal intellectual cir-
cles was research focusing on the strengths and positive quali-
ties of these families. While some of the works produced under
these circumstances managed to highlight important adaptive
features of the female-headed black household, at the same time
they tended just as often to romanticize ghetto family life and to
downplay the degree of suffering, disorganization, and violence
that afflicted so many ghetto families.
The most influential works of this latter type were Carol
Stack’s All Our Kin,217 Andrew Billingsly’s Black Families in
White America,218 and Joyce Ladner’s Tomorrow’s Tomor-
212. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The Schism in Black America,” The Public Interest,
spring 1972, pp. 7, 15.
213. Elliot Liebow, Tally’s Corner (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967).
214. David Schultz, Coming Up Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969).
215. Ulf Hannerz, Soulside (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
216. Lee Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls (Chicago: Alding, 1970).
217. Carol Stack, All Our Kin (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
218. Andrew Billingsly, Black Families in White America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1968).

row.219 In these works the authors rejected the characterization

of the mother-only black family of the inner city as broken or
disorganized and claimed instead that the matriarchal black
family form was a creative adaptation to poverty and discrimi-
nation that in many ways was a superior kind of organization
to the two-parent white middle-class family. Lower-class black
families, it was said, had a highly developed communal kinship
network that engendered a spirit of mutual cooperation and
mutual aid in stark contrast to the destructive individualism and
competitiveness that white bourgeois families were said to pro-
duce. To judge the ghetto family by white standards was seen as
a form of cultural myopia if not cultural imperialism. The black
family, Andrew Billingsly contended, was “an absorbing, adap-
tive, and amazingly resilient mechanism for the socialization of
its children and the civilization of its society.” (BFWA, p. 33)
From Crisis to Catastrophe

The intellectual fallout from the Moynihan Report controversy
persisted more than 15 years. During this time scholars as well
as journalists scrupulously avoided drawing attention to aspects
of inner-city ghetto life that might prove stigmatizing or ste-
reotyping to the black population that lived there. By the early
1980s, however, the intellectual climate began to change very
rapidly, and by the latter part of the decade the black urban
underclass had become a major focus of public concern, both in
scholarly and intellectual circles and in the popular press. Part
of the reason for this shift in focus seems to have been the emer-
gence of a new conservative mood in the electorate following
the two victories of Ronald Reagan and the rise of a self-con-
fident conservative intelligentsia that was much less concerned
about the sensitivities of liberal black leaders than their white
219. Joyce Ladner, Tomorrow’s Tomorrow (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971).

liberal counterparts were. Another reason for the shift seems to

have been the popularization of the works of a number of black
feminist writers, who often painted a picture of the violence in
many lower-class black households and the irresponsibility of
many lower-class black males that was more candid—and more
shocking—than anything white liberal scholars would ever
have done. Alice Walker’s The Color Purple,220 which was made
into a hit movie, and Gloria Naylor’s The Women of Brews-
ter Place,221 which provided the basis of a nationally broadcast
TV drama, were among the more influential of these feminist
works.
Clearly, however, what lifted the taboo on candid assess-
ments of black ghetto life were the deteriorating conditions
found in the ghetto itself. When Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote
his report, the conditions of black families living in inner-city
ghettos had reached crisis proportions, with the dimensions of
the problem perhaps best indicated by the 43 percent out-of-
wedlock birth rate that Moynihan reported for Central Harlem.
By 1980 the stable two-parent black family in the inner-city
ghettos had all but disappeared: A 1979 survey of births in Har-
lem Hospital found that almost 80 percent were out of wedlock,
and a similar pattern was found in the inner cities of most other
large metropolitan areas. The statistics that gradually accumu-
lated from the late 60s onward tell a tale of family disorganiza-
tion, personal suffering, and a climate of violence in poor black
neighborhoods that is difficult for outsiders to imagine.
To give just a sampling of those statistics: By the mid-1980s
a majority of black children were living in single-parent fami-
lies, and of these almost 60 percent were living below the official
government poverty level. Moreover, whereas most whites who
are poor remain poor only for a relatively short period of time,
220. Alice Walker, The Color Purple (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982).
221. Gloria Naylor, The Women of Brewster Place (New York: Viking Press, 1982).

the average poor black child according to an important 1983

study was found to be in the midst of a poverty spell that would
last two whole decades. Black women who give birth to chil-
dren out of wedlock are rarely able to marry, and those who do
manage to find mates will face a high incidence of divorce and
separation. According to one widely quoted estimate by Larry
Bumpass, if the rates of divorce, separation, and out-of-wed-
lock births that were registered in the 1980s remain unchanged,
86 percent of black children would spend at least part of their
childhood in a single-parent family. Among black children liv-
ing in the worst areas of the inner-city ghetto the figure would
probably be close to 100 percent. What this means, of course, is
that black children in the inner city not only grow up without a
working father present in the home but also live in a neighbor-
hood where most other children grow up under similar circum-
stances and the influence of the stable two-parent family is all
but unknown.
Criminal justice statistics revealed an equally depressing pic-
ture. According to one widely publicized estimate, by the mid-
1980s a quarter of all black males between the ages of 20 and
29 were either in jail, out on bail, on probation, on parole, or
awaiting sentencing by the courts. Estimates indicating that there
were more young black males under supervision of the criminal
justice system than in college received widespread media atten-
tion. According to a study by the National Bureau of Economic
Research, one quarter of all the income reported by inner-city
black youth in the immediate post-civil rights era was from
crime. In the years following the ghetto riots of the 1960s, virtu-
ally all black families became the victims of one or another type
of serious crime in the inner cities, and violent crime in particular
produced a mood of fear and suspicion that pervaded all of black
ghetto life. Blacks nationally were six to seven times as likely as
whites to be murder victims, with homicide being the leading
cause of death for young black males. According to one estimate

by an MIT researcher and his associates, if the high murder rates

of the immediate post-60s era persisted, the chances of an inner-
city black male being murdered if he were to spend his entire life
in the ghetto were many times greater than the chances of an
American soldier being killed during World War II.
The situation was most frightful in government-subsidized
urban housing projects. To give one example: In Chicago’s
Cabrini Green housing complex during the winter of 1981,
10 people were killed and 35 wounded by gunfire in just one
particularly violent nine-week period. Over the same period,
more than 50 illegal firearms were confiscated in the project,
as residents were subjected to an onslaught of violence led by
four major teenage gangs. The streets and housing projects of
many inner-city neighborhoods became virtual war zones in
the years following the late-60s riots, with daily life resembling
more that in a Third World failed state than in a modern demo-
cratic nation, as rival teenage gangs fought over turf and drug
dealers shot and killed not only one another but also innocent
bystanders. Along with the drug dealers and gang members,
ghetto residents had to contend with neighborhoods that were
often overrun by pimps, prostitutes, winos, muggers, and a
wide assortment of deranged and pathetic street people who
made safe and wholesome community life in black neighbor-
hoods all but impossible. By the late 1970s and early 1980s,
even the most casual observer of the ghetto scene sensed that in
some fundamental way civilization had broken down.
Enter Charles Murray

What caused the ghetto implosion in the years immediately fol-
lowing the reforms of the civil rights era? By the mid-1980s
this question became ever more pressing, and the most con-
troversial and widely discussed answer came in the form of a
sensitive and cogently argued book by social scientist Charles

Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950–1980.222

Unfortunately, Murray’s book immediately got caught up in the
ideological wars of the middle Reagan years, and as is often
the case in such circumstances, both supporters and opponents
of Murray often failed to appreciate the subtlety and complex-
ity of the arguments that Murray’s book presented. Murray, a
former member of the Peace Corps who had spent his under-
graduate years at Harvard College and received his Ph.D. from
MIT, wrote Losing Ground as a disillusioned New Frontiers-
man whose work in the late 1970s as a professional evalua-
tor of federal antipoverty programs convinced him that many
of the dramatic policy changes of the mid- and late 1960s in
regard to America’s poorest citizens had seriously backfired and
greatly exacerbated the conditions they were intended to alle-
viate. The idea of unintended consequences is certainly noth-
ing new to social scientists, but what made Murray’s book so
valuable was its ability to combine a quantitative approach to
analyzing the problems of the black poor with a psychologi-
cal sophistication and keen understanding of the motivations
and thought processes of lower-class people, that is rarely to
be found among quantitatively-oriented social scientists, espe-
cially those from middle- and upper-middle-class backgrounds.
What made Murray’s book so unique was its ability to combine
extensive data analysis with insights into the world of poor peo-
ple that one generally encounters only in the work of cultural
anthropologists.
Like all observers of the black ghetto, Murray asks in Los-
ing Ground how it could have come about in the late 1960s that
so many young blacks seemed to give up on getting ahead in the
world at the very moment when other blacks were demonstrat-
ing that it was now possible to do so. “If in the early 1960s,”
Murray wrote in an early article anticipating much of the more
222. Charles Murray, Losing Ground (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

detailed analysis of Losing Ground, “one had foreseen the com-

ing decade of sweeping civil rights legislation, an upsurge in
black identity and pride, and a booming economy in which
blacks had more opportunities than ever before, one would not
have predicted massive family breakup as a result. The revolu-
tionary change in black family composition went against the
grain of many contemporaneous forces.”223 In Losing Ground
Murray shows that from the turn of the century until the early
1960s, young black males participated in the labor force at
rates roughly equal to, or even higher than, those of their white
counterparts. But by the early 1970s a gap began to open up
between the labor-force participation rates of the two popula-
tions as many young black males seemed to be giving up on the
idea of steady work. At the same time that young black males
were dropping out of the labor force, Murray shows, young
black females in ever-increasing numbers were having babies
out of wedlock, with the fathers of their children showing ever
less inclination either to marry them or to provide long-term
support.
Murray rejects the view explaining the increase in black
male unemployment and black out-of-wedlock births primarily
as a result of the decreased demand for unskilled labor in an
increasingly high-tech-oriented economy. Unskilled older black
males in the late 60s did not encounter the same sorts of prob-
lems finding and keeping a low-skilled job as young black males,
Murray points out, and the rise in irregular employment among
the latter group, together with the rise in both out-of-wedlock
births and welfare dependency among young black females, was
too precipitous, occurring over too short a period of time, Mur-
ray argues, to be explained by long-term structural economic
forces. The major source of the weakening of inner-city black
223 Charles Murray, “The Two Wars against Poverty: Economic Growth and the Great
Society,” The Public Interest, Fall 1982, p. 15.

families, Murray says, is to be sought in counterproductive pub-

lic policies instituted during the “generous revolution” of the
Great Society period. Although most of the reviewers of Los-
ing Ground paid heed only to what Murray had to say about
changes in welfare policy, Losing Ground criticizes not only
Great Society welfare policies but also policies in education,
crime control, and what Murray calls the allocation of “status
rewards.” The policy changes in each of these four areas, Mur-
ray argues, while instituted for the noblest of reasons, had the
effect of radically altering the status and incentive structures of
the world in which poor black people lived and did so in such a
way that made it rational for the poor of any race to act in the
short run in a manner that was detrimental to their long-term
interests. Murray writes in this regard:
It is not necessary to invoke the Zeitgeist of the 1960s, or

changes in the work ethic, or racial differences, or the com-
plexities of post-industrial economies, in order to explain
increasing unemployment among the young, increased drop-
out from the labor force, or higher rates of illegitimacy and
welfare dependency. All were results that could have been
predicted (indeed, in some instances were predicted) from
the changes that social policy made in the rewards and pen-
alties, carrots and sticks, that govern human behavior. All
were rational responses to changes in the rules of the game
of surviving and getting ahead. (LG, pp. 154–5)
The most compelling explanation for the marked shift in
the fortunes of the poor is that they continued to respond, as
they always had, to the world as they found it, but that we—
meaning the not-poor and undisadvantaged—had changed
the rules of their world. Not of our world, just of theirs. The
first effect of the new rules was to make it profitable for the
poor to behave in the short term in ways that were destruc-
tive in the long term.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€We tried to provide more for the

poor and produced more poor instead. We tried to remove

the barriers to escape from poverty, and inadvertently built a
trap. (LG, p. 9)
In the area of welfare policy, Murray singles out no less

than eight important changes that occurred between 1965 and
1970, all of which, he contends, tended to undermine the lower-
class male provider role and make it rational for poor women
to have children out of wedlock and rely on the welfare sys-
tem for their support. These changes included the following:
a) more generous public assistance payments to single moth-
ers with dependent children under the Federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program (AFDC); b) a vast expansion
in the federal Food Stamp program; c) the introduction of the
Medicaid program, which provided free medical benefits for the
poor; d) increases in public-housing assistance; e) changes in
HEW guidelines that eliminated intrusive at-home welfare eli-
gibility checks; f) the 1968 Supreme Court decision in King v.
Smith, which struck down the man-in-the-house restriction that
tried to limit AFDC payments to single women not living with
a male companion; g) the 1969 Supreme Court ruling overturn-
ing local residency requirements for welfare eligibility; and h)
the Congressional thirty-and-a-third rule, which allowed wel-
fare recipients to supplement their welfare-benefit package with
their own part-time earnings (the first $30 could be kept in its
entirety, after which $1 could be kept out of every $3 earned).
These changes, Murray contends, together with a much
more tolerant and supportive attitude on the part of the white
cultural elite toward welfare recipiency itself (even among the
young and able-bodied), radically transformed the benefit and
incentive structures in which the lower-class poor operated.
These changes, Murray argues, had the effect of making the
welfare system a more attractive option for many poor women
than reliance on the low wages of a young unskilled male worker

who had little immediate chance of securing a job that paid a

middle-class wage.
It was these multifarious changes in the welfare system,
according to Murray, that were largely responsible for the fact
that the AFDC caseload, which had increased a mere 7 percent
during the entire decade of the 1950s and 24 percent during the
period 1960–1965, increased an astounding 125 percent during
the period 1965–1970 (the rise leveled off after this time, with
the caseload increasing 29 percent between 1970 and 1975 and
only 3 percent between 1975 and 1980). These changes also
contributed, according to Murray, to the tremendous increase
in black out-of-wedlock births and to the dramatic decline in
two-parent households.
To illustrate the disincentives to marriage and stable two-
parent family life that such changes produced, Murray offered
the reader a thought experiment involving a hypothetical unmar-
ried couple, Harold and Phyllis, who had just graduated from
high school and were expecting a child. The couple, who had
no intention of going to college, had to decide in the experiment
whether they would marry and live off the earnings of Harold’s
minimum-wage job, or not get married and try to live, either in
whole or in part, off of the benefits of the welfare system. Mur-
ray tries to show, using the level of welfare benefits available in
Pennsylvania (an industrial state that Murray says is typical of
the states in which the majority of welfare recipients live), that
in 1960 it would not have been a rational choice, at least not
from a purely economic standpoint, for Phyllis to have remained
unmarried and to have tried to live off public assistance rather
than marrying Harold and living off his minimum-wage job. If
she had gone on welfare in 1960, moreover, not only would she
have done worse in purely economic terms than she would have
done had she married Harold, but she would not have been able
to have Harold around as a live-in companion without jeopar-
dizing what meager welfare benefits she might receive.

By 1970, however, changes in welfare policy, Murray tries

to show, had produced a very different set of options. With the
expansion in the Food Stamp program, more generous AFDC
payments, the additional Medicaid and various housing sub-
sidies, as well as the possibility of supplementing government
payments with part-time work, someone in Phyllis’s position,
Murray contends, would have been better off in several ways by
not marrying Harold and allowing herself and her child to be
supported by the welfare system.
Since Murray assumes in the thought experiment that Har-
old and Phyllis desire to remain together, at least for the imme-
diate future, the best option for both to have taken in 1970,
Murray says, was for the couple to live together unmarried,
supporting themselves with Phyllis’s welfare check as well as
with any additional income that Harold may have been able
to bring in from outside work. The welfare system provided a
more generous (and more secure) package of benefits in 1970
than a woman could get from a minimum-wage-earning hus-
band, Murray shows, and after the invalidation of the man-
in-the-house rule in 1968, a live-in lover who worked, unlike
a live-in husband who worked, was no threat to a mother’s
receipt of AFDC benefits. Under such circumstances, says Mur-
ray, it would be a better option for Phyllis to live with Harold
unmarried since she would get companionship and certain other
benefits of marriage without its financial disabilities and risks.
Moving in with Phyllis without marrying her would also be the
best option from Harold’s perspective, according to Murray,
since he would be able to supplement her welfare check with
his own earnings but would not be under any obligation to stay
with her or the child should he get tired of either.
An important theme in Murray’s treatment of welfare policy
in Losing Ground is the difficulty—if not the impossibility—
of designing a system that provides an incentive for people to
get off welfare without at the same time giving other people

who are not on welfare a greater incentive to come onboard.

To illustrate his point, Murray offers another thought experi-
ment of a hypothetical government program designed to reduce
cigarette smoking by offering bonuses to people who quit. No
matter how such a program is designed, Murray says, it is likely
to have either no net beneficial results or very possibly nega-
tive results, since there will always be some people who engage
in the unwanted behavior in order to become eligible for the
rewards of the program, and the harmful effects thus brought
about will probably offset any good that is done. In the context
of late-60s welfare policy, Murray points to the thirty-and-a-
third rule as an illustration of his point. This rule was intended
to give people already on welfare an incentive to seek outside
work so that they might eventually become independent, but
it had the unintended effect of making welfare a much more
attractive option for those who were not yet receiving it. Mur-
ray acknowledges that some people have absolutely no choice
in terms of being in the negative condition for which govern-
ment programs offer some type of relief. “Paraplegics receiv-
ing Medicaid cannot easily be seen as ‘rewarded’ for becoming
paraplegics by the existence of free medical care.” (LG, p. 213)
But while some people are involuntarily in an undesirable situa-
tion, in most instances, Murray contends, voluntary action will
play some role, whether large or small, in shaping the situations
people are in, and in such cases changes in incentive structures
will often have a considerable impact on what people do.
Besides changes in welfare policy, the quality of life in the
inner-city ghetto was adversely affected in the late 1960s, Mur-
ray says, by a number of important changes in the areas of edu-
cational policy and crime control. In educational policy, Losing
Ground focuses on the increasing reluctance on the part of
school administrators during this period to suspend disruptive
students or to use the sanctions schools had traditionally used
to maintain classroom discipline and to provide for a healthy

learning environment. Since they often lack the backing of

strong achievement pressure from their homes and peer groups,
inner-city students, says Murray, need the support of dedicated
teachers who will demand from them regular attendance, punc-
tuality, and the regular completion of homework assignments.
In the past, to be effective, these demands had to be backed up
by the threat of various sanctions, including in-school disciplin-
ary measures, failure to promote a student to the next grade,
or outright suspension or expulsion. But in the late 1960s, says
Murray, these sanctions came into increasing disuse as more and
more schools adopted a policy of demanding very little from
their students academically, of tolerating greater degrees of dis-
ruption, and of automatically promoting students to the grade
level commensurate with their chronological age. The effect of
these new policies in the classroom, Murray believes, was disas-
trous, as teachers became demoralized over their inability to get
students to work, and many of the ablest and most ambitious
students left the public-school system in order to enroll in pri-
vate or parochial schools that offered a better environment in
which to learn.
Murray attributes the changes in educational policies dur-
ing this period to a number of factors. One, he suggests, was
simply ideological. The idea began to gain ground during the
late 60s, Murray says, that inner-city black culture had a dignity
and uniqueness of its own and that it was wrong to try to force
inner-city youth to master standard English and the sorts of
skills typically taught in white middle-class suburban schools.
Radical critics of the period often viewed the imposition of the
traditional American school curriculum on lower-class blacks
as a form of cultural imperialism that helped to undermine
black self-esteem. The idea also gained ground at this time that
schools in general were too authoritarian and should be more
flexible in allowing students to develop according to their own
inclinations and desires. Murray mentions in this context an

