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COFA satisfied the requirements under Section 109(L) of RA

8424, as amended, to enjoy the exemption from VAT on its
sale of refined sugar; its exemption from the payment of advance
VAT for the withdrawal it made from May 12, 2009 to July
22, 2009 follows, as a matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 5, 2014 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2014 of the
Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB Case No. 992,
declaring respondent Negros Consolidated Farmers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative exempt from Value-added tax (VAT) and
hence, entitled to refund of the VAT it paid in advance in the
amount of SEVEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P7,290,960.00)
for the withdrawal of the refined sugar it made from May 12,
2009 to July 22, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., del Castillo, Gesmundo, and Carandang,
JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 221505. December 05, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RANDOLPH

S. TING and SALVACION I. GARCIA, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;

CERTIORARI; AN ORDER GRANTING A DEMURRER
TO EVIDENCE IS REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BUT ONLY THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER
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RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT; RATIONALE.—

Prefatorily, we point out that the remedy from an order of
dismissal granting a demurrer to evidence is reviewable by the
CA, but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In turn, if the CA finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in granting the demurrer, such finding
is reviewable by the Court through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In People v.
Court of Appeals, et al., we explained: We point out at the outset
that in criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to
an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because
this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although
the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable
but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
x x x Thus, in Asistio v. People, et al., the Court ruled that
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us
by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case. This is in line
with the established rule “that one of the requisites of certiorari
is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will
not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.”
2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; WHEN DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES,
REQUISITES.— The right of the accused against double
jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Section
21, Article III) contained in the 1987 Constitution which provides
that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.” Time and again,
the Court has held that double jeopardy attaches if the following
elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded
to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted or convicted,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
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without his express consent. Jurisprudence, however, allows

for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final
even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit: (1) “[w]here
the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect
of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal[; and]
(2) [w]here the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in
effect a failure to prosecute.”
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE; IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT AND GRANTS THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, SUCH DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE IS ONE ON THE MERITS, WHICH IS
EQUIVALENT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
ACCUSED.— A demurrer to evidence is filed after the
prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to
evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not
sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal
of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the
acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the
Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence because to do so will place the accused in double
Jeopardy.
4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RULE ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; THE ONLY INSTANCE WHEN THE
ACCUSED CAN BE BARRED FROM INVOKING HIS
RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS WHEN IT
CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR.— The rule on double
jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. It has been held
in the past that the only instance when the accused can be barred
from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can
be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
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where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make

its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For
instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court
prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for
insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed
at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.
x x x To reiterate, for an acquittal to be considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that
the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the
trial conducted was a sham. Accordingly, notwithstanding the
alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or
appreciation of evidence that the RTC and the CA may have
committed in ordering respondents’ acquittal, absent any showing
that said courts acted with caprice or without regard to the
rudiments of due process, their findings can no longer be
reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule against
double jeopardy. Indeed, errors or irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of autrefois
acquit. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may
have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot
now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.
“[I]t bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to
afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and
safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse
of criminal processes.”

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Catabay-lauigan Law Office for respondent Randolp Ting.
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DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision 1 dated June 16, 2015 and the Resolution2 dated
November 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 134943 which affirmed the Order3 dated December 16,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, Branch 5.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In an Information dated May 30, 2011, respondents City Mayor
Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion I. Garcia, both
of Tuguegarao City in the year 2004, were charged with violation
of Section 261 (w)(b) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, for issuing a treasury
warrant during the forty-five (45)-day election ban period as
payment for two (2) parcels of land to be used as a public cemetery
for the city. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:
That on or about April 30, 2004 during the period of forty five
(45) days preceding the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections
in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused did then
and there, willfully and unlawfully issue Treasury Warrant Number
0001534514, undertaking future delivery of money chargeable against
public funds in the amount of 8,486,027.00, as payment for the
acquisition of two (2) parcel[s] of land (TCT No. T-36942 and TCT
No. T-36943) owned by Anselmo Almazan, Angelo Almazan and
Anselmo Almazan III.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, and concurred
in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Elihu A. Ybañez; rollo, pp.
37-50.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, and concurred
in by Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybañez and Ma. Luisa Quijano Padilla;
id. at 51-52.
3
Penned by Judge Jezarene C. Aquino; id. at 79-82.
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CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, respondents entered a plea of not guilty

