Book Reviews

Leonard Mlodinow
Subliminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior
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New York: Vintage Books, 2013, 260 pp., $9.98 (Paperback)

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2013

ISBN: 978-0-307-47225-0

Reviewed by Kevin Lynch

Woosong University
The notion of an unconscious mind, in disrepute among research
scientists for much of the twentieth century, now enjoys wide accept-
ance. This previous disrepute seems due to its past association with
Freudian psychoanalysis, if the frequent disclaimers by modern
psychologists that their notion of the unconscious is not the Freudian
one are anything to go by. Leonard Mlodinow’s latest book is an
introduction to this ‘new unconscious’, and is full of fascinating,
ingenious, and often surprising experiments, described with admirable
clarity, which show that our behaviour, feelings, and attitudes are
often influenced by factors of which we are unaware. We read about
shoppers who choose German wines because German music is playing
in the background, investors who invest in companies because they
have easy-to-pronounce names (all unaware of these influences), a
blindsight subject who navigates an obstacle course which he ‘can’t
see’, and much more. This new unconscious is portrayed as something
generally adaptive, taking care of the cognitive donkey-work to free
up our conscious minds for other tasks.
Methodological criticisms of studies into unconscious mentality
continue to be made (Newell and Shanks, 2014), so the notion is still
not uncontested. But Mlodinow is unmistakably in the advocates’
camp. He claims that proper scientific study of the unconscious mind
is a recent phenomenon. This rigorous, scientific orientation he attri-
butes to neuroscience in particular: ‘[s]ophisticated new technologies

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22, No. 9–10, 2015, pp. 229–40

 230 BOOK REVIEWS

[fMRI]… have made it possible, for the first time in human history,
for there to be an actual science of the unconscious’ (p. 5).
Mlodinow does an injustice to psychology here, since the most
important demonstrations of unconscious mentality have taken place
within that discipline. Easily the most important experimental para-
digm used for demonstrating unconscious mentality has been the
dissociation paradigm, a fact which moved Matthew Erdelyi to say
that ‘[t]he “unconscious”… always involves, and is defined by, a
dissociation between two indicators (or sets of indicators)’ (Erdelyi,
2004, p. 76). In experiments demonstrating unconscious perception,
for instance, the first of these is supposed to indicate consciousness of
a stimulus, while the other indicates perceptual sensitivity to that
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stimulus. Unconscious perception is demonstrated when the former

registers a negative result while the latter registers a positive result.
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Moreover, these indicators have almost always been behavioural in

nature, not neural (e.g. a blindsight subject adamantly says that he
didn’t see a stimulus, while his performance in a forced-choice test is
sensitive to that stimulus).
It’s true that recently scientists have started using neural indicators
instead of (often controversial) behavioural ones in dissociation para-
digm experiments. But, as Elizabeth Irvine recently explained, these
are just the neural correlates of the behavioural indicators traditionally
taken to mark consciousness of or sensitivity to a stimulus, so this
neuroscientific approach ‘does not seem to have moved the field
onwards. Whatever the neural evidence, most debates still rage at the
behavioural level’ (Irvine, 2013, p. 293). Historically, the tachisto-
scope has probably been of more importance for the scientific study of
the unconscious than fMRI, and even the great majority of the experi-
ments described in Mlodinow’s book are from psychology and contain
no neuroscientific data.
Mlodinow’s book serves as an excellent, well-researched intro-
duction into recent work on the unconscious mind, but in this review
I’ll be more concerned with the book’s more striking and discon-
certing (partly because of its implications for free will and autonomy)
suggestion that, as the title proclaims, we are not just influenced but
are ruled by our unconscious minds. I’ll suggest that it’s unclear that
this radical lesson can be taken from the studies which Mlodinow
discusses. For one thing, Mlodinow sees the workings of the uncon-
scious mind everywhere, with each chapter detailing its influence in
specific domains: perception, memory, categorization, social inter-
action, reasoning, etc. But once some relevant distinctions are
 BOOK REVIEWS 231

