2020] CRIMINAL LAW [L. U.

PADILLA

QUIZLERS ON SELECTED CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW1

Atty. Lorenzo U. Padilla, A.B., LL.B., M.B.A., LL.M.

Professorial Lecturer
Ateneo Law School
Liceo College of Law

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON CRIMES AND PENALTIES

QUESTIONS FROM QUIZLER NO. 4

HISTORY, SOURCES AND APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS (2);

FELONIES AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION; CRIMINAL INTENT;
DISTINGUISHING MOTIVE FROM CRIMINAL INTENT

Legality.

A. Punishability by law; ex post facto law.

Q1: What is an ex post facto law? (Salvador vs. Mapa, Jr., et

al., G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007).

Q2: XX filed an Affidavit-Complaint, charging warrantless search

and accusing YY and Others conducting a search on his vehicle without
being armed with a valid warrant. Does the complaint for warrantless
search charge a criminal offense? (Pideli vs. People, G.R. No. 163437,
February 13, 2008).
Q3: RBB, RBG, CFB, CAB, and BCA are members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG). They hold the ranks of Police Senior Superintendent,
Police Inspector, Senior Police Officer II, Senior Police Officer II, and
Senior Police Officer I, respectively. In an information dated October 18,
2005, they were charged with violation of Sec. 2203 in relation to Sec.
3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as follows: “That on or before July
27, 2004 or prior or subsequent thereto in Cagayan de Oro City and within

1 Edited by RAFAEL ANGELO M. PADILLA, A.B., LL.B. (Faculty Member, San

Beda College of Law – Alabang).

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the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused [RBB, RBG,

CFB, CAB, and BCA], all public officers being then members of the
Philippine National Police, taking advantage of their official positions, while
committing the offense in relation to office, with grave abuse thereof,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, without lawful authority or
delegation from the Collector of Customs, flag down, search and seize
three (3) container vans consigned to Japan Trak surplus (Kakiage
Surplus).” BCA remained at large. At pretrial, the prosecution and
defense stipulated that in the evening of July 27, 2004, RBB, RBG, CFB,
and CAB, upon the order of RBB, but without the authority from and
coordination with the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three container vans consigned to
Kakiage Surplus. The said vans were allowed to be brought to the
warehouse of the consignee and the actual search was done on July 28,
2004. Convicting RBB, RBG, CFB, and CAB of the offense charged, the
anti-graft court ruled that RBB, RBG, CFB, and CAB belong to the
category of officers in Sec. 2203(d); thus, they needed a written authority
from the Commissioner of Customs or District Collector in order to
conduct searches, seizures and arrests. In this case, the court said, the
prosecution established the lack of said written authority; even RBB and
RBG admitted that they did not have any authorization to search the
vans. RBB, RBG, CFB, and CAB, however, maintain that they neither
searched the container vans nor effected seizure and arrest. Indeed, the
container vans were brought to the consignee’s warehouse and not to the
CIDG headquarters. On July 28, 2004, the container vans were searched
but not by RBB, RBG, CFB, and CAB. The search was actually conducted
by Customs Police, who held the keys to the vans. Furthermore, the
vans were opened without the presence of the PNP-CIDG’s team leader,
RBG. The search was under the direction of the Customs Police because
when the Customs Police decided to stop the search, RBB, RBG, CFB,
and CAB acceded and left the premises. Thus, RBB, RBG, CFB, and CAB
did not seize anything nor arrested anybody, and could not on the
prosecution evidence be held liable for searching, and seizing the three
container vans. Can RBB, RBG, CFB, and CAB be held liable on the
remaining allegation in the Information for “illegally flagging down”
the container vans? (Boac, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 180597,
November 7, 2008)
Q4: GA instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 262, in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610 against respondents PA, RO, Dr. RA, Dr. RA and several
John/Jane Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
She alleged that through “charade and false pretenses invariably
committed by all of the respondents in conspiracy with each other, on 31
January 2002, [my] common law brother LA, although of legal age but
conspiratorially caused to be declared by” PA, RO, Dr. RA, Dr. RA and
several John/Jane Does to be “mentally deficient” and “incompetent to
give consent to his BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was then intentionally,

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unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally placed thereafter

under surgery for MUTILATION VIA “BILATERAL VASECTOMY” x x x,
EVEN WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the
GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor personal consent” of LA himself. The
Assistant City Prosecutor, however, held that the facts alleged did not
amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized in Article
262, Revised Penal Code, i.e., “[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any
way deprived (sic) [LA] of his reproductive organ, which is still very much
part of his physical self.” Should PA, RO, Dr. RA, Dr. RA and several
John/Jane Does be charged with the crime of mutilation? (Aguirre
vs. Secretary of the Department of Justice, et al., G. R. No. 170723,
March 3, 2008).

Certainty.

Q5: Is there any vagueness or ambiguity in the provisions of

Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, such that the acts
proscribed and/or required therein would not be understood by a
person of ordinary intelligence? (Securities and Exchange
Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 135808,
October 6, 2008).

Q6: Explain the reasons for the breadth of the anti-fraud

provisions found in the Revised Securities Act. (Securities and
Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., G.R.
No. 135808, October 6, 2008).