influential book in the late 60s by Jonathan Kozol, Death at an

Early Age, which called for a much more loosely structured cur-
riculum in the public schools.
Besides ideological factors, educational policies during this
period, Murray says, were influenced by important changes in
judicial interpretations of constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court decision in Gault v. Arizona (1967), Murray explains, was
the key factor here, since its effect was to extend new due pro-
cess rights to students facing disciplinary suspension, something
that had not existed previously. While this new concern with
student rights prevented certain abuses of disciplinary author-
ity, Murray concedes, one of the effects of this new emphasis on
student rights, he says, was to make it much more difficult for
teachers and school officials to deal with disruptive students.
“Teachers and administrators became vulnerable to lawsuits
or professional set-backs for using the discretion that had been
taken for granted in 1960,” Murray writes. “The rebellious
students could make life considerably more miserable for the
teacher than the teacher could for the students—through their
disruptive behavior in class, through physical threats, or even
through official channels, complaining to the administration
that the teacher was unreasonable, harsh, or otherwise failing
to observe their rights.” (LG, p. 173) The result of all this, says
Murray, is that by 1970 very little learning went on in inner-city
schools.
Changes in crime-control policy also adversely affected the
quality of life in the inner-city ghetto, according to Murray’s
analysis. Applying a rational-choice model to crime, Murray
says that whatever other factors may be involved, the easier it
is to get away with a crime without being caught or, if caught,
without being punished by a jail term, the more likely it will be
that people will engage in criminal behavior. Losing Ground
applies the insight of this simple proposition to the observed
declines in apprehension and incarceration rates and to the new

protection of the rights of the criminally accused that came about

during the 1960s and 1970s. Regarding the latter development,
Murray acknowledges that increased concern over the rights of
the criminally accused had the positive effect of extending equal
justice to the poor, but it also had the negative effect, he says,
of making it less risky for criminally inclined people to indulge
their criminal propensities, with the result that ghetto neighbor-
hoods became much less safe.
One of the most important changes in criminal-justice prac-
tices that occurred during this period, Murray demonstrates,
was a dramatic decrease in the punishment of juvenile offenders.
Juvenile delinquents in the 1960s were increasingly put on pro-
bation rather than sent to reform school or jail, Murray shows
in Losing Ground, and even if juvenile offenders did do time in
a penal institution, it became the practice of the time to seal their
official records so that having a police record in the 1960s and
1970s was a much less serious matter for a juvenile than it had
been a decade before. Murray uses juvenile-incarceration sta-
tistics from Cook County, Illinois (which includes Chicago), to
illustrate his general point of how easy it was for young people
to get away with crime following the 60s-era changes: Despite
soaring increases in juvenile crimes over the previous ten years,
by the mid-70s Cook County juvenile offenders had on average
to be arrested an incredible 13.6 times before they were first
committed to a reform school. Murray also offers national sta-
tistics showing a steep drop in the odds of being apprehended for
a burglary or robbery during this period, and when this declin-
ing apprehension rate is seen in conjunction with the declining
risk of being sent to prison after one has been apprehended and
convicted, the true decline in the deterrent value of the criminal
justice system in the immediate post-60s era is made abundantly
clear.
The three factors of a) changes in welfare policy, b) changes
in educational policy, and c) changes in criminal-justice prac-

tices, Murray says, not only acted individually to bring about

the destruction of the inner-city ghetto, but also displayed a cer-
tain interactive or synergistic effect in which each factor served
to reinforce the destructive potentials of the other. Summarizing
a good deal of the argument of Losing Ground, Murray writes:
My proposition is that the environment in which a young

person grew up changed in several mutually consistent and
interacting ways during the 1960s. The changes in welfare
and changes in the risks attached to crime and changes in the
educational environment reinforced each other.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
None of the individual links is nearly as important as
the aggregate change between the world in which a poor
youngster grew up in the 1950s and the one in which he
or she grew up in the 1970s. All the changes in the incen-
tives pointed in the same direction. It was easier to get
along without a job. It was easier for a man to have a baby
without being responsible for it, for a woman to have a baby
without having a husband. It was easier to get away with
crime.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Because it was easier to get away with crime, it
was easier to support a drug habit. Because it was easier to
get along without a job, it was easier to ignore education.
Because it was easier to get along without a job, it was easier
to walk away from a job, and thereby accumulate a record
as an unreliable employee. (LG, pp. 165, 167)
Status Rewards
In many ways what Murray has to say about the shift in “status
rewards” that occurred during the Great Society period is the most
valuable part of Losing Ground, although it is a part that crit-
ics and reviewers generally ignored. While the very term “status
rewards” is intended to link the ideas subsumed under this label
to an economic type of rational choice or utility-maximization

model in actuality Murray treats under this theory certain funda-

mental changes in social attitudes and cultural values occurring
during the late 1960s that are not normally thought of within
the context of an economic or utility-maximizing theory. One of
the problems with Losing Ground, in fact, is that it is a much
richer book, with a much more subtle and complex understand-
ing of what occurred in poor inner-city neighborhoods in the late
1960s, than is sometimes suggested by Murray’s own description
of what he is trying to do in the book. Murray’s theory is much
less parsimonious than he would lead us to believe, although,
given the complexity of the problem, lack of simplicity or parsi-
mony is hardly a fault. The changes in cultural values with which
Murray deals occurred, he says, primarily among the intellectual
and cultural elite rather than among blue-collar workers or more
traditionally minded white-collar conservatives, although their
effect was still enormous, he believes, as they helped to destroy
the basis of independence and personal dignity among the work-
ing poor.
Before the late 1960s, Murray says in this context, it was
almost universally accepted in American culture that healthy
people of working age should get jobs to support themselves,
should care and provide for their families, and in general should
carry their own weight and get by in the world without being
a burden on others. Financial independence and self-reliance
were considered very important American values, and, bar-
ring great depressions, the death of a working spouse, or other
extreme circumstances beyond a person’s control, able-bodied
people were not supposed to seek outside aid from government
or from public charities. Irresponsible or improvident people
who neglected their families or had children out of wedlock and
as a result became burdens on the public treasury were severely
condemned by the mores of the general community, Murray
points out, with the sharpest condemnation often coming from
the ranks of the working poor and working lower-middle class,

who often prided themselves on their own hard work and inde-
pendence and on the fact that they had never taken a penny
of public assistance. Before the late 60s, Murray explains, “a
person who was chronically unable to hold onto a job, who
neglected children and spouse, was a bum and a no-good, con-
signed to the lowest circle of status.” (LG, p. 180)
Until the Great Society reform period, Murray says, the
thinking among America’s intellectual and cultural elite tended
to agree with this general American view of the value of self-
reliance and the universal requirement that all healthy adults
should seek economic self-sufficiency within the context of a
stable family structure. Elite opinion also agreed with the impor-
tant and commonly drawn distinction between the deserving
and the undeserving poor. In the late 60s, however, there was
a radical shift in opinion on these matters, Murray explains,
as a new wisdom emerged among the cultural and policymak-
ing elite, one that sought to obliterate the distinction between
the worthy and unworthy poor by suggesting that all poverty
was the result of outside forces largely beyond the control of
individual poor people. The poor, says Murray, were “homog-
enized,” as poverty was no longer associated with indolence or
vice but with faults inherent in the American social and eco-
nomic order itself. If a person was poor, if a young woman gave
birth to a child out of wedlock whom neither she nor her family
could support, if a man neglected his spouse or family the sys-
tem was to blame, said this new wisdom. Under this new elite
wisdom, Murray says, welfare dependency, even by the young
and healthy, was radically destigmatized, and public financial
assistance for all who were below a certain level of income came
to be seen as a fundamental human right or entitlement that the
taxpayers were obligated to honor. The older middle-class and
working-class norms of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, Mur-
ray says, were attacked most vehemently by the welfare rights
advocates of the late 60s, who were vocal in their insistence that

all who were on the dole should consider their assistance a right,
not a charity. Within elite circles, adherence to the older distinc-
tion between the deserving and the undeserving poor came to be
looked on as callous and reactionary.
The effect of treating all welfare-dependent people as vic-
tims, however, is not without consequences for the lives of poor
people, Murray says. Telling people that they are not responsible
for their behavior because “the system is to blame” and encour-
aging people to believe that they have little control over their
lives engenders, says Murray, a sense of fatalism and helpless-
ness, as well as a tendency toward irresponsible excuse-making,
that seriously undermines upward mobility and the capacity of
the poor to cope with their day-to-day problems. Writing more
as a pragmatist than a moralist, Murray says that “by taking
away responsibility—by saying, ‘Because the system is to blame,
it’s not your faultÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€’ society also takes away the credit that
is an essential part of the reward structure that has fostered
social and economic mobility in the U.S.” (LG, p. 186) If soci-
ety can’t blame individuals for bad behavior, Murray argues, it
can’t very credibly praise them for good behavior either. It’s like
the teacher who gives all his students As. The grading system
under such circumstances ceases to serve as an incentive system,
and many of the students will not work very hard as a result. In
an article in Political Science Quarterly defending the argument
of Losing Ground, Murray says that the message that the elite
was transmitting to struggling poor people in the late 1960s was
this: “When things go wrong, there are ready excuses; when
things go well, it is luck.”224
Among poor people, blacks in the late 60s, says Murray,
were singled out for special consideration by elite opinion mak-
ers, and the effect was even more devastating than the opinion
224. Charles Murray, “Have the Poor Been Losing Ground?” Political Science
Quarterly, Fall 1985, p. 11.

shift with regard to the poor in general. The new white elite atti-
tude was driven, Murray says, by white guilt and white confusion
over the mid-60s ghetto riots, which produced, he believes, the
general conviction among the white intelligentsia and the white
policymaking elite that blacks were owed a special debt for their
past victimization, and that because of this victimization blacks
should not be held accountable for what they do. This attitude
Murray characterizes as a form of condescension that undermines
not only the kind of status reward system that leads to upward
mobility but also the capacity of a people to achieve a sense of
personal dignity and self-respect. Murray writes in this regard:
It was a very small step from [the premise that it was not the
fault of the poor that they are poor] to the conclusion that
it is not the fault of the poor that they fail to pull themselves
up when we offer them a helping hand. White moral confu-
sion about the course of the civil rights movement in general
and the riots in particular created powerful reasons to look
for excuses. It was the system’s fault. It was history’s fault.
(LG, p. 39)
Whites began to tolerate and make excuses for behavior
among blacks that whites would disdain in themselves or
their children. (LG, p. 223)
The white elite could not at one time cope with two
reactions. They could not simultaneously feel compelled to
make restitution for past wrongs to blacks and blame blacks
for not taking advantage of their new opportunities. The
system had to be blamed, and any deficiencies demonstrated
by blacks had to be overlooked or covered up—by whites.
A central theme of this book has been that the consequences
were disastrous for poor people of all races, but for poor
blacks especially, and most emphatically for poor blacks in
all-black communities—precisely that population that was
object of the most unremitting sympathy. (LG, p. 223)

The moral agonizing among whites was strikingly

white-centered. Whites had created the problem, it was up to
whites to fix it, and there was very little in the dialogue that
treated blacks as responsible actors. Until July 1964 most
whites (and most blacks) thought in terms of equal access
to opportunity. Blacks who failed to take advantage were
in the same boat with whites who failed to take advantage.
By 1967 this was not an intellectually acceptable way to
conceive of the issue. Blacks were exempted. Once more, in
a new and curious fashion, whites had put up the “Whites
Only” sign. (LG, p. 33)
Besides discouraging upward mobility, personal dignity, and

economic independence, the shift in elite opinion during the late
1960s, Murray contends, had the effect of dramatically worsen-
ing the quality of life and sense of personal well-being among
the working poor. These were the people who often did not live
much above the living standard of the welfare poor but who had
always enjoyed a much higher status in society because of the
appreciation others felt for the sacrifices they made in remaining
self-sufficient and not burdening anyone outside their extended
family. But one of the inevitable consequences of “homogeniz-
ing” the poor, Murray says, was to withdraw status and praise
from those who struggled to remain off welfare. And as status
and praise were withdrawn from the working poor, the qual-
ity of life for such people, Murray says, dramatically declined.
Their situation, moreover, was made even less tolerable by the
tendency of the white elite to treat certain menial jobs as too
demeaning to ask welfare recipients to perform. “When social
policy reinforces the ethic that certain jobs are too demeaning
to ask people to do,” says Murray, “it was those who preferred
such jobs to welfare whose basis for self-respect was stripped
from them.” (LG, p. 201)

Although Murray does not mention the fact, it was the very
working poor that he describes who protested in anger in the
late 60s against the withdrawl of public recognition of their
efforts with the popular bumper sticker of the period: I FIGHT
POVERTY—I WORK! When the working poor receive no
greater status in society than the welfare-dependent poor, there
will be little incentive for poor people to work. Indeed, Mur-
ray suggests that when working provides no greater benefits in
terms of standard of living or social status than remaining idle,
the person who works at a menial job may come to see himself
as a chump or a fool.
Assessment of Murray
Losing Ground was widely reviewed in scholarly journals and
popular magazines and created a sensation in Washington,
where Murray’s final thought experiment, suggesting that Amer-
ica’s poor would be much better off if most of the reforms of
the Great Society were scrapped, was enthusiastically embraced
by many conservative supporters of the Reagan administration.
Not since the publication of Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to
Serfdom in the mid-1940s had a public-policy-oriented book
provoked such strong reactions from both the left and the right,
although, as previously suggested, this situation did not always
contribute to a conscientious understanding of Murray’s often
complex arguments. The attack on Losing Ground from the
left side of the political spectrum was often fierce, with Robert
Greenstein’s widely read article in The New Republic, “Losing
Faith in Losing Ground,” setting the tone for a good deal of the
subsequent discussion and debate.225
225. Robert Greenstein, “Losing Faith in Losing Ground,” The New Republic, Mar.
25, 1985, pp. 12–17.

Critics of Murray tended to present two sets of data, which,

they contended, called into question Losing Ground’s basic
contention that increases in welfare expenditures between 1965
and 1970 caused an increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock
births, female-headed households, welfare dependency, and
marital instability among the black poor. If the level of wel-
fare generosity had all these bad effects, critics argued, then
one would expect to find much higher incidence of such condi-
tions in states with generous benefits as compared with states
that offered more meager welfare aid. The gap between gen-
erous and stingy states was enormous, critics pointed out—in
1975, for instance, Mississippi offered a family of four only $60
monthly in AFDC funds, while California offered more than
$400—and even when one added in the value of food stamps,
which were more uniform across states, the gap between states
was still very wide. Moreover, if generous welfare expenditures
were responsible for the rising illegitimacy and other negative
trends of the late 1960s that Murray listed, one would expect
these trends to have reversed themselves in the 1970s, Murray’s
critics argued, since the real value of AFDC benefits declined
sharply over this decade as states failed to adjust their benefit
levels to the inflationary rise in the cost of living. Yet neither of
these two conditions obtained. The most exhaustive series of
regression analyses of the available data on births to unmar-
ried women across states could find no evidence that AFDC lev-
els affected the decisions of young unmarried women to bear
children, and the authors of the study concluded that AFDC,
though having considerable influence on the ability of a young
unmarried women to form her own separate household, had no
effect on rates of illegitimacy.226 Given the fact that the rate of
illegitimacy and of female-headed households continued to rise
226. David Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, “The Impact of AFDC on Family Structure,” in
Ronald Ehrenbert, ed., Research in Labor Economics, vol. 7 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press,
1985).

throughout the 1970s despite declining real values of AFDC and

food stamps, the thesis of Losing Ground, critics concluded,
must be wrong.
Murray responded to such criticisms on at least three
occasions,227 and the counter-arguments he offered were strong.
Many of the critics of Losing Ground, Murray rightly charged,
attacked a stick-figure caricature of what is actually argued in
the book. To begin with, most critics zeroed in almost exclusively
on what was said about Great Society welfare policies, ignoring
all that was said in Losing Ground about changes in criminal-
justice procedures, changes in educational policy, the destigma-
tization of welfare recipiency, the changes in status rewards for
the working poor, and the mutual-enhancing effect of all the
late 60s changes taken together. Moreover, even with regard to
welfare policy, his critics, Murray charged, acted as if he had
treated AFDC alone, or AFDC augmented by food stamps, as
responsible for the disintegration of the black lower-class family,
completely ignoring all that is said in Losing Ground about the
other six or seven significant changes in welfare policy enacted
during this period.
To his critics’ charge that rates of out-of-wedlock births and
female-headed households should show some positive correla-
tion with the vast differences across states in AFDC levels if
the basic thesis of Losing Ground is correct, Murray countered
that the true differences in the total welfare benefit package
across states were really quite small once one added in the value
not only of AFDC but also of food stamps, Medicaid, housing
allowances, and other available benefits. In addition, Murray
contended, when one views the total benefit packages in terms
of local costs of living as well as local standards of living, they
227. Along with the two previously cited articles by Murray (“Have the Poor Been
Losing Ground?” and “The Two Wars against Poverty: Economic Growth and the
Great Society”), Murray has responded to arguments of critics in “How to Lie with
Statistics,” National Review, Feb. 28, 1986, pp. 39–41.

begin to look very similar. Murray offered in this context fig-

ures from a General Accounting Office study which indicated
that during the late 1970s the total monthly benefit package
available to a poor unmarried mother in the low-benefit area
of New Orleans was $654 if housing benefits were obtained
($511 if they were not); in the very high-benefit area of San
Francisco, by contrast, with housing benefits the value of the
total package was $867 ($734 without housing benefits). Even
as they stand, these figures do not indicate a tremendous differ-
ence across states, Murray said, and what difference there is,
he showed, almost disappears when the standard of living in
each area is taken into account. The total welfare benefit pack-
age in San Francisco (with housing benefits) represented 65.6
percent of the median household income for that area, while the
comparable figure for New Orleans was 66.4 percent (without
housing benefits the figures were 55.5 percent and 51.9 percent,
respectively).
Murray disavowed the view, however, that poor women
micro-manage their fertility rates in response to incremental
changes in welfare benefit packages. Poor women, he says, often
want to have a baby to have someone to love, and if they do
not have much of a prospect for an interesting job or for marry-
ing a high-wage-earning husband, they may well decide to have
a child out of wedlock if the welfare system will allow them
to live at what they consider a minimally decent level. What
level this is will vary from person to person, but the individual
threshold points, Murray says, will tend to cluster together so
that there will be a great jump in the number of people availing
themselves of the welfare option once the total welfare benefit
package reaches the minimum level of acceptability at which
many young married women are clustered.
In addition to the size of the total benefit package itself,
the attractiveness of the welfare option, Murray claimed, was
enhanced by such changes in welfare regulations as the thirty-

and-a-third rule and the elimination of the man-in-the-house

restriction. These changes were not repealed by the inflation of
the 1970s, and the welfare benefit package, according to Mur-
ray, still remained high enough throughout this period to enable
poor young women to have a child out of wedlock, which they
otherwise would have avoided, either through sexual absti-
nence, contraception, marriage, adoption, or abortion. In addi-
tion, as a result of the total ensemble of policy changes in the late
60s, Murray says, the destructive trends that developed in the
inner cities began to take on a life of their own, as community
standards broke down, two-parent stable families disappeared,
crime and the benefits to be gained from crime increased, and
schools ceased to be a means of upward mobility. Under such
circumstances, according to Murray, it is not surprising that a
decline in the real value of AFDC and food stamp benefits in
the late 1970s and beyond failed to produce a return to lower
levels of illegitimacy and single-parent families. Once older pat-
terns of discipline and responsibility break down, Murray says,
it is not easy to bring them back, even when incentive structures
become less antagonistic to them.228
If one surveys the whole range of policy changes during the
late 1960s that Murray focuses on in Losing Ground, the con-
tention seems unassailable that their overall effect on the stabil-
ity of the inner-city black family was negative. To use Murray’s
own instrument of the thought experiment, one might ask what
would have happened in the late 1960s if most of the Great
Society reforms Murray excoriates had never been enacted
and the country instead had moved in the opposite direction
in terms of both public policy and public philosophy. What
would have happened, for instance, if Senator Goldwater had
228. This would also be a good explanation for why out-of-wedlock birth rates among
the black poor did not drop precipitously after the 1995 welfare reforms, when welfare
benefits were time-limited and the older AFDC program replaced by the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program.