to the offense charged. At the pre-trial, it was stipulated and
admitted that Ting, as representative of the City Government
of Tuguegarao, entered into a Contract of Sale with Dr. Anselmo
D. Almazan, Angelo A. Almazan, and Anselmo A. Almazan
III for the purchase of two (2) parcels of land, identified as Lot
Nos. 5860 and 5861 located in Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City,
with an aggregate area of 24,816 square meters and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36942 and TCT
No. T-36943 of the Register of Deeds in Tuguegarao City. As
payment, Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No.
0001534514 dated April 30, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00.
On May 5, 2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused
the registration of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-144428
and TCT No. T-144429 in its name. Consequently, a complaint
was filed against respondents for violation of Section 261 (v) 5

4
Id. at 53.
5
Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
xxxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public
funds. — Any public official or employee including barangay officials and
those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
(a) Maintenance of existing and/or completed public works project:
Provided, that not more than the average number of laborers or employees
already employed therein during the sixth-month period immediately prior
to the beginning of the forty-five day period before election day shall be
permitted to work during such time: Provided, further, That no additional
laborers shall be employed for maintenance work within the said period of
forty-five days;
(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by
negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election:
Provided, That work for the purpose of this section undertaken under the
so-called “takay” or “paquiao” system shall not be considered as work by
contract;
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and (w) 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, but the same was
eventually dismissed by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) finding that since the issuance of the treasury
warrant was not for public works, no liability could arise

(c) Payment for the usual cost of preparation for working drawings,
specifications, bills of materials, estimates, and other procedures preparatory
to actual construction including the purchase of materials and equipment,
and all incidental expenses for wages of watchmen and other laborers employed
for such work in the central office and field storehouses before the beginning
of such period: Provided, That the number of such laborers shall not be
increased over the number hired when the project or projects were commenced;
and
(d) Emergency work necessitated by the occurrence of a public calamity,
but such work shall be limited to the restoration of the damaged facility.
No payment shall be made within five days before the date of election
to laborers who have rendered services in projects or works except those
falling under subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of this paragraph.
This prohibition shall not apply to ongoing public works projects
commenced before the campaign period or similar projects under foreign
agreements. For purposes of this provision, it shall be the duty of the
government officials or agencies concerned to report to the Commission
the list of all such projects being undertaken by them.
(2) The Ministry of Social Services and Development and any other
office in other ministries of the government performing functions similar
to said ministry, except for salaries of personnel, and for such other routine
and normal expenses, and for such other expenses as the Commission may
authorize after due notice and hearing. Should a calamity or disaster occur,
all releases normally or usually coursed through the said ministries and
offices of other ministries shall be turned over to, and administered and
disbursed by, the Philippine National Red Cross, subject to the supervision
of the Commission on Audit or its representatives, and no candidate or his
or her spouse or member of his family within the second civil degree of
affinity or consanguinity shall participate, directly or indirectly, in the
distribution of any relief or other goods to the victims of the calamity or
disaster; and
(3) The Ministry of Human Settlements and any other office in any other
ministry of the government performing functions similar to said ministry,
except for salaries of personnel and for such other necessary administrative
or other expenses as the Commission may authorize after due notice and
hearing.
6
Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
xxx xxx xxx
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therefrom. In Guzman v. Commission on Elections, et al., 7

however, the Court set aside the COMELEC’s resolution and
ordered the filing of the appropriate criminal information against
respondents. It found that while said issuance may not be
considered as public works under Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus
Election Code, there was still probable cause to believe that
Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code was violated
since the provision does not require that the undertaking be for
public works. Thus, the instant case.
After the pre-trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence on October 23, 2013. But instead of presenting their
evidence, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer
to Evidence and, subsequently, a Demurrer to Evidence.8 In an
Order9 dated December 16, 2013, the RTC granted the same
and acquitted the respondents. According to the RTC, while it
is uncontested that the treasury warrant or the Landbank check
in issue bears the date “April 30, 2004,” which is well within
the prohibited period, the date of the instrument is not necessarily
the date of issue. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides
that an instrument is issued by “the first delivery of the
instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a
holder.” But the prosecution failed to prove that the subject
check was delivered to the vendors of the lots within the
prohibited period. In fact, the dorsal side of the instrument bears
“May 18, 2004” as the date of payment as annotated by the
drawee bank, which is beyond the said period. The RTC added
that just because the title was issued in favor of the City