Q7: Can Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act, be assailed

on the ground that certain terms used therein (i.e., “material fact,”
“reasonable person,” “nature and reliability” and “generally
available”) are vague, such that the SEC still needed to define those
terms, by way of implementing rules, before the provisions thereof
could be applied? (Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008).

Effectivity.

Q8: What general penal statute was in force in the

Philippines prior to the enactment of the Revised Penal Code? (U.S.
vs. Tamporong, 31 Phil. 321 [1915]).

Q9: The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February

1982. The Full Disclosure Rules were promulgated by the SEC only on
24 July 1996. Did that fact render ineffective, in the meantime,
Section 36 of the Revised Securities Act, i.e., for lack of
implementing rules? (Securities and Exchange Commission vs.
Interport Resources Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 135808, October 6,
2008).

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Territoriality.

Q10: X and 23 Others attacked a Dutch boat between the Islands

of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, beyond Philippine
territory. X and Another, who were residents of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu, Philippine Islands, later returned home, where they were arrested
and were charged in before a court in Sulu, with the crime of piracy. Can
X and Another argue that since the crime charged was committed
beyond the Philippine territory, the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the same? (People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19 [1022]).

Modes of commission.

A. Act or omission.

Q11: X lived adulterously Y, a married man. Both were denounced

for adultery by Z, X's second husband. At the request of X and Y, who
promised to discontinue their life together, and to leave the barrio of
Masocol, and through the good offices of the municipal president of
Paombong, Z asked for the dismissal of the complaint. In pursuance of
their promise, X and Y went to lived in another barrio, in the same
municipality. Under pretext of going for some nipa leaves from her son by
her former marriage, N, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Niño, X
followed him to his house in the barrio of Masocol, and remained there.
Y followed X and stayed with X in the same house. One the night, while
all were gathered together at home after supper, Y expressed his
intention of burning the house of N as the only means of taking his
revenge on the Masocol resident, whom he believed had instigated Z to
file the complaint for adultery against him and X, which compelled them
to leave the barrio of Masocol. X listened to Y's threat without raising a
protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house.
Upon the strength of these facts, the court below found her guilty of
arson as accomplice. Should the judgment against X be sustained?
(People vs. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil. 353[1931]).

B. Dolo or culpa.

Q12: Discuss the ways by which the Revised Penal Code

classified felonies according to the means they are committed.
(Calimutan vs. People, G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006).

Q13: Where the Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to the

accused any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim X,
who dies as a consequence of an act attributable to the accused done
with reckless imprudence, what should such court do? (Calimutan vs.
People, G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006).

Q14: A and B, on the one hand, and X and Y, on the other, had a
chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different

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destinations, A and B being on their way home from a drinking spree,

while X and his helper, Y, were walking from the market to a place called
Crossing Capsay. A running grudge existed between A and Y, but there
was no indication that there was likewise an existing animosity between
A and X. A appears to be the initial aggressor, suddenly punching Y, who
younger and smaller in built than A, when they met on the road. The
attack of A was swift and unprovoked, which spurred X into responsive
action. Y was immediately able to run away. However, X, seeking only to
protect Y and to stop the assault of A against the latter, picked up a
stone and threw it at A. The stone was readily available as a weapon to X
since the incident took place on a road. A was hit at the back, causing
him to stop his aggression. X thereupon desisted from any further act of
violence against A. The incident could not have taken more than just a
few minutes. A subsequently died of a ruptured spleen as a consequence
of the injury thus sustained. Considering that A was hit at the back and
died as a consequence, can X be prosecuted for murder? (Calimutan
vs. People, G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006).

Q15: Since X was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the

stone at the victim A, can X be held civilly liable for A’s death
considering that his act was, however, committed with inexcusable
lack of precaution? (Calimutan vs. People, G.R. No. 152133, February
9, 2006).

Q16: Can perjury be committed by means of culpa? (Monfort

III and Monfort vs. Salvatierra, et al., G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007).

1. No malice, but there is imprudence.

Q17: X was prosecuted for having inflicted upon Y with physical

injuries. It can not be established in a conclusive manner that the injury
was caused maliciously. X, however, admitted that he treated the victim
for ulcers of the girl until he or his daughters burned her, or that the
action of the petroleum he used in the treatment irritated the said ulcers
and caused them to spread, judging from the extent of the scars.
Absence proof of malice, should X be acquitted? (U.S. vs. Divino, 12
Phil. 175 [1908]).

Q18: X, as municipal treasurer, certified that an account, showing

payments made to carpenters and day laborers who worked on the
construction of the municipal building for two successive years, as well
as the cost of certain packages of nails used therein, was a true and
exact statement. The account was approved by a resolution of the
municipal council. X further certified that the services were rendered as
stated and were necessary for the public interest, and that the articles
purchased had been recorded in the municipal register. It appeared that
Y, whose signature appears at the foot of the document, had received the
said amount as the balance due of a former account. X, therefore, failed
to tell the truth in the statement of facts contained in the said document,

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inasmuch as he stated therein that the money was intended to pay the
carpenters, when as a matter of fact it was drawn and paid to X himself,
he being commissioned by Z to collect and receive the amount loaned by
the said Z to the V and X. Y also, with reckless negligence, failed to tell
the truth in stating the facts contained in the said document. Y said
therein that he had received the money, when in reality neither was the
money paid for the work done by the carpenters, nor was it received by
him (Y). As a result, X and Y were charged with the crime of falsification
of a public document by reason of reckless negligence. On motion of X
and Y, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the facts did
not constitute the crime complained of, as in the opinion of the trial
judge there neither exists, nor can there exist, any such crime as
falsification of a public document by reason of reckless negligence. Can
the crime of falsification of public document be committed by
reason of reckless negligence? (U.S. vs. Maleza, et al., 14 Phil. 468
[1909]).

