1

KLT-40S

Overview

Full name KLT-40S

Acronym KLT-40S
Reactor type Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)
Coolant Light water
Moderator Light water
Neutron spectrum Thermal neutrons
Thermal capacity 300 MWth
Electrical capacity 70 MWe
Design Status Under construction
Designer JSC “Afrikantov OKB Mechnical Engineering” (OKBM)
Last update 23-04-2013
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KLT-40S Design Description

1. Introduction
Construction of a small-size floating nuclear cogeneration plant PATES based on a
floating power unit (FPU) of 20870 design with KLT-40S reactor plants (RPs) is currently under
way in Russia.
Russia has accumulated considerable experience in using nuclear power for propulsion of
surface vessels and submarines. High performance characteristics of RPs developed by OKBM
have been validated during long-term operation of nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear ice-
reinforced vessel on northern sea routes.
A total of 10 nuclear vessels have been constructed. Seven nuclear icebreakers and one
nuclear lighter-carrier, with 13 RPs installed on them, are currently in operation. The longest
operation time, more than 175 thousand hours, has been demonstrated by the RP on the
“Arktika” icebreaker, and the total operating time of RPs on all nuclear icebreakers amounts to
nearly 300 reactor-years.
Over the entire period of nuclear vessel operation, there have been no cases of navigation
termination due to RP failures, and no incidents associated with fission reaction control failures,
core cooldown failures, uncontrolled nuclides transport, or excessive personnel exposure [1].
The experience of development and long-term failure-free operation of nuclear vessels
served the basis for developing the small-size floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) design.
Currently, there are two possible applications for FNPPs [4]:
- provision of district heating and electricity to national consumers;
- power supply to the developing countries, including entry to the seawater desalination
market.
The PATES is a complex of buildings and structures including:
- FPU of 20870 design, which is the basic element of the PATES;
- hydraulic engineering facilities (special berth and piers for FPU docking, underwater pit,
enclosed sea area);
- coastal facilities that transfer the electricity and heat from the FPU to the coastal
communities, and also perform certain auxiliary, servicing and protective functions.
The FPU (see Fig. 1) houses two KLT-40S RPs and two turbine-generator sets with
cogeneration turbines; these two sets of equipment are installed alongside the two boards of the
FPU.
The KLT-40S RP is a pressurized-water reactor. It is based on the commercial KLT-40
marine propulsion plant and is an advanced variant of RPs that power nuclear icebreakers [2, 8].
In order to increase reliability, lifetime, service life, and to improve maintenance
conditions, RP components and safety systems underwent modernization with account of the up-
to-date requirements of Russian Rostekhnadzor’s regulatory documentation applied for nuclear
power plants.
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Fuel handling
Central
compartment
control room

Перегрузочное
помещение

АДГ
ЦПУ

Шахта
КО Аппаратная №1
Пом.
КО перегрузки
Пом. хран.
ОТВС
Вьюшки Спортзал Пит. перегруз. Пом. РУ №1 МО №1 Трансфор- Боцманская
вода обор. маторная №1
Вспом. Пом. общесуд. Кладовая
мех-мы систем мех. ЗИПа

RP compartment

Fig. 1. FPU with KLT-40S RP

The main RP design decisions are as follows [2, 8]:

- modular design: reactor, steam generators (SGs) and main circulation pumps (MCPs)
are connected with short nozzles (without long pipelines);
- four-loop system with forced and natural circulation of primary coolant;
- pressurized primary circuit with canned motor pumps and leak-tight bellow-type valves;
- once-through coiled SG;
- external gas pressurizer system;
- passive safety systems;
- proven equipment installation, repair and replacement technologies, as well as proven
equipment diagnostic and monitoring systems and tools.
The KLT-40S reactor unit is shown in Fig. 2. The main reactor plant parameters are given
in Table “Summary table technical data” in Appendix 1.
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2. RP description
The reactor unit consists of the reactor (including the core, three actuators of emergency
protection, and eight actuators of compensating groups) connected by short ducts to four SGs of
PG-28S type and four hydraulic chambers with four electric pumps installed in them.
The steam generating unit is a system of interconnected high-pressure vessels containing
removable parts of the main (replaceable) equipment.
Inner thin-walled nozzles are placed in all main nozzles, thus forming a co-axial
structure. Inner thin-walled connecting nozzles, which serve to direct the coolant flow, are fitted
together to provide minimum leakage between cavities with different pressures and
temperatures.
The steam generating unit comprises the main circulation path for heat transfer from the
reactor to the SGs.
The KLT-40S RP uses a thermal neutron spectrum, pressurized water reactor.
Structurally, the reactor (see Fig 2, Pos.1) is a high-pressure vessel with a cover. The
vessel houses the core, compensating rods and emergency protection rods. On the cover, there
are actuators of compensating groups and emergency protection groups, resistance temperature
transducers, and thermoelectric temperature transducers intended to measure reactor temperature.
The PG-28S SG consists of:
- strong and leak-tight case with the main coaxial nozzle supplying/removing the primary
coolant and attachments for SG fixing on the metal-water shielding tank;
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ECCS – emergency core cooldown system; HX – heat exchanger

Fig. 2. General view of the KLT-40S RP.
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- internals, including the SG cover with secondary coolant supply/removal nozzles and
the coiled tubing system with flow restrictors.
The tubing system is assembled of 15 cylindrical multiple-wound coils of 22×2.5 mm
tubes. The total number of 22×2.5 tubes in the tubing system is 100.
The MCP is intended to transfer primary coolant inside the steam generating unit. The
MCP is canned, centrifugal, single-stage, vertical, with shielded double-speed (double-winding)
asynchronous electric motor.
The KLT-40S RP core is based on ship technologies and uses uranium fuel with U235
enrichment below 20%, which is termed “Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)” by the IAEA. The
limitation of uranium fuel enrichment to below 20% U235 is considered by the IAEA to be a
factor that enhances proliferation resistance of nuclear systems, as LEU is not a direct use
nuclear material [10]. In order to increase uranium content, the core has a close-packed cassette
structure and therefore can contain the maximum possible number of fuel elements (FEs) and,
correspondingly, the maximum possible volume of fuel in the limited volume of the core.
The core uses FEs with smooth cylindrical cladding of corrosion-resistant zirconium
alloy (∅6.8 mm). The FEs are structurally the same as those of icebreaker reactors, but use fuel
with higher uranium content based on uranium dioxide pellets in inert matrix.
The core consists of 121 hexahedral shrouded fuel assemblies (FAs) (Fig. 3) placed in the
angles of a regular triangular lattice with a pitch of 100 mm. FA heated part height is 1200 mm,
across flats size is 98.5 mm, overall length is 1670 mm.
FEs are placed in FAs at a regular triangular lattice pitch of 9.95 mm.
Gadolinium-based burnable poison rods (BPRs) used in FAs fully compensate the
reactivity margin for fuel burnup and are similar in design to BPRs of icebreaker reactors.
Table 1. Main characteristics of the KLT-40S reactor core