won a landslide victory in 1964 comparable to that of Lyn-

don Johnson, and with the backing of a Congress overwhelm-
ingly Republican and viscerally anti-welfare, his administration
had successfully proceeded a) to pressure states to reduce their
AFDC benefits to two thirds of their 1950 levels; b) to eliminate
the food stamp program for all but the elderly and disabled; c)
to defeat all attempts to pass a Medicaid bill; d) to require
six or more unannounced at-home eligibility checks per year
for AFDC recipients; e) to make any attempt to supplement
welfare benefits through unreported outside earnings a serious
felony crime and provide for rigorous enforcement of such a
law; f) to appoint judges to the Supreme Court who would find
nothing constitutionally suspect about a rigorously enforced
man-in-the-house restriction; g) to limit welfare recipiency to
a maximum of five years over a lifetime; and h) to require all
able-bodied welfare recipients not caring for very young chil-
dren to work at least 20 hours per week in workfare-type pro-
grams, if need be, at government-sponsored WPA-type jobs?
While Murray’s critics claimed that “welfare” had no effect
on the rise in the rate of out-of-wedlock births and female-
headed households among urban blacks, it is simply inconceiv-
able to anyone with the least bit of common sense or intuitive
understanding of human nature that such a scenario as that
described would have been consistent with the actual experi-
enced rise in out-of-wedlock birth rates among inner-city black
residents from the 40 percent range that Moynihan reported for
central Harlem in the early 1960s to the 80+ percent range of
the early 1980s. Whatever other factors may have been at work
in bringing about such developments, the fact remains that a
kinder and more generous welfare system enabled significant
numbers of people to engage in types of behavior regarding
childbirth and employment that they would not have engaged
in otherwise (either because they themselves had thought of the

negative consequences or because one of more of their parents

or guardians had).
The paradoxes and unanticipated consequences of a gener-
ous system of poor relief is one that has been recognized by
perceptive observers for two centuries or more, and is certainly
not the discovery of Charles Murray. In the nineteenth century,
it was well recognized by philanthropists and Social Darwinists
alike. One of the clearest statements on the subject is to be found
in Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Memoir on Pauperism,” which he
published in 1835 based on his own observations of the effects
of the English poor laws. “Almost two and a half centuries have
passed since the principle of legal charity was fully embraced by
our neighbors [in England],” Tocqueville wrote,
and one may now judge the fatal consequences which flowed
from the adoption of this principle.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Man, like all socially
organized beings, has a natural passion for idleness. There
are, however, two incentives to work: the need to live and
the desire to improve the conditions of life. Experience has
proven that the majority of men can be sufficiently moti-
vated to work only by the first of these. The second is only
effective with a small minority. Well, a charitable institution
indiscriminately open to all those in need, or a law which
gives all the poor a right to public aid whatever the origin
of their poverty, weakens or destroys the first stimulant and
leaves only the second intact.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I recognize not only the
utility but the necessity of public charity applied to inevitable
evils such as the helplessness of infancy, the decrepitude of
old age, sickness, insanity. I even admit its temporary useful-
ness in times of public calamities which God sometimes
allows to slip from his hand.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€But I am deeply convinced
that any permanent, regular, administrative system whose
aim will be to provide for the needs of the poor, will breed

more miseries than it can cure, will deprave the population

that it wants to help and comfort.229
One can view much of Murray’s argument in Losing Ground

as a sustained attempt to demonstrate the truth of Tocqueville’s
insight, although it must be kept in mind that the number of
people who become “trapped” by the welfare system represent
only a small minority of the people who have actually used it.
As a number of Murray’s critics correctly pointed out, most
users of welfare do not become permanently dependent, a fact
the reader of Losing Ground could easily lose sight of.
Even more unassailable than Losing Ground’s analysis of
the disincentives created by Great Society welfare policies is
its analysis of the effects of destigmatizing welfare recipiency
among the able-bodied and diminishing the social status of the
working poor. Many blacks of an earlier generation tell of the
disgrace it was to be on welfare even during the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s, when honest work was hard to come by even
for the most eager and ambitious. The Ebony publisher John
H. Johnson, for instance, relates his own family’s experience of
being on welfare in the city of Chicago between 1934 and 1936:
“What I remember most about my days on welfare,” Johnson
recalls in his autobiography, “was the shame.” “I used to sit
on a stoop with a group of young men and watch the welfare
trucks cruising the neighborhood. The trucks would drive up
to my house, and someone would say, ‘They’re going to your
house.’ And I would say, ‘That’s not my house.’ We knew the
trucks were going to our houses; we were just too ashamed to
admit it.”230
229. Alexis de Tocqueville, Tocqueville and Beaumont on Social Reform, ed. Seymour
Drescher (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 14, 24–5.
230. John H. Johnson, Succeeding Against the Odds (New York: Warner Books, 1989),
pp. 74–5.

However one may criticize the social norms that encouraged

young men such as Johnson to feel as they did, such norms cer-
tainly had the positive effect of encouraging all self-respecting
people to get off welfare and become economically self-suffi-
cient as soon as they possibly could. The effects of destigma-
tizing welfare recipiency are perceptively analyzed by another
black writer, Bernard Gifford, a former deputy chancellor of the
New York City Board of Education:
In many ways the kids today are victims of liberal victo-

ries. One of the battles we fought in the 1960s was to take
the stigma away from people who are poor and place it on
society; to emphasize the structural barriers to poverty. That
needed to be done. We were successful in saying to society:
there are real structural impediments.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The problem
was that we shifted the focus of attention from local insti-
tutions—family, church, neighborhood organization—to
government. We undermined those institutions and made it
possible for people to accept welfare.
My mother was always ashamed to be on welfare. My
brother was ashamed. I was ashamed. And though we grew
up in a neighborhood where it was prevalent, we never
accepted it. And what is different now is that I see lots of
people accepting dependency. No one ought to be ashamed
to be poor. Yet I’m convinced that the shame we felt being on
welfare made us get away and escape repeating this cycle.231
What Gifford has to say here, of course, fully confirms Mur-

ray’s analysis in Losing Ground.
231. Bernard Gifford, quoted in Ken Auletta, The Underclass (New York: Random
House, 1982), p. 301.

But It Didn’t Start with the Great Society

Murray’s analysis in Losing Ground certainly goes a long way
toward explaining what happened in the black ghettos of Amer-
ica in the decades following the major policy changes of the
late 1960s. No one who wants to understand the breakdown in
black family life following the Great Society period can ignore
the weight of what Murray has to say on these matters. Nev-
ertheless, there are limitations to the Losing Ground approach
that should be obvious to anyone who has ever read the Moyni-
han Report or any number of other accounts of inner-city black
slum life during the pre-Losing Ground period of the late 1950s
and early 1960s. The simple fact of the matter is that such
trends in the inner-city black ghettos as family dissolution, out-
of-wedlock births, low labor force participation, poor academic
performance, and rising crime and delinquency were cause for
alarm among knowledgeable observers years before any of the
Great Society programs or liberal policy changes that Murray
criticizes were ever instituted.
As early as 1961, for instance, Harvard educator James
Bryan Conant responded with shock and horror at the situa-
tion he had observed in many inner-city black slums in the final
years of the Eisenhower administration. In his widely read and
influential book, Slums and Suburbs, Conant wrote:
I am convinced we are allowing social dynamite to accumu-

late in our large cities.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In some slum neighborhoods I
have no doubt that over a half of the boys between sixteen
and twenty-one are out of school and out of work. Leaving
aside human tragedies, I submit that a continuation of this
situation is a menace to the social and political health of the
large cities.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
In some [Negro slums] there are very bad gangs with
gang warfare among the boys. There are also vicious fights
outside of school between Negro girls. The condition in

one such neighborhood was summed up to one of my staff

by a principal of a junior high school who said even he
was shocked by the answers to a questionnaire to the girls
which asked what was their biggest problem. The majority
replied to the effect that their biggest problem was getting
from the street into their apartment without being molested
in the hallway of the tenement. He went on to say that the
area had a set of social customs of its own. The women, on
the whole, work and earn fairly good wages, but the male
Negro often earns less than the woman and would rather not
work at all than to be in this situation. As a consequence,
the streets are full of unemployed men who hang around and
prey on the girls. The women are the centers of the family
and as a rule are extremely loyal to the children. The men,
on the other hand, are floaters, and many children have no
idea who their father is. Similar reports from principals and
teachers can be heard by the attentive and sympathetic visi-
tor to the Negro slums of any one of several cities.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€What
is terrifying is that the number of male youth in this category
is increasing almost daily.232
Such descriptions sound all too familiar. An equally depress-

ing picture of inner-city black slum life during the immediate
pre-Great Society period was offered by Charles Silberman in
his book Crisis in Black and White:
In Northern industrial centers one out of every three Negro

workers has suffered unemployment in the last several
years.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€In some Negro neighborhoods, the unemploy-
ment rate may run as high as 40 percent. To anyone walking
through the Negro neighborhoods of any large city—and
232. James Bryant Conant, Slums and Suburbs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 2,
19–20.

to the children who grow up in them—few sights are more

familiar than the groups of idle Negro men congregating at
street corners, or the lonely Negroes sitting on their front
stoops all day long, sipping wine from bottles discretely hid-
den in brown paper bags.233
Descriptions similar to those of Bryant and Silberman can be

found in the writings of many other observers (Claude Brown’s
account of growing up in Harlem in the 1950s in his Manchild
in the Promised Land234 and the description of the disorganized
black lower class in early 1940s-era Chicago in Horace Cayton
and St. Clair Drake’s Black Metropolis235are two of the best), but
there is no need to belabor the point. Contrary to the impres-
sion one would get from Losing Ground, the problem of black
urban-family disintegration is one that first reached alarming
proportions during the Great Depression, and although the
situation improved considerably during the high-employment
years of the Second World War, it began a gradual deterioration
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s that would continue at
an accelerated pace after this period. Charles Murray makes a
very impressive case for the view that this process of deteriora-
tion intensified in the late 1960s and early 1970s in response
to major changes in public policies and elite attitudes. But he is
wrong in suggesting that it all started with the Great Society, or
that most problems that existed in poor black neighborhoods
prior to the Great Society would have worked themselves out
except for the changes of this period. (“It is genuinely an open
issue,” Murray wrote in 1982, “whether we should be talking
about spending cuts, or whether we should be considering an
233. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, p. 40.

234. Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York: New American
Library, 1965).
235. Horace Cayton and St. Claire Drake, Black Metropolis (New York: Harper and
Row, 1945).

overhaul of the entire welfare system as conceived in the Great

Society. If the War on Poverty is constructed as having begun in
1950 instead of 1964, it may fairly be said that we were win-
ning the war until Lyndon Johnson decided to wage it.” (TWAP,
p. 16)
Daniel Moynihan was certainly correct when he criticized
Losing Ground on this score. “Murray’s work is concerned pri-
marily with the growth of an urban minority underclass,” Moyni-
han remarked in his Godkin lectures as Harvard (later published
as Family and Nation). “But that is precisely what I did predict
in 1965, using data series that ended in 1964, before any of the
events that he asserts have brought about these ‘turns for the
worse’Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Losing Ground attributes developments that trouble
the author to government actions that mostly began after these
developments had commenced as clearly recognizable statistical
trends.”236 Whatever one may say of Murray’s work, it seems that
more must be considered in understanding the catastrophe of the
inner-city black ghettos in America than the bad public policies
and bad elite opinions of the Great Society era of the 1960s.
William Julius Wilson and the Changing

Structure of the Urban Economy
If the factors Murray analyzed in Losing Ground only partially
explained the deteriorating situation in the inner-city black
slums, and if certain long-term trends were apparently involved
that predate the reforms of the Great Society period, what other
factors needed to be explored? After the publication of Losing
Ground, by far the most important work to address this ques-
tion was William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged.237
236. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Family and Nation (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1986), pp. 134–5.
237. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987).

Wilson, a University of Chicago-trained sociologist and past

president of the American Sociological Association, viewed
himself in this work as a reseacher trying to restore an older
approach to the problem of black family dissolution and neigh-
borhood decline, one that would place much of the blame for
the deterioration of the ghetto on certain fundamental changes
in the nature of the modern urban economy. Wilson spends a
good deal of time addressing the arguments in Losing Ground,
and while he doesn’t dismiss Murray’s work entirely, his review
of the anti-Murray literature, together with his own studies of
the urban poor in Chicago and elsewhere, convinced him that
Murray greatly overemphasized the effect of Great Society poli-
cies in explaining the growth of an urban underclass and greatly
underestimated or ignored what Wilson sees as the most impor-
tant explanatory variable, namely, black male unemployment
brought about by the decline in the number of low-skilled inner-
city manufacturing jobs.
Although Wilson writes from the perspective of a left-ori-
ented social democrat, he is highly critical of the behavior of
many left and left-liberal-oriented writers, who, he charges,
ignored for many years the deteriorating conditions in the inner-
city ghettos and left the field open for conservative theorists like
Murray to propound views that he considers of doubtful valid-
ity. In Wilson’s own words:
The liberal perspective on the ghetto underclass and inner-

city social dislocations is less persuasive and influential in
public discourse today, because many of those who represent
the traditional liberal views on social issues have failed to
address straightforwardly the rise of social pathologies in the
ghetto.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Some liberals completely avoid any discussion
of these problems, some eschew terms such as underclass,
and others embrace selective evidence that denies the very
existence of an underclass and behavior associated with

the underclass or rely on the convenient term racism to

account for the sharp rise in the rates of social dislocation
in the inner city.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The combined effect of these tenden-
cies, is to render liberal arguments ineffective and to enhance
conservative arguments on the underclass, even though the
conservative thesis is plagued with serious problems of inter-
pretation and analysis. (TD, pp. 12–13)
Like Murray, Wilson in The Truly Disadvantaged finds

theories that would try to explain underclass growth in terms
of ongoing racism and discrimination thoroughly unpersuasive.
The underclass increased the most in size, he points out, during
the decade of the 1970s, a period following the enactment of
the most comprehensive civil rights legislation in the nation’s
history,and one that also saw the implementation of affirmative-
action policies designed to grant special preference to black job
applicants. Discrimination in the post-civil rights era, Wilson
says, has certainly been less than it was in the 1940s, yet the
black male employment picture then was much better than it
was in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the racism and discrimi-
nation theory, Wilson points out, cannot explain the very con-
siderable success of the black middle class during the very period
when the condition of the black lower class was deteriorating
most rapidly. Wilson also rejects theories of the underclass, such
as those proposed by Edward Banfield in The Unheavenly City,
which would stress differences in individual moral or behav-
ioral factors or the existence of a “culture of poverty” as causal
agents. Poor inner-city black males, Wilson says, share values
and aspirations similar to those of mainstream society, although
their aspirations, he contends, are usually thwarted by circum-
stances beyond their control.
If Great Society policy changes, continuing racism, or a “cul-
ture of poverty” don’t offer much of an explanation for the dis-
integration of the lower-class black family and the many other

pathologies of the inner-city ghetto, how is the situation to be

explained? In answer to this question Wilson develops at length
his thesis concerning the basic changes in the structure of Ameri-
can industry and the impact these changes have had in increasing
the joblessness of young black males. Wilson’s argument goes
something like this: When the hordes of European immigrants
poured into America in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, America was an industrializing nation with an expanding
blue-collar job market that offered great employment opportuni-
ties for those with little skills and without even a command of
the English language. A healthy body and an eagerness to work
were all that were usually necessary to find employment in the
great industrial centers of the Northeast and Midwest, and what
involuntary unemployment did exist was usually brief in dura-
tion and tied to the ups and downs of the business cycle.
In the last several decades, however, American industry has
undergone a major restructuring. This restructuring has been
characterized by a dramatic decline in the number of manu-
facturing jobs in the older central cities, as steel, rubber, autos,
and other traditional smokestack industries have declined in
size due to foreign competition and the movement of manufac-
turing facilities abroad. Where increases in manufacturing jobs
have occurred, they happen not in the central cities but in the
suburbs, where lower taxes, less congestion, and improved road
transportation have provided a more congenial environment
than that available in the urban metropolis. For example, in the
25-year period between 1947 and 1972, the number of manu-
facturing jobs in the 33 largest metropolitan areas declined by
880,000 at the same time that manufacturing employment in
the surrounding suburbs grew by 2.5 million. Over the same
period, these cities lost 867,000 jobs in retail and wholesale
trade while their suburbs added millions of jobs in these same
categories.

As the central cities were losing many jobs in manufactur-

ing, as well as in retail and wholesale trade, the black popula-
tion of these same cities was burgeoning, due both to natural
population growth and to the enormous influx of unskilled
agricultural laborers from the rural South. Between 1950 and
1980, for instance, the black population of the 33 largest met-
ropolitan areas increased by over five million. Since most young
blacks living in the inner cities do not own automobiles and
are not tied to the sorts of information networks that would
enable them to exploit many of the opportunities for employ-
ment in the surrounding suburbs, the result of these simultane-
ous changes has been increasing black joblessness, particularly
among black male youth.
The central cities have, it is true, gained jobs in many cat-
egories other than manufacturing and trade. But the job growth
has been in such areas as information processing, financial
services, business administration, and various high-tech fields,
all of which have educational and training requirements that
place them beyond the reach of most inner-city black residents.
Inner-city black residents are thus mismatched for jobs both
geographically and educationally, and the result is ever lower
levels of participation in the regular urban labor force. Unlike
the situation confronting the Southern and Eastern European
immigrants who came to America before the First World War,
blacks today living in America’s largest cities confront an
employment situation where there seems little room for those
who do not possess a special skill or a minimum of two years of
college education. Even a high school diploma doesn’t go very
far nowadays.
Such, in briefest outline, is the substance of Wilson’s “dein-
dustrialization” argument. Black male joblessness caused by
basic changes in the nature of urban jobs and urban job require-
ments, he explains in his book, is the key to understanding the

pathologies of the ghetto, particularly the rise in female-headed

households and out-of-wedlock births. Since the possibilities of
a steady job are so poor for so many unskilled black youth,
many young black women, Wilson says, see very limited pros-
pects for being able to marry a black male who will be capable
of fulfilling the traditional male role of breadwinner and pro-
vider. Wilson constructs what he calls a “male marriageable
pool index,” which relates the rates of employed civilian men to
women by race and age group, and he uses this index to show
how the proportion of young black males in an economic posi-
tion enabling them to support a family has steadily declined
since the 1950s. The number of marriageable men is much lower
among black men than among whites due to greater black male
joblessness and much higher black rates of mortality and incar-
ceration. Lacking the prospect of marrying a man with a stable
job, young black women, Wilson says, turn to out-of-wedlock
births as the only means of fulfilling their natural human desire
to have children. Out-of-wedlock births and female-headed
households, while not seen as an ideal situation, are neverthe-
less accepted within the inner-city black community because of
the absence of a better alternative. Wilson quotes in this context
from Kenneth Clark’s Dark Ghetto:
In the ghetto, the meaning of the illegitimate child is not

ultimate disgrace. There is not the demand for abortion or
for surrender of the child that one finds in more privileged
communities. In the middle class, the disgrace of illegitimacy
is tied to personal and family aspiration. In lower-class
families, on the other hand, the girl loses only some of her
already limited options by having an illegitimate child; she
is not going to make a “better marriage” or improve her
economic and social status either way. On the contrary, a
child is a symbol of the fact that she is a woman, and she
may gain from having something of her own. Nor is the boy

who fathers an illegitimate child going to lose, for where is

he going? The path to any higher status seems closed to him
in any case. (TD, pp. 73–4)
The destructive effect of male joblessness on family and

community life in the ghetto has been made worse, according
to Wilson, by the exodus of the more stable middle-class and
working-class elements from inner-city ghetto communities.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s and even into the 1960s, he
explains, middle-class and working-class blacks often lived in
the same inner-city neighborhoods as the poor and the unem-
ployed. Black professionals—doctors, lawyers, teachers, social
workers, etc.—not only had poor blacks as clients but also lived
very near those whom they served. Their children attended the
same schools, played on the same playgrounds, and sometimes
attended the same churches. It was this stable middle and work-
ing class, Wilson says, that provided most of the community
leadership in the ghettos and helped to establish strong commu-
nity sanctions against aberrant behavior. Black inner-city com-
munities in these earlier decades were often a source of positive
identification for the residents who lived there, Wilson explains,
and the more stable and hard-working elements tended to set
the standards for the community as a whole.
Ironically, it was partially as a result of certain civil rights
victories, according to Wilson’s analysis, that ghetto communi-
ties were deprived of this critically important stable element.
As long as access to more desirable neighborhoods in the sub-
urbs or in predominantly white sections of the cities was denied
to the more successful blacks, they were forced to remain in
the all-black central city ghettos. But with the invalidation of
racially restrictive covenants by the Supreme Court (the criti-
cal case was Shelly v. Kraemer in 1948) and the passage of fair
housing laws by many states and by the federal government in
the 1960s, many middle-class and working-class blacks began

to move out of the ghettos, leaving behind the worst-off ele-

ments. As a result of this exodus, ghetto communities became
dominated by female-headed households, unemployed or only
episodically employed young men, drug addicts, alcoholics, the
mentally disturbed, and a large criminal population. Growing
up in neighborhoods with few male breadwinners to serve as
role models for the youth, the youth of the ghettos, Wilson says,
were not able to develop the kinds of habits of regularity, punc-
tuality, cooperativeness, etc., which would enable them to suc-
ceed at a mainstream job. “In neighborhoods in which most
families do not have a steadily employed breadwinner,” Wilson
writes, “the norms and behavior patterns associated with steady
work compete with those associated with casual or infrequent
work.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The combination of unattractive jobs and lack of
community norms to reinforce work increases the likelihood
that individuals will turn to either underground illegal activity
or idleness or both.” (TD, p. 61)
The inner-city youth of the post-60s period, according to
Wilson’s analysis, differ from the inner-city youth of earlier gen-
erations, not because of changes in their basic attitudes or cul-
tural values, but because of their greater social isolation. The
most disadvantaged elements of the black lower class are now
concentrated in neighborhoods where they have little access to
people who are capable of providing the young with informa-
tion about available jobs or initiating them into the norms and
behavioral patterns required of a reliable worker. This social
isolation and concentration effect only serves to exacerbate the
problem of declining blue-collar jobs in the central city. And
when the youth no longer aspire to mainstream jobs, Wilson
says, they no longer have much of an incentive to prepare them-
selves in school to gain the basic literacy skills and other quali-
fications necessary to acquire such jobs. Teachers in inner-city
schools where such youth predominate become demoralized and
begin to lose interest in teaching. As a result, inner-city schools

almost cease to be educational institutions, and drop-out rates

often reach 50 percent or more.
Toward the end of The Truly Disadvantaged Wilson makes
a series of policy proposals designed to enhance the life chances
of the worst off among blacks in the inner cities, although he
acknowledges that his proposals, intended to bring the Ameri-
can welfare state more into line with the more highly developed
welfare states of Northern and Central Europe, lack current
political feasibility. His proposals include a program of uni-
versal child care for working mothers; universal family assis-
tance payments to all families with children; vastly expanded
job training and education programs; and better enforcement
of child-support judgments. Wilson stresses that to gain wide-
spread acceptance, such programs must be universal in scope
rather than race-specific, and like the policies of the New Deal—
but unlike the policies of the Great Society—they should try to
help the most seriously disadvantaged in ways the better off
can positively relate to. Wilson is highly critical of affirmative-
action policies in this regard, since they lack support among
most white people, he says, and generally help only the better-
off blacks, not “the truly disadvantaged.” Wilson also supports
a policy of national economic planning designed to promote,
simultaneously, full employment, economic growth, and low
inflation, although he offers no blueprint or theory as to how
this is all to be achieved, and few people, it would seem, except
the most naïve of the older-style Keynesians would find his rec-
ommendations on this score at all helpful.
Assessment of Wilson
In focusing on the structural changes in the American econ-
omy, Wilson in The Truly Disadvantaged certainly adds to our
understanding of the problem of the black ghetto. Whether
one speaks of “automation,” as analysts did in the 1950s and