2. No criminal liability where no dolo or culpa.

Q19: X was charged with having, without any precaution

whatever, fire from his shotgun a charge that lodged in the left parietal
region of Y, thereby instantly killing him. From the evidence introduced
at the trial, it has been fully proven that on the night of the crime the
deceased, Z, taking his shotgun with him went to hunt deer, first passing
by the house of V, whom he took along with him and in his company also
passed by the house of the X, whom they both invited to bring his
shotgun and go with them for a hunt. While the three men were passing
along in the middle of a field of talahib (high grass), the deceased in front
of the carrying lighted lantern fastened to his forehead, behind him X,
and lastly V, the first two men saw a deer were all mounted. Thereupon V
stopped his horse and also dismounted in order that the deer might not
become aware of the presence of the hunters by the noise. Few moments
afterwards, two shots were heard in quick succession and then the light
the deceased carried went out. V, upon noticing that the said light was
extinguished, approached the deceased. V found the X alongside of him,
raising him up, saying: "What can have happened to my godfather?'. A the
deceased could not get up, V asked X for matches and lit a little stick, by
which light witness saw the wound in the back of the head of the
deceased, who was already dead. The said wound consisted of a fracture
of the left parietal region, the brain being exposed. It has also been
proved that there had been no previous trouble between the X and the
deceased, but that on the contrary they had always been on intimate
terms of friendship. X, testifying in his own defense stated that upon
seeing that the deer, which the deceased had also noticed, might escape,
he made haste to approach the latter, who had his back toward him and
was on his left, and that, in taking hurried steps for that purpose, X
stumbled against an embankment or pilapil that lay between him and the
deceased. Thereupon, X fell on one knee, an accident which caused the
shotgun, which he had already loaded, cocked, and aimed at the deer,

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the half of whose body was now lost from sight, to be discharged, this one
charge striking the deceased in the head. The trial judge ruled that the
crime charged in the present case should be qualified as one of homicide
occasioned by reckless negligence for the reason that there was no
malice or criminal intention on the part of X in the discharge of his
shotgun which resulted in wounding and causing the instantaneous
death of the deceased; but that was, however, reckless negligence on the
part of X, for, as the deceased whom he was approaching, was almost
directly in front of him, he should have taken the precaution -- an
elemental one in handling firearms so likely to be discharged by the
slightest accident not to have carried his shotgun cocked and aimed, as
he did on the occasion in question. Is X guilty of homicide occasioned
by reckless negligence, as ruled by the trial court? (U.S. vs.
Catangay, 28 Phil. 490 [1914]).

Q20: In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa,

what elements are indispensable? (Guevarra vs. Almodovar, G.R. No.
75256, Jan. 26, 1989).

Criminal Intent.

Q21: When is proof of criminal intent necessary? (De Jesus vs.

Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 164166 & 164173-80,
October 17, 2007).

Q22: AR, under a claim of ownership, who had wanted the

properties taken out from VL’s house. AR had asked his neighbors, DG
among them, to assist him in recovering these properties. Among the
properties taken was a wooden bench, which was found in DG’s house.
Owing to the proximity of DG’s house to that of VL’s, AR had asked DG
explained that the bench was temporarily left in DG’s house until he
could transfer it. Unfortunately, before AR could remove it, VL had
already filed a complaint against them for robbery with the use of force
upon things. Can DG be held liable for robbery with force upon
things? (De Guzman vs. People, G.R. No. 166502, October 17, 2008).

Q23: Discuss the notion of “mens rea”. (Valenzuela vs. People,

G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007).

Q24: What complements or unites with “mens rea” in order to

constitute mala in se crimes? (Valenzuela vs. People, G. R. No.
160188, June 21, 2007).

1. Criminal intent, distinguished from discernment.

Q25: X, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Y and
three other children in their backyard, target-shooting a bottle cap
(tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air

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rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Y was hit by
a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated
X due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be
an accident. The parents of Y appealed to the (then) Ministry of Justice,
which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was
consequently filed, which narrated in part that X, acted with
“discernment”, following the language of Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Is the allegation of “discernment” equivalent to a statement
of criminal “intent”? (Guevarra vs. Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, Jan.
26, 1989).

Q26: In order to avoid confusing the words "intent" and

"discernment" used under the law, discuss the pertinent qualifying
sentence in People vs. Nieto, supra, on this point. (Guevarra vs.
Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, Jan. 26, 1989).

2. General intent.

Q27: Distinguish general criminal intent from specific

criminal intent. (Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217 June 27, 2006).

3. Specific intent.

Q28: Discuss general intent and specific intent in the context

of the crime of homicide or murder. (Rivera, et al. vs. People, G.R. No.
166326, January 25, 2006).