Parameter Value
1 Thermal power, MW 150
2 Number of FAs 121
3 FA across flats size, mm 98.5
4 Triangular lattice pitch, mm 100
5 Core diameter, mm 1220
6 Core height, mm 1200
7 FE dimensions across cladding, ∅×δ, mm 6.8×0.5
8 FE cladding material Zirconium alloy
Central absorber
9 Absorber element layout in FA
element
8 compensating rods +
10 Number of control rods in the core 3 emergency protection
rods

The selected method of burnup reactivity margin compensation by means of

heterogeneous poison in the BPR and control rod absorber element, the type of fuel and the main
structural material of core elements, as well as fuel lattice parameters, provide negative reactivity
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coefficients for power, fuel and coolant temperature, coolant specific volume in the entire
envelope of parameters and at any moment of core life. The mentioned factors define the high
level of KLT-40S RP inherent self-protection.
The core map is given in Fig. 4.

Fig. 3. KLT-40S RP fuel assembly

1 – FEs; 2- absorber element; 3 - nozzle; 4 – upper end; 5 – lower end.
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FA with emergency protection rod

Fig. 4. Reactor core map

Fuel handling complex

One of the advantages offered by the FPU-based PATES under construction is long-term
autonomous operation in remote regions with decentralized power supply.
The design stipulates that every 3-4 years of operation the reactor is refuelled, the spent
nuclear fuel is then stored onboard the FPU and no special maintenance and refuelling ships are
necessary. For that purpose, the FPU incorporates fresh and spent FA storages, storages of liquid
and solid wastes generated during operation and refuelling, and the fuel handling complex.
The spent FA and solid radioactive waste storage includes two stages: the wet storage,
which ensures reliable heat removal from spent FAs immediately after they have been unloaded
from the reactor, and subsequent dry storage with air cooling, which makes possible safe storage
of spent FAs at a minimum cost.
The wet storage uses leak-tight wet decay storage tanks. The spent FA and solid
radioactive waste storage includes three independent wet storage tanks, each capable of holding
the inventory of spent FAs from one reactor core. During normal operation, decay heat is
removed by one of the two active heat removal channels through three loops: from the cooling
circuit through the intermediate circuit to the seawater. There is also a passive heat removal
channel that operates by evaporating the water from the wet storage tank cofferdam into the
ventilation system.
The dry storage uses leak-tight canisters of ChT-14 type installed into dry storage
containers. The spent FA and solid radioactive waste storage includes four independent dry
storage containers, each capable of holding the inventory of spent FAs from one reactor core.
The heat from the canisters in the storage containers is removed by open-loop ventilation.
The fuel handling complex is used for reactor refuelling. It performs the entire range of
operations from cutting the welds, which attach the sleeves of emergency protection, resistance
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thermometers and thermoelectric transducers to the reactor cover, to reactor bringing to first
criticality, including unloading of spent FAs from the reactor, their transportation and placement
into wet storage tanks and dry storage containers, unloading of neutron sources, lower ends of
emergency protection, resistance thermometer and thermoelectric transducer sleeves, and loading
of fresh FAs into the reactor.
In order to maintain a high capacity factor, refuelling is performed 13 days after reactor
shutdown when the levels of residual heat releases from spent FAs are still high.
The fuel handling complex for the KLT-40S RP was developed based on the experience
of designing, manufacturing and operating fuel handling equipment for propulsion reactor plants,
with account of the modern requirements for safety assurance during potentially nuclear and
radiation hazardous activities. Many of the proven solutions validated by years of operation have
been used in the developed equipment.
The fuel handling complex includes:
− refuelling container for spent FAs;
− alignment mechanisms installed on the reactor vessel, wet storage tanks and dry
storage containers;
− machine for cutting the welds attaching the sleeves;
− hydraulic jacks, pump station, observation device, etc.
Auxiliary systems
Pressurizer system
The pressurizer system is intended to develop and keep the primary circuit pressure
within the prescribed limits in all operation modes. The KLT-40S primary circuit uses external
gas pressurizer system.
The system includes:
- four pressurizers;
- two main gas cylinder groups (6 cylinders in each group);
- stand-by cylinder group (6 cylinders);
- gas compressor;
- piping, valves, instrumentation.
System technical characteristics are given in Table “Summary table technical data” in
Appendix 1.
In the nozzle connecting the system to the reactor vessel, there is a DN25 restriction
device intended to prevent primary circuit outflow in case of pipeline rupture.
Purification and cooldown system
The purification and cooldown system is intended to maintain the required quality of
primary circuit water and to remove residual heat from the core to the third circuit water.
The system includes:
- primary-third circuit HX;
- primary circuit filter;
- two electrical cooldown pumps;
- piping, valves, instrumentation.
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The system maintains the primary circuit water quality at power operation in accordance
with the established requirements.
Fuel cycle
Ensuring maximum operation period between refuellings was an objective during
development of the fuel cycle for the KLT-40S RP. Taking into account this factor, single
loading has been accepted. The use of LEU fuel (initial uranium enrichment does not exceed
20%) has been employed to enhance proliferation resistance.
To provide maximum fuel burnup taking into account the accepted limitation on uranium
enrichment (decrease of natural uranium inventory), the fuel lattice (water-uranium ratio) has
been optimized.
Parameters of cermet fuel accepted for the KLT-40S RP allow core operation in the
manoeuvre mode without limitation in customer requirements.
The main parameters of the KLT-40S RP are given in Table 2.
Table 2.
Parameter Value
Reactor thermal power, MW 150
Fuel type Cermet
Single loading with
Refuelling mode
replacement of all FAs
Uranium inventory, kg 1273
Uranium-235 inventory, kg 179
Average uranium enrichment in the core, % 14.1
Fuel life at Nrated, eff.days 14 000
Operation period without refuelling, yr. ~ 2.3
Specific consumption of uranium-235, g235U/(MW·day) 2.05
Average fuel burnup fraction on oxide fuel basis,
45.4
MW·day/kg U

