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Role of Internal and External Aids in Statutory Interpretation: A Disquisition

on Legitimateness of Jurisdictive Discretion

Article  in  SSRN Electronic Journal · January 2020

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3744740

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Role of Internal & External Aids in Statutory Interpretation: A
Disquisition on Legitimateness of “Jurisdictive Discretion” 1

By Sylvester Udemezue2

Introduction

This work is prompted by an article3 written by Professor Farooq Kperogi.4 In

his earlier published work,5 Professor Kperogi had declared that “Nigerian

newspapers interchange ‘impeach’ with ‘remove from office’ because they are

1
“Jurisdictive Discretion” is a term invented by the present author, based on the concept of
Parliamentary Sovereignty. The author believes that since the legislative body has absolute sovereignty
to make laws, it reserves the legislative discretion to assign to words, terms and expressions used in a
statute any meaning as it may deem fit. Any meaning so assigned is binding on the courts whose only
duty in interpretation of laws should be to find out the intention of the legislature and give effect to it,
since the legislature is presumed to have said what it meant, and to mean what it has said in the statute.
2
Sylvester C. Udemezue (udems), a Legal Practitioner in Nigeria, is a Law Lecturer at Nigerian Law
School, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. +234(0)8021365545, +234(0)8109024556.
[email protected].
3
Kperogi FA, “Impeachment: Response to an Ill-Informed Law Lecturer Called Sylvester Udemezue”
(Impeachment: Response to an Ill-informed Law Lecturer called Sylvester UdemezueJanuary 1, 1970)
<https://www.farooqkperogi.com/2019/12/impeachment-response-to-ill-informed.html> accessed
November 12, 2020. Prof Kperogi`s was a surrejoinder to an earlier piece by the present writer: see:
Udemezue S.C., “Meaning of Impeachment: How Prof Farooq Kperogi Displayed Double Ignorance In
His Condemnation Of The Nigerian Media & Lawmakers By Sylvester Udemezue”
(TheNigerialawyerDecember 19, 2019) <https://thenigerialawyer.com/meaning-of-impeachment-
how-prof-farooq-kperogi-displayed-double-ignorance-in-his-condemnation-of-the-nigerian-media-
lawmakers-by-sylvester-udemezue/> accessed November 12, 2020. The earlier article by Mr.
Udemezue was a rejoinder to Prof Kperogi`s: Kperogi FA, “Impeachment Does NOT Mean Removal from
Office” (Impeachment Does NOT Mean Removal from OfficeJanuary 1, 1970)
<https://www.farooqkperogi.com/2019/12/impeachment-does-not-mean-removal-from.html>
accessed November 12, 2020)
4
Farooq Kperogi is a Nigerian-born academic, media scholar, public speaker and newspaper columnist.
Kperogi served as an Associate Professor of Journalism & Emerging Media at Kennesaw State
University, Georgia, USA. He is now an Associate Professor of Communication at the same institution.
See http://kennesaw.academia.edu/FarooqKperogi/CurriculumVitae> accessed November 12, 2020).
5
Kperogi FA, “Impeachment Does NOT Mean Removal from Office,” Op Cit.

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copying the drafters of the Nigerian constitution who don’t seem to know what

'impeachment' really means. …The people who wrote the 1999 Nigerian

constitution are clearly not sufficiently educated about the meanings of the

terminologies they deployed in the constitution. And they passed on their

ignorance to the Nigerian news media and to the Nigerian populace.”6 Although

Prof. Kperogi is not a lawyer, his declaration has thrown up a number of salient

legal questions that need to be elucidated for the benefit of lawyers and non-

lawyers alike, in Nigeria, in America and elsewhere, especially as it appears that

Prof Kperogi`s untutored, inexpert opinion (with due respect to him) has

surprisingly received some benediction from few undiscerning Nigerians. Legal

questions thrown up for determination include (1) Whether Nigerian legislators

are not entitled to give any meaning to any word used in the Nigerian

Constitution or statute; (2) whether Nigerian Lawmakers, in determining the

meaning to be ascribed to a word used (or to be used) in the Constitution or any

other Nigerian statute, are bound by meaning of such words in the “English

dictionary” or under the US Constitution, and (3) whether any Nigerian statute

is inferior or invalid only because its language fails to comply with the form of

legislative language adopted in another jurisdiction.