Q29: How may intent to kill be proved? (People vs. Mapalo,

G.R. No. 172608, February 6, 2007).

(a) Intent to kill in crimes against persons.

Q30: How is intent to kill proved in crimes against persons?

(Discussed in Rivera, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25,
2006).

Q: In crimes against persons, what may constitute evidence

of intent to kill? (People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007).

Q31: X was stabbed from behind by Y. When X turned around, Y

continued his assault, hitting X on the left arm as the latter tried to
defend himself. Do these facts, if proved by the unwavering testimony
of X, indicate intent to kill on the part of Y beyond reasonable
doubt? (Epifanio vs. People, G.R. NO. 157057, June 26, 2007).

(1) Intent to kill in parricide.

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Q32: In a prosecution for parricide, is it fatal to the accused’s

conviction if his motive for killing his wife has not been proved?
(People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007).

Q33: The killing of CV was immediately preceded by a quarrel

between the XA and CV, his wife. LA, the victim’s sister, testified that the
deceased suffered from the violent behavior of the XA who would often lay
hand on the victim during their marital squabbles. GO, XA’s father-in-
law, testified that on the night of the incident, XA arrived in their
conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door and table
and threw away the electric fan. GO tried to prevail upon XA but to no
avail. Instead, XA got his sling and arrow which he kept near the ceiling.
GO left XA’s house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law, YA,
located about four meters away; but he could still hear the victim, CV,
and XA, arguing and shouting at each other. After a while, GO requested
YA to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, YA met XA carrying CV
soaked in blood. XA disappeared after his wounded wife, CV, was rushed
to the hospital, where she died. The autopsy report revealed that the
victim sustained a punctured wound, caused by a shot with an arrow, in
the neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein, causing
massive hemorrhage. XA explains his disappearance, before his arrest in
another barangay, as being probably because he was answering the call
of nature at that time. Under the foregoing circumstances, can XA
correctly deny absence of intent to kill? (People vs. Castillo, G.R. No.
172695, June 29, 2007).

(b) Intent to gain in robbery.

Q34: When, if at all possible, may intent to gain in robbery be

presumed? (People vs. Buduhan and Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196,
August 6, 2008).

(c) Intent of gain in theft.

Q35: Discuss the notion of “intent to steal”2 in the crime of

theft. (Gaviola vs. People, G.R. No. 163927, January 27, 2006).

4. Good faith as defense.

Q36: X, then municipal Mayor, accompanied by two uniformed

policemen and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika
highway, the main thoroughfare of the town. Upon orders of X, these
laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the
stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway.
Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Y, who
later complained of what X had caused to be done. These establishments

2 The law speaks of “intent of gain” (see Article 308, Revised Penal Code).

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had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, for
non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, X, filed a complaint for judicial abatement of the stalls,
alleging that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as
nuisances per se. Y was never able to reopen his barbershop business
and so he subsequently charged X and the two policemen with the
offense of grave coercion. Can X contend that the sealing off of Y's
barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and,
therefore, under lawful authority? (Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830
[1983]).

Q37: X, then municipal Mayor, accompanied by two uniformed

policemen and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika
highway, the main thoroughfare of the town. Upon orders of X, these
laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the
stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway.
Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Y, who
later complained of what X had caused to be done. These establishments
had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, for
non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, X, filed a complaint for judicial abatement of the stalls,
alleging that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as
nuisances per se. Y was never able to reopen his barbershop business
and so he subsequently charged X and the two policemen with the
offense of grave coercion. How would good faith of X in the
performance of duty constitute a defense against the charge of grave
coercion? (Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830 [1983]).

Q38: Is good faith a valid defense against a prosecution for

perjury? (Monfort III and Monfort vs. Salvatierra, et al., G.R. No.
168301, March 5, 2007).

Q39: Is good faith a defense against a prosecution for

possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents under of Section 68, PD 705, as amended?
(Monge vs. People, G.R. No. 170308, March 7, 2008).

Q40: X and Others were charged with violations of the SSS Law for
their failure to either promptly report some of the respondents for
compulsory coverage/membership with the SSS or remit their SSS
contributions and loan amortizations. On the part of X and Others, they
have not denied their fault in not remitting the SSS contributions and
loan payments in violation of Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the
SSS Law. Instead, X and Others interposed the defenses of lack of
criminal intent and good faith, as their failure to remit was brought about
by alleged economic difficulties, and they have already agreed to settle
their obligations with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to
pay in installments. Are those valid defenses against the alleged
violation of Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law?

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(Tan, et al. vs. Ballena, et al., G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008).

Q41: Convicted of illegal possession of firearms, PS insists that he

is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and it
was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and
ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm and ammunitions are
government property duly licensed to the Intelligence Security Group
(ISG) of the AFP, the same could not be licensed under his name; instead,
what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a Mission Order
whereby ISG entrusted to him the subject firearm and ammunitions and
authorized him to carry the same around Bacolod City. PS further argues
that he merely acted in good faith when he relied on the Memorandum
Receipt and Mission Order for authority to carry said firearm and
ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave injustice if he were to be
punished for the deficiency of said documents. Conceding good faith
reliance by him on the said Memorandum Receipt and Mission
Order, should PS be acquitted of the charge of unlicensed possession
of firearm? (Sayco vs. People, G.R. No. 159703, March 3, 2008).
Q42: Is good faith a defense against a charge of estafa by
postdating a check? (Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217 June 27,
2006).