3. Safety concept
The principal safety solutions for the FPU with the KLT-40S RP are discussed in
References [3, 6, 7]. The objectives are:
- to apply a systematic approach integrating the experience and achievements in the
safety of nuclear power plants and marine propulsion plants;
- to comply with the modern safety requirements and principles developed by the world
nuclear community and established in IAEA Safety Standards and in Russian codes and
standards applicable to nuclear engineering and shipbuilding.
The engineering solutions incorporated in the design correspond to worldwide trends
followed by all state-of-the-art advanced nuclear power plants:
- priority to accident prevention measures and design simplification;
- inherent safety features;
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- defence-in-depth principle;
- passive safety features;
- limitation of the consequences of severe accidents;
- better protection against external impacts, including terrorist attacks.
The KLT-40S RP was designed on the basis of proven engineering solutions:
- compact structure of the steam generating unit with short nozzles connecting the main
equipment, without large-diameter primary circuit pipelines;
- proven reactor emergency shutdown actuators based on different operation principles:
• fast-response emergency protection rods;
• compensating groups.
- emergency heat removal systems connected to the primary and secondary circuits;
- elimination of weak design points based on the experience of prototype operation
(improvement of the primary circuit pressurizer system and several SG units, etc.);
- use of available experimental data, certified computer codes and calculation procedures.
The passive safety solutions of KTL-40S RP include inherent safety features and
‘external’ passive safety systems.
RP inherent safety is expressed in its capability to prevent occurrence, restrain
development, and mitigate consequences of the initiating events, which could lead to accidents,
using, among all, natural feedbacks and processes with no operator intervention, power
consumption or external help for a certain period of time which can be used by the personnel to
evaluate the situation and to make necessary corrective actions.
RP inherent safety is provided by the following:
a) negative reactivity coefficient for fuel and coolant temperatures, specific volume of
coolant, and negative steam and integral power coefficients of reactivity;
b) high thermal conductivity of the fuel composition determining its relatively low
temperature and correspondingly low stored energy;
c) appropriate natural circulation flow in the primary system;
d) high RP heat storage capacity which is provided by the high heat capacity of primary
coolant and metalworks, by the use of ‘soft’ pressurizer system, and design safety margin the for
pressure in case of emergency pressure increase;
e) compact design of the steam generating unit with short nozzles between the main
equipment, without large-diameter primary pipelines;
f) installation of flow restrictors in the nozzles connecting the primary circuit systems
with the reactor in order to limit the coolant outflow rate, and selection of optimal positions of
these nozzles such as to provide fast transition to the steam outflow of the primary coolant in
case of break of the corresponding pipelines;
g) favourable conditions for realization of the “leak before break” concept for the
structural elements of the primary circuit;
h) use of once-through SGs limiting the secondary circuit heat removal power the in case
of steam pipeline break accident.
Both active and passive safety systems (Fig. 5) are provided as a part of RP to perform
the following safety functions:
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- reactor emergency shutdown;
- emergency heat removal from the primary circuit;
- emergency core cooling;
- radioactive products confinement.
Active safety systems
- system of reactor shutdown with insertion of compensating control rods by the electric
drive;
- system of emergency cooldown through the SG with steam dump to the process
condenser;
- system of emergency cooldown through the purification and cooldown system HX;
- system of emergency water supply from ECCS pumps and recirculation pumps;
- filtration system for releases from the protective enclosure.
Passive safety systems
- system of reactor shutdown with insertion of compensating control into the rods core by
gravity and insertion of emergency protection rods by for force of accelerating springs when the
locking electromagnets are de-energized;
- passive system of emergency cooldown through the SG;
- system of emergency water supply from hydraulic accumulators;
- containment and normally closed localizing valves in the primary circuit auxiliary
systems and interfacing systems;
- passive reactor vessel cooldown system;
- passive self-actuating devices for actuation of safety systems;
- passive containment cooling system;
- containment.
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Fig.5. KLT-40S RP safety systems