To this end, this paper tries to explore the question: “How far, beyond the actual

or express words, language or express provisions of the statute itself, is it

permissible for courts, jurists, lawyers and non-lawyers alike to roam in their

6
Ibid.

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efforts to interpret legislation?” Put another way, what is the proper context in

which one is permitted to interpret legislative directives or provisions? This is a

question that is unavoidably intertwined with the more general question of the

proper approach to statutory interpretation. The major question sought to be

resolved herein is as to which shall prevail, in situations of conflict between

Internal and external aids to statutory interpretation? Specifically, using the

meaning of the word “impeachment” as our reference point, for illustration, in

view of Professor Kperogi`s conclusions, where the definition given to

“impeachment” under Nigerian Constitutional Law by the makers of the

country`s Constitution (internal aid) is found to be in conflict with the meaning

of the same word as used either in standard English or Law dictionaries (external

aid) or in other jurisdictions, such as the United States' Constitution (external

aid), how would we go about resolving the conflict?

The Role of Courts In Statutory Interpretation

A statute is an edict of the legislature. So, the conventional way of interpreting a

statute is to start by seeking the true intention of the makers of the affected

statute. It is the court of law that has the duty to decipher and act upon the

intention of the legislature or the mens or sentential legis. Mens legis7 is a Latin

term which means “the mind of the law;” it is used to refer to the purpose, spirit

7
See https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/mens-legis/, accessed November 12, 2020

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or intention of a law or of aws in general. The duty of courts, in this wise, is that

of objectively determining the legislative intention with guidance, furnished by

accepted principles.8 In determining the meaning to be attached to a word used

in a statute, the court must first look inwards, within the statute, to find out the

meaning intended by the makers of the statute, interpretation being the process

of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute, based on the

intentions of the legislature as conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language

used.

Scholars have identified three major rules of language applied by the courts for

purposes of statutory interpretation.9 They are (1) The Ejusdem Generis rule;10

(2) The Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius Rule and (3). The Noscitur a

sociis Rule. The “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius” Rule is relevant here and

states that the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of

all others not mentioned therein. This is illustrated by the case of R v Inhabitants

of Sedgely.11 The “Noscitur a sociis” Rule appears to be much more relevant

here; it postulates that “words (used in a statute) have no meaning except in the

context they are used.”12 The Niuean Interpretation Act provides in section 6 (1)

that “The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text, in light of

its purpose and in its context.” The legislature must be taken in a statute to have

8
R v. Secretary of State for the Environment expert Spath Holme, (2001) 1 All ER 195, p. 216(HL).
9
http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk, accessed November 12, 2020.
10
Powell v Kempton Park [1897] 2 QB 242); (2)
11
(1831) 2 B & Ad 65 (UK)
12
See Inland Revenue v Frere [1964] 3 All ER 796

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said exactly what it means, and also to mean in a statute exactly what it has said

therein. Although jurists may take the help of both the Rules or Canons of

Interpretation as well as some Internal Aids and External Aids to the Rules in the

interpretation of Statutes, it goes without saying that interpretation of a word or

expression must depend on the text and the context. In People v. Jefferson,13 the

California Court of Appeals, 4th District, USA, observed that the role of the

courts “in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to

effectuate the purpose of the law. According to the Court of Appeals of the US

state of Indiana, "the first and often last step in interpreting a statute is to examine

the language of the statute"14 As one writer puts it, “ statutory test should be both

the ending point as well as the starting point for interpretation.”15 This is because,

words are the skin of the language, while language is the medium of expressing

the object that a particular provision of the Act seeks to achieve. In other words,

to find the real intentions of the drafters of a statute, regard must be had to the

context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question. Courts

and jurists achieve this by carefully analyzing the whole scope and provisions of

the statute or of the section relating to the word or phrase under consideration.16

