Communications and Culture

Communications has been defined as the conveying or exchanging

of information and ideas. This wide definition is taken as the
starting-point for this series of books, which are not bound by
conventional academic divisions. The series aims to document or
analyse a broad range of cultural forms and ideas.
It encompasses works from areas as esoteric as linguistics and
as exoteric as television. The language of communication may be
the written word or the moving picture, the static icon or the
living gesture. These means of communicating can at their best
blossom into and form an essential part of the other mysterious
concept, culture.
There is no sharp or intended split in the series between
communication and culture. On one definition, culture refers to
the organisation of experience shared by members of a community,
a process which includes the standards and values for judging or
perceiving, for predicting and acting. In this sense, creative com-
munication can make for a better and livelier culture.
The series reaches towards the widest possible audience. Some
of the works concern themselves with activities as general as play
and games; others offer a narrower focus, such as the ways of
understanding the visual image. It is hoped that some moves in
the transformation of the artful and the scientific can be achieved,
and that both can begin to be understood by a wider and more
comprehending community. Some of these books are written by
practitioners - broadcasters, journalists and artists; others come
from critics, scholars, scientists and historians.
The series has an ancient and laudable, though perhaps unten-
able, aim - an aim as old as the Greeks and as new as holography;
it aspires to help heal the split between cultures, between the
practitioners and the thinkers, between science and art, between
the academy and life.

PAUL WALTON
COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURE
Executive Editors STUART HALL, PAUL WALTON
Published
Tony Bennett and Janet WoollacottBOND AND BEYOND: THE
POLITICAL CAREER OF A POPULAR HERO
Victor Burgin (ed.) THINKING PHOTOGRAPHY
Victor Burgin THE END OF ART THEORY: CRITICISM AND
POSTMODERNITY
lain Chambers URBAN RHYTHMS: POP MUSIC AND POPULAR
CULTURE
Andrew Davies OTHER THEATRES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ALTERNATIVE AND EXPERIMENTAL THEATRE IN BRITAIN
Erving Goffman GENDER ADVERTISEMENTS
Stephen Heath QUESTIONS OF CINEMA
Herbert Marcuse THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION: TOWARDS A
CRITIQUE OF MARXIST AESTHETICS
Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE
John Tulloch and Manuel Alvarado'DOCTOR WHo': THE
UNFOLDING TEXT
Janet Wolff THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF ART
Forthcoming
Jerry Booth and Peter Lewis RADIO: MEANINGS AND
AUDIENCES
Philip Corrigan CULTURE AND CONTROL
James Donald (ed.) CULTURAL ANALYSIS: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND CULTURAL THEORY
Stuart Hall REPRODUCING IDEOLOGIES
Dick Hebdige THE MEANING OF SUBCULTURES
Claire Johnston FEMINISM AND CINEMA
Simon Jones: BLACK CULTURE, WHITE YOUTH
John Tagg THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION
Peter Widdowson (ed.) CONSUMING FICTIONS? POPULAR
LITERATURE TODAY
 Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture
Edited and with an Introduction by
CARY NELSON and LAWRENCE GROSSBERG

M
MACMILLAN
EDUCATION
© Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 1988
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First published 1988

Published by
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Companies and representatives
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Marxism and the interpretation of culture.
_ _(communications and culture).
l. Communism and culture
I. Nelson, Cary II. Grossberg, Lawrence
III. Series
306'.01 HX523
ISBN 978-0-333-46276-8 ISBN 978-1-349-19059-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-19059-1

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 Contents

Preface, ix

Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson

Introduction: The Territory of Marxism, 1

Rethinking the Crisis in Marxism

Cornel West
Marxist Theory and the Specificity of Afro-American Oppression, 17
Discussion, 30

Stuart Hall
The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists, 35
Discussion, 58

Henri Lefebvre
Toward a Leftist Cultural Politics: Remarks Occasioned by the
Centenary of Marx's Death, 75

Chantal Mouffe
Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of
Democracy, 89
Discussion, 102

Catharine A. MacKinnon
Desire and Power: A Feminist Perspective, 105
Discussion, 117

Paul Patton
Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization, 123
Discussion, 137

A. Belden Fields
In Defense of Political Economy and Systemic Analysis: A Critique of
Prevailing Theoretical Approaches to the New Social
Movements, 141

II Toward a Contemporary Marxism

Etienne Balibar
The Vacillation of Ideology, 159

Oskar Negt
What Is a Revival of Marxism and Why Do We Need One Today?:
Centennial Lecture Commemorating the Death of Karl Marx, 211

Gajo Petrovic
Philosophy and Revolution: Twenty Sheaves of Questions, 235

v
 Ernesto Laclau
Metaphor and Social Antagonisms, 249

Christine Delphy
Patriarchy, Domestic Mode of Production, Gender, and Class, 259
Discussion, 268

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Can the Subaltern Speak?, 271

Ill The Politics of Modernity and Postmodernity

Perry Anderson
Modernity and Revolution, 317
Discussion, 334

Franco Moretti
The Spell of Indecision, 339
Discussion, 345

Fredric Jameson
Cognitive Mapping, 347
Discussion, 358

Andrew Ross
The New Sentence and the Commodity Form: Recent American
Writing, 361

Fred Pfeil
Postmodernism as a "Structure of Feeling," 381

Eugene Holland
Schizoanalysis: The Postmodern Contextualization of
Psychoanalysis, 405

IV Culture, Domination, and Resistance

Julia Lesage
Women's Rage, 419

Michele Mattelart
Can Industrial Culture Be a Culture of Difference?: A Reflection on
France's Confrontation with the U.S. Model of Serialized Cultural
Production, 429

Fernando Reyes Matta

The "New Song" and Its Confrontation in Latin America, 447

Simon Frith
Art Ideology and Pop Practice, 461

Michael Ryan
The Politics of Film: Discourse, Psychoanalysis, Ideology, 477

vi
 Jack L. Amariglio, Stephen A. Resnick, and Richard D. Wolff
Class, Power, and Culture, 487

Jean Franco
Beyond Ethnocentrism: Gender, Power, and the Third-World
Intelligentsia, 503

V Science, Technology, Politics, and Ethics

Stanley Aronowitz
The Production of Scientific Knowledge: Science, Ideology, and
Marxism, 519
Discussion, 538

Sue Golding
The Concept of the Philosophy of Praxis in the Ouaderni of Antonio
Gramsci, 543

Richard Schacht
Marxism, Normative Theory, and Alienation, 565

Armand Mattelart
Communications in Socialist France: The Difficulty of Matching
Technology with Democracy, 581

lain Chambers
Contamination, Coincidence, and Collusion: Pop Music, Urban
Culture, and the Avant-Garde, 607
Discussion, 612

VI The Politics of Theory and Interpretation

Terry Eagleton
The Critic as Clown, 619

Michel P~cheux
Discourse: Structure or Event?, 633

Hugo Achugar
The Book of Poems as a Social Act: Notes toward an Interpretation of
Contemporary Hispanic American Poetry, 651

Darko Suvin
Can People Be (Re)Presented in Fiction?: Toward a Theory of
Narrative Agents and a Materialist Critique beyond Technology or
Reductionism, 663

vii
Michele Barrett
The Place of Aesthetics in Marxist Criticism, 697

Fengzhen Wang
Marxist Literary Criticism in China, 715

Notes on Contributors, 723

Index, 733

viii
 Preface
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture grew out
of a series of events organized by the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive
Theory at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the summer
of 1983: a group of courses taught by several of the contributors (An-
derson, Fields, Grossberg, Hall, Jameson, Lesage, Petrovic, Schacht, Spi-
vak) were attended by several hundred faculty members and students;
the Marxist Literary Group held its annual meeting; and the summer cul-
minated in a large international conference. For many of those who at-
tended the conference, therefore, it was very much a culmination and
working out of discussions and disputes that had not only a long prior
history but also a very specific and extended interactive history that sum-
mer. During the following two years most of the papers were very heavily
revised, in part as a result of the challenge of the whole summer's events.
Several additional essays were solicited from people who were invited
but could not attend the conference, and a few people who attended the
conference but did not present papers submitted essays on their own.
We have retained from the conference itself only
those commentaries and discussion sessions that suggest substantive
critiques of a position, develop significantly the central issues of a par-
ticular essay, or provide interesting contrasts among positions. We have
included the names of people asking questions or offering comments
whenever they were willing to be identified; and we have cooperated
with those who preferred to remain anonymous. We have also tried to
follow people's wishes about such matters as whether or not to capitalize
"Marxism." Finally, we should note that the editors assisted with the
translation of the essays by Achugar, Balibar, Lefebvre, Mouffe, Negt,
and Wang.
Neither the conference nor the book would have been
possible without the help of a great many people. For advice, continuing
assistance, and the benefit of their experience we give special thanks to
Daniel Alpert, Nina Baym, David Bright, Theodore Brown, David Colley,
Judith Edelstein, William Fierke, Joel Hersig, Roger Martin, Mark Netter,
Gary North, William Plater, William Prokasy, Edward Sullivan, Patricia
Wenzel, Richard Wentworth, and Linda Wilson. Jefferson Hendricks
helped coordinate the conference, and many people worked long hours
during it: Roberta Astroff, Steve Ater, Van Cagle, Meredith Cargill, Sri-
ankle Chang, K. C. Chen, Karen Cole, Jon Crane, John Duvall, Michael
Greer, William May, Nelly Mitchell, Lisa Odell, Steve Olsen, David Riefman,
Mary Robinson, Phillip Sellers, and Tim Vere. James Kavanaugh provided
helpful advice on the Balibar translation. Karen Ford, Michael Greer, Mar-
sha Bryant, Teresa Magnum, Gail Rost, and Anne Balsamo assisted us
in assembling the final manuscript. The book was copyedited by Theresa
L. Sears. Financial support within the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign came from the School of Humanities, the College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences, the College of Communications, the Research Board,
the George A. Miller Endowment Fund, International Programs and Ser-
vices, the Office for Women's Resources and Services, the School of
Social Sciences, the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies,
the University Library, the Institute of Communications Research, theRe-

ix
ligious Studies Program, and the Departments of Anthropology, English,
French, Germanic Languages and Literatures, History, Philosophy, Polit-
ical Science, Sociology, and Speech Communication; external support
came from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The book was
designed by David Colley.

X
 Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson

The rather broad title of this book, Marxism and the

Interpretation of Culture, signals our belief in an emerging change in the
discursive formations of contemporary intellectual life, a change that cuts
across the humanities and the social sciences. It suggests that the proper
horizon for interpretive activity, whatever its object and whatever its dis-
ciplinary base, is the entire field of cultural practices, all of which give
meaning, texture, and structure to human life. Moreover, the title situates
Marxism at the center of such developments and thus suggests the need to
transgress the line that has traditionally separated culture from social, eco-
nomic, and political relations. Marxism, of course, has long been at least
implicitly involved in breaking down the barriers between these domains,
making each of necessity a site of interpretive activity-by politicizing in-
terpretive and cultural practices, by looking at the economic determinations
of cultural production, by radically historicizing our understanding of sig-
nifying practices-from political discourses to art, from beliefs to social
practices, from the discourse of psychology to the discourse of economics-
and, of course, by continuing to revise and enlarge a body of theory with
multidisciplinary implications. It is nearly impossible, for example, to imag-
ine that one can construct a well-informed Marxist analysis of literature
without taking into account reccent work in historiography, popular culture,
theories of otherness and sexual difference, and analyses of the contemporary
political scene. The essays gathered here clearly extend and complicate that
tradition. And we hope that a further step is taken in collecting these diverse
projects within one volume.
Indeed the very act of gathering these essays together
challenges their self-sufficiency in ways some of the authors would, no doubt,
be disinclined to allow. If the book undermines the traditional divisions
between academic disciplines, it also, by its scope, by the juxtapositions it
creates, of necessity calls many of the individual contributions into question.
This book, then, is intended to be a collective intervention in the contested
terrain it maps. Its identity depends both on the strengths of the individual
essays and on the innumerable connections and disputations evoked when
the essays are compared and contrasted. The structure of the book is de-
signed to facilitate this process of making unfamiliar connections and to
resist offering itself as its own alternative, stable map. In planning a con-
ference on this topic, we felt we had to recognize certain standard (but often
marginalized) subject areas-popular culture, Latin America, feminism-so
as to be certain that relevant constituencies were guaranteed a forum and
a chance to work together; as a result, we adopted a dual strategy of both
organizing separate sessions on these topics and placing related papers in
other sessions. In organizing the book, we were able to encourage more
diverse theoretical intersections. To read the book, we think, is to be drawn
to reorganize both it and the domain of culture itself, for any point of
entrance will lead one to risk losing control of the disciplinary terrain one
considered a secure possession. Reading the book involves continually re-
cognizing not only similarities and differences among the essays, relations
that transgress traditional disciplines, but also multiple ways of structuring
the book and thus of charting a path through the terrain in which the re-
lations among power, signification, and history are defined and debated.
Thus, for example, to read Ross on the political implications of
new writing practices is potentially to be encouraged to think of connections
with Mouffe's analysis of how new social alliances are constituted. These
issues in turn overlap with Anderson's and Petrovic's rather different con-
structions ofthe connotations of revolutionary change. Their essays connect
with Suvin's reconsideration of the representability of persons, a key issue
in revolutionary art, with Moretti's critique of the politics of modernism,
and with Reyes Matta's analysis of the role popular culture plays in radical
change. And all of these essays are either explicitly or implicitly in dialogue
with the volume's pervasive concern with the politics of theorizing within
the contemporary social formation. Alternatively, to read Ross on com-
modification may lead one to think of connections with Laclau, Pecheux,
and Spivak on the discursive nature of power; with Lefebvre, Patton, and
both Mattelarts on postmodernity and production; with Chambers and Frith
on the meaning of popular resistance; and, more obviously, with Pfeil, Hol-
land, Jameson, and Ryan. Yet the book also interrupts Ross's discourse
with the feminist demands articulated by Mouffe, MacKinnon, Lesage, and
Delphy, and with the more traditional sense of cultural politics in the essays
by Reyes Matta, Achugar, and even Schacht and Negt. As every such path-
way carries the reader into its own disciplinary and ideological articulations,
reading itself becomes an effort to empower particular ways of constituting
the discourses of Marxism, of foregrounding particular questions and an-
swers. Our own interest is in multiplying these alternatives.
As little as twenty years ago it would have been impossible to
imagine such a project and such a volume. Even as late as 1975, collections
on Marxism and culture were limited to a predictable group of writers and
interpretive frameworks.' Across a wide range of disciplines, culture was
explained in terms of structures of power that were assumed as given and
rarely questioned. Culture itself was always viewed as secondary and often
as epiphenomenal. Marx and Engels themselves, of course, repeatedly had
questioned the role of culture in politics and economics, just as they rec-
ognized the need to interpret literature and art politically and historically. 2
But their work here was very tentative and their suggestions often in conflict.
Moreover, their accounts of the relations between culture and society were
dependent on some of their most notoriously ambiguous concepts, such as
ideology (a concept whose problematic history is recounted and newly chal-
lenged in this volume by Balibar and given subtle and reflective application
2
 Grossberg and Nelson
by Hall and Spivak), intellectual labor, and base/superstructure. Later, the
Communist party institutionalized Marxist theory in the form of Zhda-
novism (the doctrine of socialist realism officially sanctioned by the Second
and Third Internationals), and culture was reduced to a reflection of eco-
nomic relations. 3 Since culture was considered to be totally determined by
its class origin and mode of production, its politics seemed easy to define.
This sort of Marxism typically refused to grant cultural practices
any specificity or to consider their active role in defining social relations
and resisting political domination. Cultural forms were generally linked to
specific classes. The dominant culture belonged to the dominant class and
reflected both its interests and its interpretation of reality. When working-
class culture that met the criteria of socialist realism could be found, it was
celebrated as revolutionary. More frequently, the working class was seen as
having accepted the ideas of the dominant class, ideas that represented the
dominant position and thus distorted actual working-class living conditions.
This theory dependably produced readings that revealed the economic con-
tent and class perspective disguised in culture's surface, formal character-
istics. 4
Yet this dismissal is itself overly reductive, for the theoretical
orientation did yield powerful insights and did place the political and social
significance of cultural production on the agenda of interpretive theory,
successfully challenging the unthinking idealization of high art. Moreover,
even the most notoriously reductive elements of traditional Marxism are
difficult to dismiss easily. In fact, one might argue that reflection theories,
however qualified and problematized, play a necessary and constitutive role,
not only for all later and more sophisticated Marxisms, but also in all his-
torically or politically grounded interpretation. Finally, the established canon
of Marxist criticism provided the tradition against which an alternative
tradition of Marxist cultural theorizing could be defined-not only, however,
by way of correction, amplification, revision, or outright rejection, but also
by way of an uneasy relation of derivation, potential return, and perhaps
even occasional nostalgia for the security of its political interpretations.
"Vulgar Marxism," that overdetermined and mythically hypostatized cat-
egory, remains the anxiously regarded double of contemporary Marxist writ-
ing.
As it happens, an alternative tradition has existed for some time,
but it remained, even as late as the 1950s, largely unknown. Antonio Gram-
sci's Prison Notebooks, central here to the essays by Hall, Laclau, West,
Mouffe, and Golding, were unpublished. 5 Lukacs's Hegelian reading of Marx,
a reading he had repeatedly renounced, and his theory of reification, which
argued against the simple class exploitation model, remained untranslated
(History and Class Consciousness, first published in 1923, appeared in En-
glish only in 1971).6 The work of Karl Korsch and Rosa Luxemburg was
virtually unknown. 7 Also untranslated were the important 1930s debates
between Lukacs and Bloch and among Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno. 8 And,
of course, work by Marx and Engels, including the Economic and Philo-
sophical Manuscripts, that later would prove influential remained unpub-
lished. 9 Moreover, productive contradictions in work that at first seemed
to provide a radical opening and then seemed more traditional and reduc-
tive, such as Lukacs's attacks on the modern bourgeois novel, took some
time to be carefully explored and recuperated in terms of their full com-
3
 plexity. 10 While Lukacs shifted critical attention to matters of form, and
thus foregrounded the specificity of superstructural effects, he continued to
read literary texts as if their class origin determined their representation of
reality. The modern bourgeois novel was to be valued to the extent that it
accurately depicted the fragmentation and lack of totalization at the heart
of bourgeois reality. Unable to offer an alternative vision, the modern bour-
geois novel failed the political test Lukacs set for all literature.
In the end, however, it was not only the internal development
of theory but also changes in the broader social formation that prompted
the need for a more sophisticated Marxism. It is essential to realize that
each generation is driven to theorize by the particular historical tendencies
and events that confront it. In the twentieth century, as it happens, each
generation has faced developments that have in some ways been parallel,
such as the different stages of technological revolution; though always in-
flected differently, these developments have stimulated the appearance of
related problematics at different points in the history of Marxist theory. If
we keep in mind the economic, political, and social upheavals that accom-
panied the development of modernity, we will recognize that the major
concerns of modern Western Marxism were formed in large part in response
to the changing historical context of the Western capitalist nations. Thus
the first major attempts to revise Marxism came between the two world
wars, partly in response to the rise of fascism, the failure of the European
working classes to organize in the name of a socialist revolution, Stalin's
rise to power and the establishment of state communism in Russia, and,
finally, the beginnings of the second industrial revolution, a revolution of
technology and communication.
Interestingly, some of the historical pressures that these events
produced have been repeated in structurally similar ways. One can trace
the history of Marxist theorizing as, in part, a continuing response to a series
of questions repeatedly prompted by historical events. One such question,
at the heart of twentieth-century Marxism and debated throughout this
volume, concerns the identity of the potentially revolutionary subject. In
the 1930s Marxists faced the problem that the working classes did not in
fact revolt in the way Marx had expected. After the Second World War a
different but comparable issue arose-the need to understand the impact of
mass culture on working-class lives (lives that were, for a time, no longer
lived in poverty) and to confront the question of how the working class
might retain the resistance that was at least a potential of class difference.
Increasingly, Marxism, under what Ernest Mandel has called "late capital-
ism," has had to confront a quite unexpectedly different structure of class
relations. 11 Thus, in the 1960s it became necessary to consider whether the
potential revolutionary subject had actually been displaced, that, as events
seemed to suggest, it was no longer to be found in the efforts of the working
class to organize itself but in protest movements centered around blacks,
distinctly privileged and middle-class college students, and women. As it
happened, these movements had a number of specific successes. But the
largely existential critiques they offered lacked an economic base, and the
movements themselves failed not only to present an alternative organiza-
tional infrastructure but also to produce broad and pervasive political change.
Their failure became the challenge for the theorists of the 1970s. A number
of specific developments in Marxist theory, such as Lukacs's understanding
4
 Grossberg and Nelson
of how class consciousness is different from class position, or the elaboration
of subcultural theory in the 1970s, speak directly to these different social
realities. Many of the essays that follow, including those by Hall, Balibar,
Mouffe, and Negt, respond both directly and indirectly to this challenge.
A number of the writers included here were either active in or
strongly influenced by another development of postwar society-the rise of
the New Left, which gave the emerging theories of Western Marxism an
organizational form. A loose, partly organized, partly fragmented configu-
ration of varied political commitments and intellectual projects, the New
Left helped establish the intellectual networks and shared urgencies that
would later energize debate within Marxist theory. Beginning in England
and in Europe as early as the mid-1950s (with much stronger links to Marx-
ism than its American counterpart of the 1960s), the New Left challenged
the ability of the inherited versions of Marxism (particularly as defined by
the communist parties) to give adequate accounts of racism and imperialism
on either side of the Iron Curtain. International events-from the Suez crisis
to the Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia-made idealiza-
tions of the major powers impossible. At the same time the violent history
of Stalinism became more widely known and documented, putting still more
distance between the New Left and those versions of Marxism aligned with
the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, with the rise of mass culture and mass society
and the development of a relatively affluent working class, the traditional
Marxist construction of class difference, with its expectations of revolution,
seemed increasingly inadequate. A consumption-oriented, technologically
invested society demanded new models of class struggle and social change,
imperatives apparent here in the essays by Hall, Negt, Petrovic, Delphy,
and Pecheux.
Finally, like most major bodies of theory, Marxism has been
gradually, but substantially, altered by the formal and linguistic self-con-
sciousness that transformed modem art and culture, a transformation that
eventually made it impossible to limit the notion of culture to a small body
of privileged texts, objects, and discourses. Cultural theory has now ex-
panded the category of culture well beyond "the best that has been thought
and said," beyond the general forms of art, language, and entertainment,
beyond the leisure (that is, nonlabor) activities of the general population.
Describing modernism's impact on Marxism would itself be a
major project; but it is necessary, in this context, to point to a few of its
key elements. Both in art and philosophy a foregrounding of issues of lan-
guage promoted a broad concern with culture, symbolic forms, communi-
cation, and meaning. In philosophy, the appearance of logical positivism
(with its concern for language and knowledge) and phenomenology (with
its focus on meaning and consciousness) helped to energize major articu-
lations of a critical humanism. The humanist (and often Hegelian) Marxism
that emerged, ranging from Lukacs to Korsch to the members of the Frank-
furt school, 12 increasingly emphasized experience as a mediating term in the
relations between social structures and individual lives. Other writers, such
as Brecht, Benjamin, and Lefebvre were strongly influenced by artistic move-
ments, while in Gramsci and Lefebvre one sees an increasing recognition
ofthe need for historical and social specificity. 13 Then, in the work of a later
generation of Marxist humanists (many of whose members, ironically, did
not read the earlier Marxist humanists until after they had already begun
5
to define their positions)-including Jean-Paul Sartre and Henri Lefebvre
in France; Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, and John Berger in En-
gland; and the Praxis group in Yugoslavia-human consciousness began to
play a still more active and creative role in accounts of sociallife. 14
Following on a critique begun, in fact, by Engels, this humanist
Marxism typically attempted to rethink (or at least problematize) the uni-
directional causality implicit in the base/superstructure model and often
focused on questions of meaning, experience, and individuality as media-
tions. Furthermore, rejecting the traditional theories that locate the working
class between false consciousness and revolution, it asked instead how hu-
man beings create meaningful social realities and emphasized discussions
of culture and ideology as the site of domination and resistance. In this
work from the 1950s and 1960s, culture as the officially sanctioned discourse
of art and knowledge is explicitly brought into dialogue with more anthro-
pological notions of culture-as whole ways of life, structures of experience,
or symbolic systems.
Typically, this generation of Marxist humanists concentrated its
efforts on conceptualizing the diverse field of culture and on describing and
defining different cultural domains, thereby clearly establishing culture as a
central political issue and interpretive problem, instead of glibly moving
through it directly into economic production and class relations or confi-
dently moving past it under the protection of an abstract philosophical
discourse. Furthermore, this second rediscovery of Marxist humanism led
critics to recognize that there are multiple cultures within the social for-
mation. In many instances, this took the form of a concern with working-
class cultures as continuing instances of difference from and even resistance
to the dominant cultural practices of the ruling classes. In other cases, some-
times fueled by the negative views of the mass culture theorists, including
those ofthe Frankfurt school, Marxists began to examine the forms of mass
media and popular culture, seeing them as occasions for more complex
relations of power and meaning than had heretofore been imagined.
As the implications of this second appearance of a humanist
Marxism began to be recognized, it became clear that cultural analysis needed
to be concerned with all the structural and meaning-producing activities by
which human life is created and maintained. As this collection demonstrates,
cultural theory is now as likely to study political categories (such as de-
mocracy), forms of political practice (such as alliances), and structures of
domination (including otherness) and experience (such as subjectification)
as it is to study art, history, philosophy, science, ethics, communicative
codes, or technology. Cultural theory is involved with reexamining the con-
cepts of class, social identity, class struggle, and revolution; it is committed
to studying questions of pleasure, space, and time; it aims to understand
the fabric of social experience and everyday life, even the foundations of
the production and organization of power itself. Consequently, it is all but
impossible to define the terrain of cultural theory by pointing to a finite set
of object-domains or to the search for a limited set of interpretive tools. In
fact, the current renaissance is, to some extent, predicated on the recognition
that the constitution of the very category of "culture" (which is often op-
posed to something else-the economic, the social, or the natural) is itself
already implicated within cultural processes.
6
 Grossberg and Nelson
In the middle and late 1960s (although it did not reach England
and America until the late 1960s and the early 1970s), Marxism underwent
a profound interchange with structuralism and semiotics, an interchange
that marks the beginning of the third moment of Marxist revision and
established the context within which the essays in this book were written,
including the apparently humanistic essays by Schacht and Golding. While
the second generation of humanist Marxists-who became known as cultural
Marxists-placed the active human agent (understood both individually and
socially) at the center oftheir theoretical perspective, it was the intersection
of Marxism with structuralism and semiotics that gave the study of culture
new momentum in the 1970s, both within Marxism and across a wide range
of disciplines and theoretical perspectives. Of course, structuralism itself
was not a static theory but an open-ended problematic built on its (at first
implicit) critique of essentialism. As Saussure argued earlier, the meaning
of a sign is not an intrinsic property of the signifier but rather a relationship
defined by the differential relations into which the signifier is inserted. 15 And
in his related critique of humanist Marxism, Louis Althusser argued, in a
series of articles collected in For Marx (1965), that the human subject is
itself a historical product, an ensemble of social relationships, not something
essential and permanent. 16 Subjectivity is culturally determined; it is a func-
tion of the ideological practices by which certain subject positions become
historically available. Furthermore, the social formation was reconceptual-
ized as a structure of relatively autonomous levels of social practices, giving
ideology a central and determining influence that could not merely be ex-
plained as the displaced trace of other forms of social practice. The over-
determination of any social practice by all the levels of the social formation
meant that culture could not be reduced to the effects of economic relations,
even if mediated through ideology. At the same time, across a wide range
of fields, semiotics was offering an analytic vocabulary for the interpretation
of signifying phenomena, while assigning such interpretations a certain in-
dependence from metaphysical issues of reality and psychological issues of
intentionality.
As structuralism developed into poststructuralism-rejecting
structuralism's unreflective claims to scientificity, crediting the semiotic and
political nature of its own theorizing, recognizing that a more radically
problematized human subject did have a place in textual production-it
began to confront the implications these positions had for its own critical
practice. While cultural Marxists did accept the ideological bases of their
own theoretical and political positions, and consequently had begun to rec-
ognize the problematic, contingent nature of their own interpretive activi-
ties, it was poststructuralism that gave Marxists the vocabulary with which
to begin theorizing their own determination.
Of course the contingent, variable nature of interpretation is also
made apparent by the whole explosion of critical vocabularies in the past
twenty-five years. If one were, today, to try to map the terrain of cultural
theory, one would have to describe developments not only within Marxism
but also within phenomenology and hermeneutics, structuralism and semi-
otics, psychoanalysis, feminism, deconstruction and poststructuralism, post-
modernism, analytic philosophy (including speech act theory, pragmatics,
and post-Wittgensteinian philosophy), as well as theoretical developments
in sociology, anthropology, and narrative theory. The fairly recent self-re-
7
flexiveness about Marxist critical practice is thus a particularly overdeter-
mined phenomenon, representing the belated extension into critical theory
of the formal self-consciousness and the problematizing of meaning and
signification long characteristic of modem art. In Marxism this move was
certainly encouraged by more complex models of the fragmented social
formation. And, of course, the poststructuralist revolution had strong im-
plications for the kinds of knowledge Marxism traditionally claimed to pos-
sess. If the meaning of a text is not intrinsic to it but rather the product of
a system of differences into which the text is articulated, then any text is
open to multiple readings. Thus it is doubtful that one can, in fact, actually
(and decisively) read the meaning and politics of a text or a practice simply
by a straightforward encounter with the text itself or by mechanically ap-
plying some interpretive procedure. If meaning itself is overdetermined, the
effects of any cultural practice (including criticism) can be both multiple
and contradictory.
Critics sensitive to these arguments increasingly found them-
selves engaged in a problematic activity, one demanding attention to their
own practices of consumption (use, appropriation) and to the contexts of
their own intellectual production. Questioning the relationship between crit-
icism and its object is especially difficult for any body of theory that, like
Marxism, is committed to political critique and opposition. Yet this is part
of Marxism's necessary (and paradoxical) burden in the contemporary the-
oretical scene, just as Marxism is also empowered to politicize epistemo-
logical doubt within other bodies of theory.
For Marxism in particular, reflections on the changing social for-
mation have been a powerful force in the development of such theoretical
positions. Many of the essays here-including those by Lefebvre, Patton,
Jameson, Pfeil, Michele Mattelart, Chambers, and Holland-in fact are con-
cerned with theorizing in response to the specific structures of the contem-
porary social formation: the emergence of multinational capitalism as the
dominant world economic structure; the rapid deployment of electronic
media and the growth of both an information and a consumer-oriented
economy; the fragmentation of the social formation and the proliferation
of subcultures; the collapse of many traditional structures of authority; and
even, finally, the explosion of critical methods that is part of the structure
of contemporary academic life. These and other changes had important
consequences, not only in the postcolonial world, where they undercut the
apparent capacity for self-determination achieved in decolonialization, but,
more powerfully, in the advanced capitalist societies themselves, where they
suggest both the impossibility of any static representation of reality and the
utility oflocalized theory and localized political resistance-though it is often
Marxism's special task to defend its more general and enduring insights in
the very face of these changes, as the essays by Anderson, Jameson, Negt,
and Fields make clear.
Lefebvre, for example, argues that such new social conditions
require new terms and concepts within Marxism, for capitalism has now
filtered into the microstructures and organization of daily life. Responding
to the increasing commodification of both experience and culture, including
language, Ross reexamines the possibilities of an avant-garde, oppositional
writing practice. Mouffe and West argue, respectively, that complex struc-
tures of resistance and domination require that Marxism radically expand
8
 Grossberg and Nelson
its theoretical and political base. Hall posits that the emergence of a hege-
monic politics of the New Right demands a strategic theoretical and political
realignment of the Left. MacKinnon and Patton, on the other hand, conclude
that Marxism is finally inadequate in the face of the challenges of contem-
porary forms of power. Fields, however, responds by arguing that the variety
of contemporary political struggles must be understood within the common
systemic structures of capitalist oppression, while Negt attempts to open a
space within those traditional categories for these new challenges.
In many of these essays, in fact, one can sense how more recent
forms of political activity have also powerfully affected Marxist theory. The
mass social movements of the 1960s, for example, were not organized by
a "party," that is, by a central, hierarchical structure. The influential May
1968 university strike in Paris, supported by parts of the labor movement,
was actually opposed by some of the formal leftist organizations. The strike
apparently came from the bottom up; and to the traditional Left, it seemed
in some ways indistinguishable from tendencies implicit in advanced cap-
italism itself. The populist potential of 1968, now symbolically linked with
late 1960s political protests in America and broadly metaphorized in Marxist
theory, has come in part to represent the need for a distinctly decentralized,
self-critical, plural, and unpredictable notion of how Marxism should de-
velop.
As Marxism has confronted its own claims to truth as a repre-
sentation of reality, claims that are just as real for those who would deny
Marxism the status of a "science," it has located itself at the center of current
epistemological debates, which have now begun to confront the problematic
nature and role of theorizing itself and the status of theoretical concepts.
Aronowitz, for example, claims that Marxists have failed to challenge the
status of science, the dominant culture of late capitalism, as a pure, uncon-
taminated form of knowledge. Unless we interrogate it as an ideological and
socially constituted discourse, Marxism can have no independent basis for
its explanatory powers. Repeatedly, in fact, these essays rewrite both the
epistemology of Marxism and its basic concepts. Amariglio, Resnick, and
Wolff conclude that if class can no longer designate a predefined and stable
set of subjects, then the very categories of power in Marxism-such as dom-
ination, class struggle, ruling and ruled classes-have to be rethought. On
the other hand, with a security uncommon in this book, Negt asserts that
since the analysis of capital has been completed, Marxists should now tum
to the remaining unresolved theoretical issues that presently block the for-
mulation of a coherent position of critique-subjectivity, the proletariat,
and ecology.
Negt's relative confidence, however, may be overshadowed by
the radically problematized logic of Balibar's "Vacillation ofldeology." Si-
multaneously challenging Marxism's most basic claims while affirming their
historical necessity, Balibar offers a history of the constitutive contradictions
between ideology and the working class, a history that also represents an
attempt to read his own situation as a leftist intellectual in France. If the
working class is to play a revolutionary role in history, Balibar argues, then
its relationship to the category of ideology must be rethought. And ifideology
is only and always the dominant ideology, then the proletariat as potentially
revolutionary subject stands outside ideology in the space of some other
ideal knowledge. But this makes Marxism a theory of "mastery without
9
 slavery," which in turn makes the revolutionary act incomprehensible. On
the other hand, if ideology is a worldview and, consequently, the proletariat
must have its own ideology, then how is the proletariat to articulate its
revolutionary struggle? The theoretical crisis of "ideology" and the crisis
over whether the working class is to be the source of revolutionary struggle
are historically one and the same. So Marxism must rethink the class identity
of the workers' movement as the blind spot in its own politics in the history
of capitalism. To do so is to deconstruct the process of the idealization of
history.
None of these critiques of Marxism's own logic and historicity
could exist, of course, without pressure and stimulation from other contem-
porary bodies of theory. Indeed many of the most productive developments
within Marxism have come both from a more intricately responsive con-
frontation with positions opposed to Marxism's basic assumptions and from
a mutually transforming dialogue with other views of culture and interpre-
tation. Barrett, Eagleton, and Wang all, surprisingly, attempt to expand
Marxist cultural theory by returning to consider more traditional questions
of aesthetics and normative criticism. Marxism has become a place where
competing theories work out their similarities and differences and articulate
their challenges to one another. These differences are now frequently fought
out within the space of a Marxist vocabulary, as disagreements over the
problematics that should constitute a Marxist discourse.
As West's analysis of difference, Holland's and Pfeil's efforts to
chart the psychodynamics of contemporary experience, Patton's and Cham-
bers's postmodernism, Laclau's and Spivak's poststructuralism, and the
book's pervasive engagement with feminism will all demonstrate, this al-
most forced dialogue of Marxism with other perspectives has had profound
implications for Marxism itself, for the issues defining Marxism have come
into question and have been reshaped as a result. Particularly important
here have been Marxism's interactions with analyses of how power is ex-
ercised in terms of hierarchical structures of difference and otherness that
are not reducible to the model of class exploitation. Marxism has had, as
a result, to rethink its understanding of racism, sexism, and colonialism, a
process that inevitably historicizes Marxism's earlier categories and con-
cerns. Confronting its own historical status has meant also that Marxism
has had to call into question basic assumptions about liberatory political
practice-the role of the working class, the function of the intellectual, the
determining nature of the mode of production, the place of the state ap-
paratus-as it has attempted to adjudicate, if not always incorporate, the
competing political claims of the various subordinate populations in late
capitalism. As the organization of this book suggests, issues of sexual dif-
ference, in particular, cut across all the traditional categories of Marxist
thought. The problematics of gender and the relations between Marxism
and feminism are central here to the essays by MacKinnon, Mouffe, Delphy,
Spivak, Pfeil, Lesage, and Franco.
Spivak's essay in particular demonstrates the complex hetero-
glossia of Marxism's engagement with other bodies of theory. Like Balibar,
she works in part through rereadings of Marx, and, like Balibar again, she
can be said to read historical realities from the instabilities of theoretical
discourses themselves. By presenting a critique of Western theory that argues
its cultural dependence on international economic exploitation, Spivak poses
10
 Grossberg and Nelson
the question of whether the subaltern woman can speak for herself. She
argues that our subject positions are constructed by the realities of global
capitalism and imperialism. So, too, the political role of the Western in-
tellectual is dependent on the construction of subjectivity at sites of enforced
silence in the Third World. Spivak's corrective analysis proceeds by a Der-
ridean reading of the colonial discourses surrounding the practice of suttee,
or widow sacrifice.
As Marxism has been challenged and rewritten, both by its dia-
logue with other bodies of theory and by its effort to acknowledge the diverse
political realities of the postwar world; as Marxism has attempted to find
more sophisticated models of the relations between culture and power, more
reflective understandings of its own position within these relations, and
more politically insightful and relevant tools for the analysis of contem-
porary structures of power-so has it become a much more varied discourse.
One can no longer speak of Marxism in isolation from other intellectual
and political positions, nor apart from the wider exigencies of history, for
Marxism is no longer a single coherent discursive and political practice. As
readers of this book will discover, there are now an extraordinary number
of Marxist positions, discourses, methods, and politics. In trying to decide
which discourses are and are not Marxist, one looks, almost ludicrously,
for an engagement with Marx's own work, though at the same time it is
essential to note that an ability to problematize Marx's writings has been
central to the whole renaissance in Marxist theory.
The struggle to decide which positions are and are not Marxist
continues to animate Marxist discourse, as in the essays by Anderson, Jame-
son, Fields, MacKinnon, Delphy, and Patton. Where, for example, is the
boundary to be drawn between deconstruction and Marxist cultural criti-
cism, between postmodernism and a Marxist analysis of late capitalism, or
between feminist and Marxist analyses of the social and economic oppres-
sion of women? In fact, can anyone attempting to write about the politics
of culture in capitalism not, in some way, be caught up in the discourses
of Marx and Marxism? As Foucault points out, privileging appeals to Marx-
ism's founding discourses obscures the way Marxism, at least in his work,
is a continuing (if implicit) context, albeit without the citations that might
serve to normalize it for readers. 17 Marxism, like the historical realities it
interrogates, cannot escape the critique of essentialism carried out by con-
temporary critical theory and manifested in the contemporary historical
context. That critique does not refuse a practice, text, or event its own
identity. But it does suggest that identity is unstable and never guaranteed
in advance; identity is part of an event's contextual determinations, the
articulation of its effects. By refusing to take its own categories for granted,
contemporary Marxism has reappropriated the critical power of Marx's in-
terpretive practice.
Thus one cannot, in light of the essays gathered here, easily set
limits to Marxism's current concerns. Yet the effort to establish the core
commitments of Marxism is a necessary part of its effort to maintain some
unique influence in the field of interpretation. The problem for Marxism is
thus twofold: on the one hand, to deterritorialize its own discourse in re-
sponse to changing historical realities; and on the other hand, to reterri-
torialize itself in order to constitute that very response. Indeed, as the reader
reorganizes this volume to suit his or her own interests and commitments-
11
deciding which patterns of alliance and opposition among the essays to
credit-the territory of Marxism will thereby be redefined. Discursively,
however, Marxism threatens to collapse into criticism with a political edge.
And that political edge is necessarily reestablished in different political con-
texts, perhaps generalizable only as something like a commitment to rev-
olutionary identification with the cause of the oppressed.
Just what will count as a revolutionary intervention is an issue
that animates, defines, and challenges all the theoretical positions and cul-
tural domains discussed in the book. One way of reading the book, in fact,
is as a debate on that issue. For example, Franco deconstructs a series of
semantic oppositions and equivalences centered around male authorship in
the Latin American literary tradition, thereby showing how "women and
indigenous people can take the production of meaning into their own hands."
Destabilizing and altering cultural semiotics from an oppositional stand-
point is also the theme of Reyes Matta's discussion of the Nuevo Canciones
movement and of Frith's analysis of pop culture as resistance, in which he
contrasts two views of subcultural resistance: the first sees politics deter-
mined by whether music, for example, is an authentic expression of an
oppositional or marginalized culture; the second locates politics in the tex-
tual manipulation of signs within and against the continuous commodifi-
cation of all meaning. Ryan, on the other hand, does not describe what
people make of the texts they consume as much as he defines a theory that
gives people an active role in political struggles within the consumption of
cultural objects. Somewhat surprisingly, in an essay that combines his earlier
humanism with a new poststructuralist play on the semiosis of"revolution,"
Petrovic provides semantic evidence for the dispersion of the revolutionary
impulse into different cultural domains. Lesage, however, argues that all
revolutionary impulses fail if they are not now centered on the historical
imperatives of sexism and racism. Anderson, finally, would cut short all
this speculation-from Achugar's analysis ofthe potential of a revolutionary
aesthetic to MacKinnon's concern with how our mental life has been col-
onized-stating firmly that revolution is only a specific, punctual, and con-
vulsive event that radically transforms the political structures of a society.
Marxism is a territory that is, it would seem, paradoxically at
once undergoing a renaissance of activity and a crisis of definition. There
is a greater sense of the distance between our theoretical categories (even
those of common sense in our daily lives) and the historical reality within
which those categories must function. Yet, throughout this book there is an
intellectual drive to deal with the disjunction between our need and our
ability to intervene in our own historical reality. These essays offer a series
of intersecting and competing discourses for that project.

Notes

For example. Berel Lang and Forrest Williams. eds .• Marxism and Art (New York: David
McKay Co .. 1972); Maynard Solomon. ed .. Marxism and Art: Essays Classic and Contem-
porary (New York: Alfred A Knopf. 1973); and David Craig. ed .. Marxists on Literature: An
Anthology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1975).
2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. On Literature and Art. ed. Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski
(New York: International General. 1974).

12
 Grossberg and Nelson
3 See David Laing, The Marxist Theory of Art. An Historical Survey (Atlantic Highlands. N.J.:
Humanities Press. 1978). For further discussions. see Mikhail Lifshitz. The Philosophy of Art
of Karl Marx. trans. Ralph B. Winn (New York: The Critics Group, 1938; reprinted, London:
Pluto Press. 1973); Henri Arvon. Marxist Esthetics. trans. Helen Lane (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 1973). For overviews of the development of Western Marxism. see Perry
Anderson. Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books. 1976); New Left
Review. ed .. Western Marxism-A Critical Reader (London: New Left Books. 1977); and
Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare. eds .. The Unknown Dimension: European Marx1sm smce
Lenin (New York: Basic Books. 1972).
4 See, for example. Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and Reality: A Study of the Sources of Poetry
( 1937; New York: New World. 1963); Ernst Fischer. The Necessity of Art: A Marxist Ap-
proach, trans. Anna Bostock (Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1963); and Georg1 Plekhanov, Art
and Social Life. trans. E. Fox and E. Hartley (Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1957).
5 Antonio Gramsc1. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. ed. and trans. Ou1nt1n Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Sm1th (New York: International Publishers. 1971).
6 Georg Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. trans. Rodney
Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1971).
7 Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, trans. Fred Halliday (New York: Monthly Review Press.
1970); Rosa Luxemburg, Selected Political Writings, ed. Dick Howard (New York: Monthly
Rev1ew Press. 1971).
8 Ernst Bloch et al, Aesthetics and Politics (London: New Left Books. 1977).
9 Many of the developments in Western Marxism built on ideas that only became available
with the eventual translation of The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. first
published in German in 1932. See Karl Marx. Early Writings, ed. and trans. Tom B. Bottomore
(London: Penguin, 1963).
10 See. for example. Georg Lukacs. The Historical Novel, trans. H. and S. Mitchell (Boston:
Beacon Press. 1963). and Studies in European Realism. trans. Edith Bone (New York: Grosset
and Dunlap, 1964).
11 Ernest Mandel. Late Capitalism. trans. Joris De Bres (London: New Left Books. 1975).
12 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans. John Cumming
(New York: Herder and Herder. 1972). See also Andrew Arata and Eike Gebhardt, eds .. The
Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Urizen Books. 1978).
13 Bertolt Brecht. Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John
Willett (London: Methuen, 1964); Walter Benjamin. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections.
ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1968); Henri Lefebvre. Everyday
Life in the Modern World. trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (New Brunswick. N.J.: Transaction. 1984);
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.
14 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason. trans. Alan Shendan-Sm1th (London: New
Left Books, 1976); John Berger, Ways of Seeing (Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1972); Raymond
Williams. The Long Revolution (London: Chatto and Windus. 1961); E. P Thompson. The
Making of the English Working Class (New York: Random House. 1963); GaJO Petrovic. Marx
in the Mid-Twentieth Century (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. 1967).
15 Ferdinand de Saussure. Course in General Linguistics. trans. Roy Harris (La Salle. Ill: Open
Court. 1986).
16 Louis Althusser, For Marx. trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage Books. 1970).
17 Michel Foucault, ·'Prison Talk.·· in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Wntings.
1972-1977. ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books. 1980). p. 52

13
I Rethinl<ing the Crisis in Marxism
 Cornel West

Marxist Theory and the Specificity of

Afro-American Oppression

As racial conflicts intensify in Europe, North and South

Amenca, As1a, and, above all, South Africa. the racial
problematic will become more urgent on the Marxist
agenda. A neo-Gramsc1an perspective on the complexity
of racism IS 1mperat1ve 1f even the beginning of a ·'war
of position" IS to be mounted. In fact, the future of
Marxism may well depend upon the depths of the anti-
racist d1mens1on of th1s theoretical and practical ·'war of
pOSitiOn .. ,

Will this statement be susceptible of under-

standing? In Europe, the black man is the
symbol of Evil. ... As long as one cannot
understand this fact, one is doomed to talk
in circles about the "black problem."
Frantz Fanon
Black Skin, White Masks

The problem of the twentieth century is the

problem of the color-line-the relation of the
darker to the lighter races of men in Asia
and Africa, in America and the islands of
the sea.
W. E. B. DuBois
The Souls of Black Folk

As we approach the later years of the twentieth cen-

tury, Fanon's characteristic candor and Du Bois's ominous prophecy con-
tinue to challenge the Marxist tradition. Although I intend neither to define
their meaning nor defend their veracity, I do wish to highlight their implicit
interrogation of Marxism. Fanon's and Du Bois's challenge constitutes the
germ of what I shall call the racial problematic: the theoretical investigation
into the materiality of racist discourses, the ideological production of African
subjects, and the concrete effects of and counterhegemonic responses to the
European (and specifically white) supremacist logics operative in modern
Western civilization.'
I understand the issue of the specificity of Afro-Amer-
ican oppression as a particular version of the racial problematic within the
context ofthe emergence, development, and decline of U.S. capitalist society
and culture. This problematic is, in many ways, similar to contemporary
philosophical discussions of "difference" that flow from the genealogical
inquiries of Michel Foucault and the deconstructive analyses of Jacques
Derrida. 2 Yet this problematic differs in that it presupposes a neo-Gramscian
framework, one in which extradiscursive formations such as modes of pro-
duction and overdetermined, antagonistic class relations are viewed as in-
17
dispensable. This neo-Gramscian framework attempts to shun the discursive
reductionistic elements in the works of the ex-Marxist Foucault and sidestep
the textual idealist tendencies in the perennially playful performances of
Derrida. But this neo-Gramscian perspective welcomes their poststructur-
alist efforts to dismantle the logocentric and a priori aspects of the Marxist
tradition. In other words, I accent the demystifying moment in their ge-
nealogical and deconstructive practices which attack hegemonic Western
discourses that invoke universality, scientificity, and objectivity in order to
hide cultural plurality, conceal the power-laden play of differences, and
preserve hierarchical class, gender, racial, and sexual orientational relations.
This effort to put forward the racial problematic within a neo-
Gramscian framework occupies new discursive space on the spectrum of
philosophies of difference; it also enacts an untapped potentiality within the
Marxist tradition. More important, this effort constitutes a sympathetic yet
biting Marxist critique of poststructuralist philosophies of difference and a
supportive yet piercing critique of the Marxist tradition from the viewpoint
of an Afro-American neo-Gramscian. In short, the time has passed when
the so-called race question, or Negro question, can be relegated to secondary
or tertiary theoretical significance in bourgeois or Marxist discourses. In-
stead, to take seriously the multileveled oppression of African peoples is to
raise crucial questions regarding the conditions for the possibility of the
modem West, the nature of European conceptions of rationality, and even
the limited character of Marxist formulations of counterhegemonic projects
against multileveled oppression.
In order to more fully understand my neo-Gramscian conception
of the specificity of Afro-American oppression, it is necessary to examine
briefly the history of Marxist conceptions of Afro-American oppression. Any
such history is itself a political act-an intervention into the present state
of the Afro-American freedom struggle. My own crude interpretation and
bold intervention bears the stamp of my neo-Gramscian stance, which takes
on practical forms in an autonomist (not micropolitical) politics (e.g., the
National Black United Front) and a prefigurative (not reformist) politics
(e.g., the Democratic Socialists of America). 3
I shall argue that there are four basic conceptions of Afro-Amer-
ican oppression in the Marxist tradition. The first conception subsumes
Afro-American oppression under the general rubric of working-class ex-
ploitation. This viewpoint is logocentric in that it elides and eludes the
specificity of Afro-American oppression outside the workplace; it is reduc-
tionistic in that it explains away rather than explains this specificity. This
logocentric and reductionistic approach results from vulgar and sophisti-
cated versions of economism. I understand economism to be those forms
of Marxist theory that defend either simple monodeterminist or subtle mul-
tideterminist causal relations between an evolving economic base upon a
reflecting and refracting ideological superstructure, thereby giving a priori
status to class subjects and modes of production as privileged explanatory
variables.
In regard to Afro-American oppression, economism and its con-
comitant logocentric and reductionistic approach holds that African people
in the United States of America are not subjected to forms of oppression
distinct from general working-class exploitation. Historically, this position
18
 Cornel West
was put forward by the major figures of the U.S. Socialist party (notwith-
standing its more adequate yet forgotten 1903 resolution on the Negro ques-
tion), especially Eugene Debs. In an influential series of articles, Debs argued
that Afro-American oppression was solely a class problem and that any
attention to its alleged specificity "apart from the general labor problem"
would constitute racism in reverse. 4 He wrote, "we [the socialists] have
nothing to do with it [the race question], for it is their [the capitalists'] fight.
We have simply to open the eyes of as many Negroes as we can and do
battle for emancipation from wage slavery, and when the working class have
triumphed in the class struggle and stand forth economic as well as political
free men, the race problem will disappear." In the meantime, Debs added,
"we have nothing special to offer the Negro, and we cannot make separate
appeals to all races. The Socialist Party is the party of the whole working
class regardless of color." 5
My aim is not simply to castigate the U.S. Socialist party or
insinuate accusative charges of racism against Debs. Needless to say, the
Socialist party had many distinguished black members and Debs had a long
history of fighting racism. Rather, I am concerned with the fact that the
Second International economism in the U.S. Socialist party lead to a lo-
gocentric and reductionistic approach to Afro-American oppression, thereby
ignoring, or at best downplaying, strategies (as opposed to personal moral
duties) to struggle against racism.
The second conception of Afro-American oppression in the
Marxist tradition acknowledges the specificity of Afro-American oppression
beyond general working-class exploitation, yet it defines this specificity in
economistic terms. This conception is antireductionistic in character yet
economistic in content. This viewpoint holds that African people in the
United States of America are subjected to general working-class exploitation
and specific working-class exploitation owing to racial discrimination at the
workplace (at the levels of access to opportunities and relative wages re-
ceived). In the U.S. Marxist past, this superexploitation thesis has been put
forward by the Progressive Labor party in the late sixties and early seventies.
Practically, this viewpoint accents struggle against racism yet circumscribes
its concerns within an economistic orbit.
The third conception of Afro-American oppression in the Marxist
tradition-the most influential, widely accepted, and hence unquestioned
among Afro-American Marxists-bolds the specificity of Afro-American
oppression to be general working-class exploitation and national oppression;
that is, it is antireductionistic and antieconomistic in character and nation-
alistic in content. This position claims that Afro-Americans constitute, or
once constituted, an oppressed nation in the Black Belt South and an op-
pressed national minority in the rest of U.S. society.
There are numerous versions of the so-called Black Nation The-
sis. Its classical version was put forward in the Sixth Congress of the Third
International (1928), modified in its 1930 Resolution, and codified in Harry
Haywood's Negro Liberation (1948). Subsequent versions have been put
forward by the Socialist Workers party's George Breitman, the Communist
Labor party's Nelson Peery, the Bolshevik League of the United States' Bob
Avakian's Revolutionary Communist party, Amiri Baraka's U.S. League of
Revolutionary Struggle, the Philadelphia Workers' Organizing Committee,
and James Forman's recent book on Self-Determination and the African-
19
American People. 6 All of these versions adhere to Joseph V. Stalin's stip-
ulative definition of a nation as set forth in his Marxism and the National
Question (1913): "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community
of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic
life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture." 7 This
formulation, despite its brevity and crudity, incorporates a crucial cultural
dimension that has had tremendous attractivenss to Afro-American Marx-
ists. In fact, the Black Nation Thesis has been and remains hegemonic on
the Black Marxist Left.
Since the Garvey movement in the early twenties-the first mass
movement among Afro-Americans-the Black Left has been forced to take
seriously the cultural dimension of the Afro-American freedom struggle. In
this limited sense, Marcus Garvey's black nationalism made proto-Gram-
scians out of most Afro-American Marxists. 8 Yet the expression of this
cultural concern among Afro-American Marxists has, for the most part,
remained straitjacketed by the Black Nation Thesis. This thesis, indeed, has
promoted and encouraged impressive struggles against racism in the U.S.
communist movement. But with its ahistorical racial determination of a
nation, its flaccid statistical determination of national boundaries, and its
illusory distinct black national economy, the Black Nation Thesis continues
to serve as an honest, yet misguided, attempt by Marxist-Leninists to re-
pudiate reductionistic views on Afro-American oppression. 9 In short, it func-
tions as a poor excuse for the absence of a sophisticated Marxist theory of
the specificity of Afro-American oppression.
The fourth and last conception of Afro-American oppression in
the Marxist tradition claims that the specificity of Afro-American oppression
is that of general working-class exploitation and racial oppression. This
conception is put forward, on the one hand, by the Socialist Workers party's
Richard Kirk (alias R. S. Fraser in reply to George Breitman), who wrote:
The Negro Question is a racial question: a matter of
discrimination because of skin color, and that's all ....
The dual nature ofthe Negro struggle arises
from the fact that a whole people regardless of class
distinction are the victims of discrimination. This
problem of a whole people can be solved only through
the proletarian revolution, under the leadership of the
working class. The Negro struggle is therefore not the
same as the class struggle, but in its independent char-
acter is allied to the working class. Because of the in-
dependent form of the Negro movement, it does not
thereby become a national or separatist struggle, but
draws its laws of development from its character as a
racial struggle against segregation and discrimina-
tion.10

And on the other hand, Linda Burnham and Bob Wing wrote in Line of
March,

More specifically, the oppressed Black racial group in

the U.S. is a unity of two interconnected but distinct
20
 Cornel West
aspects: Black people are a racially oppressed section
of the laboring masses, as well as a distinct racially
oppressed people. Between these two, the principal de-
fining aspect of the Black racial group is that of being
a racially coerced section oflabor in this country. This
view stems from our analysis of the connection be-
tween racial oppression and U.S. capitalism. As we
have emphasized, racial oppression and class oppres-
sion are qualitatively distinct social contradictions with
their own dynamics and laws of development. But they
are also interconnected. In our view, the nature of this
interconnection is defined by the fact that capitalism
gave rise to and ultimately determines the form and
content of racial oppression. In particular, the ultimate
raison d'etre of racial oppression is the need of U.S.
capital accumulation for a specially oppressed, coerced
section of labor. 11

This fourth conception of Afro-American oppression in the

Marxist tradition has been motivated primarily by opposition to the pre-
dominant role of the Black Nation Thesis in the American and Afro-Amer-
ican Left. Hence, it has been promoted by breakaway Trotskyists such as
the Spartacist League, the independent Marxist-Leninist trend Line of March,
the Communist party ofthe United States of America after 1959, and leftists
in academia such as Oliver C. Cox, James A. Geschwender, and Mario
Barrera. 12 These contributions have been useful in regard to broadening the
theoretical discourse of Afro-American oppression within Marxist circles.

My neo-Gramscian viewpoint requires a new conception of Afro-

American oppression. I suggest that certain aspects of the preceding four
conceptions are indispensable for an acceptable position, though all four
are inadequate. A common feature is that their analyses remain on the
macrostructural level; that is, they focus on the role and function of racism
within and among institutions of production and government. Any ac-
ceptable conception of Afro-American oppression, indeed, must include
macrostructural analysis, which highlights the changing yet persistent forms
of class exploitation and political repression of Afro-Americans. In this
regard, even narrow economistic Marxist analyses of Afro-American oppres-
sion are preferable to prevailing bourgeois perspectives, such as the We-
berian liberalism of William Julius Wilson, the Friedmanian conservatism
of Thomas Sowell, and the Parsonsian elitism of Martin Kilson. 13
Building upon Stanley Aronowitz's seminal though brief treat-
ment of race, 14 my neo-Gramscian viewpoint requires not only a macro-
structural approach but also a broad genealogical investigation and a de-
tailed microinstitutional (or localized) analysis. These three moments of a
neo-Gramscian perspective consist of the following:
1. a genealogical inquiry into the discursive conditions for the
possibility of the hegemonic European (i.e., white) supremacist logics op-
erative in various epochs in the West and the counterhegemonic possibilities
available;
21
 2. a microinstitutional (or localized) analysis of the mechanisms
that inscribe and sustain these logics in the everyday lives of Africans,
including the hegemonic ideological production of African subjects, the con-
stitution of alien and degrading normative cultural styles, aesthetic ideals,
linguistic gestures, psychosexual identities, and the counterhegemonic pos-
sibilities available;
3. a macrostructural approach that accents modes of overdeter-
mined class exploitation and political repression of African peoples and the
counterhegemonic possibilities available.
The aim of the first moment is to examine modes of European
domination of African peoples; that of the second moment, to probe into
forms of European subjugation of African peoples; and that of the third
moment, to focus on types of European exploitation and repression of Af-
rican peoples. These moments of theoretical inquiry-always already tra-
versed by male supremacist and heterosexual supremacist logics-overlap
and crisscross in complex ways, yet each highlights a distinctive dimension
of the multi-leveled oppression of Europeans over African peoples. 15
These three moments constitute the specificity of the European
oppression of African peoples at the level of methodology; that is, this neo-
Gramscian viewpoint should capture the crucial features of such oppression
anywhere in the world. Yet the specificity of the various manifestations of
European oppression of African peoples in particular countries is constituted
by detailed historical analyses that enact the three methodological moments.
Needless to say, these concrete analyses must be ensconced in the particular
culture, heritage, and economic history of the Africans and the nation of
which the Africans are participants and victims.
Admittedly, this neo-Gramscian project is an ambitious one, yet
the complexity of the oppression of African peoples demands it. Each of
the three moments requires major volumes, possibly lifetime endeavors.
Given the political urgency of our times, I shall briefly sketch the contours
of each moment.
In regard to the first moment-the genealogical inquiry into the
conditions for the possibility of the European (i.e., white) supremacist logics
operative in the West-I suggest that there are three such basic discursive
logics: Judea-Christian, scientific, and psychosexual. The Judea-Christian
racist logic emanates from the biblical account of Ham looking upon and
failing to cover his father Noah's nakedness and thereby receiving divine
punishment in the form ofblackening his progeny. Within this logic, black
skin is a divine curse owing to disrespect for and rejection of paternal
authority. 16 The scientific racist logic rests upon a modern philosophical
discourse guided by Greek ocular metaphors, undergirded by Cartesian no-
tions of the primacy of the subject and the preeminence of representation,
and buttressed by Baconian ideas of observation, evidence, and confirma-
tion that promote and encourage the activities of observing, comparing,
measuring, and ordering physical characteristics of human bodies. Given
the renewed appreciation and appropriation of classical antiquity, these
activities were regulated by classical aesthetic and cultural norms. Within
this logic, the notions of black ugliness, cultural deficiency, and intellectual
inferiority are legitimated by the value-laden, yet prestigious, authority of
22
 Cornel West
science. 17 The psychosexual racist logic arises from the phallic obsessions,
Oedipal projections, and anal-sadistic orientations in European culture that
endow African men and women with sexual prowess; view Africans as either
cruel, revengeful fathers, frivolous, carefree children, or passive, long-suf-
fering mothers; and identify Africans with dirt, odious smell, and feces. In
short, Africans are associated with acts ofbodily defecation, violation, and
subordination. Within this logic, Africans are walking abstractions, inani-
mate things or invisible creatures. 18 For all three white supremacist logics,
which operate simultaneously in the modem West, Africans personify de-
graded otherness, exemplify radical alterity, and embody alien difference.
The aim of neo-Gramscian genealogical inquiry is not simply to
specify the discursive operations that constitute Africans as the excluded,
marginal Other; it also is to show how white supremacist logics are guided
by various hegemonic Western philosophies of identity that suppress dif-
ference, heterogeneity, and multiplicity. Since such discursive suppression
impedes counterhegemonic practices, these philosophies of identity are not
simply ideologies but rather modes of domination with their own irreducible
dynamic and development. Similar to Derrida's own characterization of his
work, this inquiry requires "a general determination of the conditions for
the emergence and the limits of philosophy, of metaphysics, of everything
that carries it on and that it carries on." 19 Unlike Derrida's, this inquiry is
but one moment in our neo-Gramscian project, leading toward microin-
stitutional and macrostructural analyses of oppression. I suggest this first
moment is an examination of modes of European domination of African
peoples because it maps the discursive modalities-for hegemonic and coun-
terhegemonic practices-circumscribed by white supremacist logics and
thereby discloses the European discursive powers over African peoples.
The second moment-the microinstitutional (or localized) anal-
ysis-examines the articulation of the white supremacist logics within the
everyday lives of Africans in particular historical contexts. It focuses on the
effects upon African peoples of the binary oppositions of true/false, good/
evil, pure/impure within the white supremacist logics. In the complex case
of Africans in the United States of America, this analysis would include the
production of colored and Negro subjects principally enacted by the ideo-
logical apparatus (and enforced by the repressive apparatus) in the South,
the extraordinary and equivocal role and function of evangelical Protestant
Christianity (especially the Separate Baptist and Methodist denomina-
tions),20 and the blend of African and southern Anglo-Saxon Protestants and
French Catholics from which emerged distinctive Afro-American cultural
styles, linguistic gestures, and counterhegemonic practices. This analysis is,
in many ways, similar to Foucault's "microphysics of power" -the specifying
of the power relations within the crevices and interstices of what logocentric
Marxists call the superstructure. Yet, unlike Foucault's, this analysis is but
one moment in my neo-Gramscian project, whose regulative ideal is not
mere antibourgeois revolt but rather antihierarchical socialist transforma-
tion. 21 I suggest that this second moment is a probe into forms of European
subjugation of African peoples because it shows how the various white
supremacist logics shape African self-identities, influence psychosexual sen-
sibilities, and help set the context for distinctive Afro-American cultural
styles, linguistic gestures, and modes of resistance.
23
 The third moment-the macrostructural analysis-reveals the role
and function of overdetermined class exploitation and political repression
upon African peoples. This traditionally Marxist focus remains as a crucial
moment in my neo-Gramscian perspective, yet the nature of this focus is
modified. The neo-Gramscian rejection of the base/superstructure meta-
phors of economism (or logocentric Marxism) entails that it is no longer
sufficient or desirable to privilege the mode of production and class subjects
in an a priori manner and make causal claims (whether crude or refined)
about racist ideology owing to simply economic factors. Instead, following
Antonio Gramsci, the metaphor of a "historical bloc" replaces those of base/
superstructure. This new metaphor eschews the logocentric and a priori
dimension of the old metaphors by radically historicizing them, thereby
disclosing the complexity and heterogeneity suppressed by logocentric Marx-
ism. Gramsci's rejection of vulgar economism is unequivocal: "The claim,
presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism, that every fluc-
tuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an
immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as prim-
itive infantilism, and combated in practice with the authentic testimony of
Marx, the author of concrete political and historical works." 22
Gramsci's highly sophisticated investigations into the multiva-
rious modalities of class domination serves as the springboard for my own
neo-Gramscian perspective. Yet there are still significant logocentric and a
priori elements in Gramsci's work, such as the primacy of class subjects
and the bipolar class options for hegemony. Nevertheless, Gramsci's anti-
reductionistic and antieconomistic metaphor "historical bloc" promotes a
radically historical approach in which the economic, political, cultural, and
ideological regions of a social formation are articulated and elaborated in
the form of overdetermined and often contradictory class and nonclass pro-
cesses. 23 Despite this rejection of forms of determinisms, this conception of
social totality (or more specifically, the dynamics of particular social for-
mations) does not result in a mere floating crap game in that, given a his-
torical situation, structural constraints impose limits upon historically con-
stituted agents, whereas conjunctural opportunities can be enacted by these
agents. Given the historical process, many structural constraints can become
conjunctural opportunities. Yet without some notion ofhistorical structural
constraints, my neo-Gramscian perspective slides into explanatory nihilism;
namely, the refusal or inability to make explanatory commitments about
history and society. Economism is preferable to such explanatory impotence,
but fortunately Gramsci's metaphor "historical bloc" precludes such a choice.
The controversial issue of the relation between historical context
and differential intertextuality, ideological closure, and infinite dissemina-
tion serves as the major bone of contention between Marxists and post-
structuralists. My neo-Gramscian viewpoint resists explanatory nihilism;
that is, despite immense theoretical difficulties and practical obstacles it
does not give up on explaining and transforming history and society. There
is no Marxist theory without some notion of operative though transient
structural constraints in particular historical conjunctures, just as there is
no Marxist praxis without some notion of conjunctural opportunities. Post-
structuralisms rightly dismantle the logocentric and a priori aspects of Marx-
ist theory, yet they wrongly textualize historical constraints and political
praxis into mere endless chains of signifiers. To put this issue in Ernesto
24
 Cornel West
Laclau's terms, the matter is not simply the impossibility of society and
history but, more important, the specifying of the conditions for the pos-
sibility of the perennial process of this impossibility. 24 We must appeal to
metaphors of society and history in order to account for the "impossibility"
of society and history. Gramsci's metaphor of "historical bloc" performs
this function. If appropriately employed, it precludes the logocentric econ-
omism of pre-Gramscian Marxisms and the labyrinthine abyss of post-
structuralisms. Furthermore, my neo-Gramscian viewpoint rejects the rem-
nant of class reductionism in Gramsci's work. In short, my neo-Gramscian
perspective yields ideological yet differential closure-provisional structural
constraints and engaged political praxis-but with no guarantees.
Therefore the macrostructural analysis of the role and function
of overdetermined class exploitation and political repression from my neo-
Gramscian perspective goes far beyond the aforementioned four macro-
structural conceptions of Afro-American oppression in the Marxist tradi-
tion. This is so, in part, because it preserves the crucial structural feature-
the complex interaction of economic, political, cultural, and ideological re-
gions in social formations-of Marxist theory, yet it does not permit a priori
privileging of the economic region within this structural feature. I suggest
that this third moment is an investigation into the types of European ex-
ploitation and repression of African peoples because it highlights simulta-
neously the relations between African slaves and white slaveholders, African
workers and white capitalists, African citizens and white rulers.
In conclusion, the contemporary crisis of Marxism results, in
part, from extradiscursive terrains of contestation generated from racial,
feminist, gay, lesbian, and ecological social movements-movements that
are historically "new" only to ostrichlike logocentric Marxists whose sight
has been confined to the workplace-and from discursive terrains of con-
testation initiated by Gilles Deleuze and deepened by Foucault and Der-
rida.25 I use Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida (as they prefer) not as proper
names but rather as tropes signifying diverse discursive forces, including
Frenchified Nietzschean and Heideggerian elements, which now bombard
Marxist theories. In a sense, it is unfortunate that this fierce bombardment
is a thoroughly French (and more specifically Parisian) assault. It is unfor-
tunate principally because of the national baggage that accompanies the
assaults-namely, distinctively French political cynicisms and intellectual
dandyisms, alien to the seemingly incurable bourgeois optimism and in-
tellectual inferiority complexes of North Americans in the United States,
yet seductive to weary Marxist activists who have run up against walls of
History and isolated Marxist intellectuals who often remain within walls of
the bourgeois Academy, activists and intellectuals who have genuine anti-
bourgeois sentiments yet possess no energizing emancipatory vision.
My neo-Gramscian conception of the multileveled oppression of
Africans in the United States of America and elsewhere remains a rudi-
mentary response to the contemporary crisis of Marxism. As racial conflicts
intensify in Europe, South America, North America, Asia, and above all
South Africa, the racial problematic will become more urgent on the Marxist
agenda. And as the ruling classes in late capitalist societies fan and fuel the
white supremacist logics deeply embedded in their cultures, a neo-Gram-
scian perspective on the complexity of racism is imperative if even the
25
beginning of a "war of position" is to be mounted. In fact, the future of
Marxism, at least among Afro-Americans, may well depend upon the depths
of the antiracist dimension of this theoretical and practical "war of position."

Notes

1 In this definition. "materiality" simply denotes the multiple functions of power of racist prac-
tices over Africans; by "logics" I mean the battery of tropes. metaphors. notions. and con-
cepts employed to justify and legitimate white supremacist practices. This racial problematic
is related to but not identical with other possible investigative frameworks that focus on racist
practices toward other peoples of color. I do believe this problematic is useful for such
endeavors. yet I deliberately confine my major focus to peoples of African descent, especially
Afro-Americans. Also, this problematic does not presuppose that a nostalgic undifferentiated
umty or homogeneous universality will someday emerge among black, white, red, yellow,
and brown peoples. Rather, it assumes the irreducibility of racial (that is. cultural) differences.
The task is not to erase such differences but rather to ensure that such differences are not
employed as grounds for buttressing hierarchical social relations and symbolic orders.
2 The major texts I have in mind of these two prolific and profound thinkers are Michel Foucault.
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage,
1979); and Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976). For a brilliant critique and contrast of these two texts,
see Edward W. Said, The World, the Text. and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1983). pp. 118-225.
3 My political stance is autonomistic in that it is existentially anchored not simply in responses
to class exploitation but more immediately in cultural degradation and political oppression-
as is the National Black United Front led by Rev. Herbert Daughtry. Yet this autonomistic
stance does not slide into mere micropolitics because it envisions and encourages links with
those movements based primarily on class exploitation. My political stance is prefigurative
in that it is. in principle, motivated by the fundamental transformation of U.S. capitalist civ-
ilization and manifested in working within an organization (the Democratic Socialists of Amer-
ica) whose moral aspirations and internal mechanisms prefigure the desirable socialist so-
Ciety-one that is radically democratic and libertarian. This prefigurative stance does not
degenerate into reformism because. following Rosa Luxemburg's formulations in Reform or
Revolution ( 1900). it supports reforms yet opposes illusions about reforms.
4 Eugene Debs, "The Negro in the Class Struggle" and "The Negro and His Nemesis,"
International Socialist Review, Nov. 1903, Jan. 1904.
5 Quoted from PhilipS Foner. American Socialism and Black Americans (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press. 1977) For a noteworthy response to Debs's disappearance thesis. see
Manning Marable, "The Third Reconstruction: Black Nationalism and Race Relations after
the Revolution," Blackwater: Historical Studies in Race. Class Consciousness and Revolution
(Dayton. Ohio: Black Praxis Press. 1981 ). pp. 187-208. For the major work of this important
Afro-Amencan Marxist figure. see How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems
in Race, Political Economy and Society (Boston: South End Press, 1983).
6 George Breitman. "On the Negro Struggle, etc.," Socialist Workers Party Discussion Bulletin,
Sept. 1954; Bolshevik League, Liberation for the Black Nation (Bronx. 1983); Nelson Peery,
The Negro National Colonial Question (Chicago: Workers Press, 1978); Revolutionary Union,
National Liberation and Proletarian Revolution in the United States (Chicago, 1972); Amiri
Baraka, "Black Liberation and the Question of Nationality," Unity, 4:12 (1981). p. 6; Amiri
Baraka. ··Black Struggle in the 80's.·· The Black Nation: Journal of Afro-American Thought.
1: 1 ( 1981). pp. 2-5; Philadelphia Workers' Organizing Committee. Black Liberation Today:
Against Dogmatism on the National Question (Philadelphia, 1975); James Forman. Self-
Determination and the African-American People (Seattle: Open Hand Publishing, 1981). To
put it crudely, Breitman argues that Afro-Americans in the Umted States constitute an "em-
bryonic nation"; Peery holds the "Negro Nation" to be a colony; Bob Avakian's Revolutionary
Communist party claims that dispersed black communities constitute a "proletarian nation"
of a new sort; Baraka. the Bolshevik League. and Forman argue for a Black Nation in the
Black Belt South of the United States; and the Philadelphia Workers' Organizing Committee
holds that there once was a Black Nation, but it dissolved in the fifties with vast industriali-
zation. proletarianization. and urbanization of Afro-Americans.
7 Joseph V. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing
House. 1954). p. 16.
8 This almost inescapable Gramscian perspective-the nearly unavoidable theoretical and prac-

26
 Cornel West
tical confrontation with the problem of culture-has been a major preoccupation of the leading
Marx1st figures in develop1ng nat1ons. For brief samples of original third-world contributions
to Marxist theory. see Mao Tse-tung, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement
in Hunan." Selected Works, vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Language Press. 1966). pp. 23-59; "On
the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." Four Essays on Philosophy (Pe-
king: Foreign Language Press, 1968), pp. 79-133. See also Jose Carlos Mariategu1, "People
and Myth," The Morning Spirit ( 1925); and "The Religious Factor," Seven Essays of Inter-
pretation of the Peruv1an Reality ( 1927). Unfortunately, most of Mariategui's works have not
yet been translated into English. For noteworthy treatments of his thought and praxis, see
Geraldine Skinner, "Jose Carlos Mariategu1 and the Emergence of the Peruv1an Socialist
Movement." Sc1ence and Society, 43:4 ( 1979-80). pp. 447-71; and Jesus Chavarria, Jose
Carlos Mariategui and the Rise of Modern Peru (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press. 1979). See also Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencisrn: Philosophy and Ideology for De-
colomzatlon (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1970); Frantz Fanon. The Wretched of the
Earth. trans. Constance Farnngton (New York: Grove Press. 1964); Am1lcar Cabral, "Pre-
suppositions and Objectives of National Liberation in Relation to Soc1al Structure" and "Na-
tional LiberatiOn and Culture,·· Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writmgs of Ami/car Cabral.
trans. M1chael Wolters (New York: Monthly Rev1ew Press, 1979). pp. 119-37. 138-54.
9 For the most thorough and convincing critique of the Black Nation Thesis, see Linda Burnham
and Bob Wing, "Toward a Communist Analysis of Black Oppression and Black Uberat1on.
Part 1: Crit1que of the Black Nation Thesis," Lme of March: A Marxist-Leninist Journal of
Rectification, 2: 1 ( 1981). pp. 21-88.
10 R. S Fraser. "For the Matenalist Conception of the Negro Struggle." 1n What Strategy for
Black Liberation? Trotskyism vs. Black National1sm, Marxist Bulletm 5, rev. ed .. The Spartac1st
League, pp. 3, 16, reprinted from Socialist Workers Party Discuss1on Bulletm, A-30 ( 1955).
11 Linda Burnham and Bob Wing, "Toward a Communist Analys1s of Black Oppression and
Black LiberatiOn, Part II: Theoretical and Histoncai Framework," Line of March. A Marxist-
Leninist Journal of RectificatiOn, 8 ( 1981). p. 48.
12 For the recent pronouncements of the Afro-American freedom struggle by the Communist
party of the United States, see Henry Winston, Class, Race and Black Liberation (New York:
International Publishers, 1977). and the resolution on the Afro-American struggle-Wmston's
Struggle for Afro-American Liberation-adopted by the party's Twenty-second National Con-
vention in August 1979. See also Oliver C. Cox, Caste, Class, and Race: A Study in Social
Dynam1cs (New York: Doubleday, 1948); James A. Geschwender. Class, Race and Worker
Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black Workers (Cambndge: Cambridge Umversity
Press, 1977); Mario Barrera. Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality
(Notre Dame: Un1versity Press of Notre Dame, 1979). Although Barrera IS primarily concerned
w1th the rac1al problematic as it relates to Chicanos and Ch1canas. his theoretical formulations
are relevant to peoples of African descent 1n the Un1ted States of Amenca.
13 William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing Amencan
Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Thomas Sowell. Race and Eco-
nomics (New York: David McKay Co., 1975); Martin K1lson, "The Black Bourgeo1s1e Revisited:
From E. Franklin Frazier to the Present," Dissent (Winter 1983), pp. 85-96. This latter essay
is from Kilson's forthcoming book. Neither Insiders nor Outsiders: Blacks in American Society.
14 Stanley Aronowitz, The Cnsis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politics, and Culture in Marxist
Theory(New York: Praeger Publications, 1981). pp. 89-112.
15 These distinctions are necessary if we are to sharpen and refine the prevailing loose usage
of domination, subjugation, exploitation. repression, and oppression. In my view. domination
and subjugation are discursive affa1rs; the former relates to rac1al. sexual, ethnic, or national
supremacist logics, whereas the latter mvolves the production of subjects and subjectiv1t1es
within such logics. Exploitation and repression are extradiscursive affairs in that they result
from social formations and Institutions such as modes of production and state apparatuses.
Dom1nation. subjugation, exploitation. and repression constitute modes of oppression, wh1ch
are distinguished for analytic purposes. Needless to say, they relate to each other in complex
and concrete ways. These distinctions were prompted by Michel Foucault. "The Subject
and Power," Criticallnqwry, 8:4 (1982). pp. 775-95.
16 Wmthrop Jordan. White Over Black.· Amencan Attitudes toward the Negro. 1550-1812 (New
York: Norton, 1968). pp. 18-20, 36; Thomas F. Gossett, Race. The History of an Idea in
Amenca (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 1965). pp. 3-31.
17 For a further e'laboration of this logic. see Cornel West. "A Genealogy of Modern Racism,"
Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-Amencan Revolutionary Chnstlamty (Philadelphia: Westmins-
ter Press. 1982). pp. 47-65. And for the metaphilosophical motivation for th1s inquiry, see
Cornel West, "Philosophy, Politics and Power: An Afro-American Perspective," in Philosophy
Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-Amencan Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harns
(Dubuque Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co .. 1983). pp. 51-59.

27
18 The best exposition of this logic rema1ns Joel Kovel's White Rac1sm A Psychoh1story (New
York: Pantheon. 1970). For an mteresting. yet less theoretical. treatment. see Calvin C.
Hernton. Sex and Rac1sm in America (New York: Grove Press. 1965).
19 Jacques Derrida, Pos1t10ns. trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univers1ty of Chicago Press. 1981).
p. 51.
20 Primarily owing to parochial secular sens1b1lities. black and wh1te Marxist thinkers-with ex-
ceptions such as Eugene Genovese in h1s magnum opus Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the
Slaves Made (New York: Random House. 1974). pp. 159-284. and Orlando Patterson's
masterful Slavery and SoCJal Death.· A ComparatiVe Study (Cambndge: Harvard University
Press. 1982). pp. 66-76-have overlooked the tremendous 1mpact of evangelical Protes-
tantism on Afro-Americans in the United States. and espec1ally the subtle ways in which
Afro-Americans have employed the1r appropriation of this Protestantism for counterhege-
moniC a1ms. The major legacy of this appropnat1on is that present-day Afro-American re-
sistance rema1ns under the auspices of the small. yet quite visible. prophetic wing of the
black church. as exemplified by Rev. Herbert Daughtry's cha1rmansh1p of the leftist National
Black Un1ted Front and the Afncan People's Christian Organ1zation. by Rev. Joseph Lowery's
presidency of the left-liberal Southern Christian Leadership Conference (founded by Rev.
Martm Luther King, Jr.). by Rev. Benjamin Hooks's executive directorship of the liberal National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. and by Rev. Jesse Jackson's leadership
of the l1beral People United to Save Humanity. It is no historical. political. and existential
acc1dent that. as an oppos1t1onal African Intellectual and activist in the United States. I teach
in a Protestant seminary and wnte as an Afro-American neo-Gramscian Christian! For four
noteworthy texts on the rel1g1ous dimension of the rac1al problematiC 1n the Un1ted States.
see Albert Raboteau's superb Slave Religion: The "Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum
South (New York: Oxford University Press. 1978); James Cone and Gayraud Wilmore's
1nd1spensable Black Theology: A Documentary History, 1966-19 79 (Maryknoll. N.Y.: Orb is
Books. 1979); my own provocative work. Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revo-
lutionary Chnstiamty (Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 1982); and James Washington's bril-
liant hundred-page mtroduct1on to Afro-American Protestant Spirituality (New York: Paul1st
Press. 1984).
21 The seductive powers of Foucault must be resisted by leftist thinkers on two fronts: the trap
of discurs1ve reductionism. wh1ch posits the absolute (as opposed to relative) autonomy of
discursive practices. and the trap of full-blown (as opposed to provisional) antitotalism. which
promotes revolt yet precludes revolution. The Marxist path that incorporates Foucault's in-
sights has been blazed by the grand p1oneer of cultural studies, Stuart Hall. See espec1ally
h1s "Cultural Studies Two Paradigms." Media. Culture and Society. 2(1980). pp 57-72.
and "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies," in Culture,
Society and the Media. ed. M1chael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett. James Curran. and Janet
Woollacott (New York: Methuen. 1982). pp. 56-90. For subtle elaborations of this per-
spective on untouched frontiers, see Hazel V. Carby, "Schooling 1n Babylon" and "White
Woman Listen! Black Femin1sm and the Boundanes of Sisterhood." in The Empire Strikes
Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain, Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (London:
Hutchinson. 1982). pp. 183-211. 212-35.
22 Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Sm1th (New York: International Publishers, 1971 ). p. 407. For his formu-
lations of a "histoncal bloc," note pp. 136ff.. 365-66. For a useful treatment of thiS complex
issue of the relation of base and superstructure. see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Lit-
erature (New York: Oxford University Press. 1977). pp. 75-89.
23 The best theoret1cal formulation I know of this Gramscian metaphor is found in Bob Jessop's
superb work The Cap1tal1st State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press. 1982). pp. 211-59.
24 Ernesto Laclau, "The Impossibility of Soc1ety," Canadian Journal of Political and Social The-
ory. 7 12 (1983). pp. 21-24.
25 I cons1der the onginary text of poststructuralism to be Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Phi-
losophy, published m 1962 and translated into English in 1983. This provocative and often
persuasive attack on Hegel and dialectics from a Nietzschean v1ewpoint initiated and legiti-
mated the now fam1liar poststructuralist assaults on totalizmg frameworks. teleological nar-
ratives, homogeneous continUities in history. and recuperative. nostalgic strategies in inter-
pretation. The rejection of ontology left Marx1sts with no grounds for theorizing. given their
rel1ance on Hegel1an d1alect1cs. Smce I agree with this rejection. the theoretical cris1s of
Marx1sm is, I bel1eve, a serious one. Aronowitz's call-influenced by Adorno's philosophy of
difference and Murray Bookchin ·s ecolog1cal perspective-for a new will to totality guided by
1deals of workers' self-management. sexual and racial freedom, and the liberation of nature
is noteworthy. as IS Deleuze's and Guatarn's call-mediated by Spinoza and Nietzsche-for
theoret1cal nomadism guided by a political metaphysics of desire. Both call for a new Marxist
or matenalist ethics. yet neither 1s forthcoming. The major alternative is to opt for a pragmatic
v1ewpomt (1nformed by the work of Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein. and others) in which

28
 Cornel West
dialectical modes of thinking become rhetorical strategies employed in intellectual, social,
and existential warfare against dogmatic ways of thought, forms of oppression. and modes
of despair. Such rhetorical Marxism or dialectical pragmatism (to use Max Eastman's term)
preserves historically constituted human agency. accents the multileveled character of
oppression. and demystifies poststructuralist strategies by circumscribing and thereby tri-
vializing the radical skepticism that sustain them while accepting their powerful insights re-
garding the role of otherness and alterity in philosophies of identity, including most forms of
dialectical thinking. Since energizing emancipatory visions are. to put it bluntly, religious
visions. I see little alternative other than appropriating the subversive potential of Christianity
and other religions.

29
 Discussion
Comment
Despite your efforts to escape logocentrism, you maintain
the logocentric duality of black and white to describe the structure of a nation that
is, on the contrary, clearly based on multiple dominations. To make the question
of Afro-American problems central to Marxism may, for example, be to ignore
Latinos and Indians. Though you acknowledge that we are sometimes dealing with
quite specific subgroups, say Caribbean blacks, I wonder if there still may not be a
problem in your project.
West
I believe there is a specificity to the various forms of the
African experience that is distinct from that of other peoples of color. I was speaking
to just that highly limited but crucial specificity. Of course, I do not want to reenact
the very exclusion I would criticize in the dominant culture, and I do believe my
framework could (and should) be enriched by analyses of the situations of other
peoples of color. But it is important not to move too quickly to speak about a broad
spectrum of peoples of color. On the other hand, you can't talk solely about specific
oppressions without understanding the relations between the different oppressions
of Latinos, Asians, indigenous peoples, etc. For example, in a discourse against
slavery, one needs to distinguish between the oppression of indigenous peoples and
the oppression of Africans. Finally, we need to recognize that oppression is mani-
fested in different forms of discursive power.

Question
Many of us have started to study the history of black and
white Hispanic people since they came to America. We have found that they begin
a system of stratification that ironically replicates the existing black and white duality.
When I ask black Latinos whether they are light or dark, most of them say they are
light. It seems that every measure of color one takes on is simply a bourgeois tool
of self-identification. If you study kinship structures and marital selection, you see
again a stratification system inside the Latino community in which patterns of race
relations around black and white begin to replicate themselves. How does one ac-
knowledge the specific histories of these peoples while accounting for what is ob-
viously a general structure for the reproduction of racial difference?
West
Understanding the function of racial differences raises the
theoretical issue of the very play of difference itself. I do not have any Hegelian
nostalgia for undifferentiated unities now or in the future. We are in a world of
differences forever. That means we are talking about the irreducibility of differences
in the racial sphere. Yet, historically, racial differences are always constituted as
"scientific" by ideological discourses. I cannot envision, within the logics of the
modem West, with its legacy of slavery, societies that do not have racial differences.
Consequently, our social emancipatory visions and projects have to acknowledge
the irreducibility of racial differences but fight against a translation of such differences
into hierarchical social relations and symbolic orders. So we will not get beyond the
play of differences and binary oppositions. The question is how we arrest the political
and economic translation of such differences into hierarchical relations. That, to me,
is the problematic. And I would say similar things about sexuality. I do not see an
eschatological possibility of erasing these differences. To give an example: Frank
Snowden's work on black antiquity suggests that if we could only get back to the
way the Greeks interacted with the Ethiopians (when Heraclitis talked about how
beautiful black women were), then we could get beyond these black/white prejudices.
I can understand his motivations, but I think that is precisely the kind of nostalgia
that must be resisted.

30
 Cornel West
Question (Stanley Aronowitz)
Two recent texts suggest very different models of oppression
and exploitation. Each proposes a mode of determination and makes a universal
claim for it, which seems to contradict your strong bias toward historical specificity.
In Slavery and Social Death, Orlando Patterson argues that the transhistorical de-
velopment of slavery is based on the existence of a form of social domination that
produces a category of otherness within the symbolic order. This form of social
domination precedes economic exploitation and the labor process. This proposal
almost turns Marxism on its head but still maintains the methodology of a primary
contradiction (as Mao says). Class and race mediate this category of social domi-
nation; they are mechanisms by which the deratiocination process takes place. The
second text is Barrington Moore's. Moore argues that there is no possibility for
oppression to take place without consent. Thus the basis of revolt, if not revolution,
is not a struggle against oppression and exploitation but the breaking of the contract
between the oppressed and the oppressor, a contract fundamentally based on caste
considerations. As long as people have a "contractual" place in the symbolic, social,
and economic order, they are likely to reproduce their conditions of subordination.
Can you comment on these two positions?
West
First, in regard to Patterson: his notion of modal alienation,
in which a people born with no rights to predecessors (without a past) and with no
right to progeny (without a future), is part of a discourse in which black people have
no social ontology. Patterson is very ambiguous about the status of this view. If he
believes this form of alienation is prior to social processes, then I think his position
is unintelligible. If, however, he wants merely to accent the weight of that moment
of alienation, then I am with him all the way. So for me the question is how modal
alienation interacts with the various logics I have been talking about. Indeed, I think
that is the direction Patterson himself takes. Patterson invokes Marx in arguing that
slavery is a relation of domination. So Patterson views this as part of the Marxist
project, and Perry Anderson and company published his essay in New Left Review.
Second, what Barrington Moore is attempting to get at is
already clearly articulated by Ernest Becker: the relation between hegemony-the
mobilization and reproduction of the consent of the oppressed to their domination,
subjugation, exploitation, and repression-and the need for cosmic recognition, the
horror of death. How are these issues manipulated, not in any crude sense by a
ruling class, but so as to inscribe them within various modes of socialization which
ensure that human beings consent to their domination? Unfortunately, Becker sees
the horror of death in terms of Otto Rank's view of immortality-the need not to
go in and out of this thing we call life without some kind of recognition, even if it's
in a hierarchical order. But that's only one of its dimensions.

Question
Stanley suggested one way that an ontological category of
otherness precedes social processes and structures oppression. Obviously feminism
could say the same for the oppression of women by way of an already given category
of otherness. Could you give us an example, within the contemporary black liberation
movement, of how this needs instead to be read in terms of its precise historicity?
West
On a general level, I want to begin by saying that black
feminists like Audre Lorde and others are the major figures that both the black Left
and the American Left in general must come to terms with. Now I'll cite a specific
historical context in answer to your question: consider the central role of the black
church in black liberation. It is a radically patriarchal institution, even though its
membership is 70 percent black women. Thus, the black feminist movement must
in many ways be antichurch. Yet within the church itself there are black feminists
who are struggling with the history of the doctrine and the various liberation theo-

31
logies that come out of it. Nonetheless, this very specific history, with black men in
leadership roles, provides many possibilities for polarization. It isn't simply that
black men are in conflict with black women but that their relations are mediated
by various institutions. So the issue of feminism within black liberation is always
already traversed by class, by race, and by the institution of the black church. It's
crisscrossed by class fractions as well. There is no doubt, for example, that gay life-
styles will be much more acceptable among a black petit-bourgeois strata, because
they interact with the larger culture and are not as affected by the patriarchal sen-
sibilities of the black church. Yet most of these folks come out of the church, if not
in one generation then two, so there are still internal struggles going on.

Question
I'd like to know your views on the growing struggle in South
Africa. Can it be a mobilizing force for blacks in America?
West
I think that South Africa will continue to serve, in many
ways, as a symbol of evil. It represents a massive concentration of white supremacist
logic, inscribing this logic in institutions across the social spectrum. And it is no
accident that the ruling classes in late-capitalist European societies repress infor-
mation about this crypto-fascist society in the mass media. This repression will come
back with a vengeance. Yet how one goes about mobilizing resistance to South Africa
is a very difficult question. You are not only talking about the possibility of resistance
by the armed forces in South Africa, of which about 22 percent are now of African
descent; you are also talking about increasing black entrepreneurial interests in South
Africa. You are talking about the rise of a diverse black trade union movement in
South Africa that will have to define its own direction and its relation to the black
petit bourgeoisie. These are all open-ended questions. The question for us will be
whether the vocal opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa can move
toward an anticapitalist view and not remain simply, though importantly, antiracist.

Question
I'm interested in hearing your view ofliberation theology-
what it's trying to do, how it fits into Marxist theory, and its relevance to your
project.
West
I believe it is important to understand the Christian view-
point as a particular discursive formation, one that has had tremendous impact on
people, particularly on the struggle for freedom among African peoples in the United
States. That is not to say that there are not some crucial manipulative and reactionary
elements in the black church. But if we take my neo-Gramscian framework seriously,
we have to set aside all a priori enlightenment-informed, antireligious perspectives.
We have to look at religion in very different ways, different even from that of the
so-called master (small "m" for me), Karl Marx. That is important not only for
Afro-American cases but also for understanding what is going on in Iran, in Nica-
ragua, in Chile. Although there are no acceptable nostalgic moves back to represen-
tational notions of God, God remains a very important signifying term. As Karl
Barth understood, truth is always eschatological.

Question
Are you happy and hopeful about the black movement in
this country?
West
I'm not happy with the black movement; I'm not happy with
anyplace in the world. But I'm hopeful. The grounds of my hope are very complex
because I'm a Christian and a whole lot of other things. Or at least I subscribe to
that discourse in which God is a significant signifying term. I also subscribe to
32
 Cornel West
Gramsci's optimism of the will. Yet as long as you are part of the struggle, pure
hope becomes abstract because the actual historical process produces tremendous
setbacks and certain small gains.

33
 Stuart Hall

The Toad in the Garden:

Thatcherism among the Theorists

Until now, marx1sm has failed to renovate its own think-

Ing suff1c1ently to explain how modern capitalism re-
mains 1n be1ng and sustains 1ts hegemoniC position in in-
dustnallzed soc1et1es. Confronting and understanding
Thatcher1sm may be the pr1ce we nave to pay for a real
advance 1n theoretical enlightenment W1th1n the Marx1st
problematic.

This paper is summary in several senses. First, in the

course of the argument it summarizes a number of positions in the recent
debate on ideology, without attempting to elaborate arguments or detail
objections. Second, it represents a summary of my own, current provisional
take, or position, on a number of those debates. Its structure is simple. We
have been passing through a veritable deluge, in recent years, with respect
to theorizing the domain of ideology. Much of this has taken the form of
elaborate deconstructions of the classical marxist theory of ideology. The
paper takes off from and reflects on this heightened period of theoretical
contestation. However, this period of intense theorization has also engen-
dered its opposite-a rigorous critique of the hyperabstraction and over·
theoreticism that has characterized theoretical speculation since, roughly,
the impact of structuralism in the early 1970s; and the charge that, in the
pursuit of theory for its own sake, we have abandoned the problems of
concrete historical analysis.
Edward Thompson's book, The Poverty of Theory,
which mirrors in its very extremism the object it is criticizing (the project
of Althusserianism), is only the latest, most prestigious example of this
backlash. While I believe The Poverty of Theory to have been an ill-judged,
intemperate enterprise, conducted by way ofbrilliant but crude polemic and
caricature, where skillful argument and serious exemplification were the
modes required, it clearly has a point. 1 It is possible-indeed, it had been
widely attempted-to pile up one sophisticated speculative theoretical con-
struction on top of another (meanwhile compounding the puns, usually on
words already borrowed from the French, so that the whole results in the
most barbarously hybrid language), without ever once touching ground and
without reference to a single concrete case or historical example.
Therefore, instead of undertaking once more the line
of pure theoretical critique and refutation, I have attempted in this paper-
again in summary fashion-to refer some of the substantive emergent po-
sitions in the debate about ideology to the analysis of a concrete political
problem, and specifically to the current political conjuncture in Britain,
marked by the emergence of the New Right, the accession to power, first
35
in the Conservative party and then in two successive governments, of Mrs.
Thatcher and the political philosophy ("Thatcherism") she represents. The
question I pose is simple. The purpose of theorizing is not to enhance one's
intellectual or academic reputation but to enable us to grasp, understand,
and explain-to produce a more adequate knowledge of-the historical world
and its processes; and thereby to inform our practice so that we may trans-
form it. If that is so, then which of the various positions in the current
debate on ideology exhibits the greatest range, penetration, and explanatory
power in terms of accounting for the rise ofthe New Right and the extraor-
dinary political conjuncture to which it has led? Obviously, this cannot be
answered in detail within the scope of a single paper, but a kind of explor-
atory test can be made, treating the issue in a summary fashion. And that
is what is attempted here.
First, let me briefly and schematically characterize the political
conjuncture in its more demonstrable aspects. The political character of the
postwar period in Britain was defined by the "settlement" arrived at in the
1940s. Basically, a new kind of unwritten social contract emerged through
which a bargain, a historic compromise, was struck between the different
conflicting social interests in society. The Right-marginalizing their more
reactionary and free-market elements-settled for the welfare state, com-
prehensive education, the Keynesian management of economic policy, and
the commitment to full employment as the terms of peaceful compromise
between capital and labor. In return, the Left accepted to work broadly
within the terms of a modified capitalism and within the Western bloc sphere
of strategic influence. Despite the many real differences of emphasis and a
number ofbitter political and industrial struggles which marked the political
scene from time to time, the situation was characterized by a profound,
underlying consensus or compromise on the fundamental social and eco-
nomic framework within which conflicts were, for the moment, "settled"
or contained.
It is possible for quite different actual political regimes to function
in and dominate a historic compromise of that type. But, for a range of
structural factors that cannot be entered into here, variants of social de-
mocracy (principally in the form of reformist Labour governments) came-
with brief interludes-to dominate the British social formation in the 1960s
and 1970s. This followed the immediate postwar period of "restoration,"
in which fundamental capitalist imperatives were restored to their rightful
position under the aegis of Harold Macmillan's Conservative regime in the
"affluent 1950s," within the framework of U.S. world hegemony and an
expanding Atlanticism. By "dominate" I mean that Labour came, for the
first time in British history, to look like an alternative majority party of
government, not a temporary interloper; reformist goals and strategies tended
to set the objectives for the political scene, even where the actual reality of
implementation was extremely patchy. Above all, it was social democracy,
not conservatism, that seemed best able to manage the new big-state/big-
capital corporatist arrangements that developed as the basis of economic
policy and planning in the period, both to harness the working classes to
the corporatist bargains through the trade unions and, at the same time,
discipline them through Labour's historic alliance with the unions. In the
early 1960s, Harold Wilson made a bold attempt to consolidate this hegem-
ony of social democracy by harnessing a number of different sectors within
36
 Stuart Hall
a broad alliance or historical bloc composed of"workers by hand and brain"
(an unlikely social alliance, which stretched from the skilled white-coated
machinist on the shop floor to the forward-looking company management
team) and linking it with the "white heat" of the new technology behind a
corporatist state. Had this attempt succeeded, it would have created the
historical conditions for a long, settled period of reform capitalism under
social democratic management.
The underlying conditions for this stabilization did not exist,
however. The British economy and the whole industrial structure were too
weak, too tied to a traditional worldwide imperial financial role, too un-
modernized, "backward," and undercapitalized to generate the huge sur-
pluses required both to sustain the capital accumulation and profitability
processes and cream off enough to finance the welfare state, high wages, and
improved conditions for the less well-off-the only terms on which the
historic compromise could operate. As the world economic recession began
to deepen, Britain-one of the oldest and now one of the weakest links in
the capitalist chain-began to polarize under the conflicting pressures that
had eroded the basis of the earlier settlement. Labor, obliged in a crisis to
defend the system it had never intended to transform, was forced more and
more into the role of disciplining its own working class. The internal con-
tradictions inscribed in the historic compromise from its inception began
to emerge-first, in the social and political upheavals of the 1960s, then in
the countercultural social movements around the Vietnam War, and finally
(during the Conservative interregnum of Edward Heath) in the industrial
conflict and militancy of the early 1970s-and the social-democratic-dom-
inated consensus that had stabilized the British political scene up to that
point began to fracture and its legitimacy to evaporate. Both in the heartland
of economic life-wages, production, strikes, industrial conflict, union mil-
itancy, and so on-and in the emergent arenas of social life-crime, per-
missiveness, race, moral and social values, traditional social roles and
mores-the society declined into crisis. One phase of hegemony had dis-
integrated; the society entered that era of contestations, crises, and alarms
that frequently accompanies the struggles for the formation of a new heg-
emonic stage.
This was the moment of the New Right. It did not, of course,
materialize out of thin air. Ever since the disappearance, at the turn of the
century, of the Liberal party as the alternative party of government and the
rise of Labour in its place, many traditional free-market ideological elements
had gravitated from their traditional liberal home to the Conservative party,
finding within it at least a fundamental commitment to the free-enterprise
system, the ethic of possessive individualism and rugged competition that
afforded them ideological cover. These elements were combined with the
more traditional, paternal, organic Tory tradition to compose the highly
contradictory formation that modern conservatism became. But in the pe-
riod of the postwar compromise, these neoliberal elements were decidedly
pushed to the margins of the party. Let out on a tight leash at party con-
ferences, they were permitted to air their recidivistic social doctrines (the
hangem-and-flogem brigade) and to push a version of crude economic in-
dividualism and the petit-bourgeois ethic of competition against what they
regarded as the too well bred Tory squirearchy. But the more fundamental
forces dictating the political direction in the Conservative party were those
37
attempting to adapt conservatism to the conditions of life in which state
welfare, widespread social assistance, state intervention of a limited kind
in the operations of the free market, Keynesian demand management of
the economy, trade union bargaining, corporatist management strategies,
and big-state/big-capital combinations, were the order of the day.
It is true that, in the difficult years of Mr. Heath's government
(1970-74), when the signs of crisis were clearly beginning to show, there
were some significant departures moving the Conservatives closer to the
neoliberal political pole. Law and order, the need for social discipline against
the rising anarchic elements in society, a virulent racism directed against
black immigrants-these volatile elements of the populist program were
very much to the fore in the election of 1970. For a time, under Heath, the
state-trade union bargaining links were broken, corporatism was buried,
head-on confrontations with industrial militants and the unions were un-
dertaken by the government, and attempts were made to break with the
creeping elements of state capitalism that had become normal in British
industry and to restore a more free-market, competitive economic regime.
The period began with a runaway housing boom, a splurge of new banks
of a distinctly shaky and shady variety, and widespread bankruptcies as
industry tuned up for the more competitive climate of the European eco-
nomic community. The period ended with British industry on a three-day
week and the government brought down in a head-on collision with the
miners' union. Many have interpreted, retrospectively, the popularity in
this period of Mr. Enoch Powell, with his focus on race, nation, and the
free market, and the strong law-and-order, competition-or-bust spirit ofthe
early Heath period as vivid anticipations or rehearsals of Thatcherism.
Yet when Thatcherism finally emerged it was pitched against the
"creeping corporatism" of all recent governments, including that of Mr.
Heath. And it was led by distinguished converts-Sir Keith Joseph, the
leading ideologue, and Mrs. Thatcher herself-who had been ministers in
the Heath government but who now, Damascus-like, repudiated what they
called the trend toward "state socialism," which they saw as built into a
conjuncture dominated by social democracy, whatever the actual complex-
ion of the government in power. Publicly, it was in the prelude period to
the leadership stakes within the Conservative party that Joseph first emerged
as the leading ideologue of an inner-party revolution, with a series of speeches
in which the "new philosophy" was exposed. Joseph remains one of the key
"organic intellectuals" of Thatcherism, but he alienated some crucial sec-
tions of the electorate by his high-handed manner and lack of the common
touch. It was with his retirement, not from the ideological leadership ofthe
bloc, but from the public political position of party leader, that Mrs. Thatcher
emerged as the public figure best able to translate the high nostrums of
monetarism and the gospel of the free market into the homespun idioms
of the Tory householder.
Thatcherism thus won and transformed the Conservative party
first, before setting about winning and transforming the country. I shall come
back to what Gram sci would call this "organizational moment" -the "mo-
ment of party" -later. It is sufficient here to say that Thatcherism, though
it owes much to and integrates key elements of traditional Toryism, is a
radically distinct political and ideological force, radically different from older
versions of conservatism that have dominated the party throughout the
38
 Stuart Hall
postwar period-or, rather, combining the different elements of conserva-
tism in a radically distinctive and original way. It gained ascendancy first
by contesting and defeating the old guard-the party guardians, the patri-
cians-and the old doctrines. Its first historic mission was not to bend and
subvert but to contest and disperse the social democratic corporatist con-
sensus that had dominated the political scene since the end of the Second
World War and to disorganize the common sense-the political taken-for-
granted-ofthe British postwar political settlement. Its second historic mis-
sion was to reverse the dominant trends in British society. On matters of
policy, this meant reversing the trend to state-subsidized welfare, breaking
the curve of public spending and the public sector, restoring private enter-
prise and the imperatives of the free market and offree-market forces, rolling
back the tide of state intervention, underpinning profitability, keeping wages
in check, and breaking the power the working class had come to exercise
in society, via the trade unions, in economic and political life.
What concerns us more specifically here are the reversals at which
Thatcherism aimed in the area of social thought or the ideological domain.
Its mission was to stem the anticapitalist tide it believed had been allowed
to gather impetus during the 1960s-the view, to put it summarily, that no
bright young person would be caught dead going into business-and also
to crack the whole pattern of social expectations predicated on increased
state support-or what was called, in the prophetic title of a pamphlet from
the Centre for Policy Studies (of which more will be said later), "breaking
the spell of the welfare state." The mission ofThatcherism was to reconstruct
an alternative ideological bloc of a distinctively neoliberal, free-market, pos-
sessive individualist kind; to transform the underpinning ideologies of the
Keynesian state and thus disorganize the power bloc, by now habituated to
Keynesian recipes for dealing with crises in the economic life; and to break
the incremental curve of working-class power and bargaining strength, re-
versing the balance of power and restoring the prerogatives of management,
capital, and control. This was conceived on no narrow economistic basis.
The aim was to reconstruct social life as a whole around a return to the old
values-the philosophies of tradition, Englishness, respectability, patriar-
chalism, family, and nation. The most novel aspect of Thatcherism was
indeed the very way in which it combined the new doctrines of the free
market with some of the traditional emphases of organic Toryism. This
contradictory structure of ideas, around which Thatcherism in its ascend-
ancy managed to cohere the semblance of ideological unity, is best captured
in the paradoxical slogan the political theorist Andrew Gamble coined on
its behalf: "Free market and strong state."
Until its magical aura of invincibility began to depart, this for-
mation had made enormous advances, without, of course, achieving uni-
versal success at any point in this historic venture. This judgment could be
and has been contested; but it seems to me a claim, made tentatively in
1979 when I predicted successfully Thatcherism's quite unexpected victory
in the election of that year, that has, if anything, been strengthened and
confirmed rather than disproved by the passage of time. Of course, Thatch-
erism has never achieved absolute domination in electoral terms. The gov-
ernment retains the support of somewhat less than a majority of the British
electorate-the scale of the 1983 victory was undoubtedly fictitiously mag-
nified by the Falklands episode and by the split in the ranks opposite, be-
39
 tween the Labour party and the newly formed Liberal Social Democratic
Alliance. Quite rapidly in the wake of her second historic victory at the
polls in 1983, Mrs. Thatcher has consistently run into difficulties, as some
of the longer-term strategic failures (for example, a continuing level of un-
employment of over three million) have come to compound her many tac-
tical blunders and errors. No government is perfect; no politician in the
parliamentary electoral system lasts forever.
On the other hand, taking the period of political contestation
from the successful contest for the leadership of the party to the present,
Thatcherism has become, qualitatively and without question, the leading
political and ideological force. Even in the period of accident-prone gov-
ernment, the Labour party has only just managed, in crude electoral support
terms, to come level in the opinion polls-a position not strong enough to
reverse the overwhelming majority Thatcherism has secured in Parliament.
Even that is too crudely quantitative a measure. The fact is that
Thatcherism has succeeded in reversing or putting into reverse gear many
of the historic postwar trends. It has begun to dismantle and erode the terms
of the unwritten social contract on which the social forces settled after the
war. It has changed the currency of political thought and argument. Where
previously social need had begun to establish its own imperatives against
the laws of market forces, now questions of"value for money," the private
right to dispose of one's own wealth, the equation between freedom and
the free market, have become the terms oftrade, not just of political debate
in parliament, the press, the journals', and policy circles, but in the thought
and language of everyday calculation. There has been a striking reversal of
values: the aura that used to attach to the value of the public welfare now
adheres to anything that is private-or can be privatized. A major ideo-
logical reversal is in progress in society at large; and the fact that it has not
swept everything before it, and that there are many significant points or
pockets of resistance (the national health service, for example, remains one),
does not contradict the fact that, conceived not in terms of outright victory
but more in terms of the mastery of an unequal equilibrium, Thatcherism
has, in less than a decade, not only turned the tables but begun to reconstruct
the social order.
One sign of this ideological success is the effective penetration
into and dismantling of parts of the heartland, the mainstream, of the Labour
party's social base. Substantial sections of the skilled and semiskilled in-
dustrial classes, a significant percentage of organized trade unionists, a large
sector of the working-class urban vote, especially in the less deindustrialized
parts of the country, and a majority of the unemployed-to name only some
social categories-have gone over to Thatcherism in the last two elections,
abandoning their traditional loyalty to Labour. Some of this movement may
be temporary and may well revert. But for the absolutely critical decade in
which Britain has absorbed the full impact of world capitalist recession,
Thatcherism has, in these areas, positively won space. It set out to and has
effectively become a populist political force, enlisting popular consent among
significant sections of the dominated classes, successfully presenting itself
as a force on the side of the people and moving into a commanding, or
leading, position in society through a combination of the imposition of social
discipline from above-an iron regime for Iron Times-and of populist
mobilization from below-the combination I have elsewhere characterized
40
 Stuart Hall
as "authoritarian populism" (to which I shall return later). Many of the
trends and tendencies in postwar British society, which we came to assume
were part and parcel of the very conditions of survival of British capital-
ism-big-state/big-capital corporatist strategies of management and the other
corporatist features that late-capitalist economies seem to impose on the
free play of market forces-are in the process ofbeing either dismantled or
reworked into new combinations.
Of course, ideology cannot function on its own; we should not
mistake an ideological reading for an analysis of the conjuncture as a whole.
Many things affirmed in Thatcherite ideology have not materialized in the
so-called real world. The rate of inflation has been reduced and public ex-
penditure cut, but the economy has not been revitalized nor unemployment
reduced nor the money supply effectively constrained. Petit-bourgeois-type
social values, for example-though powerfully articulated in the field of
entrepreneurship, value for money, and the sacred character of the rates, as
well as in the restoration of family values and the traditional roles for
women-so far lack what might be called a "crudely material effect." Small
businesses are rapidly being set up and almost as rapidly going to the wall.
The claims in the economic arena are not that "monetarism works" but
that "there is no alternative" -a sober, stoic, and longer-term gamble for
support. Nevertheless, the ideological effectivity of Thatcherism in defining
new contours in political language and calculation is striking, and not only
at the fever-pitch high points, such as at the crest of the Falklands adventure.
What is particularly significant for our purposes is Thatcherism's capacity
to become popular, especially among those sectors of the society whose
interests it cannot possibly be said to represent in any conventional sense
of the term. This is the aspect of the phenomenon that, with respect to the
various theories of ideology, most requires explanation.
Inadequate as it is, this must suffice as an account of the phe-
nomenon to be explained. This account, however abbreviated, is not, of
course, theoretically innocent. The description of the conjuncture is already
ordered and organized by a set of concepts; it is not possible to give a
theoretically neutral account. This points up the degree to which so-called
concrete historical or empirical work is always inscribed by particular the-
ories. Nevertheless, there are common features that different accounts would
recognize at least as posing common problems requiring explanation to the
different theoretical perspectives. (No prizes are awarded to the reader who
identified the Gramscian concepts that have informed my reading of the
conjuncture.)
Despite the above qualification, I think there is still enough ground
for saying that the conjuncture I have just outlined is only partially and
inadequately explained by the application of what we would call the "classic
variant" of the marxist theory of ideology, such as we find in or derive from
Marx and Engels's German Ideology. Whereas in that theory we would
expect a broad coincidence or correspondence between "ruling class" and
"ruling ideas," we find instead significant differences of ideological forma-
tion within the so-called dominant classes, with no perfect or consistent
class symmetry in the way these ideological formations are distributed among
classes. We have, indeed, been required to speak of an internal contestation
41
 between one set of ruling ideas and another, and the partial displacement
of one by the other. Similarly, the idea of the internal fractioning of the
ideological universe of the dominant classes, or the suggestion that ideas
may have to enter into a process of vigorous polemic and contestation in
order to become the normative-normalized structure of conceptions through
which a class "spontaneously" and authentically thinks or lives its relations
to the world, are propositions equally foreign to classical marxism, at least
in its more abstract and general form. (The concrete analysis of ideological
formations in the Eighteenth Brumaire is quite a different question.) The
conventional approach suggests that the dominant ideas are ascribed by and
inscribed in the position a class holds in the structure of social relations
and that the position of dominance is guaranteed elsewhere-by class lo-
cation. It is not assumed that these ideas should positively have to win
ascendancy (rather than being ascribed it) through a specific and contingent
(in the sense of open-ended, not totally determined) process of ideological
struggle.
In the classical perspective, Thatcherism would be understood
as in no significant way different from traditional conservative ruling ideas.
I have already noted that Thatcherism is a quite distinct, specific, and novel
combination of ideological elements, distinct from other combinations
through which the dominance of the English ruling classes has, historically,
found expression. It is also the result of the positive reorganizing of certain
key elements in the discourses of the Right-partly an effect of the disor-
ganizing of a previously settled formation. Thatcherism, too, has emerged
as the result of an extended ideological struggle within the ruling bloc. Tra-
ditionally, we would expect the bourgeoisie as a "whole" class, always al-
ready inscribed with "its" ideology, to go marching through history with
monetarism imprinted (in Poulantzas's memorable phrase) ''like a number
plate on its back." We are looking here at a significant shift in thinking. Far
from one whole unified class outlook being locked in permanent struggle
with the class outlook of an opposing class, we are obliged to explain an
ideology that has effectively penetrated, fractured, and fragmented the ter-
ritory of the dominated classes, precipitating a rupture in their traditional
discourses (laborism, reformism, welfarism, Keynesianism) and actively
working on the discursive space, the occupancy or mastery of which alone
enables it to become a leading popular ideological force.
The latter point is not, of course, historically novel. Between a
quarter and a third of the British working class, however defined, has tra-
ditionally voted conservative in this century. Indeed, the most significant
period in the reconstruction of modern conservatism prior to the advent of
Thatcherism is the period from the closing decades of the nineteenth century
to the early decades of the twentieth century when, faced with the emergence
of mass democracy, the demise of the Liberal party and its replacement by
Labour, conservatism was obliged to reconstitute itself as a mass political
ideology capable of winning a majority in terms of electoral support. Some
of the ideological elements currently being recast by Thatcherism are pre-
cisely the ones that coalesced into modern conservatism-nation before class,
the organic unity of the English people, the coincidence between the "English
genius" and traditionalism, the paternal duties the privileged owe to the
lower orders, society as an orderly hierarchy of"powers," constitutionalism,
42
 Stuart Hall
and so on. In this way-from the absorption of the imperial theme by Dis-
raeli, Chamberlain, and Saintsbury in the 1880s and 1890s, to the "great
normalization" of the Baldwin era in the 1920s and 1930s-conservatism,
against the odds, came to exert a powerful hegemony over key sectors of
the popular classes, one it has not subsequently lost. Thatcherism thus poses
for the classical marxist theory of ideology a long-standing problem of his-
torical analysis, only in a new and challenging form.
The traditional escape clause for classical marxism, confronted
with this historical fact, is the recourse to "false consciousness." The popular
classes, we must suppose, have been ideologically duped by the dominant
classes, using what The German Ideology calls their "monopoly over the
means of mental production." The masses, therefore, have been temporarily
ensnared, against their real material interests and position in the structure
of social relations, to live their relation to their real conditions of material
existence through an imposed but "false" structure of illusions. The tradi-
tional expectation on the Left, founded on this premise, would therefore be
that, as real material factors begin once more to exert their effect, the cob-
webs of illusion would be dispelled, "reality" would be transferred directly
into working-class heads, the scales would fall from workers' eyes, and Mi-
nerva's Owl-the great denouement promised by the Communist Manifesto,
as the socialization of labor progressively created the conditions for mass
solidarity and enlightenment-would take wing at last (even if timed to
arrive approximately 150 years late).
This explanation has to deal with the surprising fact that mass
unemployment has taken a much longer time than predicted to percolate
mass consciousness; the unemployed, who might have been expected to
pierce the veil of illusion first, are still by no means automatic mass converts
to laborism, let alone socialism; and the lessons that can be drawn from the
fact of unemployment turn out to be less monolithic and predictable, less
determined by strict material factors, more variable than supposed. The
same fact can be read or made sense of in different ways, depending on the
ideological perspective employed. Mass unemployment can be interpreted
as a scandalous indictment of the system; or as a sign of Britain's underlying
economic weakness about which mere governments-Left or Right-can do
very little; or as acceptable because "there is no alternative" that is not more
disastrous for the economy; or indeed-within the sociomasochistic per-
spective that sometimes appears to be a peculiarly strong feature of British
ideology-as the required measure of suffering that guarantees the remedy
will work eventually because it hurts so much (the Britain-is-best-when-
backed-to-the-wall syndrome)! The logics of ideological inference turn out
to be more multivariate, the automatic connection between material and
ideal factors less determinate, than the classical theory would have us be-
lieve.
Is this a mere historical aberration-one of classical marxism's
"little local difficulties"? Far from it. Within the gap opened up here between
theoretical prediction and historico-empirical reality is inscribed, in essence,
the whole dilemma of classical marxist theory in our time as a guide to
political action; that is, its lack of adequate explanatory power about the
concrete empirical development of consciousness and practice in the work-
ing classes of the advanced capitalist world-a gap neither Lukacs's dis-
tinction between objective and empirical consciousness nor the more clas-
sical accounts of false consciousness have effectively bridged.
43
 False consciousness had been-rightly-subjected to a rigorous
epistemological critique. It assumes an empiricist relation ofthe subject to
knowledge, namely, that the real world indelibly imprints its meanings and
interests directly into our consciousness. We have only to look to discover
its truths. And if we cannot see them, then it must be because there is a
"cloud of unknowing" that obscures the unilateral truth of the real. The
proposition-outside of the very rudimentary form of psychological sen-
sationalism with which, in the name of materialism, it has occasionally been
bolstered-does not contain any developed account of the actual mecha-
nisms by which material factors ever and always reproduce their prescribed
knowledge; or, more worryingly, of the mechanisms by which the trans-
parency of the real could be obscured under conditions of false conscious-
ness.
I add two somewhat more political critiques. It is a highly un-
stable theory about the world which has to assume that vast numbers of
ordinary people, mentally equipped in much the same way as you or I, can
simply be thoroughly and systematically duped into misrecognizing entirely
where their real interests lie. Even less acceptable is the position that, whereas
"they"-the masses-are the dupes of history, "we" -the privileged-are
somehow without a trace of illusion and can see, transitively, right through
into the truth, the essence, of a situation. Yet it is a fact that, though there
are people willing enough to deploy the false consciousness explanation to
account for the illusory behavior of others, there are very few who are ever
willing to own up that they are themselves living in false consciousness! It
seems to be (like corruption by pornography) a state always reserved for
others. This resembles too palpably a self-excusing strategy to make much
claim on our credulity as a serious explanation of a mass historical phe-
nomenon.
This is by no means-as the deconstructionists would have us
believe-a reason for throwing over altogether some of the insights of the
classical marxist explanation. The social distribution of knowledge is skewed.
And since the social institutions most directly implicated in its formation
and transmission-the family jschooljmedia triplet-are grounded in and
structured by the class relations that surround them, the distribution of the
available codes with which to decode or unscramble the meaning of events
in the world, and the languages we use to construct interests, are bound to
reflect the unequal relations of power that obtain in the area of symbolic
production as in other spheres. Ruling or dominant conceptions of the world
do not directly prescribe the mental content of the illusions that supposedly
fill the heads of the dominated classes. But the circle of dominant ideas does
accumulate the symbolic power to map or classify the world for others; its
classifications do acquire not only the constraining power of dominance
over other modes of thought but also the inertial authority of habit and
instinct. It becomes the horizon of the taken-for-granted: what the world is
and how it works, for all practical purposes. Ruling ideas may dominate
other conceptions of the social world by setting the limit to what will appear
as rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable, within the
given vocabularies of motive and action available to us. Their dominance
lies precisely in the power they have to contain within their limits, to frame
within their circumference of thought, the reasoning and calculation of other
social groups. The "monopoly of the means of mental production" -or of
44
 Stuart Hall
the ••cultural apparatuses," to use a more modern phrase-is not, of course,
irrelevant to this acquisition over time of symbolic dominance vis-a-vis
other, less coherent and comprehensive accounts of the world. Nor do they
have literally to displace other ideas with illusions in order to acquire a
hegemonic position over them. Ideologies may not be affixed, as organic
entities, to their appropriate classes, but this does not mean that the pro-
duction and transformation of ideology in society could proceed free of or
outside the structuring lines of force of power and class.
Nor does it follow that interests-including material ones (what-
ever they are)-have no part in determining the play of ideas within which
different groups figure out the world and their role and allegiances in it.
The problem is that interests are not only not given as an objective feature
of a structure of positions in a social system to which we are ascribed (and
from which then dangle the appropriate forms of consciousness), but they
change historically (Marx himself spoke of .. new needs"). Class is not the
only determinant of social interest (e.g., gender, race). More important,
interests are themselves constructed, constituted, in and through the ideo-
logical process. What is more, social collectivities have more than one set
of interests; and interests can be and frequently are contradictory, even
mutually exclusive. Workers in a social system have both the interest of
advancing and improving their position and advantages within it and of
not losing their place. They are both dependent on and exploited by the
capitalist system. Hence the lines of attachment and interdependence can
run counter to and crosscut or interrupt the lines of solidarity and resistance
between capital and labor. There is no prescriptive law as to which will
always prevail. (Marx understood this actually contradictory basis to class
consciousness better than subsequent marxists, with their predisposition to
construct the pure, disembodied essence of the revolutionary proletarian as
a substitute for their own distilled moral outrage).
It is therefore possible to hold both the proposition that material
interests help to structure ideas and the proposition that position in the
social structure has the tendency to influence the direction of social thought,
without also arguing that material factors univocally determine ideology or
that class position represents a guarantee that a class will have the appro-
priate forms of consciousness. What we know now is that there is no unitary
logic of inference or deduction from one to the other. The logics of different
ideological formations remain polyvocal, or as Volosinov would say of all
discourse, .. multiaccentual"; not infinitely open-ended, but essentially plural
in character.
A somewhat modified position, then, would be that class interest,
class position, and material factors are useful, even necessary, starting points
in the analysis of any ideological formation. But they are not sufficient-
because they are not sufficiently determinate-to account for the actual em-
pirical disposition and movement of ideas in real historical societies. Thus,
we would have to accept that, alongside the revolutionary political tradition
in Britain (which has always, for historically specific reasons, been com-
paratively weak), the reformist tradition has always been well founded,
embedded in a long tradition of historical evolution and social compromise;
well articulated through a set of institutions deeply embedded in the culture
of the dominated classes; and able, under certain historical conditions (those
that have so far largely prevailed in British history), as effectively and piau-
45
 sibly to classifY the world for working people and to make sense of certain
courses of action and support, as other available traditions. This is not a
matter of ideology alone. The structures that underpin a reformist definition
of the world draw their roots from the us/them way of structuring the social
divisions in society that both feed a corporate sense of class belongingness
and are nourished by the cross-class-cutting lines of allegiance that, for
example, knit conflicting classes and social groups into the larger, symbolic
unity of the nation. What is required here is to understand how, under
different concrete conditions, the perceptions and conceptions of the dom-
inated classes can, equally cogently and plausibly, be organized, now into
the reformist, now into the revolutionary discourse. Both are ways of or-
ganizing, discursively, not false but real, or (for the epistemologically
squeamish) real enough, interests and experiences. Both impose on the same
contradictory elements alternative inferential logics. And what can be said
here of reformism-as indigenous a working-class ideology under certain
historical conditions as the revolutionary logic-can and has also to be said
and shown for Thatcherism. The first thing to ask about an ••organic" ide-
ology that, however unexpectedly, succeeds in organizing substantial sec-
tions of the masses and mobilizing them for political action, is not what is
false about it but what about it is true. By .. true" I do not mean universally
correct as a law of the universe but .. makes good sense," which-leaving
science to one side-is usually quite enough for ideology.
The most cogent critique of some of the classical propositions of
the marxist theory of ideology, such as we might find in The German Ide-
ology, is to be found in the work of Althusser, especially the seminal .. Ide-
ological State Apparatuses" essay, which has stood in contemporary debate
as the locus classicus of an alternative theorization. How does the phenom-
enon of Thatcherism stand in light of that argument?
Some of Althusser's key insights are positively confirmed; for
example, the proposition that ideology is always materialized in concrete
practices and rituals and operates through specific apparatuses. We have
spoken ofThatcherism's extensive work of ideological transformations. But
we have neglected to point out in detail how much this owes to the ways
in which these new conceptions have been concretely materialized through
the practices of state regulation in the apparatuses of the state-in education,
in schooling, in family policy, in the administrative apparatuses of local
and central government-and even more so in the specifically ideological
apparatuses. I cannot enter here in detail into this matter, but it is extremely
important, for example, to note the role of so-called private apparatuses,
such as the Institute for Economic Affairs, which was set up in the dark
days of the 1950s to advance the free-market, neoliberal cause. The lEA put
many Thatcherite conceptions into public currency long before they were
either fashionable or directly attached to any political party or faction, and
it can now realistically claim to have played a leading role in constructing
the new orthodoxy and to have .. created the post-war focus for the dem-
onstration that market analysis was indispensable for understanding and
solving economic tasks and problems." 2 This institution was committed not
only to advancing .. the truths of classical political economy" but also to the
validity of Adam Smith's philosophical view that .. the instinct of man is
to •truck and barter in markets.' " One could say the same about the later
formation of the Centre for Policy Studies by Sir Keith Joseph, which op-
46
 Stuart Hall
erated as the think tank that supported his U-turn into monetarism and
directly harnessed the free-floating currents of free-market economic and
social thinking-already making headway among leading economic jour-
nalists like Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan and among key state intellectuals
in the economic departments-directly into the mainstream of the Con-
servative party. Or, to take another aspect, the remarkable way in which
Thatcherism has gradually colonized the mass tabloid press (Britain is the
most densely served mass newspaper-reading public in the world) so that
the principal front-runners (excluding The Mirror)- The Sun, The Mail, The
Star, The Express-vie with each other in the extremity of their vivid iden-
tifications with and glorification of Thatcherism as a philosophy and the
symbolic person of Mrs. Thatcher herself
In what free-marketeers regard as the dark days of Keynesian
social democracy, the ascendancy over serious, informed, and popular mass
opinion exerted through these apparatuses and agencies provided concrete
rallying points for disabused anti-Keynesian intellectuals and points of con-
densation where alternative free-market, monetarist theoretical ideologies
were concretely applied to one practical problem after another. In the period
of the propaganda, between the succession ofMrs. Thatcher to the leadership
of the Conservative party and the winning of the election in 1979, these
organizations prepared the ground, were the trenches and fortifications, the
advance outposts in civil society itself, from which the counteroffensive to
the reigning consensus was launched; they were the base for the strategic
regrouping of state intellectuals and academics, in the treasury, the common
rooms, the think tanks and business schools from which the assault on the
existing hegemony inside the power bloc was launched. And they were also
the key sites-the popular press is strategic in this part of the process-in
the translation of doctrine and philosophy into the terrain of practice and
policy and the popular idiom of practical accomplishments. They helped
to make the "intolerable" thinkable.
All of this represents a progressive ascendancy over the appa-
ratuses of opinion formation in the society at a number of different strategic
levels, and it is precisely where the Althusserian formation runs into diffi-
culties. Althusser would argue that these are all ideological state appara-
tuses-regardless of what he considered the purely formal question of whether
they belonged to the state or not. They are "state" by virtue of their function-
the function, ascribed to the state, of sustaining the "reproduction of the
social relations of production" in and through ideology. What is striking
about Thatcherism is precisely its capacity to enter into struggle and win
space in civil society itself; to use the trenches and fortifications of civil
society as the means of forging a considerable ideological and intellectual
authority outside the realm of the state proper and, indeed, before-as a
necessary condition to-taking formal power in the state, as part of an in-
ternal contestation against key elements within the power bloc. (The hearts
and minds the lEA set out to capture were not only informed public opinion
generally but quite specifically key senior civil servants, subverted-as they
saw it-by incorrect Keynesian nostrums.)
Is this merely a quibble? I think not. Despite the apparent sim-
ilarities of phrasing (due in part to the fact that both Althusser's and my
thinking on this point has been influenced by and reflects Gramsci), two
fundamentally different processes are being described. The first (Althusser's
47
••Ideological State Apparatuses" essay) is the use of existing apparatuses to
reproduce the already given ruling ideology; the second (mine) is the struggle
and contestation for the space in which to construct an ideological hegem-
ony. The fact is that a position of ideological authority and leadership-of
intellectual and moral ascendancy-constructed by harnessing the lines of
force and opinion in the apparently .. free space" of civil society has a re-
markable durability, depth, and staying power because the adhesion it wins
among the people is not coerced, as it might be if the state were directly
involved, but appears to be produced freely and spontaneously as the pop-
ular consent to power. The differences therefore touch what I regard as the
key issue-the problem of explaining the popular consent to Thatcherism.
It is Althusser's functionalism that drives him to give an over-
integrative account of ideological reproduction and to collapse the state/
civil society distinction as if it were without real or pertinent effects. Every-
thing suggests that we must conceptualize the process by which the dominant
ideology reproduces itself as a contradictory and contested one. Indeed, the
term .. reproduction," with its strong functionalist associations, carries quite
the wrong connotations. The process must be conceptualized in terms of
the continuous production and transformation of ideology; that is, in terms
of the condensations Thatcherism has to some extent been able to effect,
to bring about, to realize. And far from allowing us to collapse the distinc-
tion, this latter approach requires us to sustain the state/civil society dis-
tinction and not to conflate the two, since civil society is such a key site in
the production of consensus. Althusser, of course, subsequently acknowl-
edged the error of emphasis in the ••Ideological State Apparatuses" essay
(in an original footnote and in his ••Notes on the !SA's" [1977], translated
into English in Economy and Society): the .. consensus effects of the ruling
class"-its ideology-cannot be regarded .. as a simple given fact, as a system
of exactly defined institutions which would automatically duplicate the vi-
olent rule of the same class or which would have been installed by the clear
political consciousness of this class of particular purposes defined by its
function." 3 They succeed in establishing their hegemony .. at the same time
through an internal struggle to overcome the contradictions of the bourgeois
class fractions and to produce unity within the bourgeoisie as ruling class."
The unification of the ruling class ••is always •incomplete' and always •has
to be resumed.' " This goes some way toward correcting the functionalism
of the original essay (though it still does not adequately tackle the state/
civil society distinction). But it cannot retrospectively correct the damaging
theoretical effects Althusser's more functionalist way of conceptualizing the
.. reproduction" of ruling class consensus had on the main line of argument
in his original essay and in those who have attempted to follow its protocols
too strictly.
Althusser's essay, of course, contains not one but two related, yet
distinct, ways of trying to secure the materialism of ideology without re-
ductionism. It is the second formulation that provided the site of a very
extensive reconstruction of classical marxist theories-the proposition, de-
rived from Lacan, that ideology is material because it operates in and through
the production of subjects. This question of ideology and the production of
subjects has unrolled in the wake of Althusser's destruction of the integral,
authorial individual subject, the subject origin of ideological discourse that
is at the heart of traditional conceptions of ideology. His appeal to Lacan
48
 Stuart Hall
is the attempt-via Lacan's rereading of the psychoanalytic tradition in light
of structuralism and Saussure-to fill the empty space created by the struc-
turalist dethronement of the "I" of enunciation.
Now anyone who is genuinely interested in the production and
mechanisms of ideology must be concerned with the question of the pro-
duction of subjects and the unconscious categories that enable definite forms
of subjectivity to arise. It is clear that the discourses ofthe New Right have
been engaged precisely in this work of the production of new subject po-
sitions and the transformation of subjectivities. Of course, there might be
an essential Thatcherite subject hiding or concealed in each of us, struggling
to get out. But is seems more probable that Thatcherism has been able to
constitute new subject positions from which its discourses about the world
make sense, or to appropriate to itself existing, already formed interpella-
tions. These have arisen through some process, central to the mechanism
of ideology itself, by which new positions have interrupted and partially
displaced older ones; or else new discourses have emerged that secure real
points of identification. In many instances, such interpellations may already
be in place. In other cases, rather than searching for the always already
essentially reactionary working-class subject (to set against his/her opposite,
the always already essentially revolutionary worker), we are driven to attend
to the capacity of new political discourses to articulate themselves on and
through the fractured, necessarily contradictory structures of formed sub-
jectivities; to work on the ground of a formed common sense, or what
Pecheux and Henry call the "preconstructed"; and thus to interpellate al-
ready formed subjects in new discursive relations.
There is no space to demonstrate in detail how this reconstitution
of subject positions is actually accomplished discursively, but it can be
shown. For example, the whole discourse of Thatcherism combines ideo-
logical elements into a discursive chain in such a way that the logic or unity
of the discourse depends on the subject addressed assuming a number of
specific subject positions. The discourse can only be read or spoken un-
problematically if it is enunciated from the imaginary position ofknowledge
of the self-reliant, self-interested, self-sufficient taxpayer-Possessive Indi-
vidual Man (sic); or the "concerned patriot"; or the subject passionately
attached to individual liberty and passionately opposed to the incursion of
liberty that occurs through the state; or the respectable housewife; or the
native Briton. Moreover, through the process Laclau has described as "con-
densed connotation," these imaginary positions, in the plenitude of their
knowledgeable relation to knowledge, trigger off and connote one another
in a chain of linked interpellations that constitute the Imaginary-the con-
dition for the so-called unity, of the discourse, ofthe speaker to the spoken,
as well as connecting one site of articulation with another: the liberty-loving
citizen is also the worried parent, the respectable housewife, the careful
manager of the household budget, the solid English citizen "proud to be
British.... " The discourses of Thatcherism are constantly in this way for-
mulating new subjectivities for the positions they are constructing, working
through interpellation.
The question at issue is not whether this interpellative process
is central to that through which ideology has its effects, but rather how we
are to understand the process. In the Lacanian rereading of Freud, which
is what Althusser was borrowing from and the source that has since provided
49
the principal site of subsequent theorization, these positionings are funda-
mentally secured through the resolution in infancy and early childhood of
some of the primary psychoanalytic processes-the Oedipus complex, pri-
mary narcissism, the mirror phase, and so on. These-in the now famous
formulations of discourse theory-are, at one and the same time, the pri-
mary mechanisms ofthe repression that becomes the basis of all apparently
stable subjective identifications; the points that establish the imaginary place
of knowledge in what then seems an empirically verifiable relation to the
world. They are the mechanism of entry into language itself, and thus into
Culture. And since these different aspects to the formation of subjectivities
are treated as identical or homologous, accomplished in the same series of
resolutions, they are also, finally, the entry into complicity with the law of
patriarchy, of the Father, or Althusser's "big S," Subject. These psychoan-
alytic processes are understood to provide the matrix of always unstable,
always contradictory locations or orientations with respect to meaning and
language, and hence with respect to ideology itself. Across this subjective
space-which is, of course, no longer unified but a place of constant dis-
placement through the fracturing effects of repression-all subsequent dis-
cursive operations play.
Now it may be that, since the securing of sexual identity is, crit-
ically, the work that is done through these unconscious resolutions (Freud),
and the field of infant sexuality is clearly such a key domain in the formation
of subjectivity, there is little doubt ofthe critical importance ofthe processes
referred to above for the interpellation of gender-a factor not only of key
social and ideological importance in itself but one that becomes reinscribed
in or relayed through a wide variety of other domains, including, of course,
the political. Patriarchal positions are absolutely central, as points of con-
densed articulation, in the discourses of both middle-class, petit-bourgeois,
and working-class respectability-an apparently nonpolitical factor that has
the effect of stabilizing and securing to the Right a whole range of other
discourses. It does not, however, follow that the whole of the process of
discursive positioning can be read off from those primary positionings or
conceived largely as simply recapitulating the system, entry into which was
sealed forever with the original resolution of Oedipal identifications. The
entry into Language as such-and hence into Culture/Ideology-does begin
to occur at that stage in the formation of subjectivity itself. But there is all
the difference in the world between the capacity to use Language as such
and the appropriation and imaginary identity with particular languages and
their specific ideological and discursive universes. What Thatcherism poses
is the problem of understanding how already positioned subjects can be
effectively detached from their points of application and effectively repo-
sitioned by a new set of discourses. This is precisely a historically specific
level of application of the interpellative aspects of ideology that is not ad-
equately resumed or explained by the transhistorical speculative generalities
of Lacanianism.
Lacanian psychoanalysis has been utilized, it seems, to explain
how it is we are formed as subjects and how we ever come to enter language,
meaning, representation. The problem before us is the rather different ques-
tion of how subjects could be induced to begin to enunciate their relation
to the world in quite different meaning or representational systems. The
level of abstraction at which the theory is operating (even if it were correct)
50
 Stuart Hall
is largely incommensurable with the nature of the object it is being wheeled
in to explain.

Throughout, I have been speaking of ideology. But, of course, in

many areas the problematic of ideology has itself been displaced into the
analysis ofthe diversity of discursive practices and formations as such. This
is directly connected with the influence of Foucault. A thorough assessment
of the strengths and limits of Foucault's work is not possible within the
scope of this essay, but one can make certain indications. From what has
already been said, it will be seen that we do not in any way refuse the
advances made by the development of the analysis of the discursive. No
social practice exists outside of the domain of the semiotic-the practices
and production of meaning. This necessarily modifies, in a radical way, the
traditional material/ideal, base/superstructure dichotomies of classical
marxist theories of ideology as well as their ascription of a dependent po-
sition to ideology in the ensemble of social practices. The positive positions
taken in this paper are thus compatible with the general emphases (not
necessarily the particular epistemological positions or other formulations)
on discourse contained in, say, Foucault's Archeology of Knowledge-a text
that, however full of interesting fluctuations, has been banished into a symp-
tomatic silence by later "true Foucaultians." (What, for example, would the
true disciples make now of Foucault's observation that discursive relations
"must be distinguished from what we might call primary relations ... which,
independently of all discourse ... may be described between institutions,
techniques, social forms, etc. After all, we know very well that relations
existed between the bourgeois family and the functioning of judicial au-
thorities and categories in the nineteenth century that can be analyzed in
their own right .... " 4 These "other relations" have since been wholly ab-
sorbed into that great nonessentialist Essence, that final Kierkegaardian trace
in the Foucault episteme, The Body.)
Leaving the deep epistemological questions aside for now (Fou-
cault's position then seemed closer to the realist philosophical position I
myself adopt than to the full-blown, neo-Kantianism into which it has sub-
sequently been drawn), many of Foucault's insights into the operations of
the discursive deeply refresh and inform our understanding of how ideo-
logical formations work, even where he positively refuses the concept of
ideology itself Discursive formations (or ideological formations that operate
through discursive regularities) "formulate" their own objects of knowledge
and their own subjects; they have their own repertoire of concepts, are driven
by their own logics, operate their own enunciative modality, constitute their
own way of acknowledging what is true and excluding what is false within
their own regime of truth. They establish through their regularities a "space
of formation" in which certain statements can be enunciated; one constel-
lation constantly interrupts, displaces, and rearranges another. This is at
one with Foucault's project: to explain how it is that "one particular state-
ment appeared rather than another."
It does not follow that social practices are only discourses. This
would be to convert a polemical claim (i.e., the social exists within the
semiotic; the ideological matters and has real effects) into an explanatory
one-but with the effect of tipping the explanation from one one-sided em-
51
phasis to its opposite. I note that the same objection is recognized even by
those, like Gary Wickham in a recent article in Economy and Society, whose
project is to go beyond or to out-Foucault Foucault. Thus, I agree with
Wickham when he writes: "I choose 'practices' [rather than discourses] be-
cause it seems less trapped in the reality side of the knowledge/reality dis-
tinction than 'discourses' is in the knowledge side." "By practices," he adds,
"I mean more than institutionally constrained actions and I mean more
than something which is outside of knowledge." (Presumably, he included
those "more than" things in the definition.) "By practices here I [Wickham]
mean common groupings of techniques and discourses" -an emphasis I
much prefer.
More difficult to absorb or take into account are the extremes to
which, in the search for a nonessentialist account, the "necessary noncor-
respondence" of discursive practices has been driven. This seems to dissolve
the real theoretical gains made by the recognition of difference, of plurality
in discourse, of the nonessentialist, multiaccentual character of ideology-
pushing them over the brink into the gospel of absolute diversity. Great
insights have been achieved in Foucault's recent work on particular dis-
cursive formations (his work on the disciplinary archipelago in Discipline
and Punish greatly outdistancing, in my judgment, the shaky historical gen-
eralizations of the more fashionable volumes on sexuality). But his work
sometimes seems to appear to command allegiance for spurious and ex-
trinsic reasons. Their specificity-law, medicine, psychiatry, sexuality-has
reinforced the "return to the concrete," without quite having to acknowledge
the claims of that old and rather unfashionable form ofknowledge that used
to be called History. And a permanently radical gloss is dubiously attached
to it simply because it contains the magical terms "power," "resistance,"
and "plebeian."
Leave aside such oddities-for example, the fact that knowledge/
power described as bypassing ideology is the problematic of ideology-and
note instead that these gains are made at the cost of a radical dispersal of
the notion of power, often achieved, so to speak, by reading Foucault through
Derrida. (To make it more perplexing, Foucault sometimes seemed to read
himself in that way!) It is one thing to speak of the switches and relays
through which one discursive practice interrupts another-Thatcherism re-
quires precisely such an analysis. It is quite another if they pass continually
on different tracks, like trains in the night, on their way to an infinite plurality
of destinations. An ascending analysis of power-"starting from its infini-
tesimal mechanisms," its "microphysics," is all very well. It subverts our
tendency to treat power as an imposed system of coercive constraint from
above. But the deep and difficult problem of the relation between the lateral
powers in the sites of civil society and social relations and the vertical powers
of, say, the state and political relationships (what was referred to earlier as
the question of the "consent to power") is not tackled but sidestepped by
distributing power "everywhere." The techniques and strategies of power
thus become, in Foucault, highly specific, but at the expense of a concept
of power that is generalized and essentialized. (The Body, as we have noted,
and Resistance are other such false-concrete, nonessential Essences in Fou-
cault's discourse.) This is, in fact, a very Durkheimean concept of power-
that abstract force or collective conscience in society that constrains us all,
or rather through which we endlessly constrain one another. And it leads
to an equally generalized Durkheimean concept of social control-except
52
 Stuart Hall
that it is now refashioned as discipline, which seems utterly without ref-
erence to any such point of condensation or articulation as the state (Fou-
cault is highly ambiguous on this point, though his disciples are not).
As this analysis of Thatcherism clearly shows, the discursive re-
lations of power cannot be constituted exclusively on the terrain of the state.
They precisely crisscross the social body. There is no moment in which the
powers that cohere in the state can ever exhaustively resume those that are
dispersed through the plurality of practices in society. Nevertheless, the
moment of the passage of power into the state and its condensation there
into a definite system of rule is a critical historical moment, representing a
distinct phase. Of course, no sovereign unity of discourse then unfolds: the
moment of "state," like that of "party," is not a final one, as conceived in
classical political theory. Thatcherism, as a discursive formation, has re-
mained a plurality of discourses-about the family, the economy, national
identity, morality, crime, law, women, human nature. But precisely a certain
unity has been constituted out of this diversity. And there are different points
of application through which, in turn, this constituted regime of truth has
been secured to certain political positions. Unless, against the tendency to
dispersal, these questions of articulation are also posed, the play of discourse
becomes nothing but a high-level, advanced game for academic deconstruc-
tionists, a matter of intellectual diversion, as the complexity of one discourse
after another is perpetually unraveled. To put the point more concretely:
the particular ways in which Thatcherism has stitched together a contra-
dictory juncture between the logics of the market and possessive individ-
ualism, on the one hand, and the logics of an organic conservatism, on the
other, are highly amenable to a Foucaultian type of analysis, provided we
understand that it is the contradictory unity so constructed and held that
rules-not the rules of diversity alone. The problem with Foucault, to put
it brusquely, is a conception of difference without a conception of articu-
lation, that is, a conception of power without a conception of hegemony.
The question of hegemony brings us, of course, to Gramsci. Again,
it is not possible within the scope of this paper to deal with Gramsci com-
prehensively, but it is possible to establish some indications as to the su-
periority of hegemony over other concepts in approaching the task of his-
torical explanation and analysis. Hegemony points to a way of conceptualizing
the emergence of Thatcherism in terms of the struggle to gain ascendancy
over a whole social formation, to achieve positions ofleadership in a number
of different sites of social life at once, to achieve the commanding position
on a broad strategic front. It entails the critical passage of a system of
domination into the authority of a leading bloc, which is capable not only
of organizing its own base through the construction of alliances between
different sectors and social forces, but which has as a central feature of that
process the construction and winning of popular consent to that authority
among key sectors of the dominated classes themselves. The advantages of
the concept of hegemony lay above all in the directness of its address (and
not in a lopsided, false-consciousness way) to the central issue of popular
consent.
Another advantage is the critique of essentialism implicit in all
of Gramsci's formulations. Hegemony is constructed, through a complex
series or process of struggle. It is not given, either in the existing structure
of society or in the given class structure of a mode of production. It cannot
53
 be constructed once and for all, since the balance of social forces on which
it rests is subject to continuing evolution and development, depending on
how a variety of struggles are conducted. Hegemony, once achieved, must
be constantly and ceaselessly renewed, reenacted. This implies a conception
of the process of social reproduction as continuous and contradictory-the
very opposite of a functional achievement. Central to this is the notion of
various forms and intensities of struggle. It is the various outcomes of these
struggles, not the reinscription in place of what already exists, that deter-
mines the nature of the unstable equilibrium on which the authority of a
social bloc is founded and that also defines its weak or unstable points, the
points of further unrolling and development. Typically, the Gramscian anal-
ysis of a conjuncture proceeds not from the invocation of the given "laws
of economic development" but from an analysis of the "current relations
of force." This, too, is not a once-and-for-all predetermined process: one
must distinguish, Gramsci argued, "various moments or levels," "intervals
of varying frequency," even, perhaps (the example is the French Revolu-
tion), "various revolutions" within an unfolding process. And the achieve-
ment of hegemony never has only one character, only a predominant tend-
ency; it is always "destruction and reconstruction" (the latter "already under
way in the very moment of destruction"), or what Gramsci elsewhere calls
"revolution/restoration. " 5
The broadening of a system of domination into a wider social
authority is thus, for Gramsci, tied in with the critique of economism. For
Gramsci, the question of hegemony cannot be purely ideological, since it
must have as its foundation the domination of a particular social bloc "in
the decisive nucleus of economic activity." All those who therefore gloss
Gramsci's concept of hegemony with the qualifying idea that it is ideological
are doing a great disservice to his breadth of thought. Gramsci is deeply
alive to the ethical, moral, intellectual, ideological, and cultural dimensions
of the struggle for hegemony, but hegemony as a concept is not ethical or
cultural alone. The culturalist reading of Gram sci has done profound dam-
age. On the other hand, for Gramsci, hegemony cannot be economic alone,
in either the first or the last instance, since it is by definition something that
includes and transcends "the corporate limits of the purely economic class,"
something that must be able to "become the interests of other subordinating
groups too," and can thus "gain the upperhand, propagate itself throughout
society-bringing about not only the unity of economic and political aims,
but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions around which the
struggle rages, not on a corporate but on a 'universal plane' and thus creating
the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate
groups-the motor force of a universal expansion, of the development of
all the 'national' energies." 6 This Gramsci equates with the "passage from
the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures," a process that
for him is analytically irreversible.
Gramsci was, of course, writing in a coded way about the his-
torical tasks of the revolutionary party and of the communist and workers'
movements. (Note, however, the constant movement toward the national
or universal level.) But his terms of analysis clearly have great analytic
purchase on the analysis of Thatcherism. Nothing in our time (certainly
nothing from the Left) so closely matches Gramsci's description of how, in
a crisis, "the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend
54
 Stuart Hall
the ex1stmg structure itself are making incessant and persistent ef-
forts .... These forces ... make imperative the accomplishment of certain
historical tasks." The process of contestation and struggle "is developed in
a series of ideological, religious, philosophical, political and juridical po-
lemics whose concreteness can be estimated by the extent to which they are
convincing and shift the previously existing disposition of social forces."
The application could not be more precise. 7 So, at a narrower level, are
Gramsci's passing remarks about laissez-faire, the doctrine to whose phil-
osophical foundations neoliberalism aims to return. In the Modern Prince,
Gramsci observes that "laissez-faire, too, is a form of state 'regulation,'
introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means," and that
consequently "laissez-faire liberalism is a political program designed to
change-so far as it is victorious-a state's leading personnel and to change
the economic program of the state itself." 8
Less well known than the essays from which the earlier passages
were taken, but equally germane to this inquiry, are those that conceptualize
the relationship between the broader processes of the struggle, which con-
struct or transform hegemony, and the processes of ideology. Gramsci uses
the term "ideology" in what may now seem a classical sense, as systems of
ideas, but in a broad context: "on condition that the word is used in its
highest sense of a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art,
in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and
collective life." He sees it also in terms of its historical functions: its role
in "preserving the ideological unity of an entire social bloc"; of providing
individuals and groups with their various "conceptions of the world,'' which
influence and modify their actions; and, above all, as a means to "organize
human masses and create the terrain on which men move, acquire con-
sciousness of their position, struggle, etc." The role of "organic ideologies,"
those that seek to propagate themselves throughout society and create a new
form of national-popular will for some immense historical task, is to in-
tervene in the terrain of ordinary, contradictory, episodic common sense;
to interrupt, renovate, and transform in a more systematic direction the
practical consciousness of the masses, the given dispositions oftheir mental
life. Common sense is itself a structure of popular ideology, a spontaneous
conception of the world, reflecting the traces of previous systems of thought
that have sedimented into everyday reasoning. Common sense, the "given
ground and dispositions of a culture"-itself the complex result of previous
struggles, reflecting previous forms of hegemony and earlier "unstable equi-
libria"-becomes the object that organic ideologies, which have evolved
their own organic intellectual strata and passed through their moment of
party, seek to refashion and transform.
The processes of ideology are conceived by Gramsci in different
ways: as an "educative task"; as a "cultural battle to transform the popular
mentality"; and, even more appositely, as a "struggle of political 'hege-
monies' of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of
the political proper." 9 Directly opposed to the monistic notion of"the dom-
inant ideology," always already in place, Gramsci asks instead, "how it
happens that in all periods, there co-exist many systems and currents of
philosophical thought and how these currents are born, how they are dif-
fused, and why in the process of diffusion they fracture along certain lines
and in certain directions"? This is a conception of the field of ideologies in
55
 terms of conflicting, overlapping, or intersecting currents or formations. The
key question-Foucault's, but in a decisively non-Foucaultian formulation-
is their fracturing: What determines their lines of diffusion, their structur-
ation, their differentiation, their rearticulation? Again, this is at the opposite
extreme from the notion of whole class outlooks confronting the already
formed whole class outlooks of another fundamental group. Dispensing with
this last vestige of essentialism, Gramsci asserts, "what matters is the crit-
icism to which such an ideological complex is subjected by the first repre-
sentatives of the new historical phase-which makes possible a process of
differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of the
old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subor-
dinate, or even incidental, is now taken to be primary-becomes the nucleus
of a new ideological and theoretical complex. The old collective will dissolve
into its contradictory elements since the subordinate ones develop so-
cially."10 The whole of Laclau's subsequent elaboration of articulation/di-
sarticulation is contained in the nucleus of that thought.
Gramsci is not blind to the site of the problems modern theorists
signify through references to "the subject," though he does not use the same
terms. But he understands the contradictory formations of consciousness:
for example, the split between the conception of the world which is "logically
affirmed" and that which is "implicit in his mode of action"; the social
character of subjectivity-"man is to be conceived as a historical bloc"-
and its composite, fractured character-the "disjointed and episodic" char-
acter of common sense, the "stratified deposits" of popular philosophy, the
"strangely composite" nature of personality, which contains "Stone Age
elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all
past phases of history at the local level and institutions of a future philos-
ophy."11 Each individual, Gramsci says, "is the synthesis not only of existing
relations but of the history of these relations. He [or she] is a precis of all
the past."
It should be clear from these selective references, and without
further, more systematic exemplification: first, how far removed Gramsci
is from the traditional or classical versions of the marxist conceptions of
ideology; second, how much he anticipates-albeit in a language not yet
reconstructed through loans from structuralism, discourse and linguistic
theory, or psychoanalysis-many of the actual advances in theorizing these
later developments have brought; third, how original some of his concep-
tions are-the rich concept of hegemony has absolutely no equivalent among
the other theorists considered here (for example, Foucault's conceptions of
power and resistance appear thin, undernourished abstractions); and fourth,
how Gramsci is able both to promulgate a novel theorization of ideology
by locating it within a broader set of historical and political processes and
retain what the other alternative theorizations quite lack. I am referring to
the final set of references-not the terminology and doctrinal content of
classical marxism, but the problematic of marxism, which structures the
whole of Gramsci's discourse and thought: the commitment to the project
of socialist transformation that distinguished marxism as a living theory,
an open-ended project of critical thought, without guarantees, from the many
other academically closed discourses that presently struggle to hegemonize
the intellectual world.
56
 Stuart Hall
I end, therefore, with a paradox: a theory designed primarily to
analyze capitalist social formations in order to point out strategic lessons
for the socialist movement-Gramsci's-tums out to have the most to tell
us about how to analyze one of the most historically reactionary and re-
gressive hegemonic-seeking formations to appear in British society in this
century. This may not be as gloomy a conclusion as it appears at first sight,
since it has been, up until now, precisely marxism's failure to renovate
adequately its own thinking to explain sufficiently how modem capitalism
remains in being and sustains its hegemonic position in industrialized so-
cieties that has been so signally lacking. Understanding Thatcherism may
be the price we have to pay for a real advance in theoretical enlightenment
within the marxist problematic. Gramsci, at least, would have taken some
pleasure from the unexpected nature of this next (last) dialectical twist.

Notes

Edward Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).
2 lnst1tute for Economic Affa1rs. The Emerging Consensus (London: lEA 1981 ).
3 Louis Althusser, "Notes on the ISA's," Economy and Society 12:4 (1983)
4 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon. 1972). p. 45.
5 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks.· Selections, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith
(New York: International Publishers, 1971). p. 168.
6 Gramsci, pp. 181-82.
7 Gramsci, p. 178.
8 Gramsci, p. 160.
9 Gramsci, "The Study of Philosophy," in Pnson Notebooks.
10 Gramsci, p. 195.
11 Gramsc1, p. 324.

57
 Discussion
Question
You seem to imply that there is a zero-sum game of political
ideology in Britain; that the Right could only move ahead because the Left was weak.
Is this a general claim or is it particular to Great Britain at this time?
Hall
I don't want to suggest it is a zero-sum game. I want to
oppose the notion that the Right advances by, as it were, setting into place an already
formulated whole conception of the world; or that it is only through its positive
statements that it is able to become a pole of new articulations. The Right's success
depends as much on its capacity to address precisely the contradictions that are
already within the formations of the Left, to move effectively into positions of
contestation. For example, the Right picked up the actual mixed and contradictory
experience of ordinary people within the welfare state, and on the basis of that
insertion into the vocabularies of the Left began to construct the discourses of an-
tistatism. So, many positions on the Right are secured not by displacing but by
disarticulating the discourse of the Left. Of course, the reasons why those discourses
on the Left are in disrepair don't necessarily have to do with that process of con-
testation/opposition. There are a whole range of real historical tasks the Left did
not and could not resolve within the limits of the program it adhered to. The Left
in Britain is, in its own terms, very close to the end of one historical program, one
whole kind of politics. So it's not simply a zero-sum game in the sense that the Right
precipitates the crisis, but rather that the Right advances through occupying strategic
territory within the terrain of the Left.
That is, therefore, the way I want to talk about the nature
of ideological struggle. I don't think the ideological field is divided into elements of
ideological discourses that have a necessary class connotation. In societies like ours,
ideological contestation does not take place between fully formed, competing world-
views-theirs and ours. The field of ideology is not divided in that way. It's a field
in which there are many different discourses and social forces in play at the same
time. Contestation often has to do with the engagement around existing ideological
symbols and slogans, winning them away from the connotative chains of association
they have acquired, which build them into languages that seem to construct topics
so that they deliver an answer that favors one end of the political spectrum. The
language of nationhood, for example, is not a language we speak but a language that
speaks us. So, in England, if you open your mouth and say "Britain," before you
know where you are, you are off to the South Atlantic. Because there is no identity
between one class and that nation, everybody has some investment in what Britain
is about; it's their future; it's a place they live in; it has a real purchase for everyone.
Everyone has some patriotic sentiments into which particular problems or projects
can be inserted. People's social identity is going to depend on the way they negotiate
themselves in relation to the nation. Consequently, I think the ideological struggle
takes place precisely over what the nation means. What are the values associated
with it and what are the excluded values? And what is the way in which those
powerful symbols can be detached from their entanglement with one set of historical
associations and rearticulated in a different direction? Now this is not only a question
about what is happening in the field of discourse but also about the way in which
social groups, social movements, or social classes come to locate themselves inside
one or another ideological configuration-how they come to see themselves as au-
thored, addressed, hailed by those statements.

Question
You seem to place very little importance on the systematic,
coherent ideological statements, such as monetarist economics or the products of
the Centre for Policy Studies. But isn't it necessary for ideological analysis to expose
the weaknesses and contradictions in such positions?

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 Stuart Hall
Hall
It is perfectly true that much of the everyday monetarist
economics the Thatcherites speak is not very internally consistent as a theoretical
system, so theoretical economists can dismantle it in a moment. This lack of intel-
lectual rigor doesn't make Thatcherism go away, partly because it operates else-
where-in more commonsense ways, at the point where it connects with the ongoing,
more episodic and contradictory common sense of people. It is at that level that
monetarism has a kind of truth, a way of referencing the way real economic devel-
opments are constructed experientially. It has a way of placing into experience what
people feel to be the errors and problems of the past. In this way, the theory connects
with people's experience.
Remember Gramsci's argument that ideology has two do-
mains-philosophy, or theoretical ideologies, and common sense-and that the re-
lations between them are governed by politics. One has to investigate quite precisely
how more elaborated theoretical ideologies fit, often very contradictorily, into peo-
ple's actual local and immediate experience. I am therefore not arguing (as con-
servative pluralists did at a certain point) that the working class is "really" reac-
tionary. The working class isn't "essentially" any one thing; like the rest of us, it's
full of conservative feelings hiding behind a lot of radical language, and vice versa.
Popular consciousness lies at the intersection of very fragmentary, contradictory
discourses. Popular ideology is not consistent. The nature of systematic ideologies
is precisely to begin to operate on common sense and to render common sense more
consistent.
To take another example, I am interested in how grand the-
ories of sovereignty, among people who have never read a word of Jefferson or
Hobbes, nevertheless link with ideas of what is "right" about our country and where
our country stops and where its boundaries symbolically should lie. The theoretical
discourse of sovereignty sometimes clarifies popular conceptions of sovereignty, but
when people move into action it's not because they have just read the Declaration
oflndependence.lt's because some of those philosophically elaborated concepts have
connected with a deeper groundwork of emotional loyalties and moral sentiments
and bits of knowledge and so on. Symbolic identification-that is the real popular
field on which those things are sorted out. In spite of the power of the media and
of the central institutions and apparatuses of ideology, it's not possible simply to
organize and deliver popular consciousness where it has to be delivered; it has a
very complicated structure, and that is what provides for the politics of interven-
tion-finding the appropriate cracks that just can't be filled in. Sometimes, precisely
at moments of hegemony, those institutions begin to work so well on so many
different sites that you despair of ever cracking it. But there is no permanent he-
gemony, only the struggle to construct and sustain it, which never ends.