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Passive safety systems use natural coolant circulation and compressed gas energy.
The required functions of safety systems are provided taking into account external natural
and man-caused impacts and internal impacts caused by the accident conditions. Functioning of
safety systems is provided in case of potential failures such as single failure, common cause
failure resulting from a single failure or impact, or personnel error.
Reliability of safety systems is provided through the systematic approach stipulating use
of redundancy, independence (separation), and diversity principles, as well as the following
measures:
- use of systems combining passive and active operation principles and elements
corresponding to the safe failure principle in the maximum extent possible (i.e. elements which
are put in the safety functioning mode in case of failures);
- automation of control, and actuation of safety functions by actuating safety systems
from self-actuated devices (by the direct action of the medium);
- conservative approach in design of protection barriers, safety systems, selection of the
range of initial events, accident development scenarios, selection of determining emergency
parameters and characteristics, and design margins.
The majority of KLT-40S RP safety systems use a two-channel configuration with
internal reservation of active elements such as valves and pumps. Use of the two-channel
configuration of safety systems in particular conditions of a floating vessel (such as a necessity
to minimize equipment size and weight, as opposed to ground-based nuclear power plants)
permits to reduce the amount of bulky equipment such as tanks and HXs.
Structures, systems and equipment of FNPPs are developed taking into account natural
and man-caused impacts typical of nuclear power plant location site and FPU towage routes and
meet the requirements of OPB-88/97, the Sea Shipping Register of Russia and other regulations.
FNPP safety is ensured under specified design-basis parameters of natural impacts on the FPU
and RP occurring at a frequency of 10-2 1/year, and impacts from operational-base and safe
shutdown earthquakes occurring at a frequency of 10-2 1/year and 10-4 1/year respectively.
For the operation site of the PATES with KLT-40S RPs, the magnitude of the
operational-base earthquake is estimated at 7 points, and that of the safe shutdown earthquake
equals 8 points.
Equipment, machinery, safety-related systems and their attachment units withstand shock
loads with acceleration not lower than 3 g in any direction, and maintain operability during
heaving which is typical during FPU operation
Safety of the PATES with KLT-40S reactors is based on the defence-in-depth principle.
This principle stipulates accident prevention and mitigation strategy, a system of physical
barriers preventing propagation of ionizing radiation and radioactive materials into the
environment, and a system of technical and organizational measures on protection of the barriers
and retaining their effectiveness, as well as measures on protection of the personnel, population
and environment.
There are several levels of technical and organizational measures under the defence-in-
depth principle [6]:
Level 1 – Prevention of abnormal operation and failure.
Level 2 – Control of abnormal operation and detection of failure.
Level 3 – Control of accidents within the design basis.
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Level 4 – Control of severe plant conditions, including prevention of accident progression
and mitigation of consequences of severe accidents.
Level 5 – Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive
materials.
Inherent passive safety features and passive safety systems of the KLT-40S reactor that
ensure the effectiveness of physical barriers for each defence-in-depth level are described below.
Level 1: Prevention of abnormal operation and failure
- negative reactivity coefficients for fuel and coolant temperature, coolant specific
volume, and total power in the whole range of reactor parameters that make reactor self-control
possible;
- high thermal conductivity of the fuel composition determining its relatively low
temperature and correspondingly low stored energy;
- compact modular design of the steam generating unit with short co-axial nozzles
between the main equipment, without long large-diameter primary pipelines, and with flow
restrictors, which excludes the possibility of large and medium LOCAs;
- pressurized primary system with welded joints, glandless canned pumps and leak-tight
bellow-type valves;
- possibility of realizing the “leak before break” concept for primary circuit elements;
- gas pressurizer system that excludes failures of the electric heaters;
- SG with lower tube-side pressure during normal operation that reduces the probability
of inter-circuit leaks.
Level 2: Control of abnormal operation and detection of failure
- active systems of control, restriction, protection and diagnostics.
Level 3: Control of accidents within the design basis
- insertion of emergency protection rods into the core by the force of accelerating springs;
- insertion of compensating rods into the core by gravity;
- passive emergency heat removal system with natural coolant circulation in all circuits
and evaporation of the water stored in the tanks;
- sufficient level of natural circulation flow in the primary circuit to cool the reactor core
in case of MCP switch off;
- restriction of unauthorized control rods movement by the overrunning clutch under the
influence of impact loads and control rod drive mechanism casing rupture; motion restraints used
in case of control and protection system standpipe rupture;
- self-actuating devices in emergency reactor shutdown system and ECCS;
- once-through SGs limiting secondary circuit heat removal power the in case of steam
pipeline rupture;
- high RP heat storage capacity which is provided by the high heat capacity of primary
coolant and metalworks, by the use of “soft” pressurizer system, and design pressure margins;
- flow restrictors in the pipelines of primary circuit systems and connection of these
systems to the hot leg of the reactor.
Level 4: Control of severe plant conditions, including prevention of accident
progression and mitigation of consequences of severe accidents
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- ECCS accumulators that provide a time margin for accident control in case of active
ECCS systems failure;
- passive reactor vessel bottom cooling system that ensures retention of the molten
corium inside the reactor vessel;
- passive containment cooling system to decrease containment pressure and to limit
release of the radioactivity;
- protective enclosure.
Level 5: Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive
materials
- Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive materials is
ensured mainly through organizational measures.
The design utilizes the systematic approach to safety analysis and validation. This
approach combines the deterministic and the probability methods.
Besides design basis accidents, the design analyses a wide range of severe accidents
where initiating events are coupled with additional safety system failures and/or personnel errors.
Severe accidents include:
- complete power plant de-energization with safety actuation system failures;
- primary pipeline rupture coupled with complete de-energization or core cooldown
failures;
- transient processes with safety actuation system failures.
In severe LOCAs with failure of all ECCS pumps, the core remains flooded during at
least 1.5 hours.
A first-level probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) has been performed for the PATES based
on the FPU with the KLT-40S RPs.
Probabilistic safety targets adopted in the PSA for the PATES based on the FPU with the
KLT-40S RPs were according to the top level Russian regulatory document NP-022-2000 and
included the probability of core damage and probability of large emergency radioactive release.
According to NP-022-2000, the target is to ensure that PSA-estimated cumulative
probability of core damage does not exceed 10-5 per reactor-year and probability of large
emergency radioactive release does not exceed 10-7 per reactor-year.
According to the PSA, the point estimate of the resulting core damage probability for the
KLT-40S RP in case of internal initiating events does not exceed 1.0E-7 per reactor-year for the
internal initiating events for full power operating conditions. Analysis of the uncertainty of RP
probabilistic safety parameters was performed by the method of statistical testing (Monte-Carlo
method) and showed that the upper confidence bound (95% quantile) of the core damage rate is
not higher than 10-6 per reactor-year.
Low probability of severe accidents with core damage is conditioned by the internal
safety and design features of the modular reactor design, and also by the redundancy and
diversity of safety systems, application of both active and passive safety systems, and use of
reliable safety-related equipment that has been proven by long operation of prototypes.
However, the design does analyse accidents with severe damage (meltdown) of the core.
Analysis of the most probable scenarios of severe accidents, as well as the PSA, shows
that the most critical scenario from the viewpoint of core damage is the one which is
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accompanied by the failure of standard ECCS channels resulting from the failure of active
elements (ECCS pumps or connecting valves of the same type).
For this situation, the design stipulates water supply into the reactor via primary circuit
purification system pipelines using steam turbine plant pumps.
Measures on mitigation of severe accident consequences include measures on
limitation of core damage scale, measures on molten corium retention inside the reactor vessel,
and measures on mitigation of radiological consequences.
Measures on limitation of core damage scale
The KLT-40S core damage process is relatively slow due to supply of water from the
