The Supreme Court ruled that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos met the one year residency requirement to run for representative of the First District of Leyte. The Court found that domicile and residence have the same meaning under election law, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain permanently or indefinitely. While Marcos was born in Manila, her domicile of origin was Tacloban, Leyte. She did not abandon this domicile and the COMELEC must proclaim her as the duly elected representative.
The Supreme Court ruled that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos met the one year residency requirement to run for representative of the First District of Leyte. The Court found that domicile and residence have the same meaning under election law, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain permanently or indefinitely. While Marcos was born in Manila, her domicile of origin was Tacloban, Leyte. She did not abandon this domicile and the COMELEC must proclaim her as the duly elected representative.
Original Description:
Original Title
Romualdez-marcos v. Comelec (1995), Godoy, Eh 201 (1)
The Supreme Court ruled that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos met the one year residency requirement to run for representative of the First District of Leyte. The Court found that domicile and residence have the same meaning under election law, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain permanently or indefinitely. While Marcos was born in Manila, her domicile of origin was Tacloban, Leyte. She did not abandon this domicile and the COMELEC must proclaim her as the duly elected representative.
The Supreme Court ruled that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos met the one year residency requirement to run for representative of the First District of Leyte. The Court found that domicile and residence have the same meaning under election law, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain permanently or indefinitely. While Marcos was born in Manila, her domicile of origin was Tacloban, Leyte. She did not abandon this domicile and the COMELEC must proclaim her as the duly elected representative.
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IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v.
COMELEC and CIRILO
ROY MONTEJO, G.R. No 119976, 18 September 1995, EN BANC
Digest by: Iris May G. Godoy, EH 201
Principle in sum:
“For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.”
FACTS:
1. 24 August 1994 - petitioner filed a cancellation of
registration in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila so she can register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
2. 28 January 28, 1995 - petitioner registered as a voter at
Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Thereafter, filed her COC on 8 March 8, 1995 for the First District Representative of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
3. 3 March 1995 Congressman Cirilo Montejo the incumbent
representative of the 1st District filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with COMELEC alleging that the petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives and prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy. 4. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected COC" wherein her answer in the original COC in item 8 - “Seven Months” changed to "since childhood."
5. 24 April 1995 COMELEC's Second Division cancelled her
certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte"
6. 11 May 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. COMELEC reversed itself the same day and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
ISSUES:
1. The sole issue for resolution is whether petitioner had
complied with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SUPREME COURT’S RULING:
1. Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the past four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
2. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile".
3. This court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
4. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person's intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
5. SC: To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
6. SC: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. 7. SC: So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
8. SC: In the light of the principles just discussed, has
petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
9. SC: “Having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.