Question
Can you clarify some of the ideas in your notion of ideo-
logical struggle, in particular the relation between language and ideology and the
lack of guarantees in this relation? Is hegemony the attempt to produce such guar-
antees?
Hall
A fundamental insight of modern linguistics is that all lan-
guage is multireferential, that there isn't a one-to-one relationship between the lin-
guistic form and the object to which it intends to refer. It is, therefore, very difficult
to argue that the material conditions in which people live can generate a single set
of meanings, as if the concept of class always means just one thing. To put it another
way, the appearance of social classes in relation to language is not that one class has
ascribed to it a whole language, discontinuous from another. You can hear the
different idioms of a language-class and gender, ethnicity and group, in the way
people use the ideolects of language. But, broadly speaking, people in a single-Ian-

59
 guage community can quite often understand one another across those boundaries.
So the field of language is not strictly segmented by class but is obviously more
open. Yet the semiotic systems of meaning are not, therefore, entirely disconnected
from the social or class positions in which the speakers are placed. The play of power
between different social groups is worked out within language, partly by the different
ways in which shared terms are accentuated, or the ways in which shared terms are
inserted into different discourses, as well as by different subcultural dialectics.
To give a concrete example, it's not the fact that some people
are the democrats and other people are not that is important. The real problem is
which meaning of democracy is actually in play. The struggle in this case is over
the different meanings of the same word. Different meanings will share some com-
mon characteristics but differ in their connotations. In ideology, in the kind of
struggle over languages that goes on, the struggle is to fill out the precise way in
which my "popular democracy" differs from your "liberal democracy." It's exactly
there, in the intersection of different connotations within the same linguistic sign,
that the struggle takes place. And it does matter which becomes the dominant def-
inition. It has real effects. Every time the word "democracy" is used, which of those
two associations does it trigger? So you can't exempt the domain of meaning, lan-
guage, representation from the play of social forces. But you cannnot think of it as
being chopped up and ascribed in blocks to those forces, so that there is always a
language those people speak and then there is our language. The linguistic or ide-
ological domain is not structured in that way.
In that sense I am a revisionist. I accept the critique of the
vulgar marxist theory of ideology in terms of reductionism. But I don't go so far as
to say that, therefore, there are simply disparate, fragmented discursive chains, one
after another, endlessly slipping past one another. I'm trying to think that relationship
in a way that brings them back together, but not as a simple unity or identity. One
can understand this project temporally. Marxism's temporal perspective suggests
that the connections between the people, say, and the slogans that mobilize them
are given in their class position or place in the mode of production. The same things
that formed them as a class also formed their ideology.
From my perspective, it is only when you get the right people
to speak the right language at the right time, to have the right identifications, that
you can mobilize them behind a set of concrete slogans. So the class/ideology identity
marxism assumes in the beginning is, for me, the end result, the product of politics.
Politics must construct the meanings and deliver the group to the slogans, not assume
that the group always "really" knew the slogans and always believed in them. They
didn't! It's quite possible for a class to be mobilized behind other slogans. Can one
develop a political practice that makes those slogans or those ways of defining the
word make sense to that group at the right moment? That is what gives political
practice a certain necessary openness. Somebody else might have a more effective
politics and organize the class around some other slogan; then the connections get
forged in a different way.
I no longer believe in the marxist notion of connections being
"given" in the origins of the social formation. There are points where connections
can be forged or radically transformed-hegemonic moments-where a wide variety
of people in different social positions all find that a particular set of symbols or
languages speaks their condition better than any other. This is the moment when
people who are not at all, socially, Thatcherites or from the same class origins
suddenly say, "Well, they aren't our kind of people, but she is talking a good deal
of sense!" Mrs. Thatcher makes sense, but from a universe other than our own. That
is a political moment of extraordinary complexity-when people you wouldn't think
would find answers in Thatcherism, if you simply analyzed their class position,
suddenly find her language more convincing, more resonant with their experience,
than that of the welfare state or Keynesianism. This is the critical moment, when

60
 Stuart Hall
masses of people are detached from their allegiance to a particular language they
have used to frame and define their experience and reattached to another language.
I still think this is why I was right when I predicted Thatch-
er's 1979 victory. I heard large numbers of people stop talking the language of
labourism, the welfare state, social democracy, and suddenly begin talking another
language of cost effectiveness, value for money, choice, freedom, etc. I heard people
responding to a set of different ideological concepts. You couldn't explain that by
a straight class analysis. You couldn't explain the fact that the majority of them
were unionized skilled and semiskilled workers who live in traditional labor, work-
ing-class communities, who appear to be fixed in their political loyalties by all the
processes that have kept the British political system stable. Yet here was a moment
when they just walked to another position altogether.
Indeed, Thatcherism gives you a better understanding of
what the struggle for hegemony is about than almost anything one has seen in the
politics of the Left. The Thatcherites were not the natural inheritors of something;
they had to engage in ideological struggle, to contest the opposition in their own
party, to construct their own position. They had to dismantle the particular sort of
social-democratic consensus that had been in place since the war. They had to unpack
the commitment to the welfare state and unravel a whole field of ideology that people
had come to take as perfectly obvious and unquestionable. They actually attacked
the groundwork of politics, not merely policy. They changed the frame, shifting the
basic forces in a fundamental way. And in order to do that they had to engage in a
powerful struggle on a whole series of fronts. The whole field of positions-the
position of women, the position of the family, the position of race, the position of
law and order-is a variety of different discourses that have been reconstructed by
the Thatcherite interventions in such a way as to construct new possible subject
positions. Then these new subject positions echo and reverberate off one another.
To give a rough example, there is a sense in which the Thatcherite project depends
on seeing the mother, who is trying to represent and understand the inability of her
child to get on in a competitive situation at school, as the same mother who is
concerned about women who go out to work and neglect their responsibility to the
family, the same as the woman who says to the miners, "You can't possibly go on
strike tomorrow because your wives and children don't have enough to live on."
These are all different positions, but the point where people begin to recognize
themselves in all of them is what I call the "point of articulation." By the notion
of hegemony I want to invoke precisely the capacity of a political formation to
intervene on all these different sites.
This way of defining hegemony is almost impossible to es-
tablish in English because of the distinction between reality and appearance. The
moment you say "appears," everyone hears "that's how it appears but it really is
something else." The notion that appearances are real is something that English finds
difficult, philosophically, to say. Similarly, it is difficult to establish a notion of
hegemony as something other than domination. As soon as you say "hegemony"
people see marching boots, rolling tanks, censorship, people being locked away. What
they cannot understand is the one thing we need to understand in societies like ours,
which is how people can be constrained while walking free; being utterly subject to
determinations that make you apparently free to say what you like. The problem
with liberal capitalism is the nature of the compulsion of a particular kind of freedom,
not the total denial of freedom. I don't mean to say that there aren't places in our
society where freedom is denied, just as I don't mean to say there aren't conspiracies.
But just as conspiracies don't explain history, so notions of direct coercion, social
control, and total domination, which is the way hegemony is customarily conceived,
are inadequate to explain the real negotations around power and language, control
and consent, on which hegemony depends.
Question
But where do these different hegemonic moments come from
and how are they effectively communicated?

61
 Hall
One is describing a circuit of relations. Not all the moments
in the circuit have equal power. There is unequal power at different points in the
circuit. The power to initiate and formulate, for instance, is not decisive because
you can't impose that formulation on everybody; but it does give you a first shot
at the field-the power to formulate the question, to set the terms. Other definitions
then have to respond to you; it's your definition that is being negotiated. The political
apparatuses are effective precisely because of the monopolization of the power to
formulate in our society. Think of how Star Wars came to be taken seriously. Thus,
a greal deal happens when policies first begin to be visibly promulgated, even though
they have a hidden prehistory.
Thatcherism has a prehistory, not only in popular discourse,
but in previous elite and expert discourses as well-in the free-market doctrines of
the Institute for Economic Affairs, for instance, which has been going since the late
fifties. So you have to start the story somewhere, for convenience, say, 1975, when
Sir Keith Joseph was going to run for prime minister but didn't make it, and Mrs.
Thatcher took his place; that is how she came to power. And it is interesting why
he didn't run and she did. Joseph was a more consistent, philosophical Thatcherite
than Mrs. Thatcher. But he went to Birmingham, a large industrial city, and he made
what were to be three keynote speeches. In one speech he referred to the problem
of overpopulation of working-class families and the inability of working-class moth-
ers to cope or to organize their lives. He was absolutely finished right there. If his
project had been to continue the paternalistic version of Toryism, that would have
been acceptable because the squire can tell mothers in the village how to bring up
their children. But if you are going into the populist, libertarian variety of conserv-
atism, that is the last thing you can do. Within a week it was decided that Joseph
was not going to run. Then the question was Where are his votes going to? and Mrs.
Thatcher came on. In that sense she is very much produced by a whole set of previous
discourses, both popular and expert ones. Nevertheless, the moment when they are
condensed in a single popular figure, and when that begins to get publicity in the
media, when that is the only figure that gets talked about, and when it gets the
highlight treatment of an election-which she dominated personally, and she had a
personal victory in the Tory party, dispersing the old crew-that condensation adds
a new dimension of power.
I want to give an account that is genuinely open at both ends
but doesn't talk about a circuit as if it were equal at all points; everybody in the
circuit does not have equal power. If you monopolize a piece of the mass media-
the apparatus of cultural production-you have a certain kind of formative power.
But it doesn't give you an absolute power. Yet we need to ask how such monopolies
might be fought, for the fact is that the popular press in Britain is less varied than
it used to be. There used to be a wider spectrum between, say, the tabloid Daily
Mirror and the Times. Those intermediary papers have been squeezed out by in-
creasing market polarization. So there are two or three quality newspapers at one
end and then a mass of popular papers that all look alike. And increasingly those
are monopolized by three or four multinational media corporations. So the actual
room for openings in the existing structure of the media are very slim.
Now there has been a good deal of discussion over the last
ten years about the possibility of starting a rival, not necessarily Labour, paper.
There used to be two Labour papers: the Mirror supports Labour but is a multi-
national tabloid with a foot in both camps; the Daily Herald was quite committed
to the Labour party and the cooperative movement, and it went out of business
with still over a million readers. The argument has been that it is impossible for
Labour to make any headway at all unless it enters the field of popular journalism
and establishes an authentic, legitimate press of its own. The trouble now is that it
is extremely difficult to capitalize such a venture. The costs of setting up a distribution
network for a new national newspaper are very serious, and, though there has been
62
 Stuart Hall
money on offer, there has not been enough. This absence is not countered by ex-
tensive internal political education. You could try to counter a national hegemony
in the press by a great deal more education in the trade unions, and Labour party
constituencies, and so on, which would build up informed public opinion able to
challenge media definitions. But both the trade unions and the Labour party remain
largely electorally rather than education-oriented. There is no counterinformation
to bring to bear against the media's simplistic ways of constructing the news. So it
is true that the whole structuring organization of the media makes it very difficult
to compete. Even if you know what to say, you don't have the channels that allow
you access to a wide slice of public opinion.

Question
How would you respond to the argument that you over-
emphasize ideological elements and exclude both the economic and the political?
Hall
The moment you give the ideological dimension of the anal-
ysis its proper place, people invert the paradigm, accusing you of thinking that things
work by ideology alone. Ideology is tremendously important, and it has its own
specificity, its own kind of effects, its own mechanisms, but it doesn't operate outside
the play of other determinations; it has social, political, economic conditions of
existence. One has to take the question of the nucleus of economic activity seriously,
as Gramsci said, even when using a hegemonic approach.
A comprehensive analysis of Thatcherism would be a col-
lective research project using a whole range of skills, addressed to a range of different
sites, including the economic. I am aware that I am cutting into this field from a
particular dimension. But there is a difference between the research programs you
define for the world and the more limited ones you engage in yourself In any case,
I don't think there is an either/or between economically and organizationally oriented
work and ideological work. The question is how to understand the articulations
between them, nonreductively. Moreover, while I don't believe that economics is
the primary definer in the sense of the first instance, or that the economy stitches
up the results in the end, it is possible to see where economic determinacy operates
in structuring the ideological field of play at any one time. It's one of the structuring
principles; it helps to set the constraints, the lines of tendency and force within which
ideology operates. What it doesn't do is deliver the right answer, the correct, pregiven
closure at the end.
That's why I am against determination in the last instance.
But I do believe in provisional analysis. Wherever your research starts, you have to
make some significant allowances in the direction of the dimensions you left out.
So those doing economic analysis have to look at the ideological traditions that are
at work, just as those analyzing ideological discourse or texts ought to look at the
operation of those legal apparatuses, economic forces, etc., that are helping to es-
tablish the field they are looking at. That is because the object of analysis is the
social formation, which is an ensemble of practices and relations; it is concrete
because it has many determinations.

Question
Why, then, are there so few studies where the two elements
are addressed, where one of them is not reduced to a skeleton?
Hall
It is difficult to do both. Practically, it means either that you
have access to a wide range of analytic skills or that you have a well-differentiated
research team. In your own work you accumulate certain insights that you can't
match in other areas. I ask myself whether I should combine a sort of naive economic
analysis with a highly sophisticated ideological one, and it doesn't seem to fit. In a
more open intellectual climate we would take some risks like that. This is one of

63
the arguments for more collective intellectual work. The Centre did try. Policing the
Crisis did try to say something about a lot of areas we didn't know a lot about,
individually, but that we didn't want, collectively, to leave off the agenda. And I
think perhaps one should even be more risky than that-risk some generalizations.
But the professionalization of intellectual life means the temptations are strong to
play it safe.

Question
Could you say something about what you think the Left
needs to be doing. Can the New Right be defeated?
Hall
If I knew that, I would be in business. But I do think one
can begin to identify some weak spots, some contradictions, places where the dis-
courses don't match up, or where there is a disparity between the promises and the
delivery. There are lots of contradictions there, but they don't easily break in our
direction or offer us big political opportunities; they require the constitution of an
equally powerful, equally convincing alternative, all the way across the political
terrain. The more hegemonic the Thatcherite alternative becomes, the more the Left
must generate a whole alternative philosophy or conception oflife or it will collapse.
Otherwise, it simply can't match what the Right is offering, which is a hegemonic
vision oflife from birth to death. There is a Thatcherite way ofbeing born, of rearing
children, of going to hospitals, of being prosperous in business; there is an image
for everyone and everything: how to bring up babies, how to teach, what you should
wear to stand in front of the classroom. It's a hodgepodge of all kinds of different
discourses; nevertheless, it does offer a set of positive social positionalities, which
condense and connote one another. And the thing about the Left is that there is no
such coherent alternative set. There is no way of being a teacher, to counter the
Thatcherite style of being a teacher. All the Left has is a disarrayed, dispersed series
ofpositionalities. Mounting a counteroffensive involves offering and setting in place
alternative and equally powerful frames for life in the twenty-first century. I don't
know whether the Labour party can be made to see that as its historical task.

Question
You have, on other occasions, stressed the key role of dis-
courses of the nation in Thatcherism-for example, in the way the nation was mo-
bilized for the Falklands war. But how does one decide whether the struggle over
terms like "the nation" is possible to win? What is the strategic question one raises
here? Can the Left engage in significant ideological struggles against Thatcherism
around the nation, or is it so likely that the Left is going to lose that we had better
find other issues?
Hall
You could make the same argument about law and order.
You could argue that you cannot possibly engage with the issues that are concealed
in the slogans of law and order because they always deliver results that are of a
deeply conservative and reactionary kind. Then, one after another the domains of
public argument are snatched away from you; you can't touch any of them because
they all seem to be articulated, organized, and structured in such a way as to deliver
a victory to the other side.
It is perfectly clear, historically, why the notion of the nation
in Britain tends in that direction. Historically, the ideological terrain is tendentially
articulated that way. But I still think that it is possible to begin to intervene on or
engage the same terrain. The problem is that, as against the way the ideological
terrain is historically articulated around the nation, it seems an abstract argument
to ask ordinary people in the street, who are being appealed to powerfully in terms
of the concrete experience of their sons sailing away on the Falklands task force, to
reidentify, against the flag, with the Argentine people. It's totally outside their ho-
64
 Stuart Hall
rizon. They've never heard of it; they have no living connections with it. The only
way they know the Argentine is as the team that always beats us at football. There
is not a lot of mileage in "We are one with the Argentines!" as a popular slogan.
I'm talking, then, about the kind of long groundwork or
preparation that is necessary. Does any nation build solidarity with another nation
when it doesn't know what it is? I suspect not. I suspect internationalism comes out
of people having a sense of their own national, popular, or community identity,
which allows them to build bridges to other people. After all, differences of national
history, culture, and identity have to be recognized. The Argentines do have different
interests from us. They do have a quite good claim to the Falklands, for example.
So these are not easy contradictions to reconcile. But the building of solidarity has
to come out of an actual, grounded sense of where we belong and fit into the world,
a sense that is different from the old national-imperial one.
It is a very risky strategy, and I'm not recommending it. I
recommend asking the questions so that the Left can actually begin to engage strat-
egies within and around the languages of popular calculation, the languages of prac-
tical consciousness, the discourse in which the man-in-the-pub says, "I'm for the
war," or "That hasn't anything to do with us." We really need to shift him and his
wife and his family from "Of course let's get at the 'Argies'," at least to "This war
is not our concern." I don't know that I could do it by saying, "Identify with the
enemy, feel at one with them." I have to begin to talk the language in which popular
calculation goes on, if I'm to appeal to any powerful counternotions that don't send
people marching off into the sunset. Furthermore, the question of interests is always
there, even though interests are themselves ideologically constructed. But that doesn't
mean there aren't contrary interests, around which alternatives can be constructed
that make sense to people. I can think of instances where the appeal to international
solidarity does eventually overcome genuine differences. The Vietnam war, in the
end, was such an example.

Comment
But it is clear that, historically, the British Empire no longer
exists. Yet Thatcher seems to use it so centrally in her anticommunism.
Hall
I think the language of empire, and the wars that have been
fought around it, still constitute a massive ideological repertoire in British history.
The fact that the empire has been worn down doesn't tell you anything about how
the vocabulary of the empire plays into present fears and anxieties about no longer
being a powerful nation and so on. In fact, it still provides a lot of the discourses
in which people construct what Britain's role in the world is. It is a living language,
although it may refer to a real situation no longer historically pertinent. I think that
those imperial traces invest the language of the holy war against communism. The
holy war against communism is not, in England, a very popular language in its own
terms. It could become popular precisely because it might mobilize traces of these
other imperial languages one forgets. People did respond to Thatcher's self-construc-
tion as the "Iron Lady" and "telling the soviets where to go," but not in the same
way as Reagan's "holy war." People are very terrified of Cruise and Pershing missiles.
There are, at the moment, counterpositionalities in popular
languages that provoke powerful resistances. We could speak the language-the true
language of the cold war-if we invested it with the energy that is associated with
an older kind of war-Falklands-type wars-that place Britain in a much stronger,
more leading position. But notions of sovereignty get in the way. Thus, notions of
sovereignty aren't entirely reactionary. The question of national independence is an
important question in the struggle against nuclear Atlanticism. People do have some
sense of their rights in saying, "If we are going to be blown up it should be on our
own decision and not because somebody else happens to be occupying 200 bases in
our country." So even those concepts one thinks of as the pillars and underpinnings

65
of a rather reactionary position are not entirely uncontradictory. They are not entirely
without a certain popular counterpositional discursive force.

Question
Where can you possibly find the resources to struggle over
the concept of "the nation"?
Hall
If the dialogue is constantly one that constructs the nation
in the direction of Great Britain, the people will be interpellated only as subjects
for war. But it's not necessarily the case that every way of being English is one that
has to justify itself by waging war. There are a lot of associations in common popular
traditions in England that are democratic. Cinema and TV in England are constantly
representing the English civil war as one between the goodies and the badies, and
the goodies are always Royalists; or all Puritans are systematically presented as dour
Cromwellians, etc. But this is also the beginning of the English revolution, the be-
ginning of popular movements secured at the price of cutting off the head of the
king. It's the beginning of the parliamentary tradition, of the curtailment of absolute
royal power. That is the English revolution-a bourgeois revolution that secured
much wider popular support. There is no preordained reason why people who feel
English shouldn't be English because of the English revolution rather than because
of the Restoration. There is a popular content to English identity-the content of
the struggle to make the nation into a popular nation rather than a nation of elites
and kings. That is a struggle that goes on all the time. The offical language is, of
course, wrapped up in the language of the crown, the royal navy, etc. But even that
language is not uncontradictory. And there are constantly struggles to win some
purchase for popular interpellations in an area that appears to be sewn up by alter-
native definitions.
Wherever you find popular struggles, the nation is always at
issue. The field of national interpellations doesn't simply disappear because time
and again one finds it inserted into a dominant discourse that is very reactionary.
It does not cease to play an important part in countermovements. The antiwar,
antiimperialist movement is one that has been sustained through a counterdefinition
of nationhood.
But it is impossible to enter this argument without asking
about the nature of popular memory in relation to language. After all, these terms
are constructed out of some sense of what the history is, and there is always a struggle
over popular historical memory. Contemporary questions always have a historical
content-not necessarily the "real" content, but content as filtered and structured in
the categories of popular memory. I don't want to suggest that the field of contestation
is so open that you can construct any articulation you wish. Quite the reverse. But
the only thing that would stem a tide like the Falklands one is some equally powerful
set of counterimages, which would call up some different connotations in the popular
memory. If you argue that nationalism has always been a difficult ideology to rear-
ticulate because of the way Britain's history as an imperial formation has tendentially
constructed the field, I would respect that answer. I disagree with the Laclau position
that all discursive articulations are possible, but I do want to hear the argument gone
through. To engage in that strategy, we will have to rethink and finally reject strategies
based on the assumption that the great mass of people live permanently in false
consciousness. I do not think it is possible to argue that a small number of people,
who are themselves, of course, not in false consciousness-the Left-should address
and mobilize large numbers of people who are. I don't think you will convince
anyone by saying, "I'm sorry. I can see through you, but you can't see through
yourself."

Comment
I'm concerned about your prioritizing "nation" to the ex-
clusion of "class" and "race."

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 Stuart Hall
Hall
First, in relation to the discourses of popular conservatism,
nation is an interpellation that directly crosscuts and neutralizes the interpellations
of class. The way to construct the notion of the nation as composed of people linked
into an organic unity is to say that what people share as a nation is larger and more
inclusive than what divides them into classes. That, essentially, is how the super-
imposition of nation over class was achieved by the Conservative party. And it has
exactly that capacity to draw people together from different sectors of the population
to suppress class differences and differences of class interest, etc., in order to unify
them around shared common characteristics on a national basis, that made con-
servatism "popular."
It is important to emphasize that racism was already present,
for instance, as the other, the unspoken of nation-for example, in the way the
Falklands war was represented. When people said "Argies," it carried a highly racist
connotation. It isn't just that these people are different, non-British; racism doesn't
exist only in relation to blacks, but in relations to all foreigners. That is the imperialist
connotation of "nation" in the British discourse. In the struggle to reach ordinary
British people, the element of what they think of themselves in relation to other
nations cannot be left out. If you leave that space empty it will constantly play the
discourse against you. Those of us who do not belong to that nation also have to
think about how we think about ourselves in relation to it.
And actually, there is a struggle, odd as it may sound, that
blacks have had to wage in order to transpose the one-race notion of the nation that
persists in the British discourse and give it a content that interpellates them; that is
to say, that makes it refer to kids who are now born of black families who have
lived in Britain for three generations, kids whose parents, for example, aren't Ja-
maican anymore. What are they? They are black British. So the question of racism
does not take you outside the terrain of national identifications necessarily but is
part of the struggle over the popular identifications present in the society. If the
British are allowed to go on thinking of themselves only in terms of the great white
British who have an imperial destiny, they will fix us all. Thus, we have to work on
the ground in which people establish their national identity and associate it with a
different range of understandings. Are the blacks Afro-Caribbeans? Are they black
British? Are they West Indian immigrants? Etcetera. The question is one of the long-
term stakes involved in the different interpellations. What is at issue is the positive
content, for both the black and white sections of the population, of the discourses
used. These don't foreclose the other struggles, which blacks conduct on another
front, about their problematic insertion in the discourse of class.
Question
Given your emphasis on the struggles over identity, what
does that imply about the Althusserian-Lacanian notion of the relationship between
ideology and subjectivity? Do we discard the notion of the intimate connection
between ideology and the concept of the subject?
Hall
Certainly, in traditional marxism, ideology has at its center
the concept of the authorially centered, Western, epistemological "I": the author of
the ideology is the person or group that speaks it, etc. So I regard the dismantling,
or dethronement, by structuralism (structural linguistics, Levi-Strauss, Althusser,
and so on) of the already integrated "I" at the center of all ideological discourses as
a major theoretical revolution. Obviously, then, there was a time when we tried to
think the operation of discourse without any reference to subjectivity. Levi-Strauss
tells us that the mythmaker is just an empty narrative point of punctuation, spoken
by the myth. But that is obviously inadequate. So we are beginning to get more
sophisticated ways of trying to theorize subjectivity. I think the attempt to theorize
the constitution of subject positions within ideological discourse, exclusively through

67
psychoanalytic mechanisms (the Lacanian moment), is an important advance for
understanding the establishment of basic orientations to language. I think that level
lays down, again, certain tendential positionalities in relation to language. And those
tendential positions are crucial in some domains. For instance, I think it is quite
right that in the domain of sexuality a great deal happens at that stage. But what I
am not prepared to say is that those primary psychoanalytic scenarios and resolutions
contain the whole of the theory of ideology; or that once those mechanisms are in
place, all that happens after that is the repetition of those same subject positions in
a succession of later discursive formations. I don't think that is so; that is, I don't
think we can replace economic determinism by a psychoanalytic reductionism. What
is constituted are the fragmentary subject positions that are then open to a range of
subsequent interpellations.
People with identities and relations to language already se-
cured nevertheless can find themselves repositioned in new ideological configura-
tions. I think Lacanianism is in danger of substituting a psychoanalytic essentialism
for a class essentialism; and that, like class essentialism, precisely leaves out the
actual play of negotiation, contradiction, interchange, etc. It leaves out the fact that
ideologies have to struggle to recruit the same lived individuals for quite contra-
dictory subject places in their discourses. I want to ask how people who already have
an orientation to language nevertheless are constantly placed and replaced in relation
to particular ideological discourses that hail and recruit them for a variety of po-
sitions.
I stand on the theoretical break that structuralism has made,
but I refuse the new poststructuralist theoretical absolutism. I think there is some-
thing built into structuralism that, once it made the break, refuses to learn anything
from what it has dethroned. You can see that in the language of many poststruc-
turalist texts. A number of times Foucault says, "I'm interested not only in that,
but also in that," and then only the "but also" is silenced. What happened to the
"not only"? Everything in Foucault is periodized around the bourgeois revolution-
ancien regime to modem-which is never itself theorized. Why do all the epistemes
shift just then? Structuralism drives itself to detotalize everything, but it doesn't go
back and recover the elements in the detotalized field, and I think that is an incorrect
notion of theorizing. Theory is always what Marx did to Ricardo. Marx said, "He
is the summit ofbourgeois thought." Being that, Ricardo is clearly ideological. Where
have I learned everything I know? Of course, from Ricardo. Where else can you go
except to the cleverest man who ever thought that system of political economy?
You deconstruct a problematic, but the new problematic
must retotalize the rational core of the paradigm it dethrones. Theory is a quite
different thing from the leap from error to truth; it releases the problem from the
terms in which the old problematic set it. But it doesn't abandon the problem. The
problem has to be rethought in better, more adequate conceptual terms. I still think,
then, that there is something about the complex interplay between subjectivity and
objective social practice, etc., that needs work within the problematic of marxist
structuralisms.

Question
Could you elaborate on your notion of theory? The way you
were just talking, theory sounds like a kind of conversation with the past. Is this
connected to the Centre's commitment to collective work?
Hall
I want to undermine the notion that theory consists offully
clarified concepts that are in a box in somebody's attic and one day you go up and
open Pandora's box and let the truth out. I want to suggest that theorizing is a
process-the operation of scientific concepts on the ground of theoretical ideolo-
gies-that always operates by deconstructing existing paradigms and at the same
time snatching important insights from what it is tossing out. So it has a necessarily

68
 Stuart Hall
mixed nature. You recover things that stand in the wrong place in the old conceptual
matrix but that nevertheless give you insights into aspects of society and culture you
did not have before. You have to reposition them.
I do want to add as well a description of the contradictory
and unformed exploratory nature of trying collectively as a group to develop a set
of theorizations in a particular area. We need to disestablish a highly possessive,
individualistic notion of what research and intellectual practice is about, which is
the dominant notion in the humanities and, indeed, to some extent, in the social
sciences. But I don't want to give an easy picture of the attempts to do collective
work at the Centre-for example, the project to write collectively. I should tell you
it's not easy; it's bloody hard. And unless you are feeling really strong, and unless
you are not addicted to those well-wrought sentences of yours (which are bound to
be the ones that nobody else likes; those are always the ones they want to rewrite,
in their style, etc.), it's very difficult. I learned a lot about what practice means in
this process. We tried to write and do research in a slightly more collective way than
the dominant way-it wasn't a big shift you know; it wasn't like we were trying to
take over the state or the telephone exchange or something. We just wanted to do
intellectual work in a slightly different way, to make a small shift, to actually displace
a dominant practice. The point is that when my favorite sentence was on the table
and somebody said, "I just struck it out," that's when I learned what practice is.
Practice is a hard taskmaster: harder to change in practice than appears in the head.
I remember especially the way in which the practice would advance well for several
weeks and then slip back; and people would say, "What does Raymond Williams
do? Doesn't he just go away and write, by himself, what he wants to write, in a
room? There is something to be said for that kind of individualism, too." And
everyone would say, "There sure is!"

Question
It's interesting that you use Gramsci against the Althusser-
ians, but Althusser himself uses Gramsci. How do you justify your reading of Gram-
sci in this context?
Hall
Gramsci is where I stopped in the headlong rush into struc-
turalism and theoreticism. At a certain point I stumbled over Gramsci, and I said,
"Here and no further!" Gramsci represented a kind of test of historical concreteness
for me against the overtheoretical claims of structuralism. He wrote out of a par-
ticular historical configuration, a particular society. When I read him, I can see
Gramsci's Italy; I can see north and south; I can see the problem the Italians have
had in attempting to form a nation; I can see the absence that left in Italian life.
You can see what Gramsci meant by saying that these are peoples who haven't yet
become a nation; they have an aspiration for the national popular but it's never
been constituted. You can see what Gramsci meant by saying that we all misun-
derstood fascism as an external force, as if it wasn't intrinsic to Italian political and
cultural life. It was in the very field of play that the Left was engaged in. The people
they won were the people we lost!
So Gramsci gave me an alternative to the antihistorical thrust
of Althusserianism. I deeply resented Althusser's conflation of historicism with the
historical. Historicism is a particular way of looking at history; but the historical is
something quite different. That is the sense in which I use Gramsci as a kind of
corrective. And I've gone on finding Gramsci extremely generative for me in two
ways. One is just that sense of the historical concreteness of theory, of theorizing
for particular cases. Althusser and Poulantzas thought that Gramsci was not properly
theorized and that their task was to fully theorize him. But the moment you fully
theorize Gramsci you lose what is most important about him, because the nature
of his theorization is precisely its concreteness. If you ask me what is the object of
my work, the object of the work is to always reproduce the concrete in thought-

69
not to generate another good theory, but to give a better theorized account of concrete
historical reality. This is not an antitheoretical stance. I need theory in order do to
this. But the goal is to understand the situation you started out with better than
before.
I suppose the second thing that attracts me to Gramsci is
precisely the un-fully theorized nature of his work. It enables me to appropriate him
more easily. He doesn't dominate the concepts I borrow from him because his
concepts aren't embedded in a full textual apparatus. It's very suggestive. There are
hints about what he means by "the national popular," but there are no good texts
on it; he never sat down and wrote it out. And therefore I have to work on it to see
what he could have meant. So I find that Gramsci prevents me from becoming a
disciple or a ventriloquist or a believer.
On the other hand, there is a danger in Gramsci. In spite of
his attack on, say, class reductionism, there is no question that Gramsci regards class
as the fundamental social dimension; whereas his notion of the politics of the war
of positions, of the struggle for hegemony on many fronts, doesn't exclusively priv-
ilege one site but precisely asks you to attend to a whole range of social contradictions
and movements. Nevertheless, one has to struggle, in a Gramscian framework, not
to give class a kind of automatic place but to understand its massive historical
constitution of the field of thought and action.

Comment (Paul Patton)

I'd like to take up your critical remark about Foucault. You
said that Foucault describes transformations that historically occur in relations with
other transformations that are described within a Marxist account. Foucault de-
scribes, for example, the emergence of the prison in terms of a quite coherent the-
oretical framework of techniques of power and the notion of disciplinary power. The
story that he tells, as you point out, clearly intersects with the Marxist account of
the development of the capitalist mode of production. And it's true that Foucault
doesn't spell out, in any theoretical sense, any articulation between his story and a
Marxist account. I wonder if you could say in more detail what you think is lacking.
Hall
Don't misunderstand the nature of my critique. I wasn't
trying to rescue a sort of classical marxist historical account behind Foucault's back,
although I do think that, in a funny way, his discourses are increasingly shadowed
by precisely that. I suspect that it is read by large numbers of people only by their
filling in the spaces, the silences. But that is not the main critique. Foucault's analyses
begin to ask the key question of how to analyze the connection between different
discursive formations in a nonreductionist way. But Foucault seems to me always
to insist on the production of a further discursive diversity and to block the path
to any conception of articulation. I agree that the problem is a real recovery of a
genuine notion of difference, variation, diversity, nonreductionism, and that his
critique of classical theories on these grounds is absolutely right. But I object to his
theoretical proviso against recuperating complex notions of articulation.
A related problem with Foucalt's analysis is precisely the
disjuncture he interposes between the power that belongs to sovereignty and the
microphysics of power that operates in everyday life and practices. He seems to talk
about them almost as if they were different and discontinuous modes of power. And
he depresses the significance ofthe state as a contradictory instance of power. I think
we need to examine the interchanges between what I call a macrohydraulics of power
and a microphysics of power. The nature of power is a very complicated question,
and Foucault is quite right to insist, against traditional notions, that power does not
radiate from the sovereign or state or centralized instance of power alone. Power is
multidimensional, a reciprocal interplay between centers of authority and practices,
covering the relations and struggles of everyday life. One of the interesting things
about our society is precisely that those centers of power are increasingly dispersed.

70
 Stuart Hall
One of the main problems of seizing power in modem democracies is that you don't
know where power (in the singular) lies. It is not in any one place. Foucault thinks
that the nature of the power derived from the state is a rather useless issue; he is
interested in the play of power at all the other intersections across a social body.
Everybody has everybody else locked into power in some ways, as well as being the
object of power. Oddly enough, this is a rather Durkheimian notion of social control
dressed up in poststructuralist language. But I want to insist that there are centers
that operate directly on the formation and constitution of discourse. The media are
in that business. Political parties are in that business. When you set the terms in
which the debate proceeds, that is an exercise of symbolic power. So I want to
continue to question the radiation of power from the constituted centers of the state,
parties, social groupings, and so on. Even then you've only just begun. Because the
power didn't begin there; these apparatuses, including, by the way, organic intellec-
tuals, operate to transform power that probably came from elsewhere. But within
the framework of popular democracy they had to get it first in order to do anything
with it. So power is already in circulation. But it circulates between constituted
points of condensation. In that sense I do borrow the Foucaultian notion but refuse
his absolute dispersion.

Question
Would you also say that power is creative in Foucault's sense,
rather than negative?
Hall
Yes, I would certainly go along with that. It is powerful
because it is positive. Think about the power to formulate terms: it is not only a
prohibition but also a positive inducement to think about something in this way.
To set those rules and promulgate a new way of conceptualizing, for example, how
the economy works is a very positive instance. But I want to know about how that
power gets supported, internalized, by those who appear to be its recipients, about
how the conduits include them and are transformed by them, as well as about the
centers from which it radiates.

Question
I am interested in how you deal with one position, a kind
of undercurrent in what you have been saying, and that is Wilhelm Reich's question
of ideology: What if the masses aren't just deluded but indeed desire, want, need
their own oppression? How do you respond to that and how does that change our
thinking about tactics?
Hall
My answer to that is not a very developed one. I know the
position, but it is not one I've really tried to think my own position in relation to.
But I don't believe people are essentially anything. I don't think that historically
one can show the masses to be exclusively in love with power anymore than that
they are outside the radii of power. The desire for power, the desire for domination
is there. But what I am extremely dubious of is the attempt, especially in the moment
of disillusionment (which I think is a moment Reich faces; it's a moment that Adorno
faces; it's a moment that the Left has faced again and again), to avoid the troublesome
problem of actually engaging with the analysis of a really contradictory field, of
intervening in a real field of struggle, by simply assigning the people whom you hope
to rescue permanently to one or the other of the poles. Everything we know about
the way in which popular consciousness is formed historically suggests perfectly
good reasons why people who have been systematically and structurally oppressed
should be implicated in their oppression. It's inscribed in the nature of secondariness
over any historical period of time in which you come to live with it and thus, indeed,
to find pleasure in it. So it's not a denial of that dimension that Reich addresses.
But the moment you collapse everything into that level, so as to say there is nothing

71
but their desire to escape from their freedom, that they are nothing but the depen-
dency of the worker on the hand that feeds him or her, nothing but the implication
of the slave with the master, you run a real risk of reductionism. You've won an
insight the simple-minded Left often denies, namely, that those inconvenient things
can exist. But you've also moved past the insight and gone over to what is, in fact,
an inversion of the earlier position. Now, in place of the endless revolutionary
potential of the proletariat, one has constructed the endlessly deceived, or endlessly
authoritarian, masses. And I think when you go back to the actual conditions in
which those situations appear in extreme form, such as fascism, you don't need a
one-sided theory of that kind. You can see why those were the elements of popular
consciousness that could be built on in certain historical situations; you can see why
the irrational made rational sense at a certain moment; you can see why the collapse
of alternative ways of understanding what was happening to them didn't connect in
the same way. But you always see other oppositional elements as well.
This is not to undermine or deny the powerful subliminal
force of unpleasant ideas. It's one of the things that in England we have had to do,
and have had to insist on, and sometimes to insist on despite sounding very reac-
tionary. For example, the problem of understanding working-class racism: we must
avoid endlessly denying it and avoid as well the simple myth that racism really
comes from above. We have had to insist that working people are deeply implicated
in forms of racism, built on deep ideological foundations; and there are good reasons
why that should be so. And you can't begin to operate in that field politically at all
unless you accept that as a given fact of life.
So I don't want to deny the kinds of observations that Reich
has made about extreme historical situations. What I object to is essentializing those
observations, freezing the historical process, and assigning it to a set of permanent
categories. When you look at the situation historically, it doesn't remain the same.
One can see that there are always other tendencies. In relation to fascism, one of
the most perplexing problems is precisely why fascism so obviously begins as an
anticapitalist revolution. Now you don't explain that simply by talking about the
built-in authoritarianism of the Germans or Italians. You also have to talk about
the intrinsic appeal to a certain "radicalism of the masses" that nevertheless was
articulated to very conventional slogans and politically reactionary positions. I don't
think Reich's view gives you enough of a purchase, by itself, even on those situations
that appear to have historically delivered very simple and stark results. I don't trust
it.

Question
Given all that you have said, in what sense would you still
describe yourself as a marxist? What, if anything, do you retain from Marx?
Hall
There are a lot of things in Marx that I choose to keep. I
choose to keep the notion of classes; I choose to keep the notion of the capital/labor
contradiction; I choose to keep the notion of social relations of production, etc.-1
just don't want to think them reductively. That is the point. It's the reductionist
understanding of the importance of economic relations that I am opposed to, not
the categories themselves. And I quite deliberately talked about the working classes
and about the level at which that is a pertinent level of abstraction.
My critique of marxism attempts to dethrone marxism from
its guarantees, because I think that, as an ideological system, it has tried to construct
its own guarantees. And I use the word "ideological" very deliberately. I think of
marxism not as a framework for scientific analysis only but also as a way of helping
you sleep well at night; it offers the guarantee that, although things don't look simple
at the moment, they really are simple in the end. You can't see how the economy
determines, but just have faith, it does determine in the last instance! The first clause
wakes you up and the second puts you to sleep. It's okay, I can nod off tonight,

72
 Stuart Hall
because in the last instance, though not just yesterday or today or tomorrow or as
far as I can see forward in history, but in the last instance, just before the last trumpet,
as St. Peter comes to the door, he'll say, "The economy works."
I think those are very ideological guarantees. And as soon
as you abandon that teleological structure under marxism, the whole classical edifice
begins to rock. Now that isn't any news theoretically these days. Almost everybody
of any note is in the business of rocking the marxist foundations. My question is,
should we now admit that, since the guaranteed philosophical and epistemological
underpinnings of the theory do not stand up, it is finished as a problematic? I want
to try to account theoretically for what is still there, what needs to be retained.
Can one retheorize the theory in a nonreductionist way? I
have tried to suggest some ways in which a modem, more discursive understanding
of ideology, which mediates the link between ideas and social forces through language
and representation, can accomplish that. That is the contemporary theoretical rev-
olution: the notion that the arena or medium in which ideology functions is one of
signification, representation, discursive practices. That is the intervening term that
has changed the nature ofthe debate. I have tried to rethink some of the things that
Marx was saying in that more discursive framework. My work, therefore, is in the
very unfashionable mode of salvage work, of deconstruction/reconstruction-a dan-
gerous enterprise in the age of deconstruction.

73
 Henri Lefebvre

Toward a Leftist Cultural Politics: Remarks

Occasioned by the Centenary of Marx's
Death
Translated by David Reifman

It was only after the Second World War that capitalism

succeeded 1n thoroughly penetrating the details of every-
day life. We need new concepts in Marxism if it is to
retain its capac1ty to help us both understand and trans-
form this rad1cally commodified contemporary world.

The topic of this book, Marxism and the interpretation

of culture, which links interpretation to the political project of Marxism,
suggests the distinct advantage of orienting oneself toward the future and
of orienting critical knowledge toward this future so as to lay the foundations
for it. At least in France, thoughts about the future are now often linked
with a particular rallying cry, one diffused in France by the students in May
1968 and taken up not only by the workers but by the whole country:
"Change life!" These were the events of May 1968: general strikes and a
pervasive expectation of radical change. Since then, the Left has gained
political momentum with this rallying cry, the only one that has resonated
with the thinking of the French masses since Marx's "Workers ofthe world,
unite!" Moreover, it accompanies the crisis of modernity and the difficulties
of the technological transformation administered by capitalism.
This orientation to the project of"changing life" forces
us to call into question many of our most basic concepts and tools. We have
to start by inquiring, again, into the nature of Marxism and the crisis it
confronts. We must also ask what must be changed and what has changed
already. Here we will find it necessary to talk about the everyday and to
ask how changes in the everyday have affected the situation of culture in
the contemporary world. This will inevitably lead us back to reflect, however
inadequately, on the general nature of culture and on its relation to the
political project of Marxism, a project of changing life itself.
What Is Marxism?
One must first of all emphasize the diversity of the
work that has been inspired by Marx's thinking. There is not one Marxism
but rather many Marxist tendencies, schools, trends, and research projects.
Marxism in France does not have the same orientation it has in Germany,
Italy, the Soviet Union, or China. In France, after the French Revolution,
after almost two centuries of democractic struggle, a certain Marxist thought
has developed. But there are also other expressions of intellectual life in
75
France that one cannot disregard, such as surrealism, since they have in-
tersected with Marxism. Moreover, one's personal history has some bearing
on these intersections. As a friend of Tristan Tzara, the Dadaists, and the
surrealists, I cannot think exactly like those who were friends of Thomas
Mann.
Nonetheless, questions about Marxism's nature are unavoidable.
For some, Marxism is defined through Marx's works. An apparently sec-
ondary, but in fact decisive, question arises: Which works? We know that
one Marxist tendency, clustered around Althusser, rejects the works ofMarx's
youth as ideological and philosophical. Would Marxism be defined only
through the works of his scientific maturity? Or rather through the last
works, considering the writings on the Paris Commune as well as The Cri-
tique ofthe Gotha Program to be of primary importance? Thus, which Marx?
For others, Marxism is defined through the works of Marx and
Engels. But between Marx and Engels there are notable differences, especially
concerning the philosophy of nature, which was an essential consideration
for Engels yet had only a subordinate importance for Marx. Thus, if one
argues that Marx and Engels constitute Marxism, one is still left to decide
which one is primary and which are the fundamental texts?
Still others declare the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as the
central texts of Marxism. But we have had the opportunity to recall on
several occasions that for a long time Stalin was promoted to the same rank
as Marx, Engels, and Lenin. On the other hand, Leninism today seems
somewhat fragile. It has strong points, such as the theory of unequal de-
velopment, and weak points, such as the thesis according to which capitalism
in the 1920s was supposed to stagnate and show itself incapable of the
continued growth and development of its productive forces. What is left of
Leninism today? Can we put Lenin's work on the same level as that of Marx
and Engels?
Another position admits into Marxism all currents of thought
stemming from Marx's works, in their diversity and plurality, including the
opposition of dogmatism and relativism. But then the question of references
arises. Do all these currents, all these works, refer equally to Marx? Where
do we find the line of demarcation that separates so-called Marxist thought
from thought that cannot be called Marxist? Furthermore, it has been noted
that all contemporary thought, indeed, the entire twentieth century, is im-
pregnated with Marxism, even the thought of those who fought it or who
diverged from it, like Schumpeter and Keynes.
Finally, it can be admitted (and this is the thesis I support) that
Marx's thinking constitutes a nucleus, an effervescent seed, the ferment of
a conception of the world that develops without being able to avoid con-
frontation with entirely different works, like those of Freud or Nietzsche.
This ferment in the modem world acts in and on this world by contributing
to its transformation (it goes without saying that Marxist thought is not the
only element of transformation). It is thus a matter of a deployment or a
development through contradictions, in the course of which there are stag-
nations, retreats, and declines, but also innovations, additions of new con-
cepts concurrent with the withering away of old ones.
According to this hypothesis, and going a little beyond it, it is
necessary to emphasize here that Marxism always was and remains racked
by internal as well as external contradictions: internal in its own develop-
76
 Henri Lefebvre
ment; external with what happens in the world. Is it necessary to recall the
consolidation of the state in the twentieth century, whereas this theory of
the modem state is not in Marx's works? Is it necessary to recall the de-
velopment ofthe capitalist mode of production over the past century, some-
thing that did not enter in a definite manner into Marx's perspective? These
contradictions have not brought about the death of Marxism but, on the
contrary, the deployment of its theory. Because these contradictions have
not brought about the withering away of the capitalist mode of production
in the manner predicted, the project needs to introduce new concepts into
the theory inspired by Marx. In order to understand the modem world, it
is necessary not only to retain some of Marx's essential concepts but also
to add new ones: the everyday, the urban, social time and space, the tendency
toward a state-oriented mode of production. This last concept accounts for
the role of the state in contemporary societies in which the state manages
all aspects of these societies and simultaneously dominates them and per-
petuates them. I emphasize that it does not designate something accom-
plished but rather a tendency toward a political form which cannot be re-
duced to traditional forms and which, from that point on, does not enter
into Marx's analyses or those conceived subsequently.
In this way, Marx's thinking continues to become global, that is
to say, to develop in a form commensurate with the current world situation
in order to understand it and, of course, in order to shift it. Incontestably,
something in Marxist thought persists. First and foremost is the imper-
turbable logic of the commodity; next, the analytic and critical understand-
ing of relations of dependence, exploitation, and humiliation, not only of
certain classes, but also of entire peoples. Peoples and countries are reduced
to dependence and exploitation, such as so-called nonaligned or developing
peoples, among which are the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
Time and again, in colloquia devoted to Marx, these people make their
voices heard. Nonetheless, it is true that the lacunae in Marx's thinking
have not been filled; rather, they have been artificially filled, notably by the
practical reinforcement of the state in socialist countries.
In my opinion, then, Marxism is an instrument of research and
discovery; it is valid only if one makes use ofit. Marx's thinking cannot be
conceived as a "pure" object of knowledge; it is not an object of episte-
mological reflection, even less a gadget that one deconstructs and recon-
structs in a kind of intellectual game. It becomes useful in understanding
what has come to pass in the modem world if one tries to orient and
transform it; any other interpretation implies radical ignorance and leads
Marxist thought to ruination. We must use it to discover what is new in
the world. It is not a system or a dogma but a reference. Marxism is a
method that, on the one hand, depends on a certain number of determined
concepts but, on the other hand, is analytic and critical of a certain historical
process of becoming. As a consequence of this movement, the real tends
toward the possible while, at the same time, eliminating other potentialities,
though the possible also comes up against the impossible, discernible only
in the course of practical action. This attitude implies a triadic analysis of
movement and becoming: reality/possibility/impossibility. Moreover, there
is a strategic objective: to change the world. It is this imperative that leads
us to introduce notions and ideas not found in Marx's thinking.
77
 Does this imply that there is a crisis in Marxism? For the group
of state-oriented and authoritarian Marxists, it cannot be a question of a
crisis in Marxism. The crisis is someone else's problem. Furthermore, for
these same people, all truth is to be found in Marx, in a repertoire that it
is sufficient to know and to disclose. To these views, which retain more
than a trace of (repudiated) dogmatism, are opposed those theories holding
that Marxism is always in crisis (and has been since its beginnings). From
the point of departure, the debate concerns the state; it unfolds between
Lassalle, that is, state socialism, and Bakunin, who wants the immediate
abolition of the state. Marx's thinking clears a path between them and is
formulated through this conflict. Is it necessary to recall that Marx approved
of the Paris Commune as the abolition ofthe existing state and the withering
away ofthe state tout court? This affirmation is incompatible with socialism
as it is constituted in Germany, as a movement and a party of the working
class, beginning in the 1860s. This conflict surfaces in The Critique of the
Gotha Program, a program that already contained virtually all state so-
cialism. Stimulating but profound contradictions; thus, permanent crisis.
The Everyday
Since Marx's death more than a century ago, much has, of course,
changed in the world. But many things have remained the same, most
notably in terms of social relations. There has been progress and regression.
In order to understand the changes, we need to supplement Marx's theories
and vocabulary. The everyday is, of course, the concept I am most well
known for adding to the vocabulary of Marxism. 1 The everyday is a kind
of screen, in both senses of the word; it both shows and hides; it reveals
both what has and has not changed.
What is the everyday? In appearance, it is the insignificant and
the banal. It is what Hegel called "the prose of the world," nothing more
modest. Before Marx, labor was considered unworthy of study, as before
psychoanalysis and Freud, sex was considered unworthy of study. I think
the same can be said of the everyday. As Hegel said, what is the most familiar
is not for all that the best known. The unrecognized, that is, the everyday,
still has some surprises in store for us. Indeed, as I was first rethinking the
everyday, the surrealists were already attempting to conjure up ways to bring
the extraordinary out of the ordinary.
Of course, the word "everyday" in English is not a perfect trans-
lation of Ia quotidienne, which really refers to repetition in daily life, to that
which repeats itself consistently. Philosophers have had a tendency to avoid
the quotidienne, to pull back from it. Since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy
has put itself above the quotidienne and excluded it from consideration. For
Plato it reflected public opinion (doxa), something vulgar; it was the contrary
of the complete truth. This conception was constantly repeated in Western
philosophy, even in Hegel. But Marx decentered this bias in philosophy and
oriented it in the direction of Ia quotidienne. Marx himself, however, con-
centrated on labor, on work, on productive activity, an emphasis followed
by many Marxists since then. But workers do not only have a life in the
workplace, they have a social life, family life, political life; they have ex-
periences outside the domain of labor. So my project was to continue cor-
recting the work of classical philosophy, much as Marx did, but to reach
dimensions of Ia quotidienne that he had not. (If one talks about philosophy
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and daily life, one has to note as well the intersection ofliterature and daily
life, for it is also through literature that the idea of Ia vie quotidienne has
entered into our reflections. Joyce, an Irish writer who had enormous in-
fluence in France, really established the idea of daily life in literature. Ulysses
is twenty-four hours in the life of an ordinary man. Many writers call them-
selves existentialists, but in reality they are continuing Joyce's exploration
of the everyday.)
The everyday has passed through three historical phases, three
stages. The first, which was discounted and neglected by philosophy and by
the philosophers, remained connected to nature for a long time, that is,
connected to what is immediately given. The rhythms of life could be only
poorly distinguished from the rhythms of nature: night and day, weeks and
months, seasons and years. This everyday life was still impregnated with
religion, and use value (in Marx's sense) still dominated. The machine was
barely distinguishable from the tool. And the city could be only poorly
distinguished from villages; it was a huge village, or an aggregate of villages.
Capitalism during this period was busy constructing locomotives, ships,
cannons, and so on, but it was not yet concerned with everyday life. This
stage lasted in France until the middle of the twentieth century, until after
the Second World War. But since the war there has been a huge wave of
industrialization and urbanization. Exchange value prevails over use value.
The commodity, the market, money, with their implacable logic, seize ev-
eryday life. The extension of capitalism goes all the way to the slightest
details of ordinary life. And one can say that, at this point, production and
the relations of production determine who is going to consume this pro-
duction. Needs and the everyday are programmed; techniques enter into
everyday life. It is extremely interesting to note that the huge multinational
corporations are introduced into the economy by everyday life. They pro-
duce detergents, clothes, all the ordinary consumer goods. It is at this mo-
ment that technical revolution substitutes itself for social and political rev-
olution, while capitalism seizes the ground that had escaped it in large part
until then: everyday life. It is at this point that marketing assumes a role.
At the end of the Second World War the Left had great hope,
but within a few years this hope had collapsed. Yet there was a grand
movement in the areas of technology and urbanism, one that transformed
many things. This epoch was marked by the development of a new class,
the technocrats. This new group of people has come to share political power
with the military and with heads of parties; it really has made the everyday
become what it is. The technocrats manipulate; they program daily life
through advertising and the media.
And now, the third stage: the everyday is not only programmed,
but it is entirely mediated and mass-mediated. Marketing allows projections
of up to ten years. The everyday is not only controlled, it is completely
manipulated. It is managed and administered, in large part by multinational
corporations that have colossal investments in it.
The everyday here becomes a social practice or, rather, the av-
erage (Ia rnoyenne) of social practice and the social practice of the middle
classes (les classes rnoyennes), something that requires an understanding of
an infra-everyday level and a supra-everyday level. The upper bourgeoisie
lives in the supra-everyday. (Onassis directed his fleet of oil tankers from
his yacht.) But hundreds of millions of poor people in the world aspire to
79
everyday life. And this idea helps us analyze and better understand the
modern world.
The everyday is a complex phenomenon. First, it is a modality
of extending the capitalist mode of production. My analysis is thus an anal-
ysis of the mode of production in its actual application. There have been
significant modifications in the capitalist mode of production, even in prop-
erty relations. The operation of multinational corporations, for example, no
longer presents us with the same mode of production Marx described, but
it is still a capitalist mode of production. Before the Second World War the
official Marxist position was that there could not be a continuing growth of
productive forces within capitalism. Indeed, in Europe we did have eco-
nomic stagnation until the Second World War. But it was obvious that in
the United States there was a growth of productive forces that was not in
conformity with Marxist arguments in Europe. Since Marx thought that
capitalism was going to die, it was essential to determine how this mode of
production had developed. Rosa Luxemburg first posed the question of why
and how the capitalist mode of production was able to continue, which is
one reason she has an important place in the history of Marxist thinking.
She defined one solution to this problem, though not the definitive one. I
have tried to continue this line of thought, to answer not only how capitalism
survives but also how it is able to grow. I have noted that once the mode
of production was established in an industry, it could integrate the industry.
It integrated agriculture, it integrated the historical city, it integrated space,
and it produced what I call Ia vie quotidienne.
Yet the everyday is not only a mode of production but also a
modality of administering society. In both instances it refers to the pre-
dominance of the repetitive, of repetition in time. And this predominance
of the repetitive is a way oflife. It is a base of exploitation and of domination.
But it is also a relation with the world and with human beings. The pre-
dominance of the repetitive masks and suppresses the fear of death, which
is one of the profound reasons that the instituting of the everyday in the
modern world succeeded: it dissimulates the tragic. This tragic period hides
from itself the tragedy it lives. This is why the great fear of the future-the
destruction of the planet-remains abstract for the overwhelming majority
of people.
The everyday is ambiguous and contradictory. On the one hand,
it provides satisfactions: it satisfies the very needs it produces. On the other
hand, the everyday provokes a malaise, a profound dissatisfaction, an as-
piration for something else. Presented in this way, the concept is not an
object constructed according to certain epistemological rules. Nor is it ap-
prehended by the deconstruction of reality. It is lived experience (le vecu)
elevated to the status of a concept and to language. And this is done not to
accept it but, on the contrary, to change it, for this everyday is modifiable
and transformable, and its transformation must be an important part of a
"project for society." A revolution cannot just change the political personnel
or institutions; it must change Ia vie quotidienne, which has already been
literally colonized by capitalism. I will come back to this point of a "project
for society" shortly.
The Cultural
Before proceeding, I would like to make a few comments about
culture. It is, first of all, necessary to recognize that this notion remains
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rather obscure and vague. In France, we have a minister of culture, though
we hardly know what his responsibilities should be. Major conferences on
culture have done nothing to clarify the situation. The word "culture" comes
from the German, where it signifies civilization, that is, values, but now it
is sliding toward designating cultural production, a movement that calls the
notion of culture into question. What can Marxist thought contribute to the
subject? Certain devout and often dogmatic Marxists oppose the concept
of ideology to the notion of culture; they reproach culturalism for elimi-
nating all of the content of this Marxist concept and notably for removing
its critical impact. Indeed, it is true that certain culturalists do not hesitate
to include in culture all forms of social life, from cooking to philosophy.
None of this, however, contributes to clearing up the confusion that prevails
around the term.
So, we do not know very well what we are dealing with. That is
why, when I think about culture, I think also of certain verses from Lewis
Carroll's Hunting of the Snark:
To seek it with thimbles, to seek it with care;
To pursue it with forks and hope;
To threaten its life with a railway-share;
To charm it with smiles and soap ...
But there is also something serious about this unstable notion of culture.
This is the notion of cultural identity. There are still groups, classes, and
entire peoples who are seeking their cultural identity; indeed, the working
class is still searching for its cultural identity. This gives some consistency
to the somewhat vague notion of culture. Given these social and political
realities, it would be regrettable if these struggles ended like The Hunting
of the Snark:
In the midst of the word he was trying to say,
In the midst of his laughter and glee,
He had softly and suddenly vanished away-
For the snark was a Boojum, you see.
I hope that you allow a certain humor around these serious mat-
ters (a permissiveness that is not always allowable in France). In any case,
it is certain that culture is no longer something easily definable and sub-
stantial, especially when one speaks of a country, a people, a region, or a
city; indeed, culture is no more readily definable if one refers to a tradition
or to cultural identity itself. The problem is especially intense for groups
such as the Basques and the Palestinians. Whatever it may be, culture no
longer has any relation to what was in other times the cultivated being.
It so happens that the word "culture" also evokes a magical image
for me, that of Sleeping Beauty. She does not doze on flowers and on fragrant
grass but on a thick mattress of texts, quotations, musical scores-and under
a vast canopy of books, sociological, semiological, historical, and philo-
sophical theses. Then one day the Prince comes; he awakens her and every-
thing around the forest comes to life along with her-poets poetizing, mu-
sicians musicking, cooks cooking, lovers loving, and so on. Singers? Songs?
Yes, they are a part of culture, yet they must not be considered in isolation
81
but within an ensemble that also includes dance, music, cartoon strips,
television, and so forth. Moreover, culture is not merely a static palimpsest
of texts; it is lived, active, which is what the fable of the wakened princess
suggests to me.
Rather than push these metaphors further, I will suggest instead
what the situation of culture is now and how critical analysis should be
oriented toward it. In what concerns me, I am far from neglecting recent
innovations and inventions and what one calls modernity, even though this
modernity is today challenged from all sides. The modernity from which
we are emerging was neither the appearance of a new culture nor that of a
new being. It was the appearance of new techniques, the time of a con-
frontation between traditional culture and innovation. But it was also the
time of an accentuated conflict between the elite and the popular, without
the capacity to resolve the conflict, a capacity that supposes new conditions.
After a period in which the sign and abstraction reigned, our surrounding
culture has slowly but forcefully begun reasserting its relation with the sen-
sible, with the senses; indeed, the contemporary cultural ensemble reveals
a new relation to the body. Around us a new kind of culture of the body is
being born. Through their struggles, women have done a lot for this new
culture of the body. After a long disappropriation, or rather an expropriation
of this body (by morality, by puritanism), the reappropriation that is taking
place is difficult and risky. It is used. It is taken back. Yet we are proceeding
in this direction.
The new culture of the body is not constructed as a relation with
primary nature but rather with a second nature. (I borrow these two terms
from Marx, who did not develop them.) Primary nature includes the forest,
the sea, the desert; second nature envelops the city and machines, but also
the elaborated body, a "worked" body that is inseparable from its urban
setting and its urban ornamentation. Second nature has the same elements
as primary nature, but it is developed as the product of human work. This
new culture has nothing in common with Marxism or philosophical ma-
terialism. Yet it is materia/because it reasserts and cultivates the body. And
within this second nature the body can be represented and become an object
of critical scrutiny. This new cultural ensemble is also apparent in the ef-
forts-often modest and even pathetic-to break with the monotony of the
everyday, to find spaces of freedom and jouissance. I notice around me, in
France and elsewhere, a pursuit of "goods" that are not the products of the
market and that have what one can call the grace of the gratuitous. As an
example and a symbol, I take the ordinary willingness to find pleasure in
beaches and in the expanses of water themselves, the lakes and oceans. As
a consequence of the way these pursuits have restructured everyday life, we
can no longer think about culture outside everydayness. While this new
culture reasserts the body as its starting point, the everyday simultaneously
seeks to represent what is human in abstract terms, as mind and soul.
Already they confront each other and strive to connect themselves to each
other, not without some confusion.
Aesthetics
If it is true that culture can no longer be conceived outside the
everyday, this is also true of philosophy and art, which constitute the center
of the cultural and define its axes. For many Marxists, it seems that art is
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only a distraction, a form of entertainment, at best a superstructural form
or a simple means of political efficacy. It is necessary to remind these people
that great works of art deeply touch, even disturb, the roots of human
existence. The highest mission of art is not simply to express, even less to
reflect, the real, nor to substitute fictions for it. These functions are reductive;
while they may be part of the function of art, they do not define its highest
level. The highest mission of art is to metamorphose the real. Practical
actions, including techniques, modify the everyday; the artwork transfigures
it.
By ignoring aesthetics, Marxists have left out the driving force
behind much modern Marxist theory. Lukacs, for example, is often spoken
about, but in isolation, his works being separated from the context of the
debates in which he was involved. For Lukacs, modern art is only a product
of bourgeois decadence, which began after Balzac and Tolstoy, with the
exception of socialist realism (Lukacs hardly knows anything besides the
novel). Adorno, however, uncovers something new in art and especially in
modern music: the negation of previous forms clears a path to new forms.
This controversy was not always noticeable, but a dialogue unfolded within
Marxism between different interpretations of something important, begin-
ning with modernity, and in France with cubism and surrealism. Neglecting
these questions has contributed to the sterilization of Marxist thought, to
the weakening of its influence, that is, to what many call the crisis in Marx-
ism.
Moreover, there are levels of art, and some works are at a higher
level than others. Poetry, music, architecture, and especially theater once
had the extraordinary power to transfigure banal reality and can possibly
regain it. Modernity is inaugurated by the great but unfinished Nietzschean
meditations on the tragic and on the Greek tragedies. When Marx wants to
characterize the "new man," the "proletarian man," he calls him Prome-
thean, inspired by Aeschylus. There is something singular in tragedy, whether
Greek, Elizabethan, or seventeenth-century French. Tragedy metamor-
phoses the spectacle of suffering and of death into a paradoxical joy. Like-
wise, poetry allows the transfiguration of sexuality into love. (I am thinking
of poets like Dante and Goethe.) As for architecture, in other times, as with
cathedrals, it could transform the banality of the everyday into magnificence.
This is the problem that many great contemporary architects pose to them-
selves. The paradox is that this aesthetic transfiguration enters in its way-
by culture-into everyday life and the relations that make society. Practical
changes and aesthetic transfigurations sometimes converge, in the great pe-
riods and the great civilizations-Greece, the Renaissance, the Enlighten-
ment, and also in certain periods in the modern world.
Thus, it is necessary to take up again not only aesthetic theory
but also the project according to which art succeeds in transfiguring practical
reality, because it does not consist of a simple passive reflection of that
reality. This thesis, which has been attributed to Marx, belongs more cen-
trally to Lukacs. Art metamorphoses reality and this metamorphosis returns
to reality. Thus, the transformation of the world is not only a realization
of philosophy but a realization of art. This development of the Marxist
project would take into account the city as a work-everything that peoples
and enriches urban space, with all that this implies. The city is a work of
art and a practical realization of art. In this way, Marxist aesthetics would
83
be taken up again, not merely as a theory of art, but as a practice that
creates.
Culture and Questions of Marxist Theory
I would like to return to Marx's thinking, remembering that it
remains a point of departure, not a point of arrival. Does it enter into
culture? Yes. I do not mean only that it is appropriate to teach and read
Marx in universities; nor that his work differs as much from the Gulag as
Christ from Torquemada. Marx's thought enters into culture without having
either the right or the claim to dominate it. I think one can conceive of
Marxism's entry into culture by analogy with contemporary physics. There
are still on earth, and even in France, people who believe that the sky is a
dome, the firmament; they believe, as in Dante's and Saint Thomas's time,
that this dome supports fixed stars above the trajectory of the planets and
that celestial beings inhabit it. Nonetheless, one can claim that contemporary
astronomy's conception of an infinity of time and space is a part of culture.
Obviously, conceptions enter into culture gradually, despite ob-
stacles and objections. The same is true for certain ideas contributed by
Freud or Marx. However, apart from what physics and astrophysics intro-
duce into culture, there are specialists proceeding in this direction whose
work pushes these concepts further. It is in this way that Marxist thought
enters into culture without being absorbed by it-and without absorbing it.
What comes from it? First of all, certain words: for example, "alienation,"
which is becoming almost as common as "repression" from psychoanalysis. 2
But what comes from Marx especially is the awareness of an important fact:
it is not sufficient to appeal to God, to gods, or to the idea of justice to fight
injustice and inequalities. This awareness and this knowledge spring, on the
one hand, from a harsh experience of oppression and repression and, on
the other hand, from Marxist thought. Is this not precisely the ethical and
political aspect, absolutely legitimate as such, of what one calls culture?
Now I think it will be possible to examine some of the questions
raised at the intersections between Marxism and contemporary culture.
Philosophy and Marxism
Some of Marx's well-known texts expressly state that philosophy
is simply an ideology and that consequently it is necessary to abolish it, to
replace it by a revolutionary science and practice. Other texts state that it
is necessary to bring philosophy into being, that is to say, to bring, in a
revolutionary manner, philosophy as a utopian project into the realization
of a society that is at once true, good, and admirable. Is this a new project
inspired from philosophy but abolishing it, or is it the realization of phil-
osophical ideals, philosophers having interpreted the world instead of chang-
ing it? For some, there is a Marxist philosophy-their own; whereas for
others, political practice has replaced philosophy. Here I would like to point
out that Adorno begins Negative Dialectics with words that merit as much
interpretation as Marx's formulation about the interpretation and the trans-
formation of the world: "Philosophy continues because the moment of its
realization was missed.... " What then remains of this immense movement
of thought that goes from Heraclitus and Parmenides to Hegel, passing
through Plato and Aristotle and so many others? What exactly is philosophy
for Marx and in relation to Marxist thought? It is unfortunate that so few
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contemporary discussions deal with this fundamental problem, as if it were
either resolved or unsolvable.
The State
In Marx, as in Engels and Lenin, we find only indications about
the state. For Marx, the state is a historical moment and not, as for Hegel,
a realized God. This transitory moment will be brought to a withering away
and to a surpassing of it. There would be many events to recall here, con-
sidering that the German working class, inspired by Lassallian state so-
cialism, was defeated and a (provisional) state of unbelievably brutal power
was constituted, the Hitlerian state. It would also be necessary to recall that,
after the end of Stalinism, the infamous scientific and technical revolution
turned up to fill the void, to be instituted in place of Marx's political and
social revolution. This led to new political forms, since the state today has
at its disposal, directly or indirectly, the resources of energy, information
and communication technology, the relations of the national market with
the world market. Whatever it may be in the contemporary world, an anal-
ysis of this triad of state/nation/classes is lacking in Marx's work. His critical
analysis revolves primarily around class relations. The nation plays a rather
secondary role in his thinking; he estimates that, beginning from the bour-
geois period, the world market was going to go beyond national frameworks
in such a way that the international working class would have only to put
the finishing touches to this process in order to make the national state and
the nation itself wither away. Since Marx, we have witnessed the appearance
of the multinationals that dominate energy, the market, and information,
but not without competition from the nation-states. It is therefore not suf-
ficient to go back retrospectively to the neighborhood of 1930 in Germany,
around 1956 with the end of Stalinism, around 1960 in Europe and in the
world with the scientific and technical revolution. Today, it is advisable to
introduce new elements into the critical analysis of the state and of the
world.
Law (le droit}
According to Marx's predictions, civil law based on private prop-
erty is destined to disappear. But is there such a thing as socialist law?
Bourgeois law, in other terms the (Napoleonic) Civil Code, had and main-
tains a democratic aspect that has developed through time. The Civil Code
in France has not remained immobile since its promulgation; workers' rights,
union rights, women's rights have been added to it, even though this list is
incomplete. But what about law in the socialist countries? Is there a legal
system proper to each socialist country or, rather, a general formation of
law in socialism? This is a critical question, for it concerns the status of
individuals and groups in socialism.
Logic and Dialectics
What is logic according to Marxism? Would it be simply, ac-
cording to one of Marx's formulations, the money of the human intellect?
Or, according to another of Marx's formulations, would it be a less potent
method of discovery than dialectics? What is its impact and what is its
relation with dialectics? How does one think mathematics? The great mod-
ern effort to think mathematics is based on logic and tends to push dialectics
85
out into the absurd. Now I believe that one can only conceptualize logic in
relation to dialectics, and vice versa; only in this way can one move from
formal to concrete identity, from logical principles to the processing of
information. In the space between logic and information one passes through
numerous intermediaries, including mathematics and even the codification
of law, which claims to take logic as its authority. A triad can be brought
in as an analytic framework of the becoming of thinking: formal logic/
dialectical logic/dialectics. This tends to substitute a more rigorous inter-
pretation for dialectics as conceived first by Hegel, then by Marx (although
he never specified his thinking on the question), then by Engels and Lenin.
It is no longer a matter of the thesis/antithesis/synthesis dialectic, nor of
dialectics in nature, nor of the affirmation/negation/negation-of-the-nega-
tion relationship. In this perspective, dialectics allows for the analysis of
becoming, that is to say, of time, more or less connected to space, something
that can only be conceived in three conflictual moments. This interpretation
of Hegel and Marx can be supported by taking, as an exemplary case, music,
the art of time, which can only be understood in relation to three notions:
melody, harmony, and rhythm. In the same way we analyze the modern
world by taking account of these three conflictual moments: the state/the
nation/classes. We could multiply the cases of becoming that can only be
seized through a dialectical triad initiated by Marx.

Information
Information is often spoken about; it is employed in an ordinary
sense: to become informed-get information through the press, the radio,
the TV. Today information is something entirely different. First, it is a
mathematical quantity-a theory that is at once mathematical, physical,
biological; that extends beyond these sciences and seems to be in full de-
ployment. Information is an advanced technique, dominated by certain
multinationals. It is also a commodity to be bought and sold, a product
that is consumed (notably through the media) but is not a material object.
It is, finally, a social practice, a way of communicating, with a usage and
even a political application. Information processing can be located neither
at the level of the base nor at the level of the superstructure in the usual
sense, for it covers the whole of modern society, from the base to the su-
perstructure. This is why it is necessary to have a Marxist and critical theory
of information systems.

The Project
We have to elaborate a cultural project, but it must, these days,
be connected to other elements of a qualitative development, one more and
more distinct from quantitative growth, that is to say, purely and simply
economic. It is a question, at least in Europe and France, of the extension
of the activities that are deployed outside the spheres dominated by the
commodity, its laws, and its logic. 3 It is a question of a slow but profound
modification ofthe everyday-of a new usage ofthe body, oftime and space,
of sociability; something that implies a social and political project; more
enhanced forms of democracy, such as direct democracy in cities; definition
of a new citizenship; decentralization; participatory self-management (au-
togestion); and so on-that is, a project for society that is at the same time
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cultural, social, and political. Is this utopian? Yes, because utopian thought
concerns what is and is not possible. All thinking that has to do with action
has a utopian element. Ideals that stimulate action, such as liberty and
happiness, must contain a utopian element. This is not a refutation of such
ideals; it is, rather, a necessary condition of the project of changing life.
These considerations, these perspectives, and this project to change
life can partly be found in Marx, but not entirely. They are implicit in Marx,
in the sense of a renewed humanism. In terms borrowed from Hegel, Marx
envisaged a total person of the future, being deployed as a body, as a relation
between the senses, as thought. These investigations converge toward a
supreme and final question that goes beyond classical philosophy. It is not
a matter of understanding what the verb "to think" signifies, as Heidegger
did, but of responding to the question, What remains to be thought now?
Marx certainly thought the world in which he lived, but the modem world
has not yet begun to think Marxism.
Thus, we need to rethink the nature of humankind. Human beings
are not merely the theoretical essence they appear to be in many pre-Marxist,
Marxist, or post-Marxist texts. To understand this in Marxist terms we need
to reformulate the conflictual relations within the triad: nature/matter/hu-
man. If a person is first and foremost an earthly being and a human body,
how do we relate the person to a representation of the world that includes
the recent contributions of all the sciences, including cosmology, astro-
physics, and microphysics? These types of knowledge extend from the in-
finitely small to the infinitely large. What, then, is the relationship of human
beings to the world of which they continue to be a part? The paradox of
Marx, which seems to escape most Marxists, is that human beings are their
own self-creations: they create themselves. In sum, the number of concep-
tions of the world seem rather limited, and Marx introduces one into them.
The other conceptions of the world take account either of the relationship
of human beings with creative nature or of their relationship with some
transcendence. Marx's thesis differs from these conceptions. The relation-
ship of human beings to themselves is considered no longer as a temporal
and spatial center of the universe but as a nucleus and center of self-creation.
This includes, at the same time, a conception of the world and a project
for life. Human beings are engaged in a perpetual adventure with its at-
tendant risks. More deeply, however, they place themselves not only into
question but also in play; they are perpetually at stake for themselves. Today
this occurs dramatically: the risk of nuclear self-destruction accompanies
self-creation.

Notes

I have elsewhere distinguished /a v1e quotid1enne (daily life) from /e quotidien (the everyday)
from Ia quotid1ennete (everydayness) "Let us simply say about da1ly life that it has always
existed, but permeated with values, with myths. The word everydav designates the entry of
this da1ly l1fe mto modernity the everyday as an object of a programming (d'une program-
marion), whose unfold1ng 1s 1mposed by the market, by the system of equivalences. by
marketmg and advertisements. As to the concept of 'everydayness,' it stresses the homog-
enous, the repetitive, the fragmentary in everyday l1fe" (Le Monde, Sunday, Dec. 19, 1982.
pp. ix, x). I have also stated that "the everyday, 1n the modern world, has ceased to be a
'subject' (abundant m poss1ble subjectivity) to become an 'object' (object of social organi-
zation)" (La v1e quotidienne ans le monde modern, Pans Gall1nard "Idees," 1968, p. 116).

87
2 The concept of alienation. in moving from Marxist thinking into culture. has lost much of its
integrity and force. For example, young women have come to me to say they do not want
any children because children represent self-alienation. I suggest that if you have a child
against your will, that constitutes alienation. But it is different if you want the child. Alienation
is determined not by the condition of women but by the action of will and desire.
3 The project described here begins with the question of how people live their everyday lives.
It leaves unanswered those considerations that might result from looking especially at those
whose incomes are well below the social average. How do the Northeastern Brazilians. the
peasants of Upper Volta. the inhabitants of the Mexican campamientos survive? [Translator's
note: This is an untranslatable play on words. The verb used. sou-vivre. does not actually
exist in French. The verb for survive is survivre and Lefebvre is playing with the prefixes sur-
(over) and sou-(under. as in underdevelopment).] Do they manage? But how? Is there not a
parallel and underground economy being constructed in relation to ultramodern industry? It
is not only a matter of turning one's attention to the way in which hundreds of millions of
people manage to survive. but to know if this modern society-from the capitalist side-is
not in the process of breaking up. A theoretical. practical. and political problem. as soon as
one does not accept that the growth of production as well as of information is sufficient to
conserve the unity of society.

88
 Chantal Mouffe

Hegemony and New Political Subjects:

Toward a New Concept of Democracy
Translated by Stanley Gray

Contemporary social movements express antagonrsms

that emerged 1n response to the hegemonrc formatron
fully Installed in Western countnes after 1945. The de-
velopment of capitalrsm (the commodifrcatron of socral
lrfe). mcreasmg state mterventron (bureaucratrzatron),
and the growrng unrforrT11ty of social life (mass culture)
have enlarged the scope of polrtrcal struggle and ex-
tended the effect of the democratic revolutron to the
whole of socral relations.

It is incomprehensible that equality should

not ultimately penetrate the political world as
it has elsewhere. That men should be eter-
nally unequal among themselves in one sin-
gle respect and equal in others is inconceiva-
ble; they will therefore one day attain
equality in all respects.
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America

Despite Tocqueville's remarkable insight into the po-

tential implications of the "democratic revolution," it is unlikely that he
could have imagined its leading, today, to our questioning the totality of
social relationships. He believed, in fact, as his reflections on women's equal-
ity testify, that the ineluctable drive toward equality must take into account
certain real differences grounded in nature. It is precisely the permanent
alterity based on such a conception of natural essences that is contested
today by an important segment of the feminist movement. It is not merely
that the democratic revolution has proven to be more radical than Toc-
queville foresaw; the revolution has taken forms that no one could have
anticipated because it attacks forms of inequality that did not previously
exist. Clearly, ecological, antinuclear, and antibureaucratic struggles, along
with all the other commonly labeled "new social movements"-1 would
prefer to call them "new democratic struggles" -should be understood as
resistances to new types of oppression emerging in advanced capitalist so-
cieties. This is the thesis my essay will develop, and I shall try to answer
the following questions: (1) What kind of antagonism do the new social
movements express? (2) What is their link with the development of capi-
talism? (3) How should they be positioned in a socialist strategy? (4) What
are the implications of these struggles for our conception of democracy?
Theoretical Positions
1. Within every society, each social agent is inscribed
in a multiplicity of social relations-not only social relations of production
89
 but also the social relations, among others, of sex, race, nationality, and
vicinity. All these social relations determine positionalities or subject po-
sitions, and every social agent is therefore the locus of many subject positions
and cannot be reduced to only one. Thus, someone inscribed in the relations
of production as a worker is also a man or a woman, white or black, Catholic
or Protestant, French or German, and so on. A person's subjectivity is not
constructed only on the basis of his or her position in the relations of
production. Furthermore, each social position, each subject position, is itself
the locus of multiple possible constructions, according to the different dis-
courses that can construct that position. Thus, the subjectivity of a given
social agent is always precariously and provisionally fixed or, to use the
Lacanian term, sutured at the intersection of various discourses.
I am consequently opposed to the class reductionism of classical
Marxism, in which all social subjects are necessarily class subjects (each
social class having its own ideological paradigm, and every antagonism
ultimately reducible to a class antagonism). I affirm, instead, the existence
in each individual of multiple subject positions corresponding both to the
different social relations in which the individual is inserted and to the dis-
courses that constitute these relations. There is no reason to privilege, a
priori, a "class" position as the origin of the articulation of subjectivity.
Furthermore, it is incorrect to attribute necessary paradigmatic forms to
this class position. Consequently, a critique of the notion of "fundamental
interests" is required, because this notion entails fixing necessary political
and ideological forms within determined positions in the production pro-
cess. But interests never exist prior to the discourses in which they are
articulated and constituted; they cannot be the expression of already existing
positions on the economic level.
2. I am opposed to the economic view of social evolution as
governed by a single economic logic, the view that conceives the unity of
a social formation as the result of"necessary effects" produced in ideological
and political superstructures by the economic infrastructures. The distinc-
tion between infra- and superstructure needs to be questioned because it
implies a conception of economy as a world of objects and relations that
exist prior to any ideological and political conditions of existence. This view
assumes that the economy is able to function on its own and follow its own
logic, a logic absolutely independent of the relations it would allegedly de-
termine. Instead, I shall defend a conception of society as a complex en-
semble of heterogeneous social relations possessing their own dynamism.
Not all such relations are reducible to social relations of production or to
their ideological and political conditions of reproduction. The unity of a
social formation is the product of political articulations, which are, in turn,
the result of the social practices that produce a hegemonic formation.
3. By "hegemonic formation" I mean an ensemble of relatively
stable social forms, the materialization of a social articulation in which
different social relations react reciprocally either to provide each other with
mutual conditions of existence, or at least to neutralize the potentially de-
structive effects of certain social relations on the reproduction of other such
relations. A hegemonic formation is always centered around certain types
of social relations. In capitalism, these are the relations of production, but
this fact should not be explained as an effect of structure; it is, rather, that
the centrality of production relations has been conferred by a hegemonic
90
 Chantal Mouffe
policy. However, hegemony is never established conclusively. A constant
struggle must create the conditions necessary to validate capital and its
accumulation. This implies a set of practices that are not merely economic
but political and cultural as well. Thus, the development of capitalism is
subject to an incessant political struggle, periodically modifying those social
forms through which social relations of production are assured their cen-
trality. In the history of capitalism we can see the rhythm of successive
hegemonic formations.
4. All social relations can become the locus of antagonism insofar
as they are constructed as relations of subordination. Many different forms
of subordination can become the origin of conflict and struggle. There exists,
therefore, in society a multiplicity of potential antagonisms, and class an-
tagonism is only one among many. It is not possible to reduce all those
forms of subordination and struggle to the expression of a single logic located
in the economy. Nor can this reduction be avoided by positing a complex
mediation between social antagonisms and the economy. There are multiple
forms of power in society that cannot be reduced to or deduced from one
origin or source.
New Antagonisms and Hegemonic Formations
My thesis is that the new social movements express antagonisms
that have emerged in response to the hegemonic formation that was fully
installed in Western countries after World War II, a formation in crisis
today. I say fully installed because the process did not begin at that time;
these hegemonic forms were evolving, were being put into place since the
beginning of this century. Thus, we also had social movements before the
Second World War, but they really fully developed only after the war in
response to a new social hegemonic formation.
The antagonisms that emerged after the war, however, have not
derived from the imposition of forms of subordination that did not exist
before. For instance, the struggles against racism and sexism resist forms
of domination that existed not only before the new hegemonic formation
but also before capitalism. We can see the emergence of those antagonisms
in the context of the dissolution of all the social relations based on hierarchy,
and that, of course, is linked to the development of capitalism, which de-
stroys all those social relations and replaces them with commodity relations.
So, it is with the development of capitalism that those forms of subordi-
nation can emerge as antagonisms. The relations may have existed previ-
ously, but they could not emerge as antagonisms before capitalism. Thus,
we must be concerned with the structural transformations that have pro-
vided some of the objective conditions for the emergence of these new
antagonisms. But you cannot automatically derive antagonism and struggle
from the existence of these objective conditions-they are necessary but not
sufficient-unless you assume people will necessarily struggle against sub-
ordination. Obviously I am against any such essentialist postulate. We need
to ask under what conditions those relations of subordination could give
birth to antagonisms, and what other conditions are needed for the emer-
gence of struggles against these subordinations.
It is the hegemonic formation installed after the Second World
War that, in fact, provides these conditions. We may characterize this for-
mation as articulating: (a) a certain type of labor process based on the
91
semiautomatic assembly line; (b) a certain type of state (the Keynesian
interventionist state); and (c) new cultural forms that can be described as
"mediating culture." The investiture of such a hegemonic formation in-
volved a complex process, articulating a set of transformations, each of
which derived from a different logic. It is impossible to derive any one of
these from another in some automatic fashion, as in an economistic logic.
In fact, the transformations of the labor process that led to Taylorization
and finally to Fordism were governed by the need to destroy the autonomy
that workers continued to exercise in the labor process and to end worker
resistance to the valorization of capital. But the Fordist semiautomatic as-
sembly line made possible a mass production for which, given the low salary
level, there were insufficient outlets. Thus, the working class's mode of life
had to change significantly in order to create the conditions necessary for
accumulation to regain its ascendancy. However, the fact that certain con-
ditions were necessary for the accumulation and reproduction of capitalist
social relations to function in no way guaranteed that these conditions would
come about. The solution was to use worker struggles, which were multi-
plying in response to the intensification of labor, to establish a connection
between increased productivity and increased wages. But this required a
state intervention with a double purpose: it was just as urgent to counter
the capitalist's inclination to lower wages as it was to set up a political
framework in which worker's demands could be made compatible with the
reproduction of capitalism. This provides significant evidence that this new
hegemonic formation resulted from a political intervention.
These changes in the labor process can also be defined as a trans-
formation of an extensive regime of accumulation into an intensive regime
of accumulation. The latter is characterized by the expansion of capitalist
relations of production to the whole set of social activities, which are thereby
subordinated to the logic of production for profit. A new mode of con-
sumption has been created that expresses the domination of commodity
relations over noncommodity relations. As a consequence, a profound trans-
formation of the existing way of life has taken place. Western society has
been transformed into a big marketplace where all the products of human
labor have become commodities, where more and more needs must go
through the market to be satisfied. Such a "commodification of social life"
has destroyed a series of previous social relations and replaced them with
commodity relations. This is what we know as the consumer society.
Today, it is not only through the sale of their labor power that
individuals are submitted to the domination of capital but also through
their participation in many other social relations. So many spheres of social
life are now penetrated by capitalist relations that it is almost impossible
to escape them. Culture, leisure, death, sex, everything is now a field of
profit for capital. The destruction of the environment, the transformation
of people into mere consumers-these are the results of that subordination
of social life to the accumulation of capital. Those new forms of domination,
of course, have been studied by many authors, but there has been a tendency,
especially at the beginning of the sixties-you will remember Marcuse's One
Dimensional Man-to believe that the power of capital was so overwhelm-
ing that no struggle, no resistance, could take place. Yet a few years later it
became clear that those new forms of domination would not go unchal-
lenged; they have given rise to many new antagonisms, which explains the
92
 Chantal Mouffe
widening of all forms of social conflict since the middle of the sixties. My
thesis is that many of the new social movements are expressions of resist-
ances against that commodification of social life and the new forms of
subordination it has created.
But that is only one aspect of the problem; there is a second
aspect that is extremely important. You remember that we have defined the
new hegemonic formation not only in terms of Fordism but also in terms
of the Keynesian welfare state. The new hegemonic formation has been
characterized by growing state intervention in all aspects of social life, which
is a key characteristic, of the Keynesian state. The intervention of the state
has led to a phenomenon of bureaucratization, which is also at the origin
of new forms of subordination and resistance. It must be said that in many
cases commodification and bureaucratization are articulated together, as
when the state acts in favor of capital. Thus, while it might be difficult to
distinguish between them, I think it is extremely important to do so and
to analyze them as different systems of domination. There may be cases in
which the state acts against the interests of capital to produce what Claus
Offe has called "decommodification." At the same time, such interventions,
because of their bureaucratic character, may produce new forms of subor-
dination. This is the case, for example, when the state provides services in
the fields of health, transportation, housing, and education.
A third aspect of the problem is that some new types of struggle
must be seen as resistances to the growing uniformity of social life, a uni-
formity that is the result ofthe kind of mass culture imposed by the media.
This imposition of a homogenized way oflife, of a uniform cultural pattern,
is being challenged by different groups that reaffirm their right to their dif-
ference, their specificity, be it through the exaltation of their regional identity
or their specificity in the realm of fashion, music, or language.
The profound changes brought about by this construction of a
new hegemonic formation gave rise to the resistances expressed in the new
social movements. However, as I have said, one should not blame new
forms of inequality for all the antagonisms that emerged in the sixties. Some,
like the women's movement, concerned long-standing types of oppression
that had not yet become antagonistic because they were located in a hier-
archical society accepting certain inequalities as "natural."
Whether antagonism is produced by the commodification of all
social needs, or by the intervention of state bureaucracy, or by cultural
leveling and the destruction of traditional values (whether or not the latter
are themselves oppressive)-what all these antagonisms have in common
is that the problem is not caused by the individual's defined position in the
production system; they are, therefore, not "class antagonisms." Obviously
this does not mean that class antagonism has been eliminated. In fact,
insofar as more and more areas of social life are converted into "services"
provided by capitalism, the number of individuals subordinated to capitalist
production relations increases. If you take the term "proletarian" in its strict
sense, as a worker who sells his or her labor, it is quite legitimate to speak
of a process of proletarianization. The fact that there are an increasing
number of individuals who may suffer capitalist domination as a class does
not signify a new form of subordination but rather the extension of an
already existing one. What is new is the spread of social conflict to other
areas and the politicization of all these social relations. When we recognize
93
that we are dealing with resistances to forms of oppression developed by
the postwar hegemonic formation, we begin to understand the importance
of these struggles for a socialist program.
It is wrong, then, to affirm, as some do, that these movements
emerged because of the crisis of the welfare state. No doubt that crisis
exacerbated antagonisms, but it did not cause them; they are the expression
of a triumphant hegemonic formation. It is, on the contrary, reasonable to
suppose that the crisis was in part provoked by the growing resistance to
the domination of society by capital and the state. Neoconservative theo-
reticians are, therefore, not wrong to insist on the problem of the ungov-
ernability of Western countries, a problem they would solve by slowing
down what they call the "democratic assault." To propose the crisis as the
origin of the new social movements is, in addition, politically dangerous:
it leads to thinking of them as irrational manifestations, as phenomena of
social pathology. Thus, it obscures the important lessons these struggles
provide for a reformulation of socialism.
New Antagonisms and Democratic Struggle
I have thus far limited my analysis to the transformations that
have taken place in Western societies after World War II and to the resulting
creation of new forms of subordination and inequality, which produced in
tum the new social movements. But there is an entirely different aspect of
the question that must now be developed. Pointing to the existence of in-
equalities is not sufficient to explain why they produce social unrest. If you
reject, as I obviously do, the assumption that the essence of humankind is
to struggle for equality and democracy, then there is an important problem
to resolve. One must determine what conditions are necessary for specific
forms of subordination to produce struggles that seek their abolishment. As
I have said, the subordination of women is a very old phenomenon, which
became the target of feminist struggles only when the social model based
on hierarchy had collapsed. It is here that my opening reference to de Toc-
queville is pertinent, for he was the first to grasp the importance of the
democratic revolution on the symbolic level. As long as equality has not
yet acquired (with the democratic revolution) its place of central significance
in the social imagination of Western societies, struggles for this equality
cannot exist. As soon as the principle of equality is admitted in one domain,
however, the eventual questioning of all possible forms of inequality is an
ineluctable consequence. Once begun, the democratic revolution has had,
necessarily, to undermine all forms of power and domination, whatever
they might be.
I would like to elaborate on the relationship between antagonism
and struggle and to begin with the following thesis: An antagonism can
emerge when a collective subject-of course, here I am interested in political
antagonism at the level of the collective subject-that has been constructed
in a specific way, to certain existing discourses, finds its subjectivity negated
by other discourses or practices. That negation can happen in two basic
ways. First, subjects constructed on the basis of certain rights can find them-
selves in a position in which those rights are denied by some practices or
discourses. At that point there is a negation of subjectivity or identification,
which can be the basis for an antagonism. I am not saying that this nec-
essarily leads to an antagonism; it is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
94
 Chantal Mouffe
The second form in which antagonism emerges corresponds to that ex-
pressed by feminism and the black movement. It is a situation in which
subjects constructed in subordination by a set of discourses are, at the same
time, interpellated as equal by other discourses. Here we have a contradic-
tory interpellation. Like the first form, it is a negation of a particular subject
position, but, unlike the first, it is the subjectivity-in-subordination that is
negated, which opens the possibility for its deconstruction and challenging.
For example, consider the case of the suffragist movement, or,
more generally, the question of why it is that, although women's subordi-
nation has existed for so long, only at the end of the nineteenth century
and the beginning of the twentieth century did subordination give rise to a
feminist movement. That has lead some Marxist feminists to say that there
was no real women's subordination before; women's subordination is a
consequence of capitalism and that is why feminism emerged under capi-
talism. I think this is wrong. Imagine the way women were constructed, as
women, in the Middle Ages. All the possible discourses-the church, the
family-constructed women as subordinate subjects. There was absolutely
no possibility, no play, in those subject positions for women to call that
subordination into question. But with the democratic revolutions of the
nineteenth century the assertion that "all men are equal" appears for the
first time. Obviously "men" is ambiguous because it refers to both men and
women, so women found themselves contradictorily interpellated. As citi-
zens women are equal, or at least interpellated as equal, but that equality
is negated by their being women. (It is no coincidence that Mary Woll-
stonecraft, one of the important English feminists, was living with William
Godwin, who was an important radical; this demonstrates the influence of
radicalism on the emergence of the suffragist movement.) So that is what I
understand by contradictory interpellation-the emergence of a section of
equality at a point of new subjectivity, which contradicts the subordination
in all other subject positions. That is what allows women to extend the
democratic revolution, to question all their subordinate subject positions.
The same analysis could be given for the emergence of the black liberation
movement.
I should emphasize here the importance of actually existing dis-
course in the emergence and construction of antagonisms. Antagonisms are
always discursively constructed; the forms they take depend on existing
discourses and their hegemonic role at a given moment. Thus, different
positions in sexual relations do not necessarily construct the concept of
woman or femininity in different ways. It depends on the way the antag-
onism is constructed, and the enemy is defined by the existing discourses.
We must also take into account the role of the democratic discourse that
became predominant in the Western world with the "democratic revolu-
tion." I refer to the transformation, at the level of the symbolic, that de-
constructed the theological-political-cosmological vision of the Middle Ages,
a vision in which people were born into a specific place in a structured and
hierarchical society for which the idea of equality did not exist.
People struggle for equality not because of some ontological pos-
tulate but because they have been constructed as subjects in a democratic
tradition that puts those values at the center of social life. We can see the
widening of social conflict as the extension of the democratic revolution
into more and more spheres of social life, into more social relations. All
95
positions that have been constructed as relations of domination/subordi-
nation will be deconstructed because of the subversive character of dem-
ocratic discourse. Democratic discourse extends its field of influence from
a starting point, the equality of citizens in a political democracy, to socialism,
which extends equality to the level of the economy and then into other
social relations, such as sexual, racial, generational, and regional. Demo-
cratic discourse questions all forms of inequality and subordination. That
is why I propose to call those new social movements "new democratic
struggles," because they are extensions of the democratic revolution to new
forms of subordination. Democracy is our most subversive idea because it
interrupts all existing discourses and practices of subordination.
Now I want to make a distinction between democratic antago-
nism and democratic struggle. Democratic antagonisms do not necessarily
lead to democratic struggles. Democratic antagonism refers to resistance to
subordination and inequality; democratic struggle is directed toward a wide
democratization of social life. I am hinting here at the possibility that dem-
ocratic antagonism can be articulated into different kinds of discourse, even
into right-wing discourse, because antagonisms are polysemic. There is no
one paradigmatic form in which resistance against domination is expressed.
Its articulation depends on the discourses and relations of forces in the
present struggle for hegemony.
Stuart Hall's analysis of Thatcherism enables us to understand
the way popular consciousness can be articulated to the Right. Indeed, any
democratic antagonism can be articulated in many different ways. Consider
the case of unemployment. A worker who loses his or her job is in a situ-
ation-the first one described above-in which, having been defined on the
basis of the right to have a job, he or she now finds that right denied. This
can be the locus of an antagonism, although there are ways of reacting to
unemployment that do not lead to any kind of struggle. The worker can
commit suicide, drink enormously, or batter his or her spouse; there are
many ways people react against that negation of their subjectivity. But con-
sider now the more political forms that reaction can take. There is no reason
to believe the unemployed person is going to construct an antagonism in
which Thatcherism or capitalism is the enemy. In England, for example,
the discourse ofThatcherism says, "You have lost your job because women
are taking men's jobs." It constructs an antagonism in which feminism is
the enemy. Or it can say, "You have lost your job because all those im-
migrants are taking the jobs of good English workers." Or it can say, "You
have lost your job because the trade unions maintain such high wages that
there are not enough jobs for the working class." In all these cases, dem-
ocratic antagonism is articulated to the Right rather than giving birth to
democratic struggle.
Only if the struggle of the unemployed is articulated with the
struggle of blacks, of women, of all the oppressed, can we speak of the
creation of a democratic struggle. As I have said, the ground for new struggles
has been the production of new inequalities attributable to the postwar
hegemonic formation. That the objective of these struggles is autonomy and
not power has often been remarked. It would, in fact, be wrong to oppose
radically the struggles of workers to the struggles of the new social move-
ments; both are efforts to obtain new rights or to defend endangered ones.
Their common element is thus a fundamental one.
96
 Chantal Mouffe
Once we have abandoned the idea of a paradigmatic form, which
the worker's struggles would be obliged to express, we cannot affirm that
the essential aim of these struggles is the conquest of political power. What
is needed is an examination of the different forms that democratic struggles
for equality may take, according to the type of adversary they oppose and
the strategy they imply. In the case of resistances that seek to defend existing
rights against growing state intervention, it is obvious that the matter of
autonomy will be more important than for those resistances that seek to
obtain state action in order to redress inequalities originating in civil society.
This does not change the fact that they are of the same nature by virtue of
their common aim: the reduction of inequalities and of various forms of
subordination. That the vast extension of social conflict we are living through
is the work of the democratic revolution is better understood by the New
Right than by the Left. This is why the Right strives to halt the progress of
equality. Starting from different viewpoints, both neoliberal theoreticians
of the market economy and those who are called, in the United States,
••neoconservatives" are variously seeking to transform dominant ideological
parameters so as to reduce the central role played in these by the idea of
democracy, or else to redefine democracy in a restrictive way to reduce its
subversive power.
For neoliberals like Hayek, the idea of democracy is subordinated
to the idea of individual liberty, so that a defense of economic liberty and
private property replaces a defense of equality as the privileged value in a
liberal society. Naturally, Hayek does not attack democratic values frontally,
but he does make them into an arm for the defense of individual liberty.
It is clear that, in his thinking, should a conflict arise between the two,
democracy should be sacrificed.
Another way to stop the democratic revolution is offered by the
neoconservatives, whose objective is to redefine the notion of democracy
itself so that it no longer centrally implies the pursuit of equality and the
importance of political participation. Democracy is thus emptied of all of
its substance, on the pretext that it is being defended against its excesses,
which have led it to the edge of the egalitarian abyss.
To this purpose, Brzezinski, when he was director of the Trilateral
Commission, proposed a plan to ..increasingly separate the political systems
from society and to begin to conceive of the two as separate entities." The
idea was to remove as many decisions as possible from political control
and to give their responsibility exclusively to experts. Such a measure seeks
to depoliticize the most fundamental decisions, not only in the economic
but also in the social and political spheres, in order to achieve, in the words
of Huntington, ..a greater degree of moderation in democracy."
The attempt is to transform the predominant shared meanings
in contemporary democratic liberal societies in order to rearticulate them
in a conservative direction, justifying inequality. If it succeeds, if the New
Right's project manages to prevail, a great step backward will have been
taken in the movement of the democratic revolution. We shall witness the
establishment of a dualistic society, deeply divided between a sector of the
privileged, those in a strong position to defend their rights, and a sector of
all those who are excluded from the dominant system, whose demands
cannot be recognized as legitimate because they will be inadmissible by
definition.
97
 It is extremely important to recognize that, in their antiegalitarian
crusade, the various formations of the New Right are trying to take advan-
tage of the new antagonisms born of commodification, bureaucratization,
and the uniformization of society. Margaret Thatcher's success in Great
Britain and Ronald Reagan's in the United States are unmistakable signs:
the populist Right has been able to articulate a whole set of resistances
countering the increase in state intervention and the destruction of tradi-
tional values and to express them in the language ofneoliberalism. It is thus
possible for the Right to exploit struggles that express resistance to the new
forms of subordination stemming from the hegemonic formation of the
Keynesian welfare state.
This is why it is both dangerous and mistaken to see a "privileged
revolutionary subject" constituted in the new social movements, a subject
who would take the place formerly occupied by the now fallen worker class.
I think this is the current thinking represented by Alain Tourraine in France
and by some of the people linked with the peace movement in Germany.
They tend to see new social movements in a much too simplistic way. Like
those of the workers, these struggles are not necessarily socialist or even
progressive. Their articulation depends on discourses existing at a given
moment and on the type of subject the resistances construct. They can,
therefore, be as easily assimilated by the discourses of the anti-status quo
Right as by those of the Left, or be simply absorbed into the dominant
system, which thereby neutralizes them or even utilizes them for its own
modernization.
It is, in fact, evident that we must give up the whole problematic
of the privileged revolutionary subject, which, thanks to this or that char-
acteristic, granted a priori by virtue of its position in social relations, was
presumed to have some universal status and the historical mission of lib-
erating society. On the contrary, if every antagonism is necessarily specific
and limited, and there is no single source for all social antagonisms, then
the transition to socialism will come about only through political construc-
tion articulating all the struggles against different forms of inequality. If, in
certain cases, a particular group plays a central role in this transition, it is
for reasons that have to do with its political capacity to effect this articulation
in specific historical conditions, not for a priori ontological reasons. We
must move beyond the sterile dichotomy opposing the working class to the
social movements, a dichotomy that cannot in any case correspond to so-
ciological separation, since the workers cannot be reduced to their class
position and are inserted into other types of social relations that form other
subject positions. We must recognize that the development of capitalism
and of increasing state intervention has enlarged the scope of the political
struggle and extended the effect of the democratic revolution to the whole
of social relations. This opens the possibility of a war for position at all
levels of society, which may, therefore, open up the way for a radical trans-
formation.
The New Antagonisms and Socialism
This war for position is already underway, and it has hitherto
been waged more effectively by the Right than by the Left. Yet the success
of the New Right's current offensive is not definitive. Everything depends
on the Left's ability to set up a true hegemonic counteroffensive to integrate
current struggles into an overall socialist transformation. It must create what
98
 Chantal Mouffe
Gramsci called an "expansive hegemony," a chain of equivalences between
all the democratic demands to produce the collective will of all those people
struggling against subordination. It must create an "organic ideology" that
articulates all those movements together. Clearly, this project cannot limit
itself to questioning the structural relations of capitalist production. It must
also question the mode of development of those forces endemic to the
rationale of capitalist production. Capitalism as a way of life is, in fact,
responsible for the numerous forms of subordination and inequality at-
tacked by new social movements.
The traditional socialist model, insofar as it accepts an assembly-
line productivity of the Fordist type, cannot provide an alternative within
the current social crisis and must be profoundly modified. We need an
alternative to the logic that promotes the maximum production of material
goods and the consequent incessant creation of new material needs, leading
in tum to the progressive destruction of natural resources and the environ-
ment. A socialist program that does not include the ecological and anti-
nuclear movements cannot hope to solve current problems. The same ob-
jection applies to a socialism tolerant of the disproportionate role given to
the state. State intervention has, in fact, been proposed as a remedy for the
capitalist anarchy. But with the triumph of the Keynesian state, the
bourgeoisie has in large part realized this objective. Yet it is just this increase
in state intervention that has given rise to the new struggles against the
bureaucratization of social life. A program wishing to utilize this potential
cannot, therefore, propose increased state intervention but must encourage
increased self-determination and self-government for both individuals and
citizens. This does not mean accepting the arguments of the New Right, or
falling back into the trap of renewed privatization. The state ought to have
charge of key sectors of the economy, including control of welfare services.
But all these domains should be organized and controlled by workers and
consumers rather than the bureaucratic apparatus. Otherwise, the potential
of this antistate resistance will simply be used by the Right for its own ends.
As for the women's movement, it is apparent that it needs an
even more thoroughgoing transformation. Such a transformation is not uto-
pian. We are beginning to see how a society in which the development of
science and technology is directed toward the liberation of the individual
rather than toward his or her servitude could also bring about a true equality
of the sexes. The consequences of automation-the reduction of the workday
and the change in the very notion of work that implies-make possible a
far-reaching transformation of everyday life and of the sexual division of
labor that plays such an important role in women's subordination. But for
this to occur, the Left would have to abandon its conservative attitude
toward technological development and make an effort to bring these im-
portant changes under its control.
We hear, all too often, as a reaction to the apologists of postin-
dustrial society, that we are still in a capitalist society and that nothing has
changed. Though it is quite true that capitalism still prevails, many things
have changed since Marx. We are, today, in the midst of an important
restructuring. Whether the outcome will strengthen capitalism or move us
ahead in the construction of a more democratic society depends on the
ability of existing forces to articulate the struggles taking place for the cre-
ation of a new hegemonic formation.
99
 What is specific to the present situation is the proliferation of
democratic struggles. The struggle for equality is no longer limited to the
political and economic arenas. Many new rights are being defined and de-
manded: those of women, of homosexuals, of various regional and ethnic
minorities. All inequalities existing in our society are now at issue. To
understand this profound transformation of the political field we must re-
think and reformulate the notion of democracy itself, for the view we have
inherited does not enable us to grasp the amplitude of the democratic rev-
olution. To this end, it is not enough to improve upon the liberal parlia-
mentary conception of democracy by creating a number of basic democratic
forms through which citizens could participate in the management of public
affairs, or workers in the management of industries. In addition to these
traditional social subjects we must recognize the existence of others and
their political characters: women and the various minorities also have a
right to equality and to self-determination. If we wish to articulate all these
democratic struggles, we must respect their specificity and their autonomy,
which is to say that we must institutionalize a true pluralism, a pluralism
of subjects.
A new conception of democracy also requires that we transcend
a certain individualistic conception of rights and that we elaborate a central
notion of solidarity. This can only be achieved if the rights of certain subjects
are not defended to the detriment of the rights of other subjects. Now it is
obvious that, in many cases, the rights of some entail the subordination of
the rights of others. The defense of acquired rights is therefore a serious
obstacle to the establishment of true equality for all. It is precisely here that
one sees the line of demarcation separating the Left's articulation of the
resistances of the new social movements from the utilization of these same
by the New Right. Whereas the Left's program seeks to set up a system of
equivalences among the greatest possible number of democratic demands
and thus strives to reduce all inequalities, the Right's solution, as a form
of populism, satisfies the needs of certain groups by creating new inequal-
ities. This is why the politics of the latter, instead of extending democracy,
necessarily widens an already deep social split between the privileged and
the nonprivileged.
The progressive character of a struggle does not depend on its
place of origin-we have said that all workers' struggles are not progres-
sive-but rather on its link to other struggles. The longer the chain of equiv-
alences set up between the defense of the rights of one group and those of
other groups, the deeper will be the democratization process and the more
difficult it will be to neutralize certain struggles or make them serve the
ends of the Right. The concept of solidarity can be used to form such a
chain of democratic equivalences. It is urgent that we establish this new
democratic theory, with the concept of solidarity playing the central role,
to counter the New Right's offensive in the field of political philosophy.
Faced with an effort like Hayek's to redefine freedom individu-
alistically, what the Left needs is a postindividualist concept of freedom,
for it is still over questions of freedom and equality that the decisive ide-
ological battles are being waged. What is at stake is the redefinition of those
fundamental notions; and it is the nature of these relations that will deter-
mine the kinds of political subjects who will emerge and the new hegemonic
block that will take shape.
100
 Chantal Mouffe
To combine equality and liberty successfully in a new vision of
democracy, one that recognizes the multiplicity of social relations and their
corresponding subject positions, requires that we achieve a task conceived
at the beginning of the democratic revolution, one that defines the kind of
politics required for the advent of modernity. If to speak of socialism still
means anything, it should be to designate an extension of the democratic
revolution to the entirety of social relations and the attainment of a radical,
libertarian, and plural democracy. Our objective, in other words, is none
other than the goal Tocqueville perceived as that of democratic peoples,
that ultimate point where freedom and equality meet and fuse, where people
"will be perfectly free because they are entirely equal, and where they will
all be perfectly equal because they are entirely free."

101
 Discussion
Question
Could you elaborate on what it is about liberal democracy
that needs to be redefined, and what a superseded or redefined liberal democracy of
the Left would be like?
Mouffe
Let me reiterate what I said in the paper while elaborating
a number of points. First, it is important to distinguish between democratic and
liberal theory. What we know today as a single ideology-liberal democracy-is in
fact the result of an articulation that took place during the nineteenth century. While
many Marxists have assumed that democracy is in essence liberal, that there is no
contradiction between the two, C. B. MacPherson has shown that the idea of de-
mocracy was articulated to that of liberalism only through struggle. That struggle
created the organic ideology that is still, in some sense, dominant today-liberal
democracy. The cost, of course, was that democracy was liberalized, though one can
also say liberalism was democratized. In this way democratic ideology became linked
with the defense of private property. Liberty came to mean the liberty to have your
own property. I think we have to fight this restriction of the idea of democracy by
rearticulating democracy with other important concepts to elaborate what I call a
"radical, plural, and libertarian democracy."
Of course, we are also confronted by the neoconservative
effort to sever the link between liberalism and democracy by redefining democracy
as individual freedom. This is clearly a defense of private property, one that severs
the link between democracy and political equality. If the idea of democracy as po-
litical equality has been incorporated and disarmed through its articulation with
liberalism, it nevertheless remains potentially subversive. That is why the New Right
is attempting to break with liberal democratic ideology by rearticulating liberalism
without democracy, thereby transforming liberal democracy into liberal conserva-
tism. I think the Left should also be trying to sever the link between liberalism and
democracy, but in order to radicalize the concept of democracy. To do that we need
to work at the level of political philosophy, to rearticulate ideas of equality and
justice.
Finally, we need to consider what kind of institutions we
would need in a radical democratic society. Left-wing Euro-communists have done
some reflection here, proposing to augment representative democratic institutions
with several forms of grass-roots democracy, both at the level of the workplace and
at the level of the community. This is necessary but not enough, because it will not
guarantee the inclusion of the wide range of democratic demands that must be
represented in the expansive hegemony I have called for. For example, grass-roots
democracy in a factory will not necessarily involve feminism or ecology. These
questions clearly call for a new type of autogestion, a type of self-management that
cannot be seen simply as laborers managing their own factory. We can perfectly well
imagine a situation in which workers manage their factory without really taking care
ofthe environment, without responding to the demands of women. To do so would
involve rethinking what kinds of products we want to see produced by society. This
new model of self-management would constitute a generalized, extended autogestion.
This is the form of institution needed for a radical libertarian democracy to be
implemented. It must be a democracy with a plurality of such institutions at different
levels of the social formation.

Question
Could you elaborate on the concept of expansive hegemony
and on how different demands would be related within the collective will?
Mouffe
First, as I read Gramsci, I don't think it is correct to see
hegemony as the imposition of a class ideology on undergroups, as many have done.

102
 Chantal Mouffe
What I've been defending is a view of hegemony as the articulation of demands
coming from different groups to what Gramsci called a "hegemonic principle." But
he distinguished two ways in which such demands can be articulated. One is through
neutralization: you can take account ofthe demand of some group, not to transform
society so as to resolve the antagonism it expresses, but only so as to impede the
extension of that demand. That is what the New Right is doing when it takes account
of some of the resistances against the new hegemonic system. It tries to neutralize
demands by creating antagonisms that prevent the creation of a chain of equivalence
between various democratic demands. That is how I understand hegemony by neu-
tralization.
The opposite way demands are articulated is in what Gram-
sci called the "expansive hegemony." Rather than neutralize demands, an expansive
hegemony links them with all other democratic struggles to establish a chain of
equivalence. Of course, the wider the chain of equivalence, the wider the democ-
ratization of society, and the wider the collective will to be built on that basis. Then
it would be unthinkable for workers to fight for their rights only and not, at the
same time, for the rights of gays and women. It is important to reiterate that what
makes a struggle democratic is not where it comes from but the way it is articulated
with other democratic struggles. Yet such an expansive hegemony must respect the
autonomy and specificity of the demands of different groups. It is not just a matter
of saying that all those demands are implicit in the demands of the working class;
that once the working class comes to power, racial, sexual, and gender contradictions
will disappear.
Once we accept that there is no one privileged struggle, no
single origin to all forms of domination, we must then avoid creating a hierarchy
of struggles. Moreover, when we realize that most struggles are struggles to demand
rights, we can recognize that in many cases rights have been acquired by creating
inequalities with respect to other groups. The rights of some exist because others
are in a subordinate position. That is certainly the case for the demands of the
working class. The workers now have some rights by virtue of the oppression of
blacks and women; the demand to give these oppressed groups their rights must
mean that some of the rights of the workers must be abridged. Thus, any attempt
to reduce inequalities among the working class requires the transformation of the
subjectivity of the workers. And for that we need a new organic ideology that defines
equality in a different way, not just on the basis of rights. In a sense, we need the
elaboration of a postindividualist liberalism in which rights are defined not as a
personal possession but as a form of solidarity among all oppressed groups. In calling
this a form of liberalism I am suggesting that it is dangerous to do away with
liberalism entirely, a danger reflected in the Soviet Union.

Question
Given your emphases on the need not to compromise the
autonomy of various movements and on the plurality of discourses, how can you
speak of a single collective will? Who could possibly interpret such a will?
Mouffe
I suppose you are right; "collective will" is a metaphor, and
it is not necessarily a very good one! It was obviously a reference to Gramsci. In
Gramsci the collective will is organized through the party on the basis of the he-
gemony of the proletariat. He believed that the working class necessarily provides
the articulating principle for an expansive hegemony. To import that notion into
my discourse creates a series of problems. Although I don't want to argue that the
working class can never be the articulating principle-of course, in some circum-
stances it might be-l do want to argue that it won't always be. While it may, under
certain historical conditions, develop the political capacity to represent the interests
of others, we can also imagine that in other circumstances another social movement

103
can be the center. We can also imagine that there might not be any center; there is
no reason why there should necessarily be a center of an expansive hegemony.
As a consequence, contrary to Gramsci, I do not believe that
the party-and I am not thinking only of the Leninist party, but of any party-will
necessarily be the agent of change. A party can be too authoritarian and too rigid
to articulate all those different movements so as to maintain their autonomy. On
the other hand, some people argue that once you question the necessary hegemony
of the party and the working class, you are left with pure diversity; they go on to
argue that there need not be any articulation of those struggles. But if you believe
there must be an articulating principle, and it is not provided by the party, where
will it be found? I think it is a mistake to look for one organization, the "good"
organization. We need to think in terms of the articulations that must take place.
Those forms of articulation will differ according to the country. For instance, I do
not believe that trade unions can always play an important role. They can play an
important role in France and Italy, but it is very unlikely that they can in England
or Germany.
So there are no recipes. Intellectuals must abandon the idea
that they have to tell the people how to organize, to design a blueprint for the "good"
organization. All spontaneous revolutions-such as those in Hungary and Poland-
have shown that people find their own form of organization. Each society must find
its own way of articulating its different struggles together. And there will be different
forms of articulation. So we can only use the Gramscian notion of a national col-
lective will, or a popular national will, in a metaphoric way. Like Rousseau's concept
of a general will, it can imply too much homogeneity.

Question
It seems to me that we are witnessing two different theoret-
ical moves in Marxism today, with different political consequences. The first is a
more traditional materialism and looks at the economic impact of and on discourse.
But it apparently results in political pessimism. The second, which seems to be yours,
privileges discourse as a way of transforming consciousness and agency. It gives a
more optimistic political prognosis, but it fails to connect discourse to actual social
groups and institutions. In that sense, it seems to be a new form of idealism. Could
you comment on this?
Mouffe
I must say that I cannot accept the opposition between ide-
alism and materialism-it doesn't pertain to my semantic world- and in that I think
I follow Gramsci. One can show that materialism is idealist, because to think that
there is only one principle of explanation, be it matter or ideas, is in fact the same
problematic. In any case, I don't understand what you mean by describing me as
idealist, especially since by discourse I understand not only speech and writing but
also a series of social practices, so discourse is not just a question of ideas. That
doesn't mean that the elaboration of a level of ideas is not important, which is why
I made the point about political philosophy. Here, again, I follow Gramsci who said
that philosophy, as ideology, permeates all levels of consciousness. Even common
sense is informed by philosophy. Philosophy is where the categories of thought are
elaborated, allowing us to speak about our experience. For example, many people
who have never read anything about democratic theory nevertheless speak and act
as political subjects on the basis of ideas elaborated by philosophers. That is why I
insist on that level of analysis. But I am not saying this is all we need. We won't
transform the world simply by writing the last word on equality. But it is important
in constructing new political subjects, so it is one dimension of the struggle.

104
 Catharine A. MacKinnon

Desire and Power: A Feminist Perspective

In my opinion, no feminism worthy of the name is not

methodologically post-marxist. At the same time, we
cannot talk about everyday life without understanding
its div1sion by gender, or about hegemony without un-
derstanding male dominance as a form of it.

This conference, however broad its inspiration, so-

phisticated its conception, competent its organization, and elaborate in what
is called here "articulation," was not principally set up to maximize con-
ferring. Conferring happens interstitially. Instead, those identified as speak-
ers do what are called "talks"; however, we read them. They are called
"works in progress"; however, many of them are quite "done." The audience
responds with what are called "questions," many of which are in the form
of statements. This event presents itself as a dialogue but operates through
a linear series of speeches. We are presented as being engaged in a process,
when in actuality we gather to produce a product. We are in a production-
consumption cycle, the product being the book that will come out of all of
this. The silence that comprises the audience's or the reader's half of the
dialogue makes my half sound like one hand clapping. An ominous sound,
I should think, for anyone trained on the Left. In partial, if entirely inad-
equate, response to these thoughts, I have, in revising my paper, interspersed
questions I received both at the time of the conference and since, along with
some partial responses. I have also retained the rhetorical style of an address
to an audience. These expository choices are an attempt to make this paper
more dialogic and open-textured, even if only marginally so.
One more thing about the politics of this project and
my place in it. We purport to want to change things, but we talk in ways
that no one understands. We know that discourses have fashions, that we're
in the midst of a certain fashion now, and a few years later it will be another,
and ten years ago it was different. We know better than to think that this
is the pure onward progress of knowledge. We participate in these fashions,
are swept along in them, but we don't set them. I'm particularly concerned
that in talking thus fashionably about complicated realities-and I'm not
saying that what we have said here is not central to real concerns-we often
have highly coded conversations. Not only one-sided but coded. What con-
ditions create access to the latest code book?
Sometimes I think to myself, MacKinnon, you write.
Do you remember that the majority of the world's illiterates are women?
What are you doing? I feel that powerfully when I think about what brings
us all here-which is to make the changes we are talking about. When
someone condemns someone else for the use of jargon, they tend to suppose
that they themselves speak plain plate-glass. I'm not exempting myselffrom
105
this criticism but saying that I see it as fundamental to developing a politics
of language that will be deconstructive.
This essay comes in three parts. The first part is in argument
form: I will state what I take to be feminism. I will take from and converse
around my articles that appeared in Signs. I do take it upon myself to define
feminism. I challenge everyone to do the same. I would like to open a
discourse on what feminism means rather than on who we think we are to
think that we can define what it means. In other words, I'd rather talk
substance than relative postures of authority. I undertake this in critical
awareness that each of our biographies limits the experience out of which
we will make such a substantive definition, knowing that none of us indi-
vidually has the direct experience of all women but that together we do, so
that this theory must be collectively created. What we are here to do is to
engage that process. Here and now. This is why the hierarchical structure
of this conference is such a problem. What kind of theory does one create
this way?
In the second part of this essay I will attempt to unpack and
extend some of the implications from the initial compressed declarative
argument. It will get more discursive. The implications of the initial ar-
gument for some central concerns in marxist theory, including the aspiration
toward a unified theory of social inequality, are extended and directed prin-
cipally to questions of method.
I will end with what I take to be some urgent questions on our
agenda-not that there aren't urgent questions unanswered throughout; just
to end with some things I do not yet, I think, adequately address. The posture
of authority I take to do this comes because I agree with what I'm saying-
which is not to shove it down your throats but to take responsibility for
my own position.
In my view, sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism.
(Those of you who know my work will recognize this from the first Signs
article. 1 I'm not assuming, though, that you do.) By sexuality is to feminism
what work is to marxism, I mean that both focus on that which is most
one's own, that which most makes one the being the theory addresses, that
which is most taken away by that which the theory criticizes. You are made
who you are to each theory by that which is taken away from you by the
social relations each theory criticizes. In marxist theory we see society fun-
damentally constructed of the relations people form as they do and make
those things that are needed to survive humanly. Work is the social process
of shaping and transforming the material and social worlds, the process that
creates people as social beings, as their interactions create value. It is that
activity by which the theory comprehends how people become who they
socially are. Class is the social structure of their work, production is its
process, and capital is one congealed form. Control is its principal issue,
that which is contested, that which we care about, that which Marx wrote
about in an attempt to alter it.
Feminism has a parallel argument implicit in it. In my view-
you will notice that I equate "in my view" with "feminism"-this argument
is that the molding, direction, and expression of sexuality organizes society
into two sexes, women and men. This division underlies the totality of
106
 Catharine A. MacKinnon
social relations in a way that is as structural and pervasive as the place class
occupies in marxist theory, although of course its structure and quality of
pervasion are different. Sexuality is the social process that creates, organizes,
expresses, and directs desire-desire here being parallel to value in marxist
theory; not itself the same, but occupying an analogous theoretical location
of being the quality that is taken for a natural essence or presocial impetus
but is actually created by the social relations, the hierarchical relations, in
question. This process creates the social beings we know as women and
men as their relations create society. Like work to marxism, sexuality to
feminism is socially constructed yet constructing. It is universal as activity
yet always historically specific and jointly comprised of matter and mind.
As the organized expropriation of the work of some for the use of others
defines the class-workers-the organized expropriation of the sexuality of
some for the use of others defines the sex-woman. Heterosexuality is its
structure, gender is its social process, the family is a congealed form, sex
roles are its qualities generalized to two social personae, and reproduction
is a consequence. (Theorists sometimes forget that in order to reproduce
one must first, usually, have had sex.) Control is gender's issue, also.
In this analysis, both marxism and feminism are theories of power
and of its unequal distribution. They both provide accounts of how social
arrangements of systematic disparity (by arrangement I don't mean to sug-
gest it's equally chosen by all) are internally coherent and internally rational
and pervasive yet unjust. Both theories are total theories. That is, they are
both theories ofthe totality, ofthe whole thing, of a fundamental and critical
underpinning of the whole they envision. The problem of the relation be-
tween marxism and feminism then becomes how both can be true at the
same time. As the focus of my attempt to address this issue, I have taken
the relationship between questions of power and questions of knowledge;
that is, the relation between the political and the epistemological, as each
theory conceives it. I will talk about the feminist theory of power and the
feminist theory of knowledge and then move into their implications for an
array of marxist methodological issues. I will then say what I think the
relation between marxism and feminism is.
By political, I mean questions of power. The feminist theory of
power is that sexuality is gendered as gender is sexualized. (This comes from
the second Signs article. 2) In other words, feminism is a theory of how the
eroticization of dominance and submission creates gender, creates woman
and man in the social form in which we know them to exist. Thus, the sex
difference and the dominance-submission dynamic define each other. The
erotic is what defines sex as an inequality, hence as a meaningful difference.
This is, in my view, the social meaning of sexuality and the distinctly fem-
inist account of gender inequality. The feminist theory ofknowledge begins
with the theory of the point of view of all women on social life. It takes as
its point of departure the criticism that the male point of view on social
life has constructed both social life and knowledge about it. In other words,
the feminist theory of knowledge is inextricable from the feminist critique
of male power because the male point of view has forced itself upon the
world, and does force itself upon the world, as its way of knowing.
An epistemology is an answer to the question How do you know?
What makes you think you know?-not exactly why should I believe you,
but your account of why your reality is a true account. The content of the
107
feminist theory of knowledge begins with its criticism of the male point of
view by criticizing the posture that has been taken as the stance of "the
knower" in Western political thought. It is the stance that Stanley Aronowitz
refers to in the present collection, the neutral posture, which I will be calling
"objectivity," that is, the nonsituated distanced standpoint. I'm claiming
that this is the male standpoint, socially, and I'm going to try to say why.
I will be arguing that the relationship between objectivity as the stance from
which the world is known, and the world that is apprehended in this way,
is the relationship of objectification. Objectivity is the epistemological stance
of which objectification is the social process, of which male dominance is
the politics, the acted out social practice; that is, to look at the world ob-
jectively is to objectify it. The act of control, of which what I have described
is the epistemological level, is itself eroticized under male supremacy. To
say women are sex objects is, in this way, sort of redundant. Sexualized
objectification is what defines women as sexual and as woman under male
supremacy.
I now want to develop some of the implications of this thesis.
First, what gender is; then, what sexuality is; then, what kind of analysis
this feminism is-in particular, why objectification is specifically male. Then
I will digress slightly on the subject and object question. Then I will talk
about the consequences of setting up a theory this way for questions of
falsifiability and uncertainty, and about the verb "to be" in feminist dis-
course.
Gender here is a matter of dominance, not difference. Feminists
have noticed that women and men are equally different but not equally
powerful. Explaining the subordination of women to men, a political con-
dition, has nothing to do with difference in any fundamental sense. Con-
sequentially, it has a lot to do with difference, because the ideology of dif-
ference has been so central in its enforcement. Another way of putting this
would be to say that there would be no such thing as what we know as the
sex difference, much less would it be the social issue that it is or have the
social meaning that it has, were it not for male dominance. Sometimes
people say to me, "Does that mean you think there's no difference between
women and men?" The only way I know how to answer that is, Of course
there is. The difference is that men have power and women do not. I mean,
simply, men are not socially supreme, women subordinate, by nature, and
it is the fact that men are, nevertheless, socially supreme that constructs
the sex difference as we know it. I mean to suggest that difference-in this
I include differance-is a gender-based concept.
For those of you who think this is a lot of rhetoric, I want to
specify the facts I have in reference. When I speak of male dominance, I
mean as its content facts, from this culture. The facts have to do with the
rate of rape and attempted rape of women, which is around 44 percent. If
you ask a random group of women "Have you ever been raped, or been
the victim of an attempted rape?" and do not include marital rape, that is
the figure. 3 Women are victims of incest by their fathers at a rate of about
one in ten; and sexual assault by other family members and friends, about
a quarter to a third of all girls. This data, by the way, is predicated on
believing women, a problem Freud had. You know that the theory of the
unconscious was devised to explain how women come to invent experiences
of childhood sexual abuse, because Freud did not believe, finally, that these
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 Catharine A. MacKinnon
experiences could have happened. If you ask women if they've been sexually
harassed in the last two years, about 15 percent report very serious and/or
physical assaults; about 85 percent of all working women report sexual
harassment at some time in their working lives. Battery of women by men
in the family is running between a quarter and a third of all women. If you
look at homicide data, between 60 and 70 percent of murdered women are
killed by their husbands, lovers, or former lovers. The same is not true for
murdered men. (Men also kill each other in great numbers.) Prostitution
by women seems to run about 12 percent of current American society; by
all reports it is women's best economic option-that is, it is the only thing,
with modeling, for which women as a group are paid-by men-more than
men. The pornography industry, an exemplary synthesis of the eroticization
of dominance and submission with capitalism's profit motive, is put at eight
billion dollars a year, with three to four times as many outlets as McDonald's
restaurants. 4 To conceptualize this data as "the sex difference" acquiesces
in, and obscures, the facts of male power it documents and suggests are
systematic.
By the way, I use the word "male" as an adjective. My analysis
of sex is social, not biological. This is not to exempt some men or valorize
all women. It is to refer to the standpoint from which these acts I have
documented are done, that which makes them invisible, which makes them
glorious, which makes them glamorous, and which makes them normal. By
"male," then, I refer to apologists for these data, to the approach that is
integral to these acts, to the standard that has normalized these events to
the extent that they define masculinity, to the male sex role, and to the way
this approach has submerged its gender to become "the" standard. This is
what I mean when I speak of the male perspective or male power. Not all
men have equal access to male power, nor can they ever fully occupy a
woman's standpoint. If they do, on occasion, they pay for it; although they
can always reclaim male power, it is subject to being consciously disavowed.
A woman can take the male point of view or exercise male power. Our
access to it is not automatic; we're not born and raised to it. But we can
aspire to it. Me, for instance, standing up here talking to you; socially, this
is an exercise of male power. It's hierarchical, it's dominant, it's authori-
tative. You're listening, I'm talking; I'm active, you're passive; I'm express-
ing myself, you're taking notes. Women are supposed to be seen and not
heard.
Question: Isn't the relationship between mother and child hierarchical and
dominant?
C.M.: I don't think so, not quite in the same sense, no. Or at most it comes
to have some hierarchical and dominant aspects under male supremacy. I
disagree with the Chodorow-Dinnerstein 5 analysis as an explanation for
male dominance. I think it is only within a context in which male power
exists, once you already have it, that the relation between the mother and
child can become one in which the mother is seen as powerful, such that
it becomes a relation ofhorror, anxiety, betrayal, and-crucially-eroticism.
I don't think this relation is why male supremacy exists.
Question: But isn't that the situation we are in-male dominance?
C.M.: It is its reality, yes. But I'm attempting to explain that reality. I find
the mother/child relation, described as a relation of dominance, to be a
109
consequence of male supremacy, not its dynamic. Female mothering does
not explain to me why hierarchy is eroticized or even why it is gendered.
If hierarchy were not eroticized in male dominant sexuality, I do not think
hierarchy would mean what it does, exist where it does, much less be at-
tached to gender, hence to "mother," who remains a woman. I'm saying
that I don't think female mothering is a why of male supremacy; although
I do think women and children are linked in eroticized powerlessness under
male supremacy. That is the level on which I disagree with that work-as
explanation.
Question: What about female power?
C.M.: I think that is a contradiction in terms, socially speaking, and I think
it will become clear why I think "female power" is a misnomer.
Now I want to speak to the question of what sexuality is, in this
theory. I do not see sexuality as a transcultural container, as essential, as
historically nonchanging, or as Eros. I define sexuality as whatever a given
society eroticizes; that is, whatever sexual means in a particular society is
what sexuality is. Sexuality is what sexuality means. This is a political her-
meneutical view. Hermeneutics concerns matters of meaning. If sexuality
is seen in this way, it is fundamentally social, fundamentally relational, and
not a thing-which, by the way, does not mean it is not material, in a feminist
sense of materiality. Because sexuality arises in relations under male dom-
inance, women do not principally author its meanings. In the society we
currently live in, the content that I want to claim for sexuality is the gaze
that constructs women as objects for male pleasure. I draw on pornography
for its form and content, for the gaze that eroticizes the despised, the de-
meaned, the accessible, the there-to-be-used, the servile, the childlike, the
passive, and the animal. That is the content of the sexuality which defines
gender female in this culture and visual "thingification" is its mode. Michele
Barrett asked earlier how we come to want that which is not in our interest.
(This is a slight reformulation, but I think it is in the spirit of her question.)
What I think is that sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is
socially constructed as that by which we come to want our own self-anni-
hilation; that is, our subordination is eroticized in and as female-in fact,
we get off on it, to a degree. This is our stake in this system that is not in
our interest, our stake in this system that is killing us. I'm saying that
femininity as we know it is how we come to want male dominance, which
most emphatically is not in our interest. Such a critique of complicity, I
would argue to Gayatri Spivak, does not come from an individualistic the-
ory.
What kind of analysis such a feminism is, specifically by what
standard it is accepted as valid, is largely a matter of the criteria one adopts
for adequacy in a theory. Iffeminism is a critique of the objective standpoint
as male, then we also disavow standard scientific norms as the adequacy
criteria for our theory, because the objective standpoint we criticize is the
posture of science. In other words, our critique of the objective standpoint
as male is a critique of science as a specifically male approach to knowledge.
With it, we reject male criteria for verification. We're not seeking truth in
its female counterpart either, since that, too, is constructed by male power.
We do not vaunt the subjective. We begin by seeking the truth of and in
that which has constructed all this-that is, in gender.
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 Catharine A. MacKinnon
So why is objectivity as a stance specifically male? First of all,
familiar to all of you, is social specificity, the particularity, the social situ-
atedness of thought. Social situation is expressed through the concepts peo-
ple construct to make sense of their situation. Either gender is one such
social situation or it is not. If it is, then theories that are constructed by
those with the social experience of men, most particularly by those who are
not conscious that gender is a specific social circumstance, will be, at the
least, open to being male theories. It would be difficult, it would take a lot
of conscious effort, for them not to be. It is not (to repeat myself) that I
have a biological theory of gender, so that every utterance out of a biolog-
ically gendered person's mouth is socially gendered in the same way. I'm
saying that it is not foreign to us that social conditions shape thought as
well as life. Gender either is or is not such a social condition. I'm claiming
that it is.
Objectivity is a stance a subject takes. This is all very interesting
on a verbal plane. Gayatri turned this question around; I'll tum it one more
time. It is only a subject that gets to take the objective standpoint, the stance
that is transparent to its object, the stance that is no stance. A subject is a
sel£ An object is other to that self. Anyone who is the least bit attentive to
gender since reading Simone de Beauvoir knows that it is men, socially,
who are subjects; women, socially, who are other, objects. Thus, the one
who has the social access to being the self that takes the stance that is allowed
to be objective, that objective person who is a subject, is socially male.
Further, we notice in language (as well as life) that the male tends to occupy
both the neutral and the male position, which is another way of saying that
the neutrality of objectivity and of maleness are coextensive linguistically,
whereas women occupy the marked, the gendered, the different, the female
position. Further-this is another expression of the sex-specificity of ob-
jectivity socially-women have been nature; that is, men have been know-
ers, mind, and women have been "to-be-known," matter, that which is to
be controlled and subdued, to be acted upon. Of course, this is all a social
order, for we live in society, not in the natural world.
In this context let me address the question of falsifiability. One
consequence of women's rejection of science in its positivistic form is that
we reject the head-counting theory of verification. Structural truths may,
but may not, produce prevalent incidence. For example, to reply to a state-
ment characterizing women's experience, "Not only women experience that,"
is to suggest that to be properly sex-specific something must be unique to
one sex. Similarly, to say, "Not all women experience that," as if that con-
traindicates sex-specificity, is to suggest that to be sex-specific something
must be true of 100 percent of the sex affected. Both of those are implicitly
biological criteria for sex: unique and exclusive. Never mind that the biology
of sex is not bipolar or exclusive. This is the way the biology of gender is
ideologically conceived. Methodological assumptions have political con-
sequences. One result of this implicitly biological notion of sex-specificity
is that differences among women (notice differences again), such as, cru-
cially, race and class, are seen to undercut the meaningfulness or even the
reality of gender. If I say, "Such and so is true of women," and someone
responds, "But it's not the same for all women," that is supposed to undercut
the statement rather than point out features that comprise the sex-specificity
of the thing. If gender is a social category, gender is what it socially means.
1 11
What that means is it either is or is not the case that all women, in particular
ways, will be hit by the reality of gender, the totality of which will then
comprise the meaning of gender as a social category. In other words, all it
proves to say that something is not the same for all women is that it is not
biological, not that it is not gendered. Similarly, to say that not only women
experience something-for example, to suggest that the fact some men are
raped makes rape not an act of male dominance when done to women-
only suggests that the status of women is not biological. Men can be fem-
inized too-and know they are when they are raped. The fact that sometimes
whites have been slaves does not make black slavery not racist. That some
non-Jews, such as gypsies and gays, were victims of the Holocaust does not
mean the Holocast was not, or was less, anti-Semitic. We know something
about the content of black slavery, that is, of white racism; we also know
something about the content of the Holocaust, I trust, that makes it im-
possible to present isolated if significant counterexamples as if they undercut
the specific meaning of the atrocities for the groups who were defined by
their subjection to them. The fact that lots of white people are poor does
not mean that the poverty of blacks has nothing to do with racism. It just
means that social relations cannot be understood by analogy to chemical
reactions or thermodynamics or even to quantum mechanics.
It has been suggested that men who experience similar feelings
to those women articulate as women may be expressing ways in which being
on the bottom of hierarchies can produce similar feelings in people. The
declassed status of"student," for example, however temporary, makes a lot
of men feel like most women feel most of the time. Except that the men
tend to feel it, because they've fallen from something. There is nothing like
femininity to dignify their indignity as their identity. Nor do women and
men come to the status of "student" in the same way. Women have been
silenced as women-told we are stupid because we are women, told that
our thoughts are trivial because we are women, told that our experiences
as woman are unspeakable, told that women can't speak the language of
significance-then had our ideas appropriated by men, only to notice that
those ideas have suddenly become worthy, even creative. Women have been
excluded from education as women. This isn't to say that we're the only
ones who've been excluded from education, but the specific history of that
for us as women brings us to a structure like that of this conference, in
which there's authoritative discourse emanating from the podium and silent
receptivity in a mass; our history brings us to this in a way that specifically
intimidates and has specific exclusionary resonances for us. To those of you
who deny this, I claim the sex-specificity of that aspect of this experience.
The next thing I want to address is the methodological question
of uncertainty. I want your thoughts on all of this, but in particular on this
question. What I'm coming to think is that because men have power over
women, women come to epistemological issues situated in a way that sheds
a rather distinct light on the indeterminacy/determinacy question as men
have agonized over it. Take the "Is there a reality and how do I know I'm
right about it?" problem; the "Is there a there there?" business. How do we
react in the face of Cartesian (updated as existential) doubt? Women know
the world is out there. We know it because it hits us in the face. Literally.
We are raped, battered, pornographed, defined by it by force, by a world
that at least begins entirely outsid<e us. No matter what we think about it,
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 Catharine A. MacKinnon
how we try to think it out of existence or into a different shape for us to
inhabit, it remains real. Try it some time. It exists independent of our will.
We can tell that it is there because no matter what we do we can't get out
of it. Male power is for us, therefore is, this kind of fact.
The point of science, as I get it, has been to replace opinion with
certainty, to replace religion and faith with the empirical hard stuff. Social
science does this by analogy to the physical world: as things move, so society
moves. Its laws of motion make society predictable, controllable-or try to.
This analogy, by the way, has been very unexamined. The analogy between
the social and the physical worlds that underlies the whole "science of so-
ciety" project, which I'm here calling a specifically male project, has not
been very deeply looked into to see whether it is applicable. Women's sit-
uation with respect to that project is that we have been that "world" for an
implicitly male-centered social science. We come to this project as the to
be known about, as part of that world to be transformed and controlled.
Cartesian doubt, this anxiety about whether the world is really there in-
dependent of our will or of our representations-if I can doubt it maybe it
doesn't exist-comes from the luxury of a position of power that entails the
possibility of making the world as one thinks it to be-which is exactly the
male standpoint. You can't tell the difference between what you think and
the way the world is-or which came first-if your standpoint for thinking
and being is socially powerful.
Consider the example of faking orgasms that Gayatri Spivak
brought up. Men have anxiety that women fake orgasms. Take women's
orgasms as an example of something about which one can have Cartesian
doubt-"How do I know she's satisfied?" Now consider why women fake
orgasms, rather than how it's too bad that men can't and therefore they're
unequal to us. I would bet you that if we had the power they have, men
would learn. What I'm saying is, men's power to make the world here is
their power to make us make the world of their sexual interaction with us
the way they want it. They want us to have orgasms; that proves that they're
virile, potent, effective. We provide them that appearance, whether it's real
for us or not. We even get into it. Our reality is that it is far less damaging
and dangerous for us to do this, to accept a lifetime of simulated satisfaction,
than to hold out for the real thing from them. For them, we are "world"
to their knowledge of world. Their Cartesian doubt is entirely justified: it's
because of their power to force the world to be their way that they're forever
wondering what's really going on out there. Heisenberg's uncertainty prin-
ciple expresses much the same situation in a slightly more aware key. If the
way you know the world is this intervention, piercing the veil, making
penetrating observations, incisive analyses ... well, women's social pow-
erlessness gives us the opposite problem. What we're forever wondering is
whether there's anything other than the reality of the world men make;
whether there is any sphere of the world that responds to our will, our
thought. Women are awash in doubt, all right, but it never has the credibility
of Descartes. It is our reality, even before our knowledge, that is in doubt.
Thus, I think that the indeterminacy that arises in discourse theory, and in
the social text, describes something that, as genders, we are unequally sit-
uated in. Ifyou don't determine reality, its indeterminacy, its unfixity, is a
good deal less apparent to you. Your world is very determinate; it is all too
fixed. It can't just be any way at all.
113
 Now I want to say something about the use of the verb "to be"
in feminist theory. If the analysis I have given is right, to be realistic about
sexuality socially is to see it from the male point of view. To be feminist
is to do that with a critical awareness of what you are doing. This explains
why feminist insights are often criticized for replicating male ideology, why
feminists are called "condescending to women," when what we are doing
is expressing and exposing how women are condescended to. Because male
power has created, in reality, the world to which feminist insights, when
they are accurate, refer, many of our statements will capture that reality,
simply exposing it as specifically male for the first time. For example, men
say all women are whores. We say men have the power to make this our
fundamental condition. So feminism stresses the indistinguishability of
prostitution, marriage, and sexual harassment. See, what a woman "is" is
that which you have made women "be"; that "is" women, as men make
women mean. They have the power to; they do-otherwise power means
nothing. It's a very empirical "is." Men define women as sexual beings;
feminism comprehends that femininity "is" sexual. Men see rape as inter-
course; feminists say much intercourse "is" rape. Men say women desire
degradation; feminists see female masochism as the ultimate success of male
supremacy and marvel at its failures.
If male power makes the world as it "is," to theorize this reality
requires its capture in order to subject it to critique, hence to change. Fem-
inists say women are not individuals. To retort that we "are" will not make
it so. It will obscure the need to make change so that it can be so. To the
feminist charge that women "are" not equal, to retort, "Oh, you think women
aren't equal to men," is to act as though saying we "are" will make it so.
What it will do, instead, what it has done and is doing, is legitimize the
vision that we already "are" equal, that this, life as we live it now, is equality
for us. It acts as if the purpose of speech is to say what we want reality to
be like as if it already is that way, as if that will help move reality to that
place. This may be true in fiction but it won't work in theory. It suggests,
instead, that if this is reality, nothing needs changing, that this is freedom,
that we choose this. To me, this is about denial and the opposite of change.
Stanley Aronowitz talked pretty extensively about marxist method.
I see two strains in marxist method; it is not monolithic. One is the more
objectivist strain that purports to take the neutral position. The other, which
I draw on, is more critical of the necessary situatedness of its own standpoint.
The second one purports to capture as thought the flux of history and un-
derstands itself-this is more in Lukacs's mode-as reflexive, as partici-
pating in an ongoing situation, trapped in it in a way, needing to be self-
critical, and also having, by virtue of that involvement, some access to the
truth of the situation. Feminism has widely been thought to contain tend-
encies of liberal feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. Too
often, socialist or marxist feminism has applied the objective strain in marx-
ism to women and called that marxist feminism. Liberal feminism has
applied the same objectivism that marxism shares with liberalism to women,
resulting in liberalism applied to women that-especially on questions of
sexuality-is markedly similar to the leftist view, because of the common
maleness of the epistemological posture. At least some versions of radical
feminism-not the biologcal but the socially based ones-are what I am
calling feminism. This feminism is methodologically post-marxist. It is a
114
 Catharine A. MacKinnon
move to resolve the relationship between marxism and feminism on the
level of method. If women are analyzed as a social group, not in indivi-
dualistic, naturalistic, idealistic, moralistic terms, nor in voluntaristic or
harmonistic terms (namely, we're all really equal and socially we have a
naturally harmonious relation between the genders at most in need of mar-
ginal reequilibration) ... that is methodologically post-marxist. I've noticed
that liberal views of sexuality-treating it in terms that are individual, nat-
ural, ideal, moral, and voluntaristic-seem to coexist remarkably well with
many people's otherwise marxist views. And, in my opinion, no feminism
worthy of the name is not methodologically post-marxist.
As an example of such a post-marxist feminism, I want to con-
sider the often raised question of whether "all women" are oppressed by
heterosexuality. The question is posed as if sexual practice is a matter of
unconstructed choice. If heterosexuality is one gendered form of sexuality
in a society where gender oppresses women through sex, sexuality and het-
erosexuality are essentially the same thing. This does not erase homosex-
uality, it merely means that sexuality in that form may be no less gendered.
Either heterosexuality is the structure of the oppression of women or it is
not. Most people see sexuality as individual, or biological, or voluntary-
that is, they see it in terms of the myth structure that politically, formally
is the liberal one. Ifyou applied such an analysis to the issue of work-and
I would like anyone who thinks that this is not a valid parallel here to target
this peculiarly sensitive example-would you agree, as people say about
heterosexuality, that a worker chooses to work? Does a worker even mean-
ingfully choose his or her specific line or place of work? If working conditions
improve, do you call that worker not oppressed? If you have comparatively
good or easy or satisfying or well-paying work, if you even like your work,
or have a good day at work, does that mean, from a marxist perspective,
that you are not exploited? I would like those who think that one chooses
heterosexuality under conditions that make it compulsory either to explain
why it is not compulsory or to explain why the word choice can be mean-
ingful here. And I would like you to address a question I think few here
would apply to the workplace, to work, or to workers: whether a good fuck
is any compensation for getting fucked. And why everyone knows what that
means.
How to make change. Marxism teaches that exploitation and
degradation somehow produce resistance and revolution. It's been hard to
say why. What I've learned from women's experience with sexuality is that
our exploitation and degradation also produce grateful complicity in ex-
change for survival. It produces self-loathing to the point of extinction of
self, respect for which makes resistance conceivable. This makes the issue
not why women acquiesce but why we ever do anything but. I would like
us to see this as a particular question for explanation and for organization.
A second urgent question has to do with class and with race. I would like
to see the beginnings of a consideration of the interconnections between the
theory of sexuality I have outlined and the forms of property possession
and ownership and the eroticization of racial degradation. I think that may
illuminate some issues of class and also some questions about race. A third
urgent issue has to do with the relation of everything I've said to all forms
of inequality. Am I describing only one form within a larger system, or is
this the system, or is this too abstract a question?
115
 What I do think is that none of our work can be done the way
it has been done, if what I am saying is taken seriously. We cannot address
aesthetics without considering pornography. We cannot think about sex-
uality and desire without considering the normalization of rape, and I do
not mean rape as surplus repression. We cannot do or criticize science
without talking about the masculinity of its premises. We cannot talk about
everyday life without understanding its division by gender, or about he-
gemony without understanding male dominance as a form of it. We cannot
talk about production without including not only its sex division but sexual
harassment and prostitution (as well as housework) as underpinning the
labor market. We cannot talk about the phallus in a way that obscures the
penis. And we cannot talk about woman as signifier in a way that loses sight
of woman as signified. We need systematically to understand, in order to
criticize and change, rather than reproduce, the connection between the fact
that the few have ruled and used the many in their own interest and for
their own pleasure as well as profit-and that those few have been men.

Notes

Note: MacKinnon refers at several points to papers presented at the conference on Marxism
and the Interpretation of Culture. Her reference to Michele Barrett's argument, however. is
not to Barrett's paper but to her response to Christine Delphy, which may be found on pp.
268-69. Though Stanley Aronowitz's and Stuart Hall's papers are considerably expanded,
they still deal with the issues to which MacKinnon alludes.
Catharine A MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory,"
Signs 7 ( 1982). pp. 515-44.
2 Cathanne A. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism. Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence." Signs 8 ( 1983). pp. 635-58.
3 Diana E. H. Russell. Sexual Exploitation (Beverly Hills. Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984); Diana
E. H. Russell and Nancy Howell, "The Prevalence of Rape in the United States Revisited,"
Signs 4 ( 1983). p. 688.
4 On incest: D. Finkelhor, Child Sexual Abuse: Theory and Research (New York: Free Press,
1984); J. Herman, Father-Daughter Incest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1981 ); J.
Renvo1se. Incest. A Family Pattern (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982). On battery:
R. and E. Dobash. Violence agamst Wives (New York: Free Press, 1979); L. Walker, The
Battered Woman (New York: Harper, 1979); D. Russell, Rape in Marriage (New York: Mac-
millan. 1982). On prostitution: K. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1979); P. Alexander, quoted in M. Griffin, "Wives. Hookers and the Law," Student
Lawyer, Jan. 1982, p. 18. On pornography: J. Cook, "The X-Rated Economy," Forbes,
1978, p. 18; M. Langelan, "The Political Economy of Pornography," Aegis, 1981, pp. 5-
17; A Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Putnam's, 1979); L.
Lovelace and M. McGrady, Ordeal (Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Books, 1980). On murder: J.
Boudouris, "Homicide and the Fam1ly," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 33 (1971). pp.
667-71; E. G1bson and S. Klein, Murder 1957 to 1968 (London: HMSO, 1969); D. Molvihill,
M. Tumin, and L. Curtis, Crimes of Violence, Eleventh Report of the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1969); L. Bowker. "The Criminal Victimization of Women," Victomology: An Inter-
natiOnal Journal, 4 ( 1979). pp. 371, 384.
5 N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender
(Berkeley: University of California Press. 1978); D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Min-
otaur.· Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York: Harper, 1977).

116
 Catharine A. MacKinnon
Discussion
(At the conference, Gayatri Spivak's talk immediately pre-
ceded Catharine MacKinnon's. Spivak, MacKinnon, and Ellen Willis were all on
stage during the discussion.)

Comment (Gayatri Spivak)

I would like to talk about the insistence, in the United States,
on adjudicating freedom by rearranging the furniture or turning lecture sessions into
town meetings. It is always Americans who pretend they can be free in a completely
structured situation. I know this sounds somewhat mean, but I think there's an
inherent meanness in that practice. In a way, it's an extremely aggressive practice,
this declaration that one is now so free and easy.
What is really at issue is the need to recognize what the
situation is in a ritual setting like this. As teachers and speakers (I have been both
here), we are to some extent paid to perform. I am serious about my work but also
about what I owe to you since you are here. So the relation of power is constantly
undone in terms of service. Thus, there are other ways of thinking about well-
articulated talks. To describe them as instances of male power is not only to forget
that a lecture is an expression of an obligation to an audience but also to forget that
the ideal of"rapping" with an audience has a history both in Ivy League institutions
and in that very New Left that feminists have criticized as sexist.
I want to make clear that I don't question your goodwill,
that what I am saying is as much a self-defense as a critique of your position. But
I do think that history is stronger than benevolence and thus that there is a problem
with authority that disguises itself as being permissive.

Comment (Ellen Willis)

Before I start, I want to say that actually men can fake or-
gasms; it's just that they usually don't have to ....
Catharine raised a whole complex of issues that are central
to the debates now going on among feminists. I would like to address her idea of
power and her definition of sex. Implicit in the system Catharine laid out is a view
of male power and female powerlessness as absolute categories, even more absolute
than if they were constituted by biology. The male point of view becomes so per-
vasive in this reality, which is entirely structured by gender, that even when it is
taken up by a member of the oppressed class-women-its meaning is unchanged.
Women can neither use 1t nor appropriate it for their own purposes. It remains male
and it remains essentially an imposition on women. Furthermore, this view has
underlying assumptions about biological maleness and femaleness, since it suggests,
in a sense, that the biological female cannot authentically exercise power.
Catharine herself has posed the basic problem with this sys-
tem: it is a closed system in which the possibility for any kind of struggle or con-
testation seems nonexistent. It is another version of Marcuse's closed system in
which capitalism is so pervasive in its ability to manipulate that any resistance is
turned around and made part of the system; at best one has the opportunity for
refusal. Yet even refusal would seem to contradict the closed system, since refusal
implies the power to define one's own situation, to feel enough pain so as to invent
the concept offeminism. Feminism suggests a power that is outside the closed gender
system; it suggests, as well, that the structure of male dominance is only a dimension
of reality, indeed, only a dimension of male/female relations. I would see feminism
as struggling against, working to abolish, the dimension of reality that is male su-
premacy, but male supremacy does not dominate all human relations.
In the feminist movement this totalizing view of power has
led to a counterculture politics that is basically a politics of despair. Writing about

117
 the situation of right-wing women, Andrea Dworkin argues that they realize there
is no way out of this system of absolute male power and absolute female power-
lessness. Feminists who hold out for change apparently don't see the gravity of
women's situation; they have chosen to make an accommodation with that aspect
of the male power structure that they think offers them the best deal. So the issue
Catharine is raising has concrete consequences within the feminist movement and
for feminist activism.
My own view is that power is not a monolithic system but
a system of overlapping contradictions. Women have always struggled against their
situation both individually and collectively. They have seized on contradictions in
the system-demanding, for example, that the concept of human rights be applied
to women-thereby using the discontinuities in the system to mobilize for their own
power. And they have allied themselves with men when the ruling classes were seen
to be oppressing them both.
This suggests a Marxist understanding of power exercised
for the sake of particular interests, whereas the system Catharine has articulated-
the system of absolute male power and absolute female powerlessness-implies a
notion of power exercised for its own sake. Men get specific economic and social
benefits from male supremacy, including having a class of people devoted to meeting
their needs. Such interests also create a situation where the dominant class is de-
pendent on the subordinate class for meeting its needs, which gives the subordinate
class a certain opening wedge of power. Threatening to withhold meeting those needs,
organizing to meet those needs in their own way, and finally opting for broader
struggle. But if one has a notion of power exercised for its own sake, then this dialectic
does not apply; there is only the closed system of absolutes. Catharine's view of
feminism, indeed, requires a kind of metaphysics of power, of power exercised for
the sheer pleasure of it; in effect, a conflation of power and eroticism.
This brings us to the issue of sex. I would agree that the
manipulation and construction of our sexuality is central to the creation of gender.
Yet I also think it cannot be subsumed under gender relations. The construction of
sexuality underpins the entire culture's authoritarian relations; it influences the struc-
tures of class and race, of dominance and submission in general. Gender is a central
example of this, but not the only one. Here, my difference with Catharine is illustrated
by the fact that she talked about the eroticization of dominance and submission,
whereas I would talk about the politicization of Eros. I do believe there is an erotic
dimension that is bodily, physiological, and, in some sense, precultural. Sexual grat-
ification is one element of eroticism, which includes the infant's intense bodily
pleasure in eating. But I want to concentrate on sexuality, since it is the key political
issue in feminist debates.
The political differences between our two positions are pro-
found. If sex is simply a function of an all-pervasive male power, then there can be
no meaningful female sexuality. Within this closed system a woman who feels desire
and pleasure is really experiencing an abnegation of self. There seems to be a fun-
damental contradiction here. Is there such a thing as pleasure that is purely negative
and imposed? I would argue that, despite contexts of powerlessness that are bound
up with pleasure, pleasure nonetheless offers something like moments of self-affir-
mation or empowerment. This again contradicts the idea of absolute powerlessness.
There is a moment of autonomy and empowerment in the demand that one's needs
be gratified, in directly seizing pleasure. At the same time there is a moment of
surrender-loss of ego control and surrender to one's feelings. In a hierarchical society
these two elements are split and the moment of empowerment is confused and
conflated with dominance. And surrender is confused and conflated with submission.
This all comes to pass through the ways the culture manipulates one's sexuality, a
process in which the relations between parents and children are as salient as those
between men and women. In fact, our sexuality is constructed in the family and in

118
 Catharine A. MacKinnon
the convergence of power relations between parents and children. These relations
are often hierarchical and oppressive in ways that cannot be subsumed within male
supremacy.
The division of eroticism-and the association of empow-
erment with dominance and of surrender with submission-occurs in both sexes,
but there are differences in how this division is fantasized and acted out socially.
Women often cannot overtly seek empowerment, even as men cannot overtly seek
surrender, but both sexes covertly seek that to which they are not overtly entitled.
Rape fantasies exemplify this pattern, to the extent that the man overtly identifies
with the rapist but also, on some level, secretly identifies with the victim, while the
woman may overtly identify with the victim but can also secretly identify with the
rapist. None of this, of course, detracts at all from the fact that it is men who have
the opportunity to act out dominance; men's confusion of empowerment and sexual
pleasure with dominance wreaks great devastation on women. At the same time,
however, it is important to realize that sex is not monolithic; it's a minefield of all
these contradictions; it's an area of struggle. Sex is not entirely given over to oppres-
sion and thus women are not limited to refusing compliance. Every time women
demand their own pleasure-despite the contradictions that may entail within het-
erosexuality-it is a moment of empowerment and liberation and a kind of wedge
into struggle in other areas. In fact, the contradiction in male sexuality-the per-
version of empowerment into dominance and the compulsion to repress the impulse
to surrender-brings a real loss of pleasure. Forcing men to realize this provides
another way into fighting male power generally.
Within the closed system of male power, heterosexuality
simply becomes a scenario of dominance and submission, and sex and rape become
indistinguishable. At that point, rape is hardly worth singling out as an issue. I see
sexuality as a more complicated set of dynamics, as a contested terrain, not a static
area of oppression. It involves the channeling of eroticism and all the culturally
produced fantasies of dominance and submission. Yet there is also a utopian aspect
to sexuality. Part of the heterosexual impulse, for example, has to do with the desire
to transcend the antagonism between men and women. Men experience this but
want to have it both ways-to maintain their power while transcending the antag-
onism, an impossibility. Women's sexuality has an undercurrent ofhope-ofgetting
men to give up their power. Even as a fantasy, it shows that part of women's sexuality
is self-assertive rather than accommodating. The cultural fantasies of intercourse as
merger and transcendence are just as real as the cultural fantasies of violation.
Moreover, on some level the fantasies of merger prefigure political possibilities. This
is not, however, intended to urge the virtues of individualism but rather to suggest
what contradictions the women's liberation movement is working on.
MacKinnon
On the issue of my effort to open up the structure of the
conference, let me say that I don't see what I did as even remotely adequate to the
critique that I suggested. I don't pretend to have made us all free. I do think, however,
that a certain kind of knowledge is created under certain conditions, and that this
conference has reproduced those conditions. Those conditions include the maleness
of the authority of the position that I'm in; but I don't imagine that, as a feminist,
I'm going around making everyone free. I'm acknowledging how the structures we're
living out right here and now are part of the cultural structures that are the topic
of my talk. I don't pretend that I changed them.
Now, as to my concept of power. I don't think of power as
something that floats freely, like some looming omnipresence, precultural or other-
wise, and then takes specific forms. In other words, I don't think of power as some-
thing that just is and then becomes economic, racial, sexual, and finally individual.
I think of power only as a socially constituted meaning, as existing only in its social
forms. I use male power to refer to what men have appropriated and arrogated to
themselves in a way that I take to be authoritative. If I don't speak of countering
male power with female power it's because that suggests we are already equal. That's

119
why I resist using a term like "female power" at all; indeed, I rarely use "female"
except to refer to biological issues. I guess I use "male" because I've so carefully
given it a social meaning, not because I think it is biological. It isn't that women
have no ways to resist, because obviously we do. But calling these resistances "power"
is misleading because they're a form of powerlessness. The reason we don't exhibit
"power" is because, whenever we do, we get pushed back into line in ways that are
forcible, painful, and depriving.
Of course, subliminal to much of this discussion is the work
of Andrea Dworkin, in particular Pornography: Men Possessing Women and Right-
Wing Women. As to the critique that Dworkin's work promotes a politics of despair,
I would suggest that the same critique would have to be made of Stuart Hall's analysis
of Thatcherism. In other words, Dworkin's analysis of right-wing women is very
similar to the one Stuart Hall made of people who choose Thatcherism; that is, they
are, at least in part, under conditions where they choose survival over militancy.
Yet it's difficult to understand the meaningfulness of the term "choice" under con-
ditions of constraint. So, either these are conditions of constraint we're talking about
or they're not. Either we operate under a condition where certain choices are he-
gemonically defined and other choices are blocked or we do not. I'm glad to hear
Ellen Willis say, for example, that she thinks Eros is in some sense precultural,
because I think that's implicit in much of the argument that stands against the
argument I make, in which sexuality is cultural to the ground. It's a lot easier to see
freedom of choice operative in your sexuality if the ground you're standing on is
partly precultural as well as in part constrained by culture. Now I see these choices
as operating within a closed system, not an absolute system, but one that is closed,
rigid, and imposed. I don't like the reality of this system; neither the system nor my
analysis of it give me pleasure.
In my overall project, what I would like to do is to redefine
what it means to be human (a concept now dominated by maleness) so that it includes
a revaluing of everything that women have always done but that has been relegated
to femaleness or the feminine. In addition, I would like to work toward a transfor-
mation in the content of what being human refers to, so that it can be something
to which women as well will want to aspire. A radical feminism involves not merely
taking on those things that men have always done but instead transforming the
content of those things in the light of women's experience.

Comment (Ellen Willis)

This may speak to part of the difference between us. I think
feminism is in part about being able to do many of the things men have always
done, which is to say that I think men have appropriated the majority of human
activities and denied them to women. In appropriating them, they have in many
ways also changed them and put them to oppressive ends. Nevertheless, there is one
level where men have defined themselves as generic human beings, and women have
been defined by what they aren't allowed to do. Part of what feminism is about is
reappropriating the world and demanding to be allowed every human activity. This
includes demanding to be able to express your violent impulses, demanding to be
able to have economic power; this isn't ultimately what feminism is about (and it's
a naive expression of that aspect of feminism), but there's an element of truth in
that impulse. The ultimate reason why this kind of feminism can't win and doesn't
make a movement is that women thereby risk becoming a kind of caricature of
power. But it's not a question of maleness, since all these human activities-both
oppressive and nonoppressive-are not inherently male. That's exactly the idea we're
fighting.

Question
I would like to ask that you address the issue of homosex-
uality and place it in the context of your work.

120
 Catharine A. MacKinnon
MacKinnon
The issue of choice is particularly relevant to issues of ho-
mosexuality. I cannot, for example, make a lot of sense out of what people call the
choice of heterosexuality; it's like saying you choose to be a capitalist or a worker.
I can understand the choice to be with a particular man who is engaged in a struggle
against the dominant male sexuality. A choice that goes against the dominant culture
is a real choice. A choice to be a lesbian, however, is different from a choice to be
a gay man. For women to choose to affirm other women, both in terms of gender
and sexuality, is very different from the choice to be a gay male. A choice to be a
gay man can represent seeing through the way sex roles have made heterosexuality
compulsory and thus be an affirmation of the feminist struggle. But it can also be
an extension of the male bond, the ultimate conclusion of heterosexuality: men come
first, men are better in every way, so why not also sexually? Yet some gay men may
make this choice because they don't want to oppress women. In other words, so
long as something in fact works against the structure of male supremacy and male
dominance, I'm willing to countenance that the word "choice" begins to apply to
it.

Comment (Ellen Willis)

I think the whole question of choice is complicated by the
fact that we have a system that sets up overwhelming punishments for not being
heterosexual, as well as certain rewards (even for women) for being heterosexual. If
there's an institutionalized system in which the only "normal" masculine and fem-
inine identity is heterosexual, not being heterosexual is not only to lose privilege
but also to be an outcast in the culture. Given that, the choice to be homosexual is
in some sense just as determined by the system. If we start with the assumption that
attraction is pansexual, then both heterosexuality and exclusive homosexuality are
artificial. If people blot out their heterosexual attraction in order to be able to rebel
against an oppressive system, it's not a free and unstructured choice. At the same
time, there are all kinds of systemic implications in being heterosexual. So it's difficult
to talk about choice in either direction, though clearly the possiblity of refusal exists
despite everything. I suppose the real question, and the one I want to ask Catharine,
is what is your explanation of why, despite this system, people do refuse and do
struggle politically?
MacKinnon
I have no explanation, though I do understand that women
struggle. But I also know that we have never won.

121
 Paul Patton

Marxism and Beyond:

Strategies of Reterritorialization

Philosophy has traditionally been concerned to leg1slate,

to draw lines of demarcation, and to establish hierar-
chies within discourse. The real alternative is not the
position of the myth1cal Other of this state philosophy,
the relativist for whom all distinction is impossible, but
that of the nomad-not so much the member of a tnbe
as an activist in a movement, a militant on behalf of an
avowedly partial perspective.