acknowledged, unconscious mentality begins to look less pervasive

than he suggests.
Firstly, Mlodinow makes no distinction between the automatic and
the unconscious. Often, things we do automatically we also do uncon-
sciously. For instance, I’ve often fidgeted with a pen while listening to
a lecture, and was surprised afterwards to see that I’d put marks all
over my hand. Also, Mlodinow discusses the subtle modifications of
behaviour and demeanour that express our thoughts, feelings, and
expectations (e.g. during a card game), which are often both automatic
and unconscious (Chapter 5). But we can also be conscious of our
automatic actions (e.g. ducking as a pigeon zooms by our head), and
there can be intermediate cases. Mlodinow isn’t sensitive to these
differences. He speaks, for instance, of how we ‘unconsciously’ make
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proper use of gerunds, subjunctive verbs, and indefinite articles when

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speaking, as we focus on the content of what we’re talking about

rather than the words. Fluent speakers do these things automatically
for sure, but unconsciously? Though we may not have our attention
focused on which words we’re using, we are not unconscious of using
them the way a blindsight subject is unconscious of the stimulus being
presented to his blind visual field, in the sense of being totally
oblivious to them, and we will generally be able to correctly report
that we appropriately used, say, the indefinite article a moment ago if
asked, unlike the blindsighter, who can’t tell us what stimulus was just
presented to his scotoma.
Even regarding actions which are both automatic and unconscious,
these do not exemplify the unconscious mind proper. Here we must
distinguish between the notion of our having thoughts, feelings,
desires, perceptions, and other mental phenomena of which we are
unconscious, and the much wider notion of being unconscious of
something, including non-mental things like physical actions.
Typically we have the former in mind when speaking of ‘the uncon-
scious mind’ (e.g. Gardner, 2003, pp. 107–8). Many of the examples
that Mlodinow discusses, however, are physical actions, bodily
changes, or internal bodily processes — not mental phenomena — of
which we are unconscious. Such cases only exemplify an ‘uncon-
scious mind’ in the latter, wider sense.
Mlodinow might argue that there must always be unconscious
mental states generating our automatic actions, however. He says that
‘though we don’t realize it, we are making many decisions each
second. Should I spit out my mouthful of food because I detect a
strange odor? How shall I adjust my muscles so that I remain standing
 232 BOOK REVIEWS

and don’t tip over?’ (pp. 33–4). Indeed, decisions are commonly
regarded as mental acts. But why not simply regard such automatic
behaviours as more or less sophisticated mechanical reflexes? Or
should we also say that alarm clocks ‘decide’ to ring when they reach
the pre-set time? That said, unconscious mental states may sometimes
influence our automatic actions.
Another phenomenon we should distinguish is being aware of an
action, but being unaware of a certain fact about it. An example would
be saying something offensive, while not realizing that it’s offensive.
Motivated reasoning, which Mlodinow discusses in the final chapter,
is arguably in this category. When assessing an issue for truth, we use
motivated reasoning when there is a certain conclusion which we hope
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is true, and then, like a lawyer tasked with convincing others of this
conclusion, we ‘seek evidence that supports it, while also attempting
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to discredit evidence that doesn’t’ (p. 200). This is a biased way of

assessing an issue. Mlodinow says that ‘motivated reasoning is
unconscious’ (p. 205), which means that people do it without being
aware that they’re being biased (p. 213). We should note, however,
that this too is not an example of the unconscious mind properly so-
called. It is being unaware of a certain fact about our actions: that they
are biased, which needn’t involve being unaware of any of our mental
states, actions, or events. That said, Mlodinow’s discussion of moti-
vated reasoning was highly illuminating, and contains a well-chosen
selection of relevant experiments.
Mlodinow shows convincingly that we often have little insight into
the causes of our behaviour. For example, many studies have shown
that our behaviour is influenced by the weather. Customers tip more
when it’s sunny for instance, though they are ‘probably unaware that
the weather influenced them’ (p. 27). Here again, it’s important to
acknowledge the distinction between being unconscious of our own
mental phenomena, and being unconscious of something more
generally. Jones might be unaware that he tipped more because it’s
sunny. But what he is unaware of here is not any mental state of his
that caused him to tip more. He is simply unaware of a certain causal
‘mechanism’: the sunny weather put him in a good mood, and when in
a good mood he tends to be more generous, which is why he tipped
more. This mechanism needn’t involve the covert operation of any
unconscious mental states, and so once again this phenomenon (and
the others like it which Mlodinow discusses) doesn’t exemplify
unconscious mentality proper.
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Another distinction that Mlodinow seems not to make but which he