ECCS accumulator that cools overheated and partially degraded core elements. Successful
implementation of measures assuring water supply into reactor at this stage of accident will
ensure flooding and cooldown of core materials, prevent formation of molten pool at the reactor
bottom and attack of molten corium on the reactor vessel.
Measures on molten corium retention inside the vessel
In order to ensure retention of the molten corium inside the reactor vessel, the design
provides for a special external reactor vessel cooling system for accidents with core melting and
relocation of the melt to the vessel bottom.
Retention of the molten corium inside the vessel allows ruling out all negative
phenomena connected with molten corium egress into the containment.
Measures on mitigation of radiological consequences
In order to exclude personnel and population overexposure in severe accidents, the
following complex of protective measures should be performed:
1. To ensure personnel safety, it is necessary to avoid personnel presence in
compartments adjoining to the containment and in other compartments with high radiation
levels.
2. To limit the exposure for population living within a radius of 1 km from the PATES, it
is possible (depending on actual radiation situation) that some protective measures will have to
be taken: shelter, iodine prophylaxis. One of protective measures is temporary limitation on
consumption of contaminated agricultural products grown within a radius of 5 km from the
PATES.
Evacuation is not needed at any distance from the PATES.
4. Proliferation resistance
Proliferation resistance of floating nuclear cogeneration plant designs is achieved, first of
all, owing to the inherent properties of RPs and FPUs, which underlie the design concepts and
are implemented through the corresponding technical solutions and organizational measures.
Such solutions include:
- lower than 20% enrichment of the fuel, as well as its chemical form (ceramics dispersed
in the inert matrix), makes it unattractive for production of mass destruction weapons;
- neither fresh, nor spent fuel is stored on the coastal facilities outside the FPU.
Operation of floating nuclear cogeneration plants in other countries is planned on
conditions “build–own-operate”, which means that the FPU will be under jurisdiction of the
Russian Federation all the time and will be serviced by Russian personnel only.
In this case, external non-proliferation measures, apart from existing political obligations
of IAEA member countries, will include negotiation of an appropriate agreement between the
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Russian Federation and the importing country, which will deal with inviolability of the FPU and
its external physical protection and guarantees of services not related to ownership rights for the
FPUs and reactor plants, and also performance of IAEA checks within the framework of the
system of guarantees.
Refuelling is performed on site, inside the FPU; spent fuel is unloaded into the temporary
storage and then the FPU is transported to the supplier country where the spent fuel is unloaded
from the temporary storage and the reactor is refuelled and repaired.
Enhancement of proliferation resistance when handling spent fuel from the PATES with
the KLT-40S RP in Russia is achieved through:
- reactor refuelling only in special maintenance centres;
- use of the standard fuel cycle of nuclear icebreaker reactors with available infrastructure
and mechanisms of protection against proliferation.
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5. Physical protection
Plant physical protection system includes the following technical measures:
- security alarms, TV observation system, and operational communications;
- access control system;
- engineered security features;
- organizational measures.
The physical protection system is zoned. For FNPP there are two zones: the zone of
water area (bound by breakwaters and dams) and coastal service area, and the zone of FPU
which is highly controlled.
6. Turbine-generator set
The steam turbine plant converts the heat power of the steam generated in the RP into the
electric power and heat power for heating water in the intermediate circuit of the cogeneration
system.
The FPU has two independent steam turbine plants, one for each RP. Main rated
characteristics of steam turbine plants are given in the Table of Appendix 1.
Each steam turbine plant consists of the following main equipment:
- turbine set;
- main ejector and seal exhaust system ejector;
- two double-speed circulation pumps (each of 60% capacity);
- three electric feed pumps with variable-speed electric drives (each of 60% capacity);
- one distribution feed pump;
- two fresh water circulation electric pumps for the generator cooldown system;
- deaerator and equalizing tank;
- four ion-exchange and two duplex mechanical filters;
- one condensation removal pump;
- regenerative feed water heaters (PND No.1 and double-case PVD No.2 and PVD No.3);
- two main heaters (each of 50% capacity) and one peaking intermediate water heater;
- air cooler for the vented steam from main ejectors, seal ejectors, and deaerators;
- steam and condensate-feed systems;
- turbine set oil supply system;
- seawater cooling system;
- intermediate circuit system.
For RP hot water and cooling tubes, there are technological condensation plants located
in reactor compartment rooms.
District heating is provided by heating the intermediate circuit water, which circulates
between the FPU and the coastal facilities, by the steam extracted from the turbines. The
intermediate circuit water is heated from 70 to 130ºC in the heaters located in turbine halls.
The following systems are shared by both steam turbine plants:
- turbine oil intake, transfer, distribution and separation system;
 20
- feed water intake and transfer system.
The turbine set works inside the steam turbine plant which converts the heat power of the
steam generated in the RP into the electric power and heat power for heating water in the
intermediate circuit of the cogeneration system.
The turbine set consists of the following main equipment:
- steam turbine with release system, turning gear, steam distribution, stop valves, control
and protection system;
- electric generator;
- surface double-circuit condenser with expansion tank, hot well, and safety diaphragm;
- three main electrical condensate pumps (each of 60% capacity);
- two coolers of fresh water of generator cooling system;
- piping and valves;
- level controller for the condenser;
- level controller for seals;
- maintenance platforms and turbine set framework.
Steam condensing system
The steam condensing cycle was designed with the main emphasis on increasing cycle
efficiency as compared with the cycles of marine propulsion RPs:
- use of an advanced system of regenerative feed water heating (in low-pressure heaters,
deaerator and high-pressure heaters) which provides a 170°C temperature at the inlet to RP SGs;
- power for FPU house loads is taken directly from main generators;
- use of electric drives for all main steam turbine plant pumps (condensate, circulation
and feed pumps);
- removal of high-temperature condensate directly into the deaerator.
7. Power output system and house loads power supply
The FPU electrical power system consists of the system generating and supplying power
to the coastal power grid, house loads power supply system, and reserve power supply system.
The system generating and supplying power to the coastal power grid includes:
- three-phase alternating current generator with switchboards of the feed and control
systems;
- main switchgear;
- transformers (including standby ones);
- power output switchboard.
The house loads power supply system includes:
- standby diesel generators;
- main switchboards;
- transformers.
All power consumers installed on the FPU, depending on their functions and importance
for safety, are referred to one of four power supply reliability groups.
 21
To supply power to consumers of groups I and II, there is and independent two-channel
emergency power supply system consisting of:
- emergency diesel generators;
- emergency diesel generator switchboards;
- RP switchboards and feeder switchboards for automated systems;
- uninterrupted power supply units;
- transformers.
8. Spent fuel and radwaste management
Fuel utilization efficiency is provided by the following engineering solutions:
- use of all improvements of nuclear fuel and fuel cycles of nuclear icebreaker reactors;
spent fuel reprocessing;
- increase of fuel burnup through the use of dispersion FEs.
Wide application of FNPPs with KLT-type reactors presupposes use of the closed fuel
cycle providing for radiochemical processing of spent fuel.
At present, the spent fuel from nuclear icebreaker RPs, which are prototypes of RPs for
small-size FNPPs, is currently reprocessed at an existing factory. It is planned to update the
existing dispersion fuel processing line to add the cermet fuel processing capability.
The minimum amount of radwaste generated by the KLT-40S reactor is provided by:
- pressurized primary circuit which is standard for marine propulsion RPs;
- closed primary coolant purification system;
- waste-free coolant handling technologies;
- modern low-waste radwaste reprocessing technologies;
- refuelling is performed in special maintenance centres.
9. Plant layout
The RPs and turbine-generator sets are located on the FPU. The FPU is a towed flush-
decked berth-connected vessel with a developed multi-tiered superstructure (Fig. 6). In the
midship of the FPU there is the reactor compartment. The turbine-generator and electric
equipment compartments are located to the bow from the reactor compartment, and the auxiliary
equipment compartment and living block are located to the stern.
This layout ensures the required safety conditions and allows optimal layout of pipelines
and electric cables.
The FPU hull is all-welded, fitted with ice reinforcements and special fixtures for towing
and fixing. The hull is divided into watertight compartments by watertight bulkheads reaching
the upper deck.
 22