1960s, or “deindustrialization,” as they did in the 1970s and

1980s, there can hardly be any doubt that in the largest urban
areas in America the number of high-paying factory jobs that
require little skill has been diminishing for many decades. The
sociologist John Kasarda, whose studies Wilson relied on heav-
ily, has demonstrated this fact with abundant evidence. To give
an example from Kasarda’s data: Over just one short decade—
between 1970 and 1980—the number of jobs in Boston requir-
ing less than a high school education decreased by 58.7 percent,
in Chicago by 41.8 percent, in Cleveland by 48.2 percent, in
Detroit by 55.0 percent, in New York by 40.4 percent, and in
Philadelphia by 47.2 percent. The number of jobs requiring only
a high school diploma also dropped over this period in each of
these same cities, though at a considerably lower rate.
By contrast, the number of jobs requiring some college study
increased very substantially in each of the six cities (in Boston
by 32.1 percent, in Chicago by 43.9 percent, in Cleveland by
53.5 percent, in Detroit by 48.4 percent, in New York by 61.0
percent, and in Philadelphia by 57.4 percent), as did the num-
ber of jobs requiring a four-year college degree or more (the
increases for the six cities were 71.4 percent, 56.7 percent, 31.0
percent, 35.3 percent, 47.3 percent, and 57.4 percent, respec-
tively). In all, between 1970 and 1980 the six cities lost a total
of almost 1.45 million jobs requiring a high school education or
less, while they gained a total of more than 995,000 jobs that
require at least some college experience.238 These figures indicate
employment shifts of very considerable magnitude, and any the-
ory of black family disintegration and underclass growth must
certainly take them into consideration. With Wilson’s basic con-
tention there can be little argument: It is unquestionably more
difficult today for an inner-city youth to find a good-paying job
238. John Kasarda, “Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass,” in William
Julius Wilson, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives, The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 501 (Jan. 1989): 26–47.

without a special skill or some college training than it was in the

1940s or in the decade preceding the Great Depression.
Wilson’s argument about the exodus of stable middle-class
elements from the ghetto and the resulting social isolation of
the lower-class families that remained there is also important
and draws attention to the often neglected element of neigh-
borhoods in understanding the quality of life in the inner city.
Youth from broken homes or single-parent families have a much
easier time assimilating mainstream values and integrating into
mainstream society—particularly into the world of regularized
work—if they are fortunate enough to live in neighborhoods
where most other families have working fathers present than
they are in neighborhoods where most of their friends and
schoolmates come from families similar to their own. This is
a simple, common-sense observation, though one easy to over-
look. Conversely, even an intact husband-wife family, with a
working father present, that lives in an area where 80 or 90
percent of the children come from households led by unwed
mothers will have great difficulty insulating its offspring—par-
ticularly its male offspring—from the destructive effects of local
street gangs and the local teenage peer-group culture, no mat-
ter how conscientious the family may be in trying to raise its
children according to general American norms. Unless it can
construct a countervailing environment centered on a socially
conservative church or a small network of stable relatives and
friends, there is a very high probability that even children from
intact families will be lost to the negative forces of the ghetto.
Again, this is a common-sense observation that nevertheless is
easy to overlook, and we have Wilson to thank for drawing our
attention to these important facts.
Wilson’s analysis, however, can be criticized on a number
of grounds. One obvious criticism, made by Christopher Jen-
cks in a long review of The Truly Disadvantaged for The New
Republic, is Wilson’s tendency to dismiss or ignore important

moral and cultural changes since the late 1960s that have surely
had a significant impact on the decay of stable family life in
the black ghetto. Specifically, Wilson gives short shrift to the
enormous changes in attitudes toward divorce, out-of-wedlock
births, and the obligations of responsible parenthood among
the supposedly stable middle class, both black and white, who
are expected to provide the role models and set the norms for
inner-city black communities. Wilson does acknowledge in one
or two places that the sexual revolution among the middle class
may have had some harmful effects in the ghetto, but he drops
the matter almost as soon as he mentions it on the grounds that
there is no way to measure the effect. Precise measurement in
the area of cultural and attitudinal changes may not be attain-
able, but an inability to measure a phenomenon precisely is
hardly a reason for ignoring it.
A decline in marriage, an increase in divorce and spouse
abandonment, and an increase in out-of-wedlock births have
been pervasive throughout American society since the mid-
1960s, and they have been accompanied by, and in part have
resulted from, radical changes in the older cultural values,
which had prescribed lifelong marriage, sexual fidelity within
marriage, and dedication to spouse and children as the only
proper mode of family existence. The disintegrating forces that
observers noted in the black ghetto in the late 50s and early 60s
were surely reinforced by the decline in these once pervasive cul-
tural norms, which were weakened by successive attacks, first
from the Playboy philosophy of the late 50s and early 60s, then
from the drug-and-drop-out culture of the later 60s, from the
antifamily feminism of the late 60s and early 70s, and finally
from the “me generation” hedonism and narcissism of the late
70s and beyond. The 25-year period from 1965 to 1990 might
be described as one in which much of the middle class itself
lost its moorings and progressively abandoned its attachment
to traditional middle-class values. The sturdy bourgeois family

man of the 1950s was to give way to the cocaine-snorting yup-

pies and buppies of a later date, who were hardly in a position
to teach the lower classes about the sanctity of home and hearth
even if they had lived in the same neighborhood.
In his review of Wilson’s book, Jencks described these gen-
eral cultural changes and their effects on lower-class family life,
providing an important addition to Wilson’s economic interpre-
tation. What Jencks wrote in this regard is worth quoting at
some length:
My own calculations show that the marriage rate among

black men with steady, well-paid jobs declined almost as
much between 1960 and 1980 as the marriage rate among
all black men. Marriage must, therefore, have been losing its
charms for non-economic reasons as well.
The stable two-parent family is losing ground through-
out American society. The trend is the same in Beverly Hills
as in Watts.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Single parenthood began its rapid spread
during the 1960s, when elite attitudes toward sex, mar-
riage, divorce, and parenthood were undergoing a dramatic
change. This change was obvious in the mass media, in the
law, and in the widely publicized activities of celebrities. In
the space of a decade we moved from thinking that society
ought to discourage extramarital sex, and especially out-of-
wedlock births, to thinking that such efforts were an unwar-
ranted infringement on personal liberty.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Americans have always believed that every couple had
a God-given right to conceive children, but until recently
we assumed that this right carried with it an obligation to
marry, to live together, and to support these children. To
enforce this obligation we exerted very strong social pressure
on couples to marry if they conceived children, and to stay
married thereafter.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Even when almost every “respect-
able” adult thought unwed parenthood, desertion, and

divorce immoral, it was hard to keep families together in

poor communities. Now that the mass media, the schools,
and even the churches have begun to treat single parenthood
as a regrettable but inescapable part of modern life, we can
hardly expect the respectable poor to carry on the struggle
against illegitimacy and desertion with their old fervor. They
still deplore such behavior, but they cannot make it morally
taboo. Once the two parent norm loses its moral sanctity, the
selfish considerations that always pulled poor parents apart
often become overwhelming.
In making this “cultural” argument, I do not mean to
deny the importance of the economic factors that concern
Wilson. I only want to suggest that economic factors alone
cannot explain the changes that began in the 1960s. It is the
conjunction of economic vulnerability and cultural change
that has proved disastrous.239
The remarks above are stated with Jencks’s characteristic

lucidity, and to anyone who lived through the trends described,
such claims are hard to ignore. Huge cultural changes in marriage
and family life that began in the mid-1960s almost certainly had
a negative impact on black families and black neighborhoods,
especially those in the poorer sections of America’s major cities.
Another important cultural trend Wilson does not consider
but that certainly had a negative impact on black ghetto youth,
was the decline in the once-venerable American work ethic,
which demanded of all able-bodied people not caring for chil-
dren that they seek gainful employment, even if at a modest
wage. Wilson does not consider supply-side factors in explain-
ing the low labor force participation rates of black youth, but
certainly during upswings in the business cycle the conclusion
is inescapable that many young blacks fail to seek employment
239. Christopher Jencks, The New Republic, June 13, 1988, pp. 28–30.

not because of a lack of jobs but because the jobs that are actu-
ally offered are in the low-paying service sectors of the economy
and are often seen as too demeaning or too unremunerative
by African American youth to be worth the effort. Wilson had
drawn attention to this fact in his earlier book, The Declin-
ing Significance of Race, but for reasons that are not clear, he
ignored these problems entirely in The Truly Disadvantaged and
does not in that work distinguish sufficiently between a situa-
tion in which there is a lack of jobs for the unskilled and a situ-
ation in which there is a lack of high-paying jobs. Certainly in
the high-employment years of the late 1980s there was no lack
of unskilled jobs in most of the Northern cities—indeed, many
security guard agencies, janitorial services, fast-food chains, and
other employers of unskilled workers at this time found them-
selves forced to raise their starting wages considerably above
the official minimum wage in order to attract sufficient numbers
of employees—and any conscientious youth at this time who
was willing to work had little difficulty finding employment.
But inner-city African American youth, like American youth
more generally, are often choosier than their parents and grand-
parents were in the sort of work they are willing to do (in one
1980 study of unemployed youth 16 to 21 years old, almost
half listed an amount 50 percent or more above the minimum
wage as the minimum they would accept before working), and
the result of this greater choosiness is often a spotty employ-
ment record and generally poor work habits and work attitudes
that make it difficult for young people to take advantage of a
“good job” even if such should come their way. Wilson had
treated these issues very candidly in his earlier book, although
perhaps so as not to give ammunition to his conservative critics
he fudged over these same issues in his later work and failed
to consider the impact of important attitudinal changes in this
area. Some of Wilson’s statements in his earlier book are worth
recalling, for like Jencks’s comments, they supplement without

negating the structural economic interpretation of The Truly

Disadvantaged:
Unlike the occupational success achieved by the more

talented and educated blacks, those in the black underclass
find themselves locked in the low-paying and dead-end
jobs of the non-corporate industries.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Many of these
jobs go unfilled, and employers often have to turn to cheap
labor from Mexico and Puerto Rico. As Nathan Glazer has
pointed out, “Expectations have changed, and fewer blacks
and whites today will accept a life at menial labor with no
hope for advancement, as their fathers and older brothers
did and as European immigrants did.”
It is not surprisingÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€that recent studies of unemploy-
ment in the urban core reveal that blacks do not experience
any special employment barriers in the casual, low-paid,
and menial jobs of the low-wage sector. In fact, many of
these jobs remain unfilled despite the extremely high unem-
ployment rate of blacks in the inner city. Employers con-
stantly complain of the difficulty of attracting and keeping
a stable work force and often comment that some blacks
seem to be more willing to go on welfare than to accept
available work.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It is no doubt true that in recent years,
attitudes concerning low-status work have changed. Work-
ers today are less wiling to accept the kinds of low-paying
and menial jobs that their grandfathers or fathers readily
accepted.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The underclass also knows that illegal activi-
ties, in many respects, provide a more lucrative alternative
to low-wage employment. It was estimated in a recent study
that roughly 20 percent of the adult residents in Harlem
lived entirely on illegal income.240
240. William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing
American Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 16, 106–8.

Beyond Murray, Wilson, and Jencks

The research of Murray and Wilson has unquestionably
enhanced our understanding of the problems of the inner-city
black poor, and although neither writer thinks very much of the
work of the other, their analyses should be seen as complemen-
tary rather than contradictory. Combining their two perspec-
tives, we get a picture of an inner-city environment in which
high-paying blue-collar jobs have been steadily shrinking since
the 1950s; better-off middle-class blacks have been moving out
to the suburbs or at least away from the older inner-city black
areas; numerous changes in government policy have made wel-
fare a more attractive option for an unwed mother than was the
case in the 1950s; welfare recipiency for the able-bodied and
unwed motherhood have lost their social stigma; there are many
fewer status rewards accruing to the working poor who carry
their own weight and refuse to take government handouts than
was the case previously; crime has gotten out of control due
in part to lax law enforcement and a belief that the poor and
disadvantaged are not responsible for their actions; and disci-
pline in the inner-city schools has collapsed so that little learn-
ing takes place. To this picture we can add the insight of Jencks
that the reduced commitment to marriage, children, and family
life on the part of the cultural elite and a broad spectrum of the
white middle class encouraged the general growth of individual
selfishness, which, in combination with the other problems of
the ghetto, helped create a social disaster.
What are we to make of this composite picture? Does it really
explain the catastrophe of the inner-city black ghetto in the latter
half of the twentieth century? Surely it is part of an explana-
tion, but it fails to address itself to one of the obvious questions
involved here, namely, why is it that American-born blacks, but
not to the same extent the members of many other ethnic groups,
have been so susceptible to the destructive social, economic, and
cultural forces in the inner city that Murray, Wilson, and Jencks

describe? No other ethnic group in America’s cities has a problem

with crime, delinquency, poor school performance, and out-of-
wedlock births nearly as severe as that of black Americans, nor
as much difficulty seeing to it that their children advance into the
ranks of the (broadly defined) middle class. If generous welfare
benefits, lack of high-paying blue-collar jobs, the movement of
wealthier and more successful people to better neighborhoods, a
decline in status rewards for being poor-but-independent, along
with changing cultural attitudes toward sex and marriage, can
produce an underclass—as the reader of Murray, Wilson, and
Jencks might reasonably infer—why hasn’t such a class emerged
on anything like the scale one finds in America in the more
highly developed European welfare states? Many of the welfare
states of Northern and Western Europe—Sweden and Denmark,
for instance—never had as strong a tradition of self-reliance as
in America; they have undergone similar structural economic
changes as in America; their more successful citizens presum-
ably like nicer neighborhoods just as much as Americans do;
they have had similar changes in attitudes toward sex and mar-
riage as in America; and they offer much more extensive welfare
benefits than in America. Yet by all accounts they do not have a
problem nearly as serious as America’s with a permanent inner-
city underclass. Moreover, if the factors that Murray, Wilson,
and Jencks describe produce an underclass, why do most of the
current immigrants to the United States, including the vast bulk
of nonwhite immigrants from Asia, Africa, and the Afro-Carib-
bean, seem so less susceptible to this process? Why, in short, the
reader of Murray, Wilson, and Jencks must ask, has it been pre-
eminently American blacks who have shown such a high degree
of susceptibility to being trapped by the welfare system and the
many cultural and policy changes since the 1960s and who have
displayed such low levels of adaptability to structural changes in
the economy?

To answer questions such as these one must turn to certain

salient features of black history, black culture, and the black
experience in America, none of which Murray, Wilson, or Jen-
cks show much interest in investigating. One can only speculate
on the reasons for their disinterest in such matters—residual
fallout from the Moynihan Report controversy may be part of
an explanation, as well as the general bias against cultural and
historical approaches by much of contemporary social science.
But it is certain that even by combining the rational-choice type
of incentive and disincentive model that Murray offers to ana-
lyze the many policy changes of the late 1960s with Wilson’s
structural unemployment and middle-class-exodus models and
adding Jencks’s account of the changes in family morality and
cultural values among the white American middle class, some-
thing is radically missing from our understanding of the “dark
ghettos” of the inner cities.
In his Labor Department memorandum, Daniel Moynihan
had tried to explain how the legacy of past brutalization and
oppression continued to have a great impact on black commu-
nal life in the urban North long after black people had escaped
from the horrors of slavery and life in the Jim Crow South.
Here Moynihan was continuing in a tradition of interpretation
that had held the historio-cultural and historio-psychological
dimensions of the black experience in America to be of utmost
importance for understanding contemporary black problems.
Moynihan drew much of his thinking on these matters from
the pioneering research of the black scholar E. Franklin Frazier,
whose The Negro Family in the United States was the standard
work on its subject for a generation of social scientists.241 Virtu-
ally every social scientist of note who wrote on African American
241. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family in the United States (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1939).

issues from the 1930s through the 1960s shared Moynihan’s and
Frazier’s view in this regard, and indeed, to anyone whose mind
is not constrained by methodological dogma or a partisan politi-
cal agenda their view here would seem to be a simple postulate
of common sense. History and culture do matter, and the idea
that one can gain a good understanding of what has happened
in the black neighborhoods of Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant,
Detroit, Watts, or South Chicago by explanations that ignore
African American specific factors should be viewed with utmost
skepticism.242
242. In subsequent books both Murray and Wilson realized that there was something
missing from their respective accounts of black ghetto disintegration, and they sought
to provide what they saw as some of the missing element. For Murray in The Bell
Curve (co-authored with Richard Herrnstein), the missing element was distributional
differences in the kind of intelligence measured by IQ tests and the difficulties posed
for low-IQ individuals in gaining employment, raising children, obeying the law, and
other social outcomes. Ethno-racial groups were shown to possess different mean
IQ scores, with Jews at the top, followed in rank order by Asians, whites, Latinos,
African-Americans, and sub-Saharan black Africans. The black/white IQ difference was
attributed to some unknown combination of genetic and environmental factors. The
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: The Free
Press, 1994).
Wilson, in a follow-up book to The Truly Disadvantaged titled When Work
Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor, moved in a culturalist rather than a
genetic/heriditarian direction. While still stressing the “deindustrialization” theory of
his earlier book, Wilson in this later book was struck by huge differences between poor
blacks and poor Mexican immigrants in the inner cities in terms of their marriage and
family arrangements and their work habits. He came to believe that cultural differences
between the two groups put African Americans, especially the males, at a distinct
disadvantage in terms of maintaining stable marital relations and stable work habits.
“A brief comparison between inner-city blacks and inner-city Mexicans (many of whom
are immigrants)Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€provides some evidence for these cultural differences,” Wilson
writes. He continues: “Mexicans come to the United States with a clear conception
of a traditional family unit that features men as breadwinners. Although extramarital
affairs by men are tolerated, ‘a pregnant, unmarried woman is a source of opprobrium,
anguish, or great concern.’ Pressure is applied by the kin of both parents to enter into
marriage. The family norms and behavior in inner-city black neighborhoods stand in
sharp contrast.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Inner-city black women routinely say that they distrust men and feel
strongly that black men lack dedication to their families. They argue that black males
are hopeless as either husbands or fathers and that more of their time is spent on the
streets than at home.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The women in the inner city tend to believe that black men
get involved with women mainly to obtain sex or money, and that once these goals
are achieved women are usually discarded.” Wilson also contrasts the black male and
Mexican-immigrant male work ethic: “The ethnographic data [from our Chicago study]