should at least consider making is that between brain activity and
mental activity. As Mlodinow discusses, there are all sorts of compli-
cated processes that occur in the brain and nervous system, for
example during visual perception, and ‘you have little knowledge of
or access to the processing’ (p. 35). Such ‘unconscious processes can
never be directly revealed through… self-reflection… because they
transpire in areas of the brain not open to the conscious mind’ (p. 16).
People often write as if this is more surprising than our having little
knowledge of or introspective access to the processes taking place
within our livers or digestive systems. We have, ordinarily, no per-
ceptual access to any of our brain processes, be they associated with
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unconscious or conscious mentality, or non-mental regulative

functions. Who ever assumed otherwise?
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But in what sense are these brain processes ‘unconscious pro-

cesses’? Undoubtedly they are, like our liver processes, processes of
which we are unconscious (most of us at any rate: neuroscientists,
who study these processes, are aware of them in a sense, and can
sometimes see them occurring using fMRI). But from the fact that
we’re unconscious of a process it doesn't follow that it’s an uncon-
scious mental process. That further thesis would need arguments,
which Mlodinow doesn’t provide.
Besides his suggestions as to the pervasiveness of the unconscious,
Mlodinow also makes the logically distinct suggestion that it exercises
a domineering effect over us, ‘much more powerful than we have
previously believed it to be’ (p. 8). For instance, ‘[w]e believe that
when we choose a laptop… and even fall in love, we understand the
principle factors that influence us. Very often nothing could be further
from the truth. As a result, many of our most basic assumptions about
ourselves, and society, are false’ (pp. 25–6). Mlodinow is moved to
say this about love by a study which found that people marry their
namesakes with surprising frequency. Browns marry other Browns
much more frequently than they marry Smiths, Joneses, etc., though
they would never give this as their reason for liking their partner.
From this he concludes that we have a ‘tendency to be unconsciously
biased in favor of traits similar to our own, even such seemingly
meaningless traits as our names’ (p. 19). The basic assumption about
ourselves that is false here is, presumably, that we fall in love
principally on the basis of looks and personality.
Though there may be other ways of interpreting these findings, let’s
grant that people can, without realizing it, find someone attractive
 234 BOOK REVIEWS

because he/she has the same surname. But could this be the principle
factor on which their love is based? If so, then we could expect that if
Sarah Brown met James, and didn’t fancy him (he lacks the traits she
avers to look for in a partner), she might find herself warming to him
after discovering that he too is a Brown. This factor should be
sufficient in itself to sustain romantic feelings (or it wouldn’t be a
‘principle factor’). But that is implausible to say the least, and the
mentioned findings hardly prove it. What they might lead us to expect,
however, is that if James and Charlie were similarly good-looking,
funny, etc. then Sarah might rate James more highly if he, but not
Charlie, was also a Brown. It would take much stronger evidence than
Mlodinow presents to show that, in matters of the heart, we are ruled
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by such unacknowledged influences.

In light of the above distinctions, this book might be better con-
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ceived as being about failures of self-knowledge in a wide sense,

rather than the unconscious mind in particular, and as an introduction
to that it succeeds very well in giving a flavour of recent research in a
variety of cognitive domains. However, careful readers might remain
unconvinced that it vindicates the book’s subtitle.

References
Erdelyi, M.E. (2004) Subliminal perception and its cognates: Theory, indeter-
minacy, and time, Consciousness and Cognition, 13 (1), pp. 73–91.
Gardner, S. (2003) The unconscious mind, in Baldwin, T. (ed.) The Cambridge
History of Philosophy 1870–1945, pp. 107–116, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Irvine, E. (2013) Measures of consciousness, Philosophy Compass, 8 (3), pp. 285–
297.
Newell, B.R. & Shanks, D.R. (2014) Unconscious influences on decision-making:
A critical review, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, pp. 1–19.