The principal intellectual effect of the protest move-

ments that erupted in English-speaking countries during the 1960s and 1970s
has been the revival of marxism. Since then, we have seen a vast amount
of new research into marxism, and an avalanche of marxist social theory.
More recently, however, marxism's hegemony over radical social thought
and politics has begun to fall apart. The criticism of fundamental principles
of historical materialism and the proliferation of alternatives have been such
that one can properly speak of a "crisis" in leftist thought. 1 In addition to
the familiar historical anomalies and failures to materialize, two novel sources
of difficulty stand out.
The first has been the emergence of a range of specific-
issue political movements whose ideals and aspirations fall outside of those
traditionally encompassed by marxism. These include struggles against so-
cial government through techniques of individualization, by minority groups
such as women, homosexuals, prisoners, and psychiatric patients. ("Mi-
nority" here does not mean numerically inferior but divergent from the
norm.) These also include the struggles of racial minorities, ecological ac-
tivists, peace and antinuclear groups. The fact that such movements cannot
be defined in terms of class interests has led some to speak of a "crisis of
identity" within the socialist movement. 2 At the same time, the strength of
these movements in the advanced capitalist countries, and the importance
of the issues they raise, has led others to question the adequacy of marxism
as a guide to the present, much less the future.
The second source of difficulty has been the translation
and assimilation of much poststructuralist French philosophy and social
theory. This has been seen to provide not only substantive alternatives to
the productivist perspective of marxism but also an explicit rejection of
many ofthe assumptions and meta-theoretical principles that govern marx-
ist discourse. For some, this theoretical confrontation is the central contem-
porary difficulty facing marxism. Thus, Alex Callinicos devotes the major
part of his recent book, Is There a Future for Marxism?, to the refutation
of "the 'nietzschean' challenge offered to marxism by Foucault and De-
123
leuze. " 3 He acknowledges that the challenge proceeds on a philosophical
plane as well as at the level of substantive social theory by charging these
"anarcho-nietzscheans" with propagating a philosophy that denies the pos-
sibility of both objective knowledge and social emancipation. 4
In addition to theorizing new objects of political concern (lan-
guage, discourse, desire, and power), it is true that an important contribution
of poststructuralist thought in general has been to politicize the question of
styles of thought and rationality. Much of it is characterized by a rejection
of the characteristic operations and values of the dominant forms of Western
rationality: values such as unity, hierarchy, foundation, and transcendence.
In part, this shift is evident in the different style in which the analysis of
concrete objects such as forms of writing, desire, or power relations is carried
out. In part, it is a matter of an explicit philosophical and methodological
program. Deleuze and Guattari, for example, preface their sequel to Anti-
Oedipus with an exposition of a rhizomatic model of organization which
departs at every turn from the dichotomous and hierarchical tree structure
that has dominated Western thought. 5
It should not be thought that these questions of abstract theo-
retical principle are entirely remote from the concern with new political
movements. In fact, these two sources of difficulty for marxism converge
on the question of styles of theorizing and modes of argument. Any con-
sideration of what is at issue in the polemics between marxists and feminists,
ecologists or theorists of other forms of marginality leads directly to a con-
cern with the principles and intellectual strategies that determine marxist
responses. For example, since marxist feminism, by definition, cannot be a
discourse that takes as its primary object the specific forms offemale oppres-
sion, one feminist response has been to opt for an autonomous theory, a
"conceptual separatism," that takes the oppression of women as its point
of departure. Since it does not wish to deny the exploitation of wage labor,
this response is immediately caught up in the "problem" of relativism: How
can society be both capitalistic and patriarchal at once? Which term is
primary? Thus, perceptive critics argue that a historical and materialist
social theory that takes into account such autonomous analyses will have
to adopt a different model of rationality. 6
Nor should the political importance of these issues be underes-
timated. The style of rationality with which we operate will determine the
range of intellectual strategies available to us, which in turn will set the
limits of our political practice as intellectuals. The current debate concerning
the future of marxism provides clear illustration of this. Among its chiefly
marxist protagonists, the defense of orthodoxy takes a variety of forms. One
is the resort to "unorthodox" readings of the canonical texts in the attempt
to recover, or provide, alternative traditions within marxism that might
better account for some of the anomalies. Jacoby, for example, concludes
his Dialectic of Defeat with a call for a new "critical theory" to explain what
he calls "class unconsciousness": the failure of revolutionary class con-
sciousness to emerge. Such faith in the tradition appears unshakable. An-
other defense involves the appeal to the pseudo-neutrality of methodological
criteria derived from the natural sciences. Callinicos deals with the problem
of stalinism and the gulag in this manner, treating it as a potential refutation
that must be explained in terms of basic marxist theory if it is not to en-
124
 Paul Patton
courage the search for alternative approaches. However, the preference for
one explanatory strategy over another is not neutral. It is for political reasons
rather than "objective" considerations of explanatory adequacy that one
might prefer an account of the gulag in terms of the techniques of power it
mobilizes, to one in terms of the relations of production that characterize
the Soviet social formation. 7 These are the same sorts of reasons that lead
us to prefer a power-oriented approach to those aspects of capitalist society
that classical marxism tends to treat as secondary: the institutions of sex-
uality, mental health, education, and the family. Ultimately, the defense of
orthodoxy refuses to take seriously the possibility that these new political
concerns might call into question not only the goals of socialism but the
forms of understanding of history on which these are founded.
It is this question of intellectual strategies in response to differ-
ence that forms the main concern of this paper. I will deal with only some
of the strategies frequently employed in debates between marxist and non-
marxist social theory, in particular with some ofthe forms of argument that
tend to draw the theoretical and political perspectives of autonomous social
movements back onto the discursive field of marxism. I shall attempt to
name and criticize two of the more important of such theoretical obstacles
to the emergence of a creative radical political culture: (1) the unitarian
conception of knowledge and (2) the will to totality.
My primary examples of these strategies come from two of the
"crisis of marxism" books already mentioned-those by Callinicos and
Aronowitz. This is by no means to equate these books in other respects,
since they take up diametrically opposed positions in response to this crisis.
Moreover, they are only intended to serve as illustrations of forms of ar-
gument that are all too common elsewhere. Much of my argument is based
on the intellectual strategies evident in the work of Deleuze, Foucault, and
others. The conception of theory appropriate to this work is explicitly set
out in various texts by Deleuze and Guattari, notably in Rhizome. I shall
apply some deleuzean concepts to this question of what is an appropriate
relation to marxism, in order to free the space in which it is posed rather
than to provide an unequivocal answer, bearing in mind that these concepts
are themselves only momentary staging points along lines of theoretical
flight.
One way to approach the problem is to contrast Callinicos's con-
ception of marxist theory, and the nature of his response to the work of
Deleuze and Foucault, with the rather different attitude toward theory shared
by those authors and with their own practical relationship to marxism.
Callinicos defends a classical conception of classical marxist theory: it is no
different from any other "scientific research program" and may be defined
by a method and a set of core doctrines such as materialism, the determining
role of the relations of production, the centrality of class struggle, and so
on. His predominant attitude toward non-marxist theory is essentially re-
active: the superiority of marxism must be asserted, along with the priority
of the problems marxism addresses. Accordingly, his criticism is, for the
most part, a practice of denunciation on the basis of fixed dichotomies.
Where positions differ from those of marxism, they are denounced from
the standpoint of the latter. In this manner, for example, the implicit denial
125
of the prospect of social emancipation through a single revolutionary event
is seen to lead either to a harmlesss academicism or to a reactionary pes-
simism.8
In fact, the relationship between the work of Foucault and De-
leuze and marxism is more fluid than Callinicos allows. While they are not
marxist theorists, neither are they critics of marxism who set out to refute
its claims. The only criticism of marxism they practice is the active criticism
that is the by-product oftheir own selective use of it. Foucault, for example,
cites Marx in Discipline and Punish as a historian or historical source,
although not as the founder of a discursive formation whose rules he seeks
to be guided by. Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, take up Marx's
account of primitive accumulation in Anti-Oedipus, in order to demonstrate
the singular and contingent conjunction of deterritorialized flows that made
capitalism possible: a deterritorialized flow of labor produced by rural en-
closure and a deterritorialized flow of money able to be employed as capital.
In a similar fashion, they incorporate into their own theory of the capitalist
social machine a generalized version of the contradictory tendency Marx
describes in relation to the rate of profit: capitalism is a system that con-
stantly approaches its own limits while at the same time deferring them,
overcoming them by their reproduction on a larger scale. The process is
endless, since the limits are immanent to the system itself, determined by
the same conditions that govern the expanded reproduction of capital. So,
for Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism works by breaking down social codes
and territorialities, replacing these with an "axiomatic system," the fun-
damental axiom of which is that everything be subject to the laws of market
exchange. Deterritorialization on the one plane is accompanied by reterri-
torialization on the other. 9
The question of their relationship to marxism is one that is only
posed from outside the theoretical work of Foucault and Deleuze; within
it, the question of marxism does not arise. At the level ofintellectual strategy,
it is the positivity of this approach that must be underscored. These authors
deploy elements of marxist theory in the process of elaborating something
else, a different form of intelligibility of social reality. In one direction, these
expropriations of marxist analyses amount to a deterritorialization of frag-
ments of the corpus. Deterritorialization is the operation characteristic of
lines of flight; it is the movement by which one leaves a territory. As such,
with rare exceptions, it is accompanied by a simultaneous movement of
reterritorialization on some other domain, not necessarily continuous with
the first. The intellectual strategy of deterritorialization itself obeys this law
of double movement, for, in another direction, these marxist analyses are
simultaneously reterritorialized on a new theoretical "plane of consistency,"
incorporated as functional elements of a new discursive apparatus. Thus,
for example, the redescription in Anti-Oedipus of capitalism as an axiomatic
of decoded flows occurs in the context of a general machine theory of desire,
and specifically as part of an attempt to theorize certain abstract figures, or
mega-machines, in terms of which social formations might be understood:
the territorial machine of lineage and filiation, the despotic state machine
of the primitive empires. . . . Similarly for Foucault, the analysis of the
disciplinary techniques that formed part ofthe conditions of the specifically
capitalist production process finds its theoretical surface not in the theory
126
 Paul Patton
of capitalist production and exchange but in a projected "analytics" of mi-
cropower relations.
In one sense, the first movement is primary: the decison to leave,
to quit the familiar theoretical territory, must be taken before anything else
is possible. Ultimately, however, the second is more important, since the
creation or occurrence of anything new requires the construction of an as-
semblage that makes it possible. In Rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari draw
no distinction between their conception of a book and their understanding
of desire. In either case it is a matter of assemblage. Their theory of desire
is unequivocally constructivist: desires only exist insofar as they are assem-
bled, insofar as the component parts are welded together into some sort of
functional machine, be it emotional, political, or artistic. There is no desire
outside of such a determinate assemblage. It requires a plane of consistency,
or "body without organs," which has no prior existence but must be con-
structed along with the realization of the desire itself. So it is with books,
which are also assemblages, collective assemblages of statements: "How can
a book be a body without organs? There are several ways, according to the
nature of the lines considered, their content or density, their possibility of
convergence on a plane of consistency which would secure their selection." 10
Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical practice, like their theory of
desire, is constructionist rather than deconstructionist. The important thing
is the construction of the body or plane on which a life may be led or an
enterprise conducted. Deconstruction remains an essentially critical oper-
ation, devoted to the unsettling of certainty, the disruption of fixity of mean-
ing, encouraging undecidability in the constructions of existing metaphysics.
Denying the possibility of a fixed point from which to criticize, it can only
gesture toward the possibility of another model of rationality. Rhizome, by
contrast, may be read as a prolegomenon to an alternative metaphysics. It
outlines both a style of thought and a range of concepts, necessarily inexact
and mobile, with which they propose to conduct the analysis of a variety
of domains which are themselves constructed in the process: rhizomatics,
schizoanalysis, micropolitics, pragmatics. . . . This metaphysics of strata,
assemblages, multiplicities, and lines is developed and deployed in Mille
Plateaux.
In the latter sections of Mille Plateaux, the earlier project of
defining the abstract machines that govern the functioning of social for-
mations becomes centered on the specification of two figures, the state and
nomadism. Very crudely, the opposition between these is the difference
between an agent or force of territorialization and a force or movement of
deterritorialization. The nomad is the figure of deterritorialization par ex-
cellence, inventor and realizer of a machine de guerre that is implacably
hostile to the state. As a form of existence, nomadism is distinguished from
the sedentary state form in a variety of ways: by its relationship to space,
its internal articulation, and its system of affects. The state, on the other
hand, is defined, above all, by its apparatuses of capture; that is, by its
specific procedures for territorializing land, labor, and money. These are so
many variations on the themes of rent, profit, and taxes; so many procedures
for the entrapment of subjects.
My interest in mentioning this project here is not to take up its
consequences for political analysis, which would be considerable, but to
127
make use of its application to the question of intellectual strategies, for,
Deleuze and Guattari suggest, there is also a state form of thought. There
are forms of theoretical capture that define the limits of the rationally ac-
ceptable and preclude the possibility of different objects, let alone different
styles of thought. The politics of theory is not only a matter of content but
also a matter ofform. Marxism has many ofthe appearances of a state form
in the realm of theory. As a discursive assemblage, it is capable of alliance
with some of the most powerful nondiscursive techniques of capture. This
is the basis for Andre Glucksmann's impertinent question, How is it that
a discourse ostensibly committed to human emancipation can function
alongside a system of concentration camps? 11 In the different context of
advanced capitalism, marxism's adoption of forms of theoretical capture
provides the basis on which it can function as the "master discourse" of
revolution, asserting and enforcing its ideological hegemony over the va-
rieties of resistance to forms of subjection and domination. Finally, it is
perhaps this participation in a state form of thought that explains why
marxism has been able to accede to the position of "loyal opposition" to
the dominant forms of knowledge within the academic and political insti-
tutions of the bourgeois society it condemns. 12
It is clear, in any case, that marxism is inhabited by deeply rooted
intellectual resistance to the idea of a nomadic social theory, pluralistic and
deterritorialized. This is not just a matter of affective attachment to the
tradition or the idea of being a marxist, although this certainly plays a part.
There are also a number of theoretical figures that serve to block the en-
thusiasm for radical alternatives and maintain the preeminence of a certain
style of marxist thought. These not only render impossible the kind of
intellectual strategy in relation to marxism that is evident in the work of
Deleuze and Foucault, but they determine the forms of intellectual response
to any such novel approaches. In the remainder of this paper I want to
analyze two of the principle apparatuses of intellectual capture prevalent
within marxism.
Unitarian Epistemology
One of the ways in which marxism's position as the "master
discourse" of human emancipation is maintained is by the tacit privileging
of its own perspective in debates with others. Where they are not condemned
for failing to respect marxist criteria or assumptions, the positions of fem-
inists, black activists, or environmentalists are reinterpreted in marxist terms,
their political and theoretical priorities reordered according to marxism's
own causal hierarchy. From the standpoint of those who do not share the
commitment to marxism, this is a completely circular process of argument.
It is, nevertheless, a powerful technique for enforcing adherence to the faith,
commonly deployed, for example, against feminists who take the social
relations of patriarchy, rather than the social relations of capitalism, as their
analytic point of departure. The possibility that both kinds of explanation
together might enrich our understanding of society is not entertained: "For
historical materialism, causal pluralism cannot be supported." 13
The rationale for this exclusion of non-marxist perspectives does
not lie in historical materialism so much as in a certain meta-theoretical
assumption about knowledge. This is the idea that if a given theory provides
knowledge of the social field, then no different set of concepts may also
128
 Paul Patton
provide knowledge of that field, or if they can, it is only to the extent that
they are consistent with the prior theory. Knowledge (or science) properly
so-called is necessarily unique. Marxism has always tended to adopt uni-
tarian views of knowledge and truth, whether of an empiricist or a historicist
kind. Whether it is presented as an adequate representation of reality or as
the authentic worldview of the class destined to universality, the effect is
the same: to ensure that there is only one true science of history. In the
recent history of marxism, Althusser stands out for his attempt to develop
an epistemology that is neither empiricist nor historicist. Yet he still retains
the idea that there is but a unique science of history, presented in the guise
of a metaphor: there is only one continent of history and it was discovered
by Marx. This is the basis for his hard-and-fast distinction between science
and ideology, and for the particularly dogmatic form of criticism performed
on the basis of that demarcation criterion.
So long as the uniqueness assumption is retained, however, quite
different epistemological theories may underwrite the same type of criticism.
For example, Callinicos defends a popperian conception of "objective
knowledge," by which he means theoretical discourse that corresponds to
reality. The true theory, on this view, is necessarily unique since it is defined
by the univocal relation of correspondence supposed to obtain between it
and reality. Callinicos's polemical responses to the theories of micropower
and desire then illustrate the form of criticism. His judgments of the non-
representationalist as well as non-marxist positions of Foucault and Deleuze
are made from within the framework of his own representationalist and
marxist assumptions, since his conception of theoretical debate is the fa-
miliar marxist one of struggle between two competing positions. The pos-
sibility of partial and limited claims is not admitted, nor is the idea of a
plurality of truths. Since there can only be one truth, and since all claims
are equally totalizing, the positions must be mutually exclusive. Debate as
to their relative merits is thus ruled by the logic of exclusive disjunction:
revolution or reform, relations of power or relations of production, and so
on. Callinicos thus shares with many marxists a monoperspectivism that
turns all theoretical difference into theoretical antagonism. Any attempt to
theorize the social field in non-marxist terms is apt to be considered a threat,
no matter how much it might otherwise owe to the work of Marx.
Deleuze and Foucault, by contrast, practice a perspectivism that
occupies an altogether different epistemological space from that occupied
by the defenders of objective knowledge. Theirs is a thoroughgoing relativ-
ism that allows for the plurality of truths. As a result, they view their own
theories as necessarily limited in scope and not exclusive of alternatives.
As Francois Ewald comments, "the rule of a perspective is that it not be
unique, nor opposed to other perspectives. Every adoption of a perspective
is inscribed in the relativity of its own point ofview." 14 This leads to a quite
different practice of criticism. Since it does not impose the demand for unity
and consistency across the entire theoretical domain, it allows for the pos-
sibility of nonantagonistic theoretical difference. This does not mean that
criticism becomes impossible, but it does show certain kinds of criticism
to be futile, notably the kind that simply denounces one set of principles
from the standpoint of another set.
To the extent that it is combined with a unitarian conception of
knowledge, marxism is inhabited by an epistemological conservatism, un-
129
able to tolerate radical perspectives that are not based upon the determining
role of the relations of production. This inhibits the proliferation of alter-
natives, excluding not only the perspectives of power and desire, but also
the very idea of an autonomous feminist theory. However, historical ma-
terialism may be detached from this conception of knowledge and this prac-
tice of criticism. Aronowitz points to the work of Adorno, for example, as
opposing the fundamental categories of Hegelian logic with the idea of a
negative dialectic that would "insist on difference as an ineluctable feature
ofreality." 15 Moreover, Aronowitz himself argues for the rejection of marx-
ism's monocausal conception of history in favor of a pluralistic approach
that would allow for a multiplicity of determinations. Only such an open-
ended conception, he argues, can enable us to take seriously the indepen-
dence of those structures of determination that underlie the struggles of the
autonomous social movements. 16 On this point, both Adorno's work and
Aronowitz's own recommendations converge with the views of the post-
structuralists. As well as a philosophical debt to Nietzsche, they share the
rejection of the unitary and totalizing conception of knowledge.
The Position of the Totality
The second, powerful figure of reterritorialization that haunts
marxism, and that may even affect those sympathetic to the movements
beyond it, is the injunction to adopt the point of view of the totality. This
will to totalize takes a variety of forms. Typically, it enjoins us to address
society as a whole and is accompanied by a commitment to a unitary project
of emancipation that may leave no room for the specific, limited concerns
of "marginal" social movements. Alternatively, it may be applied to the
dispersion of political subjects, calling for their recombination into a single,
totalizing subject.
Thus, it is often argued that autonomous movements may have
a limited effectivity, serving to put new forms of resistance onto political
agendas or into public discourse, but that change in the social conditions
that underlie oppression can occur only as the result of a global movement.
Revolutionary social change, because it affects the interests of a variety of
oppressed groups and must confront the power of ruling interests, requires
the formation of a broadly based coalition. On this basis, Hilary Wainwright
argues for a twofold process of totalization; first, there needs to be "a com-
mon program of political and social change, meeting the needs of all op-
pressed groups"; and second, these different sources of social strength need
to be drawn together so as to pitch their combined "popular power against
the existing state." 17
The same will to totalize may be seen to operate in Aronowitz's
discussion of the limits of historical materialism. Despite his overall sym-
pathy for the concerns of the autonomous social movements, his discussion
is conducted throughout on the assumption that these movements must, if
they are to be effective, unite in a new "counterhegemonic bloc." Despite
his willingness to abandon many of the core doctrines of historical mate-
rialism, he retains the ideal of a totalizing emancipatory project. The result
is a political program that remains profoundly marxist in outlook, if not in
doctrine: a new utopianism within which marxism remains the "moment
of anti-capitalism in the general movement against all forms of domination
and hierarchy." 18
130
 Paul Patton
There are, however, good political reasons for rejecting the sug-
gestion that the only finality that gives sense to these new social movements
is their alliance in a counterhegemonic front. The major premise of the
argument for this is demonstrably false: change in existing social relations
does not have to be mediated by the totality. The conditions that sustain
oppression can be altered piecemeal. The relationship of particular groups
to the relations of production, if not the relations themselves, can be altered
locally. For example, the campaign for land rights conducted by Australian
aborigines in recent years, through legal and political channels as well as by
direct action, has resulted in the restitution of land to aboriginal commu-
nities, enabling them to produce means of subsistence as well as commod-
ities. Similarly, much recent feminist political activity can be seen as a
guerilla campaign waged against various manifestations of the systematic
oppression of women in male-dominated society, often with significant local
results. For example, a Sydney group called Freedom for Women Behind
Bars fought for several years for the release from prison of women who
killed their husbands in response to domestic violence. They succeeded not
only in having individual women released but in focusing public attention
on this particularly brutal aspect of the social relations of patriarchy and in
bringing about changes in the law.
There are many more examples, and they all show that immediate
changes in the conditions of sexual, racial, and class domination are possible.
Such changes are not only worthwhile in themselves, but they may also
contribute in various ways to the larger process of breaking down existing
forms of institutionalized oppression. It is never easy to predict where the
fault-lines of a given conjuncture lie, or from where might come the lines
of flight that destabilize an entire social system. Marxism has been notor-
iously unsuccessful in predicting the potential for global effectivity of such
things as the student movement or antiwar protests. For all these reasons,
we should perhaps argue not for moving beyond the fragments toward the
global politics of a new alliance but for multiplying the fragmentary effects
of such local campaigns.
The point here is not to deny that the perspective of the totality
is an important vector of political calculation but to deny that it is the only
one. Of course, the global balance of social forces is important; even groups
such as those just mentioned must take account of it in their specific strug-
gles. Not that the effectivity of these social movements should be limited
to questions of legislation, state apparatuses of the social relations of pro-
duction. Since feminist, ecological, and racial liberation movements only
exist insofar as they assemble energies and desires directed at changing
people's lives, they are capable of effects on many fronts: they may contribute
to the creation of new aesthetic and cultural forms or to the development
of new ethics that are inseparable from new forms of subjectivity. Whether
or not such possibilities are realized may depend, for example, on the degree
to which the political apparatus proper allows for the expression of these
desires. 19 None ofthis, however, should mislead us into seeing politics only
in global, molar terms. On the contrary, it demonstrates the no less im-
portant need to defend a space for more immediate, molecular forms of
political action.
The privilege attached to the totalizing perspective also needs to
be resisted on the level of theory, where it has analogous effects to those in
131
the domain of political judgment. To return to Aronowitz's discussion, the
political project of a new alliance also informs his analysis of the theoretical
perspectives implied by these movements. His account of their objectives
is also directed at finding a level at which they are on common ground.
Since marxism is no longer permitted the role of "master discourse" of
counterhegemony, Aronowitz looks for some other objective basis for the
desired unity. His solution is to follow Adorno and Horkheimer in seeking
to ground patriarchy, racism, sexual oppression, and the destruction of the
environment in the exploitative attitude toward nature, where this is taken
to include both external nature and internal, human nature. Thus, he pro-
poses as the theoretical basis for the new global political project the idea of
a new relationship to nature. 20
This attempt to make the domination of nature the archimedean
point for social criticism remains unconvincing in several areas. For ex-
ample, it relies on a repression hypothesis in regard to human sexual nature,
which both Lacan and Foucault have given us reason to doubt. More im-
portant, however, it is the very project that should be questioned. This is
a matter of elaborating a unified object of historical understanding and
political struggle that would fulfill the same function as the "totality in
thought" formerly provided by marxism. Ultimately, this amounts to a
refusal to accept the possibility of difference and discontinuity at the heart
of human history, and a corresponding refusal to allow that there can be
irreducibly different theoretical perspectives, each in its own way critical of
existing social reality. It is the refusal to accept, for example, that patriarchy
may be a system of oppression quite distinct from that imposed by capital;
one that may intersect with capital but cannot be subordinated to it or
subsumed along with it under a more profound social pathology. The con-
ception of theory appropriate to the independent aims of the new social
movements is one that can allow conceptual autonomy to the objects of
their contestation. Accepting the inevitability of difference requires a de-
territorialized conception of the theoretical field, such that a plurality of
theoretical objects is possible. This is what Deleuze has called a "nomadic
conception of thought": the theoretical domain conceived as a milieu, rather
than a territory, within which we may assemble and deploy whatever kinds
of theoretical apparatus may prove useful, or necessary, to the enterprise
in which we are engaged.
The refusal of difference in theory implies an assumption of hom-
ogeneity that is often nothing more than the effect of one perspective having
adopted for itself the position of the totality. To the extent that marxism
takes up this position, defining the object of all social theory, it imposes its
own homogeneity and territoriality upon the entire domain of political anal-
ysis. Conceived of in this manner, marxism allows other accounts only to
the extent that they can be recoded in marxism's own terms. Thus, it is
often argued that Foucault's microphysics of power must be situated within
the broader perspective of historical materialism, since, of the two, only the
latter deals with society as a whole. It is suggested that it is a theoretical as
well as a political weakness in Foucault's account that he does not relate
history as understood in terms of power to the history of class struggle. 21 It
is as though apparatuses and techniques of power can only be properly
understood, or be proper objects of political contestation, to the extent that
they can be located within a totalizing perspective.
132
 Paul Patton
The political aspect of this argument has already been dealt with
above. At the level of theory, the objection is no more convincing. First, it
begs the question against someone who eschews the totalizing position. The
appeal to the social totality thus serves to privilege a particular kind of
historical explanation, that of marxism. Second, Foucault's own explanation
ofthe emergence ofthe prison as the dominant mode of punishment might
just as well be taken as a refutation of the implicit claim that historical
explanation must proceed by reference to a global theory. This explanation
works by redescribing this event in the context of the social expansion of
the techniques of disciplinary power. He defines the birth of the prison as
an event in the terms of a rich conceptual and empirical apparatus con-
structed around the notion of micropower. This is the theoretical "plane of
consistency" on which his account operates. No explanation does more than
this, nor are there any ultimate standards of adequacy over and above the
effects of intelligibility that are produced. There are, of course, as I suggested
earlier, external reasons why we should prefer some kinds of explanation
to others.
We need to distinguish between the universalizability of a per-
spective and the sense in which it may be called "totalizing." A political or
theoretical perspective is universalizable to the extent that it can be applied
to the whole range of social phenomena. Feminism, for example, is a uni-
versalizable perspective, applicable to all aspects of social policy: military
strategy and foreign policy are no less legitimate objects of feminist concern
than child-care, as a number of British women have recently demonstrated.
Foucault's conception of the social field as an acentered domain of power
relations is also universalizable in this sense. While it does not claim to
exhaust the range of possible kinds of analysis, nor to exclude other per-
spectives, it may nevertheless be applied to all spheres of social activity.
Similar remarks could be made about the deleuzean perspective based on
desire: commerce, no less than the cinema, involves the assemblage and
operation of desire.
A perspective is "of the totality" in a quite different sense to the
extent that it purports to stand outside and oversee the different analyses
of particular theories or to regulate the conflicting demands of particular
social movements. Here, in the case of political perspectives, it is the social
totality and its government that is at issue. The injunction to adopt a global
view, even if it is initially only in respect of the conflicting needs of other
oppressed groups, is ultimately the injunction to govern a multiplicity of
interests. The position of the totality is the position of power, the perspective
of the state whose duty it is to resolve conflicting interests, establish prior-
ities, and institute hierarchies. This is undoubtedly an important function,
even necessary in some situations. However, it expresses a different interest
to that of a participant in a minority or specific-issue movement. This is
why the injunction to adopt the position of the totality must be resisted
from the point of view of these social movements; not because the position
of the totality is in itself illegitimate, but simply because it is a different
position. The specificity and irreducibility of the minority position have to
be defended against all attempts to abolish that difference. This is hardly a
novel assertion. In practice, autonomous movements do resist the pressure
to be subsumed into larger strategic unities, as well as the demand to justify
133
their concerns in terms of a totalizing theory. What lags behind is the the-
oretical recognition of the minority position, of the right to hold a limited
and partial perspective. 22
In the realm of theory, the position of the totality determines the
typical perspective of the philosopher. Philosophy pretends to universality,
even when its concerns are most particular, providing the theoretical foun-
dations for existing orders of temporal power. To the extent that it has been
historically constituted as a state form in thought, philosophy has been
concerned to legislate, to draw lines of demarcation, and to establish hier-
archies within discourse. The real alternative is not the position of the
mythical Other of state philosophy, the relativist for whom all distinction
is impossible and nothing is any better than anything else, but that of the
nomad-not so much the member of a tribe as an activist in a movement,
a militant on behalf of an avowedly partial perspective. Above all, it is the
relation to theoretical space that is not the same. 23
Marxism has a tendency to straddle these two positions, speaking
now against the bourgeoisie as the representative of the economically ex-
ploited proletariat, now against the localized concerns of the autonomous
movements from its own global, scientific perspective. The extent to which
it currently adopts the latter position may be a measure of how much marx-
ists aspire to the perspective of the state. Marxism, however, can survive
the abandonment of the state perspective. It is, rather, the philosophical
framework for certain forms of argument that would be lost. Detaching
marxism from the position of the totality and the unitarian conception of
knowledge would render inappropriate some of the discursive means by
which marxists often defend the superiority of their approach over other
perspectives. What would be gained is a deterritorialized conception of the
theoretical field, a precondition for the acceptance of plurality and the prac-
tice of an intellectual nomadism. Such an attitude toward theory is already
implicit in some of the positions that have been put to this conference. If,
as Aronowitz suggests, there is no normal science, then we are left with a
plurality of not necessarily competing, critical theories. If, as Laclau suggests,
society is an impossible object, then there is no reason to expect that it
could be encompassed within a single, closed theoretical system. We are
left with an open-ended and pragmatic attitude, which need not deny the
utility of marxist analyses in particular cases, but which does imply that
the question of whether or not one remains marxist is of absolutely no
importance.

Notes
See espectally Stanley Aronowttz. The Crisis in Historical Materialism (New York: Praeger,
1981 ); Alex Callinicos. Is There a Future for Marxism? (London: Macmillan, 1982); Russell
Jacoby, D1alectic of Defeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 ). Barry Smart,
Foucault, Marxism and Critique (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), discusses much
of this literature and the relationship of Foucault's work to contemporary marxism. There are
also many arttcles on th1s theme, beginning with Althusser's address to the II Manifesto
conference ( 1977), repnnted in Power and Revolution in Societies (London: Ink Links, 1979).
Cf. P. Sweezy, "A Crisis 1n Marxtan Theory," Monthly Review, 31:2 (1979); E. Altvater and
0. Kallscheur, "Soctaltst Politics and the Cris1s in Marxism," The Socialist Reg1ster (1979).
2 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Socialist Strategy-Where Next?" Marxism Today,
25:1 (1981)

134
 Paul Patton
3 Callimcos. p. 3.
4 Callinicos, p. 111.
5 M1fle Plateaux (Paris: Editions Minuit, 1980). The introduction, "Rhizome," appears in De-
leuze and Guattari, On the Lme (New York: Semiotext[e]. 1983). An earlier version, published
separately, is translated in Ideology and ConsCiousness, 8 ( 1981)
6 Notably Mia Campioni and Elizabeth Gross. "Love's Labours Lost: Marxism and Feminism,"
in Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx, ed. Judith Allen and Paul Patton (Sydney:
Intervention Publications, 1983). A clear case for the methodological and political importance
of an autonomous femin1st theory was put forth by Christine Delphy in "Pour un feminism
materialiste," 1n L'Arc, 61:6 (1975). an issue devoted to Simone de Beauvoir.
7 Callinicos, chap. 8.
8 Callimcos. pp. 160-62.
9 Anti-Oedipus (New York: Viking Press, 1977), pt. 3, sees. 9, 10. In Mille Plateaux, the authors
insist on the nonmetaphorical character of this comparison: "It IS the real characteristics of
axiomatic systems which enable one to say that capitalism and current politics are literally
a system of axioms" (pp. 576-77).
10 On the Lme, p. 3; a slightly different rendering of the same passage is given in Ideology and
Consciousness, 8, p. 50.
11 Andre Glucksmann, La cuisiniere et le mangeur d'hommes (Paris: Seuil, 1975).
12 See The Left Academy, ed. B. Oilman and E. Vernoff (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).
13 Gregor Mclennan, Marxism and the Methodologies of History (London: New Left Books,
1981). p. 233. For examples of this kind of response to non-marxist feminism, see Michele
Barrett, Women's Oppression Today (London: New Left Books, 1980). and the discussion
in Jud1th Allen, "Marxism and the Man Question: Some Implications of the Patriarchy De-
bate." in Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx.
14 Franco1s Ewald, "Anatom1e et corps politiques," Critique, 343 (1975), p. 1246.
15 Aronow1tz. p. 26.
16 Aronowitz, pp. 59-60.
17 She1la Rowbotham, Lynne Segal, and Hilary Wainwright, Beyond the Fragments: Feminism
and the Making of Socialism (London: Merlin Press, 1980). p. 5. A similar argument is
developed in the concluding passages of the article by Laclau and Mouffe (see note 2).
18 Callinicos. p. 133.
19 Compare the explanation offered for the relative weakness of the autonomous social move-
ments in France and the strength of the extrapolitical opposition in West Germany in A.
Touraine, "State and Soc1al Forces in Socialist France." Telos, 55 (1983). The vitality of
the German "scene" is evident in The German Issue, 4:2 (1982).
20 In a more recent article, Aronowitz continues to campaign for a "social and cultural left"
umfied at the most general level by its challenge to "the capitalist domination of nature."
The prospects for such a "social ecology" movement, however, are more circumspectly
expressed. See Stanley Aronowitz, "Socialism and Beyond: Remaking the American Left.
Pt. I," Socialist Rev1ew, 69 ( 1983).
21 Stuart Hall raised an objection of this kind in his opening night address to this conference,
arguing for the importance of a global analysis of hegemony, where this is understood as
the punctual alignment of social forces in a given conjuncture. It is not clear that he needed
to do this, smce pointmg to specific connections between, say, the reconstitution of social
relations such that late capitalism can survive in Britian and the reinforcement of patriarchy
does not require any systematic homogeneity between these two objects. For a classic
example of th1s kind of response to Foucault, see Nicos Poulantzas. State, Power. Socialism
(London: New Left Books. 1980), pp. 67-68.
22 This is evident in Gerard Raulet, "The Agony of Marxism and the Victory of the Left," Telos.
55 ( 1983). where in the context of arguing for the need for a new political rationality as part
of a process of resoc1alizat10n, it is asserted that, "in contrast to the dominant modality of
consensus which only gives us a pseudo-consensus, both unfree and manipulated, a new
political culture is needed which will develop a totalizing strategy that takes differences as
its starting point. This strategy must be a totalizing one because the new rationality-a non-
reductive rationality-can no longer tolerate a purely dualistic mode of existence which JUX-
taposes technical rationality and traditional symbols" (p. 177).
23 An account of modern philosophy as a state form is given in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979). Paul Feyerabend, in a
recent discussion of the relationship between theory and practice, distinguishes between

135
the position of participant and that of observer in relation to any well articulated practice,
whether it be artistic, political, or ecclesiastical. In the philosophy of science, this distinction
covers the difference between the philosopher and the practicing scientist. Much of the force
of Feyerabend's attack on theories of scientific method rests upon his appeal to the position
of participant. He is, of course, too kind to the philosophers in describing their position as
merely that of observers who only want to know what is going on. See Paul Feyerabend,
Science in a Free Society (london: New Left Books, 1978). pp. 18-19.

136
 Paul Patton
Discussion
Question (Peter Rose)
Don't you think we need a theoretical and strategic basis for
creating linkages between different progressive movements? If they are left in con-
stant isolation and nomadism, they are susceptible to various kinds of co-optation
and differentiation that may not ultimately be progressive. In fact, without some
common ground, what basis is there for judging a particular movement to be pro-
gressive?
Patton
I was not rejecting any attempt to find a common ground
but rather the claim of certain totalizing perspectives to define the only possible
form of coding for these new social movements. Certainly one of the consequences
of the view of micropolitics that I alluded to as a political strategy would be to find
and encourage productive and broadly effective connections between these move-
ments. The example that I referred to in passing-the interest of certain British
women in peace and antinuclear movements-seems to me a very good example
of the connection between two specific concerns but one that doesn't require any
particular global political framework.

Question (Michael Ryan)

I would like to pose three questions. First, it strikes me that
you do an injustice to your own conceptual system when you make such a totalized
monolith out of Marxism. There is no one thing called Marxism. There are just
different attitudes toward the tradition. Callinicos represents a Euro-communist theo-
rizing that many of us don't identify with. And this is not just a matter of naming,
because it has to do with your disavowal of traditional economism. After all, these
movements are related, and one of the moments of articulation is the economic.
My second question concerns your use of "the nomadic," which strikes me as ex-
tremely romantic, and it has resonances with a masculine ideology of a culture of
flight perhaps best captured in Kerouac. Finally, I wonder if there is not a stronger
basis for the politics you are advocating, namely, that the molar is always molecular.
Patton
First, my characterization of marxism was quite intention-
ally polemical. And I tried to make that clear by suggesting that I was talking about
certain figures, rhetorical figures, figures of thought that inhabit marxist discourse.
In a sense, the central point of my paper wasn't concerned with marxist conceptions
of politics but rather with the conception of theory within which particular political
and theoretical prescriptions are offered and carried out. I was trying to unsettle that
totalizing conception of theory, and that by no means excludes the possibility of
other uses and of other kinds of marxist theory.
Second, my use of the metaphor of the nomad, like Deleuze
and Guattari's use of the "schizo" (as in schizoanalysis) in Anti-Oedipus, is not an
appeal to the real individuals or communities that are associated with the name. In
both cases the term is used to create an abstract figure which can be juxtaposed to
other figures. Thus, the schizo is opposed to the paranoid pole of desire; the nomad
is opposed to the social organizational model of the state and sedentary forms of
organization. So I don't think it is quite as much a romantic flight from the conditions
of metropolitan culture as it might appear. You are also quite right to point out that
the molecular and the nomadic cannot, in reality, be separated from the molar and
the sedentary, from the state form. The importance of the distinction, however, is
its ability to provide two clear-cut, identifiable, opposing poles for political orga-
nization, for conceptions of theory, even for an approach to literary texts, forms of
collective assemblage of desire. It is that setting up of the two opposing poles that
seems to me important for the recasting of the terms in which we think about the
field of political analysis and other things.

137
 Comment (Nancy Fraser)
I disagree on a number of points on the question of the
relation of theory and practice. I want to defend a certain kind of totalizing theory
by making a sharper distinction than you do between theory and practice. I do this
not to defend traditional Marxism because, ironically, traditional Marxism too closely
connects them in a way somewhat homologous with your position. Let me put it
this way: You seem to want to argue directly from a style of theorizing to the kind
of politics that follow from it. You claim that totalizing, monocausal, empirical
theories somehow necessarily lead to Stalinist-Leninist centralized forms of political
practice, and that if we stand back from such theoretical practices, we are guaranteed
a democratic, pluralistic political practice. It seems to me that theory and practice
don't have that kind of close connection. One way I might get at this is to raise a
hypothetical question: What if it should tum out that some monocausal, empirical
theory of society could actually have a real explanatory power in accounting for
more phenomena than other available theories? You seem to say we can't choose
that style of theorizing because the politics are bad. It is logically conceivable that
such a theory might, in fact, be able to tell us things and that we would still have
all kinds of political choices. Our political responses are not determined by the style
of our theorizing in that close way. Let me put it another way: I think there are at
least three kinds of critical theorizing that we need. First, an empirical, critical theory
of what is happening in contemporary society, of where the tendencies for crisis are,
of what the possibilities for change are. This should be as absolutely broad and as
explanatorily powerful as we can make it. Second, we need the kind of normative
political theory that Chantal Mouffe talked about: theorizing about what kinds of
institutions we want to guarantee plurality and difference and nomadism and all
those things you want-that is a political question. And finally, we need a critique
of ideology of the sort that Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida have been developing.
In other words, I want to detotalize critical theory in order to argue that some parts
should be as totalized as possible.
Patton
The question of the relationship between theory and practice
is the important one, and it can be taken up in a variety of ways. I wasn't talking
about the political consequences that flow from certain kinds of theory-the usual
sense in which marxist discussions of the relationship are carried on. I was, rather,
treating them, insofar as they can be treated as distinct domains, on the same plane
and talking about a homology between a politics of theory and political practice. In
that sense, what I am objecting to in a style of theorizing are the effects that it has
on our ability to theorize. In particular, I am objecting to the way in which certain
conceptions of the nature of theory impose limitations, close out the possibility of
alternative theorizations. (One only has to look at the debates between marxists,
marxist-feminists, and other kinds of feminists to see how it operates.) It is that
politics of theory that was my concern.
And I agree with your plea for a certain kind of totality and
the need for an understanding of society as a whole. The distinction I made between
the two senses in which one can say that a perspective is totalizing was directed in
part at that, since the kind of totalization I was objecting to was not the totalizing
of a powerful, universalizable general theory (although it is a further question of
how likely it is that we would ever find a theory that would apply to social phenomena
in general). I was objecting to the view that if we have a powerful general theory
like that, then there is no need to encourage alternatives; that, indeed, the fact of
its being powerful and strongly explanatory should be taken as an argument against
the elaboration of alternatives. In that sense, the politics of theory that I am defending
is very close to the kind of epistemological pluralism that Feyerabend defends. And
my response to your hypothetical question-What would we do if we had such a

138
 Paul Patton
powerful theory?-would be the same as Feyerabend's: we should still encourage the
search for alternatives because it is only on that basis that criticism is possible.
Indeed, a society in which one dominant mode of explanation or theoretical form
is imposed, taught, and funded for research is undemocratic in the realm of ideas.

139
 A. Belden Fields

In Defense of Political Economy and

Systemic Analysis: A Critique of Prevailing
Theoretical Approaches to the New Social
Movements

Both local resistances and new social movements must

come to an understanding of the systemic impediments
to their emanc1patory proJects. They must also build alli-
ances with other groups if they are to work toward a
more humane world.

Much of the writing done by contemporary theorists

who consider themselves to be Marxist or neo-Marxist is a self-conscious
reaction against either political economy as it has been traditionally under-
stood or systemic analysis of any nature. The root of the reaction is twofold:
(a) the proletariat has not served as an agency for change in the capitalist
industrialized countries in which Marx anticipated the revolution; (b) where
revolutions have taken place under the banner of Marxism, at least in the
Eastern European context, party and state have assumed enormous power
over individuals and the relations of production bear some striking simi-
larities to those in the West. In both instances it is difficult for these theorists
to find revolutionary subjects, the obvious precondition for basic change.
The theoretical dispute of the sixties between Marxist
humanists and structural Marxists did not offer much in terms of theories
of agency or the constitution of revolutionary subjects. The first school,
appearing after the distribution of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts in the West,
was too abstractly philosophical. It sought to establish that Marx indeed
had a vision of "man" that was something more than a reflection of the
mode of production at any given historical juncture. The structuralist re-
sponse, particularly from the pen of Louis Althusser, rejected any such
essentialist notion; however, it appeared as abstract as the humanist for-
mulation in that it left little room for a revolutionary subject. The subject
in capitalist society was merely a product of ideology. The various structural
levels-ideology, politics, economy-seemed rigidly fixed vis-a-vis individ-
uals, the concept of overdetermination among structures notwithstanding.
If the Marxist humanists appeared to be guilty of a kind of essentialist
moralism, the reaction they produced in the form of Althusserian structur-
alism appeared to be characterized by a scientistic mode of exposition that
left little more room for social change than the functionalist and cybernetic
approaches offered by non-Marxist social scientists.
Then along came the "events" of 1968 in France! The
world of Marxist and neo-Marxist theorizing would never be the same again.
Acting subjects brought the productive, distributive, and service capabilities
141
of a major Western capitalist nation to a halt for a substantial period of
time. Moreover, after 1968, one saw in France an increasing radicalization
and growth of groups that were confronting the state over a wide area of
concerns.
I want to argue that the perceptions of what happened in 1968
and after in France were very selective. Some focused on the students rising
up against the educational structures and the subsequent challenge to all
kinds of hierarchical structures by those subjected to them. Others, partic-
ularly Marxist revolutionary groups in France, focused more on the partic-
ipation of workers in the "events" and the subsequent increase in worker
militancy. Indeed, if one only focuses on the student role, one is unlikely
to appreciate fully the facts that between eight and nine million workers
engaged in a general strike, many taking over their plants, and that even
one of the labor "hierarchies," the Confederation Francaise Democratique
du Travail, was supportive of the actions of the students and workers. 1 If
the students supplied the necessary catalyst for the workers, the workers
supplied a shielding action that limited the regime's responsive possibilities.
Similarly, in the 1970s some focused on the proliferation of
movements of nonworkers while others focused on the actions of workers.
After 1968, worker militancy showed a marked increase over what it had
been prior to the events of that year. Not only did the number of strike
actions and working days lost increase, but there was also a qualitative
escalation in tactics. Plant occupations and holding bosses hostage became
a much more common occurrence. Moreover, two sectors of the working
population that were among the most vulnerable now became among the
most assertive: women workers and immigrant workers from North Africa,
particularly the Algerians.
One finds the same kind of selective attentiveness in the United
States. Some writers have been very attentive to the feminist movement,
the environmental movement, the peace movement, the gay movement,
and so on-in sum, to movements that are to a great extent middle-class
movements. Relatively ignored have been the struggles of working people
in the 1970s, such as the struggles of Farah pants workers, the struggles of
farm workers, and the struggles of southern textile workers. Once again,
these were struggles that involved primarily women and minority workers.
Like many of the struggles in France, they were struggles at the site of
production and indicated clear systemic linkages between the structures of
capitalism, racism, and patriarchy.
The conceptualization of "new social movements," however,
contained strong impulses to react against structuralism by deconstructing
systemic analysis and to dichotomize between struggles of workers in which
economic/material concerns are explicitly articulated and concerns of other
largely middle-class groups that seem to have no material implications be-
cause they are not articulated. Since systemic analysis has been undercut,
if the "discourse" of the actors is not a materialist or economic one, then
there is no way to make the connection.
If the proletariat has failed the revolutionary challenge, some
have argued, maybe the new force for basic change could now be the new
social movements. After all, if the students could force the state to a stand-
off in 1968, why could not a plurality of opposition groups force changes
in the social and political sites of power? Perhaps it would not be a cen-
142
 A. Belden Fields
tralized explosion beginning in the capital (e.g., Paris, the center of state
sovereignty) this time. Perhaps it would be more amorphous, less noticeable
to the nonparticipants, but much more enduring.
I have generalized enough. I now want to turn to four theorists
who have, in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent, contributed
to what I regard as the unfortunate tendencies of deconstructing systemic
analysis and avoiding the implications for political economy of many strug-
gles that seem to be about something else.
Michel Foucault
Much of the subsequent writing regarding new social movements
spins off from the thinking of Michel Foucault. Foucault was a teacher in
the university system the students were revolting against. The revolt of 1968
was suggestive to Foucault in his attempt to challenge Althusser's structur-
alism and to offer a competing conception of power from which he criticized
virtually all observable political action that was not spontaneous. I do not
think it inaccurate to refer to Foucault's political orientation as anarchist.
Foucault's practical problem is an important one: in his words,
"to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present
system." 2 The problem with utopian revolutionary theories, including Marx-
ism, in Foucault's view, is that they seem inevitably to use the techniques
of the present system (armies, parties, courts, etc.) in order to bring about
social transformation. This frustrates the utopian project itself; witness the
repressiveness of the Soviet Union. For Foucault, this cannot be fully ex-
plained either by the "backward" state of Russia when the revolution took
place or by the personality of Stalin. The above, more basic theoretical
problem was at work.
Foucault's resolution is to take a second look at the phenomenon
of power. He penetrates through the almost exclusive focus on "state power,"
"sovereignty," and "legality." For Foucault, we need to consider power as
something that is diffused throughout society, something that circulates,
something about which it is often impossible to say that it circulates exclu-
sively in so-and-so's hands.
Foucault directs us to the extremities, to the sites where power
is exercised on people in concrete experiences. He seeks to break through
the abstraction of the state and to reach down to the concrete level of human
interaction where power is really and visibly exerted (e.g., the prison). The
social interactions at these sites are informed by disciplinary knowledges
that provide techniques (e.g., modern prisons are inspired by Bentham's
scientific penology-the invention of the Panopticon-and by psychiatry-
the prison psychiatrist). Schools, mental institutions, and so on, are decen-
tered or regional areas in which control is exercised and conformity de-
manded-and obtained. Foucault's descriptions of such institutions remind
one of Frederick Wiseman's films.
"Discourse" is defined by Foucault as "the group of statements
that belong to a single system of formation." 3 An example would be psy-
chiatric discourse. It is through discourse that disciplines articulate their
knowledge; and there is an integral relationship between power and knowl-
edge that no utopian scheme can overcome. 4 But not all domains are dis-
cursive. If systems of knowledge are examples of discursive formations,
"institutions, political events, economic practices and processes" are con-
143
 sidered by Foucault to be "nondiscursive domains." 5 The relationship be-
tween the discursive and the nondiscursive must be established by inves-
tigation.
Foucault's own resolution is less than satisfactory. On the one
hand, he has us focusing on power as it is manipulated at the extremities
by anonymous and changing agents. This power grew up piecemeal, as a
result of new disciplinary advances and techniques; and it grew from the
bottom up. No identifiable group or individual decided to implement it "so
as to further their interests or facilitate their utilization of the social body." 6
Local conditions and particular needs shaped power in piecemeal fashion,
"prior to any class strategy." 7
On the other hand, Foucault tells us, these decentered regions of
power with their own discourses and techniques do, indeed, serve the in-
terests of capitalism: "power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain
capitalist exploitation." 8 In one text he states: "One must ... conduct an
ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mech-
anisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own
techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have
been-and continue to be-invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, trans-
formed, displaced, extended, etc. by ever more general mechanisms and by
forms of global domination. " 9 In another text, Foucault pulls the ladder out
from under us. He rejects "theory and all forms of general discourse. The
need for theory is still part of the system we reject." 10 Analogous with the
Maoist way of surrounding the cities from which power emanates by gaining
control of the countryside, Foucault argues that we must engage "the sys-
tem" "on all fronts-the university, the prisons, the domain of psychiatry-
one after another since our forces are not strong enough for a simultaneous
attack." 11 But we do this without any overarching or, in Foucault's word,
"totalizing" theory.
How can we account for the larger and particularly nondiscursive
structures Foucault admits exist? We do not have to, theoretically. "The
system" does the work for us. In the face of this multifronted attack at the
peripheries, "the system it opposes, as well as the power exercised through
the system, supplies its unity." 12 Foucault's concern over utopian theories
becoming perverted in action thus leads to a rejection of any kind ofholistic
systemic analysis, but it does so without denying that the system exists or
that all power ultimately serves capitalism in the present epoch. The unity
of the system will reveal itself-hence no general discourse and theory are
necessary. Only regional theories are permitted, the force of which comes
from regional, particular, and local popular knowledges of the people sub-
jected to institutions and discourses of power. These knowledges are anti-
sciences to be uncovered by genealogical research into the history of strug-
gles. They are presently disguised within functionalist and systematizing
theory; but, again in a way that resembles a Maoist formulation, this time
the "mass-line," they can be resurrected.
More encouragement yet for the possibility of change. Foucault
"suggests," as a hypothesis, that "there are no relations of power without
resistances." 13 He later adds, however, that "what I have said here is not
'what I think,' but often rather what I wonder whether one couldn't think." 14
In fact, strategically, Foucault leaves us with very little to hold onto. He
tells us that power is amorphous, a machine in which everyone is caught
144
 A. Belden Fields
up. And he finds that "against these usurpations by the disciplinary mech-
anisms, against this ascent of a power that is tied to scientific knowledge,
we find that there is no solid recourse available to us today." 15
Foucault had contact with a group of French activists with a
Maoist-anarchist orientation, La Gauche Proletarienne. 16 They accepted the
proposition that all power worked to the advantage of capitalism (and, they
added, the state) and struggled beside any group that was willing to take on
the state in a violent manner. By Foucault's logic they were correct in mount-
ing the barricades along with small shopkeepers who were protesting taxes.
However, they came under severe criticism from Sartre for not analyzing
the nature of the antagonism and for not understanding that the struggle
being waged was in no way progressive. In Sartre's view, the revolt was a
resurrection ofPoujadism, the right-wing populism that was strong in France
in the 1950s. The problem is, if one cannot rise above the local sites of
struggle, what evaluative criteria can one apply to such struggles? If all
manifestations of power serve capitalism, it does not follow that all reaction
against that power is progressive.
Foucault's only critical criterion appears to be nonreplication of
the forms of the present system. Thus, when the French Maoists held "trials"
for wealthy people who had abused working-class victims but had been
acquitted by the courts, Foucault argued that by using the forms of the
courtroom, the Maoists were in fact resurrecting the bourgeois court. He
was critical of any action they took that resembled party, army, or judicial
systems. 17 The proper forms, according to Foucault, remained "to be dis-
covered."18 This, of course, leaves us without the ability to theorize generally
for fear of "totalizing"; it also leaves us without any indication of how to
struggle even at the peripheries of the system of power.
Foucault encourages the regional struggle by groupuscules (small
groups), but he assumes no responsibility-except a negatively critical one-
for developing strategies consistent with his analysis. After all is said and
done, one feels that perhaps one has reread Camus twenty-five years later,
a Camus who has lived through the events of 1968 and is attempting to
theorize its initial spontaneous success, its inspiration for the creation of
all kinds of struggling, decentralized groupuscules, and its inability to change
fundamentally the structure of French political economy. Foucault tells us
not to even think about the latter!
Jiirgen Habermas
In Legitimation Crisis, written in 1973, Jurgen Habermas thinks
a lot about the latter. In this text, Habermas is concerned about how systems
learn at two levels: the cognitive/technical and the moral/practical. The
cognitive/technical seems to have a life of its own, much like Foucault's
disciplinary or scientific knowledges which supply the techniques for the
exercise of power. However, for Habermas the normative learning process
Piaget analyzes in individuals is transposed onto society as a whole. The
struggle in Habermas's theory is for a rational language, for a communicative
competence that is essential for the development of normative criteria. Un-
like Foucault, Habermas does not shirk from systems analysis because it
has been used extensively by functionalists. But he tries to create a role for
rational/critical human subjects who do not simply accept the validity of
what present themselves as system imperatives.
145
 Two crucial terms for Habermas are "system" and "life-world."
Systems contain mechanisms that enable them to avoid or overcome crises,
which occur "when members of a society experience structural alterations
as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened." 19
Life-world thematizes the "normative structures (values and institutions)
of a society. " 20 If the concept of "system" retains the notion of equilibrium
("steering," in Habermas's terminology) from functionalist systems theory
and cybernetics, life-world permits a communal critique of system requisites
by rational-moral beings who establish criteria through linguistic commu-
nication. The vision is almost an Enlightenment one of people establishing
moral truths through language and of limiting the claims of systems and
cognitive/technical knowledge on that basis. It is both more totalizing and
more optimistic than Foucault's analysis. The individual subjects, however,
are communicators rather than organizers and strugglers. 21
Foucault engaged in communication with the French Maoists,
but he did not actually develop a theory of social movements, only of the
sites in which they ought to operate. It is clear, however, that he favored
groups or groupuscules that worked in a decentered fashion and with de-
centered analyses over groups with holistic analyses and strategies. Thus,
while the structuralist Althusser remained in the Communist party, Foucault
would talk with and encourage the Maoist-anarchists but not the Marxist-
Leninist-Maoists, Trotskyists, or the Communist party.
In the late seventies Habermas focused directly on opposition
movements in an article entitled "New Social Movements," in which he
attempts to distinguish between the "old politics" that had existed before
the sixties and the "new politics" that had emerged as of his writing. His
general characterization of the new politics is that it "entails problems of
quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, and human rights." 22
Thus, the normative-critical capacity thematized by the life-world would
seem to be called into play against the cognitive/technical claims of systems.
Some of the other important characteristics of the new politics follow.
1. "The new politics are not sparked by problems of distribution,
but concern the grammar of forms of life. " 23
2. They are "a colorful mixture of groups on the periphery ...
removed from the 'productivist core' of performance in late capitalist so-
cieties, those who are more sensitive to the self-destructive consequences
of the growth in complexity, or who are more seriously affected by them.
The bond that unifies these heterogeneous groups is the critique ofgrowth." 24
3. With the exception of the feminist movement, where "the
struggle against patriarchal oppression and for the realization of a promise
that is deeply rooted in the acknowledged universalistic foundations of mo-
rality and legality lends feminism the impetus of an offensive movement,
all other movements are defensive in character." They are "movements of
resistance and retreat [and] seek to stem or block the formal, organized
spheres of action in favor of communicative structures; they do not seek
to conquer new territory." 25
4. "A critique of growth based on environmental and peace con-
cerns provides the common focus. . . . What sparks the protest . . . is the
tangible destruction ofthe urban environment, the destruction of the coun-
tryside by bad residential planning, industrialization and pollution, health
146
 A. Belden Fields
impairments due to side effects of civilization-destruction, pharmaceutical
practices, and so forth. These are developments that visibly attack the or-
ganic foundations of the life-world and make one drastically conscious of
criteria of livability, of inflexible limits to the deprivation of sensual-aes-
thetic background needs. " 26
5. "Ascribed characteristics such as sex, age, skin color, even
neighborhood and religion, contribute to the establishment and delimitation
of communities, the creation of sub-culturally protected communications
groups which further the search for personal and collective identity. High
value is placed on the particular, the provincial, small social spaces, decen-
tralized forms of interaction and nondifferentiated public spheres. This is
all intended to promote the revitalization ofburied possibilities for expres-
sion and communication. Resistance to reformist intervention also belongs
here. Such intervention becomes its opposite because the means of imple-
mentation run counter to the declared, social-integrative objectives." 27
6. "The new conflicts thus arise at the seam between system and
life-world." They are a reaction to the "colonization" of the life-world by
the "economic and political-administrative system of action" and to the
"abstraction and neutralization process by virtue of which work and public
opinion have been linked to media-directed interactions in modern socie-
ties."28
Sociologically, the people adhering to the new politics are young,
middle-class, and well educated. Workers, entrepreneurs, and the profes-
sional middle class, according to Habermas, still support the older distrib-
utive-productive kind of politics with its fear of scarcity. The actual group-
ings that Habermas points to as being part of this complex of new social
movements, at least in the German Federal Republic, are
the anti-nuclear and environmental movement; the
peace movement (encompassing the North-South con-
flict); the citizens' action movement; the alternative
movement (which comprises urban scenarios with
squatters and alternative projects as well as commu-
nities in the country); minorities (the elderly, homo-
sexuals, disabled people, etc.); the psychological scene
with support groups and youth sects; religious fun-
damentalism; the tax protest movement [which he later
and confusedly admits must be separated out]; parent
associations' school protest; resistance to "modernist
reforms"; and ... the women's movement. Further-
more independence movements struggling for re-
gional, linguistic, cultural, or religious autonomy are
also of international significance. 29
Despite the differences that have been pointed out between Ha-
bermas and Foucault, Habermas's view of the new social movements owes
a considerable debt to Foucault. In point 1, when Habermas talks about
problems of distribution, he is referring to distribution of wealth and eco-
nomic resources, something that concerns adherents of the old politics. The
new social movements are not concerned with that, and there would be no
147
argument with Foucault on this point. For Foucault, the concern is with
the distribution of power, not of wealth in the old politics sense. Moreover,
the grammar of forms of life that Habermas refers to relates to his concept
of communicative groups and, although not very well spelled out, does not
seem to differ fundamentally from Foucault's contestation over discourse
at the various sites of the exercise of power.
In point 2 Habermas finishes off the concern over economics by
arguing that productivity is a matter of concern only in a negative sense.
As with Foucault, the groups operate on the periphery of society. What pulls
them together is not a critique of capitalism as a system of production and
distribution; rather, it is a critique of the qualitative effects of growth as
such.
In point 3, the feminist movement excepted, Habermas presents
these movements as purely defensive. They do not attempt to totalize or
extend their influence beyond their specific area of interest. They are lo-
calized, defensive responses against the encroachment of systems with their
imperatives and cognitive/technical language. Points 4 and 5 are further
elaborations on this point. What is emphasized, and is consistent with Fou-
cault, is the notion of decentralized forms of interaction.
Point 6 entails a difference from Foucault's view. The concept
of a "seam" between system and life-world suggests that there are spaces
in which the economic and political-administrative system of action has
not penetrated. The view seems to be that there are little fortresses in which
these groups or movements live that have not yet been contaminated by
the larger system. These are islands of rational communication that are
attempting to hold the exterior system at bay. For Foucault, power is totally
permeating. No economic and political-administrative system is theorized
in Foucault, but the ubiquitous exercise of power is somehow cumulatively
at the service of capitalism.
In fact, the concept of a seam between system and life-world
represents a considerable conceptual shift on the part of Habermas. In Le-
gitimation Crisis, life-world is a conceptual way of thematizing the moral/
practical capabilities of human beings. In "New Social Movements," life-
world becomes a spatial metaphor, representing areas that are being de-
fended against encroachment by exterior systems with a different and im-
perialistic logic and language.
In my view, neither Foucault nor Habermas is correct on this
point, but Foucault is more correct than Habermas. No space is as free from
the penetration of larger systems of dominance and subordination as Ha-
bermas suggests, and no battles are as purely defensive as Habermas seems
to think: all will be forced to confront the dominant systems (which Foucault
seems to simultaneously recognize and refuse to consider theoretically); and
each emancipatory movement will be just as defensive/offensive as any
other. The dichotomy, which is never theoretically justified anyway, between
a universalistic, offensive feminist movement and defensive movements
protecting their own territory must fall way.
Habermas seems to seek confirmation that his ideal speech sit-
uation is a real possibility in actual little islands of life that have resisted
the encroachment of systems. He gives us much more optimism than Fou-
cault does. But the dichotomy is just too idealistic. The systems are om-
nipresent, the specific battles have more in common than a critique of
148
 A. Belden Fields
growth, and it is always a struggle for the social movements to keep the
languages straight. This is no reason for pessimistic despair. It just means
that the situation facing opposition or protest social movements in late-
capitalist societies is more complex than the "small is beautiful" vision
Habermas suggests.
Chantal Mouffe
While there are some similarities between Habermas and Mouffe
(since she has contributed an essay to this volume, I need not recount her
approach), one major difference is that in Mouffe's analysis the new social
movements are not purely defensive-they really do threaten the system in
its totality. Moreover, Mouffe adds the very important criterion of solidarity,
which is lacking in the formulations of Foucault and Habermas. We have
a much clearer notion of process here than in Habermas's rather static life-
world (whether one views it as a concept of rational/normative capability
or as spatial metaphor). Finally, Mouffe rightly argues against the clear
opposition between the working class and the new social movements, which
is particularly important in Habermas's distinction between the adherents
of the new politics and the old politics, a distinction he borrows from the
political scientist Ronald Inglehart. 30 In all of the above, Mouffe's thinking
represents an advance over that of Habermas.
There are, however, problems in Mouffe's approach, the most
glaring being the privileging of discourse. She does not define discourse in
her essay and thus leaves herself open to the interpretation that discourse
refers to language (this point was raised in the question-and-answer period
that followed her presentation). She responded to the criticism that her
formulation was idealist by saying: "I understand not only speech and writ-
ing, but also a series of social practices, so discourse is not just a question
of ideas." 31 Clearly, Mouffe does not want to go to the extreme of Barry
Hindess and Paul Hirst, for whom discourse refers only to theory, and thus
language, and is divorced from any real objects in the world.
But what, precisely, is the definition of discourse? Since Mouffe
does not provide a definition, can we gain any insight by looking at the
writing ofher sometimes collaborator Ernesto Laclau? In one of his articles,
Laclau writes:
By "discursive" I do not mean that which refers to
"text" narrowly defined, but to the ensemble of the
phenomena in and through which social production
of meaning takes place, an ensemble which constitutes
a society as such. The discursive is not, therefore, being
conceived as a level or even as a dimension of the
social, but rather as being co-extensive with the social
as such. This means that the discursive does not con-
stitute a superstructure (since it is the very condition
of all social practice) or, more precisely, that all social
practice constitutes itself as such insofar as it produces
meaning. Because there is nothing specifically social
which is constituted outside the discursive, it is clear
that the non-discursive is not opposed to the discur-
sive as if it were a matter of two separate levels. His-
149
 tory and society are infinite text. ... Economic prac-
tice should thus be considered as discourse. 32
By this definition, all social practices are discursive. A bit later on in the
same article, however, Laclau makes reference to the "non-discursive con-
ditions in which antagonism emerges." 33 If we are truly considering the social
world as an ensemble of social practices and relationships, and this is pre-
cisely the advantage that the Gramscian hegemonic approach is supposed
to offer over the more static structural approach, then what are we to make
of these "non-discursive conditions"?
The fact is that there are social and political interactions that are
clearly physical and material, and one would really have to stretch the
imagination to see them as discursive, which Laclau does. He sees peasants
being driven off their lands as a discursive phenomenon. While there is
always a message (threat, attempted intimidation) attached to severe ma-
terial and physical punishment, does it really advance us to see everything
as discourse-including driving peasants off the lands, forcing them to work
on large plantations at low wages, torturing and killing them when they
attempt to organize? This is a material and physical chain of events that is,
indeed, designed to send messages, but for the final aim of preserving a
certain mode of production and the set of privileges that attaches to it. I
can sympathize with Mouffe's attempt to deny a clear cleavage between the
ideal and the material, between idealism and materialism, between the base
and the superstructure. But I do not see how calling everything that is social
"discourse" clarifies that relationship, and I fear that we are back at the sort
of privileging that is objectionable to her in the base/superstructure meta-
phor of traditional Marxism.
The discourse that Mouffe uses, and here I mean language, indeed
can easily be interpreted as an idealistic one. She states: "[as] soon as the
principle of equality was admitted in one domain ... the eventual ques-
tioning of all possible forms of inequality was an ineluctable consequence.
Once begun, the democratic revolution had, necessarily, to undermine all
forms of power and domination, whatever they might be." 34 "All positions
that have been constructed as relations of domination/subordination will
be deconstructed because of the subversive character of democratic dis-
course."35 These are statements that beg to be read as commitments to
idealism. One is tempted to ask why, if that is not how we are supposed to
read such statements, this formulation is any more enlightening than Lenin's
emphasis on politics and his resurrection of ideology as an important aspect
of the process of politics (as opposed to Marx's completely negative view
of ideology as false mental commitments at the service of dominant sys-
tems).
Mouffe's almost deterministically progressive language, the ful-
fillment ofTocqueville's prediction with which she begins her essay, serves
to hide one of her shrewder insights. I get the feeling that these new move-
ments are all ineluctably (a favorite word) marching toward equality and
democracy. One certainly gets that impression from Habermas's treatment
as well, although he admits that sometimes tax revolts can be quite reac-
tionary. That, however, seems to be the exception for Habermas. Mouffe,
on the other hand, tells us specifically that, "like the workers, these struggles
are not necessarily socialist or even progressive." 36 She furthermore suggests
150
 A. Belden Fields
a criterion for the assessment of how progressive a movement is, that is,
its link to other struggles. 37 This is an interesting insight that ought to help
us judge, for example, among various manifestations of nationalism: those
that assert rights to independence, self-respect, and cultural development
but respect and support such assertions on the part of others as well, as
opposed to nationalistic expressions that are chauvinistic and exclusive-
that is, intrinsically hostile to both internationalism and other internal claims
on people's allegiances. We could, using this text, avoid the "all third-world
nationalism is revolutionary" versus "all nationalism is reactionary" di-
chotomy that has proved to be so fruitless as Marxists have attempted to
come to grips with nationalism.
The language used in the first three-quarters of Mouffe's essay
lulls us into an idealist, deterministic reading that is quite at odds with the
fertility of the concluding section. I find it especially interesting that in that
last section the word "discourse" does not appear once. It is replaced by
words such as "struggle" and "solidarity" and the contention that "capi-
talism as a way of life is, in fact, responsible for the numerous forms of
subordination and inequality attacked by new social movements." 38
In sum, the absence of a definition of discourse and what appear
to be two different approaches to this in Laclau's work (everything social
is discourse versus the existence of nondiscursive conditions that give rise
to antagonism) are confusing. The "everything is discourse" approach is
either literally nonsensical (at least to this writer) or is bound to lead us to
a retreat to the purely theoretical domain divorced from the world of con-
crete reality, a retreat that we find in Hindess and Hirst's Mode ofProduction
and Social Formation, 39 that preserves the worst, scientistic feature of Al-
thusserian structuralism. On the other hand, if it is admitted that there are
nondiscursive conditions that give rise to antagonism, then we need to
specify those in terms of systemic effects and concrete human experience,
interests, and relationships. We are then no longer justified in prioritizing
discourse the way Mouffe does. But we cannot have it both ways.
Paul Patton
In some senses, the least delicate of the four approaches that I
shall discuss is that of Paul Patton (his essay also appears in this volume).
Patton begins with a healthy skepticism of a Marxism so caught up in an
epistemological totalization that it cannot recognize difference or particu-
larlity. (At first, he seems to argue that skepticism is intrinsic to Marxism,
but toward the end of the essay he takes the contrary position.) That, of
course, is an old and correct charge against some theoreticians and self-
professed practitioners both in the West and in the "socialist" countries.
Foucault, Habermas, Mouffe, and this writer would all agree with Patton.
However, he then draws upon Foucault's diffuse theory of power but, using
Deleuze's concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization, and nomadic
theory, pushes his analysis and conclusions to micrologic or decentered
extremes.
Like Habermas, Patton views the new social movements as de-
fensive. They represent the principle of deterritorialization. The state, on
the other hand, represents the principle of territorialization. The state is
totalizing; by nature, it practices a kind of internal imperialism; it is out to
"capture" the new social movements, to destroy their difference. Marxism,
151
 at least as portrayed by Patton in its concrete texts and practices, is a to-
talizing discourse and thus must become complicit in the state's territo-
rializing practices-hence Marxist theorists' complicity with state academic
institutions in the West and Marxists' responsibility for statist conditions
in the "socialist" countries.
Patton's resolution, however, is to present us with a view of new
social movements that not only reflect difference but are totally separated
and isolated from one another. He even rejects the possibility of broadly
based coalitions because that degree of analytically and strategically putting
together the complex of power would represent an unacceptable totalization
which would threaten the autonomy of each of the parts. 40 Patton writes:
"The injunction to accept a global view, even if it is initially only in respect
of the conflicting needs of other oppressed groups, is ultimately the injunc-
tion to govern a multiplicity of interests." 41
I would submit that Patton has failed to distinguish between
"difference" and total "separateness" (the latter might go by the name "ali-
enation"). Indeed, Mouffe's concept of solidarity has gone completely by
the wayside. There is no sense, in Patton's analysis, of the need to mediate
between legitimate self-interest and the interest and needs of others at the
group level. One wonders how the individuals within such groups are sup-
posed to have social sentiments strong enough to constitute the groups-
unless the groups we are talking about are not emancipatory but are simply
constituted to advance a narrow self-interest of relevance only to themselves.
Are we then left with a reformulation of "interest group liberalism" or,
perhaps, Nozick's individualistic, libertarian utopianism?42
Given Patton's apparently total rejection of utopianism, I am not
sure that we could even get to Nozick's position. Again, in Patton's dicho-
tomous either/or framework-either territorialization or deterritorialization;
either micrologic or macrologic; either destruction of identity or total sep-
arateness-the point is missed that an emancipatory group must to a certain
extent be utopian but can be utopian without attempting to go from the
present to "the new socialist man." It can, indeed, be engaged in a project
for the creation of a more humane world respecting "difference." But it
cannot do this unless it transcends its own boundaries, or "territory," in
two ways: (1) it comes to an understanding of the systemic impediments to
its project, and (2) it reaches out to other groups and engages in mutual
expressions of solidarity and strategic networking.
Just as in Habermas, women get singled out regarding the re-
striction against universalizability: "A political or theoretical perspective is
universalizable to the extent that it can be applied to the whole range of
social phenomena. Feminism, for example, is a universalizable perspective,
applicable to all aspects of social policy: military strategy and foreign policy
are no less legitimate objects of feminist concern than child-care, as a num-
ber of British women have recently demonstrated." 43
Are women being used here merely as an example of a univer-
salizability that can avoid the trap oftotalizing? Or, as in Habermas, is there
something really different about the struggle of women than the other new
social movements? If the former is true, once we indicate how other move-
ments (e.g., those of workers and minorities) have real stakes in military
strategy and foreign policy-U.S. people of color being used disproportion-
ately as troops against people of color in Vietnam, Grenada, and Central
152
 A. Belden Fields
America; U.S. workers losing jobs to Central American countries where
wages and working conditions are poor and labor unrest dealt with by final
means-are we not totalizing in the sense of coming to an understanding
of the systemic dynamics of structures of oppression at both the national
and international levels? Is that not precisely what this use of feminism as
an example invites? On the other hand, if women are exceptional, as in
Habermas's formulation, one can only, once again, ask why. The criteria
are just not obvious.
Patton's major contention is that ..change in existing social re-
lations does not have to be mediated by the totality. The conditions that
sustain oppression can be altered piecemeal. The relationship of particular
groups to the relations of production, if not the relations themselves, can
be altered locally." 44 Relations of production are singled out here because
he is answering Marxists, who are particularly concerned with that, not
because he seems to privilege these relations.
As proof of his contention that conditions can be altered piece-
meal, Patton points to empirical examples of practice. He first tells us about
a case of Australian aborigines using legal and political channels as well as
direct action to gain back some of their lands for subsistence farming. He
then goes on to say that much feminist activity also has had .. significant
local results," 45 specifically referring to a group of women in Sydney who
succeeded in gaining the release of women who had killed their spouses in
response to violent abuse. According to Patton, these women also secured
some changes in the laws and brought public attention to this aspect of
patriarchal social relations.
All of this might be true. These groups might have won some
victories at the local level. However, one can just as easily find counter-
examples in Western societies, especially among the poor, where such purely
local attempts did not work and, in some cases, led to very costly defeats. 46
Would Patton seriously argue that blacks in the United States should have
pursued purely local strategies in the civil rights campaign of the sixties?
Given the distribution of power in the local southern communities, that
would have been suicide.
Specifically in regard to the aboriginal people, they may well be
isolated and retain the potential for agricultural self-sufficiency. But Patton
is not writing at the time of Rousseau. Subsistence farming, hunting, and
gathering are not the dominant modes of production. If the land claims of
the aboriginal people ever posed a serious threat to the dominant mode of
production, no doubt they would stand little more chance of regaining those
lands than the native Americans would of reclaiming the major cities and
agricultural lands of the United States. Or, take another theoretical possi-
bility, a purely local attempt on the part of peasants in El Salvador or
Guatemala to regain their land rights. This might strike one as being a
ludicrous extreme. However, Central American experiences are very in-
structive, particularly when one examines the success of the Nicaraguan
revolution, which was based upon the dual thrusts oflocal, usually Christian-
oriented base organizations and the centralized FSLN. The continuing di-
alectic involving the relationship between local groups (both supportive and
oppositional groups) and the centralized, state machinery is the most in-
teresting aspect of that revolution and differentiates it from the Cuban case,
153
where the revolution was won by a single, military group and the base
committees were creations of the central power after the revolution.
The example of feminism is of a different order from that of
Australian aborigines or landless Central American peasants. Here we are
talking about the system of patriarchy reinforced by a multitude of op-
pressive structures. But here, as well, most grass-roots groups operating at
the local level see the necessity for (I) a systemic understanding of patriarchy
on the order of a systemic understanding of capitalism and the links between
patriarchy and capitalism (e.g., the "family" wage; the enormous profits of
the pornography industry) and (2) political networking as the expression of
an understanding that while local grass-roots work is crucial, it must be part
of a national and international undertaking. Totally disconnected efforts are
much more likely to be either frustrated or assimilated by the dominant
structures than are efforts that are part of a larger social movement.
This adds complexity. One of the most difficult tasks facing the
women's movement is to determine how the concerns of first-world women
can be meshed with those of third-world women. But this has a reflexive
heuristic value, as a reminder that first-world women are not homogeneous-
there are black, Latina, native American, Asian-Pacific, and so on, women
within the local contexts of North American first-world women. System
complexity comes home to the locality, penetrates right into those neigh-
borhoods of Chicago, New York, or Los Angeles. This is also true of workers
(e.g., workers from France, Algeria, and Mali in a Renault factory in Paris).
What does it mean to argue for a purely local action and strategy in this
world so far from a homogeneous, aboriginal community? It means the
opposite of putting things together, the opposite of understanding how
oppressions relate to and reinforce each other. It not only means difference,
for one can accommodate difference with a notion of mediation. No, it also
means fragmentation. To whom is fragmentation of the oppressed useful?

Conclusion
One of the major advantages of a dialectical approach is its em-
phasis upon the concept of mediation of apparently contradictory social
currents. When that concept of mediation is ignored, the way is paved for
rigid dichotomizations and an opting for one side or the other. "Workerist"
approaches and "new social movement" approaches as mutually exclusive
options strike me as equally baseless. We ought not to turn away from the
most dogmatic interpretations of the base/superstructure metaphor only to
walk into another metaphoric trap that prioritizes language or discourse and
constructs theory-proof roofs over local sites of contestation.
I would like to make two other observations. First, at least from
the U.S. perspective, it is a bit late to be talking about new social movements
in the way Habermas and Patton do, because imperialism has reached such
an aggressive pitch in the policies of the overtly ideological Reagan admin-
istration. Particularly by its actions in Central America, its prioritization of
the military and business sectors, and its cutbacks on domestic programs
to aid the worst off, that administration has clearly demonstrated the dis-
tributive systemic stakes involved in imperialistic behavior and their re-
lationship to the structures of capitalism, racism, and patriarchy at home.
As opposed to the seventies, when imperialism took more subtle and less
154
 A. Belden Fields
militaristic forms, an anti-imperialist movement has arisen whose function
is to show the practical and theoretical implications of this phenomenonY
Second, the thrust of micrologic analysis is toward a single-issue
strategic approach, precisely the opposite of the above anti-imperialist ap-
proach. Within the U.S. context, the micrologic approach receives strong
support from the "ideology of practicality." One of the major ways by which
U.S. political culture has been rendered nonideological is precisely by the
emphasis placed upon local, short-term results and the correlation of such
"success" with micrologic strategies. Thus, Martin Luther King, Jr., was
severely criticized for jeopardizing possible advances in civil rights when
he criticized the war effort in Indochina. This micrologic approach frustrates
systemic analyses which reveal dynamics in the political economy that are
not otherwise obvious to those who think and act in purely compartment-
alized terms. The kind of theorizing done by pluralists in the political science
discipline has been a scientific discourse that reinforces compartmentalized
thinking and delegitimizes systemic, political economy approaches by la-
beling them unscientific "ideologies." 48 It would be sad and ironic if the
same tendency were to arise from the ranks of neo-Marxists today when
the strategic stakes in the anti-imperialist struggle are at a more acute level.

Notes

1 The CFDT is the second largest labor confederation in France. It is characterized by a strong
attachment to the concept of worker control over industry (autogestion).
2 Michel Foucault. "Revolutionary Action: 'Unttl Now,"' Language, Counter-Memory, Practice,
trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1977). p. 230.
3 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Shendan Smith (New York:
Harper and Row. 1972). p. 107.
4 Michel Foucault, "Prison Talk," Power/Knowledge, trans. Colin Gordon et. al. (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1972). p 52.
5 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 162.
6 Foucault. "The Eye of Power." Power/Knowledge, p. 159.
7 Foucault. Power/Knowledge, p. 159.
8 Foucault. "Intellectuals in Power," Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 216.
9 Foucault, "Two Lectures." Power/Knowledge, p. 99.
10 Foucault. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 231.
11 Foucault. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 230.
12 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 231.
13 Foucault, "Power and Strategies," Power/Knowledge, p. 142.
14 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 145.
15 Foucault. Power/Knowledge, p. 107.
16 On La Gauche Proletarienne see A. Belden Fields, "French Maoism." in Sohnya Sayres et
al., eds., The 60s without Apology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). and
Ftelds, Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France and the United States (New
York: Praeger and Autonomedia, 1987).
17 Foucault, "On Popular Justice: A Discussion wtth Maoists," Power/Knowledge, p. 1.
18 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 28.
19 JOrgen Habermas. Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).
p. 3.
20 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 4.

155
21 In this sense, I think that the theorizing of Anthony Giddens represents an advance over that
of Habermas. Giddens takes care to introduce the "acting" subject into his theory of "struc-
turation." See Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1979).
22 JOrgen Habermas, "New Social Movements," Telos 49 (1981). p. 33.
23 Habermas, "New Social Movements," p. 33.
24 Habermas, "New Social Movements," pp. 33-34.
25 Habermas, "New Social Movements," p. 34.
26 Habermas, "New Social Movements." p. 35.
27 Habermas, "New Social Movements," p. 35.
28 Habermas, "New Social Movements," p. 37.
29 Habermas, "New Social Movements," p. 34.
30 See Ronald lnglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: lntergenerational Change in Post-
Industrial Societies," American Political Science Review 65:4 ( 1971), pp. 991-1017, and
The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
31 Chantal Mouffe, "Discussion," in this volume, p. 104.
32 Ernesto Laclau, "Populist Rupture and Discourse," Screen Education, no. 34 (1980), p.
89.
33 Laclau, p. 90.
34 Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of De-
mocracy," in this volume, p. 94.
35 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects," pp. 95-96.
36 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects," p. 98.
37 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects," p. 100.
38 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects," p. 99.
39 Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst. Mode of Production and Social Formation.· An Auto-critique of
Pre-capitalist Modes of Production (London: Macmillan, 1977).
40 Paul Patton, "Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterntorialtzation," tn thts volume, p. 131.
41 Patton, p. 133.
42 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopta (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
43 Patton, p. 133.
44 Patton, p. 131.
45 Patton, p. 131 .
46 For a classic study of this see Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View from the
Bottom," in Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe, eds., An End to Political Science (New York:
Basic Books, 1970), pp. 111-43.
47 I deal more explicitly with this in "U.S. Anti-imperialist Movements in Two Contexts: The
War in Indochina and the Intervention in Central America," Scandanavian Journal of Devel-
opment Alternatives 5:23 (1986), pp. 209-46.
48 See, for example, Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963). where class, elite, and stratification theories are attacked from
an empirical, "scientific" perspective. This was written before there was even an explicitly
Marxist body of literature in U.S. political science.

156
II Toward a Contemporary Marxism
 Etienne Balibar

The Vacillation of Ideology

Translated by Andrew Ross
and Constance Penley

The cns1s of Marxism is shaped by the history of the

way the class struggle has been organ1zed in the con-
text of the party; it is a history of contradictory relations
between the "scientific" theory of historical materialism
and actual proletanan political pract1ce. Part of this his-
tory can be traced in the concept of 1deology, wh1ch ex-
presses not only a consistent antithesis between the
dominant ideology and the revolutionary proletanat but
also a continuous ser1es of displacements-like that
from the intellectuals to the masses.

Since there is a "crisis of Marxism" in the centenary

of Marx's death, I would like to offer a schematic account of one of its most
palpable elements, perhaps the most palpable of them all. I have had the
occasion elsewhere, along with others and in their wake, to suggest that this
crisis is much more profound and radical than is commonly acknowledged.
It does not arise either from the relative exhaustion of a theory of history
and social reality or from an initial error that led Marxists to stray from
the paths of the intellectual, moral, and political progress ofhumanity. Nor
does it arise from the perverse effects of a use of Marxism that would
contradict its original aims, a use currently summed up in the phrase "ac-
tually existing socialism."
Crisis in Marxism or Crisis in Politics
Contrary to the facile alternative suggested by an all
too hackneyed logic, the political and ideological uses of Marxist theory are
no more logically implied in its original formulations than they are exterior
to its meaning (or to its truth). In fact, the political and ideological uses of
Marxism either produce or actually create its meaning; they maintain the
historical process of its production, which already includes the texts ofMarx,
of Engels, his "close comrade in arms," and of their successors. From this
point of view, Marxist discourse-taken in its totality as a scientific discourse
and as an institutional form of political organization-starts out by pointing
to the acute contradiction between the old and the new, between materialism
and idealism, the effect of a revolutionary irruption as well as a conservative
recuperation, if not a counterrevolutionary one in the strictest sense of the
term. (By contrast, and of little importance, is the internal contradiction of
the two aspects of the Hegelian system which Marxists have incessantly
discussed, not so much to explain one of the sources of the constitution of
Marxism as unconsciously to project the irreducible duality of their own
thought upon it.)
Because the Marxist contradiction is internal, because
it cannot be located between this or that part of the system but cuts across
159
 each of its fundamental theses or concepts, because, finally, it keeps dis-
placing its effects and its point of application, it is perfectly vain to imagine
that one could get rid of that contradiction either by purifying Marxism of
its "bad side," in order to deliver it into positivism, or by refuting it, in
order to consign it to the trash can of history. Whether in the name of Marx
or of Marxism-Leninism, scientific socialism, or anti-Marxism, the contra-
dictions at stake here are, at present, strictly insurmountable; they never
stop working our everyday existence, just as that existence never stops work-
ing them (and the rowdy proclamations of theories of totalitarianism are
just one of the many symptoms of this). 1 The only possible way to carry
out philosophical and political work today is by staying within the imme-
diate boundaries of this internal/external crisis, closest to its sensitive areas.
The initial political and epistemological break in Marxism occurs
when the terms of this contradiction are bound up, alongside the double
positioning of the concepts of a science of history and the watchwords of a
proletarian politics, within the unity of a "theoretical perspective based on
a notion of class."
Thus, it is from the inside that the crisis of Marxism affects our
current political situation. For unless we seek refuge in the illusion (cloaked
in hypocrisy) of a political thought and practice that cuts the cost of the
extremities of the class struggle and indefinitely defers the settling of ac-
counts between social antagonisms (whether those of the economic crisis
of capitalism, or those of the political crisis of socialism), unless we find
the key to the good state and a healthy world economic order in the account
books of technology or law, who would deny that the basic problems of all
practical politics are still those at stake in the crisis of Marxism? Are there
other ways of historically doing away with the recurring forms, old and new,
of the exploitation and oppression of certain men and women by others
than that of the revolutionary (not necessarily catastrophic) transformation
of the determining social relations of social existence? And is there a rev-
olutionary practice other than a collectively organized one in which "the
masses make history," along with the permanent, built-in risk of a dual
outcome (which, as experience shows, can be produced simultaneously): an
effective liberation and the reproduction of a new "barbarism" whose tech-
nological sophistication scarcely disguises its ongoing primitivism?
If that is, indeed, the general problem, then the crisis of Marxism
has nothing to do with the specific fate-specific, in accordance with the
needs of a particular cause-of any single doctrine, nor even with that of
historicist ideology and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century social utopias
that are usually seen as its origin. In its most acute form the crisis of Marxism
is the crisis of modem politics itself.
It is absurd, however, to try to generalize this "crisis" all in one
go, as if its terms could be definitively established, for we would only end
up with either a formalistic description or else a repetition of its symptoms,
perpetually bringing together the false evidence of the immediate realities
that contradict Marxist theory (the retreat of the workers' movement, the
dissolution of the proletariat described by Marx and Lenin, the latent des-
potism and technocracy of socialist revolutions, the structural transfor-
mation of capitalism, the vitality of mass religious ideology that detracts
from class consciousness, etc.) with the announcement of new acts of rev-
olutionary faith.
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 Etienne Balibar
Marxism's contradictions have no pure or simple existence; they
only exist within a practico-theoretical history. To grasp them we must work
out a detailed examination of this history, by addressing, simultaneously,
the formulation of problems, the application of concepts, and mass social
practice. Above all, this involves work on the transformations of the work-
ing-class movement, since it is specifically through the fusion of Marxist
discourse with the practice of workers' organizations that each seems to
have acquired, over the past century and more, a mutual trust in the other's
consistency and continuity.
Such an analysis does not spring to hand; it is not well known;
and it can no longer be got at simply by destroying classical illusions about
the meaning and internal coherence ofMarxism as a worldview. In principle,
it still involves a considerable degree of the unknown-since there are only
disparate elements of such a history of Marxism in existence today. How-
ever, it has no truck, a priori, with the unknowable or the esoteric.
I am offering only a small part of such an analysis, a very pro-
grammatic account of the history of the theory and even its origins. I want
to discuss the position of the concept of ideology in the Marxism of Marx
and Engels and its importance, not only for what it gives rise to, but ulti-
mately for our present state of affairs. I will emphasize the theoretical vac-
illation that characterizes the concept of ideology, a vacillation that con-
sistently manifests itself in terms of an eclipse, an antithetical deviation, or
a displacement of the problematics.
A Double Birth for a Single Concept
Our starting point is marked by the odd distribution of the term
"ideology" in Marx and Engels's texts themselves (in which language is the
materialist site of the production of their concepts). Omnipresent in the
writings of 1845-46, reduced to a few peripheral appearances in the period
1847-52, ideology is almost nowhere to be found after that until its fullblown
restoration in the 1870s, chiefly from the Anti-Duhring on. In a sense, it is
used there simply as a well-known philological fact; but if we look more
closely, it can also be seen as the source of a false understanding played out
in all contemporaneous discourses on Marxism, starting with its own dis-
course about itself.
The concept of ideology is clearly a decisive innovation and en-
sures Marxism's theoretical specificity. 2 Althusser sees its formulation as an
unimpeachable sign of the break that engenders it. Yet it has actually been
formulated twice, in disparate historical contexts and within problematics
that precluded any immediate conflation: first, in The German Ideology by
Marx and Engels (though mostly Marx), an unpublished text whose uneven
yet insistent influence, brought to light by various rereadings and rediscov-
eries, can be traced throughout the entire history of Marxism; and second,
in the group of historical and philosophical texts, mostly by Engels, designed
to provide Marxism, for the first time, with the appearance of a system and
to point out the ways in which that system could be applied. Writing these
texts over two decades (initially under the supervision of Marx and then in
the course of a systematic rereading of Marx's published and unpublished
work), Engels at once gave historical materialism its name, rediscovered the
term "ideology," and (temporarily) covered over the problems he was posing
in the guise of an entirely coherent, indeed even positive, definition. This
161
second formulation is actually even more complex and contradictory, but
it served to give the concept of ideology its initial outlines.
How can we fail to assign some symptomatic value to this twenty-
year eclipse of the crucial term "ideology" following its debut (if we can
call it that, since the text was not published) and extensive deployment in
The German Ideology?Ideology almost vanished from the discourse of Marx
and Engels. There are a few furtive appearances, particularly in polemical
references from 1846 to 1852 to the "ideologues" of the bourgeoisie and
the petit bourgeoisie (Proudhon et al.), then nothing more. There is no
mention of ideology in the great political analyses of the conjuncture and
relations of forces, such as The Eighteenth Brumaire, which Engels none-
theless took as the model of a materialist account of historical events. (In
this subtle analysis of the political representation of social forces, all that
is at stake is the question of"class in itself' and "class for itself.") Ideology
does not appear in the preliminary work of Capital (notably the Grundrisse),
nor even in the detailed critique of the economists (theories of surplus
value). Here, again, it is simply a matter of the difference between classical
economy and vulgar or apologetic economy. 3
Above all, there is nothing about ideology in Capital, which,
whether one likes it or not, is the cornerstone on which depends the solidity
or fragility of the Marxist edifice. It can no doubt be argued that a good
number of the theoretical apparatuses that figure in the classical analyses
of ideology are well and truly present in Capital: those pertaining to com-
modity and money fetishism and, more generally, to the inverted relation
Marx sets up between the deep sphere of production and the superficial
sphere of exchange. Clearly these analyses, by dint of their object, ought to
be part of the field of a theory of ideology (or of bourgeois ideology), either
to explain the specific effects of ideology or to give an account of genesis.
That only makes more conspicuous the absence of ideology in the theoretical
space of Capital and generally within what is called the moment of "Capital"
in the history of Marxism. Far from signifying the absence of any corre-
sponding questions, this suggests a recognition that the question is not so
simple that it can be inscribed, unequivocally, within any one theoretical
statement.
I think it is worth considering this eclipse, not as an accident or
an irrelevant terminological quirk, but as the sign of a difficulty, if not a
fundamental contradiction. This hypothesis would be confirmed if we could
find an instance where the definition of ideology is incompatible with the
critique of political economy and where the description of fetishism can be
inserted. Our hypothesis already has its counterproof: after Capital, the term
"fetishism" disappears in its turn from the texts of Marx and Engels, in
spite of its conceptual precision4 and in spite of the organic place it occupies
at the core of the development of"value-form" or in the explanation ofthe
relation between the essence and the appearances of capitalist production,
hence of the relation between wage exploitation, the consciousness assumed
by the laborers themselves, and the discourse of the economists. In place
of fetishism-but is it really in the same place?-a new term appears, one
Engels salvaged from a forgotten manuscript, "ideology," whose meaning
he (consciously?) transforms. This extraordinary shuffling of identities sug-
gests that if the question of ideology is constitutive for historical materi-
alism, then several relatively incompatible approaches are involved, each
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 Etienne Balibar
depending on different conditions, each of which has to be pursued in its
tum. The study of these differences (which academia has completely ob-
scured) then becomes a privileged means of access to the internal contra-
dictions of the Marxist problematic.
Materialism and Criticism
Without going into the tricky details of the text of The German
Ideology, I would like to point out a few of its noteworthy features in a way
that will throw some light on the paradoxical nature of the concept of ide-
ology. We can start with a double question: what makes Marx's materialism
historical and what makes his conception of history materialist?
Marx's history is obviously not materialist simply because it pur-
ports to eliminate the speculative in order to constitute itself on an empir-
ically verifiable causality. In principle, this elimination entails snatching
history from the clutches of teleology, both in its religious forms (Provi-
dence, the meaning of history, Origins and Destinies) and in its philosoph-
ical forms (a periodization, governed by a principle of Human Progress-
moral, juridical, spiritual, or logical); in short, this entails eliminating any
identification of a Subject of history. In Marx, this critique coincides with
the attack on an illusion that is also a fraud, one that makes the State the
universal component of historical process and Man, as a universal abstrac-
tion, its proper subject. Yet this critique of speculation cannot be reduced
to an empiricism or positivism (though general formulations point it this
way, starting from the idea of a definitive departure from philosophy). Nor
does it rely on a simple clarification of the economic process, of social labor,
and of the needs and material interests of the classes. By itself such an
analysis (of the "real bases" ofhistory) can only return to the presuppositions
common to both political economy and classical philosophical utilitarian-
ism, whose individualist materialism itself also rests on an abstract hy-
pothesis of human nature (and also, undoubtedly, on the perspective ofthe
state, though less obviously so).
Despite what the term traditionally suggests, Marx's materialism
can be contained neither within the definition of the matter of history nor
within the application of a historical point of view (evolutionary, progres-
sive, dialectical) with regard to matter. 5 It is presented as an essentially
derivative position, as a critique of idealist (abstract, speculative, etc.) rep-
resentations/illusions which mask over, mystify, and repress the determin-
ing reality ofthe labor ofthe individual and of social production. By virtue
of its own labor, this critique alone can provide materialism with its specific
content while also confirming that there is no universal materialism outside
specific positions, conjunctures, or struggles.
Historical materialism is primarily an analysis (or a series of
analyses) of the formation, the real production, of idealist representations
of history and politics-in short, of the process of idealization. In The Ger-
man Ideology this is the professed objective of a complex and incomplete
construction centered on the role of the "division of manual and intellectual
labor." Historical materialism is constituted when it can prove (and to the
extent to which it can prove) that the idealization of history is itself the
necessary result of a specific history. We can then see how the idea of a
scientific critique (along with the equation, science = history) might be
justified: because the movement of criticism that opens the analysis of these
163
questions is itself just as much the result of"real historical relations" as are
the idealities it addresses. As with science, the categories of history are
manifest as problems in their own right (questions, as Marx puts it) rather
than as explanations or autonomous responses.
Yet this is still not enough. We must come to terms with the
force, or forces, that sanction the way the idealization of history imposes
itself, not only on those who have an interest in it, but also on those for
whom it mystifies the real and thereby calls a halt to the movement for
liberation. On this point, someone like Stimer can only offer a tautology:
the domination of ideas is the realm of ideas of domination (order, hier-
archy, the sacred, etc.). What is the point of these ideas of democratic lib-
eration (individual rights, political equality) if they are incarnated, in their
tum, within the statist order (albeit a profane, nonhierarchical one) of the
postrevolutionary bourgeoisie? In suggesting that every state makes use of
religion and morality to impose its power, and that every discourse, when
it begins to conflict with their interests, divides individuals, one from the
other, Machiavelli and Hobbes do nothing to break out of this vicious circle;
they only translate it into the language of a functionalist philosophy of power
(the dominant ideas, whatever they are, are those serving the interests of
the powerful; at best the powerful must believe in the ideas so that those
they dominate do likewise). It is necessary to determine the question his-
torically, to examine the nature of the "ideas of the ruling class" and the
way they become the dominant ideas. Thus, the concept of ideology adds
a third question to the preceding two. With respect to the other critiques
of the speculative illusion (Kant, Feuerbach) or the necessity of appearances
(Hegel), whether anthropological and ahistorical or historical and dialectical,
Marx's originality lies in his overdetermining the question of the cause or
necessity of idealities by questioning their mode of action, their power, or
their subjugating effects. 6
Considered in the light of this triple determination (the critique
of teleology and speculative theory, the materialist origin of idealization,
and the analysis of the effects of domination), the concept of ideology seems
to be the correlative of a definition of the real relations that determine the
historical process. In traditional philosophy such an invocation of the real
and the empirical could only correspond to a recognition of error or illusion,
an antithesis between idealism and realism. The materialist critique of ide-
ology, for its part, corresponds to the analysis of the real as a relation, as
a structure of practical relations. It corresponds to the discovery that the
reality of the real is not a being identical to itselfbut is, in a sense, a specific
abstraction the individual can only at first perceive as an abstraction twice-
removed-speculative or, as Marx puts it, inverted and rendered autono-
mous. It is not individuals who create this abstraction, for they are them-
selves basically only relations or the product of relations. The whole science
of history is virtually the distinction between these two antithetical abstrac-
tions, which is to say that it breaks up or deconstructs their identification.
It is in this that the science of history is "concrete."
The Purely Proletarian Act
In rereading Marx's argument, however, it seems to be dominated
by one forceful theoretical intervention, the abstraction of which is itself
rather flimsy: an intervention that posits, against ideology, in the form of
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 Etienne Balibar
a force or antithetical instance, the very being of the proletariat, or, more
precisely, the prophetic establishment in the very place occupied by the
revolutionary proletariat of the discourse critiquing ideology. Thus, it is
from this site, the real site of truth as well as the place from which the world
is changed, that one can grasp the equivalence between the different types
of idealization that constitute ideology: consciousness produced at a distance
from the real, abstraction of the conditions of existence, inversion of their
limitation (or their particularity) in a fictional universality, autonomization
of intellectual labor, political idealism, and philosophico-religious specu-
lation (of which German Hegelianism is the quintessential example). It is
only from this site that we can see the fundamental equivalence between
ideology and idealism, a correspondence that makes the idea of a materialist
ideology or a materialist philosophy a contradiction in terms.
By that same token, however, materialism is defined as an ab-
solutely positive term that gathers and unifies within itself all the antitheses
of ideology/idealism: (real) life, (real) individuality, production (of condi-
tions of existence), history, praxis, and, lastly, the revolutionary practice of
the proletariat (or communism, not as the ideal future, but as the "real
movement to do away with the existing state of things" without ever losing
touch with production, its initial condition). The real movement of history
is a developing labor of production (what philosophers call "alienation")
accompanied by a developing production-or, better still, a productivity-
of labor. The proletariat is thus a self-affirmation of production and a self-
negation of labor, which is to say that the materialist instance is only seen
to be a revolutionary practice when ideology in general can be identified
with idealism. And this identification is only possible from the point of view
of the proletariat.
Marx's argument thus comes full circle, and it is a strictly phil-
osophical circle. Although his thesis-completely identifying material exist-
ence with practice and formally bound up within what he calls the "totality
of productive forces"-is powerful and profound (if not wholly original), it
nonetheless reconstitutes itself as philosophical at the very moment Marx
claims to have abolished philosophy.
This circle is actually the result of adding a rupture (which rad-
ically divorces practice from abstract theory) to a denegation. The theoretical
discourse announcing this divorce is not a true "discourse" in that it does
not assume a theoretical position; it is, rather, the site of practice itself, or
the self-articulation of practice (which presupposes, among other things, a
notion ofthe absolute transparency oflanguage-"the language of real life").
Moreover, it is the only discourse that, because of its obviousness, is held
not by the intellectuals but by the proletariat itself, or at least in the name
of the proletariat-the discourse of communism. 7
This initial circle presents a major difficulty which The German
Ideology copes with only by way of new denegations, precisely in repro-
ducing the same circle for the proletariat itself. Consider two of its forms.
1. The self-consciousness of the proletariat is opposed to ideo-
logical illusion/inversion, but this consciousness must be both unmediated
(conscious of its being, that is, its conditions of existence) and produced as
a practical negation of the unmediated; to live up to this, the proletariat
must transform and revolutionize itself. The proletariat is the prerequisite
condition and the end result of its own revolutionary practice. Marx writes:
165
 "In revolutionary activity, changing oneself and changing one's conditions
(of existence) are the same thing."
2. The proletariat is first and foremost a class, the class antagonist
of the bourgeoisie, and hence places its own interests above theirs. Put like
this, however, the proletariat would, by definition, lack universality, or,
more precisely, it would be caught up in tum within the mystifying and
abstracting process that subsumes a "specific interest" into a "general in-
terest." For the interests of the proletariat to tally with a real universality,
with practice as such, those interests must cease to be class interests; and
for that to happen, the proletariat itself must cease to be a class, must be a
classjnonclass. Marx writes of "a class which has really rid itself of the old
ways, and which stands in opposition to them at the same time." This is
the surprising distinction made between the proletariat as a class and the
proletariat as the masses. Only the masses are revolutionary, because they
represent the disintegrating state of "society" (Ia dissolution en acte de Ia
"societe") as it exists, at the point when extreme exploitation has completely
stripped the workers of all property and all inherited historical specificity,
leaving them effectively naked. Marx presents us with this radical loss of
individuality in the shape of a radical individualization. And revolution is
nothing but this act itself, or the way history acts out this disintegration,
which is its own product. But by the same rigorous logic, this means that
there is no-or, at this point, there is no longer any-class struggle. Properly
speaking, the bourgeoisie is the only class in history; before it there were
only castes, orders, states (Stiinde), which were not yet real classes. As for
the proletariat, once it matches its definition, it is no longer simply a class
but the masses.
I will not discuss here the historical analyses that Marx uses to
support this thesis; they are primarily generalizations, a hyperbolic extension
of Adam Smith's ideas about the division of labor. In fact, they are derived
from the politico-philosophical assumptions that define the proletariat. Yet
we must emphasize the disastrous logical consequences of these analyses in
the case of the relation between the (communist) proletariat and politics,
two terms that are quite simply incompatible. The proletariat, by definition,
is the negation of all politics identified with an ideological illusion/abstrac-
tion. Similarly, communism is the nonstate (Staat), a state of things (Zu-
stand) in which all political mediation has, by definition, disappeared.
Because the proletariat is the actual negating (or the act of prac-
tical negation) of all ideology, there is no such thing as a proletarian ideology,
or an ideology of the proletariat, just as we have seen that it would be absurd
to talk about a materialist ideology. The proletariat is precisely the mass of
concrete individuals, inasmuch as, and in accordance with their own con-
ditions of existence, these individuals destroy all ideology (or ideological
consciousness). That is why, as the Manifesto insists on repeating, the pro-
letariat has no nationality or religion, no family or morality, no politico-
juridical illusions; that is the absolute "Illusionslosigkeit" of the proletariat
as such. This leads us, of course, to ask about the empirical working class
hie et nunc: is it really so devoid of all ideological consciousness? The answer
suggested by the text of The German Ideology is simple but completely
tautological and speculative: such a working class would not (or not yet) be
the revolutionary proletariat. 8
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 Etienne Balibar
We should not, however, hasten to pass judgment on this con-
struction, doing no more than condemning it for its idealist or speculative,
if not mystical, character and thereby repeating Marx's attack on Hegelian
and post-Hegelian philosophy. On the one hand, this construction includes
the articulation of concepts that will be shown to be susceptible to a series
of changes and modifications, ending with its very opposite: a historical
analysis of the struggles of the proletarian classes as these struggles are
determined by the successive configurations, created by capitalism, of the
working class and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, and most important
by the very fact of its critical radicality, this formulation is likely, in a
different context, to take on a new function and hence a new meaning. It
will come to stand for something all the more pertinent to our reading of
it, something more than a separation: an inevitable contradiction between
the ideologies of the proletariat (whether spontaneous or imported; in fact,
you never have one without the other) and revolutionary practice. The
corollary is that there always comes a time when "revolutionary ideologies"
prove to be counterrevolutionary in practice, a time when revolutions (if not
the revolution, which is, by definition, a myth) come into conflict with
revolutionary ideologies or ideologies of the proletariat and effectively de-
stroy them-in other words, what Marx does not "think" but what we can
think, by no means arbitrarily, in some of the concepts of The German
Ideology, that which these concepts think today, namely, this intrinsically
contradictory relation between revolution and ideology. Though this is not
what Marx says in The German Ideology, it is a use we can make of his
most radical philosophical theses, turned back on themselves and against
the "dogmatic sleep" of Marxism. Could this retrospective reading salvage
for us the most profound sense of what Marx understood at the time by
the term "proletariat"? Is it not so much a class existence as an effective
class struggle which, in propelling itself beyond its initial conditions, divides
up ideology and thereby exposes it?
Domination without the Dominated?
Almost immediately the theses of The German Ideology posed
some insoluble contradictions for Marx. One therefore understands why it
was necessary for him to do away with this concept of ideology, if not with
the problems it harbored. 9
The first difficulty lay in the impossibility of inserting the dis-
course of political economy into the theoretical space as it was defined. It
would not, in fact, fit into either the category of ideological abstraction (since
its specific object was productive labor, analyzed as a relation; the division
of labor and exchange) or into that of historical materialism or the science
of history (because, to express the point of view of the bourgeoisie-Marx
calls economists their "scientific representatives" -the discourse of political
economics always erects a specific interest, that of private property, into the
realization of human nature in general). This difficulty lies at the heart of
The German Ideology. Indeed, it is from Adam Smith, Ferguson, and the
Saint-Simonians that Marx draws the materialist categories of a periodi-
zation of civil society, a correspondence between the forms of property and
the forms of the division of labor. All this becomes untenable when Marx,
progressing from Smith to Ricardo, comes to grips with the Ricardian def-
inition of value in order to extract socialist conclusions from it-in The
Poverty of Philosophy and, implicitly, the Manifesto.
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 Far from clearing up this difficulty, Marx's extension of this cri-
tique to Ricardian economic principles (the definition of labor and value)
only makes things worse. The critique of economic categories can no longer
consist in the prior separation of the domain ofthe real from that of illusion
but rather consists in the work of internally deconstructing each theoretical
category. Such a critique involves separating the contradictory elements
imbricated within the economic concepts in order to confront them with a
practice that is not directly the revolutionary practice of the proletariat but
is, rather, the practice of capital (with its own contradictions). Thus, one
would have to be able to think both the objectivity of economic discourse
and its bourgeois class character simultaneously; or even, contrary to the
original definition, to think both the real and the imaginary within ideology.
This is precisely what Marx tries to do in his analysis of fetishism, in at-
tempting to demonstrate how the simultaneous birth of the "form of value"
and the necessary illusions of commodity production is brought about, though
he returns to a problematic of illusion inspired by Kant and Feuerbach. 10
A second difficulty, however, may be more directly decisive. It
arises from the radical antithesis between the autonomous action of the
proletariat (absolutely creative because it is absolutely determined by its
conditions of existence) and the abstract world of politics. One would think
that by the time Marx (and Engels) wrote The German Ideology this difficulty
could no longer be ignored, since at that very moment Marx was doing his
utmost to bring about a reformation of communists from several countries
within a single international organization, soon to become the League of
Communists. If that is not practicing politics (and specifically against the
states and their ruling classes), one wonders what is. The evidence of this
difficulty in the text itself is a symptomatic lack of coherence, political theses
that seem to be totally out of place, or equivocal statements for which several
contradictory readings are possible.
Hence, these formulations no longer have anything to do with
communism as a real movement of universal history but rather with real,
living communists of the sort one meets hie et nunc (in Paris, for instance),
communists we have to call to mind in order to explain this name we give
to the real movement: "You can count on the fingers of one hand the few
bourgeois communists that have surfaced since Babeufs time who are not
revolutionaries; everywhere the great mass of communists is revolutionary."
The differences are thereby set up between French (political) ide-
ology and German (philosophical) ideology: the former is to the latter what
history or practice in general is to ideology in general, namely, its antithesis,
and thus its real criterion. Here, again, Marx takes up the old nostalgic
notions of the young German radicals (going back at least to Fichte): "It is
impossible to write history in Germany because history does not happen
here." History happens in France; it happens politically. And it is because
this political element is not purely illusory, or rather because all illusions
are not equal, that the real differences between these ideologies offer a base
for the concept of the revolutionary proletariat, as important, perhaps, as
the reference to the bedrock assumption of material existence or production.
Above all, these differences are the effect of a historically different relation
to the state. They do not refer to an absolute action, with neither past nor
future, but to a specific historical memory: the French had Danton and
Robespierre, "the masses rising," Babeuf, Bonaparte; the Germans had only
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 Etienne Balibar
Metternich and Wilhelm-Friedrich, who, at best, watched history pass by
in the streets below.
The problem becomes more sharply defined in Marx's paradox-
ical formula of the dominant ideology. What does "ideology of the ruling
class" mean? From one paragraph to the next, Marx gives us two answers,
and it is from these that we can infer, not without ambiguity, the meaning
of the question posed. This ambiguity is clearly reflected in the double
semantic value of the term "herrschend": is it the dominance of a body of
representations or a discursive paradigm that typifies the epoch of its own,
more or less undivided, ''rule," 11 or else the domination exercised (in a
"repressive" manner, overtly or otherwise) by one body of representations
over another, and, through this mediation, by one practice over another,
by one way of life or thought over another? Both are correct, but to un-
derstand the causality at work we must look to another, more tricky am-
biguity, one characterized by the fact that unraveling it, in every case, gives
rise to an aporia.
We can construe the dominant ideology as a kind of "symbolic
capital" of the ruling class itself, as the body of representations that expresses
its relation to its own conditions and means of existence (for the bourgeoisie,
for instance, commodity ownership, juridical equality, and political liberty),
or at best as the expression of the relation of the average members of the
ruling class to the conditions of domination common to their class (hence,
the kind of universal values this domination assumes for each of them).
How does this representation impose itself on individuals who do not have
the same relation to the conditions of existence as do the ruling class (manual
workers, for example)? Clearly it cannot be because it is forced on them by
the material means (which includes the press and intellectual production
in general) monopolized by the ruling class (a monopoly acquired through
the mediation of their ideological servants-scribes and scholars of every
ilk). Such a domination, however, remains necessarily exterior to the con-
sciousness of the oppressed (without bringing in, as Marx did not, the ir-
rationalist hypothesis of a "desire for submission"). This is why Marx writes
that, for the proletariat, the representations of the dominant ideology-
whether juridical, moral, patriotic, or otherwise-ultimately do not exist, or
are purely fictional. But then the concept of ideology disintegrates, surviving
only as a variation on the conspiracy theories of the "useful fictions" of
power ("If God did not exist, they would have to invent him") of the sort
put forward by the mechanistic rationalists of the eighteenth century.
Alternatively, we can construe ideological domination as there-
sult (always already present, which is to say neither automatically nor eter-
nally acquired) of a true ideological struggle, that is, as the domination of
one ideological consciousness over another. From this point of view, what
always corresponds to the constitution of a dominant ideology, in tendency
at least, is the constitution of a dominated ideology, yoked to a process of
repression but capable of subverting it. How do we interpret this conflicted
birth? Do we pose the reciprocal confrontation, for example, of the repre-
sentations of the relations members of the antagonistic classes have with
their respective conditions of existence? Probably not. Rather, we pose against
each other the representations of the relations individuals of antagonistic
class have to the antagonism itself, that is, to the social relation that unites
them while opposing them and to its derivative forms (property, division
169
of labor, the state, etc.)-a relation they cannot, of course, live in the same
manner but one that necessarily represents, for them as for others, the uni-
versal of a given epoch, which is their epoch, or the epoch of their antag-
onism.
This second interpretation is much more profound than the first.
In fact, Marx's text points toward it. At any rate, we find its deferred trace
in the resume of 1859 (the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy) in a reference to the "ideological forms through which
men are made conscious of conflict, and draw it to a conclusion."
If we ourselves draw to its conclusion the logic brought into play
here, we will obviously find ourselves in opposition to any thesis imputing
an absolute lack of reality to the ideological world, and we will no longer
understand the sense in which this world "lacks history," or the sense in
which it "cannot exist" for the proletariat. Moreover, we will conclude that
there are not only real differences in the ideological world but also contra-
dictions, and that they clash with the contradictions of practice, contrib-
uting, in themselves, to "real life."
At this stage of Marx's problematic, however, this interpretation
is no less aporetic than the one before; and in order to be able to bring it
to conclusion, a dominated ideology would have to be placed in opposition
to the dominant ideology-which is exactly what Marx does not do, except
implicitly, in the emptiness or vacillation of the expression "dominated
ideology." The whole of The German Ideology is precariously balanced on
this concept of dominant ideology, for which there is no corresponding
dominated ideology! It would be impossible to take this term literally with-
out giving credence, finally, to the concept of a proletarian ideology and
thus without questioning, again, the divorce of the proletariat from all ide-
ology. And this means breaking up the whole constituent structure of ma-
terialism, the layers of correspondence between materiality, production,
practice, history, and revolution.
Historical Materialism or Political Materialism
It is obvious that Marx has no solution to the problem. But he
is hardly able to ignore it, since it is the essence of revolutionary politics.
Ample confirmation of this is provided in the Communist Manifesto, written
two years after The German Ideology. The Manifesto presents, more than
ever, and crucially, with respect to the definition of revolutionary con-
sciousness, the radical antithesis between such consciousness and all the
forms of social consciousness that actually reflect the past history of former
class oppressions: "The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture
with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves
the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." These ideas are none other
than those of nationality, religion, family, liberty, culture, law, and so on,
which used to make up the content of what Marx calls "ideology."
If the Manifesto refutes accusations of immorality and barbarism
leveled at communism, the "specter which haunts Europe," it is clearly not
to paint a better picture of proletarian morality, nor even proletarian culture,
but rather to establish that the bases of morality and culture have already
been destroyed by the rule of the propertied bourgeoisie. 12
This essential de-ideologization, or, if you like, this a-ideological
tendency of the proletariat, is consistent with the catastrophism of the theses
170
 Etienne Balibar
in the Manifesto on class antagonism (the idea of "absolute impoverish-
ment"; the bourgeoisie can no longer feed those who feed it), and with its
universalism (the idea of crisis and of world revolution). It is consistent
with the description of socialist and communist literature put forward in
chapter 3, a remarkable outline for a class analysis of the anticapitalist
ideologies but one strictly limited to the range of nonproletarian discourses,
or discourses that express not the proletariat itself but rather the figure it
cuts in the imaginary of other classes. 13
Confronted with this imaginary, the discourse of the Manifesto
is positioned, at once, by the critical relation it maintains with this imaginary
and another radically different relation, since it looks not to the past but to
the future of the movement, to the way this future is already at work in the
present. This discourse, however, should be provided with an appropriate
name and proof of existence other than the ideological. Otherwise, it will
fall back into the vicious circle that would appear if the proletarian character
of Marx and Engels's theses became an authority unto itself and if com-
munism had no existence outside the publication ofits manifesto! The name
and the proof are combined in one phrase: "We do not here refer to that
literature which, in every great modern revolution, has always given voice
to the demands ofthe proletariat, such as the writings ofBabeufand others."
Perhaps the whole trouble lies in the interpretation of "and others"! What
irreducible tendency do the writings of Babeuf represent? And how is this
tendency less ideological than that of the "systems of Saint-Simon, Fourier,
Owen, etc."?
The context of this question is quite clear. What distinguishes
Babeufs communism (and that of the Blanquistes) is simply that it is purely
political, that it identifies itself with the practical revolutionary will against
the systems, themselves identified with reformism. 14 In this, however, we
have the full-blown contradiction of the Manifesto: how do we think a
politics without political ideology, without a discourse on the state, or the
future State, or the future of the state (were it to disappear)?
On this question the Manifesto strikes a markedly different note
than The German Ideology. It uncovers, or recovers, a materialism other
than that of history or even practice: a materialism of politics. Its analysis
of the class struggle is articulated with the definition of a strategy. 15 The
principal idea, with respect to the revolution, is no longer that of an act at
once complete and instantaneous, although this image always haunts its
catastrophic vision of the crisis of capitalism. Rather, it is a process, or a
transition, that will bring about the change from a class society to a classless
society, starting from social contradictions within their actual configura-
tions. Henceforth, the very concept of practice changes its meaning; it has
to include the moment of a direction, in the dual sense of the term-ori-
entation and project, or program. The real movement of the revolution is
no longer a radical breakup of bourgeois society, liberating the totality of
the productive forces-or at least this is only its negative condition. Rather,
it is a progressive construction, or composition, of forces, capable of joining
together "the interests and immediate goals of the working class" with "the
future of the movement," and capable of severing the constraints common
to all of the "already established workers parties," transcending-but not
ignoring-their national divisions and the limitations of their respective
"class points of view."
171
 It is clearly no longer a case of representing the revolutionary
proletariat as situated beyond any existence as a class, in a mass of de-
individualized individuals, as The German Ideology would have it. On the
contrary, the concept of a class struggle must be extended to the revolu-
tionary process itself in order to think the revolution within the class struggle
(and not the class struggle within the imminence of revolution). Within the
revolution, far from distinguishing itself from the bourgeoisie by ceasing to
be a true class, the proletariat actually "constitutes itself as the ruling class"
(by way of the "triumph of democracy"), which must lead dialectically to
its own negation and the destruction of all class rule, including its own. It
is hardly credible that the proletariat, acting in this process as a specific
class, would not be both the bearer of an ideology proper and driven by the
representations borne by that ideology. Thus, the proletariat is ultimately
determined in its action, or in the strategic vicissitudes of its action, by
these representations.
Does Marx pose this problem? Yes, if you take into account his
reflection on the historical conditions in which the bourgeois class struggle
inevitably had to educate politically the proletarian class struggle. And no,
in the sense that none of the theses of the Manifesto correct, however mod-
estly, the myth of a class consciousness as being radically exterior to ide-
ology, nor do they give any idea of what a proletarian ideology might be.
Since then, theoretical conflict can only be resolved (apparently) by breaking
up the concept of ideology and abandoning its very use. Exit ideology,
German or otherwise. 16
II
In the first part of this study I have tried to show why the concept
of ideology, set up in opposition to the philosophy of history, was obliged
to disappear very quickly from Marx's problematic under the pressure of
the very contradictions it established. 17 I have summarized those contra-
dictions of an internal nature in demonstrating the ambiguity of the idea
of domination implied in the notion of a dominant ideology. As for those
of an external nature, I have linked these contradictions to the impossibility
encountered in Marx's application of this concept to the classical political
economy he was attacking. Above all, I have tried to point out the diffi-
culties, for a materialism founded on the absolute antithesis of ideology and
practice, of concretely thinking the problems and goals of a proletarian
politics that began to take shape in 1848, around the experience of the
European revolutions and their failures.
I shall now take the liberty of jumping over twenty years of
history in order to consider the conditions of the revival of the concept of
ideology in Marxism in the form given it by Engels. Again, we should speak
of a vacillation, but in a different way, for it is no longer the case of a
possible double reading of a single term. Rather, there is an unresolved
theoretical (and linguistic) conflict signaled by the recourse to two concurrent
terms, each of them assured of a long life: ideology and worldview. What
does this conflict consist of? At what level of development does it surface
in Engels's theoretical activities? And what can it teach us about the con-
tradictory articulations of theory and politics? 18
Two Concepts for One Problem?
These two terms make their debut in Engels's writing at the same
time; the formulations of the Anti-Duhring, which employs them both, can
172
 Etienne Balibar
be used as a point of reference. At the beginning of chapter 10, part 1,
"Morality and Law-Freedom and Necessity," is the first definition of ide-
ology: it comes from the opposition between the methodology of materialist
thinking, which proceeds from the real to the conceptual, and that of idealist
thought (''a priorist" and "axiomatic"), which inverts this process in order
to pass (fictitiously) from the concept, or the abstraction, to the real which
it spuriously purports to engender. 19 The definition, then, is purely episte-
mological. It implies, however, that if the effect of ideological discourse
belongs to the order of knowledge (and of misunderstanding), its object,
and its raison d'etre, is social and political: ideological systems always result
from the combination of a completely arbitrary element, which for Engels
would be a result of the individual imagination, and an objective element
constituted by preexisting social perspectives or conceptions (Anschauun-
gen), which express (ausdruck) real social relations. These perspectives are
always already invested in a certain interest or position ("positiv oder ne-
gativ, bestiitigend oder bakiimpfand''). We are thus led to believe that if the
specific modality of the ideas of ideology is to appear in the form of "eternal
truths," universal and ahistorical, then it is precisely because they represent
a political value judgment, a sanctioning of the existing social order, which
goes forth masked.
This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the model for
ideological discourse (ideologues and philosophers a la Diihring plagiarize
their ideas from it, while vaunting their theoretical "originality") is the
juridical discourse that turns on liberty, equality, justice, the rights and
obligations of people, contractual relations, relations ofviolence, and so on.
Engels returns here to a habitual theme of Marx's critique, one that joins
the economic critique and the political critique in making juridical ideology
the kernel of all bourgeois philosophical ideology. 20 Within this arrangement,
the term "ideology" stands only for the misunderstanding, or the illusion,
implied by these secondary characteristics. Ideology, by definition, does not
admit of any historical effectivity, apart from its blocking knowledge and
consciousness of the real movement; ideology is "pure" ideas.
Another term surfaces, however, alongside this critique: world-
view. It is remarkable that Engels never gives it a general definition. Clearly
it has been borrowed; in fact, it is an imported term. Even more than
ideology, it is a word whose currency is widespread and riddled with al-
lusions to the philosophical issues of Franco-German history. 21 But prior
to the diffusion of Marxism, worldview had never figured as a systematic
concept. In the Anti-Duhring, and simultaneously in a series of other articles,
published or otherwise (particularly those exhumed between the wars under
the title Dialectics of Nature), there is not only an attempt to counteract
"ideology" (and idealism) with a "scientific" and "materialist worldview"
but also the means of truly revealing it for what it is, the "communist world-
view that we (will) represent, Marx and I, in quite a large number of do-
mains" (which, taken literally, implies that others could represent it, too,
in their own way, in other domains).
The goal of this project poses an immediate problem. In oppo-
sition to the idealism of bourgeois ideology which vindicates the existing
order, the idea of a communist and materialist worldview constitutes itself
within the critical recurrence ofMarx's theory-a theory of exploitation and
the state. It is the fact of this theory that sustains it. From then on, we find
173
ourselves running counter to the theses of The German Ideology. Even when
these terms and propositions are taken up again (or rediscovered), the point
ofreference (and the perspective on the structure and functions of ideology)
has clearly been radically displaced-to the other end of the philosphical
spectrum-from practice (and pure practice at that) to theory, or to historical
materialism as a science of social production and class struggle.
One insistent theme, developed specifically in the fragments of
Dialectics of Nature, conveniently maps out this reversal of perspective: a
history of thought (des Denkens), the trajectory and principal stages of which
Engels tries to chart. Whereas in The German Ideology thought has no
history of its own, now the logic of this history gives its content to the
materialist-communist worldview and allows the historical necessity of
idealizations of ideology to be understood. In an ultrapositivist way, the
Marx of The German Ideology denies philosophy any knowledge value and
any historical positivity. Engels now takes the opposite position. If he is
hesitant to qualify as philosophy (or materialist philosophy)22 the com-
munist worldview, whose kernel is the theory of history "discovered" by
Marx, he nonetheless sees philosophy as a legitimate domain ("the laws and
operations of thought"), and, above all, he describes the birth of the theory
of history in terms of an essential relation to philosophy and its history.
The materialist worldview is not, in this respect, a radical shift of ground,
an absolute antithesis of all philosophy. If it succeeds in going beyond the
categories of philosophical thought, then it is because it comes out of them,
in the dual sense of an origin and an issue, or rather because it comes out
of their contradictions. So there are contradictions in philosophy (and con-
sequently in good dialectics. Even if philosophy is not itself the real, there
is a reality in philosophy. Engels says as much in his later, improved reading
of Hegel: all that is contradictory is real).
To put it another way, materialism, or some materialism (even
in the form of its inversion and its denegation), is necessarily present within
this history ofthought in the form of an element always already constitutive
of philosophy. The history of thought, of which philosophy is a kind of
concentrate, is the struggle for and against materialism. In contrast to The
German Ideology, for which only practice is materialist in the true sense,
it is now necessary to posit that there is a theoretical materialism (well prior
to historical materialism).
Let us not join those who have hastened to label this new dis-
course ofEngels as regressive. Such a way of posing the problem of relations
between theory and practice, or materialism, regardless of its own difficul-
ties, is much less speculative than a way that directly identifies practice with
reality in making it equivalent to the purely revolutionary act and establishes
ideology (if not all theory) on the level of illusion or nonbeing. At least in
this new arrangement a place (that of discourse?) is set aside for the con-
frontation between revolutionary practice and ideological domination, cut-
ting across the opposition of worldviews and the interference between the
history of thought and the history of class struggles. If materialism is a
specific relation between theory and practice, one ought to be able to see it
in theory itself.
As we will see, this modification is linked to new political con-
ditions within the workers' movement. But it is also clear that it is ordained
by the unimpeachable "fact" of Marx's production of a theory of class
174
 Etienne Balibar
struggle. The first concept of ideology ran up against the difficulty of thinking
of the classical economic theory targeted by Marx's critical project at the
beginning of the 1850s as a science, or even as a nonscience. The second
concept of ideology and its antithesis, the worldview, constitutes an initial
attempt to come to terms with the scientific consequences of this critique
and its implications, as much in the field of theory (the identification of
juridical and anthropological presuppositions of bourgeois economy) as in
the practical field of proletarian revolution (the passage from the moral
idealism of utopian socialism to the mass politics of scientific socialism,
transcending the abstract alternatives oflaw and violence, or anarchism and
state socialism, etc.).
A well-known term sums up this recasting of the Marxist prob-
lematic: dialectical materialism (or dialectical method). But does this am-
bivalent term (the later history of Marxism proves it) 23 not serve, again, to
camouflage a forced resolution? Is the idea of a "history of thought," sup-
porting this recourse to the dialectic, anything more than the result of con-
fusing two separate processes that are not strictly complementary and inev-
itably tend to drift apart-namely, a (political) history of ideologies and a
(theoretical) history ofworldviews? In Engels himselfthe immediate breakup
of this false identity is quite evident. The formulations I have just referred
to are only the beginning of a contradictory development, or a dual diver-
gence.
We must recall here the conditions that provided a proper time
and space (over twenty years) for Engels's theoretical reflections, straddling
the death ofMarx. At the outset, following the Commune and the dissolution
of the First International, the formation of workers' parties was on the
agenda. Conditions developed within the struggle of tendencies against an-
ticipated deviations, represented in anarchism, trade union syndicalism
(apolitical), nationalist state socialism (Lassalle) or its liberal form (a jur-
idical socialism we will hear more about; or, in France, "possibilism"). The
struggle for a revolutionary socialism and the hegemony of Marxist theory-
indeed, for control of the Social Democratic party-are effectively bound
together. However, from the 1880s on (after Marx's death), the situation is
reversed: already within German social democracy this hegemony has been
officially attained (and the Program of Erfurt sanctions it). Volume 1 of
Capital, reinstated by Engels himself within the more general historical
framework set forth in the Manifesto, is recognized as the theory of the
party, along with the interpretation of it put forward by the Anti-Duhring.
While the first texts by Engels (and the last by Marx) are written to inaugurate
and enforce Marxism, Engels's last are also written against it, because its
mission, even though incomplete, has been too successful. 24 They are written
as an attempt to rectify what, in the process of constituting a Marxist or-
thodoxy, appears from the start to be an idealization and an ideologization
of theory, as disturbing in its critical form (neo-Kantian: Bernstein) as in
its materialist form (Darwinian: Kautsky). As part of this realignment, could
there not also be an element of self-criticism, more or less avowed, directed
not only at Engels's own writing (since Bernstein and Kautsky insist they
became Marxists by reading the Anti-Duhring) but also at the "perverse"
effects of the (available) texts of Marx, along with their omissions or ex-
cesses?
175
 These reflections also anticipate the character of the crisis of
Marxism openly pronounced in the years immediately following Engels's
death. They are inscribed, moreover, within the compass of the same prac-
tical contradictions, the same dislocations (decalages). The contradictions:
on the one hand, the growth of the Socialist party, the strengthening of its
organization, and its trade union ties; on the other, its tendency to subor-
dinate itself to the "rules of the game" of bourgeois politics, drawn up by
the state, such that Engels fears Germany will repeat the English counter-
example (a "bourgeoisification" of the proletariat that fails to explain the
concept of the "workers' aristocracy"). The dislocations: between the theses
freshly culled from Capital concerning the development of class relations
in capitalist society and the consequences effectively borne out by the Great
Depression of the 1870s (the emergence of a finance capital and the first
signs of a social politics from the bourgeoisie, not easily reducible to the
simple formula of a "class which has become redundant"). 25
This displacement (Engels literally changes his position toward
Marxism, or, if you prefer, Marxism escapes him) is carried over into con-
ceptual revivals. The splitting up of the pair ideologyjworldview can be
taken as a symptom of the crisis. These concepts are wont to shift around:
arising out of an essentially epistemological problematic, they end up, in
the 1890s, being formulated in an essentially historical and political way
(one is tempted to say that they are now back where they started). Their
symmetry falls apart; they run alongside each other, becoming partly in-
terchangeable and, at the same time, partly incompatible.
The Failure of Engels's Epistemological Project
If Engels's first formulations, at the time of the Anti-Duhring and
Dialectics of Nature, are heavily drawn toward the epistemological, this is
not only a result of the theoretical "fact" represented by Capital; it is also
the effect of the ideological environment. Erkenntnistheoretisch, the adjec-
tive Engels uses, is the very word that for neo-Kantians qualifies the problem
of knowledge, which is not the case for Weltanschauung (or at least not
yet). 26 In the Anti-Duhring, Engels sets out by opposing to philosophy a
simple Anschauung der Welt; he then graduates to the idea of a Weltan-
schauung (or W eltau.ffassung), which takes into account the materialist as-
pect of philosophy, basing itself on a history of nature, of society, and of
thought-a worldview that must be "scientific" as much in its form as in
its content. This brings us back to the question of method, to a traditional
opposition between a system ofknowledge, phantasmically constructed, and
systematic knowledge, proceeding indefinitely, beyond any closure (Engels's
only originality here is to apply this distinction to Hegelian philosophy,
thereby showing that the dialectic transforms theoretical thought on the
condition that it transforms itself within this experimental proof). As for
the content, it leads us back to the laws of "internal connections" between
things, discovered by science, and to the general "law of evolution," which
it eventually articulates for each specific domain (the examples of Laplace,
Helmholtz, Darwin, and Marx). If philosophy as Engels practices it does
not lay the foundations for these laws, then it reflects their analogy and their
common antithesis to the metaphysics of nature (in this, Engels is clearly
more Aristotelian than Kantian). The idea of the history of thought is thus
established; it stands for the claim that, in history, "materialism" and "di-
176
 Etienne Balibar
alectic" reciprocally imply each other. Each is a means of developing the
otherY
Engels's argument is obviously neither conclusive nor free of
vacillation (particularly over the definition of philosophy). However, it is
plainly not vulgar, and certainly not scientistic according to the criteria of
contemporary discourse. 28 Its basic features would have to be put to a prop-
erly positivist test, whereby it could be seen that any significant agreements
point, nonetheless, to an entirely different attitude toward tendencies, one
that generally disavows a conception of the relation between theory and
practice (and, consequently, the status of a "science of politics") in the
positivist mode of a simple exteriority, as a prediction or application, im-
plying the primacy of theory. A more delicate question is that of the relations
between Engels's epistemological project and post-Darwinian "evolutionist"
ideology. Whenever he characterizes the dialectical element of worldview,
Engels always harkens back to the Darwinian example, the analogy between
the discovery of a "historical law of nature" and Marx's own "natural law
of history," as well as the analogy between these two discoveries, on the
one hand, and the historicism of Hegel, on the other (they share the basic
idea of process). More seriously, this same Engels, who openly challenges
social Darwinism (in the often cited letter to Lavrov, for example, dated
November 12, 1875), does not think twice about applying pseudo-Darwinian
models of the "natural selection of ideas" to the history of Christianity and
socialism (he was neither the first nor the last to take this path so well worn
today).
We can observe in this the undeniable effects of the attraction
exercised on Engels's thought by that of Haeckel-the first, it appears, to
have used the phrase "struggle between two worldviews" -one monist, me-
chanist, even materialist; the other dualist, finalist, and spiritualist-in his
History of Natural Creation (1868). If Engels does not employ the technique
Haeckel made the cornerstone of his evolutionism, 29 the "fundamental law
of biogenetics," or the "theory of the recapitulation of phylogeny by on-
togeny" (could it be that he really thought it too "mechanistic"?), he none-
theless retains the idea of the principle of evolution as a passage from inferior
to superior, in the sense of an increasing complexity, by shifts at levels of
organization. Written into this law is the passage from natural to human
history and the differentiation therein (from life to work, from work to
language and consciousness). Hence, the linking of Darwin with Marx-one
a theorist of the descent of humankind, the other a theorist of the necessity
of the passage from capitalism to socialism-results in founding the latter
upon the increasing mastery over nature (by way of science, social planning).
So the proletariat is not only "heir to classical German philosophy," it is
heir to the full range of evolution, in short, the Son of Man (not, of course,
theological Man, but "natural" Darwinian Man). 30
If we are obliged to take this tendency seriously-one well and
truly present in Engels, which will be dominant for a good part of his pos-
terity-it is because it goes hand in hand with a countertendency that is,
perhaps paradoxically, manifest in the very way he rediscovers Hegel and
reverts to his dialectic, itself surely "evolutionist" though irreducible to the
model of biological evolutionism. The idea of history conceived as evolu-
tionary law, though heavy with consequences, only temporarily provides
Engels with the structure of his materialist dialectic-through its relation to
177
 a specific worldview or image: the fixed or mechanistic structure of natural
science, the political philosophy, and the metaphysics of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. This critique, however, very quickly changes its
tune. Having used the weapons of evolutionism against the fetish of fixity
(le fixisme), it directs the firepower of its Hegelian references (and occa-
sionally Fourierist ones) against the transformation of evolutionism and, in
its turn, into a metaphysics or a system. For Engels, the idea of evolutionary
law never works alone; it is always accompanied by its opposite number,
which defines the dialectic through contradiction. Evolutionism ignores this
completely (including Darwin and, most of all, Haeckel). Contradiction,
however, is not the "struggle to survive."
The importance of Hegel's thought, according to Engels, though
he cannot establish its laws, lies in its positing the whole world (natural and
social) as a process and wholly identifying this process with its intrinsic
structure, the internal sequence of a set of contradictions. In Engels's sense,
a dialectical law, holding sway within the material conditions specific to it
and with which it interacts (Wechselwirkung), does not express the conti-
nuity of a developing order or plan (belonging, implicitly, to a subject) but
rather the moments of a contradiction or the phases of an antagonism. Here
we must grasp as important the thesis that explicitly calls for the world to
be thought of not as a "complex of things" but as a "complex of processes,"
that is, a complexity without a preexisting or final identity.
Though the results of this investigation were later to be presented
as a "coherent" system, I do not think that it would be tenable; yet it must
be judged in context. Ultimately, Engels can be seen here playing off one
teleology against another (and under the circumstances, we should not be
surprised by the political and theoretical ambiguity that results when, in the
name of his dialectical explanation of the tendency toward socialism-the
source for which is Marx's famous phrase about the "expropriation of the
expropriaters" as a "negation of a negation" -he finds himself cornered once
more by the insoluble problem of a nonteleological conception of the end
of the state, which would not be the end of history). However, if we want
to accept, as a working hypothesis, the general inevitability of evolutionism
as a nineteenth-century scientific ideology, 31 we will have to call attention
to both the theoretical impasse caused by this recourse to Hegel in the
constitution of a materialist worldview and the singular place it occupies,
historically, between the official bourgeois evolutionism of the nineteenth
century (notably, that which will inspire Kulturkamp.f) and the Darwinian
Marxism of social democracy. Engels's efforts then take on the air of a long-
awaited critique of evolutionism at the heart ofthe workers' movement and
Marxism itself.
Engels, however, seems to have considered this untenable, an
indication of which is the failure and abandonment of the theoretical proj-
ects whose fragments are collected in Dialectics of Nature. Our understand-
ing of this stems from the paradox inherent in the idea of such a history of
thought: indeed, the more Engels adds to his empiricist proclamations (e.g.,
all thought comes from experience, or social experience), the more it appears
his history of thought is fundamentally autonomous, with its own preex-
isting logic, and consonant with a composite dialectical structure that does
not come from experience but from the idealist tradition! As if by chance,
this structure always falls back upon the Trinitarian model of the familiar
178
 Etienne Balibar
adventures of the dialectic and posits materialism, hence the materialist and
communist worldview, as the end of the process. And it happily falls in
with Engels's own critique of Hegel, with respect to the system and the
Absolute Spirit. Could communism-materialism not be another name for
Absolute Spirit? How can one not ask oneself this question? 32
Above all, Engels assumes that the materialist world view is iden-
tical to the communist one. What justifies his identifying them? To say that
the latter is the attainment of materialism, through Marx, as a science of
the historical necessity of communism, only provides a mirror image ofthe
question. It can be said that the communist worldview will necessarily be
materialistic because it bases itself on extending the contemporary scientific
method, culminating in the articulation oflaws of evolution, to history and
politics. But it can also be said that materialism, basically, stands for nothing
other than this configuration of principles: communism + science = ma-
terialism. What seems to be missing here is a specifically political compo-
nent, one both internal to the theory and necessarily implicated in its his-
tory.JJ
But where do we go to look for this lack-to the materialist side
or the communist side? Which of these two terms suggests a class point of
view, and who can thus add it to science without it being a "foreign addi-
tion"? In fact, two historical structures, fundamentally at odds with each
other, layered one on top of the other, are at stake here. The first is that of
the adventures of the dialectic, from its Greek origins to its completion in
historical materialism. The second is that of the struggle between materi-
alism and idealism throughout the history of thought. Each of these cate-
gories, considered alone, can be read in a perfectly idealistic way, as an
expression of the autonomy of thought.
What would authorize another reading would be to understand
each of these categories, and each in relation to the other, as expressing a
political determination, the very instance of the class struggle. This would
involve saying, on the one hand, that materialism in different historical
epochs expresses resistance to the established order, the struggle of the op-
pressed and the exploited, in order to understand how the history of the
dialectic, intersected by this struggle, ends up precisely in a theory of ex-
ploitation and the advent of communism. It would involve demonstrating,
on the other hand (Engels occasionally suggests this, or do we foist this
interpretation on him?), that the first form of the dialectic, the Greek one,
is organically linked to the emergence of the class-state in the ancient city
and that its ultimate form (representing, to some extent, its immanent self-
criticism) is aimed at thinking the disintegration of that bond, the end of
the state and its classes. Then we would have an explanation of how the
relation between materialism and idealism is inverted before our eyes; how,
for the first time, the struggle of the exploited ceases to assume the simple
form of an endless resistance or rebellion, or of a stepping-stone toward a
new order of domination; how, for the first time, the consciousness of the
struggling class ceases to be idealistic (or utopian) and how the theory of
this struggle can be identified with materialism, with the thinking of the
real movement. However, for this interpretation, or the closest alternative,
to lead us effectively away from any preestablished plan, we would need a
complete history of the "class struggle within theory" and its necessary
material conditions. The relationship between materialism and the class
179
struggle would no longer seem naturally given or guaranteed; it would be
produced as an encounter, fusion, or conflict within the determined con-
ditions on which its modalities depend. But if Engels's assumption implicitly
encompasses this historical problem, it also calls an immediate halt to any
attempt at concrete analysis.
State, Masses, Ideology
If this analysis is correct, we are in a better position to judge the
new definition of ideology that Engels puts forward in Ludwig Feuerbach
and the End of Classical German Philosophy ( 1888). Engels's new definition
is the result of ten years of trial and error, a process manifest in his recti-
fication of and reaction against the nascent Marxism I have set out above. 34
This detailed definition begins with the critique of the Hegelian
dialectic, showing that the contradiction of materialism and idealism must
be thought of as immanent. An idealism can itself be historical; one must,
however, distinguish idealism from the "ideological process" in general. The
ideological process (a formulation appearing in Ludwig Feuerbach) is more
general than idealism, which is only a necessary, but derivative, effect of
the ideological process within specific conditions:
Some ideologies, even more refined, even more distant
from their material and economic base, take the form
of philosophy and religion. Here it is the correspond-
ence of representations with their conditions of ma-
terial existence which becomes increasingly complex,
increasingly extenuated by the links in between. But
it exists nonetheless.... once constituted, each ide-
ology is developed on the base of given elements of
representation and goes on to develop them. Other-
wise it would not be an ideology; i.e., use ideas as
autonomous entities that develop on their own and
are subject solely to their own laws. That the condi-
tions ofthe material existence of men, in whose minds
this mental process takes place, determine its course
in the last instance, remains for them a necessarily
unconscious fact, or else all ideology would be at an
end.
It is clear that ideology is a system of differences, a chain of mediations.
The opposition of practice to ideology takes the form of a relation (the
unconscious last instance) between two histories, one of which (that of sec-
ondary ideological elaborations) is inserted into the other (that of econom-
ics) by way of a materialist birth.
None of this would move us beyond a well-worn empiricism were
it not for the way Engels attaches this definition to a new conception of the
state. The birth of ideological forms is mediated essentially by the history
offorms of the state apparatus ("the State is the foremost ideological power").
What we have again (as in The German Ideology, which Engels had just
reread in manuscript, salvaged from the "nibbling rats") is at once a theory
of the state and a theory of ideology. Yet their respective articulation has
changed. In The German Ideology, ideology is formally anterior to the state,
180
 Etienne Balibar
since it arises directly out of the division of labor at the base of the devel-
opment of civil bourgeois society. In substance, however, it is no different
from the state itself (which is to say, alienation): they are mirror images of
the same critique of political illusion. Strictly speaking, the bourgeois state
is itself only an ideological form, its material base being the division of
intellectual and manual labor.
In Ludwig Feuerbach, there is a tendency to recognize a real
complexity of the state, not only because it assumes both the general, pro-
ductive functions of society and the coercive role of a class-state but also
because it recapitulates or condenses all the historically anterior forms of
domination (whereas the capitalist production relation actually effaces the
past). This singular reality of the state apparatus in history raises the ques-
tion of a (re)production of ideology by the state, or at least in strict complicity
with the existence of the state, by means of those institutions that have a
"statist" disposition (like the medieval Church). Only through this statist
mediation is the relation to social antagonisms established, the result being
the state, autonomized as a class apparatus. Only this internal relation to
the state explains why the organization of ideology ultimately tends to man-
ufacture dogmas or systems that ratify their own specific logic-if not their
own axiomatics-giving them the illusory appearance of truth. In effect, no
state is viable that does not suppress the contradiction in germ within every
difference, in the unified interests of a dominant discourse. This relation,
finally, enables the mapping of a topography of ideological regions (religious,
juridical, moral, philosophical); it shows that in each social formation the
articulation and hierarchy of these regions changes. When a new class be-
comes dominant and the state apparatus changes form, a new ideological
form likewise becomes dominant, which means that it imposes its own logic
on other forms after the fashion of its "enlightenment" (a metaphor inspired
by Hegel). Thus, every revolt against the state, subject to this determining
dominant system, necessarily starts as a heresy.
But this definition of ideological forms is not a given in itself. It
fulfills a well-defined role-to resolve, in a materialist and scientific manner,
the question of the historical movement (geschichtliche Bewagung) and its
motor forces (Treibkriifte), otherwise known as the reciprocal problem of
the reduction of an ideology to its material base. 35 Engels thus comes to
terms with what, since Machiavelli and Hegel, has been a classical question,
one that is typically ideological, namely, the relation between "individuality
and the mass" (and even the relation between the individual, the masses,
and the leaders: the repetition of the Napoleonic origins of the concept of
Fuhrer). Engels tries to solve this by combining two preexisting theoretical
components: first, the whole gnosiological construction of the inverted ide-
ological image as a means of explaining how, in people's minds, interests
become ideas, then motives, and finally desires; second, the statistical con-
struction of the composition of individual wills, which explains why people
desire some determined outcome but end up with something altogether
different. The conjuncture of these two components makes ideological forms
the fundamental explanation of the Ruckwirkung the process of reflexive
determination (action en retour) by which the historical process defines itself.
What is important here is not so much the fact that ideology acts reflexively
(agisse en retour) upon its base but, more fundamentally, that ideology is,
181
in its own right, the median term of the historical process or of the image
that society constructs of itself, which forever generates its historicity. 36
Whatever the validity or originality of Engels's constructions,
they conclude with an irrefutable judgment: the concept of ideology can be
both an instrument for the differential analysis of social formations and an
organic component of the theory ofhistory. It follows that the same concept,
thus defined, can be tracked down and pinpointed theoretically within his-
torical materialism. Yet this conclusion is tautological. In reality, there was
no historical materialism beyond a critique of ideology (The German Ide-
ology) and of political economy (Capital) until the time had come for raising
the question of the relation between the economic, political, and ideological
"instances." It is crucial that we recognize this problem as that of the his-
torical relation between the masses and the state.
Historical materialism for Engels is neither the single concept of
class struggle, nor even the correspondence of ideology with class relations,
but the articulation of a series of concepts: class, state, masses, ideology.
That the class struggle is the "motor of history" and that it is "the masses
who make history" still does not represent a solution but, rather, the problem
itself. In the conjuncture of what one can analyze as "the classes" (antag-
onism) and "the masses" (or mass movements), Engels attempts to define
what should be understood as ideology: if the masses in their "being" are
nothing other than a class-or, rather, do not exist as real individuals other
than as individuals of specific classes-their mode of historical existence
cannot be reduced to that of classes.
Just as Rousseau asked himself What makes a people a people?
and answered by way of the contract and its distinctive ideality (or its
symbolic form), Engels ponders What is it that constitutes the masses as
the masses? and answers by way of ideology and its distinctive uncon-
sciousness, linking it to a materialist birth in which the state represents the
instance of the class struggle. On the political scene, where regimes come
and go historically, the classes are not introduced in person, in the abstract,
but as masses and mass movements, always already subject to the reflexive
effect of ideology. It is this last moment that represents the concrete instance
of politics.
In spite of what has just been suggested, however, it would be
wrong to believe that the concept of ideology, defined in this way, actually
enables Engels to solve the ongoing problem concerning the relation between
the scientific theory of historical materialism and proletarian political prac-
tice, or the organization of the class struggle in the form of the party. This
solution would only support, hie et nunc, a distinction between a revolu-
tionary politics "leading to a great historical transformation" and a simple
"tempest in a teapot," which applies to what the theoretical formulation of
Ludwig Feuerbach always returns to in its reduction of the ideological makeup
of the masses to the sum of individual variables (une resultante des mobiles).
It also applies to two expressions that, within this problematic, are more
impossible than ever: that of materialist ideology and proletarian ideology,
since each implies the other and, if not the existence of a proletarian state,
then at least the constitutive role played by the existing state in their for-
mation. If there is an ideology of the proletariat, it is either a nonideology
(Illusionslosigkeit) or the dominant ideology itself, surviving in the delayed
consciousness or miraculously turned against the state which (re)produces
182
 Etienne Balibar
it. Engels thus, on the one hand, has a principle for explaining the historical
movement in terms of ideology; and on the other, he has a revolutionary
force devoid of ideology, which, in this sense, is not a force. 37
"Neither God, nor Caesar, nor Tribune"
One would think that it is in order to solve this problem from
another angle that Engels embarks on a new attempt to define "worldview."
The most interesting text from this point of view is probably the article he
co-wrote with Kautsky in 1887, "Juridical Socialism," attacking the theses
of Anton Menger. 38 Engels's argument rests on a comparison among the
"three great world-views": medieval, bourgeois, and proletarian.

The medieval world-view was essentially theologi-

cal. ... it is Catholicism which constitutes the unity
of the Western European world, made up of devel-
oping peoples in a constant relation of reciprocity. This
unification (Zusammenfassung) was not simply an ideal
product (ideell). It was an effective (wirklich) unifica-
tion ... thanks to the feudal, hierarchical organization
of the Church.... It was the Church, with its feudal
landed property, which constituted the real (rea/e) link
between different nations, and which lent its religious
consecration to the wordly order of the feudal State.
The clergy, after all, were the only cultivated class of
the period. It went without saying that all thought had
for its origin and base (Basis), the dogma of the Church.
Law, natural science, and philosophy were each reg-
ulated in accordance with the content of the teachings
of the Church.