Within the context of the present survey it is not possible to
suggest that the Mexican immigrants are harder workers because they ‘come from areas
of intense poverty and that even boring, hard, dead-end jobs look, by contrast, good to
them.’Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The dataÂ€.Â€.Â€.Â€reveal that the black men are more hostile than the Mexican
men with respect to the low-paying jobs they hold, less willing to be flexible in taking
assignments or tasks not considered part of their job, and less willing to work as hard
for the same low wages.” When Work Disappears (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996),
pp. 98–9, 140–1.
Both Daniel Patrick Moynihan and E. Franklin Frazier believed that the fragility
of family bonds among African Americans in the urban North was at least partially a
legacy of the slavery and Jim Crow eras, where a strong sense of the father as provider
and protector of his family never had a chance to develop or to become strongly
internalized or institutionalized. This idea has been more recently developed by James
Q. Wilson in his book The Marriage Problem, where he goes beyond Moynihan and
Frazier in tracing certain black family patterns back to those the black slaves brought
with them from West Africa. Here J.Q. Wilson continues in a tradition of interpretation
popularized in the early twentieth century by the anthropologist Melville Herskovits,
who believed there were many New World survivals of African customs. Like W. J.
Wilson, J. Q. Wilson is struck by the different pattern of family formation and stability
between recent Mexican immigrants and lower-income African Americans. He writes
on this: “Controlling for income, the rate at which Latinos take welfare benefits is
only about one-fifth the rate at which African Americans do. They are poorer and less
educated than blacks, and many are certainly in a risky legal situation, but they are
not nearly as likely to have children living without two parents.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The high rates
of out-of-wedlock births for black women cannot be explained by intelligence, for
holding IQ constant, black women are three times as likely as Latinos and five times
as likely as Anglo white women to have out-of-wedlock children. There is, of course,
an easy explanation for this difference—culture.” The Marriage Problem (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), p. 108.
In recent years, genetic-based theorists have bought into the “African legacy”
theory but given it a heriditarian twist. The high rates of infant deaths endemic to a
disease-ridden tropical climate, in combination with the ease of obtaining plant foods
to sustain life, they argue, led to a genetic propensity among sub-Saharan African
males for following a reproductive strategy involving multiple partners, high numbers
of offspring, and a corresponding low level of parental investment in the rearing of
each child. Males developing in much colder, less disease-ridden environments, they
say, evolved a genetically programmed reproductive strategy focused on fewer offspring
and the greater male parenting-involvement needed for each cold-climate-reared child
to survive. Climate and local ecology, they say, can, over time, genetically influence
mating strategies in surviving offspring. It is possible—and likely—they say, that culture
and genes interact, and that genetic propensities will influence cultural values, so that
sub-Saharan African populations and their recent descendants will be naturally more
tolerant of widespread out-of-wedlock births than populations that have evolved over
the millennia in much colder climates (such as northern Asia). This, they say, is why
black populations not only in Africa but also in the U.S., South America, and the
Caribbean are more tolerant of out-of-wedlock births than the Asian-descendant and
European-descendant populations living next to them. The most influential proponent
of this view is the Canadian psychologist J. Philippe Rushton in his book Race,
Evolution and Behavior, 3rd ed., (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

deal with all the cultural, historical, and psychological factors

that need to be explored in order to understand the catastrophe
of the black ghetto. Some of the more salient of these factors,
however, can be set forth in rough outline. It must first be under-
stood that most of the black inhabitants of America’s ghettos
are direct descendants of a displaced rural peasantry, forced
out of the cotton-agricultural economy of the rural South in the
25-year period following the end of the Second World War.243 We
might call this the era of the Great Automation Migration, since
Some find Rushton’s ideas incendiary, although like any theory in social science they
must be validated or refuted based on the best evidence, not the most widely shared
ideology.
243. See Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991),
and his earlier two-part article in the Atlantic, “The Origins of the Underclass,” June
1986, pp. 31–6, and July 1986, pp. 54–68. Lemann’s thesis, which is identical to Daniel
Moynihan’s, is that much of the problems of the inner-city black ghettos of America
in the latter half of the twentieth century are the result of the rapid migration of rural
blacks ill-prepared for the challenges of urban life. His thesis was later attacked by
the U.S. News and World Report urban specialist David Whitman on the ground that
ample statistics show Southern-born blacks to have done better in the North in terms
of getting and holding a job and staying out of jail than blacks born in the North
(David Whitman, “The Great Sharecropper Success Story,” The Public Interest, 104
(1991): 3–19). But Whitman’s attack on Lemann’s thesis was based on an error, since
Whitman failed to take account of the “second-generation dynamic” and as a result
misinterpreted the indisputable fact that first-generation black migrants often did
better than many in the second and third generation. Whitman failed to understand
the connection between the downward mobility of the second and third generations
and the parenting and socialization failures of the first. The problems with displaced
peasant cultures, such as the Irish in the nineteenth century and the Southern-reared
African Americans in the second half of the twentieth, are often most acutely seen in
the second and subsequent generations when urban-reared children and grandchildren,
especially the males, need guidance and discipline in a new, bewildering, and challenging
environment—guidance their parents are ill-equipped to provide. The problem is
particularly acute with “push-driven” migrations, where the immigrants have not been
highly self-selected for ambition, drive, future-orientation, desire to see their children
get ahead, etc. The analysis presented in the text confirms the basic Moynihan-Lemann
insight, which has not received the appropriate consideration it deserves among social
scientists specializing in urban problems. The “second-generation problem,” however,
has been taken up recently in conjunction with the latest immigrant groups to America
by a number of leading academic sociologists. See, for instance, Alejandro Portes
and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Alejandro Portes, ed., The New Second
Generation (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996); and Ruben G. Rumbaut
and Alejandro Portes, eds., Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001).

it resulted from the introduction into Southern agriculture of

tractors and automatic cotton-picking machines, which, in con-
junction with the introduction of chemical weed-killers, practi-
cally eliminated the need for black agricultural labor, and more
than any other factor in the twentieth century, was responsible
for the massive migration of black people from the Southern
farms and rural areas to the Northern and Midwestern cities.
The Great Automation Migration differed from the first great
migration of blacks out of the rural South that began during
the First World War—the migration that produced so many of
the vibrant black working-class communities in the Northern
and Midwestern cities of the 1920s—in two important ways.
It was much greater in size, and unlike the earlier migration in
which the northward-bound blacks were driven by the allure of
greater opportunity for self-improvement and upward mobil-
ity, it was what demographers call a “push-driven” migration,
caused by the involuntary displacement of black farm workers
and sharecroppers from the agricultural regions of the South
brought about by the rapid mechanization of Southern agricul-
ture in the immediate post-World War II era.244
To give some indication of just how massive the exodus
from Southern agriculture was during the period after the Sec-
ond World War, consider the following figures: According to
the 1940 U.S. Census more than 40 percent of blacks worked
244. As late as the 1910 Census, almost 9 out of 10 blacks lived in the South, most of
them in small towns or rural areas. The first large migration of African Americans out
of the South began in earnest during the years of the First World War (1914–1918),
when the supply of cheap immigrant labor flowing into America from Southern and
Eastern Europe was abruptly cut off as the European belligerents conscripted most of
their young men into the military, resulting in huge labor shortages in many Northern
and Midwestern American cities. Many ambitious Southern blacks at this time heeded
the call of Northern industrialists to leave their Southern abodes and create a new life
for themselves and their families in the urban North. On balance this Great Migration
(as it is called) was a considerable success and went on to create decent working-class
communities in places like the South Side of Chicago and New York’s Harlem with an
élan and morale that later older ghetto residents would look back upon nostalgically
with a sad yearning.

on farms, the vast bulk of the farms being in the South; when
the 1970 Census was taken, this figure had plummeted to a
minuscule 4.4 percent. Over the decade of the 1950s, the net
black out-migration from the six Deep South states, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Arkansas, and Louisiana,
was a staggering 1.2 million, with Mississippi and Alabama
accounting for 547,000 of these. The state of Mississippi alone
during the 1950s had a net loss of 323,000 blacks, almost a
quarter of its entire black population, and a figure roughly
equal to the total net out-migration of blacks from the entire
South during the decade of the 1930s. Charles Silberman has
rightly described the post-World War II black migration out of
the agricultural South as one of the great migrations of history,
and the authors of the most important demographic history of
blacks in America do not exaggerate when they describe the
rural-to-urban migration that took place during the 1950s as
“the relocation of black America.”245 Not surprisingly, the most
frequent destinations of the black migrants were the states with
the largest industrial cities, with New York, Illinois, California,
Ohio, Michigan, and New Jersey showing the greatest net gain
in their black populations over this period.
As Oscar Handlin and other students of human migra-
tions have documented, the problem of adjusting to life in a
complex, competitive, work- and achievement-oriented urban
environment is always difficult for people from a rural peas-
ant background, but at least four salient factors distinguished
the post-World War II black migrants from the Deep South
from many other rural immigrants, which, when taken together
and in conjunction with the various factors analyzed by Wil-
son, Murray, and Jencks, made it extremely difficult for either
the migrants or their children to meet the pressing challenges
245. Rex Campbell and David Johnson, Black Migration in America: A Social
Demographic History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981).

of the new urban environment. These factors were a) the gen-

eral poverty, illiteracy, and social isolation of the population;
b) the lack of an entrepreneurial tradition or experience with
buying and selling, and more generally, the lack of a tradition
of self-improvement; c) the involuntary nature of the migration
itself and the resulting nonselectivity of much of the migrant
population in terms of such important personal characteristics
as ambition, self-discipline, and future-orientation; and, d) the
legacy of Southern violence, oppression, and extreme negative
psychological conditioning. Each of these factors requires fur-
ther elaboration.
To begin with the first, it is important to realize just how
impoverished, socially isolated, and intellectually backward the
typical black sharecropper or rural black farm worker was who
lived in the cotton- and tobacco-growing regions of the Deep
South before the massive out-migration of the postwar years.
Other than a few pieces of usually second-hand household fur-
niture, assorted housewares, and a tiny amount of inexpensive
clothing and other inexpensive personal items, the typical share-
cropper or farm worker owned virtually nothing. He usually
lived in a small decrepit shack lent to him by his landlord, lack-
ing both electricity and indoor plumbing; he received an amount
of food and money from the landlord that was just enough to
keep himself and his family going; he owned no tools, no capi-
tal, no draft animals; and he had almost no savings other than
the few dollars he might have in his home for personal items and
foodstuffs. Though not subject to periodic famines, the typical
sharecropper or farm worker family led a truly subsistence-level
existence, little better than that of a medieval serf. When forced
to migrate north, the family had almost no financial resources
with which to begin life in the new environment.
Most sharecroppers and rural farm worker were not much
better off in terms of their educational resources or exposure
to knowledge and ideas. In 1940 the average black adult in the

South had less than five years of education, and even this low
figure offers an exaggerated picture of the level of intellectual
achievement among Southern blacks. Black schools in rural
areas of the South were typically operated for only six or seven
months out of the year (white schools were usually run for nine
months), and per pupil expenditures were usually only a small
fraction of what they were for white schools, despite the fact
that per pupil expenditures for white schools in the South were
the lowest in the nation. One study of black schools in Alabama
in the late 1930s showed a per pupil expenditure that was less
than 15% of the national average for all students. Through-
out the 1930s and 1940s the pay for teachers in many rural
Southern black schools was so low that in many cases schools
had to employ teachers who themselves were only barely liter-
ate and barely able to do grammar school-level arithmetic. A
standard achievement test administered to over 300 black Ala-
bama schoolteachers in the early 1930s resulted in an average
test score that was below the national average for ninth-graders.
The typical farm worker’s home contained no books, peri-
odicals, or newspapers. In his classic study of 612 black share-
cropper families in the cotton-growing regions of the South,246
sociologist Charles S. Johnson found that only nine of the fami-
lies—less than 1.5 percent—received a daily newspaper. The vast
majority of sharecropper homes—over 85 percent—received no
newspapers, magazines, or periodical literature of any kind, not
even a monthly farm journal. As Johnson remarked of these
families: “Reading and writing are not a serious part of the rou-
tine of daily life for either adults or children.” The displaced
sharecroppers and farm workers who migrated north could
bring with them no more intellectual resources than they could
financial ones.
246. Charles S. Johnson, Shadow of the Plantation (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1934).

Poverty and illiteracy by themselves have certainly not been

an insuperable barrier to social and economic advancement for
immigrants to America. Many immigrants have been poor, and
in the English language at least the vast majority have been illit-
erate. But the poor and illiterate blacks who migrated to the
Northern cities from the Deep South in the 1950s and early
1960s also lacked what was often so decisive to the success of
many foreign immigrants to these shores, namely some rudi-
mentary experience in buying and selling and in the ways of
a market economy. Small business has often been a lifeline for
many ethnic minority immigrants—the Chinese, Jews, Italians,
Armenians, Greeks, and West Indians in the early decades of
this century, for instance; Koreans, Vietnamese, Asian Indians,
and Arabs today. But Southern-born blacks and their offspring
never developed the kind of enterprising business spirit that one
finds in these other groups. The few African American-owned
businesses existing in the Northern cities have usually been con-
fined to personal services or to specialty products purchased
mainly by a black clientele (e.g., barber shops, beauty parlors,
funeral homes, black-oriented cosmetic shops, etc.), and only
rarely has black business been able to compete successfully in
non-black markets.
Even in the inner-city ghetto itself, the proprietors of small
businesses have most frequently been foreign-born immi-
grants—Jews in the 20s and 30s, for example, and Asians
today—while one of the few cases where there was a large black
business presence in the inner city, that is, in New York’s Har-
lem between the world wars, the businesses were usually owned
not by Southern-born blacks but by Jamaicans and other West
Indian immigrants. Many reasons have been offered to explain
the low participation of African Americans in small business,
and each must be carefully evaluated, but part of the reason is
certainly to be sought in the rural Southern background from
which most African Americans have come.

Unlike many European peasants, black sharecroppers and

black rural farm workers not only owned nothing but also had
little experience in selling at market even small quantities of
produce. In the cotton-growing regions of the South, all buy-
ing and selling operations on the plantations were conducted
by the landowner, who alone was responsible for all business
and financial matters. The Southern sharecropper and farm
labor system was specifically intended, in fact, to discourage
individual initiative and entrepreneurship among blacks, and to
keep the black laborer dependent on the landlord for his day-
to-day sustenance. Together with the general rules of caste sub-
ordination extant in the South, the Southern farm labor system
seems to have been successful in producing exactly what South-
ern cotton growers wanted it to produce—a black labor force
that was extremely docile, dependent, and submissive. Our best
source for understanding the effect of this Southern system on
Southern black attitudes, habits, and personality formation is
John Dollard, whose masterful Caste and Class in a Southern
Town,247 first published in 1937, is still indispensable reading
for anyone who wants to understand the genesis of many of our
contemporary black urban problems.
According to Dollard, the institution of the “furnish,” in
which the landlord, in addition to providing the farm laborer
with a small shack to live in, advanced him a small monthly
allotment of money or credit to take care of his basic subsis-
tence-level needs, was specifically designed to instill in the poor
black agricultural laborer a sense of infantile dependency and
subservience. According to Dollard’s own observations and the
testimony of many of his informants, the system was very suc-
cessful in achieving its goals:
247. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1937.

Middle class Negro informants uniformly deplored the

passivity of lower class Negroes and often reproached them
with it. One said he believed that many tenant farmers do
not care much whether they make money out of a crop or
not. They are satisfied with a secure furnish, take it easy,
and let the white man worry.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€A bird in the hand is worth
two in the bush to lower class Negroes. Informant believed
that habits which might lead to advancement are especially
weakened by the security of the furnish. So long as they have
a living, however meager, and the indefinite guarantee of this
living, [Negro farm workers] are not forced to save; they
always know that they will be furnished a house the year
round and food for six or seven months while the crop is
growing. Under these circumstances the Negro cropper expe-
riences none of that institutional pressure which produces an
ambitious and aggressive attitude toward economic life.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
The furnish system is a kind of permanent dole which
appeals to the pleasure principle and relieves the Negro of
responsibility and the necessity of forethought. Very impor-
tant in the above account are the personal dependence and
attitude of passive expectation of the tenant toward his
landlord.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€One can think of the lower class Negroes as
bribed and drugged by this system. The effect of the social
set-up seems to be to keep [lower class] Negroes infantile,
to grant them infantile types of freedom from responsibil-
ity, and also to exercise the autocratic control over them
which is the prerogative of the patriarchal father. The shift
from a clinging, dependent adjustment to parents over to an
independent attitude toward the world is always perceived
as slightly traumatic by children. Parents at least are careful
to enjoin the child to “act like a big boy,” and so on, as a
means of persuading him to abandon infantile adjustments.
The southern caste set-up, on the other hand, encourages the

lower class Negro to “act like a little boy,” and this in fact
he does. (CCST, pp. 402–5)
Besides the infantile dependency encouraged by the practice

of the furnish, the Southern caste system itself, Dollard says,
provided ample disincentives to socioeconomic advancement
not only for poor black sharecroppers but for all blacks, regard-
less of their occupation. Southern whites generally believed that
blacks had a definite “place” in society, and, as Dollard explains,
any attempt to rise above this place by efforts to improve one’s
social and economic position might be interpreted by whites as
a hostile act of aggression against the caste system itself and a
threat to specifically white prerogatives:
Strange as it may seem, this effort on the part of Negroes [to

improve their socio-economic position] is perceived by the
white caste as an affront. Holding a prestigeful job, own-
ing a large tract of land, having a special talent by which
the Negro competes with white people are forms of activity
which are defined as aggressive. It is plain to see how the
caste situation tends to discourage or prevent vertical social
mobility in Negroes. In Southerntown, at least, resentment at
Negro “rising” is felt not only by lower class white people,
but by the middle class people as well.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Every Negro who has achieved advancement beyond
lower class status in Southerntown has been made aware
of this envy and resentment at his aggressive mobility. Such
Negroes are said to get ideas beyond their station, that is, to
threaten the fixed inferior and superior positions of Negro
and white castes. The individuality and independence which
go with landownership, for example, seem to be defined as
aggressive behavior on the part of a Negro.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Although it
does not happen often, the threat of being driven off one’s
own land is always there.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€The homes and barns of the

innocent and upright may be destroyed. The knowledge that

this can happen has a tendency to discourage the capable
Negroes from saving and building up farms of their own.
(CCST, pp. 297–9, 428–9)
One doesn’t need much of a sociological imagination to pre-

dict that people with the sort of background and past experi-
ence that Dollard describes in these paragraphs are not likely
to become successful and aggressive entrepreneurs should they
find themselves moving to the urban industrialized centers of
the North. Those whose skills are limited to picking cotton, hoe-
ing weeds, milking cows, and running errands for the boss man
but who have had little experience with money and markets, or
with the risks and rewards of private economic initiative, are
not likely to take advantage of new entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties in small businesses even if such opportunities should present
themselves in abundance.
Poverty and illiteracy, together with a total absence of a
tradition of entrepreneurship and self-improvement, are back-
ground characteristics that under any circumstances would pro-
vide formidable obstacles to an immigrant population’s upward
social and economic advancement in an urban economy. The
members of the Great Automation Migration, however, were
handicapped by two additional factors, each of which was
probably of significantly greater importance than the total com-
bined impact of these other two forces. The first of these was the
involuntariness of the migration itself and the resulting (relative)
nonselectivity of those transplanted in the process. If we define a
“voluntary” economic immigrant as one who has the opportu-
nity to remain employed at his traditional occupation without
his basic livelihood being threatened, but despite this possibility
chooses to migrate in order to improve the social and economic
position of himself and his family, and if we define an “invol-
untary” economic immigrant as someone who does not have

such a stay-as-you-are option but is forced to move because of

loss of employment and the destruction of a traditional way of
life, then it is clear that there are major differences between the
typical voluntary and the typical involuntary economic immi-
grant that will be of major significance in terms of their ability
to succeed in an achievement-oriented market economy.248 The
self-selection process that determines who migrates and who
stays behind in the case of voluntary immigrants will result in
an immigrant population very different in character than one
in which this self-selection process has not operated or has not
operated to the same degree.
Voluntary economic immigrants migrate for the specific pur-
pose of getting ahead in life and seeing to it that their children
and grandchildren get ahead. They are often single-minded in the
pursuit of this goal and are often willing to adapt themselves to
whatever is necessary to achieve their ends. Compared with the
stay-at-homes and the involuntarily uprooted, voluntary immi-
grants typically show a greater degree of dissatisfaction with
their lowly economic and social position; they display higher lev-
els of ambition, aspiration, and energy; they have higher levels of
self-confidence and a correspondingly lower level of self-doubt
and feelings of inferiority; they display a greater willingness to
take calculated risks to further their economic advancement;
they have more clearly defined life-goals and a more focused
direction to their efforts to achieve these life-goals; they have
greater confidence in their ability to alter their personal situation
positively though personal sacrifice and hard work; they have a
higher degree of optimism and greater faith in the future; and in
general, they display a more creative use of their varying talents
248. The terms “voluntary immigrant” and “involuntary immigrant,” as set forth here,
are, of course, intended as “ideal types.” Like “monopoly,” “oligopoly,” and “perfect
competition” in economics, or “upper-class,” middle-class,” and “working class” in
sociology, they paint with a broad brush and obviously don’t capture all the richness of
the real world. Crude as they are, they are useful in capturing many of the social world’s
salient features.