Fig. 6. The FPU

FPU floodability is ensured when any two adjoining compartments are flooded an all
specified load modes and in compliance with the Sea Shipping Register of Russia.
Reactor compartment
The RP is installed in the reactor compartment located in the midship of the FPU.
Each RP has its own steel leak-tight protective shell. The reactor compartment is guarded
on the outside by the protective enclosure consisting of multi-layer ceilings of the superstructure
roof, machine room bulkheads, and superstructure side rooms.
All these structures constitute the external protective barrier of the reactor compartment,
which is capable of withstanding external physical impacts, including aircraft crash on the FPU.
Turbine compartment
The FNPP has an autonomous machine room housing the turbine-generator set with
auxiliary servicing systems, and the power unit. The machine room is located to the bow from
the reactor compartment and is separated by the transverse bulkheads of the reactor compartment
protective enclosure.
General layout
Normal operation of the FNPP requires a certain arrangement of water space and coastal
infrastructure. The coastal infrastructure includes:
- hydraulic engineering structures (jetties, beacons, boom barriers, etc.);
- waterfront structure (sea-walls, piers, etc.);
- transmission pylons intended for transport of generated electricity to the consumers;
- coastal structures.
Hydraulic engineering structures are intended for FPU safe offshore location and fixing.
Technical communication with the coast is carried out using the berthing facilities. Support and
maintenance vessels can approach and moor alongside the FPU. The coastal infrastructure and
special devices are intended for transfer of electricity and heat from the FPU to the consumers.
 23

Coastal structures Hydraulic

engineering structure

FPU

Fig. 7. General view of PATES based on the FPU of 20870 design

10. Efficiency and performance

The efficiency of the FNPP with KLT-40S RPs is determined by the following factors
[2, 5]:
- the RP is based on the commercially produced marine propulsion RP of KLT-40 type
and offers high reliability and guaranteed safety, which was demonstrated by failure-free
operation of similar RP designs during about 300 reactor-years
- FNPPs can be serially manufactured in shipyards and then delivered to the customer
fully assembled, tested and ready for operation;
- compact modular layout of the RP and, accordingly, minimum size of the containment;
- minimum scope and cost of capital construction work needed to prepare the FNPP
operation site and the water area;
- no need to create transportation links, power transmission lines, or preparatory
infrastructure required for ground-based nuclear power plants;
- high degree of freedom in selecting the location for a FNPP as it can be moored in any
coastal region;
- considerable reduction of construction period (4 years);
- availability of the entire nuclear vessels servicing and maintenance infrastructure in
Russia will permit to minimize costs for FNPP maintenance and refuelling;
- FPU disposal at a specialized factory;
- FNPPs with expired service life can be replaced with new ones;
- possibility of RP operation in manoeuvre modes without limiting consumer
requirements;
- FPUs can be used as part of desalination complexes.
Fuel utilization efficiency and reduction of natural uranium consumption is provided by
the following engineering solutions:
 24
- use of all improvements of nuclear fuel and fuel cycles of nuclear icebreaker reactors;
spent fuel reprocessing;
- increase of fuel burnup through the use of dispersion FEs.
Main technical and economic parameters of the PATES based on the FPU of 20870
design with KLT-40S RPs are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Main technical and economic parameters, as predicted by the developers, of the
PATES
Index Value
FPU displacement, t 21 500
Rated electric output, MW 2×30
FOAK plant delivery term, years 4
Plant service life, years 40
Plant availability target 0.85
Number of Operation Personnel 58
Specific capital investments for construction, $/kWe 3500
…4000
cost of generated electric power (condensation mode), ¢/kW·hr ∼5.0
Net cost of heat power, $/Gcal ∼20

11. Development status of technologies used for the plant Technologies used for KLT-
40S RP development and their current status are given in the Table below.
Reactor technology Status
Modular PWRs for Russian nuclear Widely used reactor technology,
vessels operation experience of marine multi-
purpose reactors exceeds 6500 reactor-
years
Icebreaker type KLT-40S reactor for the The RP and FPU designed were
FOAK FNPP developed; FPU construction license
was obtained from the regulatory
authority (RF GAN); fabrication of RP
and steam-turbine plant equipment is
under way
Nuclear shipbuilding technology The total of 11 nuclear vessels was
constructed (icebreakers, one lighter
carrier), FPU construction is in progress
Reactor of the nuclear cogeneration plant Under construction; IAEA review was
(AST-500) regarding safety ensuring performed [11]
approaches and solutions

Main engineering solutions of the KLT-40S RP are as follows:

 25
- modular layout of the main equipment (reactor, steam generator, MCPs); coaxial cross-
nozzles of the main primary coolant circulation path;
- pressurized primary circuit;
- once-through coiled modular SGs;
- cassette core with cermet fuel (uranium oxide in the silumin matrix); enrichment does
not exceed 20%;
- passive safety systems;
- use of existing metallurgical, press forging and machine-assembly technologies
available at the manufacturers of nuclear icebreaker power plants;
- use of existing equipment mounting, repair and replacement technologies and systems
and means of equipment diagnosis and monitoring;
- minimum impact on personnel, population and the environment; consequences of any
accidents are minor, which is confirmed by the long operation experience of nuclear icebreakers.
The basic KLT-40S RP production technologies mastered on the commercial scale are as
follows:
- technology of main equipment fabrication and vessel system welding;
- technology of SG tubing manufacture of titanium alloys;
- technology of manufacturing and assembling the in-vessel coaxial elements that provide
coolant circulation;
- canned MCPs fabrication technology;
- dispersed FE and FA fabrication technology;
- technology of structural materials providing FE corrosion and radiation resistance
during operation;
- technology of fabrication of normal operation system and safety system elements (self-
actuated devices, pressurizer, tanks, HXs, pumps, filters);
- nuclear ship building technologies.
Potential application of the above technologies:
- manufacture of RPs for ground-based nuclear power plants of small-size (with KLT-
40S RP) and medium size (such as VBER-300);
- establishment of nuclear power-generation and desalination complexes;
- application of KLT-40S RP as a source of process steam;
- development of FNPPs that do not require refuelling on the operation site [9].
12. Design status and planned schedule
The design of the PATES based on the FPU of 20870 design with KLT-40S RP is being
developed by Russian organizations and enterprises having a unique experience in designing,
building and operating nuclear reactors for the Navy and civil fleet.
 26
Main participants of the ATES-MM project
Company Responsibility area
JSC “Afrikantov OKB Mechanical
Chief designer of the RP, packaged
Engineering” (OKBM), Nizhny
supplier of the RP
Novgorod
RRC “Kurchatov Institute”, Moscow Scientific supervisor of the RP design
JSC “TsKB “Iceberg”, Saint Petersburg General designer of the FPU
Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute Scientific supervisor of the FPU design
Designer of coastal and hydraulic
JSC “Atomenergo”
engineering facilities
United Shipbuilding Corporation,
FPU builder
“Baltiysky Zavod”, Saint Petersburg
Rosatom, JSC “Energoatom Concern”,
Directorate of FNPPs under Project customer and investor
Construction
General designer and supplier of the
JSC “Kalouzhsky Turbine Plant”
turbine set