Engels goes on to note that the power of the mercantile bourgeoi-

sie was built out of the very substance of feudalism. The Reformation,

in its theoretical aspect was no more than a series of

efforts on the part of the bourgeoisie, urban plebeians,
and peasants in revolt, to adapt the old theological
world-view to the transformation of economic con-
ditions and conditions of existence of the new classes.
The banner of religion was waved for the last time in
seventeenth-century England, but, scarcely fifty years
later, the new world-view made its appearance in
France in all of its purity as the juridical world-view.
It was to become the classical bourgeois view. It was
a lay version (Verweltlichung) of the theological view:
in place of divine right was human right, in place of
the Church was the State. Those economic and social
relations that had been presented as creations of dogma
and of the Church that sanctioned them were now
represented as based on the law, and as a creation of
the State.
183
 This is explained, Engels argues, by a threefold activity: the universalizing
of exchange, which requires fixed contractual form in accordance with state
norms; free trade, which imposes the watchword of equality for all before
the law; and the struggles of the bourgeoisie for political power, which, since
the bourgeoisie is up against privilege, has to take the form of demands for
its rights. All that, let us note, is very general but seems incontestable.
Against these two worldviews of the historical ruling classes, En-
gels posits the proletarian worldview, which is "in the process of taking over
the world" through socialism, and the strengthening of the working-class
movement (Lenin and Gramsci would say that it has a tendency to become
hegemonic). This idea appears to differ from the outline of the history of
ideology sketched out in Ludwig Feuerbach only by way of a substitution
of terms. But the substitution is enough to do away with the obstacle that
the concept of ideology encounters: it clears a space for the proletariat. We
can now speak of a proletarian worldview that would be to the class struggle
of the proletariat what the juridical world view had been for the bourgeois
class struggle: its weapon and its justification. We thereby move, it seems,
away from an account of the reproduction of ideological dominations (in
which, to be frank, they are all substantially the same, insofar as they le-
gitimate the existing order) toward an account of transformation in which
the relation to the state could be inverted. Thus, the conflict of worldviews,
according to their content and the nature of the classes that hold them,
would not be limited to adjusting the various configurations of a game of
ideological regions (or discourses of domination, which buttress each other)
but would overturn their effects.
Have we actually gotten any further? Perhaps not. In describing
the "prolonged struggle" between two worldviews, bourgeois juridical and
communist proletarian, as the form of the actual class struggle, Engels shows
us that the latter has a necessary place in history. It is important that his
demonstration is wholly based on the reaffirmation of the existence ofjur-
idical ideology, which is always stubbornly denied, even among the critics
of the school of natural law. It is also symptomatic that this demonstration
now has as its counterpart the eclipse of the very term "ideology. " Engels
seems to be in a quandary about defining the proper content ofthe proletarian
worldview with a term comparable to "theological" and "juridical," which
characterize its two precedents. He stubbornly agonizes over these difficul-
ties, as is evident in the description he offers for the transition of the bour-
geois worldview to the proletarian worldview. He condenses and clarifies
the analysis of utopian socialism proposed in Anti-Duhring by identifying
two stages. Socialist ideas first appear in a form itself juridical by turning
against the bourgeoisie its own watchword and ideal of equality. Then they
appear in a humanist and implicitly "moral" form that sanctions the critique
of juridicalism but rejects all politics considered to be bourgeois (this cor-
responds very nicely to the themes of the early writings of Marx and Engels
themselves). We can see what this transition actually leads to, with the
experience of the revolutions and the growth of the workers' movement:
the recognition ofthe political nature ofclass struggle, denied by all previous
worldviews, for which politics is rather the suppression of class struggle (but
not, of course, the classes themselves). Thus, it is not an a priori deduction
but its very history that would provide us with the key to the unique "con-
184
 Etienne Balibar
tent" of the proletarian view, which would let us know another theory and
another political practice. 39
For all the worldviews, it always comes back to an idea of politics
(or a political idea), "for all class struggle is political," as was already sug-
gested in the Manifesto (what was earlier called a "materialism of politics").
However, in the case of feudalism and the bourgeoisie, politics appears in
different forms and under different names (religious or juridical) that sub-
limate and disguise it. In a number of texts from the same period (prepa-
ratory to his work in The Origin of the Family), Engels uses a remarkable
phrase to describe the process of displacement toward certain goals, oflateral
objectives (Nebenzwecke, Nebendinge) "tangential" to the fundamental
problem of class struggle. This suggests that politics, in its essence, is not
juridical, contrary to what is always assumed, for the sake of argument, in
the humanist works of his youth or in The German Ideology. The juridical
is itself a political disguise, one of the means of sidetracking political activity
that detours toward these Nebenzwecke, either fictional or real. What would
characterize the proletarian worldview, to the extent of lifting statist con-
straints, would be the recognition of politics itself as a directly political
form, without any displacement or diversion.
This argument only appears to be tautological, for the class strug-
gle, in the last analysis, has a precise stake in it. Engels enters here into the
whole consideration of communism, precipitated by the Commune, whose
blueprint Marx has already provided (particularly in the Critique of the
Gotha Program): communism is a politics of labor, not only as a struggle
of workers aspiring to "government by the working class," but, more pro-
foundly, as a redefinition and recomposition of politics starting from the
very activity of labor, as a reciprocal transformation of politics by labor
and labor by politics. This is what I have proposed elsewhere as the second
concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Marx and Engels-a new
form of politics, not a simple revolutionary strategy for seizing power. 40
This reading of Engels's historical project assumes that we also
might put an end to the ambiguity of the term "domination," present as
much in the expression "dominant ideology" as in "dominant worldview."
Until this point, paradoxically, Engels has always treated the proletarian
worldview, that of the exploited, in a manner strictly parallel to that of the
exploiters (apologists for slavery, serfdom, capitalism). In describing and
historically placing this revolutionary worldview, he anticipates the fictional
moment when it will, in turn, come to be dominant and "take over the
world." Is it not just this anticipation that curtails any analysis of the or-
ganization of the class struggle corresponding to a proletarian worldview,
precisely by constantly shuttling it back and forth between the statist analogy
and its abstract antithesis, from the "party-state" to the "anti-state" party?
Indeed, according to the logic of Engels's historical account, one would need
to have an institution or an organization corresponding, on the part of the
proletariat, to what the church or state had been in order to satisfy this
function of theoretically developing the "class point of view" expressed by
the worldview. To say that this institution is the "revolutionary party"
(which Engels does not) would be to give a name to the process it suggests,
that of an "affinity" or "correspondence" between what goes on in the mind
of the proletariat during the class struggle and what Marx's mind produced:
a materialist conception of history. But this would be to run the risk, as the
185
anarchists point out, of perpetuating a political form that does not break
with the historical inheritance of forms of domination.
Religion and "The Thought of the Masses"
Engels seeks to bring about this theoretical change by representing
the masses not from above but from below, in the light of their own "con-
victions" (what he designates, in the preface to the English edition of So-
cialism: Utopian and Scientific, as a "creed," translated as credo). However,
he is only able to do this in an indirect way, through a comparison between
the history of socialism and that of Christianity. Let us reread, from this
standpoint, one of his last texts, the "Contribution to the History of Prim-
itive Christianity," from 1894 to 1895. 41 There he expresses satisfaction in
discovering in Renan (of whom he has a rather low opinion) a comparison
between the groups formed by the first Christians during the decadent Ro-
man Empire and the modem "sections of the workers International," a
comparison he intends to resurrect in order to shed light on the history of
modem socialism by way of the Christian example. It is not enough to
identify the base of political class unity with the revolt of the exploited,
enslaved, or wage laborers; it remains to show how that base is produced
out of the multiplicity of groups, sects, and rival organizations, and to de-
scribe the way in which, faced with exploitation, they represent to them-
selves salvation, the hopes and struggles that both unite them and perpetuate
their divisions, which are properly the objects to be explained in examining
revolutionary mass movements. As opposed to the Jacobin model, it is the
Church or ("pre-Constantinian" Christianity) that here stands for, as is often
the case in the German philosophical tradition, the antithesis of the statist
imperium and the autonomous form of the organization of social con-
sciousness.
··rn fact," writes Engels,
the struggle against a world which, from the outset,
has the advantage of power, and the simultaneous
struggle of the innovators among themselves, are com-
mon to both the primitive Christians and the social-
ists. The two great movements are not made by leaders
and prophets-though there is no shortage of prophets
in either-they are movements of the masses. And all
mass movements necessarily begin in confusion be-
cause all "thought ofthe masses" (Massendenken) pro-
ceeds by way of contradictions, since it lacks clarity
and coherence (sich zuerst in Widerspruchen, Unklar-
heiten, Zusammenhangslosigkeit bewegt); they are
confused still, precisely on account of the role played
by their prophets in the beginning.
And later:
From where did the first Christians draw their recruits?
Chiefly from "the worked and the over-worked,"
members of the lowest social echelons, as befits a rev-
olutionary group.... There was absolutely no com-
186
 Etienne Balibar
mon path to liberation for so many diverse elements.
For each, paradise lost was behind them .... What was
the solution, the sanctuary, for these oppressed and
impoverished slaves? What was the common way out
(Ausweg) for these different human groups, with di-
vergent and often opposing interests? There was cer-
tainly a need to find one, and it had to be one single
great revolutionary movement to embrace them all.
The solution exists, but not in this world. As things
stood, it could only be a religious solution. A new
world was discovered.
Early Christianity is truly a primitive communism.
These texts, the sheer extreme of Engels's speculations, are not
without their relevance, even a historical one; but they are clearly circular,
presupposing what they set out to demonstrate. What they no doubt pro-
claim, and in no uncertain terms, is that "the masses think," that the pro-
letarian worldview is nothing other than the thought of the masses, whose
specific content (what we term the "politics of labor") is not the result of
a simple configuration of the class struggle but represents the conclusion to
a long history (and a properly historical memory). In this sense, this thinking
is not that of individuals; it is not the sum of individual psychologies (in-
terests/motives/desires). Does this show the influence of social psychology,
of the sort for which, at this time, certain reactionary theorists are drawing
up a program?42 I say no, since we do not find in Engels any trace of the
two constitutive elements of such a psychology: neither the idea that the
constitutive process of the masses is its relation to a leader or an organizer
(meneur); nor the idea that the thought of the masses is, in the last analysis,
religious in the sense of a so-called elementary (archaic, primitive) religiosity
that makes a periodic return in human social behavior. Rather, we find the
reverse, the idea that religious conviction, with its own ambivalence, is a
given historical form of the thought ofthe masses. This means that the line
of demarcation could not be clearly drawn without constructing a concept
of the unconscious, one different from the notion of a shadow cast-epis-
temologically or biologically-by consciousness; one that would theoretically
reflect both the imaginary of salvation and the interpellation of individuals
(if necessary, by themselves) as bearers of the collective, institutional iden-
tity of the group, the social movement.
Engels's comparison never really breaks free from the positivist
antithesis between illusion and reality, even when it willingly takes to task
the most simplistic and dogmatic forms. Already, his insistence upon the
heritage of classical German philosophy and utopian socialism in historical
materialism is at odds with the congenital scientism of the workers' party.
But it always refers only to abstract intellectual productions. In making of
socialism not only an analogue of primitive Christianity but also the distant
result of its transformation-through the revolutionary mass movements of
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the peasant wars, the utopias of the
English Levellers and Diggers, the struggle of the Fourth Estate in the French
Revolution-Engels inscribes the ideological relation to history within the
very content of the proletarian worldview, or, if you will, within the mode
of production of mass consciousness. But he only does this in order to
187
confirm an evolutionist view of that history: in the end, sufficient cause for
the transformation can always be found in the ..real conditions" of liber-
ation, that is, in the development of the productive forces and in the sim-
plification or the radicalization of class antagonisms by capitalism. If real
communism can grow out of imaginary communism, it is because these
conditions force the proletariat today to leave illusion behind; it is because
there actually exists a preestablished harmony between the impoverishment
of the masses, the radical absence of property among wage workers, and the
radical absence of illusions in Marxist theory. The political content of mass
thinking remains suspended within this preestablished harmony, which is
basically always that of a radical negativity and which requires all the ped-
agogical and organizational work of a party to bring it to the attention of
the world.
Ill
The trajectory we have mapped, from the formulations of the
young Marx to those of the later Engels, even if incomplete, helps to sketch
the problematic of ideology within early Marxism. We have seen both an
astonishing consistency, in the expression of an antithesis between the dom-
inant ideology and the revolutionary proletariat, and an uninterrupted series
of conceptual displacements, leading ultimately to a complete inversion of
the initial positions: from practice to theory, from speculation to history,
even from intellectuals (ideologues) to the masses (and their own thought).
I think we have also provided some of the materials for a critique. What
would the essential points of that critique be?43
Party Form and Class Identity
The theoretical problem of ideology has always been determined
by the same practical problem: that of the constitution of a revolutionary
force (or form). The constitutive role of the concept of ideology in historical
materialism corresponds to the emergence of the workers' movement as a
real force in the political field and to its polarizing effect there. Conversely,
the revival of the concept of ideology in the discourse of the social sciences
and of politics itself, even if it takes the form of a misappropriation, cor-
responds exactly to this polarizing effect. To begin with, the workers' move-
ment is the "foreign body" of politics; as such, it has to be expelled. Later,
when its inclusion within politics becomes an irreversible fact, it is the whole
of politics-discourse and practice-organized around its inescapable pres-
ence. As for the theme of the "end of ideologies" (or the "end of world-
views"), whether in a pragmatic and decisionist form or in a hypercritical
or skeptical form (designating the critique of dominant ideologies as ide-
ological in itself), it also corresponds, for more than half a century, to the
attempt to relativize this polarizing effect on the political field, and thus to
the attempt to find a political structure that would be situated beyond or
outside class struggles-and would therefore be more essential than class
struggles. 44
This confirms, then, that what is in question in the vicissitudes
of this theoretical problem are the problems posed by the institution of the
party form (/'institution de Ia forme parti) and the contradictions it harbors.
The history of the workers' movement, from the 1840s on, is a dialectic of
integration within and opposition to the party form. The workers' move-
188
 Etienne Balibar
ment-and thus the existence of a working class as a political force-has
never been able to constitute itself outside of the party form, no more than
it has been able to confine itself to the party form. In fact, the party form
contains an "impurity" or basic ambivalence that is responsible for its his-
torical efficacy and necessity: it is not only the form in which the workers'
movement resists assimilation into the dominant political model but also
the form in which it is thereby admitted or introduced into that model, in
order, eventually, to transform it, like the Trojan horse. That is why, when
the crisis of the party form develops historically within the workers' move-
ment (irreversible nowadays, even if its outcome is unclear), it is accom-
panied by a reconsideration of the Marxist (and anti-Marxist) discourse on
ideology and a deconstruction of the very concept of dominant ideology.
In part, this reconsideration also constitutes, if not a totally impracticable
"return to the origins," at least a reactivation of the internal difficulties
repressed in the constitutive moment of the concept. The history of the
problem of ideology, including when it simply repeats the oscillations of
the initial formulation, expresses in a privileged way the historical contra-
dictions of the party form (I do not say it reflects or explains them).
The position of Marx and Engels, from this point of view, is very
revealing. They already show a manifest tendency, as does the whole Marxist
tradition thereafter, to formulate a concept in order to be able to think the
class identity of the workers' movement and provide the working class with
a practical recognition of its own historical identity. This tendency is in-
scribed from the start in the idea of a transformation from class in itself to
class for itself. As opposed to the philosophical concept of class conscious-
ness, the idea of a proletarian world view describes this perspective and can
furnish it with a practical name. If that becomes inseparable from the goal
of constructing a party in such a way that the worldview of the proletariat
realizes itself as the conception of the party, it is because the proletarian
worldview only exists within the framework of a struggle against the dom-
inant worldview (or ideology), dissociating itself from the latter by way of
a periodically reaffirmed break. This is primarily because of the need to
provide a historical continuity for the class identity, which is a result of this
break. The continuity must go beyond the revolutionary conjunctures in
which it is most conspicuous, both for itself and, above all, for the ruling
class(es), conjunctures where the unity of the social body around a certain
form of the state is shown to be a fiction, if it is not shattered altogether. 45
From the catastrophism of 1840-50 to the evolutionism of the
last period, the theoretical work of Marx and Engels is aimed at a steady
distribution and accumulation, through a series of conjunctures, of the ir-
ruptive energy of revolutionary movements. It is aimed not only at tran-
scending the slackening effects of the counterrevolutionary phases, those in
which capitalism expands, but also at effectively anticipating the construc-
tion of new social relations. The base of this continuity is the industrial
revolution itself; its matter is formed in the meeting of exploitation with
class instinct and the proletarian revolt, but its form can only come out of
organization. 46 Party organization and worldview crystallize a relation of
forces, mediate an effective conquest of power and appropriation of knowl-
edge without which it would be silly to believe that the masses could ever
"make their own history." Under these circumstances class struggle within
society can be carried to the limits of the system and beyond.
189
 But is the position of Marx and Engels really as simple as this
facile continuity suggests? The impossibility of talking about a proletarian
ideology (as will be readily done later within the Socialist and Communist
parties) and the oscillation between the concepts of ideology and worldview
can be considered symptomatic. They redirect us toward the aporias also
present, in the same period, within the definition of the party form. What
remains unclear is the question of whether the conception of the party
articulated by Marx and Engels, along with their definition of proletarian
politics, ultimately represents nothing more than a critique of the different
concurrent tendencies at the heart of the workers' movement (particularly
the anarchist antistatist tendency and the statist tendency ofpost-Lassallean
social democracy). The strength of the Marxist position is that it exposes
the "fetishism of the State," as present in its abstract negations as in its
fantasies of pragmatic utility, and that it therefore clears an autonomous
space for the problem of the politics of the workers' movement. Its weakness
is in only being able to manifest this theoretical autonomy by way of a
permanent tactical compromise between those tendencies, or rather by way
of a political "art" of struggle on several fronts, as a function of the con-
junctures, at the very moment when the continuity of organization is being
reasserted as a guarantee of the correctness of this theoretical autonomy.
The same aporia can be seen-but with paradoxically prolific
consequences-in the difficulty Marx and Engels experience in occupying a
stable position inside the organization, in what could be called the economy
of the party form, as bearers of theoretical activity and scientific discovery
concerning class struggle. Everything happens as if the unity of theoretical
"core" and political "core," or the theoretical and strategic "direction" (a
unity denounced on suspicion by the anarchists, as the "dictatorship" of
Marx, thus providing ahead of time one of the elements of the future critique
of Marxist totalitarianism), had never been able to exist without immedi-
ately breaking apart again. In the period of the First International, Marx
was the strategic director of a very embryonic movement, but only as a
mediator and arbiter of conflicts between tendencies in the organization,
not as a theoretician of the mode of capitalist production. Any division thus
takes effect, in a sense, within Marx, within his own subjectivity. In the
period of social democracy, Marx and Engels were officially in charge ofthe
party's theoretical direction but not, strictly speaking, of its political direc-
tion, which was in the hands of the "organic intellectuals" of the party
apparatus with whom they found themselves in a constantly ambivalent
relation, sometimes of conflict and sometimes of reciprocal advantage on
the question of joining forces with the working masses. A series of well-
known historical incidents illustrates this contradiction.
We can no longer believe nowadays that this represents only a
historical delay, whether in the constitution of the working class as a col-
lective intellectual or in the proletarianization of political apparatuses, since
this contradiction is reproduced at each stage of the history of the workers'
movement and Marxism. That is why, no doubt, the theory of the party
form has never resolved the dilemmas of spontaneity and centralism, except
in some of the intuitive critiques of Lenin, Gram sci, and Mao, at the time
of its transformations, crises, and reworkings. In reality, the idea of the
intellectual direction of class struggle can only be divided up, constantly,
between the two discursive forms it must assume: program and theory. Each
190
 Etienne Balibar
is constituted as a way of engaging through thought the historical process
in action, but each is constructed from different points of view or different
conceptual rules of play. (Both are equally ways of responding to the de-
mands of politics-if need be, by addressing them directly, but from different
subjective positions). 47
The fact that Marx and Engels (just as, in their own way, Lenin
or Gramsci) are uncomfortable with the reduction of either of these positions
to the other, always preserving a residual disparity between them-or cov-
ering it up under the pressure of circumstances-explains their resistance to
the constitution of a political-theoretical dogma. In this context, the very
idea of scientific socialism still possesses for them a critical connotation-
and a democratic one in the strongest sense of the term. This is not an
example of taking advantage of science to legitimize a managerial role, let
alone the means of extending to a clique (or a caste) of Marxist intellectuals,
disciples ofthe author of Capital, the theoretical sanction they need in order
to establish a monopoly over political leadership. It is, rather, an attempt,
in the spirit of the Aufkliirung, to make available to the masses, or the base
itself, the instruments of its historical orientation against the rule ofleaders,
prophets, and other bosses. In this way, the theoretical core would tend to
be situated everywhere (as Pascal would have said), as a kind of noncenter.
However, if the unity of theoretical thought (science, philosophy) and the
thought of the masses is, indeed, the effect sought after by the proletarian
worldview, it remains to this day the object of a postulate, that is, the more
it remains empirically uncertain, the more it is affirmed as a unity of op-
posites.
Historicity without History
My proposal was to read as a symptom Marxism's conceptual
oscillation between ideology and worldview, the symptom of a practical
contradiction recurring throughout the history of the theory but also of a
blockage in theory itself, one with a progressively more immediate effect
on analyses of the state and the capitalist system. This blockage is quite
evident (for us) in most of the texts by Marx and Engels that bear on the
crisis, the wage form, syndicalism in its relations with proletarianization,
and the difference between reform and revolution. Finally, what is at issue
is the way Capital represents the historicity of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction.
The striking fact about the theoretical forms I have described is
that they never break free from either the metaphysical symmetry of truth
(or being) and illusion (or unreality), or from the political symmetry of
society and the state, even though the articulation of new definitions, and
the passage from one term to the other, is always presented in terms of an
attempt to transcend that symmetry. It could be that these two schema are
intrinsically related and that the problems they pose may in fact be the
same. 48
Because the expressive relation between society (or, more pre-
cisely, mercantile society) and state (as the organ of the "general functions"
of society and as the organization of the ruling class) finds itself under
interrogation, we can say that there is a fundamental incompatibility be-
tween historical materialism and this representation of a social system as
the superimposition of two spheres (economic and political, private and
191
public, base and superstructure, society and state, etc.) that derive from
philosophy and classical political economy. In the last analysis, it is the
Marxist concept of class struggle that contradicts this representation, in
rendering invalid any conception of history as the expression of society
within the state or the symmetrical absorption of the state within society.
The concept of ideology implies, in principle, the same critique. Finally,
however, each new definition reproduces in its own way the same symmetry
or dualism: it has only been displaced or formulated in a different way. The
concept of class struggle is thereby buried again underneath the problematic
of economy, political philosophy, and the classical philosophy of history.
Paradoxically, the concept of critique nullifies the effect of theoretical rup-
ture, or the epistemological break of historical materialism. Hence, the vac-
illation proper to the concept of ideology points toward and invites the
theoretical vacillation in Marxism between the before and the after, the
within and the beyond of a break with economic ideology and the bourgeois
ideology of history that it denounces.
Engels's formulation in Ludwig Feuerbach (one could say the
same about the analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital) points this out
in a rather significant way. Against an economist representation of history
in which the state is only the instrument of the ruling class in the class
struggle, and the latter, in turn, the expression of a law of correspondence
between relations of property and the development of productive forces,
Engels sketches the analysis of a disparity or a dialectical game, characterized
by the difference between the classes and the masses. In posing within the
sphere of ideology the question of the constitution of the masses as "motor
forces" of history, and defining the ideological process by way of its internal
relation to the state, he introduces a germ of conceptualization that would
carry us much further than the simple idea of a reflexive action of one
sphere on the other. The masses, as Engels sees it, obviously exceed the
sphere of the state, conceived as an apparatus of power, while determining
its concrete forms. To specify this internal determination of the mode of
ideological thought and of the state itself, it would be necessary either to
advance to "a broadening of the concept of State," causing it to encroach
structurally upon the sphere of society (this is Gramsci's method), or to try
to think an "action at a distance," an "absent causality" of the state within
the ideological process that characterizes the irreducible complexity of what
is called the state (this is Althusser's method). The interest of the latter, of
course, would be in supplementing Engels's insistence on the unconscious
nature of the ideological process. The unconscious would precisely express
this double instance, or double modality of the historical action of the ruling-
class state, at once immediately manifest within its coercive and adminis-
trative apparatus and indirect and invisible in its effect on the ideology of
the masses. This differential gap between consciousness and unconscious-
ness in the social and political struggle would thus designate the very ma-
teriality of ideology, its mode of historical action.
It is not difficult to see how the classical symmetry of society and
state is lodged at the heart of this definition of ideology. It is represented
there (very classically, for anyone who has read Hobbes and Hegel) by way
of an account of the "birth" of ideology based on individual interests. That
these interests are implicitly or explicitly defined as class interests, that they
are determined by the material conditions of labor and the existence of
192
 Etienne Balibar
individuals, changes nothing; far from it, since this birth wholly reproduces
the classical model of the formation of the "general interest" (or the "general
will") arising from the concurrence of individual interests. As we have seen,
this is the idea of the result or sum of variable forces (resultantes des var-
iables). In other words, Engels's concept of ideology revives, by virtue of
its theoretical form alone, if not its political content, the Hegelian conception
ofthe upheaval ofthe state arising out ofthe contradictions of civil society:
what Hegel christened "the cunning of reason."
In its form, the movement of the masses is to class antagonism
in Engels what the state is to civil society in Hegel: its dialectical transcend-
ence, or its active totalization. In both cases there is a birth of historical
individuality proceeding from the "infra-historical" individuality, that of the
economic classes and the empirical individuals they comprise. The very
thesis (also a watchword) according to which "it is the masses who make
history" therefore takes on a new light, as the equivalent of the role assigned
by Hegel to the "great men" (and we must remember that on this point
Engels felt it necessary to reduce the role of the "great men" to that of the
masses). Engels's construction suggests that the masses are the truly ''great
men" (of the state) of history; in this sense, it inverts the ideological, statist
theme that Hegelian philosophy has taken up. This inversion, however,
preserves its Hegelian theoretical structure: both the masses and ideology
function, respectively, like the "great men" and the "spirit of the people"
in Hegel, namely, as the "spirit of the age" realizing itself. The trajectory
in Engels (and Marx) that leads from class antagonism to communism through
the action of the masses (or their historical individuation) exactly parallels,
notwithstanding the difference in their contents, what in Hegel leads from
civil society to freedom within the state, through transcending the concur-
rence that expresses the individuality of the "great men." The myth of the
"great men" (Is it so original to the nineteenth century?) is replaced by a
corresponding myth of the masses. 49
Earlier on, I took up the paradox posed, on the one hand, by the
dynamics of mass movement in the sphere of ideology and, on the other,
by a revolutionary force without an ideology proper. One might add that
it is the concept of the movement of history that is at stake here. Perhaps
the paradox seems clearer now, for Engels's definition only had a temporary
use; the distance between classes and masses, that is, between two modes
of manifesting the same social reality (one passive, the other active; or one
as the "effect," the other as the "cause" of the transformation of social
relations) is in every case destined to collapse. In the historical movement
of the proletariat, masses and classes ultimately come together again.
Engels's comparison of primitive Christianity with socialism has
exactly the same consequences. On the one hand, there is the complexity
and irreducible heterogeneity of the "worked and the overworked," who
join forces in the imaginary hope of Christian salvation; and on the other,
there is the homogeneity and preexisting unity of the modem proletariat,
which alone constitutes the masses within bourgeois society. In the former
case, the distance remains an irreducible one; in the latter, it collapses. Again,
it is the thesis culled from the Manifesto (and projected onto the theory of
Capital, according to the evidence of Marx) of a historical simplification of
class antagonism that is responsible for this reduction. The ideology of the
proletarian masses can be homogeneous with a directly political class con-
193
sciousness and a scientific-materialist worldview because the modern form
of exploitation is the tendency to establish a single "norm of existence"
(Lebensstandard, says Engels), a "living wage" for everyone, and is the
submission ofthe great mass of individuals to a process of proletarianization
(and impoverishment) in which everyone becomes identical.
In this historical argument the theory of capitalist exploitation
reveals its own internal impasse. Marxism stumbles on a paradoxical lim-
itation-and it is a very serious one-of its representation of history, which
can be illustrated in a number of ways.
Historical materialism is based on the discovery of the historicity
of the capitalist mode of production and its corresponding economic cat-
egories: the relation between capital and wage labor is not "eternal"; pro-
duced historically, it must disappear under the effect of its internal contra-
dictions. However, what Marx never really considers (nor, with any ease,
do his successors} 50 is a history of capitalism in which the relation between
capital and wage labor (hence the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat, and the very composition of the classes) would take on new
forms, still based on the accumulation of capital, commodity exchange, and
the purchase of a labor force but qualitatively different from those that gave
rise to the first industrial revolution. This failure is quite clear in Capital
itself. Even if Marx does not provide any computable time frame for the
development of the contradictions of capitalism, these are nonetheless con-
sidered fatal in their immediate form, that is, ultimately leading to the break
with and the smashing of the system.
We are thus confronted with a theory that paradoxically affirms
and denegates the historicity of capitalism. Although the class struggle is
presented as the necessary effect of the relations of capitalist production, it
nonetheless has no effect on them as long as no revolutionary transformation
intervenes. It is always a case of all or nothing, of preserving capitalism
identical to itself as long as it does not destroy it. This denegation, obviously
related to the critique of reformism, is particularly evident in the analyses
of syndicalism, aimed at showing that the economic working-class struggles
only affect the regulation of norms of exploitation and change nothing of
the relations of production. This paradox of a historicity without history is
resolved precisely by the proposition of laws of evolution postulating the
permanence of the system's structure.
There is a direct relation between this blockage and the difficulties
we have encountered with the notion of dominant ideology. When Engels
defines the bourgeois world view by its juridical base, he invokes an argu-
ment borrowed from the history of the bourgeois struggles against feudalism
which were carried out in the name of the law and in the dominant form
of juridical discourse. He offers us no way of knowing whether this form
stays the same indefinitely when the bourgeoisie becomes dominant and
when the political problem becomes the struggle to maintain the exploitation
of the working class. We can assume he thinks it does: for one, the general
form of wage relations is always that of a contractual commodity exchange;
and, second, the material instrument of the struggle is always the unme-
diated state, which is instituted as a guarantee of private property. These
implicit arguments, however, harbor the same paradox of a historicity with-
out history (or an essence of capitalism) as those regarding the relation of
production itself. We certainly have two successive configurations for the
194
 Etienne Balibar
conflict between worldviews: first, the theological-feudal against the jurid-
ical-bourgeois, then the juridical-bourgeois against the communist-prole-
tarian. But the second ofthese has no effect on the contents ofthejuridical-
bourgeois view, which remains true to its origins, for once and for all (as
if the law functioned similarly against feudal privileges as against working-
class demands). In other words, the existence of the proletariat and its
struggle (that of the workers' movement) plays no role in the formation and
transformation of the dominant ideology. Here, again, is the paradox of
domination without the dominated I discussed in the first part of this study.
The same theoretical obstacle can be seen from the side of the
proletariat. If the relation of production is a constant, the working class has
no other history than that of extensions of proletarianization, of the kind
identified with those of the salaried classes or "middle strata." Henceforth,
the question of proletarian ideology is also represented in terms of all or
nothing: a submission of the proletariat to the dominant ideology or a lib-
eration from illusions, conscious or unconscious. Historically, there are
working-class ideologies, bound up in different forms of exploitation, sites
and conditions of existence, origins and mass cultural "traditions" (national,
familial, religious), but these remain unthought and unthinkable. This is
simply the result of a number of exceptions and delays; it has no theoretical
relevance. Similarly, the fact that political organization, even when it is built
with the aid of a scientific theory, produces mass ideological effects on the
working class in providing them with a means of acknowledging their iden-
tity and is beyond the range of historical analysis and criticism. The working
class therefore becomes the blind spot of its own politics. 51
The Mask of Politics
Let us then apply to Marx and Engels their own distinction be-
tween method and system, in which method is not simply what remains of
a system once it has been deprived of its conclusions or goals but rather
what enters into contradiction with these conclusions and goals and, as a
result-sooner or later-brings on a crisis in the system. 52 In the different
theoretical forms we have encountered, the idea of a distance from the real
has always been present, whether it takes the form of a doubling, an in-
version, or a partitioning: the idea of a thinking that takes off at a tangent
from the real, toward a lateral object (Nebenobjekt), and therefore deflects
practice toward a fictive end, a Nebenzweck. It has always been clear that
this deflecting (or metaphorical) operation has a political effect, in the sense
of class struggle, but we have seen both Marx's and Engels's reluctance to
define it as the distance of all politics from the real or as the distance from
politics that would be the real itself.
We must look, then, at the way ideological dominations or world-
views have been periodized. In the theological medieval form there would
be an implied division of the instances of power (and consciousness, and
representation or discourse): on the one side, the feudal state, the organi-
zation of the ruling class of landed serf-owning gentry; on the other, the
Church, at once caught within the feudal system and raised above it, there-
fore capable ofbestowing upon that system a guarantee of sacred authority.
If religious (Christian) ideology's distance from the real is explained by this
division, one can draw out its consequences: although the feudal state (mon-
archy, empire) is explicitly represented as topmost in the hierarchy of rulers
195
 (the nobility), the Church is legally and effectively a community of all of
the faithful, masters and slaves; while the state constitutes the world on
behalfofthe rulers, the Church, which draws its unity from its self-reference
to a mystical beyond, is at the same time the organizer of everyone's ev-
eryday life, and of society.
What happens when a lay bourgeois ideology (a profane wisdom:
Weltweisheit, as Hegel says) replaces this religious ideological apparatus? It
seems that the division is reabsorbed. The Church, denounced as a "state
within the state," does not disappear but loses its role of guaranteeing au-
thority when the state stops organizing itself around a community of castes.
The state then stands on its own, at once object (or means) and subject of
the representations of the dominant ideology; it functions directly as an
ideological power. Juridical ideology would thus be the direct expression of
statist domination; but it can also be said that it is pure mystification in
the service of this domination: an absolute transparence corresponds to
absolute manipulation.
In fact, Engels's description, confirmed by Marx's analyses of the
bourgeois state, suggests another reading: there is a new division and split-
ting of what, compared to its feudal past, seems quite simple. But this time
the splitting is generated by the machine of the state, as a differentiation
between state power and juridical order. This division repeats itself, in a
way not entirely fictional, since it structures the practices, the distinction
of the state, the "organization of the ruling class," and civil society, in which
are inscribed all those relations of exchange that allow for the circulation
of commodities and take the form of the contract. It also allows an ideal
term (the law) to function as a guarantee of state power (and to appear as
the lowest and uppermost limits of its empire): the division helps distinguish
the political from the juridical, which would be situated above the political,
expressing at the same time the community of its subjects. Finally, this
division provides for the displacement or deflection of the goals of practice
toward an ideal object (in the event of the "rule of ends" of law, the rule
of the "rights of Man," liberty-equality-fraternity, etc.).
This entire process illustrates a "law" of the transformation of
ideological dominations, a law of division-unity-division or (for unity is
only a theoretical abstraction) a law of displacement, of the substitution of
divisions. What actually designates the intermediate unity is the moment
of transition in which the form of the state is seen as the real stake of a
transformation, of a "seizure of power" (whatever the duration of this trans-
formation; and this does not involve a measurable interval but, rather, the
structural characteristic of a developing process). In practice, two transfor-
mations come together in this transition: the transformation of the form of
the state by the class struggle, and the transformation of the dominant
representations of domination (for example, the passage from sacred au-
thority to juridical authority, from the Christian state to the constitutional
state, from the clerical intellectual to the legal or scholarly intellectual). We
can say this moment is eminently political when these transformations re-
veal their real stake (state power, the forms of its apparatus) in a theory
and a historical mass practice. A theory of class struggle, or rather a concrete
analysis of the forms class struggle takes in a determined historical transi-
tion, can show us, at any time, what its goals are. To describe the modality
of the relation thus established between class struggle and its representation
196
 Etienne Balibar
as political, we must use metaphors: let us say that it is in the vacillation
of ideology that politics appears, but this time in the sense in which a form
of ideological domination (theology, for example) must be negated in its
power or in its capacity to represent the real, so that another (the juridical,
for example) can take its place. We can also use another metaphor, the
twisting of the relation between state and ideology, which must be undone
so that the relation is twisted in the opposite direction, as a several-stranded
rope twists one way and then the other under the effect of two forces. 53
The bourgeoisie's accession to power (its transformation into a
ruling class) is thus already represented as political (in forging the concept
ofthe modern state). And this representation sustains its own materialism,
one whose critical force is directed against theology: it involves destroying
the idea inherent in everyday human life of a community of sin and salvation
in order to replace it with the idea of an immanent social bond, woven here
on earth into the exchange of commodities, the division of labor, contracts,
government institutions, the constitution of the state and its various powers.
Under these conditions, what are the representations thrown up by the
struggle of a new class, the proletariat, against the bourgeois state? They
take the form of a new materialism whose critical force is directed, this
time, against the idealism proper to juridical ideology (against the ideological
twisting of the real into the form of the law)-in effect, what can be called
historical or dialectical materialism. These representations also introduce
another concept of politics, which initially takes the form of the concept of
another politics, irreducible to bourgeois politics: a politics of the masses,
of labor, a communist politics. But can we not assume that this critique is
accompanied by its own movement of ideological twisting? Or even that,
if proletarian politics homogenizes what was present in the double form of
the political and the juridical (in stripping bare the appeals and political
stakes of the law), it is also accompanied by its own division?
To say that the unity of the political is divided afresh is to say
that, in certain conditions, politics itself can become the "mask" of politics:
it does not constitute a last term, a final solution to the enigma of class
struggle (or history) but one of its forms, in which we still find symptoms
of a distance from the real which has characterized the concept of ideology.
What we must give up entirely is the idea of a "language of real life," this
promised land of the philosophical critique envisaged in The German Ide-
ology, whether one reads into the expression "language of real life" an im-
potent reduction of all language to the "life" it expresses, or whether we
find the converse, the ideal of an originary language, absolutely "true" and
nonmetaphoric. Politics, including that of the exploited class, since it is
always both practice and language, or practice within language, must be
what is masked over indefinitely and what is unmasked in its own words,
or rather in the use made of them. 54
It is not impossible to find Marx and Engels recognizing this
situation, the practical state of things (but only the practical state). This is
related, significantly, to their experiences of the dislocation (decalage) be-
tween the language of theory and the operations ofthe political party-hence
the example of the episode of the Critique of the Gotha Program, whose
result is as interesting as its origins. If Marx's critiques went unpublished,
it was probably at the request of the party officials they might have offended,
but it is also, as Engels tells us, because, within this conjuncture, the workers
197
read into the Program what was not there (the affirmation of a class position),
and, because of this, these critiques lost their "usefulness." But to read this
position it would have to have been there, at least in the form of words
that could take hold of a class practice; that is, it would have to have been
in a conjunctural relation with the words or in the "line of demarcation"
these words might trace out between the universes of discourse of a certain
political conjuncture. Perhaps today we are less surprised by the possibility
of such an equivocal reading, given that the history of revolutions in this
century has shown how the words of religion or patriotism (even nation-
alism) can bear the class struggle and, at other times, how the words of the
class struggle only support nationalism, if not religion.
Is this to say that, in the "sound and fury" of history, there is
no practical difference but only successive forms of a perpetual illusion? On
the contrary, it is clear that there are, precisely, differences, some of them
irreducible. It is not because the judiciary appears, along with the antago-
nism between bourgeois and proletarian, in the form of a political mask
that the bourgeois critique of religious ideology (which is made in its name)
is entirely negated. What fails is its pretense to the ultimate truth of Man
or History. Similarly, the fact that proletarian politics is divided and covered
over again from the moment it acquires its own autonomy does not negate
the difference between law and politics revealed by the critique of bourgeois
juridical ideology. It simply signifies that this critique is also the moment
of an incomplete process with no foreseeable end. From the point of view
of this unfolding process, the succession of worldviews appears like a series
of divisions and identifications of politics. But this figure-if it is not ab-
solute-is no more unreal than the present process itself.
Let us take this further. Bourgeois ideology, by confusing in the
same category of reason both juridical discourse and scientific discourse,
has constructed a way of making one pass for the other and of therefore
presenting science as a new form of the absolute. Conversely, the fact that
proletarian politics is not based, in the last analysis, on reason but on the
irreducibility of class antagonism can allow a recognition of the objectivity
of scientific knowledge within its limits, extracted from the oscillation of
"all or nothing" (subjectivism/objectivism, skepticism/speculation). Under
these conditions, the fact that the concept of ideology in Marx or Engels is
ultimately constituted by a denegation of the essentially metaphoric nature
of language explains how a metaphysics of truth (or of the meaning of
History) is built up around it. This does not, however, warrant substituting
a generalized skepticism (through which other metaphysics might reappear)
for the analysis or critique of ideologies. It is not a question of substituting,
within a hyperbolic transcendence of worldviews, the metaphoricity oflan-
guage for the identification of ideological differences, but of inscribing ide-
ological effects as differential effects within the sphere of language.
If there is, again, a fresh division and a recovery of proletarian
politics, inasmuch as it is given as politics pure and simple, what are its
operative terms? First, it seems there is the same play of distinctions and
confusions between economy and politics, one symptomatically present in
the Saint Simonian formula taken up by Engels in Anti-Duhring: "to replace
the government of men by the administration of things and the management
of productive operations." This distinction/confusion can be equally read
into the watchword "abolition of labor" in the works of the young Marx
198
 Etienne Balibar
and in the later call for a (communist) politics of labor. It is striking that
this distinction/confusion is to be found simultaneously in the two opposite
tendencies between which the workers' movement constantly bounces back
and forth, beginning with the model ofthe commune (or the Soviet model):
either the workers' council (or the factory council), self-management asso-
ciations, or state planning. Above all, however, this same distinction struc-
tures the way the workers' movement has practiced politics against the
juridicalism of bourgeois politics: not in simply disavowing the juridical
form but in distinguishing law from juridical ideology so as to avoid be-
coming a prisoner of the law through juridical ideology; to avoid "believing
in the law" by "turning it round" and using it against the ruling class (either
in forms of mass syndicalism or by way of universal suffrage). So, while the
practice of the workers' movement has tended toward reformism, revolution
has become its point of honor and its myth- what is believed in order not
to believe in juridical ideology. And it is in this period-that of the first
crisis of Marxism-that the ideologies of organization are constituted (still
active in France today: Sorel against Lenin) to represent at times the union
and at other times the party, one opposite the other, as the revolutionary
form, the only one incompatible with the system (while the other remains
inside it) and hence the sole bearer ofthe proletarian worldview. Both these
representations, moreover, can seem Marxist, in the name of the critique
of economism, by virtue of the struggle against "constitutional illusions,"
"parliamentary cretinism," or Jacobinism.
But what matters most here is the fact that the distinction/con-
fusion between politics and economics, each exceeding the other while im-
plying it, structures the workings of the bourgeois state in its relation to
society. Economics has become the principal area of state intervention in
social practice. In a contradictory way, it is also a constant hindrance to
efficient decision making: what we call the crisis (all political discourse
depends on how we assign a cause to it, or how we ascribe responsibility
for it). Thus, transformation cannot be separated from the effects on the
bourgeois state of the workers' movement as a mass movement. Nor can
it be separated from the way in which, forcing the bourgeois state to reor~
ganize itself as a function of its existence, the workers' movement has seen
its own aims being displaced and finds itself displaced within the field of
politics. The same words that used to denote a real political objective have
now come, in a way, to mean a lateral or metaphorical objective, a Neben-
sweck. This is either because the struggle has already achieved this objective,
albeit in an unrecognizable form, or because it can no longer be what it
was, the conditions that made it thinkable and historically practicable having
been destroyed by the class struggle. 55
Behind the process of indefinite displacement of ideological forms
lies the process of displacement of the conditions of class struggle. Both can
be thought within the materialist notion of a permanent divergence of real
history in relation to the trajectory and direction drawn up for each period
by the sum or result of social conflicts in the sphere of discourse. It is
remarkable that, in their critique of utopianism, but also in the aporia of
their proletarian worldview, inasmuch as it has no specific content, or their
proletarian ideology as a nonideology, Marx and Engels leave, wide open
and undetermined, a double possibility: either the myth of a definitive es-
cape from ideology, corresponding to the myth of the end ofhistory, or the
199
concept of a "critique of politics" (which we can call materialism or com-
munism), yet to be determined as a function of the ways in which politics
itself masks its reality or its illusions. 56
Of the "Truth" and the "Whole"
If the historical process (what we understand as history) never
sticks to the path which, from its internal ideological tension, it seems to
follow, then every simple representation of a result (or a salvation, even a
worldly one) in the form of its anticipation or extrapolation is necessarily
a lure, that of a Nebenzweck, even if it is the necessary form of practice.
What is real is exactly that a transformation takes place in this form. It is
a series that diverges without limit, not one that converges on an ideal limit.
A bifurcation in an unforeseen form, it results from the instability of social
relations.
The representation of historical convergence is one of the great
common features of a philosophy of history which, in the modern age, goes
from Leibniz to Teilhard de Chardin ("everything which rises must con-
verge"). In Marx and Engels it is present in the lay form of the "negation
of a negation," which manifests itself in two ways. Practially-historically, it
subtends the extrapolation of the historical tendencies of capitalism that
lead to its crisis (while history is, rather, a mutation of the form, or mech-
anism, of crises) and to the growth of the "objective conditions of revolu-
tion" (while history concerns revolutions that happen elsewhere, in places
where these conditions are not met); but it leads also to the subjective
conditions of revolution. Witness, in its echo of Marx's post-1848 expec-
tations forty years earlier, Engels's forecast, which we can take to be the
prototype for the evolutionist ideology of the party: "For the first time in
history, a soundly knit workers party has appeared [in Germany] as a real
political force. It is a force whose existence and mercurial rise are as in-
comprehensible and mysterious to governments and old ruling classes as
the flow of the Christian tide was to the powers in decadent Rome. It
increases and develops its forces as surely and inexorably as did Christianity
before it, so much so that its rate of growth-and hence the moment of its
ultimate triumph-can now be computed mathematically. Instead of sup-
pressing it, the anti-socialist legislation has given it a boost" (letter from
Engels to Kautsky, November 8, 1884).
Does this representation also subtend the epistemological notion
of an absolute truth as an ongoing process of sublation or integration of
relative truths (or relative errors)? In both cases, historical-political and
epistemological, it is much the same positivist metaphysics (Hegelian or
not) that is perpetuated in the heart of Marxism.
This metaphysics, if not suppressed (for it embraces every plan
for organization except that one seeks to maintain a radical individualism
or one that is anarchistic in principle), is at least counteracted by the si-
multaneous representation of the irreducibility of the antagonism and its
nonteleological character (thereby incompatible with any expectation of a
final solution). In the heat of the moment the reality of the historical process
can be practically appropriated. Lenin clears up this point by defining his-
torical materialism as the "concrete analysis of concrete situations" and by
substituting a conception of the moment of absolute truth present in each
relative truth (Philosophical Papers) for a conception of the absolute truth
200
 Etienne Balibar
as the progressive integration of relative truths. Taking this further, we can
say that all truth is both a fact of and an effect of a conjuncture, in several
senses.
Truth-or, rather, the true-is an effect of conjuncture, in that it
contradicts the dominant forms or criteria of universality, that is, it em-
bodies a practical criticism of ideology, and is therefore produced within the
context of ideology. One can read in the same way Hegel's thesis that makes
all truth the aftereffect of a negation through defining it by its essential
recurrence (Nachtrtig/ichkeit), which is not exactly the glorification of a fait
accompli, since that fait accompli presents itself in the very forms of the
dominant ideology. The only certainty-but it is, at least, something-is that
there is something in ideology incompatible with a certain practice of col-
lective transformation (also with a certain form of social communication).
We can call this current, critical certitude "truth" in the materialist sense.
And inasmuch as it signals this practical effect-not stable or definitive, but
irreducible-the concept of ideology is materialist and breaks free of the
circle of dogmatism (originary or final truth) and skepticism (no truth, or
truth as pure mystification, moral fiction, "loss ofbeing," etc.). If the primary
ideological effect is thus to change all knowledge (and also some nonknow-
ledges) into an illusion of universality, the concept of ideology has its pri-
mary effect in the division of the concept of truth: between a concept that
postulates its autonomy and one that acknowledges its practical dependence
on the conjuncture; or to put it differently, between a concept that designates
as truth the fantasy of a self-consciousness absolutely contemporaneous with
itself and its conditions and a concept of truth as a process (or production)
of knowledge, implying a noncoincidence, an irreducible noncontempor-
aneity of discourse and its conditions.
In the case of historical struggles, the truth is also an effect of
conjuncture in that it is produced as a coming together, an exceptional
condensation of the class struggle and the mass movement, inasmuch as
these two realities are always relatively heterogeneous. No effect of knowl-
edge (or truth) arises from what remains only mass movements, unified by
an ideological faith and essentially defined-even when they weather well,
or inspire a revolution, or smash the established order-as fluctuating forces,
always ambivalently attracted to and repulsed by the state. Nor can truth
arise from stabilized configurations of the class struggle, ones that nurture
the dogmatism of the established order, or the "subaltern" dogmatism, as
Gramsci put it with a vengeance, of the resistance of the oppressed organized
in their trenches, each one characteristic, in effect, of what Gramsci also
called the processes of "passive revolution." Indeed, one can ask whether
these processes are not really the ordinary state of history inasmuch as it
misunderstands itsel£
What makes a break in knowledge (or some of its conditions)
irrupt is the novelty ofthe conjunction of mass movements and class strug-
gle, the days Lenin spoke of, following Marx, "during which the masses
learn more than they would in years" (Days, however, can themselves be
years if the problem is not chronological but structural. This would involve
questioning the metaphor of a "crisis" subtending this formulation): whether,
as Marx brilliantly analyzes for the nineteenth-century revolutions, the
structure of class antagonism ends up by polarizing, displacing, and radi-
calizing the mass movements; or whether, above all, as Lenin, Gramsci,
201
 and Mao had a better opportunity to see, the mass movements (religious,
nationalistic, "cultural" as in May 1968, or, tomorrow, perhaps pacifistic),
constituted on the ''surface" of the social formation (But what is "surface"
and what is "depth"? Are we not to think these descriptive categories as
intrinsically reversible?), determine a class struggle that remains hypothet-
ical and provide it with its concrete content. I say "above all" because Marx
and Engels probably did not envisage this reciprocity, in spite of their di-
alectic, and generally applied a reductionist conception to the class struggle,
preventing them in the same movement from concretely developing the
critical idea of a historical process (proces) whose causality would not express
the destiny of a predestined subject (proletariat or other) but rather the
contradictory articulation of the masses and the classes, never quite the
same even "in the last instance." To parody Kant, it could be said that
without the mass movements the class struggle is empty (which is to say,
it remains full of dominant ideology). However, without the class struggle,
the mass movements are blind (which is to say, they give rise to counter-
revolution, even fascism, as much as revolution.) But there is no a priori
correspondence between these two forms. 57
I would like to draw two further consequences from these hy-
potheses. The first is that the great theoretical lure in the history ofMarxism
has been constituted by the ever-developing and ever-aborting project of a
theory of ideology. One can say that this project is grounded, for Marx and
Engels, both in the dissatisfaction that provokes the constant vacillation of
their concept of ideology and in the temptation to develop descriptions of
the ideological inversion effect, which they put forward in terms of a co-
herent theory, articulated with the theory of capitalist exploitation, and so
on. Neither Marx nor Engels, however, seems to have thought about con-
stituting such a theory (unless, perhaps, it goes by the name "dialectic");
yet the constitutive instability of a founding concept is not exactly a the-
oretical lack. Rather, this project is the symptom of the relation to Marx
maintained by Marxists and of the contradictions of that relation; it is, at
the same time, the closed field of their confrontations or antithetical de-
viations. We should remember how this project is constituted (Bernstein is
the first within the revisionist camp to formulate it in these terms, but, just
as quickly, Plekhanov takes it up in the orthodox camp, opposing social
psychology to the development of consciousness, the lesson ofTaine to that
of Kant, etc.) and what forms it later takes, right up to Sartre and Althusser,
during what can be called the classical period of Marxism (the formation
and dissolution of the parties of the Second and Third International, all
with essentially the same common theoretical base). Sometimes this project
is economistic, at others times antieconomistic. Paradoxically, it can be both
at the same time (Lukacs and, in general, all theorizing that tries to employ
dialectically the commodity form against the mechanicalness, the evolu-
tionism, or the reductionism of class).
What I would like to emphasize here is that the idea of a theory
of ideology has always functioned as an ideal means ofcompleting historical
materialism, of"filling up a hole" in its representation of the social totality,
and thus as a means of constituting historical materialism in totality, as a
system of explication that is generically consistent, at least according to its
laws. Again, this ever-reviving project must be read as a kind of symptom:
the necessity to complete the social whole-which is indeed the ambition,
202
 Etienne Balibar
avowed or not, of all sociology and thus not of Marxism alone (other, ad
hoc concepts arise from this point: mana, symbolic order, systemic restraint,
etc.). This is finally to be able completely to localize the cause, in a given
representation, in an outline of the structure of the social totality, whether
in one of its parts, identified as the site of "determination in the last in-
stance," or in the reciprocal play of all of its parts, that is, in their complexity
or their Wechselwirkung together (even their hypercomplexity). And if the
missing link must be designated "ideology," then it is because this term,
turned against its initial use, comes to connote the imaginary correspond-
ence between the practice of organization and theoretical knowledge in a
program that would be formulated once and for all (that is, until it is fulfilled,
until one can say "mission accomplished," even "transcended"). 58 In this
sense, the return of teleology to Marxism and the project of a theory of
ideology (or a science of ideologies) seem to me always to be strictly cor-
relative. One could even suggest that they always serve to compensate for
the horizontal division that introduces class struggle into society, thereby
preventing it from being represented as a whole-a compensation by way
of another, more abstract unity, a principle of vertical totalization, if not
material, at least theoretical or explanatory. The theory of ideology would
then be symptomatic of the permanent unrest, maintaining with Marxism
its own recognition of the class struggle!
I think that we can and should uphold the contrary: that the
programs are never fulfilled, although they are sometimes adequate to their
conjuncture (what Althusser suggests calling "practical accuracy," lejustesse
pratique); that the theory, or rather the concept, of ideology denotes no other
object than that of the nontotalizable (or nonrepresentable within a given
order) complexity of the historical process; and that historical materialism
is incomplete in principle, not only in the temporal dimension (since it
posits the relative unpredictability of the effects of determined causes), but
also in its theoretical siting (topique), since it requires the articulation of
the class struggle in extramaterial concepts (for example, the unconscious,
or sexuality).
Such a position seems to me to be consistent with the idea, argued
above, of an effect of truth within the conjuncture. In political terms, this
implies not the absolute separation or natural antagonism of knowledge and
judgment, or organization, but the impossibility of a true fusion of theo-
retical and strategic functions (included, of course, under the weak form of
a division of labor, with a provision for mutual services, whether the theo-
rists propose that the "politicians" test the results of their analyses or else
the "officials" hire the "organic intellectuals" to develop plans for them).
If it is the meeting, or the conflict, between theory (or theories) and practices
that gives rise to both knowledge and politics in the strong sense (the trans-
formation of social relations), then it is certainly necessary, from time to
time at least, that theory be produced outside the organization, which does
not necessarily mean on another class base but according to other modalities
and a different relation to discourse. It may even be that there are more
opportunities-and not less-within this parallelism for the social division
of labor to evolve and that theory (as a social activity) will increasingly
cease to be a monopoly of individuals or of castes, a business for intellec-
tuals-in short, for those Marx, in the beginning, calls "ideologues."
203
 Notes

See Alain Badiou, Theorie du SUJet (Paris: Seuil, 1982) and his presentation on January 1 7,
1983, at the Ecole Norm ale Superieure (to appear in Re)Ouer le politique. Ill, Ed1t1ons Galilee).
2 I leave aside the very interesting question of Marx's retrieval of the term "ideology" from
the French sensualist ideologues and the distortion it undergoes in the process.
3 In this schematic account there is one notable exception: the reference made in the preface
of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy to the "ideological forms" identified
with "social consciousness." This text is explicitly retrospective, alluding in particular to The
German Ideology, whose persistent trace it carries. But its importance lies elsewhere. It
teaches us nothing about ideology in any direct way, unless about its insistence within
Marxism, even at the cost of the most outright conceptual indeterminacy (see the theme of
··correspondence'').
4 The classic French translation (Roy's) obscures the conceptual precision of fetishism in Cap-
Ital. The recent publication, after a long delay, of J. P. Lefebvre's translation, by Editions
Sociales, provides a definitive text for this question and others.
5 It is, however, important to note that the materialism of The German Ideology does not relate
to the idea of matter, that 1t is a "materialism without matter," because it is nonsubstantial.
See also the Theses on Feuerbach.
6 Marx is neither the first nor the last philosopher to take up the problem of the production of
idealities, or the process of idealization, in this overdetermined form (see Spinoza before and
Freud after). It is remarkable that these three intellectual efforts, clearly related but formulated
within entirely d1fferent concepts, have actually surfaced Independently and heterogeneously.
Marx read Spinoza closely; but by way of an astonishing quid pro quo, inscribed within the
tradition of the Aufklarung, and in his struggle against romantic pantheism. he has only seen
in Spinoza an apology for rationalism and democracy. On this point see A. Matheron, "Le
traite theologico-politique vu par le jeune Marx," Cahiers Spinoza, 1 ( 1977).
7 This identification of the place of theory with the place of practice must be given as already
there. But 1t IS, more accurately than my hasty presentation suggests, in the vein of a tendency
that Marx seeks to define 1t after a fashion itself historical-a tendency toward the simulta-
neous breakup of manual labor and intellectual labor specifically, and hence the1r distance
or divergence. See my study "Sur le concepte marxiste de Ia 'division du travail manuel et
intellectuel' et Ia lutte de classes." in Manuels et intellectuels dans le transition au socialisme,
ed. Jean Belkhir (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1985).
8 Both Marx and Engels bear witness to the true answer: we have seen this proletariat radically
stripped of ideology. See The Condition of the Working Class in England: "I discovered that
you were much more than members of an insular nation who would only be English: I have
affirmed that you were men. "
9 It is tempting to explain, in addition to editorial rejections and the difficulties suffered in these
troubled times through the insecurity of their personal situations, that Marx and Engels aban-
doned The German Ideology "to the nibbling critique of the mice."
10 I have tried to show elsewhere that this analysis, in spite of its dialectical power, and because
it is offered in the form of a simple demonstration of the logic of commodities, had to become,
for Marxism, a lasting obstacle to the analysis of economic ideology as the dominant 1deology,
or the ideology of the state. And so it has, paradoxically, encouraged the "return" of the
economic "repressed" in this economism, one repeated Indefinitely ever since as the "return
to the young Marx" (in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Class1cal German Philosophy).
11 I am thinking of a contemporary example, the "episteme" of Michel Foucault, and more
generally of the universals of the culturalists.
12 Indeed, Marx, who is faithful on this point to his own German ideology, suggests that the
proletariat alone can save the classical culture of humanity (Homer, Dante, Shakespeare)
from its degeneration into bourgeois philistlnism (see the 185 7 introduction to the Critique
of Political Economy).
13 It is an analysis that is in no way mechanistic. Preceding the Lenin of the articles on Tolstoy
and the Mao of Talks at the Yenan Forum, 1t already implies the distinction (and the articulation)
of existence (or origin) from class and class positions, hence the analysis of their conjunctures.
14 This is a reformism in which, it should be noted, Marx and Engels explicitly place the 1dea
of the "transformation of the State as the simple administration of production."
15 Hence, the dominant model in Marx's thought regarding this strategy 1s that of a "permanent
revolution" which offers the long-term transformation of bourgeois revolutions into proletarian
revolutions and the short-term transformation of the radical democratic program into the
communist program (because the polarization of the class struggle nullifies the petite bourgeoisie

204
 Etienne Balibar
as an autonomous force). See Stanley Moore, Three Tactics, the Background in Marx (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1963) and my article, "Dictature du proletariat." in Dictionnaire
critique du marxisme, ed. G. Labica and G. Bensussan (Paris: P.U.F , 1982).
16 Another symptom of th1s disintegration is the generalization in the 1850s (when Marx was
pondering the "immaturity" of the proletanat) of the conceptual pair class in itself/class for
itself. which works symmetncally as much for the bourgeoisie as for the proletariat. the two
"revolutionary classes" of history. But th1s is preceded, in the Manifesto, by a return to a
"conspiracy" theory, a purely instrumentalist one, of the law as the will of the ruling class:
"Your law is only the will of your class worked into the law, a will whose content is determined
by the concrete conditions of existence of your class."
17 See Raison Presente, 66 ( 1983).
18 The first version of the following analyses took the form of a presentation on May 17, 1980,
in the research seminar on the history of materialism led by Oliver Bloch at the Universite de
Paris I. I would like to thank G. Labica. B. Lacorra, Cl. Ma1nfoy, S. Mercier-Josa, M. Pecheux,
J. Texier, and E. Walter for observations that have been very useful to me in preparing this
study.
19 Although the pairs abstract/concrete and thought/real are not strictly commutative, Engels's
formulations on this are clearly more empiricial than those of Marx in the 185 7 introduction
(unpublished) to the Critique of Political Economy, where it is the scientific method. inasmuch
as it proceeds from the abstract to the "concrete of thought," that seems to engender the
real. start1ng from the concept. and thus creates an idealistic illusion. In his cntical reading
of Hegel, Marx touches on the idea of the conditions and ideological effects inherent in
scientific practice itself, but he does not use the term.
20 From the Grundrisse to the Cntique of the Gotha Program. by way of books 1 and 3 of Capital,
Marx presents a similar critical analysis of the categones "liberty" and "equality" as an
internal reflection of production and commodity circulation, which produces (for example. in
the chapter on commodity fetishism) a comparison between Juridical and religious idealities
(or abstractions) and a substitution of one for the other within history. However, what is never
really clear in Marx is whether the law is itself ideological or whether it is better to make a
distinction between law (property, contract, etc.) and juridical ideology (liberty and equality).
21 See the examples given in "ldeologie," in Geschichtliche Grundbeariffe, Brunner. Conze, and
Koselleck, eds. (Stuttgart: Band 2, 1978).
22 The problem of terminology which Engels comes across here is far from idiosyncratic. At
th1s same time, French positivists like Littre also posit a substitution of "worldview" for
"philosophy" in order to designate the form in which, unconsciously and spontaneously, the
positivist spirit becomes self-conscious and systematic (I owe this information to E. Coumet).
23 Remember that in this period Marx was the first to make a reference to the dialectic (and
not only in matenallsm). See the postface to the second German edition of Capital (1872),
where some of his formulations are rather close to the conclusions of the Critique of Political
Economy published by Engels in 1859.
24 On the use of this term and on the ambivalence of the relations first Marx and then Engels
have with it. see G. Hapt's detailed account. "Marxe il marxismo," in E. Hobsbawm et al.,
Storia del marxismo (Einaudi, vol. 1). On the crisis of Marxism, seeR. Racinaro, La cris1 del
marxismo (Bari: De Donato, 1976); H. J. Steinberg, "II partito e Ia formaziore dell' ortodossie
marxiste," 1n Storia del marxismo, vol. 2.
The question of knowing whether the older Engels effected a change in point
of view or still mainta1ned. as Ch. Andler believes ("Fragment d'une etude sur Ia decom-
position du marxisme," Revue socialiste, 1913). "two successive systems" has been the
object of contemporary debates. See, lastly, the absorbing study of Oskar Negt, "II marxismo
e Ia teoria della rivoluzione nell' ultimo Engels," in Storia del marxismo, vol. 2. Although in
complete agreement with the idea of a critical application of historical materialism to its own
history (of the sort already performed by Korsch). and hence of a program of material analys1s
of the working class. I cannot agree with Negt that the latter ought to take the form of a
"critique of the political economy of the force of labor," nor, a fortiori, of an "application of
the law of value" to this critique. This would involve a special discussion, primarily about the
meaning and the lim1ts of validity for an identification of ''force of labor'' as a ··commodity'·-
in short, about the reading of Capital.
25 See the essential article by Engels, "Notwendige und Oberflussige Gesellschaftsklassen,"
Marx-Engels Werke, vol. 21 .
26 F. A. Langue's Histoire du materialisme, which represents the union between Marxist, neo-
Kantian, and Darwinian circles, was published in 1866. 0 Bloch's commentary on it clearly
shows that while Engels rejects its epistemological theses, he does borrow a plan from it.
or rather a historical project It is with Dilthey, at the end of the century, as we know, that
the term Weltanschauung, of Romantic origin (Schelling, Schleiermacher) becomes the

205
 watchword of the philosophy of history and hermeneutics developed by the vitalist and sub-
Jectivist currents of neo-Kantlanism against the rationalist currents (from Cohen to Cassirer).
27 The idea of a history of thought. understood in th1s way, obviously leads to several interpre-
tations or programs of research: that of an empirical history of the sciences and their effects
upon philosophy; that of a history of theories of the sort proposed by Althusser in Reading
Capital. in reviving an expression of Hegel's; and. finally, that of a history of class struggle
w1thin theory, ultimately considered by the same Althusser as the proper terrain of philosophy
(see Lenm and Philosophy, Positions) and wh1ch we will come across later on in taking up
the difficulties of Engels's text.
28 The study by B. Kedrov. "Engels et ses pn§decesseurs," La classification des sciences. val.
1 (French translation of the 1977 Russian edition). is unfortunately fiawed by his persistent
desire to present Engels's thinking in terms of "the Marxist solution" to "the problem of the
classification of the sciences." It seems. by contrast. that there are some original ideas to
be found in the highly documented study by Sven Eric Liedman. Motsatsernas Spel: The
Philosophy of Engels and Nineteenth-Century Science (Lund: Bo Cavefors Bokforlag. 1977).
but I have only been able to consult a short resume of it in English.
29 G. Canguilheim. G. Lapassado. J. Piquemal. J. Ulmann. "Du developpement !'evolution a
au XIXe siecle," Thales. annee 1960. special 1ssue (Paris: P.U.F .. 1962). is far and away
the most rigorous study of the history and concepts of evolutionism before and after Darwin.
30 A stnk1ng illustration of this theme can be found in H. G. Wells. A Short History of the World.
which tells the story of humanity starting from the formation of the solar system and ending
with socialism.
31 See G. Canguilheim. ldeologie et rationalite dans /'histoire des sciences de Ia vie (Paris: Vrin.
1977). Canguilheim's work (see also Thales) proves that it is impossible to discuss evolu-
tionism as such; rather. we must speak of evolutionisms (Lamarck. Comte. Spenser. Darwin.
Haeckel) according to their .. constants" and their incompatibilities-what Foucault aptly char-
acterizes as "points of heresy" in The Order of Things-and also the totally different effects
produced by the inscription of evolutionist statements within theoretical/experimental or spec-
ulative fields. The studies of Y Conry and D. Lecourt. particularly those in Raison Presente.
no. 66. seem to me to subscribe clearly to this point of view.
32 We can read Engels's "historical" account in the following way (see. e.g., particularly in
Dialectics of Nature. the text entitled "Old Preface to the Anti-Duhring"): ( 1) Greek dialectic.
(2) classical metaphysics. (3) modern dialectic; or this way: ( 1) the abstract unity of dialectic
and ("phys1cal") materialism. (2) the division of dialectic from materialism, (3) a new concrete
unity of dialectic and (historical) materialism; or finally: ( 1) the unity of philosophy and the
sciences (within the sphere of philosophy). (2) the division of philosophy (speculation) and
the sciences (empiricism). (3) the new unity of philosophy and the sc1ences (within the sphere
of the sciences).
33 Paradoxically, thought only avoids this autonomization when it is "false," a dialectical idea
we could use to rect1fy the teleological conceptions of knowledge (in material terms. the
"falsity" is the "truthful" element). but only on the condition that it no longer be presented
in the form of a failure or an objection. Nonetheless. it is in Anti-Duhring, in response to the
"eternal verities" of positivism (this critique is also made of Haeckel). that Engels comes to
terms with the Hegelian critique of the "moral opposition between truth and error," that is.
the critique of the classical metaphysical dualism of knowledge. preserved intact by positivism.
It is only 1n this indirect manner that the practical and the political point of view are found to
be represented.
34 See in particular "Bruno Bauer und das Urchistentum" ( 1882). in Marx-Engels Werke. val.
19. which constructs a parallel between modern ideologies. those of the ancient world
(philosophical and. above all. JUridical). and those of the medieval world (theological and
generally clerical). All these texts were first published in Neue Zeit. Kautsky' s review and the
bastion of orthodox Marxism.
35 This reduction is the grand proof. the unflaggingly repeated Marxist argument as it is practiced
by Conrad Schmidt. Lafargue. or Kautsky. It involves, on the one hand. retracing the origin
of the philosophical categories garnered by Engels (the distinction between simple causality
and reciprocal action. first articulated by Kant) and. on the other. giving some idea of its
afterlife (particularly in Gramsci and Sartre. who both consistently rework Engels's outline).
36 Let us judge the extent of this progress in relation to Marx's formulations in Capital. where
it is the regulative intervention of the state (the legislation of the manufacturers) that is given
as the "conscious reaction" of society to its own "organism."
37 Gramsci. from this point of view. is not mistaken in posing together the problem of proletarian
hegemony and of the "crisis of the state" (ignored by Engels. if not by Lenin).
38 .. Juristensozialismus." Marx-Engels Werke. val. 21 . p. 491. It is to the credit of Petter
Schettler. who gives us an illuminating analysis of it. to have brought to our attention the

206
 Etienne Balibar
importance of th1s text (see his study "Engels und Kautsky als Kritiker des Juristensozialis-
mus," Demokratis und Recht. no. 1, 1980).
39 One constantly comes across this denegation of the existence of a juridical ideology, artic-
ulated from very different perspectives. One recent and very interesting example is in the
work of J. F. Lyotard, starting from his "pragmatic" analyses of the relations of commumcation
1n advanced capitalism. See, for example, Instructions pai'ennes (Paris: Galilee. 1977). pp.
55-56, "showing" that there is no bourgeois. JUridical Ideology because. generally speaking,
there 1s no dominant ideology within capitalism; capital would be. as such, indifferent to
ideology (to "semantics"). in contrast to archaic structures like the state, the party, the
Church, and so on. Similarly, he writes later (p. 76) that money, as a medium of commu-
nication, is outside of ideology, even JUridical ideology. The most delicate position to discuss
would, of course, be that of juridical positivism (Kelsen). which explicitly distinguishes juridical
ideology and legal norms from natural law.
40 See my article "Dictature du proletariat. .. in Oictionnaire critique du marxisme, ed. G. Labice
and G. Bensussan (Paris: P.U.F., 1982). It is stnking that. during this penod, Engels is moved
to say someth1ng new about the ancient City (in The Ongin of the Family) which clarifies the
"civic" sense of the idea of community present within the term "communism ... In the ancient
city-note that its own worldview has not yet. in itself. been properly named-the citizens
directly and collectively pursue the common public interests without being "displaced" toward
the religious Nebenzwecke (albeit upon the repressed base of slavery). which clarifies the
ulterior motive behind the curiously Aristotelian phrase in The Erfurt Program (written against
the anarchists), according to which "the workers are political by nature." More than a nos-
talgic definition of politics, by way of the Greek example, it is a question of thinking the crux
of the proletarian worldview in reference to what, throughout the entire classical tradition,
symbolizes politics as such. Following upon the analysis of the Greek city as the first form,
in its contradictory development, of the fus1on of politics and statism in the history of class
struggle, it 1s a way of showing that, in the transition to communism. the crucial stake of
struggle is the possibility of dissociating politics from statism by associating (or fusing) politics
with labor-two poles of a contradiction that cuts across all of history. See E. Balibar, C.
Luporini. A. Tosel, Marx et sa critique de Ia politique (Paris: Maspero, 1979).
41 "Zur Gesch1chte des Urchristentums" ( 1894-95), Marx-Engels Werke, vol. 22, p. 449; and
see Marx and Engels, The Holy Family.
42 The work of Gustave Le Bon, The Psychology of Crowds, which Freud discusses (for better
or worse?) in Mass Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Labriola and Plekhanov, in
particular, are very much taken up with the question of the relation between the theory of
ideology and social psychology.
43 Is such a retrospective critique, coming, by definition, "too late," not at once an oversimplified
and perfectly useless exercise? But suppose-as I suggest at the beginning of this study-
that the problems of current Marxism and its crisis are posed in a less linear fashion? This
might be a way out of the false dilemma of repetition and liquidation, neither of which change
anything.
44 SeeM. Heidegger's project to move out of the "doldrums" of the disputes around Weltan-
schauungen ("The Age of the World-View." 1938). establishing a distance from historicism
but particularly from a certain form of direct identification of the "destination" of humankind
and its mobilization. Read the interesting sixth issue of the review Metamorfosi (Turin, 1982).
"La decisions." with articles by C. Preve and M. Turchetto, among others.
45 In this respect it is difficult to see-unless we question the very idea of a class politics-how
the meaning of the party form in the workers' movement could not correspond to the de-
velopment of a certain "schismatic spirit" within the working class. Not only does the con-
stitutive role played by intellectuals over the entire history of the workers' movement not
present an obstacle, it largely contributes to the phenomenon of workerism. It is all the more
interesting to see Lenin (in What Is to Be Done?) defining the proletarian political party by
its capacity to intervene in all classes of soc1ety, that is, together, as a "unity of opposites."
46 Sorel says the organizing "myth." But. conversely, has every organization not its own working
myth? Gramsci, in particular, asks this question.
47 For the most elaborate thoughts on th1s, one should consult the recent work of Lecourt,
L 'ordre et les jeux (Paris, 1981), chap. 4, and La philosophie sans feinte (Paris, 1982). In
a prev1ous study ("Etat, parti, ideologie," 1n E. Balibar. C. Luporini, A. Tosel. Marx et sa
critique de Ia politique [Paris: Maspero. 1979]), I tried to relate this gap between "two
centers" that pers1st in Marx and Engels's analyses of the party to what Althusser calls the
"double inscription" of the theory of Marx within its own "topic": first, as the thought of
the historical whole, fictively exterior to 1ts action (proces); and second, as the "ideological
form," 1nscribed and acting within this whole (and hence determined by it). But it was also
a case of demonstrating the limits of th1s representation, preventing the party from really
analyzing its own history, thereby falling far short of subsequent Marxist theorization.

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48 See my article "Marx le JOker," 1n Re1ouer le politique, ed. Luc Ferry (Paris: Galilee, 1981)
49 See the study by S Mercier-Josa, "Espnt du peuple et ideologie," Pour lire Hegel and Marx
(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980). p. 69.
50 This same difficulty does not rule out some interesting though puzzling conceptual creations:
witness Engels's distinction between "revolution from above" and "revolution from below"
(1n relation to the way in which Napoleon Ill or B1smarck would have been "prevented" from
making themselves the "testamentary executors" of the revolutions of 1848, after having
surpressed them-which IS also a way of explaming why the proletariat is prevented from
acting upon the base of B1smarckian or Napoleonic society, even in its political forms, 1nstead
of "reviving" 1848, according to the model of "permanent revolution"). With his own notion
of "passive revolution" (implicitly opposed to "active revolution" or to "revolutionary revo-
lution"). Gramsc1 seems to be on the same track.
51 In this Situation each word becomes a double-edged weapon. The notion of a "proletarian
worldview" can act as the 1ndex of work1ng-class ideologies (in the sense of practice, rather
than opmions). Irreducible to the dom1nant ideology. But it can also prevent all critical de-
velopment of these ideologies in themselves-in the case of labor, family, or the state-to
the extent that. according to the log1c of speculative empiricism, it pos1ts these ideologies
as d1rect "representatives" of the universal (and through them the archetype of the worker).
Conversely, it IS not at all clear that the fact of speaking about working-class ideology, as
Marx and Engels do not do, is enough to ruin the specular relation; "the worker" is a place
within the action of capitalist labor. Under the guise of "g1ving power" (ideas or words) to
the workers, such a notion perpetuates their position (even puts them back in it) It can thus
be the instrument of a "new bourgeoisie" (including a "new bourgeoisie" of the party).
52 I try to use the very terms of Marx and Engels "out of the necess1ty to attack them," wh1ch
seems to me to be one of the indispensable ways of determming what they think.
53 "Classical" political theory from Machiavelli to Hobbes and Rousseau (w1th its conformists
and its heretics) is an admirable example-perhaps too much so-of this vacillation of ide-
ology, from theology to the JUridical, along with the moment of political recognition of the
real state it contains. This moment, however, is never "pure" (even in Machiavelli), since
the untwistmg movement of theological recovering is always already also the twistmg move-
ment of the JUndical recovenng.
54 That politics is also 1ts own mask is what prevents it from being based upon a concept or
theory of "social ties," contractual or otherwise-no more so, of course, 1f it is defmed as
"alienation" from the onginary social bond. Through his concept of the "social relations of
production" and the1r history, Marx enters onto another terra1n. However, inasmuch as the
crit1que of ideology means, for him, foreseeing an end to ideology, an absolute transparency
of soc1al relations, or, 1f you will, a society in which individuals are at last contemporaries
and thus the omnipotent creators of their own social relations, the problematic of the "soc1al
tie" is seen to be freshly inserted into all of his analyses.
55 This does not mean that proletarian ideology has become "dominant" in the modern state;
but it undoubtedly has played a determining role in its transformations, both before and, even
more, after the Soviet revolution, the lessons of which bourgeo1s capitalists have been as-
Similating and preaching aga1nst ever since. Every bourgeois, even capitalist. state, is today,
in this sense, postrevolutionary. Negri is correct on th1s point; see La classe ouvriere contre
l'etat (Paris: Gal1lee, 1976). This is a better explanation of the fact that the crisis of the
state-otherwise known as its restructuring-implies, on the part of the avant-garde ideo-
logues of the ruling class, coming to terms with what they themselves call "proletarian
ideology," or, rather, whatsoever of proletanan ideology has been incorporated into the
bourgeois state. Th1s is the meaning of neoliberalism, of antitotalitarian d1scourse, and so
on.
56 In his book Language, Semantics and ldeolpgy, trans. Harbans Nag pal (New York: St. Martins,
1982). Michel Pecheux has shown the implications, as far as a discourse theory is concerned,
of an ideological pos1tion (or better, within ideology); such a position can only be defined as
the not inconsiderable sum (and this is different from a reciprocal neutralization) of the '' dom-
inant" worldview, and the proletarian class struggle, with no other support or point of ref-
erence than to this very struggle. The paradox that is central to his analyses is that of a
subJect who has to be able to pull h1mself out of the mess he or she has fallen into (the
"Munchhausen" effect)-is this not, strictly speaking, the truth of any revolutionary practice?
57 A hint of this problem can be found in Marx, though in as contradictory a fashion as the
relation to ideology, namely, in the hesitation often experienced in the use of the two terms
"proletanat" and "working class" (Arbeiterklasse). The former, which carries all of the po-
litical weight of the Manifesto, IS practically absent from Capital, particularly in its first edition,
except specifically as an oblique reference back to the Manifesto. Moreover, if the term
"proletariat" connotes the aggregate of the living conditions and reproduction of the work1ng
class (and not only its productive function). these are-in spite of the polemic against Mal-

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 Etienne Balibar
thusianism and the thesis of the "brazen law of wages" -at once standardized, and hence
neutralized in their historical diversity and political relevance. within the concept of a tendency,
inherent to the capitalist system. toward the minimal reproduction of the market labor force.
58 Naturally, the temptation to regard the object of historical materialism as a necessary and
sufficient whole and to present it with its would-be missing link can take forms other than
those of a theory of ideology. In particular. it can take the altogether different form of a theory
of the state. which is hardly surprising when one begins to suspect that every historical form
of the state has. as Marx put it. a double "base": both in the form of relations of production
and that of ideological relations. It is striking that all of Althusser's theoretical work (from his
initial definition of the overdetermination of historical causality to the introduction of the
concept of ideological state apparatus) oscillates between two tendencies: one takes up
again, albeit in a somewhat novel way, the Marxist project of a theory of ideology (or a theory
of the state); the other explicitly considers the concept of ideology in terms of a constant
excess, or deficiency, in relation to any totalization of social complexity or political practice,
at the risk of crediting Marx with the very opposite of what he thought. Consequently, the
work of Althusser, better than others, it seems to me, is able to anticipate the most significant
features of the crisis of Marxism.

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 Oskar Negt

What Is a Revival of Marxism and Why Do

We Need One Today?: Centennial Lecture
Commemorating the Death of Karl Marx
Translated by Michael Palencia-Roth

How is one to commemorate the centennial of Karl

Marx's death? It is surely no ordinary anniversary, such as is due other
great thinkers of the past. 1 One would speak quite differently, for example,
in remembering Kant or Hegel, for however great their cultural significance
has been for Europe, their theories do not have the sort of practical force
that leads rebelling masses or social movements to use their categories as
points of orientation. Yet, as proponents of academic theories that shaped
philosophical schools and were transmitted by a philosophical education,
they were in a position to influence the thinking of an entire generation of
intellectuals-Marx and Engels as well as Lenin and Mao Tse-tung.
On the Dialectic of Truth-Content and Reality-Content
Kant's and Hegel's work is directed toward a concept
of the completed world, one that, as Hegel says, philosophy paints in very
somber colors. The entire substance of Marx's theory, conversely, is a lever
for a movement toward social emancipation and a new society. This may
sound very mechanical, but it is so only in the sense that conscious historical
transformation inevitably requires the powers of material intervention-
which is one reason why theoretical deduction is not an end in itself for
this theory, despite the stringency of the thought process that characterizes
its claim to truth.
Expressing it this way, though, risks a practical mis-
understanding. If Marxist theory is to be confirmed principally in the trans-
formation of objective conditions, then it does not require us to renounce
an immanent truth-content. On the contrary, the problem that Marxist the-
ory is concerned with is not constricting but expanding truth-content, an
expansion based on doubling the presentation of the problem: grasping the
true conditions (a grasping, however, that does not stop either during the
process of understanding or upon its completion) and bursting these con-
ditions (possible only when the power of the conceptual work, which feeds
on the suprareferential consciousness, actually corresponds to the structure
of these conditions).
That sounds very simple; in fact, the stipulation that
historical praxis (not pragmatic-instrumental praxis) is a central criterion
211
 of truth for Marxism bears on a critical problem whose difficulties have
produced many fluctuations in Marxist theory. These difficulties are espe-
cially clear today. When we speak about contemporary relationships to the
theories of Marx and Engels, we realize we must consider the extremely
stressful, contradictory, and tragic history of Marxism. What today circulates
under the global, inclusive title "The Crisis of Marxism" reveals the inability
of many intellectuals, who consider themselves leftists, to recognize Marxist
theory in its substantive content as historical fact. The theory succumbs to
the idealist prejudice that the validity oftruth cannot be linked to the social
origins of concepts and perceptions. Intellectuals are at pains to discover
the class content and the origin in self-interest of all ideas that do not come
from Marx and Engels. Yet, while applying the maxims of Marx's materialist
conception of history to bourgeois society, they act as if the origins and
history of Marxist thought are removed from historical mediation.
The consequence is that the dialectic inherent in Marxist thought-
between truth-content and reality-content-will not be carried out in its
determined ways; rather, it will be reduced to one of the two sides (according
to specific perception-guiding interests). Those Marxist intellectuals who are
unhappy with the structure of existing societies that base their self-under-
standing on Marx, who regard their structures as an inversion and moral
corruption of Marxist positions, are inclined to tum their attention to the
original truth-content of the theories of Marx and Engels. They sink into
their work, constantly bringing to light new facets of its humanistic foun-
dations, and from the reconstruction of the original history of this thought
they gain the moral and speculative strength they need for political resistance
work. Thus they sink into an attitude that does not allow itself to be intim-
idated by the normative power of facticity and to be led to the point where
the reality of error enjoys greater esteem than the unreality of truth.
This kind of attitude, grounded in a moral and political integrity,
is radically opposed to the attitude that considers Marxist thought essentially
true wherever it is bound up with the reality of existing societies. Lenin's
thesis that "Marxism is all-powerful because it is true" underlies such an
immediate coupling oftruth-content with reality-content; more precisely, it
makes plain the reduction of truth-content to reality-content: what affirms
itself as real cannot be untrue. In their interpretive discussions, these Marxist
theorists behave toward Marx and Engels as though everything Marx and
Engels say is, in a certain sense, explicable teleologically, that is, directed
toward this reality. Thus they have no trouble elucidating those aspects of
Marxism that legitimate this reality. The dialectic of truth-content and real-
ity-content, a structural element of each epochal theory, has given way to
a fundamentally positive attitude toward the existing postrevolutionary power
relationships. The motivating center of materialist criticism is unexpectedly
transformed into an element of counterrevolutionary decay. Just how much
reality dominates possibility in these social orders is shown in the fact that
the prevailing reality-concept is doubled, as though it needs the additional
magical practice of fortification. They speak of a real, existing socialism as
though there is an existing socialism that is unreal. Marxist thought is thus
so pulled into the undertow of reality that the historical difference between
the present and the past is sacrificed.
I consider the exclusive adherence to either position questionable
because it cancels the immanent tension in the work of Marx and Engels
212
 Oskar Negt
on which its historical substance rests; in both cases it transforms a theory
of historical materialism into an unhistorical, idealistic worldview. At the
beginning of the 1960s Jiirgen Habermas pointed to a similar cleavage in
Marxism. He saw the separation of natura/law from revolution, whose unity
is constitutive for Marxist thought, internationally transformed and dis-
tributed for the production of ideology among enemy powers in the East-
West conflict.
Truth Criterion and Anticipation
Marxism is an epochal theory containing all the instruments of
self-criticism. Moreover, it does not need to give up its truth-content if it
uses these critical means on itself. If, as has so often been said, Marxist
thought represents a radical break in the history of European thought, then
that is valid in a decisive way for the criterion of truth itself. Truth is
traditionally an agreement between an object and the mental image of it.
As Aristotle argues, adequatio intellectus atque rei. Nothing here is said
about whether the object itself is true. Truth is a relationship of agreement
between a concept or mental image and the state of affairs understood thereby.
Hegel calls this a relationship of correctness, while whatever is true tran-
scends mere agreement between the content of the conception and the object.
For Hegel, a true state is not one understood correctly in a conceptual sense
but one based on certain kinds of moral precepts and laws. According to
traditional notions, even a theory that reflects a false reality correctly might
be considered true.
According to our way of thinking, this moment of truth is always
present when we undertake scientific investigations. Even so, it is only one
moment. It is unthinkable that in our time we should give up all claim to
grasping realities in their constellations of facts and thus restrict ourselves
to presenting, as the only proofoftruth, those perspectives and utopias that
transcend this reality. Nevertheless, there is more to truth than the corre-
spondence between categories and reality. It is precisely the circumstantial
dialectic that sharpens theoretical consciousness and propels it to a critical
movement of contiguous contraries so that the true sides of facts are not
crushed in their finiteness or in their potentialities and so that manifest
realities do not become unrealities, chimeras. Truth in this sense is no mere
quality of the thinking Subject but a subjective-objective relation that cannot
be determined independently of the structure of the object analyzed. Of
course, the object itself has true and untrue components that also require
the subjective activity of thought if they are to be grasped.
It is characteristic of Marxist thought that all its determining
categories have this double structure. On the one hand, they designate reality
in its sentient, graspable, and discoverable qualities. On the other hand,
insofar as they also always indicate better possibilities, they point beyond
the condition reality has attained. Reality and anticipation are thus inse-
parable from all Marxist concepts about the determining relationships of
society.
When Marx speaks of class, he means the objective and subjective
conditions of the masses. Whether the masses wish it or not, this implies
the living conditions through which their individual life chances are assim-
ilated at the same level. In the relationship of classes with one another, this
structure gives rise to the battle cry for the transformation of the entire
213
society. But the whole conception of a class society receives its precise truth-
content not in the confirmation that there are classes or that there must
always be classes; it is confirmed, rather, in that this class society is to be
abolished. That there are classes, and that the description of the conditions
of these classes is accurate, still does not exhaust the truth-content of the
concept of class. Perhaps one can formulate it paradoxically: the fact that
there are classes contains in it the normative charge to abolish class society
and to set up the freer condition of a classless society.
What I have said about the concept of class is valid in the same
way for a series of other decisive categories. When Marx speaks of produc-
tive work, he persists in maintaining that this is a relationship between hired
labor and capital, not a material element of work. The productive work is
that which produces value and surplus value. It has always been a matter
of controversy whether or not scholastic subtleties have since crept into this
apparently restricted explanation. According to Marx, a piano player is not
productive; the builder of pianos is. A clown who performs before me at
home is engaged in unproductive work; the same clown who does the same
act in a circus is engaged in productive work because he or she is in the
service of an entrepreneur. Despite the fact that Marx here sees the restric-
tion of productive work as a criticism of personal service activities within
a feudal dependency, the concept of productive work points to a society in
which no one would be excluded from work. Marx speaks of a "republic of
work" in which science could be set free for the first time. Productive work-
used in the narrow sense as hired labor-is linked with forced labor in a
real way, not only in a metaphoric one; by the same token, productive labor
refers to the possibility of the objectification of the individual through self-
realization. "Productive work" and "human production" therefore belong
together in the vision of the possible development of society, just as, in the
existing reality, they are separated from one another.
A similar double structure lies in the concepts "division oflabor"
and "cooperation." The animal spirits, which are included in this cooper-
ation and for which the capitalist pays nothing, comprise the underside of
work relationships; they are determined by instinctive activities that exist
as quite separate motivations for work. These types of work relationships
depend on exactly this point of contact among human beings, among their
social needs, in order to bring about an organized process of work. Marxist
categories are therefore at once relationships of correctness toward the social
reality and implicit truth claims vis-a-vis that reality.
The Praxis of Refutation in Marxist Thought and the Memento Mori
of the Categories
What I have just explained touches on the question of how Marx-
ist theory can be refuted. The fact that an analysis of this theory in terms
of its logical consistency is not enough to establish its historical truth can
be seen from the empirical hint that precisely these forms of refutation make
up a host of good objections. What energy has been expended, in the hundred
years since Marx's death, to overturn his work either logically or in a sci-
entific-theoretical sense! There is probably no other theorist so many have
tried to refute.
The forms of refutation inherent in Marxist thought are peculiar
to his case. First, even when Marxist categories are used in a scientific way,
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 Oskar Negt
their object is not to make possible statements of eternal verities. Nor can
it be said that the conditions designated by these categories are immutable.
All Marxist concepts and perceptions carry within themselves a memento
mori (literally, "Consider that you must die!"), a basic theme of self-ne-
gation. This self-negation does not occur because Marxism has failed to
account fully for empirical conditions. As I have tried to show, that is only
one side of Marxism.
Second, Marxist theory is neither a form of prophecy nor a series
of statements contrary to fact. According to Karl Popper, a statement is
scientifically real when it is falsifiable but not falsified, which means that a
statement must be able to be examined according to empirical reality, and
must survive this examination, but must not be refuted by it. Marxist cat-
egories also exist under the pressure of falsifiability. But the reality that
could be falsified concerns a different structure. Let us suppose that a society
might arise for which the Marxist concept of class is no longer completely
applicable. The question would then be whether this picture of a classless
society is merely an objective illusion that conceals everything we under-
stand from the concept of class: exploitation, oppression, and alienation.
If one accepts Popper's concept of falsification, then, as applied
to Marxist theory, it must be understood in the following way: a theoretical
refutation is linked to a real change in relationships. A true refutation of
Marxist theory would be, paradoxically, that the reality the theory tries to
comprehend has become a completely different one (through the practically
accomplished emancipation of men and women). Consequently, Marxist
theory would be refuted only when the alienating conditions of life it de-
scribes no longer exist; human beings would have attained a condition in
which they are freely able to lead a socially self-realized life. Then Marxist
theory in its strict sense would be superfluous and a kind of pluralism might
arise that many today already accept as an alternative to Marxism. This
pluralism loses its concealing function of domination only if human beings
coordinate their own activities freely and sensibly.
The Fundamental Conflict in the Contemporary Interpretation of
Marxist Theory
If one starts from the thought that Marxist theory in its funda-
mental form is a historical theory, then a world-historical conflict follows
which determines the developmental laws of Marxist thought in the con-
temporary world. If it is true that each mere repetition or varying inter-
pretation of Marxism's original truth-content contradicts its essence-be-
cause unhistorical aspects thereby necessarily creep into the triangular
relationship of past, present, and future-then it is simultaneously correct
not to allow the historical development of Marxist thought to be assimilated
into those systems that appeal to Marxism as a legitimizing facade for ex-
isting conditions.
The primary contradiction to which Marxist theory as a historical
theory is open consists of the following: Marx's point of departure is that
it is not the political power relationships of a society that hold it together
at its core; rather, the social ensemble is founded on the capitalist form of
the law of value, which regulates the form of production and exchange so
that the state, at best, can take part in eliminating certain disparities. But
the true power over reality lies in the production of goods, which is the
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foundation Marx relies on to ascertain whether or not a system is ripe for
revolutionary transformations.
Historically, revolutions have taken place precisely in those coun-
tries where the law of value was not fully developed, where the production
of goods had not yet saturated the ensemble of social relations. Consider
the problem of social cohesion: in these lands the traditional means of
production, the high concentration of capital in a few regions, and the dif-
ferent forms of communal property exist simultaneously; the despotic state
is necessary to balance this explosive mixture of various nonsimultaneous
forms of production and property. To be sure, there is a developed prole-
tariat, small by modern industrial standards, but it is surrounded by an
oppressive mass of small producers and farmers-a group whose existence
and consciousness shows they have not been drawn into the modernizing
process. Marxist theory has not providedfor the revolutionary transformation
of these societies. Toward the end of his life, Marx did not exclude such
societies from this use of the theory, but he did see that revolutions in
underdeveloped regions are necessarily dependent on revolutionary trans-
formation in developed countries if they want to push through a program
of social and political transformation without bureaucratic deformation.
Thus the contradiction: revolutions have occurred in places where
the circumstances are not as Marx supposed necessary for revolutions to
retain their emancipatory character; and revolutions have not occurred in
places where the conditions for true revolutionary transformation are sup-
posedly ripe. From the perspective of a moral worldview formulated in
developed societies, one cannot argue that it would have been better that
no revolutions should have taken place in such conditions or that revolution
should wait until the conditions correspond to Marxist hypotheses. In such
a view there is as well a blind, unhistorical element. If one assumes the true
power of Marxism to be where Marxism has actually seized the masses,
then one must also insist on taking literally the Marxist standards for rev-
olutionary transformations.
Of course, Marxist theory does not depend on the rights won by
workers in bourgeois societies being restricted to facilitate the industriali-
zation and modernization of society. These rights have become precarious
in all phases of bourgeois society, but they have never been done away with
fully (if one disregards the travesties of capital in fascism). For Marx, it was
unthinkable that the mechanisms of the merely representative democracies
and their corresponding systems of bourgeois public spheres could be abol-
ished without putting in their place much freer and more open forms of
public spheres. His critique of the bourgeois public sphere is directed against
its limitation; the sense of the critique consists in expanding, not abolishing,
the freedom of speech, the freedom to form coalitions, and the right of
assembly.
Historically, we now find ourselves facing a peculiar state of af-
fairs. We seem to be forced to take back the Kantian critique of the onto-
logical argument when we say that Marxist thought gained real power-
something in addition to mere theory-wherever conditions for a true eman-
cipation were not favorable. Insofar as these systems lack historical legiti-
macy and repeatedly have to confirm for themselves the power of reality,
the result is an ideology in the classical sense, that is, a necessarily false
consciousness. Kant says that "a hundred real thalers are not worth a bit
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more than a hundred imaginary ones." "To be" is apparently not a real
predicate, that is, a concept of something that can be added to the concept
of the thing-which is an objection to the ontological argument: existence
must be added to the conception of God, to the notion of the totally con-
summate being. Thus it is said that the conception of God cannot be con-
sidered an ens realissimum unless existence is comprised in it.
That is the theoretical side of the refutation of the ontological
argument. For the clever, practical bourgeois person-and Kant was one-
the matter looks a bit different: "In my financial circumstances there is more
to a hundred real thalers than to the idea of a hundred real thalers (that is,
than to a hundred possible thalers). For the object is in reality contained
in the idea not merely analytically but also synthetically (it is an idea de-
terminant of my condition)." As the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach makes
clear, Marxist theory is oriented toward practical change. In this regard it
is not pointless to ask where Marxist theory has really changed the world,
where something synthetic has been added. Naturally one can retreat to the
trickle-down effect and say that many precepts of Marxist social theory have
invaded modem intellectual disciplines and have become part of the real
power of those disciplines, and yet one may not be able to name a single
one of the precepts in question. That is one side of the history of Marx's
influence he himself certainly had in mind. Basically, however, his skepti-
cism about the transformative power of the intellectual disciplines alone
was so great that, as he states in "The Class Struggles in France," he could
imagine a truly and freely developing intellectual discipline, that is, a dis-
cipline in accord with its practical tasks of emancipation, only in a "republic
of work," in a freely organized society.
"Criticism" and "partisanship" still belong together in Marx's
work. According to him, partisanship is constituted by developing the sci-
entific truth-content in the radical criticism of all that exists, that is, in the
criticism that gets to the human root. A partisanship separated from this
developed truth-content and in favor of socialism and the proletariat would
be considered an ahistorical adventure. At the same time, however, the
theoretical reconstruction of the laws determining the modem world, with-
out their conditions coming to a head because of their capacity for change,
is supposed to be a decisive partisanship, an extension of the blindness
toward the historical powers of the past. The separation of partisanship
from criticism is, however, an essential characteristic of Marxism's historical
development. This separation reveals itself not only in the internal history
of the Marxist science but also in the newly formed international class fronts.
If so-called Western Marxism is designed to restore the wounded honor of
a critically constituted truth-content of Marxist theory (this is clearest in
the Frankfurt school, which therefore also labels its Marxism a critical the-
ory), then the leading normative demand for a Marxist legitimation of Sta-
linism is oriented completely toward partisanship, that is, toward Marxism's
thoughtless vow to defend the "Fatherland of Socialism."
Orthodoxy and Foreign Identification
It would require no particular effort to develop the dialectic be-
tween the power of reality and the truth-content of Marxist thought if this
separation of partisanship from truth could have maintained its one-di-
mensional frontline positions. One might thereby be able to comfort oneself
217
 with the thought that, in industrially underdeveloped countries, revolu-
tionary developments are established with the help of Marxist proposals for
modernization, but that a socialist transformation of society does not have
to come about because of it. Such a rectification, however, has proven im-
possible. Marxist thought, anchored in historical realities, has shaped and
put its stamp on the entire Marxist discussion to such a decisive extent that,
even in those countries for which Marxist theory was intended in its original
form, no step can be taken in the recuperation of the origins of Marxist
thought without at the same time being critical of"real, existing Socialism"
and its consequences. Equipped with the "imprimatur" of successful revo-
lutions, Marxist thought has returned to the western European countries of
its origin and here has become compressed into a new orthodoxy. Conse-
quently, the transformation of social realities in these countries has removed
itself from precisely the spirited investigative look that is fundamental for
the Marxist adaptation of reality.
There is another equivalent to the separation of partisanship from
criticism: the separation of the means of investigation from the modes of
presentation. Whoever does not follow Marxism literally in producing his
or her own work is quickly suspected of revisionism. The literal-minded
scholarship-and literal-mindedness is always characteristic of formal or-
thodoxies-has grown and completely oppresses the spirited modes of in-
vestigation that Marx himself used on the society ofhis time and that could
have been the only means of comprehending the altered conditions of cap-
italism transformed by the socialist state.
It is not my task in these musings to go into detail on how one
may speak, for example, of Russian and Chinese developments as social
orders, each with its own idiosyncratic structure. In both societies, however,
Marxism is, in a specific way, the product of the assimilation of Western
rationalism to their dominant ways of thought and their long traditions of
understanding nature and the world. To judge these forms of socialism
according to Marx makes sense only if one recognizes at the same time the
completely independent character of these social orders, which RudolfBahro
quite properly characterizes as protosocialist. The claim to truth in these
societies is not documented in Marxist theory; rather, it arises primarily
out of the immanent logic of development of these countries. Only on this
foundation can the true role of Marxist thought in the revolutionary pro-
cesses of these countries be recognized.
In order to gain a new approach to Marx, we must free Marxist
thought from the organizational contexts which, for more than half a cen-
tury, have determined the political and cultural front lines in the class
struggle: I am thinking here of the Third International. This embodied, since
1927 at the latest, the idea of"Socialism in a Country," which was supposed
to present a bulwark against the fascist and bourgeois forms of domination
and which understood itself to be the genuine heir to Marxist theory. The
other connection that arose is not completely free from the reactions to
these monopolizing, revolutionary thoughts. What represented itself after
1917 as the Second International of social democracy bears the imprint, on
the one hand, of the transformational experiences of the capitalist system;
on the other hand, it is also characterized by resistance to a form of socialism
that made an appeal to Marx but that, given the reality of Russia's devel-
opment, could not keep its promise of freedom. I do not consider it at all
218
 Oskar Negt
too bold to maintain that social democracy would have died off long ago
if it had not been for Stalinism. In fact, the Stalinist version of Marxism-
which is merely a legitimating facade for domination-has done more to
discredit socialism in the world than all the reactionary propaganda against
Marxism taken together. (In a controversy between Lukacs and Bloch, it is
clear how these misunderstandings operated: for Lukacs, even the worst
socialism is better than the best capitalism; Bloch objects to that, correctly
so, by saying that the worst socialism is no longer socialism and is therefore
much more dangerous because it contributes to discrediting the socialist
idea in the world.)
Today we find ourselves in a situation in which we must read
Marx anew. Insofar as this challenge always arises in situations of social
crisis, it is not new. When I say that we must study Marx anew I mean also
that we must free ourselves from identifying with prior and sympathetic
revolutions in other countries and with the modes of thought linked to
them. Since the late 1960s this identification with alien interests has occurred
frequently in different contexts, and the result has been that the spirited
application of Marxist categories and incidents to the concrete conditions
of the countries in question has been blocked. In the second half of the
1970s disillusionment concerning such identification with foreign interests
arose because many admired products of social change either were destroyed
or did not take the course the socialist intellectuals in this country had
imagined.
A New Study of Marx Is Necessary
In light of these historical changes in Marxist theory, and in light
of the dissension in which it presently finds itself, it seems impossible to
propose a renewal of Marxist thought without acknowledging the theory to
be substantially a historical one and without making evident the mechanism
of its entanglement in history. Essential to this renewal is the recognition
that the separation of theories and realities into distinct confines (the result
of that monopolizing position of Marxist orthodoxy) cannot simply be can-
celed at one blow without being conscious of the reasons for these delim-
itations. Today, many who have become uncertain (but who nonetheless
want things to remain as they were) are inclined to cover up the history of
these separations by coupling Marx's work with other movements. What
the modem sciences have produced-be it psychoanalysis, industrial soci-
ology, or the theory of language-is linked to the categories and cognitive
contexts of Marxism by means of an "and": Marxism and the natural sci-
ences, Marxism and psychology, Marxism and ecology, and so on. Almost
every new movement that appears today and is engaged in theoretical self-
reflection produces such a new and.
These couplings are all attempts to complete the scientific, de-
velopmental history of Marxism by way of an exterior expansion, a history
characterized by the separation of certain contents of experience, a history
bourgeois sciences appropriated. The developmental history of Marxist
thought has thereby been considered to have followed the normal laws of
the history of a theory; but new theories and new realities have arisen. This
shows, however, an insensitivity to the materialist conception of history;
and the constitution of social reality, in the context of contradicting Marx's
ideas, remains uncomprehended. Central to the development of Marxism
219
is the question of why, in developing, it should have ignored or even sup-
pressed many twentieth-century practical movements and theoretical anal-
yses. Mere "and couplings," added subsequently, do no more than weave
ideological threads about the web of an ahistorical reconstruction of Marx's
work.
The basic presupposition behind reconstituting a living dialogue
with Marxist thought-thereby investigating the history of Marxism's ex-
clusions-is the recognition of the historical boundaries of Marxist theory
itself. This recognition does not contain an objection to its truth-content.
On the contrary, truth is constituted first of all through history. As Walter
Benjamin put it, truth has a temporal core. Whoever thinks that perceptions
are flawed because they have a genesis has fallen back into the ideological
illusion of the bourgeois philosophy of origins. What Marx ascribes to Ar-
istotle-namely, that he works within a historical boundary, without the
truth-content of his theory thereby being diminished in the least-must be
applicable to Marx as well.
Acknowledging the historical boundaries of Marxist thought
makes it possible for us to analyze this epoch-making work from historical
perspectives. One consequence is that we can escape the abstract alternative
of either accepting as true everything that Marx thought and wrote or re-
jecting everything as false. The forceful character of this logic of alternatives
has done much to facilitate anti-Marxist thought, which is, in large measure,
a truth reaction in the scholastic mode. Since Marx's death, several phases
of dried-up Marxist orthodoxy have alternated with phases of emotional
anti-Marxism. Undergirded by the logic of abstract alternatives, the history
of orthodox Marxism is compensated for by the shadowy world-understand-
ing of renegades and dissidents.
In considering Marx historically, the point is to avoid judging
him according to absolutist truth claims. In the global confrontation of
whether or not everything in Marxist thought is true or false, the decisive
question is not posed. Is not the point to determine, in detail, where in
Marxist thought the agendas have been completed and where they have not?
The agenda of the analysis of capital has certainly been completed; incom-
plete is the agenda concerning the consitution of the Subject. Everything that
Marx said is correct, but he did not say everything that we need in order
to comprehend the modem world. Capital does not have to be written yet
again; and it certainly does not have to be recapitulated to the point of
senselessness in terms of the old categorical relationships. If we distinguish
complete from incomplete agendas, then we recognize simultaneously that
Marx mainly undertook the scientific development of a field at the point
at which an established science of it already existed. How could he speak
scientifically about the constitution of the Subject when in his lifetime there
was no psychology of internal development or of compulsive desires?
If one starts from the premise that Marx, in all modesty, saw his
theory as fulfilling a dual function (as an introduction to research and an
introduction to commerce), then one must be careful about asserting what
authentic materialist thought consists of. We can certainly learn more about
research by studying the way Marx analyzes theories and social relationships
than by repeating the logic of his presentation, which owes a good deal to
the tradition of grand bourgeois philosophy, that is, to the Kantian critique
of pure reason and to Hegel's science of logic. As Marx himself emphasizes,
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 Oskar Negt
dialectic is the form of thought that is active in matter-and it is active in
such a way that it does not prescribe how matter acts in an external sense
but rather how matter, in an effort to conceptualize itself, constitutes itself
in its own movement. Hegel says that dialectic is pure observation, which
is possible only through extreme effort, only through the work of the concept.
When I speak of the "logic of research" having priority over the "logic of
presentation," I do so in an authentically Marxist sense in order to be able
to translate the completed results back into their modes of production; Marx
himself proceeds in this way in his entire critique of political economy. It
is not the products that are placed in relation to one another but rather the
basic modes of production.
I will try to make clear in three problem areas those perspectives
from which it is sensible (and possible) to speak of a revival of Marxism.
Rather than include Marx's work in its entirety, I will work by examples
that point to situations of particular importance today. Certainly I am not
going to attempt, after the fact, to integrate everything that is historically
new into the body of Marxist categories and perceptions. Since Marxist
theory, in its essential content, is based on developed, bourgeois-capitalist
countries, it makes sense first to discuss its truth-content so that its history
(which is subject to the specific developmental conditions of those countries)
is reconstructed without laying oneself open to the charge of partiality con-
cerning those successful revolutions that also made an appeal to Marx. The
fact that one works all too happily with borrowed realities has resulted in
the development of a critical-productive relationship to Marxist thought
according to one's own social conditions.
Above all, there is the question, asked repeatedly, about the con-
stitution of the proletariat as the bearer of a historical mission of change.
There have been many dismissals of the proletariat from the stage of history;
however, the fact of the matter is-and one must always return to it-this
point, even up to the present, has not gained a clear plausibility in everyone's
eyes. The second problem is based on the history of the constitution of the
Subject. Even the most orthodox representative of materialist psychology
is becoming increasingly conscious that people do not think and behave
according to conditioned reflexes or to patterns of images. If we take seri-
ously the Marxist conception of humankind as the ensemble of social re-
lations-Marx himself considers this ensemble to be an "inner commu-
nity" -then it must be assumed that Marx believes the Subject has a
complexity equal to or greater than that of the "exterior community," greater,
that is, than the organically constructed structure of a highly developed
social order. The third area concerns the altered relationship of work, the
forces of production, and nature. What appears onstage today as an ecol-
ogical question is not a specialized problem of social production or of the
organization of social and communal living, not even in relation to nature.
It concerns, rather, the specific character of the history of industrial civi-
lization as a whole.
The Proletariat as Substance and the Proletarian Characteristics
The concern for the historical Subject in the history of Marxism
has been given substance in such a way that it has completely suppressed
research on proletarian subjects. We have failed to identify individual pro-
letarian characteristics and to study how they are combined. The substan-
221
 tialization of the proletariat at the level of its historical-philosophical di-
mensions corresponds to the narrowing of vision with regard to the daily
and (in a sense) worldly characteristics of individual proletariats; and it
corresponds to the collective forms in which oppressed men and women
conduct their battles for liberation. The view that a class, a group, or a rank
could become the subject of history simply because of its existential con-
dition or because of its higher social consciousness has always been ques-
tionable in any case. Certainly the alternative to the substantialization of
the proletariat is not the dissolution of classes into merely individual entities
consisting of the conditions of existence and of subjective attitudes.
In order to be able to find a new approach to research on the
proletariat, one needs above all to adopt the way of seeing that Marx himself
uses. When, in Capital, he starts with the notion of society as a gigantic
collection of commodities, he also emphasizes that the single commodity
is the cell-form of this whole and that the purpose of science is to decipher
the inner dynamics of this cell-form. Marx is never content with determining
synthetic wholes for which, in terms of politics and economics, he is able
to identify only apparent movements. He focuses instead on the micro-
scopic, on the "compressed particular," whose inner contradictory nature
determines the true movement of the whole. This analytic approach is as
valid for the analysis of commodities as it is for the political assessment of
the entire condition of a society, such as Marx undertakes in the "Eighteenth
Brumaire," in which he puts forward the constricted conditions of existence,
the needs and characteristics of small landholders, as the exposed secret of
patriotism and of the emperor's masquerade.
Now it is rather remarkable that Marx should display the analytic
tools ofthe critique ofthe reification of consciousness and ofbehavior; and
also that he should name the basic perversions of a society in which the
production of commodities predominates. The fetishism of the commodity,
which is the basis for the mechanism of all reification, of the personalizing
of factual relationships as well as of the distortion of the process and its
result so that the entire objective world takes on a ghostly objectivity-all
this Marx applies to all the essential affairs of society (even if he does so
often in hints of future research projects). But he avoids applying this basic
analysis of societal perversions to the proletariat itself. This is all the more
astounding because the cognitive methods he developed-aimed precisely
at naming the manifold stumbling blocks to change-suggest that incisive
research is also to be devoted to the subjects of this change. Marx acts as
though the proletariat, because of its collective condition of misery, has the
ability, concretely earned in practical battles, to unite itself in organizational
terms and to bring the process of revolutionary upheaval to a successful
conclusion. If, with regard to all other social contexts, Marx persists in
microanalysis, then, concerning the proletariat, he is dealing essentially with
a synthetic whole. Of course, Marxists can object that Marx himself in no
way glorifies or gives substance to the proletariat. At various points in his
work he emphasizes the need for the working class to educate itself for
revolutionary emancipation. 2
Marx was aware that under certain social conditions that allow-
as they did in England-the proletariat to take part in the exploitation of
the entire world, a worker aristocracy could arise in and alongside the work-
ing class. What he does not undertake, however, is the cell analysis of the
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 Oskar Negt
characteristics, inclinations, and expectations of individual members ofthe
proletariat insofar as these are societal characteristics and not merely in-
dividual or psychological ones. Whatever works to project the reifications
ofbourgeois society into the proletariat seems to Marx to be not constitutive
of the collective process of emancipation and, on the contrary, to be easily
surmountable. Thus, the fact of the nonanalysis of the proletariat, placed
on a scientifically comparable level with the analysis of commodities, gives
the proletariat the appearance of a substance making its way according to
hard-and-fast historical rules.
The defective adaptation of the fetishism analysis to bourgeois
society as a class object-an Object that tries to develop into a Subject
through its battles with the will and with consciousness-is something that
led both Marx and Engels (particularly in his later work) to a doubly faulty
assessment: as they observed the quantitative growth of the working class
and its organizations, and as they became aware of the undermining of the
bases for legitimacy of the old class domination, they overestimated the
revolutionary will of the working class and underestimated the capacities
of the existing form of domination either to neutralize parts of this revo-
lutionary will or to absorb it. In 1891, after the Erfurt Program had been
accepted, Engels triumphantly asserted that "all the remains ofl..assalle-ism
have been destroyed. We have a completely Marxist agenda!"
As we know today, that was not totally false. The state-aided
undertakings favored by Lassalle, which were supposed to place socialism
on the path to a "system of acquired rights," gave way to the strong, sobering
effect of a twelve-year ban on democratic socialism. This state, which Las-
salle intended to be a reconciliation of the differences between prussianism
and socialism in the interests of the working class, was established in reality
only in the minds of a few pragmatists after the lifting of the socialist laws.
But how the movement really fared does not become apparent in the plat-
form of the party congress. Those who were trained to recognize Marxist
formulas could easily discern the Marxist arguments in the theoretical, in-
troductory part of the Erfurt Program. But even on the programmatic level,
it was evident that, where the concern was with practical and short-term
goals, the old state orientation of democratic socialism still existed; it was
not at all broken by the experiences of being legally banned.
The contradiction between the reality and the program of the
worker's movement goes back to its early history, which Marx and Engels
lived through themselves, and in 1914 this contradiction became evident
only by means of a historic pauper's oath. In the analysis of the bourgeois
systems of economics and politics, Marx insists in detail upon the difference
between public declarations and actual activities. In the history of the sit-
uation of the proletariat, continuous confusions between program and reality
creep into Marx's and Engels's analyses.
These mistaken assessments also are manifest in the predictions
Engels makes in his later work concerning the possible beginning of revo-
lutionary upheaval. Shortly before his death, he declared that the revolution
would probably come at the end of the (nineteenth) century, and it would
be a good thing if the proletariat still had this time to prepare for the as-
sumption of power. Ifthe revolution were to come earlier, then the bourgeois
intelligentsia-the teachers, the doctors, the engineers, and so on, whose
help the proletariat would have to count on for the reconstruction of so-
223
 ciety-would be thoughtlessly betrayed. These classes would have to be
brought into the process of the proletarianization of society so that, out of
the loss of the bourgeois conditions of existence, they might learn to fa-
miliarize themselves with the perspectives of a new society.
How could Engels have arrived at such mistaken prognoses? He
had such an unbelievable ability to predict the results of the constellation
of armies and battles that he could foresee the debacle that befell the French
army at Verdun, yet he allowed himself to be misled by the exuberance of
idealism. In both the successful and the unsuccessful prognoses, it is cer-
tainly not a question of prophetic abilities in the usual sense. When Engels
predicted the decisive battle between two contending armies, even though
their plans still called for different marching orders, he did so by means of
an infallible analysis of compelling material conditions. The immersion in
details, the penetrating look into the contradictory nature of the military
cell-organization, in clear distinction to strategic intentions that have merely
been conceived-all this makes possible a caution concerning the material
before him, material whose inner dynamics emerge because of an intense
concentration on their conceptual work, material which is not subsumed to
biased ideas from without. If the proletariat is not the object of such cell
analyses, then it is not possible to make prognoses based on the proletarian
contexts' own movements.
It was during the time of national socialism that Marxist thought
first paid greater attention to the cell-characteristics of the proletariat and
therefore to those individual proletariat interests linked to the existing sys-
tem of domination. At that time people were forced to recognize that the
quantitative power of worker organizations and the battle-preparedness of
the working class were not enough to prevent its complete destruction. Also,
the failure of the November Revolution and other European revolutionary
attempts did not result in replacing the substance analysis of the proletariat
with an empirical analysis. Here one must cite the researches into "family"
and "prejudices" by the Frankfurt School for Social Research; these have
been trailblazing in overcoming the notion that the powerful proletarian
camp could maintain itself free from the destructive influences ofthe bour-
geois environment. The proletarian family, rather than being simply the
counterpart of the bourgeois family, reproduces its mechanisms. Authori-
tarian and authoritarian-dependent characters arise not only in bourgeois
but also in proletarian families. Ethnocentric prejudices, the hatred of for-
eigners, the inclination to conceal the causes of crises and to expect Fuhrer-
like personalities to overcome them-these and other mechanisms of per-
version, of the reification of behavior and of consciousness, also arise as
ways of handling things in the working class. That does not mean that the
susceptibility of workers to authoritarian developments is identical to that
of the bourgeois class. But this difference is not based on existing disposi-
tions; it is based, rather, on the ways these dispositions can be collectively
bound and neutralized.
In his research on the behavior of blue- and white-collar workers
in the prefascist period, Erich Fromm has developed an interesting thesis.
The working class is not free of those prejudices and of that reified con-
sciousness brought about by the capitalist production of commodities and
their corresponding conditions of domination. However, as long as there
exists an organizational support for workers, as long as unions and the
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 Oskar Negt
Communist and the Social Democratic parties can be preserved as historical
organizations with certain traditions and perspectives on a change of cir-
cumstances and on the elimination of present misery-as long as all this
occurs, the loyalty of the worker toward these organizations by and large
will be preserved. It was not the workers who voted for Hitler in such great
numbers; it was the dispossessed petite bourgeoisie, the authority-bound
yea-sayers of the bourgeois classes, of the civil servant classes, of the white-
collar classes, ofthe small-time producers, and so on. But national socialism
is not founded on these classes exclusively; it is also capable of mobilizing
overwhelming portions ofthe working class for its purposes. The Nazis were
materialistic opportunists; they knew precisely that the destruction of worker
organizations was the first step in mobilizing for their own purposes the
behavior potential that had been kept in check by collective restraints. When
these worker organizations were destroyed, the work force fell into the laps
of the National Socialists, for them to deal with as they pleased. This explains
why there were many attempts to resist collectively as long as these worker
organizations still existed, and why this resistance was reduced to particular,
single sacrifices when the collective resistance, supported by powerful or-
ganizations, ceased.
Although Marx and Engels had not placed this perspective of a
dialectic proper to proletarian cell-characteristics and their organization at
the center of their analysis, they did not exclude the possibility of a catas-
trophe, involving the entire society, that would signal the end of both the
ruling and the oppressed classes. They were probably not able to imagine,
however, that the working class, once reduced to a noncollective natural
state of private exploitability, could take an active part in exploiting itself.
In light of the difficulty concerning these theoretical-historical
and historical experiences, what are the consequences today of holding fast
to class analysis and at the same time coming upon the reality of proletarian
living conditions? It is not the single member of the proletariat who con-
stitutes that cell-form to which one can return in order to make evident the
political movements of fundamental forces. The individual is no synthetic
whole whose organizing center consists of a stable identity. And the working
class is not an oversized individual who participates in history according
to homogeneous norms. As we discover the cell-forms in the individual
proletarian characteristics of the workers, we are able simultaneously to see
those bourgeois characteristics that bind the worker to the existing society.
We must start from the methodological rule of thumb that ambivalences
and dual values are contained in each single characteristic of the worker.
The fact that workers belong to a class and are affiliated with it politically
does not stamp them entirely; it concerns only certain characteristics. Their
need to free themselves from oppression and from exploitation or to battle
contemporary misery may lead them to organize into unions or to join a
workers' party. Their entire livelihood is not necessarily loyally bound to
these organizations; rather, they can be so involved-through other aspects
of their circumstances-with the existing order of domination that only the
politicization of these conditions can produce a total economy of attitudes,
which grants them a certain independence from the continuing influences
of the existing system of domination.
One of the fundamental mistakes of Marxist proletariat analyses
is the assumption that workers who organize into unions and proletarian
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 parties are exclusively proletarian in character. I consider as proletarian
those characteristics and forces, directed toward emancipation, which aim
to break through the existing conditions of domination by means of per-
tinent opposition. If one proceeds in light of such an evaluation, then it is
no longer self-evident that one sees proletarian characteristics only in the
traditional working classes and acknowledges them only where there is a
situation of need in terms of the material conditions of life. When people
unite in order to fight against developments that threaten the fundamental
grounds of human existence, they express such proletarian characteristics
in the process of organizing their battles themselves. But even here we are
speaking of parts rather than wholes. In this regard one can say that "pro-
letarian characteristics" and "proletarian motives" come into play in bour-
geois initiatives, in the women's liberation movement, in the antinuclear
movement, in the student movement, even though all these initiatives and
movements cannot be directly linked to the traditional notion of the in-
dustrial working class. The battle is not carried out with an eye toward
transforming the entire society in terms of its existing system of domination
and organizing it anew into another society. In actuality, the movement is
focused on the detail, on the cell-form. But even the concentration on certain
points to which emancipatory interests are tied gives rise to a decisive ma-
terial lever, a concrete point of contact with objective reality, intended to
effect a new organization of the remaining characteristics as well.
If one starts from the cellular organization of those characteristics
that are linked to the process of emancipation or that depend on the existing
system, then one presupposes also another concept of the organizing process
and of organization. Traditionally, organizations have the tendency to chal-
lenge and to bind people on certain aspects of their interests and loyalties.
One joins a party and pays the dues of loyalty for the protection expected
from the party. By and large these organizations are not interested in pol-
iticizing whole persons, in loosening the non-emancipatory characteristics
from their natural involvement with existing dependencies. Exacting loyalty
as the main method of payment, however, has scant effectiveness in chang-
ing consciousness and behavior.
This traditional notion of organization, mainly influenced by the
model of the ideal bourgeois association, is apparently partially responsible
for the scant attention workers' organizations pay to the consciousness in-
dustry and the media. In their own consciousness and behavior, once they
become aware of their true interests, workers are not empty vessels to be
filled. Wherever the daily tabloid is the predominant workers' paper, that
is where ideological material is continuously made palatable and where
behavioral positions are actualized, all of which have precisely the function
of not allowing workers to become aware of their immediate interests. Fou-
cault located domination in the detail, in those arenas of movement that
people have, in those times and places that determine their living conditions.
Thus, it is not the system of domination by and large that hinders liberation;
rather, it is the attachment we have for certain things, which often is so
powerful that we make decisions that go against our own interests.
The whole person is the goal of liberation, not its point of depar-
ture. Of course, in a not exclusively metaphoric sense one can say that
people, constituted as they are under the conditions of exploitation and
oppression, still do not make up a true, synthetic unity. A synthetic unity
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 Oskar Negt
would arise when the individual characteristics reach a stage of emanci-
pation that allows them to be constituted in a way that gives them identity.
That would presuppose that people's capacity to make sociability and sol-
idarity their object has been developed enough for them to recognize them-
selves in objective reality. The negation of self-alienation proceeds along
the same path as does self-alienation, according to Marx, and the negation
of self-alienation can be accomplished only when the cell-forms ofthe Sub-
ject-Object relationship are being changed. Human significations arise only
in order to beget the human objects of signification.
The Altered Position of the Subject in the Revolutionary Process
At a time when most people, whether willingly or not, were pulled
into the undertow of class polarization, it was natural to consider the force
of objective conditions as defining and limiting the arena of human action.
In continuously reproaching Marx with misunderstanding himself objec-
tively, people completely overlook the fact that this objectivity was not a
question of cognitive judgment alone; rather, it was mediated by history.
In cases where people are pulled into this class polarization, where they
become merely the appendage of capital, Marx and Engels speak of societal
natural laws. They do not do this to immortalize these natural laws but to
make clear how little human will and consciousness actually intervene in
historical processes.
If this superstructure of the objective in Marx's time is justified,
then the as-it-were transcendental point of view-through which nineteenth-
century life can be observed in light of the rapid development of capital-
cannot be extended seamlessly to cover those circumstances in which capital
predominates just as it did before and in which people's needs simultane-
ously grow in complexity and their forms of resistance become differentiated
to an extent unimaginable by Marx. The anti-idealistic formula that the
being of society determines consciousness and not vice versa is not a law
that is independent of history.
The growth of the forces of production has not eliminated ex-
ploitation and oppression, but the forms in which they make their way are
based on the consideration of the dimensions of the Subject in domination
to a far higher extent in the developed capitalist social orders than they
were in Marx's time. As long as one has grounds for the assumption that
people have nothing to lose but their chains, one is able to deduce-from
the want found in the objective situation-the motive for overcoming the
existing situation. And one is able to rest assured that the pressure of cir-
cumstances will one day compel people to revolutionary activity, regardless
of their ready excuse that they do not count. As soon as this close tie between
motives for action and the objective situation no longer exists-because of
the differences among systems of domination and because of the immense
growth in society's wealth-the motives directed toward overcoming the
present society become more complex as well.
Today we find ourselves in a situation in which a revolutionary
theory of action is necessary. In this point as well the developmental history
of Marxism has been determined by unfortunate separations. The utopia-
prohibition of Marx and Engels has the worthwhile tendency of directing
criticism toward conceptions that make the revolutionary will and the need
for a free society the sole lever of change. In opposition to that, Marx and
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Engels justifiably insist on the material basis of all constellations, which
must be understood without illusions before successful historical action is
possible. The strategic function of this utopia-prohibition is defined through
the historical situation in which all opposition forces-regardless of the camp
they are active in-have an overabundance of consciousness, ideas, and good
intentions. Marx and Engels were aware that ideas alone could not accom-
plish anything against the compacted power of a capitalist class founded on
material relationships.
Once the original profundities of Marx and Engels in relation to
Subject and Object are declared to be eternal verities, many investigations
and theories establish themselves next to Marxist historical science and
occupy the lacunae in materialist analysis. Not all these theories conceive
of themselves explicitly as answers to the loss of the Subject in Marxism.
However, while Marxists staunchly repeat the microanalysis of the pro-
duction of commodities and of capital, there develops (alongside and com-
pletely independent of the ideology of Marxist orthodoxy) a theory of the
Subject that pursues the microperspective deep into the fundamental con-
stitution of the individual. By contrast, Freudian psychoanalysis, with its
discriminating way of interpreting the life of the psyche in terms of mere
interests and needs, resembles the struggle of the concept, a struggle that
Marx followed in investigating the total context of production and repro-
duction in social life. If, with his characteristic instinct for rooting out great
scientific discoveries, Marx had learned of Freud's theory, he would prob-
ably have dealt with it as he had Hegel, for Freudian psychoanalysis is also
bourgeois in its origin and is not written with the future proletariat in mind.
Marx constantly stresses that the value of categories and percep-
tions is not exhausted in their genesis. Even in Freudian psychoanalysis,
Marx would have discovered the "rational kernel" he shelled out of Hegel's
absolute idealism in order to be able to stand this theory right side up again.
The battle of orthodox Marxists against psychoanalysis proves
itself increasingly to be Theater of the Absurd, and the categories of de-
marcation are more "police concepts" than those supposedly required by
the matter at hand. That point is also valid for the history of science during
the 1920s, where important Marxists like Wilhelm Reich were cut off from
the communist movement because they put the notion of ambivalence in
needs and interests-in sum, the daily conflicts of workers-at the center of
their investigations. It was not only the rank-and-file party members who
followed the mechanism of a psychological apparatus (a battle arena that
includes repression, overcompensation, reality adjustment, and the superego
as censor) but also the guiding spirits of this movement who could not
adhere strictly to the catalog of duties for collective action, making amends
thereby for all the damage to socialization suffered under bourgeois society.
If people had noticed this, then they would not have so helplessly faced the
collapse of the workers' movement and the torrential growth of fascism as
if it had been a natural catastrophe. Let me make my critique polemically
sharper: even burghers and functionaries of ''real existing socialism" are
stamped by categories like ego, superego, and ego-ideal, let alone the psy-
choses and neuroses that indicate a failure of socialization; they are stamped
by their ability to adjust to reality and by their individual capacity for
organizing spatial and temporal circumstances according to objective de-
mands, especially by their entire behavior toward the Social Being. It is
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 Oskar Negt
pure fiction that people work only according to the rules of the neurophys-
iological system and that they are able to raise their interest and needs
straight up to the level of consciousness.
It is notorious that the battle against psychoanalysis runs along
a line-determined by archaic prejudice-which states that the messenger of
misfortune is its cause. Whoever refers to the complexity of the Subject, to
the manifold stumbling blocks that stand in the way of socialist, progressive
thought, will not be accepted as someone who is investigating the material
conditions of the alteration of the Subject. That person will be regarded,
rather, as a propagandist for bourgeois dissolution. Of course, the conse-
quence of this prejudice is that underneath the official consciousness of these
social orders an ever stronger unconsciousness settles in, one that does not
get public expression and produces various forms of protest and attitudes
of escape.
This prejudice against subjectivity, however, has even deeper
systemic causes. At its foundation is obviously the conception that capital,
the economy-on the whole, the conditions commonly regarded as mate-
rial-are the hard objects of science, whereas the psyche is made up of soft
matter, something malleable with no shape of its own. Today we know,
however, that people can die just as easily because of psychological problems
as they can because of an axe or material objects, things that injure them
physically. Historically as well, this mistake of considering objective reality
as worthy of theory and psychological reality as a question of sentiment has
always worked out unfortunately. For example: in the final analysis, the
collective wishful notions of many who felt their national honor compro-
mised through the Treaty of Versailles had much greater material reality
than the Maginot Line, which was overrun in just a few days. It is a mean-
ingful exaggeration to say that in this sense those realities of mass psy-
chology, which, of course, are always anchored in individual psyches, can
be more objective than stone.
In the 1970s the entire history of the Third International repeated
itself under completely different assumptions in the form of the battle against
psychoanalysis. Those dimensions of the Marxist analysis of capital that
had been forgotten in the postwar period were again pushed into conscious-
ness in obtrusive orthodoxy. The more analyses referred to capital, the more
scientific they appeared and the more emphatic was the exclusion of psy-
choanalytically oriented investigations. These analyses of capital joined forces
with an equally rigid concept of organization. It can commonly be said that
the greater the threat-because of those psychic energies that have been
forced into the subconscious-to that which the censuring court of the ego
has to do, the more decisive is the repression of psychoanalysis. Also, the
battle against psychoanalysis is always indicative of the fact that the Subject
takes great pains to keep its true needs hidden beneath its consciousness.
In this context, if one takes the concept of orthodoxy seriously,
then one has to endow it with new life. An orthodox Marxist is not one
who repeats Marxist terms as if one could unquestioningly apply this sub-
stantially historical theory arbitrarily to historical circumstances. An ortho-
dox Marxist is, rather, one who can adjudicate the dialectic between the
concept and the object. Whatever Marx says about the constitution of the
Subject was not based on the developed science of psychology, which cor-
responded to the science of political economy then available. Concerning
229
the individual, he basically makes only statements of principle: about the
individual being tied to the process of constituting bourgeois society and
about the possibilities for emancipation. The forms in which the Social Being
is transformed into the Subject, on the other hand, largely escaped the
contemporary scientific knowledge of psychology. For this reason, Marx
only formulates a research direction in relation to the Subject when he speaks
of an ensemble of social relations or, better, when he speaks of the inner
common being of men and women. That the outer common being, the
society, is simply reflected in the Subject remained completely alien to Marx,
for in the society itself one can already find constituents of the Subject. All
exterior elements of society exist also within, but precisely in the form of
subjective elements that are related according to their inner logic. If one
considers Marx's statements about the individual and subjectivity to be the
results of research processes corresponding to the level of knowledge of
political economy, and one repeats these statements thanks to a specially
formulated art of citation, then seeing things from the level of knowledge
today, one would push Marx back to a prescientific level. Marx hints at a
materialist theory of subjectivity, but he did not develop it as he did the
theory of political economy; indeed, he could not. In order to accomplish
that today, it is unavoidable that we end the compressed exclusion of psy-
choanalysis from the Marxist scientific context and at the same time take
up those special investigations that are based on the real exploration of the
Subject.
The Precarious Relationship of Work, the Forces of Production, and
Nature
I come now to the third and final topic, namely, that a revival
of Marxist thought is both necessary and meaningful. On the one hand,
"revival" means a strict adherence to the content (not merely the vocab-
ulary) of Marxist theory; on the other hand, it means carrying through
unfulfilled agendas that are real research programs and that contribute to
the orientation of the contemporary world. The most difficult point of such
an unfulfilled agenda concerns the altered relationship between work, the
forces of production, and nature.
Marx investigated the relationships of the logic of capital with
unbelievable thoroughness, but he did not do the same with the underside
of capital, which capital feeds on and which is generally the basis for the
constitution of the object: the active work force. This is all the more as-
tounding because active, or live, labor is the source of value and surplus
value; it therefore constitutes that which finally also establishes the social
context. Strictly speaking, for Marx, we are born for the first time when we
receive our first paycheck. Of course, that is an exaggeration, for Marx knew
that commodities cannot go to market all alone. Even here it is certainly
not a question of principle, which criticism must take as its point of de-
parture. It is, first, a problem of a differentiated scientific procedure; and,
second, a problem of an unsystematically labeled direction of research.
"The determination ofthe value of the labor commodity contains
a historical and moral element" -so writes Marx in the first volume of
Capital. Only the determination of value? That matter aside, we have no
systematic indication of Marx's cognitive interest in either element (that is,
the moral or the historical element of the active work force) either within
230
 Oskar Negt
or beside the question of the determination of value. If it is true that active
labor is the determining source (but not the sole source) of societal wealth,
even of value and surplus value, then it is incomprehensible to me how
Marx could pay so little attention to-and use so few of his powers of
discrimination on-the historical and social character of labor, for he did
not otherwise hesitate to investigate even the most minute transaction in
the context of capital when it concerned the economy of dead labor.
It is necessary-particularly in a centennial celebration of Marx-
to break down the reifications of Marxist orthodoxies and, without thereby
subscribing to the stupid mechanisms of delimitation, to revalidate provi-
sional thinking and pose hypothetical questions. One of these hypothetical
questions might be, Is it completely impossible that capital's power of real-
ity, a power Marx wished to comprehend without illusions in order to de-
stroy it, so fascinated Marx that he was incapable of perceiving the forms
of resistance on the part of active labor beyond those of the proletariat,
valorized as a collective Subject?
If it should prove true that a fascination with the power of capital-
as Marx formulates it in the "Communist Manifesto" -is something that
affected Marx himself, then a further question presents itself: Should not
the underside of capital, a political economy of labor, be developed ac-
cording to the present conditions in order for us to be able to grasp the
historical effectiveness of capital at all? To do so would not constitute an
abrogation of the mechanisms investigated in Capital. On the contrary, it
would be the integration of this capitalistic legitimation into a political
economy oflabor as the science that is at the foundation ofthe entire process
of the production and reproduction of society.
Nineteenth-century capital was fully integrated into the notion
of social progress; nothing that existed beyond the capitalist context was
able to avoid that progress. But under the developed conditions of capitalism
the situation becomes increasingly absurd: the more capital develops, the
less it is able to provide the active work force with conditions of realization.
Even the old historically generic privilege of human beings to be the sole
possessors (and users) of brains, muscles, and nerves has been threatened
by modem machine systems. In these conditions, where is the active work
force, the live labor? What are the new possibilities of realization for them
when they fall out of the scheme of capital? How can one prevent unique
historical skills from decaying because they can find no perspicuous activity
or because they are pushed into the kinds of activity that serve the additional
exploitation and degradation of men and women?
Today these are no longer just questions of the economics of
crisis. They centrally concern the ways of people's lives, their relationships
to one another and to nature. If one considers Capital to be the dominating
viewpoint in the analysis, then of course one can develop notions that the
bourgeois media, with its technologically improving consciousness industry,
is about to use the labor that has been excluded from the productive work
process to prevent people from becoming conscious of their new social
situation; or that the bourgeois media is about to integrate the newly avail-
able labor forces into a proliferating apparatus of white-collar workers and
civil servants in order to control, by means of a Big Brother state, the energy
of protest. Capitalism has always been able to find areas of employment for
the active work force in order to forestall the catastrophe or the revolution.
231
But in doing so it matters little which fantasy capitalism is able to develop
in the interests of crisis management, something one surely should not
underestimate; what is most threatening, however, is that the Left has al-
lowed its own fantasy of change to be undermined by the crippling fasci-
nation with the possibilities of power in capitalism. The Left stares fixedly
at the old concept of work and refuses to think of work as taking any form
other than the subsistence labor defined by capital; everything beyond that
the Left labels "play" or "leisure time." In relation to the underside of the
analysis of capital, however, Marx himself has a very precise notion of work
as one of the essential means of expression by which people discover their
identities. While the Subject objectifies itself, the Object subjectifies itself:
this Subject-Object dialectic is central for an emancipatory concept of work,
without which even a liberation of science would not take shape.
People frequently reproach Marx and Engels for having a concept
of progress which they, unreflectively, did not tie to the development ofthe
forces of production. In fact, there are statements by Marx and Engels that
confirm this. For example, Engels says: "steam engines, electricity and spin-
ning wheels have been more revolutionary than the impact of Blanqui,
Raspail and Barbes." Yes, more revolutionary in the destruction of old
relationships(!)-in that productive forces like these still have determining,
liberating functions. But the old relationships or conditions have already
disintegrated, and the main thing now is to build a new society with themes
oriented not toward the power of disintegration but rather toward the so-
ciological fantasy of how a new, liberated society should look. Only then
does the developmental logic of the forces of production lose its defining
import. The function of capitalistic forces of production is to destroy tra-
ditional relationships; the importance Marx and Engels attributed to these
forces of production may be one reason why their theories, elaborated in
terms of classes emancipating themselves in traditional social orders, have
been understood as theories of modernization.
However much Marx and Engels assign a deciding role in social
development to the productive forces of the capitalist structure, they also
understand that the plundering behavior of capital toward people and nature
has a double meaning. Traditional dependencies are pulled into the under-
tow of commodity production, and the objective conditions of a possibly
new organization of society arise. Marx was conscious that in this way the
prodtlction disturbances of the ecological balance were linked inescapably
to the tendencies immanent in the logic of capital. In the first volume of
Capital he says that, with the steady growth of the urban population, piled
together in large centers, capital production would both enlarge the historical
force of society and disturb the metabolism between people and nature. (For
example, we do not return to the soil those components used up as foodstuffs
and clothing; the process of exchange is one-sided.) If urbanization, there-
fore, is linked to a concentration of the proletariat (which can thereby be-
come a historically powerful force), the same process threatens the physical
health of the urban worker and the spiritual life of the peasant. The capitalist
transformation of the process of production appears to be the martyrdom
of the producers, and labor seems to be a means of enslavement, of im-
poverishing the worker. The social combination of working processes be-
comes an organized oppression of individual spiritedness and freedom. Each
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 Oskar Negt
increase in the soil's fruitfulness for a given period also speeds the ruin of
its long-term fruitfulness. Marx summarizes his arguments on the relation-
ship between people and nature in the following way: "the more a country
like the United States of America, for example, bases its development on
heavy industry, the quicker will be this process of destruction. Capitalist
production accordingly develops the technology and combination of social
production processes only at the same time that it undermines the well-
springs of all wealth: the earth and the worker."
This dialectic of progress and destruction, developed at the in-
tersection of city and country, points to a contextualized materialist analysis
of ecology. The ecological problems cannot be separated from inclinations
inherent in capital, but they also are not absorbed by them. Marx did not
pursue this view further, since he hoped that the destruction of the worker
and the soil would not come to pass because the proletariat would carry
out the revolution. Marx venerates Justus von Liebig, who discovered ar-
tificial fertilizer, and he speaks in favor of using fertilizer as a means of
increasing productivity. Evidently, Marx could not imagine the current so-
cial situation in which farmers complain that the soil only functions as a
place where fruits are attached, that the only places where there is still life
in the soil are the graveyards.
I am not concerned with cramming into the categories of Marxist
thought all the social developments and protest movements that have ap-
peared on the historical horizon. But it is a question of giving up-not
without peril-theories that explain entire social contexts because individual
events cannot be grasped any longer with these theories' cognitive means.
As an epochal social theory, Marxist theory on the whole continues to ex-
plain much more than those compartmentalized bourgeois theories of em-
pirical research, which can make clear highly focused, single phenomena,
but which pay no attention to the main problem of theory construction,
namely, context, concrete totality.
Whatever is valid for the qualitative workplace-and though this
is intimated in Marx, it is not developed into a political economy oflabor-
is valid in a similar way for the concept of nature. Marx explicity discusses
this concept in his early writings; but even in Capital and in the Grundrisse
it is not entirely absent. In no way does it seem to be misguided to base a
theory of ecology on Marx. It is in the third volume of Capital that Marx
gives an almost poetic rendition of our relationship to nature. To be sure,
the statement is hidden in economic stipulations on rent from the soil,
formulated as a kind of natural-law contract in the interests of succeeding
generations: "From the perspective of a higher economic social formation,
a man's private ownership of part ofthe world appears to be just as unsavory
a proposition as a man's private ownership of another man. Even a whole
society, a nation, yea even all contemporary societies taken together, are
not the owners of the earth; they are its occupants only, its beneficiaries
and, as boni patres farnilias (as good family fathers), they have the respon-
sibility of leaving behind an improved planet to succeeding generations."
We have a natural-law duty to fashion the earth in such a way that we do
not place a burden on the living conditions of future generations.
Accepting Marx's statement, one could link it effectively to to-
day's fears about nuclear power. Even the argument that the creation of
nuclear power plants both commits and endangers generations is linked to
Marxist thought, and not only in a superficial sense. A generation that
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conducts itself like good parents must make the prudent handling of the
earth the guiding principle of its behavior.
I now come to the end. No social emancipation movement can
do without theory. Ruling classes limit themselves to using bits of legiti-
mation as facades for their power. But the oppressed classes who wish to
free themselves depend in their own battle for emancipation on fusing utopia
and knowledge. When Marxism gives up the claim to a revolutionary theory
of action, it degenerates into bourgeois academic posturing. The practical
meaning of theory consists in the fact that it is impossible for emancipation
movements to determine the conditions and limits of actions solely through
practical experimentation. When men and women continuously run up
against blank walls and have no idea why they are frustrated, the result is
passivity and numbness because of failure. Freud defines thinking as a "trial
act." That is also valid for the possible learning processes of historically
active classes and groups, for there is no emancipation movement that can
afford willingly to relinquish the social memory of the history of resistance
and struggle.
I have already emphasized that it is not a matter of the rein-
statement of a literal-minded orthodoxy. Marx does not investigate every-
thing necessary for explaining the contemporary world. Each person who
has to deal with modem conditions acquires an understanding of this world
not only from reading Marx but also from reading Max Weber and other
sociologists and philosophers. Nothing learned here is superfluous. What is
missing from these theories, however, is the cohesive explanation that is
linked by its perspective on emancipation movements. Cohesiveness is the
crucial criterion for a theory that furnishes us with directions to help us find
our way in the world and in our own lives. A spirited revival of Marxist
thought would be an essential crystallization point for concrete, historical
work in which today's emancipation movements might better be able to
evaluate their social place and more effectively organize their generalizable
processes of learning.

Notes

(Translator's note: I am grateful to Jochen Hoffman for his meticulous advice on the many
problems this text presented.)
In an extemporaneous speech I lectured on the viewpoints presented here, first in a forum
for adult education at the New Market Square, in Cologne (February 4, 1983) and then at
the Social Academy in Dortmund (February 10, 1983). Subsequently, I worked these view-
points into an essay and expanded on them considerably. Wherever possible, however, I
have kept the lecture format.
2 The most famous instance is Marx's reckoning with the Willich-Schapper faction in a session
of the central governing body of the Communist League on September 15, 1850: "In the
place of critical observation the minority puts a dogmatic one, in the place of a materialist
observation an idealist one. For you the driving-wheel of the revolution is not real conditions
but the will alone. We tell the workers: you must experience fifteen, twenty, or fifty years of
bourgeo1s wars and peasant battles, not only in order to change conditions but also in order
to change yourselves and to prepare yourselves for political rule. You say, on the contrary:
either we must come to power immediately or we will lie down and go to sleep."

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 Gajo Petrovic

Philosophy and Revolution:

Twenty Sheaves of Questions

1. Must philosophy always be written exclusively in

the form of dissertations, where everything is systematically explained, ar-
gued, and illustrated? Has not philosophy already appeared in the form of
epic poems, novels, short stories, and plays; in the form of prose poetry,
dialogues, letters, and books of travel? Has it not been shown that philosophy
can be successfully expressed in the form of theses (Feuerbach, Marx) and
even of sermons and commands (Nietzsche)? Might one, then, try to say
something in the form of questions? Is the question (pftanje) not the form
in which thought takes its nourishment (pltanje)? Indeed, are not "philos-
ophy" and "revolution" precisely the concepts that question everything else,
and should they not, then, be able to bear the cutting edge of every question?
2. Is philosophy the thought of Being, or is it the thought
of revolution? If it is the former, is it a thought that thinks Being, or is it
a thought that is thought by Being? If philosophy is a thought that thinks
Being, is this thought an ascertainment of what is, a search for what can
be, or a prescribing of what must occur? Is its calling to stigmatize the
harmful, extol the useful, show the way to the desirable, strengthen the belief
in what is achievable, support the hope in what is not yet lost, or incite to
what might be dangerous? Is it a neighbor or a stranger to Being, its shepherd
or its hunter, its sower or its mower, its bodyguard or its concentration
camp, its prophet (porok) or its vice (porok)? Is it a little of everything or
nothing but a rigorous, inexorable thought, which, while thinking Being in
its essence, rejects all these metaphoric descriptions as a kind of children's
wear which is not fitting for its seriousness, so that to all questions about
what or who it is, it replies with self-confidence that it is, in itself, the thought
of Being, in person and without any further additions?
3. If Being is what philosophical thought thinks, what
is that Being? If what is not the proper question, then how is it? Does it
exist regardless of whether anybody thinks it? And is it distinguished pri-
marily by the way in which it exists regardless of whether it is being thought?
Does it experience its being thought as a pleasure or a discomfort, an en-
richment or an impoverishment, an extollation or a humiliation, a perfec-
tion or a desecration? Does it laugh indifferently at that thought which exerts
itself for it, not realizing that all its efforts remain idle? Or perhaps it is
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Being itself which strives after thought because it feels that without thought
it remains incomplete and insufficient, nameless and voiceless?
4. If philosophy is the thought that thinks Being, can it at the
same time be the thought that is being thought by Being? Is not a person,
as a philosopher, one who, by philosophizing, reflects on Being? Are not
people a species with a particular being and philosophy one of their most
special activities? Or perhaps people, while thinking Being, do not think as
particular beings existing in one of the possible modes of Being but as the
beings with an exceptional relationship to Being, comprising within them-
selves all possible forms of Being? And is philosophy only one among our
many thoughts, or is it the thought which we, as people, think, the thought
through which Being talks to itself?
5. If philosophy is the thought ofBeing, can it also be the thought
of revolution? Is not revolution one particular social phenomenon that may
be the subject matter of history, sociology, or political science but by no
means also of philosophy? Are not the philosophers stepping over not only
the fields of sociology and political science but also directly over politics
and political struggles, if they try to say something about revolution? Is it
really a mere accident that the concept of revolution did not acquire citi-
zenship in respectable technical dictionaries and encyclopedias of philos-
ophy? Can a philosopher as a philosopher (not to say as a citizen) be in-
terested in revolution? Or is revolution perhaps such an important and
specific phenomenon that philosophy, in addition to paying attention to
many other interesting and important phenomena, must also pay some
attention to this one that is so extolled and blamed, so exciting and frightful?
If not, how could it be that a philosopher should not, out of professional
duty, be concerned with the nature of revolution? What, then, is revolution?
6. Is every putsch, every change in the individuals or groups in
power, already a revolution, or is a revolution only a change in which power
passes over from one class to another? Is every transfer of power from one
class to another necessarily a revolution, or is it only such a transfer of
power that is accompanied by the construction of a new social order? Is
every replacement of one social order by another a revolution, or is it only
such a supersession by which a "lower" order is replaced by a "higher" one?
Is every transformation of a lower order to a higher one a revolution, or
does revolution in the full sense establish an essentially different, classless
society, a really human society in which the self-alienation of people dis-
appears and the relationships between people become really human?
7. Is revolution merely a change in this or that aspect of the social
order, or is it a change of the whole social order in all of its aspects? Is
revolution merely a change of the social order, or is it a change in people?
Is it a change in some of our activities or is it a transformation of the whole
person? Is it every human transformation or only a transformation through
which we become fundamentally different? Is it merely a transformation of
people, or is it a change in the "universe," the creation of a basically different
type of Being, a free, creative Being, essentially different from every Being
that is not human, inhuman, or not yet fully human?
8. Is revolution bound to people or are revolutions in nonhuman
nature also possible? Should not big and sudden changes in nature be ac-
knowledged as revolutions? Would we not, in this way, give an ontological
foundation to revolutions in history? Do not revolutions in history remain
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inexplicable if we deny revolutions in nature? Or perhaps, on the contrary,
by denying revolutions in nonhuman nature we make it possible to under-
stand revolutions in history and in nature in general. Are not people exactly,
as beings of revolution, beings of nature who transcend their mere natu-
ralness? Are not revolutions in history the only "natural" revolutions?
9. But are there really any revolutions in history? Is revolution
merely a transition from one historical state to another, so that it is, like
everything else, also in history, or is it a leap out of history, a step into
eternity and timelessness? Can the locomotive engines of history be their
own wagons? Can midwives of the new society help at their own birth? Is
a revolution without certain presuppositions possible? Is a revolution pos-
sible without absolute, ahistorical criteria and without negating the histor-
ically given? Can the antihistorical character of revolution be incorporated
into history as a kind of absurd detail, or is it the essential thing that makes
history possible?
10. Is revolution an event in conformity with natural laws or is
it a violation of laws and legality? Is revolution an expression of necessity,
or is it a stepping over into the realm of freedom? Does revolution realize
the possible or open up new possibilities? Is it a production of the planned
or a spontaneous creation of the unexpected? Is not free creative activity
the essential characteristic of revolution?
11. Are revolutions condensed fragments of social progress or
are progress and revolution basically as different as the constant repetition
of the improved old and the free creation of the qualitatively new, as the
controlled increase of humanity measured in ounces, and the full blossom
of humaneness that cannot be weighed? Are revolutions the basis of all
progress? Is progress the best preparation for revolution? Can revolution be
incorporated into progress? Can progress be combined with revolution? Or
is progress, with its goals, methods, and roads, all of which have been de-
termined in advance, of necessity opposed to the revolutionary vision with
its unrestraint and openness for possibilities?
12. Is revolution without revolutionary organizations possible? Is
revolution with pseudorevolutionary organizations possible? Does not rev-
olution entail a self-organization that renders the free creativity of all in-
dividuals feasible? Does not organization tend to subordinate the action of
all to common interests as conceived by chosen individuals? Is the orga-
nization the criterion for what is revolutionary, or is the revolutionary deed
the criterion for the revolutionary character of any organization? Is real
revolution possible only in the framework of institutions, or are institutions
the tombs of revolution? Does a "responsible" revolution remain within
prescribed limits, or is every revolution a pitiless criticism of everything
existing and a bringing to life of the unseen? Is self-management one of the
goals of revolution, or is every revolution self-activity and self-organization,
self-creation and self-government?
13. Do revolutions suffer from illusions, or are "revolutionary
illusions" truths feared by reactionary forces? Do revolutions lean to ro-
manticism, or is "revolutionary romanticism" a living reality abhorred by
counterrevolution? Are revolutions prone to destruction, or is revolution
"destructive" because it does not want to take part in the construction and
reconstruction of the exploitive social order? Do revolutions eat their chil-
dren, or are they themselves eaten by counterrevolutions?
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 14. Are we allowed to speak about revolutions in the plural, or
is only one, single Revolution possible? If small and "relative," "little"
revolutions are possible, are they something peculiar, or are they revolutions
only insofar as they participate in that single true, absolute and total Rev-
olution?
15. Is the meaning and sense of revolution inside itself or in some
later fruits it is supposed to bring, in a permanent condition it should es-
tablish? Can a revolution be victorious? Does not "victory" for a revolution
mean its end, hence its defeat? What can follow after revolution if not
counterrevolution? Is not the only possible true victory of revolution its
further continuation? But can revolution be continued perpetually? Is not
revolution exactly what is different from the customary, from that which
lasts forever and repeats itself continuously?
16. Is revolution merely a transition from one form of Being to
another, higher one-or perhaps a peculiar break, a leap, a "hole" in Being-
or is it not only the highest form of Being but also Being in its fullness? Is
not revolution the most developed form of creativity, the most authentic
form of freedom? Is it not the field of open possibilities, the realm of the
truly new? Is not revolution the very "essence" of Being, Being in its essence?
And if revolution is Being itself, is not philosophy as a thought of Being by
that very fact (and not in addition to it) the thought of revolution?
17. Can revolution get along without philosophy? Why should
revolution not be able to manage without the thought of revolution? Is not
revolution irrational, chaotic, immediate; is not thought rational, ordered,
mediated? Is thought necessary to a volcanic eruption, especially if it is an
eruption of humanity? But is revolution without thought really possible?
Does revolution not presuppose conscious human will, commitment, and
risk? Is it not led by a project of a possible future? Is not thoughtfulness
the inner form of true spontaneity?
18. Can philosophy do without revolution? Why not? Were not
many logics, methodologies, theories of knowledge, ontologies, ethics, and
aesthetics elaborated without any help from revolution? Were not plenty of
aporias and antinomies, subtleties and distinctions found and established
without revolution? Is not that philosophy which associates itself with rev-
olution a new one (not to say bent on innovations), hitherto unknown and
unusual? Does it not represent a negation of all existing philosophy? How-
ever, must philosophy really be and remain always the same? Should it not
deny itself if this is the condition for its becoming really thought? Is not
the thought of revolution after all closer to great philosophies of the past
than are the pseudo neutral scholastic disciplines that, at the highest technical
level, engage in apologies for the existing order?
19. Can the thought of revolution merely think about revolution,
without taking part in its realization? Does real thought only study, observe,
and consider, or does it subvert the established, the antiquated, the con-
secrated, by opening up and creating the new and the not-yet-seen? To put
it more briefly, is true philosophy merely the thought of revolution or is it
the thought-revolution (thought as revolution)?
20. Are not general meditations about revolution only an obstacle
for the concrete realization of revolution, or are these "abstract" musings
perhaps a precondition for a true revolutionary attitude? Have revolutions
failed thus far because there has been too much philosophizing about them
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or because critical thought was suppressed? Have revolutions broken under
the weight of philosophical books or under the pressure of economic inter-
ests and class privileges? Are the enemies of socialism those who exploit
the workers or those who speak about that loudly? Are counterrevolution-
aries those who live in magnificent palaces or those who refuse to be their
court jesters?
Coda 1985: Introduction
The twenty sheaves of questions were written in 1968 and pub-
lished in Serbocroatian and French the following year. 1 It may seem strange
to publish now, in English, a text that was written that long ago. But the
twenty sheaves of questions were not only a summary of my basic views
at the time but also a program for their further elaboration, a program I
still regard as both topical and not yet completed. In addition, I regard the
"thinking of revolution," which I try to put forward in the sheaves, as the
most promising interpretation of Marx, an interpretation that does not aim
to remain an interpretation only. Of course, my own version of the thinking
of revolution is not the only one. Indeed, there are at least two versions of
that thinking which should be more widely known than they are-those
developed by Milan Kangraga and Danko Grlic. But it is my own version
I want to pursue here. First, I want to comment briefly on the basic meaning
and structure of the sheaves. Then I want to discuss the relationship between
the interpretation of Marx's thought contained in them (its interpretation
as the thinking of revolution) and two other widespread interpretations of
that thought (its interpretation as historical materialism and as philosophy
of praxis).
A Few Remarks on the Twenty Sheaves of Questions
Though I discussed philosophy and revolution in the form of
questions, I do not want to suggest this is the only proper way of doing
either philosophy or the thinking of revolution. I regard this only as one
possible way of writing philosophy-to be sure, one that is especially apt to
stress the critical nature of philosophy, its capacity to bring everything into
question.
It is not difficult to see that some of the questions are merely
rhetorical. They more or less clearly suggest an answer; that is, they are
really propositions in the guise of questions. But not all of them are of that
type. Many are genuine questions, a challenge to thinking to find an answer,
if it is possible to do so. Taken in isolation and regarded from the outside,
those questions meant as genuine questions are not distinguishable from
those meant only as disguised answers. Only in context is it possible to tell
them apart.
The grouping of questions into sheaves was not made quite at
random, so they should not be understood as heaps. Questions bound to
one sheaf belong together: one should be careful not to untie them in such
a way that those belonging together fall apart. Sheaves in the fields are always
somehow ordered; those of which I speak now are numbered as well. These
simplifying numbers serve as a warning that one should read the series in
sequence. To understand them and to judge them one must have the pa-
tience to consider them one by one.
The first sheaf of questions is introductory. In the form of ques-
tions it considers the possibility of using that form for discussing philosophy
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and revolution. This is essential, because if we deny this possibility, the
remaining nineteen sheaves have little purpose. And if the first sheaf of
questions represents a preliminary justification of the form of the whole
text, then the last sheaf can be regarded as a subsequent and supplementary
justification of its content (e.g., general meditations about revolution) in the
form of a questioning refusal of some possible objections.
Sheaves 2 to 19 are concerned basically with one question, the
one with which sheaf 2 begins: Is philosophy the thought of Being, or is it
the thought of revolution? This question asks about philosophy-not about
one or some of its qualities, but about what philosophy is (or rather can
become). The question suggests we choose between "philosophy is the thought
of Being" and "philosophy is the thought of revolution." Though it does
not claim these are the only possible answers, in proposing to opt for one
of the two it certainly gives them preference before others. Does the question
exhibit some personal sympathy or affection for those two answers, or is it
an intimation that those two important answers overshadow all others
(though other answers may be important too)? Since the "or" seems exclu-
sive, the question seems to demand that we commit ourselves to only one
of the answers. Yet the demand need not be accepted. A question that is
not posed properly may be rejected or corrected. This is exactly what hap-
pens to this question when we get to the sixteenth sheaf: is not philosophy
as a thought of Being by that very fact (and not in addition to it) the thought
of revolution)? And this is further improved by the concluding question of
the nineteenth sheaf: is true philosophy merely the thought of revolution
or is it the thought-revolution (thought as revolution)?
Does this mean the initial question of the second sheaf is a failure,
or is it, despite its inadequacy, indispensable? Is it possible to understand
the meaning and the scope of the "thesis" that philosophy exactly as the
thought of Being can (and ought to) be at the same time the thought-rev-
olution (thought as revolution) if one does not understand also the possi-
bility of the opposite view that philosophy can (and must) be only one of
the two, either the thought of Being or the thought of revolution?
The second question of the second sheaf assumes that we have
opted for the first of the two basic possibilities (philosophy is a thought of
Being), and it asks how this should be understood. The question suggests
that the thesis about philosophy as the thought of Being can be understood
in two basic ways: philosophy is the thought that thinks Being, and philos-
ophy is a thought that is being thought by Being. By simplifying this a little,
it would be possible to say, according to the first view, the thesis that phi-
losophy is a thought of Being means that philosophy is the thinking that
has Being for its subject matter or object; according to another view, it
means that philosophy is a thinking that, as a function or an instrument,
belongs to Being.
The thought that fancies itself a subject degrading Being to its
object will hardly ever reach that object. The thought that considers itself
a function or an instrument will hardly ever become an authentic thought.
Thus, if I use here some traditional technical terminology (such as subject
and object), it is not to justify the traditional conceptual framework but
rather to become conscious of it in order to get out of it. But let us leave
terminology aside and come back to the "thing itself."
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 Gajo Petrovic
If we assume that philosophy is a thought that thinks Being, we
can regard this relationship from two sides: from the side of thought and
from the side of Being. We can ask how this thought (subject) is related to
Being (object) and, more specifically, how it succeeds in thinking Being; but
we can also ask what is meant by Being and how Being (the object) is related
to thinking (the subject).
The third question of the second sheaf, assuming that philosophy
is the thought that thinks Being, sketches some possible attitudes of thought
to Being. The three basic possibilities mentioned (stating the facts, discov-
ering essential possibilities, and prescribing the norms) only roughly indicate
the problematics. The remaining questions of the second sheaf investigate
more complicated and specific relationships of thought to Being.
The whole third sheaf of questions remains within the conception
of philosophy as the thought that thinks Being. Yet it is not concerned with
the relationship ofthought to Being but with Being itself and its relationship
to thought. As it is not difficult to see, the last question decisively rejects
the idea that Being is a mere object passively enduring the activity of the
thinking subject. In this way we come to the fourth sheaf, which considers
the idea that philosophy is thought by Being. It concludes by asking, Is
philosophy only one among our many thoughts, or is it the thought that
we, as people, think, the thought through which Being talks to itself?
This ends the preliminary examination of the possibility that
philosophy is a thought of Being. In the fifth sheaf the consideration of the
second basic possibility begins, the possiblility that philosophy is the thought
of revolution. The preliminary consideration of that other possibility ex-
tends from sheaf 5 to sheaf 15, to be transformed in the next sheaf into a
common examination of the two basic possibilities in their intrinsic con-
nection or identity. Considering philosophy as the thought of Being-which
by that very fact is not only the thought of revolution but also thought as
revolution (sheaves 16 to 19)-is the very gist of the whole text.
But this is not my last word on the point. In a number of later
publications I try to show that when philosophy becomes the thinking of
revolution it is no longer philosophy in the old sense. The thinking of
revolution is a new, higher type of thinking in which traditional philosophy
is transcended and overcome (a little more about that below).
This is not to say that these sheaves of questions have lost their
value. Sheaves 6 and 7, for example, suggest a certain concept that is of
decisive importance for all subsequent sheaves and for the whole of my
subsequent work. This is why I have tried to elaborate them in a "positive"
way (also in the form of theses) in my paper "The Philosophical Concept
ofRevolution." 2 That paper touches also on some of the questions in other
sheaves, as do my books Philosophy and Revolution and The Thinking of
Revolution. 3 However, many of these questions have not been satisfactorily
discussed so far. Thus, I still regard the sheaves as my basic task and my
actual program.
In the twenty sheaves I mention Marx only once (in the first
sheaf), as a thinker who wrote philosophy in the form of theses. But I make
no claim that this small system of questions has something to do with Marx.
As a matter of fact, it is more important for me to develop an adequate
interpretation (or, rather, proper thinking) of revolution than to give an
adequate interpretation of Marx. But justice requires me to say that the
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questions are inspired by Marx and that I regard their presentation of the
thinking of revolution (as developed in works by friends and by myself) as
the most adequate interpretation of Marx. This claim has to be supported,
which is what I want to do at least partly in the next section.
Historical Materialism, Philosophy of Praxis, and Thinking of
Revolution
In order to support the claim that the thinking of revolution is
the relatively best (i.e., most adequate, truthful, or fruitful) interpretation
of Marx, I want to say a few words about the relationship between historical
materialism, philosophy of praxis, and the thinking of revolution. However,
before I start discussing these three interpretations of Marx (let us call them
that, though this description may be questionable, at least for the last of
them), I want to indicate exactly why these interpretations have been chosen
for a common consideration.
Marx has been interpreted in many different ways, not only as a
historical materialist, a philosopher of praxis, and a thinker of revolution,
but also, for example, as a dialectical materialist, a political economist, a
critic of political economy, a political thinker, the founder of scientific so-
ciology, and an ideologist of communism. So why are three interpretations
chosen for consideration? The reason-not quite subjective and not simply
objective-lies in the assumption that these are the interpretations that still
have some chance to be taken seriously when claiming (1) that they most
adequately show the basic meaning of Marx's thought, and (2) that they
have some relevance for the topical problems of the contemporary world.
Some other interpretations of Marx, though still widespread, can-
not be regarded as serious rivals to these three. Thus, the interpretation of
Marx as a dialectical materialist was the official interpretation of his phi-
losophy in some countries and in many communist parties (including Yu-
goslavia) in the 1950s and early 1960s. At that time, I was also writing
essentially from that perspective. 4 Since then, no new variation of that con-
ception has emerged (except, perhaps, Althusser's structuralist version of
dialectical materialism, which has also pretty much gone out of fashion);
thus there are no reasons to examine dialectical materialism anew.
Another interpretation I will not rexamine is one according to
which Marx was primarily a political economist who founded the scientific
study of the political economy of capitalism (for some he created the political
economy of socialism as well). I would argue that it was shown long ago
that Marx was not an economist but a critic of political economy. That is,
in fact, an interpretation I do want to clarify here. Although alternative
theories of political economy can be used to criticize one another, a critique
of political economy as such can only be mounted from a viewpoint outside
political economy. So we need to decide what Marx's standpoint was for
his critique of political economy: historical materialism, philosophy of praxis,
or the thinking of revolution? Or perhaps none of these.
Was Marx, then, a historical materialist? This interpretation of
Marx's thought is one of the oldest and, at the same time, still one of the
most widespread and vital. It owes its prestige and influence partly to its
intrinsic merits and partly to the renown and influence of its author, Fried-
rich Engels, who expounded it in texts published when Marx was still alive
(in "Karl Marx," in Anti-Diihring, and in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific)
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and who repeated it concisely in his famous speech at Marx's graveside. 5
Of course, according to Engels, Marx's views cannot be reduced merely to
historical materialism; we owe two major discoveries to Marx: the discovery
of the "law of development of human history" (historical materialism) and
the discovery of the "special law of motion governing the present-day cap-
italist mode of production and the bourgeois society" (surplus value). Marx
also made a number of discoveries in different fields (allegedly even in
mathematics). But Engels explicitly singled out historical materialism and
the doctrine of surplus value as Marx's basic discoveries, historical mate-
rialism being the first and most important.
Engels's interpretaton of Marx as primarily a historical materi-
alist and a political economist became, with small variations, dominant
among the theoreticians of the Second International. While partly disa-
greeing about whether Marx's alleged rejection of every philosophy was good
or bad, and whether some kind of philosophy might be helpful nevertheless,
they mainly agreed that the true and mature Marx was not a philosopher
but a historical materialist and economist. The important theoretician of
the Second International who insisted that Marx had a philosophy called
"dialectical materialism" was G. V. Plekhanov. Due to his disciple, Lenin,
this view became obligatory in the Third International. Then it was dog-
matized and canonized in Stalinism and compromised by inhuman prac-
tices, which demonstrates the philosophical fragility of dialectical materi-
alism and its inadequacy to Marx. Since then, the main current of Western
Marxism and Western Marxology has returned to the traditional conception
of Marx as a historical materialist and a political economist. The view of
Marx as a historical materialist has also been the starting point for some
contemporary attempts at the reconstruction and renewal ofMarx's thought,
that is, its modernization and adaptation to the spirit of the time. 6
Yet Engels inspired not only the interpretation of Marx as a
historical materialist and economist, as developed in the Second Interna-
tional, but also the view of Marx as a dialectical materialist, as developed
in the Third International. While he was glorifying Marx as the founder of
historical materialism and the scientific political economy, and passing in
silence Marx as a philosopher, Engels, in his polemics with Diihring, entered
a general philosophical discussion and ventured a number of rather preten-
tious philosophical statements. Similarly, in the manuscripts published post-
humuously as Dialectics of Nature, Engels engaged in constructing a kind
of a dialectical and materialist philosophy of nature. This suggests that he
wanted to fill the philosophical gap he felt existed in Marx. Thus, it may
be possible to say that the theoreticians of the Second International (or their
majority), in their interpretations of Marx, followed Engels's explicit inter-
pretation, while Plekhanov, Lenin, and the Third International followed
(and tried to explicate) the implicit interpretation expressed in Engels's own
theoretical efforts.
However, we are not interested here primarily in the historical
adventures of historical materialism but in its value as an interpretation of
Marx and as an answer to the question about history and humankind. In
its narrow, vulgar, or dogmatic version, historical materialism is a theory
about the absolute dominance of the economic factor in history (economic
determinism). Since this theory has been convincingly criticized both by
Engels and by many others, we may leave it aside. In its broader version,
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which we find in Engels and in many outstanding Marxists, historical ma-
terialism regards history as an interaction of different factors, in which the
economic factor can be temporarily overpowered but comes through in the
last analysis (or ultimately): "According to the materialist conception of
history," wrote Engels in his famous letter to J. Bloch, "the Ultimately
determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real
life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted.... There is an
interaction of all of these elements in which amid all the endless host of
accidents ... the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary." 7
In a number of papers I have criticized this broader version of
historical materialism, especially its claim to be Marx's general theory of
history (and the best theory of history overall). I have tried to show that
historical materialism was not Marx's general theory of people and history
but rather his critique of the self-alienated individual of class society ("man"
as "economic animal") and of self-alienated human history (or, rather, pre-
history). We are not as we are because we are, according to Marx, of necessity
economic animals; we are self-alienated precisely because we remain on the
level of economic animals. We are not, of necessity, split into mutually
opposed spheres that relate in an external interaction; consequently, the
economic sphere is not even necessarily ultimately the determining factor
of history. On the contrary, as long as human history remains (even ulti-
mately) determined by one of its spheres, we are still in the phase of pre-
history, in the antechamber of true human history as the human creative
being of praxis. True human history begins only when people begin to create
and shape freely themselves and their human world.
At the time I was rethinking these issues, a number of Yugoslav
(and non-Yugoslav) philosophers came to similar conclusions; thus the in-
terpretation of Marx's thought as basically a philosophy of praxis developed
and spread. This movement has produced detailed discussions of human
freedom, creativity, alienation, and de-alienation, and it has developed the
concepts of humanism and socialism in a new way. With the emergence of
the philosophy of praxis the question about the relationship between his-
torical materialism and the philosophy of praxis arose too. Some interpreters
of Marx have come to think that the analysis of people as beings of praxis
can be incorporated into the inherited theory of historical materialism as
its partial enrichment or supplement. Others argue that the philosophy of
praxis as a finally found, both adequate and fruitful interpretation of Marx
can dispense with historical materialism.
In my opinion, the theory of historical materialism and the phi-
losophy of praxis really can be connected, but only on the basis of the
philosophy of praxis. In other words, the theory of historical materialism
can be incorporated as a moment into the philosophy of praxis, but the
philosophy of praxis cannot be incorporated into historical materialism.
Historical materialism, or the materialist conception of history, as the phrase
emphasizes, attempts to conceive history in a materialistic way. The ma-
terialistic character of historical materialism consists in that the determining
role in history is attributed to a specific-material factor, the economic one.
The decompositon of people into different factors, and the discovery of the
ultimately determining material factor of historical development, is not
something accidental but the very essence of historical materialism. There-
fore, it is not clear how, except formally or nominally, the idea of a person
244
 Gajo Petrovic
as a total being and of free creativity as the essential quality of a person
can be incorporated into it. Insofar as there is some talk of praxis within
historical materialism, praxis can only be conceived as a human activity,
or as a set of such activities (such as economic or political activity). In the
same way, freedom is here of necessity interpreted as the known necessity
(or as an activity based on the known necessity), and creativity as a mul-
tidetermined transformation (a transformation determined by material needs,
material laws, etc.) of the given. Only terminology remains here from the
philosophy of praxis. Within the conception of historical materialism, so-
cialism cannot be imagined as an essentially new, integral form of our being
(our human, free being) but merely as a new social and economic formation.
Thus, the road to socialism cannot be understood as a free human deed but
only as the predetermined, lawful development of socioeconomic organi-
zations and institutions.
However, if the philosophy of praxis cannot be forced into the
narrow limits of historical materialism, it is itself sufficiently broad to en-
compass historical materialism-as a special theory. In the philosophy of
praxis we are conceived as free creative beings who shape ourselves and
our world through our activities. But exactly as a free being one can alienate
oneself from oneself, become a self-alienated, unfree being, an economic
animal. Exactly because we alienate ourselves from ourselves, the theory of
historical materialism can be partly justified and validated as an explanation
and criticism of the self-alienated society. However, taken out of the whole
philosophy of praxis and rendered independent, historical materialism can
only describe the mechanism of economic determination and exploitation
in the class society; it cannot even express the decisive thesis that this society
and people are self-alienated, inhuman. Unsatisfactory as a general theory
of society and of people, an independent historical materialism is not suf-
ficient even for a full understanding of class society. Describing the facticity
of that society as it is, it cannot adequately understand its historical limi-
tation because it cannot conceive of an essentially different, not-self-alien-
ated society.
Opting for the philosophy of praxis, some are inclined to retain
for it the traditional name "historical materialism." This terminology can
only be inadequate and confusing. How can we call a theory "historical
materialism" if its central concept, the concept of praxis, transcends the
distinction between the material and the spiritual? It is quite conceivable
that in a historical materialism (or in a materialist conception of history)
the metaphysical (or ontological) concept of matter need not be central. But
in a materialist conception of history, some materialist concept, a concept
of some material entity or activity, should nevertheless be central. However,
praxis as conceived by Marx is not a material activity as opposed to a
spiritual activity but is the structure of every human activity insofar as it
is free.
If the interpretation of Marx's thought as a philosophy of praxis
is deeper and more adequate to Marx's thought as a historical materialism,
it does not mean that it is also the best possible interpretation of Marx. Or,
more precisely, it perhaps is the relatively best interpretation of Marx (if
we take the word "interpretation" strictly), but, just as Marx was not merely
an interpreter of former thinkers, those who today want to think in his spirit
and on his level cannot remain merely interpreters of his thought. More
245
than any interpretation, that thinking is most faithful to Marx which does
not remain only an interpretation-the thinking of revolution.
As is well known, the interpretation of Marx's thought as a phi-
losophy of praxis has behind it a rather long history (or merely prehistory?):
from the Italian Marxists A. Labriola and A. Gramsci, through early Lukacs
and Bloch, to H. Lefebvre and the Yugoslav praxis-philosophers. Precisely
in that last group, it seems, the philosophy of praxis has been developed
most fully and most consistently, so that here some of its difficulties and
limitations have become best visible.
The journal Praxis was created as a forum for developing the
philosophy of praxis. However, in the first issue the philosophy of praxis
was already superseded, as can be seen in the editorial expressing the basic
views of praxis-philosophers. 8 The editorial seems to testify that praxis-
philosophers were already no longer merely praxis-philosophers, that they
had become something else. It explains the need for the new journal in the
following way: "Despite the abundance of journals, it seems to us that we
do not have the one we wish: a philosophical journal which is not narrowly
'technical,' a philosophical journal which is not only philosophical, but also
discusses the topical problems of Yugoslav socialism and of man and the
contemporary world." And further: "In agreement with such views we want
a journal that will not be philosophical in the sense in which philosophy is
merely one special field, one scientific discipline, strictly separated from all
the rest and from the everyday problems of man's life. We want a philo-
sophical journal in the sense in which philosophy is the thought of revo-
lution: a pitiless critique of everything existing, a humanistic vision of a
truly human world and an inspiring force of revolutionary activity."
Praxis was not conceived as a vehicle for the philosophy of praxis
but rather as a vehicle for the thinking of revolution. The central concern
of praxis-philosophers has become not praxis but revolution (not in the
usual sense!). To be sure, the sentence that follows immediately after the
passage quoted above speaks in a different way: "The title Praxis has been
chosen because praxis, that central concept of Marx's thought, most ade-
quately expresses the sketched conception of philosophy." But this is ob-
viously an inconsistency, or rather the original standpoint which here co-
exists with the new one.
Was this reformulation of the philosophy of praxis into the think-
ing of revolution an instance of progress or regression? Does the thinking
of revolution reject the philosophy of praxis, or does it include it in itself?
Or are these two mutually irrelevant conceptions that can coexist in a peace-
ful way?
If Marx's philosophy is really the thinking of revolution, and if
revolution is its central concept, this does not mean that the concept of
praxis should be eliminated from it. The conception according to which
Marx's thinking is a philosophy of praxis is not simply false, it is insufficient
insofar as it stops halfway. In that conception we are regarded as beings of
praxis, and praxis as free creative activity. The highest form (and also the
essence) of praxis for Marx is revolution, a radical negation of the self-
alienated society and person, creation of a truly human community com-
posed of free human beings. Such a concept of praxis is not, of course, the
only one possible; there have been many different ones. Exactly for this
reason the very phrase "thinking of revolution" has an advantage over the
246
 Gajo Petrovic
phrase "philosophy of praxis." But it is not only a matter of naming. Re-
gardless of how we decide to name thought in the spirit of Marx, it is
important to think what was, for him, also most important: the possibility
of praxis as revolution.
However, the defect of the interpretation of Marx's thinking as
the philosophy of praxis is not only in the name "praxis," nor (what is more
important) in the hesitation to think praxis, in the spirit of Marx, as rev-
olution, but is hidden in the name "philosophy." As is well known, Marx
spoke about overcoming, superseding, and realizing philosophy. The leading
theoreticians of the Second International interpreted this as a demand for
a rejection of every philosophy. Opposed to such a positivist elimination
of philosophy, Plekhanov and Lenin insisted that Marxism had a philos-
ophy. Lenin, however, at the time strictly divided Marxism into three main
parts: a philosophy, a political economy, and a politics. Not all advocates
of Marx's philosophy have drawn such a sharp dividing line, but as a rule
they more or less strictly divide Marxism into parts and discuss its problems
within the limits they have drawn. Thus, revolution has been regarded as
a social phenomenon, and the problems of revolution have been discussed
within the limits of Marx's social and political theory. Philosophy has been
reserved for a discussion of "more general" problems.
Viewing Marx's philosophy as the thinking of revolution means
a radical break with this tradition and a revival of Marx's original insight,
which brings philosophy and revolution together inseparably. In this new-
old conception, philosophy does not live in a world of abstract generalities;
it is concerned with the basic possibility (and reality) of our time, and this
is revolution. On the other hand, revolution should not be conceived merely
as a political or social phenomenon. The true revolution would radically
change people and society, creating a new, higher mode of Being. As such,
revolution cannot be understood if it is studied merely inside the social
sciences or within some special philosophical discipline such as the philos-
ophy of politics or social philosophy. The problem of revolution is the
central problem of the central philosophical disciplines-ontology and phil-
osophical anthropology. However, even this is not quite right. More pre-
cisely, the phenomenon of revolution can be adequately thought only by a
philosophy that is not divided into philosophical disciplines and is not
separated from social sciences and from social praxis. In other words, the
phenomenon of revolution can be thought adequately only by a philosophy
that is no longer philosophy in the traditional sense, by a philosophy that
has become the thinking of revolution. This means that the formulation in
the opening editorial of Praxis should be corrected: We do not want phi-
losophy in that sense in which it is the thinking of revolution; we believe
that traditional philosophy should be transcended by the thinking of rev-
olution.
The last statement can be again misunderstood as a plea for a
positivist elimination of philosophy. However, this does not follow from
what was said. The thinking of revolution presupposes and incorporates
philosophy (i.e., what was essential in it). Far from being unphilosophical,
it is in many respects more philosophical than any previous philosophy.
Exactly for that reason, it cannot remain merely philosophical.
247
 Notes

1 The twenty sheaves of questions were orig1nally prepared to be read on August 21, 1968,
as part of the F1fth Sess1on of the Korcula Summer School, wh1ch was devoted to "Marx
and RevolutiOn." However, early in the morning of that day the news spread that the troops
of the Warsaw Pact had invaded Czechoslovakia. The work of the school was interrupted,
the 1nvasion was d1scussed. and an appeal to world public op1nion and a number of telegrams
(such as a protest telegram to Brezhnev) were issued. The appeal was first signed by Ernst
Bloch; the Signatures of Herbert Marcuse, Serge Mallet, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Lucien Gold-
mann, Thomas Bottomore, Eugen Fink, Jurgen Habermas, and others followed. On August
22 the school resumed 1ts work. Some of the papers that had been scheduled for the
preceding day were squeezed into the remaining program, but I renounced reading m1ne.
Thus. I f1rst read my text at a Croat1an Philosophical Society meeting in autumn 1968. It was
published in the Belgrad Student, a paper that played an 1mportant role in the Yugoslav
student rebellion of 1968. and then in the JOurnal Praxis, nos. 1-2 ( 1969). which brought
out the proceedings of the 1968 Korcula Summer School.
2 In M. Markovic and G. Petrovic, eds., Praxis: Yugoslav Essays m the Philosophy and Meth-
odology of the Social Sciences, Boston Stud1es in the Philosophy of Science, val. 36, (Dor-
drecht, Boston, London: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 151-64.
3 Philosophie and revolutiOn (Reinbek be1 Hamburg Rowohlt, 1971 ); Filosofia y revolution
(Mex1co: Editonal Extemuoraneos, 1972); Filozofija i revolucija (Zagreb Naprijed, 1973);
M1sljenJe revoluc1}e (Zagreb: Napnjed, 1978).
4 See my Filozoflja i marks1zam (Zagreb Mladost, 1965). translated mto English as Marx in
the Mid- Twentieth Century (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
5 See K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke (Berlin, 1969). vol. 19, pp. 102-6, 209, 335-36.
6 Most 1mportant among those attempts is probably Habermas's reconstruction of histoncal
materialism; see Zur Rekostruktwn des Historischen Materialismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1976). A number of interesting attempts 1n the same direction have been collected m: U.
Jaegg1 and A. Honneth, eds., Theorien des historischen material1smus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1976). and A. Honneth and U. Jaeggi, eds., Arbeit, handlung, normativitiit: Theorien des
histonschen matenalismus, 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980)
7 Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W W Norton, 1972). p. 640-
41.
8 "A quo1 bon praxis," Praxis.· A Philosophical Journal (International Edition), 1:1 (1965). pp.
3-7.