Q43: In issuing postdated checks, in payment of jewelries she

bought, which checks were dishonored on presentment to the drawee
bank, X avers that she acted in good faith and exerted her utmost efforts
to confer with the payee to settle her obligations. She points out that she
made monthly cash payments to lessen her civil liability and later on, for
convenience, deposited the monthly payments at the payee’s bank
account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands. After her conviction by
the RTC of estafa by issuing postdated checks, she continued to make
payments even during the pendency of the case in the CA, and presently
continues to make deposits to the payee’s bank account. X asserts that
her efforts to settle her civil obligations to the payee of those checks
indicate that she has no intention of duping the latter, as well as the
absence of deceit on her part. That she failed to comply with her
obligations by failing to make good the checks as they fell due does not
suggest deceit, but at best only financial hardship in fulfilling her civil
obligations. Can X argue that, based on the foregoing facts, there is
no factual and legal basis to convict her of estafa, and insist that
criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes
as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and
there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the
act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose? (Recuerdo vs.
People, G.R. No. 168217 June 27, 2006).

Q44: On May 25, 1954, X filed a complaint against Y, for quieting

of title with a plea for injunctive relief, which case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 111. The suit involved a 40,500-square-meter parcel of coconut

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land, identified as Cadastral Lot 1301 (coconut land). Y, for his part,
claimed ownership over the property. On July 29, 1955, the trial court
ordered the dismissal of the complaint and declared Y the lawful owner of
the property. The decision became final and executory and, as a result, Y
was placed in possession of the property. Y died intestate and was
survived by his son, Z. X also died and was survived by his son, A.
Almost 30 years thereafter, on October 1985, Z filed a complaint against
A and four others for recovery of possession of a parcel of land and
execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The property of A is located
on the north of Lot 1301, and is actually denominated as Lot No. 1311
(residential). During the pendency of the case, Z left the Philippines and
stayed in the United States of America. Z entrusted the land to the care
of his nephew, R. At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, 3 persons were
seen climbing the coconut trees in Lot 1301. Under the supervision of A
and his wife, they gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the
coconut trees. As a result, A and his wife were charged with and
convicted of the crime of qualified theft. On appeal, can A correctly
argue that the prosecution failed to prove animus lucrandi (intent
to gain) on his part considering that he had been taking coconuts
from the property in broad daylight three times a year since August
5, 1993 on his honest belief that he was the owner of the land where
the coconut trees were planted but it was only after he took
coconuts on September 6, 1997 that he was charged of qualified
theft; that, moreover, his honest belief that he owned the land
negates intent to steal, an essential element of the felony of theft?
(Gaviola vs. People, G.R. No. 163927, January 27, 2006).

5. Mistake of facts.
(a) Not a case of mistake of facts.
Q45: RK’s white and black-spotted cow was taken from Sitio Taed,
where it was grazing. Its taking was without RK’s consent. The said cattle
was later seen in the possession of the PR and his co-accused. When
apprehended with the cattle, PR and his co-accused offered no
satisfactory exlanation for their possession of the missing bovine.
Instead, PR and his co-accused pleaded mistake of facts, i.e., and his
employer, MN, were of the erroneous belief that the cow was owned or
raised by AT, not RK. AT, however, testified that he went to MN’s house
on April 12, 1994 was to exact payment of a white female cow sold for
butchering in 1993, and not to sell the white and blackspotted cow. At
also stated that he did not have cows grazing at Sitio Taed. Is this
defense of “mistake of facts”, as pleaded by PR and his co-accused,
tenable? (Pil-Ey vs. People, G.R. No. 154941, July 9, 2007).

Q46: In a disco pub, full of civilians, SPO2 X, who was then

together with R, accosted the victim, SGT Y, why he had in his
possession a firearm. SGT Y identified himself saying “I am MIG” and
when SGT Y was about to get his wallet on his back pocket for his ID,
SPO2 X anticipated that the victim was drawing his firearm on his waist

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prompting said policeman to shoot the victim. SGT Y died as a

consequence of the bullet wound he sustained. Can SPO2 X be
absolved from criminal liability on the ground of mistake of fact?
(Baxinela vs. People, G.R. No. 149652, March 24, 2006).

6. Mala in se or mala prohibita.

Q47 : Discuss the distinction between acts that are mala in se

from acts that are mala prohibita, underscoring the importance of
such distinction in determining criminal liability. (Tan, et al. vs.
Ballena, et al., G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008).

Q48: X and Y were convicted of a violation of section 7 of Act No.

1655 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Pure Food and Drugs
Act. X alone appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in holding him
criminally responsible, in the same way as his agent, Y, notwithstanding
the fact that he had never had any knowledge of the acts performed by
the Y, sale of adulterated coffee or of any kind of coffee. Record discloses
that Y, while in charge of X's tienda (store) and acting as his agent and
employee, sold, in the ordinary course of business coffee which had been
adulterated by the admixture of peanuts and other extraneous
substances. Can a conviction under the Pure Food and Drugs Act
be sustained where it appears that the sale of adulterated food
products charged in the information was made without guilty
knowledge of the fact of adulteration, and without conscious intent
to violate the statute? (U.S vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577
[1915]).