The design of a PATES based on the FPU with KLT-40S RPs was developed in
accordance with State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM long-term activity program
(2009 -2015).
Construction of the FPU and equipment fabrication has been under way since 2007.
Initially, FPU construction started in the shipyard of “Sevmash” plant in Severodvinsk. However,
since “Sevmash” was overloaded with other projects, FPU construction was handed over to
“Baltiysky Zavod”. “Baltiysky Zavod” (Saint Petersburg) is a member of the United
Shipbuilding Corporation and specializes in building Navy vessels, large-capacity civil cargo
vessels, and icebreakers (powered by nuclear or diesel plants).
The contract between “Baltiysky Zavod” and JSC “Energoatom Concern” was signed on
27 February 2009 and renewed on 7 December 2012. The contract includes construction,
launching, fitting-out, testing and commissioning of a FPU of 20870 design for the PATES with
KLT-40S RPs.
In accordance with the contract, the FPU is to be ready for transportation in 2016. After
integrated testing inside the PATES, the FPU will be commissioned to the “Energoatom”
Concern at the operation site.
At present, fabrication of main equipment for the PATES reactor and turbine-generator
sets is completed.
 27
REFERENCES
[1] POLUSHKIN A.K., KUZIN E.A., VOROBIOV V.M., KLYKOV D.M., PANOV J.K.,
“Implementation of the project for the construction and operation of a nuclear heat and
power plant on the basis of a FPU with KLT-40S reactors”, Small Power and Heat
Generation Systems on the Basis of Propulsion and Innovative Reactor Technologies,
IAEA-TECDOC-1172, Vienna (2000) 53-66.
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Advanced Light Reactor
Designs, IAEA-TECDOC-1391, Vienna (2004) 733-754.
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Innovative Small and Medium
Sized Reactors: Design Features, Safety Approaches and R&D Trends, IAEA-TECDOC-
1451, Vienna (2004) 103-124.
[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Non-Electric Nuclear
Heat Applications: Technology and Safety, IAEA-TECDOC-1184, Vienna (2000) 69-79.
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Economics of Nuclear
Desalination: New Developments and Site Specific Studies, IAEA-TECDOC-1561,
Vienna (2007) 72-77.
[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Design Features to Achieve
Defence in Depth in Small and Medium Sized Reactors, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series
Report NP-T-2.2, IAEA, Vienna (2009).
[7] BELYAEV V., POLUNICHEV V., “Basic safety principles on using KLT-40S reactors”,
IAEA-AG-1021 IWGFR/97 24-42.
[8] ANTONOVSKY G.M., MITENKOV F.M., et al., “PWR-type reactors developed by
OKBM”, Nuclear News, a publication of American Nuclear Society (March 2002).
[9] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Small Reactor Designs
Without On-Site Refueling, IAEA-TECDOC-1536, Vienna (2007) 269-297.
[10] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidance for the Application of an
Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems – INPRO Manual –
Overview of the Methodology, IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev. 1, Volume 5, November
2008.
[11] “Independent review of safety at Gorky district heating nuclear plant”. IAEA, Vienna,
1989 (Parts 1 and 2).
Abbreviations
ATES-MM - small-size floating nuclear cogeneration plant
BPR - burnable poison rod
ECCS - emergency core cooldown system
FA - fuel assembly
FE - fuel element
FNPP - floating nuclear power plant
FOAK - first of a kind
FPU - floating power unit
HX - heat exchanger
LOCA - loss of coolant accident
 28
LWR - light water reactor
MCP - main circulation pump
NOAK - n-th of a kind
OKBM - JSC “Afrikantov OKB Mechanical Engineering”
OPB - “General provisions on nuclear power plants safety”
PSA - probabilistic safety analysis
PWR - pressurized water reactor
R&D - research and development
RP - reactor plant
SG - steam generator
 29
Appendix 1
Summary Table Technical Data of KLT-40S RP
Parameter Value Dimension
General plant data
Reactor thermal output 2×150 MW(th)
Power plant output, gross 2×35 MW(e)
Power plant output, net 2×30 MW(e)
Power plant efficiency, net 23.3* %
Mode of operation Load follow
Plant design life 40 Years
Plant availability 85 %
Operating base earthquake (safe shutdown OBE-7 (SSE-8);
earthquake) PGA, g maximum
acceleration 3 g
Primary coolant material light water
Intermediate coolant material, if applicable -
Moderator material, if applicable light water
Type of cycle Indirect core cooldown
Thermodynamic cycle Rankine steam condensing cycle
Non-electric applications:
- Potable water 20000-100000** m3/hour
- Process steam -
- Heat (for district heating or process) 2×73 (max) Gcal/hr
- Hydrogen (or other advanced energy carrier) -
- Other -
Safety goals
Core damage frequency 10-6 /reactor-year
Large early release frequency 10-7 /reactor-year
Occupational radiation exposure ∼1,0 Person-
mSv/reactor-
year
Operator action time (Grace period) 1.5 hr
Economic goals
Mode of deployment Distributed
Levelized unit electricity cost for NOAK plant 4.5-5 (as of 2006) ¢/kW⋅hr
Levelized unit cost of a non-electrical product for
 30
NOAK plant
- Heat 20-22 $/ Gcal
- Potable water 0.8-0.9 $/m3
Reactor core
Fuel column height 1.2 m
Equivalent core diameter 1/155 m
Average linear heat rate 14.0 kW/m
Average fuel power density 117.8 kW/kgU
Average core power density 119.3 MW/m3
Fuel material UO2 in inert matrix
FE type Smooth-rod,
cylindrical
Cladding material Zirconium alloy
FE outer diameter 6.8 mm
Lattice geometry triangular
Number of FE in FA 69; 72; 75
Number of FA 121
Enrichment of reloaded fuel in equilibrium core 13; 15.7*** Weight %
Fuel cycle length 28 Months
Average discharge burn-up of fuel 45.4**** MW·d/kg
Burnable absorber (mode of use/material) gadolinium; 46.3 kg
Mode of reactivity control Control rods
Mode of reactor shut down Control rods
Control rod absorber material Dysprosium titanate,
boron carbide
Soluble neutron absorber Cadmium nitrate
Primary coolant system
Primary coolant flow rate 761 kg/s
Reactor operating pressure 12.7 MPa
Core coolant inlet temperature 280 °С
Core coolant outlet temperature 316 °С
Intermediate coolant system -
Power conversion system
Working medium water, water steam
Working medium flow rate at nominal conditions 67 kg/s
Working medium pressure/temperature (SG outlet) 3.82/290 MPa/°С
 31