Though schools of statutory interpretation vary on what factors should be

considered, all approaches to statutory interpretation start (if not necessarily end)

with the language and structure of the statute itself.17 This is because the

13
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441
14
See Ashley v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1037, 1039, 1040 (2001)
15
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-589.html, accessed November 12, 2020
16
Rao, S., “External Aids to Interpretation of Statutes: A Critical Appraisal,” published on ww.ssrn.com,
accessed 22 December 2019.
17
Everycrsreport, Op Cit

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language and provisions of a statute are the most reliable indicators of the intent

of the makers of the statute.18

Aids to Statutory Interpretation

An Aid to statutory interpretation is a device that helps or assists in deciphering

the meaning of the words used in a statute.19 There are various aids to the rule of

interpretation, but for purposes of statutory interpretation, the courts usually have

recourse to both internal aids and external aids. Internal aids are those aids

which are available within the statute itself, though some of them may not be

part of the enactment. For example, a definition contained in the Definition

Section (Interpretation Clause) of a particular statute, not from any other

statute nor from anywhere else, should be used for the purpose of that statute.

The object of a definition section/clause is to avoid the necessity of frequent

repetitions in describing the subject matter to which the word or expression

defined is intended to apply.20 Explaining the value of Statutory Text or

Definition Section as a crucial tool for statutory interpretation in an article titled,

“A Guide to Reading, Interpreting And Applying Statutes,”21 Suraj Kumar and

Taylor Beech had this to say:

18
People v. Lawrence (2000) (US) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228]; See also Barnhart
v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)
19
Yadav V and others, “Aids to Interpretation of Statutes” (Law Times JournalMarch 3, 2019)
<http://lawtimesjournal.in/aids-to-interpretation-of-statutes/> accessed November 12, 2020
20
Ibid
21
published in 2017 in The Writing Centre of the Georgetown University Law Centre
<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-
and-Applying-Statutes-1.pdf> accessed November 12, 2020.

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 Many statutes contain a “definitions” section that sets forth and defines

the key terms used in the statute. You might find these definitions either

in the section of the statute you are analyzing or in one of the first sections

of the entire act. Sometimes these specific terms are codified as definitions

for a chapter or title of the relevant statute, meaning that they are

intended to apply to the entire chapter or title (unless otherwise

specified). These definitions are important because they suggest that

legislatures intended for a term to have a specific meaning that might

differ in important ways from its common usage.

External Aids are materials outside the statute but which are referred to in order

to decipher the meaning of words used in the statute. Internal Aids include Long

Title, Short Title, Preamble, Schedule, Marginal Notes, Headings and Title of a

Chapter, Punctuation, Explanatory Notes, other sections of the Act and the

Definition sections/clauses in the Act. External Aids include Dictionaries, Other

Statutes, Textbooks, Academic Writings, Law Commission Reports, Case law

(Judicial decisions), Hansard, and other materials outside the statute.

Internal Aids Versus External Aids

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The principle of law is that where the setting, provisions, context and object of

an enactment have provided sufficient guidance for interpretation of the words

used for purposes of such enactment, there is no need to have recourse to any

extrinsic/external materials. Put differently, where the statute itself contains

within itself, sufficient provisions to help determine the meaning of any word or

words used in the statute, the courts are to not look at anything outside the statute.

Explaining the crucial role Internal Aids play in statutory interpretation,

Rayhanul Islam22 argues that the legislature is entitled to lay down legal

definitions of its own language, and where such definitions are embodied in the

statute itself, it becomes binding on the courts. According to him, when the

statute itself provides a dictionary or other definition for the words used, the

court must look into that dictionary for interpretation. Accordingly, although

external aids are useful tools for the interpretation or construction of statutory

provisions, courts take recourse to external aids ONLY when internal aids are

either not forthcoming, non-existent or inadequate. In an Indian case, B.

Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of A.P. and others, 23 it was held that

“where internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to

external aids to discover the object of the legislation. This is now a well-settled

principle of modern statutory construction.” It is therefore safe to conclude that

where an external aid is inconsistent with an internal aid, for purposes of

22
Riya LN, Bangladesh LH and Rayhanul Islam, “Internal Aid of Interpretation” (Law Help BDJuly 15,
2019) <https://lawhelpbd.com/jurisprudence/internal-aid-interpretation/> accessed November 12,
2020
23
AIR 1986 SC 120, O,

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interpreting a particular word or expression used in a Statute (the Nigerian

Constitution for example), the meaning ascribed to the word within the statute,

by provisions of the statute (internal aid) must prevail over that given to it by the

external materials such as dictionaries or other statutes (external aid). Section

12(1) of the Jamaican Interpretation Act explains better. It provides that “where

expressions are defined in or for the purposes of any Act, such expressions shall

have the meanings assigned to them, unless there is anything in the subject or

context repugnant to, or inconsistent with, such meaning.”24 While explaining

the Cardinal principles governing the interpretation of constitutional provisions,

Nikki Tobi (JSC) stated in the Nigerian case of Inakoju & Ors V. Adeleke &

Ors,25 observed:

“This court cannot in the interpretation of specific provisions of the

Constitution, gallivant about or around what makers of the Constitution

do not say or intend. On the contrary, this court must interpret any section

of the Constitution to convey the meaning assigned to it by the makers of

the Constitution?”

Jurisdictive Discretion (Legislative License)

It is a truism in legislative drafting and process that lawmakers, while ascribing

definitions to words used in a statute, are not obliged to adopt the dictionary or

popular meaning or interpretation of such words. The truth is, as Nsofor JCA

24
http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic2_jam_interpretation_act.pdf
25
(2007) LPELR-1510 (SC)

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observed in Yusuf v. Obasanjo,26 “we are not slaves to words; indeed, we are

their masters.” Thus, in legislative drafting or process, words take any meaning

as assigned to them by the law makers, and this is because lawmakers reserve

the discretion or have the license to give to any word any meaning as they (the

law makers) may deem fit. Where the words used in a statute are defined in a

peculiar way, and are perhaps given a meaning different from their ordinary,

contemporary, common meaning, the courts are bound by the meaning provided

within or by the statute. See the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit in the case of United States v. Piervinanzi.27 The US Supreme Court

appears to have given a good guide on this. In the case of Consumer Product

Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al.,28 the US apex Court stated

that “the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute

itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that

language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive”

It is this discretion/license/freedom that the present author has chosen to describe

as “Jurisdictive Discretion” or “Legislative License.” In other words,

“Jurisdictive Discretion” is a term invented by the present author, based on the

concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty29 (also known as Parliamentary

26
(2003) All FWLR (Pt. 172) 1862)
27
23 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1994)
28
447 U.S. 102 (1980)
29
Note that Legislative sovereignty is subject to certain restrictions. First is the doctrine of separation
of powers which limits the legislature's scope often to general law-making (for example, every Bill made
by the legislature requires executive assent before it can become law, although there is the legislative
power of veto, in Nigeria, for example, under section 58 (5) of the Nigerian Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended), and second, judicial review, where laws passed by the
legislature may be declared invalid in certain circumstances by the courts.

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Supremacy or Legislative Supremacy), which is a concept in the Constitutional

Law of some countries; the concept postulates that the legislature possesses

absolute sovereignty to make laws and that for this purpose, the legislature is

supreme over all other government institutions, including the executive and the

judiciary. It also holds that the legislature reserves the right or discretion to

change or repeal any previous legislation as it may deem necessary, and that (for

purposes of law-making), the legislature is not bound to adopt the format or

content in any written law or precedent.30 The author believes that since the

legislative body has absolute sovereignty to make laws, it possesses the

legislative discretion, license or freedom to assign to any words, terms and

expressions used in a statute, any meaning as it may deem fit. And any meaning

so assigned becomes binding on the courts whose only duty in interpretation of

laws should be to find out the intention of the legislature and give effect to it,

since the legislature is presumed to have said what it meant, and to mean what it

has said in the statute. This concept is so strong that where language of legislation

and case law are in conflict, there is a presumption that legislation takes

precedence.31 While Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to legislate, and the

jurisdictive discretion to assign any meaning it deems fit to words and

expressions used in statutes; the courts retain the sole jurisdiction

to interpret statutory language, albeit with a view to giving effect to the intention