and energies. Those among their compatriots lacking these char-

acteristics typically choose to stay home when that is possible.
(Recall Tocqueville’s observation in this context about economic
ambition being less of a driving force in many men than a desire
for a simpler life of greater idleness and leisure.)
Involuntary immigrants, on the other hand, particularly
if they come from peasant backgrounds or other premodern,
fixed-status-order societies radically different from the U.S.,
rarely display these features, or display them to a much lesser
extent. Moreover, by the very fact that they have been invol-
untarily uprooted and forced to move to a strange and often
bewildering environment where they do not necessarily desire
to be, involuntary immigrants will be more inclined to be fatal-
istic about life, to believe that most things depend on “luck,”
to be more pessimistic and self-pitying, to have less faith in a
benign future, and to have less confidence in their own capaci-
ties to alter their life for the better. Although such characteristic
are not what economists and quantitatively oriented social sci-
entists like to study, these differing attitudes, motivations, and
psychological characteristics can be enormously important in
determining who gets ahead and who does not in a competitive
capitalist environment.
Motivational and attitudinal disadvantages, however, are
not the only ones from which the involuntarily uprooted suffer.
Compared with voluntary immigrants, involuntary immigrants
will be less likely to have planned long in advance and to have
saved up money to help support themselves in their emigration;
they will be less likely to possess marketable skills; and they
typically will not have as capable a support network of family
and friends in the area to which they have migrated that will be
able to help them make a successful adjustment. This last factor
is particularly important, since it is often these individual sup-
port networks that provide new immigrants and their families
with valuable information about jobs and the ways of getting

ahead in new surroundings, and they can often lend the immi-
grants money or provide other goods and services in time of
need. Success or failure in the new urban environment can often
depend on the degree of support an immigrant receives from
such private networks.
The difference between voluntary and involuntary immigrant
groups is well illustrated in the relative success (compared with
many inner-city African Americans) of recent black immigrants
from Haiti. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the West-
ern hemisphere; its people are largely illiterate; they have darker
racial features than most American blacks; they speak a French
patois first, maybe some fragmentary English. Yet the poor Hai-
tians who have immigrated to the United States in recent years
seem to be displaying patterns of upward social and economic
mobility clearly superior to those of earlier African Americans.
In Miami, for instance, where the Haitian population is very
substantial, a struggling but surviving working-class community
has emerged that stands in marked contrast to the city’s Afri-
can American ghettos of Overtown and Liberty City. Many of
the small businesses in the Haitian area are Haitian-owned, and
employers throughout Florida are said to prefer Haitian workers
to native Americans, whether black or white, because of their
greater reliability and greater eagerness to work. Haitian parents
often try to keep their own children away from African Ameri-
can children, whose influence they feel is often harmful.249
The example of the Haitian immigrants and, indeed, of suc-
cessful black immigrants from many other areas of Africa and
the Afro-Caribbean, also helps to illustrate the final handicap
under which the members of the Great Automation Migration
249. See Alex Stepick, “The Haitian Informal Sector in Miami,” City and Society 5
(1991): 10–22; Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation
of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Margarita Mooney, Faith
Makes Us Live: Surviving and Thriving in the Haitian Diaspora (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2009).

had to labor in their attempted adjustment from a rural to an

urban environment. This is the fact that the black migrants
from the Deep South, unlike foreign-born black immigrants
from Africa or the Afro-Caribbean, had been socialized into the
ways of a white-dominated caste society that not only had a
subordinate place assigned to blacks but also tried to convince
blacks through generations of brutal and pervasive negative
conditioning that this was their rightful place because of their
alleged mental inferiority and innate childlike immaturity. The
destructive effect of the inferiority doctrine on black-self-confi-
dence and the black self-image can hardly be underestimated,
and of the four factors distinguishing the members of the Great
Automation Migration from many other rural immigrants who
have come to America, it is this which arguably has had the
most harmful and the most lasting effects in preventing black
adjustments to the demands of an increasingly high-tech and
information-oriented economy.
Every aspect of social life in the Deep South was designed
to convince black people that they occupied a lower order of
humanity than that occupied by the superior whites. Whether
it was the requirement that blacks allow whites to be waited
on first in retail establishments; that they give up their seats on
crowded buses and trains to white people; that they address
white people by such honorific titles as “Mr.,” “Mrs.,” “Sir,”
or “Boss,” while they themselves, no matter how prominent or
mature in years, were addressed by their first names in the man-
ner in which one would address a child; that they enter a white
household only through the back door and never shake the hand
of a white person—these and numerous other social customs in
the Deep South were intended to reinforce the general Southern
view that black people were so lowly and degraded, so animal-
like and inferior, so mentally and morally unfit for any kind of
higher civilization, that they would never be capable of living
together with white people on a level of social equality.

For understanding some of the psychological effects of Deep

South customs on black development, John Dollard is once
again one of our best sources. His description of the brutality
of some of these customs, together with the social and psycho-
logical effects they were intended to have, is chilling, especially
when one considers how widespread such customs were and
how generally accepted within the dominant white society:
Violations of caste custom may also lead to the beating of

a Negro. A local informant told me of a Negro physician
who came down from the North to practice in a southern
town. He had resolved to accept the situation and do the
right thing. But one day in talking to a drugstore clerk he
occasionally forgot and said “yes” and “no.” The clerk flew
into a rage and bellowed at him, “Say, nigger, can’t you say
‘Yes, sir’?” The doctor corrected his mistake. That evening a
group of young white men called at his house, took him out
into the country, and beat him severely. Subsequently he had
to leave town.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Southern white informants are not reticent about the
use of assault on Negroes; rather they talk about it with a
self-confident satisfaction. One declared, for example, that
the “nigger” is all right in his place.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€He mentioned the
case of a “nigger” who once worked for him and refused to
do something he was told to do. Informant got his black-
jack and beat him about the head until he was unconscious.
When the “nigger” woke up, informant asked him if he
wanted any more. The Negro replied, “No, boss, Ah’s got
enough.” Informant did not discharge the Negro but sent
him back to the job and “he was one of the best niggers I
have ever had.” Informant said he has, on occasion, broken
all the knuckles of his right hand, exhibiting same, hitting
“niggers.” Another white man said that the only thing to

do with “uppity niggers” is to smash them down. If they get

“sassy,” hit them: that is all they understand.
A Negro man related the story of a friend who was
appointed postmaster of a little town in the South. The white
people resented the appointment and threatening rumors
began to circulate concerning what the whites would do if
the postmaster did not get out. Informant worked occasion-
ally with his friend but finally, in face of hostility of the
white people, decided to quit. The postmaster stayed on.
A few weeks later he was caught by a gang of whites and
beaten so badly that he died shortly afterwards.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
There are, are of course, other forms of aggression
besides the direct physical violence which we have been
discussing. One of them is undoubtedly moral intimidation,
that is, an attack on the self-esteem of another individual.
This type of aggression is a chronic policy of the white caste
in the South; its aim seems to be to humiliate the Negro, to
put him on another and lower scale of humanity.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€One
of [the forms of personal derogation of Negroes] is the caste
etiquette which is compulsory for Negroes. A white friend
gave me some instruction on this score immediately after
I arrived in Southerntown.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Of course, at first I made
mistakes and on one occasion a white friend gently reminded
me, “You know, down here we never refer to a Negro as
‘Mr.’ or ‘Mrs.’; they don’t expect it and we never do it. We
always call them by their first names no matter if they are
doctor or preacher or teacher or anything else. If we should
call them ‘Dr.’ or Mr.’ or ‘Mrs.,’ they would get the idea that
they were somebody and get real cocky.”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
Another form of personal derogation of Negroes is to
apply the special and unfavorable designation, “nigger,” to
them. It stamps the Negro as an inferior man and seems to
isolate him from the community of human sympathy and

cooperation. At first it was jarring to hear the word used,

but I heard it repeated so often that eventually it lost its
shock for me.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€There are many forms of personal deroga-
tion of Negroes which are hard to classify. One of these, for
example, is that Negroes are expected to “wait” or stand
at the end of the line until white persons are through. In
the case of Negroes and whites waiting in a professional or
business office, it is taken for granted that whites are served
first. A Negro employee of a white boss was much irked
by having eternally to wait for conferences until no white
people were about. The white employer understood quite
well, as indeed did his employee, that he could not afford to
let it be said that he let a white person wait while he talked
to a Negro. This sort of thing is extremely discouraging and
disheartening, as probably it is meant to be. It is difficult to
keep up a tone of active self-feeling and self-respect when
one constantly receives these signs of negative evaluation
from others. (CCST, pp. 339–44)
It is often said that under the constraints of the Jim Crow

system, black people developed two faces (or two personalities),
a role-playing one which they displayed before white people,
and their true face (or true personality) which they exhibited
only when they were alone among each other. There is no doubt
much truth in this observation, and certainly for anyone who
wanted to preserve even a minimal sense of human dignity,
such a double life was an absolute necessity. But it would be
the height of foolishness to suppose that the efforts to convince
black people that they were innately inferior to whites was
without its harmful effects. On the contrary, it would seem to
be only the very exceptional person, or the person fortunate
enough to have a very exceptional and supportive family, who
could come through such an experience psychically unscathed.
In the great majority of cases, the more reasonable assumption

would seem to be that the systematic effort over generations to

convince black people that they were inferior to whites had just
the effect it was intended to have, and that, at the very least, the
inferiority doctrine sowed the seeds of self-doubt among black
people that has served to undermine the self-confidence of even
some of the most able and ambitious. As the previously quoted
Andrew Billingsly (in a more characteristically lucid moment)
reminds us: “It should not be difficult to discern that people
who, having been told for 200 years—in ways more effective
than words—that they are subhuman, should begin to believe
this themselves and internalize these values and pass them on
to their children and their children’s children.” (BFWA, p. 49)
The rural, Deep South farm hand, the most backward, illiterate,
isolated, and poorest of all blacks in the South, no doubt inter-
nalized these negative values more readily than anyone else.
Displaced Sharecroppers and their

Delinquent Sons: When the Children
and Grandchildren No Longer
Remember the South
What happened to the displaced sharecroppers and rural farm
hands when they came to live in the big city in the 1950s and
1960s? How successful were they at getting and keeping a job,
at establishing and maintaining a stable family, and most impor-
tant of all, at preparing their children and grandchildren for
the great challenges posed by life in a new competitive urban
environment where one’s “place” was no longer ascribed (at
least not in the same way it was in the rural South), and upward
socioeconomic mobility was not only permitted of immigrants
and their children but also expected of them? While a compre-
hensive history of the Great Automation Migration has yet to
be written, from what we do know it seems that for many dis-
placed sharecroppers and other rural blacks, the move to the

great Northern metropolis proved to be a disaster—frequently

for the Southerners themselves but much more frequently for
their children and grandchildren. When the displaced share-
croppers and other rural blacks entered the world of the North-
ern industrial city, one populated by immigrants from many
parts of the world who had come to America explicitly to get
ahead, they entered an alien universe, where a new competitive
work-and-achievement game was being played that they were
singularly ill-prepared to master. Indeed, they were almost pre-
programmed to fail. Their background and conditioning, the
circumstances of their migration, their poverty, illiteracy, and
lack of useful urban skills, together with the racial discrimina-
tion they inevitably faced (which was often greater than that
faced by members of other immigrant groups) conspired to
insure that they would not do very well in terms of the self-
improvement values of the new urban culture.
The results were predictable: Some men got discouraged by
their inability to secure a high-paying job or one that offered the
possibility for advancement. Others were resentful over the fact
that while they had important tasks to do on the farm, which
women could not do as well, in the urban North, where a man’s
status primarily depends upon earning power, they can earn no
more at most of the low-skilled jobs available to them than their
wives can earn as domestics. And in the impersonal atmosphere
of the big city, of course, many succumb to the all-too-human
vices of gambling, alcoholism, and womanizing, which had pre-
viously been kept under a much greater degree of social control
in small Southern towns and rural areas through the general
surveillance of the local community and the influence of the
local black church. Family desertion by the males seems to have
been a common response to many of these developments.
Still, for the Southern-reared sharecropper and other rural
blacks life in the urban metropolis was often experienced in
more positive terms. After all, the standard of living the South-

erner encountered in the urban North, even at the wages of the

lowest paid janitor, hotel worker, elevator operator, or other
service worker, was a vast improvement over the abject pov-
erty of the rural South, and since the rural black Southerner
was conditioned in his formative years not to have high aspira-
tions or ambitions, the fact that he might not do as well as the
members of certain other immigrant groups in America was not
always a problem. In the urban North, even the poorest South-
ern migrant usually lived in a structurally sound building—one
with glass windows and efficient indoor heating, electric light-
ing and electric refrigeration, hot and cold running water, and
even a flush toilet. Most of these apartments, moreover, were
outfitted with serviceable second-hand furniture, and in time
many migrants were able to add to their household items their
own radios and television sets. Although such living arrange-
ments may seem shabby by middle-class standards, compared
with their former existence in the falling-down shacks of the
cotton plantations and impoverished Southern “nigger quar-
ters”—with their dirt floors, leaking roofs, stinking outhouses,
sparse furnishings, and lack of electricity—these new homes in
the urban North offered many distinct amenities.
There were other advantages as well. In the North black
people no longer had to face the daily humiliation of the Jim
Crow system; they were no longer subject to lynching or mob
violence (or to the legal lynching that often passed for justice
under the Southern court system); they had access to much bet-
ter medical care; and both their rights and their interests were
much better cared for by the urban political systems that had
become increasingly solicitous of black votes. All in all, life
under such circumstances for the transplanted rural black, even
if he had to toil for the rest of his days at a low-status job, might
be seen as quite tolerable.
Where the real problems begin to emerge, and indeed on
such a scale that they will eventually overwhelm and ultimately

destroy the black inner-city ghettos as decent places to live, are

in the second and subsequent generations. One might speak
here of a bewildered-father/delinquent-son syndrome. Chil-
dren who have been raised in the urban North will typically
develop Northern-style aspirations and desires. They will see
that upward mobility is possible in the North and that no white
caste system will try to instill in them the conviction that they
must stay in their assigned “place.” Given a normal level of
youthful energy and enthusiasm, they will probably want to rise
up in the world, “make something of themselves,” and advance
according to the accepted American pattern. However, their
parents will be almost totally useless to them in terms of provid-
ing them with the guidance, discipline, knowhow, and resources
necessary to achieve their desired ends. Whether one is talking
about money or start-up capital, a dedication to educational
advancement, above-average levels of self-discipline, entrepre-
neurial skills, high levels of self-confidence, familial supervision
and “push,” or the special habits of perseverance and dedica-
tion to long-range plans, the displaced sharecroppers and rural
farm workers will not be able to provide their offspring with
what it takes to advance in the Northern industrial city.
Moreover, the children of the Deep South migrants no lon-
ger remember the poverty of the rural South, so what may have
satisfied their parents in terms of their improved socioeconomic
status in the North cannot possibly satisfy them. Their frustra-
tions will grow. The problem will be particularly acute in the
case of males, since it is males in America—as in virtually all
societies—who have traditionally held the role of breadwinners
and providers and have been under the most social pressure to
advance themselves in terms of their occupational and income
status. However successful he may be at holding down a low-
paying menial job, given his ignorance of the ways of an urban
industrial society and his past conditioning to be docile and pas-
sive, the black migrant from the rural South will often prove a

failure as a guide and role model to his male offspring under the
new competitive conditions of the urban North.
As the sons of the Deep South migrants begin to enter their
critical teen years, where rebelliousness is normal and forceful
and creative parenting most critical, they begin to lose respect for
their fathers and mothers, who will increasingly appear to them
as ignorant country bumpkins, if not contemptible Samboes and
Uncle Toms. The situation will be even worse, of course, if the
father has deserted the family and their mother alone is respon-
sible for their discipline and upbringing. Confronted with the
intolerable situation of rising desires and expectations that have
been induced by growing up in an upwardly mobile society and
a realization of the fact that, given their meager familial cultural
and financial resources, they will have little chance of succeed-
ing along a conventional career and achievement path, the male
teenagers will have a very powerful incentive to drop out of
mainstream society and renounce the traditional male husband/
provider role. Since such teenagers will typically live in neigh-
borhoods where there will be large numbers of other teenagers
from similar backgrounds as themselves, the stage will be set
for the emergence of delinquent gangs and deviant teenage peer
group cultures that will provide alternative conceptions of what
it means to be a man. And such alternative conceptions will
surely prove more alluring and more in tune with the impulsive-
ness, thrill-seeking, and short time horizons of male youth than
will most mainstream conceptions.
The Second Generation in New York

City’s Harlem
Perhaps nowhere is the conflict between the bewildered, South-
ern-reared parents and their rebellious, gang-and-delinquency-
prone sons better illustrated than in Claude Brown’s classic
account of his growing up in Harlem in the 1950s. Brown’s

reminiscences can add flesh and specificity to what has been

said so far in more general terms. His autobiographical Man-
child in the Promised Land is a classic of second-generation
estrangement literature and is worth quoting at length. With
great pathos he explains below the inability of his parents to
guide their children in the bewildering environment of urban
New York:
[I knew that Pimp, my younger brother, had problems

now]. He had that problem of staying home and taking all
that stuff from Dad. Mama had told me that he had had a
fight with Dad. He was fighting back now. He was declar-
ing his independence. I didn’t know what to do when he
started complaining about how Dad and Mama and Papa,
my grandfather, were still in the woods and he was grow-
ing up. He was getting away from all that old down-home
[down South] stuff, and he didn’t go for hearing it all the
time around the house. I knew he was right, because I’d had
the same feeling. You feel as though they’re trying to make
something out of you that you couldn’t be and didn’t want
to be if you could, as though they’re trying to raise you as a
farm boy in New York, in Harlem. I knew he was right.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I
tried to talk to [Mama]. I said, “Look, Mama, Pimp grew up
here in New York City.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€He didn’t grow up on all that salt
pork, collard greens, and old-time religion. You can’t make
a chitterlin’ eater out of him now.”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€It seemed as though
[Mama and Dad]Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€were going to bring the South up to
Harlem with them. I knew they had had it with them all the
time. Mama would be telling [my sisters] Carole and Margie
about the root workers down there.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
It seemed as though Mama and Dad were never going
to get out of the woods until we made them get out.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I
wanted to say, “Look, Mama, we’re in New York. Stop all
this foolishness.” She and Dad had been in New York since

1935. They were in New York but it seemed like their minds
were still down there in the South Carolina cotton fields.
Pimp, Carole, and Margie had to suffer for it. I had to suf-
fer for it too, but because I wasn’t at home as much, I had
suffered less than anybody.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I guess I had an arrogant atti-
tude toward the family. I saw them all as farmers.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Living
in that house wasn’t too hard on Carole and Margie but for
a boy it must have been terribly hard. Everybody was far
away, way back in the woods.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€They didn’t seem to be
ready for urban life. They were going to try to guide us and
make us do right and be good, and they didn’t even know
what being good was. When I was a little boy, Mama and
Dad would beat me and tell me, “You better be good,” but I
didn’t know what being good was. To me, it meant that they
just wanted me to sit down and fold my hands or something
crazy like that. Stay in front of the house, don’t go anyplace,
don’t get into trouble. I didn’t know what it meant, and I
don’t think they knew what it meant, because they couldn’t
ever tell me what they really wanted.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
They needed some help. The way I felt about it, I should
have been their parents, because I had been out there on
the streets, and I wasn’t as far back in the woods as they
were.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I remember how Dad thought being a busboy was a
real good job.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€To him it was a good job because when he
was nine years old, he’d plowed the fields from sunup to sun-
down. I came in one night and told Mama. I said, “Mama,
I’m gon quit this job at Hamburger Heaven, because it’s get-
ting too damn hard on me.”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I said I was going to school,
and that plus the job was kind of tough on me. After Dad
couldn’t take any more, he lifted his head out of the paper
and said, “Boy, you don’t need all that education. You better
keep that job, because that’s a good job.”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
I guess I could understand their feeling in this way. Their
lives were lived according to the superstitions and fears that

they had been taught when they were children coming up

in the Carolina cotton fields. It was all right for them down
there, in that time, in that place, but it wasn’t worth a damn
up in New York.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€Mama and Dad and the people who
had come to New York from the South about the time they
did seemed to think it was wrong to want anything more out
of life than some liquor and a good piece of cunt on Satur-
day night. This was the stuff they did in the South. This was
the sort of life they had lived on the plantations. They were
trying to bring the down-home life up to Harlem. They had
done it. But it wasn’t working. They couldn’t understand it,
and they weren’t about to understand it.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€
I could sense the fear in Mama’s voice when I told her
once that I wanted to be a psychologist. She said, “Boy, you
better stop that dreamin’ and get all those crazy notions
outta your head.” She was scared. She had the idea that
colored people weren’t supposed to want anything like
that. You were supposed to just want to work in fields or
be happy to be a janitor.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I remember the times I tried
to explain these things to Mama, just what was happening
in Harlem, just what was happening between my genera-
tion and hers. I would tell her, “Look, Mama, don’t you
remember when I used to play hooky from school, steal
things, and stay out all night? Do you know why I was doin’
that?”Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I’d tell her about rebellion.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I’d say, “Look,
Mama, when people start ruling people and they rule ‘em
wrong, in a way that’s harmful to them, they have to stop
them. They’ve got to rebel; they’ve got to get out from under
their rule.Â€.Â€.Â€.Â€I had to rebel. I had to get away from all that
old down-home nonsense you been talking.’”250
250. Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York: New American
Library, 1965), pp. 279–93.