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials

for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. —
During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction
of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding
paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds.
7
614 Phil. 143 (2009).
8
Rollo, p. 41.
9
Supra note 3.
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Government of Tuguegarao on May 5, 2004, it does not follow

that payment was in fact made on the same day. The Law on
Sales provides that payment of the purchase price is not a
condition for the transfer of title, in the absence of stipulation
to the contrary.
In a Decision dated June 16, 2015, the CA denied the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and affirmed the RTC’s
Order. Like the RTC, the CA cited the Negotiable Instruments
Law and held that every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument to
the payee for the purpose of giving effect thereto. Without initial
delivery of the instrument from the drawer of the check to the
payee, there can be no valid and binding contract and no liability
on the instrument. Also, without delivery, the instrument cannot
be deemed to have been issued. Thus, the date on the check,
April 30, 2004, pertains to nothing more than the date of the
making or drawing of the instrument. Moreover, the CA ruled
that neither can the date of notarization of the deed of sale,
May 5, 2004, be considered as the date of issuance. This is
because notarization only serves to convert a private document
to a public one, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Furthermore, it was held that the issuance
of a check is not payment until the check has been encashed.
Thus, since the check herein was presented for payment and
encashment on May 18, 2004, which is well after the prohibited
period, respondents were correctly acquitted.10
Aggrieved by the CA’s denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the OSG filed the instant petition on January
7, 2016 invoking the following argument:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE 16 DECEMBER 2013 ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT GRANTED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TING’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
DESPITE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION’S
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. 11
10
Supra note 1, at 41-49.
11
Rollo, p. 23.
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In its petition, the OSG posits that it duly established beyond

reasonable doubt that respondents violated Section 261 (w)(b)
of the Omnibus Election Code. As such, the RTC had no clear
legal and factual basis to grant City Mayor Ting’s demurrer to
evidence.
Prefatorily, we point out that the remedy from an order of
dismissal granting a demurrer to evidence is reviewable by the
CA, but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In turn, if the CA finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in granting the demurrer, such finding
is reviewable by the Court through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In People v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 12 we explained:
We point out at the outset that in criminal cases, the grant of a
demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may
not be appealed because this would place the accused in double
jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is
still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The People thus correctly filed a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to question the RTC’s
grant of demurrer. Nonetheless, we emphasize that the CA disposed
of the merits of an original special civil action when it ruled that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting Ang’s demurrer
to evidence because the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
were insufficient to sustain a conviction. The CA ruling, therefore,
may be questioned before this Court through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Where the issue or question involves
or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision (e.g., whether
the CA correctly ruled that the RTC judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in granting the accused’s demurrer), and not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond
the province of a petition for certiorari.
Thus, in Asistio v. People, et al.,13 the Court ruled that under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or

12
G.R. Nos. 205182-83, August 5, 2013 (Minute Resolution, Second
Division).
13
758 Phil. 485 (2015).
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resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature

of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us
by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case.14 This is in line
with the established rule “that one of the requisites of certiorari
is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will
not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.” 15
On the substantive issues, we find that the RTC should not
have granted the demurrer to evidence.
For clarity, Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code
is reproduced as follows:
ARTICLE XXII.
ELECTION OFFENSES
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of
materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices. — During the period of forty-five days preceding
a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works,
except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph;
or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that subparagraph (b)

above is violated when: (1) any person issues, uses or avails
of treasury warrants or any device forty-five days preceding a
regular election or thirty days before a special election; (2) the