248
 Ernesto Laclau

Metaphor and Social Antagonisms

The order of society is only the unstable order of a sys-

tem of differences that is always threatened from the
outside. As an underlying mechanism that gives reasons
for its partial processes, society never actually exists.
Indeed, it is because no meaning is actually fixed that
there IS a space in which hegemonic struggle can take
place.

One way of describing my project in this paper is that

I want to continue the work of Max Black by extending the domain of
metaphor from the area of science to that of social antagonisms. My ar-
gument will revolve around three basic concepts: hegemony, discourse, and
antagonism.' I will present these three concepts against the background of
the thesis that society is ultimately impossible.
Let me start by referring to a classic text in the history
of marxism, one that contains, in nascent form, many of the problems I
will analyze: Rosa Luxemburg's Mass Strike, the Political Party and the
Trade Unions. But let me first say something about the moment in which
her book was written. The book was part of a considerable discussion about
the role of mass strikes in overcoming the capitalist system subsequent to
their successful use during the first Russian revolution. But, in fact, the book
was also at the center of a still larger discussion concerning what was then
called, for the first time, the crisis of marxism, a phrase coined by Thomas
Masaryk. This crisis was the result of a set of historical processes I can only
briefly describe here. First, the great depression that had started in 1873
had come to an end toward 1896, and marxists began to realize that this
was not the last crisis of capitalism. Second, with the boom that ensured
the end of the depression and lasted until the beginning of the First World
War, many of the old certitudes were put into question. Among these, one
in particular created a problem in the image of the identity of the working
class which had existed up to that moment. This was the increasing dis-
sociation between economic and political struggle, or the polarization within
socialist politics between trade unions and the party as the center of decision.
This was perhaps the first moment in the history of socialism where one
sees a breakup of the different positions of the class subject and, increasingly,
a decentering of classes as a nucleus of socialist politics. Finally, from the
moment of crisis on, the identity of the working class was perceived in-
creasingly as split. It is the problem of this split identity that Rosa Lux-
emburg deals with in her book.
Luxemburg's answer to the problem of the unity of
the working class involves what today we would call the "unfixing" of the
meaning of any social event. She argues as follows: We are wrong in trying,
249
a priori, to determine or fix the meaning of the strike or the party as moments
in a socialist transition because, in fact, the unity of the working class is
not achieved in that way. Instead, the unity of the working class is the
process of the revolution itself. Luxemburg describes Russia at the time as
a country in which there was widespread repression and, as a consequence,
an accumulation of unfulfilled democratic demands. Then, in one locality
we have a strike of a particular fraction of workers around a very localized
and particular issue. But in this climate of generalized repression, the mean-
ing of this strike cannot simply rest there. Immediately, this strike begins
to represent, for the whole population, a resistance against the regime. And
immediately the meaning of this event is transformed into a political act.
This, Luxemburg says, is the unity between political and ideological de-
mands. It is not a unity that is given by any structure determinable a priori,
but is constructed in this process of what today we would call the overde-
termination of the meaning of a social event. The following year, another
strike takes place in a different locality and about a different issue, not a
union issue, but the same process of unity takes place. We see here that the
unity of the class is precisely a symbolic unity. We have a symbol whenever
the signified is more abundant than, or overflows, a given signifier. That is
to say, we have a process of condensation. And in this process of conden-
sation, the unity of a series of signifieds is created. If the unity of the class
is created through this process of symbolic representation, the unity of the
class itself is a symbolic event and belongs consequently to the order of the
metaphor.
This is the most profound sense of the spontaneity ofRosa Lux-
emburg: the perception that there is a kind of unity between elements in a
social formation which totally escapes the category of necessity that had so
far dominated the discourse of the Second International. But at the very
moment she gives a place to this opening, she also closes her discourse in
an essentialist way. There is, after all, a problem with this way of presenting
the unity of the class. Here, two discourses are producing contradictory
effects in Luxemburg's text. If the class is united through the overdeter-
mination of different struggles, why does the resulting entity have to be a
class? Why could it not be some different type of social identity or social
subject? Why does the necessary result have to be a class subject? Her answer
is the traditional, rather uninteresting one: because of the necessary laws of
capitalist development.
But if we withdraw the essentialist assumption, we immediately
see, in a microcosm, many phenomena that are going to dominate the history
of the twentieth century. In the countries of the Third World, this process
of overdetermination of popular struggles creates social identities that are
not essentially class identities. And in the case of the advanced capitalist
countries, we also see that the dispersion of social struggles has created new
forms of subjectivity which escape any kind of class identification. These
developments introduce some gaps into the argument concerning the nec-
essary laws of capitalist development as presented by the Second Interna-
tional.
The concept of hegemony emerged in the marxist tradition pre-
cisely as a concept destined to fill this gap. It emerged in the discussions of
social democracy in Russia, discussions about the relationship between so-
cial classes and democratic tasks. For the old essentialist scheme, which was
250
 Ernesto Laclau
defended by the Mensheviks in the last moment, there is a necessary succes-
sion of stages. The argument was that the bourgeoisie was extremely weak
in the Russian case and could not take up its own democratic task, so it
had to be taken up by the proletariat. The problem was the significance of
this relationship of "taking up" tasks that do not correspond to the class
essence of the subject as posed by the Second International. What is the
importance ofthis gap which had emerged in the chain of necessity? Within
the Russian debates, Plekhanov argued that it was minimal and that the
working class simply had to force the bourgeoisie to take up this task, while
Trotsky argued that the gap was maximal and required a total transference
of the democratic task to a new class subject in the process of the revolution.
But in the discourse of all the participants in this debate, this gap was seen
as an abnormal situation that subsequent capitalist development was going
to supersede. That is to say, the necessary complement of the Russian rev-
olution was going to be the European revolution and, in this sense, the gap
which the concept of hegemony tried to cover had itself to be quickly
superseded.
But, on the contrary, this gap became wider and wider. Thus, in
the discourse of Leninism, this gap covers an entire historical space because
the contradiction of the imperialist stage is such that there is no precise and
necessary relation between the degree of economic development of a given
country and its readiness for revolutionary process. Trotsky developed the
consequences of this analysis when he argued that combined and uneven
development is the historical law of our time. But then, do we not have to
ask ourselves, ifthis unevenness is constitutive of all struggles, what exactly
is normal development? The very idea of normal development has com-
pletely collapsed, and the identity and nature of political relations, once this
category of necessity collapses, have to be put into question. This separation
between those tasks that are essential to a class and those that are external
to that class but have to be taken up by it creates a complex dialectic between
interiority and exteriority. Once this class has taken up these democratic or
popular tasks and enters into a complex system of political and social re-
lations of a new type not predetermined by the class nature of the subject,
this relation comes to be an integral part of the subjectivity of the class.
Consequently, either the class ceases to be merely a class or, on the contrary,
when viewed from the outside, the class is taking a purely instrumental and
external relation with these tasks in order to ensure a succession of political
effects.
Lenin made a rather eclectic attempt to solve this problem. Len-
inism, and the whole tradition of the Comintem, wanted to accept the
complexity of the political scenarios in which working-class practices had
to operate. These complex scenarios were not explained at all by the pure
relation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, that is to say, by the
struggle that was internal to the very identity of the class. On the other
hand, Leninism wanted to maintain a pure class identity. Historical subjects
were always classes. They attempted to fill this gap through the concept of
the vanguard party which represented both the historical interests of the
working class and a system of political calculation which, while maintaining
the homogeneity of class subjects, engaged in very complicated political
operations. These in tum gave rise to a totally militaristic political language.
The essential definition of historical subjectivity as class remained as un-
251
 questioned as in Kautskyism. (I have elsewhere described Leninism as the
surrealist moment of Kautskyism.)
The problem of the relation between the internal and external
exists at many theoretical levels and has a long history in Western thought.
It was a central element in Hegel's philosophy as well as in much of Anglo-
Saxon philosophy. The debate between Bradley's idealism and Russell's
logical atomism is, to a large extent, a discussion about the internal or
external character of relations for certain series of given identities.
In Gramsci, we find a new turning point in this transformation
of the dialectic between internal and external. In his concept of hegemony,
he accepts the idea that many relations that do not have a class character
in fact come to constitute the very identity of class subjects. There is no
direct continuity between political subjectivity and classes in the economic
sense. The dialectic between the internal and external has evolved to a new
point. The concept ofhegemony no longer involves the direction of elements
whose identity remains the same through all of the processes, as in Lenin's
argument. On the contrary, hegemony is a process of rearticulation, of the
internalization through new articulations of something that was external.
However, Gramsci still retains an element of essentialism because this pro-
cess of the interiorization of the external always has to take place around
a class core. While the class core remains very deeply buried below an
ensemble of layers, it is this class core that we see dissolving today.
We can see not only that hegemony can take place whenever
there is this process of the internalization of the external but also that there
is no necessary core around which this internalization has to take place. In
fact, what we are seeing today in advanced capitalist countries is a dispersion
of positionalities of the subject, of the proliferation of struggles, none of
which has an essence in itself; rather, each depends upon an ensemble of
relations that need not be organized around a class core. From this, however,
many problems emerge. First, if hegemony is no longer the hegemony of
the class subject, whose hegemony is it? And second, what is involved in
these hegemonic relations? What are the requirements for a relation to be
hegemonic? How must we conceive of social links in order to be able to
understand them as hegemonic ones? To address these questions, I need to
move from the historical terrain to a set of more theoretical considerations.
I shall begin to answer these questions from a point, one among
many possible starting points, within the trajectory of the Althusserian school.
Althusser attempted to break with essentialist conceptions of social rela-
tions, and this break took place around the central concept of overdeter-
mination. As this concept has been so frequently misunderstood as multiple
causality, it is necessary to go back to its initial meaning in Althusserian
analysis and to the precise constructive effects that this concept had to play
within the field of marxist discursivity.
For Althusser, it was not a causal concept at all. The concept was
taken from two existing disciplines: specifically, linguistics and psycho-
analysis. In these disciplines it has an objective dialectical connotation,
particularly in psychoanalysis; and since this objective connotation is related
formally to the content it designates, Althusser's borrowing is neither ar-
bitrary nor metaphorical. That is to say, for Althusser there was a specific
logic involved in psychoanalytic relations which had to be incorporated into
historical analysis. The concept of overdetermination in Freud only makes
252
 Ernesto Laclau
sense within a symbolic world and involves the symbolic constitution of
relations. Taking us back to the same point I drew earlier in my discussion
of Luxemburg, Althusser initially uses the concept in his analysis of the
Russian revolution. The deepest sense of the concept in Althusser's analysis
is that any kind of social relation is constituted in a symbolic way. However,
the full development of the concept, its full constructive effect, could not
be reached because Althusser attempted to make it compatible with another
element of his theoretical system, namely, the concept of determination in
the last instance by the economic. The latter concept had a double effect,
even if determination in the last instance never arrives, as Althusser insisted;
it is there, producing some precise theoretical effects in his discourse. First,
it says that there is one element, the economy, which, in whatever social
formation we are speaking about, has to be defined separately from any
kind of social relations. Otherwise, the concept of determination in the last
instance would be meaningless. Second, it implies that society has an es-
sence. Despite whatever mediating processes are involved, determination
in the last instance defines the locus at which the particular effect-society-
is created. And once we have accepted that society has an ultimate structure,
that it is ultimately an intelligible and rational object, the concept of over-
determination can only circumscribe a field of contingent effects within a
framework of necessity, which is the horizon of any possible social meaning.
Subsequently, in both France and England, there was a sustained
deconstruction of the Althusserian discourse which led to the liquidation
of the architecture of the whole Althusserian system. However, this project
did not redefine or reestablish what overdetermination means; there was
no way back to the concept of overdetermination. On the contrary, it in-
volved a logistic attempt to show that there was really no connection at all
between elements where one had supposed the existence of a necessary
connection. This project was carried to its ultimate conclusion in the work
of Hindess and Hirst in England, for example. They abandoned practically
all the concepts of marxist theorization through a purely logical critique of
the consistency of Althusserian connections. The problem with this position
is not their surrendering of the language of marxism but rather that this is
ultimately self-defeating. If you start by saying that there are no logical
connections between two elements, then you have to ask about the internal
connections within the elements themselves; and you will have to find there
also that there are no necessary connections. The problem with this type of
exercise is, simply put, that the structure of the social world is not the
structure of a conceptual order. Here we can see an increasing polarization
between an essentialism of the structure and an essentialism of the elements.
That is to say, we are right back to the polemic between Bradley and Russell:
either a logicism of the structure or a logical atomism.
The question is how we move outside this critical situation. I
think the way out is to start by considering the very terrain on which these
two extreme positions constructed their discourse, the terrain of a closed
system. Either we have a closed system of identities (Russell, Leibnitz) or
a closed system of the structure (Spinoza, Bradley, Plekhanov). But both
positions accept that society as such is a closed system. If we abandon this
assumption, many of the theoretical problems discussed here begin to dis-
solve. Why? Because if the system is not closed, then the meaning of each
253
 element of the system and of the system as such is constantly threatened
from the outside. Both relations and identity are always in a precarious state
because there are no signifieds that can be ultimately fixed. In other words,
relations never succeed in totally absorbing the identity of every element.
Each element has a surplus of meaning because it cannot be located in a
closed system of difference. And at the same time, no identity is ever def-
initely and definitively acquired. Such a situation, in which there is a con-
stant movement from the elements to the system but no ultimate systems
or elements-these are finally metaphoric expressions-a structure in which
meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed, is what I call "discourse."
The concept of discourse describes the ultimate nonfixity of any-
thing existing in society. One must, of course, not reduce discourse to speech
and writing but instead expand it to any kind of signifying relation. This
concept of discourse is the terrain on which a concept of hegemony can be
constructed. The closest use I find to the notion of discourse that I am
proposing is in Derrida's "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the
Human Sciences." There he links the notion of discourse to the dissolution
of any transcendental signifier. He argues that when the transcendental sig-
nifier is recognized as an illusion, when all we have is the constant sliding
of difference, everything becomes discourse because discourse is precisely
the moment of nonfixity. In other words, discourse is not a mental act in
the usual sense. Material things, external objects as such, also participate
in discursive structures. This is not unlike Wittgenstein's concept of lan-
guage games, which involves the constitution of a signifying order in which
the materiality of the things themselves participates. Thus, the concept of
discourse requires a radical reconsideration of the nature of the sign. To
what extent do the two poles of langue-the paradigmatic and the syntag-
matic-involve two incompatible logics? I shall come back to this question
at the end of my argument.
Now let me return to the notion ofhegemony. Society as a sutured
space, as the underlying mechanism that gives reasons for or explains its
own partial processes, does not exist, because if it did, meaning would be
fixed in a variety of ways. Society is an ultimate impossibility, an impossible
object; and it exists only as the attempt to constitute that impossible object
or order. That is to say, the order of society is the unstable order of a system
of differences which is always threatened from the outside. Neither the
difference nor the space can be ultimately sutured. We can speak about the
logic of the social, but we cannot speak of society as an ultimately rational
and intelligible object. And the fact that we cannot speak of society in such
a way is why we have to have a concept of hegemonic relations. Hegemonic
relations depend upon the fact that the meaning of each element in a social
system is not definitely fixed. If it were fixed, it would be impossible to
rearticulate it in a different way, and thus rearticulation could only be thought
under such categories as false consciousness.
If no meaning is ultimately fixed, conquered, mastered, then there
is a space in which hegemonic struggle can take place. For example, I would
say that the concept of hegemony is perfectly relevant to feminism because
feminism can only exist in a hegemonic space. Consider the signifier
"woman": what is its meaning? Taken in isolation it has no meaning; it
must enter into a set of discursive relations to have some meaning. But, on
the one hand, "woman" can enter into a relation of equivalence with family,
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 Ernesto Laclau
subordination to men, and so on; and, on the other hand, "woman" can
enter into discursive relations with "oppression," "black people," "gay peo-
ple," and so on. The signifier "woman" in itself has no meaning. Conse-
quently, its meaning in society is going to be given only by a hegemonic
articulation. Here the Lacanian concept of point de capitan, the nodal point
that partially fixes meaning, is profoundly relevant for a theory of hegemony.
Can one ever confront this movement of difference, this contin-
uous deferral of the moment of reaching the transcendental signified? Are
there certain experiences in which the vanity of the movement itself, the
ultimate impossibility of any objectivity, manifests itself? Such a moment
exists in society-it is the moment of antagonism. I shall argue briefly that,
first, antagonistic relations are not objective relations and, second, that an-
tagonisms take place outside rather than inside society because antagonism
is what limits the societal effect. There have been many discussions about
antagonism, from theories of conflict to marxist theories of contradiction,
but most of these have taken for granted the meaning of what it is to be in
an antagonistic relation and then they move immediately to speak about
concrete antagonisms.
I can use the discussions ofLucio Colletti and the Della Volpean
school to describe the problem of antagonism. Colletti poses the distinction
between real opposition and contradiction, which he takes from Kant's
discussion (in The Critique of Pure Reason) of Leibnitz's theory of contra-
diction. Briefly, a relation of real opposition is between two things, while a
relation of contradiction is between propositions. A car crash is a real op-
position, while asserting "I am A" and "I am not A" at the same time is a
contradiction. Colletti argues that in a materialist perspective, which refuses
to reduce the real to the concept, the concept of contradiction can play no
function. We have to describe the entire ensemble of social antagonisms in
terms of a theory of real opposition. But I do not think antagonistic relations
are relations between things. A car crash is not an antagonistic relation;
there is certainly no enmity between the two intervening entities. The con-
cept of real opposition is either a metaphor from the physical world trans-
lated into the social world or vice versa, but clearly it is not useful to try
to subsume the two types of relations under the same category.
Can we describe antagonisms, then, as contradictions? Given that
we contradict each other constantly in social life, some people have con-
cluded that contradiction does not necessarily involve any idealistic sub-
ordination of the real to the concept. For example, Jon Elser has argued
that it is one thing to assert that the real is contradictory and another to
assert that there are contradictions in reality; that is to say, there are situ-
ations in reality that can only be understood in terms of contradiction.
However, even accepting the possibility of contradictions in reality, I do
not think we can speak of antagonisms as contradictions. After all, somebody
can have two absolutely contradictory beliefs but they cannot live this con-
tradiction in antagonistic terms. Codes oflaw can be partially contradictory
without this contradiction generating any kind of antagonism.
So how are we to explain antagonism? We might begin to rethink
the question by asking what the categories of real opposition and logical
contradiction have in common. The answer is that both are objective re-
lations; they produce their effects within a system of differences. Altema-
255
tively, I want to argue that antagonistic relations are not objective relations
at all but involve the collapse of any possible objectivity.
In an antagonistic relation there is the peculiar possibility that
the object, the entity that I am, is negated. On the one hand, I am something,
a pure presence, logos, identity, and so on. On the other hand, this presence
is precarious and vulnerable. The threat which the other represents trans-
forms my own being into something questionable. But at the same time
those who are antagonizing me are also not a full presence because their
objective being is a symbol of my not being; and in this way, their objective
being is overflowed by a meaning that fails to be fixed, to have a full presence.
Thus, antagonism is neither a real opposition nor a logical contradiction.
A real opposition is an objective relation between things; a contradiction
is an equally objective relation between concepts. An antagonism is the
experience of the limits of any possible objectivity, the way in which any
objectivity reveals the partial and arbitrary character of its own objectifi-
cation. To use a simile from linguistics, if the langue is a system of difference,
then antagonism is the failure of difference. And in this sense antagonism
locates itself in the limits of language and can only exist as a disruption of
language, that is, as metaphor.
If you examine any sociological or historical account of concrete
antagonisms, you will find that the account explains the conditions and the
processes that made the antagonism possible but becomes silent in the face
of having to explain the antagonistic relation as such. For instance, those
who explain how landlords began to expel peasants from the land inevitably
reach a point at which they commonly say, "And at this moment, logically,
the peasants reacted." There is a gap in the text, and you, the reader of the
account, must fill in the gap with your common sense, your experience, and
so on. Antagonism is something that is showable but not sayable (using the
Wittgensteinian distinction). Antagonism is the limit of the social, the wit-
ness ofthe ultimate impossibility of society, the moment at which the sense
of precariousness reaches its highest level. Antagonism operates within a
system of difference by collapsing differences. And differences are made to
collapse by creating chains of equivalences. For instance, if I say that, from
the point of view of the interests of the working classes, liberals, conserv-
atives, and radicals are all the same, I have transformed three elements that
were different into substitutes within a chain of equivalence. If difference
exists only in the diachronic succession of the syntagmatic pole, equivalence
exists at the paradigmatic pole. Equating differences reduces the possible
differential places the system can have. This is why any antagonism always
tends to disrupt a system of differential positionality and to simplify the
social space.
Ultimately, antagonism can only operate in a world that is di-
vided between two opposed camps, two paratactic successions of opposed
equivalences. Why is this so? Because if we introduce a tertium quid, it
immediately creates a precise location for each of what were previously two
camps. And in this sense, antagonisms transform the two poles in objective
relations. Antagonism only fully develops in a radically sharp opposition
between two camps, with a frontier internal to the societal effect.
To conclude, I want to raise two sets of questions that place the
concept of antagonism into the context of contemporary political struggles.
First, to what extent does the fact that left-wing politics in advanced in-
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 Ernesto Laclau
dustrial societies is ceasing to be a politics of the frontier the result of the
increasing difficulty of dividing the social space into two camps? In this
sense, we are in a transition to a new type of society in which the plurality
of antagonisms cannot create the politics of the frontier in the traditional
sense in which left-wing politics has been understood. And second, does the
proliferation of social spaces divided into two camps give us the way to
accede to a new conception of politics in which the unity and homogeneity
of the political world cannot be assumed?

Notes

1 The present essay was delivered orally at the conference that provided the basis for th1s
volume. The full argument is developed in the first three chapters of Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics
(London: New Left Books, 1985).

257
 Christine Delphy

Patriarchy, Domestic Mode of Production,

Gender, and Class
Translated by Diana Leonard

As classes, men and women are soc1ally named, differ

ent1ated, and made pertinent through social pract1ces
The patnarchal system wh1ch subordinates women to
men 1n contemporary soc1ety IS based 1n the econom1c
relations of the domestiC mode of production.

The analysis of patriarchy in our society that I have

been developing for the last fifteen years has a history I would like to detail.
I came to my use of the concept and to the model growing out of it by way
of two projects whose theoretical concerns might seem unrelated. One proj-
ect was to study the transmission of family property (patrimony), and the
other was to reply to criticisms of the women's liberation movement that
had come from the Left.
As it happened, when I started to do research on these
two topics, I found that lack of relatedness was only apparent. This might
have been predictable from the coherent commitment that had led me to
these topics: I had wanted to work "on women," which is to say, for me,
on women's oppression. Yet my director of studies at the time told me this
was not possible, so I chose to study the inheritance of property instead,
hoping eventually to get back to my initial interest by an indirect route. In
my research I first discovered what a great quantity of goods change hands
without passing through the market; instead, these goods were passed through
the family, as gifts or "inheritance." I also discovered that the science of
economics, which purports to concern itself with everything related to the
exchange of goods in society, is in fact concerned with only one of the
systems of production, circulation, and consumption of goods: the market.
At the time (between 1968 and 1970) I was also par-
ticipating in the activities of one of the two groups that historically helped
create the new feminist movement in France. I was very annoyed-and I
was not alone, though like the hero of Catch 22 I thought I was being
personally got at!-by one of the men in this mixed group. He claimed that
the oppression of women could not be as severe or as important as the
oppression of the proletariat because although women were oppressed, they
were not "exploited."
I was well aware that something was wrong with his
position. In that group, at least, we recognized that women earned half as
much as men and worked twice as hard, but apparently women's oppression
nevertheless had, in theory, no economic dimension! While we knew at the
time that housework existed, we saw it principally as a question of an unfair
259
division of boring tasks; and since we did not ask the relevant questions
about the problem, not surprisingly we got no relevant answers. However,
my work on patrimony-that is, on the economic aspects of the nonmarket
sphere; or, to put it another way, on the nonmarket sphere of the economy-
served to help me find and pose certain of these questions. Others, at the
time, were also discovering the theoretical as well as the practical importance
of housework, but they came to it by different routes and therefore arrived
at rather different conclusions.
Analysis of gifts and the inheritance of property within the family
allowed me to demystify the market. This prevented my getting caught in
the classic trap of opposing exchange value and use value, an opposition
that had lead the pioneers (Benston and Larguia), as well as those who came
later, into a number of impasses, or, if you will, into a circular route from
which they could find no way out. By showing that this opposition only
makes sense if one adopts the viewpoint of the market, I was able to propose
a theory in which nonmarket value, instead of being a problem in under-
standing housework, is one of the clues to elucidating the specific nature of
housework. By taking this nonvalue as a constitutive element of housework,
I was able to show that (a) housework's exclusion from the market was the
cause, and not the consequence, of its not being paid for; (b) this exclusion
involved not only housework, nor only particular types of work, but rather
social actors as well, or, to be more precise, work done within certain social
relations; and (c) in seeking to understand housework, it is a mistake to see
it merely as a particular set of tasks, whether one is seeking to describe them
or to explain them in terms of their "intrinsic usefulness." I have taken up
all these points again in my recent work, but they were present, at least in
germ, in "The Main Enemy." 1 From this time on I have been able to propose
a theoretical rather than an empirical analysis of housework, which I see
as a particular part of the much larger category of"domestic work," thanks
to my initial creation of the concept ofthe "domestic mode of production."
Since 1970 I have also used the term "patriarchy," and in all my
work I have tried to specify and delimit this word and to state precisely the
relations between patriarchy and the domestic mode of production. I am
still working on this. If I have used a fairly vague term, it has been so as
to show from the start that I consider the oppression of women to be a
system. But the question is, what are the system's components and how is
it constituted? The notion has to be filled in, and this can only be done bit
by bit.
I have, however, since entering the field, restricted the meaning
I attach to the term "patriarchy." For many, it is synonymous with "the
subordination of women." It carries this meaning for me, too, but with this
qualification: I add the words "here and now." This makes a big difference.
When I hear it said, as I often do, that "patriarchy has changed between
the stone age and the present," I know that it is not "my" patriarchy that
is being talked about. What I study is not an ahistoric concept that has
wandered down through the centuries but something peculiar to contem-
porary industrial societies. I do not believe in the theory of survivals-and
here I am in agreement with other Marxists. An institution that exists today
cannot be explained by the fact that it existed in the past, even if this past
is recent. I do not deny that certain elements of patriarchy today resemble
elements of the patriarchy of one or two hundred years ago; what I deny is
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 Christine Delphy
that this continuance-insofar as it really concerns the same thing-in itself
constitutes an explanation.
Many people think that when they have found the point of origin
of an institution in the past, they hold the key to its present existence. But
they have, in fact, explained neither its present existence nor even its birth
(its past appearance), for one must explain its existence at each and every
moment by the context prevailing at that time; and its persistence today (if
it really is persistence) must be explained by the present context. Some so-
called historical explanations are in fact ahistorical, precisely because they
do not take account of the given conditions of each period. This is not
History but mere dating. History is precious if it is well conducted, if each
period is examined in the same way as the present period. A science of the
past worthy of the name cannot be anything other than a series of synchronic
analyses.
The search for origins is a caricature of this falsely historical
procedure and is one of the reasons why I have denounced it, and why I
shall continue to denounce it each and every time it surfaces-which is, alas,
all too frequently. (The other reason why I denounce the search for origins
is because of its hidden naturalistic presuppositions.) But from the scientific
point of view, it is as illegitimate to seek keys to the present situation in
the nineteenth century as in the Stone Age.
Since 1970, then, I have been saying that patriarchy is the system
of subordination of women to men in contemporary industrial societies,
that this system has an economic base, and that this base is the domestic
mode of production. It is hardly worth saying that these three ideas have
been, and remain, highly controversial.
Like all modes of production, the domestic mode of production
is also a mode of circulation and consumption of goods. While it is difficult,
at least at first sight, to identify in the capitalist mode of production the
form of consumption that distinguishes the dominant from the dominated,
since consumption is mediated by wage, things are very different in the
domestic mode. Here consumption is of primary importance and has this
power to serve as a basis for making discriminations, for one of the essential
differences between the two modes of production is that domestic produc-
tion is not paid but rather maintained. In this mode, therefore, consumption
is not separated from production, and the unequal sharing of goods is not
mediated by money. Consumption in the family has to be studied if we
want not only to be able to evaluate the quantitative exploitation of various
members but also to understand what upkeep consists of and how it differs
from a wage. Too many people today still "translate" upkeep into its mon-
etary equivalent, as if a woman who receives a coat receives the value of
the coat. In so doing they abolish the crucial distinction between a wage
and retribution in kind, produced by the presence or absence of a monetary
transaction. This distinction creates the difference between self-selected and
forced consumption and is independent of the value of the goods consumed.
Every mode of production is also a mode of circulation. The
mode of circulation peculiar to the domestic mode of production is the
transmission of patrimony, which is regulated in part by the rules of in-
heritance but is not limited to them. It is an area that has been fairly well
studied in some sectors of our society (e.g., farming) but completely ignored
in others. Here we can also see, on the one hand, the difference between
261
the abstract model and the concrete society and, on the other hand, the
consequences of the fact that our social system (or more precisely the rep-
resentation that has been made of it, i.e., the model of our social system)
is composed of several subsystems.
The intergenerational circulation of goods is interesting in that
it shows the mechanisms at work that produce complementary and antag-
onistic classes: the division between owners and nonowners of the means
of production. The effect of the dispossession is clear in the agricultural
world: those who do not inherit-women and younger siblings-work unpaid
for their husbands and inheriting brothers. Domestic circulation (the rules
of inheritance and succession) leads directly into patriarchal relations of
production. But patrimonial transmission is equally important at another
level in reconstituting, generation after generation, the capitalist mode of
production. It not only creates possessors and nonpossessors within each
family, but it also creates this division among families. This is the only
aspect of patrimonial transmission that has really been studied to date. The
former, the division into classes of a kin group, is passed over in silence by
many sociologists and anthropologists, who pretend, against all the evi-
dence-and in particular against all the evidence on the division of society
into genders-that all the children in a family inherit equally the goods and
status of the head of the family. But being the only effect of patrimonial
transmission recognized by (traditional) sociology makes its reconstituting
of capitalist classes no less real, and this is, indeed, one of the times when
the domestic mode of production meets the capitalist mode and where they
interpenetrate.
Depriving women of the means of production is not the only
way in which women are dispossessed of direct access to their means of
subsistence, if only because many families do not have any family property
not to transmit to them. The same effect is produced by the systemic dis-
crimination women face in the wage-labor market (let us for the moment
call it the "dual labor" market). This too pushes women to enter domestic
relations of production, mainly by getting married. The situation of women
on the labor market has been well studied, and the only originality in my
approach has been to invert the direction of the links usually established.
While ordinarily it is seen as the family situation that influences the capacity
of women to work outside, I have tried to show that it is the situation
created for women on the labor market that constitutes an objective incen-
tive to marry; hence, the labor market plays a role in the exploitation of
women's domestic work.
How should this fact be conceptualized? How should we interpret
its meaning with regard to the relations between patriarchy and the domestic
mode of production? Can we talk of capitalist mechanisms serving the do-
mestic mode of production, or must we speak of domestic mechanisms at
work in the labor market? Whatever the reply-and the question will stay
open for a long time-one thing is clear: whether it concerns patrimonial
transmission (which assists, if not creates, relations of production other than
those that are strictly domestic) or the capitalist labor market (which assists,
if not creates, relations of production other than capitalist ones), the two
systems are tightly linked and have a relationship of mutual aid and assis-
tance. Moreover, the relations between patriarchy and the domestic mode
of production are not simple relations of superposition. The domestic mode
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 Christine Delphy
of production in places overruns patriarchy and in places is slighter. The
same is true also of the capitalist mode of production: one of its institutions,
the labor market, is in part ruled, or used, by patriarchy.
Thus, the domestic mode of production does not give a total
account of even the economic dimension of women's subordination. And
it does not account for other dimensions of this subordination, in particular
the oppressions that are just as material as economic exploitation, including
all the varieties of sexual violence. Some of these forms of violence can be
attached to the appropriation of women's labor power. For example, C.
Hennequin, E. deLesseps, and I attached them to the prohibition of abor-
tion. 2 Since the bringing up of children is labor extorted from women, it
could in fact be thought that men fear women will seek to escape from the
labor of child-rearing, notably by limiting births, and that men therefore
accord themselves the means to withdraw such control from women by
prohibiting abortion. The constraint to be heterosexual and the "choice"
within sexuality of practices that result in impregnation can also be seen as
a means to withdraw control over fertility from women and give it to men.
The same sort of reasoning has been applied to marital violence3 and rape. 4
However, to be fair, the links so established are too abridged to be called
full explanations. There remain whole sections ofwomen's oppression that
are only very partially, if at all, explained by my theory. This can be seen
as a shortcoming, but not an involuntary one; rather, it is a consequence
of certain refusals and choices of a methodological kind which I have made.
I distrust theories that seek from the outset to explain as a totality
all the aspects of the oppression of women. The first, general reason I distrust
them is that such theories themselves remain particular. In being too glued
to their object, to its specificity, they become specific, unable to locate their
object among other similar things (e.g., among other oppressions), because
they do not possess the tools to make it comparable. However, the explan-
atory power of a theory (or a concept or a hypothesis) is tied to its capacity
to discover what is common to several phenomena of the same order, and
hence to its capacity to go beyond the phenomenal reality (i.e., what is
immediately present) of each case. The idea that the raison d'etre of things
is to be found beyond their appearance, that it is "hidden," is part of sci-
entific procedure (though it can, of course, be contested).
Thus, one of the objections that has been made to my use of the
concepts "mode of production" and "class" has been that these concepts
were created to describe other situations and that in using them I deny the
specificity of our oppression. But analysis proceeds by a kind of logical
"butchery." To understand a phenomenon, one begins by breaking it down
into bits, which are later reassembled. Why? So that the bits will be the
same for all instances of the phenomenon studied. (Here the phenomenon
under study is the subordination of one group by another, the oppression
of women being one instance.) The recompositions later obtained are then
comparable. With a few concepts a geographer can describe any landscape.
To understand is first to compare. This is how all sciences proceed, and it
is how we proceed in everyday life: how you and I describe a person, a
place, a situation to people who are not able to have direct experience of
them.
But these nonspecific concepts are made not so much to describe
things as to explain them. (Although all description requires a classification
263
 and, hence, at the start is an explanation, all explanation is also a description
insofar as it can itselfbe further explained.) This is the ambition of analysis.
The bits into which a phenomenon is broken are also not those of immediate
perception. The economic dimension, for instance, is not an "obvious"
category for thinking about the family today, but then it was also not an
obvious one for thinking about any phenomenon whatsoever a few centuries
ago, even those our current language now calls "the economy."
It follows that when the bits are gathered together, the assem-
blages so obtained are in no way restitutions of the objects initially treated
but rather models: images of what it is suggested are the realities underlying
and causing the objects. The initial "objects" are also not themselves "pure"
facts but rather the immediate perception of things, informed in a nonex-
plicit fashion by a certain view of the world (what Feyerabend referred to
as "natural evidences"). Thus, it could be said, on the one hand, that the
more a theory pretends to be "general" (its object), the more it has descrip-
tive power and the less it has explanatory power; and, on the other hand,
the more it is intended to account for immediate perception, precisely be-
cause to have a descriptive power it must stick to the "facts," the more it
is ideological.
The other reason for my distrust of theories that wish to be "total"
is that even when they do not aim to "cover" everything, they still aim to
explain everything by a single "cause"; and when their concern is women's
oppression, this thirst for a single cause generally leads straight into the arms
of naturalism. Naturalism is a major sin of which we are not responsible
since it is the indigenous theory-the rationalization-for oppression. Today
it is applied to the oppression of women and people "of color," but it was
also used to explain the oppression of the proletariat scarcely a century ago.
It is not sufficiently recognized that the exploitation of the working class
was justified, in the nineteenth century, by the "natural" (today one would
say "genetic") inferiority of its members. And naturalism continues to infect
our thought. This is most obvious in antifeminist thinking, but it is still
present, in large measure, in feminism itself.
Feminists have been shouting for more than a decade whenever
they hear it said that the subordination of women is caused by the inferiority
of our natural capacities. But, at the same time, the vast majority continue
to think that "we must take account of biology." Why exactly? No one
knows. Science has thrown out, one after another, all the "biological ex-
planations" of the oppression of proletarians and nonwhites, so it might be
thought that this type of account would be discredited. This century has
seen the collapse of such racist theories, even though one-quarter of pri-
matologists keep trying to save them from annihilation. But the role that
biology never merited historically it does not merit logically either. Why
should we, in trying to explain the division of society into hierarchical
groups, attach ourselves to the anatomy of the individuals who compose,
or are thought to compose, these groups? The pertinence of the question
(not to speak of the pertinence of the replies furnished) still remains to be
demonstrated as far as I am concerned.
Naturalist "explanations" always choose the most convenient
biology of the moment. In the last century it was the (feeble) muscles of
women; in the 1950s it was the (deleterious) influence of our hormones on
our moods; today it is the (bad) lateralization of our brains. Feminists are
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 Christina Dalphy
outraged by such "theories," but no one has yet explained to me how these
theories differ fundamentally from the explanation in terms of women's
ability to gestate which is so in favor today under the name of "repro-
duction."
One of the axioms, if not the fundamental axiom, of my approach
is that women and men are social groups. I start from the incontestable fact
that they are socially named, socially differentiated, and socially pertinent,
and I question these social practices. How are they realized? What are they
for? It may be (again, this remains to be proved) that women are (also)
females and that men are (also) males, but it is women and men who interest
me, not females and males. Even if one gives only minimal weight to the
social construction of sexual difference, if one contents oneself with merely
stating the pertinence of sex for society, then one is obliged to consider this
pertinence as a social fact, which therefore requires an equally social ex-
planation. (Just because Durkheim said it does not make this any less true.)
This is why an important part of my work is devoted to denouncing ap-
proaches that seek a natural explanation for a social fact, and why I want
to dislodge all approaches that implicitly bear the stamp of this reduction-
ism.
A considerable theoretical step forward was taken ten years ago
with the creation of the concept of"gender." The term is, however, unfor-
tunately little used in French and not systematically used in English, with
the result that we continue to get entangled by the different meanings of the
word "sex" or are constrained to use paraphrases (e.g., "sexual divisions in
society"). The concept of gender carries in one word both a recognition of
the social dimension of the "sexual" dichotomy and the need to treat it as
such, and its consequent detachment from the anatomical-biological aspect
of sex. But it only partially detaches the social from the anatomical. If gender
identifies a social construction, it is, however, not arbitrarily built on no
matter what: it is constituted by anatomical sex, just as the beret is set on
the head of the legendary Frenchman. And, since its creation, the concept
of gender, far from taking wing, has seemed always to function in composite
expressions such as "sex and gender" or "sex/gender"-the "and" or the
slash serving to buttress rather than separate the two. When two words are
always associated, they become redundant; when, in addition, the associ-
ation is not reciprocal-when sex can happily dispense with gender-the
optional addition of the second term seems but a cautious form of speech
that lacks real meaning.
The concept of gender has thus not taken off as I would have
wished, nor has it given rise to the theoretical development it carried in
germ. Rather, gender now seems to be taken at its most minimal conno-
tation. It is accepted that the "roles" of the sexes vary according to the
society, but it is this variability that is taken to sum up the social aspect of
sex. Gender is a content of which sex is the constraining container. The
content may vary from society to society, but the container itself does not.
Gayle Rubin, for example, maintains that sex inevitably gives birth to gen-
der. In other words, the sexual dimorphism of the human species contains
in itself not only the capacity but also the necessity of a social division. The
very existence of genders-of different social positions for men and women
(or, more correctly, for females or males)-is thus taken as given, as not
265
 requiring explanation. Only the content of these positions and their (even-
tual, according to Rubin) hierarchy are a matter for investigation. Those
who, like me, took gender seriously find themselves, today, pretty isolated.
I give above my reasons for mistrusting "specific" explanations.
They may, perhaps, not totally explain for readers my use of the term
"class." Beyond responding to the needs of analysis as described above-
though, perhaps, no better than another concept might (namely, breaking
down an object-here the oppression of women-into small sections, or,
more precisely, into nonspecific dimensions)-the concept of class has the
advantage of being the only one I know that at least partially responds to
the strict requirements of a social explanation. It is perhaps not totally
satisfying, but it is the least unsatisfying of all the terms used to analyze
oppression.
The term "groups" says nothing about their mode of constitution.
It can be thought that the groups-the dominant and the dominated-each
have an origin that is sui generis; that having already come into existence,
they later enter into a relationship; and that this relationship, at a still later
time, becomes characterized by domination. The concept of class, however,
inverts this scheme. It implies that each group cannot be considered sep-
arately from the other because they are bound together by a relationship of
domination; nor can they even be considered together but independent of
this relationship. Characterizing this relationship as one of economic ex-
ploitation, the concept of class additionally puts social domination at the
heart of the explanation of hierarchy. The motives-the material profit in
the wide sense-attributed to this domination can be discussed, and even
challenged or changed, without changing the fundamental scheme.
Class is a dichotomous concept and thus has its limitations. But
we can also see how class applies to the exhaustive, hierarchical, and pre-
cisely dichotomous classifications that are internal to a given society, such
as the classification into men or women (adultjchild, white/nonwhite, etc.).
The concept of class starts from the idea of social construction and specifies
its implications. Groups are no longer sui generis, constituted before coming
into relations with one another. On the contrary, it is their relationship that
constitutes them as such. It is, therefore, a question of discovering the social
practices, the social relations that, in constituting the division by gender,
create the groups of gender (called "of sex").
I put forward the hypothesis that the domestic relations of pro-
duction constitute one such class relationship. But this relation does not
account for the whole of the "gender" system, and it also concerns other
categorizations (e.g., by age). I would put forward as another hypothesis
that other systems of relationship constitutive of gender divisions also ex-
ist-and these remain to be discovered. If we think of each of these systems
as a circle, then gender division is the zone illuminated by the projection
of these circles onto one another. Each system of relations, taken separately,
is not specific, either of gender division or of another categorization. But
these systems of relations do combine in various ways, each of which is
unique. According to this hypothesis, it is the particular combination of
several systems of relationships, of which none is specific, that gives sin-
gularity to the division.
Is it the specificity of this combination that is meant when we
say that patriarchy is a system? Or does this combination, in addition to
266
 Christine Delphy
being unique and noncontingent possess a meaning? And is it this meaning
that makes patriarchy a system? Above all, what are the other systems that
articulate with the domestic mode of production to form patriarchy? These
are some of the questions I think we must pursue.

Notes

Originally published in 1970, "The Main Enemy" is reprinted in Chnstine Delphy, Close to
Home: A Materialist Analys1s of Women's Oppression (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press. 1984).
2 C HenneqUin, E. Lesseps, and C. Delphy, "L'interdiction de l'avortement: Exploitation econ-
omique," Partisans ( 1970). no. 54-5.
3 J. Hanmer, "Violence and the Social Control of Women." in G. Littlejohn et al.. eds., Power
and the State (london: Croom Helm, 1978).
4 On the issue of rape. see the mimeographed paper "Patriarchal Justice and the Fear of
Rape," issued by Feministes RevolutiOnnaires in 1976.

267
 Discussion
Comment (Michele Barrett)
I want to make three comments on Christine's position which
I think are particularly central for understanding the relation between Marxism and
feminism. I don't want to dwell very long on any of them, since I have engaged
them in a more detailed way elsewhere.
The first point concerns the question of gender. I think Chris-
tine is absolutely right that the analysis of gender has not taken off in the way that
a lot of feminists hoped it would. But I think that is partly because there has been
a theoretical debate about how we analyze gender. I might briefly characterize this
debate along a continuum between two extreme positions. At one end (and I would
locate Christine here) is a theory that sees gender as, in a sense, a Durkheimian
social fact. What we are studying when we look at the acquisition of gender is the
acquisition of a social identity that is already there. At the opposite pole is the
theoretical view that there is no such fixed social category already there but, rather,
that the meaning of gender-the meaning of femininity and masculinity-is con-
structed anew in every encounter. I would associate this view with discourse theory
and the various kinds of feminist appropriations of discourse theory.
Neither of these poles is very satisfactory. The Durkheimian
position doesn't explain social change, and I think that there has been a considerable
amount of change in the meaning of gender. The discourse position doesn't explain
persistence. If you insist that gender is created anew on every occasion, you can't
explain how it is that familiar things keep popping up time and time again. So it
seems to me that the more useful way to approach gender would be somewhere
between these two extremes. And I think the failure of gender analysis to really take
off is due to the way the debate has been defined already.
The second issue I want to raise involves the concept of
class. While I agree to some extent with what Christine says, I think it is necessary
to pose the difficulties of reconciling a Marxist and a feminist approach. Christine
reconciles these through the concepts that she uses (e.g., patriarchy, domestic mode
of production, and wage-labor). Clearly, one might use different concepts but still
pose, in a very general way, the theoretical relationship between Marxism and fem-
inism. I've argued in the past that this is an extremely difficult project and that, to
put it crudely, the success of the project is not really assisted by simply using a
Marxist concept of class in relation to gender. Christine acknowledges that it is not
ideal but maintains that it is the least unsatisfying term with which to analyze
oppression. But when we are trying to reconcile Marxist and feminist approaches,
we must face the problem that Christine raises at the very beginning, which is the
question of the distinction between exploitation and oppression. The real key to the
debate is to describe how we might say that women are exploited rather than op-
pressed by men. The concept of class, as developed by Marx, does not simply register
dichotomy; it is not simply a descriptive term that can be transferred onto other
sets of relations-or, at least, it can only be transferred metaphorically. The question
is crucial politically because it raises the question of the status of economic arguments
and the status of exploitation as an economic category in political theory and political
strategy. And it seems to me-I'll float this as a rather provocative point-that it
doesn't help us in thinking about feminist questions to reproduce some of the dif-
ficulties associated with the concept of class that Marxism has plowed through with
great pain and suffering.
My third point concerns the relations between political strat-
egies and theoretical interpretations. I will give two examples. The first is the question
of biology: whether feminism is, as it were, infected by naturalism as soon as it
raises the question of biology. While I completely agree with Christine in principle,
I think that a political difficulty remains because we are not in a situation where
impeccable logic rules the world. We are in a situation where biologistic arguments
absolutely hold the commanding heights of popular sentiments on the question of
268
 Christine Delphy
gender. We simply cannot afford the luxury of saying that biological or biologistic
arguments should not be addressed by feminists. In fact, our arguments have too
often been very unconvincing. There is a political imperative that demands more
work here, more serious engagements with and refutations of pseudoscientific ar-
guments, and more popular campaigning as well.
The other example I want to give is perhaps a bit more
controversial: abortion. Of course, it's true that abortion is a feminist issue. But we
will be in a lot of trouble politically if we rest there, because abortion is an issue
that cannot really be posed exclusively in terms of the antagonism between men and
women, or of male control over women. To pose it in that way is to deny the role
of women in the antiabortion movement, and that is, in some ways, a rather pa-
tronizing approach. Nor is it politically helpful at this moment because it leaves the
Right too much in control of popular ideologies. And it doesn't give due recognition
to the complexity of women's experience. Instead, it tends to imply that women
mistake their own interests, rather like the traditional Marxist view of the working
class as misperceiving their own objective interests. Neither position really engages
with the question-at the level of either experience or popular ideology-of why
people want these things that we are, analytically, so critical of. The refusal to engage
with the question of consent leads us into a victimology ofwomen. Those ofus who
come from the other side of the Atlantic are very conscious of this because of the
phenomenon of Thatcherism: that you cannot make do with a theoretical position
in which you don't take seriously the "nonprogressive" needs, wants, and desires of
people. Paradoxically, that leads me back to my first point, that we need to consider
in a more nuanced, more complex way how gender is constructed and the political
parameters of that process.

269
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Can the Subaltern Speak?

An understanding of contemporary relations of power,

and of the Western intellectual's role within them, re-
quires an examination of the Intersection of a theory of
representation and the polit1cal economy of global capi-
talism. A theory of representation po1nts, on the one
hand, to the doma1n of ideology, mean1ng, and subjec-
tiVIty, and, on the other hand, to the doma1n of politics,
the state, and the law.

The original title of this paper was "Power, Desire,

Interest." 1 Indeed, whatever power these meditations command may have
been earned by a politically interested refusal to push to the limit the found-
ing presuppositions of my desires, as far as they are within my grasp. This
vulgar three-stroke formula, applied both to the most resolutely committed
and to the most ironic discourse, keeps track of what Althusser so aptly
named "philosophies of denegation." 2 I have invoked my positionality in
this awkward way so as to accentuate the fact that calling the place of the
investigator into question remains a meaningless piety in many recent cri-
tiques of the sovereign subject. Thus, although I will attempt to foreground
the precariousness of my position throughout, I know such gestures can
never suffice.
This paper will move, by a necessarily circuitous route,
from a critique of current Western efforts to problematize the subject to the
question of how the third-world subject is represented within Western dis-
course. Along the way, I will have occasion to suggest that a still more
radical decentering of the subject is, in fact, implicit in both Marx and
Derrida. And I will have recourse, perhaps surprisingly, to an argument that
Western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit with Western
international economic interests. In the end, I will offer an alternative anal-
ysis of the relations between the discourses of the West and the possibility
of speaking of(or for) the subaltern woman. I will draw my specific examples
from the case of India, discussing at length the extraordinarily paradoxical
status of the British abolition of widow sacrifice.

Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the

West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of
the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized "subject-effects"
gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often provid-
ing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe
as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the
West, this concealed Subject pretends it has "no geo-political determina-
271
 tions." The much-publicized critique ofthe sovereign subject thus actually
inaugurates a Subject. I will argue for this conclusion by considering a text
by two great practitioners of the critique: "Intellectuals and Power: A Con-
versation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze." 3
I have chosen this friendly exchange between two activist phi-
losophers of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative
theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, enabling
one to glimpse the track of ideology. The participants in this conversation
emphasize the most important contributions of French poststructuralist the-
ory: first, that the networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous
that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive-a per-
sistent critique is needed; and second, that intellectuals must attempt to
disclose and know the discourse of society's Other. Yet the two systemat-
ically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intel-
lectual and economic history.
Although one of its chief presuppositions is the critique of the
sovereign subject, the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is framed
by two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: "A Maoist" (FD,
205) and "the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). Intellectuals, however, are named
and differentiated; moreover, a Chinese Maoism is nowhere operative.
Maoism here simply creates an aura of narrative specificity, which would
be a harmless rhetorical banality were it not that the innocent appropriation
of the proper name "Maoism" for the eccentric phenomenon of French
intellectual "Maoism" and subsequent "New Philosophy" symptomatically
renders "Asia" transparent. 4
Deleuze's reference to the workers' struggle is equally proble-
matic; it is obviously a genuflection: ''We are unable to touch [power] in
any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted by this
diffuse mass, so that we are necessarily led ... to the desire to blow it up
completely. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense is linked in this
way to the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). The apparent banality signals a
disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labor, a ges-
ture that often marks poststructuralist political theory. 5 The invocation of
the workers' struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing
with global capitalism: the subject-production of worker and unemployed
within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the
working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and
thus from "humanistic" training in consumerism; and the large-scale pres-
ence of paracapitalist labor as well as the heterogeneous structural status of
agriculture in the Periphery. Ignoring the international division of labor;
rendering "Asia" (and on occasion "Africa") transparent (unless the subject
is ostensibly the "Third World"); reestablishing the legal subject of socialized
capital-these are problems as common to much poststructuralist as to struc-
turalist theory. Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those
intellectuals who are our best prophets of heterogeneity and the Other?
The link to the workers' struggle is located in the desire to blow
up power at any point of its application. This site is apparently based on a
simple valorization of any desire destructive of any power. Walter Benjamin
comments on Baudelaire's comparable politics by way of quotations from
Marx:
272
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
Marx continues in his description of the conspirateurs
de profession as follows:" ... They have no other aim
but the immediate one of overthrowing the existing
government, and they profoundly despise the more
theoretical enlightenment of the workers as to their
class interests. Thus their anger-not proletarian but
plebian-at the habits noirs (black coats), the more or
less educated people who represent [vertretenj that side
ofthe movement and of whom they can never become
entirely independent, as they cannot of the official rep-
resentatives [Repriisentantenj of the party." Baude-
laire's political insights do not go fundamentally be-
yond the insights of these professional conspirators....
He could perhaps have made Haubert's statement, "Of
all of politics I understand only one thing: the revolt,"
his own. 6

The link to the workers' struggle is located, simply, in desire.

Elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari have attempted an alternative definition
of desire, revising the one offered by psychoanalysis: "Desire does not lack
anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is lacking
in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject except
by repression. Desire and its object are a unity: it is the machine, as a
machine of a machine. Desire is machine, the object of desire also a con-
nected machine, so that the product is lifted from the process of producing,
and something detaches itselffrom producing to product and gives a leftover
to the vagabond, nomad subject." 7
This definition does not alter the specificity of the desiring subject
(or leftover subject-effect) that attaches to specific instances of desire or to
production of the desiring machine. Moreover, when the connection be-
tween desire and the subject is taken as irrelevant or merely reversed, the
subject-effect that surreptitiously emerges is much like the generalized ide-
ological subject of the theorist. This may be the legal subject of socialized
capital, neither labor nor management, holding a "strong" passport, using
a "strong" or "hard" currency, with supposedly unquestioned access to due
process. It is certainly not the desiring subject as Other.
The failure of Deleuze and Guattari to consider the relations
between desire, power, and subjectivity renders them incapable of articu-
lating a theory of interests. In this context, their indifference to ideology (a
theory of which is necessary for an understanding of interests) is striking
but consistent. Foucault's commitment to "genealogical" speculation pre-
vents him from locating, in "great names" like Marx and Freud, watersheds
in some continuous stream of intellectual history. 8 This commitment has
created an unfortunate resistance in Foucault's work to "mere" ideological
critique. Western speculations on the ideological reproduction of social re-
lations belong to that mainstream, and it is within this tradition that Al-
thusser writes: "The reproduction of labour power requires not only a re-
production of its skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its
submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of
the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of
273
 exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domi-
nation of the ruling class 'in and by words' [par Ia parole]. " 9
When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of power,
he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser
here attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems
of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari
are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that a
developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production in
institutionality, as well as in the "effective instruments for the formation
and accumulation of knowledge" (PK, 102). Because these philosophers
seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only
schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a me-
chanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align
themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a
continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture." The mechanical
relation between desire and interest is clear in such sentences as: "We never
desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself
where desire has placed it" (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent,
and power slips in to create the effects of desire: "power ... produces positive
effects at the level of desire-and also at the level of knowledge" (PK, 59).
This parasubjective matrix, cross-hatched with heterogeneity,
ushers in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influ-
enced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for "the last instance" is
now between economics and power. Because desire is tacitly defined on an
orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to "being deceived." Ideology as
"false consciousness" (being deceived) has been called into question by
Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a di-
chotomy of deception and undeceived desire: "We must accept the scream
of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they
actually desired a fascist regime" (FD, 215).
These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive
contradiction-that is where they admittedly part company from the Left.
In the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the dis-
course of power. Foucault often seems to conflate "individual" and "sub-
ject";10 and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his
followers. Because of the power of the word "power," Foucault admits to
using the "metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its sur-
roundings." Such slips become the rule rather than the exception in less
careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric
discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun oftheory,
the Subject of Europe. 11
Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role
of ideology in reproducing the social relations of production: an unques-
tioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the "object being," as De-
leuze admiringly remarks, "to establish conditions where the prisoners
themselves would be able to speak." Foucault adds that "the masses know
perfectly well, clearly" -once again the thematics ofbeing undeceived-"they
know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well"
(FD, 206, 207).
What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these
pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached
274
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
with Deleuze: "Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school,
in barracks, in a prison, in a police station" (FD, 212). This foreclosing of
the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production
has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism-the justifying
foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism-to define its own arena
as "concrete experience," "what actually happens." Indeed, the concrete
experience that is the guarantor of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers,
and schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the in-
tellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. 12 Neither Deleuze nor Fou-
cault seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing
concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division oflabor.
The unrecognized contradiction within a position that valorizes
the concrete experience of the oppressed, while being so uncritical about
the historical role of the intellectual, is maintained by a verbal slippage.
Thus Deleuze makes this remarkable pronouncement: "A theory is like a
box of tools. Nothing to do with the signifier" (FD, 208). Considering that
the verbalism of the theoretical world and its access to any world defined
against it as "practical" is irreducible, such a declaration helps only the
intellectual anxious to prove that intellectual labor is just like manual labor.
It is when signifiers are left to look after themselves that verbal slippages
happen. The signifier "representation" is a case in point. In the same dis-
missive tone that severs theory's link to the signifier, Deleuze declares,
"There is no more representation; there's nothing but action"-"action of
theory and action of practice which relate to each other as relays and form
networks" (FD, 206-7). Yet an important point is being made here: the
production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract
"pure" theory and concrete "applied" practice is too quick and easy. 13
If this is, indeed, Deleuze's argument, his articulation of it is
problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: represen-
tation as "speaking for," as in politics, and representation as "re-presen-
tation," as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only "action," the
theoretician does not represent (speak for) the oppressed group. Indeed, the
subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting real-
ity adequately). These two senses of representation-within state formation
and the law, on the one hand, and in subject-predication, on the other-are
related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with
an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subject-
privileging.14 Because "the person who speaks and acts ... is always a mul-
tiplicity," no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or ... union" can rep-
resent "those who act and struggle" (FD, 206). Are those who act and struggle
mute, as opposed to those who act and speak (FD, 206)? These immense
problems are buried in the differences between the "same" words: con-
sciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and
re-presentation. The critique of ideological subject-constitution within state
formations and systems of political economy can now be effaced, as can the
active theoretical practice of the "transformation of consciousness." The
banality of leftist intellectuals' lists of self-knowing, politically canny sub-
alterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent them-
selves as transparent.
If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the
shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political
275
 economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the
other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten ("rep-
resent" in the first sense) and darstellen ("re-present" in the second sense)
in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where
Marx touches on "class" as a descriptive and transformative concept in a
manner somewhat more complex than Althusser's distinction between class
instinct and class position would allow.
Marx's contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class
can be a differential one-its cutting off and difference from all other classes:
"in so far as millions offamilies live under economic conditions of existence
that cut off their mode oflife, their interest, and their formation from those
of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontation ffeindlich
gagenuberstellenj, they form a class." 15 There is no such thing as a "class
instinct" at work here. In fact, the collectivity of familial existence, which
might be considered the arena of "instinct," is discontinuous with, though
operated by, the differential isolation of classes. In this context, one far more
pertinent to the France of the 1970s than it can be to the international
periphery, the formation of a class is artificial and economic, and the eco-
nomic agency or interest is impersonal because it is systematic and heter-
ogeneous. This agency or interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the
individual subject, for it marks the subject's empty place in that process
without a subject which is history and political economy. Here the capitalist
is defined as "the conscious bearer [Trager} of the limitless movement of
capital." 16 My point is that Marx is not working to create an undivided
subject where desire and interest coincide. Class consciousness does not
operate toward that goal. Both in the economic area (capitalist) and in the
political (world-historical agent), Marx is obliged to construct models of a
divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent
with each other. A celebrated passage like the description of capital as the
Faustian monster brings this home vividly. 17
The following passage, continuing the quotation from The Eigh-
teenth Brumaire, is also working on the structural principle of a dispersed
and dislocated class subject: the (absent collective) consciousness of the
small peasant proprietor class finds its "bearer" in a "representative" who
appears to work in another's interest. The word "representative" here is not
"darstellen "; this sharpens the contrast Foucault and Deleuze slide over,
the contrast, say, between a proxy and a portrait. There is, of course, a
relationship between them, one that has received political and ideological
exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the poet and the sophist,
the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful. In the guise of a
post-Marxist description of the scene of power, we thus encounter a much
older debate: between representation or rhetoric as tropology and as per-
suasion. Darstellen belongs to the first constellation, vertreten-with stronger
suggestions of substitution-to the second. Again, they are related, but run-
ning them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is where
oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essen-
tialist, utopian politics.
Here is Marx's passage, using "vert ret en" where the English use
"represent," discussing a social "subject" whose consciousness and Vertre-
tung (as much a substitution as a representation) are dislocated and inco-
herent: The small peasant proprietors "cannot represent themselves; they
276
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
must be represented. Their representative must appear simultaneously as
their master, as an authority over them, as unrestricted governmental power
that protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine
from above. The political influence [in the place of the class interest, since
there is no unified class subject] of the small peasant proprietors therefore
finds its last expression [the implication of a chain of substitutions-Ver-
tretungen-is strong here] in the executive force [Exekutivgewalt-less per-
sonal in German] subordinating society to itself."
Not only does such a model of social indirection-necessary gaps
between the source of"influence" (in this case the small peasant proprietors),
the "representative" (Louis Napoleon), and the historical-political phenom-
enon (executive control)-imply a critique of the subject as individual agent
but a critique even of the subjectivity of a collective agency. The necessarily
dislocated machine ofhistory moves because "the identity of the interests"
of these proprietors "fails to produce a feeling of community, national links,
or a political organization." The event of representation as Vertretung (in
the constellation of rhetoric-as-persuasion) behaves like a Darstel/ung (or
rhetoric-as-trope), taking its place in the gap between the formation of a
(descriptive) class and the nonformation of a (transformative) class: "In so
far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that
separate their mode oflife ... they form a class. In so far as ... the identity
of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community ... they do not
form a class." The complicity of Vertreten and Darstellen, their identity-in-
difference as the place of practice-since this complicity is precisely what
Marxists must expose, as Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire-can only
be appreciated if they are not conflated by a sleight of word.
It would be merely tendentious to argue that this textualizes Marx
too much, making him inaccessible to the common "man," who, a victim
of common sense, is so deeply placed in a heritage ofpositivism that Marx's
irreducible emphasis on the work of the negative, on the necessity for de-
fetishizing the concrete, is persistently wrested from him by the strongest
adversary, "the historical tradition" in the air. 18 I have been trying to point
out that the uncommon "man," the contemporary philosopher of practice,
sometimes exhibits the same positivism.
The gravity of the problem is apparent if one agrees that the
development of a transformative class "consciousness" from a descriptive
class "position" is not in Marx a task engaging the ground level of con-
sciousness. Class consciousness remains with the feeling of community that
belongs to national links and political organizations, not to that other feeling
of community whose structural model is the family. Although not identified
with nature, the family here is constellated with what Marx calls "natural
exchange," which is, philosophically speaking, a "placeholder" for use value. 19
"Natural exchange" is contrasted to "intercourse with society," where the
word "intercourse" (Verkehr) is Marx's usual word for "commerce." This
"intercourse" thus holds the place of the exchange leading to the production
of surplus value, and it is in the area of this intercourse that the feeling of
community leading to class agency must be developed. Full class agency (if
there were such a thing) is not an ideological transformation of conscious-
ness on the ground level, a desiring identity of the agents and their interest-
the identity whose absence troubles Foucault and Deleuze. It is a contes-
tatory replacement as well as an appropriation (a supplementation) of some-
277
thing that is "artificial" to begin with-"economic conditions of existence
that separate their mode of life." Marx's formulations show a cautious re-
spect for the nascent critique of individual and collective subjective agency.
The projects of class consciousness and of the transformation of conscious-
ness are discontinuous issues for him. Conversely, contemporary invoca-
tions of "libidinal economy" and desire as the determining interest, com-
bined with the practical politics of the oppressed (under socialized capital)
"speaking for themselves," restore the category of the sovereign subject
within the theory that seems most to question it.
No doubt the exclusion of the family, albeit a family belonging
to a specific class formation, is part of the masculine frame within which
Marxism marks its birth. 20 Historically as well as in today's global political
economy, the family's role in patriarchal social relations is so heterogeneous
and contested that merely replacing the family in this problematic is not
going to break the frame. Nor does the solution lie in the positivist inclusion
of a monolithic collectivity of "women" in the list of the oppressed whose
unfractured subjectivity allows them to speak for themselves against an
equally monolithic "same system."
In the context of the development of a strategic, artificial, and
second-level "consciousness," Marx uses the concept of the patronymic,
always within the broader concept of representation as Vertretung: The small
peasant proprietors "are therefore incapable of making their class interest
valid in their proper name [im eigenen Namenj, whether through a parlia-
ment or through a convention." The absence of the nonfamilial artificial
collective proper name is supplied by the only proper name "historical
tradition" can offer-the patronymic itself-the Name of the Father: "His-
torical tradition produced the French peasants' belief that a miracle would
occur, that a man named Napoleon would restore all their glory. And an
individual turned up" -the untranslatable "es fand sich" (there found itself
an individual?) demolishes all questions of agency or the agent's connection
with his interest-"who gave himself out to be that man" (this pretense is,
by contrast, his only proper agency) "because he carried [tragt-the word
used for the capitalist's relationship to capital] the Napoleonic Code, which
commands" that "inquiry into paternity is forbidden." While Marx here
seems to be working within a patriarchal metaphorics, one should note the
textual subtlety of the passage. It is the Law of the Father (the Napoleonic
Code) that paradoxically prohibits the search for the natural father. Thus,
it is according to a strict observance of the historical Law of the Father that
the formed yet unformed class's faith in the natural father is gainsaid.
I have dwelt so long on this passage in Marx because it spells
out the inner dynamics of Vertretung, or representation in the political
context. Representation in the economic context is Darstellung, the philo-
sophical concept of representation as staging or, indeed, signification, which
relates to the divided subject in an indirect way. The most obvious passage
is well known: "In the exchange relationship [Austauschverhiiltnis] of com-
modities their exchange-value appeared to us totally independent of their
use-value. But if we subtract their use-value from the product oflabour, we
obtain their value, as it was just determined [bestimmtj. The common ele-
ment which represents itself [sich darstelltj in the exchange relation, or the
exchange value of the commodity, is thus its value." 21
278
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
According to Marx, under capitalism, value, as produced in nec-
essary and surplus labor, is computed as the representation/sign of objec-
tified labor (which is rigorously distinguished from human activity). Con-
versely, in the absence of a theory of exploitation as the extraction
(production), appropriation, and realization of (surplus) value as represen-
tation of labor power, capitalist exploitation must be seen as a variety of
domination (the mechanics of power as such). "The thrust of Marxism,"
Deleuze suggests, "was to determine the problem [that power is more diffuse
than the structure of exploitation and state formation] essentially in terms
of interests (power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests)" (FD,
214).
One cannot object to this minimalist summary ofMarx's project,
just as one cannot ignore that, in parts of the Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and
Guattari build their case on a brilliant if "poetic" grasp of Marx's theory of
the money form. Yet we might consolidate our critique in the following
way: the relationship between global capitalism (exploitation in economics)
and nation-state alliances (domination in geopolitics) is so macrological that
it cannot account for the micrological texture of power. To move toward
such an accounting one must move toward theories of ideology-of subject
formations that micrologically and often erratically operate the interests that
congeal the macrologies. Such theories cannot afford to overlook the cate-
gory of representation in its two senses. They must note how the staging of
the world in representation-its scene of writing, its Darstellung-dissimu-
lates the choice of and need for "heroes," paternal proxies, agents ofpower-
Vertretung.
My view is that radical practice should attend to this double
session of representations rather than reintroduce the individual subject
through totalizing concepts of power and desire. It is also my view that, in
keeping the area of class practice on a second level of abstraction, Marx
was in effect keeping open the (K.antian and) Hegelian critique of the in-
dividual subject as agent. 22 This view does not oblige me to ignore that, by
implicitly defining the family and the mother tongue as the ground level
where culture and convention seem nature's own way of organizing "her"
own subversion, Marx himself rehearses an ancient subterfuge. 23 In the con-
text of poststructuralist claims to critical practice, this seems more recu-
perable than the clandestine restoration of subjective essentialism.
The reduction of Marx to a benevolent but dated figure most
often serves the interest of launching a new theory of interpretation. In the
Foucault-Deleuze conversation, the issue seems to be that there is no rep-
resentation, no signifier (Is it to be presumed that the signifier has already
been dispatched? There is, then, no sign-structure operating experience, and
thus might one lay semiotics to rest?); theory is a relay of practice (thus
laying problems of theoretical practice to rest) and the oppressed can know
and speak for themselves. This reintroduces the constitutive subject on at
least two levels: the Subject of desire and power as an irreducible meth-
odological presupposition; and the self-proximate, if not self-identical, sub-
ject of the oppressed. Further, the intellectuals, who are neither of these S/
subjects, become transparent in the relay race, for they merely report on
the nonrepresented subject and analyze (without analyzing) the workings of
(the unnamed Subject irreducibly presupposed by) power and desire. The
produced "transparency" marks the place of "interest"; it is maintained by
279
vehement denegation: "Now this role of referee, judge, and universal witness
is one which I absolutely refuse to adopt." One responsibility of the critic
might be to read and write so that the impossibility of such interested
individualistic refusals of the institutional privileges of power bestowed on
the subject is taken seriously. The refusal of the sign-system blocks the way
to a developed theory of ideology. Here, too, the peculiar tone of denegation
is heard. To Jacques-Alain Miller's suggestion that "the institution is itself
discursive," Foucault responds, "Yes, ifyou like, but it doesn't much matter
for my notion of the apparatus to be able to say that this is discursive and
that isn't ... given that my problem isn't a linguistic one" (PK, 198). Why
this conflation oflanguage and discourse from the master of discourse anal-
ysis?
Edward W. Said's critique of power in Foucault as a captivating
and mystifying category that allows him "to obliterate the role of classes,
the role of economics, the role of insurgency and rebellion," is most pertinent
here. 24 I add to Said's analysis the notion of the surreptitious subject of
power and desire marked by the transparency of the intellectual. Curiously
enough, Paul Bove faults Said for emphasizing the importance of the in-
tellectual, whereas "Foucault's project essentially is a challenge to the leading
role of both hegemonic and oppositional intellectuals. " 25 I have suggested
that this "challenge" is deceptive precisely because it ignores what Said
emphasizes-the critic's institutional responsibility.
This Sjsubject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by
denegations, belongs to the exploiters' side of the international division of
labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the
kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the
Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical,
is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or
critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the
constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the
textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy
(invest?) its itinerary-not only by ideological and scientific production, but
also by the institution of the law. However reductionistic an economic anal-
ysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire
overdetermined enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic economic sit-
uation requiring that interests, motives (desires), and power (of knowledge)
be ruthlessly dislocated. To invoke that dislocation now as a radical dis-
covery that should make us diagnose the economic (conditions of existence
that separate out "classes" descriptively) as a piece of dated analytic ma-
chinery may well be to continue the work of that dislocation and unwittingly
to help in securing "a new balance of hegemonic relations. " 26 I shall return
to this argument shortly. In the face of the possibility that the intellectual
is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Selfs shadow, a
possibility of political practice for the intellectual would be to put the eco-
nomic "under erasure," to see the economic factor as irreducible as it rein-
scribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it
claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. 27
II
The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the
remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the
280
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration
of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subject-ivity. It is well known
that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the epis-
teme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth
century. 28 But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the
narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two
projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged
parts of a vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that
the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as
"subjugated knowledge," "a whole set of knowledges that have been dis-
qualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level
of cognition or scientificity" (PK, 82).
This is not to describe "the way things really were" or to privilege
the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. 29 It
is, rather, to offer an account ofhow an explanation and narrative of reality
was established as the normative one. To elaborate on this, let us consider
briefly the underpinnings of the British codification of Hindu Law.
First, a few disclaimers: In the United States the third-worldism
currently afloat in humanistic disciplines is often openly ethnic. I was born
in India and received my primary, secondary, and university education
there, including two years of graduate work. My Indian example could thus
be seen as a nostalgic investigation of the lost roots of my own identity.
Yet even as I know that one cannot freely enter the thickets of "motiva-
tions," I would maintain that my chief project is to point out the positivist-
idealist variety of such nostalgia. I turn to Indian material because, in the
absence of advanced disciplinary training, that accident of birth and edu-
cation has provided me with a sense of the historical canvas, a hold on
some of the pertinent languages that are useful tools for a brico/eur, especially
when armed with the Marxist skepticism of concrete experience as the final
arbiter and a critique of disciplinary formations. Yet the Indian case cannot
be taken as representative of all countries, nations, cultures, and the like
that may be invoked as the Other of Europe as Self.
Here, then, is a schematic summary of the epistemic violence of
the codification of Hindu Law. If it clarifies the notion of epistemic violence,
my final discussion of widow-sacrifice may gain added significance.
At the end of the eighteenth century, Hindu law, insofar as it can
be described as a unitary system, operated in terms offour texts that "staged"
a four-part episteme defined by the subject's use of memory: sruti (the heard),
smriti (the remembered), sastra (the learned-from-another), and vyavahara
(the performed-in-exchange). The origins of what had been heard and what
was remembered were not necessarily continuous or identical. Every in-
vocation of sruti technically recited (or reopened) the event of originary
"hearing" or revelation. The second two texts-the learned and the per-
formed-were seen as dialectically continuous. Legal theorists and practi-
tioners were not in any given case certain if this structure described the
body of law or four ways of settling a dispute. The legitimation of the
polymorphous structure oflegal performance, "internally" noncoherent and
open at both ends, through a binary vision, is the narrative of codification
I offer as an example of epistemic violence.
281
 The narrative of the stabilization and codification of Hindu law
is less well known than the story of Indian education, so it might be well
to start there. 3° Consider the often-quoted programmatic lines from Ma-
caulay's infamous "Minute on Indian Education" (1835): "We must at pres-
ent do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the
millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour,
but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class
we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich
those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomencla-
ture, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge
to the great mass of the population." 31 The education of colonial subjects
complements their production in law. One effect of establishing a version
ofthe British system was the development of an uneasy separation between
disciplinary formation in Sanskrit studies and the native, now alternative,
tradition of Sanskrit "high culture." Within the former, the cultural expla-
nations generated by authoritative scholars matched the epistemic violence
of the legal project.
I locate here the founding of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in
1784, the Indian Institute at Oxford in 1883, and the analytic and taxonomic
work of scholars like Arthur Macdonnell and Arthur Berriedale Keith, who
were both colonial administrators and organizers of the matter of Sanskrit.
From their confident utilitarian-hegemonic plans for students and scholars
of Sanskrit, it is impossible to guess at either the aggressive repression of
Sanskrit in the general educational framework or the increasing "feudali-
zation" of the performative use of Sanskrit in the everyday life of Brah-
manic-hegemonic India. 32 A version of history was gradually established in
which the Brahmans were shown to have the same intentions as (thus pro-
viding the legitimation for) the codifying British: "In order to preserve
Hindu society intact [the] successors [of the original Brahmans] had to
reduce everything to writing and make them more and more rigid. And that
is what has preserved Hindu society in spite of a succession of political
upheavals and foreign invasions." 33 This is the 1925 verdict of Mahama-
hopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri, learned Indian Sanskritist, a brilliant rep-
resentative of the indigenous elite within colonial production, who was
asked to write several chapters of a "History of Bengal" projected by the
private secretary to the governor general of Bengal in 1916. 34 To signal the
asymmetry in the relationship between authority and explanation (depend-
ing on the race-class of the authority), compare this 1928 remark by Edward
Thompson, English intellectual: "Hinduism was what it seemed to be ...
It was a higher civilization that won [against it], both with Akbar and the
English." 35 And add this, from a letter by an English soldier-scholar in the
1890s: "The study of Sanskrit, 'the language of the gods' has afforded me
intense enjoyment during the last 25 years of my life in India, but it has
not, I am thankful to say, led me, as it has some, to give up a hearty belief
in our own grand religion. "36
These authorities are the very best of the sources for the nonspe-
cialist French intellectual's entry into the civilization of the Other. 37 I am,
however, not referring to intellectuals and scholars of postcolonial produc-
tion, like Shastri, when I say that the Other as Subject is inaccessible to
Foucault and Deleuze. I am thinking of the general nonspecialist, nonaca-
demic population across the class spectrum, for whom the episteme operates
282
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
its silent programming function. Without considering the map of exploi-
tation, on what grid of "oppression" would they place this motley crew?
Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well
say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic
violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the
lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze
(in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of so-
cialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed,
if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here),
and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic
is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront
the following question: On the other side of the international division of
labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic
violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier eco-
nomic text, can the subaltern speak?
Antonio Gramsci's work on the "subaltern classes" extends the
class-position/class-consciousness argument isolated in The Eighteenth Bru-
maire. Perhaps because Gramsci criticizes the vanguardistic position of the
Leninist intellectual, he is concerned with the intellectual's role in the sub-
altern's cultural and political movement into the hegemony. This movement
must be made to determine the production of history as narrative (of truth).
In texts such as "The Southern Question," Gramsci considers the movement
ofhistorical-political economy in Italy within what can be seen as an allegory
of reading taken from or prefiguring an international division oflabor. 38 Yet
an account of the phased development of the subaltern is thrown out of
joint when his cultural macrology is operated, however remotely, by the
epistemic interference with legal and disciplinary definitions accompanying
the imperialist project. When I move, at the end of this essay, to the question
of woman as subaltern, I will suggest that the possibility of collectivity itself
is persistently foreclosed through the manipulation of female agency.
The first part of my proposition-that the phased development
of the subaltern is complicated by the imperialist project-is confronted by
a collective of intellectuals who may be called the "Subaltern Studies" group. 39
They must ask, Can the subaltern speak? Here we are within Foucault's
own discipline of history and with people who acknowledge his influence.
Their project is to rethink Indian colonial historiography from the per-
spective of the discontinuous chain of peasant insurgencies during the co-
lonial occupation. This is indeed the problem of"the permission to narrate"
discussed by Said. 40 As Ranajit Guha argues,
The historiography of Indian nationalism has for a
long time been dominated by elitism-colonialist eli-
tism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism ... shar[ing] the
prejudice that the making of the Indian nation and
the development of the consciousness-nationalism-
which confirmed this process were exclusively or pre-
dominantly elite achievements. In the colonialist and
neo-colonialist historiographies these achievements are
credited to British colonial rulers, administrators, pol-
icies, institutions, and culture; in the nationalist and
283
 neo-nationalist writings-to Indian elite personalities,
institutions, activities and ideas. 41
Certain varieties of the Indian elite are at best native informants for first-
world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other. But one must never-
theless insist that the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably heteroge-
neous.
Against the indigenous elite we may set what Guha calls "the
politics of the people," both outside ("this was an autonomous domain, for
it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the
latter") and inside ("it continued to operate vigorously in spite of [colo-
nialism], adjusting itself to the conditions prevailing under the Raj and in
many respects developing entirely new strains in both form and content")
the circuit of colonial productionY I cannot entirely endorse this insistence
on determinate vigor and full autonomy, for practical historiographic exi-
gencies will not allow such endorsements to privilege subaltern conscious-
ness. Against the possible charge that his approach is essentialist, Guha
constructs a definition of the people (the place of that essence) that can be
only an identity-in-differential. He proposes a dynamic stratification grid
describing colonial social production at large. Even the third group on the
list, the buffer group, as it were, between the people and the great macro-
structural dominant groups, is itself defined as a place of in-betweenness,
what Derrida has described as an "antre": 43
elite { 1. Dominant foreign groups.
2. Dominant indigenous groups on the all-India level.
3. Dominant indigenous groups at the regional and
local levels.
4. The terms "people" and "subaltern classes" have
been used as synonymous throughout this note. The
social groups and elements included in this category
represent the demographic difference between the total
Indian population and all those whom we have de-
scribed as the "elite."

Consider the third item on this list-the antre of situational in-

determinacy these careful historians presuppose as they grapple with the
question, Can the subaltern speak? "Taken as a whole and in the abstract
this . . . category . . . was heterogeneous in its composition and thanks to
the uneven character of regional economic and social developments, differed
from area to area. The same class or element which was dominant in one
area ... could be among the dominated in another. This could and did
create many ambiguities and contradictions in attitudes and alliances, es-
pecially among the lowest strata of the rural gentry, impoverished landlords,
rich peasants and upper middle class peasants all of whom belonged, ideally
speaking, to the category of people or subaltern classes." 44
"The task of research" projected here is "to investigate, identify
and measure the specific nature and degree ofthe deviation of[the] elements
[constituting item 3] from the ideal and situate it historically." "Investigate,
identify, and measure the specific": a program could hardly be more essen-
284
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
tialist and taxonomic. Yet a curious methodological imperative is at work.
I have argued that, in the Foucault-Deleuze conversation, a postrepresen-
tationalist vocabulary hides an essentialist agenda. In subaltern studies, be-
cause of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary in-
scription, a project understood in essentialist terms must traffic in a radical
textual practice of differences. The object of the group's investigation, in
the case not even of the people as such but of the floating buffer zone of
the regional elite-subaltern, is a deviation from an ideal-the people or sub-
altern-which is itself defined as a difference from the elite. It is toward this
structure that the research is oriented, a predicament rather different from
the self-diagnosed transparency of the first-world radical intellectual. What
taxonomy can fix such a space? Whether or not they themselves perceive
it-in fact Guha sees his definition of "the people" within the master-slave
dialectic-their text articulates the difficult task of rewriting its own con-
ditions of impossibility as the conditions of its possibility.
"At the regional and local levels [the dominant indigenous groups]
... if belonging to social strata hierarchically inferior to those of the dom-
inant all-Indian groups acted in the interests of the latter and not in con-
formity to interests corresponding truly to their own social being." When
these writers speak, in their essentializing language, of a gap between interest
and action in the intermediate group, their conclusions are closer to Marx
than to the self-conscious naivete ofDeleuze's pronouncement on the issue.
Guha, like Marx, speaks of interest in terms of the social rather than the
libidinal being. The Name-of-the-Father imagery in The Eighteenth Bru-
maire can help to emphasize that, on the level of class or group action,
"true correspondence to own being" is as artificial or social as the patro-
nymic.
So much for the intermediate group marked in item 3. For the
"true" subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no unre-
presentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the intellec-
tual's solution is not to abstain from representation. The problem is that
the subject's itinerary has not been traced so as to offer an object of seduction
to the representing intellectual. In the slightly dated language of the Indian
group, the question becomes, How can we touch the consciousness of the
people, even as we investigate their politics? With what voice-consciousness
can the subaltern speak? Their project, after all, is to rewrite the development
of the consciousness of the Indian nation. The planned discontinuity of
imperialism rigorously distinguishes this project, however old-fashioned its
articulation, from "rendering visible the medical and juridical mechanisms
that surrounded the story [of Pierre Riviere]." Foucault is correct in sug-
gesting that "to make visible the unseen can also mean a change of level,
addressing oneself to a layer of material which had hitherto had no perti-
nence for history and which had not been recognized as having any moral,
aesthetic or historical value." It is the slippage from rendering visible the
mechanism to rendering vocal the individual, both avoiding "any kind of
analysis of [the subject] whether psychological, psychoanalytical or linguis-
tic," that is consistently troublesome (PK, 49-50).
The critique by Ajit K. Chaudhury, a West Bengali Marxist, of
Guha's search for the subaltern consciousness can be seen as a moment of
the production process that includes the subaltern. Chaudhury's perception
that the Marxist view of the transformation of consciousness involves the
285
knowledge of social relations seems to me, in principle, astute. Yet the
heritage of the positivist ideology that has appropriated orthodox Marxism
obliges him to add this rider: "This is not to belittle the importance of
understanding peasants' consciousness or workers' consciousness in its pure
form. This enriches our knowledge of the peasant and the worker and,
possibly, throws light on how a particular mode takes on different forms in
different regions, which is considered a problem of second-order importance
in classical Marxism." 45
This variety of "internationalist" Marxism, which believes in a
pure, retrievable form of consciousness only to dismiss it, thus closing off
what in Marx remain moments of productive bafilement, can at once be
the object of Foucault's and Deleuze's rejection of Marxism and the source
of the critical motivation of the Subaltern Studies group. All three are united
in the assumption that there is a pure form of consciousness. On the French
scene, there is a shuftling of signifiers: "the unconscious" or "the subject-
in-oppression" clandestinely fills the space of "the pure form of conscious-
ness." In orthodox "internationalist" intellectual Marxism, whether in the
First World or the Third, the pure form of consciousness remains an ideal-
istic bedrock which, dismissed as a second-order problem, often earns it the
reputation of racism and sexism. In the Subaltern Studies group it needs
development according to the unacknowledged terms of its own articulation.
For such an articulation, a developed theory of ideology can again
be most useful. In a critique such as Chaudhury's, the association of "con-
sciousness" with "knowledge" omits the crucial middle term of"ideological
production": "Consciousness, according to Lenin, is associated with a
knowledge of the interrelationships between different classes and groups;
i.e., a knowledge of the materials that constitute society.... These defini-
tions acquire a meaning only within the problematic within a definite knowl-
edge object-to understand change in history, or specifically, change from
one mode to another, keeping the question of the specificity of a particular
mode out of the focus. " 46
Pierre Macherey provides the following formula for the inter-
pretation of ideology: "What is important in a work is what it does not say.
This is not the same as the careless notation 'what it refuses to say,' although
that would in itself be interesting: a method might be built on it, with the
task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged. But
rather this, what the work cannot say is important, because there the elab-
oration of the utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence." 47
Macherey's ideas can be developed in directions he would be unlikely to
follow. Even as he writes, ostensibly, of the literariness of the literature of
European provenance, he articulates a method applicable to the social text
of imperialism, somewhat against the grain of his own argument. Although
the notion "what it refuses to say" might be careless for a literary work,
something like a collective ideological refusal can be diagnosed for the cod-
ifying legal practice of imperialism. This would open the field for a political-
economic and multidisciplinary ideological reinscription of the terrain. Be-
cause this is a "worlding of the world" on a second level of abstraction, a
concept of refusal becomes plausible here. The archival, historiographic,
disciplinary-critical, and, inevitably, interventionist work involved here is
indeed a task of"measuring silences." This can be a description of"inves-
286
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
tigating, identifying, and measuring ... the deviation" from an ideal that is
irreducibly differential.
When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness
of the subaltern, the notion of what the work cannot say becomes important.
In the semioses of the social text, elaborations of insurgency stand in the
place of "the utterance." The sender-"the peasant"-is marked only as a
pointer to an irretrievable consciousness. As for the receiver, we must ask
who is "the real receiver" of an "insurgency?" The historian, transforming
"insurgency" into "text for knowledge," is only one "receiver" of any col-
lectively intended social act. With no possibility of nostalgia for that lost
origin, the historian must suspend (as far as possible) the clamor of his or
her own consciousness (or consciousness-effect, as operated by disciplinary
training), so that the elaboration of the insurgency, packaged with an in-
surgent-consciousness, does not freeze into an "object of investigation," or,
worse yet, a model for imitation. "The subject" implied by the texts of
insurgency can only serve as a counterpossibility for the narrative sanctions
granted to the colonial subject in the dominant groups. The postcolonial
intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss. In this they are a paradigm
of the intellectuals.
It is well known that the notion of the feminine (rather than the
subaltern of imperialism) has been used in a similar way within deconstruc-
tive criticism and within certain varieties of feminist criticism. 48 In the
former case, a figure of"woman" is at issue, one whose minimal predication
as indeterminate is already available to the phallocentric tradition. Subaltern
historiography raises questions of method that would prevent it from using
such a ruse. For the "figure" of woman, the relationship between woman
and silence can be plotted by women themselves; race and class differences
are subsumed under that charge. Subaltern historiography must confront
the impossibility of such gestures. The narrow epistemic violence of im-
perialism gives us an imperfect allegory of the general violence that is the
possibility of an episteme. 49
Within the effaced itinerary ofthe subaltern subject, the track of
sexual difference is doubly effaced. The question is not of female partici-
pation in insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of labor,
for both of which there is "evidence." It is, rather, that, both as object of
colonialist historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological con-
struction of gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the context of colonial
production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as
female is even more deeply in shadow.
The contemporary international division of labor is a displace-
ment of the divided field of nineteenth-century territorial imperialism. Put
simply, a group of countries, generally first-world, are in the position of
investing capital; another group, generally third-world, provide the field for
investment, both through the comprador indigenous capitalists and through
their ill-protected and shifting labor force. In the interest of maintaining the
circulation and growth of industrial capital (and of the concomitant task of
administration within ninteenth-century territorial imperialism), transpor-
tation, law, and standardized education systems were developed-even as
local industries were destroyed, land distribution was rearranged, and raw
material was transferred to the colonizing country. With so-called decolo-
287
 nization, the growth of multinational capital, and the relief of the admin-
istrative charge, "development" does not now involve wholesale legislation
and establishing educational systems in a comparable way. This impedes
the growth of consumerism in the comprador countries. With modern tele-
communications and the emergence of advanced capitalist economies at
the two edges of Asia, maintaining the international division oflabor serves
to keep the supply of cheap labor in the comprador countries.
Human labor is not, of course, intrinsically "cheap" or "expen-
sive." An absence oflabor laws (or a discriminatory enforcement of them),
a totalitarian state (often entailed by development and modernization in
the periphery), and minimal subsistence requirements on the part of the
worker will ensure it. To keep this crucial item intact, the urban proletariat
in comprador countries must not be systematically trained in the ideology
of consumerism (parading as the philosophy of a classless society) that,
against all odds, prepares the ground for resistance through the coalition
politics Foucault mentions (FD, 216). This separation from the ideology of
consumerism is increasingly exacerbated by the proliferating phenomena of
international subcontracting. "Under this strategy, manufacturers based in
developed countries subcontract the most labor intensive stages of produc-
tion, for example, sewing or assembly, to the Third World nations where
labor is cheap. Once assembled, the multinational re-imports the goods-
under generous tariff exemptions-to the developed country instead ofselling
them to the local market." Here the link to training in consumerism is almost
snapped. "While global recession has markedly slowed trade and investment
worldwide since 1979, international subcontracting has boomed.... In these
cases, multinationals are freer to resist militant workers, revolutionary up-
heavals, and even economic downtums." 50
Class mobility is increasingly lethargic in the comprador theaters.
Not surprisingly, some members of indigenous dominant groups in com-
prador countries, members of the local bourgeoisie, find the language of
alliance politics attractive. Identifying with forms of resistance plausible in
advanced capitalist countries is often of a piece with that elitist bent of
bourgeois historiography described by Ranajit Guha.
Belief in the plausibility of global alliance politics is prevalent
among women of dominant social groups interested in "international fem-
inism" in the comprador countries. At the other end of the scale, those most
separated from any possibility of an alliance among "women, prisoners,
conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals" (FD, 216) are the
females of the urban subproletariat. In their case, the denial and withholding
of consumerism and the structure of exploitation is compounded by pa-
triarchal social relations. On the other side of the international division of
labor, the subject of exploitation cannot know and speak the text of female
exploitation, even if the absurdity of the nonrepresenting intellectual making
space for her to speak is achieved. The woman is doubly in shadow.
Yet even this does not encompass the heterogeneous Other. Out-
side (though not completely so) the circuit of the international division of
labor, there are people whose consciousness we cannot grasp if we close off
our benevolence by constructing a homogeneous Other referring only to our
own place in the seat of the Same or the Self. Here are subsistence farmers,
unorganized peasant labor, the tribals, and the communities ofzero workers
on the street or in the countryside. To confront them is not to represent
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 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(vertreten) them but to learn to represent (darstellen) ourselves. This argu-
ment would take us into a critique of a disciplinary anthropology and the
relationship between elementary pedagogy and disciplinary formation. It
would also question the implicit demand, made by intellectuals who choose
a "naturally articulate" subject of oppression, that such a subject come
through history as a foreshortened mode-of-production narrative.
That Deleuze and Foucault ignore both the epistemic violence
of imperialism and the international division of labor would matter less if
they did not, in closing, touch on third-world issues. But in France it is
impossible to ignore the problem of the tiers monde, the inhabitants of the
erstwhile French African colonies. Deleuze limits his consideration of the
Third World to these old local and regional indigenous elite who are, ideally,
subaltern. In this context, references to the maintenance of the surplus army
of labor fall into reverse-ethnic sentimentality. Since he is speaking of the
heritage of nineteenth-century territorial imperialism, his reference is to the
nation-state rather than the globalizing center: "French capitalism needs
greatly a floating signifier of unemployment. In this perspective, we begin
to see the unity of the forms of repression: restrictions on immigration, once
it is acknowledged that the most difficult and thankless jobs go to immigrant
workers; repression in the factories, because the French must reacquire the
'taste' for increasingly harder work; the struggle against youth and the repres-
sion ofthe educational system" (FD, 211-12). This is an acceptable analysis.
Yet it shows again that the Third World can enter the resistance program
of an alliance politics directed against a "unified repression" only when it
is confined to the third-world groups that are directly accessible to the First
World. 51 This benevolent first-world appropriation and reinscription of the
Third World as an Other is the founding characteristic of much third-world-
ism in the U.S. human sciences today.
Foucault continues the critique of Marxism by invoking geo-
graphical discontinuity. The real mark of "geographical (geopolitical) dis-
continuity" is the international division oflabor. But Foucault uses the term
to distinguish between exploitation (extraction and appropriation of surplus
value; read, the field of Marxist analysis) and domination ("power" studies)
and to suggest the latter's greater potential for resistance based on alliance
politics. He cannot acknowledge that such a monist and unified access to
a conception of"power" (methodologically presupposing a Subject-of-power)
is made possible by a certain stage in exploitation, for his vision of geo-
graphical discontinuity is geopolitically specific to the First World:
This geographical discontinuity of which you speak
might mean perhaps the following: as soon as we strug-
gle against exploitation, the proletariat not only leads
the struggle but also defines its targets, its methods,
its places and its instruments; and to ally oneself with
the proletariat is to consolidate with its positions, its
ideology, it is to take up again the motives for their
combat. This means total immersion [in the Marxist
project]. But if it is against power that one struggles,
then all those who acknowledge it as intolerable can
begin the struggle wherever they find themselves and
289
 in terms of their own activity (or passivity). In en-
gaging in this struggle that is their own, whose objec-
tives they clearly understand and whose methods they
can determine, they enter into the revolutionary pro-
cess. As allies of the proletariat, to be sure, because
power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain
capitalist exploitation. They genuinely serve the cause
ofthe proletariat by fighting in those places where they
find themselves oppressed. Women, prisoners, con-
scripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals
have now begun a specific struggle against the partic-
ular form of power, the constraints and controls, that
are exercised over them. (FD, 216)
This is an admirable program of localized resistance. Where possible, this
model of resistance is not an alternative to, but can complement, macro-
logical struggles along "Marxist" lines. Yet if its situation is universalized,
it accommodates unacknowledged privileging of the subject. Without a the-
ory of ideology, it can lead to a dangerous utopianism.
Foucault is a brilliant thinker of power-in-spacing, but the aware-
ness of the topographical reinscription of imperialism does not inform his
presuppositions. He is taken in by the restricted version of the West pro-
duced by that reinscription and thus helps to consolidate its effects. Notice
the omission of the fact, in the following passage, that the new mechanism
of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the extraction of
surplus value without extraeconomic coercion is its Marxist description) is
secured by means of territorial imperialism-the Earth and its products-
" elsewhere." The representation of sovereignty is crucial in those theaters:
"In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have the production of an
important phenomenon, the emergence, or rather the invention, of a new
mechanism of power possessed of highly specific procedural techniques ...
which is also, I believe, absolutely incompatible with the relations of sov-
ereignty. This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies
and what they do than the Earth and its products" (PK, 104).
Because of a blind spot regarding the first wave of "geographical
discontinuity," Foucault can remain impervious to its second wave in the
middle decades of our own century, identifying it simply "with the collapse
of Fascism and the decline of Stalinism" (PK, 87). Here is Mike Davis's
alternative view: "It was rather the global logic of counter-revolutionary
violence which created conditions for the peaceful economic interdepend-
ence of a chastened Atlantic imperialism under American leadership.... It
was multi-national military integration under the slogan of collective se-
curity against the USSR which preceded and quickened the interpenetration
of the major capitalist economies, making possible the new era of com-
mercial liberalism which flowered between 1958 and 1973." 52
It is within the emergence of this "new mechanism of power"
that we must read the fixation on national scenes, the resistance to eco-
nomics, and the emphasis on concepts like power and desire that privilege
micrology. Davis continues: "This quasi-absolutist centralization of stra-
tegic military power by the United States was to allow an enlightened and
flexible subordinancy for its principal satraps. In particular, it proved highly
290
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
accommodating to the residual imperialist pretensions of the French and
British ... with each keeping up a strident ideological mobilization against
communism all the while." While taking precautions against such unitary
notions as "France," it must be said that such unitary notions as "the work-
ers' struggle," or such unitary pronouncements as "like power, resistance is
multiple and can be integrated in global strategies" (PK, 142), seem inter-
pretable by way of Davis's narrative. I am not suggesting, as does Paul Bove,
that "for a displaced and homeless people [the Palestinians] assaulted mil-
itarily and culturally ... a question [such as Foucault's 'to engage in politics
... is to try to know with the greatest possible honesty whether the revo-
lution is desirable'] is a foolish luxury of Western wealth." 53 I am suggesting,
rather, that to buy a self-contained version of the West is to ignore its
production by the imperialist project.
Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault's analysis
of the centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of
that heterogeneous phenomenon: management of space-but by doctors;
development of administrations-but in asylums; considerations of the pe-
riphery-but in terms of the insane, prisoners, and children. The clinic, the
asylum, the prison, the university-all seem to be screen-allegories that fore-
close a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism. (One could open
a similar discussion of the ferocious motif of "deterritorialization" in De-
leuze and Guattari.) "One can perfectly well not talk about something be-
cause one doesn't know about it," Foucault might murmur (PK, 66). Yet
we have already spoken of the sanctioned ignorance that every critic of
imperialism must chart.
Ill
On the general level on which U.S. academics and students take
"influence" from France, one encounters the following understanding: Fou-
cault deals with real history, real politics, and real social problems; Derrida
is inaccessible, esoteric, and textualistic. The reader is probably well ac-
quainted with this received idea. "That [Derrida's] own work," Terry Eag-
leton writes, "has been grossly unhistorical, politically evasive and in prac-
tice oblivious to language as 'discourse' [language in function] is not to be
denied." 54 Eagleton goes on to recommend Foucault's study of "discursive
practices." Perry Anderson constructs a related history: "With Derrida, the
self-cancellation of structuralism latent in the recourse to music or madness
in Levi-Strauss or Foucault is consummated. With no commitment to ex-
ploration of social realities at all, Derrida had little compunction in undoing
the constructions of these two, convicting them both of a 'nostalgia of
origins'-Rousseauesque or pre-Socratic, respectively-and asking what right
either had to assume, on their own premises, the validity of their dis-
courses." 55
This paper is committed to the notion that, whether in defense
of Derrida or not, a nostalgia for lost origins can be detrimental to the
exploration of social realities within the critique of imperialism. Indeed, the
brilliance of Anderson's misreading does not prevent him from seeing pre-
cisely the problem I emphasize in Foucault: "Foucault struck the charac-
teristically prophetic note when he declared in 1966: 'Man is in the process
of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever more brightly
upon our horizon.' But who is the 'we' to perceive or possess such a ho-
291
 rizon?" Anderson does not see the encroachment of the unacknowledged
Subject of the West in the later Foucault, a Subject that presides by disa-
vowal. He sees Foucault's attitude in the usual way, as the disappearance
of the knowing Subject as such; and he further sees in Derrida the final
development of that tendency: "In the hollow of the pronoun [we] lies the
aporia of the programme." 56 Consider, finally, Said's plangent aphorism,
which betrays a profound misapprehension of the notion of "textuality":
"Derrida's criticism moves us into the text, Foucault's in and out." 57
I have tried to argue that the substantive concern for the politics
of the oppressed which often accounts for Foucault's appeal can hide a
privileging of the intellectual and of the "concrete" subject of oppression
that, in fact, compounds the appeal. Conversely, though it is not my inten-
tion here to counter the specific view of Derrida promoted by these influ-
ential writers, I will discuss a few aspects of Derrida's work that retain a
long-term usefulness for people outside the First World. This is not an
apology. Derrida is hard to read; his real object of investigation is classical
philosophy. Yet he is less dangerous when understood than the first-world
intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the op-
pressed speak for themselves.
I will consider a chapter that Derrida composed twenty years ago:
"Of Grammatology As a Positive Science" (OG, 74-93). In this chapter
Derrida confronts the issue of whether "deconstruction" can lead to an
adequate practice, whether critical or political. The question is how to keep
the ethnocentric Subject from establishing itself by selectively defining an
Other. This is not a program for the Subject as such; rather, it is a program
for the benevolent Western intellectual. For those of us who feel that the
"subject" has a history and that the task ofthe first-world subject of knowl-
edge in our historical moment is to resist and critique "recognition" of the
Third World through "assimilation," this specificity is crucial. In order to
advance a factual rather than a pathetic critique of the European intellec-
tual's ethnocentric impulse, Derrida admits that he cannot ask the "first"
questions that must be answered to establish the grounds of his argument.
He does not declare that grammatology can "rise above" (Frank Lentric-
chia's phrase) mere empiricism; for, like empiricism, it cannot ask first
questions. Derrida thus aligns "grammatological" knowledge with the same
problems as empirical investigation. "Deconstruction" is not, therefore, a
new word for "ideological demystification." Like "empirical investigation
... tak[ing] shelter in the field of grammatological knowledge" obliges "op-
erat[ing] through 'examples'" (OG, 75).
The examples Derrida lays out-to show the limits of gramma-
tology as a positive science-come from the appropriate ideological self-
justification of an imperialist project. In the European seventeenth century,
he writes, there were three kinds of "prejudices" operating in histories of
writing which constituted a "symptom of the crisis of European conscious-
ness" (OG, 75): the "theological prejudice," the "Chinese prejudice," and
the "hieroglyphist prejudice." The first can be indexed as: God wrote a
primitive or natural script: Hebrew or Greek. The second: Chinese is a
perfect blueprint for philosophical writing, but it is only a blueprint. True
philosophical writing is "independen[t] with regard to history" (OG, 79)
and will sublate Chinese into an easy-to-learn script that will supersede
actual Chinese. The third: that Egyptian script is too sublime to be deci-
292
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
phered. The first prejudice preserves the "actuality" of Hebrew or Greek;
the last two ("rational" and "mystical," respectively) collude to support the
first, where the center of the logos is seen as the Judaeo-Christian God (the
appropriation of the Hellenic Other through assimilation is an earlier story)-
a "prejudice" still sustained in efforts to give the cartography of the Judaeo-
Christian myth the status of geopolitical history:
The concept of Chinese writing thus functioned as a
sort of European hallucination. . . . This functioning
obeyed a rigorous necessity.... It was not disturbed
by the knowledge of Chinese script ... which was then
available. . . . A "hieroglyphist prejudice" had pro-
duced the same effect of interested blindness. Far from
proceeding . . . from ethnocentric scorn, the occulta-
tion takes the form of an hyperbolical admiration. We
have not finished demonstrating the necessity of this
pattern. Our century is not free from it; each time that
ethnocentrism is precipitately and ostentatiously re-
versed, some effort silently hides behind all the spec-
tacular effects to consolidate an inside and to draw
from it some domestic benefit. (OG, 80; Derrida ital-
icizes only "hieroglyphist prejudice")
Derrida proceeds to offer two characteristic possibilities for so-
lutions to the problem of the European Subject, which seeks to produce an
Other that would consolidate an inside, its own subject status. What follows
is an account of the complicity between writing, the opening of domestic
and civil society, and the structures of desire, power, and capitalization.
Derrida then discloses the vulnerability of his own desire to conserve some-
thing that is, paradoxically, both ineffable and nontranscendental. In cri-
tiquing the production of the colonial subject, this ineffable, nontranscen-
dental ("historical") place is cathected by the subaltern subject.
Derrida closes the chapter by showing again that the project of
grammatology is obliged to develop within the discourse of presence. It is
not just a critique of presence but an awareness of the itinerary of the
discourse of presence in one's own critique, a vigilance precisely against too
great a claim for transparency. The word "writing" as the name of the object
and model of grammatology is a practice "only within the historical closure,
that is to say within the limits of science and philosophy" (OG, 93).
Derrida here makes Nietzschean, philosophical, and psychoan-
alytic, rather than specifically political, choices to suggest a critique of Eu-
ropean ethnocentrism in the constitution of the Other. As a postcolonial
intellectual, I am not troubled that he does not lead me (as Europeans
inevitably seem to do) to the specific path that such a critique makes nec-
essary. It is more important to me that, as a European philosopher, he
articulates the European Subject's tendency to constitute the Other as mar-
ginal to ethnocentrism and locates that as the problem with all logocentric
and therefore also all grammatological endeavors (since the main thesis of
the chapter is the complicity between the two). Not a general problem, but
a European problem. It is within the context of this ethnocentricism that
he tries so desperately to demote the Subject of thinking or knowledge as
293
to say that "thought is ... the blank part of the text" (OG, 93); that which
is thought is, if blank, still in the text and must be consigned to the Other
of history. That inaccessible blankness circumscribed by an interpretable
text is what a postcolonial critic of imperialism would like to see developed
within the European enclosure as the place of the production of theory. The
postcolonial critics and intellectuals can attempt to displace their own pro-
duction only by presupposing that text-inscribed blankness. To render thought
or the thinking subject transparent or invisible seems, by contrast, to hide
the relentless recognition of the Other by assimilation. It is in the interest
of such cautions that Derrida does not invoke "letting the other(s) speak
for himself' but rather invokes an "appeal" to or "call" to the "quite-other"
(tout-autre as opposed to a self-consolidating other), of "rendering delirious
that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us. " 58
Derrida calls the ethnocentrism of the European science of writ-
ing in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a symptom of the
general crisis of European consciousness. It is, of course, part of a greater
symptom, or perhaps the crisis itself, the slow turn from feudalism to cap-
italism via the first waves of capitalist imperialism. The itinerary of rec-
ognition through assimilation of the Other can be more interestingly traced,
it seems to me, in the imperialist constitution of the colonial subject than
in repeated incursions into psychoanalysis or the "figure" of woman, though
the importance of these two interventions within deconstruction should not
be minimized. Derrida has not moved (or perhaps cannot move) into that
arena.
Whatever the reasons for this specific absence, what I find useful
is the sustained and developing work on the mechanics of the constitution
of the Other; we can use it to much greater analytic and interventionist
advantage than invocations of the authenticity of the Other. On this level,
what remains useful in Foucault is the mechanics of disciplinarization and
institutionalization, the constitution, as it were, of the colonizer. Foucault
does not relate it to any version, early or late, proto- or post-, of imperialism.
They are of great usefulness to intellectuals concerned with the decay ofthe
West. Their seduction for them, and fearfulness for us, is that they might
allow the complicity of the investigating subject (male or female profes-
sional) to disguise itself in transparency.
IV
Can the subaltern speak? What must the elite do to watch out
for the continuing construction of the subaltern? The question of"woman"
seems most problematic in this context. Clearly, if you are poor, black, and
female you get it in three ways. If, however, this formulation is moved from
the first-world context into the postcolonial (which is not identical with the
third-world) context, the description "black" or "of color" loses persuasive
significance. The necessary stratification of colonial subject-constitution in
the first phase of capitalist imperialism makes ··color" useless as an eman-
cipatory signifier. Confronted by the ferocious standardizing benevolence
of most U.S. and Western European human-scientific radicalism (recogni-
tion by assimilation), the progressive though heterogeneous withdrawal of
consumerism in the comprador periphery, and the exclusion of the margins
of even the center-periphery articulation (the "true and differential subal-
tern"), the analogue of class-consciousness rather than race-consciousness
294
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
in this area seems historically, disciplinarily, and practically forbidden by
Right and Left alike. It is not just a question of a double displacement, as
it is not simply the problem of finding a psychoanalytic allegory that can
accommodate the third-world woman with the first.
The cautions I have just expressed are valid only if we are speak-
ing of the subaltern woman's consciousness-or, more acceptably, subject.
Reporting on, or better still, participating in, antisexist work among women
of color or women in class oppression in the First World or the Third World
is undeniably on the agenda. We should also welcome all the information
retrieval in these silenced areas that is taking place in anthropology, political
science, history, and sociology. Yet the assumption and construction of a
consciousness or subject sustains such work and will, in the long run, cohere
with the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic vio-
lence with the advancement of learning and civilization. And the subaltern
woman will be as mute as ever. 59
In so fraught a field, it is not easy to ask the question of the
consciousness of the subaltern woman; it is thus all the more necessary to
remind pragmatic radicals that such a question is not an idealist red herring.
Though all feminist or antisexist projects cannot be reduced to this one, to
ignore it is an unacknowledged political gesture that has a long history and
collaborates with a masculine radicalism that renders the place of the in-
vestigator transparent. In seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen to
or speak for) the historically muted subject of the subaltern woman, the
postcolonial intellectual systematically "unlearns" female privilege. This
systematic unlearning involves learning to critique postcolonial discourse
with the best tools it can provide and not simply substituting the lost figure
of the colonized. Thus, to question the unquestioned muting of the subaltern
woman even within the anti-imperialist project of subaltern studies is not,
as Jonathan Culler suggests, to "produce difference by differing" or to "ap-
peal ... to a sexual identity defined as essential and privilege experiences
associated with that identity. " 60
Culler's version of the feminist project is possible within what
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese has called "the contribution of the bourgeois-dem-
ocratic revolutions to the social and political individualism of women." 61
Many of us were obliged to understand the feminist project as Culler now
describes it when we were still agitating as U.S. academics. 62 It was certainly
a necessary stage in my own education in "unlearning" and has consolidated
the belief that the mainstream project of Western feminism both continues
and displaces the battle over the right to individualism between women and
men in situations of upward class mobility. One suspects that the debate
between U.S. feminism and European "theory" (as theory is generally rep-
resented by women from the United States or Britain) occupies a significant
corner of that very terrain. I am generally sympathetic with the call to make
U.S. feminism more "theoretical." It seems, however, that the problem of
the muted subject of the subaltern woman, though not solved by an "es-
sentialist" search for lost origins, cannot be served by the call for more
theory in Anglo-America either.
That call is often given in the name of a critique of "positivism,"
which is seen here as identical with "essentialism." Yet Hegel, the modern
inaugurator of "the work of the negative," was not a stranger to the notion
of essences. For Marx, the curious persistence of essentialism within the
295
dialectic was a profound and productive problem. Thus, the stringent binary
opposition between positivism/essentialism (read, U.S.) and "theory" (read,
French or Franco-German via Anglo-American) may be spurious. Apart
from repressing the ambiguous complicity between essentialism and cri-
tiques ofpositivism (acknowledged by Derrida in "OfGrammatology As a
Positive Science"), it also errs by implying that positivism is not a theory.
This move allows the emergence of a proper name, a positive essence,
Theory. Once again, the position of the investigator remains unquestioned.
And, if this territorial debate turns toward the Third World, no change in
the question of method is to be discerned. This debate cannot take into
account that, in the case of the woman as subaltern, no ingredients for the
constitution of the itinerary of the trace of a sexed subject can be gathered
to locate the possibility of dissemination.
Yet I remain generally sympathetic in aligning feminism with
the critique of positivism and the defetishization of the concrete. I am also
far from averse to learning from the work of Western theorists, though I
have learned to insist on marking their positionality as investigating sub-
jects. Given these conditions, and as a literary critic, I tactically confronted
the immense problem of the consciousness of the woman as subaltern. I
reinvented the problem in a sentence and transformed it into the object of
a simple semiosis. What does this sentence mean? The analogy here is
between the ideological victimization of a Freud and the positionality of
the postcolonial intellectual as investigating subject.
As Sarah Kofman has shown, the deep ambiguity of Freud's use
of women as a scapegoat is a reaction-formation to an initial and continuing
desire to give the hysteric a voice, to transform her into the subject of
hysteria. 63 The masculine-imperialist ideological formation that shaped that
desire into "the daughter's seduction" is part of the same formation that
constructs the monolithic "third-world woman." As a postcolonial intellec-
tual, I am influenced by that formation as well. Part of our "unlearning"
project is to articulate that ideological formation-by measuring silences, if
necessary-into the object of investigation. Thus, when confronted with the
questions, Can the subaltern speak? and Can the subaltern (as woman)
speak?, our efforts to give the subaltern a voice in history will be doubly
open to the dangers run by Freud's discourse. As a product of these con-
siderations, I have put together the sentence "White men are saving brown
women from brown men" in a spirit not unlike the one to be encountered
in Freud's investigations of the sentence "A child is being beaten." 64
The use of Freud here does not imply an isomorphic analogy
between subject-formation and the behavior of social collectives, a frequent
practice, often accompanied by a reference to Reich, in the conversation
between Deleuze and Foucault. So I am not suggesting that "White men
are saving brown women from brown men" is a sentence indicating a col-
lective fantasy symptomatic of a collective itinerary of sadomasochistic
repression in a collective imperialist enterprise. There is a satisfying sym-
metry in such an allegory, but I would rather invite the reader to consider
it a problem in "wild psychoanalysis" than a clinching solution. 65 Just as
Freud's insistence on making the woman the scapegoat in "A child is being
beaten" and elsewhere discloses his political interests, however imperfectly,
so my insistence on imperialist subject-production as the occasion for this
sentence discloses my politics.
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 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
Further, I am attempting to borrow the general methodological
aura of Freud's strategy toward the sentence he constructed as a sentence
out of the many similar substantive accounts his patients gave him. This
does not mean I will offer a case of transference-in-analysis as an isomorphic
model for the transaction between reader and text (my sentence). The anal-
ogy between transference and literary criticism or historiography is no more
than a productive catachresis. To say that the subject is a text does not
authorize the converse pronouncement: the verbal text is a subject.
I am fascinated, rather, by how Freud predicates a history of
repression that produces the final sentence. It is a history with a double
origin, one hidden in the amnesia of the infant, the other lodged in our
archaic past, assuming by implication a preoriginary space where human
and animal were not yet differentiated. 66 We are driven to impose a hom-
ologue of this Freudian strategy on the Marxist narrative to explain the
ideological dissimulation of imperialist political economy and outline a
history of repression that produces a sentence like the one I have sketched.
This history also has a double origin, one hidden in the maneuverings behind
the British abolition of widow sacrifice in 1829,67 the other lodged in the
classical and Vedic past of Hindu India, the Rg- Veda and the Dharrnasastra.
No doubt there is also an undifferentiated preoriginary space that supports
this history.
The sentence I have constructed is one among many displace-
ments describing the relationship between brown and white men (sometimes
brown and white women worked in). It takes its place among some sentences
of "hyperbolic admiration" or of pious guilt that Derrida speaks of in con-
nection with the "hieroglyphist prejudice." The relationship between the
imperialist subject and the subject of imperialism is at least ambiguous.
The Hindu widow ascends the pyre of the dead husband and
immolates herself upon it. This is widow sacrifice. (The conventional tran-
scription of the Sanskrit word for the widow would be sati. The early colonial
British transcribed it suttee.) The rite was not practiced universally and was
not caste- or class-fixed. The abolition of this rite by the British has been
generally understood as a case of "White men saving brown women from
brown men." White women-from the nineteenth-century British Mission-
ary Registers to Mary Daly-have not produced an alternative understand-
ing. Against this is the Indian nativist argument, a parody of the nostalgia
for lost origins: ••The women actually wanted to die."
The two sentences go a long way to legitimize each other. One
never encounters the testimony of the women's voice-consciousness. Such
a testimony would not be ideology-transcendent or "fully" subjective, of
course, but it would have constituted the ingredients for producing a coun-
tersentence. As one goes down the grotesquely mistranscribed names of these
women, the sacrificed widows, in the police reports included in the records
of the East India Company, one cannot put together a "voice." The most
one can sense is the immense heterogeneity breaking through even such a
skeletal and ignorant account (castes, for example, are regularly described
as tribes). Faced with the dialectically interlocking sentences that are con-
structible as "White men are saving brown women from brown men" and
"The women wanted to die," the postcolonial woman intellectual asks the
question of simple semiosis-What does this mean?-and begins to plot a
history.
297
 To mark the moment when not only a civil but a good society
is born out of domestic confusion, singular events that break the letter of
the law to instill its spirit are often invoked. The protection of women by
men often provides such an event. If we remember that the British boasted
of their absolute equity toward and noninterference with native custom/
law, an invocation ofthis sanctioned transgression of the letter for the sake
of the spirit may be read in J. M. Derrett's remark: "The very first legislation
upon Hindu Law was carried through without the assent of a single Hindu."
The legislation is not named here. The next sentence, where the measure
is named, is equally interesting if one considers the implications of the
survival of a colonially established "good" society after decolonization: "The
recurrence of sati in independent India is probably an obscurantist revival
which cannot long survive even in a very backward part of the country." 68
Whether this observation is correct or not, what interests me is
that the protection of woman (today the "third-world woman") becomes a
signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at such inau-
gurative moments, transgress mere legality, or equity oflegal policy. In this
particular case, the process also allowed the redefinition as a crime of what
had been tolerated, known, or adulated as ritual. In other words, this one
item in Hindu law jumped the frontier between the private and the public
domain.
Although Foucault's historical narrative, focusing solely on West-
ern Europe, sees merely a tolerance for the criminal antedating the devel-
opment of criminology in the late eighteenth century (PK, 41), his theoretical
description of the "episteme" is pertinent here: "The episteme is the 'ap-
paratus' which makes possible the separation not of the true from the false,
but of what may not be characterized as scientific" (PK, 197)-ritual as
opposed to crime, the one fixed by superstition, the other by legal science.
The leap of suttee from private to public has a clear and complex
relationship with the changeover from a mercantile and commercial to a
territorial and administrative British presence; it can be followed in cor-
respondence among the police stations, the lower and higher courts, the
courts of directors, the prince regent's court, and the like. (It is interesting
to note that, from the point of view of the native "colonial subject," also
emergent from the feudalism-capitalism transition, sati is a signifier with
the reverse social charge: "Groups rendered psychologically marginal by
their exposure to Western impact ... had come under pressure to dem-
onstrate, to others as well as to themselves, their ritual purity and allegiance
to traditional high culture. To many of them sati became an important
proof of their conformity to older norms at a time when these norms had
become shaky within." 69)
If this is the first historical origin of my sentence, it is evidently
lost in the history of humankind as work, the story of capitalist expansion,
the slow freeing of labor power as commodity, that narrative of the modes
of production, the transition from feudalism via mercantilism to capitalism.
Yet the precarious normativity of this narrative is sustained by the puta-
tively changeless stopgap of the "Asiatic" mode of production, which steps
in to sustain it whenever it might become apparent that the story of capital
logic is the story of the West, that imperialism establishes the universality
of the mode of production narrative, that to ignore the subaltern today is,
willy-nilly, to continue the imperialist project. The origin of my sentence
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 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
is thus lost in the shuffle between other, more powerful discourses. Given
that the abolition of sati was in itself admirable, is it still possible to wonder
if a perception of the origin of my sentence might contain interventionist
possibilities?
Imperialism's image as the establisher of the good society is
marked by the espousal of the woman as object of protection from her own
kind. How should one examine the dissimulation of patriarchal strategy,
which apparently grants the woman free choice as subject? In other words,
how does one make the move from "Britain" to "Hinduism"? Even the
attempt shows that imperialism is not identical with chromatism, or mere
prejudice against people of color. To approach this question, I will touch
briefly on the Dharmasiistra (the sustaining scriptures) and the Rg- Veda
(Praise Knowledge). They represent the archaic origin in my homology of
Freud. Of course, my treatment is not exhaustive. My readings are, rather,
an interested and inexpert examination, by a postcolonial woman, of the
fabrication of repression, a constructed countemarrative of woman's con-
sciousness, thus woman's being, thus woman's being good, thus the good
woman's desire, thus woman's desire. Paradoxically, at the same time we
witness the unfixed place of woman as a signifier in the inscription of the
social individual.
The two moments in the Dharmasiistra that I am interested in
are the discourse on sanctioned suicides and the nature of the rites for the
dead. 7°Framed in these two discourses, the self-immolation of widows seems
an exception to the rule. The general scriptural doctrine is that suicide is
reprehensible. Room is made, however, for certain forms of suicide which,
as formulaic performance, lose the phenomenal identity of being suicide.
The first category of sanctioned suicides arises out of tatvajniina, or the
knowledge of truth. Here the knowing subject comprehends the insubstan-
tiality or mere phenomenality (which may be the same thing as nonphen-
omenality) of its identity. At a certain point in time, tat tva was interpreted
as "that you," but even without that, tatva is thatness or quiddity. Thus,
this enlightened self truly knows the "that"-ness of its identity. Its demo-
lition of that identity is not iitmaghiita (a killing of the self). The paradox
of knowing of the limits of knowledge is that the strongest assertion of
agency, to negate the possibility of agency, cannot be an example of itself.
Curiously enough, the self-sacrifice of gods is sanctioned by natural ecology,
useful for the working of the economy of Nature and the Universe, rather
than by self-knowledge. In this logically anterior stage, inhabited by gods
rather than human beings, of this particular chain of displacements, suicide
and sacrifice (iitmaghiita and iitmadiina) seem as little distinct as an "in-
terior" (self-knowledge) and an "exterior" (ecology) sanction.
This philosophical space, however, does not accommodate the
self-immolating woman. For her we look where room is made to sanction
suicides that cannot claim truth-knowledge as a state that is, at any rate,
easily verifiable and belongs in the area of sruti (what was heard) rather
than smirti (what is remembered). This exception to the general rule about
suicide annuls the phenomenal identity of self-immolation if performed in
certain places rather than in a certain state of enlightenment. Thus, we move
from an interior sanction (truth-knowledge) to an exterior one (place of
pilgrimage).lt is possible for a woman to perform this type of(non)suicide. 71
299
 Yet even this is not the proper place for the woman to annul the
proper name of suicide through the destruction of her proper self. For her
alone is sanctioned self-immolation on a dead spouse's pyre. (The few male
examples cited in Hindu antiquity of self-immolation on another's pyre,
being proofs of enthusiasm and devotion to a master or superior, reveal the
structure of domination within the rite). This suicide that is not suicide
may be read as a simulacrum of both truth-knowledge and piety of place.
If the former, it is as if the knowledge in a subject of its own insubstantiality
and mere phenomenality is dramatized so that the dead husband becomes
the exteriorized example and place of the extinguished subject and the widow
becomes the (non)agent who "acts it out." If the latter, it is as ifthe metonym
for all sacred places is now that burning bed of wood, constructed by elab-
orate ritual, where the woman's subject, legally displaced from herself, is
being consumed. It is in terms of this profound ideology of the displaced
place of the female subject that the paradox of free choice comes into play.
For the male subject, it is the felicity of the suicide, a felicity that will annul
rather than establish its status as such, that is noted. For the female subject,
a sanctioned self-immolation, even as it takes away the effect of "fall" (pa-
t aka) attached to an unsanctioned suicide, brings praise for the act of choice
on another register. By the inexorable ideological production of the sexed
subject, such a death can be understood by the female subject as an excep-
tional signifier of her own desire, exceeding the general rule for a widow's
conduct.
In certain periods and areas this exceptional rule became the
general rule in a class-specific way. Ashis Nandy relates its marked preva-
lence in eighteenth- and early ninteenth-century Bengal to factors ranging
from population control to communal misogyny. 72 Certainly its prevalence
there in the previous centuries was because in Bengal, unlike elsewhere in
India, widows could inherit property. Thus, what the British see as poor
victimized women going to the slaughter is in fact an ideological battle-
ground. AsP. V. Kane, the great historian of the Dharmasastra, has correctly
observed: "In Bengal, [the fact that] the widow of a sonless member even
in a joint Hindu family is entitled to practically the same rights over joint
family property which her deceased husband would have had ... must have
frequently induced the surviving members to get rid of the widow by ap-
pealing at a most distressing hour to her devotion to and love for her hus-
band" (HD II.2, 635).
Yet benevolent and enlightened males were and are sympathetic
with the "courage" of the woman's free choice in the matter. They thus
accept the production of the sexed subaltern subject: "Modem India does
not justify the practice of sati, but it is a warped mentality that rebukes
modem Indians for expressing admiration and reverence for the cool and
unfaltering courage of Indian women in becoming satis or performing the
jauhar for cherishing their ideals of womanly conduct" (HD 11.2, 636). What
Jean-Francois Lyotard has termed the "dijferend," the inacessibility of, or
untranslatability from, one mode of discourse in a dispute to another, is
vividly illustrated here. 73 As the discourse of what the British perceive as
heathen ritual is sublated (but not, Lyotard would argue, translated) into
what the British perceive as crime, one diagnosis of female free will is
substituted for another.
300
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
Of course, the self-immolation of widows was not invariable rit-
ual prescription. If, however, the widow does decide thus to exceed the letter
of ritual, to turn back is a transgression for which a particular type of penance
is prescribed. 74 With the local British police officer supervising the immo-
lation, to be dissuaded after a decision was, by contrast, a mark of real free
choice, a choice of freedom. The ambiguity of the position of the indigenous
colonial elite is disclosed in the nationalistic romanticization of the purity,
strength, and love of these self-sacrificing women. The two set pieces are
Rabindranath Tagore's paean to the "self-renouncing paternal grandmothers
of Bengal" and Ananda Coomaraswamy's eulogy of suttee as "this last proof
of the perfect unity of body and soul. " 75
Obviously I am not advocating the killing of widows. I am sug-
gesting that, within the two contending versions of freedom, the constitution
of the female subject in life is the place of the difj"erend. In the case of widow
self-immolation, ritual is not being redefined as superstition but as crime.
The gravity of sati was that it was ideologically cathected as "reward," just
as the gravity ofimperialism was that it was ideologically cathected as "social
mission." Thompson's understanding of sati as "punishment" is thus far
off the mark:
It may seem unjust and illogical that the Moguls, who
freely impaled and flayed alive, or nationals of Europe,
whose countries had such ferocious penal codes and
had known, scarcely a century before suttee began to
shock the English conscience, orgies of witch-burning
and religious persecution, should have felt as they did
about suttee. But the differences seemed to them this-
the victims of their cruelties were tortured by a law
which considered them offenders, whereas the victims
of suttee were punished for no offense but the physical
weakness which had placed them at man's mercy. The
rite seemed to prove a depravity and arrogance such
as no other human offense had brought to light. 76
All through the mid- and late-eighteenth century, in the spirit of
the codification of the law, the British in India collaborated and consulted
with learned Brahmans to judge whether suttee was legal by their homog-
enized version of Hindu law. The collaboration was often idiosyncratic, as
in the case of the significance of being dissuaded. Sometimes, as in the
general Sastric prohibition against the immolation of widows with small
children, the British collaboration seems confused. 77 In the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the British authorities, and especially the British in
England, repeatedly suggested that collaboration made it appear as if the
British condoned this practice. When the law was finally written, the history
of the long period of collaboration was effaced, and the language celebrated
the noble Hindu who was against the bad Hindu, the latter given to savage
atrocities:
The practice of Suttee ... is revolting to the feeling of
human nature.... In many instances, acts of atrocity
have been perpetrated, which have been shocking to
301
 the Hindoos themselves. . . . Actuated by these con-
siderations the Governor-General in Council, without
intending to depart from one of the first and most
important principles of the system of British Govern-
ment in India that all classes of the people be secure
in the observance of their religious usages, so long as
that system can be adhered to without violation of the
paramount dictates of justice and humanity, has
deemed it right to establish the following rules ....
(HD 11.2, 624-25)

That this was an alternative ideology of the graded sanctioning

of suicide as exception, rather than its inscription as sin, was of course not
understood. Perhaps sati should have been read with martyrdom, with the
defunct husband standing in for the transcendental One; or with war, with
the husband standing in for sovereign or state, for whose sake an intoxicating
ideology of self-sacrifice can be mobilized. In actuality, it was categorized
with murder, infanticide, and the lethal exposure of the very old. The du-
bious place of the free will of the constituted sexed subject as female was
sucessfully effaced. There is no itinerary we can retrace here. Since the other
sanctioned suicides did not involve the scene of this constitution, they en-
tered neither the ideological battleground at the archaic origin-the tradition
of the Dharrnasastta-nor the scene of the reinscription of ritual as crime-
the British abolition. The only related transformation was Mahatma Gan-
dhi's reinscription of the notion of satyagraha, or hunger strike, as resist-
ance. But this is not the place to discuss the details of that sea-change. I
would merely invite the reader to compare the auras of widow sacrifice and
Gandhian resistance. The root in the first part of satytigraha and sati are
the same.
Since the beginning of the Puranic era (ca. A.D. 400), learned
Brahmans debated the doctrinal appropriateness of sati as of sanctioned
suicides in sacred places in general. (This debate still continues in an aca-
demic way.) Sometimes the cast provenance of the practice was in question.
The general law for widows, that they should observe brahrnacarya, was,
however, hardly ever debated. It is not enough to translate brahrnacarya as
"celibacy." It should be recognized that, of the four ages ofbeing in Hindu
(or Brahmanical) regulative psychobiography, brahrnacarya is the social
practice anterior to the kinship inscription of marriage. The man-widower
or husband-graduates through vanaprastha (forest life) into the mature
celibacy and renunciation of sarnnyasa (laying aside). 78 The woman as wife
is indispensable for garhasthya, or householdership, and may accompany
her husband into forest life. She has no access (according to Brahmanical
sanction) to the final celibacy of asceticism, or sarnnyasa. The woman as
widow, by the general law of sacred doctrine, must regress to an anteriority
transformed into stasis. The institutional evils attendant upon this law are
well known; I am considering its asymmetrical effect on the ideological
formation of the sexed subject. It is thus of much greater significance that
there was no debate on this nonexceptional fate of widows-either among
Hindus or between Hindus and British-than that the exceptional prescrip-
tion of self-immolation was actively contended. 79 Here the possibility of
302
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
recovering a (sexually) subaltern subject is once again lost and overdeter-
mined.
This legally programmed asymmetry in the status of the subject,
which effectively defines the woman as object of one husband, obviously
operates in the interest of the legally symmetrical subject-status of the male.
The self-immolation of the widow thereby becomes the extreme case of the
general law rather than an exception to it. It is not surprising, then, to read
of heavenly rewards for the sati, where the quality of being the object of a
unique possessor is emphasized by way of rivalry with other females, those
ecstatic heavenly dancers, paragons offemale beauty and male pleasure who
sing her praise: "In heaven she, being soley devoted to her husband, and
praised by groups of apsartis [heavenly dancers], sports with her husband
as long as fourteen Indras rule" (HD II.2, 631).
The profound irony in locating the woman's free will in self-
immolation is once again revealed in a verse accompanying the earlier pas-
sage: "As long as the woman [as wife: strz] does not burn herself in fire on
the death of her husband, she is never released [mucyate] from her female
body [strisarfr-i.e., in the cycle of births]." Even as it operates the most
subtle general release from individual agency, the sanctioned suicide pe-
culiar to woman draws its ideological strength by identifying individual
agency with the supraindividual: kill yourself on your husband's pyre now,
and you may kill your female body in the entire cycle of birth.
In a further twist of the paradox, this emphasis on free will es-
tablishes the peculiar misfortune of holding a female body. The word for
the self that is actually burned is the standard word for spirit in the noblest
sense {titman), while the verb "release," through the root for salvation in
the noblest sense (muc - moska) is in the passive (mocyate), and the word
for that which is annulled in the cycle of birth is the everyday word for the
body. The ideological message writes itself in the benevolent twentieth-
century male historian's admiration: "The Jauhar [group self-immolation
of aristocratic Rajput war-widows or imminent war-widows] practiced by
the Rajput ladies of Chitor and other places for saving themselves from
unspeakable atrocities at the hands of the victorious Moslems are too well
known to need any lengthy notice" (HD II.2, 629).
Although jauhar is not, strictly speaking, an act of sati, and al-
though I do not wish to speak for the sanctioned sexual violence of con-
quering male armies, "Moslem" or otherwise, female self-immolation in
the face of it is a legitimation of rape as "natural" and works, in the long
run, in the interest of unique genital possession of the female. The group
rape perpetrated by the conquerors is a metonymic celebration ofterritorial
acquisition. Just as the general law for widows was unquestioned, so this
act of female heroism persists among the patriotic tales told to children,
thus operating on the crudest level of ideological reproduction. It has also
played a tremendous role, precisely as an overdetermined signifier, in acting
out Hindu communalism. Simultaneously, the broader question of the con-
stitution of the sexed subject is hidden by foregrounding the visible violence
of sati. The task of recovering a (sexually) subaltern subject is lost in an
institutional textuality at the archaic origin.
As I mentioned above, when the status of the legal subject as
property-holder could be temporarily bestowed on the female relict, the self-
immolation of widows was stringently enforced. Raghunandana, the late
303
 fifteenth-/sixteenth-century legalist whose interpretations are supposed to
lend the greatest authority to such enforcement, takes as his text a curious
passage from the Rg- Veda, the most ancient of the Hindu sacred texts, the
first of the Srutis. In doing so, he is following a centuries-old tradition,
commemorating a peculiar and transparent misreading at the very place of
sanction. Here is the verse outlining certain steps within the rites for the
dead. Even at a simple reading it is clear that it is "not addressed to widows
at all, but to ladies of the deceased man's household whose husbands were
living." Why then was it taken as authoritative? This, the unemphatic trans-
position of the dead for the living husband, is a different order of mystery
at the archaic origin from the ones we have been discussing: "Let these
whose husbands are worthy and are living enter the house with clarified
butter in their eyes. Let these wives first step into the house, tearless, healthy,
and well adorned" (HD 11.2, 634). But this crucial transposition is not the
only mistake here. The authority is lodged in a disputed passage and an
alternate reading. In the second line, here translated "Let these wives first
step into the house," the word for first is agre. Some have read it as agne,
"0 fire." As Kane makes clear, however, "even without this change Apararka
and others rely for the practice of Sati on this verse" (HD IV.2, 199). Here
is another screen around one origin of the history of the subaltern female
subject. Is it a historical oneirocritique that one should perform on a state-
ment such as: "Therefore it must be admitted that either the MSS are corrupt
or Raghunandana committed an innocent slip" (HD 11.2, 634)? It should
be mentioned that the rest of the poem is either about that general law of
brahmacarya-in-stasis for widows, to which sati is an exception, or about
niyoga-"appointing a brother or any near kinsman to raise up issue to a
deceased husband by marrying his widow." 80
IfP. V. Kane is the authority on the history of the Dharmasastra,
Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law is the practical guide. It is part of the
historical text of what Freud calls "kettle logic" that we are unraveling here,
that Mulla's textbook adduces, just as definitively, that the Rg- Vedic verse
under consideration was proof that "remarriage of widows and divorce are
recognized in some of the old texts." 81
One cannot help but wonder about the role of the word yonf. In
context, with the localizing adverb agre (in front), the word means "dwelling-
place." But that does not efface its primary sense of "genital" (not yet per-
haps specifically female genital). How can we take as the authority for the
choice of a widow's self-immolation a passage celebrating the entry of adorned
wives into a dwelling place invoked on this occasion by its yonf-name, so
that the extracontextual icon is almost one of entry into civic production
or birth? Paradoxically, the imagic relationship of vagina and fire lends a
kind of strength to the authority-claim. 82 This paradox is strengthened by
Raghunandana's modification of the verse so as to read, "Let them first
ascend the fluid abode [or origin, with, of course, the yonf-name-a rohantu
jalayonimagne], 0 fire [or of fire]." Why should one accept that this "prob-
ably mean[s] 'may fire be to them as cool as water'" (HD 11.2, 634)? The
fluid genital of fire, a corrupt phrasing, might figure a sexual indeterminancy
providing a simulacrum for the intellectual indeterminacy of tattvajnana
(truth-knowledge).
I have written above of a constructed counternarrative of wom-
an's consciousness, thus woman's being, thus woman's being good, thus the
304
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
good woman's desire, thus woman's desire. This slippage can be seen in the
fracture inscribed in the very word sati, the feminine form of sat. Sat tran-
scends any gender-specific notion of masculinity and moves up not only
into human but spiritual universality. It is the present participle of the verb
"to be" and as such means not only being but the True, the Good, the Right.
In the sacred texts it is essence, universal spirit. Even as a prefix it indicates
appropriate, felicitous, fit. It is noble enough to have entered the most priv-
ileged discourse of modern Western philosophy: Heidegger's meditation on
Being. 83 Sati, the feminine of this word, simply means "good wife."
It is now time to disclose that sati or suttee as the proper name
of the rite of widow self-immolation commemorates a grammatical error
on the part of the British, quite as the nomenclature "American Indian"
commemorates a factual error on the part of Columbus. The word in the
various Indian languages is "the burning of the sati'' or the good wife, who
thus escapes the regressive stasis of the widow in brahmacrya. This ex-
emplifies the race-class-gender overdeterminations of the situation. It can
perhaps be caught even when it is flattened out: white men, seeking to save
brown women from brown men, impose upon those women a greater ide-
ological constriction by absolutely identifying, within discursive practice,
good-wifehood with self-immolation on the husband's pyre. On the other
side of thus constituting the object, the abolition (or removal) ofwhich will
provide the occasion for establishing a good, as distinguished from merely
civil, society, is the Hindu manipulation of female subject-constitution which
I have tried to discuss.
(I have already mentioned Edward Thompson's Suttee, published
in 1928. I cannot do justice here to this perfect specimen of the justification
of imperialism as a civilizing mission. Nowhere in his book, written by
someone who avowedly "loves India," is there any questioning of the "ben-
eficial ruthlessness" of the British in India as motivated by territorial ex-
pansionism or management of industrial capital. 84 The problem with his
book is, indeed, a problem of representation, the construction of a contin-
uous and homogeneous "India" in terms of heads of state and British ad-
ministrators, from the perspective of "a man of good sense" who would be
the transparent voice of reasonable humanity. "India" can then be repre-
sented, in the other sense, by its imperial masters. The reason for referring
to suttee here is Thompson's finessing of the word sati as "faithful" in the
very first sentence ofhis book, an inaccurate translation which is nonetheless
an English permit for the insertion of the female subject into twentieth-
century discourse. 85)
Consider Thompson's praise for General Charles Hervey's ap-
preciation of the problem of sati: "Hervey has a passage which brings out
the pity of a system which looked only for prettiness and constancy in
woman. He obtained the names of satis who had died on the pyres ofBikanir
Rajas; they were such names as: 'Ray Queen, Sun-ray, Love's Delight, Gar-
land, Virtue Found, Echo, Soft Eye, Comfort, Moonbeam, Love-lorn, Dear
Heart, Eye-play, Arbour-born, Smile, Love-bud, Glad Omen, Mist-clad, or
Cloud-sprung-the last a favourite name.' " Once again, imposing the upper-
class Victorian's typical demands upon "his woman" (his preferred phrase),
Thompson appropriates the Hindu woman as his to save against the "sys-
tem." Bikaner is in Rajasthan; and any discussion of widow-burnings of
305
Rajasthan, especially within the ruling class, was intimately linked to the
positive or negative construction of Hindu (or Aryan) communalism.
A look at the pathetically misspelled names of the satis of the
artisanal, peasant, village-priestly, moneylender, clerical, and comparable
social groups in Bengal, where satis were most common, would not have
yielded such a harvest (Thompson's preferred adjective for Bengalis is "im-
becilic"). Or perhaps it would. There is no more dangerous pastime than
transposing proper names into common nouns, translating them, and using
them as sociological evidence. I attempted to reconstruct the names on that
list and began to feel Hervey-Thompson's arrogance. What, for instance,
might "Comfort" have been? Was it "Shanti"? Readers are reminded ofthe
last line ofT. S. Eliot's Waste Land. There the word bears the mark of one
kind of stereotyping of India-the grandeur of the ecumenical Upanishads.
Or was it "Swasti"? Readers are reminded of the swastika, the Brahmanic
ritual mark of domestic comfort (as in "God Bless Our Home") stereotyped
into a criminal parody of Aryan hegemony. Between these two appropria-
tions, where is our pretty and constant burnt widow? The aura of the names
owes more to writers like Edward FitzGerald, the "translator" of the Ru-
bayyat of Omar Khayyam who helped to construct a certain picture of the
Oriental woman through the supposed "objectivity" of translation, than to
sociological exactitude. (Said's Orienta/ism, 1978, remains the authoritative
text here.) By this sort of reckoning, the translated proper names of a random
collection of contemporary French philosophers or boards of directors of
prestigious southern U.S. corporations would give evidence of a ferocious
investment in an archangelic and hagiocentric theocracy. Such sleights of
pen can be perpetuated on "common nouns" as well, but the proper name
is most susceptible to the trick. And it is the British trick with sati that we
are discussing. After such a taming of the subject, Thompson can write,
under the heading "The Psychology of the 'Sati'," "I had intended to try
to examine this; but the truth is, it has ceased to seem a puzzle to me. " 86
Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and
object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine
nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration
of the "third-world woman" caught between tradition and modernization.
These considerations would revise every detail ofjudgments that seem valid
for a history of sexuality in the West: "Such would be the property of
repression, that which distinguishes it from the prohibitions maintained by
simple penal law: repression functions well as a sentence to disappear, but
also as an injunction to silence, affirmation of non-existence; and conse-
quently states that of all this there is nothing to say, to see, to know." 87 The
case of suttee as exemplum of the woman-in-imperialism would challenge
and deconstruct this opposition between subject (law) and object-of-knowl-
edge (repression) and mark the place of "disappearance" with something
other than silence and nonexistence, a violent aporia between subject and
object status.
Sati as a woman's proper name is in fairly widespread use in
India today. Naming a female infant "a good wife" has its own proleptic
irony, and the irony is all the greater because this sense of the common
noun is not the primary operator in the proper name. 88 Behind the naming
of the infant is the Sati of Hindu mythology, Durga in her manifestation
as a good wife. 89 In part ofthe story, Sati-she is already called that-arrives
306
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
at her father's court uninvited, in the absence, even, of an invitation for
her divine husband Siva. Her father starts to abuse Siva and Sati dies in
pain. Siva arrives in a fury and dances over the universe with Sati's corpse
on his shoulder. Visnu dismembers her body and bits are strewn over the
earth. Around each such relic bit is a great place of pilgrimage.
Figures like the goddess Athena-"father's daughters self-pro-
fessedly uncontaminated by the womb"-are useful for establishing women's
ideological self-debasement, which is to be distinguished from a deconstruc-
tive attitude toward the essentialist subject. The story of the mythic Sati,
reversing every narrateme of the rite, performs a similar function: the living
husband avenges the wife's death, a transaction between great male gods
fulfills the destruction of the female body and thus inscribes the earth as
sacred geography. To see this as proof of the feminism of classical Hinduism
or of Indian culture as goddess-centered and therefore feminist is as ideo-
logically contaminated by nativism or reverse ethnocentrism as it was im-
perialist to erase the image of the luminous fighting Mother Durga and invest
the proper noun Sati with no significance other than the ritual burning of
the helpless widow as sacrificial offering who can then be saved. There is
no space from which the sexed subaltern subject can speak.
If the oppressed under socialized capital have no necessarily un-
mediated access to "correct" resistance, can the ideology of sati, coming
from the history of the periphery, be sublated into any model of interven-
tionist practice? Since this essay operates on the notion that all such clear-
cut nostalgias for lost origins are suspect, especially as grounds for coun-
terhegemonic ideological production, I must proceed by way of an exam-
ple.9o
(The example I offer here is not a plea for some violent Hindu
sisterhood of self-destruction. The definition of the British Indian as Hindu
in Hindu law is one of the marks of the ideological war of the British against
the Islamic Mughal rulers of India; a significant skirmish in that as yet
unfinished war was the division of the subcontinent. Moreover, in my view,
individual examples of this sort are tragic failures as models of interven-
tionist practice, since I question the production of models as such. On the
other hand, as objects of discourse analysis for the non-self-abdicating in-
tellectual, they can illuminate a section of the social text, in however hap-
hazard a way.)
A young woman of sixteen or seventeen, Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri,
hanged heself in her father's modest apartment in North Calcutta in 1926.
The suicide was a puzzle since, as Bhuvaneswari was menstruating at the
time, it was clearly not a case of illicit pregnancy. Nearly a decade later, it
was discovered that she was a member of one of the many groups involved
in the armed struggle for Indian independence. She had finally been en-
trusted with a political assassination. Unable to confront the task and yet
aware of the practical need for trust, she killed hersel£
Bhuvaneswari had known that her death would be diagnosed as
the outcome of illegitimate passion. She had therefore waited for the onset
of menstruation. While waiting, Bhuvanesari, the brahmacarini who was
no doubt looking forward to good wifehood, perhaps rewrote the social text
of sati-suicide in an interventionist way. (One tentative explanation of her
inexplicable act had been a possible melancholia brought on by her brother-
in-law's reveated taunts that she was too old to be not-yet-a-wife.) She gen-
307
eralized the sanctioned motive for female suicide by taking immense trouble
to displace (not merely deny), in the physiological inscription of her body,
its imprisonment within legitimate passion by a single male. In the im-
mediate context, her act became absurd, a case of delirium rather than
sanity. The displacing gesture-waiting for menstruation-is at first a reversal
of the interdict against a menstruating widow's right to immolate herself;
the unclean widow must wait, publicly, until the cleansing bath of the fourth
day, when she is no longer menstruating, in order to claim her dubious
privilege.
In this reading, Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri's suicide is an unem-
phatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of the social text of sati-suicide as much
as the hegemonic account of the blazing, fighting, familial Durga. The emer-
gent dissenting possibilities of that hegemonic account of the fighting mother
are well documented and popularly well remembered through the discourse
of the male leaders and participants in the independence movement. The
subaltern as female cannot be heard or read.
I know of Bhuvaneswari's life and death through family con-
nections. Before investigating them more thoroughly, I asked a Bengali
woman, a philosopher and Sanskritist whose early intellectual production
is almost identical to mine, to start the process. Two responses: (a) Why,
when her two sisters, Saileswari and Raseswari, led such full and wonderful
lives, are you interested in the hapless Bhuvaneswari? (b) I asked her nieces.
It appears that it was a case of illicit love.
I have attempted to use and go beyond Derridean deconstruction,
which I do not celebrate as feminism as such. However, in the context of
the problematic I have addressed, I find his morphology much more pain-
staking and useful than Foucault's and Deleuze's immediate, substantive
involvement with more ..political" issues-the latter's invitation to ..become
woman"-which can make their influence more dangerous for the U.S. ac-
ademic as enthusiastic radical. Derrida marks radical critique with the dan-
ger of appropriating the other by assimilation. He reads catachresis at the
origin. He calls for a rewriting of the utopian structural impulse as .. ren-
dering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us." I
must here acknowledge a long-term usefulness in Jacques Derrida which I
seem no longer to find in the authors of The History of Sexuality and Mille
Plateaux. 91
The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry
lists with ..woman" as a pious item. Representation has not withered away.
The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she
must not disown with a flourish.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Khachig Tololyan for a painstaking first reading of this essay.

2 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1971). p. 66.
3 Michel Foucault. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans.
Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). pp. 205-17
(hereafter cited as FO). I have modified the English version of this, as of other English trans-
lations, where faithfulness to the original seemed to demand it.

308
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
It is important to note that the greatest "influence" of Western European
intellectuals upon U.S. professors and students happens through collections of essays rather
than long books in translation. And, in those collections, it is understandably the more topical
pieces that gain a greater currency. (Derrida's "Structure, Sign, and Play" is a case in point.)
From the perspective of theoretical production and ideological reproduction, therefore, the
conversation under consideration has not necessarily been superseded.
4 The·re is an implicit reference here to the post-1968 wave of Maoism in France. See Michel
Foucault, "On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists," Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon).
p. 134 (hereafter cited as PK). Explication of the reference strengthens my point by laying
bare the mechanics of appropriation. The status of China in this discussion is exemplary. If
Foucault persistently clears himself by saying "I know nothing about China," his interlocutors
show toward China what Derrida calls the "Chinese prejudice."
5 This is part of a much broader symptom, as Eric Wolf discusses in Europe and the People
without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
6 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. Harry
Zohn (London Verso, 1983). p. 12.
7 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Richard
Hurley et al. (New York: Viking Press, 1977). p. 26.
8 The exchange with Jacques-Aiain Miller in PK ("The Confession of the Flesh") is revealing
in this respect.
9 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 132-33.
10 For one example among many see PK, p. 98.
11 It is not surprising, then, that Foucault's work, early and late, is supported by too simple a
notion of repression. Here the antagonist is Freud, not Marx. "I have the impression that
[the notion of repression] is wholly inadequate to the analysis of the mechanisms and effects
of power that it is so pervasively used to characterize today (PK, 92)." The delicacy and
subtlety of Freud's suggestion-that under repression the phenomenal identity of affects is
indeterminate because something unpleasant can be desired as pleasure, thus radically rein-
scribing the relationship between desire and "interest" -seems quite deflated here. For an
elaboration of this notion of repression, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). p. 88f. (hereafter
cited as OG); and Derrida, Limited inc.: abc, trans. Samuel Weber, Glyph 2 ( 1977), p. 215.
12 Althusser' s version of this particular situation may be too schematic, but it nevertheless seems
more careful in its program than the argument under study. "Class instinct," Althusserwrites,
"is subjective and spontaneous. Class position is objective and rational. To arrive at proletarian
class positions, the class instinct of proletarians only needs to be educated; the class instinct
of the petty bourgeoisie, and hence of intellectuals, has, on the contrary, to be revolutionized"
(Lenin and Philosophy, p. 13).
13 Foucault's subsequent explanation (PK, 145) of this Deleuzian statement comes closer to
Derrida's notion that theory cannot be an exhaustive taxonomy and is always formed by
practice.
14 Cf. the surprisingly uncntical notions of representation entertained in PK, pp. 141, 188. My
remarks concluding this paragraph, criticizing intellectuals' representations of subaltern groups,
should be rigorously distinguished from a coalition politics that takes into account its framing
within socialized capital and unites people not because they are oppressed but because they
are exploited. This model works best within a parliamentary democracy, where representation
is not only not banished but elaborately staged.
15 Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). p.
239.
16 Karl Marx, Captial: A Critique of Political Economy, val. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York:
Vantage Books, 1977). p. 254.
17 Marx, Capital, I, p. 302.
18 See the excellent short definition and discussion of common sense in Errol Lawrence, "Just
Plain Common Sense: The 'Roots' of Racism," in Hazel V. Carby et al., The Empire Strikes
Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1982). p. 48.
19 "Use value" in Marx can be shown to be a "theoretical fiction"-as much of a potential
oxymoron as "natural exchange." I have attempted to develop this in "Scattered Specu-
lations on the Question of Value," a manuscript under consideration by Diacritics.