Reaching Critical Mass: The 60s and Beyond

To understand the disintegration of the ghettos that took place
in the 1960s, 1970s, and beyond—the explosion in out-of-wed-
lock births and in crime, the decline in male parental responsi-
bility, the exodus of the better-off away from the chaos of the
inner cities—one must understand, in addition to the factors
that Murray, Wilson, and Jencks analyze, that it was during
this period that the Northern-reared male offspring of the Great
Automation Migration entered the turbulent period of their
adolescent years and the years of their young adulthood. One
must also understand the enormous attractiveness that the teen-
age gang and the values of the male street culture can have for
lower-class adolescents, even for those who come from fairly
stable homes. Compared with the humdrum existence of life
along a more conventional work and achievement path (even
if one has confidence that one can succeed along such a path),
the thrills and excitement of being together with one’s buddies
on the street can be enormously alluring. Hell-raising and gang-
banging are seductively attractive for many young men, offering
charms that a more sedate lifestyle can hardly match.
For those who are corrupted by their influence, however, the
gangs and deviant peer group cultures will virtually destroy a
young man’s chances of becoming an effective husband or fam-
ily man. The values of the gangs and adolescent peer groups
represent a complete inversion of the bourgeois family ethic:
Maleness comes to be identified with sexual prowess and the
ability to con and exploit a string of transient sexual partners;
women are referred to contemptuously as “bitches” and “ho’s,”
while fathering children out of wedlock for whom one takes no
responsibility comes to be seen as a crucial rite of passage and
proof of one’s manhood; students who work hard at school in
order to advance themselves according to mainstream norms are
taunted for “acting white”; pimping, drug-dealing, numbers-
running, fencing stolen goods, and other forms of street hustles

and criminal activities come to be seen as vastly preferable to the

less exciting (and much less remunerative) conventional jobs;
getting high on dope becomes the major form of recreation; an
emphasis on toughness, manipulation, and violence comes to
dominate relationships with outsiders; and Superfly comes to
replace the church-going family man as the dominant figure to
emulate.
In a community where such values come to prevail, it is not
hard to understand why there are so few “marriageable black
males,” why young black women might give up on finding a
stable husband, and why the level of crime, delinquency, and
street violence reach such a point that normal community life
becomes impossible and those with the financial means move
away. The problem of the second generation was compounded
in the 1960s by the sheer number of black youth in the ghetto.
During this decade, the number of black teenagers living in cen-
tral cities increased by almost 75 percent, thus compounding
the “second-generation effect” with a “critical-mass” effect.
As more and more black male youth dropped out of main-
stream society and hung out in street gangs and other deviant
peer groups, the more stable elements of the ghetto community
were simply overwhelmed and could not control the destructive
explosion that so large a number of improperly guided adoles-
cents unleashed. When the number of teenage Claude Browns
and Pimp Browns reach critical mass, all hell breaks loose—and
with a fury that the more stable elements in the community are
powerless to contain.
The “second-generation effect,” it should be understood, is
not peculiar to rural Southern black migrants, nor is it a phe-
nomenon that has appeared only since the Second World War.
Oscar Handlin, one of our acutest observers of immigrant life
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, sees the problem
of second-generation delinquency as one that to some extent
affected all of the immigrant groups that came to America’s

large cities, although of course, it was a vastly more manage-

able problem in the case of some groups than others. Speak-
ing of the high rates of “intemperance, prostitution, pauperism,
gambling, criminality, and juvenile delinquency” that observ-
ers complained of in New York City’s slums during the latter
part of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth,
Handlin says that such problems were in part “the results of
the destruction of old habits and of the shocking effects of new
conditions.” He goes on:
The disruption of family ties and the dissolution of the

authority of accepted values unsettled the norms of personal
behavior and left the individual confused and therefore vul-
nerable at moments of crisis. That was why the second gen-
eration was in a particularly precarious situation. Compelled
to devise their own standards, its members often found those
in conflict with the rules of established society, so that street
sports and gang activity verged almost imperceptibly over
into crime and vice. The degree of susceptibility to one or
another of these disorders varied from ethnic group to ethnic
group, although none was altogether free of them.251
The closest historical parallel to the experience of the Great

Automation Migration was undoubtedly that of the potato
famine generation of Irish Catholic immigrants. The similarities
are indeed striking: like the displaced sharecroppers and rural
black Southerners of the Great Automation Migration, the Irish
Catholic immigrants of the late 1840s potato famine genera-
tion were an involuntarily uprooted rural peasantry, who came
to the urban centers of America less because they wanted to
than because they had little choice—their purpose in leaving
251. Oscar Handlin, The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing
Metropolis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 37.

was more to survive and get by than to thrive or get ahead. And
like the black sharecroppers and impoverished rural blacks,
they were a destitute population, unskilled and often illiterate,
with little experience in the ways of entrepreneurship or self-
improvement. And also like the black sharecroppers, they were
an oppressed and despised people, ruled by an alien “race” that
did everything it could to degrade and humiliate them and to
convince them that compared with their English masters they
were inferior and animal-like beings.
The Irish response to urbanization in America paralleled
that of the rural blacks: family life became disorganized; hus-
bands abandoned their wives; alcoholism and within-group
violence became rampant; the male youth turned to crime and
delinquency; the areas of the cities in which they lived became
dangerous slums from which respectable people fled; many
became burdens on private and public eleemosynary institu-
tions; and the more incorrigible among the young men filled
up the public jails (whence our terms “paddy wagon”—the
police van in which rowdy Irish “paddies” were hauled off to
jail—and “hooligan”—a variation on the common nineteenth-
century Irish surname Houlihan).
It was, in fact, this close parallel between the trajectories
of the potato famine generation of Irish immigrants and the
Great Automation Migration of Southern blacks that provided
Daniel Moynihan, himself an Irishman who had studied the
nineteenth-century Irish immigrant experience in great depth,
with the insight and understanding that enabled him to compre-
hend developments in the black ghettos of America that baffled
everyone else.252 “Country life and city life are profoundly dif-
252. Shortly before its publication, an earlier version of this article (now this chapter)
was sent by me to the Washington office of Daniel Patrick Moynihan on the remote
chance that the New York senator might actually see it and read it. (I had never before
had any previous contact with Senator Moynihan or his office). To my astonishment

ferent,” Moynihan wrote in his famous report. “The gradual

shift of American society from a rural to an urban basis over
the past century and a half has caused abundant strains, many
of which are still much in evidence. When this shift occurs
suddenly, drastically, in one or two generations, the effect is
immensely disruptive of traditional social patterns. It was this
abrupt transition that produced the wild Irish slums of the 19th
Century Northeast. Drunkenness, crime, corruption, discrimi-
nation, family disorganization, [and] juvenile delinquency were
the routine of that era. In our own time, the same sudden transi-
tion has produced the Negro slum—different from, but hardly
better than its predecessors, and fundamentally the result of the
same process.” (MR, p. 17) 253
Moynihan not only read the article but also called me personally on the telephone in the
office I was occupying at that time in Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School in order to
discuss at length various points I had made in the piece. I remarked to Moynihan that I
thought the reason he was able to understand so much better than most other observers
the disintegrating process taking place in the black urban ghettos of the early 1960s
was because he had seen it all before in his earlier studies of the nineteenth-century
Irish. “Yes, absolutely!” was his reply. “That was the reason.” He then said he’d once
acknowledged this in print (in a work I hadn’t read and now can’t remember the title
of).
253. In commenting on the Moynihan Report, Martin Luther King, Jr., who seems to
have agreed with much of Moynihan’s analysis, also traced the current ghetto problems
of blacks to the rapid rural-to-urban transition. Although he doesn’t specifically
draw the Irish analogy, King, like Moynihan, believed that, regardless of skin color,
involuntarily uprooted rural peasants face a daunting task in an urban environment and
are in danger of losing control of their children to the surrounding allure of the street.
In an address delivered in Westchester County, New York, soon after the publication
of Moynihan’s report, King had this to say: “[Some Negro families] found their way
to the North in a movement [sociologist E. Franklin Frazier] aptly describes as ‘into
the city of destruction.’ Illiterate, undisciplined, afraid, and crushed by want they were
herded into slums. City life then, as now for migrant groups, has been ruinous for
peasant people. The bewilderment of the complex city undermined the confidence of
fathers and mothers, causing them to lose control of their children whose bewilderment
was even more acute.” Martin Luther King, Jr., from an address delivered at Abbott
House, Westchester County, New York, Oct. 29, 1965, reproduced in Lee Rainwater
and William Yancey, The Moynihan Report and the Policy of Controversy (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 402–9, 406.

Irish Eyes are Smiling (But the Ghetto Angels

Have Yet to Sing)
Depressing as it may seem, the analogy with the displaced Irish
peasants of the nineteenth century gives cause for hope, for
although the movement was arduous and painful, proceeding at
a very slow, intergenerational pace, with the aid of their church
the Irish did go on in the third, fourth and subsequent genera-
tions to develop strong community and family structures that
eventually conformed to the general American middle-class pat-
tern. What will become of inner-city black families and their
neighborhoods is, of course, impossible to predict. On some
measures, at least, it would seem as if the situation could hardly
get any worse. Although tough law enforcement has helped to
reduce dramatically crime in the ghetto from the Wild West days
of the heroin and crack epidemics, the decline has meant that
there are currently more black men in prison or otherwise under
supervision of the criminal justice system than in college. Young
black males face odds of almost one in three of spending at least
a year behind bars sometime during their lifetime. The odds for
ghetto males can be as high as one in two.
The black family situation is equally dire. Currently almost
seven out of ten black babies are born out of wedlock, and the
rate in the more impoverished inner-city communities is sub-
stantially higher. With the dominant middle-class society itself
in American having reached a low point in its own family sta-
bility, the task of reconstructing the two-parent black family is
more daunting than ever.
One thing can be said with a fair amount of certainty, how-
ever, and that is that for improvement to take place a candid
assessment of what has gone wrong and what needs to be done
must be undertaken by all interested parties. We have people
such as Murray, Wilson, and Jencks to thank—like Moynihan,
Frazier, Dollard, and Myrdal before them—for shedding light
on important aspects of this continuing American dilemma.

i nde x
abolitionist personalism, as used by L. B. Johnson,

53–58 74–75
Abrams, Elliot, 66n See also racial preferences
academic disengagement, in college admissions
212–213 Affirmative Discrimination
acting white, 212, 323, 326, (Glazer), 18
340, 475 African Americans
Adarand v. Pena (1995), 29– becoming college
30, 101, 373 professors, 148–154
Adelson, Joseph, 71n family dissolution and,
adolescent peer groups, 475– 388–397
476 incarcerated males, 399–
affirmative action 400
in college admissions, 10, inferiority, feelings of.
12, 105–110 See inferiority doctrine/
defenses of, 69–74 stereotype
earliest use of term, 81 journalistic discrimination
emergence of, 63 against, 59–61, 61–62n
in employment, 10–11, 15, law school student
25, 34–38, 46–47, 65–66, mismatching, 222–233
91–94 male joblessness, 442–444
myths and pathologies of, middle class growth of, 15
74–90 in military, 127

482â•…index
out-of-wedlock births, 398– American Apartheid:

399, 402, 418–420, 422, Segregation and the Making
434, 440, 449n, 480 of the Underclass (Massey
rewarding college and Denton), 332
underachievement of, An American Dilemma
119–215 (Myrdal), 249, 386
role models, need for, American Enterprise Institute,
72–73 136
SAT scores of, 106–109, Andrew W. Mellon
155–156 Foundation, 21, 133, 135–
scholastic 137, 148–149, 163, 277
underperformance of, Antidiscrimination Law
16–17 and Social Equality
in sports, 126 (Koppelman), 97
studying science and Arcidiacono, Peter, 218–222
engineering, 189–199 armed forces. See military
underperformance of, 319 Asians
white and Asian attitudes as honorary whites, 239–
toward affirmative action, 240
376–379 positive effect of presence
See also black underclass in on college campus, 266
inner cities post-college employment
African immigrants, benefits of undergraduate
462–463 affirmative action, 215–
African legacy theory, 449n 222
Afro-Caribbean immigrants, SAT scores of, 106–109,
446, 462–463 155–156, 195, 199–203,
All Our Kin (Stack), 396 201n
Allen, Walter W., 166n, 268– self-esteem and, 281
270 work ethic and high
Allport, Gordon, 301 achievement of, 213–214,
altruism, 22 313, 333–340, 342–343
alumni legacy college athletics. See sports, diversity
admissions, 360 in

Bakke, Allan, 244 Black Families in White

See also Regents of the America (Billingsly), 396
University of California v. black family dissolution. See
Bakke (1978). urban-family disintegration
Banfield, Edward, 18, 431 black feminist writers, 398
Bar Passage Study, 224 Black Metropolis (Cayton
Barber, Elinor, 148–154, 163– and Drake), 428
168, 194, 292 black middle class, 15
Barker, Ernest, 40–41n black pride movement, 394–
baseball, integration of, 62, 395
249 black underclass in inner
Behind Ghetto Walls cities, 383–480
(Rainwater), 396 from crisis to catastrophe,
“On Being a Good Neighbor” 397–400
(King), 52–53 displaced sharecroppers and
Bell, Derrick, 124–125 delinquent sons, 467–
The Bell Curve (Murray and 471
Herrnstein), 448n future of, 480
Berghe, Pierre van den, 21 before Great Society, 426–
Berry, Mary Francis, 33 429
best black syndrome, 357 growing up in Harlem,
bewildered-father/delinquent- 471–474
son syndrome, 470–471 Moynihan Report, 388–393
Billingsly, Andrew, 396–397, Moynihan Report, response
467 to, 393–397
Birmingham marches, 57 Murray, assessment of,
Black American Students in 417–426
an Affluent Suburb—A Murray on, 400–411
Study of Academic overview, 383–393
Disengagement (Ogbu), second-generation effect,
212 475–479
Black Education: Myths and status rewards and, 411–
Tragedies (Sowell), 13 417

484â•…index
unique factors contributing campus diversity, attitudes

to, 445–467 toward, 172–189
Wilson, assessment of, Canada, Geoffrey, 384
437–444 Carter, Jimmy, 244–245
Wilson on, 429–437 Carter, Stephen, 102–103,
Blood and Belonging 104, 357
(Ignatieff), 370 Case, Clifford, 36–37
Bloom, Alan, 185–187 Caste and Class in a Southern
Bok, Derek, 133–135, Town (Dollard), 301–302,
138–140, 147, 157, 161– 456-458
162, 167–168, 182–184, Cato Institute, 136
195, 204, 214, 218, 233, Cayton, Horace, 428
275, 277, 301, 305, 380 Chang, Mitchell, 196–199
Bowen, William, 133–135, Christian roots of American
138–140, 147, 157, 161– personalism, 43–44
162, 167–168, 182–184, civic engagement, 254–260
195, 204, 214, 218, 233, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34–
275, 277, 284, 301, 346 38, 43–47, 65–66, 74–75,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse 116, 273, 387
and Revival of American civil rights, origins of term,
Community (Putnam), 84, 84n
255–256 Civilian Infrastructure Corps,
Bradley, Bill, 189 26
Brightman, Edgar S., 48 Clark, Joseph, 36–38, 44,
Broom, Leonard, 386 46–47
Brown, Claude, 385, 428, Clark, Kenneth, 341, 384,
471–474 394, 434–435
Buber, Martin, 39 cognitive impairment from
Bumpass, Larry, 399 ghetto stress, 329–340
bureaucrats, federal, and Cole, Stephen, 148–154, 163–
desire for power, 90 168, 194, 292
The Color Purple (Walker),
Cabrini Green, 400 398

Coming Up Black (Schultz), The Declining Significance of

396 Race (W. J. Wilson), 443
compassion, 84–86 DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974),
Conant, James Bryan, 426– 29–30, 33, 101, 103
427 deindustrialization, 432–434,
contact hypothesis 438, 448n
defined, 241–243 Depth of souls and being,
origins of, 247–250 42–43
Putnam’s challenge to, Dershowitz, Alan, 245–246,
253–262 273
revised, 250–253 detribalization and immigrant
Council of Ivy Group experience, 58–61
Presidents, 135, 149, 333– DeWolf, L. Harold, 48
334 discrimination
crime in inner city black in Civil Rights Bill of 1964,
neighborhoods, 399–400 34–38
crime-control policy changes in journalism, 59–61,
1960-1970, 409–410 61–62n
Crippen, Timothy, 367–368 as justification for
Crisis in Black and White affirmative action, 66
(Silberman), 387, 427–428 “The Disease as Cure”
(Scalia), 101
Dale, Stacy Berg, 136–148 disruptive students, 407–409
Dark Ghetto (Clark), 394, The Disuniting of America
434–435 (Schlesinger), 18, 376
Daughters of the American diversity on college campuses,
Revolution, 58 241–274
The Death and Life of Great in the academy, 262–271
American Cities (Jacobs), 18 attitudes toward, 172–189
Death at an Early Age contact hypothesis defined,
(Kozol), 409 241–243
Declaration of Independence, contact hypothesis, origins
44–45 of, 247–250

486â•…index
contact hypothesis, elite universities and racial

Putnam’s challenge to, preferences, 136–148
253–262 Elliott, Rogers, 190–196,
contact hypothesis, revised, 199
250–253 entrepreneurship, 18, 217,
in law schools, 222–233 344, 453, 456, 459, 470,
mismatching and 478
downward raiding, 271– Equal Employment
274 Opportunity Commission
overview, 241–243 (EEOC), 65
racial preference policies Escape from Freedom
and, 14–15 (Fromme), 43n
rationale for, 243–247 “Estimating the Payoff to
Dollard, John, 24, 301–302, Attending a More Selective
302n, 456–458, 464–465 College: An Application of
Douglas, William O., 29, 101, Selection on Observables
103 and Unobservables” (Dale
downward raiding, 271–274, and Krueger), 136–137
296–304 ethnic nepotism, 22
See also institutional The Ethnic Phenomenon (van
mismatch effect den Berghe), 21–22
Drake, St. Clair, 428 ethnic rage, 23–24
D’Souza, Dinesh, 342, 374 Ethnicity Indifference
DuBois, W.E.B., 328 Principle, 92–93
ethnicity vs. race, 361–376
economic immigrants, 459– ethnicly homogeneous
462 Hispanic minority myth, 79
economic limits of ethnicly homogeneous white
preferentialist policies, majority myth, 78–79
127–131 ethnocentrism, 22, 366–367
educational policy changes in evolution, 449n
late 1960s, 407–409 evolutionary psychology, 24,
Eibl-Ebesfeldt, Irenäus, 366 362–369