Igor Aleksander
Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness
London: Imperial College Press, 2015, 452 pp.
ISBN: 978-1-78326-569-5

Reviewed by Simon Raggett

This revision of Igor Aleksander’s Impossible Minds, the original
version having been written about 20 years ago, might remind us of
relativity theory’s ‘twin paradox’. The author could be thought to have
left the London of the 1990s in a very powerful spacecraft travelling
 BOOK REVIEWS 235

close to the speed of light. When he puts down again, perhaps in the
Kensington Gardens of 2014, only a few seconds have passed on the
clock in his space ship, but two decades of important changes in
neuroscience and biology have happened on Earth, little of which is
apparent in this book.
The author acknowledges that impressive computers, such as chess
playing machines, derive their success from the stored abilities of the
programmers. Instead, he is interested in the ability of a computer to
demonstrate the mental properties normally found in living organisms.
He asks what aspects of neurophysiology might give a subject the
feeling that they were conscious, and argues that some guide to this
might be derived from the study of computer processing. The com-
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puter used for his own research attempted to replicate feats that would
be termed ‘conscious thought’ if performed by humans.
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However, even at an early stage, the notion of consciousness

becomes rather clouded, with a distinction being made between ‘arti-
ficial consciousness’ and ‘real consciousness’ as possessed by ‘me
and my human friends’. It seems that a distinction is being made, but
it is unclear as to what exactly that is. Distinct or otherwise, it is
suggested that the ability to analyse artificial consciousness might
allow us to understand how ‘real consciousness’ arises.
The author’s plan is to show by small steps how properties
associated with our own consciousness might get into his computer,
and by this means explain our own consciousness. By showing how
parts are linked together to make his computer function, we may
understand how neurons are linked together to produce consciousness.
The author stresses that he understands how his computer functions,
and thus how any consciousness that comes to be attributed to it
would function.
The argument of this book starts with, and is based on, what the
author calls a ‘Basic Guess’. This Basic Guess is that consciousness is
due to the firing patterns of neurons that constitute the ‘inner’ or
‘state’ neurons of the brain, as distinct from ‘outer’ or sensory
neurons. The conscious and internal firing patterns are proposed to be
learned directly from the transfer of activity from the outer sensory
neurons to the ‘inner’ or ‘state’ neurons.
This ‘guess’ may have looked challenging at the original time of
writing, when consciousness was only just beginning to be discussed
at all in orthodox circles. However, for a reader used to a more
intensive exploration of neural systems and even of neurons them-
selves, there is an immediate question as to what it is about such
 236 BOOK REVIEWS

neurons or firing patterns that leads to consciousness, given that the

electrical and chemical characteristics of firing do not in themselves
require consciousness.
A more specific neuroscience-related problem with the ‘Basic
Guess’ is the manner in which the firing patterns are learnt through the
transfer of activity between sensory and inner neurons. This proposal
is quite hard to square with modern descriptions of the learning/
memory process. The hippocampus is central to this process, and
receives inputs from both the prefrontal and parietal cortex. Inputs
from the orbitofrontal and the amygdala are seen as important in terms
of reward-related learning. There are also important inputs from visual
and auditory sensory neurons, but these are higher-sensory neurons in
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the temporal cortex, at the end of a process of several cortices, plus

feedback activity, rather than the retina-type external signal sensors
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detailed by the author. In the author’s version, the distinct processes of

initial perception and subsequent memory/learning found in modern
descriptions have been conflated into a single process.
There is an additional problem here with the author’s segregation of
sensory and ‘inner neurons’, given that in modern descriptions sensory
processing is not a single category but builds through a series of
cortices with feedback loops between the higher and lower cortices
that may also involve reference to the stored memory system; the
higher sensory cortices look to have more in common with the
author’s inner neurons than with the type of single sensory response to
external signals that he is talking about.
Establishing a conscious image appears to require a process of feed-
back from the higher to the lower cortices; this feedback process may
relate the initial incoming stimuli to stored memories. These stored
memories could be argued to bear some resemblance to the ‘inner’ or
‘state’ neurons of the author’s system, but the distinction is less clear,
as the memories referred to are themselves thought to be stored in
sensory neurons. Frontal areas equate more nearly to the author’s
‘inner’ or ‘state’ neurons, but these areas still feed back to the
memories stored in the sensory cortex, meaning that it is difficult to
sharply segregate the two systems.
The author argues that consciousness requires sensors feeding into
some form of internal machinery. Such internal machinery can have
outputs leading to action or behaviour. So in this scheme, a pencil is
not conscious, but ants and clockwork mice are both potentially con-
scious. Rather than viewing consciousness as something having a
greater or lesser variety of content, the author views it as a spectrum,
 BOOK REVIEWS 237