309
20 Derrida's "Linguistic Circle of Geneva," especially p. 1431., can provide a method for as-
sessing the irreducible place of the family in Marx's morphology of class formation. In Margins
of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
21 Marx, Capital, I, p. 128.
22 I am aware that the relationship between Marxism and neo-Kantianism is a politically fraught
one. I do not myself see how a continuous line can be established between Marx's own
texts and the Kantian ethical moment. It does seem to me. however, that Marx's questioning
of the individual as agent of history should be read in the context of the breaking up of the
individual subject inaugurated by Kant's critique of Descartes.
23 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus
(New York Viking Press, 1973). pp. 162-63.
24 Edward W Said, The World, the Text, the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard Un1versity Press, 1983).
p. 243.
25 Paul Bove, "Intellectuals at War: Michel Foucault and the Analysis of Power," Sub-Stance.
36/37 ( 1983), p. 44.
26 Carby, Empire, p. 34.
27 This argument is developed further in Spivak, "Scattered Speculations." Once again, the
Anti-Oedipus did not ignore the economic text. although the treatment was perhaps too
allegorical. In this respect, the move from schizo- to rhyzo-analysis in Mille plateaux (Paris:
Seuil, 1980) has not been salutary.
28 See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A H1story of Insanity in the Age of Reason,
trans. Richard Howard (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), pp. 251, 262, 269.
29 Although I consider Fredric Jameson's Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic
Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981) to be a text of great critical weight, or perhaps
because I do so. I would like my program here to be distinguished from one of restoring the
relics of a privileged narrative: "It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative,
in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental
history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity" (p.
20)
30 Among many available books, I cite Bruse Tiebout McCully, English Education and the Origins
of Indian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).
31 Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speeches by Lord Macaulay: With His Minute on Indian Ed-
ucation, ed. G. M. Young (Oxford: Oxford University Press, AMS Edition. 1979). p. 359.
32 Keith, one of the compilers of the Vedic Index, author of Sanskrit Drama in Its Origin, De-
velopment, Theory, and Practice, and the learned editor of the Krsnayajurveda for Harvard
University Press, was also the editor of four volumes of Selected Speeches and Documents
of British Colonial Policy ( 1763 to 1937), of International Affairs ( 1918 to 1937). and of the
British Dom1nions ( 1918 to 1931 ). He wrote books on the sovereignty of British dominions
and on the theory of state succession, with special reference to English and colonial law.
33 Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri. A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts
in the Government Collection under the Care of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta: Asiatic
Society of Bengal, 1925). vol. 3, p. viii.
34 Dinesachandra Sena, Brhat Banga (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press. 1925), vol. 1, p. 6.
35 Edward Thompson, Suttee: A Historical and Philosophical Enquiry into the Hindu Rite of
Widow-Burning (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928). pp. 130, 47.
36 Holograph letter (from G. A. Jacob to an unnamed correspondent) attached to inside front
cover of the Sterling Memorial Library (Yale University) copy of Colonel G. A. Jacob, ed .. The
Mahanarayana-Upanishad of the Atharva-Veda with the Dipika of Narayana (Bombay: Gov-
ernment Central Books Department, 1888); italics mine. The dark invocation of the dangers
of this learning by way of anonymous aberrants consolidates the asymmetry.
37 I have discussed this issue in greater detail with reference to Julia Kristeva's About Chinese
Women, trans. Anita Barrows (London: Marion Soyars, 1977). in "French Feminism in an
International Frame," Yale French Studies, 62 (1981).
38 Antonio Gram sci, · 'Sorne Aspects of the Southern Question,·' Selections from Political Writ-
ing: 1921-1926, trans. Quintin Hoare (New York: International Publishers. 1978) I am using
"allegory of reading" in the sense developed by Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural
Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1979)
39 Their publications are: Subaltern Studies 1: Writing on South Asian History and Society, ed.
RanaJit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982); Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South
Asian History and Society, ed. RanaJit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); and RanaJit

310
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonia/India (Delhi: Oxford University
Press. 1983).
40 Edward W. Said, "Permission to Narrate," London Review of Books (Feb. 16, 1984).
41 Guha, Studies, I, p. 1.
42 Guha, Studies, I, p. 4.
43 Jacques Derrida, "The Double Session," Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981 ).
44 Guha, Studies, I, p. 8 (all but the first set of italics are the author's).
45 Ajit K. Chaudhury, "New Wave Social Science," Frontier, 16-24 (Jan. 28, 1984), p. 10
(italics are mine).
46 Chaudhury, "New Wave Social Science," p. 10.
47 Pierre Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, trans. Geoffrey Wall (London: Routledge,
1978), p 87.
48 I have d1scussed this issue in "Displacement and the Discourse of Woman," in Mark Krupnick,
ed., Displacement. Derrida and After (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), and in
"Love Me, Love My Ombre, Elle: Derrida's 'La carte postale,' " Diacritics 14, no. 4 ( 1984),
pp. 19-36.
49 This v1olence in the general sense that is the possibility of an episteme is what Derrida calls
"writing" in the general sense. The relationship between writing in the general sense and
writing in the narrow sense (marks upon a surface) cannot be cleanly articulated. The task
of grammatology (deconstruction) is to provide a notation upon this shifting relationship. In
a certain way, then, the critique of impenalism is deconstruction as such.
50 "Contracting Poverty," Multinational Monitor, 4, no. 8 (Aug. 1983), p. 8. This report was
contnbuted by John Cavanagh and Joy Hackel, who work on the International Corporations
Project at the Institute for Policy Studies (italics are m1ne).
51 The mechanics of the invention of the Third World as signifier are susceptible to the type of
analysis directed at the constitution of race as a signifier in Carby, Empire.
52 Mike Davis, "The Political Economy of Late-Imperial America," New Left Review, 143 (Jan.-
Feb. 1984), p. 9.
53 Bove, "Intellectuals," p. 51.
54 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1983), p 205.
55 Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Matenalism (London: Verso, 1983), p. 53.
56 Anderson, In the Tracks, p. 52.
57 Sa1d, The World, p. 183.
58 Jacques Dernda, "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adapted in Philosophy," trans. John P
Leavy, Jr., in Semia, p. 71.
59 Even in such excellent texts of reportage and analysis as Gail Omvedt's We Will Smash This
Prison! Indian Women in Struggle (London: Zed Press, 1980), the assumption that a group
of Maharashtrian women in an urban proletarian situation, reacting to a radical white woman
who had "thrown in her lot with the Indian destiny," is representative of "Indian women"
or touches the question of "female consciousness in India" is not harmless when taken up
with1n a first-world soc1al formation where the proliferation of communication in an interna-
tionally hegemonic language makes alternative accounts and testimonies instantly accessible
even to undergraduates.
Norma Chinchilla's observation, made at a panel on "Third World Feminisms:
Differences in Form and Content" (UCLA, Mar. 8, 1983), that antisexist work in the Indian
context is not genuinely antisexist but antifeudal, is another case in point. This permits
definitions of sexism to emerge only after a society has entered the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, thus making capitalism and patriarchy conveniently continuous. It also invokes the
vexed question of the role of the" 'Asiatic' mode of production" in sustaining the explanatory
power of the normative narrativization of history through the account of modes of production,
in however sophisticated a manner history is construed.
The curious role of the proper name "Asia" in this matter does not remain
confined to proof or disproof of the empirical existence of the actual mode (a problem that
became the object of intense maneuvering within international communism) but remains
crucial even in the work of such theoretical subtlety and importance as Barry Hindess and
Paul Hirst's Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge, 19 7 5) and Fredric Jame-
son's Political Unconscious. Especially in Jameson, where the morphology of modes of
production is rescued from all suspicion of historical determinism and anchored to a post-

311
 structuralist theory of the subject, the "Asiatic" mode of production, in its guise of "oriental
despotism" as the concomitant state formation, still serves. It also plays a significant role in
the transmogrified mode of production narrative in Deleuze and Guattari' s Anti-Oedipus. In
the Sov1et debate. at a far remove, indeed, from these contemporary theoretical proJects.
the doctrinal sufficiency of the "Asiatic" mode of production was most often doubted by
producing for it various versions and nomenclatures of feudal, slave, and communal modes
of production. (The debate is presented in detail in Stephen F. Dunn, The Fall and Rise of
the Astatic Mode of Production [London: Routledge, 1982].) It would be interesting to relate
this to the repression of the imperialist "moment" in most debates over the transition from
feudalism to capitalism that have long exercised the Western Left. What is more important
here 1s that an observation such as Chinchilla's represents a widespread hierarchization within
third-world feminism (rather than Western Marxism). which situates it within the long-standing
traffic with the impenalist concept-metaphor "Asia."
I should add that I have not yet read Madhu Kishwar and Ruth Vanita, eds.,
In Search of Answers: Indian Women's Voices from Manushi (London: Zed Books, 1984).
60 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1982). p. 48.
61 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Placing Woman's History in History," New Left Review, 133 (May-
June 1982). p. 21.
62 I have attempted to develop this idea in a somewhat autobiographical way in "Finding Fem-
inist Readings: Dante-Yeats," in Ira Konigsberg, ed., American Criticism in the Poststruc-
turalist Age (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981).
63 Sarah Kolman, L'{migme de Ia femme: La femme dans les textes de Freud (Paris: Galilee,
1980)
64 Sigmund Freud, " 'A Child Is Being Beaten': A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of
Sexual Perversions," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, trans. James Strachey et al. (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), vol. 17.
65 Freud, "'Wild' Psycho-Analysis," Standard Edition, vol. 11.
66 Freud, "'A Child Is Being Beaten'," p. 188.
67 For a brilliant account of how the "reality" of widow-sacrifice was constituted or "textualized"
during the colonial period, see Lata Mani, "The Production of Colonial Discourse: Sati in
Early Nineteenth Century Bengal" (masters thesis, University of California at Santa Cruz,
1 983). I profited from discussions with Ms. Mani at the inception of this project.
68 J. D. M. Derrett, Hindu Law Past and Present: Being an Account of the Controversy Which
Preceded the Enactment of the Hindu Code, and Text of the Code as Enacted, and Some
Comments Thereon (Calcutta: A. Mukheqee and Co., 195 7). p. 46.
69 Ashis Nandy, "Sati: A Ninteenth Century Tale of Women, Violence and Protest," Rammohun
Roy and the Process of Modernization in India, ed. V. C Joshi (Delhi Vikas Publishing House,
1975). p. 68.
70 The following account leans heavily on Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of the Dharmasastra
(Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1963) (hereafter cited as HD, with volume,
part, and page numbers).
71 Upendra Thakur, The History of Suicide in India: An Introduction (Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar
Lal, 1963). p. 9, has a useful list of Sanskrit primary sources on sacred places. This laboriously
decent book betrays all the signs of the schizophrenia of the colonial subject. such as bour-
geois nationalism, patriarchal communalism, and an "enlightened reasonableness."
72 Nandy, "Sati."
73 Jean-Francais Lyotard, Le differend (Paris: Minuit, 1984).
74 HD, 11.2, p. 633. There are suggestions that this "prescribed penance" was far exceeded
by social practice. In the passage below, published in 1938, notice the Hindu patristic
assumptions about the freedom of female will at work in phrases like "courage" and "strength
of character." The unexamined presuppositions of the passage might be that the complete
objectification of the widow-concubine was just punishment for abdication of the right to
courage, signifying subject status: "Some widows, however, had not the courage to go
through the fiery ordeal; nor had they sufficient strength of mind and character to live up to
the high ascetic ideal prescribed for them [brahmacarya]. It is sad to record that they were
driven to lead the life of a concubine or avarudda stri [incarcerated wife]." A. S. Altekar, The
Position of Women in Hindu Civilization: From Prehistoric Times to the Present Day (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1938). p. 156.
75 Quoted in Sena, Brhat-Banga, II, pp. 913-14.
76 Thompson, Suttee, p. 132.

312
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
77 Here, as well as for the Brahman debate over sati, see Mani, "Production," pp. 71 f.
78 We are speaking here of the regulative norms of Brahmanism. rather than "things as they
were." See Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, trans. J. D. M. Derrett (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1973). p. 46.
79 Both the vestigial possibility of widow remarriage in ancient India and the legal institution of
widow remarriage in 1856 are transactions among men. Widow remarriage is very much an
exception, perhaps because it left the program of subject-formation untouched. In all the
"lore" of widow remarriage, it is the father and the husband who are applauded for their
reformist courage and selflessness.
80 Sir Monier Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899). p.
552. Historians are often impatient if modernists seem to be attempting to import "femin-
istic" judgments into ancient patriarchies. The real question is, of course, why structures of
patriarchal domination should be unquestioningly recorded. Historical sanctions for collective
action toward social justice can only be developed if people outside of the discipline question
standards of "objectivity" preserved as such by the hegemonic tradition. It does not seem
inappropriate to notice that so "objective" an instrument as a dictionary can use the deeply
sexist-partisan explanatory expression: "raise up issue to a deceased husband"!
81 Sunderlal T. Desai, Mulla: Principles of Hindu Law (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 1982). p. 184.
82 I am grateful to Professor Alison Finley of Trinity College (Hartford, Conn.) for discussing the
passage with me. Professor Finley is an expert on the Rg-Veda. I hasten to add that she
would find my readings as irresponsibly "literary-critical" as the ancient historian would find
it "modernist" (see note 80).
83 Martin Heidegger. An Introduction to Metaphysics. trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Dou-
bleday Anchor, 1961). p. 58.
84 Thompson, Suttee, p. 37.
86 Thompson, Suttee, p. 15. For the status of the proper name as "mark." see Derrida, "Taking
Chances."
86 Thompson, Suttee. p. 137.
87 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books.
1980), vol. 1, p. 4.
88 The fact that the word was also used as a form of address for a well-born woman ("lady")
complicates matters.
89 It should be remembered that this account does not exhaust her many manifestations within
the pantheon.
90 A position against nostalgia as a basis of counterhegemonic ideological production does not
endorse its negative use. Within the complexity of contemporary political economy, it would.
for example, be highly questionable to urge that the current Indian working-class crime of
burning brides who bring insufficient dowries and of subsequently disguising the murder as
suicide is either a use or abuse of the tradition of sari-suicide. The most that can be claimed
is that it is a displacement on a chain of semiosis with the female subject as signifier. which
would lead us back into the narrative we have been unraveling. Clearly, one must work to
stop the crime of bride burning in every way. If, however, that work is accomplished by
unexamined nostalgia or its opposite, it will assist actively in the substitution of race/ethnos
or sheer genitalism as a signifier in the place of the female subject.
91 I had not read Peter Dews. "Power and Subjectivity in Foucault," New Left Review. 144
( 1984). until I finished this essay. I look forward to his book on the same topic. There are
many points in common between his critique and mine. However. as far as I can tell from
the brief essay, he writes from a perspective uncritical of critical theory and the intersubjective
norm that can all too easily exchange "individual" for "subject" in its situating of the "ep-
istemic subject." Dews· s reading of the connection between "Marxist tradition" and the
"autonomous subject" is not mine. Further. his account of "the impasse of the second
phase of poststructuralism as a whole" is vitiated by his nonconsideration of Derrida, who
has been against the privileging of language from his earliest work. the "Introduction" in
Edmund Husser!, The Origin of Geometry, trans. John Leavy (Stony Brook, N.Y.: Nicolas
Hays, 1978). What sets his excellent analysis quite apart from my concerns is. of course,
that the Subject within whose History he places Foucault's work is the Subject of the European
tradition (pp. 87. 94).

313
Ill The Politics of Modernity and Postmodernity
 Perry Anderson

Modernity and Revolution

"Revolutron" rs a term wrth a precrse meanrng: the po-

lrtrcal overthrow from below of one state order and its
replacement by another Nothing rs to be garned by dt-
luting rt across trme or extendrng it over every depart-
ment of sacral space.

The relation between modernity and revolution has

been a focus of intellectual debate and political passion for at least six or
seven decades. It already has a long history, in other words. It so happens,
however, that in 1983 a book appeared that reopened the debate with such
renewed passion and such undeniable power that no contemporary reflection
on modernity and revolution could avoid trying to come to terms with it.
The book to which I refer is Marshall Berman's All That Is Solid Melts into
Air. My remarks will focus-very briefly-on the structure of Berman's ar-
gument and how it provides us with a persuasive theory capable of con-
joining the notions of modernity and revolution. I will start by reconstruct-
ing, in compressed form, the main lines of his book and then proceed to
some comments on their validity. Any such reconstruction sacrifices the
imaginative sweep, the breadth of cultural sympathy, and the force oftextual
intelligence that is integral to All That Is Solid Melts into Air. These qualities
will surely, over time, make this work a classic in its field. Although a proper
appreciation of the book exceeds our business today, it must be said at the
outset that a stripped-down analysis of the general case is in no way equiv-
alent to an adequate evaluation of the importance and attraction of the work
as a whole.
Modernism, Modernity, Modernization
Berman's essential argument begins as follows:
There is a mode of vital experience-experience of space
and time, of the self and others, of life's possibilities
and perils-that is shared by men and women all over
the world today. I will call this body of experience
"modernity." To be modern is to find ourselves in an
environment that promises us adventure, power, joy,
growth, transformation of ourselves and the world-
and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy every-
thing we have, everything we know, everything we are.
Modern environments and experiences cut across all
boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and
nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense,
modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is
317
 a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all
into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and re-
newal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and
anguish. To be modem is to be part of a universe in
which, as Marx said, "All that is solid melts into air." 1
What generates this maelstrom? For Berman it is a host of social
processes: he lists scientific discoveries, industrial upheavals, demographic
transformations, urban expansions, nation-states, mass movements-all
propelled, in the last instance, by the "ever-expanding, drastically fluctuat-
ing" capitalist world market. These processes he calls, for convenient short-
hand, "socioeconomic modernization." Out ofthe experience born of mod-
ernization, in tum, has emerged what Berman describes as the "amazing
variety of visions and ideas that aim to make men and women the subjects
as well as the objects of modernization, to give them the power to change
the world that is changing them, to make their way through the maelstrom
and make it their own"-visions and values that have come to be loosely
grouped together under the name of "modernism."
The ambition of his book, then, is to reveal the "dialectics of
modernization and modemism." 2 Between these two lies the key middle
term of "modernity"-neither economic process nor cultural vision but the
historical experience mediating one to the other. What constitutes the nature
of the linkage between them? Essentially, for Berman, it is development,
which is really the central concept of his book and the source of most of
its paradoxes-some of them lucidly and convincingly explored, others less
seen.
In All That Is Solid Melts into Air, "development" means two
things simultaneously. On the one hand, it refers to the gigantic objective
transformations of society unleashed by the advent of the capitalist world
market: that is, essentially but not exclusively economic development. On
the other hand, it refers to the momentous subjective transformations of
individual life and personality which occur under their impact: everything
that is contained within the notion of self-development as a heightening of
human powers and a widening of human experience. For Berman the com-
bination of these two, under the compulsive beat of the world market,
necessarily spells a dramatic tension within the individuals who undergo
development in both senses. On the one hand, capitalism-in Marx's un-
forgettable phrase ofthe Manifesto, which forms the leitmotif of Berman's
book-tears down every ancestral confinement and feudal restriction, social
immobility and claustra! tradition, in an immense clearing operation of
cultural and customary debris across the globe. To that process corresponds
a tremendous emancipation of the possibility and sensibility of the indi-
vidual self, now increasingly released from the fixed social status and rigid
role hierarchy of the precapitalist past, with its narrow morality and cramped
imaginative range. On the other hand, as Marx emphasized, the very same
onrush of capitalist economic development also generates a brutally alien-
ated and atomized society, riven by callous economic exploitation and cold
social indifference, destructive of every cultural or political value whose
potential it has itself brought into being. Likewise, on the psychological
plane, self-development in these conditions could only mean a profound
disorientation and insecurity, frustration and despair, concomitant with-
318
 Perry Anderson
indeed, inseparable from-the sense of enlargement and exhilaration, the
new capacities and feelings, liberated at the same time. Berman writes, .. This
atmosphere of agitation and turbulence, psychic dizziness and drunkenness,
expansion of experiential possibilities and destruction of moral boundaries
and personal bonds, self-enlargement and self-derangement, phantoms in
the street and in the soul-is the atmosphere in which modern sensibility
is born." 3
That sensibility dates, in its initial manifestations, from the ad-
vent of the world market itself-1500 or thereabouts. But in its first phase,
which for Berman runs to about 1790, it lacks any common vocabulary. A
second phase then extends across the nineteenth century, and it is here that
the experience of modernity is translated into the various classical visions
of modernism, which Berman defines essentially by their firm ability to
grasp both sides of the contradictions of capitalist development-at once
celebrating and denouncing its unprecedented transformations of the ma-
terial and spiritual world without ever converting these attitudes into static
or immutable antitheses. Goethe is prototypical of the new vision in his
Faust, which Berman, in a magnificent chapter, analyzes as a tragedy ofthe
developer in this dual sense-unbinding the self in binding back the sea.
Marx in the Manifesto and Baudelaire in his prose poems on Paris are shown
as cousins in the same discovery of modernity-one prolonged, in the pe-
culiar conditions offorced modernization from above in a backward society,
in the long literary tradition of St. Petersburg, from Pushkin and Gogol to
Dostoevsky and Mandelstam.
Berman argues that a condition of the sensibility so created was
a more or less unified public still possessing a memory of what it was like
to live in a premodern world. In the twentieth century, however, that public
simultaneously expanded and fragmented into incommensurable segments.
Therewith, the dialectical tension of the classical experience of modernity
underwent a critical transformation. While modernist art registered more
triumphs than ever before-the twentieth century, Berman says in an un-
guarded phrase, .. may well be the most brilliantly creative in the history of
the world" 4-this art has ceased to connect with or inform any common
life: as Berman puts it, ..we don't know how to use our modernism." 5 The
result has been a drastic polarization in modern thought about the experience
of modernity itself, flattening out its essentially ambiguous or dialectical
character. On the one hand, from Weber to Ortega, Eliot to Tate, Leavis
to Marcuse, twentieth-century modernity has been relentlessly condemned
as an iron cage of conformity and mediocrity, a spiritual wilderness of
populations bleached of any organic community or vital autonomy. On the
other hand, against these visions of cultural despair, in another tradition
stretching from Marinetti toLe Corbusier, Buckminster Fuller to Marshall
McLuhan, not to speak of outright apologists of capitalist .. modernization
theory" itself, modernity has been fulsomely touted as the last word in
sensory excitement and universal satisfaction, in which a machine-built
civilization itself guarantees aesthetic thrills and social felicities.
What each side has in common here is a simple identification of
modernity with technology itself-radically excluding the people who pro-
duce and are produced by it. As Berman writes: .. Our nineteenth-century
thinkers were simultaneously enthusiasts and enemies of modern life, wres-
tling inexhaustibly with its ambiguities and contradictions; their self-ironies
319
and inner tensions were a primary source of their creative power. Their
twentieth-century successors have lurched far more toward rigid polarities
and flat totalizations. Modernity is either embraced with a blind and un-
critical enthusiasm, or else condemned with a neo-Olympian remoteness
and contempt; in either case it is conceived as a closed monolith, incapable
ofbeing shaped or changed by modem men. Open visions oflife have been
supplanted by closed ones, Both/And by Eitherj0r." 6 The purpose of Ber-
man's book is to help restore our sense of modernity by reappropriating the
classical visions of it. "It may tum out, then, that going back can be a way
to go forward: that remembering the modernisms of the nineteenth century
can give us the vision and courage to create the modernisms of the twenty-
first. This act of remembering can help us bring modernism back to its roots,
so that it can nourish and renew itself, to confront the adventures and
dangers that lie ahead. " 7
Such is the general thrust of All That Is Solid Melts into Air. The
book also contains a very important subtext, which must be noted. Berman's
title and organizing theme come from The Communist Manifesto, and his
chapter on Marx is one of the most interesting in the book. It ends, however,
by suggesting that Marx's own analysis of the dynamic of modernity ulti-
mately undermines the very prospect of the communist future he thought
it would lead to, for if the essence ofliberation from bourgeois society would
be for the first time a truly unlimited development of the individual-the
limits of capital, with all its deformities, now being struck away-what could
guarantee either the harmony of the individuals so emancipated or the
stability of any society composed of them?
Even if the workers do build a successful communist
movement, and even if that movement generates a
successful revolution, how amid the flood tides of
modem life, will they ever manage to build a solid
communist society? What is to prevent the social forces
that melt capitalism from melting communism as well?
If all new relationships become obsolete before they
can ossify, how can solidarity, fraternity and mutual
aid be kept alive? A communist government might try
to dam the flood by imposing radical restrictions, not
merely on economic activity and enterprise (every so-
cialist government has done this, along with every cap-
italist welfare state), but on personal, cultural and po-
litical expression. But insofar as such a policy
succeeded, wouldn't it betray the Marxist aim of free
development for each and all?8
Yet, Berman argues,
if a triumphant communism should someday flow
through the floodgates that free trade opens up, who
knows what dreadful impulses might flow along with
it, or in its wake, or impacted inside? It is easy to
imagine how a society committed to the free devel-
opment of each and all might develop its own dis-
320
 Perry Anderson
tinctive varieties of nihilism. Indeed, a communist
nihilism might turn out to be far more explosive and
disintegrative than its bourgeois precursor-though also
more daring and original-because while capitalism
cuts the infinite possibilities of modern life with the
limits of the bottom line, Marx's communism might
launch the liberated self into immense unknown hu-
man spaces with no limits at all. 9
Berman thus concludes: "Ironically, then, we can see Marx's dialectic of
modernity re-enacting the fate of the society it describes, generating energies
and ideas that melt it down into its own air."
The Need for Periodization
Berman's argument, as I have said, is an original and arresting
one. It is presented with great literary skill and verve, uniting a generous
political stance with a warm, intellectual enthusiasm for its subject: the
notions ofboth the modern and the revolutionary, it might be said, emerge
morally redeemed in his pages. Indeed, for Berman, modernism is pro-
foundly revolutionary. As the dust jacket proclaims: "Contrary to conven-
tional belief, the modernist revolution is not over."
This book, written from the Left, deserves the widest discussion
and scrutiny of the Left. Such discussion must start by looking at Berman's
key terms, "modernization" and ''modernism," and then at the linkage
between them through the two-headed notion of "development." If we do
this, the first thing that must strike us is that while Berman has grasped
with unequaled force of imagination one critical dimension of Marx's vision
of history in The Communist Manifesto, he omits or overlooks another
dimension that is no less critical for Marx and is complementary to the first.
Capital accumulation and the ceaseless expansion of the commodity form
through the market is, for Marx, a universal dissolvent of the old social
world, which he legitimately presents as a process of "constant revolution-
izing of production, uninterrupted disturbance, everlasting uncertainty and
agitation." The adjectives "constant," "uninterrupted," and "everlasting"
denote a homogeneous historical time in which each moment is perpetually
different from every other moment by virtue of being next, but-by the same
token-each moment is eternally the same as an interchangeable unit in a
process of infinite recurrence. Extrapolated from the totality of Marx's the-
ory of capitalist development, this emphasis very quickly and easily yields
the paradigm of modernization proper-an anti-Marxist theory, of course,
politically. For our purposes, however, the relevant point is that the idea
of modernization involves a conception of fundamentally planar develop-
ment-a continuous-flow process in which there is no real differentiation of
one conjuncture of epoch from another, save in terms of the mere chron-
ological succession of old and new, earlier and later, categories themselves
subject to unceasing permutation of positions in one direction as time goes
by and the later becomes earlier, the newer older. Such is, of course, an
accurate account of the temporality of the market and of the commodities
that circulate across it.
But Marx's own conception of the historical time of the capitalist
mode of production as a whole was quite distinct from this: it was of a
321
complex and differential temporality in which episodes or eras were dis-
continuous from each other and heterogeneous within themselves. The most
obvious way in which this differential temporality enters into the very con-
struction ofMarx's model of capitalism is, of course, at the level ofthe class
order generated by it. By and large, it can be said that classes as such scarcely
figure in Berman's account. The one significant exception is a fine discussion
of the extent to which the bourgeoisie has always failed to conform to the
free-trade absolutism postulated by Marx in the Manifesto, but this has few
repercussions in the architecture of Berman's book as a whole, in which
there is very little between economy, on the one hand, and psychology, on
the other, save for the culture of modernism that links the two. Society as
such is effectively missing.
If we look at Marx's account of that society, what we find is
something very different from any process of planar development. Rather,
the trajectory of the bourgeois order is curvilinear: it traces not a straight
line ploughing endlessly forward, or a circle expanding infinitely outward,
but a marked parabola. Bourgeois society knows an ascent, a stabilization,
and a descent. In the very passages of the Grundrisse that contain the most
lyrical and unconditional affirmations of the unity of economic development
and individual development, which is the pivot of Berman's argument, Marx
writes of ..the point of flowering" of the basis of the capitalist mode of
production as ..the point at which it can be united with the highest devel-
opment of productive forces, and thus also of the richest development of
the individual." He also stipulates expressly: ..It is nevertheless still this
basis, this plant in flower, and therefore it fades after flowering and as a
consequence of flowering .... As soon as this point has been reached, any
further development takes the form of a decline." 10 In other words, the
history of capitalism must be periodized, and its determinate trajectory re-
constructed, if we are to have any sober understanding of what capitalist
.. development" actually means. The concept of modernization occludes the
very possibility of that.
The Multiplicity of Modernisms
Let us now revert to Berman's complementary term .. modem-
ism." Although this postdates .. modernization," in the sense that it signals
the arrival of a coherent vocabulary for an experience of modernity that
preceded it, once in place, modernism too knows no internal principle of
variation-it simply keeps on reproducing itself. It is very significant that
Berman has to claim that the art of modernism has flourished, is flourishing,
as never before in the twentieth century, even while protesting at the trends
of thought that prevent us from adequately incorporating this art into our
lives.
There are a number of obvious difficulties with such a position.
The first is that modernism, as a specific set of aesthetic forms, is generally
dated precisely from the twentieth century, is indeed typically construed by
way of contrast with realist and other classical forms of the nineteenth,
eighteenth, or earlier centuries. Virtually all of the actual literary texts ana-
lyzed so well by Berman-whether Goethe or Baudelaire, Pushkin or Dos-
toevsky-precede modernism proper in this usual sense of the word (the
only exceptions are fictions by Bely and Mandelstam, which precisely are
twentieth-century artifacts). In other words, by more conventional criteria
322
 Perry Anderson
modernism too needs to be framed within some more differential conception
of historical time.
A second, related point is that once modernism is treated in this
way, it is striking how uneven its distribution actually is, geographically.
Even within the European or Western world generally, there are major areas
that scarcely have generated any modernist momentum. My own country,
England, the pioneer of capitalist industrialization and master of the world
market for a century, is a major case in point: beachhead for Eliot or Pound,
offshore to Joyce, it produced no virtually significant native movement of
a modernist type in the first decades of this century-unlike Germany or
Italy, France or Russia, Holland or America. It is no accident that England
should be the great absentee from Berman's conspectus in All That Is Solid
Melts into Air. The space of modernism, too, is thus differential.
A third objection to Berman's reading of modernism as a whole
is that it establishes no distinctions either between very contrasted aesthetic
tendencies or within the range of aesthetic practices that comprise the arts
themselves. But in fact it is the protean variety of relations to capitalist
modernity that is most striking in the broad grouping of movements typ-
ically assembled under the common rubric "modernism." Symbolism,
expressionism, cubism, futurism or constructivism, surrealism-there were
perhaps five or six decisive currents of "modernism" in the early decades
of the century from which nearly everything thereafter was a derivation or
mutant. The antithetical nature of the doctrines and practices peculiar to
these would suffice in itself, one would have thought, to preclude the pos-
sibility that there could have been any one characteristic Stirn mung defining
the classical modernist bearing toward modernity. Much of the art produced
from within this range of positions already contained the makings of those
very polarities decried by Berman in contemporary or subsequent theori-
zations of modern culture as a whole. German expressionism and Italian
futurism, in their respectively contrasted tonalities, form a stark instance.
A final difficulty with Berman's account is that it is unable, from
within its own terms of reference, to provide any explanation of the divar-
ication it deplores between the art and thought, practice and theory, of
modernity in the twentieth century. Here, indeed, time divides in his ar-
gument, in a significant way: something like a decline has occurred, intel-
lectually, which his book seeks to reverse with a return to the classical spirit
of modernism as a whole, informing art and thought alike. But that decline
remains unintelligible within his schema, once modernization is itself con-
ceived as a linear process of prolongation and expansion, which necessarily
carries with it a constant renewal of the sources of modernist art.
The Sociopolitical Conjuncture
An alternative way to understand the origins and adventures of
modernism is to look more closely at the differential historical temporality
in which it was inscribed. There is one famous way of doing this, within
the Marxist tradition: the route taken by Lukacs, who read off a direct
equation between the change of political posture of European capital after
the revolutions of 1848 and the fate of the cultural forms produced by or
within the ambit of the bourgeoisie as a social class. After the mid-nineteenth
century, for Lukacs, the bourgeoisie becomes purely reactionary-abandon-
ing its conflict against the nobility, on a continental scale, for all-out struggle
323
against the proletariat. Therewith it enters into a phase of ideological de-
cadence, whose initial aesthetic expression is predominantly naturalistic but
eventually issues into early twentieth-century modernism.
This schema is widely decried on the Left today. In fact, in Lu-
kacs's work, it often has yielded rather acute local analyses in the field of
philosophy proper: The Destruction ofReason is a far from negligible book,
however marred by its postscript. On the other hand, in the field of liter-
ature-Lukacs's other main area of application-the schema proved rela-
tively sterile. It is striking that there is no Lukacsian exploration of any
modernist work of art comparable in detail or depth to his treatment of the
structure of ideas in Schelling or Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard or Nietzsche;
by contrast, Joyce or Kafka-to take two of Lukacs's literary betes noires-
are scarcely more than invoked and never are studied in their own right.
The basic error of Lukacs's optic here is its evolutionism, that is, time differs
from one epoch to another, but within each epoch all sectors of social reality
move in synchrony with each other, such that decline at one level must be
reflected in descent at every other. The result is a plainly overgeneralized
notion of "decadence"-one, of course, enormously affected, it can be said
in extenuation, by the spectacle of the collapse of German society and most
of its established culture, in which Lukacs had himself been formed, into
nazism.
If neither Berman's perennialism nor Lukacs's evolutionism pro-
vide satisfactory accounts of modernism, then what is the alternative? The
hypothesis I will briefly suggest here is that we should look rather for a
conjunctural explanation of the set of aesthetic practices and doctrines sub-
sequently grouped together as "modernist." Such an explanation would in-
volve the intersection of different historical temporalities, to compose a
typically overdetermined configuration. What were these temporalities? In
my view, "modernism" can best be understood as a cultural force field
"triangulated" by three decisive coordinates. The first of these is something
Berman perhaps hints at in one passage but situates too far back in time,
failing to capture it with sufficient precision: the codification of a highly
formalized academicism in the visual and other arts, which itself was in-
stitutionalized within official regimes of states and society still massively
pervaded, often dominated, by aristocratic or landowning classes that were
in one sense economically "superseded," no doubt, but in others were still
setting the political and cultural tone in country after country of pre-First
World War Europe. The connections between these two phenomena are
graphically sketched in Arno Mayer's recent and fundamental work, The
Persistence of the Old Regime, 11 whose central theme is the extent to which
European society down to 1914 was still dominated by agrarian or aristo-
cratic (the two were not necessarily identical, as the case of France makes
clear) ruling classes, in economies in which modem heavy industry still
constituted a surprisingly small sector of the labor force or pattern of output.
The second coordinate is then a logical complement of the first:
the still incipient, hence essentially novel, emergence within these societies
of the key technologies or inventions of the second industrial revolution;
that is, telephone, radio, automobile, aircraft, and so on. Mass consumption
industries based on the new technologies had not yet been implanted any-
where in Europe, where clothing, food, and furniture remained overwhelm-
324
 Perry Anderson
ingly the largest final-goods sectors in employment and turnover down to
1914.
The third coordinate of the modernist conjuncture, I would argue,
is the imaginative proximity of social revolution. The extent of hope or
apprehension that the prospect of such revolution arouses varies widely,
but over most of Europe it was "in the air" during the Belle Epoque itself.
The reason, again, is straightforward enough: forms of dynastic ancien re-
gime, as Mayer calls them, did persist-imperial monarchies in Russia, Ger-
many, and Austria, a precarious royal order in Italy; even the United King-
dom was threatened with regional disintegration and civil war in the years
before the First World War. In no European state was bourgeois democracy
completed as a form or the labor movement integrated or co-opted as a
force. The possible revolutionary outcomes of a downfall of the old order
were thus still profoundly ambiguous. Would a new order be more unal-
loyedly and radically capitalist, or would it be socialist? The Russian Rev-
olution of 1905-7, which focused the attention of all Europe, was emblematic
of this ambiguity, an upheaval at once and inseparably bourgeois and pro-
letarian.
What was the contribution of each of these coordinates to the
emergence of the force field defining modernism? Briefly, I think, the fol-
lowing: the persistence of the anciens regimes, and the academicism con-
comitant with them, provided a critical range of cultural values against
which insurgent forms of art could measure themselves but also in terms
of which they could partly articulate themselves. Without the common ad-
versary of official academicism, the wide range of new aesthetic practices
have little or no unity: their tension with the established or consecrated
canons is constitutive of their definition as such. At the same time, however,
the old order, precisely in its still partially aristocratic coloration, has af-
forded a set of available codes and resources from which the ravages of the
market as an organizing principle of culture and society-uniformly detested
by every species of modernism-could also be resisted. The classical stocks
of high culture still preserved-even if deformed and deadened-in late nine-
teenth-century academicism could be redeemed and released against the old
order, as also against the commercial spirit of the age, as many of these
movements saw it. The relationship of imagists like Pound to Edwardian
conventions or Roman lyric poetry alike, of the later Eliot to Dante or the
metaphysicals, is typical of one side of this situation; the ironic proximity
of Proust or Musil to the French or Austrian aristocracies is typical of the
other side.
At the same time, for a different kind of "modernist" sensibility,
the energies and attractions of a new machine age were a powerful imagi-
native stimulus, one reflected, patently enough, in Parisian cubism, Italian
futurism, or Russian constructivism. The condition of this interest, how-
ever, was the abstraction of techniques and artifacts from the social relations
of production that were generating them. In no case was capitalism as such
ever exalted by any brand of "modernism." But such extrapolation was
precisely rendered possible by the sheer incipience of the still unforeseeable
socioeconomic pattern that was later to consolidate so inexorably around
them. It was not obvious where the new devices and inventions were going
to lead. Hence the, so to speak, ambidextrous celebration of them from
Right and Left alike-Marinetti or Mayakovsky. Finally, the haze of social
325
 revolution drifting across the horizon of this epoch gave it much of its
apocalyptic light for those currents of modernism most unremittingly and
violently radical in their rejection of the social order as a whole, of which
the most significant was certainly German expressionism. European mod-
ernism in the first years of this century thus flowered in the space between
a still usable classical past, a still indeterminate technical present, and a still
unpredictable political future. Or, put another way, it arose at the intersec-
tion between a semi-aristocratic ruling order, a semi-industrialized capitalist
economy, and a semi-emergent, or semi-insurgent, labor movement.
The First World War, when it came, altered all of these coor-
dinates, but it did not eliminate any of them; for another twenty years they
lived on in a kind of hectic afterlife. Politically, of course, the dynastic states
of Eastern and Central Europe disappeared. But the Junker class retained
great power in postwar Germany; the agrarian-based Radical party contin-
ued to dominate the Third Republic in France, without much break in tone;
in Britain, the more aristocratic of the two traditional parties, the Conser-
vatives, virtually wiped out their more bourgeois rivals, the Liberals, and
went on to dominate the whole interwar epoch. Socially, a distinctive upper-
class mode of life persisted right down to the end of the 1930s, whose
hallmark-setting it off completely from the existence of the rich after the
Second World War-was the normalcy of servants. This was the last true
leisure class in metropolitan history. England, where such continuity was
strongest, was to produce the greatest fictional representation of that world
in Anthony Powell's Dance to the Music of Time, a nonmodernist remem-
brance from the subsequent epoch. Economically, mass production indus-
tries based on the new technological inventions of the early twentieth cen-
tury achieved some foothold in two countries only-Germany in the Weimar
period, and England in the late 1930s. But in neither case was there any
general or wholesale implantation of what Gramsci was to call "Fordism,"
on the lines of what had by then existed for two decades in the United
States. Europe was still over a generation behind America in the structure
of its civilian industry and pattern of consumption on the eve ofthe Second
World War. Finally, the prospect of revolution was now more proximate
and tangible than it had ever been-a prospect that had triumphantly ma-
terialized in Russia, touched Hungary, Italy, and Germany with its wing
just after the First World War, and was to take on a new and dramatic
immediacy in Spain at the end of this period.
It is within this space, prolonging in its own way an earlier ground,
that generically "modernist" forms of art continued to show great vitality.
Quite apart from the literary masterpieces published in these years but
essentially nurtured in earlier ones, Brechtian theater was one memorable
product purely of the interwar conjuncture, in Germany. Another was the
first real emergence of architectural modernism as a movement, with the
Bauhaus. A third was the appearance of what was, in fact, the last of the
great doctrines of the European avant-garde-surrealism, in France.
The West's Season Ends
It was the Second World War that destroyed all three of the
historical coordinates I have discussed and therewith cut off the vitality of
modernism. After 1945, the old semiaristocratic or agrarian order and its
appurtenances were finished, in every country. Bourgeois democracy was
326
 Perry Anderson
finally universalized. With that, certain critical links with a precapitalist
past were snapped. At the same time, Fordism arrived in force. Mass pro-
duction and consumption transformed the West European economies along
North American lines. There could no longer be the smallest doubt as to
what kind of society this technology would consolidate: an oppressively
stable, monolithically industrial, capitalist civilization was now in place.
In a wonderful passage of his book Marxism and Form, Fredric
Jameson admirably captures what this meant for the avant-grade traditions
that had once treasured the novelties of the 1920s or 1930s for their oneiric,
destabilizing potential: "The Surrealist image," he remarks, was "a con-
vulsive effort to split open the commodity forms of the objective universe
by striking them against each other with immense force." 12 But the condition
of its success was that
these objects-the places of objective chance or of pre-
ternatural revelation-are immediately identifiable as
the products of a not yet fully industrialized and sys-
tematized economy. This is to say, that the human
origins of the products of this period-their relation-
ship to the work from which they issued-have not yet
been fully concealed; in their production they still show
traces of an artisanal organization of labor while their
distribution is still assured by a network of small shop-
keepers .... What prepares these products to receive
the investment of psychic energy characteristic of their
use by Surrealism is precisely the half-sketched, unef-
faced mark of human labor; they are still frozen ges-
ture, not yet completely separated from subjectivity,
and remain therefore potentially as mysterious and as
expressive as the human body itself. 13
Jameson goes on to say:
We need only exchange, for that environment of small
workshops and store counters, for the marche aux puces
and the stalls in the streets, the gasoline stations along
American superhighways, the glossy photographs in
the magazines, or the cellophane paradise of an Amer-
ican drugstore, in order to realize that the objects of
Surrealism are gone without a trace. Henceforth, in
what we may call post-industrial capitalism, the prod-
ucts with which we are furnished are utterly without
depth: their plastic content is totally incapable of serv-
ing as a conductor of psychic energy. All libidinal in-
vestment in such objects is precluded from the outset,
and we may well ask ourselves, if it is true that our
object universe is henceforth unable to yield any "sym-
bol apt at stirring human sensibility," whether we are
not here in the presence of a cultural transformation
of signal proportions, a historical break of an unex-
pectedly radical kind. 14
327
 Finally the image or hope of revolution faded away in the West.
The onset of the Cold War, and the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, can-
celled any realistic prospect of a socialist overthrow of advanced capitalism
for a whole historical period. The ambiguity of aristocracy, the absurdity
of academicism, the gaiety of the first cars or movies, the palpability of a
socialist alternative, were all now gone. In their place there now reigned a
routinized, bureaucratized economy of universal commodity production, in
which "mass consumption" and "mass culture" had become virtually in-
terchangeable terms.
The postwar avant-gardes were to be essentially defined against
this quite new backdrop. It is not necessary to judge them from a Lukacsian
tribunal to note the obvious: little of the literature, painting, music, or
architecture of this period can stand comparison with that of the antecedent
epoch. Reflecting on what he calls "the extraordinary concentration of lit-
erary masterpieces around the First World War," Franco Moretti in his
recent book Signs Taken for Wonders writes: "extraordinary because of its
quantity, as even the roughest list shows (Joyce and Valery, Rilke and Kafka,
Svevo and Proust, Hofmannsthal and Musil, Apollinaire, Mayakovsky), but
even more than extraordinary because that abundance of works (as is by
now clear, after more than half a century) constituted the last literary season
of Western culture. Within a few years European literature gave its utmost
and seemed on the verge of opening new and boundless horizons: instead
it died. A few isolated icebergs, and many imitators; but nothing comparable
to the past." 15 There would be some exaggeration in generalizing this judg-
ment to the other arts, but not, alas, all that much. Individual writers or
painters, architects or musicians, of course produced significant work after
the Second World War, but the heights of the first two or three decades of
the century were rarely or never reached again. Indeed, no new aesthetic
movements of collective importance, operative across more than one art
form, emerged after surrealism. In painting or sculpture alone, specialized
schools and slogans succeeded each other ever more rapidly, but after the
moment of abstract expressionism-the last genuine avant-garde of the West-
these were now largely a function of a gallery system necessitating regular
output of new styles as materials for seasonal commercial display, along the
lines of haute couture: an economic pattern corresponding to the nonce-
producible character of "original" works in these particular fields.
It was now, however, when all that had created the classical art
of the early twentieth century was dead, that the ideology and cult of mod-
ernism was born. The conception itself is scarcely older than the 1950s, as
a widespread currency. What it betokens is the pervasive collapse of the
tension between the institutions and mechanisms of advanced capitalism
and the practices and programs of advanced art, as the one annexed the
other as its occasional decoration or diversion, or philanthropic point d'hon-
neur. The few exceptions of the period suggest the power of the rule. The
cinema of Jean-Luc Godard, in the 1960s, is perhaps the most salient case
in point. As the Fourth Republic belatedly passed into the Fifth, and rural
and provincial France was suddenly transformed by a Gaullist industrial-
ization appropriating the newest international technologies, something like
a brief afterglow of the earlier conjuncture that had produced the classical
innovatory art of the century flared into life again. Godard's cinema was
marked in its own way by all three of the coordinates described earlier.
328
 Perry Anderson
Suffused with quotation and allusion to a high cultural past, Eliot-style;
equivocal celebrant of the automobile and the airport, the camera and the
carbine, Leger-style; expectant of revolutionary tempests from the East, Ni-
zan-style.
The upheaval of May-June 1968 in France was the validating
historical terminus of this art form. Regis Debray was to describe the ex-
perience of that year sarcastically, after the event, as a voyage to China that,
like Columbus's, discovered only America-more especially, landing in
California 16-that is, a social and cultural turbulence that mistook itself for
a French version of the Cultural Revolution, when in fact it signified no
more than the arrival of a long-overdue permissive consumerism in France.
But it was precisely this ambiguity-an openness of horizon, where the shapes
of the future could alternatively assume the shifting forms of either a new
type of capitalism or the eruption of socialism-that was constitutive of so
much of the original sensibility of what had come to be called "modernism."
Not surprisingly, it did not survive the Pompidou consolidation that suc-
ceeded, in Godard's cinema or anywhere else. What marks the typical sit-
uation of the contemporary artist in the West, it might be said, is, on the
contrary, the closure of horizons: without an appropriable past, or imagi-
nable future, in an interminably recurrent present.
This is not true, manifestly, of the Third World. It is significant
that so many of Berman's examples of what he reckons to be the great
modernist achievements of our time should be taken from Latin American
literature. In the Third World generally, a kind of shadow configuration of
what once prevailed in the First World does exist today. Precapitalist oli-
garchies of various kinds, mostly of a landowning character, abound; cap-
italist development in these regions is typically far more rapid and dynamic,
where it does occur, than in the metropolitan zones, yet it is infinitely less
stabilized or consolidated; socialist revolution haunts these societies as a
permanent possibility, one already realized in countries close to home-
Cuba or Nicaragua, Angola or Vietnam. These are the conditions that have
produced the genuine masterpieces of recent years that conform to Berman's
categories: novels like Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of
Solitude and Salman Rushdie's Midnight's Children, from Colombia and
India, or films like Yilmiz Guney's Yo/, from Turkey. However, works such
as these are not timeless expressions of an ever-expanding process of mod-
ernization but emerge in quite delimited constellations, in societies still at
definite historical crossroads. The Third World furnishes no fountain of
eternal youth to modernism.
The Limits of Self-Development
So far, we have looked at two of Berman's organizing concepts-
modernization and modernism. Let us now consider the mediating term
that links them: modernity. That, it will be remembered, is defined as the
experience undergone within modernization that give rises to modernism.
What is this experience? For Berman, it is essentially a subjective process
of unlimited self-development, as traditional barriers of custom or role dis-
integrate-an experience necessarily lived at once as emancipation and or-
deal, elation and despair, frightening and exhilarating. It is the momentum
of this ceaselessly ongoing rush toward the uncharted frontiers of the psyche
that assures the world-historical continuity of modernism; but it is also the
329
 momentum that appears to undermine in advance any prospect of moral
or institutional stabilization under communism; indeed, perhaps, to disal-
low the cultural cohesion necessary for communism to exist at all, rendering
it something like a contradiction in terms. What should we make of this
argument?
To understand it we need to ask, Where does Berman's vision
of a completely unbounded dynamic of self-development come from? His
first book, The Politics of Authenticity, which contains two studies-one of
Montesquieu and the other of Rousseau-provides the answer. Essentially,
this idea derives from what the subtitle of the book rightly designates the
"radical individualism" of Rousseau's concept of humanity. Berman's anal-
ysis of the logical trajectory of Rousseau's thought, as it sought to contend
with the contradictory consequences of this conception across successive
works, is a tour de force. But for our purposes the crucial point is that
Berman demonstrates the presence of the same paradox he ascribes to Marx
within Rousseau: if unlimited self-development is the goal of all, how will
community ever be possible? For Rousseau the answer is, in words that
Berman quotes: "The love of man derives from love of oneself'-"Extend
self-love to others and it is transformed into virtue." 17 Berman comments:
"It was the road of self-expansion, not of self-repression, that led to the
palace of virtue.... As each man learned to express and enlarge himself,
his capacity for identification with other men would expand, his sympathy
and empathy with them would deepen." 18
The schema here is clear enough: first the individual develops
the self, then the self can enter into relations of mutual satisfaction with
others-relations based on identification with the self. The difficulties this
presumption encounters once Rousseau tries to move-in his language-
from the "man" to the "citizen," in the construction of a free community,
are then brilliantly explored by Berman. What is striking, however, is that
Berman nowhere himself disowns the starting point of the dilemmas he
demonstrates. On the contrary, he concludes by arguing: "The programs of
nineteenth-century socialism and anarchism, of the twentieth-century wel-
fare state and the contemporary New Left, can all be seen as further de-
velopments of the structure of thought whose foundations Montesquieu and
Rousseau laid down. What these very different movements share is a way
of defining the crucial political task at hand: to make modem liberal society
keep the promises it has made, to reform it-or revolutionize it-in order
to realize the ideals of modem liberalism itself. The agenda for radical
liberalism which Montesquieu and Rousseau brought up two centuries ago
is still pending today." 19 Likewise, in All That Is Solid M efts into Air, Berman
can refer to "the depth of the individualism that underlies Marx's
communism" 20-a depth which, he quite consistently goes on to note, must
formally include the possibility of a radical nihilism.
If we look back, however, at Marx's actual texts, we find a very
different conception of human reality at work. For Marx, the self is not
prior to but constituted by its relations with others, from the outset: women
and men are social individuals whose sociality is not subsequent to but
contemporaneous with their individuality. Marx wrote, after all, that "only
in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his
gifts in all directions: only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom
possible." 21 Berman cites the sentence but apparently without seeing its
330
 Perry Anderson
consequences. If the development of the self is inherently imbricated in
relations with others, its development could never be an unlimited dynamic
in the monadological sense conjured up by Berman, for the coexistence of
others would always be such a limit, without which development itself could
not occur. Berman's postulate is thus, for Marx, a contradiction in terms.
Another way of saying this is that Berman has failed-with many
others, of course-to see that Marx possesses a conception of human nature
that rules out the kind of infinite ontological plasticity he assumes himself.
That may seem a scandalous statement, given the reactionary cast of so
many standard ideas of what human nature is. But it is the sober philological
truth, as even a cursory inspection of Marx's work makes clear and Norman
Geras's Marx and Human Nature-Refutation of a Legend makes irrefut-
able. 22 That nature, for Marx, includes a set of primary needs, powers, and
dispositions-what he calls in the Grundrisse, in the famous passages on
human possibility under feudalism, capitalism, and communism, Bedurf-
nisse, Fahigkeiten, Krafte, Anlagen-all ofthem capable of enlargement and
development but not of erasure or replacement. The vision of an unhinged,
nihilistic drive of the self toward a completely unbounded development is
thus a chimera. Rather, the genuine "free development of each" can only
be realized if it proceeds in respect of the "free development of all," given
the common nature of what it is to be human. In the very pages of the
Grundrisse on which Berman leans, Marx speaks without the slightest equiv-
ocation of "the full development of human control over the forces of na-
ture-including those of his own nature"; of"the absolute elaboration (Her-
ausarbeiten) of his creative dispositions," in which "the universality of the
individual ... is the universality ofhis real and ideal relationships." 23 The
cohesion and stability Berman wonders whether communism could ever
display lies, for Marx, in the very human nature it would finally emancipate,
one far from any mere cataract of formless desires. For all its exuberance,
Berman's version of Marx, in its virtually exclusive emphasis on the release
ofthe self, comes uncomfortably close-radical and decent though its accents
are-to the assumptions of the culture of narcissism.
The Present Impasse
To conclude, then, where does this leave revolution? Berman is
quite consistent here. For him, as for so many other socialists today, the
notion of revolution is distended in duration. In effect, capitalism already
brings us constant upheaval in our conditions of life and in that sense is-
as he puts it-a "permanent revolution," one that obliges "modem men and
women" to "learn to yearn for change: not merely to be open to changes
in their personal and social lives, but positively to demand them, actively
to seek them out and carry them through. They must learn not to long
nostalgically for the 'fixed, fast-frozen relationships' of the real or fantasized
past, but to delight in mobility, to thrive on renewal, to look forward to
future development in their conditions of life and relations with their fellow
men. " 24 The advent of socialism would not halt or check this process but
on the contrary would immensely accelerate and generalize it. The echoes
of 1960s' radicalism are unmistakable here. Attraction to such notions has
proved very widespread, but they are not, in fact, compatible either with
the theory of historical materialism, strictly understood, or with the record
of history itself, however theorized.
331
 "Revolution" is a term with a precise meaning: the political over-
throw from below of one state order and its replacement by another. Nothing
is to be gained by diluting it across time or extending it over every de-
partment of social space. In the first case, it becomes indistinguishable from
mere reform-simple change, no matter how gradual or piecemeal-as in
the ideology of latter-day Eurocommunism or cognate versions of Social
Democracy; in the second case, it dwindles to a mere metaphor, one that
can be reduced to no more than supposed psychological or moral conver-
sions, as in the ideology of Maoism, with its proclamation of a "Cultural
Revolution." Against these slack devaluations of the term, with all their
political consequences, it is necessary to insist that revolution is a punctual
and not a permanent process; that is, a revolution is an episode of convulsive
political transformation, compressed in time and concentrated in target,
with a determinate beginning-when the old state apparatus is still intact-
and a finite end-when that apparatus is decisively broken and a new one
erected in its stead. What would be distinctive about a socialist revolution
that created a genuine postcapitalist democracy is that the new state would
be truly transitional toward the practicable limits of its own self-dissolution
into the associated life of society as a whole.
In the advanced capitalist world today, it is the seeming absence
of any such prospect as a proximate or even distant horizon-the lack,
apparently, of any conjecturable alternative to the imperial status quo of a
consumer capitalism-that blocks the likelihood of any profound cultural
renovation comparable to the great Age of Aesthetic Discoveries in the first
third of the twentieth century. Gramsci's words still hold: "The crisis con-
sists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born;
in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears." 25 It is
legitimate to ask, Could anything be said in advance as to what the new
might be? One thing, I think, might be predicted. Modernism as a notion
is the emptiest of all cultural categories. Unlike Gothic, Renaissance, Ba-
roque, Mannerist, Romantic, or Neoclassical, it designates no describable
object in its own right at all: it is completely lacking in positive content. In
fact, as we have seen, what is concealed beneath the label "modernism" is
a wide variety of very diverse-indeed, incompatible-aesthetic practices:
symbolism, constructivism, expressionism, surrealism. These -isms, which
spell out specific programs, were unified post hoc in a portmanteau concept
whose only referent is the blank passage of time itself. There is no other
aesthetic marker so vacant or vitiated, for what once was modem is soon
obsolete. The futility of the term "modernism," and its attendant ideology,
can be seen all too clearly from current attempts to cling to its wreckage
and yet swim with the tide still further beyond it, in the coinage "post-
modernism" -one void chasing another, in a serial regression of self-con-
gratulatory chronology.
If we ask ourselves what revolution (understood as a punctual
and irreparable break with the order of capital) would have to do with
modernism (understood as this flux of temporal vanities), the answer is, it
would surely end it, for a genuine socialist culture would be one that did
not insatiably seek the new, defined simply as what comes later, itself to be
rapidly consigned to the detritus of the old, but rather one that multiplied
the different, in a far greater variety of concurrent styles and practices than
had ever existed before-a diversity founded on the far greater plurality and
332
 Perry Anderson
complexity of possible ways of living that any free community of equals,
no longer divided by class, race, or gender, would create. In other words,
the axes of aesthetic life would, in this respect, run horizontally, not ver-
tically. The calendar would cease to tyrannize, or organize, consciousness
of art. The vocation of a socialist revolution, in that sense, would be neither
to prolong nor fulfill modernity but to abolish it.

Notes

Perry Anderson's "Modernity and Revolution" was first presented at the conference on
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. It was subsequently published in New Left Review
and 1s reprinted here with their permission.
Marshall Berman. All That Is Solid Melts into Air (New York Simon and Schuster. 1983). p.
15.
2 Berman, All That Is Solid, p. 16.
3 Berman, All That Is Solid, p. 18.
4 Berman. All That Is Solid, p. 24.
5 Berman. All That Is Solid, p. 24.
6 Berman. All That Is Solid. p. 24.
7 Berman, All That Is Solid, p. 36.
8 Berman, All That Is Solid, p. 104.
9 Berman. All That Is Solid, p. 114.
10 Karl Marx. Grundnsse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie (Frankfurt, 1967). p. 439.
11 Arno Mayer. The Persistence of the Old Regime (New York Pantheon. 1982). pp. 189-273.
12 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1971). p. 96.
13 Jameson. pp. 103-4.
14 Jameson. p. 105.
15 Franco Moretti, S1gns Taken for Wonders (New York: Schocken. 1983). p. 209.
16 Regis Debray, "A Modest Contribution to the Rites and Ceremonies of the Tenth Anniver-
sary," New Left Review 115 (1979). pp. 45-65.
17 Marshall Berman. The Politics of Authenticity (New York: Atheneum. 1970). p 181.
18 Berman, Politics, p. 181 .
19 Berman. Politics. p. 317.
20 Berman. All That Is Solid, p. 128.
21 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers
Co .. 1970). p. 83; cited by Berman. Politics. p. 97.
22 Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature (New York: Schocken, 1983).
23 Marx, Grundrisse. pp. 387. 440.
24 Berman. All That Is Solid, pp. 95-96.
25 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey
Noweii-Smith (New York: International Publishers Co .. 1971). p. 276.

333
 Discussion
Question
What do you mean by human nature?
Anderson
Marx never really fully articulates his concept of human
nature. But there are innumerable passages of his work we can use to bring out the
contours of and assumptions behind his implicit conception of human nature. That
conception clearly has a biological origin, in the sense that the human physiognomic
structure is that of a specific animal species. This endows us with certain potentials,
obvious psychological needs, physical powers, and certain dispositions as well-the
latter a word he uses quite a lot. On the other hand, the course of human history
immensely enlarges, elaborates, and complicates that primary physiological basis,
so that human nature is an indissoluble compound of the biological and the social.
The fact that the biological is always coded in social terms does not mean that it
can be simply absorbed by the social. We cannot simply say that human nature is
the ensemble of social relations at any one given moment. The biological basis sets
certain determinate limits to what kinds of change any given historical variation
can impose. Indeed, it is only because human nature has a determinable core of
meaning that we can speak of human emancipation at all. Were it not for that core,
we would have no markers at all, no criteria for talking of liberation, emancipation,
or of a better society.

Comment (Gajo Petrovic)

I understand Marx to say that the essence of human nature
is that we don't have a nature in the sense in which all other beings have one. For
Marx the possibility of being free is what, if you like, constitutes human nature. But
this is a negation of "nature" in any ordinary sense of the word, since it doesn't
imply an essence or a set of fixed qualities. I would say that what is specific to human
beings is their structure of being-praxis or freedom.
Anderson
Of course, for Marx human nature isn't fixed. Gajo is quite
correct on this point, but it doesn't mean that its principles of variation are unlimited.
We can't imagine human beings who don't have certain physiological necessities of
an elementary sort: food, shelter, relationships with others, and so on. So in a sense
those are constants throughout human history, but they are coded in and elaborated
by the changing social forms of human society. These two positions aren't incom-
patible.

Comment
The fact of a biological substrate is what a lot of the debate
about modernism and postmodernism is all about. As I understand Berman, the
end of the road for modernism was its attempt to describe, to create, to represent
in many forms of art precisely the field of energies and the structure of human nature
that would provide the ground for its liberating project. But modernism kept running
into the dead end of fascism. While I share many of your attitudes toward modernism
and postmodernism, I think you undervalue the postmodernist project; it is a useful
corrective to many of those premature claims for closure that modernist art and
sociology initiated. Berman's fear is that the malleability of human nature, its ability
to be saturated by many sociosymbolic codes, does not in itself solve the value
problem. Your discussion of the problems of a revolutionary communism that too
quickly totalizes itself does not necessarily suggest how communism is to define the
ethical principles that will enable it to avoid falling into traditional structures of
victimization (antisemitism, the Gulag). For Berman, the benefit of the capitalist
order is the limit it sets on such ethical transgressions, limits it so far has not broken.
334
 Perry Anderson
Anderson
I don't entirely disagree, but I think Berman greatly over-
states the degree of human malleabilility. His assumption is empirically just not so.
Thus the frightening scenario he conjures up is not one we should be overly worried
about. There are many other more serious problems than those of a kind of com-
munism that capsizes over into generalized nihilism. I think that particular worry
is a fairy story.

Question
You set out in a very impressive way the conjunctural con-
ditions for modernism as it distinguishes itself from an older realist discourse. And
you mention Lukacs, who, although acutely conscious of this transformation, is
unable to grasp the spirit of modernist literature. But you repeat Lukacs's gesture,
it seems to me, in the way you dismiss postmodernism. Why do you refuse a dia-
lectical assessment of what succeeds modernism if, as you say, modernism is over
after the Second World War?
Anderson
There are two differences. Lukacs has a homogeneous and
evolutionary conception of historical phases. Once capitalism enters into what, for
him, is a period of historical decline after 1848, then everything has to go into decline.
That's not a position I would subscribe to. Capitalism today remains both an im-
mensely dynamic and a stable economic force; at the same time it is manifest that
its political powers of innovation or renewal are bankrupt. You have only to look
at the quality of its world leaders. Compare them with the generation of Roosevelt,
Churchill, and de Gaulle. It's obvious that changes have occurred and, from the
point of view of the loyal bourgeoisie, not for the better. The economic and the
political don't necessarily go in tandem.
Now, as far as aesthetic practices since the war are concerned,
it's not that all works of art since then are negligible. I can think of some you could
describe as great. Rather, my point is that, if we look at the whole panorama, it is
difficult to see anything that stands comparison with the creative years of the early
part of this century. If people want to contest that, the onus of proof would be on
them to come up with some names similar to the ones Franco Moretti cited in
literature. The point about postmodernism is that I don't take it to be an aesthetic
practice at all. I think it is a doctrine, a very tenuous doctrine indeed, built on the
back of something that is also enormously tenuous, namely, modernism. What strikes
me about it is the absence of those positive aesthetic programs we identify with the
great moments of symbolism, expressionism, futurism, constructivism, and surre-
alism. All of these words denote quite specific aesthetic biases, practices, and em-
phases. Postmodernism is simply a reference of a purely temporal sort; it has no
determinate content. And today I don't think we can find aesthetic programs op-
erative across more than one art form of the sort we find in the modernist epoch.
That's what strikes me most forcibly and makes me very wary of the notion of
postmodernism.
Finally, I would insist on the possibility of identifying great
individual works of art. I would deny the nihilist position of excluding the possibility
of anything of significance emerging today. But I do react strongly against a complete
historical relativism, one that simply assumes that any one historical age necessarily
produces as good art or as much art as another historical age. Nobody in his or her
right mind has ever claimed that the art of the dark ages is equivalent to the art of
classical Greece. I'm not saying we're in a dark age now-we aren't-but I do think
you cannot just level out historical epochs on the presumption that there is a constant
fund of human creativity that is always going to find equivalent expression.

Question
You offer a utopian vision for the postrevolutionary world.
Not that you are offering it in recompense for all the costs of the revolution-no

335
one would pretend that a revolution is made for art-but you speak nevertheless
about the proliferation of art in the postrevolutionary period. Could you offer us an
explanation, comparable to the triangulation you described for the period of the late
nineteenth/early twentieth century, that would provide us a material basis for un-
derstanding why art might flourish in the postrevolutionary period? Then perhaps
you could comment on whether our historical experience of socialist revolutions
supports your claim.
Anderson
If you look back at all the utopias-from William Morris's
to Marcuse's-in nearly all of them, even in the utopian socialists, there is a great
emphasis on simplicity; and simplicity usually implies uniformity as well. The whole
utopian tradition, in effect, assumes that a free and equal society would be trans-
parent. My presumption, on the contrary, is that a socialist society would be a far
more complicated one than what we have today. It seems perfectly clear that if you
actually had a socialist society in which production, power, and culture were gen-
uinely democratized, you would have an enormous multiplication of different ways
of living. People would choose how to live, and it is perfectly obvious that people
have different temperaments, gifts, and values. These differences are suppressed and
compressed within very narrow limits by the capitalist market and the inequalities
of bourgeois society.
The simple monolithicity of capitalist private property con-
trolling all the means of production would be broken down into a great variety of
different forms of social control of the economy and of wealth. The political system
would be enormously more complicated. You wouldn't just have elections every
five years of a more or less symbolic sort-elections of a powerless parliament or a
too-powerful president with a permanent bureaucracy. You would have multiple
electoral mechanisms.
The number of people who can create art in our society, who
can find any sort of aesthetic self-expression, is a fraction of what would be possible
if society were democratic in this more radical socialist sense. You would get some-
thing like what existed in the epoch of high modernism. The really interesting thing
about that period is not the completely confected and bogus notion of modernism.
What is interesting is how many quite different and incompatible but concurrent
aesthetic programs and practices there were. That is the richness of the period from
1900 to 1930. I think that richness would be reproduced on a much larger scale if
you didn't have the particular triangulation of the early twentieth century-a de-
clining aristocratic order, an incipient bourgeois technology, and the prospect of
social revolution. After a revolution that installed a postcapitalist socialist democ-
racy, you would have the material basis for a much richer social and cultural life.

Question
You seem to argue for a concept of revolution as a single
transformative event. Do you see no value in a view of revolution as a more gradual
social process?
Anderson
I think the notion of revolution should be valued and upheld,
but also limited; the two operations necessarily go together. Marx's theory of his-
torical materialism is more than simply a sociology of revolution. While it includes
a program for socialist revolution, that is not its totality. The totality of history is
not merely the history of revolutions. Nor is the history of socialism the totality of
the history of revolutions. To retain the utility of the concept of revolution you have
to set some kind of boundaries. This doesn't depreciate the importance of the long-
term social, economic, and cultural transformations that must occur in any postrev-
olutionary society. But there is an enormous danger, as twentieth-century political
history has shown, in a demagogic extension of the notion of revolution beyond the
336
 Perry Anderson
period when one state is overthrown and replaced by another. We saw that very
clearly in China in the 1960s, just as we saw it in the Soviet Union in the 1930s,
which are not dissimilar experiences. So it's necessary to be both hard and sober
about revolution.
Question (Cornel West)
I would like to go back to the charge that your position is a
repetition of Lukacs's evolutionism. Given the papers at this conference that have
trashed classical versions of Marxism, it is important to note that you represent a
highly refined version of classical Marxism. Indeed, when you specify the three
coordinates of the conjuncture, you still start with the economic and the political.
The ideological and the cultural are reflected and refracted by those first two dom-
inant and determinant coordinates. If that is so, then your ritualistic gesture to
overdetermination is a mask for an economism, for a classical logocentric view. In
many ways this is a breath offresh air, given a certain discourse analysis. Nonetheless,
one wants to know, how do your views differ from Lukacs's evolutionism?
Anderson
What you are calling classical Marxism is not something I'm
particularly ashamed of; actually, I think it's a kind of common sense. Culture has
material conditions of possibility, and it's important to look at those rather than
become simply bemused or bewitched by the genuine magnificence of modernist
works of art. In my analysis I did emphasize some cultural determinants as well.
For example, if one is going to look at the range of practices we now call modernism,
we have to look at the bogey of realism as well. The real enemy at the time the
modernist movements crystallized was academicism, not realism.
Finally, my position is not evolutionistic. I've suggested that
the conjuncture that produced modernism can recur at other times and at other
points across the globe. Berman is right to see a lot of third-world contemporary
fiction as having some of the vitality of the original modernist forms.

Question
If the only masterpieces are now coming out of the Third
World (and the only hope for revolution is in the Third World), is any significant
art being produced in modem Western capitalist societies that furthers the analysis
of revolution?
Anderson
I'm not certain that the function of art is to further the
analysis of social developments in an instrumental sense. But it wouldn't be difficult
to cite major works of art that have come out of first- or second-world experiences.
They are not necessarily modernist or postmodemist. I regard Solzhenitsyn's First
Circle as a very great novel, although much of the rest of his work is inferior. The
other example, cited in my paper, is the highly conservative, multivolume novel by
Anthony Powell, A Dance to the Music of Time; this is the most important piece of
postwar fiction in the English language for the metropolitan world. I'm confident it
will be looked back on as a very great work, although it's not modernist in any strict
sense.

Question
Could you comment on the ostensible antimodemism of
nazism? Because it was actually nazism, not World War II, that wiped out Wiemar
culture.
Anderson
I don't think nazism by itself destroyed those creative im-
pulses. Don't forget that Brecht's masterpieces were actually produced well after the
triumph of German fascism. The question of the attitude of successive political
regimes of the thirties to various forms of avant-garde art is rather complex. One

337
would have to explore the reasons why nazism was implacably hostile to anything
other than the most sterile neoacademic art, whereas Italian fascism was not. Right
down to the end, Italian fascism maintained a fondness for certain avant-garde and
modernist art. It's not the case, for instance, that all Italian architecture ofthe period
is bad. We would also have to discuss the attitude of the Soviet regime institution-
alized under Stalin and the way it wiped out an extraordinarily rich and experimental
cultural life.

Comment (Doug DiBianco)

I'm concerned with the privileging of the first thirty years
of the century as the key years of artistic accomplishment. While I would agree that
people like Proust, Rilke, or Stravinsky produced great works, the rest of the century
includes equally important work. It seems to me that these works are all films. I
would include directors from Renoir to Sembene, from Bunuel to Pasolini, from
Mitzougoushi to Bresson. I would list Ozu's An Autumn Afternoon, Hawks's Rio
Bravo, and Waters's Pink Flamingoes, and many others.
Anderson
Well, I like the movies, too. But to be honest, I don't find
the resources within me, seriously, to compare Rio Bravo to Remembrance ofThings
Past. It's just a different order of achievement.

338
 Franco Moretti

The Spell of Indecision

Marx1sts have too often Interpreted the aesthetic f1eld of

modernism by emphas1z1ng the oppos1t1onal politics of
1rony and amb1guity. But 1t IS not clear that these are, in
themselves, subvers1ve. They may also be the bas1c
pr1nc1ples of capitalism's hegemony. Marx1sm has to re-
cover a cr1t1cal relationship to culture 1f it IS not to sur-
render all cla1ms to h1story and respons1b1l1ty.

In the past two decades the dominant attitude toward

modernism within Marxist criticism has completely changed. In essence,
Marxist readings of avant-garde literature are increasingly based on in-
terpretive theories-Russian formalism, Bakhtin's work, theories of the
.. open" text, deconstructionism-which, in one way or another, belong to
modernism itself. This sudden loss of distance has inevitably given way to
a sort of interpretive vicious circle; but what seems to me even more sig-
nificant is the transformation that has occurred in the field of values and
value judgments. From this point of view, recent Marxist criticism is really
little more than a left-wing ..Apology for Modernism."
We need only think of such pioneering Marxist work
in the field of modern art as that of Benjamin and Adorno, and the extent
of this cultural transformation (or reversal) becomes immediately evident.
Benjamin and Adorno associated ..fragmentary" texts with melancholy, pain,
defenselessness, and loss of hope. Today, these same texts, along with the
whole aesthetic field they evoke, would suggest the far more exhilarating
concepts of semantic freedom, detotalization, and productive heterogeneity.
In the deliberate obscurity of modern literature, Benjamin and Adorno saw
the sign of an impending threat; now this obscurity is taken rather as a
promise of free interpretive play. For them, the key novelist of the modern
world was, quite clearly, Franz Kafka; today, just as clearly, he has been
replaced by James Joyce, whose work is just as great, but certainly less urgent
and uncanny.
By and large, I agree with critical emphasis on the
antitragic or nontragic elements of modernism. What does not convince me
at all, however, is the widespread idea that what we may call the dominant
..ironic" mode of modernist literature is subversive of the modern bourgeois
worldview. There is no doubt that .. open" texts contradict and subvert
organicistic beliefs, but it remains to be seen whether, as is now widely and
uncritically assumed, in the past century the hegemonic frame of mind has
not in fact abandoned organicism and replaced it with openness and irony.
I will try to show that such is indeed the case and that, although I consider
irony an indispensable component of any critical, democratic, and pro-
gressive culture, there is a dark side to its modernist version with which we
339
are not familiar enough and which may be even more relevant to Marxist
culture than those elements given greater attention in the recent past.
Let us start with a small classic of the modernist imagination,
one which, I believe, we owe to Lautreamont: an umbrella and a sewing
machine meeting on an anatomical table. Dada, surrealism, Pound, Eliot,
and several others have produced countless variations on this basic model
and its attendant aesthetic, one which, to be sure, ironically negates any
idea of "totality" and any hierarchy of meanings, leaving the field free for
a virtually unlimited interpretive play.
Fine-and yet is this really such a subversive image? It would
seem that Lautreamont's dream was shared, not only by fellow poets, but
also by the owners of the first department stores as well. Describing their
windows, D' Avenel wrote in 1894 that "the most dissimilar objects lend
each other mutual support when they are placed next to each other." "Why
should they be?" wonders Richard Sennett, to whom I owe the quotation;
he replies: "The use character of the object was temporarily suspended. It
became 'stimulating,' one wanted to buy it, because it became temporarily
an unexpected thing; it became strange." 1
A common object transformed into something unexpected and
strange: is this not precisely the disautomatization of the way we perceive
everyday things advocated by that crucial modernist principle-ostranenie-
ofRussian formalism? Likewise, is it not also the basic technique of modem
advertising, which took off shortly after the golden age of avant-garde move-
ments and whose task is to endow commodities with a surprising and pleas-
ant aesthetic aura?
These are just local affinities, so I will try to broaden the field of
inquiry a little. At the tum of the century, Georg Simmel wrote an essay
on "The Metropolis and Mental Life" in which he maintained that the main
psychological problem of the city dweller lies in "the swift and continuous
shift of external stimuli ... the rapid telescoping of changing images ... the
unexpectedness of violent stimuli."2 In Simmel's metropolis, which is a
typically modernist text, stimuli can be dangerous-can be shocks, as Ben-
jamin puts it when writing about Baudelaire. One has to protect oneself
from them. But at the same time one cannot do that simply by being blind
to them, because they are the best the modem world has to offer and suggest:
objects to be owned, social roles to be played, fascinating situations to be
experienced.
One has then to see and not to see, to accept and to disavow at
the same time. It is a contradictory predicament, and in order to make us
"feel at home" in the bourgeois metropolis-a feeling that is bound to be
very near the core of what we call the "hegemonic worldview" -both external
stimuli and subjective perception have to possess rather peculiar attributes,
which, once more, tum out to be barely distinguishable from those usually
associated with literary modernism. As for the stimulus, it has to be "evoc-
ative" more than "meaningful"; it must possess as little determinacy as
possible and therefore be open to, or better still produce, such a plurality
of associations that everybody can "find something" in it. It must, in other
words, center around that key word of modernism: ambiguity. By contrast,
what must develop on the side of the subject is the idea that this galaxy of
associations is valuable as such, not as a starting point from which to move
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 Franco Moretti
toward a definite choice-whether the choice is of a specific object, in ad-
vertising, or a semantic choice, in the reading of a poem-but as a "field of
possibilities" whose charm lies precisely in its growing irreducibility to the
field of "actuality."
This is an aesthetic-ironic attitude whose best definition still lies
in an old formula-"willing suspension of disbelief' -which shows how much
of the modernist imagination-where nothing is unbelievable-has its source
in romantic irony. And romantic irony-observed one of its sharpest critics,
Carl Schmitt, in Politische Romantik-is a frame of mind that sees in any
event no more than an "occasion" for free intellectual and emotional play,
for a mental and subjective deconstruction of the world as it is. Devoted
to the category of "possibility," romantic irony is therefore incapable and
even hostile to whatever resembles a decision. But decision-leaving aside
Schmitt's reactionary development of this concept-is inseparable from praxis
and history. Decisions have to be made all the time; even, paradoxically,
in order to ensure the existence of that realm of possibility and indecision
to which romanticism and modernism have attached such a central mean-
ing. In order to come to terms with this paradoxical coexistence of tension
and indecision, modern literature has developed one of its most powerful
metaphors, of which I shall now briefly sketch three different stages.
Let us start with the first chapter of Balzac's La peau de chagrin.
The hero has just lost his last francs at roulette, and tonight he is going to
drown himself in the Seine. In the meantime, he wanders through an old
curiosity shop, though it is really much more than that-let us say it is
something midway between the Louvre and the Bon Marche. He is be-
witched by the heterogeneous, almost surrealistic collection of objects that
surround him. His imagination flares up in a perfect romantic reverie, when
all of a sudden his dream comes true, thanks to that metaphor I have
announced: the pact with the Devil. The Devil is a highly popular character
with all oppositional cultures, so I will not attempt to criticize him/her but
will simply point out the price of the pact: "And what shall be my counter-
service therefore?" asks Goethe's Faust. Mephisto replies: "The time is long:
thou need'st not now insist." 3 The time is long. Over a century later, Thomas
Mann's Mephisto echoes this line: "We sell time.... that's the best thing
we have to offer ... " (Doktor Faustus, chap. 25).
We sell time and, in fact, buy it too. What happens is that Faust
and Mephisto, so to speak, exchange times: to Faust, the unlimited possi-
bilities of the future; to Mephisto, not eternity (Faust's soul, in the end, will
go to Heaven) but the present. The line I have just quoted-"The time is
long: thou need'st not now insist"-does not defer Faust's payment but
enacts it. Precisely by not worrying "for the present," Faust ends up by
surrendering it completely to Mephisto.
In Goethe, therefore, time splits: there is Faust's time, devoted
to explorations and experiments, always fully and splendidly in view, and
Mephisto's time, more often than not invisible but devoted precisely to
those ruthless actions that are nectssary in order to realize Faust's desire
and visions, but of which Faust himself would prefer to feel innocent. "I
grudge thee not the pleasure I Oflying to thyself in moderate measure" (vv.
3297-98) is Mephisto's sarcastic and truthful reply to Faust's disavowals in
the crucial scene ofthe Gretchen tragedy (and a similar exchange takes place
again in the episode of Philemon and Baucis).
341
 One major psychological result of the pact is therefore a growing
sense of irresponsibility on Faust's part. The enjoyment of "all treasures of
the earth" is severed, although not completely, from the awareness of what
is necessary to their production: "Before chaste ears one may not name
straight out I What chaste hearts cannot do without" (vv. 3295-96). It is
clear that the issue of decision, here, has not been erased but rather entrusted
to someone who, being the Devil, will act in a totally unscrupulous way.
Decision has not been eliminated; that cannot be. It has become even more
cruel, and precisely because Faust leaves it to Mephisto, but it has also
become less visible; and it is almost possible not to feel its weight.
In our second text, Flaubert's L 'education sentimentale, Me-
phisto has become a hidden devil. Frederic Moreau already enjoys the gifts
traditionally offered by Mephisto-youth, beauty, and money-without hav-
ing to sign any contract. A wealthy old uncle dies, and that is it; there is
really no responsibility on Frederic's part. The distribution of this social
power is the product of an entirely autonomous mechanism that is also, for
the same reason, utterly unpredictable. The course of history is no longer
contradictory and cruel (as in Goethe) but rather inscrutable and erratic.
Potentially, it is even more catastrophic, but it has also become so remote
that Frederic can see it-and does see it, in the first days of the 1848 rev-
olution-simply as a show to be contemplated.
This aesthetic attitude toward life and history is the key to an-
other novelty of Flaubert's work. Here money ceases to be the medium
through which desire is satisfied, as Marx pointed out was the case with
Goethe's Mephisto. In L 'education sentimentale money is desirable because
it allows not satisfaction but its postponement. Now that he is rich, Frederic
can finally indulge in his dreams as dreams. Since he knows that he can
realize them whenever he wishes, there is no need actually to do so now:
"And indeed there will be time 1 ... 1 And time yet for a hundred inde-
cisions, 1 And for a hundred visions and revisions.... "
Frederic's life is really a monument to ironic indecision-so much
so that he manages to remain undefined even in those crucial years between
1848 and 1851 when everybody had to take sides. And you probably can
recall the last page of the novel: "the best thing we have had," says an aged
Frederic to his lifelong friend Deslauries, is that flight from the brothel, in
early adolescence, when "the sight of so many women, all at his disposal"
had paralyzed Frederic's capacity for decision. The best thing we can have
is an experience that has not taken place and therefore can be reexperienced
in a totally unconstrained and subjective way. The romantic charm of in-
decision has found its most adequate temporal expression: no longer Faust's
violent desire for the future, but daydreaming, which can freely renegotiate
between and manage past, present, and future alike. The split between two
different times and two parallel lives has gone a step further.
Daydreaming is the kernel ofBloom's "stream of consciousness"
in Ulysses, which is the third text. Stream of consciousness, we know, does
not deal with consciousness but with what is usually called the "precon-
scious," which contains the countless "possible selves" of each individual,
what he/she would like to be or to have been but-for whatever reason-is
not. From this point of view, Bloom's daydreaming completes the separation
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 Franco Moretti
between "objective" and "public" time, and its "subjective" and "private"
version. The latter, it goes without saying, is by now considered the most
interesting of the two; life as "actuality" has become far less meaningful
than that parallel form, life as "possibility."
But Joyce's more significant and typically modernist innovation
lies in the fact that he has managed to break down the connection between
"possibility" and "anxiety." This connection was still strong in Goethe (in
the interplay of "streben" and "Sorge" in Faust), in Kierkegaard, and 1n
that great and pained exploration of the logic of a possible second life that
was the nineteenth-century novel of adultery (of which Haubert was, pre-
dictably, a master). In Ulysses, adultery has become a harmless pastime,
and even the most extreme experiments of its modernist imagination may
well produce stupefaction, but they no longer evoke anything threatening.
How did this disconnection between "possibility" and "anxiety"
come to pass? The remarkable weakening of guilt feelings that has occurred
in our century is certainly part of the answer, but perhaps something else
has been at work too. The "possibilities" of a "second" life produced anxiety
because they constituted a challenge to what was "real" and forced every-
body to rethink his/her own "first" life. Imagination, so to speak, was taken
quite seriously: to the extent that it was a promise, it was also a threat. This
implied a great deal of discomfort and stiffness-and also of anxiety and
guilt-but precisely because the products of the imagination were a source
for inspiration and transformation of man's and woman's "first" and "ac-
tual" life.
It is this feedback that has ceased to work in our century. Mod-
ernist imagination has become immensely more ironic, free, and surprising
than it was in the past-but at the price of leaving our "first" life wholly
bereft of these qualities. From this point of view, modernism appears once
more as a crucial component of that great symbolic transformation that has
taken place in contemporary Western societies: the meaning oflife is sought
no more in the realm of public life, politics, and work; instead, it has mi-
grated into the world of consumption and private life. This second sphere
has become incredibly more promising, exciting, and free, and it is within
its boundaries that we can indulge in our unending daydreams. But they
are symmetrical; and more than that, they owe their very existence to the
bored and blind indifference of our public life. Daydreams-even the most
subversive ones-really have no interest in changing the world because their
essence lies in running parallel to it, and since the world is merely an "oc-
casion" for their deployment, it may just as well remain as it is. Roman-
ticism, observed Carl Schmitt, managed to coexist with all sorts of political
regimes and beliefs. This is even more true of modernism, whose unbe-
lievable range of political choices can be explained only by its basic political
indifference.
There is a complicity between modernist irony and indifference
to history, and we find one of its most perfect expressions in Joyce's rhe-
torical choice to rewrite what is practically the same passage in two or more
different styles, a device that is emphasized in several chapters of Ulysses
and present as well in the text as a whole. Almost never "motivated" (with
the personality of the speaker, for instance), this technique is put in front
of the reader as a breathtaking exercise in literary competence and, I should
343
add, in literary irony, since the root of irony lies precisely in being able to
see something from more than one point of view.
Still, this rhetorical choice has a rather evident consequence on
our perception of time and history. The status of history in Ulysses is, as
you know, intrinsically rather low; to put it plainly, very little happens in
the book. But more than that, the multiplicity of styles forces our attention
away from whatever happens and focuses it entirely on the various ways
in which events can be seen. To use narratology's standard terms, Joyce
radicalized the narrative tendency that aimed at overdeveloping the level
of "discourse" at the expense of the "story." What is really meaningful is
not what happens, the logic of events and decisions, but rather our un-
motivated-that is, free-subjective reactions to it. And in order for our
reactions to be fully unconstrained, the story should exert as little pressure
as possible; if the story stands still in eternal repetition-as in Finnegan's
Wake-so much the better.
Novels, of course, can stop stories, but not history, and the forms
with which we picture historical moments to ourselves are crucial for the
fashioning of our identity. Once avant-garde literature abandoned plot, the
void was inevitably filled by a parallel literary system-mass literature-
which, just as inevitably, has acquired an ever increasing relevance. The
appeal of mass literature is that "it tells stories," and we all need stories; if
instead of Buddenbrook we get The Carpetbaggers, then Harold Robbins it
is. This certainly represents no progressive development in our perception
of history, but it is nonetheless a fact that, in this century, narrative forms
capable of dealing with the great structures and transformations of social
life more often than not have belonged to the various genres of mass lit-
erature and, more broadly, mass culture.
I believe that Marxist criticism has not only unduly underesti-
mated the relevance of mass culture in our century but has also been blind
to its systematic connection with avant-garde experiences. If the study of
modernism must be a study of modem cultures and its role in history-and
not just of a chosen section of it-we must realize that the silence of mod-
ernism is as meaningful as its words and that it has also been covered by
other, quite different voices. And, finally, what a century of modernism
teaches us is that irony, extraordinary cultural achievement though it is,
has to recover some kind of problematic relationship with responsibility
and decision, or else it will have to surrender history altogether.

Notes

1 Richard Sennett. The Fall of the Public Man (New York: Random House. 1976). p. 144.
2 Georg Simmel. "The Metropolis and Mental Life." On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected
Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1971). p. 325.
3 J. W. Goethe, Faust. trans. Bayard Taylor (london: Sphere Books. 1969). w. 1649-50.

344
 Franco Moretti
Discussion
Comment (Colin MacCabe)
Much as I respect your ability to restate a traditional Marxist
case, I find it difficult to contain my anger at the way those who invoke "comrade
history" never pay much attention to particular histories. I'd like to focus on a
couple of your examples from Joyce. You argue that the treatment of adultery in
Ulysses represents a decline from its treatment in the bourgeois novel of the nine-
teenth century. In the nineteenth-century novel, you claim, adultery at least was
seen as a major problem; it typically focused the difference between two possible
fives. I want to suggest that your position ignores the way adultery functioned
throughout the nineteenth century and ignores, as well, the way Joyce produces it
in Ulysses. Within the novel adultery is linked with art, as when Stephen has a vision
ofhimselfas the great artist, as Shakespeare, in the moment in which his and Bloom's
faces congeal in the mirror, underneath the antlers of the cuckold. I think Joyce is
suggesting that that kind of serious art, with its commitment to absolute meaning,
is inextricably linked to the concerns of the cuckold, to the man's desire to control
his seed. So I think your reading slights the text.
The second point I want to make is about the whole notion
of public life and the way in which Joyce's texts are considered to back away from
an interest in and concern with public life. Once again, it is important to reflect on
the actual history in which Joyce's text was issued in 1922, in exactly the same year
as the Irish Free State gained independence. It is difficult to imagine-and I am sure
that Joyce could not imagine it-a public life in a state in which the national liberation
movement was linked to a totally reactionary church. This left someone like Yeats
in 1928 and 1929 having to speak in the senate as divorce was outlawed, indeed as
a whole series of reactionary measures went through. (Even now the Irish state is
going to enshrine abortion in its constitution.) Once we supply that historical context,
we can understand why Joyce felt that there was no public voice for him in Ireland.
He made that very clear in a whole series of writings very early on in Trieste and
then in the novels. This in turn reflects back on a general problem in Marxist ethics.
It seems to me that what Franco was saying is that one of the things we have to
think very seriously about-and perhaps this is one of the times when we have to
think very seriously about it-is what one does when public positions cannot be
taken.
Moretti
Although adultery occupies a large section of the text, it has
ceased to be a highly meaningful and potentially tragic event in the lives of the
characters. Adultery did function that way in the nineteenth-century European novel,
but it no longer does in Ulysses. My effort, then, was to explain how the concept of
adultery was dissociated from the idea of anxiety. This seems to me one of the
strangest psychocultural events of our century.
As for the issue of public life, I would not want to say that
public life is good in itself, that any public position is worthy simply because it is
public. But to be more specific, consider the history of the genre to which Ulysses
belongs, the history of the novel. For two and one-half centuries the novel has been
a sustained effort to fix the meaning of an individual's life in its connection with
public events, with history, macro-history, if you wish. Now, I would maintain that
Ulysses tends to break down this connection in a very radical way. You object by
recalling the conditions oflrish public life and you end up by asking what one should
do when public positions are impossible. Well, a hundred years before Joyce wrote
Ulysses, Stendhal faced this problem in writing The Red and the Black, which is the
story of a young man who believes in certain values that are no longer publicly
tenable. Stendhal dealt with the problem of the untenability of a public voice in a
particular historical context. Ulysses does not confront this problem. In Ulysses the
weight is placed on subjective dreaming, and public life seems less important as a
result. I suppose we need a shootout on Ulysses; we've been disagreeing for years.

345
 Question (Darko Suvin)
I would like to take a position halfway between Franco Mor-
etti and Colin McCabe. The way to deal with an important process such as mod-
ernism is dialectically, to identifY its contradictions and the dominant moment within
them. This is also a problem of deciding what is the true canon of modernism.
Marxists have too often accepted the canon of bourgeois theoreticians which moves
from Kafka to Joyce. The proper canon of modernism would be the one significant
for us today. What is the dominant contradiction in this canon? It is the tension
between those who tried to have their work intervene in history and those who
despaired of it, the tension between Brecht and Joyce. We also need to consider the
place of mass literature within modernism.
Moretti
"Modernism" is a portmanteau word that perhaps should
not be used too often. But I don't think I would classifY Brecht as a modernist-
perhaps the young Brecht, but then several of the problems I have identified in other
modernists might also apply to the young Brecht. I certainly would not include Saint
Joan, the Lehrstucke, or The Measures Taken within modernism. I just cannot think
of a meaningful category that could include, say, surrealism, Ulysses, and something
by Brecht. I can't think of what the common attributes of such a concept could be.
The objects are too dissimilar.

Comment
You maintain the reflection theory of culture when you deny
the conflictual status of modernism and assert its complete harmony with the goals
of capitalism in the age of the big department store. And then, by way of an essen-
tialist and moralistic invocation, you argue that our need for stories is fulfilled by
mass literature once modernism abandons plot. Finally, your call for a modernist
irony connected with decision is based on no ground that I can identifY except
voluntarism.
Moretti
When I say we all need stories, that is not a moralistic in-
vocation; it is a statement of fact. We all need to have stories in our heads, plots
that give meaning. But the main question concerned irony and decision. You object
that there is no ground for my reconnection of irony and decision, that it is ultimately
voluntaristic. You are absolutely right. It is a choice we have to make. I'm not saying
No to modernism-it is certainly a great cultural development. The point is that it
has a reverse side, one I have been trying to elucidate. And I wonder whether this
great development, which is modernist irony, can be put to use by combining it
with other values. I have proposed that irony be joined with decision. But I am not
at all sure it is a connection that can be worked out. While at present I don't see
any ground for their combination, it would be a pity if it proves impossible, because
either way you lose something that could be very important for human culture.

346
 Fredric Jameson

Cognitive Mapping

Without a conception of the social totality (and the pos-

sibility of transformmg a whole social system), no prop-
erly socialist politics is possible. It involves trying to
1magine how a society without hierarchy, a society that
has also repudiated the economic mechanisms of the
market, can possibly cohere.

I am addressing a subject about which I know nothing

whatsoever, except for the fact that it does not exist. The description of a
new aesthetic, or the call for it, or its prediction-these things are generally
done by practicing artists whose manifestos articulate the originality they
hope for in their own work, or by critics who think they already have before
their eyes the stirrings and emergences of the radically new. Unfortunately,
I can claim neither of those positions, and since I am not even sure how
to imagine the kind of art I want to propose here, let alone affirm its pos-
sibility, it may well be wondered what kind of an operation this will be, to
produce the concept of something we cannot imagine.
Perhaps all this is a kind of blind, in that something
else will really be at stake. I have found myself obliged, in arguing an aes-
thetic of cognitive mapping, to plot a substantial detour through the great
themes and shibboleths of post-Marxism, so that to me it does seem possible
that the aesthetic here may be little more than a pretext for debating those
theoretical and political issues. So be it. In any case, during this Marxist
conference I have frequently had the feeling that I am one of the few Marxists
left. I take it I have a certain responsibility to restate what seem to me to
be a few self-evident truths, but which you may see as quaint survivals of
a religious, millenarian, salvational form of belief.
In any case, I want to forestall the misapprehension
that the aesthetic I plan to outline is intended to displace and to supercede
a whole range of other, already extant or possible and conceivable aesthetics
of a different kind. Art has always done a great many different things, and
had a great many distinct and incommensurable functions: let it continue
to do all that-which it will, in any case, even in Utopia. But the very
pluralism of the aesthetic suggests that there should be nothing particularly
repressive in the attempt to remind ourselves and to revive experimentally
one traditional function of the aesthetic that has in our time been peculiarly
neglected and marginalized, if not interdicted altogether.
"To teach, to move, to delight": of these traditional
formulations of the uses of the work of art, the first has virtually been
eclipsed from contemporary criticism and theory. Yet the pedagogical func-
tion of a work of art seems in various forms to have been an inescapable
parameter of any conceivable Marxist aesthetic, if of few others; and it is
347
 the great historical merit of the work of Darko Suvin to repeatedly insist
on a more contemporary formulation of this aesthetic value, in the sugges-
tive slogan of the cognitive, which I have made my own today. Behind
Suvin's work, of course, there stands the immense, yet now partially insti-
tutionalized and reified, example of Brecht himself, to whom any cognitive
aesthetic in our time must necessarily pay homage. And perhaps it is no
longer the theater but the poetry of Brecht that is for us still the irrefutable
demonstration that cognitive art need not raise any of the old fears about
the contamination of the aesthetic by propaganda or the instrumentalization
of cultural play and production by the message or the extra-aesthetic (basely
practical) impulse. Brecht's is a poetry of thinking and reflection; yet no
one who has been stunned by the sculptural density of Brecht's language,
by the stark simplicity with which a contemplative distance from historical
events is here powerfully condensed into the ancient forms of folk wisdom
and the proverb, in sentences as compact as peasants' wooden spoons and
bowls, will any longer question the proposition that in his poetry at least-
so exceptionally in the whole history of contemporary culture-the cognitive
becomes in and of itself the immediate source of profound aesthetic delight.
I mention Brecht to forestall yet another misunderstanding, that
it will in any sense be a question here of the return to some older aesthetic,
even that of Brecht. And this is perhaps the moment to warn you that I
tend to use the charged word "representation" in a different way than it has
consistently been used in poststructuralist or post-Marxist theory: namely,
as the synonym of some bad ideological and organic realism or mirage of
realistic unification. For me "representation" is, rather, the synonym of
"figuration" itself, irrespective ofthe latter's historical and ideological form.
I assume, therefore, in what follows, that all forms of aesthetic production
consist in one way or another in the struggle with and for representation-
and this whether they are perspectival or trompe l'oeil illusions or the most
reflexive and diacritical, iconoclastic or form-breaking modernisms. So, at
least in my language, the call for new kinds of representation is not meant
to imply the return to Balzac or Brecht; nor is it intended as some valori-
zation of content over form-yet another archaic distinction I still feel is
indispensable and about which I will have more to say shortly.
In the project for a spatial analysis of culture that I have been
engaged in sketching for the teaching institute that preceded this conference,
I have tried to suggest that the three historical stages of capital have each
generated a type of space unique to it, even though these three stages of
capitalist space are obviously far more profoundly interrelated than are the
spaces of other modes of production. The three types of space I have in
mind are all the result of discontinuous expansions or quantum leaps in
the enlargement of capital, in the latter's penetration and colonization of
hitherto uncommodified areas. You will therefore note in passing that a
certain unifying and totalizing force is presupposed here-although it is not
the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, nor the party, nor Stalin, but simply capital
itself; and it is on the strength of such a view that a radical Jesuit friend of
mine once publicly accused me of monotheism. It is at least certain that
the notion of capital stands or falls with the notion of some unified logic
of this social system itself, that is to say, in the stigmatized language I will
come back to later, that both are irrecoverably totalizing concepts.
348
 Fredric Jameson
I have tried to describe the first kind of space of classical or
market capitalism in terms of a logic of the grid, a reorganization of some
older sacred and heterogeneous space into geometrical and Cartesian hom-
ogeneity, a space of infinite equivalence and extension of which you can
find a kind of dramatic or emblematic shorthand representation in Fou-
cault's book on prisons. The example, however, requires the warning that
a Marxian view of such space grounds it in Taylorization and the labor
process rather than in that shadowy and mythical Foucault entity called
"power." The emergence of this kind of space will probably not involve
problems of figuration so acute as those we will confront in the later stages
of capitalism, since here, for the moment, we witness that familiar process
long generally associated with the Enlightenment, namely, the desacrali-
zation of the world, the decoding and secularization of the older forms of
the sacred or the transcendent, the slow colonization of use value by ex-
change value, the "realistic" demystification ofthe older kinds of transcend-
ent narratives in novels like Don Quixote, the standardization of both sub-
ject and object, the denaturalization of desire and its ultimate displacement
by commodification or, in other words, "success," and so on.
The problems of figuration that concern us will only become
visible in the next stage, the passage from market to monopoly capital, or
what Lenin called the "stage of imperialism"; and they may be conveyed
by way of a growing contradiction between lived experience and structure,
or between a phenomenological description of the life of an individual and
a more properly structural model of the conditions of existence of that
experience. Too rapidly we can say that, while in older societies and perhaps
even in the early stages of market capital, the immediate and limited ex-
perience of individuals is still able to encompass and coincide with the true
economic and social form that governs that experience, in the next moment
these two levels drift ever further apart and really begin to constitute them-
selves into that opposition the classical dialectic describes as Wesen and
Erscheinung, essence and appearance, structure and lived experience.
At this point the phenomenological experience of the individual
subject-traditionally, the supreme raw materials of the work of art-be-
comes limited to a tiny comer of the social world, a fixed-camera view of
a certain section of London or the countryside or whatever. But the truth
of that experience no longer coincides with the place in which it takes place.
The truth of that limited daily experience of London lies, rather, in India
or Jamaica or Hong Kong; it is bound up with the whole colonial system
of the British Empire that determines the very quality of the individual's
subjective life. Yet those structural coordinates are no longer accessible to
immediate lived experience and are often not even conceptualizable for
most people.
There comes into being, then, a situation in which we can say
that if individual experience is authentic, then it cannot be true; and that
if a scientific or cognitive model of the same content is true, then it escapes
individual experience. It is evident that this new situation poses tremendous
and crippling problems for a work of art; and I have argued that it is as an
attempt to square this circle and to invent new and elaborate formal strat-
egies for overcoming this dilemma that modernism or, perhaps better, the
various moderisms as such emerge: in forms that inscribe a new sense of
the absent global colonial system on the very syntax of poetic language itself,
349
a new play of absence and presence that at its most simplified will be haunted
by the erotic and be tattooed with foreign place names, and at its most
intense will involve the invention of remarkable new languages and forms.
At this point I want to introduce another concept that is basic
to my argument, that I call the "play of figuration." This is an essentially
allegorical concept that supposes the obvious, namely, that these new and
enormous global realities are inaccessible to any individual subject or con-
sciousness-not even to Hegel, let alone Cecil Rhodes or Queen Victoria-
which is to say that those fundamental realities are somehow ultimately
unrepresentable or, to use the Althusserian phrase, are something like an
absent cause, one that can never emerge into the presence of perception.
Yet this absent cause can find figures through which to express itself in
distorted and symbolic ways: indeed, one of our basic tasks as critics of
literature is to track down and make conceptually available the ultimate
realities and experiences designated by those figures, which the reading mind
inevitably tends to reify and to read as primary contents in their own right.
Since we have evoked the modernist moment and its relationship
to the great new global colonial network, I will give a fairly simple but
specialized example of a kind of figure specific to this historical situation.
Everyone knows how, toward the end of the nineteenth century, a wide
range ofwriters began to invent forms to express what I will call "monadic
relativism." In Gide and Conrad, in Fernando Pessoa, in Pirandello, in
Ford, and to a lesser extent in Henry James, even very obliquely in Proust,
what we begin to see is the sense that each consciousness is a closed world,
so that a representation of the social totality now must take the (impossible)
form of a coexistence of those sealed subjective worlds and their peculiar
interaction, which is in reality a passage of ships in the night, a centrifugal
movement of lines and planes that can never intersect. The literary value
that emerges from this new formal practice is called "irony"; and its phil-
osophical ideology often takes the form of a vulgar appropriation of Ein-
stein's theory of relativity. In this context, what I want to suggest is that
these forms, whose content is generally that of privatized middle-class life,
nonetheless stand as symptoms and distorted expressions of the penetration
even of middle-class lived experience by this strange new global relativity
of the colonial network. The one is then the figure, however deformed and
symbolically rewritten, of the latter; and I take it that this figural process
will remain central in all later attempts to restructure the form of the work
of art to accommodate content that must radically resist and escape artistic
figuration.
If this is so for the age of imperialism, how much more must it
hold for our own moment, the moment of the multinational network, or
what Mandel calls "late capitalism," a moment in which not merely the
older city but even the nation-state itself has ceased to play a central func-
tional and formal role in a process that has in a new quantum leap of capital
prodigiously expanded beyond them, leaving them behind as ruined and
archaic remains of earlier stages in the development of this mode of pro-
duction.
At this point I realize that the persuasiveness of my demonstra-
tion depends on your having some fairly vivid perceptual sense of what is
unique and original in postmodernist space-something I have been trying
to convey in my course, but for which it is more difficult here to substitute
350
 Fredric Jameson
a shortcut. Briefly, I want to suggest that the new space involves the suppres-
sion of distance (in the sense of Benjamin's aura) and the relentless satu-
ration of any remaining voids and empty places, to the point where the
postmodern body-whether wandering through a postmodern hotel, locked
into rock sound by means of headphones, or undergoing the multiple shocks
and bombardments of the Vietnam War as Michael Herr conveys it to us-
is now exposed to a perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all shel-
tering layers and intervening mediations have been removed. There are, of
course, many other features of this space one would ideally want to comment
on-most notably, Lefebvre's concept of abstract space as what is simul-
taneously homogeneous and fragmented-but I think that the peculiar dis-
orientation of the saturated space I have just mentioned will be the most
useful guiding thread.
You should understand that I take such spatial peculiarities of
postmodernism as symptoms and expressions of a new and historically
original dilemma, one that involves our insertion as individual subjects into
a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames
range from the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to
the unimaginable decentering of global capital itsel£ Not even Einsteinian
relativity, or the multiple subjective worlds of the older modernists, is ca-
pable of giving any kind of adequate figuration to this process, which in
lived experience makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject, or,
more exactly, the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and dispersion
of this last (which can no longer even serve the function of the Jamesian
reverberator or "point of view"). And although you may not have realized
it, I am talking about practical politics here: since the crisis of socialist
internationalism, and the enormous strategic and tactical difficulties of co-
ordinating local and grassroots or neighborhood political actions with na-
tional or international ones, such urgent political dilemmas are all imme-
diately functions of the enormously complex new international space I have
in mind.
Let me here insert an illustration, in the form of a brief account
of a book that is, I think, not known to many of you but in my opinion of
the greatest importance and suggestiveness for problems of space and pol-
itics. The book is nonfiction, a historical narrative of the single most sig-
nificant political experience of the American 1960s: Detroit: I Do Mind
Dying, by Marvin Surkin and Dan Georgakis. (I think we have now come
to be sophisticated enough to understand that aesthetic, formal, and nar-
rative analyses have implications that far transcend those objects marked
as fiction or as literature.) Detroit is a study of the rise and fall of the League
of Black Revolutionary Workers in that city in the late 1960s. 1 The political
formation in question was able to conquer power in the workplace, partic-
ularly in the automobile factories; it drove a substantial wedge into the
media and informational monopoly of the city by way of a student news-
paper; it elected judges; and finally it came within a hair's breadth of electing
the mayor and taking over the city power apparatus. This was, of course,
a remarkable political achievement, characterized by an exceedingly so-
phisticated sense of the need for a multilevel strategy for revolution that
involved initiatives on the distinct social levels of the labor process, the
media and culture, the juridical apparatus, and electoral politics.
351
 Yet it is equally clear-and far clearer in virtual triumphs of this
kind than in the earlier stages of neighborhood politics-that such strategy
is bound and shackled to the city form itself. Indeed, one of the enormous
strengths of the superstate and its federal constitution lies in the evident
discontinuities between city, state, and federal power: if you cannot make
socialism in one country, how much more derisory, then, are the prospects
for socialism in one city in the United States today? Indeed, our foreign
visitors may not be aware that there exist in this country four or five socialist
communes, near one of which, in Santa Cruz, California, I lived until re-
cently; no one would want to belittle these local successes, but it seems
probable that few of us think of them as the first decisive step toward the
transition to socialism.
If you cannot build socialism in one city, then suppose you con-
quer a whole series of large key urban centers in succession. This is what
the League of Black Revolutionary Workers began to think about; that is
to say, they began to feel that their movement was a political model and
ought to be generalizable. The problem that arises is spatial: how to develop
a national political movement on the basis of a city strategy and politics.
At any rate, the leadership of the League began to spread the word in other
cities and traveled to Italy and Sweden to study workers' strategies there
and to explain their own model; reciprocally, out-of-town politicos came to
Detroit to investigate the new strategies. At this point it ought to be clear
that we are in the middle of the problem of representation, not the least of
it being signaled by the appearance of that ominous American word "lead-
ership." In a more general way, however, these trips were more than net-
working, making contacts, spreading information: they raised the problem
of how to represent a unique local model and experience to people in other
situations. So it was logical for the League to make a film of their experience,
and a very fine and exciting film it is.
Spatial discontinuities, however, are more devious and dialec-
tical, and they are not overcome in any of the most obvious ways. For
example, they returned on the Detroit experience as some ultimate limit
before which it collapsed. What happened was that the jet-setting militants
of the League had become media stars; not only were they becoming alien-
ated from their local constituencies, but, worse than that, nobody stayed
home to mind the store. Having acceded to a larger spatial plane, the base
vanished under them; and with this the most successful social revolutionary
experiment of that rich political decade in the United States came to a sadly
undramatic end. I do not want to say that it left no traces behind, since a
number oflocal gains remain, and in any case every rich political experiment
continues to feed the tradition in underground ways. Most ironic in our
context, however, is the very success of their failure: the representation-
the model of this complex spatial dialectic-triumphantly survives in the
form of a film and a book, but in the process of becoming an image and a
spectacle, the referent seems to have disappeared, as so many people from
Debord to Baudrillard always warned us it would.
Yet this very example may serve to illustrate the propositionthat
successful spatial representation today need not be some uplifting socialist-
realist drama of revolutionary triumph but may be equally inscribed in a
narrative of defeat, which sometimes, even more effectively, causes the whole
architectonic of postmodern global space to rise up in ghostly profile behind
352
 Fredric Jameson
itself, as some ultimate dialectical barrier or invisible limit. This example
also may have given a little more meaning to the slogan of cognitive mapping
to which I now tum.
I am tempted to describe the way I understand this concept as
something of a synthesis between Althusser and Kevin Lynch-a formula-
tion that, to be sure, does not tell you much unless you know that Lynch
is the author of a classic work, The Image of the City, which in its tum
spawned the whole low-level subdiscipline that today takes the phrase "cog-
nitive mapping" as its own designation. 2 Lynch's problematic remains locked
within the limits of phenomenology, and his book can no doubt be subjected
to many criticisms on its own terms (not the least of which is the absence
of any conception of political agency or historical process). My use of the
book will be emblematic, since the mental map of city space explored by
Lynch can be extrapolated to that mental map of the social and global
totality we all carry around in our heads in variously garbled forms. Drawing
on the downtowns of Boston, Jersey City, and Los Angeles, and by means
of interviews and questionnaires in which subjects we asked to draw their
city context from memory, Lynch suggests that urban alienation is directly
proportional to the mental unmapability of local cityscapes. A city like
Boston, then, with its monumental perspectives, its markers and monu-
ments, its combination of grand but simple spatial forms, including dramatic
boundaries such as the Charles River, not only allows people to have, in
their imaginations, a generally successful and continuous location to the
rest of the city, but in addition gives them something of the freedom and
aesthetic gratification of traditional city form.
I have always been struck by the way in which Lynch's conception
of city experience-the dialectic between the here and now of immediate
perception and the imaginative or imaginary sense of the city as an absent
totality-presents something like a spatial analogue of Althusser's great for-
mulation of ideology itself, as "the Imaginary representation of the subject's
relationship to his or her Real conditions of existence." Whatever its defects
and problems, this positive conception of ideology as a necessary function
in any form of social life has the great merit of stressing the gap between
the local positioning of the individual subject and the totality of class struc-
tures in which he or she is situated, a gap between phenomenological per-
ception and a reality that transcends all individual thinking or experience;
but this ideology, as such, attempts to span or coordinate, to map, by means
of conscious and unconscious representations. The conception of cognitive
mapping proposed here therefore involves an extrapolation of Lynch's spa-
tial analysis to the realm of social structure, that is to say, in our historical
moment, to the totality of class relations on a global (or should I say mul-
tinational) scale. The secondary premise is also maintained, namely, that
the incapacity to map socially is as crippling to political experience as the
analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience. It follows
that an aesthetic of cognitive mapping in this sense is an integral part of
any socialist political project.
In what has preceded I have infringed so many of the taboos and
shibboleths of a faddish post-Marxism that it becomes necessary to discuss
them more openly and directly before proceeding. They include the prop-
osition that class no longer exists (a proposition that might be clarified by
the simple distinction between class as an element in small-scale models of
353
society, class consciousness as a cultural event, and class analysis as a mental
operation); the idea that this society is no longer motored by production
but rather reproduction (including science and technology)-an idea that,
in the midst of a virtually completely built environment, one is tempted to
greet with laughter; and, finally, the repudiation of representation and the
stigmatization of the concept of totality and of the project of totalizing
thought. Practically, this last needs to be sorted into several different prop-
ositions-in particular, one having to do with capitalism and one having to
do with socialism or communism. The French nouveaux philosophes said
it most succinctly, without realizing that they were reproducing or rein-
venting the hoariest American ideological slogans of the cold war: totalizing
thought is totalitarian thought; a direct line runs from Hegel's Absolute
Spirit to Stalin's Gulag.
As a matter of self-indulgence, I will open a brief theoretical
parenthesis here, particularly since Althusser has been mentioned. We have
already experienced a dramatic and instructive melt-down of the Althus-
serian reactor in the work of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, who quite
consequently observe the incompatibility of the Althusserian attempt to
secure semiautonomy for the various levels of social life, and the more
desperate effort of the same philosopher to retain the old orthodox notion
of an "ultimately determining instance" in the form of what he calls "struc-
tural totality." Quite logically and consequently, then, Hindess and Hirst
simply remove the offending mechanism, whereupon the Althusserian ed-
ifice collapses into a rubble of autonomous instances without any necessary
relationship to each other whatsoever-at which point it follows that one
can no longer talk about or draw practical political consequences from any
conception of social structure; that is to say, the very conceptions of some-
thing called capitalism and something called socialism or communism fall
of their own weight into the ash can of History. (This last, of course, then
vanishes in a puff of smoke, since by the same token nothing like History
as a total process can any longer be conceptually entertained.) All I wanted
to point out in this high theoretical context is that the baleful equation
between a philosophical conception of totality and a political practice of
totalitarianism is itself a particularly ripe example of what Althusser calls
"expressive causality," namely, the collapsing of two semiautonomous (or,
now, downright autonomous) levels into one another. Such an equation,
then, is possible for unreconstructed Hegelians but is quite incompatible
with the basic positions of any honest post-Althusserian post-Marxism.
To close the parenthesis, all of this can be said in more earthly
terms. The conception of capital is admittedly a totalizing or systemic con-
cept: no one has ever seen or met the thing itself; it is either the result of
scientific reduction (and it should be obvious that scientific thinking always
reduces the multiplicity of the real to a small-scale model) or the mark of
an imaginary and ideological vision. But let us be serious: anyone who
believes that the profit motive and the logic of capital accumulation are not
the fundamental laws of this world, who believes that these do not set
absolute barriers and limits to social changes and transformations under-
taken in it-such a person is living in an alternative universe; or, to put it
more politely, in this universe such a person-assuming he or she is pro-
gressive-is doomed to social democracy, with its now abundantly docu-
mented treadmill of failures and capitulations. Because if capital does not
354
 Fredric Jameson
exist, then clearly socialism does not exist either. I am far from suggesting
that no politics at all is possible in this new post-Marxian Nietzschean world
of micropolitics-that is observably untrue. But I do want to argue that
without a conception of the social totality (and the possibility of transform-
ing a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is possible.
About socialism itself we must raise more troubling and unsolved
dilemmas that involv~ the notion of community or the collective. Some of
the dilemmas are very familiar, such as the contradiction between self-
management on the local level and planning on the global scale; or the
problems raised by the abolition of the market, not to mention the abolition
of the commodity form itself. I have found even more stimulating and
problematical the following propositions about the very nature of society
itself: it has been affirmed that, with one signal exception (capitalism itself,
which is organized around an economic mechanism), there has never existed
a cohesive form of human society that was not based on some form of
transcendence or religion. Without brute force, which is never but a mo-
mentary solution, people cannot in this vein be asked to live cooperatively
and to renounce the omnivorous desires of the id without some appeal to
religious belief or transcendent values, something absolutely incompatible
with any conceivable socialist society. The result is that these last achieve
their own momentary coherence only under seige circumstances, in the
wartime enthusiasm and group effort provoked by the great blockades. In
other words, without the nontranscendent economic mechanism of capital,
all appeals to moral incentives (as in Che) or to the primacy ofthe political
(as in Maoism) must fatally exhaust themselves in a brief time, leaving only
the twin alternatives of a return to capitalism or the construction of this or
that modem form of "oriental despotism." You are certainly welcome to
believe this prognosis, provided you understand that in such a case any
socialist politics is strictly a mirage and a waste of time, which one might
better spend adjusting and reforming an eternal capitalist landscape as far
as the eye can see.
In reality this dilemma is, to my mind, the most urgent task that
confronts Marxism today. I have said before that the so-called crisis in
Marxism is not a crisis in Marxist science, which has never been richer, but
rather a crisis in Marxist ideology. If ideology-to give it a somewhat dif-
ferent definition-is a vision of the future that grips the masses, we have to
admit that, save in a few ongoing collective experiments, such as those in
Cuba and in Yugoslavia, no Marxist or Socialist party or movement any-
where has the slightest conception of what socialism or communism as a
social system ought to be and can be expected to look like. That vision will
not be purely economic, although the Marxist economists are as deficient
as the rest of us in their failure to address this Utopian problem in any
serious way. It is, as well, supremely social and cultural, involving the task
of trying to imagine how a society without hierarchy, a society of free people,
a society that has at once repudiated the economic mechanisms of the mar-
ket, can possibly cohere. Historically, all forms of hierarchy have always
been based ultimately on gender hierarchy and on the building block of the
family unit, which makes it clear that this is the true juncture between a
feminist problematic and a Marxist one-not an antagonistic juncture, but
the moment at which the feminist project and the Marxist and socialist
project meet and face the same dilemma: how to imagine Utopia.
355
 Returning to the beginning of this lengthy excursus, it seems
unlikely that anyone who repudiates the concept of totality can have any-
thing useful to say to us on this matter, since for such persons it is clear
that the totalizing vision of socialism will not compute and is a false problem
within the random and undecidable world of microgroups. Or perhaps an-
other possibility suggests itself, namely, that our dissatisfaction with the
concept of totality is not a thought in its own right but rather a significant
symptom, a function of the increasing difficulties in thinking of such a set
of interrelationships in a complicated society. This would seem, at least, to
be the implication of the remark of the Team X architect Aldo van Eyck,
when, in 1966, he issued his version ofthe death of modernism thesis: "We
know nothing of vast multiplicity-we cannot come to terms with it-not
as architects or planners or anybody else." To which he added, and the
sequel can easily be extrapolated from architecture to social change itself:
"But if society has no form-how can architects build its counterform?" 3
You will be relieved to know that at this point we can return
both to my own conclusion and to the problem of aesthetic representation
and cognitive mapping, which was the pretext of this essay. The project of
cognitive mapping obviously stands or falls with the conception of some
(unrepresentable, imaginary) global social totality that was to have been
mapped. I have spoken of form and content, and this final distinction will
allow me at least to say something about an aesthetic, of which I have
observed that I am, myself, absolutely incapable of guessing or imagining
its form. That postmodernism gives us hints and examples of such cognitive
mapping on the level of content is, I believe, demonstrable.
I have spoken elsewhere of the turn toward a thematics of me-
chanical reproduction, of the way in which the autoreferentiality of much
ofpostmodernist art takes the form of a play with reproductive technology-
film, tapes, video, computers, and the like-which is, to my mind, a degraded
figure of the great multinational space that remains to be cognitively mapped.
Fully as striking on another level is the omnipresence of the theme of par-
anoia as it expresses itself in a seemingly inexhaustible production of con-
spiracy plots of the most elaborate kinds. Conspiracy, one is tempted to
say, is the poor person's cognitive mapping in the postmodern age; it is a
degraded figure of the total logic of late capital, a desperate attempt to
represent the latter's system, whose failure is marked by its slippage into
sheer theme and content.
Achieved cognitive mapping will be a matter ofform, and I hope
I have shown how it will be an integral part of a socialist politics, although
its own possibility may well be dependent on some prior political opening,
which its task would then be to enlarge culturally. Still, even if we cannot
imagine the productions of such an aesthetic, there may, nonetheless, as
with the very idea of Utopia itself, be something positive in the attempt to
keep alive the possibility of imagining such a thing.

Notes

Dan Georgakis and Marvin Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, A Study in Urban Revolution
(New York: St. Mart1n's Press, 1975).

356
 Fredric Jameson
2 Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960)
3 Quoted in Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980). pp. 276-77.

357
 Discussion
Question (Nancy Fraser)
First, I want to say something, for the record, about the
implicit political gesture built into your presentation of the question of totality, which
seemed to me rather irresponsible, given that there have been many discussions of
the issue and that many nuanced positions have been expressed. You essentially
conflated many differences and subtle positions on this question. But I do have a
more constructive question to ask, because I am also sympathetic to a certain kind
of totalizing thought, namely, a critical social science that would be as total and
explanatorily powerful as possible. Thus, I wonder why you assume that cognitive
mapping is the task of the aesthetic? Why wouldn't that be a task for critical social
science? Or are two different kinds of tasks conflated in your paper?
Jameson
The question of the role of the aesthetic as opposed to that
of the social sciences in explorations of the structure of the world system corresponds,
for me, to the orthodox distinction (which I still vaguely use in a somewhat different
way) between science and ideology. My point is that we have this split between
ideology in the Althusserian sense-that is, how you map your relation as an indi-
vidual subject to the social and economic organization of global capitalism-and the
discourse of science, which I understand to be a discourse (which is ultimately
impossible) without a subject. In this ideal discourse, like a mathematical equation,
you model the real independent of its relations to individual subjects, including your
own. Now I think that you can teach people how this or that view of the world is
to be thought or conceptualized, but the real problem is that it is increasingly hard
for people to put that together with their own experience as individual psychological
subjects, in daily life. The social sciences can rarely do that, and when they try (as
in ethnomethodology), they do it only by a mutation in the discourse of social science,
or they do it at the moment that a social science becomes an ideology; but then we
are back into the aesthetic. Aesthetics is something that addresses individual ex-
perience rather than something that conceptualizes the real in a more abstract way.

Question
Your paper suggests that cognitive mapping is an avenue by
which we might proceed at this point in time. Is this a tactical or a strategic choice?
If it is tactical, then how do you conceive the question of strategy? And if it is
strategic, what do you consider the problem of tactics today? The reason I raise such
a question is that there seem to be opportunities now to create an interconnected
culture that might allow real political problems to be discussed. If that's true, the
question of strategy and tactics seems central.
Jameson
That's an important question. I would answer it by trying
to connect my suggestion with Stuart Hall's paper, in which he talked about the
strategic possibilities of delegitimizing an existing discourse at a particular historical
conjuncture. While I haven't used it, the language of discourse theory is certainly
appropriate here (along with my own more dialectical language). My comrade and
collaborator Stanley Aronowitz has observed that whatever the Left is in this country
today, it has to begin by sorting out what the priorities really are. He takes the
position that our essential function for the moment is pedagogical in the largest
sense; it involves the conquest of legitimacy in this country for socialist discourse.
In other words, since the sixties, everybody knows that there is a socialist discourse.
In the TV serials there's always a radical; that has become a social type, or, more
accurately, a stereotype. So while people know that a socialist discourse exists, it is
not a legitimate discourse in this society. Thus no one takes seriously the idea that
socialism, and the social reorganization it proposes, is the answer to our problems.
Stuart Hall showed us the negative side of this struggle as the moment in which a
358
 Fredric Jameson
hegemonic social democratic discourse finds its content withdrawn from it so that,
finally, those things that used to be legitimate are no longer legitimate and nobody
believes in them. Our task, I think, is the opposite of that and has to do with the
legitimation of the discourses of socialism in such a way that they do become realistic
and serious alternatives for people. It's in the context of that general project that
my more limited aesthetic project finds its place.
Question (Darko Suvin)
First of all, I would like to say, also for the record, that I
agree with your refusal to equate totality with totalitarianism. I want to remind
people of the strange origins of the connotations of the word "totalitarianism." They
arose after the war, propagated by the Congress of Cultural Freedom, which was
associated with such names as Stephen Spender and Irving Kristol and with journals
such as Encounter, funded by the CIA as it turns out. This is admittedly not a
conclusive argument; even people funded by the CIA can come up with intelligent
ideas now and then. But it should make us wary of such an equation. So I think
your rebuttal is well taken and not at all irresponsible.
Now to my question. I have a major problem with this idea
of postmodernism, even though your elaboration of it is more sophisticated than
Ihab Hassan's. I would like to try to suggest a way out of this problem. Rather than
thinking of your three stages of capitalism-which I gather are coextensive with
realism, modernism, and postmodernism-as closed, Hegelian world-historical mon-
ads subsequent to each other in time, so that at some point (around 1910 or 1960)
one begins and the other ends, couldn't we think of capitalism as a whole (beginning
whenever you wish), and then a series of movements (such as realism, modernism,
postmodernism) that have become hegemonic in a given subphase of capitalism but
that do not necessarily disappear. After all, most literature and painting today is still
realistic (e.g., Arthur Hailey). In other words, we have shifting hegemonies, although
I think it is still a question of how one proves that a shift of such major dimensions
(e.g., the shift associated with the names Picasso, Einstein, Eisenstein, and Lenin)
really occurred in the 1960s. But in that case, postmodernism could emerge as a
style, even become hegemonic in the United States and Western Europe, but not in
India and Africa, and then lose its dominant position without our having to shift
into a new episteme and a new world-historical monad. And you would have a
subtler interplay between a simultaneously coexisting realism, modernism, and post-
modernism, on various levels of art and literature.
Jameson
The questions of periodization, coexistence, and so on, are
difficult and complex. Obviously, when I talk about such periods they are not sealed
monads that begin and end at easily identifiable moments (beginning in 1857 and
ending in 1913, or beginning in 1947 or 1958, etc.). And there are certainly survivals
and overlaps. I would, however, like to say something about the problem people
have with the concept of postmodernism. For me, the term suggests two connected
things: that we are in a different stage of capital, and that there have been a number
of significant cultural modifications (e.g., the end of the avant-garde, the end of the
great auteur or genius, the disappearance of the utopian impulse of modernism-
about which I think Perry Anderson was both eloquent and extremely suggestive).
It's a matter of coordinating those cultural changes with the notion that artists today
have to respond to the new globally defined concrete situation of late capitalism.
That is why it doesn't bother me too much when friends and colleagues like Darko
Suvin or Perry Anderson or Henri Lefebvre find this concept of postmodernism
suspicious. Because whatever Perry Anderson, for example, thinks of the utility of
the period term-postmodernism-his paper demonstrates that something really fun-
damental did change after 1945 and that the conditions of existence of modernism
were no longer present. So we are in something else.
Now the relative merit of competing terms-postmodernism
or high modernism-is another matter. The task is to describe that qualitatively

359
different culture. By the same token, I trust that people who have some discursive
stake in other terms, such as totality or its refusal, do not take my remarks on the
subject too narrowly. For example, I consider the work of Chantal Mouffe and
Emesto Laclau an extremely important contribution to thinking about a future so-
cialist politics. I think one has to avoid fighting over empty slogans.
Comment (Cornel West)
The question of totality signals an important theoretical
struggle with practical implications. I'm not so sure that the differences between
your position and Perry Anderson's, and those put forward by Stanley Aronowitz,
Chantal Mouffe, Emesto Laclau, and a host of others can be so easily reconciled.
And it seems to me that if we continue to formulate the question in the way that
you formulate it, we are on a crash course, because I think that holding on to the
conception of totality that you invoke ultimately leads toward a Leninist or Leninist-
like politics that is basically sectarian, that may be symptomatic of a pessimism
(though that is a question). If we opt for the position that Mouffe, Laclau, Aronowitz,
and others are suggesting, the results are radically anti-Leninist as well as radically
critical of a particular conception of totality. It is important to remember that nobody
here has defended a flat, dispersive politics. Nobody here has defended a reactionary
politics like that of the nouveaux philosophes. Rather, their critiques of totality are
enabling ones; they are critiques of a totality that is solely a regulative ideal we never
achieve, never reach. And if that is the case, I really don't see the kind of reconcil-
iation that you are talking about. I think you were very comradely in your ritualistic
gestures to Chantal and Emesto and others, but I am not so sure that we are as close
as you think. Now that means we're still comrades within the Left in the broad
sense, but these are significant differences and tendencies within the Left, and I
didn't want to end the discussion with a vague Hegelian reconciliation of things
when what I see is very significant and healthy struggle.
Jameson
I don't understand how the politics I am proposing is re-
pressive, since I don't think I have yet even proposed a politics, any more than I
have really proposed an aesthetics. Both of those seem to be all in the future. Let
me try to respond by expanding on the distinction that came up in the second
question, the notion of tactics versus strategy. It is not a question of substituting a
total class/party politics for the politics of new social movements. That would be
both ridiculous and self-defeating. The question is how to think those local struggles,
involving specific and often different groups, within some common project that is
called, for want of a better word, socialism. Why must these two things go together?
Because without some notion of a total transformation of society and without the
sense that the immediate project is a figure for that total transformation, so that
everybody has a stake in that particular struggle, the success of any local struggle is
doomed, limited to reform. And then it will lose its impetus, as any number of issue
movements have done. Yet an abstract politics that only talks socialism on some
global level is doomed to the sterility of sectarian politics. I am trying to suggest a
way in which these things always take place at two levels: as an embattled struggle
of a group, but also as a figure for an entire systemic transformation. And I don't
see how anything substantial can be achieved without that kind of dual thinking at
every moment in all of those struggles.

360
 Andrew Ross

The New Sentence and the Commodity

Form: Recent American Writing

The propos1t1on that language IS not about the world

but IS in the world Itself has had as many serious politi-
cal and epistemological ramifications 1n recent years as
Marx's famous thes1s on Feuerbach, which 1t both re-
sembles and, perhaps, supersedes Yet the problem of
the Intellectual's weary anxiety about co-option persists
How do we tell the real thing from its simulation? The
pomt IS, there IS no "real thing." Writers have been
say1ng It, and Marx1sm will have to speak to 1t.

We imagine that there is a gap between the

world of our private fantasies & the possibili-
ties of meaningful action & so it becomes
easy to talk & talk on what is lacking, to dis-
course on end, & yet feel impotent. "What's
to do. " But this gap is a measure not so
much of desires or depression or impotence
but of ourselves. It has been the continual
failure of Marxist aesthetics to insist that this
gap is simply another illusory pan of our
commodity lives. It is at the root of our col-
lectivity.
Charles Bernstein
'Three or Four Things I Know about Him"

The train ceaselessly reinvents the station.

Barrett Watten
1-10

Of all the "casualties" sustained by American writing

in the volatile cross fire of political imperatives that prevailed in the thirties,
George Oppen's case is, perhaps, the most exemplary. Barely though suc-
cessfully launched as a poet in New York, and too much of a formalist to
sustain his convictions, artistically, in that time and place, he shunned the
available alternatives like the New Masses, stopped writing in 1932, and
dropped out of literary circles for over twenty-five years, at first organizing
the unemployed and then living in itinerant "exile" in California and Mex-
ico. In her autobiography, his wife, Mary, describes their return from a trip
to France as "the momentous winter of 1932 ... when we began to see and
understand what was happening." 1 For Oppen himsdf, forty-five years later,
the imperative ofthat year was still painfully clear (though italicized, which
is to say mediated): "we wanted to know if we were any good I out there"
("Disasters," Primitive). Here is the poet on trial again, and in Oppen's case
somehow called on to explain where the politically irresponsible, like Pound,
had long since been pardoned for their "aesthetic" crimes. Indeed, Oppen
361
 recalls a meeting with Hugh Kenner in which the poet attempted to explain
at length what populism had meant for a writer in the thirties, at which
point Kenner interrupted: ''In brief, it took you twenty-five years to write
the next poem." 2
For most of us, Kenner's "in brief' would seem much too flimsy,
logically or otherwise, to bear the heavy moral weight of his remark. And
under other circumstances one might be tempted to demonstrate how nor-
mative such logical moves are in the "official" literary histories of modem
poetry, where Kenner's work has held more than a little sway. 3 As it is, my
interests here are primarily descriptive rather than polemical, and are there-
fore more concerned with Oppen's dilemma than with Kenner's. "In brief,"
I shall be pointing to some of the ways in which recent American writing
has approached that dilemma a half-century later and found that it is no
dilemma at all. Clearly, it is not the mere fact of the passage of a half-
century, Oppen's term of disgrace twice over, that has made the difference.
And for some writers on the Left, the burden of history has actually only
increased, forcing their hand further, as it were, into the awkward and con-
suming habits of the protest poem, or else the thankless perpetuation of
right-thinking sentiments. On the contrary, we can point above all else to
concrete developments in Marxist theory during this period that have en-
abled writers to face the full brunt of political commitment in terms of their
own cultural practice, rather than in the service of some external cause or
party line, no matter how loosely drawn. This, of course, is not to deny that
a new field of activity is not also a field of conflict, perhaps even more
irreconcilable than ever. What is clear, nonetheless, is that Oppen's dilemma
can no longer be found in the same place: "There are situations," he writes,
"which cannot honorably be met by art, and surely no one need fiddle
precisely at the moment that the house next door is burning"-Brecht is
under fire here! Regardless of whether we might agree with Oppen that it
is not a question of aesthetics, or "bad fiddling," his final opinion-that "the
question can only be whether one intends, at a given time, to write poetry
or not"-would have to be regarded today as a superannuated one. 4
Oppen's dilemma, however, is a product of modernist culture,
the very model of crisis culture, because it is wholly consumed by its con-
tradictions; even the debates of the day about Marxist aesthetics-Bloch
versus Lukacs, Lukacs versus Brecht, Benjamin versus Adomo-are perfectly
antagonistic, while the artist is generally perceived as a binary or double
agent: "In Pound I am confronted by the tragic double of our day. He is
the demonstration of our duality. In language and form, he is forward, as
much the revolutionary as Lenin. But in social, economic, and political
action he is as retrogressive as the Czar." 5 In modernism, the "political"
and the "aesthetic" struggle for sovereignty over every last inch of cultural
soil, both within and beyond the limits of language-and also nationality.
The radicalism of Hugh MacDiarmid, for example-to "aye be whaur I
Extremes meet"-which lures him into an impossible dual allegiance to
communism and Scottish nationalism, is always spliced by another set of
linguistic oppositions: between the oral subversiveness of Scots and the
assimilative power of English. Whereas MacDiarmid lives out this heady
mix, Joyce, confronted with a similar set of options, collapses all contra-
dictions onto the page and creates an international politics of the signifier.
362
 Andrew Ross
It is Pound, however, whose instrumentalism is most complete
and who can thus strip the most heterogeneous experience of conflict into
Confucian-cum-Imagist forms: "When I gather chestnuts on the hills of
Rapallo I step outside the capitalist system." 6 And it is Pound whose work,
ironically enough, offers the clearest manifestations of the kind of thinking
classed as "economist" and "historicist," tendencies that have recently fallen
into disrepute within Marxism itself. 7 Of course, Pound has his own notions
about economic determinism (it so blatantly serves his own didactic ends),
while the "homogeneous time" of his historicism appeals unambiguously
to an aesthetic termination of history, the fascist form of the inevitability
theory of revolutionary Marxism. In this, however, Pound is much more
than the archetypal American tourist, a mobile commodity form like Bau-
delaire's.flaneur or Enzensberger's "tourist ofthe revolution," "exchanged"
and "used" in support of an external logic of social and economic relations. 8
Pound's difference, after all, lies in his overt subjectivism, or what Charles
Olson called "the beak of his EGO," the willful, controlling impulse to
organize any field of available materials. 9
The struggle against that subjectivist impulse is a dominant fea-
ture of the political development of modernism, and it takes the form of a
movement toward objectivism. As much as anything else, this movement
helps determine the style of the aesthetic manifestos of the Popular Front:
Breton's "surrealistic situation of the object," for example, or Francis Ponge's
more quiescent Le parti pris des chases. Oppen's own debt to this com-
mitment is historically marked by his association, at the end of the twenties,
with the Objectivist poets-Louis Zukofsky, Charles Reznikoff, William Car-
los Williams, and Carl Rakosi (who also gave up his literary career and
became a social worker). The content-oriented regional populism of Carl
Sandburg, Vachel Lindsay, and Edgar Lee Masters was already thriving at
the time. What distinguished the Objectivists, however, was their emphasis
on form and technique as a conscious activity of intellectual labor, their
concerns with particulars and everyday life, and their common appeal to
moral (not representational, which is to say traditionally realist) imperatives
of sincerity, authenticity, and conviction: "An Objective ... Desire for what
is objectively perfect, inextricably the direction of historic and contemporary
particulars." 10 The objectification of the poem is also an act of demystifi-
cation, for it determines the poem's existence in an everyday world of par-
ticulars, as opposed to the universalistic, hieratic realm of symbolist cor-
respondences.
To scan the direction of American poetry since the thirties, it
would seem that the lesson of the Objectivists' stand against mystification
has had little impact. In the dense outcropping of "academic" poetry that
accompanied New Criticism, a genteel taste for the wrangling of the Me-
taphysical Poets (among them Karl Shapiro, Delmore Schwartz, the Agrar-
ians, J. V. Cunningham, etc.) quickly degenerated into an full-blown "per-
sonality" cult that glorified the orneriness or eccentricity of the poet's private
genius, a cult (Theodore Roethke, John Berryman) that moves from the
braggadocio of decadent bodily consumption to the celebration of nervous
breakdown and finally suicide. Geoffrey Thurley describes these paeans to
the reified self as a "symptom of [mid-century] affluence," but perhaps he
is closer to the mark in his depiction of the campus poet of the fifties as a
"class eunuch." 11
363
 The radical tradition, by contrast, monumentally represented in
Donald Allen and Warren Tallman's 1960 anthology The New American
Poetry, is generally characterized by its dominant anti-intellectualism. As-
suming the unbridled Renaissance air of the sixties, many of the poets
represented in that anthology espoused the kind of political romanticism
that appealed to arcane and mystificatory images of "bardic" power-sha-
manism, orality, Orientalism, Americanism. "Hot" lives were valued over
and above the problematic of language and form. The theatricalization of
nonconformity and anticonventionality displaced the necessity of respond-
ing to the familiar, numbing strangeness or automatism of everyday life.
Above all, in most of the work of the Beats and the Black Mountaineers,
modernity-urban, technological, and massively commodifed-is either
passed over entirely for some preindustrial cause or else pilloried for its
dark Satanic birthright in Capital (if Vietnam was a crise de conscience for
many of these writers, it was more often than not cast in the same tech-
nological-voodoo drama-Ginsberg's Wichita Vortex Sutra is the best ex-
ample and is quite symptomatic); only the New York school stood by its
acceptance of modem life, even if that acceptance often took the form of
an undiscriminating optimism (a Forster-like faith in personal friendship),
the other side of the utopian coin. And as for the figures who fell outside
of these movements-Robert Bly, James Wright, Adrienne Rich, Robert
Lowell, and so on-their "topical" discussion of political questions reaf-
firmed the polite, social role of poetry as a recognized and largely innocuous
liberal organ.
Clearly, then (and we cannot say in spite ofthe Objectivists, if
only on account of their relative obscurity until recently), these transcen-
dental categories of "poet" and "poem" are dying hard. Aside from the
subjectivist/objectivist debate, however, it is, of course, the question of
language itself that has increasingly come to occupy the forefront of dis-
cussion about cultural autonomy with respect to modem writing. As a nos-
trum for Oppen's empirical defection from language, the counterexample
of Zukofsky's "survivalism" has been revalued in recent years. Eschewing
not only the International but every shred of activism in an age of the engage,
Zukofsky's alternative insistence on the value of intellectual labor comes
to a focus in his perception that history is to be found in language: in
utterance, measure, pitch, sound, particularity, and general craftsmanship.
There is a theoretical and practical clarity about Zukofsky' long
poem A-"the words are my life" -which is almost Leninist (the stance is
a studied one 12) in its balanced, intellectual inspiration. The debt to deter-
minism and necessity runs high throughout his work: in the objective, uni-
versal design of things-Bach's perception that "the order which rules music
is the same order that controls the placing of the stars"; in the determined,
or positioned, voice of the artist-"He who creates I Is a mode of these
inertial systems" ("A"-6); and even in the compositional principle he calls
the "Aleatorical Indeterminate," by which the linguistic play so boldly as-
serted in his poetry is everywhere subject to the necessity of strict musical
codes. A is not a "Marxist" poem (it has been described as "an epic of the
class struggle" 13), if that means, for example, "telling the story" of surplus
value. Nor, as Eisenstein sought to do in his films, does it attempt to embody
a formal, dialectical method to relay affect and information, the twin com-
ponents of the art of agit-prop. On the contrary, Zukofsky's example turns
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 Andrew Ross
on the desire to fully compose his personal experience of historical change
over the space offorty years of American politics. More important, however,
it involves something like an honest or respectful encounter with language
as a given medium, where other American writers have imposed their the-
oretical will on the medium, forcing it to comply with other, more "natural"
processes (Pound's ideographism, Olson's projectivism, the Beat rap, etc.).
Consequently, it is Zukofsky, not only as anti-iconoclast but also
as linguistic technocrat, who has been adopted as one of the chief precursors
of the "language" poetry movement that has made a powerful impact on
American writing in the last five or six years. In effect, the work that has
been characterized as language writing falls outside the more familiar tend-
encies I have touched on so far. In its political claims it exhibits. little or
no "partyness," at least wherever we can speak of political content; and in
its ideological bearing it is rigorously opposed to the dominant anti-intel-
lectualism of radical American writing. Much of this essay will be devoted
to discussing the consequences of this new hardheadedness in cultural and
social matters. I shall, of course, be concerned with describing some of the
more common features of the language movement, or at least those that
make a special appeal to discursive attention. The dangers of this should
be self-evident, however, for there is no excuse for commodifying, yet again,
the "aesthetic" line of a new school. Indeed, many of the writers involved
have been intent on guarding their work, in various ways, against this in-
evitable form of recognition by the culture industry, for there is a much
larger social project at stake, of which this "guarding against" can be in-
terpreted as both an internal symptom and a form of oppositional activity.
Let us assume that this double interpretation is not the result of
a traditional double-bind (the "natural" dilemma of the poet confronted
with an imperfect and uncomprehending world) but rather a contradiction
that can be analyzed at a number of levels-political, economic, and ideo-
logical-and in conjunction with some estimate of the complex social stand-
ing of the arts in America today. Within the context of this larger analysis,
we can pose the following question: In an age in which the established roles
of an avant-garde no longer exist, or have been stripped of all progressive
meanings (an age in which the countercultural gestures have all been played
out, and the traditional refuge of "poetic license" or "art for art's sake" is
no longer politically desirable), how does the old necessity of producing
some kind of oppositional response come into conflict with the new necessity
of recognizing or coming to terms with a massive commodification of ex-
perience governed by a rationality that increasingly insists that all culture
now is mass, or popular, culture? In addition, we shall want to ask what
form this conflict will assume; to what extent its terrain will be almost wholly
technocratic-the rejection of appeals to organicism, natural or social to-
talities, utopianism-and to what extent it will still find room for the classic
fetishism, for example, of Mayakofsky's revolutionary proviso-"the other
foot was still running along a side-street." 14
Before discussing in greater detail the work produced by the lan-
guage poets, it would be useful to consider very briefly some of the devel-
opments in Western Marxist theory that have made it possible for writers
now to present their work as politically sufficient in itself. Clearly, the broad-
est shift in emphasis has been in the relative autonomization of the notion
of ideology. Freed from the orthodox economic insistence on its secondary
365
 superstructural role as an illusory or "false" consciousness, determined at
every tum by the relations of production, ideological practices have in-
creasingly assumed the full significance of their "specific effectivity," which
Marx had barely acknowledged in his fitful discussions of aesthetics. 15 As a
result, the unitary world-picture of"society" as a mechanistic structure built
on a materialist base has been replaced by more multideterminate analyses,
like Althusser's "social formation," which recognizes the "specific effectiv-
ity" of human practices lived out in each of three regions: the economic,
political, and ideological.
This transformation, of course-from the causal dominance of
the mode of production to a less mechanistic model-is not the mere con-
sequence of a "barren" pursuit of theoretical sophistication (at a certain
stage in Althusser's own thinking, "theory," in the opinion of some of his
critics, took on more than its fair share of autonomy); 16 on the contrary, it
is a real response to the cumulative need, from the failure of the Western
proletarian revolutions onward, to account for the survival and growth of
capitalism. Various theories of mediation were therefore necessary as mod-
ifications of an earlier reflectionist thinking: Lenin's role for the Party as
vanguardist, Lukacs's account of the reification of human relations, Gram-
sci's notion of hegemony, and so on. In addition to developing more efficient
explanations for the constitutions of social structures, Marxist theorists also
pursued ways of accounting for capitalism's maintenance of social relations
as an effective medium for extending and reproducing its ideological dom-
inance. It is at this point that cultural practices come to be recognized as a
specific area of political conflict and change, and therefore as a material
praxis in their own right, available for oppositional activity. In short, the
theoretical conditions for a cultural revolution were now fully present, and
ideology became the privileged terrain of analysis in Western Marxism,
"sounded," as Perry Anderson puts it, "by thinker after thinker with an
imagination and precision that historical materialism had never deployed
here before." 17
For the most part, the materialist analysis of ideological relations
has based itself on various extensions of Marx's discussion of commodity
fetishism. For Lukacs, there was no doubt that commodification was "the
central structural problem of capitalist society in all of its aspects." 18 In
other words, the commodity character of a capitalist mode of production
based on an abstract system of exchange is just as much a social as an
economic effect. Consequently, social relations are reified and "veiled" to
the material producer, a set of circumstances that is then made to appear
"natural."
To say that this analytic concept ofreification (focused primarily,
for Lukacs, on the alienated "plight" of the humanist individual) can be
generalized to explain the universalization of capital's ideological domi-
nance, is to make room for later theories of consumer society saturation
like Baudrillard's, which describe the "no-win" option presented by late
capitalism. A further extension of this thinking has in fact resulted in the
various forms of post-Marxism (promulgated by the Gulag question), which
tum on resistance to the rationality of Marxist discourse itself, now per-
ceived by some as a repressive, totalizing project with little tolerance for
its dissidents, theoretical or otherwise. Without the time to properly describe
these developments, it would be useful to preserve the shift in strategic logic
366
 Andrew Ross
that they demonstrate; a shift from the humanist insistence on the priority
of delivering the individual from the alienated situation of commodity ex-
istence, to the emphasis on the priority of analyzing the rationality of sys-
tematic discourses, whether the discourse of reification or the discourse of
Marxist totalities. Such a distinction may only be meaningful if seen in
terms of a certain history of Marxist thinking; and, therefore, it may be
reductive to employ it as a way of delineating the differences between forms
of resistance that are possible today. Nonetheless, it does seem to put into
question some of the more popular conceptual ways of talking about op-
positional practice-and I am thinking in particular of the sixties debate
about working inside/outside or for/against the system. Clearly, it is this
metaphor of inside/outside that has had to be rethought, for there is no
more of a position "outside" ideology and commodification than there is
a place "outside" language.
The contradictions involved in developing such a position, how-
ever, can be seen in the work of the Frankfurt school. Committed to the
study of the nonmechanistic specificity of culture, their analysis of the "cul-
ture industry" as a development in the universalization of the commodity
form established, for the first time, the importance of examining the sig-
nificance of mass, or popular, culture. Few would deny, however, that mass
culture per se has a monolithically negative value for both Adorno and
Horkheimer; and for Marcuse, the distinction between negative material
(popular) culture and positive intellectual (high) culture is strictly observed
in his theoretical practice. Modernist "art," in effect, was seen as a refusal
of the one-dimensional permeation of mass culture, and therefore regarded
as a subversive force, a way of keeping one's head above the floodwaters.
The same kind of nostalgic proviso is evident in Adorno and Horkheimer's
lingering faith in what lies behind the "rationalization" of the world (We-
ber's term), a faith in the Enlightenment pursuit of rational self-interest that
has merely been "irrationally" organized, in advanced capitalism, into the
perverted form of instrumental reason (or technological rationality), geared
to subsuming and incorporating all oppositional forms into standardized
and bureaucratic systems. The rationality of the commodity system, then,
is real, but it is not the real rationality of human purpose (which exists
nonetheless-as in the classic proposition of Freudian fetishism).
If the Frankfurt critique has less relevance today than twenty
years ago, then perhaps this is indeed a consequence of the increasingly
systematic dominance of technological rationality and the related erosion
of oppositional circumstances; more than ever, perhaps, co-option is a prob-
lem of totalitarian proportions. There is, however, another theoretical per-
spective that bears on this question, and it is one that stems from a renegade
product of the Frankfurt school: Benjamin's studied belief in the positive
use of certain aspects of the technocratic apparatus, especially the radical
potential of mechanical reproduction. For Benjamin, there is no "other"
order of human relations behind the commodity system, no unalienated
realm of objectivity that is somehow more "real" than the reified present.
His claim for the mass cultural apparatuses in an age of mechanical repro-
duction is that they usurp the authority of the art cult of originality and
authenticity, replacing it with a new set of relations to the object-less stable,
less institutionalized, and much more secular-relations, in short, that are
themselves closer to the conditions for reproducibility and thus lend them-
367
selves to the radical project of a "functioning transformation" of mass cul-
ture. In Benjamin's critique, art is stripped of its higher rank and put to
work as a technocratic force in its own right, rather than mourned as a lost
comrade.
More recent theorists in this vein have not, generally, been willing
to share Benjamin's technological optimism. In the French tradition we
have seen the Situationists promote an exclusive faith in the liberation of
the individual from the alienation of the "spectacle"-their epistemological
model for all modern social relations. And Baudrillard has produced the
most exhaustive critique ofthe one-dimensional code of consumer society.
His particular analysis of the logic of consumption is worth examining here
because it asserts that there is no longer any counterhegemonic, or positiv-
istic, value to be found in the traditional Marxist options of "real" pro-
duction or "concrete" labor; the positing of use value as the materialist
underside of exchange value is no longer viable in a commodity system that
presents its medium of exchange as a "nonreflecting surface." 19
Baudrillard's working metaphor (and it is much more than a
metaphor or model) for this instant readability of the whole system is "the
smooth operational surface of communication," 20 for it is not just the com-
modity object itself but the whole system of objects, or its meaning, that is
consumed at every turn. Baudrillard therefore extends Marx's critique of
political economy to a critique of the economy of signification, which semi-
otics has provided as an analytic code for explaning all systems, and finds
the same logic of exploitation and domination at work there. To put it
crudely, signifier and signified correspond to exchange value and use value.
Within the free circulation of a commodity system, however, the signifier
is always exchanged like a sign, offering itself as full value, in the absence
of a signified. As a result, both codes, that of signification and of commodity,
are seen to rest on the "abstract equation of all values." 21 All meanings are
equal, and therefore the illusion of democratic choice is perpetuated, yet
again, for the consumer.
One of the possible cultural uses to be made of Baudrillard's
analysis of the "code of general equivalence" is its contribution to a critique
of a modernism bound to the politics of the signifier. In this respect, the
easy lure of the polysemic served up for reader and critic alike-the right
to produce an infinity of meanings out of any particular text-would only
serve to reproduce the polyvalence of the system itself. All meanings, again,
are equal and thus can be exchanged without endangering the abstract logic
of the system. If the modernism of Mallarme and Joyce, brought to cul-
mination in the poetics of Tel Quel, has largely been perceived as an attack
on the rationalism of the Cartesian subject, then it can also be interpreted,
now, as a way of helplessly reproducing the rationality of commodification
that has everywhere incorporated the liberationary strategies of modernism.
Such are the rapidly changing ethics of political literacy.
In its most general terms, then, we can characterize the recent
cultural withdrawal from modernism as a shift from the critique of ration-
alism to a critique of universalism (or, rather, the rationality of universal-
ization). For writers, this has meant modifying the traditional militancy
against what Marcuse calls the "operationalism" or "functionalization" of
language-the instrumental identification of"things and their functions" 22-
and taking up instead either of two alternatives (which are not mutually
368
 Andrew Ross
exclusive): first, the less glamorous task of adopting wholesale the terms or
conditions of this "functionalizing" process, thereby feigning complicity in
order to foreground and reveal the working codes of any institutional dis-
course (a practice that has its relevance, as I shall argue, to the language
poet's project but is primarily associated with the Image Scavenger pho-
tographers-Barbara Kruger, Richard Prince, Sherrie Levine, Cindy Sher-
man, etc.); and second, the maverick use of transcultural pastiche-a con-
sciously undoctored infusion of high and mass culture-in order to counteract
the purity value of Literature for the culture industry (Kathy Acker's fearless
experiments with popular fiction are a striking example).
In the context of American writing under consideration here, it
is problematic to speak of values, structures, or traditions inherited from a
modernist avant-garde. Moreover, it has often been pointed out that the
political thrust of the historical avant-garde (notwithstanding its own "fail-
ure," a fact that cannot simply be explained away by pointing to its suppres-
sion at the hands of fascism and Stalinism), in its crusade to dissolve the
institution of "autonomous" art, failed to carry over into a postwar intel-
lectual and artistic milieu that was itself to be brutally depoliticized by the
McCarthy era. More often than not, however, this essentially nostalgic per-
spective has served neoconservative interests as much as it has benefited
the American cultural Left. Indeed, the current, lively debate over the con-
ceptual validity of the term "avant-garde" is also a struggle for the political
soul ofpostmodernism. Is postmodernism an ahistorical free-for-all in which
supply-side critical theory rubs shoulders with the panstylistic mercenaries
of the culture industry? Or is it still committed to attacking the power to
define cultural meanings exercised by the ideological apparatuses of this
same culture industry, a critique of similar proportions to that of the his-
torical avant-garde but mounted on different terms and in accord with dif-
ferent strategies?23
Without wishing to complicate this debate needlessly, it is im-
portant to recognize, again, that there are different social, economic, and
ideological elements involved in the cultural makeup of any radical or "avant-
garde" art practice, and therefore it is often quite reductive to speak of an
avant-garde "tradition," as if it were an imprimatur to which new groups
can have equal historical and geographical access. The very least we can
say is that all avant-garde practices work in oppositional proximity to their
specific institutional discourses: art-the gallery and the museum; writing-
the trade publishing houses; theater-Broadway; film-Hollywood; music-
concert halls; and for all of these, the various review circuits, the academy,
and, ultimately, their place in cultural histories.
Unlike other "language"-oriented groups elsewhere (Tel Quel in
France, Gruppo 63 in Italy, even the Noigandres circle in Brazil), there
exists no centralized social, political, and ideological role for an avant-garde
among American writers. The ideological thrust of the Beats, for example,
such as it was, came closest to national attention purely on account of its
media impact as an easily aestheticized life-style. Instead of a centralized
avant-garde, then, there are what Ron Silliman has called "networks" and
"scenes," distinguished by their specific social organizations-the Objectiv-
ists, Black Mountain-who depend on contact through correspondence and
thus generally manifest a much more homogeneous aesthetic than those
writers who belong to a scene-Bolinas, St. Marks, NaropajBoulder, North
369
Beach-randomly composed of more community elements. 24 Moreover, the
situation whereby different groups constantly vie for some kind of temporary
dominance over the national scene is not a simple effect of what is habitually
passed off as the "natural" decenteredness of American life. On the contrary,
this phenomenon of the "poetry wars" is largely determined by the exclusive
practices of a publishing industry that consistently ensures that the most
progressive writing is denied widespread distribution, unlike the practices
in other countries where the avant-garde often enjoys a traditionally ac-
cepted, if not prominent, place on major publisher's lists and where there
is a ritually acknowledged line of succession to that privileged place. As Jed
Rasula puts it, "in terms of the critical apparatus that dominates the review
media, 'American poetry' consists only of that portion of poets published
with a university press or a New York trade publisher's imprimatur." 25 Of
course, as little as 3 percent of all American poetry is published by these
presses, while over 90 percent of the contents of any single anthology ori-
ented toward the lucrative college course reading list market is likely to be
drawn from those collections with the well-known poetry imprimaturs26-
Atheneum, Viking, Norton, Random House, Penguin, Wesleyan, Yale.
Inasmuch as one can speak of a commodity market in poetry,
the evidence of the small-press revolution of the last few decades (based on
developments in offset printing technology and supported by extensive NEA
subsidization), with its thin web of distribution outlets nationwide, has had
little impact on the dominant patterns of distribution and consumption;
after almost fifty years, New Directions, a pioneer, is still a marginal figure
in terms of its review drawing power, while other reliable houses like Black
Sparrow, The Figures, Jargon, and even City Lights, have a commercial
credit that is negligible in proportion to the radical influence of the writers
they publish. This last observation, of course, invites conclusive judgments
about the extracommercial value of certain writers, an evaluative path I
have no intention of pursuing here. Suffice it to say that Poetry published
by the major presses is generally, as one might expect, more easily "con-
sumed" than less well distributed writing; to give just one example, the John
Ashbery published now by Viking/Penguin is easier to "read" (an activity
that has too many social, economic, and ideological determinations for it
to have purely cognitive effects) than the John Ashbery of, say, the Ecco
Press, from the seventies.
Where, then, do the language poets fit into this global pattern?
As a group, they are organized around two specific "scenes" in the Bay Area
and the urban New York area respectively, with some "network" elements
(though by no means homogeneous or noncontradictory) existing between
the two. Predominantly white, baby-boom, middle-class, and heterosexual, 27
with a prominent role claimed by women, both scenes have displayed a
commitment to investigating the aesthetic and ideological components of
a group practice: there are, for example, no manifesto or leading figures to
point to, for in many respects it is the idea of the Poet within an authorial
tradition that is in question: "the individual ... needs to be defined not as
a single isolated Romantic individual but as a methodological practice learned
in active collective work with other's reading and writing.... It is to bring
back a visceral understanding of the collective nature of consciousness that
I suggest the things I do. The centrality of the inscription of the individual
cannot be subverted. The nature ofthat inscription is 'our' investigation." 28
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 Andrew Ross
In contrast, then, to the inherited structure of the writers' group or com-
munity as an instrumental support for a more coherently propagated "voice,"
here is an integrated community, urban, residential, and largely nonboh-
emian, intent on generating productive resistance through collective practice
to the commodification of such a "voice." In terms of publication and
distribution, a series of ongoing poetics debates and presentations of new
work have appeared in journals created as specific group outlets over the
last ten years: This, Roof, Tottel's, Qu, A Hundred Posters, miam, Hills,
L=A=N=G= U=A=G=E, and Poetics Journal, as well as the respective
presses of This, Segue, Tuumba, Roof, and The Figures. As important,
however, has been the use of other discourses, not just to support the mar-
ginal distribution of the poetry, but also to critique, again, the transcendental
Poet who only writes or speaks pure poetry: the notorious espousal of theory-
oriented discourse, the highly successful and exotic Poet's Theater, and the
gradual displacement of the poetry reading by the specific cultural form of
the "talk"-public presentations that range, in their incorporation of
"marked" elements, from the discursive edges of performance art to the
more inflexible margins of the formal lecture29 (again, however, it is im-
portant to point to the economic and political determinations of this seem-
ingly "autonomous" form of cultural discourse). 30 There remains a precar-
ious but effective distinction between putting these formations to work as
a way of better propagating an "aesthetic" line or message and employing
them as a means of analyzing the construction of a collective, social ex-
periment in writing: the full recognition that "poetry gets shaped-informed
and transformed-by the social relations of publication, readership, corre-
spondence, readings, etc. (or historically seen, the 'tradition'), and indeed,
that poetry community(ies) are not a secondary phenomenon to writing but
a primary one." 31
On an intermediate level, somewhere between the commodity
form of the "book" itself and the question of the commodification of lan-
guage, there have been numerous recent attempts to reinterpret material
forms of resistance to the transparent activity of reading. One can point to
Hannah Weiner and Johanna Drucker's respective experiments with ty-
pographic variation; the extraordinary rhythmical density of David Mel-
nick's zaum poems (after the Cubo-futurist manner of Khlebnikov and
Kruchemyk); the graphic exploration of space and page in the work ofPeter
Inman and Robert Grenier; the sometime asyntactic field poetry of Clark
Coolidge, Bernadette Mayer, and Bruce Andrews; and, on a different level,
the fragile performance-oriented "monologues" of Steve Benson. It is im-
portant to distinguish these individual projects, on the one hand, from the
specific epistemological claims of the (now largely defunct) concrete poetry
movement, claims that were essentially related to problems of visual per-
ception, whereas most of these writers are engaged with problems of cog-
nitive perception; and, on the other hand, with the more general ethos of
the modernist emphasis on the autonomy and materiality (early and late
modernism, respectively) of the word. Indeed, for the sake of polemical
convenience, we might contrast the so-called modernist Revolution of the
Word, more often than not a reassertion of the divinity of the Word, with
Shklovsky's "Resurrection of the Word": "The aim of Futurism is the res-
urrection of things-the return to man of the sensation of the world." 32
Rather than eschew the world for a better idea of it, the aim of much of
371
 language writing, in agreement with Shklovsky's proposition, would be to
return us to the world in different ways, through a series of cognitive-per-
ceptual shocks.
In a synthesis that is, of course, much more than a synthesis of
these two slogans, we are confronted now with the more universal question
of Jameson's "Prison-House of Language." (Lyn Hejinian puts it baldly:
where once one sought a vocabulary for ideas, now one seeks ideas for
vocabularies. " 33) The proposition that language is not about the world but
is in the world itself has had as many serious political and epistemological
ramifications in recent years as Marx's famous thesis on Feuerbach, which
it both resembles and, perhaps, supersedes: "The philosophers have only
interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it."
Language is no longer merely "practical consciousness," as Marx put it in
The German Ideology; it is also seen as the "constructive" fabric of social
reality. To ignore the need to respond consciously to that process oflinguistic
mediation and construction is to effectively renounce any hope of partial
understanding, let alone control, of that social reality. Such a response,
moreover, for writers as much as anyone, involves the acknowledgment of
the extent to which dominant political codes, the system of capital and the
traces of its history, are on "display" in the language we use. Responding,
then, to the givenness of language is also to respond politically to the in-
strumentality of these codes and the way in which they effortlessly circulate
the "natural" meanings of ideological life according to Baudrillard's golden
commodity rule of "general equivalence."
One of the dominant impulses of modem American writers has
been to act on language rather than within it. As a result, modernist Amer-
ican poetry has consisted, in its radical element, of a series of attempts to
force language to conform to some theoretical ideal-the natural, kinetic
flux of organic processes-or to reproduce certain ideological qualities of
"American" discourse-spontaneity, directness, sincerity, heroism, authen-
ticity-as a way of capturing the "raw" American, as opposed to the "cooked"
European voice. Whatever genuinely liberating value "free verse" had for
the early modernists, the history of its development as a writing medium
in America is also the history of a remarkable complicity with a system that
fosters and markets the lived illusion of the "free" as its chief set of ideo-
logical meanings. From the various restagings of serious Whitmanesque
thunder to the inimitable kitsch nonchalance of Frank O'Hara's "just free
that's all, never argue with the movies," 34 writers have failed to actively
recognize that the celebration of liberationary formal means is the specific
form of American political internment. Behind the lure of autonomism is
the cunning of automatism.
In their critique of this same automatism-the universalization
of perceptual habits that sustains and is sustained by the commodity sys-
tem-various language writers have responded to the need for certain his-
torical projects. Ron Silliman has sketched out a rough "history of refer-
entiality" dating from the impact of the emergence of capitalism on the arts
and tracing the subsequent fetishization of the instrumentalist conception
of language. 35 Charles Bernstein has been involved in examining, histori-
cally, the increasing standardization of expository writing as a process that
sacrifices method for universal forms: "As a mode, contemporary expository
writing edges close to being merely a style of decorous thinking, rigidified
372
 Andrew Ross
and formalized to a point severed from its historical relation to method in
Descartes and Bacon. It is no longer an enactment of thinking or reasoning
but a representation (or simplification) of an eighteenth-century ideal of
reasoning. And yet the hegemony of its practice is rarely questioned outside
of certain poetic and philosophic contexts." 36
In looking for historical models of opposition to this contem-
porary plain style, much of Barrett Watten's work has been devoted to
following through the consequences of the Russian formalist emphasis on
defamiliarization: the willful use of grammatical "devices" that counterpoint
rhythmical insistence with unexpected semantic shifts, as a means of ren-
ovating the reader's perceptionY Watten's aim is to explore not only the
cognitive but also the social effects of a limited kind of syntactical activity.
But this is not to revive the old homology between formal and social dis-
junction. On the contrary, what is foregrounded by these experiments with
parallelism, subordination, and other grammatical elements is the language
system itself and its otherwise transparent methods of circulating meaning
(while the easy Luddism of smashing this system of language relations is
replaced by the practice of constructing new relations within the system).
In this respect, Hejinian's comment on the book jacket of Silliman's Tjant-
ing is symptomatic: "The reader recognizes every word." First, there is no
poetic arcane, and thus the writing can acknowledge the rhythmic require-
ments of everyday life. (Watten says, "It is possible, in fact, to read this
book on the bus.") Second, beyond this fresh appeal to a realism there is
also an appeal to fresh perception, not as an end pursued in itself, but
through a recognition of the universality ("every word") oflanguage relations
and our complicity with their "hegemonic" ways.
The net result is a claim for the importance of writing that at-
tempts to expose our patterns of consumption at the commodity level of
meaning. Clearly, this is no celebration of the utopian reader, free to produce
meanings at will, in response to the open invitation of canonical post-
structuralism. Nor is it the celebration of a liberationary, utopian language,
like the surrealists' discourse of contradictions. The construction of a future,
utopian or otherwise, lies instead in a technologically planned present, or
more properly, in the shock of recognizing the fully systematic domination
of the present. Bernstein, for example, describes the familiar experience of
reification: "What purports to be an experience is transformed into the blank
stare of the commodity-there only to mirror our projections with an un-
seemly rapidity possible only because no experience of 'other' is in it. " 38
The traditional response of modernist writers would be to celebrate this
"other" (use value, phonic excess, polysemy), a privilege that poetry can
afford and everyday discourse cannot. The response of today's political
writer is to demonstrate why that "other" is not there in commodified lan-
guage use.
If we had to isolate, fetishistically, any one common feature of
the language poet's practice, it would be the complex socioaesthetic focus
on sentence construction within much of their work-an effect that has been
called, albeit far from unequivocally, the new sentence. 39 Accordingly, its
formal characteristics are described in such a way as to ensure maximum
opportunity for reinterpretation. Set within a larger variable structure, like
the paragraph, the new sentence is perceived as a flexible coordinate, at once
a unit of measure, a relatively autonomous element of syllogistic
373
(dis)continuity, and a wholly autonomous object of cognitive attention. Here
are a few examples:

We came to the landing place with buck knives and

whale grease for the job. The garbage had yet to be
put out. Barges up and down the river intersected long
treeless vistas of acquisition. Sugar in the pan was
pornography in the minds of men. That intimacy saved
for green grass. Your flow. A product said, "Hit me
with a club." We were about the world, high above
apartment houses. You couldn't cross the channel
necking on the bridge. After the waldorf salad came
virgilian fortitude. I thought I wanted to intend and
determine.
Jean Day
"Ticonderoga"

An approximation of love began to haunt him, deny

him nothing. Beige afternooons wedged under sky for
miles. On the screen gorgeous creatures fly off the han-
dle. Partners time the pauses between gestures. One
horizon lowers while the other lifts. He sat next to her
in class, trying vainly to control the pseudopod that
flowed toward her. They're my hands. The possessive
dutifully dispersed over the hayfield.
Bob Perelman
"a.k.a."