Working medium supply flow rate at nominal 67 kg/s

conditions
Working medium supply temperature 170 °С
Reactor vessel
Inner diameter of cylindrical shell 1920 mm
Wall thickness of cylindrical shell 128 mm
Total height, inside 3892 mm
Base material Steel
15Cr2NiMoVA-A
Design pressure/temperature 16.2/350 MPa/°С
Transport weight 70.5 t
Guard vessel -
SG or HX of the power circuit
Type Vertical, coiled,
once-through
Number 4
Mode of operation Secondary coolant on the tube side,
primary coolant on the shell side
Total tube surface area 284 m2
Number of HX tubes 100
Tube outside diameter 22 mm
Tube material Titanium alloy
Transport weight 23 t
Intermediate HX -
Primary circulation system
Circulation type Forced
Pump type Canned, centrifugal, single-stage,
vertical, double-speed
Number of pumps 4
Pump speed rpm
- large pump speed 50 s-1
- small pump speed 16.7 s-1
Head at rated conditions 38 m
Flow at rated conditions 870 m3/h
Intermediate circulation system -
Circulation system of the power circuit
Circulation type Forced
 32

Pump type Condensate and feed electric pumps

Number of pumps 3 condensate pumps;
3 feed pumps
Pump speed rpm
- condensate pump 2970
- feed pump 1200-3000
Head at rated conditions m
- condensate pump 110
- feed pump 750
Flow at rated conditions m3/h
- condensate pump 150
- feed pump 150
Pressurizer
Type External, gas-operated, with gas
cylinders
Total volume 8.16 m3
Working medium volume: full power/zero power 6.03/6.1 m3
Active devices used No
Primary containment
Type Steel
Overall form (spherical/cylindrical) Rectangular parallelepiped
Dimensions (diameter/height) 12×7.92×12 m
Design pressure/temperature 0.5/200 MPa/°С
Design leakage rate 1.0 Volume %/
day
Secondary containment
Type System of
compartments
Overall shape Rectangular
Dimensions 15 000 m3
Design pressure/temperature -
Design leakage rate Waterproofness and leak-tightness
according to the Sea Shipping
Register of Russia
Equipment and systems located in the space -
between the primary and the secondary containment
Residual heat removal systems
- Active heat removal through the purification and 1 channel with equipment
 33
cooldown system redundancy
- Active heat removal through the process 1 channel with equipment
condenser redundancy
- Passive heat removal through ECCS HXs 2 channels
Safety injection systems
- Active system for water supply from makeup
pumps (2 channels)
- Active system for water supply from recirculation
pumps (2 channels)
- Passive system for water supply from hydraulic
accumulators (2 channels)
Turbines
Type of turbines Steam, condensing-extraction
Number of turbines 2
Number of turbine sections per unit (e.g. 2
HP/MP/LP)
Turbine speed 3000 rpm
HP turbine inlet pressure/temperature 3.43/285 MPa/°С
Generators
Type Three-phase
Number 2 (on FPU)
Rated power 43.75 MVA
Active power 35 MW
Voltage 10.5 kV
Frequency 50 Hz
Total generator mass including exciter 80 t
Condensers
Type Surface,
double-circuit
Condenser pressure 5 kPa
Compressors -
Plant configuration and layout
Plant configuration options Floating, two RPs on
a barge
Surface area of the plant site
- area of water 15 000 m2
- coast territory 8000 m2
Elevation or underground embedding of the nuclear Floating
 34
island
Core catcher None. The molten corium is to be
contained inside the reactor vessel
owing to external cooling of the
vessel bottom
Protection against aircraft crash Collision protection against
helicopter crash (type Ка-32s, mass
11 t, crash speed 15 m/s) owing to
thicker plating and floors, and
stiffness ribs. Protection against
aeroplane crash is ensured by
organizational measures
Protection against flooding Not required
Features for protection against collision with other To mitigate collision consequences,
ships and in accordance with the
requirements of RF Rules for
Nuclear Vessels, the FPU is fitted
with anti-collision protection means.
The anti-collision protection was
developed based on the nuclear ice-
breaker design experience and has
the following features which improve
its capacity.
In the areas of RP anti-collision
protection, the existing floors are
reinforced by thicker plating sheets
and deck plating and longitudinal
framing with larger cross-sections.
Board plating thickness is increased
from 18 to 22-30 mm, longitudinal
stiffness ribs of the board are
reinforced, thickness of upper deck
plating near the board is increased
from 8 to 22 mm, thickness of the
first-tier superstructure deck plating
near the board is increased from 10
to 30 mm, longitudinal stiffness ribs
of the first-tier superstructure deck
near the board are reinforced.
The design takes into account the
following navigational accidents:
- docking impact;
- collision with other vessels during
towage;
- stranding during towage.
Features for protection against tsunamis Ensured by siting the FNPP in
protected water areas (bays, river
mouths) and building appropriate
protective structures (breakwaters,
 35
dams, etc.)
Notes:
* in the mode of maximum electric output
** when used in a desalination complex (FPU+desalination unit)
*** for FOAK cores (for NOAK cores, enrichment does not exceed 19.75%)
**** on oxide fuel basis