Executive Order 10925 foreign-born black

(Kennedy), 387 immigrants, 462–463
Executive Order 11246 Forty Years of Economic
(Johnson), 65–66, 74–76, Progress for Blacks (Welch
176, 176n, 373, 373n, 387 and Smith), 129–130
Executive Order 11375 14th Amendment to U.S.
(Johnson), 65–66, 75–76, Constitution, 36, 84n, 245
116, 373, 373n Fox, John B., Jr., 162
Frazier, E. Franklin, 18, 24,
fair housing laws, 435 447–448, 449n
fairness and reciprocity, Fromme, Erich, 43n
112–128 Fryer, Roland, 321n
family destabilization, 448– furnish system, 456–458
449n, 477, 480
See also Moynihan Report The Game of Life: College
fear of the poor and Sports and Educational
oppressed, 87–88 Values (Bowen and
Federal Aid to Families Schulman), 346–356
with Dependent Children gangs, 475–476
program (AFDC), 404–406, Gardner, Howard, 345n
418–419 Garrison, William Lloyd,
federal bureaucrats and desire 54–56
for power, 90 Gault v. Arizona (1967),
female-headed black families, 409
396–398, 418, 427, 434– General Social Survey, 256
436, 441–442 genetics, 345, 345–346n,
feminism, 63–64 449n
Fischer, Claude, 345n ghettos, 83, 329–340
Fleming, Jacqueline, 166n, Gibson, Margaret, 339
266–267 Gifford, Bernard, 425
Food Stamps, 404, 406, 418– Glazer, Nathan, 18, 44, 79,
419, 421 444
Ford Foundation, 135 Glenn, Norval, 386
Fordham, Signithia, 326 Goldwater, Barry, 388, 422

488â•…index
Gordon, Milton, 26 Hispanics

government policy in ethnicly homogeneous
employment, suggested Hispanic minority myth,
principles of, 92–94 79
grade inflation, 208–209 piggybacking on 60s-era
Great Automation Migration, black struggle, 238–239,
450–452, 459, 462–463, 341
467, 475, 477–478 rise of militants, 63–64
Great Society, 386, 403 role models, need for,
Greenstein, Robert, 417 72–73
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), SAT scores of, 106–109,
216, 243, 317 155–156
guilt, white collective, 80–86, studying science and
235–240 engineering, 189–199
homogenization of the poor,
Haitian immigrants, 462 413–417
Handlin, Oscar, 452, 476–477 Horowitz, Donald, 374
Hannerz, Ulf, 396 Horowitz., Donald, 24
Harlan, John Marshall, 28, Humphrey, Hubert, 36, 388
273 hypocrisy, 86
Harlem, growing up in, 471–
474 “I Have a Dream” (King),
Harlem Children’s Zone, 384 51–52
Harrison, Lawrence, 233–235 iconographic reforms, 235–
Hayek, Friedrich, 18, 417 236
Head Start, 124 Ignatieff, Michael, 370
Hegel, 48n immigrants and
Heritage Foundation, 136 detribalization, 58–61
Herrnstein, Richard, 111n, incarcerated black males,
333–334, 345n 399–400
Herskovits, Melville, 449n Increasing Faculty Diversity:
high-rise public housing, The Occupational Choices
17–18 of High-Achieving Minority
Hill, Lister, 37 Students, 148

Independent Institute, 136 juvenile offenders, 410

Inequality by Design:
Cracking the Bell Curve Kane, Thomas, 221n
Myth (Fischer), 345n Kasarda, John, 438
inferiority doctrine/stereotype, Katzenstein, Mary, 374
101–104, 111–112, 159– Keeley, Lawrence, 364n
160, 170–173, 221, 234, Kemp, Jack, 189
264, 284–286, 302, 319, Kennedy, John F., 387
463–467 Kennedy, Randall, 245, 247,
institutional affirmative 273
action, 287–288, 287–288n Kerner Commission, 81–82,
institutional mismatch effect, 82n
154, 162–163, 165, 182, King, Martin Luther, Jr., 33,
192–199, 222–223, 228– 40n, 42n, 44, 47–53, 56–
230, 271–274, 278, 288n 58, 63, 327–328, 385, 479n
involuntary immigrants, King v. Smith (1968), 404
461–462 Klitgaard, Robert, 155–156
IQ tests, 448n Koppelman, Andrew, 97–98
Irish immigrants, 477–480 Kozol, Jonathan, 409
I-Thou relationships, 39 Kristol, Irving, 238n, 387
Krueger, Alan, 136–148
Jacobs, Jane, 18 Ku Klux Klan, 58, 67, 88
Jeffersonian (liberal) roots
of American personalism, Ladner, Joyce, 396
43–53 Latinos. See Hispanics
Jencks, Christopher, 24, 384, Law School Admission
440–441, 445–447 Council, 224
Johnson, Charles S., 454 Law School Admissions Test
Johnson, John H., 424 (LSAT), 224–225, 317
Johnson, Lyndon, 18, 44–46, law school student
74, 116, 373, 383, 387, mismatching, 222–233
388, 422, 429 law schools admissions,
journalistic discrimination, 316–318
59–61 legacy college admissions, 360

490â•…index
legal myth of affirmative man-in-the-house rule, 404,

action, 74 406, 421
Lemann, Nicholas, 450n manufacturing, restructuring
Leonard, Jonathan, 128 of, 432–434, 438
Li, Jian, 357–359 The Marriage Problem (J.Q
liberal roots of American Wilson), 449n
personalism, 43–53 Marshall, Thurgood, 33
liberalism, in 1960s, 81, 81n Massey, Douglas, 168–173,
Liebow, Elliot, 396 264–265, 332
Lindsay, John, 82 materialist-careerist ethic,
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 91
180–183 McArdle, John, 195–196
Lopreato, Joseph, 367–368 McGuiness, Kenneth C., 77n
“Losing Faith in Losing McWhorter, John, 187, 206–
Ground” (Greenstein), 417 209, 265, 312, 319, 323
Losing Ground: American Meaning, humans as centers
Social Policy 1950–1980 of, 40–42
(Murray), 401–411, 417– Medicaid, 404
426 Medical College Admissions
Loury, Glenn, 104–105, 321n Test (MCAT), 316
low effort syndrome, 212– medical school admissions,
213 315–316
“Memoir on Pauperism”
male joblessness, 394, 432– (Tocqueville), 423–424
435, 432–436, 442–444 merit, lack of, in college
male marriageable pool index, admissions policy, 275–381
434 black underperformance
Malkiel, Nancy Weiss, 208– and, 319
209 cultural factors and, 340–
The Man Without Qualities 346
(Musil), 43n disincentive effects of racial
Manchild in the Promised preferences, 305
Land (Brown), 428, 472– dysfunctional subcultures
474 and, 329–340

middle class complacency mother-only black families,

and, 324–329 396–397, 418, 427, 434–
overview, 275–284 436, 441–442
race vs. ethnicity, 361–376 motivation, student, 204–206
recruitment and corruption Moynihan, Daniel Patrick,
of educational standards, 18, 24–25, 341, 384, 388–
346–356 397, 429, 447–448, 449n,
stigma harm of racial 478–479
preferences, 284–296 Moynihan Report, 25, 388–
tribal loyalties and enmities, 393
356–361 response to, 393–397
upward ratcheting/ Murray, Charles, 24, 104,
downward raiding, 296– 110–111, 111n, 345n, 384,
304 400–411, 417–426, 448n
white and Asian attitudes Musil, Robert, 43n
toward blacks re Myrdal, Gunnar, 249, 386
affirmative action, 376– Mystery, humans as centers
379 of, 40–42
middle class complacency,
324–329 National Labor Relations Act
military (Wagner Act) of 1935, 74n
blacks as disciplined National Longitudinal Study
officers, 355n of Freshmen, 277
integration of, 62, 248– The Nature of Prejudice
249, 251 (Allport), 301, 302n
veterans preference bills, Naylor, Gloria, 398
11, 127 negative stereotyping, 98,
Mill, John Stuart, 39 100, 103, 112–113, 241,
Mirandola, Pico della, 44n 247–248
mismatching in higher The Negro Family in the
education. See institutional United States (Frazier),
mismatch effect 447–448
Moral Man and Immoral The Negro Family: The
Society (Niebuhr), 42n Case for National Action

492â•…index
(Moynihan). See Moynihan parental guidance, 470–474

Report See also Moynihan Report
“The Negro Today Is Like Patterson, Orlando, 345n
the Immigrant Yesterday” Peabody Picture Vocabulary
(Kristol), 387 Test, 155
nepotism, 22 personalism
Nevitte, Neil, 180–183 abolitionist, 53–58
New Frontier, 386 Christian roots of, 43–44
“new racists,” 110–111 defenses of, 69–74
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 42n defined, 39
“nigger,” use of term, 465– detribalization and
466 immigrant experience,
Nisbett, Richard, 345n 58–61
Nixon, Richard, 383 and emergence of
No Proxy Principle, 92 affirmative action, 62–69
nonpersistence rate, 190–191, explained, 40–43
195 King and, 40n, 44, 47–53,
48n
O’Connor, Sandra Day, 216, liberal roots of, 43–54
219, 243, 246–247 myths and pathologies of,
Office of Federal Contract 74–90
Compliance (OFCC), 65 public policy and, 91–94
Ogbu, John, 211–212, 326, Piazza, Thomas, 376–379
345, 352 “pipeline problem” in college
Orfield, Gary, 182 education, 151–154, 172
out-of-wedlock births, Plaut, Steven, 68n
398–399, 402, 404–405, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 10,
418–420, 422, 434, 440, 28–29, 273
449n, 480 post-college employment,
215–222
parental demands on student Powell, Colin, 355, 355n
performance, 213, 306– Powell, Lewis, 215, 219, 243,
308, 313, 324, 338–340 245

power, desire for among black scientists and

federal bureaucrats, 90 engineers, dearth of,
“the projects,” 17–18 189–199
The Promised Land blacks becoming college
(Lemann), 450n professors, 148–154
public housing assistance, 404 campus diversity, attitudes
public housing, highrise, toward, 172–189
17–18 conclusions, 233–240
Punjabi Sikh immigrants, at elite universities, 136–
339–340 148
Purdy, Larry, 305 law school student
Putnam, Robert, 243–262 mismatching, 222–233
overview, 133–136
quotas, harm done by, 13, rewarding
160–161n underachievement, 199–
215
Race, Evolution and Behavior stereotype vulnerability and
(Rushton), 449–450n underperformance, black,
Race, Racism and American 154–163
Law (Bell), 124–125 stereotype vulnerability,
race vs. ethnicity, 361–376 research on, 163–172
racial preferences as antidote racism
to racism as blasphemy, 46–47
definitions, 99–111 defined, 99–100, 112–113
economic limits of, 127– as explanation for
131 underclass growth,
reciprocity and fairness, 431
112–128 racial preference policies
racial preferences in college and, 13–14
admissions, 133–240 as way of life, 365–366
benefitting whites and See also racial preferences
Asians in post-college as antidote to racism
employment, 215–222 Rainwater, Lee, 341, 396

494â•…index
reciprocity and fairness, 163–164, 191–193,

112–128 195–203, 201n, 287–288n,
recruitment of school athletes, 287–289
346–356, 359 Scalia, Antonin, 29, 101
Regents of the University of Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 18,
California v. Bakke (1978)., 376
215, 243, 273, 299n school vouchers, 26
Reuther, Walter, 38 Schulman, James, 284, 346
Revised Order No. 4., Schultz, David, 396
Department of Labor, second-generation effect,
Office of Federal Contract 475–479
Compliance, 77, 77n segregation
Rickey, Branch, 249 and cognitive impairment,
Rieder, Jonathan, 118–123 329–340
Rivers, Eugene, 26 King on, 50–51
The Road to Serfdom in military, 62
(Hayek), 18, 417 Self-Representation Only
Robinson, Jackie, 62, 249 Principle, 92
role models, 72–74 self-righteous hypocrisy, 86
romanticism, 87 “The Selling of Joseph”
Rothman, Stanley, 180–183, (Sewall), 53–54
266 Sewall, Samuel, 53–54
Rudenstine, Neil, 148–149 sexual discrimination, 76
Rushton, J. Philippe, 365– The Shape of the River
366, 449–450n (Bowen and Bok), 133–148,
Russell Sage Foundation, 135, 157, 161, 275, 277
149 sharecroppers, 451–459,
Rustin, Bayard, 67 467–471
Ryan, William, 394 Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), 435
Silberman, Charles, 387,
Sander, Richard H., 223–232 427–428
Sanderson, Stephen, 22 Skrentny, John David, 11
SAT scores, 105–110, 152– Slave and Citizen
153, 155–158, 160–161, (Tannenbaum), 61

Slums and Suburbs (Conant), Steele, Claude, 158–159,

426–427 159n, 161–165, 207, 211,
Smith, James P., 129–130 352
Smyth, Frederick, 195–196 Steele, Shelby, 17, 134, 160,
Sniderman, Paul, 376–379 209, 235–238, 296n, 314,
social capital, 256, 258– 327
259 Steinberg, Laurence, 212,
Social Capital Community 313
Benchmark Survey, 257 stereotype vulnerability,
social engagement, 254–260 154–163, 163–172, 207,
social mythology of 348, 352
affirmative action, 74–90 stereotyping, 39, 70, 82, 165,
socioeconomic homogeneity 247–249, 352, 397
of blacks and Hispanics stereotyping, negative, 98,
myth, 78 100, 103, 112–113, 241,
Soulside (Hannerz), 396 247–248
The Source of the River stigma, 100–103, 284–296
(Massey et al.), 168, 264, stress hormones effect on
275, 277 developing brains, 329–340
Southern caste system, 458, Stride Toward Freedom
464–466 (King), 49
Sowell, Thomas, 13, 24, 95n, student discipline, 407–409
160–161n, 165, 232–234, student motivation, 204–206
278, 335, 345, 374 Student Nonviolent
Spheres of Justice (Walzer), Coordinating Committee
11–12, 131 (SNCC), 56
Spielberg, Steven, 145 student work ethic, 204–206
sports, diversity in, 62, 126, Summers, Clyde, 304n
184–185, 188–189, 249, Sumner, William Graham,
251, 346–356, 359 366
Stack, Carol, 396 Swain, Carol, 318n
standardized testing, 155
status rewards, 411–417 Tally’s Corner (Liebow), 396

496â•…index
Taming the River (Charles et The Unheavenly City

al.). See merit, lack of, in (Banfield), 18, 431
college admissions policy upward ratcheting, 296–304
Tannenbaum, Frank, 61 See also institutional
test anxiety, 158–159 mismatch effect
Thatcher, Margaret, 253–254 urban housing projects, 400
Thernstrom, Abigail, 214, urban-family disintegration,
305, 328 199–215, 279–280, 430
Thernstrom, Stephen, 214,
305, 328 Vars, Fredrick, 161
thirty-and-a-third rule, 404, veterans preference bills, 11,
407, 421 127
Title VI, Civil Rights Act of victimization of the poor,
1964, 34–37, 65 413–417
Title VII, Civil Rights Act of Vietnamese immigrants,
1964, 34–38, 65, 74–75, 336–339
116 Vigdor, Jacob, 218–222
To Be Equal (Young), 387, visceral universalism, 119–
391–392 120, 123
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 423– voluntary economic
424 immigrants, 459–462
Tomorrow’s Tomorrow Voting Rights Act of 1965,
(Ladner), 396–397 387
tribalism, 38–40, 64–65,
356–361 Walker, Alice, 398
The Truly Disadvantaged (W. Wallace, George, 36
J. Wilson), 429–437, 448n Walzer, Michael, 11–12, 99,
assessment of, 437–444 124, 131
Truman, Harry, 62, 248 War Before Civilization
trust, 254–259 (Keeley), 364n
two-faced personalities, 466 War On Poverty, 429
Watts riots, 394
Underdog Equality Principle, wealth-donor admissions
92–93 preferences, 360

Weber, Max, 262 as centers of black families,

Weiner, Myron, 23–24, 374 427, 448–449n
Welch, Finis, 129–130 difficulty in finding mates
welfare, 279, 342n, 384, 402– among blacks, 281–282,
407, 410–425, 444–446 435, 448n, 476
“What Antidiscrimination disrespected by black men,
Law is Against” 475
(Koppelman), 97–99 role models, need for,
When Work Disappears: The 72–73
World of the New Urban SAT scores of, 195
Poor (W. J. Wilson), 448n welfare and, 404–405,
Where Do We Go from Here: 418–421
Chaos or Community See also female-headed
(King), 49–51, 51n black families; out-of-
white “liberals,” 84–89 wedlock births
white society, defined, 82–83 The Women of Brewster Place
Whitman, David, 450n (Naylor), 398
Who Prospers? (Harrison), Woods, Tiger, 184
233 work ethic, 204–206, 266,
Williams, Robin M., 392 442
Williams, Walter, 355 working poor, 412, 416–417,
Wilson, James Q., 333–334, 419, 424, 445
449n Wright, Richard, 385
Wilson, William Julius, 24,
383–384, 429–437, 437– xenophobia, 22, 366–367
444, 445–447, 448n
Wolfe, Alan, 304n Young, Whitney M., Jr., 387,
women 391–392
academic underperformance
among athletes, 348

Wounds That Will Not Heal - Affirmative Action and Our Continuing Racial Divide (2012) by Russell K. Nieli

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wounds That Will Not Heal - Affirmative Action and Our Continuing Racial Divide (2012) by Russell K. Nieli

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wounds That Will Not Heal - Affirmative Action and Our Continuing Racial Divide (2012) by Russell K. Nieli

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

VISIT…

(continued from front flap)

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 1 9/25/12 8:48 AM

Encounter Books New York • London

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v7.indd 3 10/1/12 3:56 PM

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

First American edition published in 2012 by Encounter Books,

Manufactured in the United States and printed on

FIRST AMERICAN EDITION

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 4 9/25/12 8:48 AM

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 5 9/25/12 8:48 AM

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 7 9/25/12 8:48 AM

seventh essentials edition (new york:

w. w. norton & company, 2009), pp. 128–30.

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 8 9/25/12 8:48 AM

R acial preferences in the U.S. first arose in response to the

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 9 9/25/12 8:48 AM

From the very beginning, however, racial preference policy

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 10 9/25/12 8:48 AM

America and require verbal dodges and prettifying obfuscations

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 11 9/25/12 8:48 AM

Justice. “In our culture,” Walzer wrote, “careers are supposed

3. Ibid., pp. 152–3.

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 12 9/25/12 8:48 AM

Economist and social critic Thomas Sowell, a long-time

The actual harm done by quotas is far greater than having a

Having debated the issue of racial preferences in many

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 13 9/25/12 8:48 AM

roots in our racist culture. So don’t blame racial preference poli-

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 14 9/25/12 8:48 AM

And by upwardly ratcheting visible minorities into institutions

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 15 9/25/12 8:48 AM

entrants into medical schools, law schools, business schools, and

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 16 9/25/12 8:48 AM

students and their parents both know, as essayist Shelby Steele

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 17 9/25/12 8:48 AM

the high-rise craze was a noble experiment that failed—and at

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 18 9/25/12 8:48 AM

The last chapter is in many ways the most important in the

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 19 9/25/12 8:48 AM

black poor—for those to whom history, fate, and human malice

The book seeks to achieve three main goals. First, it seeks

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 20 9/25/12 8:48 AM

no-punches-pulled approach to revealing the corruption and

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 21 9/25/12 8:48 AM

organisms are biologically programmed to be nepotistic, i.e. to

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 22 9/25/12 8:48 AM

sensitivity and protectiveness that history shows often escalates

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 23 9/25/12 8:48 AM

Weiner, Thomas Sowell, and Donald Horowitz. Evolutionary

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 24 9/25/12 8:48 AM

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 25 9/25/12 8:48 AM

prescriptions, believing, among other reasons, that they would

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 26 9/25/12 8:48 AM

criticize affirmative action unless you have something concrete

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 27 9/25/12 8:48 AM

ribus, while in the civic realm we are all unum—participants

WoundsthatWillNotHeal_v2.indd 28 9/25/12 8:48 AM