14
Id. at 496, citing Artistica Ceramica, Inc., et al. v. Ciudad del Carmen
Homeowner’s Ass’n., Inc., et al., 635 Phil. 21, 30 (2010).
15
Id. at 496-497.
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warrant or device undertakes the future delivery of money, goods

or other things of value; and (3) the undertaking is chargeable
against public funds.
The attending circumstances in the instant case depict a
violation of the provision cited above. First, the subject Treasury
Warrant No. 0001534514 was dated April 30, 2004, which date
falls within the election ban period beginning on March 26,
2004 and ending on the election day or May 10, 2004. As such,
it is deemed prima facie to have been drawn, made, accepted,
and indorsed on said date.16 On the basis of said presumption,
it follows that the treasury warrant was delivered to the Almazans,
for delivery naturally precedes acceptance. Moreover, while
this presumption is disputable, respondents merely filed their
Demurrer to Evidence and presented no evidence to challenge
the same.
Second, even assuming that the treasury warrant was issued
on another date, said date could not have been later than May
5, 2004, which is the date when the deed of sale was notarized.
According to the CA, the fact that the undated deed was notarized
on said date is of no moment because notarization only serves
to convert a private document to a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
The Court, however, finds merit in the OSG’s argument that
the defense cannot rely on the lack of date on the deed of sale.
In fact, when said document was notarized on May 5, 2004,
the same was evidence that the deed was formally executed on
or before, but not after, such date. This is pursuant to the Rules
on Notarial Practice which provides that when a document is
notarized, the notary public subscribes that a person appeared
before him, presented a document, and affirmed the contents
thereof, which in this case included the issuance of the treasury

16
Section 11 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Sec. 11. Date, presumption as to. - Where the instrument or an acceptance
or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be
the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance, or indorsement, as the
case may be.
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warrant as payment for the lots.17 Thus, by virtue of the deed

of sale notarized on May 5, 2004, the parties thereto, namely,
the Almazans as sellers and the City Government of Tuguegarao,
represented by City Mayor Ting, as buyer, appeared before
the notary public and affirmed on said date the contents of the
deed of sale stating that the sellers unconditionally sold,
transferred, and conveyed the lots, for and in consideration of
8,654,914.08, to them. 18 Consequently, as the OSG maintains,
this acknowledgement of payment in the deed of sale, coupled
with the admission of respondents that the subject check was
used as payment for the lots, is evidence of its receipt by the
Almazans on a date no later than May 5, 2004 for, as Section
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides, public
documents, such as the notarized deed of sale herein, are evidence
of the facts giving rise to their execution, as well as the date
of their execution.19
Third, it must be noted that May 5, 2004 was also the date
when the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration
of the sale and the issuance of new TCTs in its name. But the
RTC ruled that even if the title was already issued in favor of
the City Government of Tuguegarao, it does not follow that
payment was made on the same day because as the Law on
Sales provides, payment of the purchase price is not a condition
for the transfer of title, in the absence of stipulation to the
contrary. Thus, the courts below found that since the dorsal
side of the instrument bears the date “May 18, 2004” as the
date of payment annotated by the drawee bank, which is beyond
the prohibited period, respondents cannot be held liable. It must
be emphasized, however, that actual payment of the purchase
price is not an element of the offense charged herein. To repeat,
the subject provision expressly states that a person shall be
guilty of an election offense if he or she issues, uses, or avails
of treasury warrants or other devices undertaking the future

17
Rules on Notarial Practice, Sections 2 and 6.
18
Rollo, pp. 109-110.
19
Pedrano v. Heirs of Benedicto Pedrano, 564 Phil. 369, 377 (2007).
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delivery of money, goods, or other things of value chargeable

against public funds. Clearly, the offense is committed even if
the payment or the delivery of money was made after the
prohibited period. Hence, that the check was encashed on May
18, 2004, or after the prohibited election ban period, does not
render respondents innocent of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the courts below proceeded to dismiss the
complaint against respondents, relying on the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law as to the meaning of the word
“issue.” True, Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
defines “issue” as the first delivery of an instrument, complete
in form, to a person who takes it as a holder. In fact, the Court
has held in the past that delivery is the final act essential to the
negotiability of an instrument. 20 But, as the OSG points out,
the issue in this case neither concerns the negotiability or
commerciability of the treasury warrant nor the parties’ rights
thereon. Note that the subject provision of the Omnibus Election
Code does not merely penalize a person who “issues” treasury
warrants or devices, but a person who “issues, uses or avails”
of treasury warrants or devices. As such, the term “issues” under
the subject provision should not be construed in its restricted
sense within the meaning of Negotiable Instruments Law, but
rather in its general meaning to give, to send, or such other
words importing delivery to the proper person. To the Court,
this is more in keeping with the intent of the law for basic
statutory construction provides that where a general word follows
an enumeration of a particular specific word of the same class,
the general word is to be construed to include things of the
same class as those specifically mentioned. 21 Thus, for as long
as the device is issued, used, or availed of within the prohibited
period to undertake the future delivery of money chargeable
against public funds, an election offense is committed.