Q49: X and Y were convicted of a violation of section 7 of Act No.

1655 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Pure Food and Drugs
Act. X alone appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in holding him
criminally responsible, in the same way as his agent, Y, notwithstanding
the fact that he had never had any knowledge of the acts performed by
the Y, sale of adulterated coffee or of any kind of coffee. Record discloses
that Y, while in charge of X's tienda (store) and acting as his agent and
employee, sold, in the ordinary course of business coffee which had been
adulterated by the admixture of peanuts and other extraneous
substances. Can a conviction under the Pure Food and Drugs Act be
sustained where it appears that the sale of adulterated goods was
made by agents or employees in the regular course of employment,
but without knowledge on the part of the principal of the fact that
the goods sold were adulterated? (U.S vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30
Phil. 577 [1915]).

Q50: X was charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696
of the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows: “Any person who
shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own
premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view,
either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or

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device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to

designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or
any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by
the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the
purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag,
banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is
commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five
hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for
not less than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine
and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court”. Can it be argued that
before a conviction under this provision can be had, a criminal
intent on the part of the accused must have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

Q51: “The legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its
commission a crime without regard to the intent of the doer and, if such
an intention appears, the courts must give it effect although the intention
may have been innocent (12 of Cyc., page 148)”. How may courts
determine whether or not, in a given case, the statute is to be so
construed? (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

Q52: X was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a

statute reading as follows: “No person or persons shall sell or exchange or
expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk”. Y purchased at X's store 1 pint of milk which was
shown to contain a very small percentage of water more than that
permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts. Can X
object to the proceedings on the ground that he was not allowed,
upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to pose
upon the trier of facts the question whether it existed, but was
condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent
totally immaterial and his guilt consist simply in having sold the
adulterated article whether he knew it or not and however carefully
he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article?
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

Q53: A statute provided that an inspector of elections of the

city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in
writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth
clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided
that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should
be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named S was removed by G,
without notice. G was arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under
the statute. G invokes an honest misconstruction of the law under legal
advice and sought to offer evidence on this point. Can G question the
law on the ground that it considers an act a crime without regard to
criminal intent? (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

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Q54: A statute provided that if any township committee or other

body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in
excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting
such board shall be guilty of a crime. X violated this law by voting to
incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. X offered to show that, in
aiding in the passage and effectuation of the resolution, he did so under
the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest
motives, and that he therein exercised due care and caution. Is this
defense sufficient to absolve X of criminal liability? (U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

Q55: X was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one piece of

wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was
conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention.
Should X be convicted despite such absence of fraudulent intent?
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

Q56: X was convicted of a violation of the statute which provided

that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture,
sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to
sell," oleomargarine, etc. X believed that if, from the evidence, its would
appear that he did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or
knew of there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but,
as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then he should be
acquitted. Is X correct? (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]).

Q57: X was charged with a violation of Section 878 in connection

with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No.
4. The law was explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties." Would the appointment to and
holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under the statute?
(People vs. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164 [1967]).

Q58: X was charged with a violation of Section 878 in connection

with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by

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Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No.

4. The law was explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties." Would it matter if the accused
relied on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the
accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by section 879"? (People vs.
Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164 [1967]).

Q59: What is the nature of the crime of unlicensed possession

of firearm? (Sayco vs. People, G.R. No. 159703, March 3, 2008).
Q60: In a prosecution against a corporate officer for violation of
the Trust Receipts Decree (Presidential Decree No. 115), as such officer
of the entrustee corporation, can he validly argue that he neither had
the intent to defraud the etnruster bank nor personally
misused/misappropriated the goods subject of the trust receipts
and, so, should not be prosecuted for such violation? (Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company vs. Go and Bautista, G.R. No. 155647, November
23, 2007).

Q61: X and Others were charged with violations of the SSS Law for
their failure to either promptly report some of the respondents for
compulsory coverage/membership with the SSS or remit their SSS
contributions and loan amortizations, which they admit, in violation of
Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law. Discuss the
nature of the alleged violation of Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and
(h) of the SSS Law and, consequently, the significance of their
admission at preliminary investigation level? (Tan, et al. vs. Ballena,
et al., G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008).

Q62: PM and PP were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and

thus in possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper
authority from the DENR. PM has never denied this fact. But in his
attempt to exonerate himself from liability, PM claims that it was PP, the
owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log

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down from the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for
processing. Would it matter that PM did not own the the pieces of
lumber found in his possession or that his help was merely solicited
by PP to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said
lumber? (Monge vs. People, G.R. No. 170308, March 7, 2008).

Q63: Is the offense defined under Section 3(g), RA 3019, as

amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, malum in se or malum prohibitum? (Go vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 172602, April 13, 2007, per Mr. Justice Callejo, Sr.; see also Go vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 172602, September 3, 2007 [Resolution
on Motion for Reconsideration], per Madam Justice Ynares-Santiago).