with the clockwork mouse having minimal consciousness while a

human has ‘impressive’ consciousness.
The author provides a detailed description of how a system based on
neurons or analogous switches could work in terms of the value of
inputs, and how the neurons are designed to fire or not fire. This is a
simple model of sensors to internal processors to actuators providing
action and behavioural output. This approach runs into considerable
problems in terms of neuroscience. It is known that in many instances
complex movements and the location of targets of action are con-
trolled by the unconscious dorsal stream of the brain; this runs from
the very beginning of sensory input at the retina to the point of
beginning to initiate motor activity.
Thus the author’s suggested neuron model might well sense external
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signals, process them internally, and initiate action, without involving

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consciousness. This means that anything equivalent to what the author

refers to as ‘inner’ or ‘state’ structures could be either conscious or
unconscious, and stringing a system of switches or even neurons
together is no guide to whether a system will involve consciousness or
why.
Consciousness is involved with the distinct ventral stream that feeds
forward to the frontal areas, and has putative other functions, or
perhaps none at all. The evidence for separate dorsal and ventral
processing has the effect of confounding the whole purpose of this
book, which seeks to argue that assembling a sequence of switches for
sensing internal processing and subsequent actuation could give a
guide to how consciousness is produced. The models for neuron
function described by the author only work well for producing action,
which does not in itself help us with the problem of consciousness.
The treatment of the role of individual neurons in this book is
difficult to square with the findings of neuroscience. The author advo-
cates so-called ‘iconic representation’, which means the direct transfer
of the activity of the outer or primary sensory neurons to the ‘inner’
neurons, by means of the ‘dominant synapse’, something that seems to
be otherwise absent from the literature and is in any case not really
compatible with the science of sensory processing. At an early stage
researchers had discovered that single neurons could be active for
particular images but not for others, thus giving rise to the idea of the
‘grandmother’ neuron, which would supposedly only fire for grand-
mother’s image. Subsequently, single-neuron studies have refined this
rather impractical idea, to instead give a sparse representation of such
neurons, which may also code for a number of similar images.
 238 BOOK REVIEWS

However, impracticality is not the author’s reason for rejecting

evidence for the importance of single neurons. His concern is that the
representation is ‘local’ and needs to be interpreted by other parts of
the system, which is seemingly not possible in his oversimplified
‘inner’ neuron to actuator scheme of the brain. In the modern under-
standing of the brain, these neurons project to frontal and hippocampal
areas.
The description of how the ‘inner’ neurons of a conscious organism
are supposed to work bears only a tenuous relationship to neuro-
science. Three sets or categories are detailed in this book. Firstly,
there are neurons responsible for perception and perceptual memory;
these can be related to the higher visual system, but this skates over
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the complicated process of generating such perceptions. Secondly,

there are mysterious ‘auxiliary inner neurons’ responsible for
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‘labelling’ events. No such neurons appear in the literature, although