20
Dy v. People, et al., 591 Phil. 678, 689 (2008).
21
Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, 690 Phil. 321,
333 (2012).
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned circumstances, however,

we resolve to deny the petition on the principle of double
jeopardy.
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that the December
16, 2013 Order of the RTC, on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, is a judgment of acquittal. The OSG is, thus, barred
from appealing said order because to allow the same would
violate the right of respondents against double jeopardy. The
right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no
less than the Bill of Rights (Section 21, Article III) contained
in the 1987 Constitution which provides that “[n]o person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.”
Time and again, the Court has held that double jeopardy
attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Jurisprudence, however, allows for certain exceptions when
the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion
of the accused, to wit: (1) “[w]here the dismissal is based on
a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution
has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits
and operates as an acquittal[; and] (2) [w]here the dismissal is
made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of
his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to
prosecute.”22
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has
rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether
the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough
to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and
22
Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, 675 Phil. 656, 667 (2011).
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grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is

one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the
accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review
an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to
do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.23
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without
exceptions. It has been held in the past that the only instance
when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against
double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused
or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no double
jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and forthwith
dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and
(2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was
not ready for trial and adjudication.24
In the instant case, the Court finds that the elements of double
jeopardy are present herein. A valid information was filed against
respondents for violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code resulting in the institution of a criminal case
before the proper court of competent jurisdiction. Subsequently,
respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and were
acquitted; the dismissal of the case against them being based on
a demurrer to evidence filed after the prosecution rested its case.
It must be noted, moreover, that while an acquittal by virtue
of a demurrer to evidence may be subject to review via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by a
petition for review under Rule 45 like in this case, there is no
showing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process. “Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that

23
Id. at 668.
24
Id.
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capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount

to lack of jurisdiction. `The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused
should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly
abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority
to dispense justice.” 25
A review of the records of the instant case reveals no abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court so grave as to result
in the reversal of its judgment of acquittal. While the law provides
certain exceptions to the application of the rule on double
jeopardy as when a trial court prematurely terminates the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the Court finds these
exceptions inapplicable to the case at hand. It must be noted
that the RTC herein duly gave the prosecution ample opportunity
to present its case by allowing the latter to submit the pieces
of evidence necessary for conviction. It cannot, therefore, be
gainsaid that the prosecution was deprived of due process of
law. In fact, in its petition before the Court, the OSG made no
mention of any objection as to the manner by which the RTC
conducted the proceedings. Neither did it particularly allege a
denial of its right to due process. Instead, the OSG merely argued
that the RTC granted respondents’ demurrer to evidence without
any clear and factual basis, failing to make a careful consideration
of its evidence and merely focusing on the highly technical
provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. To the Court,
however, this cannot result in a complete reversal of the judgment
of acquittal. Even if we are to assume that the RTC had
overlooked certain facts in arriving at its conclusions, this
supposed misappreciation of evidence will, at most, be considered
only as a mere error of judgment, and not of jurisdiction or a
manifestation of grave abuse of discretion. It is, therefore, not
correctible by a writ of certiorari. 26

25
Id. at 668-669.
26
People v. Court of Appeals, et al., 691 Phil. 783 (2012).
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To reiterate, for an acquittal to be considered tainted with

grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the
prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial
conducted was a sham. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged
errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation
of evidence that the RTC and the CA may have committed in
ordering respondents’ acquittal, absent any showing that said
courts acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of
due process, their findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed
and set aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
Indeed, errors or irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of autrefois acquit.
We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been
committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be
corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. “[I]t
bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford
the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard
him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes.”27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 16, 2015 and
Resolution dated November 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 134943 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Del Castillo, Leonen, Reyes, Jr., J., and Hernando JJ., concur.

27
People v. Tan, 639 Phil. 402, 417 (2010).
*
Additional member in lieu of Justice Gesmundo per Raffle dated
November 26, 2018.