Q64: Can the fact that an unfunded check was issued merely
for purposes of accommodation of another, and not for value or
consideration received by the issuer, constitute a defense against a
charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, considering the
nature of the act therein defined as crime? (Ricaforte vs. Jurado,
G.R. NO. 154438, September 5, 2007).

7. Motive.

(a) Proof of motive, not essential to conviction.

Q65: In assailing his conviction for homicide, R points out that he

had no motive to harm the victim, A. He maintains that it was a rumble
where the participants acted on their own, with no clear intention of
conspiring to hurt or kill a particular person. However, as testified to by
V, it was R who suddenly appeared from a corner and stabbed A near his
heart while A was chasing his assailant, L. Should the court acquit R
of the charge of homicide, considering his claim that he had no
motive to harm the victim? (Resayo vs. People, G.R. No. 154502, ,
April 27, 2007).

Q66: In a murder case, can the accused exclusively predicate

his defense upon bare denial and a lack of proof of motive? (People
vs. Dorico, et al., 54 SCRA 172 (1973]).

(b) Complainant’s motive, immaterial.

Q67: In a prosecution for incestuous rape, the theory of the

defense turned on the motive of the complainant in filing the case,
although the accused asserted that could not fathom the motive of his
daughter for filing these cases against him, as he had a very close
relationship with her, being his favorite child. His relationship with his
wife, though, was not pleasant. So, he believed that his wife’s amorous
relationship with her cousin priest was the motivating factor for these
criminal cases against him as these would pave the way for his

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incarceration and for his wife to freely maintain her relationship with her
lover priest. Are these considerations relevant at all in the
determination of the guilt of the accused for the offense charged?
(People vs. Crespo, G.R. No. 180500, September 11, 2008).

Q68: In assailing his conviction for homicide, R points out that he

had no motive to harm the victim, A. He maintains that it was a rumble
where the participants acted on their own, with no clear intention of
conspiring to hurt or kill a particular person. However, as testified to by
V, it was R who suddenly appeared from a corner and stabbed A near his
heart while A was chasing his assailant, L. Should the court acquit R
of the charge of homicide, considering his claim that he had no
motive to harm the victim? (Resayo vs. People, G.R. No. 154502, ,
April 27, 2007).

(c) Mistake in attribution of motive, immaterial.

Q69: In a murder case, the trial court, on convicting an accused

observed that "the motive of the killing of [the victim] by the [accused]
was a land case." The identity of the accused as the author of the killing
was not disputed. In fact, he admitted having killed the deceased. The
accused, however contended on appeal that [a] civil case could not be
considered as the motive of the killing where the accused have no interest
therein, its being the father of the accused who was the plaintiff in said
case, and even granting that the accused is interested in the case as son
of the plaintiff therein, the same will not be a sufficient ground for him to
ambush, attack and kill [the victim]. Under the circumstances, is it
sufficient to reverse conviction for the accused to assail the trial
court’s finding of motive? (People vs. Diva, 23 SCRA 332 [1968]).

(d) Variance of motives, negating conspiracy.

Q70: The manner by which both accused, RO and RS, attacked

their victims, AO and BA, does not clearly and convincingly show that RO
and RS were motivated by a common intent of killing AO and BA. There
is doubt on whether RO was among those who confronted BA’s group
about their teasing of BC, who was admittedly a close relative of both
accused. Prosecution witness VA’s testimony that RO was among those
who confronted BA’s group contradicts the testimony of EN, another
prosecution witness, that RO was not present when the initial
confrontation occurred at 4:30 p.m. Further, RO was not even among the
group who first attacked the victims while they were heading home. As
the trial court found, there is no evidence that RO and RS were at the
crime scene at the same time. Also as testified to by VA, RO suddenly
appeared from a corner and stabbed AO near his heart while AO was
chasing his assailant, LY. From the foregoing circumstances, it is not
clear whether RO, in stabbing AO, and RS, in wounding BA, shared the
same unlawful intent. There is no evidence showing that RO was
impelled by the same motive of retaliating against BA’s group for teasing

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BC. Nothing shows that RO knew that his cousin BC was being teased by
BA’s group. RO stabbed AO upon seeing AO run after his cousin LY. It
can be inferred, from this act alone, that RO reacted to AO’s act of
chasing LY. Thus, another explanation for RO’s act would be to protect
his cousin LY and prevent AO from harming him, instead of retaliating
against BA’s group for teasing BC. Can the such variance of motives
among the accused aid in determining the non-existence or absence
of conspiracy? (Resayo vs. People, G.R. No. 154502, April 27, 2007).

(e) When motive is vital.

Q71: How may proof of motive aid the prosecution in

completing or perfecting its case? (U.S. vs. Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil. 256
[1913]).