this function could be related to evaluative areas such as the orbito-
frontal, and anterior cingulate. Thirdly, there are inner neurons
responsible for ‘life support’ functions that are not involved in con-
sciousness. While it is true that support of bodily processes is uncon-
scious, this entirely misses the other role of the unconscious dorsal
system in supporting many actions and processes of location.
The author’s scheme is indicated to include representations of its
output in its internal state structure. The output neurons are seen as
being driven by a combination of external inputs and the internal state
of the system. The author is aware that the proposal that output is
driven by internal processes raises the difficult question of free will,
and whether the inner processing means that the system has such free
will.
In the discussion of this, there is a scenario in which robots are
released in an area supplied with edible substances. They are pro-
grammed to respond to half the substances as ‘yummy’ and half as
‘yucky’. Eventually, a route followed can be driven by the choice of
that most likely to lead to ‘yumminess’. The problem here is that they
are pre-programmed to have a particular response to the yummy
edibles. The programmes are not something produced within the
brain, as happens with human responses; there is no requirement for
them to be anything like conscious tastes, and it would be much
simpler for one string of ‘0s’ and ‘1s’ to get the robot moving in the
‘yummy’ direction, and another stream to get it moving in the ‘yucky
direction’. Unfortunately this is no help in determining how taste or
other reward/punisher evaluations become conscious. The simplistic
 BOOK REVIEWS 239

yummy/yucky choice also misses entirely the key function of the

reward system, which is that of making the choice between different
rewards, different timing of rewards, and different balances between
rewards and the costs of obtaining them.
Despite these shortcomings, the original book was possibly
advanced for its time in accepting the importance of emotions as
leading to adaptive behaviour, and could be seen as foreshadowing the
subsequent development of research into the reward system. For the
author, the primary function of consciousness is seen to be the
memory of past experience, and its integration into present perception
and future scenarios. The author thus views emotions as having a
function in terms of evaluating possible actions, on the basis of repre-
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sentations of past experience stored in the memory system.

A large chunk of the latter part of this book deals with language,
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which was at one point viewed as a possible basis of consciousness,

but is generally accorded less importance now. This may be partly
because research has tended to emphasize the degree of similarity
between human and other mammal brains, and partly due to the
discovery of how conscious activity is correlated to regions of the
brain not directly associated with language. Beyond that the end part
of the book covers a mixed range of related topics including subjects
such as robots in literature.
In summary, the book fails to come to terms with the complexities
of the brain and the possible role of consciousness in its systems.
Simply identifying consciousness with the firing patterns of neurons
does nothing to tell us how these processes might generate conscious-
ness. The simplistic relationship between outer sensory neurons and
internal neurons is hard to square with the actual functioning of the
brain in producing and evaluating conscious images. The demonstra-
tion that computer switches analogous to neurons could produce
actions is unhelpful, in that the brain’s unconscious dorsal system can
produce actions, while consciousness is related to other brain systems.
The failure to tackle this last problem looks to confound the book’s
main purpose of trying to show that a system of switches for pro-
ducing action would of its nature also produce consciousness.
 240 BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS RECEIVED
Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent review

Alter, Torin, and Nagasawa, Yujin (eds.), Conscousness in the Physical

World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism (OUP 2015)
Carruthers, Peter, The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory
Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought (OUP 2015)
Coates, Paul, and Coleman, Sam (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Per-
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ception, and Consciousness (OUP 2015)

Cohen Kadosh, Roi, and Dowker, Ann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Numerical
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Cognition (OUP 2015)

Doris, John M., Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
(OUP 2015)
Doyon, Maxime, and Breyer, Thiemo (eds.), Normativity in Perception
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015)
Garvey, James (ed.), Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Mind
(Bloomsbury 2015)
Huston, Joseph P., Nadal, Marcos, Mora, Francisco, Agnati, Luigi F., and
Cela-Conde, Camilo J. (eds.), Art, Aesthetics, and the Brain (OUP 2015)
Kriegel, Uriah, The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP 2015)
Mendola, Joseph, Anti-Externalism (OUP 2013)
Neisser, Joseph, The Science of Subjectivity (Palgrave Macmillan 2015)
Overgaard, Morten (ed.), Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research
(OUP 2015)
Rowland, Gavin, Mind Beyond Matter: How the Non-material Self Can
Explain the Phenomenon of Consciousness and Complete Our Under-
standing of Reality (Burdock 2015)
Sen, Madhucchander, Externalism and the Mental (OUP 2015)
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine, The Phenomenology of Dance (50th Anniversary
Edition) (Temple University Press 2015)
Wendt, Alexander, Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and
Social Ontology (CUP 2015)

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[email protected] if you wish to review one of the above mentioned
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