30
“Parliamentary Sovereignty” (WikipediaDecember 8, 2019)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_sovereignty> accessed November 12, 2020
31
“Statutory Interpretation” (WikipediaDecember 5, 2019)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_interpretation> accessed November 12, 2020

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of the lawmakers. Where, however, the legislature is uncomfortable with the

interpretation given to a particular statute by the courts, the legislature reserves

the right or discretion (jurisdictive discretion) to override the Court. According

to Eskridge, in the USA alone, between 1967 and 1990, about 187 decisions of

US courts were overridden by statutes.32 Even the executive power of Assent33

provided for under the Constitution of many countries is not absolute because,

in Nigeria, for example, section 58 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic

of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, provides that “where the President withholds his

assent and the bill is again passed by each House by two-thirds majority, the bill

shall become law and the assent of the President shall not be required.” These

are a further confirmation of Jurisdictive Discretion.

One may give yet another illustration of a legitimate exercise of Jurisdictive

Discretion by drawing a simple distinction between the word “DIRECTOR” as

defined by the an English Dictionary and the same word as used under the

Nigerian Corporate Law. Oxford provides a definition of “director”34 in English

as either (1) a person who is in charge of an activity, department, or organization;

or (2) a member of the board of people that manages or oversees the affairs of a

32
Eskridge WN, “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions” (1991) 101 The Yale
Law Journal 331
33
Section 58(3) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Cap C19, Laws of the Federation
of Nigeria, 2004 provides that “Where a bill has been passed by the House in which it originated, it shall
be sent to the other House, and it shall be presented to the President for assent when it has been
passed by that other House and agreement has been reached between the two Houses on any
amendment made on it.”
34
“Director: Definition of Director by Lexico” (Lexico Dictionaries | English)
<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/director> accessed November 12, 2020

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business; or (3) a person who supervises the actors and other staff in a film, play,

or similar production. On the other hand, it is seen that the meaning of the word

“director” as used under Nigerian Law is much wider than the meaning ascribed

to it by the Oxford English dictionary. The term “director,” under Nigerian law,

is used to mean any one of the following: (1) persons duly appointed by the

company to direct and manage the business of the company;35 or (2) Any person,

who need not be a member or officer of a company, on whose instructions and

directions the directors of a company are accustomed to act;36 or (3) Any person

occupying the position of director by whatever name called. 37 The obvious

implication of this is that, in other to be treated as a director of a Company in

Nigeria, a person need not be a member or officer of the company and need not

even be among the persons who were/are expressly appointed or named as

directors of the company. As observed by Taofeeq Yusuf,38 although English is

the language of the law in Nigeria, it has been held repeatedly by the courts39

that “words may take a technical meaning when used in legal instruments or

statutes and sometimes may seem grammatically incorrect.”

There is no point belaboring the principle that legislators reserve the discretion

(jurisdictive discretion) to give any meaning/definition as they may choose, to

any word used in a particular statute, and that such definition, when given is

35
see section 269((1) Companies & Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 2020 (Nigeria).
36
Op Cit, section 868(1)
37
Ibid
38
Legal Practitioner, Senior Lecturer, Nigerian Law school, Kano, Nigeria
39
See for example DAMINA v. STATE (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt.415) 546

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binding on the courts and on all. This is why the word “impeachment” in

Nigerian Constitutional Law means “removal from office,” while in the United

States Constitution, the same word is used to mean “indict” or “accuse.”