The back of the head resting on the pillow was not

wasted. We couldn't hear each other speak. The puddle
in the bathroom, the sassy one. There were many years
between us. I stared the stranger into facing up to Max-
ine, who had come out of the forest bad from wet
nights. I came from an odd bed, a vermillion riot at-
tracted to loud dogs. Nonetheless, I could pay my rent
and provide for him. On this occasion she apologized.
An arrangement that did not provoke inspection. Out-
side on the stagnant water was a motto. He more than
I perhaps though younger. I sweat at amphibians, man-
aged to get home. The sunlight from the window played
up his golden curls and a fist screwed over one eye.
Right to left and left to right until the sides of her body
were circuits. While dazed and hidden in the room,
he sang to himself, severe songs, from a history he
knew nothing of. Or should I say malicious? Some
rustic gravure soppy but delicate at pause. I wavered,
held her up. I tremble, jack him up ....
Carla Harryman,
"For She"
374
 Andrew Ross
The music is not of my choosing.
The enormous seaminess throws a textbook punch.
But it wasn't the stars that thrilled me.
Alan Bernheimer
"Word of Art"
On the level of traditional poetics, the new sentence has none of
the fixed quantitative appeal of its predecessors in the field of prosodic
innovation-the move from the foot to the line, to the syllable, and to the
breath, marked by a whole series of poetic events such as Pound's Cathay,
Williams's Spring and All, Olson's The Distances, and Ginsberg's Howl. A
more relevant referent would be Gertrude Stein (the Jamesian sentence and
the Hemingway sentence are actually fixed ideological qualities rather than
experiments in quantitative measure) or the French tradition of the prose
poem. The defamiliarizing devices within the sentence, and the syntactical
renovation that is worked through between sentences, are part of a process
aimed at the consistent decontextualization of the present tense; not the
symbolist's infinite present, nor Stein's painstaking exhaustion of the pres-
ent, but a regeneration of the common diversity of the present through the
labor of compositional technique. As a formal medium, the range of aes-
thetic advantages offered by the new sentence is considerable: multiplicity
of points of view, the restricted pleasure of "jump-cutting," narrative ex-
perimentation, the capacity to accommodate a limitless variety of infor-
mation, marked discourses, voice, personality, and so on.
To assess the full rationality of the new sentence, however, it is
necessary to step outside poetics and point to the instrumentality of the
sentence as a discursive element grounded in social communication. The
ability to form and complete sentences is both a class marker and a func-
tional index of practical efficiency in a technocratic world. In the same way
the genteel "organic" art-sentence (now largely the discursive preserve of
academe) used to betoken a social distance or aloofness from "trade," so
now the functionalist sentence is an act of disavowal, not only in its med-
itated obscurantist ambitions (newspeak-"War Is Peace, Peace Is War";
Marcuse's surrealistic examples of bureaucratic contradiction: "Labor is
seeking Missile Harmony"; etc.), but also in its simulation oflogical control
and classification, behind which lies the largely autonomous reality of the
ceaseless circulative capacity of the system. It is at the level of the sentence,
then, as the central symbolic form of the social fabric, that meaning is
exchanged, which is to say, culturally received, accepted, and consumed by
the individual. The decision to work, then, at the level of the sentence rather
than at the archaic or "imaginary" level of the nonsyntactical fragment is
in many respects the result of a political choice; it represents a decision to
meet with the political realities of a shared discursive condition and not to
insist on the rarefied rhetorical plane writers are inclined to protectively
regard as their inherited polemical turf.
The willfulness ofthis decision is particularly apparent in Barrett
Watten's writing. In contrast to the traditional poetic affection for Anglo-
Saxon diction, or to the more recent ludic appeal of etymologizing, much
ofWatten's language use is singularly Latinate and technologicalist, insisting
on the concrete austerity of its object status: "No wires account for I Failure
of specific response. 1A triangle gives, I circles branch out. Forced I Exposure
375
to limit distorts" (.. Position"). Elsewhere, the ..sentence-producing" mech-
anism is foregrounded, its monochromatic rhythms variably transformed:
Let no one consider the original noise.
Outside there's noise. Time doesn't print.
A bar of sulfur lies on a mahogany table. From this
point to the frontier is exact.
The distance between yourself and what you are in-
tended to see.
Steam-driven pilings hold up the bridge like logs under
the feet of sunburnt slaves rolling !-beams to their des-
ignated resting place on a riverbank in Kansas .
.. Relays"
The flagrant denial of .. voice" and ..body" here is an internal critique of
the aura of poetic authenticity. In renouncing this aura, the writing begins
to conform to what Benjamin perceived as the radical condition of mass-
produced art forms-a capacity to find value in the fact of reproducibility
and turn it to popular advantage.
Again, it is not enough to merely celebrate this quality of re-
producibility. In some of Watten's work, the automatic rhythm is com-
pressed into more dialectical forms and assumes the density of units of
intellectual montage:
I
The world is complete.
Books demand limits.
II
Things fall down to create drama.
The materials are proof
III
Daylight accumulates in photos.
Bright hands substitute for sun.
IV
Crumbling supports undermine houses.
Connoisseurs locate stress.
.. Complete Thought"
Here, repetition has been replaced by the effect of reproducibility taken up
in its properly contradictory forms. As Watten puts it, .. The train ceaselessly
reinvents the station" (with its hint ofSaussure's .. 9:10 Geneva Express"):
the practice of parole transforms, rather than conforms to, the theoretical
shape of langue. Above all, however, what is important is that we recognize
and accept the quota of readers' work involved in this kind of poetry. For
once, there is the sense that a fair deal has been struck; the labor of com-
position is somehow equal to the labor of reading, and so the readers share
meaning rather than merely responding to the writer's meaning, or else
producing their own at will. The result is somewhere between the ease of
consumption and the headache of comprehension. Watten's work neither
hands out privileges nor jealously guards its own. It formulates action.
376
 Andrew Ross
What this last phrase calls to mind, yet again, is that the param-
eters of conceptual categories like .. formalism" have shifted considerably
over the past fifty years. If Brecht was correct to insist on the supra-aesthetic
dimensions offormalism-.. When I read that the autarky of the Third Reich
is perfect on paper, then I know that this is a case of political formalism" 40-
we no longer share his need to formulate an alternative concept of realism
to uphold as a political nostrum. This is not to say that we cannot share
his generous and broad-minded conceptual understanding of realism. On
the contrary, what I have tried to suggest is that the imperative of political
realism no longer means keeping aloof from the dominant political for-
malism, which is to say, the commodity forms of meaning. Indeed, the
realism of writers today is that they can engage this sense of form on its
own terms, in order to expose the universality of its codes. Realism, in this
sense, is not at odds with a conception of formalism but rather with other,
..unrealistic" attempts to construct a subversive space completely outside
commodity formalism. Moreover, not only these aesthetic categories offor-
malism and realism have been displaced, or shifted ground, but so has the
very idea of an .. aesthetics" itself. As Lyn Hejinian puts it (ofWilliam Carlos
Williams's position poem), .. There will never be another red wheelbarrow,
and that very clearly is the type of the fate of any single realism. " 41
Clearly, we are also discussing the fate of Marxist aesthetics, a
tradition in which there have only been highly circumscribed roles for poets:
the bureaucratic myth of Mayakofskyism, the neo-Byronic freedom fighter,
the MaoistjConfucian slogan lyricist. Lukacs has almost nothing to say
about poetry, and in recent years, Jameson, Macherey, and Eagleton have
each, in their own ways, reasserted the traditionally dominant Marxist con-
cern with narrative, and specifically the novel genre. One of the major
reasons for this neglect is the ideology of poethood itself and the exclusionary
privileges associated with its most resistant quality, that of poetic license.
Of course, I am not suggesting that in spite ofthis time-honored conception
poets suddenly have the opportunity to be ideological watchdogs. What I
argue is that we can interpret the evidence of this serious project undertaken
by the language poets as a sign that a certain conception of Marxist aesthetics
has perhaps matured, if not wholly come of age, and most significant of all,
in America.
To conclude, we should acknowledge, for the last time, the im-
portant historical referent of the thirties. Here is Roman Jakobson, stylishly
mourning .. the generation that squandered its poets": .. There are some coun-
tries where ladies' hands are kissed, and others where one merely says, 'I
kiss your hand.' There are countries where Marxist theory is answered by
Leninist practice and countries where the madness of the bold, the bonfire
of faith and the Golgotha of the poet are not merely figurative expres-
sions.... " 42 It would be polemically apposite to follow this with a different
rhetorical challenge written from a different point of view and grounded in
the different political-aesthetic realities of today. It is not that I cannot think
of at least one or two examples. What makes such a gesture impossible is
the fact that rhetoric no longer acts as agent provocateur; it has a different
agency and a different object that are just as much internally located as
externally projected toward. It is this general shift in the theory and practice
of radical writing that I have been examining, and, in the instance of Amer-
ican poetry, I have tried to describe some of the historical, social, and
377
ideological contexts for that shift. There is more than enough evidence today
ofpostmodemist literary and art practices that are seriously politicized. The
achievement of these practices is that they are making an art out of the
constantly assimilated position in which they find themselves. By contrast,
the problem of the intellectual's weary anxiety about co-option persists: How
do we tell the real thing from its simulation? The point is, there is no "real
thing." Writers and artists have been saying it, and Marxism will have to
speak to it.

Notes

These lines are from an earlier draft of a chapter in Mary Oppen, Meaning a Life: An Au-
tobiography(Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow, 1978). which appeared 1n Ironwood, 5 (1975).
p. 58.
2 Interview with Charles Amirkhan1an and David Gitin, Ironwood, 5 (1975), p. 23.
3 Kenner. of course. has been one of the most successful apologists for Pound. Notwithstand-
ing the consequences of th1s k1nd of apology, 1nasmuch as it coincides with an apology for
poetry tout court, one might want to begin by asking Hans Magnus Enzensberger' s question
of all the plaintiffs against poetry: Why is it always poetry as a whole that is put on trial? On
this point. Plato stands 1n the same camp as traditional Marxist aesthet1c1ans. See Enzens-
berger's sweeping "Poetry and Politics," Critical Essays, ed. Reinhold Grumm and Bruce
Armstrong, trans. M1chael Roloff (New York: Continuum, 1982).
4 Oppen's answer to Brecht, however, reads as if it m1ght also be the grounds of a response
to Enzensberger's question posed above: "The actually forbidden word Brecht. of course,
could not wnte. It would be something like aesthetic. But the definition of the good life is
necessarily an aesthetic definition, and the mere fact of democracy has not formulated it,
nor 1f 1t is achieved, will the mere fact of an extension of democracy, though I do not mean
of course that restriction would do better." From "The Mind's Own Place," Kulchur. 3:10
(Summer 1963). p 8.
5 Charles Olson. Charles Olson and Ezra Pound: An Encounter at St. Elizabeth's, ed. Cathenne
Seelye (New York: GrossmansNiking, 1975), p 53.
6 Oppen, Meaning a Life, p. 136.
7 The terms are Althusser' s, or are associated primarily with Althusser' s critique of Marxist
humanism, but the reaction against these tendencies can be traced back through Gramsci,
Lukacs, and Lenin to Engels's attempts at "revisionism" after Marx's death.
8 See Terry Eagleton's extravagant discussion of BenJamin's description of the flaneur as a
self-contradictory commodity form in Walter BenJamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism
(London: Verso, 1981).
9 "Mayan Letters." Selected Writmgs. ed. Robert Creeley (New York: New Directions, 1966).
p. 82.
10 Preposttions: The Collected Critical Essays of Louis Zukofsky (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1981).p.12.
11 Geoffrey Thurley, The American Moment: American Poetry in the Mid-Century (London: Ed-
ward Arnold, 1977). pp. 184, 36.
12 "Lenin mvented . . a new medium, something between speech and action, which is worth
... study." Zukofsky quoting Pound in Eric Mottram, "1924-1951: Politics and Form in
Zukofsky," Maps. 5 ( 1973). p. 76.
13 Contributor's note to New Directions m Prose and Poetry, ed. James Laughlin (New York:
New Directions, 1938).
14 Roman Jakobsen. "The Generation That Squandered Its Poets," Literature and Revolution,
ed. Jacques Ehrmann (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). p. 125.
15 For a concise and evenhanded account of the abandonment of economism, see Raymond
Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," Problems in Materialism and
Culture (London: Verso, 1980).
16 Althusser's response to cnticism, in Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. Graham Lock (London:
New Left Books, 1976). includes his famous confession of and apology for "theoreticism."

378
 Andrew Ross
17 "In the final days of Western Marxism, one can, indeed, speak of a veritable hypertrophy of
the aesthetic-which came to be surcharged w1th all the values that were repressed or denied
elsewhere in the atrophy of living social 1st politics: utopian images of the future, ethical maxims
for the present, were displaced and condensed into vaulting meditations on art with which
Adorno or Sartre concluded much of their life's work." Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of
Historical Materialism (London: Verso, 1983). p. 17.
18 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1971 ), p. 82.
19 Baudrillard· s attack on the concept of ·'production'' can be found in The Mirror of Production,
trans. Mark Poster (St Louis: Telos Press. 1975).
20 "The Ecstasy of Communication," The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed.
Hal Foster (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay Press. 1983). p. 127.
21 "Towards a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign," For a Critique of the Political
Economy of the Stgn, trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981). p. 150. Anal-
ternative metaphorical model for the circulation and exchange of Information would be Der-
rida's "postal state"-the product, as he sees it, of the historical development of capitalism
and the process of postal rationalization. Derrida's counterprinciple-"a letter can always
not reach its destination" -is an appeal to the undecidability of reception/consumption, as
opposed to production. See La carte postale (Paris: Flammarion, 1980).
22 Marc use is quoting Stanley Gerr on "the linguistic tendency 'to cons1der the names of things
as being indicative at the same time of their manner of functioning, and the names of prop-
erties and processes as symbolical of the apparatus used to detect or produce them.' "
From One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston:
Beacon Press. 1964). pp. 86-87.
23 To choose two symptomatiC manifestations of this debate, Peter BUrger's neglect of con-
temporary art practices in Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), could profitably be balanced against BenJamin Such-
low's incisive rev1ew of Burger's book, "Theorizing the Avant-Garde," Art in America (Nov.
1984). pp. 19-21. For an argument that considers both sides but leans toward Burger's,
see Andreas Huyssen, "The Search for Tradition: Avant-Garde and Postmodernism in the
1970s," New German Critique, 22 (Winter 1981), pp. 23-40.
24 Ron Silliman, "The Political Economy of Poetry," L=A=N= G= U=A= G=E (Open Letter
5:1). vol. 4, pp. 60-65. For a full-blown analysis of the commercial nepotism that regulates
social groupings among American intellectuals, see Richard Kostelanetz's "naming names"
expose of the "New York literary mob" and others in The End of Intelligent Writing-Literary
PolitiCS in America (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1974).
25 See Jed Rasula's revealing "year by year listing of books of poetry prominently reviewed in
the trade press. as denved from the Book Review Index." The percentage of reviews devoted
to small-press books is, of course, infinitesimal, while writers who have had both trade and
small-press publishers have "benefited" or "suffered" respectively from the disparity in the
attention paid to their work. Rasula's intention IS to show how the representation of Poetry
IS produced, not to argue that well-known writers are more mediocre than small-press writers.
See "The Role of Critics and the Emperor's New Clothes in American Poetry," Sulfur, 9
(1984), pp. 149-67.
26 Silliman, "The Political Economy of Poetry."
27 Silliman, for example, comments on the radical difference between the content-specific ori-
entation of minority, oppressed, or gay/lesbian writers, on the one hand, and the "purely
aesthetic" schools of white middle-class writers, on the other. He argues that "in fact the
aesthetics of those (latter] schools is a direct result of ideological struggle. . It is char-
acteristic of the class situation of these schools that this struggle is carried on in other
(aesthetic) terms." From "The Political Economy of Poetry," p. 62.
28 Response by Charles Bernstein to Silliman's comments on his "Thought's Measure,"
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, vol. 4, p. 22.
29 A representative selection of the early "talks" is in Hills, 6, and a later selection has been
published as Writmg!Talks, ed. Bob Perelman (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1985). Poet's Theater scripts are published in Hills, 9.
30 In the case of the later talks, for example, many of which are subsidized through arts centers
in the form of writers' residence grants from the NEA, one has to consider the NEA's erratic
decisions in recent years to cut residency grants for artists and to axe critics' grants altogether,
while leaving the writers' quota largely intact The ideological constraints of working under
state sponsorship are familiar enough. The NEA, perceived as a national ornament, enjoyed
its most prominent period of financ1al and Ideological autonomy under the Nixon administra-
tion. The contrast with its impoverished condition under the New Right, which perceives it

379
 as a purely ideological organ, is quite stnking. On some recent developments-the political
overridmg of the "peer-panel" system for grant distnbution, the preferential treatment of
m1d-career as opposed to younger artists-see Catherine Lord, "The President's Man: The
Arts Endowment under Frank Hodzoll," Afterimage, 10:7 (Feb. 1983).
31 Charles Bernstein, "The Conspiracy of 'Us'," The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, ed.
Charles Bernstein and Bruce Andrews (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Umversity Press, 1984),
pp. 186-87.
32 Viktor Shklovsky, "The Resurrection of the Word," Twentieth-Century Studies, 7/8 (Dec.
1972), p. 41.
33 "If Written Is Wnting," The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, p. 29.
34 Quoted by Bill Berkson in "Talk," Hills, 617 (Spring 1980), p. 19.
35 Ron Silliman, "Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World," The L=A=N=
G=U=A=G=E Book, pp. 121-32.
36 Charles Bernstein, "Wnt1ng and Method," Poetics Journal, 3 ( 1983), p. 8.
37 Barrett Watten, "Russian Formalism and the Present," Hills, 617 (Spnng 1980), pp. 50-74.
38 Charles Bernstein, "The Dollar Value of Poetry," The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, p.
140.
39 "1) The paragraph organizes the sentences; 2) The paragraph is a unit of quantity, not logic
or argument; 3) Sentence length is a unit of measure; 4) Sentence structure is altered for
torque, or Increased polysemy/amb1gu1ty; 5) Syllogistic movement IS a) limited b) controlled;
6) Pnmary syllog1stic movement is between the preceding and following sentences; 7) Sec-
ondary syllogistic movement is toward the paragraph as a whole, or the total work; 8) The
limiting of syllogistic movement keeps the reader's attention at or very close to the level of
language, that is most often at the sentence level or below." From Ron Silliman, "The New
Sentence," Hills, 617, (Spring 1980), p. 216.
40 Bertold Brecht, "On the Formalistic Character of the Theory of Realism," in Ernst Bloch et
al., Aesthetics and Politics, ed. Ronald Taylor (London: New Leh Books, 1977), p. 72.
41 Quoted from "Footnotes," a collage of comments about realism collected for a public pre-
sentation m the catalog for Eighty, Langton Street Residence Program 1981 (San Francisco,
1982), p. 133.
42 Jakobson, "The Gerneration That Squandered Its Poets," p. 124.

380
 Fred Pfeil

Postmodernism as a "Structure of Feeling"

In a w1de range of popular and avant-garde cultural

works, one can see a sh1ft 1n the subject's relation to
self, language, and difference Th1s postmodern struc-
ture of feel1ng has 1ts or1g1ns 1n fundamental changes
that have taken place 1n the fam1ly structure of Amen-
can m1ddle-class l1fe. While the resulting de-Oedlpaliza-
tlon has released new sociopolitical forces, these have
been Significantly contained by the capitalist hegemony
Postmodern1sm foregrounds this Inherent Irresolution

This essay is founded in a specific pleasure, a double

bemusement, and perhaps a certain orneriness. The pleasure began when I
discovered New Wave music (at first, Brian Eno and Talking Heads); it was
reformulated in the work of other musicians (The Gang of Four, Philip
Glass), in performance art (Laurie Anderson), and even, to a limited extent,
in prose fiction (Kathy Acker), the rather antiquated and provincial region
of the culture industry in which I myself work. I came to these works halt-
ingly, serendipitously. I behaved as the typical cultural consumer in late
capitalism behaves, operating out of a typically serialized solitude, flying
more or less blind. Only retrospectively, as I tried to analyze and account
for my enjoyment, did I realize that the kind of aesthetic experience they
create and offer-and thus the pleasure I was seeking to understand-had
already been categorized as postmodem.
To this initial bemusement-the perplexity of a new
pleasure, a new name, and the not altogether happy discovery that I had
come to enjoy works that bore a family resemblence to other texts (e.g.,
Ashbery or Sollers) I had long found unsatisfying-was added another: I
soon found a large body of criticism ready to explain not only what these
works were like, how they functioned to produce what effects, but even why
and how these effects might give pleasure. Leaving aside such partial re-
sponses as the unrigorous enthusiasm of a Marjorie Perloff, 1 or the blanket
"search-and-destroy" operations carried out by a Hilton Kramer or Gerald
Graff, 2 such criticism falls into two camps, one that finds in postmodemist
art a progressive, subversive, perhaps even potentially revolutionary insight
and impulse; the other that explains its power and attractiveness as the
effect of its stylized (re)presentation of a recent twist in the long dialectic
of capitalist alienation, a freshly extended set of fragmentations and reifi-
cations that postmodemist art now invites us to enjoy as the newly beautiful
and true. The stage is thus set for a new version of the old debate over the
possibility of an authentically counterhegemonic artistic production within
late capitalist society-a debate that has been, until now, carried out most
fiercely and fruitfully within the Marxist tradition. 3 Yet-and herein lies my
381
second bemusement, and the orneriness as well-despite the real intelligence
that informs discussion ofpostmodern art from either point of view, I have
been dissatisfied with both positions.
Prodded by this blend of pleasure, curiosity, dissatisfaction, and
hubris, I want to articulate a rather different understanding both of the
postmodern art I have come to enjoy and of its relationship to politics and
culture. Such an understanding begins, inevitably, in dialectical self-reflex-
iveness, in articulating the specific qualities of the enjoyment of postmod-
ernist work I experience as one member of a serially dispersed yet socially
distinct group, that is, as a member of a particular mass audience, whose
emergence constitutes a significant moment in contemporary American cul-
ture insofar as it marks a breakdown in the antagonistic yet mutually de-
pendent categories of high culture and mass or "popular" culture. Previ-
ously, as Fredric Jameson has noted, the movement of the forms, techniques,
and effects of high cultural production into mass culture has been subter-
ranean and anonymous. 4 Schonberg's revolution in musical language, for
example, creeps into the scores of countless TV programs and Hollywood
films without announcing its name; surrealism is swallowed up and sur-
passed by each day's crop of smugly self-mocking ads; and the hermetic
self-inspection of abstract expressionism is converted into familiarity, even
affability, on the walls of corporate lobbies.
Of course, the opposite process also continues to recur, as the
motifs of mass culture are "sublimated" and reprocessed into high culture.
Until very recently this has been the case in American postmodernism as
well. From Warhol through Salle in painting, O'Hara through the L=A=N
=G=U=A=G=E group in poetry, Coover, Pynchon, and Barthelme in
fiction, the icons and representations of mass culture reappear within forms
that we might as well admit are now, by custom and usage, received as
ineluctably "high": the so-called quality novel or short story, the volume
of poetry, contemporary sculpture, painting, or print. That in this sense
"postmodernism" has been until recently only the newest extension of mod-
ernism itself is suggested as well, I would submit, by the argument carried
out in relatively sterile formalist terms through most of the seventies in
such academic-literary journals as boundary 2, Triquarterly, and The Buck-
nell Review (and no doubt in various art and music journals as well) over
whether such a body of work could even be said to exist as a distinct region
within the kingdom of high cultural practices. 5 Now, however, when new
work bearing a distinct and undisguised postmodernist stamp "goes gold"
in records and sells out concert halls from New York to Portland, Oregon,
such arguments and the formalist methodologies on which they rest may
reasonably be said to have been resolved and superseded. Postmodernist
aesthetic practice, whatever its origins in high culture, is now itself, like
Laurie Anderson and Philip Glass, what culture industry specialists call a
"crossover" phenomenon. So the question we must ask of it-or rather, of
the part of it that is most decisively disengaged from high art-is less where
it comes from or how it is made than what pleasures it makes possible for
what social groups.
My use of the term "structure of feeling" is intended to indicate
precisely such a methodological shift, from the study of fixed and formal
internal relations and genealogies to a more fluid, shifting social analysis.
The term, of course, is Raymond Williams's attempt to do conceptual justice
382
 Fred Pfeil
to any set of circumstances resembling the cultural situation we now face,
that is, the unconsolidated emergence of the distinctly new, in both social
life in general and aesthetic practice in particular: "For structures of feeling
can be defined as social experiences in solution, as distinct from other social
semantic formations which have been precipitated and are more evidently
and more immediately available.... Yet this specific solution is never mere
flux. It is a structured formation which, because it is at the very edge of
semantic availability, has many of the characteristics of a pre-formation,
until specific articulations-new semantic figures-are discovered in material
practice. " 6
I propose that we seek out such work precisely insofar as it speaks
to the desire and dread inherent in such a "structure of feeling," of a certain
modality of social experience that lies "at the very edge of semantic avail-
ability." The origins of this modality lie in part in recent shifts in the pro-
cesses of the subject's earliest notions of self and other, figure and ground,
language and difference. 7 To think ofpostmodernism as a structure offeel-
ing, however, is to leave the question of its political and/or ideological
valence open for as long as possible, until the relationship between this set
of aesthetic practices and social reality has been fully theorized and reas-
sembled.
What social groups constitute the mass audience for the post-
modernist work of Talking Heads, Laurie Anderson, Philip Glass? What
pleasure does this audience seek and find in such work? We may answer
the first question fairly summarily; the second will take some time. From
my own experience I think it is safe to say this audience is composed pri-
marily of middle-class whites from around eighteen years of age to upward
of forty, mostly college-educated, with a greater parity of females to males
than has ordinarily been the case in markets for "avant-garde" work. We
are speaking, then, of a significant minority within a generation and a half
of consumer society, a group that has either lived its childhood or come to
maturity through the long crisis and congealment of the sixties and seventies;
a generation and a half, moreover, whose social destiny has remained clear:
we are to be the switchpoints between capital and labor, the intermediary
administrative and reproductive component of a vast apparatus of exploi-
tation and valorization. 8 Our journey has been aided by major transfor-
mations in the structure of families and the ideology of parenting, a de-
Oedipalizing process both conditioning and conditioned by related devel-
opments in the "external" realm of production and typically characterized
by the diminution into relative absence of effectual paternal authority in
the home and the concomitantly increased, problematic presence of the
mother. 9 So far, family and child-rearing practices in both working-class and
ruling-class families have proved more autonomous, self-perpetuating, and
resistant to change than those of the middle-class American family; 10 but
for the offspring of the middle class, de-Oedipalization has had profound
effects on the nature of felt experience-a major prerequisite for our mass
audience's enjoyment of postmodernist work.
What, then, is the nature of this enjoyment? How is delight pro-
duced from the interaction between this audience and a David Byrne in-
toning:
383
 What is happening to my skin?
Where is the protection that I need?
Air can hurt you too
Air can hurt you too
Some people say not to worry about the air
Some people never had experience with
Air ... Air11
or Laurie Anderson's electrically distorted chant, "0 Superman-0 Judge-
0 Mom and Dad," 12 or Lucinda Childs's dispassionate recital of botched
quotations and proto-sentences-"! feel the earth move under my feet. I feel
tumbling down tumbling down. I feel it Some ostriches are a like into a
satchel. Some like them. I went to the window and wanted to draw the
earth. So David Cassidy tells you when to go into this one into a meat. So
where would a red dress. So this will get some gas. So this could This would
be some of all of my great friends. Jay Steve Julia Robyn Rick Kit and Liz.
So this would get any energy. So if you know what some like into were. So
... So about one song" 13-through a musical texture characterized both by
its utter harmonic simplicity and repetitiousness and its minute, ceaseless
rhythmic transmutations? What common features may we find in such work
that enable us to label it "postmodernist" in the first place?
What these works have in common is, first of all, a certain quality
or manner of utterance and performance-deadpan, indifferent, deperson-
alized, effaced-that effectively cancels the possibility of traditional audience
identification. The speaker or singer is in no way "expressing" him/herself
through his/her performance, inviting us to share and eventually merge our
similar yet distinct experience, emotions, and individual sensibilities with
his/her own. David Byrne, the main vocalist of Talking Heads, delivers the
song's scant melodies in an off-kilter blend of warbles and shouts, a mixture
of sudden random enthusiasms and mumbled toss-offs that mock the tropes
of expressivity by rendering them "illegible." In Einstein on the Beach, the
Wilson/Glass "opera," Lucinda Childs and other speakers declaim or recite
their texts through the music without a hint of expressive inflection, while
the music itself remains similarly centerless. One finds oneselflistening less
to the work than across it. As Craig Owens has noted of performance artist
Laurie Anderson, "the only access to herself that she allows is through all
kinds of technological filters which amplify, distort and multiply her actual
voice in such a way that it can no longer be identified as hers." 14
The result of these techniques is familiar to connoisseurs of"high"
postmodernist art: one is confronted not with a unified text, much less
by the presence of a distinct personality and sensibility, but by a discontinu-
ous terrain of heterogeneous discourses uttered by anonymous, unplaceable
tongues, a chaos different from that of the classic texts of high modernism
precisely insofar as it is not recontained or recuperated within an over-
arching mythic framework. The sense of self (up on the stage or out in the
audience) called up and produced by these postmodernist works is a spe-
cifically poststructuralist one as well, whose difference from an earlier, more
unitary structuralism may be measured by the difference between Levi-
Strauss's "I am the place in which something occurred" and Laurie An-
derson's "I am in my body the way most people drive in their cars." 15 The
"I" of the Levi-Strauss quotation, however diverse its determinations, is
384
 Fred Pfeil
still single, demarcated, isolable; but the self as aimless driver belongs ev-
erywhere and nowhere. Moreover, in this latter view of self and world,
whatever passes through the windshield passes through the mind as well;
indeed, consciousness may be understood as only that passage, that motion
itself.
But a practice that moves away from notions of totalization and
singularity and techniques of expressive presence toward new assumptions
of decentered dispersion and techniques of absence, depersonalization, and
disassembly into a multiplicity of codes immerses us in a fresh and seem-
ingly hopeless dialectic between inside and outside, figure and ground. This
dialectic is the second specifically postmodernist constituent of the works
I have mentioned, a dialectic that depends on the near-perfect reversibility
of the description just formulated above. In presenting us with a shifting,
centerless concatenation of codings, postmodernist work from Beckett and
Rauschenberg to Laurie Anderson and Talking Heads offers us two opposed
alternatives, between which we are free to oscillate indefinitely. We may
allow ourselves to drift into that space and accept its mutating babble as
the very image of consciousness; or we may confront that same babble, that
"scrabble system," as Laurie Anderson calls it, 16 as a distilled representation
of the whole antagonistic, voracious world of Otherness, engaged in an
endless struggle to engulf, colonize, and devour the self, to scribble its graffiti
on our every surface, to precode and appropriate the spot of Being that still
permits us to stand. The alternatives, in short, are to disperse ourselves
across the codes or take enormous, well-nigh paranoid precautions against
them: Laurie Anderson invites us to "Let X = X"; David Byrne warns us
to watch out for animals ("They're laughing at us") and "Air." 17 But the
result of either point of view is that experience becomes a matter of pure
internality. Either codes and their unrelenting proliferations are the sole
constituents of selfhood, or else they have nothing to do with it except as
an overwhelming threat. In either case, the possibility of what we have
considered real speech, that is, a meaningful relationship between sign and
referent, and of the related distinction between figure and ground has been
abandoned.
It follows that such a closed solipsistic universe is fundamentally
two-dimensional, lacking depth, perspective, or time. If, through its un-
bounded dispersion or its incommunicable solitude, there is only the self,
then experience itself, in the sense of events, is a fiction. Thus the mise-en-
scene-or lack thereof-in postmodern art is characterized by shifts in surface
rather than development in time. Fredric Jameson has compared this tau-
tological, amnesiac effect with the Lacanian description of schizophrenia:
"the only verbal operations available to the schizophrenic are those involved
in the contemplation of material signifiers in a present which is unable to
hold onto past and present. Each signifier thus becomes a perpetual present,
an island or enclave in time, succeeded by a new present which emerges
equally in the void, with no links to anything that preceded it, or any project
to come." 18
This description is posed in terms of the view in which the self
and the signifier stand distinctly opposed to one another. Yet I believe it
could be put in terms of the first view as well, that we could say with equal
accuracy that the schizophrenic and/or the postmodernist work finds its
Being in this signifier, this discourse; then that one, over there (which, of
385
course, becomes instantly here); and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, the lyrics
of "0 Superman" and the electronically distorted timbres of Laurie An-
derson's voice alter abruptly, without transition: first a "Mom" is addressed,
among others, in the burbling tones of an amplified mellotron; then a chatty,
ordinary voice tells us its owner is not at home and invites us to leave a
message; then a third voice or timbre, perhaps a mixture of the first two,
says, "Hello? This is your Mother. Are you there? Are you coming home?"
Despite these inexplicable shifts in speaker and tone, we may sense the slim
possibility of a narrative of sorts; but Anderson is an expert at tempting us
with such mirages and then erasing them. The voice will soon change again,
and before long another voice-or perhaps one of the earlier ones-will
inform us that "neither snow nor rain nor gloom of night shall stay these
couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds." 19 It is this
endless antivista of unrelated presences, surfaces, voices, in an autorefer-
ential succession without consequence, that is suggested by the stammering
chorus of Talking Heads's "Heaven" ("Heaven is the place I The place
where nothing 1 Nothing ever happens"), 20 as well as by Edwin Denby's
description of the experience of Wilson/Glass's Einstein on the Beach: "It
isn't symbolism or telling a story-watching it happen, the spacious pro-
portions for looking and seeing make it easy to breathe and stay open and
very soon to realize the exalting strength ofthe music listening to it section
by section, a continuous present moment of time for four hours." 21
Such a schizoid spatialization of time into "sections" is not un-
ambiguously pleasurable, notwithstanding Denby's delight. Just as the vi-
sion of the boundlessly dispersed self is caught up with the fear of disso-
lution, the flip side of the ease of "breathing" and "staying open" is the
terror of a contingency from which all possibility of eventful significance
has been drained. This is the place, then, to emphasize that each of these
three postmodemist "pleasures of the text" contains a countervailing anx-
iety. Indeed, the experience of this newly constituted mass audience for
postmodemist work is most fundamentally this very unstable play between
a primal delight and a primal fear, between two simultaneous versions of
the primary aggressive impulse, that which seeks to incorporate the world
into itself and that which struggles to prevent its own engulfment. This
dialectic is the postmodem "structure of feeling." Unlike either previous
high culture (with its formal and/or mythic boundaries) or mass culture
(with its prepackaged, foretold happy endings), postmodemism immerses
us within the desire and dread it evokes without resolving their oscillation
on the level of either content or form. It remains to be seen, of course,
whether such a practice can continue; how long Laurie Anderson, Talking
Heads, Philip Glass, and others like them will keep on producing such
decidedly irresolute work before they slide into the ingratiating cliches of
mass culture or the formal sublimations of high art. 22 But the fate of such
work turns in part on another question, that of the social origins and destiny
of the desire and fear, the structure of feeling, called up by this work for its
audience.
The question of the social roots of this structure of feeling brings
us back to the existence of the two "camps" of cultural criticism cited at
the outset. Their explanations of the advent and increasing popularity of
postmodemist work follow, of course, from their definitions of its primary
functions and effects, and, in one case in particular, more specifically from
386
 Fred Pfeil
its internal workings as art. Thus, what Rosalind Krauss, Craig Owens, and
other members of the October editorial group find both essential and pro-
gressive about postmodernist work is the extent to which it reveals all ex-
perience as already-coded, as so many instances of preexistent codes and
discourses at work. 23 The postmodernist project is "to 'de-originate the ut-
terance' ";24 or, as Charles Russel puts it, "To make discourse evident is
the main goal of post-modernist literature and art. To reveal the absolute
and intimate connection between ourselves as speakers and listeners and
our socially determined patterns of perceiving, thinking, expressing and
acting is the function of self-reflexive artworks. Meaning as a system, culture
as a set of discourses, individuality as a product of social codes ofbehavior-
these are the themes of our art. " 25
This definition and the claims it entails are obviously not wholly
incompatible with my description of the postmodernist work I have enjoyed;
indeed, as a description of postmodernist artistic intentions it is substantially
correct, especially given the close ties of many postmodernist artists to the
institutions of art history and criticism. 26 Yet such a definition does not
bring us much closer to an understanding of why large audiences are avail-
able for the performance art of Laurie Anderson, the "opera" of Philip Glass
and Robert Wilson, the concerts of Talking Heads. Is it possible that these
audiences seek and take pleasure in the "de-origination of the utterance,"
either to liberate themselves from the spell of its codes or to realize them-
selves as the shifting, uneven product of their proliferation? To ask the
question is to answer it; but for the most part, adherents of postmodernism,
a progressive cultural practice, do not-and perhaps, given their definition,
cannot-face the question at allY The increasing mass appeal of the kind
of work they proclaim is less a subject requiring investigation than circum-
stantial proof that the sub-rosa cultural revolution to free ourselves from
the tyranny of enforced signification is indeed under way. So we are invited
to assume precisely what seemed to be in question-the political potential
and valence of postmodernist work.
That such an aporia is itself the symptom of a systematic con-
temporary disabling of historical thought is suggested by Jameson's more
enlightening account of the postmodernist dynamic. He argues that the
emergence of the poststructuralist claim to truth, with its attendant Fou-
caultian exaltation of free play against the omnipresence of Power, is at one
with the postmodernist aesthetic it extols. Both reflect the recent transfor-
mation of advanced capitalist society in its ever-increasing repression of the
marks of material production, its ever-advancing commodification of cul-
ture and language into a meaningless atmosphere of free-floating signifiers,
loosed from their signifieds:
"the autonomization of language" ... is at one with
the universal fragmentation, compartmentalization,
specialization of all kinds of other areas through late
capitalism. However privileged the area of language
may seem to be, therefore, from a social perspective
it is yet another symptom of the intensified process of
reification and commodification, which seeks to col-
onize ever more remote and archaic enclaves in hu-
man experience as well as in the social world, within
387
 the psyche, as well as in Nature itself. (The infra-
structural reality of this process ... is what we have
seen Mandel [the contemporary Marxist political
economist] identify as a new and more totalizing wave
of industrialization and mechanization ofhitherto un-
rationalized zones of production.)28
Elsewhere, Jameson has proposed the notion of the "linguistic,"
the concept of a paradigmatic set ofliterary (and/or more broadly aesthetic)
techniques and effects which convey the quintessential "feel" of space and
time in a given mode of production. Postmodernism, for Jameson, is just
such a "linguistic" or "aesthetic"-one that (re)presents to its audience the
alienated, already coded, precommodified "reality" we experience every day
in what Debord has called "the society of the spectacle." As such, the work-
ings of postmodernism are at best merely mimetic, at worst habituating,
insofar as we learn through it to enjoy the free play of our chains. Jameson
does not hold out much hope for those who aim to produce a progressive
aesthetic in the present conjuncture: "with the eclipse of culture as an au-
tonomous space or sphere, culture itself falls into the world, with the result
that the latter becomes completely acculturated; in the society of the spec-
tacle, the society of the image, media society, everything has become cul-
tural, and this will clearly make for real and new problems about the pos-
sibility of any politics, any politics within the cultural sphere proper, since
the latter is now virtually coterminous with society as a whole." 29
Jameson's measured pessimism is a salutary warning to any would-
be progressive artists and their proselytizers, including those operating under
the banner of the postmodern. And his diagnosis of the postmodernist "lin-
guistic" moment can help us toward a fully social and historical under-
standing of the structure offeeling I have described. To travel that distance,
though, it is necessary to locate those events and processes that may be
viewed as prototypical instances of the general phenomena whose hege-
monic presence, according to Jameson, is the definitive cultura,l character-
istic of late capitalism: commodification, or the conversion of substance
into form, ends and use values into sheer instrumentality; and reification,
the materialization into a fantasized concrete of the immaterial, form and
the abstract. And we must concentrate on these dialectically interrelated
phenomena as they occur in the life cycle of the mass audience whose
outlines we have already sketched.
Such instances are not hard to find. Indeed, their presence is
obvious in my description of the postmodernist mass audience as the newest
generation of consumer society, trained and aimed for positions in what is
politely called the "middle strata" of the work force-professionals and man-
agers of the system. That such training involves a protracted "education"
in obedience to and enactment of arcane formal procedures, mastery of a
specialized instrumentalist vocabulary, and the ability to tolerate both ever-
higher levels of abstraction and ever-longer periods of routinized time will
be obvious to all who have passed through a non-elite college or university. 30
As good professionals in education, social work, or business, we can all
affirm that such preparations are necessary. Our expanded numbers in these
fields, the work we do, the forms we fill out and put out, the standards by
which we judge and are judged, designate us as both chief agents and most
388
 Fred Pfeil
immediate victims of the "bureaucratization of the world," the "adoption
of impersonal rules which specify procedure and make possible exact eco-
nomic calculation." 31 Living out one's working life under "bureaucratic con-
trol, " 32 while readministering its rules and norms as our work, we come to
inhabit and extend a realm of reification par excellence, a social landscape
that, in the words of Jon Schiller, appears "mysterious, omniscient and
omnipotent, capricious, pervasive, and seemingly beyond the control of any
single individual or group":
One's experience of such institutions simultaneously
feels like an event in nature and a force that is insanely
human in its rationality. Unlike the choice of ac-
quiescence or rebellion confronting one in patriarchal
[e.g., early capitalist] institutions, the individual now
finds himself reduced to adaptation or anomie. It is
not surprising that the typical attitudes in relation to
bureaucracy repeat those of the pre-oedipal period:
helpless dependence and rage; schizoid splits between
normal affective experience and the routinization de-
manded by a peculiar rationality; and paranoid idea-
tion that one is under constant surveillance and con-
trol. 33
Thus the torments of the "bureaucratic soul" in a world from
which the visible presence of Power and Authority are gone-torments whose
resemblance to both the darkly negative, anxious side of the postmodernist
structure of feeling and the Lacanian description ofthe schizophrenic is far
from coincidental. And if we turn from the reified world of production to
the spectacular world of consumable objects that confronts this same au-
dience in its leisure time, we will find an equally striking convergence, for
the audience for postmodernist work is a subgroup of the most critical and
fiercely wooed market sector for consumable commodities. As professionals,
managers, administrators, we have a larger share of discretionary income
than any class or stratum below us; and we outnumber the ruling class, who
in any case cannot be expected to shoulder the enormous "white man's
burden" of consumption. The result is that we of the post-World War II
baby boom and after who have taken our places in the middle strata of the
work force are the primary "target audience" in the society of the spectacle.
For us the glossiest magazines are published, from Mademoiselle to Playboy;
for us Apocalypse Now and Kramer vs. Kramer are made; and for us the
cornucopia of advertising pours out its lavish, illusory wealth. In the short-
hand of Marxist jargon, we are the "subjects hailed" by the "aestheticization
of commodities," well-trained experts in the peculiar art of reading the good
sex life into toothpaste or deodorant, the pastoral picnic into the bottle of
Gallo chablis:
We are given two signifiers [in an ad-e.g., Catherine
Deneuve and Chane! No. 5], are required to make a
"signified" by exchanging them. The fact that we have
to make this exchange, to do the linking work which
is not done in the ad, but which is made possible only
389
 by its form, draws us into the transformational space
between the units of the ad. Its meaning only exists
in this space: the field of transaction; and it is here
that we operate-we are this space.
Now, ifthe meaning of the ad exists in the
transformation of meanings between signs, and if this
tranformation takes place in us ... this is placing us
in the space of the signified. 34
Once again, here in Williamson's analysis of the interpellation
of the reader/viewer/listener as simultaneously subject and signified in the
ad, we are confronted with a process that is both a constitutive element of
the experience of the emergent mass audience for postmodernist work and
a behavior markedly similar to that of our poor schizophrenic. Only this
time, we catch him/her on the upswing in his/her prison of internality, at
the self-exalting moment of identification across a dispersed field of signi-
fiers. Moreover, as we follow Williamson's Lacanian argument about how
we are induced to enter this imaginary space, we encounter another familiar
landmark-the pre-Oedipal stage of psychic development and, in particular,
the mirror stage. Lacan describes the mirror stage in terms that are simul-
taneously phenomenological and semiotic/linguistic; 35 it is the crucial in-
termediary moment between the unformed selfs total immersion in the
"Imaginary," a state before either "I" or "not I," and the properly Oedipal
moment in which the subject receives its name through the access "the
Father" gives it to that realm of Law, Authority, and signification Lacan
denotes as the "Symbolic." In this unstable stage of development, the child
momentarily perceives itself and its reflection or representation as one and
the same, a unified "Ideal-Ego"; whereas after its induction into Language
and the Symbolic, such a fusion of sign and referent, however longed for,
is no longer possible. Yet according to Williamson, advertisements work,
that is, persuade us to do the signifying work they require, precisely by
promising us that impossible bliss of reunion, an "Ego-Ideal" that tempts
us to reach out, then vanishes again:
Ads . . . show you a symbol of yourself
aimed to attract your desire; they suggest that you can
become the person in the picture before you. But merg-
ing with an "objectified" image of yourself is impos-
sible: the desire for it is simply a channeling of the
desire for the pre-Symbolic, Imaginary Ideal-Ego. It is
important to remember that the subject cannot com-
pletely be returned to the mirror as it were, since to
understand an advertisement is to comprehend a sys-
tem of differences that is of the Symbolic order. What
they can do is to misrepresent the position of the sub-
ject, and to misrepresent its relation to him .... So ads
form a symbolic system which appropriates and ap-
parently represents the Imaginary; thereby embodying
the inherent contradiction of the mirror-phase. 36
In exposing the way ads feed on our longing for the last moment
of pre-Oedipality, when, for better or worse, for bliss or rage, what was
390
 Fred Pfeil
outside the unformed self could still be experienced as inside, Williamson's
analysis seems to bring us closer still to agreement with Jameson's thesis
that postmodemism is the new linguistic for a space-time transformed and
degraded by the domination of the processes of reification and commodi-
fication. Indeed, if those of us in the middle strata do live fundamentally
in, through, and between the pre-Oedipalizing modalities of bureaucracy,
on the one hand, and advertising, on the other, then the underlying con-
clusion ofJameson's Marxist analysis ofpostmodemism seems inescapable:
far from serving any progressive-subversive function, postmodemism merely
provides its audience with foregrounded, stylized glimpses of its own alien-
ations, an intensified yet controlled experience of its own unmastered pre-
Oedipal quandary. However necessary, in the grand Hegelian dialectic of
Marxist becoming, may be the moment it crystallizes, on its way to the
proletarianization of the world and the apocalyptic moment of international
class struggle, postmodemism today is not revolutionary cultural practice
but the newest version of the homeopathic dose.
Yet however suggestive our Marxist analysis may seem to be, it
has failed to meditate with sufficient historical self-consciousness on its own
terminological instruments-or, more specifically, on the peculiar appro-
priateness of a distinctly psychoanalytic language to describe public social
experience. Moreover, we have failed to mention a third level of description
and analysis though which our subject, the mass audience for postmodemist
work and the structure offeeling that connects the two, may be investigated:
the level of primary socialization, the family, where, as Sartre has said, the
subject's "interiorization of the exterior" truly begins. 37 A fully materialist
analysis of the postmodemist structure of feeling cannot begin when the
members of this mass audience stare at their first commercial or receive
their first paychecks; nor can it ignore its own terminological shifts. If the
structure of feeling expressed in postmodemist work and its reception is
most accurately described in psychoanalytic terms as a pre-Oedipal rela-
tionship with the world, if the discourse of class analysis has become infused
with (or invaded by) the discourse of psychoanalysis, we must look for an
explanation in the de-Oedipalized middle-class home.
A brief review of the basic axioms of post-Freudian psycho-
analysis may be in order-in particular, those arising from the work of
Melanie Klein. Since Klein's pioneering studies of the mother-child rela-
tionship, we have come to understand the Oedipal moment not merely as
the rude insertion of the father's power and authority, leading to the child's
fear- or envy-ridden compliance, but as a cathexis the child seeks out and
desires, since by this means it is able to counter and mitigate the all-en-
veloping omnipotence of the mother and its attendant, painfully ambiva-
lent-hating and fearing, loving and wanting-relationship with her. Thus,
the strength of the Oedipal break may be seen not only as the function of
the strength of the father's presence and authority but of both the length
and quality of nurturance the child has received from its mother. If the
mothering has been marked by relatively severe rearing practices-little
touching, say, and/or repeated frustration of oral, anal, and genital drives-
the Oedipal break will be less intense than if the same pre-Oedipal period
is more indulgent and nurturant.
Ifthese axioms 38 hold, then to understand the de-Oedipalization
of the contemporary middle-class family we must examine not only the
391
 degree of the father's authority but also the recent history of the practice
and ideology of mothering. The social phenomenon of de-Oedipalization is
therefore to be read dialectically, as a moment in the history of the American
middle-class family characterized both by the father's relative absence and
by the onset of more indulgent mothering than that practiced before World
War II and Dr. Spock. In other words, de-Oedipalization must also be seen
in terms of the increasing strength and intensity of the pre-Oedipal stage of
psychic formation. In Schiller's words, "the father's intervention into the
[mother-child] dyad became more urgent while his influence was becoming
more superficial. Stated in a spatial metaphor, the psychic area occupied by
unconscious maternal representations has expanded and the domain of the
internalized paternal authority correspondingly diminished." 39
These interrelated phenomena, in turn, must be understood as
effects of wider forces at work in American society. The de-authorization
of the middle-class father is an effect created both by the "suburbanization"
of American life, the increased real and psychic distance between work site
and home, and the replacement at that work site of the "authority of the
master" -normally the petit-bourgeois father himself-by the "monotonous
power of process, " 40 as he finds his work and status no longer in a bygone
kingdom of small business but as a professional member of a bureaucratized
state or corporate structure. Likewise, though on a wider historical scale,
the postwar changes in mothering are only the most recent extension of a
general "softening" of the ideology and practice of child-rearing underway
in Western society since around the end of the eighteenth century-a "soft-
ening" deeply connected with capitalism's explosive, unrecontainable dis-
covery of the "free individual." 41
Having reconstructed the concept of the de-Oedipalization of the
American middle-class home, it is now possible to reverse field on some of
the points contained in the initial Marxist analysis offered earlier: to argue
the extent to which the de-authorization of the father combined with the
increasing hegemony of the pre-Oedipal mother themselves enable the sub-
ject to play advertising's elusive Lacanian game, to lose and find itself in
the endless corridors of bureaucratic administration and control-and to
play something like the same interminable game, with all its pleasures and
anxieties, through the experience of postmodernist work. In this way we
can account for the necessity of psychoanalytic language, even in what has
been so far a Marxist analysis, to describe our structure of feeling. If, as
Lacan suggests, the Oedipal moment consitutes the subject's accession
through the Father into the realm of the Symbolic, that thenceforth ines-
capable kingdom of name, signification, and category, and if that accession
is incomplete or weak for members of our subject audience, then their
experience of the Symbolic will be distinctly toned and to some extent even
recaptured by the pre-Oedipal Imaginary. Such a subject may perceive its
relationship to Authority not in terms of the Oedipally derived notions of
neurosis, repression, and the hysterical symptom, nor within the bounded
Symbolic categories of class, but rather in terms of a widely dispersed,
elusive yet omnipresent Power before which one either directly acts out a
spontaneous rebellion or else caves in, submits, even clings: "Power is ev-
erywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from
everywhere. And 'Power,' insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and
self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these
392
 Fred Pfeil
mobilities, the concatentation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn
to arrest their movement." 42 Omnipresent, permanent, repetitious, inert,
self-reproducing: the terms of Foucault's notorious definition precisely cat-
alog the full paranoia of entrapment in the pre-Oedipal world. Small wonder
that a generation of young American middle-class intellectuals has already
come to love it so well and quote it so often; it is the structure of feeling
they live.
Our plunge into the family thus seems merely to have strength-
ened the Marxist case against postmodernism as a potentially progressive
cultural movement. Insofar as its structure of feeling can be understood as
the product of forces we have tracked back to the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, our analysis may stand as a Marxist triumph, founded in Marx's
original vision of the primacy of production. And insofar as this same struc-
ture of feeling proves itself resistant to the fundamental categories of Marx-
ism-the deep ontological reality of forces and relations of production, or
that moment ofhistorical becoming inherent in the notion of Class-it shows
its own deficiency as an agent of revolutionary change. Yet it is at this point,
having set forth a Marxist analysis of postmodernism, that it becomes pos-
sible to take the opposite perspective. We may now examine what new light
the postmodernist moment throws back on Marxism itself-from a some-
what different yet equally materialist perspective that increasingly offers
itself as a point of view and practice superseding Marxism.
I refer, of course, to a specifically feminist materialism whose
outlines have begun to appear increasingly distinct in the work of Dorothy
Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, and Isaac Balbus, among
others, and whose explanatory power has grown immeasurably over the last
ten years or so. It might be possible to argue that feminist-materialist theory
today occupies the same relation to the two most visible strains in the
American feminist movement that Marx's historical materialism took in
relation to the analogous wings ofthe workers' movement of a century ago:
both combating a liberal reformist tendency, on the one hand (social de-
mocracy; the "bourgeois" reformist politics of N.O.W.), and an ultra-Left,
idealist voluntarism, on the other (anarco-syndicalism; the separatism of
"radical" feminists). This analogy is, of course, no proof of the more recent
theory's validity, which can only be established by other means. A feminist
materialism must be able to demonstrate its self-reflexive understanding of
its own historical emergence and enablement out of the postmodernist mo-
ment, and the extent to which its method and project constitute a necessary
transvaluation of the Marxist perspective on social reality, including the
present moment.
We may begin this task by reanalyzing the difference between the
old and new conception of power as a specifically gendered one. Here, for
example, are two quotations, both reasonably well known to their respective
audiences, whose somewhat perverse juxtaposition expresses this difference
quite well.

Labour is, in the first place, a pro- So hold me, Mom, in your long
cess in which both Man and Nature arms.
participate, and in which Man of So hold me, Mom, in your long
his own accord starts, regulates, and arms.
393
controls the material reaction be- In your automatic arms. Your elec-
tween himself and Nature. He op- tronic arms. In your long arms.
poses himself to Nature as one of So hold me, Mom, in your long
her own forces, setting in motion arms.
arms and legs, head and hands, the Your petrochemical arms. Your
natural forces of his body in order military arms.
to appropriate Nature's production In your electronic arms. 44
in a form adapted to his wants. By
thus acting on the external world
and changing it, he at the same time
changes his own nature. He devel-
ops his slumbering powers and
compels them to act in obedience
to his sway. 43

In a very real sense, our evaluation of the postmodernist structure

of feeling and our decision for or against a feminist rather than a Marxist
materialism both depend on how we interpret the shift in sexual coding
these quotes exemplify. The possibility of coding the humanly produced
world as maternally feminine clearly arises from the historic explosion of
"familialism" in general, and the pre-Oedipal in particular, across the entire
cultural map; in its eerie invocation of a military-industrial Mother, so
weirdly reminiscent of earlier Romantic appeals to an equally maternal
Nature, Laurie Anderson's lines stand as a prototypical illustration of the
collapse of the Symbolic back into the Imaginary. Yet the historic moment
of de-Oedipalization also makes it possible for us to read into Marx's classic
assertion of the ontological primacy of production as the constitutive, de-
fining action of human life a new and startlingly historicized perspective.
Suddenly it appears as a neatly compressed account of the very origins of
industrial society's obsession with production, objectification, instrumen-
tality, and signification in the Oedipal escape from the Mother, here repro-
jected as Nature, whose landscape and forces Man becomes Man by learning
to dominate. 45
By this reading, Marx's grounding of the human project in its
form and relations of production is less an unquestionable truth than a
projection of a given moment in the long dialectical history of the sex-
gender system of the West: a moment that is the very apex of Oedipality
itself, given both the ideology and practice of an ever-more indulgent moth-
ering within the newly privatized home, together with the retained-yet-dis-
tinct, still-authorized relative presence of the Father. Thus, from the per-
spective of a feminist materialism, our Marxist argument is at least partly
incorrect. It is not true that the postmodernist moment and structure of
feeling are distinguished by the fact that "the dominant themes of famili-
alism-including the authority relations identified by psychoanalysis-are
pervasive in ideology generally. " 46 Rather, such themes are necessarily dom-
inant in all societies in which sexuality is socially constructed and arranged.
One of the chief tasks of a properly materialist feminism-one
whose strategies are grounded in the assumption of the ontological priority

394
 Fred Pfeil
not of the domination of nature in production but of the domination of
women in the family-is a history of the manifold forms and relations of
sex-gender systems. Such a history would supply the basis for an account
of the Lacanian categories of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, categories
left unhistoricized until now. 47 But there is another task for a feminist ma-
terialism: the task of accounting for itsel£ Marx willingly admitted and
explained the extent to which his method of historical materialism and its
allied utopian vision of communist society was explicitly enabled by the
emergence of capitalism: the stripping away of all human relations but the
"cash nexus," he argued, permits us to see at last that "the history of all
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles, " 48 just as the historic
rise ofthose two great antagonists, Capital and the massed Proletariat, points
the way toward a communist society in which all domination-except of
Nature-is only a reminder of the past. How, then, does the feminism of
Benjamin, Balbus, and Dinnerstein theorize its own historical enablement
out of the crux of the postmodemist moment? Does the de-Oedipalization
of contemporary middle-class culture really contain any utopian dimension
or revolutionary potential? If so, what is that potential for, and where does
it point from here?
The key question in this series is the second, and for Marxists
the obvious answer is No. The de-Oedipalization of middle-class life is a
capitalist pathology; the postmodemist culture arising from this pathology
is a mystification expressing only a very local, representational truth. Rev-
olutionary practices thus must await the moment when the revolutionary
subject constitutes itself through a re-Oedipalized entry into the Symbolic,
either through full recognition of its name as the Proletariat, master of
Nature, vide Jameson, or else through a reconstitution within the family of
the authorized Father, as suggested in the recent reactionary work of the
Marxist Christopher Lasch. 49 But for a materialist feminism, the answer is
Yes. De-Oedipalization opens the way to new, more coherent and complete
definitions of domination and Utopia alike. Moreover, insofar as its ap-
pearance is itself the perverse dialectical outcome of an earlier hegemony
of the Oedipal, with all its associated effects-an emphasis on instrumen-
tality, objectification, the flight from the pre-Oedipal Imaginary into the
Symbolic, and the male domination of Nature and women alike-it is a
prime example of that very "cunning of History" Marx and Hegel first
perceived. Our present confrontation with the social world we have created-
a Nature in which we are deeply implicated and from which we derive our
being-a social realm now coextensive with what is left of the other nature
on which it was built, is the result of a long era ofOedipality and the neurotic
domination of Nature.
This problem of Nature and our relationship to it is first and
most dramatically experienced by the subject as the problem of that Mother
who appears both coextensive and excruciatingly detached from us, who
has the power to meet or frustrate our every need. 5° The Oedipal break with
the Mother, moreover, serves not to resolve this painful ambiguity of good
mommy/bad mommy, inside and outside, but to allow the subject to take
flight from it into the Symbolic, where it will be repressed, only to reemerge
as the domination of nature and the subjugation of women. The dialectical
return of pre-Oedipality closes off this perverse escape route, and the de-
Oedipalized subject now must face itself within an ecosystem whose "nat-

395
 ural" and "social" elements are inextricably fused. De-Oedipalization makes
possible a domination-free conception of political association and action as
well. However hostile male leftists and progressives may still be toward
women in general and feminism in particular, 51 their origins in de-Oedi-
palized middle-class homes account in large part for a profound shift in
political style, away from vanguardist conceptions and democratic-centralist
modes of organization toward grassroots mobilization and conscious de-
cision making. 52
Such changes are not merely the result of opportunistic thefts or
"lessons taken" from the women's movement but are also the result of a
deep convergence. This same general process of de-Oedipalization, which
loosens the bonds of male domination of women enough to release women
and their hitherto repressed social vision of reciprocity and nurturance into
the public realm, also dictates that the Oedipal break for the male child
more and more closely resembles that incomplete accession to the Symbolic
that has been historically characteristic of female psychic development. In
Stephanie Engels's terms, "the augmented importance of emotional relat-
edness, embeddedness, and dependence, and the decline of radical emo-
tional rupture and devastation [i.e., of the Oedipal break] put the contem-
porary boy in an effective and developmental position that looks much like
that traditionally characteristic of little girls." 53
From a feminist-materialist perspective, then, the de-Oedipali-
zation of American middle-class life releases historically new and progres-
sive social forces into American life-forces that Marxism, with its hypos-
tatization ofOedipality, is essentially incapable ofjoining or even evaluating
at their full worth. Yet these new forces all point to the necessity of a further
development within the sex-gender system, for if, as these new materialists
maintain, "the character of the relationship between the adult self and its
sexual, political and 'natural' others is decisively shaped by the character
of the relationship established between the childhood self and its first and
most salient, i.e., its parental others," 54 then the problems for those who
participate in the new social movements arising from de-Oedipalization-
feminism, the environmental movement, and a host of progressive grass-
roots coalitions-must be traced back to an unresolved dilemma within the
sex-gender system. De-Oedipalization may, for example, determine the sub-
ject's reinsertion back into a newly expanded Nature, but it does not supply
the material prerequisites for a newly articulated, deliberate yet benign re-
lationship with it. The subject reimmersed in an essentially pre-Oedipal
relationship to the world appears more likely to swing from one pole of
internality to another, from a rage at all that surrounds and threatens it to
a deliriously dispersed self-exaltation across the whole terrain of hollowed-
out signifiers. Neither, of course, are the new strategies of consensus and
grassroots consciousness raising and mobilization, however salutary these
may be compared to their antecedents, presently equipped to deal with
internal disagreements or to move from consciousness raising to concrete
social action.
Finally, it is clear that the increasing number of de-Oedipalized
middle-class male subjects, even ostensibly politically progressive ones, in
no way guarantees any decrease in their fear of and hostility toward women.
The relative closing off of the Oedipal escape route often seems to have
increased that hostility and fear, now that the safety of domination and the
396
 Fred Pfeil
flight to the Symbolic is no longer available. Thus, it is possible to return
in partial agreement to the Marxist critique of the postmodernist moment
in American culture. Lasch's pessimistic depiction of the de-Oedipalized,
narcissistic subject's susceptibility to "soft" authoritarianism should not be
taken lightly; nor can Jameson's linkage of what he calls "micro-politics"
to terrorism, and his judgment of both as politically ineffectual, be dis-
missed. 55 But from a feminist-materialist standpoint, the solution to such
problems lies not in returning to the Symbolic-neither by restoring paternal
authority nor by messianic class struggle on a global scale-but in supplant-
ing the false resolution-through-escape offered by Oedipality to the intol-
erable swings of pre-Oedipality with a genuine passage through the pre-
Oedipal into a new sense of identity/otherness made possible by the co-
equal presence of male and female partners as mothers.
A transformation from exclusively female mothering to shared
mothering would be revolutionary, then, not only insofar as it would entail
wide-ranging transformations in the forms (and, arguably, relations) of pro-
duction, and in the relation of "public" to "private" life, but inasmuch as
the child's subjectivity could for the first time be defined and constituted
in a real dialectical interchange between Imaginary and Symbolic realms.
This essentially political project could be put in more strictly Hegelian terms,
as the transcendence of the antithetical terms ofnonidentityjimmersion and
identity/detachment through a historically new sense of identity as a mu-
tually reciprocal otherness56-a sense that would open the way for the de-
velopment of the new social forces both released and reconstrained by the
present hegemony of the de-Oedipal. 57
I have taken this detour through recent feminist theory in order
to lay the ground for an evaluation of the postmodernist structure offeeling,
one far different, and far more deeply ambivalent, than either the celebratory
fervor of its poststructuralist adherents or the dialectically tempered dis-
approval of the Marxist camp. The Jamesonian critique of postmodernist
cultural practice is correct insofar as it allows us to see the roots of these
practices in the de-Oedipalization of middle-class American society. Yet in
its privileging of the Oedipal escape into the Symbolic-a privileging in-
scribed within Marxism's general ontological assumptions-Marxism is un-
able to discover the historical possibilities of the postmodernist structure
of feeling or to specify preconditions for their development. A return to this
postmodernist structure of feeling, and more specifically to the experience
of those postmodernist works in music and performance art that have re-
cently begun to attract a mass audience, inevitably suggest, from a feminist-
materialist perspective, a more dialectical, even ambiguous judgment of that
experience-a judgment giving full weight to both the possibilities such work
offers us and the constraints it reproduces and distills.
I would like to conclude by trying to describe the experience of
postmodernist work from a feminist-materialist standpoint, in something
like its full ambiguity and irresolution. I have chosen exemplary moments
from three postmodernist works in which there seems to surface, at least
for an instant, something like a distinct political or historical reference point.
The first moment is the explicit appearance of the figure or image "Einstein"
in the Wilson/Glass opera Einstein on the Beach. Or perhaps "explicit fore-
grounding" is the better term, for in a sense the Einstein figure is never
397
absent. In every scene and interlude (or "Knee Play"), performers "dressed
'like Einstein,' as Wilson sees him, in grey pants, suspenders and black tennis
shoes,'' are present on stage. 58 Thus the figure of "Einstein" is decentered,
replicated, dispersed across the decelerated, oneiric landscape of the work.
Moreover, when an unmistakable representation of Einstein appears-a pho-
tograph of the young Einstein flashes on the backdrop, accompanied by the
spoken announcement "Berne 1905"; a figure dressed as Einstein, wigged
and mustachioed, plays the violin on the forefront of the stage-its presence
is immediately folded back into the musical and/or dramatic ground of
nonconsequential repetition and succession. In Einstein on the Beach, we
experience this constant engulfment of the historical figure more or less
wholeheartedly as a pleasure; the embedding and scattering ofthe Symbolic
figure, so problematic and disturbing in the range of contradictory meanings
its presence calls up (Einstein the socialist and devout pacifist; Einstein the
"Father of the Atom Bomb," etc.), defuses the potential force and compli-
cation of those meanings by dissolving them in a preverbal Imaginary space.
Wilson freely admits how much his dramaturgic practice owes to his ob-
servations of the mother-infant relationship; 59 and he describes the goal of
his productions as a relationship of Imaginary, preverbal communication-
through-identity between spectator and performer: "Ideally, someone in the
audience might reach a point of consciouness where he is on the same
frequency as one of the performers-where he receives communication di-
rectly."60 Needless to say, this is an impossible ideal, insofar as any com-
munication involves some perception of difference, some relation to that
Symbolic realm Wilson wants to efface. Yet the pleasure we are invited to
experience is precisely that of an unambiguous, pure, and omnipotent return
to life in the Imaginary-to pre-Oedipality as a new, sublime Benign.
Such moments from Einstein on the Beach, and the blissful pre-
Oedipal immersion they offer us, may be compared with a more troubled
moment in the recent work of Wilson's collaborator, composer Philip Glass,
in collaboration with filmmaker Godfrey Reggio in his 1982 Koyaanisqatsi.
As reviewers noted, the film itself is both rather simpleminded and sur-
prisingly incoherent. 61 A narrationless contrast between the steady majestic
grace ofunspoiled Nature and the brutal, senseless frenzy of contemporary
Western industrial society is apparently intended to make us aware that our
world is "out of balance" (Koyaanisqatsi being a Hopi word for such a
world); yet this explicit intent is undercut by the berserk excitement we
come to feel during the long montage sequence of speeded-up footage of
crowds streaking down stairs, zipping in and out of corporate towers, and
of traffic smearing into multicolored veins. The perverse beauty and ex-
citement of this sequence, moreover, are extended and complicated by Glass's
music, in which a slowly rising set of choral arpeggios, through ascension,
repetition, and crescendo, gradually turn into a nearly intolerable screamfest.
In this way-for the music never ceases to be overwhelmingly, repetitiously
gorgeous-Glass's score contributes to the film's decoding of the very set of
Symbolic categories introduced at its conclusion, when the audience is given
a set of Hopi words and proverbs with which, presumably, we are intended
to structure and encode the experience we have just been through. The
problem is that this literal accession to the Symbolic is rather too much like
the Oedipal moment for the American middle-class child, that is, both too
weak and too late.
398
 Fred Pfeil
Although the experience of Koyaanisqatsi thus proves to be in
its own way as much an aesthetic (re)experience of the pre-Oedipal Ima-
ginary as Wilson's Einstein on the Beach, here our pleasure in that Imaginary
engulfment is more problematically riddled with a pre-Oedipal aggressive-
ness absent from most of Wilson's work. Such a troubled, delirious, oscil-
lating pleasure is typified in our reaction to the musical sequence just de-
scribed: so gorgeous, continuous, and overwhelming that we want it never
to stop, yet so shatteringly intrusive and monotonous that it is simultane-
ously a menace to be resisted.
From the critical and political position I have taken here, I would
like to say that this latter pleasure seems preferable to the former, not by
any criterion of aesthetic "quality" or intensity of feeling, but in terms of
the recognitions and affirmations these two different modalities of pleasure
call upon us to make. Evidently, both Wilson's dramaturgy and (at least in
the sequence discussed) Glass's music invite us to enjoy our fundamentally
pre-Oedipal relationship to the world, the reclamation of social experience
and historical representation by the Imaginary. Yet whereas in Wilson's
work the pleasure induced by that reclamation is a regression to be wished
for and enjoyed, in Glass's music it is also experienced as intolerable. Insofar
as a modality of pleasure encourages a given attitude toward the structure
of feeling it draws on, and so valorizes certain attitudes toward the world,
Wilson's work is liable to the charge that it encourages a heedless acceptance
and acquiescence on the part of the enjoying subject, while Glass's work
more dialectically invites us to enjoy such a pre-Oedipal relationship yet
wish for a resolution of its antinomies.
That may be all that the best postmodernist work can do for the
mass audience now seeking it out: in this moment-characterized both by
the release of new sociopolitical forces through the de-Oedipalization of
middle-class American life and by the hegemony of this same de-Oedipalized
social-sexual structure that tends to block the further development of those
social forces-the most progressive postmodernist work can only foreground
our inherent irresolution. Thus, postmodernism offers its mass audience the
most scandalously ambivalent pleasure possible. Yet as I see and hear these
works, there are rare moments that seem to edge slightly past this threshold
to hint at the possibility of a genuine passage through the pre-Oedipal into
another structure of feeling, another form of life.
Such a moment occurred for me at the end of a performance by
Laurie Anderson when, in the characteristically neutral, even empty voice
that constitutes a sort of pedal point in her vocal repertoire, she announced
"Born-never asked," without inflection. On the screen behind her a series
of still images appeared, slide projections of old colored rotogravures de-
picting various wild animals-leopards, snakes, and so on-in their tropical
habitats; meanwhile, a low, percussive cadence of saxophone and taped
sound gradually transformed itself into a slowly varying melody, simulta-
neously blues-y and vaguely "Eastern" in character, familiar from her having
performed it on the violin earlier that night. "You were born," she said in
the same toneless voice, "and so you're free. Happy Birthday."
The words and pictures offered us a pleasure not so different from
that I have just described in connection with Glass's music-a pleasure
fundamentally in recognition of our real ambivalence. The covert melan-
cholia of the music, the sense of past time saturating the slides of the old
399
pictures, seemed to hint either that we are inevitably not, after all, so fully,
preverbally immersed and/or that perhaps the freedom of such an Imaginary
existence was not so free anyway. The very flatness of Anderson's voice
both affirmed and retracted its own liberatory announcement. Then the
music stopped and the sequence of images concluded with one rotogravure
depicting two white men in colonial uniforms astride two elephants, out
hunting in what had suddenly become an Empire, a dominated zone. It was
an astonishing instant, exhilirating yet perplexing; rather as if, with the
entrance of the historical-political into the ambiguous postmodemist pleas-
ure of the pre-Oedipal, I was being hailed by a new sense, a new kind of
relationship to the Real, which neither I nor Laurie Anderson nor anyone
else in the hall was as yet able to live or name.
My aim in this essay has been not only to articulate the social
transformations that have made such a call liminally possible within the
most engaged postmodemist work, but to explain this final, most vexing
pleasure, and the structure of feeling it might rest on.

Notes

Marjorie Perloff, Frank O'Hara. Poet among Painters (New York: G. Braziller, 1977). or "Con-
temporary/Postmodern: The 'New' Poetry," in Romanticism. Moderntsm. Postmodernism.
ed. Harry R. Garvin (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press. 1980). pp. 171-79. In both these
writings, Perloff offers interesting insights into the techniques and effects of the poetry she
describes but fails to consider the question of what makes such poetry pleasurable to what
groups of readers. In other words. her criticism remains enclosed within a formalism that
stunts its own best insights.
2 Hilton Kramer's game defense of modernism and high culture in general may be followed in
the New York Times. Most of Gerald Graff's "pacification" operations to date are collected
in Literature against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 1979).
3 For an example of the major arguments and positions involved in the Marxist debate. see
Ernst Bloch et al., Aesthetics and Politics (London: New Left Books, 1977).
4 See Fredric Jameson, "Reflections in Conclusion," in Aesthetics and Politics, pp. 196-213,
from which most of my examples of modernist "trickle-down" have been taken, and his
equally remarkable "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," Social Text. 1 (Spring 1979),
pp. 130-48.
5 See, for example, the contributions by lhab Hassan and Wallace Martin in the final section
of Romanticism. Modernism. Postmodernism, pp. 117-26, 146-54; lhab Hassan, "Joyce.
Beckett, and the Post-modern Imagination," in Triquarterly, 34 (Fall 1975), pp. 179-200;
and/or David Antin, "Modernism and Postmodernism: Approaching the Present in American
Poetry," boundary 2. 1. no.1 (Fall 1972). pp. 98-133.
6 Raymond Williams. Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press. 1977). pp.
133-34 (final emphasis mine).
7 In another essay I have explicitly criticized this very concept. and Williams's Marxism and
Literature as a whole, for its incompatibility with the Marxist-materialist tradition it purports
to follow and extend; see Fred Pfeil, "Towards a Portable Marxist Criticism: A Critique and
Suggestion." College English. 41, no. 7 (Mar. 1980). pp. 753-68. I now wish to alter that
criticism, but not retract it. Specifically, it seems to me that Williams's use of concepts like
"structure of feeling" and criticisms of such standard Marxist terminology as the familiarly
opposed "base" and "superstructure" slide into a proto-idealist abstraction and insubstan-
tiality precisely because his allegiance to the primacy of production blinds him to another at
least equally primary process and level of material practice: the acquisition and construction
of self, language, and gender, a process that feminists argue is at least as fully constitutive
of production in the Marxist sense as it is constituted or determined by the latter. Without
the grounding of a feminist theory rooted in the psychosociological history of selfhood, en-
genderation. and the subject's accession into the universe of signification, Williams's critique
of orthodox Marxism rests upon air; and his emphasis on the process of signification appears

400
 Fred Pfeil
as an idealist "invisible man," both swathed and blindfolded by the Marxist wrappings that
hold its shape barely in place.
8 See the landmark essay by Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class,"
in Between Labor and Capital, ed. Pat Walker (Boston: South End Press, 1979). pp 5-45.
9 For a vivid social history and analysis of this transformation, see Barbara Ehrenreich and
Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 750 Years of Experts' Advice to Women (New York:
Doubleday, 1979), pp. 211-324; and for an insightful account of the profound psychological
shifts resulting from it. and of their political significance, see Nancy Chodorow, "Oedipal
Assymetries and Heterosexual Knots." Social Problems, 23 (Apr. 1976). pp. 454-68.
10 On the relative stability of the ruling-class and working-class family structure, see Amy Swerd-
low, Renata Bridenthal. Joan Kelly, and Phyllis Vine, Household and Km (Old Westbury, N.Y.:
Feminist Press, 1981 ), pt. 2, pp. 50-105. For a further examination of the life cycle of the
contemporary American working-class family, see Lillian Rubin's moving Worlds of Pain: Life
in the Working-Class Family (New York: Basic Books. 1976)
11 Lyrics from "A1r," on Talking Heads, Fear of Music (Sire Records, SKR-6076, 1979).
12 Lyrics from "0 Superman," on Laurie Anderson, B1g Science (Warner Bros. Records BSK-
3674, 1982)
13 Text by Christopher Knowles, quoted from a booklet accompanying Robert Wilson and Philip
Glass, Einstein on the Beach (Tomato Records TOM-4-290 1, 1979).
14 Cra1g Owens, "Amplifications: Laurie Anderson:· Art in America, Mar. 1981, p. 122.
15 The quotation from Levi-Strauss is the epigraph to Nadine Gordimer, Burger's Daughter (New
York: Viking, 1979); I do not know its original source. The quotation from Laurie Anderson
is 1n Cra1g Owens, "The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory of Postmodernism.'' October,
12 (Spring 1980). p. 59.
16 From my notes on her sold-out performance in Portland, Oregon, sponsored by the Portland
Center for the Visual Arts, April 24, 1982.
17 "Let X~ X" is on Anderson's Big Science, "Air" and "Animals" (from which the quotation
is taken) are from Talking Heads's Fear of Music.
18 Fredric Jameson, "Language and Modes of Production" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 28-
29.
19 "0 Superman.'' on Anderson's Big Science.
20 "Heaven.'' on Talking Heads's Fear of Music.
21 Back liner notes to Wilson and Glass's Einstein on the Beach.
22 In recent works by postmodernist composers Phil1p Glass and Steve Reich Glassworks, Var-
iations for Wmds, Strings and Keyboard, 1979, and Vermont Counterpoint, 1982-both to
my knowledge presently unrecorded-! believe it is possible to hear distinct signs of such
harmonies reminiscent of those of Gershwin-signs that may be symptomatic of a movement
toward the tropes and satisfactions of mass culture.
23 I should note that, in his recent work, Craig Owens has been concerned to describe and
endorse a v1ew of postmodernist cultural production that is simultaneously far more political
and more discriminating than the view ascribed to him here; see. for example, "The Discourse
of Others.'' in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (New York:
Bay Press, 1983). Nonetheless. Owens's mam concern remains the politics and intended
political effects of specific, politically self-conscious postmodernist works; whereas my aim
here, as I hope has now become clear, is to provide a symptomatic political reading both of
certain mternally unpolitical, even retrograde postmodern works that have managed to reach
a mass audience, and-even more decisively-of the mass audience that consumes them.
24 The phrase is Roland Barthes's. quoted by Rosalind Krauss, "Poststructuralism and the
'Paraliterary'.'' October, 13 (Summer 1980), p. 190.
25 Charles Russel, ·'The Context of the Concept.·' in Romanticism, Modernism, Postmodernism,
p. 190.
26 The members of Talking Heads have New York art school backgrounds, for example, while
Laurie Anderson at one time was herself a practicing art historian. In addition to such bio-
graphical details, I suspect close relationships inevitably exist as well between the artists and
their academic-intellectual publicists.
27 The one exception to th1s silence that I know of is Rosalind Krauss's suggestion that students'
interest in contemporary postmodernist literature-chiefly the work of Barthes and Derrida-
follows from their absorption of the modernist tent of self-reflexiveness in both texts and
readings; see her "Poststructuralism and the 'Paraliterary' :· p. 40. But such an explanation
scarcely touches the question of pleasure; rather, it opens up the ground for another round

401
 of the stale argument over whether or not postmodernism is distinct from modernism, a
debate I have already suggested we should not have to engage in anymore.
28 Fredric Jameson, "The Concept of the Sixties" (unpublished manuscript). p. 23.
29 Jameson, "Language and Modes of Production," p. 28.
30 Those whose degrees come from community colleges and/or elite schools are invited to
investigate the social dynamtcs of thetr own educational experience as well. For any such
mvestigation, the most detailed and useful text is, of course, Samuel Bowles and Herb Gintis,
Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976). especially pp. 201-23.
31 "The bureaucrattzation of the world" is the tttle of Henry Jacoby's historical analysis of the
rise and spread of bureaucracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); the second
quotatton is from Anthony Giddens, Sociologv.· A Brief but Critical Introduction (London:
Macmillan, 1982). p. 88.
32 Cf. Rtchard Edwards's use of this term, as differentiated from etther "technical" or "direct"
control, in Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Baste Books, 1979).
33 Jon Schiller, "The New 'Family Romance'," Triquarterly, 52 (Fall 1981). p. 70.
34 Judith Wtlliamson, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meamng in Advertisements (Salem:
Marion Soyars, 1978). pp. 44-45.
35 See Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Phase as Formative of the Function of the I," New Left
Review, 51 (Sept.-Oct. 1968). pp. 71-77.
36 Willtamson, p. 65.
37 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Knopf, 1963). p.
63.
38 My account here is particularly reductive insofar as 1t conflates highly significant differences
between female and male engenderation and psychtc formation in both the pre-Oedipal and
Oedipal stages. For a far more comprehensive analysis, see Nancy Chodorow, The Repro-
duction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of
Caltfornia Press, 1978). especially pp. 57-140; and Isaac Balbus, Marxism and Domination:
A Neo-Hegelian, Femmist, Psychoanalv.ttc Theory of Sexual, Political, and Technological Lib-
eration (Princeton: Princeton Universtty Press, 1982). pp. 303-22.
39 Schiller. "The New 'Family Romance'." p 83.
40 lbtd., p.71.
41 A good deal of the concrete historical data necessary for the construction of this argument
with regard to American soctety in particular may be found in Carl Degler, At Odds: Women
and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980)
42 Michel Foucault. The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon,
1978). p. 93.
43 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 177 (my emphasis).
44 "0 Superman," on Anderson's Big Science.
45 My reading here summarizes and extends that of Balbus in Marxism and Domination, pp.
269-78; and of Phyllis Zuckerman, "Nature as Surplus-the Work of the Text in Marx," the
minnesota revtew, (n.s.) 20 (Spring 1983). pp. 103-11.
46 Michele Barrett and Mary Mcintosh, "Narcissim and the Family A Critique of Lasch," New
Left Review, 135 (Sept.-Oct. 1982). p. 48.
47 See Gayle Rubin, ''The Traffic in Women,'' in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna
Retter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). pp. 15 7-21 0-probably the first feminist
work to lay the grounds for such an undertaking. Isaac Balbus attempts a very brief and
inevitably reductive historical sketch of the Western sex/gender system as the determinant
of what he calls the "mode of symbolization" in Marxism and Domination, pp. 303-52. Of
course, much more work needs to be done.
This is perhaps also the place for a bnef word on the peculiar relevance and
obstructiveness of Lacantan terminology and analysis in such an undertaking. I suspect. for
example, that many Lacanians, perhaps especially Lacanian Marxists, would want to criticize
my rough equation of the Lacanian "mirror-stage" with the pre-Oedipal stage as defined by
femtnist-materialists after Klem. Yet it is this very disengagement of the process of the for-
mation of the self from the mother-child relationship by means of the frankly hypothetical
scenario of the child before the mirror that arouses my suspicion. It may be that the importance
of Lacanian thought for much recent Marxist theory-for example, in the work of both Jame-
son and Williamson, ctted above-ts not only a functton of the real value of the concepts of

402
 Fred Pfeil
the Imaginary, the SymboliC, and the Real, for Marxist and feminist work alike, but of the
opportunity Lacanian analysis offers Marxism to speak of the constitution of the self in psy-
choanalytiC terms without opening a Pandora's box of the sex/gender system-and thus of
sexual politiCS generally. So, while the categones of the Imaginary and the Symbolic seem
to me of fundamental importance for feminist analysis, they must not only be historicized by
that analySIS but detached as well from any unrevised concept from which the presence of
the subject's f1rst and most s1gnificant Other and the whole question of engenderation are
elided.
48 Karl Marx, "The Communist Manifesto." in Karl Marx. Selected Wntmgs, ed. David Mclellan
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1977). p. 222.
49 The messian1c moment of class struggle proper is called up frequently and regularly in Jame-
son's work. See. for example, the closing pages of his essay "On Interpretation," The Political
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially SymboliC Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
pp. 17-102, and the prophecy with which "The Concept of the Sixties" closes: "even if
Marx1sm is . not now true, it will become true again as the global development of this
new stage of capitalism unfolds before us" (p. 35).
Lasch's more confused and regressive prescriptions may be found in Haven
in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New York: Norton, 1974) and The Culture of
Narc1ssism: American Life in an Age of Dimimshing Expectations (New York: Norton, 1979)
Unfortunately, the undialectical harshness of his JUdgment of de-Oedipalization infects work
that IS far more suggestive and interesting than his own. Jon Schiller's "The New 'Family
Romance'," for example, IS crippled by a reading of de-Oedipalization that owes too much
to Lasch and too little to D~nnerstein and Chodorow; thus is he able to conclude that de-
Oedipallzatlon leads only to a "rebellious practice" whose "psychology . . seems to pre-
clude any active political significance" (p. 84).
50 For a fuller exposition of both this point and those that follow, see Dorothy Dinnerstein, The
Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and the Human Malaise (New York: Harper
and Row. 1976); and Balbus, Marxism and Domination, pp. 303-52.
51 For an insightful analysis of this de-Oedipalized hostility, see Balbus, pp. 384-98. especially
p. 393.
52 Unfortunately, the converse seems to be true as well. Insofar as working-class men and
women stilll1ve and labor within a world in wh1ch Oedipality remains supreme, working-class
women may cont1nue to find it hard to make common cause with feminism; and working-
class men and women alike may find political organizations with one form or another of top-
down control-from the Revolutionary Communist party to the local Democratic party ma-
chine-most "natural" to them.
53 Stephanie Engels, "Femininity as Tragedy: Re-examining the 'New Narcissism'," Socialist
Review (Sept.-Oct 1980). p. 97.
54 Balbus. p. 303.
55 Lasch, "The Concept of the Sixties," pp. 31-35.
56 See Balbus. pp. 279-302. Once again, moreover, it is interesting to compare the de-Oed-
ipalized utopia sketched out by feminist-materialists like Balbus and Dinnerstein with Marx's
equally tentative, deliberately sketchy observations on the Utopia at the origin and end of his
youthful speculation on communist society 1n his notes on James Mill; for example, "our
products would be like so many mirrors, out of wh1ch our essence shone'' (Karl Marx: Selected
Writings, p. 122). appears in light of Lacanian terminology and a feminist-materialist analysis
as a flagrant example of the Oedipalized subject's hopeless longing for its pre-Symbolic "Ideal-
Ego."
57 I should make clear that of the three maJor feminist-materialists whose work I have drawn
upon here. it is D1nnerstein and Balbus who have argued the case for "co-mothering" along
these holistic lines. By contrast, Chodorow calls for co-mothering as a necessary step in the
achievement of sexual equal1ty and freedom, that is, for the cause of women's liberation
spec1f1cally.
58 Susan Flakes. "Robert Wilson's Einstein on the Beach," The Drama Review, 72 (Dec. 1976).
p. 71.
59 See Calvin Tomkins, The Scene.· Reports on Post-Modern Art (New York: Viking, 1976). p.
240.
60 Quoted in Tomkins, p. 263.
61 See. for example, Gregory Sandow's review in The Village Voice, Oct. 12, 1982, p. 58.

403
 Eugene Holland

Schizoanalysis: The Postmodern

Contextualization of Psychoanalysis

The radical cleavage between psychic and soc1al deter~

mination no longer exists. Marxist cultural criticism must
dismantle the processes of recoding (bureaucratization,
the nuclear family, and consumerism) that perpetuate
the power of capitalist society and prevent the realiza~
tion of permanent revolution.

The use of psychoanalysis for marxist cultural analysis

has long presented a serious difficulty: the problem of moving from the
dynamics of the nuclear family in the domestic sphere to questions of eco-
nomics, politics, and class struggle in the public sphere. Of course, the sep-
aration of domestic from public life, as well as the classical form of the
nuclear family, are themselves historical phenomena. And, indeed, Freud
and freudian thought have been readily identified as products of late-nine-
teenth-century European society, a period in which family life was relatively
autonomous and thus of considerable importance in psychic development.
With the decline of the nuclear family's autonomy in our own, very different
late-twentieth-century society, however, the continuing relevance of ortho-
dox psychoanalysis is far less readily apparent.
In his monumental study of Haubert, Sartre takes as
his point of departure the autonomous existence and importance of young
Haubert's family life and then asks how someone with that particular family
background and experience could have become one of the greatest writers
of the age. The crux ofSartre's argument hinges on his answer to the question
What was it about the young Haubert's neurotogenic childhood that so
perfectly suited him to the objective neurosis of his age? Indeed, how could
Haubert's art have been "at one and the same time a neurotic response to
a subjective malaise and to the objective malaise of literature?"' For the
nineteenth century, then, even a form of psychoanalysis carefully attuned
to the importance of the larger social context proceeds on two parallel tracks:
one psychobiographical, examining Haubert's family life; the other socio-
historical, examining the culture and society of the Second Empire.
But what happens once the domestic sphere is rein-
tegrated into the fabric of social life? At this point, the status of the family
and the Oedipus complex in psychoanalytic explanation becomes proble-
matic. Even while documenting the decline of the autonomous nuclear fam-
ily and its permeation by advanced capitalist social relations, for example,
Christopher Lasch nonetheless retains an orthodox freudian emphasis on
the family as prime determinant of psychic life. Yet all the evidence he
presents points in the opposite direction: family life may have been a "haven
from a heartless world" and a predominant influence on the psyche in the
nineteenth century, but the advanced capitalist forms of schooling, govern-
ment, health care, entertainment, business, and so forth have by now re-
405
 duced the family's role to a minimum. 2 Under these conditions, the old
freudian problem of the relatively self-contained nature of family life and
childhood may prove less of an obstacle for marxist cultural analysis. There
are, moreover, theoretical developments within psychoanalysis itself that
may enable us to understand a gamut of important psychic phenomena not
derived from oedipal conflict in the nuclear family.
As is so often the case in Freud's works, it is one of his own key
discoveries that undermines what otherwise appears to be a basic axiom of
freudian theory: the centrality of family life and the Oedipus complex in
psychic development. Under the rubric Nachtraglichkeit, Freud argues that
many psychic disturbances are not the result of a linear determinism based
on a traumatic childhood event but rather a dialectical interaction between
initially meaningless memory-traces and later experiences that reactivate
those traces and endow them with meaning only "nachtraglich, apres coup,"
after the fact. But then these later experiences need not be restricted to the
nuclear family: any number ofkinds of interaction in any number of social
settings may reinvoke childhood memory-traces and endow them with
meanings that depend, for one thing, on the existence of a memory-trace
but also on the nature of the later experience itself. 3
Laying heavy emphasis himself on the concept of Nachtrag-
lichkeit, Jacques Lacan has further shifted attention away from the nuclear
family by rewriting the Oedipus complex as a linguistic rather than a pri-
marily intrafamilial phenomenon. More important than the biological fa-
ther, in this view, is the function of the "name-of-the-father" in the Symbolic
order of language. For Lacan, the structuring of the individual psyche de-
pends on the structure oflanguage, in which the name-of-the-father occupies
a central position. Here we have already moved beyond the nuclear family
as the determining matrix of psychic life to the quintessentially social in-
stance oflanguage-even if the terms ofLacan's Symbolic order themselves
reproduce the structure and dynamic of Freud's original Oedipus complex.
But what if the name-of-the-father functions differently in dif-
ferent societies? This is the question Gilles Deleuze and Felix Gauttari pose
in The Anti-Oedipus, as they move beyond Lacan to firmly ground indi-
vidual psychic life in a broadly social rather than strictly familial matrix of
determinations. 4 Drawing on a vast range of anthropological and historical
data, Deleuze and Guattari show that the name-of-the-father functions in
classical oedipal fashion only in certain types of social formation and, more-
over, that advanced capitalism is not such a social formation. Indeed, they
argue that today the Oedipus complex is an anachronism, playing only a
marginal-and repressive-role in the hands of the orthodox freudian psy-
choanalytic establishment.
In order to demonstrate how different the dynamics of the Sym-
bolic order can be in different societies, Deleuze and Guattari present a
typology of social forms, drawn from the works of Morgan and Engels but
based on the interplay of two categories derived from Nietzsche and Marx:
power and economics. The three social formations outlined in The Anti-
Oedipus-savagery, despotism, and capitalism-are not to be understood as
concrete historical stages of social evolution but rather as ideal types, as the
logical permutations of basic social organization, shown in Figure 1 as the
mapping of a semantic system or combinatoire. 5 Savagery, in this scheme,
represents "primitive communism," a preclass society where power circu-
406
 Eugene Holland

Capitalism

I power society economic society

Despotism I XI y
Permanent
Revolution
I
I
-Y I -X

I non-economic society non-power society I

Savagery
Figure 1.

lates throughout the community and does not accrue to a single group or
individual. This is no rousseauistic Utopia, however, since savage society
is the one most harshly governed by exacting codes of conduct, belief, and
meaning-codes that Deleuze and Guattari consider inherently repressive.
And since authentic, unconscious desire is radically indeterminate-or
"schizophrenic," in their term, any fixed determination of it, such as that
imposed by linguistic and social codes, hence inevitably distorts and mis-
represents it. 6
As much as the Symbolic codes of savage society may irrevocably
fix and therefore distort desire, savage coding nonetheless operates in a
comparatively egalitarian manner so as to avoid and even actively defuse
accumulated power. Under despotism, by contrast, distorting representa-
tions are promulgated precisely in order to establish class divisions and
hierarchy, as the distortions inherent in all forms of coding are bent to the
service of explicit political power and direct social domination. Only here
does the name-of-the-father-or, more aptly, the name-of-the-despot-gov-
ern the entire Symbolic order; only here are the name-of-the-father and
patriarchal domination in the nuclear family homologous with the name-
of-the-despot and political domination in society as a whole; only here are
all social codes in the Symbolic order subordinated to the all-powerful im-
perial "overcoding" of the despot. As the privileged source of all "author-
ized" meaning and true possessor of all social wealth, the despot represents
and occupies the fixed center of the Symbolic order in traditional power
society.
Under capitalism, by contrast, there is no fixed center of this
kind, no transcendental signified, no established authority figure; rather,
exchange value and the market ruthlessly undermine and eliminate all tra-
ditional meanings and preexisting social codes: 7 the fabric of capitalist so-
ciety is knit not by concrete, qualitative relations but by abstract, quanti-
tative ones-by the "cash nexus. " 8 The basis of capitalist society is not
territory, as in savagery, nor the priest, king, or god, as under despotism,
but the abstract calculus of capital itself. Capital, as an abstract, quantitative
calculus, provides no universal codes capable of organizing and compre-
hending the whole of social life. In opposition to savage "coding" and des-
potic "overcoding," then, the semiotic process governing the Symbolic order
under capitalism is "decoding," market society's aggressive elimination of
all preexisting meanings and codes. 9
407
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, more important than the
Oedipus complex in determining the nature of psychic life, given the dif-
fering nature of the Symbolic order in different types of society, is the specific
form ofsemiosis operative in a particular social formation. And the decoding
process, inasmuch as it frees desire from capture and distortion by social
coding, must be considered one of the positive features of the capitalist
Symbolic order: one corollary of the immense productivity of capitalism
admired by Marx is the freedom it grants desire to escape fixture in estab-
lished codes. But the liberating effects of decoding that stem from the eco-
nomic component of capitalist society are always accompanied by opposing
processes of recoding stemming from its power component, which tie freed
libidinal energy back onto factitious codes so as to extract and realize pri-
vately appropriable surplus value. This opposition between decoding and
recoding derives not so much from the classical, nineteenth-century con-
tradiction between outright owners of capital and the dispossessed as from
the contradiction between the generally socialized production of surplus
value, on the one hand, and its private management, on the other. Capi-
talism devotes itself to production as an end in itself, to developing the
productivity of socialized labor to the utmost; yet due to private investment
in the means of production, social labor and life also are restricted to pro-
duction and consumption which valorize only the already existing capital-
stock.
In the third volume of Capital, Marx outlines these two moments
of capital's ongoing self-expansion. 10 In a first moment, a new, more pro-
ductive capital-stock transforms the preexisting apparatuses of production
and consumption, and this "continual revolution of the means of produc-
tion" characteristic of capitalism spawns decoding throughout society. But
in a second moment, this progressive movement is abruptly stopped and
everything is recoded: the evolving apparatuses of production and con-
sumption alike are tied down to now-obsolete capital-stock solely to valorize
it and realize profit on previous investment. The decoding process liberates
all kinds of creative energies (in consumption as well as in production) at
the same time that it revolutionizes and socializes productive forces; but
then recoding yokes and stultifies the relations of production and con-
sumption in the service of private surplus appropriation.
In this light, one of the aims of revolution is to eliminate the
power component from capitalism so as to enable the decoding process
inherent in economic society to free libidinal energy as much as possible
from the constraints of social coding. Thus, having disappeared as the basis
of despotic society as a whole, the semiotic form of power society never-
theless reappears under capitalism in a host of miniature despotisms, each
imposing a factitious code on a domain of human activity whose libidinal
energies relentlessly seek to escape it. A marxist cultural criticism wants to
target and dismantle the processes of recoding that serve to perpetuate the
power component of capitalist society and thus prevent the realization of
permanent revolution. This is, in fact, one of the aims ofwhat Deleuze and
Guattari call "schizoanalysis," their postmodern transmutation of psycho-
analysis. For convenience' sake, we may locate these recoding processes
schematically in three domains-the sphere of production, the nuclear fam-
ily, and the sphere of consumption-according to whether the temporary
and local meanings they introduce serve to enable people to perform jobs
408
 Eugene Holland
and administrative functions, induce them to consume certain commodities
to realize profit on invested capital, or finally prepare them to accept psy-
chological manipulation in a wide range of oedipal forms.
In the sphere of production, the most pervasive and widely rec-
ognized form of recoding is bureaucratization. In bureaucracy, a given do-
main of human activity is isolated from the warp and woof of social life,
stripped of its traditional meanings and practices, and then subjected to the
abstract rationality of formal administration. Free human activity is de-
prived of its spontaneous self-determination and subordinated to the process
Max Weber calls "rationalization." But this rationalization takes place in
a host of parallel and semiautonomous domains of application linked only
by the market; hence, Lukacs's concept of reification is more appropriate
and revealing. Full-scale capitalist development witnesses the taylorization
and technologization of production, the professionalization of knowledge
and expertise, the bureaucratization of public administration. Reification
in all these domains means that
artificially isolated partial functions [are] performed
in the most rational manner by "specialists," [which]
has the effect of making these partial functions auton-
omous [so that] they develop through their own mo-
mentum and in accordance with their own special laws
independently of other partial functions of society....
All issues are subjected to an increasingly formal and
standardized treatment ... in which there is an ever-
increasing remoteness from the qualitative and ma-
terial essence ofthe "things" to which [such] bureau-
cratic activity pertains. 11
One counterpart to the administrative mode' of capitalist recoding
exemplified in bureaucracy is the aesthetic of modernism. Although its do-
main of application is very different, the same form of semiosis applies: cut
off from direct communication with its public, the modernist artwork is no
longer conceived of as expressing social life itself but rather as presenting
the artist's own privileged point of view or mode of perception; reference
to the work of art itself replaces reference to social life as the organizing
master code of the work. This form of reified recoding appears with par-
ticular clarity in architecture of the so-called International Style, especially
in the monumental buildings of Mies van der Rohe and the urban plans of
Le Corbusier. The office building, referent of high modernist design-the
social relations that the signifying systems of architecture and urban plan-
ning ultimately refer to-has been banished; and the dense and complex
interlocking network of city life has been completely ironed out by Le Cor-
busier into vacuous parkland punctuated by high-rise towers linked by free-
ways. The aesthetic domain is emptied of its conventional, social content
and reorganized according to a new and more abstract master code. All that
remains once social reference has been eliminated in these ways is the special
meaning these designs are intended to convey, their signified. And what the
high modernist monument or cityscape in fact signifies is rationalization
itself, the notion of a purely formal or abstract rationality that will solve
409
the problems of the city through systematic simplification and the problems
of architectural aesthetics through absolute purification. Thus the decoded,
abstract rationality of"form follows function" (the elimination of ornament,
the subordination of design to technology, etc.) is reendowed with a positive
meaning-recoded "on the spot" or "in place" (sur place), as Deleuze and
Guattari would say-with the slogan "less is more." 12
Because, under capitalism, it is segregated from social production,
where decoding operates at full throttle, the nuclear family is a prime locus
of recoding. 13 Isolated from society at large, and thus restricted to the family
triangle for its objects of desire, the individual psyche takes the full impress
of the Oedipus complex; hence the relative adequacy of freudian psycho-
analysis in describing oedipal desire in the nuclear family under classical
or market capitalism, that is, insofar as the nuclear family itself retains a
relative autonomy from "external" social forces. But the nuclear family does
not long retain even that relative autonomy, as Christopher Lasch has shown,
once capitalism moves from the market to the monopoly stage around the
tum of the century.
Whereas Lasch considers a renewed Oedipus to be our last hope
for psychic health and social stability in the face of rampant pathological
narcissism, Deleuze and Guattari see the nuclear family's oedipal inscription
of the psyche as a last-ditch effort to repress desire in its authentic, schiz-
ophrenic form. Sequestered from the decoding process at work in capitalist
society at large, the nuclear family reinscribes the oppressive but now so-
cially obsolete role of the despot in the repressive figure of the father, which
the individual then internalizes as the name-of-the-father function of La-
can's Symbolic order. Furthermore, as the nuclear family breaks down and
increasingly fails to perform the oedipal reinscription of desire, according
to schizoanalysis, it is precisely psychoanalysis that steps in to finish the
job. If need be, the psychoanalyst shoulders the mantle of the despot (in
the famous "transference") to ensure that no desire at all escapes oedipal
triangulation. From the point of view of schizoanalysis, then, the Oedipus
is an archaic and reactionary despotism installed at the heart of the nuclear
family under capitalism to recontain the free flow of desire unleashed by
capitalist decoding in society at large. And the institution of psychoanalysis
is the repressive agency of last resort whenever the deteriorating nuclear
family fails to ensure complete oedipalization all by itself.
Comparing schizoanalysis with Lasch's perspective is illuminat-
ing because both address some of the same material-the disappearance of
the autonomous bourgeois ego-but from opposing points of view: the lib-
eration Deleuze and Guattari celebrate under the rubric of schizophrenia,
Lasch castigates as a feature of pathological narcissism; Lasch explains the
development of what he calls the "culture of narcissism" in terms of the
decline of the family, whereas Deleuze and Guattari insist on placing the
family in its sociohistorical context and considering culture and society as
a whole. Based on the ego psychology of Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut,
and taking the family as its pivotal determining instance, Lasch's "histor-
ical" explanation runs something like this: The autonomous bourgeois fam-
ily is dissolved by the pervasive administration of monopoly capitalism,
with two principal results. First, paternal authority declines, stunting the
development of the child's superego; and second, maternal instinct falters,
410
 Eugene Holland
as the mother's ambivalent feelings split the child's self-image into good
and bad versions that cannot be synthesized, while the child's inconsistent
behavior traumatizes frustration, on the one hand, by inculcating exagger-
ated expectations that are, on the other hand, systematically denied. The
result is a narcissistic personality that will eventually contribute to a nar-
cissistic culture.
The problem with this explanation is not so much that it is wrong-
Lasch's work contains valuable insights despite its flaws-but that it retains
the centrality of the nuclear family in an orthodox-psychoanalytic interpre-
tation of a culture in which, as Lasch himself documents, the nuclear family
plays a less and less decisive role in the formation of the individual psyche.
Rather than interpret culture in terms of the vicissistudes of family life,
schizoanalysis proposes to understand capitalist culture in terms of capital's
basic social processes-decoding and recoding-yet without denying the fam-
ily unit and the Oedipus complex their particular function within capitalist
society.
Schizoanalysis would thus explain the decline of superego func-
tions, and indeed the increase of ego instability itself, not in terms of the
demise of the family, as Lasch would have it, but in terms of the decoding
of social authority and of experience in general, which takes place (in France,
at any rate) during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Schizoanalysis
is poststructuralist as well as postmodernist, in that it retains the structuralist
axiom that subjectivity is an effect of social codes; hence, when they break
down, so does the "autonomous" bourgeois subject. The transition from
feudal and mercantile despotism to capitalism had already been secured
during the period of bourgeois ascendancy through the replacement of au-
thority figures (God, the Sun King, etc.) by the authority of reason. However
universal a structure the superego may be, its functions are considerably
increased in this first moment of bourgeois cultural revolution, with the
internalized conscience of the Protestant spirit and the internalized ration-
ality of the Enlightenment. But as market relations spread throughout so-
ciety, even this enlightenment reason succumbs to decoding: market society,
Marx says, "strips of its halo every profession hitherto regarded with rev-
erence and awe."I 4
In his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis-Napoleon, Marx not only
strips bourgeois political philosophy of its halo-by parodying Hegel-but
also ruthlessly deflates the social authority of the Second Empire itself,
showing why, under democratic conditions, the bourgeoisie had to forfeit
its direct political rule and cultural expression in order to maintain its eco-
nomic rule behind the scenes. And with characteristic accuracy, Marx rec-
ognizes that both the humiliated bourgeoisie and the defeated proletariat
would retreat from the pursuit of their "rational interests" in the public
sphere of class struggle into the private sphere of domestic consumption
just coming into its own under the Second Empire and which has expanded
ever since.
Consumerism is, indeed, the principal vehicle for recoding. Our
own experience of the rhythms of fad and fashion in consumer society; the
general effects of advertising, mass marketing, public relations, and political
propaganda analyzed by Jean Baudrillard, Guy Debord, J. P. Faye, and
others; and also accounts of the "successive private religions" of the mod-
411
 ernist avant-gardes since the late 1880s offered by Renato Poggioli, Walter
Benjamin, and others-all provide ample evidence of the ways in which
recoding introduces various local and temporary meanings into the other-
wise barren landscape of life under capitalism. 15
Acknowledging the emergence of consumerism in the latter half
of the nineteenth century puts Lasch's decline-of-the-family thesis in a dif-
ferent, somwhat broader perspective: the issue is not just the collapse of
paternal authority or maternal instinct but the function of the family in
society as a whole. The nuclear family of the late nineteenth century is not
some isolated refuge from capitalist competition-indeed, it is no "haven
in a heartless world"-but is, rather, the very locus of consumption. Pho-
tographs from this period present a telling image, for example, of the bour-
geois domestic interior-stuffed full of every last gewgaw and knickknack
imaginable. 16 Indeed, if modernist recoding is private religion, then the
home is its altar; and its idol, as Walter Benjamin put it, 17 is the fetish called
"Commodity." In the garish light of consumerism-which has become blind-
ing and now floods into the public sphere as well (in the form of"recreational
shopping," for example), so that the individual body itself has become a
temple of narcissistic recoding-narcissistic rage cannot be imagined to be
directed against mothers who traumatize frustration by acting inconsis-
tently, but must be understood in relation to an entire society that constantly
offers instant and unlimited gratification yet ultimately refuses to "deliver
the goods." Consumer society promises everyone satisfaction but can allow
no one enough satisfaction ... to stop consuming.
In the same vein, narcissists' inability to synthesize good and bad
is not primarily a result of ambivalent mothering but stems, rather, from
the pervasive disjunction under capitalism between the dreary, exploited
sphere of work and the glittering rewards of administered leisure and con-
spicuous consumption. Narcissists may insist that "living well is the best
revenge," but no amount of cynical hedonism can bridge the gap between
production and consumption-a gap that the expansion of capital steadily
reproduces on a larger and larger scale. Thus, narcissistic personality split-
ting, cynical-defensive disdain for others and for community, and desperate
self-absorption are not just the result of absent fathering and bad mothering
but a product of the libidinal structure of capitalism itself: narcissism man-
ifests what we might call the "capital-logic" of contemporary culture.
Schizoanalysis provides a means not of simply deriving culture
from the logic of capital but of answering Althusser's question regarding
how we explain the historical effectivity of a given semiautonomous de-
velopment.18 The issue is not whether narcissistic parents are likely to raise
narcissistic children (which is all ego psychology by itself can tell us)-of
course they are. Nor is the point to deny the family any role whatsoever in
perpetrating the culture of narcissism, for Althusser's concept of overde-
termination enables us to consider a variety of relations (interdependence
or independence, mutual reinforcement or cancellation, etc.) that may ob-
tain between various instances in society. The point here is that nowadays
the infantile narcissism fostered by the nuclear family is not resolved in
adult life but reinforced and exacerbated by a social formation in which
narcissism resonates wherever the logic of commodities and recoding has
penetrated: in bureaucracy, in the professions, in modernist art and archi-
tecture-indeed, as Lasch suggests, nearly everywhere.
412
 Eugene Holland
Now the main thrust ofpostmodemism-in art as well as theory-
and what distinguishes it decisively from modernism, is its refusal of re-
coding. In the history of architecture-where its advent is particularly clear-
cut and well understood 19-postmodemism defines itself against modernism
by ironically playing with existing architectural codes instead of elaborating
new ones of its own, and particularly by playing various codes off against
one another. In a public low-income housing project in New Haven, Con-
necticut, for example, the prominent postmodem architect/urban planner
Charles Moore has designed an apartment tower for the elderly in explicit
relation to a Knights of Columbus office tower located just across the free-
way. The insurance headquarters occupy six or eight glass-walled floors
supported on !-beams suspended between massive cylindrical pillars that
form the four comers of the building. In the old-age apartment tower, by
contrast, the right angles where the four main bare concrete walls would
have met have been neatly shaved away, creating a more or less square
tower that appears to have no comers at all. Rather than existing inde-
pendently as a self-contained monument with its own architectural code,
Moore's building makes ironic reference to local buildings and architectural
codes, thereby highlighting the disparities between the massive stability and
presence of the insurance industry and the meager insufficiency and depen-
dency of public housing.
In addition to embedding itself in its specific context in this way,
postmodem architecture often borrows from the architectural tradition, un-
abashedly mixing styles from widely dispersed historical periods or geo-
graphic regions. As opposed to modem architecture, and by ironically re-
ferring to other buildings and other styles while insisting on relating design
to the particular cultural context and physical location, postmodem archi-
tecture proclaims not an abstract necessity but its own contingency; not self-
contained autonomy but self-confessed relativity; not pure transcendence
but particular, historical contextuality. It thereby refuses recoding. 20
As a postmodem critique and renewal of psychoanalysis, schi-
zoanalysis also refuses recoding, denying privileged status in The Anti-Oed-
ipus, for example, to either the marxian or the freudian interpretive code.
Instead, it plays the one off against the other, so as to avoid erecting its own
master code. Just as the introduction of history into freudian theory rela-
tivized the Oedipus complex and politicized psychological analysis, so too
is the introduction of the unconscious into economics and politics bound
to have far-reaching consequences for marxist political and cultural analysis.
Less important for schizoanalysis than so-called rational interests and im-
puted "class consciousness" are the unconscious dynamics or "forms of
semiosis" underlying all kinds of human activity-from the production of
value in a factory, for example, to the production of consensus and action
in a political group, to the production of meaning in a work of art.
As a form of cultural criticism, schizoanalysis opposes interpre-
tation, for interpretation merely reinforces semiotic despotism by translating
one authorized code-that of the author or "creator"-into another author-
ized code-that of the critic. Rather than reinforce authority by multiplying
equivalent codes in this way, postmodemist schizoanalysis produces inter-
ference between codes and so acts to undermine their authority. Decon-
struction is an important precursor to schizoanalysis, in that Derrida has
rendered most forms of interpretation inoperative by demonstrating the
413
 inherent instability of the master codes on which interpretation has been
based. Yet even though he manages to decode logocentrism, Derrida does
so, as he says, strictly from within its own parameters. As a discourse of
philosophy, deconstruction remains, like modernism, a basically self-refer-
ential discourse; so even while heralding the "end of western metaphysics,"
Derrida remains only on the threshold of postmodernism.
Postmodernist criticism is explicity contextual, and by treating
philosophical discourses from Plato to Searle out of context, as so many
versions of the same logocentric master code, Derrida inevitably overlooks
contextual differences. So, at the limit, deconstructive decoding results merely
in dazzling displays oflexical pyrotechnics. Normally, semiotic codes func-
tion through the interplay of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations; but a
("decoded") unstable code cannot impose the constraints on paradigmatic
substitution necessary to produce determinate meaning. One result is the
so-called textual indeterminacy that has become the trump card of much
neo-derridean criticism in the United States-for example, J. Hillis Miller
discussing his difficulties interpreting Wallace Stevens's poem "The Rock":
"The multiple meanings of the word 'cure,' like the meanings of all key
words in 'The Rock,' are incompatible, irreconcilable. They may not be
followed, etymologically, to a single root which will unifY or explain them,
explicate them in a single source.... However hard [we try] to fix the word
in a single sense it remains indeterminable, uncannily resisting [any] at-
tempts to end its movement." 21 The so-called abyss ofthe paradigmatic axis
of discourse henceforth appears as an unavoidable obstacle to interpretive
procedures that would curtail the free play of semiosis and limit paradig-
matic substitution according to some law of equivalence (such as cigar
"means" penis, money "equals" feces, or whatever).
But discourse always entails syntagmatic relations as well. And
whereas the paradigmatic relations of substitution in discourse are virtual
(hence, "open to interpretation"), the syntagmatic relations of combination
in a given discourse are actual: a discourse consists precisely of a particular
combination of signs that has been realized. The hallmark of Foucault's
discourse analysis is that it eschews interpretation and concentrates instead
on this facticity of actualized discourse. Rather than relate a particular dis-
course to the entirety ofWestern metaphysics, Foucault analyzes the specific
rules of combination it displays and relates it, along with other discourses
displaying these rules, to the specific institutional contexts that form their
conditions of existence. Discourse is thus analyzed in its singularity and
contingency, instead of being recoded in terms of a personal experience it
would express, a period-style it would reflect, or a historical tradition it
would transmit and perpetuate. Foucault's sole points of reference are the
rules by which a discourse is constituted and the contexts within which it
coexists. In refusing the historical master plots of Hegel, Marx, and others,
Foucault emphasizes the unexpected, thereby evoking a history that is, by
its very constitution, subject to change.
If Foucault's discourse analysis examines the codes operative in
specific discursive formations and the effects of power they achieve in par-
ticular historical contexts, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis examines
the other side of the coin: the forces at work in discourse and society that
challenge the imposed closure of codes and strive to free desire from capture
in codified representation. Assuming the effective integration ofthe classical
414
 Eugene Holland
proletariat into capitalist hegemony-and it is important to be clear on the
assumption Deleuze and Guattari are making in a book written in the wake
of May 1968 when even the French Communist party sided with the forces
of order against the general strike: that there is perhaps not total but, prac-
tically speaking, effective integration of the proletariat into the development
plan of late capitalism-Deleuze and Guattari assert that the fundamental
contradiction in the fully developed capitalist mode of production operates
not between discrete social classes but between the socialization of produc-
tion, on the one hand, and the private appropriation of surplus, on the
other. Hence their promotion of schizophrenic decoding as the very move-
ment of permanent revolution, as opposed to the constriction and limitation
of social revolution by capitalist recoding.
As a result, schizoanalytic criticism is primarily a pragmatic anal-
ysis of texts, one that assesses the impact on readers' desire, regardless of
content or meaning. A work of art, just as much as a political formation or
an economic process, has a form of semiosis that tends either to limit desire
to the exigencies of a code or to free desire to pursue its own schizophrenic
trajectories. 22 The aims of schizoanalysis are thus to expose strategies of
recontainment and closure wherever they operate to recode desire; and,
more important, to locate and intensify the "lines of flight" by which, in
art as well as politics, desire may avoid and undermine the pervasive re-
coding of power relations under advanced capitalism.

Notes

1 Jean-Paul Sartre, L'idiot de Ia famil/e (Paris: Gallimard, 1971-72), vol. 3, pp. 40-41; also
cited by Hazel Barnes, Sartre and Flaubert (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1981),
who agrees that "Sartre wants to show that Flaubert became the writer he was m response
to two lines of conditioning .... One line represents the Influence of the family, the other
that of society and cultural tradition" (p. 11 ).
2 See, in particular, Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: Amencan Life in an Age of
Diminishing Expectations (New York: Norton, 1979); see also his earlier study, Haven in a
Heartless World: The Family Beseiged (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
3 Freud introduces this important concept in "Project for a Scientific Psychology," Standard
Edition, vol. 1, esp. pp. 356-58; it also figures prominently in his discuss1on of the "Wolf
Man" case, in Standard Edition, vol. 17, esp. pp. 37-38.
4 The English version, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem,
and H. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), appeared five years after the French, L 'anti-Oedipe:
Capitalisme et schizophreme (Paris: Seuil, 1972).
5 For clarity's sake, I present the three social formatiOns Deleuze and Guattan outline in Chapter
3 of Anti-Oedipus ("Sauvages, barbares, civilises"), along with the fourth, projected stage
(permanent revolution), in a semantic rectangle derived from A. J. Greimas, Du sens (Paris:
Seuil, 1970).
6 It is crucial to understand that Deleuze and Guattari distinguish absolutely between the pro-
cess of schizophrenia and the clinical entity "the schizophrenic." The latter is a product of
psychiatry's forced receding of the free-flowing libidinal energy characteristic of the process
of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari do not condone the institutional production and con-
finement of "schizophrenics," nor do they idealize their condition.
7 Thus, in a project closely aligned with Deleuze and Guattari's perspective (Discipline and
Punish, trans. A. Sheridan [1975; New York: Pantheon, 1977]), Foucault distinguishes the
centralized form of power characteristic of despotism from the dissemmated, quantifying
power appropriate to capitalist decoding. The latter IS a form of power Foucault himself says
is Integral to the development of industnal capitalism (in Power/Knowledge, ed. Col1n Gordon
[New York: Pantheon, 1980]. p. 105 )
8 That is (usmg terms Deleuze and Guattari do not), capitalist soc1ety is constituted by digital
rather than analogous relations: the capitalist "axiomatic" (to revert to their terminology)

415
 JOins decoded (digital) flows-of wealth, labor power, knowledge, consumer tastes, and so
on-for the sake of extracting a differential surplus from them; whatever local (analogue)
codes may temporarily spring up in the process are strictly incidental to capital's basic "ax-
iomatic" process of self-expansion.
9 Some sense of the content of "decoding" may be suggested by recalling how science
replaces sense experience with a mathematical calculus, as in lockean psychology where
color (henceforth a mere "secondary" quality) is decoded by the calculus of wavelengths
("primary" quality).
10 See Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ernest Untermann, (New York: International Publishers, 1967).
vol. 3, pp. 249-50.
11 See Georg Lukacs, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," History and Class
Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1B71 ), especially sec.
1, "The Phenomenon of Reification." I quote from pp. 103, 99.
12 The postmodern critique of modern1st city planning and urban "renewal" was initiated in
1961 by Jane Jacob's important book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New
York: Random HouseNintage Press).
13 More properly speaking, the nuclear family for schizoanalysis is the prime locus of "reterri-
torializatJon" rather than recoding. Terntorialization is the process of fixing desire on an object
whereas coding (and overcoding and recoding) fix desire to representation. Thus, the nuclear
family reterritorializes schizophrenic desire by restricting it to certain objects (Mommy and
Daddy). while it is actually psychoanalysis that recodes-by providing desire with the socially
sanct1oned representation of the "Oedipus complex."
14 See Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, 1n Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics
and Philosophy, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959). pp. 6-41, where Marx
descnbes the basis of decoding in this way: "The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every
occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the phy-
sician, the lawyer, the priest the man of science into its paid wage laborers. . The bourgeoi-
Sie cannot live without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby
the relations of product1on, and with them the whole relations of society. Constant
revolution1z1ng of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitat1on distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-
frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts
into air . " (p 10)
15 See Jean Baudnllard, Pour une critique de l'econom1e politlque du signe (Paris: Gallimard,
1972). and Simulacres et simulation (Paris: Galilee, 1981 ); Guy Debord, La societe du
spectacle (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1967); J. P. Faye, Langages totalitaires (Paris: Hermann,
1972); Renata Poggioli, The Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1968); Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: Epic Poet in the Era of High
Cap1talism, trans. Harry Zohn, (London: NLB, 1973). The term "private religion" has been
used by Fredric Jameson to refer to the modernist aesthetic in literature.
16 See, for example, chapter 13 of E. J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Capital, 1848-1870 (New
York: Scribner's Sons, 1975). and the discussion in Rosalyn Williams, Dream Worlds: Mass
Consumption in Late-19th-Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
17 See Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, especially "Paris, Capital of the 19th Century," sec. 1,
3,4.
18 This IS a question posed by Althusser' s rewriting the historical problematic in terms of "struc-
tural causality" and "overdeterminatJon." See For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (1965; New
York: Random House, 1969). specifically: "Contradiction and Overdetermination," pp. 87-
128, esp. pp. 119-26; and "On the Materialist Dialectic," pp. 161-218, esp. pp. 200-10.
19 Thanks in large part to the works of Charles Jencks: The Language of Postmodem Architecture
(New York: Rizzoli, 1977) and Late-Modem Architecture and Other Essays (New York: Rizzoli,
1980)
20 For an insightful analysis of postmodern art, see Craig Owens, "The Allegorical Impulse:
Toward a Theory of Postmodernism," October 12 ( 1980). pp. 67-86, and 13 ( 1980). pp.
59-80, esp. pp. 79-80.
21 See J. Hillis Miller in Georgia Review (Spring 1976). p. 10.
22 In the Anti-Oedipus, the schizoanalysts denied having any political program; but Deleuze and
Guattanlater actively supported Italian Marxist Toni Negri, to date the most important theo-
ritJcian of m1cropolitics. As Michael Ryan puts it in his very suggestive book Marxism and
Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
"we have reached a point in history where the wealth of struggles has outrun the abstractly
mediating ["recoding"] form of authority" (p. 217).

416
IV Culture, Domination, and Resistance
 Julia Lesage

Women's Rage

Is consciousness-raising sufficient to change women's

behavior, Including our self-conception and our own col-
onized mmds? We need to promote self-conscious, col-
lectively supported, and politically clear articulations of
our anger and rage.

Feminism by itself is not the motor of change. Class,

anti-imperialist, and antiracist struggles demand our participation. Yet how,
specifically, does women's consciousness change? How do women move
into action? How does change occur? What political strategies should fem-
inists pursue? How, in our political work, can we constantly challenge sexual
inequality when the very social construction of gender oppresses women?
In 1981 I visited Nicaragua with the goal of finding
out how and why change occurred there so quickly in women's lives. "The
revolution has given us everything," I was told. "Before the revolution we
were totally devalued. We weren't supposed to have a vision beyond home
and children." In fact, many Nicaraguan women first achieved a fully human
identity within the revolution. Now they are its most enthusiastic support-
ers. For example, they form over 50 percent of the popular militias, the
mainstay of Nicaragua's defense against United States-sponsored invasions
from Honduras and Costa Rica. In the block committees, they have virtually
eliminated wife and child abuse. Yet in Nicaragua we still see maids, the
double standard sexually, dissatisfaction in marriage, and inadequate child-
care. Furthermore, all the women I talked to defined their participation in
the revolution in terms of an extremely idealized notion of motherhood
and could not understand the choice not to reproduce.
I bring up this example of Nicaragua because Nica-
raguan women are very conscious of the power of their own revolutionary
example. They know they have been influenced by the Vietnamese and
Cuban revolutions and are very much shaping how Salvadoran women
militants are looking at women's role in the Salvadoran revolution. Because
of the urgency and violence ofthe situation, unity between men and women
was and is necessary for their survival, but the women also want to combat,
in an organized and self-conscious way, specific aspects of male supremacy
in the workplace, politics, and daily life.
Both here and in Nicaragua, women's daily conver-
sation is about the politics of daily life. They talk to each other often,
complaining about men and about managing the domestic sphere. Women's
talk also encompasses complaints about poor and unstable work conditions,
and about the onerous double day. However, here in the United States that
conversation usually circulates pessimistically, if supportively, around the
same themes and may even serve to reconfirm women's stasis within these
419
unpleasant situations. Here such conversation offers little sense of social
change; yet in our recent political history, feminists have used this preex-
isting social form-women's conversation in the domestic sphere-to create
consciousness-raising groups. But to what degree is consciousness raising
sufficient to change women's behavior, including our self-conception and
our own colonized minds?
We do not live in a revolutionary situation in the United States.
There is no leftist political organization here providing leadership and a
cohesive strategy, and in particular the struggle against women's oppression
is not genuinely integrated into leftist activity and theory. Within such a
context, women need to work on another, intermediate level, both to shape
our revolutionary consciousness and to empower us to act on our own
strategic demands. That is, we need to promote self-conscious, collectively
supported, and politically clear articulations of our anger and rage.
Furthermore, we must understand the different structures behind
different women's rage. Black women rage against poverty and racism at
the same time that they rage against sexism. Lesbians rage against hetero-
sexual privilege, including their denial of civil rights. Nicaraguan women
rage against invasions and the aggressive intentions of the United States.
If, in our political work, we know this anger and the structures that generate
it, we can more genuinely encounter each other and more extensively ac-
knowledge each other's needs, class position, and specific form of oppres-
sion. If we do not understand the unique social conditions shaping our
sisters' rage, we run the risk of divisiveness, of fragmenting our potential
solidarity. Such mutual understanding of the different structures behind
different women's anger is the precondition of our finding a way to work
together toward common goals.
I think a lot about the phenomenon of the colonized mind. Every-
thing that I am and want has been shaped within a social process marked
by male dominance and female submission. How can women come to un-
derstand and collectively attack this sexist social order? We all face, and in
various ways incorporate into ourselves, sexist representations, sexist modes
of thought. Institutionally, such representations are propagated throughout
culture, law, medicine, education, and so on. All families come up against
and are socially measured by sexist concepts of what is "natural"-that is,
the "natural" roles of mother, children, or the family as a whole.
Of particular concern to me is the fact that I have lived with a
man for fifteen years while I acutely understand the degree to which het-
erosexuality itself is socially constructed as sexist. That is, I love someone
who has more social privilege than me, and he has that privilege because
he is male. As an institution, heterosexuality projects relations of dominance
and submission, and it leads to the consequent devaluation of women be-
cause of their sex. The institution of heterosexuality is the central shaping
factor of many different social practices at many different levels-which
range, for example, from the dependence of the mass media on manipulating
sexuality to the division of labor, the split between the public and private
spheres, and the relations of production under capitalism. Most painfully
for women, heterosexuality is a major, a social and psychological mode of
organizing, generating, focusing, and institutionalizing desire, both men's
and women's. Literally, I am wedded to my own oppression.
420
 Julia Lesage
Furthermore, the very body of woman is not her own-it has
been constructed by medicine, the law, visual culture, fashion, her mother,
her household tasks, her reproductive capacity, and what Ti-Grace Atkinson
has called "the institution of sexual intercourse." When I look in the mirror,
I see my flaws; I evaluate the show I put on to others. How do I break
through representations of the female body and gain a more just represen-
tation of my body for and of myself?
My social interactions are shaped by nonverbal conventions which
we all have learned unconsciously and which are, as it were, the glue of
social life. As Nancy Henley describes it in Body Politics, women's nonverbal
language is characterized by shrinking, by taking up as little space as possible.
Woman is accessible to be touched. When she speaks in a mixed group, she
is likely to be interrupted or not really listened to seriously, or she may be
thought of as merely emotional. And it is clear that not only does the
voyeuristic male look shape most film practice, but this male gaze, with all
its power, has a social analog in the way eye contact functions to control
and threaten women in public space, where women's freedom is constrained
by the threat of rape.
We need to articulate these levels of oppression so as to arrive
at a collective, shared awareness of these aspects of women's lives. We also
need to understand how we can and already do break through barriers
between us. In our personal relations, we often overcome inequalities be-
tween us and establish intimacy. Originally, within the women's movement
we approached the task of coming together both personally and politically
through the strategy of the consciousness-raising group, where to articulate
our experience as women itself became a collective, transformative expe-
rience. But these groups were often composed mostly of middle-class women,
sometimes predominantly young, straight, single, and white. Now we need
to think more clearly and theoretically about strategies for negotiating the
very real power differences between us. It is not so impossible. Parents do
this with children, and vice versa; lovers deal with inequalities all the time.
The aged want to be in communion with the young, and third-world women
have constantly extended themselves to their white sisters. However, when
women come together in spite of power differences among them, they feel
anxiety and perhaps openly express previously suppressed hostility. Most
likely, such a coming together happens when women work together inten-
sively on a mutual project so that there is time for trust to be established.
Yet as we seek mutually to articulate the oppression that con-
strains us, we have found few conceptual or social structures through which
we might authentically express our rage. Women's anger is pervasive, as
pervasive as our oppression, but it frequently lurks underground. If we
added up all of women's depression-all our compulsive smiling, ego-tend-
ing, and sacrifice; all our psychosomatic illness, and all our passivity-we
could gauge our rage's unarticulated, negative force. In the sphere of cultural
production there are few dominant ideological forms that allow us even to
think "women's rage." As ideological constructs, these forms end up con-
taining women.
Women's rage is most often seen in the narratives that surround
us. For example: Classically, Medea killed her children because she was
betrayed by their father. Now, reverse-slasher movies let the raped woman
pick up the gun and kill the male attacker. It is a similar posture of dead-
421
 end vengeance. The news showed Patty Hearst standing in a bank with a
gun embodying that manufactured concept "terrorist," and then we saw her
marrying her FBI bodyguard long after her comrades went up in flames. In
melodrama and film noir, as well as in pornography, women's anger is most
commonly depicted through displacement onto images of female insanity
or perversity, often onto a grotesque, fearful parody of lesbianism. These
displacements allow reference to and masking of individual women's rage,
and that masked rage is rarely collectively expressed by women or even
fully felt.
We have relatively few expressions of women's authentic rage
even in women's art. Often on the news we will see a pained expression of
injustice or the exploitative use of an image of a third-world woman's grief.
Such images are manipulated purely for emotional effect without giving
analysis or context. Some great feminist writers and speakers such as Mary
Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Harriet Tub-
man have provided models by which we can understand ourselves, but too
often the very concept of "heroine" means that we hold up these women
and their capacity for angry self-expression as the exception rather than the
rule.
In Illinois, women chained themselves together in the statehouse
when it was clear that the ERA would not pass; the women sought to express
our collective anger at our legislators' cowardice and to do so in a con-
spicuous, public way. But actions such as these often have little effect beyond
their own time span. We need to think beyond such forms to more socially
effective ones. It is a task open to all our creativity and skill-to tap our
anger as a source of energy and to focus it aesthetically and politically. We
may have to combine images of anger with something else-say, images of
how women can construct the collectivity as a whole. It is here that, by
their example, our third-world sisters have often taken the lead. Rosa Parks
refusing to sit in the back of the bus, Harriet Tubman leading slaves to the
North, an Angolan mother in uniform carrying a baby and a rifle, a Viet-
namese farmer tilling and defending her land, Nicaraguan women in their
block committees turning in wife abusers to the police-these images let us
see that women can gain more for themselves than merely negating the bad
that exists. And it is in their constant need to attack both sexism and racism,
as well as poverty and imperialist aggression, that third-world feminists now
make us all see much more clearly both the urgent need for and the pos-
sibility of reconstructing the whole world on new terms.
Artistically, emotionally, and politically women seem to need to
glimpse dialectically the transcendence of our struggle against sexism before
we can fully express sexism's total negation, that is, our own just rage.
Sometimes our suppressed rage feels so immense that the open expression
of it threatens to destroy us. So we often do not experience anger directly
and consciously, nor do we accurately aim our rage at its appropriate target.
To transcend negation and to build on it means that we have to see what
is beyond our rage. An example of such transcendence was demonstrated
by Nicaraguan mothers of "martyred" soldiers (those killed by U.S.-paid
counterrevolutionaries) to Pope John Paul II when he visited Managua in
April 1983. They stood in the rows closest to the podium where the Pope
spoke and they all bore large photos of their dead children. As the events
of the day unfolded, the women created an image that stirred the whole
422
 Julia Lesage
people, one that the Pope could not go beyond or even adequately respond
to. Here is what happened: The Pope spoke on and on to the gathered crowd
about obeying the hierarchy and not getting involved with the things of this
world. In frustration and anger, the women began to shout, "We want peace,"
and their chant was taken up by the 400,000 others there. The women's
rage at personal loss was valorized by the Nicaraguan people as a whole,
as the grieving mother became a collective symbol of the demand for peace.
The chant, "We want peace," referred simultaneously to national sover-
eignty, anti-imperialism, religion, and family life. The women spoke for the
whole.
This brings me back to my original question about women's po-
litical action in the United States today. One of the major areas of inves-
tigation and struggle in the women's movement has been the sphere of daily
life. This struggle, represented by an early women's movement phrase-"the
personal is the political" -derives from women's real material labor in the
domestic sphere and in the sphere of social relations as a whole. Women
have traditionally done the psychological labor that keeps social relations
going. In offices, in neighborhoods, at home, they often seek to make the
social environment safe and "better," or more pleasant. That such labor is
invisible, particularly that it is ignored within leftist theory and practice, is
one ofthe more precise indices of women's oppression. And it is feminists'
sensitivity to and analysis of social process that clarifies for them the sexism
on the Left. Often at a leftist conference or political meeting, many men
continue to see women and women's concerns as "other," and they do not
look at what the Left could gain from feminist theory or from women's
subcultural experience or from an analysis of women's labor. Women who
come to such an event have already made a commitment to learn and to
contribute, so they make an effort to continue along with the group as a
whole but are impeded by sexist speakers' intellectual poverty (e.g., use of
the generic "he"), macho debating style, and distance from political activ-
ism. Furthermore, not only women feel this political invisibility at leftist
events. When black labor and black subcultural experience in the United
States is not dealt with, nor is imperialism, or when racism is theoretically
subsumed under the rubric of"class oppression" and not accorded its spec-
ificity, then third-world participants face the same alienation.
To demonstrate this process and analyze what divides us, I will
describe an incident that occurred at the Teaching Institute on Marxist
Cultural Theory in June 1983. It is worth discussing because it is the kind
of incident that happens all too often among us on the Left. Early in that
summer session, a coalition of students and the two women faculty mem-
bers, Gayatri Spivak and me, formed to present a protest statement to the
faculty. It was read in every class. Here is what it said:
The Marxist-Feminist Caucus met on Friday June 17th
and concluded that the "limits, frontiers and bound-
aries" of Marxist cultural theory as articulated by the
Teaching Institute excluded and silenced crucial issues
of sexism, racism and other forms of domination. We
find ourselves reproducing in the classrooms of the
Teaching Institute the very structures which are the
object of our critique. The Marxist-Feminist Caucus
423
 therefore proposes that each class set aside an hour
weekly to discuss strategic silences and structural ex-
clusions. A Marxism that does not problematize issues
of gender and race, or of class consciousness in its own
ranks, cannot hope to be an adequate tool for either
social criticism or social transformation.
The institute had a format of having famous Marxist intellectuals
lecture, specifically males with job security who have never incorporated a
feminist analysis into their theoretical work. Both the format and the content
of their lectures enraged some of us, but not others. In a sense, writing a
protest statement divided the school's participants between the political ones
and the consumers of Marxist theory. This is because critical theory itself
has become a pathway for elitist advancement in the humanities and social
sciences in universities where these areas are facing huge cutbacks. And the
canon of that critical theory is based on Marx and Freud and their contem-
porary interpretants, Althusser and Lacan. Both at the Teaching Institute
and at prestigious universities, young academics could get their quick fix of
Marxism, the knowledge of which could help greatly in their academic ca-
reer.
This is a capitalist mode of consuming knowledge. Too many
students, especially career-pressured graduate students, want only a well-
conceived lecture, a digest of Marxist theory and social analysis, something
that can be written in a notebook, taken home, and quoted from in a future
paper or journal article. Furthermore, we intellectuals fall into this capitalist-
competitive mode. We feel pressured inside ourselves to be the best. Stu-
dents are told to buy the best. All the faculty at the Teaching Institute felt
that they could not make a mistake, that they had to read and show they
had read everything, that they had been challenged on their political practice,
accused of being racist or sexist or undemocratic. Our control over the
classroom and studied theoretical polish became a kind of professional hys-
teria and worked against the collective building of Marxist knowledge and
theory that we have needed for more effective social change.
Since the early 1970s women have come together in meetings
like these, in feminist seminars, caucuses, and workshops, partly in resist-
ance to a certain macho leftist or academic style and partly to build a new
body of knowledge and feminist political practice. And we have been suc-
cessful at doing this but it has meant double or triple work for us. Feminist
scholarship does not usually lead to academic promotion for a woman. The
knowledge women produce is easily marginalized, as was made painfully
obvious at that summer school.
Feminists and third-world students came to the Teaching Insti-
tute knowing how much they needed Marxist theory. They understood that
abolishing capitalism and imperialism was the precondition for liberation.
They came as political participants expecting to learn theoretical tools to
use in fighting oppression. But sex and race were too often ignored-! would
say stupidly ignored-as social determinants in the theories presented about
social change. (Beyond that, students felt intimidated by name-dropping
and teachers' and other students' failure to explain terms. They felt they
had to give a polished rebuttal or a cohesive "strategic intervention" before
they could speak to refute a lecturer's point.) And when students raised
424
 Julia Lesage
issues of sexism or racism, deflection became the all too frequent tactic used
by teachers or some of the white male students in response. No wonder that
women, with their sex-role socialization, were often too intimidated to speak.
This is a sad analysis, but not an infrequent one in academia. It
speaks about political theory and academic sexism and racism, and elitism
and class privilege. The incident reveals much of what divides politically
progressive people in the United States. These differences must be acknowl-
edged in depth if we are to work together politically in a coalition form. In
particular, I understand the texture of women's silence in a forum that
demanded a highly rational and developed intervention. Many of the women
students at the Teaching Institute already produced feminist theory, but the
intimidating nature of this kind of aggressive public speaking made them
seem like nonparticipants. And it often happens to me, too. I know that we
watch and despair of our own colonized psyches which hold us back in
silence precisely when we would choose to be political actors, especially in
a Marxist forum.
What we have seen in the 1970s and 1980s in North America
and Europe is a supercession of political forms related to developments in
radical consciousness. Conditions have evolved in the United States that
make it impossible to conceive of a revolutionary organizing strategy that
does not embrace a black and minority revolution and a feminist revolution.
The lesson of the civil rights/black power movement was that blacks will
organize autonomously. Now it is the offspring of that movement, Jesse
Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, that has taken the lead in building an anti-
imperialist coalition that addresses the specific struggles and organizing forms
ofblacks, Latinos, women, and gays. Such a coalition relates to the existence
of the women's movement, the gay and lesbian movement, the anti-im-
perialist movement, by supporting these groups' autonomous organizing
and granting new respect, not by subsuming or controlling them. Further-
more, at this point in U.S. history, issues of mass culture and mass com-
munication have to be dealt with, so that minority figures such as Jesse
Jackson or Harold Washington, Chicago's black major, have developed an
ongoing analysis about racism in the press.
As a feminist who has worked both in the cultural sphere and in
anti-imperialist work, I have experienced this supercession of forms. In the
early 1970s a politically active woman was either "on the Left" or "in the
independent women's movement." Some socialist feminists within leftist
organizations formed caucuses to try to influence their organizations. In the
1970s I chose to work mostly within the independent women's movement,
especially in creating a women's studies program at an urban university. In
developing feminist media now within the women's movement, I find many
of my sisters addressing broader issues of imperialism, racism, class oppres-
sion, and the nuclear threat. Many of us are joining progressive coalitions
around these issues. Within these coalitions we must be able openly to
declare, "I am a feminist and our feminist position represents the most
advanced stand. You men have to join us." Indeed, many men, often younger
men, have. As feminists, we are the ones who are building a whole theoretical
critique of mass culture and mass communication; we are the ones who are
learning how to appropriate all of culture in an oppositional way. And
because of our historical position in advanced capitalism, we are one of the
425
first social movements to address cultural issues in such a thorough and
complex way.
Many feminists are eager to participate in coalitions, the major
political strategy for us in the 1980s. In Chicago, we saw the women's move-
ment and the Left work to elect Harold Washington. In the San Francisco
area, gays and lesbians have formed a Central America support group. Both
in the United States and abroad, the antinuclear movement contains within
it all-women's affinity groups. Latinos in various areas identify and organize
as Puerto Rican or Mexican-American according to their ethnic origins and
concentration, and also unite in Central American solidarity work. This
great diversity of sectoral organizing enriches all of us who are working for
social change.
Some of the best aspects of current progressive organizing have,
in fact, derived specifically from the development of the contemporary wom-
en's movement. I mentioned the consciousness-raising groups earlier. I think
the women's movement has introduced into political discourse an open and
direct critique of the macho style and political posturing of many male
leaders. As feminist activists, we have created among ourselves new forms
of discussion and a creative, collective pursuit of knowledge-in contrast to
an older, more aggressive, male debating style. Particularly important for
me, the women's movement has pursued and validated as politically im-
portant cultural and artistic work. In Chicago, where I live, I experience a
strong continuum and network among community-based artists and women
in the art world. We have built up intellectual ties between academic women
and feminist film- and videomakers who have created an analysis of how
sexuality is manipulated in the visual culture that surrounds us. As a con-
sequence, feminist film criticism has developed a new theoretical framework
for analyzing ideology and the mass media. In fact, I think that our building
of a feminist cultural theory has made a key contribution to the Left and
to revolutionary movements throughout the world.
When I want to consider how unleashing our anger might ca-
pacitate us to act for change, I reconsider Frantz Fanon's essay "Concerning
Violence" in The Wretched of the Earth. In that essay he describes deco-
lonization, particularly the process by which the native sheds the colonizer's
values and the colonizer's ways. I understand that my black and Latina
sisters in the United States experience a rage against the economic and racial
violence perpetrated every day against them; in a way that is similar to
what Fanon describes: this rage knows its resolution lies in a complete
change of the economic order in which we live. At the same time, I must
ask what kind of rage it would be that would effectively contest women's
oppression-given all the levels at which gender inequality and women's
oppression is articulated in social and personal life. What Fanon describes
to us is a specific historical moment at which mental colonization can be
and is surpassed. As I look at women's mental colonization, I see our in-
ternalized sense of powerlessness, our articulation into masochistic struc-
tures of desire, and our playing out of personae that on the surface seem
"passive," "self-defeating," "irrational," "hesitant," "receptively feminine,"
or even "crazy." Much of this behavior stems from internalized and sup-
pressed rage. Fanon describes such behavior in the colonized and posits
active rage, the violent response to violence, as its cure.
426
 Julia Lesage
What would the overturning of male supremacy and women's
colonization mean to women? How would it be accomplished? Fanon un-
derstands that a whole social structure and a new kind of person must come
into being, and that those with privilege know, fear, and resist this. His call
to armed struggle, based on the very clear demarcations and abuses of power
that the native always sees, signals a survival struggle that does not char-
acterize the war between the sexes. As I read Fanon for what he can teach
me about women's resistance to oppression in nonrevolutionary society, I
read him as a communist psychiatrist talking about how social movements
can change the mentality of the oppressed. When I ask about revolution for
women now, minimally I see that our contestation cannot be conducted in
the mode of nice girls, of managing the egos of and patiently teaching those
who oppress, which is a skill and duty we learned from our mothers in the
domestic sphere. If we do so, once again we will be placed in that very role
of"helpmate" that we are trying to overcome. Angry contestation may take
us the extra step needed to overcome our own colonized behavior and tardy
response.
Let me now rewrite for you parts of Fanon's essay to show its
power when discussing the relation between psychological and social change.
The distance between the violence of colonization and its necessary response
in armed struggle, and the emotional rage I am referring to here in combating
sexism, marks the distance between the periphery and the center of inter-
national capitalism. By using Fanon in this way, I do not wish to co-opt
him for the women's movement but to learn from him, just as I learned
from the Nicaraguan women's courage and tenacity. If women must learn
to be openly angry, we must learn to draw links between ourselves and those
who are more oppressed, to learn new methods of struggle and courageous
response.

Combating women's oppression as we know it is a

historical process: that is to say, it cannot become in-
telligible or clear to itself except in the exact measure
that we can discern the movements that give it his-
torical form and content. Combating women's oppres-
sion is the meeting of two intrinsically opposed forces,
which in fact owe this originality to that sort of sub-
stantification that results from and is nourished by the
social construction of gender. The husband is right
when he speaks of knowing "them" well-for it is men
who perpetuate the function of wife. Men owe the re-
production of their bodies and psyches to the family.

Feminist revolution never takes place unnoticed, for

it influences individuals and modifies them funda-
mentally. It transforms passive femininity crushed with
inessentiality into privileged agency under the flood-
lights of history. A new kind of woman brings a new
rhythm into existence with a new language and a new
humanity; combating women's oppression means the
veritable creation of new women who become fully
427
 human by the same process by which they freed them-
selves.
Feminists who decide to put their program into prac-
tice and become its moving force are ready to be con-
stantly enraged. They have collectively learned that
this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only
be called into question by absolute contestation.
The sex-gender system is a world divided into com-
partments. And if we examine closely this system of
compartments, we will at last be able to reveal the
lines of force it implies and to mark out the lines on
which a nonoppressive society will be reorganized.
At the level of individuals, anger is a cleansing force.
It frees the woman from her inferiority complex and
from despair and inaction; it makes her fearless and
restores her self-respect.
At this point I will stop citing from and reworking Fanon, de-
liberately at the point of individual rage. Now is a time when we need to
work in coalitions, but we must be very honest about what divides us and
what are the preconditions we need before we can work together. I have
made the decision to work in leftist and feminist cultural work and in Latin
American solidarity work. I think in all our strategies we must analyze the
relation of that strategy to feminist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist demands.
Women comprise over half the population; any class issues in the United
States are intimately tied to the question of racism; we all live off the labor
of workers, often underpaid women, in the Third World; and socialist rev-
olution is being waged very near us. Personally, I know that it is by my
contact with Nicaraguan women, who insist that men and women must
struggle together for our mutual liberation, that I have been politicially and
emotionally renewed.
The problems grow more acute. We know that the Right is racist,
homophobic, and sexist. We in the women's movement must stop turning
our anger against each other and learn the most effective ways to work
together for social change. We can focus our anger and harness it, but to
do that we must clearly analyze cause and effect. If theory accompanies
anger, it will lead to effective solutions to the problems at hand. We have
great emotional and social power to unleash when we set loose our all too
often suppressed rage, but we may only feel free to do so when we know
that we can use our anger in an astute and responsible way.

428
 Michele Mattelart

Can Industrial Culture Be a Culture of

Difference: A Reflection on France's
Confrontation with the U.S. Model of
Serialized Cultural Production
Translated by Stanley Gray and Nelly Mitchell

The intersection of culture, technology, and economrcs

is an important srte of political struggle. The value of
the presence of American television serres on the
world's screens can no longer be estrmated by crrterra
applied in the early seventies. Commercial serres are a
way of organrzmg social relations, the penetration of
commercial logic rnto the relatrons lrnking the state and
civil socrety.

The Problem: Cultural or Economic?