Q72: At around 11 p.m., EA, RS, PZ, and their two companions
were eating merienda near the copra kiln when they were sprayed with
gunfire. EA was fatally hit and fell on the ground. RS, PZ and their two
companions ducked and crawled to seek cover. About five minutes after
the first burst of gunfire, GZ, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen
firing at RS, PZ and their two companions as well as in the direction of
the copra kiln. About 20 to 25 minutes after the first burst of gunfire, GZ
was again seen clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle
along with three armed companions, after which, their group left the
scene of the crime. The Information charged GZ as the sole perpetrator of
the crime of Murder. The three other armed men were not included as
John Does. There was no allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the following
circumstances may be culled: (a) Both PZ and RS testified that they saw
GZ with three other armed companions minutes after EA was shot but
they did not testify that they saw him in the vicinity before the shooting
of EA; (b) PZ testified that only one shot hit EA; (c) PZ testified that he did
not see GZ shoot at EA and that he merely assumed that GZ was the one
who shot the victim when the latter passed by him. Prosecution witness
PZ testified that he did not know of any motive on the part of GZ to kill
EA. RS testified that he only presumed that GZ shot at EA. Are these
circumstances not sufficient to establish the guilt of GZ for Murder
beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 157221 , March
20, 2007).

Q73: When is proof of motive essential for conviction? (People

vs. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431[Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891- 92], April 3,
2007).

Q74: E, an eyewitness to an actual shooting incident who has not

been shown, nay alleged, to have an ill motive to incriminate X, the
accused therein, narrated early on in her sworn statement before the
police that she saw X, in the company of John Doe when the latter shot
the victim, and that the two immediately fled thereafter. And despite the

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lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected, she maintained

and never waned in such tale. She even furnished the motive for the
killing of the victim. Is motive necessary for the conviction of X for
the crime herein charged? (People vs. Paoyo, G.R. No. 170193, April 4,
2007).

(f) When motive considered the same as intent.

Q75: In a prosecution for homicide where there was no direct

evidence to prove the commission of the crime by the accused, the
prosecution sought to prove motive on the part of the accused to kill the
victim through the previous act of the accused of peeping through the
bathroom and the victim’s room on two occasions – while she was taking
a bath and while she was inside the room with a friend. For his part, all
that the accused could offer was bare denial of the accusations against
him. The accused faults the prosecution’s theory linking him to the crime
on the ground that the connection between the alleged “peeping incident”
and intent to kill was so remote; and thus insufficient to convict him. Is
the “peeping incident”, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses,
relevant to establish intent on the part of the accused to kill the
victim? (Salvador vs. People, G.R. No. 164266, July 23, 2008).

(g) Motive alone cannot prove the commission of crime.

Q76: In the elections of 1934 in which M and N, both of Batac,

Ilocos Norte, were rival candidates for the office of representative for the
second district of said province, N was elected. The term for which the
latter was elected was, however, cut short as a result of the approval of
the Constitution of the Philippines under the general elections for
members of the National Assembly were by law set for September 17,
1935. In these general elections N and M resumed their political rivalry
and were opposing candidates for assemblyman in the same district. In
the strife N again came out triumphant over M. In the afternoon of
September 19, 1935, in celebration of N's victory, a number of this
followers and partymen paraded in cars and trucks through the
municipalities of Currimao, Paoay and Batac, Ilocos Norte, and passed in
front of the house of the M in Batac. The parade is described as
provocative and humiliating for the defeated candidate, M. The
assemblyman-elect, N, was not, however, destined to reap the fruits of
his political laurels for on the night of September 20, 1935, he was shot
and killed in his house in Batac. Very intensive investigation of the crime
by the Government authorities, particularly the Philippine Constabulary,
followed, as a consequence of which an information was filed L, a
businessman of Batac, Ilocos Norte, with having committed the murder of
N. After trial, however, L was acquitted. This acquittal resulted in another
protracted investigation and detective work by the Governmental
agencies, particularly the Division of Investigation of the Department of
Justice, with a view to solving the murder of N. On December 7, 1938. or
more than three years after the death of N, M, P, F and Q were

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prosecuted for the crime of murder. According to the theory of the

prosecution, F was selected as the trigger man for two reasons, namely:
because he is experienced in pistol shooting, having been cadet major in
the University of the Philippines, and because he was below eighteen
years of age and, if discovered and convicted, would be merely sent to
Lolomboy reformatory school. With reference to the first reason, it is even
represented that M, father of F, not only acquiesced in the arrangement
but apparently encouraged his son to perform the foul task, with the
simple remark that an assurance be made that the target was not missed
and, if if the testimony of a prosecution witness were to be believed, M
was to go in the meantime to Laoag, Ilocos Norte, thereby leaving his son
to accomplish the dirty job while he, the person most affected by the
electoral triumph of N, was to stay away safe and sound. F was
convicted, with the other defendants. The trial court was of the opinion
that the M, P, F and Q conceived the idea of killing N with some
seriousness only in the morning of September 209, 1935, after the
provocative and humiliating parade held by N's followers and partymen in
the afternoon of the preceding day. The Supreme Court, on appeal, found
no other evidence linking M, P, F and Q to the killing of N. Should such
conviction be sustained? (People vs. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468 [1940]).

(h) Absence of motive negating voluntariness.

Q77: X lives with his wife in his parent's house. One day, a fiesta
was being celebrated and visitors were entertained in the house. Among
them were Y and Z. Early that afternoon, X, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon
meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen.
X attacked Y and X and tried to attack his father after which he wounded
himself. X's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days
later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated
in the mother's womb. The evidence shows that the defendant not only
did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly.
Neither did he have any dispute with Y and Z, or have any motive for
assaulting them. Is motive relevant to the defense of X? (People vs.
Taneo, 58 Phil. 256 [1933]).

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