Viewed from the perspective of the discussions above, one may safely conclude

that Prof Farooq Kperogi spoke out of sheer inexperience when he described

“the people who wrote the 1999 Nigerian Constitution” as “clearly not

sufficiently educated about the meanings of the terminologies they deployed in

the Constitution. And they passed on their ignorance to the Nigerian news media

and to the Nigerian populace.”40 The Professor`s unversed outburst and

bumbling position may be overlooked on grounds that he is not a lawyer but only

a journalist and teacher of journalism; he is neither learned in the niceties of law

nor does he understand the concepts and principles at play in legislative

drafting, legislative process, statutory interpretation and on the legislative

independence of legal systems and sovereign nations. What Prof Kperogi failed

to appreciate is that, partly because each country is a sovereign with power to

determine its fate and order its affairs, provisions of statutes as well as meaning

of purpose of words and expressions used in certain statutes differ from country

to country. Nigeria law is not American law. Every sovereign country maintains

and operates its own legal system with a set of laws, rules and regulations (based

on its own needs, desires and peculiarities). It is erroneous for anyone to suggest

40
Kperogi FA, “Impeachment Does NOT Mean Removal from Office” (Impeachment Does NOT Mean
Removal from Office January 1, 1970) <https://www.farooqkperogi.com/2019/12/impeachment-does-
not-mean-removal-from.html> accessed November 12, 2020

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that the standard, format or provisions of US laws and rules should or must be

extended to dictate the tone, pace or language of Nigerian laws. In having argued

that, because “impeachment” is used under the American Constitutional Law to

mean “accusation” or “indictment”, the word must necessarily be assigned the

same meaning under the Nigerian legal system, what Prof Kperogi has done is,

with due respect, akin to one suggesting that the President of the United States

of America should extend his leadership to cover Nigeria, an independent nation.

As the present author has explained, based on law, when a legislative house

ascribes to a statutory word a meaning that is different, wider or narrower than

the popular meaning of the affected word, it does not mean that the legislators

are ignorant or unaware of the existence and scope of the popular, dictionary

meaning. Such is a legitimate exercise of Jurisdictive Discretion. And this is in

consonance with both the positivist and the realist ideas of law as a matter of

what has been posited (enacted) by the legislative authority. Courts must

presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute

what it says therein. Those were the words of a United States Court in the case

of Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain.41 Legal positivism, for example,

represents the theory that the existence and content of law depends on social facts

and not on its merits. The English jurist, John Austin42 had formulated the idea

that “the existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it

41
112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)
42
(1790–1859)

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be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed

standard, is a different enquiry” As Green and Adams have observed,43 the

positivist proposition does not say that law’s merits are unintelligible,

unimportant, or peripheral to the philosophy of law. It rather says that they do

not determine whether laws or legal systems exist. In conclusion, they argue that

whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of certain structures

of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice. In effect,

what laws are in force in a society/system depends on what social standards its

officials recognize as authoritative; for example, legislative enactments, judicial

decisions, or social customs. These standards differ from jurisdiction to

jurisdiction and from country to country. No one country is entitled to impose its

own standards on any other sovereign country or to expect that the standard in

another country must be measured with its own lens. This is the reason behind

the age-long principle, that one country`s judicial decisions lack binding effect

on the stare decisis of another country.44 It is settled law in Nigeria that

provisions of foreign statutes do not apply to Nigeria except those and to the

extent permitted by Nigerian law or statutes. Hon Justice Nikki Tobi, JSC offered

an explanation to this, in the case of Inakoju & Ors V. Adeleke & Ors, where

he said:45

43
Green L and Adams T, “Legal Positivism” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, December 17, 2019)
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/> accessed November 12, 2020
44
See the Nigerian cases of Alli v. Okulaja (1972) 2 All NLR 351; Dada v.The State (1977) 2 NLR 135;
Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd. v. Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47; and Oladiran v. The State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.
14) 75.
45
(2007) LPELR-1510 (SC) pp. 61-62, paras. C-B

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 Certainly, it will not only be ridiculous but an abuse of statehood with all

its attendant ramifications in international law, for courts of a sovereign

country operating an equally sovereign and independent legal system to

be bound by decisions of courts of another country having the same status

in international law and practice. The United Nations Charter clearly

recognizes the equality of States as subjects of international law, even the

smallest States, and so the question of one sovereign nation succumbing

to the judicial decisions of another sovereign nation should not arise at

all, no matter the historical tie or connection. Viewed from this angle, it

is submitted that decisions of English courts, whether by the House of

Lords or the Court of Appeal, should be persuasive authorities in Nigeria,

and this applies to all Nigerian courts.

It must however be pointed out that, unlike the position in Constitutional Law,

the Law of Evidence of Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States of

America appear to use the word “impeachment” to mean the same thing. In each

of the three countries, the term is used to refer to the process of calling into

question the credibility of an individual testifying as a witness in a trial; i.e.,

discrediting a witness by cross-examining the witness about facts that reflect

poorly on the witness' credibility or, in some cases, or by introducing extrinsic

evidence that reflects negatively on the witness' truthfulness or knowledge. It is

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reported46 that under the common law of England, a party could impeach its own

witness if one of four special circumstances was met, namely: (1) If the witness

was an adverse party (such as the plaintiff/claimant calling the defendant to the

stand, or vice versa); (2) If the witness was hostile (such as the witness refusing

to co-operate with the party that called him/her); (3) If the witness was one that

the party was required by law to call as a witness; and (4) If the witness surprised

the party who called him by giving damaging testimony against that party. In the

USA, the Federal Rule of Evidence47 permits any party to impeach (that is,

attack) the credibility of any witness. Tracey Timlin48 explains:

Rule 608 (b) of the United States` Federal Rules of Evidence provides one

of the most useful and powerful impeachment tools available to lawyers

during cross-examination. Specifically, Rule 608(b) enables lawyers to

ask targeted and damaging questions about a witness’ past bad actions,

or specific instances of misconduct, during cross-examination. A strong

line of questioning under Rule 608(b) can destroy a witness` credibility

and leave little room for rehabilitation.

Nigeria`s Evidence Act, 2011, summarizes the position under the Nigerian

evidence law when it states that “the credit of a witness may be impeached in the

46
“Witness Impeachment” (Wikipedia, December 12, 2018)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witness_impeachment> accessed November 12, 2020
47
Rule 607
48
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/trial-practice/practice/2019/rule-608-
b-impeachment-tool/ accessed November 12, 2020

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following ways by any party other than the party calling him or with the consent

of the court by the party who calls him (a) by the evidence of persons who testify

that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe him to be unworthy of

credit; (b) by proof that the witness has been bribed, or has accepted the offer of

a bribe, or has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence; or

(c) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which

is liable to be contradicted.”49

Conclusion

The point being made here, flowing from the aforesaid, is that lawmakers all

over the world have the Jurisdictive Discretion to give any definition as they

deem fit, to any word, term or expression used in any statute. And those for

whom the law is made and to whom it applies are bound by such definition. Thus,

where a certain legislation decides to ascribe to a word, a peculiar meaning that

is or appears wider, narrower or even different from the dictionary, popular

meaning, such meaning must be preferred to the popular meaning. That is the

case with the Nigerian Constitutional Law under which “impeachment” means

“removal from office,” as opposed to its meaning in the USA. The makers of

Nigeria’s Constitution are not obliged to adopt the definition of “impeach” as

used in American Constitutional Law. And Nigerian courts or lawyers have no

reasons to have recourse to the US Constitution or the English Dictionary (both

49
Section 233

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 of which are mere external aids) in determining the import of the word

“impeachment” as used in the Nigerian Constitution, since the Nigerian

Constitution has by itself left no one in doubt as to what meaning the makers of

the Constitution intended the word to have or bear.50 Flowing directly from the

concept of sovereignty of nations, is the principle that the highest law-making

body in each independent country is the ultimate overseer or authority in the law-

making process of the country, for the order and good governance of that

country. It would be absurd for anyone to suggest that the legislative language

in one country (such as in Nigeria) must conform with that of another country.

And the mere fact that a country`s legislative language as expressed in its statutes

differs from that of another country, does not render the lawmakers in the former

ignorant or unlearned, neither does that adversely affect the potency or cogency

of its legislation.

The End

By:

Sylvester Chukwunekwu Udemezue,

Legal Practitioner,
Lecturer,
Nigerian Law School (Yenagoa Campus),
Bayelsa State, Nigeria.
08109024556, 08021365545.
[email protected].

50
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, sections 146(3)(a) and 191(3)(a).

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