In France, the need for a cultural policy related to the
current strategy of reindustrialization has given a notable urgency to the
question of the "American program" or "serialized American production."
While the current audiovisual system is passing through a severe production
crisis, various new channels of communication are offered to the French
through the development of the video market, the opening of a fourth TV
channel, the move to the operational stage of direct satellite broadcasting,
and the active promotion of cable TV. All this stimulates the urgent need
for innovation in the areas of programming and public service. What content
should be put in these new containers?
Debates on this question-too rare, we think-falsely
revolve around the fear that the creation of new channels will simply open
up more welcoming invasion routes for North American programs-ale-
gitimate fear, given the precedent of those countries whose televisual systems
have been deregulated. France's problem is no doubt a familiar one. Less
familiar is the possibility, a real one since the socialist government's ascen-
sion to power on May 10, 1981, that such debate could get somewhere.
The glee of U.S. industrialists would be enough to
justify the fear of invasion. A recent issue of Computerworld lauded the
multiplication of channels and networks in Europe as so many new ways
to disseminate American cultural products: "It's good for us!" 1 Our worry
is merely the other side of the coin.
The inevitable reference to the North American threat
has the advantage of giving one name to various issues at stake while evoking
the weight of the several determinants (technical, financial, cultural) that
affect communication policy. The North American program becomes the
429
 emblem of the mass media model which the logic of capitalism puts into
place and generalizes.
What is at stake may be formulated by the following questions:
Will the policy favoring technological development, crucial to France's rein-
dustrialization, be able to accommodate a political goal that would seek to
prevent the subjection of cultural industries to a single influence, that of
the market? Will this policy open the way to the creation of a national
programming enterprise, one that would not respond to new challenges by
simply copying the transnational production model currently provided by
the United States? Will it stimulate the search for alternatives, for original
ways of programming and broadcasting? What ratio between equipment
and creation will be used in budget allotments? How will commercial logic
be aligned with the social logic governing the interests of groups, the wid-
ening base of audiovisual production, the participation by citizens in the
choice of technologies and the definition of their use? Is a "local" product,
one that would permit a particular collectivity to express and to reappro-
priate its sounds and images, compatible with the international market? Is
there an "alternative" product that could be international yet not in the
mold of a transnationalized mass culture?
The French observe with fascination the succession of new tech-
nologies. They are like the group of shepherds in the Pyrenees village who
appear on "La Planete Bleue" ("The Blue Planet," a program designed to
popularize science) and are shown to be dazzled by the panoply of new
technology displayed before their eyes. Increasingly numerous and euphoric
articles in the press celebrate this "advent." We are finally participating in
modernity-a modernity we rejected for many years, for reasons that po-
litical and cultural anthropology should wish to clarify. Compare France's
audiovisual equipmemt with that of the other European countries-televi-
sion sets in the past; video, today. France is and has always been one of
the last to benefit from such goods.
If the signs of technological progress fascinate us so, is it not
because they signal modernity par excellence; in other words, American
modernity? Few of the media can resist confessing their joy at rejoining the
founding myth. It is as though the United States, the first country to have
written its history on celluloid, profiting from the combined effects of a
liberal economy and the development of the media, had acquired at once
and for all time a power and a faculty: the power to anticipate every dream
of growth in this world of the image; and the faculty to repeat endlessly
with each technological and industrial innovation, "I am your Imaginary."
Dissonant in this echo chamber were the words of the French
representative at the UNESCO Conference in Mexico, in July 1982, in a
speech decrying the U.S. monopoly ofthe means and distribution of cultural
production and calling for the affirmation of identities and pluralities. The
speech inspired a noisy polemic in the French press: cries of indignation
against chauvinistic isolationism and jingoism, protesting the suicidal folly
of this rebellion against a hegemony seen as natural, hence both fated and
justified. The TV page of Le Monde took this opportunity to speak of the
pusillanimity of"French television and the boredom it exudes." The masses
were called upon to exercise their plebiscite, to voice their will regarding
the only culture deemed to be theirs in this advanced industrial age.
430
 Michele Mattelart
Because of the narrow focus on the harm done to Americano-
philia and Atlanticism, an important point of the Mexico speech was almost
completely overlooked, though it was as central to this speech as it has been
more recently in debates on cultural politics. This was the phrase, or rather
watchword, "Economy and Culture, the same struggle," a key phrase des-
ignating the true locus of the challenge. In a country like France, which has
until recently abhorred such indelicate linking of these two terms and two
realities, the phrase has a special force. Malraux's words, "Cinema is an art,
but it is also an industry," anticipated the realism of the new watchword,
but whether because of the times, Malraux's persona, or the restriction to
cinema, his remark was not understood as revolutionary.
The colloquium on "Creation and Development" at the Sor-
bonne in February 1983, which brought togther 400 intellectuals from all
over the world, revealed a general tendency to unbalance the two terms in
question: in designing a program for emerging from the crisis, the role of
culture was given the most weight; the powerlessness of economy served as
reason to belittle it. President Fran~ois Mitterand said: "Doctrinaire econ-
omists give us recipes that don't work anywhere." American economist J.
K. Galbraith agreed: "It is the artist who is at the cutting edge of devel-
opment, not the engineer." 2 It was then generally accepted that one must
look to intelligence, innovation, creation, and culture for the salvation of
the world. Note that in these verbal jousts, if the words "economy" and
"culture" are not always conjoined, their structural tension shows in the
personal confrontation of economists and producers of culture.
The views of this colloquium, called by some l'internationale de
/'imaginaire, were shortlived. Almost immediately, the ministerial reshuf-
fling ofMarch 1983 signaled a return to a more orthodox view. Economists
were recalled to their posts; culture took a back seat. The weight of eco-
nomics was reasserted.
One could foresee that things were not going to be so simple,
however. Wherever there is discussion of the future of culture, the shadow
of "Dallas" is cast. "Dallas": a ready-made anathema. This is the poverty
we want no part of. (A cultural poverty, obviously; in "Dallas" no one is
broke!) And yet, while the Sorbonne was excommunicating "Dallas," con-
tracts were being signed to renew programming in France (TF 1, one of the
three French television channels, purchased twenty-three more episodes in
1983). While the American writer Susan Sontag was claiming that "Amer-
ican culture is not as important as people say it is," 3 the great majority of
televiewers the world over were preparing to enjoy that Saturday, as usual,
J.R.'s latest Machiavellian plots and Sue Ellen's new torments. The con-
tradiction (if it is one) needs analysis because it points to constraints per-
ceived as real in the coupling of economy and culture.
Does Commercial Mean Universal?
One is tempted to explain the success of such TV serials by ana-
lyzing their narrative structure or their content, by sticking to the text. Such
a media-centric bias would be typical of a certain sociology, one that re-
presses an all-important fact: what is televised is the product of a television
system that is in turn the product of a history. The system's organizing
mode embodies the characteristics of its genealogy and, beyond that, of its
assigned role in the reproduction of the society as a whole, most notably in
relation to other socializing systems that express the "general will."
431
Economy and Culture
The equation was settled from the outset in the United States,
where the mass media system was developed under the auspices of the
commercial. As such the equation served for the conquest of markets and
assumed its universalizing role. For this reason it is a serious challenge when
France wishes to affirm at once the desire for independence and recognition
of the inescapable imperatives of the equation.
Whenever new markets are being conquered, a commercial sys-
tem has advantages over a system of public service. " 'Merchants have no
homeland.' These words are Jefferson's, not mine," said Salvador Allende
more than fourteen years ago, explaining to the U.N. General Assembly his
government's objections to the actions of foreign firms in Chile. That is to
say, business recognizes no frontiers, and markets have no limits. Public
services, on the other hand, must obey the logic of national limitation rec-
ognized by political states. Commerce is, a fortiori, more favorable to in-
ternationalization than public service. Yet it would be a mistake to stop at
a juridical definition of public service. This would mask its difference from
private service, a radical difference that may be formulated thus: the "au-
diences" of one are the "citizens" of the other.
It is well known that it took France a long time to see the im-
portance of the technological development of mass culture, and that the
role of such technology in the economic and political areas, in the propa-
gation of the country's values and cultural modes abroad, has never had in
France the importance it assumed from the start in the United States. Look,
for example, at the differences in the way the two countries have used the
educational system and the mass media to produce consensus, and at the
changes that have brought France to see in the media explosion the main
social problem.
It is, in fact, only recently that France has felt the need to imagine
a television that would be specifically French and could also compete in
the market. In France, the association of television with literature, theater,
and cinema has been a telling one, and the production of French cinema
seems 'to have been more often inspired by the creative urge of an author
than by the stimulus of commercial competition. 4 If a programming industry
has not developed, it is because of the weakness of capital investment in
cultural industries, public service in one way or another implying loss of
profit. The fact should lead to deeper analysis of the traditional conception
of culture in France and its fall-out in today's situation, which is dominated
by the imperative to pass to a new stage of serialized productions. 5 This is
the kind of discontinuity scorned by those who hold to notions of the "global
village" and the "single screen," those who are ready to use the pressure of
modem communication to homologize all cultural realities.
If the aim is industrialization, a culture is handicapped when its
tradition, emphasizing the cultural connection between creation and the
technical capacity to reproduce, dictates that it be seen as a public service.
Eloquent on this score was the president of MCA Universal TV, at the last
MIP TV in Cannes, April 1983: "In the French products that we see, there
is no 'network appeal.' The subjects are generally too national, not com-
mercial enough and also too cultural for the average American viewer. An-
other thing is that what we are offered are usually mini-series when we are
more interested in full-length ones starring actors known to the U.S. public.
432
 Michele Mattelart
For the time being, we aren't buying co-productions. Two years from now
we may reconsider, who knows? But I should add that we already have in
stock an enormous number of productions. We scarcely need to look for
new ones." 6 Le Film Franr;ais objected that "some U.S. channels buy French
series, HBO and PBS, for example" to which the MCA Universal president
replied: "PBS has little money and HBO aims at a different audience. All
well and good, but it isn't for the average American T.V. viewer." (Note
the self-complacency, interesting when one remembers that projections of
the market for 1990 give the networks only 59 percent of prime-time viewing
over the new broadcasting systems. The trend is already confirmed in some
large American cities, notably in San Francisco.)
The president of MCA Universal has, in any case, sketched the
profile of a product not unlikely to succeed in the game of internationali-
zation: an average product aimed at the average consumer in the United
States, the viewer of American network programs. 7 His criteria are clearly
those of the commercial oligopoly that discounts PBS or any kind of pro-
gramming not aimed at a mass public.
The problem is complicated today by cable networks, which ought
to imply segmented markets. Will their productions be fundamentally dif-
ferent from the dominant one? Doubts arise when one hears an independent
producer like Lorimar, the producer of"Dallas," speaking at the 1983 Cannes
Film Festival: "The films we plan to make for cable will have big budgets
and big names. We must keep up the quality, with an eye to international
sales. " 8 The new systems may well provide new paths to the international
market.
The examples of Brazil and Mexico support the thesis that com-
mercial TV is the easiest to internationalize. These countries, alone among
outsiders of the industrial group, have succeeded in competing in the in-
ternational market, particularly Brazil. There are commercial monopolies
in both countries: TV Globo in Brazil, and Televisa in Mexico. Both com-
pete internationally using serials in the soap opera mode-telenovelas that
comprise an overwhelming majority of their dramatic production. The par-
adox is that in these countries, whose economies are much less independent
than those of the large industrialized countries, a commercial monopoly
like the television monopoly in Brazil can compete successfully for prime-
time hours using programs made at home. Out of the ten most popular
programs in Brazil, only two are foreign-made.
In Europe, on the other hand, vulnerability to American series
and more generally to the American mode of production has led to a doctrine
of privatization, a doctrine with a long history, passing through many phases
before yielding the current policy of deregulation. To say simply, as did a
French communist deputy at a parliamentary debate, that television is like
a "faucet pouring out images made in the U.S." is to overlook this history
and to displace the problem by paying more attention to consequences than
causes. The success of the American series is only a symptom of dependency
on a model in which the standardized series, particularly the American-type
series, has a natural place. It is a model that, among the three functions it
is supposed to perform-to inform, to educate, to entertain-chooses to em-
phasize the third, to entertain.
The Concentric Circles of Concentration
It is tempting to explain the strength ofNorth American programs
by resorting to the time-honored and undeniably valid arguments that point
433
to high production standards, excellent technical quality, professionalism,
the efficiency of the marketing system, the efficacy of block-booking, and
so on. Regarding this last practice, it is amusing to remember the petulance
with which Boris Vian criticized a comparable practice used in marketing
jazz records. In one of his jazz chronicles for Combat (October 30, 1947),
he wrote:
This week's gripe is directed specifically at Columbia
and to His Master's Voice, two heads of the same
hydra. The individuals entrusted with the confection
of our favorite black goodies, thinking they were clever,
have produced two monstrosities in a very short time:
three months ago it was "Whatta You Gonna Do" by
Louis Armstrong, with, on the flip side, a horrible thing
by Glenn Miller called "Falling Leaves." And now we
have a Columbia disc putting Harry James's "I Didn't
Mean a Word I Said" on the back of Count Basie's
"Lazy Lady Blues." I have to tell these clods that the
worst Armstrong is still better than the best Miller,
and though I don't want to be nasty to Harry James,
this particular number is lousy. I can't believe that
Messieurs Columbia and His Master's Voice were un-
able to come up with other masters of Basie and Arm-
strong to produce some decent combination. Their
abominable act reminds me of rutabaga vendors dur-
ing the Occupation who would make you buy five kilos
ofthese before they would sell you half a box of"Mon-
strueux de Carentan." 9 ("Monstrueux de Carentan"
are a kind of leeks prized by connoisseurs. Rutabagas
were and still are a kind of turnip, as inedible at table
as in the moviehouse.) [Translator's note: Navet, tur-
nip, is a term used for mediocre films.]
Along with block-booking, we should mention other key com-
ponents in the American repertoire: mastery of the adventure genre, skill
in packaging and balancing scenarios, rhythm, casting, the great tradition
of entertainers in the United States, and so on. All these elements attest to
the long experience this industry has behind it and its power today as a
commercial model of unparalleled entertainment value. It is not only in the
form of finished imported products (series and telefilms) that the model
operates in our televisual systems, but also and above all in the form of
matrices that are, for better or worse, nationalized. Is not all of France
invited to quiver with excitement each Sunday at the showing of"Incroyable
Mais Vrai" ("Incredible But True"), an exact replica of an American pro-
gram?10 Likewise, "Champs Elysees," on Saturday nights, which draws a
surprisingly large audience away from ••Dallas" on a rival channel, feeds on
the kind of musical show perfected in the United States, dishing up a style
that almost all our star singers have adopted. Mireille Mathieu, appearing
on this program, before a scintillating backdrop of Manhattan, on February
18, 1983, in the company of Patrick Duffy (alias Bobby Ewing of"Dallas"),
designated for us in a completely natural fashion that place of ultimate
434
 Michele Mattelart
sanction where the box-office value of products like popular songs is de-
termined: "Et si j'ai su te plaire I C'est a Ia terre entiere I Que je plairai I
Mon vieux New York" ("If I can make it there 1 I'll make it anywhere,"
etc.)
All these arguments have weight, centrally or marginally, de-
pending on the case. I would like to try to go deeper and fix several key
links in the chain of this American technique.
Reassessing the decision made several years ago by the Cuban
Institute of Art and Cinema to devote its resources to the production of a
single epic-length, big-budget, historical film, to be coproduced by Spain
(and which was to spawn a TV serial), Tomas Gutierrez Alea, author of
Memorias del Subdesarrol/o and La Ultima Cena (among others), drew
attention to one of the laws governing the success of an industry: the cor-
relation of quality and quantity. He recalled a moment in the history ofthe
Soviet film industry, reported by the filmmaker Dovjenko: 11
Dovjenko says that at a certain moment, the managers
of the Soviet film industry realized that, of the let's
say 100 films produced so far, only five could be called
"excellent" and some twenty "good," whereas there
were fifty "mediocre" ones and twenty which were
unquestionably "bad." So they decided, with apparent
good sense, to produce only "good" and "excellent"
films the following year, and they reduced the total
number to be produced to twenty-five in which they
would invest all the resources and effort it would have
taken to make 100. To their surprise it turned out that
of these twenty-five films there were only two "excel-
lent" ones and only five "good"; ten were "mediocre"
and eight "bad." They decided to limit further the
quantity, to concentrate all efforts on very few films
and to produce only the number which had been called
"good" or "excellent" the year before, judging that if
they limited production to seven films they would get
seven masterpieces. Result: "Excellent"-0; "Good"-
2, etc. 12
From another angle, a similar appeal to the correlation of quan-
tity and quality was heard at the beginning of 1983 when the unions of the
industry's professionals, artists, and performers voiced their objections to
the increase of advertising on TV:
The intrusion of announcers in programs reduces the
amount of "fresh" or original production. Advertising
gives us work on a short-term basis but diminishes
long-term employment. The law of opinion polls is
that films will always get preference over dramatic
pieces. "Twelve Angry Men"; people will look at that,
so isn't that enough? Announcers aren't interested in
programs designed for T.V. in which actors would have
an input. No doubt it is dangerous to manipulate cri-
435
 teria of quality, but it is well known that it is through
a certain quantity of original production that the qual-
ity proper to audio-visual creation will surface. And a
management bound by viewer-ratings is not going to
take the financial risk entailed by quantity. 13
Another interesting convergence appears in the conclusions of a
study group that met in September 1983 under the auspices of the Coop-
eration Culturelle et Technique Francaise and the International Council of
French-Speaking Radio and Television. The group considered factors work-
ing against the effort to reestablish a North-South balance in the exchange
of TV programs. Among the conclusions I note the following: "That national
production is still weak also explains the fact that programs from the South
rarely attain the technical quality required for international diffusion." 14
Quality/Quantity
The use of pilot programs (only North America can afford them)
expresses the cardinal truth of this correlation and reinforces this truth by
combining the use of pilots with that of opinion polls. Leaving less to chance,
this reduces by a good deal the risk that inevitably plagues the television
and film industries. 15
Underlying both this practice and Dovjenko's demonstration is
the obvious question of what is meant by "quality." If any concept is im-
possible to fix in the absolute it is this one, relative as it must be to inter-
national pressure, the definition of needs, aesthetic criteria, and production
norms. In the case of the pilot, for example, quality is judged by the appeal
of a product to an average viewer and is sanctioned by viewer ratings.
It would require another essay to deal with this complex problem.
I will only point out here that in 1981 the three U.S. networks paid for
eighty-five pilots that brought forth only twenty-three programs. Since the
estimated cost of a pilot hour is some $750,000, the process cost the networks
about $63 million in 1981. 16 At NBC the production of pilots has reached
a new high. Thirty-one of these were authorized for the 1983-84 season, as
compared to twenty-two the preceding season. CBS okayed twenty pilots-
thirteen comedies and seven dramas-for 1983-84. These figures belie ru-
mors that the networks are turning away from the production of pilots
because of the cost. 17
Pilot production shows at once the strength and vitality of the
North American industry and its remarkable capacity to tap new resources.
It also shows the adaptability of a system that can ally a heavily institu-
tionalized organization with an enormous expenditure of creative resources,
including marginalized ones, a system that can combine technical perfection
and professional finish with experimental forms produced in small, inde-
pendent studios.
The dialectic operating among the central apparatus and its mar-
gins needs exploration. What is concerned is an organic relationship estab-
lished quite early in the United States among intellectuals, creators, and the
cultural industry, and more generally speaking between institutions of
knowledge and institutions of industrial research (some might wish to add
military research). In France, the relations oflarge institutions to the creative
activities of marginalized sectors (whose marginality tends to shrink like
436
 Michele Mattelart
Balzac's peau de chagrin, one should add) is only now being theorized,
thanks to the current political reversal and the consequent stimulus to res-
tructure. Is it not surprising that the most effective managers of the current
restructuring of communication and information industries are, in many
European countries, especially in France, veterans of May 1968 or have ties
to movements that attacked the functioning of the dominant media? There
is no doubt that it would be useful at this point to pursue a historical analysis
of the ways in which intellectuals have attained organic or traditional status
in each country, and of the way in which their relationship to the machinery
of power, that of the media or other, has evolved.
Let me return to the question of quantity, for it raises other
points. A first one, frequently made, uses quantity as a trump card by citing
the large stockpile of available programs, programs already proven to be
profitable on the American market and consequently available to the various
national systems at a cost well below that of local production. "A fifty-five
minute series costs an average of 1,000,000 FF if it is French, 1/20 of that,
or 52,000 FF if it is foreign." 18
A second point concerns a promising trend of research into the
reception of visual messages and an effort to renew our understanding of
the image's signifying processes. It is a trend that criticizes by implication
the pressure exerted on our notion of image reception by an originary and
prevailing code based on the concept of analogy. The new approach locates
the significance of the image not just in its impression of reality but in the
image's relation to other images within a corpus. What is observed is a
complex dialogue of interreferential images producing an effect of exchange
and intertextuality.
When Zbigniew Brzezinski said, ••The U.S. is the society which
is the best at communicating," he no doubt was unaware of the different
meanings his sentence might convey. The flow of images in American series
constantly rekindles the memory the North American image factory has
produced, constantly recalls the image-repertoire from which its images are
formed.
There is, in fact, in the United States today, a trend that appar-
ently represents a conscious effort to manipulate this image memory, par-
ticularly by reawakening the memory of genres, by playing on the genre-
effect: a film like Raiders ofthe Lost Ark is a veritable digest of the adventure
film; "Dallas" is positioned at the confluence of the Western, the soap opera,
and the family saga. In its time, "Sesame Street" showed the advantage to
be gained by a clever recycling of the materials TV provides for the child's
image-repertoire each day. It employed these materials as stimuli that could
reinforce the effect sought: the dramatization of its educational objectives.
It incorporated all the genres and forms that mass culture has popularized
among children: cartoons, puppets, sketches, comedies, series, commercials,
and so on. The novelty of this prototype of the educational series lay pre-
cisely in its synergetic channeling of all the genres and resources of this
immense image-bank to create a pedagogical model. 19
It is as though the process of commercial concentration within
the industry itself, evidenced by the rise of conglomerates, had somehow
entailed a similar process of concentration in the area of the symbolic. The
creation of derivative and of multimedia products is a function of this same
movement: the popular TV film is a spin-off of a popular movie; the play-
437
thing or the phonograph record continually reawakens a chain of association,
definitively blurring the division between infrastructure and superstructure
in a vast syndrome of repetition.
Leaving aside the case of the new (as of 1983) Japanese cartoon
industry, 20 need I add that the only industrial-cultural complex possessing
such a base for cycling and recycling products within the network of com-
mercial goods is the North American one. The new industries of micro-
computers and video games eagerly exploit this huge arsenal. French net-
works would certainly have liked to reproduce this system. Their attempts
simply failed.
A New York television director, speaking in Cannes about the
opening of the American market to French products, said: "The French
must be willing to hedge their bets. They should remember a few essential
points: they should study the American market, they should provide a pol-
ished product, timed to the minute; they should avoid dubbing or subtitling
and produce a version done directly in English; they should conform to the
different lengths of American programs (either twenty-two and a half or
forty-eight and a half minutes) leaving time for the commercials which have
to be insertetf' (emphasis added). 21
This last requirement shows how a TV system can maintain its
hegemony at a time when, needing more programs than it has in stock, it
must accept foreign products. It is well known that the obligation to provide
advertising time entails more than the editing of programs-it implies a
rhythm; it conditions all of production by creating an imperative to program
"technical events." Such constraints are especially troublesome for the French
system because it does not tolerate the insertion of commercials into the
film itself, and also because it is predisposed by cultural tradition and by
the production mode of SFP (Societe Fran~aise de Production) to make a
certain type of film: dramas or historical series. The hiatus, the incongruity
that is felt, even if only at the immediate visual level, between the imagery
used in historical films and the world of signs used in advertising explains
the French resistance to a homogenized televisual discourse. In the televised
continuum are juxtaposed "texts" whose discontinuity signals the contra-
dictions existing in society at large, a discontinuity that is a break in the
circulation of merchandise. Such contradiction must also filter into the dis-
course of television in the United States, though communication research
rarely takes account of it. This research, when it is critical, is usually dom-
inated by a theory of manipulation. It has not analyzed in any depth how
the functioning of political and civil society is articulated in respect to the
functioning of this commercial machinery designed to create consensus.
There is, nevertheless, a strong link between the American pro-
duction of serials and the advertising appeal that governs the mode of pro-
duction and consumption in all zones of television and perhaps daily life.
It is significant, for example, that documentaries are just as affected as other
forms by the obsession with speed. A critic of the Cahiers du Cinema,
summing up a retrospective show of ten years of American television (at
the Centre Beaubourg, December 1981) put it this way: "Apparently com-
petition is tough and the T.V. viewer's hand is quick to tum the knob. Every
forty-five seconds the documentary changes point of view. A study of the
number of changes in angle and scene in American programs would be
fascinating. I am sure that if you averaged it out for all programs you would
438
 Michele Mattelart
get a BUTT (base unit of television time) of some forty-five seconds." 22
Does this not suggest that the law of competition is operative in every
dimension of American TV?
No doubt the principal effect resulting from the intersection of
culture and technology is the generation of a temporal mode I will call
"spectacular." In a recent study I discovered the pervasiveness of the tempo
of advertising in "Sesame Street." This series-the fact needs to be empha-
sized-remains one of the few examples of a conscious attempt to rethink
the problem ofthe low level of institutionalized mass culture, its correlation
of mediocrity and commercial appeal. Wanting to raise the level, its creators
could not but obey the commercial laws in place and used advertising appeal
to enhance the new pedagogical messages they were sending, primarily, let
us not forget, to the children of ethnic minorities who were disadvantaged
within the regular school system. On the temporality of the spectacular I
wrote:
It is not only the turning to account of "technical
events" which characterizes Sesame Street, but the in-
clination to exploit for pedagogical purposes all the
stimuli of the world of consumer products, and the
standardization of affect wrought by the consumer so-
ciety in the senses and imaginations of children. Using
the seduction of rhythm and variety, Sesame Street
succeeds above all by recycling the signs available in
the vast stockpile of commercial culture and by rein-
tegrating the child in this culture. What triumphs here
is a temporal mode determined by industrial culture,
a temporality regulated by the artificial, a time unlike
that of daily life. It is a time of record times, of the
exceptional, of the spectacular. (The creators of Se-
same Street could not, or did not want to direct their
critical thinking to the structuring force commanded
by the spectacular.) This mode, geared to technological
progress, disqualifies other tempi, other rhythms. Re-
pressed, along with the temporal rhythm of daily life,
of reality, and the duration oflived experience, are the
rhythms specific to other cultures. The significance of
this last is all the more vivid in a series aimed at ethnic
minorities, at children coming from cultures other than
this highly industrialized one. Fighting against segre-
gation, the series subjects these children to the irre-
versible progress of modernity. It assimilates, homog-
enizes, agglutinates them by attuning them to the
instantaneity and immediacy inherent in its teaching
methods and in the culture of anticipation it promotes.
It is legitimate to wonder whether the real educational
message of Sesame Street does not consist in this ini-
tiation to the consumer world with its mass-attuned
modalities of time and space. 23
But the complex reality of commercial television production
obliges us to push this analysis further. The merchandising that finds its
439
way into the famous Brazilian telenovelas, for example, points, indeed, to
a matrix governed by serialized industrial production. But this does not
suffice to bring about a total assimulation of the telenovela and the North
American serial. There is, notably, a different treatment of time and con-
sequently of narrative structure, a treatment responding to the demands of
a different mode of audience communication, to an audience subject to a
different economy of symbols and a different degree of integration into
modernity. 24 The same questions could be raised with respect to the film
industry in India and the Middle East, Lebanese television, and so forth.
The notion of time is a central one in the process of the inter-
nationalization of televised products. French series are reproached, often
by the French themselves, for being too "slow." The stubbornness of this
obstacle is expressed in trade negotiations and in articles discussing ex-
changes or coproductions: "French series drag. French series are a drag."
But here, again, it is not easy to determine where the defect or the quality
begins or ends.
Culture as an Agency of Planetary Regulation?
In stressing the industrializing role of the North American mass
media system, another factor may tend to get slighted. This system has had
remarkable service as a nation-builder. At an early date the United States
was obliged to create signs that could promote universal alliance, rallying
signs to suit the composite nature of the population, made up of immigrants
of different races and ethnic origins. The response to this need, compelling
since the War of Secession, is provided by the culture of the mass media.
The comic book or the Western, series like "Kojak" or "Dallas," contribute
importantly to the amalgamation of this national society. What is all too
often forgotten is that the first effort to amalgamate took the form of an
attack on national society itself. The first test, in fact, of the universal value
of North America programs (and of their profitability) is made within the
limits of the national territory. The verdict of a sufficiently mixed and rep-
resentative national public will become a guarantee of universality. 25
It is interesting that, within the television field, it is the series
that tends to prescribe the most universal appeal or the most predictable
readings. By increasing the internal constraints of the image and the nar-
rative structure (the recurrence of signs: characters, gestures, scenery, ac-
tions), the series rigorously controls the actant-spectator's production of
meaning and keeps interpretations from proliferating. The series has a lev-
eling effect that improves its communication with viewers inscribed in dif-
ferent cultural spaces. So the repetition of signs, based on the logic of a
mode of production that seeks to minimize costs (an economy of means)
also works effectively as communication: by limiting the semantic field it
guarantees a more universal readability.
The Italian filmmaker Ettore Scola points to another operation
that complements the one I have just described: "The success of a telefilm
depends mainly on the specificity of a product which contains in itself its
own promotional campaign; each episode stimulates the viewer's desire to
reexperience emotions already felt. What counts is not the search for novelty
but the confirmation of a habit, and this is true of all aspects, from the
program time to the narrative plot to the reappearance of characters and
actors. The self-promotion multiplies automatically each week. " 26 And the
440
 Michele Mattelart
former director ofTV Globo says something much like this when explaining
why te/enovelas have had such success on Brazilian networks, particularly
TV Globo, where they are shown at seven, eight, and ten o'clock each night:
"T.V. is a habit. Whoever can keep the viewer tuning in to the same channel
has won the fight for an audience. " 27
This ever-renewed process of amalgamation is seen at another
level of ideological communication: American series enter into an incessant
dialogue or exchange (though an unequal one) with all the concerns and
tensions that agitate civil society, diminishing their contradictions, turning
latent problems into already solved ones. Such is the "presence" in them
of blacks, women, and ethnic minorities and their problems. All these are
oblique means by which these series speak to us, awaken in us their echo.
National Consensus; Worldwide Consensus
Eternally vigilant in plugging any breech in the perfected con-
sensus, stepping up this metabolic vigilance in times of crisis, these series
offer us symbolic remedies for our misery in the form of docudramas and
family sagas. The medicine they most favor is the return to the family. 28
The force of these fables is today felt the world over.
The value of the presence of American series on the world's
screens can no longer be estimated by the criteria applied in the early sev-
enties. The game and the stakes have a different importance and nature.
What makes treatment of this theme difficult is in large part the persistence
of ready-made judgments and arguments formed under that long militant
tradition whose banner reads, "Yankee, go home!" All those who struggled
against the Vietnam War shared the view that American preponderance in
the field of mass culture was a priori a bad thing and attacked the hegemony
of the consumer society. A similarly Manichean view has prospered recently
using the slogan, "In the East, nothing new," capitalizing on disappointed
hopes or crippled utopias and paralyzing any critical analysis of the two
existing antagonistic models. "In any case, its worse on the other side": with
this new cliche, free enterprise is equated with freedom itself. The social
reality embodying this in its concrete power structure is accepted as the
insurpassable horizon of our time. Its stubborn toughness becomes a source
of pleasure, something you can play with.
Fascination is the other face of the welfare-recipient complex we
suffer as citizens of welfare states born of Keynesianism. It is fed by a
marketing policy infatuated with the expensive, extolling the fantastic bud-
gets and the astounding profits made in record time by recent American
superproductions. 29 This is the very image of our flabby capitalism, ashamed
at having to wait for the state to erect the theater where we could express
our inventiveness, our creativity; embarrassed that we can only stage our
past history, that we must leave to others the task of nourishing the future's
memory.
The advent of the commercial series is also the advent of a com-
mercial mode of organizing social relations, one extending far beyond the
organization of cultural production. It is nothing other than the penetration
of commercial logic into the relations linking the state and civil society: the
state has to resort to advertising in order to mobilize its citizens, using
marketing techniques and television to implement its campaigns in the
public interest (campigns on contraception, solidarity, promotion of reading
skills, etc).
441
National Consensus; Transnational Consensus
This logic, a logic of the privatization of all spheres of collective
and intellectual life, responds to the pressure inherent in the model of trans-
national expansion. Favoring a transnational organization of power, it tends
to erode public space and function.
Whatever obstructs the growing integration of national
economies in the world arena and the new interna-
tional division of labor is apt to become the favored
target of this remodeling (i.e., the remodeling of forms
of social control recommended by the Trilateral Com-
mission). The primary target is no doubt the Nation-
State, its structures and machinery as a whole. Despite
their numerous internal contradictions, the structures
and organizations of societies labelled "existing de-
mocracies" retain genealogically vestigial norms and
values which resist the movement towards the trans-
nationalization of economies. Transnational cultural
production implies more than a cultural project; it im-
plies a new organization of power. It is probably
through the infiltration of cultural merchandise that
transnational logic most effectively weakens the var-
ious national resistances. 30
How do things stand with efforts to resist this technological and
social mutation? The political crisis it inspires is felt both on the right and
on the left, but perhaps more painfully on the left, now that it has-mirabile
dictu-the chance to exercise power. The national secretary for cultural ac-
tion of the Socialist party pronounced this indictment in May 1982, at the
Cannes Festival: "That the Left, in power, has neither been able nor has
wanted to eliminate the influence of the market on the development of
cultural industries should surprise no one. But that it should abandon them
to the market with enthusiasm, this is a cause for alarm." 31
The media appear to be subjugated by the dynamics of enter-
tainment, defined, as though by natural fiat, by the American hegemony.
In 1984, French Antenne 2 was committed to produce a big family saga in
the spirit of "Dallas." "Conceived by two teams of writer-producers, this
series of 26 episodes will tell the story of a family which controls an im-
portant local daily newspaper." 32 The publishing house Nathan, specializing
in pedagogical material, continues to produce software in English for the
Thompson microcomputer, following in the wake of Hachette, which has
for quite some time now been competing in the American market, and the
film company Gaumont, which is stepping up its established operations in
the United States and Brazil. As to the well-known fourth channel, promised
to be opened soon (as of 1983), the decision to finance it as pay TV seems
to put a heavy mortgage on whatever potential it might have had to diversify
French programming or to facilitate the intercommunication of small in-
terest groups as part of a wider public service. It seems that pay TV works
only for the benefit of the "large public."
Among the effects attributable to this fascination with technology
(a fascination leading to a literal transposition into images of the idea of
442
 Michele Mattelart
America as the symbol ofliberty and democracy), one of the most harmful
is surely the perversion of the notion of decentralized, interactive com-
munication. This occurs because the desired virtues are attributed to tech-
nology itself, based on the assumption that social revolution is simply a
product of technological revolution, even though this latter is usually only
a new "interface." One of the important factors affecting the current situ-
ation is no doubt the repression of this: that communication, before serving
as support or means, is basically a social practice.

Notes

1 Quoted by Herbert Schiller 1n an mterv1ew in RevolutiOn, 155 (Feb. 1983).

2 Le Monde, Feb. 15, 1983; and Le Ouotidien de Paris, Feb. 14, 1983.
3 Le Monde, Feb. 15, 1983.
4 When he was try1ng to put togther an encyclopedia of French films to prepare for the advent
of video-d1scs and cassettes, the representative of the audiov1sual section of the publisher
Seuil noted that qual1ty French film production "has always gone aga1nst the grain of the
dom1nant mode of production.·' Out of 500 t1tles selected for the catalog (wh1ch was com-
piled with an eye to the international market), only 3 belonged to the firm Gaumont. 40 to
Pathe. [Translator's note: 1.e., to large firms; the rest were made by small compan1es.] The
representative concluded: "A bad omen for the future of French films, when you cons1der
that today's tendency to concentrate cap1tal does not favor small company production."
lnterv1ew with Franco1s Lesterl1n, Sonov1sion, Apr 1979 Quoted 1n A and M. Mattelart,
"Une culture pour gerer Ia crise," Le Monde 01plomat1que, Oct. 1979.
5 It IS well known that serial production 1mpl1es, m one way or another, th·e death of the 1nd1vidual
creator and greatly mod1fies the status of the scenanst. The f1nancial and commercial director
of Antenne 2 explamed 1n the following terms how the status of creat1on m France could
prevent television producers from respecting commercial and International considerations:
''The French producer considers himself a creator and hence master of his creation. He does
what he pleases and feels. He doesn't think about commercial problems outs1de his pro-
duction. He works for his public, and h1s public 1s the French public." (Roundtable organized
by the Mission pour un Espace Audiov1suel Latin, Pans, Spring 1983.) Th1s could be set
alongside the op1n1on of Jean-Claude Lattes, in 1983 a representative of the publ1sher Hach-
ette, who said in an interview 1n Publishers Weekly, June 7, 1976: "We have good writers.
The problem is that they write for Pan sian crit1cs or for their fnends rather than for the people
who buy books. . . The tough-minded real1sm I have discovered in America has meant a
lot to me. The French seem to feel ashamed at be1ng mvolved in busmess. We have 1deas.
We are literary. But you, you talk about 'book bus1ness.' The difference 1s fundamental. I
want to be an American ed1tor."
6 Le Film Fram;;a1s, Feb. 25, 1983. I should note that not all American TV producers prefer
regular to mim-senes. Some th1nk that the mmi-senes IS the form of the future because,
having a lower budget. it makes coproduct1ons advantageous.
7 An opinion confirmed by Woody Allen 1n an mterv1ew for The Bus1ness of Film at Cannes,
May 10, 1983: "America a1ms most of 1ts production at the middle class, whether 1t's pop
mus1c or automobiles. Europe has always catered to the habits of an anstocratic el1te and a
poor m1ddle class." And Orson Welles, meet1ng with the students of the lnstltut des Hautes
Etudes Cinematograph1ques de Paris affirmed w1thout hes1tation that "French subjects do
not interest Amencans." These are subjective v1ews, of course, but they show the k1nd of
obstacles to Intercultural exchanges.
8 Le Film Franr;:ais, May 11, 1983.

9 Boris Vian, Autres ecrits sur le Jazz, 1 ("Jazz-Hot/Combat"). texts collected, prefaced, and
annotated by Claude Remeil (Paris Christian Bourgeo1s, 1981)
10 "lncroyable Mais Vra1" is, furthermore, based on paired sequences that show the inven-
tiveness, extraordmary performance, or explo1ts of all kmds of ord1nary people from places
like Arizona or the Auvergne. The "local" is transcended through the spectacular The French
host. incidentally, works in collaboration with an Amencan hostess.
11 Alexandr Petrovich Dovjenko, La palabra y el escntor en el cme (Montevideo: Ed1ciones
Pueblos Unidos, 1957).

443
12 Tomas Gutierrez Alea. "Dramaturgie (cinematografica) y realidad," document presented to
the Semmaire de Dramaturgie Cinematographique held on the occasion of the Fourth Festival
of New Latin-American Cinema, Havana, Dec. 2-12, 1982.
13 "Non a l'austerite, le spectacle doit continuer," Tambour, Tete 7 rouge (Paris, Winter 1982-
83)
14 Document from the Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (Paris, Sept. 1982).
15 A brief comparison will illustrate the risk these industries face. At about the time when the
Cuban film 1ndustry had its "commercial" failure because it had concentrated all its resources
on a single production, United Artists went into bankruptcy because of the failure of an
enormously expensive superproduction. It was bought up by MGM.
16 "TV's Drive on Spiralling Costs," Business Week, Oct. 26, 1981.
17 Figures given in the Japanese review Movie/TV Marketing, 4 (Tokyo, 1983).
18 Claude Degand, "La situation economique du cinema en Europe," Le Cinema et I'Etat.
Colloque (Lisbon, June 1978). Quoted 1n Filmaction, special issue on "Les ecrans colonises"
(Feb.-Mar, 1982).
19 This matter is explored at length in "Education, television et culture de masse. Reflexion sur
une industrie des contenus," in A. Mattelart andY. Stourdze, Rapport de Ia Mission. Vol.
2: "Technologie, culture et communication" (Paris: La Documentation Franc;aise, 1983),
pp. 150-78.
20 The cartoon seems to be the TV form most likely to generate by-products. The Japanese
cartoon industry (which has taken over dominance in this market, formerly held by North
America) IS a good example. The cartoon "Dr. Slump," which appeared on Japanese TV
screens in May 1981, gave rise, by the end of the same year, to 8,000 different derivative
products. Certain Japanese senes programmed in France were responsible for 200 such
products. See Jacques Mousseau, "Piaidoyer pour une industrie franc;aise du dessin ani me,"
Communication et langage, 2• trimestre ( 1982).
21 Le Monde. May 3. 1983.
22 Cahiers du Cinema, Jan. 1982.
23 Michele Mattelart, "Education, television et culture de masse."
24 The incredibly large number of episodes in telenovelas is significant. Armand Mattelart and
I have published some hypotheses on this subject in Femmes et industries culturefles (UNESCO,
Document file no. 23, Division of Cultural Development, 1981-82).
25 It has been noticed that the characters of Kojak and Columbo (in the series so named) referred
respectively to Eastern Europe and to "ltalianness." Thus, these guardians of law and order
served admirably as signs of the Integration of ethnic minorities into the American nation.
The name "Kojak" also seems to answer to the demand for universal appeal by its similarity
to one of the most universally known brand names: Kodak. George Eastman, the inventor of
celluloid film. decided to name h1s products "Kodak" because he wanted a worldwide market
and the phonemes in this word are pronounced the same in most known languages.
The move toward the "global film," with as little dialogue as possible, is
another symptom. It implies the use of big stars, strong images, and violent action, which
do not require subtitles. The French firm Gaumont has moved toward this formula, though
rather tamely, in its plans for La petite bande, "a charming story without dialogue which will
be marketed as a film for children of all languages." Le Film Franc;ais, May 11, 1983.
26 In "Materiali sui telefilm," 4, Teleconfronto (Mostra lnternaziale del Telefilm). May 29-June
5, 1983. In Femmes et industries culturefle. Armand Mattelart and I examine this question
of hab1t and ntual t1me in order to correlate the use of daily episodes over a long period of
t1me by telefilms and particularly by telenovelas with what we call "feminine temporality,"
the spec1fic temporal rhythm of feminine subjectivity, which may be found in the lived ex-
penence of other oppressed groups.
27 Brazilian Television in Context (London: British Film Institute, 1982).
28 Cf. A. and M. Mattelart, De /'usage des medias en temps de crise (Paris: Editions Alain
Moreau, 1979); in Italian, I mas media nella crisi (Editiori Riuniti, 1981 ), in which this idea
1s developed at length.
29 Here is how the magazine VSD presented Stephen Spielberg's E. T. on its front page, when
it opened in Paris theaters in December 1982: "E. T., the extra-terrestrial/ He makes you
laugh, cry, and he earns /750 million centimes every day I for his producer Stephen Spielberg."
30 A. Mattelart, Transnat1onals and the Third World: Struggle for Culture (South Hadley, Mass.:
J. F. Bergin, 1983).

444
 Michele Mattelart
31 Press conference by Didier Motchane, national secretary for cultural action of the Socialist
party, Cannes, May 9, 1983.
32 In Le Film Fram;ais, Feb. 18, 1983. The ad continues: "Antenne 2 is co-produc1ng this
series with a consortium of private companies which, for the occasion, have allied under the
name 'Groupment d'lnteret Economique. · Shooting will begin at the end of 1983 and, if the
series is successful, another 26 episodes will be prepared. It will be programmed in groups
of 13 episodes, shown weekly starting in September, 1983."

445
 Fernando Reyes Matta

The .. New Song" and Its Confrontation

in Latin America

The context of contemporary Latm Amenca demands

that a song move Ill the spaces created by the culture
mdustry as well as 1n 1ts own spaces. The resulting al-
ternative d1stnbut1on channels for popular songs have
made 1t poss1ble to attempt to redeem the products of
the electronics mdustry-the record and the cassette-in
order to place them at the serv1ce of a revolutionary
v1ew of the world.

The Festival de la Nueva Canci6n Latinoamericana

("New Song") was held in Nicaragua in 1983. 1 The most representative
voices of this continental movement were present at this event: Silvio Rod-
riguez, Noel Nicola, and Vicente Feliu of the Cuban New Troubadours
(Nueva Trova) movement; Isabel Parra and Eduardo Carrasco (director of
the Quilapay(m group) of Chile; Daniel Viglietti from Uruguay; Chico Bu-
arque from Brazil; Mercedes Sosa from Argentina; Aly Primera from Ven-
ezuela; Amparo Ochoa from Mexico; and a number of singers and groups
from El Salvador, Puerto Rico, Bolivia, Peru, and the U.S. Latin American
community. Voices in exile and voices that came from their own countries
gathered together to join the mobilizing musical forces of Carlos and Luis
Mejia Godoy of Los Palacaguina, and of a dozen or so artists who have
participated "with the strength of the guitar" in the struggle to create a new
Nicaragua. The festival was organized in solidarity with the Nicaraguan
people and as a demonstration of unity in the face of aggressions inflicted
upon Central America. But that solidarity held an even deeper meaning,
because the artists who joined hands in Nicaragua have earned wide rec-
ognition in spite of persecution and boycotts by the industrial system's mass
media. Their strength is born of a music that does not shun confrontation
but, on the contrary, works to denounce the social and political contradic-
tions of Latin America. This music and poetry are inserted into the popular
culture at precisely those points where we find the forms and language of
a folklore excluded from the "cultural industry" controlled by the trans-
national capitalist system.
"Louder, so that the enemy can hear us!" shouted Car-
los Mejia Godoy when all the artists were on stage at once to interpret the
festival's theme song. These words, which still refer to Central America's
circumstances, made evident a very profound perspective: the voices united
on a Sunday afternoon in Managua symbolized the presence of a rich and
widespread music that for more than twenty years has been capable of
providing the impetus for a commitment rooted in the numerous liberation
struggles taking place in Latin America.
447
 This development, blooming since the mid 1960s, has crystallized
into different modes of expression that have contributed, in varying degrees,
to the creation of a "new song" or "countersong" for Latin America. These
new expressive styles can be found in the Cuban Nueva Trova and the
Chilean Nueva Canci6n movements; in a segment of the Bossa Nova music;
in the rescue of Andean chords; and in a variety of other national endeavors
for the creation of a new musical culture. As the festival demonstrated, these
musicians have been anxious to link their own musical and poetic reality
with the instruments and lyrics from other countries that recognize the
culture of liberation. Some very significant evidence of this commitment
can also be found in the "salsa" music of Ruben Blade and Willie Colon
and, since the Malvinas war, in Argentinian rock.
This process is only now beginning to be studied systematically.
Growing analysis is centered on the textual and cultural meanings and the
sociopolitical determining factors that nourish this music; on specific prob-
lems shaping the creative process, including the line between poetry and
pamphlet; on questions concerning artists' independence when they have
assumed, at the same time, a political and an aesthetic commitment; and
on the actual social setting created by the music itself, in view of its ex-
traordinary capacity for expansion. Only now is an attempt being made to
compile data and establish a theory to explain this social phenomenon. The
research work done by Casa de las Americas in Cuba, the Canto Nuevo
Forums promoted by UNESCO, and testimonial investigations carried out
by CENECA in Chile and ILET in Mexico make some initial conclusions
possible.
There appear to be three essential characteristics of this new mu-
sic that affect its growth and acceptance:
1. The different manifestations of this new popular song move-
ment, in spite of its meager and wholly insufficient presence in the dominant
mass media systems, manage to become widely known and rapidly dissem-
inated from country to country. Thanks to the circulation of tapes, of records
passed from hand to hand, of festival registers, and the artists' tours them-
selves, these songs swiftly cross national frontiers. More than any other
expression of the liberation or revolutionary struggle in every country (thea-
ter, poetry, novels, films, magazines, etc.), the song being created is dis-
tinctively and universally Latin American; moreover, it is ubiquitous.
2. The symbols used by the Canto Nuevo movement apparently
appeal successfully to the popular sensibility in all countries, regardless of
the actual country of origin of the music itself. Its proposals, both as a social
and political commitment and a perspective on the theme oflove, are easily
adapted to different cultural stages. Thus the Nueva Trova movement has
penetrated and expanded in the Chile of Pinochet, just as the creations of
the Chilean Nueva Canci6n movement acquire new meanings among the
committed artists of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico. In effect, we are
witnessing the development of a permanent renationalization process of
Canto Nuevo creations. In addition to contributing, then, to the gestation
of an alternative and combative Latin American culture, the popular col-
lective memory assumes certain ballads as its own and inscribes them within
its particular culture, recognizing a meaning that is historically local and
relevant. "Gracias a la Vida" ("Thanks to Life") by Violeta Parra and "Te
448
 Fernando Reyes Matta
Recuerdo, Amanda" ("I Remember You, Amanda") by Victor Jara are two
examples of this process of cultural adoption.
3. The Nueva Canci6n movement has generated its own inde-
pendent dynamics to attain social significance, in spite of its being rejected
or ignored by the recording transnationals and great regional networks. It
has gained a position because its strength is derived elswhere-from an
identification with proposals for truly democratic change. Building on the
continuing and reciprocal communication between the minstrels and their
public, the movement finds expression in an increasing number of records
and cassettes, in a kind of counterstrategy of dissemination only made pos-
sible through the support of students, workers, poverty-stricken city dwell-
ers, rural workers, and many other grass-roots and base organizations.
Functions and Commitments
In view of previous experience, however, it seems necessary to
analyze the social projections (or functions) that the Nueva Canci6n move-
ment has made evident through its different national manifestations.
1. A function of synthesis emerges from lyrics, contingent in time
and space, and capable of making a powerful appeal to the popular masses
and their political vanguards. These texts interpret complex political the-
ories and socioeconomic analyses and disseminate them in an accessible
form. A good example is the way the cultural transnational model of con-
sumption is portrayed by Ruben Blade in the "salsa" rhythm: "A plastic
girl, rough and close at hand." Pablo Milanes relates the artist to the irrev-
ocable demands of reality: "A poor wretch indeed is the singer of our times
I who fears risking his chord I in fear of risking his life." The problem of
the exploited rural worker and the struggle for agrarian reform are described
in four lines by Daniel Viglietti: "Down with the wire fencing, 1 down with
wires, I the land is mine and yours and theirs, I it belongs to Pedro and
Maria, to Juan and Jose." Here the overwhelming beauty of the simple but
revolutionary idea that the land belongs to everyone is made to encompass
the entire universe.
2. A function of rupture emerges in that the new music opens
possibilities for expression and creates gaps in the dominant discourse where
the popular voice is being repressed by political and economic authoritar-
ianism. There is a clear creativity in the construction of language and sym-
bols, beyond the lyrics themselves, that link the identity of the artist and
the people in mutual communication. From Chico Buarque's experience in
Brazil to the eruption of the Canto Nuevo movement in Chile and the Canto
Popular movement born under military dictatorship in Uruguay, there have
been countless examples of this opening of gaps for the voice of the neglected
masses, for "those who have no voice."
3. A function of anticipation emerges in that many expressions
of the Canto Nuevo movement work for the construction of a more just
and egalitarian society, synthesizing latent hopes. "When the War Is Over,
Love" is the Nicaraguan song created under Somoza. Quite simply, but
deeply, the social and collective situation is linked to the particular dreams
of a couple in love. "Let us step forward, I all our banners flying high, I
united in such a way I that loneliness is no more," is Silvio Rodriguez's
proposal, in pounding, tropical rhythm. Possibly one of the most universal
examples is "We Shall Overcome," created in the thick of the Chilean Pop-
ular Unity experience.
449
 4. A function of convocation to meet emerges in that, for the
popular masses, a music that refers to its struggles, hopes, and joys, its
understanding of love and solidarity, promotes the possibility of an ardent
meeting. One feels closer to those who share in the common struggle. Fes-
tivals and special live events pave the way for a symbol whose force and
application extend beyond the song itself. Even in the most repressive sit-
uations, the song creates a space marked "Here we are." The summons
enlarges and deepens the significance of the song. Emotions become collec-
tive and a phenomenon is created whereby the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts.
5. A function of denunciation is essential to the Canto Nuevo
movement, provided that the popular masses share interests, struggles, and
aspirations. The different creative trends assume the task of denouncing the
conditions created both nationally and internationally by the dominant sys-
tem. From an aesthetic point of view, this is the most dangerous function
in the development and existence of the movement. The singer-author walks
the razor's edge between poetry and pamphlet at this point. No other fact
is as clear to the popular creators: denunciation is not synonymous with
coarse language and purile texts. "We mustn't be afraid of pamphlets," says
Aly Primera, who mobilizes masses with his music. "He who sees pamphlets
in life, will only sing pamphlets in song. But he who sees poetry in life and
in the struggle for a better life, will create and sing poetry," declared Silvio
Rodriguez in a Mexican interview. Quilapay(ln has evolved into different
(superior?) levels of poetry and music as a result of its European exile;
however, when Quilapayun was engaged to sing in Mendoza (an Argentinian
city located very close to the Chilean border) at the end of 1983, some 5,000
Chileans in attendance demanded to hear the direct, contingent songs that
characterize the history of this musical group and of Chile's political life.
6. A function of confrontation emerges in that, although the Canto
Nuevo movement and its diversified expressions do not always signify a
mass phenomenon (as is generally the case with alternative media expres-
sions in the face ofLatin American power situations), such forms of artistic
manifestation evidently irritate, disturb, and provoke the hegemonic forces.
The strength of the music is especially terrifying. The images it projects
achieve greater coincidence with the struggles of the neglected popular mas-
ses and their mobilization than those of any other cultural form. This is
why the movement is fought against and repressed and, inevitably, situated
in a zone of confrontation and defiance. For mass-supported artists, then,
the best weapon is an imaginative capacity. Gerardo Vandre, guitar in hand,
was banished from Brazil in 1970 for his music; Mercedes Sosa was for-
bidden radio and TV appearances upon her return to Argentina in 1982
under the military regime. And there are many other examples because the
so-called National Security Doctrine, in its unrelenting persecution of the
"internal enemy," has always identified the Canto Nuevo movement and
its artists with a highly dangerous reality. At the hour of repression, the life
of a politician or notorious government official may be pardoned, but never
that of a Victor Jara.
The Canto Nuevo movement fulfills these functions through its
social praxis, exemplifying truly democratic alternatives to the transnational
capitalist system in force. The artist committed to popular causes needs
450
 Fernando Reyes Matta
social organizations to grow and to become a faithful representative, the
proper upholder of cultural symbols, a mobilizing agent. Hence the rela-
tionship with festivals, labor unions, feminist and student organizations,
churches, and a wide variety of institutions that make up the social network
the artist strengthens with his or her verses and music. This is the general
context to be considered in the following analysis where, in addition to
establishing a chronology for the Latin American Nuevo Canci6n move-
ment's formative process and its significance, an outline of the recording
industry's behavior in relation to the movement is provided. Some of the
new music's experiences in the construction of its own recording and dis-
semination networks are also discussed. By linking the movement's tech-
nological and artistic extensions, we will be able to better reflect its inquis-
itive and freedom-seeking nature.
Song and Conflict
Since the end of the sixties a wave of committed and innovative
singers and songwriters has grown up in Latin America. Groups of young
people and new singing voices have taken the road opened by pioneers like
Violeta Parra and Atahualpa Yupanqui, in different circumstances and with
different styles. The reality of the continent challenges and creates obliga-
tions. The imagination of the song composers was shaken by internal social
conflicts; by the progressive and overflowing migration from country to city;
by the youth, born at the end of the Second World War, who were searching
for their own values; by the Church, which could not avoid committing
itself more and more deeply to the necessities of the "people of God"; by
the dramatic emergence of the guerrilla army, which left to history the
witness and symbol of Che Guevara. All of this involves a generation that
made songs into more than objects of transitory entertainment or massive
trade.
In Chile, this process came together in the movement that took
the name Nueva Canci6n Chilena. The movement's members broke with
so-called neo-folksong, which misrepresents the conflicts in the countryside
in descriptions of landscapes and of the aboriginal world viewed through
the eyes of the landowners. The songs ofVictor Jara, Angel and Isabel Parra,
Rolando Alarcon, Patricio Manns, along with those of groups such as In-
tillimani and Quilapay6n, form part of the current Nueva Canci6n. They
redeem forms and words to create a song that comes from the people and
flows back to them. They interweave musical instruments, thereby fulfilling
the dream of Latin American integration that neither political nor economic
decisions achieve. The charango (a small string instrument from the alti-
plano) and the cuatro (a small four-string Mexican guitar) are united with
the Andean quena (a sort oflndian flute), with the bombo /egU,ero; maracas
open a space for the gij,iro (a gourd used as an instrument in Cuba) and the
claves. The guitars maintain their presence, but in a musical world that is
more and more Latin American. This is a new kind of song and lyrics. It
is because of this difference that the Nueva Canci6n Chilena was very in-
fluential in the rest of Latin America.
The Chilean song became a source of cultural influence which
increased in strength during the three years of the Popular Unity govern-
ment. At the same time, comparable movements were developing in other
places, especially in the very expressive Cuban context, which saw the emer-
451
gence of a new kind of song called the Nueva Trova (trova has the same
root as "troubador"). Its most famous proponents-Silvio Rodriguez, Pablo
Milanes, and Noel Nicola-made their first tour outside Cuba in 1970, in
Chile. Three years before, at the Festival of Varadero, it became evident
that their music was breaking new and fertile ground. At the beginning,
their music was not always understood or accepted in all sectors of Cuban
society. However, its richness enabled it to survive, and it came to have a
strong influence at the beginning of the 1980s as it was echoed in various
parts of the world, especially among Latin American youth.
The period in which the Nueva Canci6n Chilena and the Nueva
Trova were first becoming known was also an epoch in which people became
conscious of the contradictions and conflicts inherent in their national sit-
uations and began to recognize them as features of a larger phenomenon:
underdevelopment and economic and cultural dependency are pressing real-
ities in all of Latin America. This continent has been one of the primary
zones of expansion for capitalism in its transnational phase. The phenom-
enon cuts across the whole of society, affecting its political, social, economic,
and cultural dimensions. It invades the process through which societies
conceive of their development and define their history.
The sensibilities of the singers are highly responsive to this reality:
"If we were Americans," sings Rolando Alarc6n; 2 "Song for Latin American
Unity" is the contribution of Pablo Milanes; the Uruguayan Daniel Viglietti
creates "A Song to My America"; from repressed Brazil emerges Milton
Nascimento with "American Heart"; while the Argentinian Cesar !sella in-
vites the American brother to sing, from all of his geographical diversity,
in his "Song with Everyone."
This wave of creativity, uniting names of pioneers and new voices,
has reshaped and renovated Latin American song. What Yupanqui began
in Argentina was followed by the expressive force of Mercedes Sosa, !sella,
and many more. In Uruguay, Viglietti is joined by the Olimareftos and
Alfredo Zitarrosa. In Peru, there is Nicomedes Santa Cruz rediscovering the
people's roots, while Tania Libertad begins to follow her own path, as does
Amparo Ochoa of Mexico. Soledad Bravo, in Venezuela, erupts with the
purity of her voice, which brings the songs of her fellow Latin Americans
to levels of extraordinary beauty. Meanwhile, in Cuba, Silvio and Pablo,
along with Noel Nicola and Vicente Feliu go back to the hundred-year-old
trova and bring it to a rebirth in the context of revolutionary history. In
Brazil, Chico Buarque, Milton Nascimento, and Gerardo Vandre insist that
creativity does not die, even amid the repression and authoritarianism that
surrounds them.
All of them and others, too, in one way or another, sowed the
seeds of a movement that became an expression of the struggle for social
transformation taking place in diverse parts of the continent. For creating
both a synthesis and a symbol, these people were persecuted and exiled
when the popular movements for social change which nourished the songs
were drowned or repressed. Now is the time of ruptures, of silence, and of
exile. Yet such Latin American songs continue to live, especially in Europe,
and continue the struggles of the 1970s. Its voices clamor for full democracy
and for the right to return to sing with their people. This is the case of
Mercedes Sosa, the Quilapay11n, Viglietti, and the Parras, to name a few.
New languages, new geographies, trips and planes, distances and emotions
452
 Fernando Reyes Matta
have defined a new chapter, a new sense ofliving through history, that such
songs have to express in order to be themselves. Some doubt that the song
of Latin American exile is the real expression of what it is to be Latin
American now. Others think the emergence of new currents, what has been
called in Chile the Canto Nuevo, characterizes a fertile time in which Latin
American heterogeneity searches for convergence. Neither viewpoint is a
definite synthesis: these are currents that interweave in a creative continuity,
whose meeting creates a collective memory and a basic instinctive resource
for the people's sensibility.
As the young Chilean essayist Alvaro Godoy has said, "The Nueva
Canci6n, and now the Canto Nuevo, are two moments in one movement,
with a present and a past, which we would call popular song, differentiating
it from the song ofthe people which has always existed and which is, without
a doubt, its root and its countenance. " 3 This inward- and outward-looking
song searches for the moment of relevance within different daily realities
and a common national direction, creating more than once a dialogue of
singer-composers. Some of them advance with the people in the effort to
construct new democratic realities. They live in a time of open spaces, in
which they can proclaim their commitments, their demands, and their con-
victions. Others have had to learn to live in semisilence, to use words
calculatedly, and at the same time, paradoxically, to give poetry a greater
force and suggestiveness. But some are victims of a greater phenomenon:
exile, the freedom to sing only at a great distance from the people, as the
only alternative to an inner creativity that is close to the self but must
maintain a guarded voice amid repression. The cause is the same: the cap-
italist developmental model which, in its most acute expressions in Latin
America, postulates the democracy of consumerism, individualism, atom-
ization, and everything that tears the social fabric in which this song is
nourished and defines itself. It is the same capitalism that, joined by the
defenders of private interests, is moving against Nicaragua and El Salvador,
obstructing a process that aims for the good of the great deprived majorities.
Such reality does not escape the new song. The contributions of
Carlos Mejia Godoy and the Palacagiiina, like that of the Banda Tepeuani,
come from this perception. The former sang of the feats of the Sandinistas
against the dictatorship of Somoza; the latter invoked the will to aid the
struggle of the Salvadoran people. Song and action. Song, struggle, and
poetry. As always. But today the centers of domination have the world
communications media structure in their favor; they have philosophers like
Milton Friedman to announce that it is the time of "freedom to choose"
with money in hand; and they also have their industrially produced symbols,
like John Travolta, who sing in their fiberglass environments, under alien-
ating lights, to a youth that has surrendered to an uncommitted wandering
in the city, understood as the place where personality dissolves.
Confrontation in the Record Industry
The development of popular song has suffered directly from
transnational expansion. Indeed, transnational expansion is simultaneously
a political, economic, and cultural phenomenon; thus radio, television, and
the recording industry have been practically closed to the expression of
commitment to structural change. Obviously, such an attitude is under-
standable. It is defined by the conflict of interests. And within the boundaries
453
of that confrontation-consciously or not-radio and television stations be-
come instruments of a kind of "transnational culture" that encourages cul-
tural synchronization and moves toward a model of domination of the
world. 4 Advertising, records, imported programs, transnational news agen-
cies, all interweave to create a communications framework that subscribes
to order and coherence.
Within this coherence, popular song is dysfunctional, or else it
is only permitted a degree of presence which does not threaten the dominant
model: "Radio is an auditory medium of communication and its forte is
music. It depends, therefore, on recorded materials available to it. The
national recording companies publish almost exclusively foreign recordings
and there are even some companies which only sell imported material. On
the other hand, the public, as it only has that one range of possibilities,
obviously only asks for those songs that are already being delivered to it,"
says the radio/TV announcer Miguel Davagnino in a publication about
Canto Nuevo. 5 In one way, the Mexican Gabino Palomares was saying the
same thing in 1982 when he announced the release of his second album in
five years. He recognized that that was not much but called attention to the
difficulties big industry places before singers like him: "Our music is dis-
missed by transnational companies. This phenomenon is understandable,
as our themes are in direct conflict with their interests. Fortunately, there
are recording companies that, though small, allow us to record. Our work
recalls that which the minstrels did in their time. There is a lack of truth-
fulness in the communications media, and we fill the gap. It is arduous
work, above all because we do not have the materials necessary, but the
people's acceptance of our work is what leads us forward." 6
Another element with a determining influence on the nondistri-
bution of national music, popular song, and folk music is the relationship
between the transnational capitalist recording companies and the disc jock-
eys and radio programmers. "Making records independently," says Chico
Mario de Souza, the promoter of a musicians' cooperative in Brazil, "we
discovered that the recording companies pay the radio stations to play their
records. Radio becomes a loudspeaker for the recording companies, by means
of bribery. Every month some programmers receive money to play certain
records. They're told: play this piece 20 times a day, this other one 10 times,
and so on. They play very little Brazilian music. Thus the radio stations
keep on playing and making surveys of popularity. They put the music on
the telenovelas-because there is bribery there too-and everyone begins to
buy the record, which gives a lot of money to the recording companies." 7
The situation seems to be similar in the majority of Latin Amer-
ican countries. Mexico, the other giant music market, is a scene of the same
kind of corruption. But in this case the most eloquent testimony, from
someone who saw the murky business from the inside, comes from Jorge
Alvarez, former artistic director of the Capitol label:
The big record companies have a budget, of course an
overly high one, to run their public relations, their
promotion campaigns. There are cases, for example,
in which payola is not used, that is a check is not given
so that a certain melody will be programmed by a
station. But this is made up for by sending the broad-
454
 Fernando Reyes Matta
caster on a trip to Europe, or giving him a new car,
or sending him to Acapulco .... It has been known to
happen that artistic directors ask fifty-thousand pesos
(US $2000) per month from new small companies, in
exchange for promoting their product on a given radio
station. The big companies have specialized personnel,
known in the radio world, who manage these things ....
Or else, the record company sends a programmer to
a concert in Los Angeles or New York, all expenses
paid. In other cases, he or she is invited to Europe on
a pleasure trip, on the company's account, of course....
Another way to promote records is the one CBS uses:
it doesn't give a cent to the artistic directors, but from
time to time it gives them a special promotion deal
of records to give to the public; it may be a thousand,
two thousand, three thousand, five thousand records
by the strongest artists: Chicago, or Earth, Wind and
Fire. 8
When music is seen exclusively as a commercial product, and
when radio becomes part of a whole system that makes culture an industry
and the public a market, all this follows almost inevitably. But there is even
more: misrepresentation of the public's taste. "It is said that radio pro-
gramming is done according to telephone calls.... But this too is fixed. I
don't know if all of the companies have them, but Capitol does: a few boys
and girls contracted to call in by phone and inflate the ratings. Until 1976
when I left Capitol, I never agreed with the method, but it was instituted
in 1975."9
Pressure, money, fixed programming. All that brings the local
system in line with the interests of the big transnational consortia of the
record business. If one looks at the heart of the system, the statistics are
eloquent. Five companies share 80 percent of the North American market.
Warner has 25 percent; CBS, 20 percent; Polydor, 15 percent; RCA, 12
percent; Capitol (EMI), 8 percent. 10 From there, the business expands into
the rest of the world, and its growth affects not only small local brands,
open to the diffusion of popular song or so-called committed song, but the
whole national recording system in countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and
Mexico.
The current open market policy has contributed to this pattern
by directly affecting local subsidiaries and independent businesses. "Records
imported from the United States and Europe, which are sold in the super-
markets, are hurting the national market in general; it is because of this that
we music publishers have brought a protest to the corresponding authorities
in order that they restrict imports," declared Enrique Marquez in November
1980. Marquez is a well-known Mexican music publisher whose ability to
publish Mexican music was seriously affected by the great opening of the
market permitted by the government when oil revenues increased. 11 In an-
other oil-producing country, similar complaints were raised two months
earlier: "A sharp blow has been received by the Venezuelan recording in-
dustry with the decree that permits the free importation of records from
this month onwards (September 1980), as one of the hundred products
455
approved by the Venezuelan government. Before, the only records that could
be freely imported were of classical music; the new regulations establish
that any individual or company can import records, paying only five percent
of the value of the product. This is fatal for the national industry," stated
a memorandum coming from Caracas, published by the Mexican press. 12
These examples demonstrate the contradictions generated by the
application in the peripheral countries of strategic policies of expanding
transnational capitalism. At the same time, there is another factor that de-
termines the conditions for the diffusion of music: the overflowing abun-
dance of cassettes and radio-cassette recorders. A concrete example is given
by these Chilean statistics: "The size of national production and its stag-
nation may be compared to the absolute quantity and the rate of growth of
imports. In 1978, the sales figures (ofrecords) of$4.5 million is somewhat
higher than the $3.6 million worth of cassettes, both blank and prerecorded,
sold during that year. The tendency observed in 1979-a growth of 55%-
reveals that already in that year the national market for recordings is sup-
plied principally from the exterior. The competition is mostly from amateur
recordings. The $4 million in blank cassettes imported during 1979 indicate
that there is a substitute for the consumption of recorded material by the
simple home-made copy of that material." 13 In Chile, a country of 11 million
inhabitants, it is estimated that there are between 14 and 15 million radio-
cassette recorders. It is one of the tools of transnational electronic manu-
facture that has succeeded in penetrating even the sectors of the population
with the least income.
Is this good or bad from the perspective of popular song? Ricardo
Garcia, radio announcer and record producer, is recognized as the initial
driving force behind the Canto Nuevo in Chile, as he was earlier for the
Nueva Canci6n Chilena. He sees the problem in two facets: industrial and
social, from the perspective of the label Alerce, the company that has made
available the new voices of Chilean popular song, as well as the creations
of Victor Jara, Violeta Parra, Silvio Rodriguez, and Pablo Milanes. More-
over, his case testifies to the possibility of action even in restricted spaces,
when there is the will and tenacity to do so: "The world record market is
in crisis, especially in Chile, where the masses' small power to consume is
directed towards imported articles. To this problem is added the phenom-
enon of the radio-cassette, which allows private recording of music. The
case of Alerce is more critical, as its public has, in general, scarce resources.
However, the real public is much wider. Each Alerce record is heard by
more or less large groups, which are particularly interested in folk music or
Chilean music, and they re-record on a cassette, which is heard by still more
people. This is good for the diffusion of the music, but bad for us." 14
Alternatives, Force, and Poetry
This situation, in which a song must move in the spaces created
by the culture industry as well as in its own spaces, has opened the possibility
of alternative distribution channels for popular songs. The record labels that
try to create independent distribution systems multiply: labels such as Pueblo,
NCL (Nueva Canci6n Latinamericana), Fot6n, Alerce. Behind them is the
will to redeem those products of the electronics industry-the record and
the cassette-in order to place them at the service of a cultural view of the
world that inaugurates new times. Some do not make it, and some only
456
 Fernando Reyes Matta
barely do. But they open up vistas to explore that are different from those
offered by the transnational capitalist model. An eloquent example was seen
in Brazil, where the Musicians' Cooperative of Rio de Janeiro created a
department for "alternative records." "The initiator of this was Antonio
Adolfo," says Chico Mario de Souza. "He had made several successful re-
cordings and had participated in festivals. But afterwards he began to feel
mutilated, unable to produce what he liked. No one wanted to record his
music. Then he did it on his own, and then he went out to sell his records
from place to place all over Brazil. That way he sold more than 15,000
records and created the consciousness that it was possible to break the
boycott ofthe multinationals. Others followed him: Danilo Caimi, Luli and
Lucinha. And the secrets of the work were passed to other composers: how
to make the cover and credits, what studio to record in, how many records
to print, where and how to sell. Thus the movement went on growing." 15
Though the beginnings of the experiment were modest, they al-
ready constitute an important trend. Groups like Barca do Sol and Boca
Livre have managed to sell more than 40,000 copies in five months. De
Souza's own record, "Raizes," also sold well. For that reason, the press
agency EFE reported from Rio de Janeiro, at the beginning of 1981, that
the Brazilian record market for popular music had in
1980, as a great novelty, the explosion of independent
producers and the "discovery" of regional markets....
"That's enough now" was the rebellious cry of the
independent musicians, who triumphed justly. If the
list of the 20 best long-playing records of 1980 is ana-
lyzed, it is apparent that not less than six were pro-
duced independently.... The success of the indepen-
dents is not only due to their intrinsic value, but also
to the discovery of the existence of an urban market
that likes regional themes .... Some dedicated musi-
cians like Dori Gaymmi embraced, or collaborated
courageously with, this renovation of musical taste,
which, in sum, wishes to escape from the dictates of
international fashion in order to submerge itself in the
rich sounds, rhythms, and melodies that are closest to
the earth and to what is Brazilian. 16
What can be the force inherent in a popular song that has a mass
audience? On the one hand, the answer lies in the vitality and support
granted to it by its links to social organizations. Even in very authoritarian
situations, as in the Southern Cone, a relationship between song and the
social fabric is established. Festivals of solidarity; meetings of students;
meetings organized by churches, unions, and other workers' groups; festivals
organized by cultural organizations-all create the framework in which pop-
ular song finds its ratification and orientation. On the other hand, the in-
herent force of popular song emerges from its call for commitment to the
history of which it is a part and to the destiny of the great deprived ma-
jorities. "Today my song is in solidarity with El Salvador and the struggle
of its people," said the Mexican Gabino Palomares on presenting his second
LP. Eduardo Peralta, a twenty-one-year-old Chilean musician, commented
457
 upon returning from Europe and meeting his friends of the Nueva Canci6n
again that "I think about the liberty that clearly shows the inner human,
that always transcends systems and schemes. In my songs I want to em-
phasize the creative potential of the human being." In Uruguay, while talk-
ing about the work of almost a hundred artists who perform in theaters and
on the stages of sport facilities, the magazine La Democracia said in Sep-
tember 1982: "We cannot push aside this cultural manifestation ofthe his-
torical moment in which we live.... Our people need to participate, to find
paths, and to do so saying that it is the people who are searching. That is
what has given our people the Canto Popular: this is the path of their search."
Litto Nebbia, with his LP Creer, was premonitory when he said of Argentina
in 1982: "I believe that in spite of so much melancholy, so much grief and
so many wounds, it's only a question of trying to live."
Between 1982 and 1983 a new process began to affect the Latin
American reality: redemocratization. In Brazil, great opposition figures made
their comeback in the political scene by actively participating in state gov-
ernment elections. Leone! Brizola was elected governor of the state of Rio
de Janeiro and Darcy Ribeiro was elected deputy governor. The latter is an
anthropologist and former minister of education under the Goulart admin-
istration deposed in 1964 by the military. Within this context, the Canto
Nuevo movement emerges to assume other commitments, standing closer
now to the working classes and their struggle for full democracy and total
respect for human rights. It is no longer a question of merely recovering
the minimum right to say what one thinks, but of breaking off completely
with the numerous injustices still in force in Brazil, the most heavily in-
debted of all third-world countries.
But the situation also calls for progress. The popular "New Song"
artists, those in exile and those who strive for liberation in their own coun-
tries, have had a chance to meet at the festivals of Sao Paulo and Puerto
Alegre. The Cubans Silvio Rodriguez and Pablo Milanes went on a grand
tour through Bolivia, while in Chile their music has been gaining steady
popularity through cassettes, magazines, and some democratic radio sta-
tions. Actually, 1983 marked the beginning of a new stage in the struggle
of the Chilean people against the Pinochet dictatorship. The convergence
of forces has changed: youth (who were five and ten years old during the
coup of 1973) now play a major role and defy the system. No truly massive
event could be held without the presence of the new popular song voices,
such as Isabel Aldunate, Osvaldo Torres, and many other groups. They sing
the irreverent songs of today, the music that demands democracy. And the
forbidden songs of fellow artists still in exile are repeated with energy and
daring.
Argentina's transformation has brought the forbidden music even
closer to the Southern Cone: 1983 found this country exploding with home-
comings. Quilapay(m traveled a cross-country circuit and reached the out-
skirts of the Chilean cordillera, while Angel Parra and other important mem-
bers of the Chilean Nueva Canci6n movment, still banned from their country,
also prepared a grand Argentinian tour. Daniel Viglietti, established in Bue-
nos Aires, is also getting closer to home: Uruguay. He was there in 1983,
on the other side of the La Plata River. The Argentinians and many of
Viglietti's countrymen, close by, are having the chance to learn ofhis current
thinking: "I don't see myself as a pure musician, or guitar player, or poet.
458
 Fernando Reyes Matta
I rather feel like a man who walks those paths, a human being who is trying
to communicate with others, who is trying to receive and transmit some
messages in a world organized to destroy them. Capitalism blocks them,
manipulates them, changes their meaning.... There is a communication
war going on, a war in which imperialism destroys news as efficiently as if
it were using neutron bombs. Outside appearances are left to remain intact,
but truth is being destroyed." 17
Within this frame of thought and these new political instances-
the struggles for recovery or achievement of democracy and a free destiny
for Central America-a number of singers met in Varadero, Cuba, on No-
vember 27, 1982, at which time the Nueva Canci6n movement's Interna-
tional Permanent Committee was created. The press release defines this
growing commitment and confirms the network constructed by the artists
and their creations. Part of the declaration says:
The artist must not only live and create according to
his times; he has a chance to project himself toward
the future and to support, through art and life, the
continuous clamor for social change demanded by the
peoples of all nations. The Nueva Canci6n movement
stands side by side of all that which makes man free
and guides him along the road toward a better future.
It is art without class or country, and its message is
that of hope and humanity's highest ideals. We, as
participants of the First International Nueva Canci6n
Forum, in Varadero, Cuba, celebrate the Tenth An-
niversary of the Cuban Nueva Trova movement and
declare ourselves in favor of nuclear disarmament and
world peace, and in favor of the Cuban Revolution,
that is building its future in spite of the yankee im-
perialist blockade and permanent aggressions . . . in
favor of solidarity with the popular struggle for total
liberation in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa,
Asia, including the industrially developed capitalist
countries; against yankee influence in El Salvador and
Guatemala and the threat of imperialist intervention
in those countries that have decided to determine their
own destiny .... 18
The following artists signed on behalf of their respective countries: Brazil,
Chico Buarque; Spain, Joan Manuel Serrat; Uruguay, Daniel Viglietti; Chile,
Angel Parra; Nicaragua, Carlos Mejia Godoy; Angola, Sam Tocas; German
Democratic Republic, Elle Viterhoff; Mexico, Oscar Chavez; Argentina, Ar-
mando Tejada Gomez; Cuba, Silvio Rodriguez; and the United States, Pete
Seeger. This is the new network created by the "New Song" in Latin Amer-
ica, a message of solidarity and committed struggle that opens its way in
the midst of the cultural industry, gaining acknowledgment, especially among
youths. It offers hope for those who build the future.

Notes

Nueva Canci6n, Canto Nuevo, Nuevo Cancionero, and so on. are among the different names
assumed by a similar process of artistic search and expression within the Latin American

459
 struggle for liberation. Consequently, I use these terms (especially the first two) synonymously.
Since Nueva Trova, Nueva Canci6n, and Canto Nuevo refer to specific national movements,
they are left in the original Spanish. In any case, all the terms mentioned denote a new
popular musical creation, linked to mass organizations and other grass-roots groups and with
a problematic relation to the existing economic base. I have defined them collectively as the
"new popular song movement."
2 In the context of the "New Song," the term "American" is understood as "Latin American,"
a projection of Bolivar's conception. It therefore opposes the term "North American," or the
more colloquial or pejorative "gringo," commonly used to refer to U.S. citizens.
3 La Bicic/eta (Santiago de Chile), Apr. 11, 1981.
4 Cees Hamelink, "The Cultural Synchronisation of the World," WACC Journal, 11 (1978).
5 La Bicicleta.
6 El Dia (Mexico). Dec. 21, 1980.
7 Cadernos do Terceiro Mundo (Rio de Janeiro), June 24, 1980.
8 Uno mas Uno (Mexico). June 29, 1980.
9 Uno mas Uno.
10 M. Moskowitz et al., Everybody's Business (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).
11 Excelsior (Mexico). Nov. 9, 1980.
12 Excelsior (Mexico). Sept. 26, 1980.
13 Poder econ6mico y libertad de expresi6n, Diego Portales C., Editorial Nueva lmagen/ILET,
1981 , Mexico.
14 La Bicicleta.
15 Cadernos do Terceiro Mundo.
16 El Hera/do (Mexico), Jan. 4, 1980.
17 Humor (Buenos Aires). Nov. 1983.
18 El Dia (Mexico). July 19, 1983.

460
 Simon Frith

Art Ideology and Pop Practice

Historical events and discourses have ra1sed questions

about the mean1ng of ·'the popular'· and about the na-
ture of "the pleasure" to which recent pop music re-
sponds. The practices of pop music produce their own
kinds of low theory, different critena of political correct-
ness, and different theories of how music can work po-
litically. Current debates begin by accept1ng the com-
modity status of music and by defining revolt as style,
politics as gesture.

I want to begin by saying that coming to an American

university from 1983 Britain was a very surreal experience. With a cheer-
leaders' camp and a fraternity weekend in progress, I felt as ifl had wandered
onto the set of a satirical film about 1950s American youth culture. In that
setting this conference became a necessary form of security: enter here for
all those comforting words-hegemony, ideology, discourse, and so on. I felt
not so much that we were in an ivory tower as a lighthouse, sending out
beams of theory in the hope that people would see the light, that by illu-
minating the rocks and eddies of cultural practice we could help them set
their courses more clearly.
In this paper I want, in some respects, to reverse this
process. I have to confess that I spend more time listening to records than
reading theoretical texts, and what interests me are the flashes of light that
come from the cultural marketplace itself In other words, rather than using
cultural theory to illuminate cultural practice, I want to examine certain
cultural practices and suggest ways in which they can help us refine cultural
theory. This strategy has been forced on me, in part, by necessity. There is
still remarkably little cultural theory, Marxist or otherwise, that makes sense
of the pop and rock process. Adorno remains, after nearly fifty years, the
key referent (think, by contrast, of the development of film theory in the
same period). There are several reasons for the Marxist neglect of popular
music-the organization of the academy and academic disciplines, leftist
assumptions about "the popular" (to which I will return), and so on, but
the effect has been that what theories of pop there are have developed out
of the day-to-day practices of pop itself, out of people's need to bring some
sort of order and justification to the continuing processes of musical eval-
uation, choice, and commitment-whether such people are musicians, en-
trepreneurs, or fans.
The practice of pop involves, in short, the practice of
theorizing. Perhaps we should call the results low theory-confused, incon-
sistent, full of hyperbole and silence, but still theory, and theory that is
compelled by necessity to draw key terms and assumptions from high theory,
461
 from the more systematic accounts of art, commerce, pleasure, and class
that are available. It is this latter process that interests me here. What I
want to suggest is that from the mid-1950s (the rock 'n' roll moment) to
the end of the 1960s there developed a distinct rock sensibility that had, at
its cutting edge, an account of itself that drew on the Marxist critique of
mass culture. From the mid-1970s (the punk moment) to the present, by
contrast, there has emerged a pop sensibility that has, at its cutting edge,
an account of itself that draws on what I am going to call an avant-garde
critique of mass culture.
I can best illustrate this rock/pop distinction by example. A recent
issue of Dave Marsh's muckraking newsletter Rock 'n' Roll Confidential
carried a story in praise of Molly Hatchett, the heavy rock band. According
to Marsh, when several ..radical" new wave/punk bands were asked to play
a benefit for a steelworkers' union local in Pittsburgh, they all, for one reason
or another, refused. Molly Hatchett agreed immediately and did everything
to help make the concert successful-playing for free, contributing their own
resources so that other bands could play too, raising a lot of money for the
workers. The question this report raised concerned the relationship between
Molly Hatchett's music-traditional macho rock-and their politics. A reader
asked, Does a correct political act guarantee .. good" rock music? Marsh's
reply was straightforward: the political importance of rock 'n' roll lies in its
articulation of working-class experience. Molly Hatchett had thus shown
themselves to be authentic rock 'n' rollers; issues of sexism and racism must
be resolved within rock 'n' roll conventions. By these criteria new wave,
experimental bands are (as the Pittsburgh incident confirmed) elitist and
bourgeois-.. art" is a way of distancing music from the working class.
This is a useful summary of the politics of the rock sensibility:
good music comes from the authentic expression of a (working-class) com-
munity's needs and values. In Britain, at about the same time, there took
place the annual Glastonbury Festival. This is partly an attempt to preserve
the 1960s hippy ethos (it is a drug-centered event, for instance), but it is
also, nowadays, a commercial event-you pay to go in and the (considerable)
profits go to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The hippy/CND link
is a peace-and-love vibe, and the atmosphere of Glastonbury is usually
nonpolitical-the only speech made from the platform this summer, for
example, came when one progressive rock band, The Enid, denounced an-
other, Marillion, for signing with EMI.
But then Fun Boy Three appeared. They were at that point a
successful commerical pop act (i.e., they had Top Ten hits-they have since
split up), both smart and political, but political in a way different from
Molly Hatchett. Fun Boy Three's politics came from their management of
disparate pop signs. The group-two black men and a white man-was a
remnant of Britain's 2-Tone movement (in which punk met ska); their
musicians, lined solidly behind them on stage, were all women. Terry Hall,
the lead singer, sang entertaining songs without making any attempt to please
his audience, to address them, at all. At Glastonbury the group performed
a popped-up, contemptuous version of The Doors's .. The End," an iconic
song of the rock sensibility, and as the song ended Hall dispassionately set
fire to the U.S. flag. The political meaning of this gesture (carefully calculated
and repeated, to the producer's horror, on a live TV show a couple of days
later) was ambiguous. A gesture against Reagan and American imperialism,
462
 Simon Frith
against Cruise missiles, certainly, but also, equally apparently, a gesture
against American music, against rock culture, against the festival itself. Either
way, the immediate effect was to jolt the audience's sense of what was
happening. Should they cheer or boo? There was a moment of confused
hostility; as in avant-garde precedents the audience had to react without
knowing how.
The point I want to examine here is not whether Molly Hatchett
or Fun Boy Three was, in 1983, more politically correct, but how different
criteria of political correctness are produced by different popular sensibil-
ities, by different (low) theories of how music can work politically. Rock
arguments in the 1960s thus focused on the problem of commercial "co-
option," the transformation of culture into commodity, and on rock's re-
lation to certain sorts of organized political struggle, to protest. Rock was
thought to be, under certain conditions, and despite the constant process
of capital's recuperation, socially subversive. Or at least it could be, and
was therefore an important site of struggle. Today, such arguments have
lost their force (in Britain that is; in the United States they still have res-
onance, hence the continued importance of rock heroes like Bruce Spring-
steen and John Cougar Mellencamp-I will come back to possible reasons
for the British/American difference later). As a site of struggle, rock has
become too mushy to offer much of a foothold. Those British political rock
bands that continue (singing their support of strikers, for example, like the
Redskins) seem deliberately, proudly archaic-as if even "authentic" work-
ing-class politics is now a matter of style. To quote a British street pamphlet,
The End of Music, distributed anonymously in Leeds in 1978 but partic-
ularly appropriate to this conference setting: "A subversion that was lived
directly, active though confused, has been turned into its opposite-con-
sumerism for a passive audience. No longer an incitement to the destruction
of the university but an adjunct of the university as Saturday night enter-
tainment, fitting in neatly with the present conformism of students."
This does not mean, however, that music is no longer a site of
cultural dispute but, rather, that the terms of the dispute have shifted. Cur-
rent pop debates start by accepting, celebrating even, music's commodity
status, by defining revolt as style, politics as gesture (as with Fun Boy Three's
flag burning). This discursive shift is one of the important effects of punk.
Punk was the most theorized form of popular music ever, and this was, in
part, because it could be used to stand for so many ideas at once. On the
one hand, punk was a raw restatement of the rock argument-a challenge
to the multinationals' control of mass music, an attempt to seize the tech-
nical and commercial means of music production, a rank-and-file youth
expression of class solidarity. On the other hand, punk was an art movement,
a deliberate attempt by bohemian demimonde of the fashion industry to
make a spectacle, to manipulate the media, to con the kids, to make money-
" cash from chaos!" in Malcolm McLaren's slogan. At issue in the subsequent
squabbles about the meaning of punk were the concepts of authenticity and
artifice. Was punk authentic proletarian expression or artificial style? This
is, in an important sense, a false dichotomy (which I will come back to),
but it marked the division within punk itself, a division subsequently ex-
pressed by the freezing of punk proletarianism into the nostalgic gestures
of Oi and the emergence of the punk bohemians into the glittery new pop
movement. Faced with this choice, British leftist interest in music, stirred
463
by punk, has waned. The role of pop in the era of mass youth unemployment
has turned out to be, it seems, "escapism" (just as it was in the 1930s).
Adorno lives.
I do not disagree with this conclusion as such, but what I want
to examine is the concept of escapism (which is, I suppose, tied into what
I mean by the pop sensibility). Escapism is, in cultural practice, not an easy
activity, and the problems its poses are precisely the reason why pop debates
now tum around the issues of style and artifice rather than class and capital,
drawing their terms from avant-garde rather than Marxist models. I am
using the term "avant-garde" very loosely here, with the justification that
it is a term used loosely (but widely) by pop musicians and audiences them-
selves; but in general the suggestion is that, whereas rock musicians try to
differentiate themselves from the mainstream of pop hackery in the language
of authenticity, sincerity, and solidarity, pop musicians define themselves
against the cultural mainstream in much more self-consciously formalist
terms. Similarly, while the rock tradition depends on a sense of community-
musicians speak for as well as to their fans-pop musicians have no desire
to represent anyone but themselves, are more concerned with cult and co-
terie, with establishing difference.
In making such schematic constrasts between rock and pop I
should make two points clear. First, I am concentrating here on how these
sensibilities differ at their radical edge, but we must note that they also differ
in terms of their recuperation. Pop is thus obviously vulnerable to direct
commercialism-its criteria of success can be translated into numbers, sales
figures, profits, and so on. For Britain's best-selling music magazine, Smash
Hits, a key exponent of the pop sensibility, to be commercially successful
means to be culturally significant, and vice versa. The commercial recu-
peration of rock works differently: the profit motive is concealed by sociology
and best-selling records are legitimated in terms of their success at repre-
senting a mood, a social current, a generation, and so on (think of those
1960s quasi-academic rock books or the general stance of Rolling Stone).
The recuperation of music in both cases means showing how it confirms
the social order, but the terms of the confirmation, pop or rock, differ.
Second, the 1970s rock/pop shift was not just the result of some
random play of stars and influences. Rock sensibility began to falter (marked
by the "crisis" of punk) because of the collapse of the idea-which emerged
in the 1950s and gave cultural shape to the 1960s-that "youth" is a com-
munity. Orthodox rock history has popular music stagnating until the trans-
formative moment of rock 'n' roll (the central cliche in such history is "the
rock revolution"). But we could equally interpret rock 'n' roll as a reac-
tionary cul-de-sac, a futile attempt to deny the logic of mass cultural pro-
duction in a new folk movement (and folk musicians and folk ideologies,
particularly the celebration of "live" performance, were, it should be re-
membered, central to the development of rock in both Britain and the
United States). The new folk was youth, and from this perspective punk
was just one more tragic gesture against technological change and capitalist
disruption. The fantasy that pop musicians could be some sort of organic
intellectuals has been remarkably stubborn, and it was only when the ma-
terial basis ofthe fantasy-youth as class-broke down in the 1970s recession
that different ways of conceiving of pop politics began to be attractive.
464
 Simon Frith
To be a bit more specific, I would like to suggest that the radical
version ofthe pop sensibility draws on three strands ofavant-garde thought.
The most obvious, but probably least significant, source is avant-garde art
music-least significant because even when these musicians are interested
in rock devices (electronic amplification, volume, repetition, etc.) they are
not much interested in the problem of the rock audience. For example, I
went to see the New York composer Glenn Branca conduct one of his
symphonies in London. His music is made by a group of musicians playing
notes within a minimal range oftones (but a wide range of electronic pitch)
over and over again on amplified guitars and homemade electronic key-
boards. The music gets louder and louder as the works progress, and the
effect, after a while, is of being trapped in a room full of noisy, heavy,
relentless machinery-one's ears, by necessity, have to make music, patterns,
out of what is, in fact, a din. The performance I went to took place in an
arts center before an audience of about thirty people, half, obviously reg-
ulars, wearing ear plugs. At the end we all applauded politely. The perform-
ance, in short, had no popular cultural significance at all, and I wished that
Branca had been playing, instead, as support to Iron Maiden, the heavy
metal band that was playing around the comer on the same night. The idea
ofhead-bangers having to make sense of the sheer tedium of Branca's music
(which is rather louder than Iron Maiden's as well) is more avant-garde
simply because it would have involved the kind of audience challenge (and
response) that is no longer possible in the art world itself.
The pop influence ofthe musical avant-garde has come less from
its own particular experiments (New York minimalism, European free im-
provisation) than from its theoretical argument that people can be made to
listen to music that does not confirm their expectations-either because
forms are stripped down to their elements and then nothing happens or
because (as in free improvisation) all rules as to what is music, what is
musical, are suspended. Whatever else is going on, the aim is not to please
the public. This paradoxical idea-musicians seeking to disrupt their form,
to make unpopular music-has obvious resonance for postpunk performers,
as does avant-garde formalism, the idea that as music is constructed so it
can be deconstructed; taken-for-granted musical meanings are exposed by
being placed in "inappropriate" contexts. But although this is certainly an
argument developed in art music, its most important source in pop has
been, in fact, the technological possibilities of recording and mixing first
opened up by black musicians-the dub mixers and toasters of Jamaica, the
rappers and scratch mixers of New York City. What they did was change
the musical object, the ground of their creativity, from song and performance
to the record itself. To make new music out of such finished productions
means, quite literally, to deconstruct them. In reggae, anyway, if not in
literary criticism, deconstruction is a material practice, one that, among
other things, completes the breakdown of the distinction between musician
and engineer, artist and technician, record player and record maker.
The most controversial result-Malcolm McLaren's Duck Rock
LP-is also the most revealing for the argument here. What from a rock
perspective was obviously a rip-off (McLaren mixed together African re-
cordings, New York street and radio noise, studio tricks, and claimed the
results as his own), was from his own pop art position a political gesture
that exposed the national-cultural base of the sound standards we usually
465
take for granted. He suggested, further, that to conceive musical meaning
was as important an artistic activity as to make music. (And his record's
commercial success did indeed help open a space in British charts and dance
floors for New York and African sounds.) Think, too, of the way in which
records are routinely issued now in a number of mixes (party mix, radio
mix, club mix, London mix, seaside mix, etc.). On the one hand, this is an
easy way to exploit the fans; on the other hand, it exposes the studio pro-
cesses and calculations kept hidden when records are presented as "natural,"
"finished" goods.
This leads to the second set of avant-garde arguments, about the
construction of the "authors" of music-the musicians, the performers, the
stars. The arguments here partly reflect filtered-down structuralist descrip-
tions of representation but have come into pop most significantly from art
schools. The issues can be divided into two.
First, there is the realization that what is involved in pop is not
simply music but music as articulated through a performer or, rather, through
an image of a performer. Thus we cannot distinguish the meaning of Elvis
Presley's music from the meaning of Elvis Presley; and if musical meaning
is conventional, not natural, so is our sense of pop personality. We read
qualities like sincerity, spontaneity, anger, sexuality, passion, and so on,
into performers because of the way they organize the signs of their person-
ality. From this perspective, the basis of performance is not spontaneity
(which in ideological terms binds rock to nature) but calculation (which
binds pop to culture).
Second, pop works not simply through any old combination of
sound, image, and personality, but through their combination as a com-
mercial package. Artistic interest in the making of meaning does not end
when the music is made, the record released, the performance over, but is
equally invested in the way in which it takes on its public meanings via the
media of television, radio, advertisement, the star system, and so on. The
new interest in this reflects another technological development-video, which
blurs, finally, the distinction between making music and marketing a com-
modity. Pop groups are now expected to construct their music as its own
advertisement, a video spot on MTV.
I want to make two points about these positions. First, they draw,
in Britain, on a very long tradition of art school involvement with rock
music, which has always placed a premium on style, on the aesthetic com-
bination of sound and look. Presentation (clothes, hair, face, person) has,
in this tradition, always been as important as musicianship, personality as
careful a construction as everything else-emotions are displayed rather than
expressed transparently. British rock stars have rarely been self-effacing,
anonymous in the American hairy rock way (except during the "progressive"
rock phase of the early 1970s when performers' "musicianship" was guar-
anteed by their lack of pop personality-e.g., Yes, Barclay James Harvest,
Supertramp). There has always been a distinct strain of irony running through
British pop, an obvious gap between the person and the personality, a de-
tached tone of voice that binds Mick Jagger to Johnny Rotten, Bryan Ferry
to Boy George (there is even an art school heavy metal band, Motorhead).
These performers present themselves and stand aside; they revel in sexual
ambiguity, playing games with the male/female, passive/active conventions
466
 Simon Frith
that are involved in being sold as a star, in being both an object of desire,
a pinup, and its initiator.
It is not enough, though, to explain British pop sensibility by
empirical reference to its art school connections. The question is why art
schools in Britain, unlike the United States, should give shape to popular
cultural ambition. This is too wide a question to go into properly here, but
it involves contrasting ideologies (and possibilities) of social and geograph-
ical mobility. Such ideologies shape mass cultural forms (and explain British
youth's peculiar concern with fashion and style) simply because a central
task of popular culture in capitalist societies is to handle the problem of
individual success and failure. From pop music evidence it seems, then,
that in the United States people's opportunities to change their circum-
stances-to make it-are taken for granted (however fallaciously), while in
Britain they are not. Successful American musicians have nothing to justify
or explain; their wealth and good fortune is not taken to make them any
different than their fans (this is most obvious in country music). In Britain,
by contrast, pop success is furtive, hedged with guilt, accusations of selling
out, justifications ofwealth in terms ofhard work or good deeds. Rock stars
thus justify their position in terms of Romantic ideology, by reference to
their difference (with which their fans can collude) from "ordinary people"-
this is the art school connection. They play down stardom's material con-
sequences, mock their own popularity. It is noticeable that the urban groups
in the United States that are least likely to "make it"-blacks and Latins-
have the most fashion-conscious youth cultures and the most flamboyant
pop personalities (from James Brown to Prince), and something similar to
British pop irony can also be found in the proletarian stadium-rock tradition
that runs from Alice Cooper through Kiss to Van Halen. But none of these
stars has quite the contempt for the mass audience that is essential to the
British pop stance. In the United States that only comes from self-con-
sciously bohemian performers-Dylan, Frank Zappa, Jim Morrison, Lou
Reed-who did not think of themselves as pop stars in the first place.
In Britain, then, the art school approach to pop has always had
an obvious rock presence, but it is only now that it is becoming central to
how music is discussed and made sense of. One sign of this is the emergence
of David Bowie as a superstar; another is the increasing importance of
designers and packagers-Factory Records, for example, became Britain's
most successful postpunk independent label with designer Peter Saville as
a key member of its staff. But the most direct evidence lies in how pop is
now discussed-in magazines and press handouts, in reviews and interviews.
Go into the Arts Council bookshop in London's Covent Garden and you
can see the new generation of pop culture magazine: Blitz, Face, ZG, and
i-D lie alongside Art Monthly, Artline, and Art Farum in the same haphazard
confusion that they lie next to No. 1, Smash Hits, and Flexipop in most
branches ofW. H. Smith. Like the teen weeklies, these new magazines are
consumer guides to rock and pop fashion. Like the art glossies, they assume
a knowledge of art and design and media form-the terms of modernism,
futurism, expressionism, and neoexpressionism are flung about in their at-
tempts to define current styles in music.
These magazines are not, in themselves, radical or even loosely
avant-garde, but they do suggest that the processes of pop construction can
be analyzed and debated. And so the third strand of avant-garde ideas I
467
want to mention is precisely concerned with politicizing that dispute. The
inspiration here was, I suppose, situationism (the reference point of Fac-
tory's self-styled "politics," for example), which puts the emphasis on pop
as spectacle, situation, event, as something that involves the construction
of an audience (and thus returns us to the idea of shocking the public). The
pop roots of this argument obviously lie in punk (the Sex Pistols drew
directly on situationist theory), but the most significant political music has
concerned pop as a sexual event.
Feminist musicians, in particular, have been concerned not sim-
ply with the question of rock's musical structure-Is it a patriarchalfarm?-
but, more important, with the ways in which performances and events use
conventions of masculinity and femininity, situate the audience in certain
ways, and define subjectivity. The issue facing women in rock is that, while
there have obviously been women's voices, there has also been, far more
obviously, a female silence or, to put it more accurately, a female silencing.
To speak thus means more than simply to pick up a guitar, to move close
to the mike. The first time I saw a feminist rock band perform it took me
some time to understand why the event felt so difficult (the women were,
at first hearing, using orthodox enough rock musical forms). What I even-
tually realized was that this was also the first time I had been to a rock
concert when I was not, as a man, the subject of the musicians' (male or
female) address. The effect was not to be excluded from the event (just as
women are not excluded from rock events) but to have no obvious place
in it-in an immediate, emotional way I could not make sense of what was
happening. And it is precisely this effect that bands concerned with sexual
politics, like the Gang of Four and the Au Pairs, have tried to put into play:
to confuse an audience and then to use that confusion as the basis for an
active process of making sense out of conversation, hesitation, the move-
ments in and out of private and public expression.
Again, the rock-despised, "artificial" 1970s genre of disco was
important in this context for the questions it raised (in its very use of
"formulas") about the pop construction, via dance, of the body. I am think-
ing not just of the erotic rules written into disco by its gay and non-Wasp
connections but also of the importance of the "anonymous" dance floor as
a place to pose. Disco offered an alternative to rock 'n' roll's traditional
boy-meets-girl party conventions, and Britain's dance floor poseurs, Bowie
boys and girls initially, became the New Romantics, a pop movement
spawning such ambiguous and even asexual stars as Boy George and Mar-
ilyn. If dressing up was, like glam-rock before it, primarily a boys' affair,
David Bowie himself was, nevertheless, an important inspiration for girls
too (as interviews with both feminist musicians and fans reveal). What
mattered was his simple assertion: "I'm different." Sexual politics is about
questions, not answers, and Bowie suggested that the most ''natural" of
rock's meanings, its "raunchiness," was actually just another (and rather
dreary) pose.
By this stage of the argument, I am sure that you are wondering
about the relevance of such fringe, artistically and politically, self-conscious
musicians and consumers to an understanding of how music works as pop-
ular culture. Before I go on I need to clarify two points in particular.
First, I am not suggesting that pop and rock, as mass cultural
forms, have changed in any significant ways. The issues I am talking about,
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 Simon Frith
particularly those revolving around creativity and commodity, the artist
and the marketplace, are issues deeply enmeshed in the history of capital-
ism-which accounts, for example, for the continuing importance for rock
musicians (and the rock industry, too) of both romantic and modem ideo-
logies. The contradictions of pop, in short, continue, and what I am referring
to in describing a shift in sensibility is a shift in the terms people use to
make sense of the contradictions and the ways they are positioned by them.
To put it simply, the question remains the same-Is commercial success a
sign of artistic and/or political failure?-but the terms of the answer change.
Second, I am not suggesting that the word "deconstruction" now
trips lightly off record buyers' lips-I do not expect that the average fan of
Culture Club, for example, would find this paper of any obvious relevance
to their taste. What I am suggesting, rather, is that pop sensibility works as
a grid placed over pop practice and pop experience, a framework, a common
sense within which musicians, record buyers, record producers, disc jockeys,
and so on, make sense of what they are doing, account for the choices and
judgments they make. Thus, if within the rock discourse an abusive term
like "selling out" has wide currency, even though most of its users never
stop to think through the assumptions it rests on, so it is now possible to
pick up Smash Hits and find people using the abusive terms "rockist" with-
out specifying how they recognize rockist tendencies (faking sincerity, sim-
ulating "community") when they hear them.
I am sure I have been exaggerating the extent to which pop com-
mon sense has changed-in reality pop and rock discourses still swirl around
together and are not as clearly distinguishable as my schematic approach
suggests. Still, there have been changes. I want to end by suggesting a couple
of reasons why the sort of pop sensibility I have described has appeared in
Britain in conjunction with the rise of Thatcherism, and this goes back to
the problem I started with, the meaning of "escapism." To summarize my
position, I want to argue, first, that the development of populist discourse
in politics, the spread of new sorts of appeal, from the Right to "the People,"
has raised questions about the meaning of "the popular"; and second, that
the development of generalized youth unemployment, the reorganization
of youth into a position of dependence, has raised questions about the
meaning of "pleasure." The new pop is a response to both sets of questions.
Taking "the popular" first. In a recent paper, Tony Bennett has
suggested that the problem of most leftist accounts of the popular is that
they use a model of "the people" that refers to an ideal people in the past
and/or an ideal people in the future but never real people now (which is
why New Right populism has had such an impact-the Left has not been
in a strong position to contest it). In terms of popular music, the effect of
this has been a convention of analysis that values popular music either as
agit-pop (it does things to the people, instructs them, inspires them, etc.)
or as folk-pop (it expresses the people, emerges joyously from them). What
has not been examined is how music works to construct the people. To put
it another way, the description "popular" music is not simply a quantitative
description (referring to a number of listeners). It describes, too, a cultural
form, part of whose significance is, precisely, that it offers an account of the
popular-pop charts, for example, do not just register record sales and airplay
but work to give music a particular sort of public presence. Popular music
is music that takes up certain spaces in popular memory, that establishes
469
shared codes of musical meaning (most obvious in their shorthand use in
advertisements), that works, in other words, to make a particular sort of
unity out of the listening public. Subgenres of popular music-rock, disco,
reggae, and so on-are engaged in similar processes: they give cultural shape
to "taste publics" and in doing so help define what those tastes mean-in
terms of identity, commitment, value, and so on. You are what you listen
to; you are not what you do not listen to.
There is a lot more to be said about these processes, and in
particular, from a Marxist perspective, about their role in defining the petite
bourgeoisie, whose identity, so often unstable and ambiguous in material
terms, is particularly dependent on symbols of identity and difference. But
the point I want to make here is that now, more than ever before, the political
work of constructing "the people," and differences among "the people," is
visible, as Thatcherism links "the people" to "the nation," reaffirms dis-
tinctions of male/female (in the family), black/white (in our "cultural her-
itage"), employed/unemployed (in the language of enterprise and progress),
normal/abnormal (in a reaffirmed moral common sense). And so the idea
of the people as "the audience" has become a more self-consciously signif-
icant aspect of popular music making, too. The artificiality of"the popular"
is, in short, readily apparent, and popular culture reflects the consequent
tensions-whether in an aggressively nostalgic reassertion of rock as work-
ing-class music, a denunciation of pop elitism, or in the restless new pop
attempt to confuse the alliances and divisions on which Thatcherite pop-
ulism depends, by blurring racial and sexual divisions (like Culture Club),
and by making a mockery of the idea of "national" music.
It is thus significant that at the height of the Falklands crisis (when
no pop record was, to my knowledge, issued in support of the war) the
general move among young white pop musicians was to introduce all sorts
of Latin and African elements into their records (and disc jockeys were
being similarly eclectic in clubs and discos). Now this was, from one per-
spective, an echo of British colonialism, making money out of other people's
music, but it also contradicted, in musical terms, the nationalist message
that was being pumped relentlessly out of every other medium, whether in
the crude terms of the tabloid press or in the measured tones with which
the BBC absorbed the Task Force into the cliches of 1939-45 war reports.
Pop eclecticism can, then, have a cultural effect. It did, that summer, counter
the official messages about Latins over there and Britains over here, just
as, in 1977, the Sex Pistols's "God Save the Queen" threw its own sort of
pall over the official rejoicing at the Silver Jubilee.
As for the problem of pleasure, I have not got much to add to
what I say in Sound Effects, but the point I want to stress is that just as
work can no longer be taken for granted by youth culture, nor, consequently,
can leisure, and this, in turn, calls into question the hedonistic routine on
which rock and pop have always been based. Thus, though a record like
Wham's "Wham Rap!" (a disco-based assertion of the right not to work,
to have a good time all the time, "You've got soul on the dole!") was a big
hit, it clearly worked as fantasy rather than as any sort of explicit political
comment. The implications are clear-the fragility of traditional youthful
pleasures is now apparent; people have to work at having fun. And the real
significance of"Wham Rap!" -that of pop music generally-is that it remains
a crucial, perhaps the crucial, source (for youth, at any rate) of unofficial
470
 Simon Frith
articulations of doubt and need and desire. Pop gives people ways to speak
themselves, to think themselves, that can counter (though they often con-
firm) official ways of saying things. One of the important tasks of populism
is to control the ways in which the private becomes public (and vice versa);
one of the important tasks of pop is to subvert that control. It is worth
noting, in this context, the clear strand of New Right thought in both Britain
and the United States which, in the name of high culture, denounces mass
culture in general and pop music in particular.
Such attacks are made, as always, in defense of hierarchy and
tradition, against ignorance, spurious equality, and so on, but they com-
monly are placed now within the New Right's celebration of common sense
(which is taken to "see off" the "extremism" of trade unions or the "de-
viance" of feminists). Thus, the danger of current pop music lies less in its
mindlessness or triviality (which concerned 1930s mass culture critics) than
in its articulation-rock "subverts" common sense. Pop music has become
an ideological issue again (the BBC banning records with the same bizarre
logic of"offensiveness" as in the mid-1960s) because the problem ofleisure
and unemployment has arisen just as the leisure industry is being acclaimed
as the solution to Britain's economic problems. The transformation of elec-
tronic goods into consumer goods, the development of cable TV, video
recording, home computers, and so on, have put an economic premium on
people's leisure tastes (and, in some respects, threatened state and oligo-
polistic manipulation of those tastes). Pop's leisure significance is thus being
fought for again-hence Britain's newest youth subculture, the "casuals,"
whose aggressive, stylistic celebration of leisure goods and "life-style" con-
ceals both continuing dole queues and continuing "hooliganism"-the street-
comer menace now comes from such nice, clean-cut, Tory-looking boys and
girls!
The casuals are a suitable symbol of pop politics-elusive, am-
biguous, momentary in their cultural effects; signs, in Dick Hebdige's words,
of "logic escaping." The problem raised at this conference in the discussion
that followed lain Chambers's paper and mine was how this relates to con-
ventional socialist politics-organized, rational, strategic. Most of the ques-
tions revealed a general concern with the authority of pop culture and pop
criticism. What right had I, as a male/white/bourgeois/academic to interpret
the experience of womenjblacksjworkersjyouth? The answer, which I was
too nervous to give at the time, is none. Pop meaning is not revealed by
experts-whether constituted by good theory or "authentic" experience.
Nearly every questioner approached rock and pop in moral terms, as if
"good" music gets through despite "bad" people (the industry, superstars,
men), as if we can still speak of a "real" popular culture (the culture of the
Third World, the oppressed) being "falsified" by capitalist incorporation.
Such an idea of"truth" seems to me an unhelpful starting point.
The important question is not whether one piece of music is more authentic
than another-Malcolm McLaren versus Afrika Bambaataa, the Thompson
Twins versus Holly Near-but why authenticity is an issue in popular cul-
ture, why some sorts of inauthenticity are more suggestive than others. Pop
musicians are not organic intellectuals; they have no authority that matters.
It is, rather, their lack of authority that enables their effects to happen at
the point of consumption. There is an obvious difference (obvious to anyone
who has taken pleasure from pop) between meanings grasped "from un-
471
derneath" and meanings imposed "from on top." However easily we can
describe their packaging, their hard sell, it is undeniable that the cultural
impact of Elvis Presley or the Beatles, Bob Marley or Michael Jackson, the
Sex Pistols or Patti Smith, was not written into their music in advance. The
recognitions and resonances they caused in their audiences were unknown
until they occurred. Pop music is not revolutionary (or even liberating) as
such. It matters because it is an important way in which people, young
people in particular, accommodate themselves to capitalism, accommodate
themselves, that is, to the contradictions of capitalism. To study pop music
is to study a way in which common sense (including our own common
sense) is shaped; to discover places, moments, where that common sense
breaks down, cannot deal with needs and desires via straightforward con-
sumerism, sets up alternative fantasies and demands.
Pop politics are momentary, operating only in the present (and
then as a series of remembered, nostalgic moments). This again confounds
the temporal orderliness of socialist politics, the idea of progress and de-
velopment. From the latter point of view, the so-called ambiguity of pop
signs means only an endless process of incorporation. The point, though,
is that this (undeniable) process tells us nothing about the "authenticity"
of what is incorporated. Pop movements have their effect, their moment,
and are then spent, consumed. To give a recent American example: New
York's hip-hop scene of graffitists, rappers, scratch dee-jays, and break dan-
cers was a form of self-help that was transformed, almost immediately, from
communal activism to Horatio Alger success story. But the latter reading
does not invalidate the former, it just reflects a shifting context. The power
of the hip-hop community remains an aspect of even its ••incorporated"
version.
The pleasure of popular cultural forms-whether pop songs, soap
operas, or news stories-comes from their play on feelings of recognition
and difference, familiarity and novelty, change and stability. The point I
want to make finally (and here I differ from lain Chambers) is that capital's
disruption of people's lives is something to resist as well as celebrate. While
Thatcherism, for example, is obviously reactionary-back to the family, the
nation, Victorian enterprise, and so on-it is experienced as radical, as
threatening taken-for-granted rights-to a job, an education, a hospital bed,
an effective trade union. Socialist opposition means looking back as well as
forward (and the difficulty for the British Left is precisely how to get the
balance right); and keeping a grasp on history is as much a task for popular
culture (and for its subversion of official common sense) as is seizing the
present. The paradox of pop music, in other words, is that in its endless
pursuit of novelty it provides us with moments of delight, partnership, and
confidence that are, literally, recorded. What most struck me about the con-
ference discussion was the (irrational?) commitment to particular songs,
styles, and sounds that was revealed by people's orderly, rational, anxious
questions.
Coda 1984: Money Changes Everything
I went to Gothenburg for a meeting of the International Asso-
ciation for the Study of Popular Music. As we waited to take off, Bob Dylan's
••Mr. Tambourine Man" (instrumental version) was piped throughout the
airplane. Most people at the meeting had been involved, one way or another,
472
 Simon Frith
in "alternative" popular musics-music for socialism, rock in opposition,
independent labels, free radio. I listened to talks on gender and timbre,
revolutionary songs in Nicaragua, music while you work, the history of the
tango, the new leisure technologies. Everything was connected. During a
free afternoon I walked around Gothenburg looking for a record shop. I
located the music section in a large department store; it had a rack of "folk
music" arranged alphabetically by country. Under "England" I found an
LP by Leon Rosselson, the socialist songwriter, and one by Steeleye Span.
I bought Victor Jara's Canto Libre (on a West German label), Luis Kalaffs
El Rey del Merengue (Dominican dance music on a French record label),
and Black Stalin's In an Earlier Time (Trinidadian protest on a New York
record label).
One evening we gathered to watch the Eurovision Song Contest;
a Stockholm paper was to call for our expert vote and commentary. Some
people (like me) were deeply implicated in the aesthetics of Euro-pop; to
others, the competition made no musical sense at all. We argued. On screen
the Swedish song (performed by a boys-only group, Bucks Fizz) won; it had
been performed first, so we had, embarrassingly, missed it. The argument
got heated. Should we be involved in the daft commercial process at all?
We told the newspaper nothing and agreed that it was good that Sweden
won-next year the Swedes could (as in 1975, after Abba) hold an opposi-
tional event.
I returned to England to find a news release from the Labour
party: a 2,500-pound prize for a BETTER song for Europe! "A song that
reflects the true hopes and concerns ofyoung people in Britain," Eric Heffer
said. "We'll be particularly interested in songs about the main themes in
the European election campaign-peace, jobs and the waste of resources and
human lives in Europe at present." In the Coventry News there were details
of a forthcoming CND week. On Tuesday, at Barras Green Social Club,
Leon Rosselson and Roy Bailey appeared, described in the paper as "well
known in disarmament folk circles." On TV the Flying Pickets were being
humorous with a pop song, their jokey approach (endemic in left-wing cab-
aret) conveying an odd mixture of disdain and embarrassment at dealing
with pop at all. On the news, National Union of Miners pickets sang new
versions offootball songs and Neil Kinnock could be seen in Tracy Ullman's
video for ••My Guy's Mad at Me."
In New Socialist, the magazine of the Labour party, Leon Ros-
selson writes about "the silence at the heart of the labor movement," but
his piece is really a description of the "silence" at the heart of popular culture
itself. Even the most spontaneous political song must draw on people's
musical memories and practices (think of the recurring importance of re-
ligious music to protest song), and Rosselson's point is that Britain (or
maybe just England?) has no flourishing song culture from and into which
political movements can feed. Most people these days sing together only in
school assemblies or in well-demarcated rituals-the bus trip, closing time,
the terraces (now, apparently, the primary source of picket line and demo
songs). Rosselson notes the suggestion that this is "because the mass media
and the market place have annexed song, divided people into performers
and consumers, turned the song idiom into a package to be purchased for
leisure consumption."
473
 All of this serves to rerun the folk/massjpop culture debate which,
despite everything, haunted the Illinois conference on Marxism. To state
the obvious again: Not silence but cacophony is at the heart of popular
culture; our lives are filled with the sounds of (canned) music-while we
work and rest, shop and play. The trouble with the folk argument is that it
cannot avoid a tone of heroic regret. I am haunted by the chilling irony of
one of Rosselson's images, "women and children in Soweto singing as they
were being shot down by the police, singing as they defied the bullets. The
power of song."
The power of song. The power of pop. The question is how the
latter, which is now our central source of music, can relate to the labor (or
any other) movement. Rosselson writes of songs: "They are a way-the most
emotionally intense way-of sharing, of feeling less alone and more alive,
of making connections between the personal life and the public world. They
give hope and heart and at least the glimmer of a vision of a different sort
of society. They can help us find our own voices and thus give us back a
belief in our own creativity."
A fine description of why pop matters, too-even if it has its
effects very differently than in the collective, cooperative, live music-making
process Rosselson celebrates. Pop is capitalist culture, not just as a com-
modity form, but because it is used to make sense of the experience of
capitalism (which means something more than the experience of class/age/
race/gender). The politics of pop revolves precisely around inauthenticity:
pop is about our construction as consumers (of goods, fantasies, imageries);
it moves us pleasurably around the marketplace, measures desires in simple
cash terms, gives passing shape to the fragmentation of our senses, puts
together, on the dance floor, the meaning of the body. Pop is ephemeral
and inconsequential, organizes time into an overwhelming presence-with
the past as nostalgia, the future as daydream. Its manic eclecticism is a
perfect expression of the sticky cultural fingers of multinational capital (so
that Chilean, English, and Trinidadian political songs reach a Swedish public
via American, German, and French record companies on the shelves of a
plush bourgeois department store).
Not instructive, not expressive, simply there. How can pop ever
be "radical"? It is important not to answer this question by reference to
models of nonpop political music. For Rosselson the model is the spon-
taneous song making of the Wobblies; in Sweden the model was the Eu-
ropean alternative rock scene; in Illinois the model was the 1960s movement
underpinned by romanticized British youth subcultures. Pop certainly can-
not be radical according to these ideals; its politics work differently: within
the pop process. Pop intentions (the reasons why music is made) matter
less than pop effects-segments of Malcolm X's "No Sell Out" careening
around the dance floor, people singing along with Special AKA's "Free
Nelson Mandela," puzzling out what Elvis Costello is saying in "Peace in
Our Time," recognizing the emotional tension of Womack and Womack's
"Love Wars." It is easy to dismiss the significance of such bitty, trivial
interventions in packaged pleasure, to ridicule, say, Cyndi Lauper's claim
to account for female fun, but even at this moment of video-pop, recorded
music remains, of all mass media, the most open to the sounds at the bottom
of the social heap, the only one in Britain, for example, in which CND
support is taken to be the norm, not the exception.
474
 Simon Frith
The question remains: How do individual moments of pop con-
sumption relate to socialism, to labor and liberation "movements"? The
answer lies in the ways in which pop works to create "the popular," to form
communities of style and taste. Remember that pop rarely deals with a
"mass" audience as such but, rather, sets up patterns of inclusion and ex-
clusion; and despite the tenacious leftist-folk belief, the possibilities of mu-
sical community are not cut off by technological development, by capitalist
competition. Black musicians, for example, have gleefully used studio tech-
nology, radio, records themselves as tools in a continuous social commen-
tary. The question, then, is how the identities put into play by pop relate
to the identities addressed by other media. There are an increasing number
of people-advertisers, politicians, knowledge peddlers, designers, clothes
makers, disc jockeys, television commentators-telling us who we are; pop
feeds into a melee. Its "radical" significance can only be judged by its place-
at specific historical moments-in this melee.
Pop offers identities less through shared experience than through
shared symbols, a common sense of style. Pop history reveals that radical
pop (radical symbolism) makes better sense of some sorts of collectivity
than others. The most clear-cut political music, for example, has been rooted
in nationalist struggle (as in much black music), in the politics of leisure
(as with youth cults or gay disco), or in a combination of the two (as in
certain kinds of feminist music). Class consciousness-this is the problem
for Marxists-has, by contrast, on the whole not been amenable to pop
treatment-pop celebrations of "working classness" have not created au-
diences along politically conscious lines (think of country music or main-
stream American "blue-collar rock"). But then the irrelevance of pop to
"the labor movement" may reflect the irrelevance of the labor movement
(and traditional socialism?) to the ways in which people (including socialists)
now define themselves outside work. The political meaning of the Labour
party's New Song for Europe (which had still not appeared in 1984) will
depend not on the ideological correctness of its lyrics but on how it is
popular. In this debate, that old Juke Box Jury question is still the most
relevant: Will it be a hit?

475
 Michael Ryan

The Politics of Film: Discourse,

Psychoanalysis, Ideology

Soc1al rupture and radical change are not future events.

They are permanent poss1bilit1es mscribed in the very
structure of an megalitanan soc1ety, poss1bil1ties con-
firmed by the sort of 1deolog1cal operations at work in
popular film.

From the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, Marxist

theorizing about film and culture was guided by the work of such path-
breaking British theorists as Stephen Heath and Stuart Hall. Heath, working
out of an amalgamated paradigm based in the work of French thinkers
Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, and Chris-
tian Metz, argued for a theory of "subject positioning" in film. Hall, com-
bining the indigenous cultural studies strain of Richard Hoggart, Raymond
Williams, and E. P. Thompson with the Marxist structuralism of Althusser
and Pierre Bourdieu, and Antonio Gramsci's recently translated theory of
hegemony, argued that culture was a site of domination and resistance.
While representatives of these two theories frequently clashed, the two ap-
proaches nevertheless shared certain qualities. For example, each in its own
way generated pessimistic political conclusions, and neither conceptualized
the development of popular-based political strategies. Heath's theory dis-
allowed a politically enabling reading of popular film, while Hall's allegiance
to Gramsci's essentially Leninist theory of domination precluded seeing the
level of the popular as anything other than a region of resistance to a dom-
ination that was given priority, both conceptually and politically. I will be
concerned here primarily with film theory, choosing to address the issue of
cultural theory elsewhere, 1 although, as I shall argue, the critique of film
theory necessarily entails a reconsideration of the concepts of ideology and
hegemony operative in cultural studies.
All theories are specific to their society and their time.
The recent British theories emerge out of a specific intersection in British
intellectual history of a French-influenced, postanalytic philosophical ren-
aissance in literary, social, and philosophical thought, with a resurgent, pre-
dominantly Trotskyist-Leninist movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Al-
thusser's notion of ideology and Gramsci's notion of hegemony permitted
economism to be superseded in the name of cultural determination, while
allowing the retention of the Leninist model of social hierarchy and dom-
ination from above. Top-down models of politics have been prevalent on
the Left for historical reasons: the undereducation of the masses made man-
agement by intellectual elites the only feasible way to carry out reform or
revolution. But bottom-up models have also existed-from the Paris Com-
477
munards to the anarchists, the Wobblies, the Spartacists, and most recently
the Italian Autonomists. Although these alternative political forms were
always squelched by their opponents, that did not mean their alternative
was not valid. In the very real material sense of levels of socialization,
education, and cultural development, the world was not ready for them.
British film and cultural theory is aligned with a top down po-
litical model that may be appropriate to a society in which the privileging
of the popular base is not as strong as in the United States. But, I would
argue, the peculiarities of U.S. cultural life, where anti-intellectualism and
the critique of social hierarchy are so prevalent that the disfranchised are
not likely either to flock to the local cinema to see the latest Straub/Huillet-
Oshima double bill or to embrace a new "hegemonic bloc," make necessary
slightly different theories of film and culture that would give rise to political
models or strategies more suitable to the U.S. context. A first step in that
direction would be the replacement of the Leninist or elitist top-down ori-
entation of British theory with an orientation that takes as its point of
departure the energies, needs, and desires operative at the popular level and
that conceives of those energies as the productive force that generates so-
ciety. This different conceptual frame necessarily prescribes a more bottom-
up political strategy, one that would see the popular base as the primary
term in any possible political equation, not as either a mere site of(generally
failed) "resistance" or a lower realm of "misrecognition."
Discourse
The study of the relationship between film and society has been
split in recent years between the formalist approach (represented by Heath
and others) and the sociological approach (represented by Wright, Biskind,
Jump Cut, and others). But in the light of deconstructive analysis, the for-
malist/sociological opposition is untenable. The theory of discourse in film
formalism must ultimately be a theory of society; and no sociology of film
is feasible that is not concerned with discursive and cultural forms.
Film is fundamentally social because it draws on and reproduces
social discourses and because it is itself a socially discursive act. Cinematic
discourse is inherently social, for even the most formal dimension of film
presupposes social codes of perception that allow it to be received and
decoded by audiences. Moreover, the external object or referent that film
sociology posits for fictional film is always a construct of the semiotic or
rhetorical operations of film discourse. Social conventions allow that refer-
ent to appear to assume objective or "real" status. The literal referents in
film are actors and sets. It is the audience's imagination, schooled in the
viewing of fiction, that creates the illusion. 2 In addition, the references to
history and society that films generate or presuppose are themselves me-
diated by other social discourses; at no point do even the most sociological
references of film leave the formal dimension of signifying systems and
"touch ground." The social ground is itself interwoven with discourses (class,
race, sex, ethnicity, nationality, work, personal narrative, etc.). Outside of
film representations are other sets of representations, from which the ma-
teriality of social life is inseparable. Therefore, formal analysis is inherently
social because it is the analysis of representational and perceptual conven-
tions that are collectively held, and sociological analysis is necessarily formal
because film enunciates meaning through discursive operations that cannot
478
 Michael Ryan
be deemed secondary to a supposedly pre- or extradiscursive social reality;
that reality is itself constituted and mediated by discourses.
I use .. discourse" in this broad way to subsume social and cultural
systems and activities for a strategic reason. I wish to emphasize that film
and the culture and society in which it is produced are not two separate
spheres. Film is a subset of social processes (or social discourses). And the
strategies of valorization and representation in film are not .. fiction" in
relationship to a .. real" world that is in no way structured by the same sorts
of strategies of valorization and representation that one finds in film. The
narratives and stories in film are also at work in everyday life, as the stories
people tell themselves to make sense of their lives, as the narratives people
live out when they perform certain actions (romance), and as the scenarios
that script events so that they follow relatively predictable patterns (war,
revolution). 3 As social beings, humans inhabit systems of significance; their
lives are structured by codes of valorization (aggressivejnonagressive, dom-
inantjnondominant, etc.) that determine the range of their social action.
Thus, the concept of discourse allows a deconstruction of the opposition
between culture (as a realm of signifying practices) and society (as a realm
of experience or life that is supposedly prediscursive, a sort of nature or
objectivity that is not shaped by representational codes or mediated by
signifying practices).
Films are discourses in part because they are made up of elements
(characters, actions, settings, and so on) that already have meanings and
values (are encoded) within the existing social systems of significance, the
prevailing social discourses or systems of encoded relations whereby each
social element takes on meaning by virtue of occupying a certain position
in the social system or of being in differential relation to other elements in
the system (male/female, rich/poor, white/nonwhite, as well as such things
as character types-executive/radical, capitalist/worker, and so on). As each
element in language takes on value differentially or relationally, that is, by
being marked or not by certain values (inflectedjnoninflected, etc.), so each
social element takes on value through its difference from other elements.
Each element is encoded by possessing or not possessing certain traits. Films
incorporate these elements, recodify them, and give them meanings and
values specific to the codes of the film, but the raw material out of which
the new values and images are constructed is always already codified by
social codes of meaning. For example, the mafia don in The Godfather is a
negatively valorized figure in the U.S. social code of crime who is revalorized
as a heroic figure in the discourse of the film. In other words, the don is a
figure who has meaning or who occupies a valorized position in the ar-
rangement of things in U.S. society. His position is encoded in overdeter-
mined ways; that is, it is constituted by certain codes of thought and behavior
that prescribe certain articulations of those codes in determinable actions.
In addition, his life is made up of a threading together of a number of social
discourses (ethnicity, criminality, patriarchy, etc.) that fit into larger chains
of social discourses that make up U.S. society at this point in history. Most
films rely on such precodified elements, which are incorporated, recodified,
and made part of the specifically cinematic discourse of film.
In order to describe the material circuits that connect film dis-
course to social discourses, I have recourse to the concept of transcoding.
Film discourse transcodes social discourses. I use the metaphor of .. material
479
circuits" to name the real, concrete linkages that conduct ideas, issues, mean-
ings, as well as fears, tensions, and desires, from society into film. The
metaphor allows one to circumvent the metaphysical doctrine of represen-
tation whereby the referent or object is posited as external to the system of
signifiers. The notion of a material circuit implies that there is no exteriority
of the referent, no objective ground to the film signifier. Rather, the two
are part of one system, or a multiplicity of interconnected systems that relay
social ideas and feelings from the extracinematic culture to film and back
into the culture, where they circulate further. At no point is the relation
between film and society nonmaterial, but it may be incorporeal or uncon-
scious.
Whether or not one uses the concept of "discourse" to describe
the film/society relation is ultimately irrelevant. What matters is that the
relation be conceived in a way that emphasizes the social character of even
the most seemingly formal or aesthetic elements of popular film; that the
social world be conceived as a system of valorizations or meanings that are
sites of struggle ("contests of representation") between groups for social
power; that representation and strategies of representation be seen as es-
sential, rather than secondary, to those valorizations and struggles; and that
cinematic representations be linked to those struggles as acts of valorization
that privilege one side or the other, one set of values or interests over
another. Contemporary film theory that uses the concept of discourse em-
phasizes the aspect of address by which a film positions its audience to
perceive the world in a certain way. The model of discourse is linguistic;
the film and the perceiving subject are conceived on the linguistic model
ofintersubjective communication; and the theory emphasizes the conscious,
spontaneous, phenomenal realm of film viewing. By broadening this use of
discourse to mean a system of significance, both cognitive and behavioral,
that includes cultural forms, social actions, and psychological structures, I
wish to emphasize the unconscious, material, nonphenomenal, systematic,
and collective character of the film/society intersection.
The "meaning" of popular film, its political and ideological sig-
nificance, does not reside in the screen-to-subject phenomenology of viewing
alone. That dimension is merely one moment in a circuit, one effect oflarger
chains of determination. Film representations are one subset of wider sys-
tems of social representation (images, narratives, beliefs, etc.) that determine
how people live and that are closely bound up with the systems of social
valorization or differentiation along class, race, and sex lines. Audiences are
not univocally "positioned" by films; rather, they either accept or reject
cinematic representations of the world, but they do so in accordance with
the social codes they inhabit. The specifically cinematic discourse, whereby
a film addresses an audience, is determined by broader social discourses,
the systems of significance and valorization that determine social subjects
as male or female, working class or ruling class, and so on. Thus, I would
argue that the psychoanalysis of film cannot be realized fully until it also
becomes a sociology of social discourses that permits a more differentiated
and situational understanding of how specific films address different audi-
ences and generate different meaning effects in varied contexts.
Psychoanalysis
The broadening of the concept of discourse permits a formulation
of the psychoanalytic relation between film and audience that is more social,
480
 Michael Ryan
more oriented toward the interrelation between patterns of conscious, in-
dividual identification and unconscious, systematic, and nonphenomenal
structures that are transindividual or collective. If films are transcodings of
social discourses, and if audiences are not passive receivers but active read-
ers whose reception of film texts is determined in part by social codes in
which they live, then both films and audiences are likely to change and be
influenced by social transformations. In other words, films do not do one
thing at all times to a unidimensional audience, and audiences react in
different ways to different film representations depending on the condition
of the symbolic codes in which they live, codes that are based in social
structures and that change with changes in those structures. Film, film view-
ing, and film meaning, therefore, are irreducibly historical and social. Film
is also, for this reason, irreducibly political, not a positioning of the subject,
but a struggle to enlist subjective identification for or against certain values
or ideas that are essential to the maintenance or usurpation of social power.
In transcoding social discourses, films offer for identification and
internalization either old values or new valorizations (either, say, the in-
dependent woman as witch or as admirable and emulatable model); film
discourse can help recode the existing social discourses or systems of sig-
nificance (as, indeed, many films, as a result oftranscodings from feminism,
recode the prevailing valorization of the independent woman). For example,
although the ground of cinematic enunciation must be congruent with the
frame of reception, many films seem to enlist audience identification in
order, then, to introduce figures or stories or dramatic enactments that shift
the frame of reception in some way. Frequently, it is the film forms "closest
to home" (melodrama, say) that allow for the greatest leverage in this regard.
It is their very formal conservatism that seduces audiences into situations
of address that offer new values or shifts in old ones. For this reason, classical
genres are frequently characterized by significant shifts in value and ideology
(the positing of native Americans in the western, for example, from enemy
to object of sympathy [from Stagecoach to Cheyenne Autumn] or the de-
piction of independent feminine sexuality in melodrama from anathema to
flexible option [from Peyton Place to The Turning Point]). Thus, film rep-
resentations enlist audience identification or sympathy with different sides
in social debates and social struggles. And the movement of those social
struggles in part determines what sorts of representations will appear on
screens. Changes in society affect both what sorts of representations appear
and how audiences will relate to them.
The emphasis in current film theory on individual perception as
subject positioning can be shifted to include collective thought and behavior
through this conceptualization of film as an articulation of the broader
systems of significance or discourses that make up a society and as an object
of collective identification that can help recode prevailing social valoriza-
tions. In order to fully describe this process, I will have recourse to what
in psychoanalysis is called "object relations theory." 4
Object relations theory holds that a person's sense of self or iden-
tity is constituted through identifications with social objects, images of which
are internalized. Such objects can be figures, such as parents, or social values,
norms, and institutions, such as the nation, the family, the class, or the
ethnic group. Internalization of objects works on even the most "primal"
or instinctual levels of the id; consequently, there is nothing in the psyche
481
that is not social. All levels of the psyche, including the supposedly presocial
realm of instinct, are shaped through relations with social objects. Object
relations theory differs from the traditional Freudian libido theory, which
understands all social action as manifestations of internal drives or instincts
that dominate behavior and must be repressed upon entry into society through
the Oedipal passageway. Psychoanalytic film theory, based in the work of
the neo-Freudian analyst Jacques Lacan, thus sees sexuality and the problem
of sexual difference (essentially, the Oedipal problem) as the focus of film
analysis. The theory is concerned with the individual viewer's perceptions
or with the positioning of individual subjects rather than with collective
social processes, and it privileges as radical those filmmakers who seek to
disrupt normal perceptual codes. Popular film is a symptom of regress be-
cause it pacifies rather than disturbs, nurtures a narcissistic misapprehension
of the real nature of things rather than provokes the audience to question
and critique the film's putative status as a realistic representation. Realism
is illusory or imaginary because it occludes the difference between film sig-
nifiers and their signifieds. Lacanian film theory tends to be pessimistic in
regard to the problem of social change on the popular level because instinc-
tual drives, in the traditional Freudian/Lacanian account, are relatively un-
changing. All one can hope to do is to rearrange an ineluctable misappre-
hension through radically discontinuous cinematic strategies of repre-
sentation. 5
Object relations theory is different in that it emphasizes collective
behavior over individual perception, social institutions and relations over
libidinal or exclusively sexual problems, the movement of social change
over the stasis of instinct, and the possibility of a politics based in popular
desires and needs over a politics based in a counterpopular form of radical
film work. An account of the film-society relationship that takes its cue from
object relations theory would suggest that in order for a society to remain
integral, film images or representations and the symbolic codes that inform
them must replicate the objects with which people identify in that society.
In other words, film representations must be like the social objects whose
images are internalized in the socialization process and who give people a
sense of personal and collective identity. All personal identity is therefore
social or collective, and people will share certain personality patterns be-
cause they share objects of identification: "There are ... aspects of person-
ality ... that are shared, and the symbolic codes on which the sharing is
based have a controlling influence over the individual in society. In these
terms we can understand how a class of individuals experiences, within a
believable latitude, similar erotic and aggressive feelings or inhibitions, or
how similar frustrations, fears, and anxieties can arise in a group of people
faced with the same social conditions." 6 Film representations embody val-
ues, portray institutions and norms, and project idealized figures that elicit
identifications from audiences that cohere with already socialized or inter-
nalized patterns of identification.
Films also can come to represent collectively felt "frustrations,
fears, and anxieties." Individual and group anxiety arises when there is a
disruption in the symbolic codes or structures of identification that provide
meaning and a sense of identity. Such disruption can be produced by crises
in the economic, political, or social spheres, since the structures of identi-
fication are stitched into those spheres. At times of social crisis or radical
482
 Michael Ryan
change, the images that people identify with (and pay to see) will also change.
Social crises upset habitual symbolic codes and patterns of identification,
producing a sense of loss, frustration, and anxiety. As a result, people will
either regress to more secure objects (authoritarian leaders) or attempt to
construct new social situations, symbolic codes, and objects of identification.
Film plays a role in this process by providing either regressive or progressive
objects of identification, by reasserting old symbolic codes of meaning or
by forging new ones, and by depicting either a world in which an unam-
biguous and secure conservative ideology permits a reconstitution of older
patterns of collective identity or one in which more liberal or radical at-
tempts to formulate new values, institutions, and norms are privileged.
Films can thus help create a new social discourse by offering
representations of new values, institutions, and modes of behavior for col-
lective identification and internalized modeling. Film discourse and social
discourse intertwine as a struggle not only over how reality will be repre-
sented but over what that reality will be. Films play a role in the social
construction of reality in that they influence collectively held representations
or ideas of what society is and should be. They help shape beliefs regarding
how people should act, what values should be privileged, what institutions
like the family should look like, and so on. Such beliefs are essential to the
continued existence of social norms, behavior, and institutions. The pa-
triarchal family would not continue to exist if people did not believe it
should exist in that form. Psychological participation is thus required if
public values and institutions are to be maintained or changed. And social
psychology operates through representations that are collectively held. In
this way, reality (the public domain of institutions as well as the beliefs and
values people hold regarding what is true or good) is socially constructed.
How people perceive the world and what values and institutions of that
world they subscribe to are in part determined by representations of that
world, which they internalize through the socialization and educational pro-
cess, one that is reinforced and continued through popular films. That so-
cialization process is also challenged by the representations of alternative
values in some films. As a result, popular film is a terrain of contesting
representations that articulate a struggle between regressive and alternative
models of social institutions and values.
Ideology
The deconstruction of the formalism/sociology opposition through
the notion of discourse and the posing of an object-relations-based psy-
choanalytic alternative to the Lacanian model suggest that the politics of
film need not be limited to the creation of avant-garde artifacts. It is possible
to imagine a political use of popular film forms that would work to recode
the prevailing social discourses. But the existing theory of ideology in film
theory legislates against such a possibility. That theory suggests that ideology
is a general trait of all popular fictional films, all of which uniformly produce
an imaginary misapprehension of real conditions in the audience. Ideology
in this sense is an undifferentiated exercise in domination.
The general theory of ideology as domination in British film and
cultural studies is nondynamic and nonrelational. The only possible action
it allows the oppressed is one of response ("resistance") to a power ("dom-
ination," "hegemony") that is conceived as prior, self-sustaining, and un-
483
mediated. Fittingly, the only alternative to power, in the cultural theory
that derives from this theory of ideology, is another ••hegemonic bloc," a
replacement of power by power in a top-down approach. There is a necessary
relationship between the concept of ideology (furthered by Leninists-Al-
thusser and Gramsci) and the top-down politics of hegemonic blocs or of
elite film work that derive from it. The formulation of an alternative bottom-
up politics requires a reconceptualization of the notion of ideology.
Rather than conceive of ideology as an exercise in domination
that breeds resistance, it might be more accurate to describe ideology as
being itself a response to .. resistance," as the resistance power groups direct
at a force and a potential for revolt that is mistakenly relegated to a sec-
ondary or responsive status when it is called .. resistance." There can be no
ideological domination where there is no .. resistance" or where there is no
structural threat to the existing order. Ideology in this sense is forced closure,
the imposition of harmony on the ever-open possibility of conflict, but the
necessity of that force and that imposition itself testifies to something ide-
ology hopes to deny, that is, the primordiality of difference, the structural
possibility of a disordering of ideological order that precedes and determines
order. Ideology, as the suturing of difference or the representation of unity
where there is conflict, is a symptom of an attempt to reduce differences of
force that are a necessary structural part of an inegalitarian society to a
spurious identity of interests or common desire. Ideology would not be
necessary if a potential for resistance or an irreducible and threatening dif-
ference did not exist, as a structural possibility of the social system.
For example, the positioning of women in film can be thoroughly
ideological, that is, an exercise in domination through representation. But
such exercises are always responses to resistances, differences, and desires
in society, which, if they were not deflected, channeled, and bound, would
result in a radical reconstruction of the order that secures power for dom-
inant racial, sexual, and economic groups. Therefore, ideological films can
serve as good barometers of the progressive or radical potentials in a society.
They act as registers of the potentially radical energies and forces in a society
by reacting against them (deflecting, channeling, and binding).
For example, the representation of women in Kramer vs. Kramer
is ideological and political because it positions women as objects of eros
and power on the part of men and as mirrors for women that reinforce their
subjugation through an identification with helplessness and weakness. This
exercise in ideological domination is a response to a structural tension or
difference of power and position between men and women. It is an exercise
in domination, but such an exercise would not be necessary if the subjugated
did not threaten (in a structural and permanent way) to break the imposed
cohesion and harmony of the system. Women have had to be taught to
submit because they would not have done so naturally. The very necessity
of .. education" of this sort, the promotion of ideology through film, is itself
an indication of the unnaturalness of what is taught as being natural. The
exercise in domination is also, more specifically, a response to a resistance
on the part of women, increasingly since the late 1960s, to the power of
men. Such a negative response to the women's movement would not be
necessary if that movement were not succeeding in making it possible for
women to live and be in ways other than the ones depicted in Kramer vs.
484
 Michael Ryan
Kramer, ways that undermine male power and therefore elicit negative re-
sponses.
Films, in consequence, require a double reading. On the one
hand, they disclose the contours of ideology, the way desire and fear are
channeled to assure the hegemony of white-male-dominated capitalism. On
the other hand, they also provide a record of popular energies emerging out
of structural differences in society which threaten to disturb hegemony and
therefore must be channeled in ways that neutralize them and integrate
them to the existing power structure of undifferentiated unity. Hegemonic
channeling does not create the energies and differences it manages and ad-
ministers; rather, it responds to a structural potential for revolt and poten-
tially radical desires. But those differences and energies are not a secondary
resistance to a more primordial domination, for it is those energies that
build the very social structure that the ruling race, sex, and class control
for their own benefit. Hegemony is merely a box encasing social energies
that create and maintain the social world, and those energies constitute a
real power that hegemonic groups must manage, administer, and control if
their rule is not to cease. Hegemony is therefore structurally unstable, a
blanket thrown over a tiger rather than a windowless prison.
Social rupture and radical change, in other words, are not future
events; they are permanent possibilities inscribed in the very structure of
an inegalitarian society, a possibility that is confirmed by the necessity of
the sort of ideological operations at work in popular film. To say that film
is ideological, therefore, is not simply to say, negatively, that it reinforces
the power of the powers that be; it is to say, positively, that there are forces
and structural differences in white patriarchal capitalist society that make
ideology necessary. Ideology is not domination; it is, rather, the resistance
of resistance.
This reformulation of the theory of ideology applies to British
cultural theory in general, but it is also meant to address a need specific to
the U.S. context for theoretical formulations that tie in with the bottom-up
politics that seem the only feasible alternative in U.S. society. The refor-
mulation also applies more specifically to the question of film practice, which
includes both the use of film to gain politically enabling knowledge and the
use of filmmaking to change minds. It suggests that people interested in
carrying out political work through film in the U.S. context might concen-
trate on popular fictional forms as well as on alternative or avant-garde
forms of filmmaking, the value and relevance of which should not be down-
played. And it implies that popular films can be used to read or diagnose
the state of mind of those large sectors of society to which popular films
appeal. The insights gained from such diagnosis can in turn be used to
formulate political programs or policies that would have a popular appeal.
Granted, the prevailing subenculturation and undereducation of the popular
base in the United States prevents a simple privileging of the popular in
ahistorical terms. But the reality of the failure ofthe U.S. Left to overcome
its marginal status, despite its increasing intellectual sophistication, and to
attain a popular appeal also makes such a strategy imperative. 7

Notes

1 See Michael Ryan, Political Criticism (forthcoming from MacMillan).

485
2 See Michael Ryan, "Militant Documentary: Mai 68 par lui-meme," Cinetracts, 24:3-4 (Fall
1979L pp. 1-21.
3 See Richard Johnson, "What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?" (Mimeograph, Occasional Paper
#74, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham); and Lisa Gornick, "Turning
the Tables: Women Analysts with Men Patients," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Psy-
chology, Yale University.
4 For a general overview of the theory, see H. Guntrip, Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy, and
the Self (New York: Basic Books, 1971 ).
5 The critique of realism is, of course, carried out in the name of a higher realism or truth-
revealing the workings of the cinematic apparatus, destroying the illusion. Like socialist re-
alism. which also criticized fantasy and debunked the personal realm in favor of public duty,
the new antisocial realism is critical of the imaginary or self-oriented domain of social life.
The problem with raising a formal tactic (displaying the apparatus) to a political principle is
that it neutralizes substance or content as a criterion of politics (since content depends on
the acceptance of the realist illusion). Some conservative or liberal films- The Asphalt Jungle
or Knock On Any Door, for example-could thus be termed radical because they conclude
with a figure of authority addressing the camera and breaking the narrative illusion. Ultimately,
of course, content resolves into form, and vice versa. The critique of realism is not that it is
bad form but that is has bad political content (ideology). And social content also collapses
into a matter of form. for the struggle for social power ultimately comes down to a struggle
over the way society will be organized, the form it will take.
6 G. Platte and F. Weinstein, Psychoanalytic Sociology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press. 1973). p. 23.
7 For a further elaboration of these ideas, see the conclusion to Douglas Kellner and Michael
Ryan, Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film (forthcom-
ing).

486
 Jack L. Amariglio, Stephen A. Resnick, and
Richard D. Wolff

Class, Power, and Culture

The concept of overdetermination demands that we re-

Ject any essentialist definitions of culture. Thus we can-
not explain culture as the result of a single, determining
social process. Indeed, we cannot base our notion of
culture on a single, discursively privileged concept. Art,
music, literature, and history are the result of both eco-
nomic and political forces, including class processes and
the ordenng of soc1al behavior.

Marxist theory is, as always, developing unevenly.

While advances have been made in staking out distinct Marxist positions
in history and epistemology, 1 there does not exist at present a generally
accepted Marxist social theory. Indeed, we do not yet agree about the con-
stitution of those objects that might function as the distinct objects of a
unified Marxist social theoretical discourse. The field of Marxist social the-
ory is made up of numerous concrete .. fragments" that can only tenuously
be said to reside in the same theoretical space. Yet we must be wary of
attempts to produce a ..grand synthesis" by privileging either certain favored
objects of Marxist discourse or essentialist schemata that reduce the ele-
ments of social analysis to the effects of a single element. For us, the frag-
mentation of Marxist social theory must be viewed as the concrete deter-
mination of interacting discursive and nondiscursive processes.
In this paper we want to begin to theorize the speci-
ficity of cultural processes (which we loosely define as processes of the pro-
duction and circulation of meaning) and their conditions of existence by
focusing on the relation between cultural processes and class. We reject both
the theoretical essentialism that would derive culture from a single deter-
mining social process within the social formation and the essentialism that
would derive the concept of culture from a single discursively privileged
concept. 2 Hence, we do not aim to treat culture as the necessary effect of a
base-superstructure model that presents cultural processes as the epiphe-
nomena of a social essence. Nor do we advocate the .. logical deduction" of
concrete cultural processes from a general concept of social totality.
Overdetermination and the Specificity of Cultural Processes
The question of the specificity of cultural processes
cannot be determined within Marxist discourse independent of the question
of the specific conditions of existence of these processes. Our focus is on
one of these conditions: the concrete class processes that exist alongside the
cultural, political, and natural processes in social formations at a moment
in time. However, the question of specifying cultural processes is not a
secondary question to be resolved by referring it to a primary question, that
487
of specifying class processes. In opposition to all such attempts to treat the
conceptualization of cultural processes as complete or sufficient once it is
referred to as a prior conceptualization of class, we take the following meth-
odological stance: class functions in the social totality, neither as the de-
terminant "in the last instance" of the processes that make up a concrete
social formation, nor as the central concept of Marxist theory from which
all other concepts are derived or to which they must always defer. Instead,
following Althusser and Marx, 3 we affirm the overdetermination of all social
processes, including all concepts (not excepting overdetermination) used to
construct these processes in discourse.
The notion of overdetermination means viewing concepts, pro-
cesses, events, agents, and so on, in terms of their conditions of existence
and the effects of their interaction. This concept specifies that every social
process is a unique site constituted by the interaction of all other social
processes in a social formation. No process can be reduced to the effects of
a single process or partial subset of processes. Each uniquely determined
social process participates in the overdetermination of all other social pro-
cesses. An overdetermined social process is not a transparency from which
each of the constituent social processes can be simply identified and "read."
That is, a social process does not express or represent any or all of its con-
stituent aspects; rather, it is the product of a complex process of transfor-
mation, where the determinations emanating from each social process are
acted upon and altered as they interact. Overdetermination is a concept
that stresses a "decentering" of discourse and history in its rejection of all
forms of essentialism. 4
The logic of overdetermination presents us with a seemingly un-
solvable dilemma. If there are no essences or ultimate determinants in Marx-
ist theory, then what is the role of class in that theory? For us, the concept
of class serves as an initial position or thesis, the guiding thread from and
with which a particularly Marxist knowledge is constructed. Like all con-
cepts, it too is overdetermined and thus its meaning changes as its political,
economic, and cultural conditions change. To borrow from Hegel, this in-
itially posed concept or thesis of class is empty. Stripped of its many de-
terminations, it is the abstract idea of class. Its complex meaning is con-
structed (i.e., it exists) by virtue of its discursive conditions of existence.
The ceaseless and mutual interaction between the concepts of class and
nonclass processes is precisely how Marxist discourse develops.
One implication of the concept of overdetermination is that cul-
tural processes cannot be completely autonomous or self-reproducing at the
level of the social formation. They do not contain their own conditions of
existence as their essences. Likewise, the concept of cultural processes is not
self-contained or self-referential. Cultural processes have no center that man-
ifests itself through the autonomous reproduction of these processes or that
stamps every one of the dispersed processes presently termed "cultural"
with the mark of the same determination. Cultural processes always emerge
and are reproduced in certain locations with specific conditions of existence.
As the conditions of existence vary from location to location, cultural pro-
cesses are dispersed and differentiated. The specific forms in which art,
music, literature, and history exist are the combined result of forms of
economic processes (including the class processes) and forms of political
processes (including the ordering of social behavior). Similarly, the concept
488
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
of culture is equally conditioned, and it emerges as a specific discursive field
only by virtue of its overdetermination by concepts of other social processes
and by nondiscursive processes. This last point holds as well against the
current Marxist reductionism that asserts the primacy of nonclass or non-
economic processes (such as signifying or political processes or processes
of power) in the determination of social and historical events. 5
Yet there are a number of theorists who have attacked economic
determinism only to replace it with new essences. 6 This tendency is clearly
demonstrated in many readings of Michel Foucault's works, in which power
relations are seen as the primary or dominant constituent of discursive
formations, where discursive formations are understood as the predominant
constituent of modern cultural processes.
Two similar tendencies have recently emerged from other quar-
ters. The first is crystallized in the American anthropologist Marshall Sah-
lins's text Culture and Practical Reason. Sahlins opposes the Marxist concept
of "praxis" as the primary explanation of human culture. Instead, he seeks
to find the symbolic or meaningful in all social processes and to enshrine
the symbolic "as giving each mode of life the properties that characterize
it," 7 that is, its meaningfulness. Sahlins's symbolic determinism assumes
that diverse social processes are essentially marked by the site of their birth
in the realm of symbols. Thus Sahlins seeks to demonstrate that exchange
is not merely determined by the symbolic but is, at its core, a symbolic
event.
A second tendency is the reduction of social relations to "poli-
tics," where politics is understood as the interplay of domination and sub-
ordination. 8 Such "strategies" assume either that the signifying practices of
the cultural sphere essentially produce subjects who participate in relations
of domination/subordination or that these practices are themselves neces-
sarily inscribed within and bear the imprint of such relations. Similarly,
economic relations, including class relations, are seen essentially as relations
of exploitation, defined and understood as relations between dominant and
dominated. 9
One of the more subtle examples of this tendency is found in the
writings of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst. 10 They define class relations on
the basis of the correspondence between "the separation from/possession
of the means of production" and the mode of appropriating surplus labor.
Their inclusion of the separation/possession couplet in the definition guar-
antees that class signifies an underlying "political" relationship, because the
couplet is exclusively theorized in terms of rights of exclusion and the forms
of domination that derive from these rights. Thus Hindess and Hirst join
other Marxists, such as P.-P. Rey 11 and N. Poulantzas, 12 in referring the
concept of class to the "deeper" reality of power or exploitation. For these
Marxists, class "differentiation" and oppression are only one form of the
exploitation, oppression, and domination that undergird all social relations.
While Foucault is sometimes cited as an authority for this view, we do not
agree with this reading ofhis notions of the relations and exercise of power.
The methodological principle of overdetermination instructs us
to refuse each of these tendencies while acknowledging their partial truth.
Such tendencies always strictly deduce the concrete from the general, al-
lowing the concrete to display the sign of its origin. For us, on the other
hand, the concrete must be treated as surface; there is no "absent" deeper
489
reality manipulating the surface. Differences in the constitution of cultural,
political, and economic processes cannot be understood unless we specify
the relations every distinct process has with its conditions of existence, the
other processes that partly constitute it. We can now tum to an exploration
of the overdetermination of class processes by cultural processes, and vice
versa.
Class Processes, Class Positions, and Class Identity
Class processes are the specific social processes that involve the
performance/appropriation and distribution of surplus labor. 13 The defini-
tion does not designate any particular form of performance/appropriation
or distribution. Although class processes are partly conditioned by processes
of power and culture, no specific form of these processes can be deduced
from the general concept of class processes. Similarly, the participation of
agents in determinate class processes involves rules of objectification, modes
of exclusion, the designation of limits, the stipulation of functions, and so
on, on the one hand, and modes of subjectification that allow agents to be
inserted into these processes, on the other. However, processes of power
and culture do not function as the primary constituents of class processes.
Rather, the intersection of concrete relations of power, signifying practices,
discursive formations, and so on, overdetermines specific class processes of
the extraction and distribution of surplus labor.
We differentiate between fundamental class processes (the per-
formance/extraction of surplus labor) and subsumed class processes (the
process within which already appropriated surplus labor is distributed to
agents). 14 There are different kinds of fundamental class processes (e.g., com-
munal, feudal, capitalist, slave), 15 since there are distinct forms in which
surplus labor may be performed/appropriated in a social formation. In ad-
dition, each of these fundamental class processes has its subsumed class
process. While any concrete social formation may involve different fun-
damental and subsumed class processes, there is usually one socially prev-
alent mode of the fundamental class process. 16
This prevalence does not necessarily entail the economic, polit-
ical, or cultural domination of the agents who participate in this process in
the social formation as a whole. First, it is possible that agents may partic-
ipate in a prevalent fundamental class process or in any other of the fun-
damental class processes on both "sides" of the process (as performers and
extractors of surplus labor). Second, agents may participate in several dif-
ferent fundamental class processes simultaneously (e.g., feudal lords can
appropriate rent from peasants and surplus value from agricultural wage
laborers; kulak farmers may pay feudal rent to an overlord while they extract
surplus labor from wage laborers hired to work their lands; wage earners
may produce surplus value for their employers even while they extract
corvee labor from their spouses in the household). Third, agents may si-
multaneously occupy fundamental and subsumed class positions (e.g., in-
dustrial capitalists can also be financiers or presidents of universities; factory
workers can also be owners of the means of production and managers of
the production process on the shop floor). Additionally, in some cases (no-
tably, modem corporate capitalism), the direction and control of any fun-
damental class process may not be in the hands of the agents ofthat process
but may reside instead with occupants of particular subsumed class posi-
490
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
tions. 17 And finally, the social prevalence of any class process never means
that the agents who participate in that process (or the process itself) essen-
tially determine the position and status of agents in every other social pro-
cess. In sum, it is only possible to designate specific class processes at a
given historical moment.
One important consequence of this position is that the notion of
class is not reducible to the agents who participate in class processes. The
notion of class is not a "noun" designating groups of agents who appropriate
or distribute surplus labor. Thus, we cannot specify eternal, unambiguously
defined groups of agents as the ruling or ruled classes. For example, the
"working class" and the "capitalist class" of a capitalist social formation
are not comprised of permanent residents of singular class positions who
represent some permanent class status in and through their every gesture.
Class position does not refer to always already constituted class agents.
Rather, agents participate and are located in class processes in contradictory
ways; they may hold numerous class positions, requiring different and per-
haps clashing subjective identities. Similarly, class struggles refer, then, to
struggles over fundamental and subsumed class processes by agents who
occupy different class and nonclass positions; they do not refer to "classes
of individuals" struggling. Nor are they either the cause or the result of
agents' recognition of their true, essentially determined class positions. 18
Alliances are frequently formed among agents in different class
positions in the course of struggles to reproduce or transform an existing
conjuncture of class and nonclass processes. 19 These alliances may change
in the course of these struggles, thereby changing the direction and possible
outcomes of such struggles. In our view, what comprises a working or cap-
italist class depends upon the particular alliances that arise at a given mo-
ment in the struggle to reproduce or transform the capitalist fundamental
and subsumed class processes: only such struggles are class struggles. Strug-
gles over nonclass social processes are irreducibly different from class strug-
gles, although they determine class processes and struggles, and vice versa.
The class identity of agents is established by the intersection of
class and other social processes, most notably cultural processes. It is a
multifaceted social constitution that is not reducible to the "experience" of
agents in class process. Class identity is the "understanding" agents have
of themselves that enables them to participate in class processes and, there-
fore, to occupy particular class positions. This "understanding" is differ-
entiated from other forms of "self-knowledge" that enable agents to partic-
ipate in nonclass processes, although there may be considerable overlap
between particular class and nonclass identities.
Class identity is one form of the "subjectification" of social agents.
We define processes of subjectification as a subset of cultural processes that
constitute agents as self-defined and self-conscious in relation to "others."
They permit the inscription and participation of these "selves" in social
processes and subjugate them to the demands, restrictions, rules, and
obligations20 that are enunciated in the processes. Agents are "subjectified"
in ways that make it possible for them to occupy numerous, contradictory
class positions. The reproduction or transformation of determinate class
processes partly depends upon the capacity of class "subjects" to either carry
out or subvert the procedures and strategies that comprise the processes.
This capacity is not guaranteed by or secured within class processes them-
491
selves, nor is it attributable to a reflexive "ideology" that merely mirrors
the "objective" class positions. The cultural processes that "subjectify" agents
do not uniformly stamp agents with the capacity for either subjection or
insubordination. They help to produce, in the same set of agents, varying
capacities to be subjected and "revolutionized" within different class pro-
cesses or even within the same class process.
Culture and Ideology
The processes that fundamentally determine the subjectivity of
agents in particular class positions are most often labeled "ideological."
There is an extensive Marxist literature that deals with the problems of
using the concept of ideology to designate particular cultural processes. 21
One frequently mentioned problem is that the concept of ideology is often
constructed in relation to a base-superstructure dichotomy. In such a di-
chotomy, cultural processes are not "material" or, if material, are not con-
stituent of the base; instead, they function chiefly to reflect or express a
primary material (often economic) reality. Culture is reduced to its function
as ideology, and ideology-the realm of "ideas" -always refers to a reality
outside of itself. Moreover, ideology reflects that reality in either a "true"
or, more often, a mystificatory way. Culture, as ideology, becomes the field
of mystified discourse, "falsely" reflecting, even "inverting," the "real" base.
The reduction of culture to its ideological function has two dis-
cursive functions: first, it establishes a hierarchy of social processes; second,
it distinguishes between ideology and science, where science is a true ap-
propriation of the "primary reality" to which it and ideology both refer.
When agents misperceive their "real" relations to each other and to their
individual experiences, they are under the sway of ideology, which becomes
synonymous with "false consciousness." They are inserted into material
relations that are objectively harmful to a majority of these agents. In the
cultural realm, only science, understood as "revolutionary theoretical prac-
tice," is ever completely liberating, although ideology may be historically
necessary to achieve partial, strategic gains in actual struggle. The field of
culture is limited to the unstable interplay of science and ideology.
Foucault: Discourse, Power, and the Processes of Subjectification
Foucault and Althusser provide two convergent lines of criticism
of this view of the relationship between culture and ideology.22 Foucault,
in The Archaeology of Knowledge, argues that the relation between ideology
and science does function in the constitution of discursive formations but
only on a very different basis.23 Discursive formations are differentiated
according to their "regularities"-their rules of object construction, enun-
ciation, formalization, and so on. Such discursive formations are concrete
discursive realities whose functioning as either scientific or nonscientific
knowledges can never be referred to a silent presence beneath the network
of concrete rules and interacting effects that comprise their material exist-
ence. The division between science and ideology is not a measure of varying
degrees of success in producing truth as opposed to mystification.
For Foucault, science is merely one form of discursive practice.
It is never coextensive with what he calls knowledge. The question of the
ideological functioning of science or any other discursive formation involves
the way in which any discourse modifies, articulates, and validates the field
492
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
of knowledge. 24 For Foucault, to label a discursive formation as nonscientific
is to designate a particular network of concrete rules of formation that are
only partially differentiated from the network of rules that constitute a sci-
ence. Actual discursive formations are never purely scientific nor "ideolog-
ical" since there is no center of a discursive formation that guarantees a
uniform set of effects or imposes a uniform set of constitutive rules. 25
Foucault investigates discursive formations for their effects in
producing knowledge and power, which are intrinsically interconnected:
discursive formations are knowledges that function to permit the operation
of power. In some of his formulations, Foucault goes so far as to suggest
that the field of discourse is primarily constituted by relations of power,
while the primary effect of knowledge is the exercise of these relations. 26
Discourse is a field of strategies and tactics that creates differentiations
placing limits on what can be stated and by whom, and so on.
Discourse also constructs particular modes of objectification
(knowledges) through which agents are produced as subjects and inscribed
within a network of "localized" power relations. For Foucault, the subjec-
tification of agents since the Enlightenment, the historical moment of the
emergence of the "subject," is the effect of the emergence of knowledge.
Knowledge is the field in which subjects are made the object of discourse,
and thus are made ready for the operation of power. 27 For example, Foucault
argues that the basis for "disciplines" such as clinical medicine, psycho-
analysis, criminology, and political economy is the subject's body as object
of knowledge. Thus based, these disciplines permit various nondiscursive
interventions into and inflictions on the body, such as imprisonment, sur-
veillance, therapy, enumeration, and "accumulation." The knowledge of
subjects in the human sciences thus permits the subjection of agents to the
exercise of power in all social processes.
Foucault argues that power has no center, such as the state, from
which it extends or derives; 28 rather, it is dispersed throughout the social
formation. Although relations of power pervade all social processes, they
neither constitute the essence nor the primary determinant of these pro-
cesses. Relations of power have conditions of existence that are not reducible
to these relations. Subjects do not emerge through the interplay of relations
of power alone. Foucault says "that the mechanisms of subjectification can-
not be studied outside their relation to the mechanisms of exploitation
['which separate individuals from what they produce'] and domination [e.g.,
ethnic, social, and religious 'forms of domination']. But they do not merely
constitute the 'terminal' of more fundamental mechanisms. They entertain
complex and circular relations with other forms." 29 Elsewhere, he distin-
guishes between power relations, relationships of communication, and ob-
jective capacities (which are involved in the transformation of the "real"
through the application of labor). 30 These "three types of relationships, in
fact always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, and use
each other mutually as means to an end. " 31 For Foucault, modes of sub-
jectification are not the special province of power but involve the interef-
fectivity of relations of power with their conditions of existence.
Foucault's acknowledgment ofthis intereffectivity brings him quite
close to the Marxist notion of overdetermination. He is careful not to reduce
cultural processes to relations of power, or vice versa. Power is not the
essence of"cultural" phenomenon; rather, the discursive formation specifies
493
those aspects of discourse that are in excess of sign systems and that chiefly
function in the network of power relations. Meaning is not reduced to power,
and power is not reduced to meaning.
Althusser: Subjects and the Materiality of Ideology
A second line of criticism of the reduction of culture and ideology
to mystification may be found in Althusser's rejection of the concept of false
consciousness and his insistence on the materiality of ideological practice. 32
Ideology is taken from the realm of "ideas" and placed instead within the
specific apparatuses that constitute the sites for concrete ideological activ-
ities. Furthermore, ideology is defined by those cultural processes whose
effect is the constitution of subjects. Subjectification proceeds by concrete
cultural processes of "interpellation": 33 naming, identifying, and inscribing
subjects within social processes. Since interpellation is never a matter of
truth or falsity, ideology exists wherever subjects are created. According to
Althusser, ideology represents the "imaginary" relations of individuals to
their "real" conditions of existence. 34 Put another way, this discursive con-
tent is made up of the naming and narration that construct a view of agents
as subjects inscribed within and marked by social processes.
Althusser's concept of ideology can be used as a discursive device
to investigate the science/ideology opposition. Althusser denies the epis-
temological basis for the distinction between true (scientific) and mystifi-
catory (ideological) discourses. Rather, the opposition is partly a distinction
between "objective knowledges" about theoretically designated objects and
"knowledges" that "function as practical norms governing the attitudes and
concrete adoptions of positions of men with respect to the real objects and
problems of their social and individual existence, and of their history." 35
Neither of these "knowledges" has an epistemological claim to absolute
truth.
Ideological "practices" require particular apparatuses for their
performance. Particular class processes are one of the conditions of existence
of the reproduction or transformation of these apparatuses, which require
the distribution of surplus labor both to themselves and to the agents re-
sponsible for their direction and operation. These agents thus occupy sub-
sumed class positions. Conversely, particular forms or modes of subjecti-
fication and the apparatuses in which they emerge are conditions of existence
for concrete class processes.
Both Foucault and Althusser shift our understanding of the cul-
ture-ideology-power conjuncture toward a concern with the specificity of
cultural processes and relations of power within which historically deter-
minate subjects are created. We need, however, to distinguish clearly be-
tween their theoretical projects. Foucault merely gestures toward class and
other social "overdeterminants" of power and culture, while Althusser lo-
cates the overdetermination of these social processes at the heart of his
project. Foucault substitutes the "juxtaposition" of social processes for the
stronger notion of overdetermination. Lecourt has argued that "the weak-
ness in the concept of juxtaposition is precisely that it is not a principle of
determination. " 36
For Foucault, discursive practices are a primary means and site
for the constitution of subjects, although he has recently included nondis-
cursive practices in the overdetermination of subjects. Althusser, on the
494
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
other hand, acknowledges from the outset the range and diversity of concrete
processes that overdetermine subjects. However, one problem in Althusser's
position is his designation of ideological state apparatuses as primary sites
within which the subjects of a capitalist social formation are interpellated.
This suggests a centering rather than a dispersion of subjectification pro-
cesses, in contrast to Foucault.
The Overdetermination of Class Processes and Subjectifying
Cultural Processes: An Illustration
In the remaining part of this paper we shall examine the inter-
effectivity of processes of subjectification and class processes. Since there is
no general way to specify the effects of their interaction, we briefly illustrate
their overdetermination in a concrete social formation.
We choose as our illustration the interaction of class and nonclass
processes in primitive communism. Our choice is informed by both theo-
retical and political considerations. First, the notion of communism, both
primitive and advanced, has a limited but key place in the writings of Marx
and Engels. We will reformulate their discussions to "add" that agents may
occupy different class (and nonclass) positions in so-called classless societies.
This approach permits us to show how struggles over class processes ov-
erdetermine and are overdetermined by struggles over cultural processes.
Second, this theoretical construct has important political consequences. It
suggests that the interaction between class and nonclass processes in a prim-
itive communist social formation may produce struggles over the funda-
mental class process which set in motion a transitional conjuncture. 37
In many primitive communal social formations, kinship over-
determines fundamental class processes and is in turn overdetermined by
them. Kinship is one way in which agents are constituted as particular kinds
of subjects capable of participating in communal class processes. However,
kinship is not reducible to its function in creating such subjects. But in this
function kinship serves as a condition of existence for the primitive com-
munal fundamental class process.
Kinship is a particular subset of all cultural processes that makes
such relations of consanguinity and affinity "meaningful," including forms
of address, forms of marriage, modes of descent reckoning, ritual practices,
and storytelling. Though they may be predominantly signifying practices,
they are not exclusively so. Kinship processes not only produce kin subjects
as members of a collective subjectivity (clan or commune), they also position
these kin subjects in nonkinship processes, such as class processes, while
providing an identity or set of identities for subjects in relation to these
nonkinship processes. In many primitive communal social formations, agents
enter into fundamental and subsumed class processes as kin or commune
members: their class subjectivity is overdetermined by their kin identity,
and vice versa.
A primitive communal fundamental class process is one in which
the performers of surplus labor are also the extractors of that surplus labor.
However, the membership of the commune is never identical with the per-
formers of surplus labor. As Marx forcefully argued in the Grundrisse, 38 the
commune as such is partly constituted by the intersecting kin/territorial
processes that run through the social formation; that is, the commune is in
excess of the group of "direct producers." The commune functions as a
495
 network of kin/territorial processes to position direct producers within the
lineage, commune, and village, so that the extraction of surplus labor is
done by the lineage, commune, village. Direct producers, then, both perform
and directly appropriate surplus labor through the commune, village, or
lineage, but not as an exclusively designated group in opposition to non-
surplus-producing members of these social bodies.
Kinship processes distribute agents to class positions in the pro-
cesses of performing surplus labor. For example, teams of laborers partic-
ipating in subsistence activities, such as hunting, gathering, agriculture, are
often organized along lineage lines. Members of the same lineage, differ-
entiated by age, gender, or proximity to an ancestral totem, may perform
different tasks or combine their labor in the performance of surplus labor.
To take one specific example, among the seventeenth-century Iroquois, the
primary producers of agricultural surplus product were women inscribed in
distinct matrilineages. Agricultural plots were chiefly clan holdings worked
by members of the same matrilineage-as Iroquois kin rules determined,
the women of the clan performing surplus labor as mothers, daughters, and/
or sisters. Women in Iroquois society were, therefore, partly subjectified
and inscribed within the communal fundamental class process by kinship
designation.
Within the lineage there were further differentiations of tasks that
depended upon age, status, and location in relation to ancestral heads of
the clan. These differentiations not only distributed agents to different lo-
cations in the performance of surplus labor, but also constituted subsumed
class positions; some of the clan members, by virtue of their particular
kinship status, were either partly or completely freed from the performance
of surplus labor. These members received portions of already communally
appropriated surplus labor because of their participation in social pro-
cesses-including those that secured the reproduction of the clans-that served
as conditions of existence for the communal fundamental class process.
Among the Iroquois, members of healing societies, sachems (rep-
resentatives ofthe clan in communal government), traders, warriors, elders,
and so on, all received portions of surplus labor distributed to them by
matrons of the clans in their prescribed role as distributors of communally
appropriated surplus labor. These subsumed class agents participated in
processes that serve to reproduce the conditions of communal surplus labor
extraction. For example, sachems were responsible for the recitation of clan
legends and for the maintenance of domestic peace according to clan rules.
Although the office of clan sachem was held exclusively by Iroquois men,
they were elected by the matrons of the clan.
Upon contact with the Europeans, the power of the matrons and
sachems to affect tribal decisions and preserve peace was slowly eroded by
the growth of certain subsumed classes, such as warriors and traders (mostly
comprised of men), who sought to become increasingly independent of the
matriclans, whose very independent growth was conditioned on the spread
of hostilities, which did much to hasten and even challenge the existing
kinship processes. Thus, the transformation of the Iroquois social formation
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was determined in part by the
alteration in kinship practices and the limitation of the field of their play
in affecting the communal fundamental class process. This process was thus
displaced in part by the effective destruction of the matrilineal principles
496
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
and by the ascendancy of occupants of certain subsumed class positions,
such as warriors and traders, whose rise was conditioned on new modes of
subjectification, such as Christianity, individualism, and patriarchal nuclear
familial processes.
In Iroquois society, warriors were organized in bands, and their
statuses in these bands often depended on their status in the kin hierarchy.
In providing protection for the kin-based commune, warriors helped to
reproduce the commune and, therefore, the communal fundamental class
process. However, as occupants of subsumed class positions, warriors in-
creasingly sought their independence from the clans and struggled to receive
larger distributed portions of surplus labor. This struggle to acquire an in-
creased share of surplus labor was affected by the European colonizers who
consciously undermined the predominance of the matrilineages through
such agents and apparatuses as Jesuit missionaries and the teaching of pa-
triarchal Christianity, and unconsciously undermined matrilineal predom-
inance through the demands of the fur trade (which radically altered the
Iroquois' predominant mode of subsistence from agriculture organized on
the basis of the matriclan to hunting, which was increasingly less structured
by the matriclan). Thus, the introduction of patriarchal nuclear familial
relations in the eighteenth century, one of several new modes of subjectiv-
izing warriors (as well as other members of the community) that gradually
displaced the matrilineal principles, contributed to warriors gaining greater
independence and, thereby, greatly increasing their distributed shares of
surplus labor. It should also be noted that these new modes of subjectifi-
cation inscribed warriors in expanded or newly created noncommunal fun-
damental and subsumed class processes.
In these communal social formations, where kinship is a primary
mode of subjectifying occupants of class positions, these agents do not pos-
sess unfragmented subject identifications; rather, inclusion in a lineage pro-
duces the possibility of insertion in quite different fundamental and sub-
sumed class positions. Among the Iroquois, the same woman might perform
and appropriate surplus labor through participation in agricultural clan work
teams (thus occupying fundamental class positions), while at the same time
holding various "offices" (e.g., as a member of a healing society) or per-
forming other activities (e.g., trading) and, therefore, occupying subsumed
class positions. She could also participate in relationships in which no class
process occurs; thus, she might occupy no class position. When the same
set of kin practices inscribed agents in different class positions, the repro-
duction of the communal class processes was more easily secured. However,
when alternative kin and nonkin modes of subjectification appeared that
located agents in class positions, the reproduction of the Iroquois communal
fundamental class process was jeopardized.
Kinship is constructed and reproduced in concrete cultural pro-
cesses through concrete apparatuses. The economic reproduction of agents
who play a key part in the emergence, enunciation, transmission, extension,
and transformation ofkinship signs and procedures is one of the conditions
of existence for these processes. The distribution of surplus labor to these
agents is necessary for the existence and reproduction of concrete appara-
tuses where kinship is enunciated and transmitted. For example, particular
feast days that celebrate certain ancestral figures or clan totems require a
distribution of surplus labor from the producers/appropriators to agents who
497
organize and carry out the ritual symbolic acts of feast/celebration. This is
most obviously true for those celebrations where the destruction of wealth
(ceremonial offerings) for symbolic purposes takes place. Also, special lo-
cations, such as temples or clan lodges, may be created for the performance
of acts that entail kin subjectification, such as the recitation and memori-
zation of "founding" myths in which clan totems, ancestors, and current
clan members are discursively linked. The existence and reproduction of
these locations require the distribution of already communally extracted
surplus labor and often are a direct cause for the expansion of the perform-
ance of surplus labor.
If the distribution of surplus labor to particular occupants of
subsumed class positions is not forthcoming, the existence of the apparatuses
in which kinship is formulated and reproduced may be threatened. Not
surprisingly, one of the tactics employed by European colonialists in con-
quering, transforming, and administering diverse primitive communal so-
cial formations from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries was to take
control of the agents and/or processes by which communal surplus labor
was distributed and redistributed or outlawing such distribution to those
rituals and practices designed to reinforce and reproduce the "original"
communal kinship structures. As a countertactic, many communal societies
ostracized those members who introduced or represented alternative (often
European) modes of subjectification within the dominant kinship structure.
Ostracism, of course, was a means of cutting off distribution of surplus labor
to these agents. As with the Iroquois, clan representatives frequently fought
the inroads of Christianity by refusing to permit surplus labor to be directed
to institutions or events where Christianity would be taught.
Finally, our illustration reminds us that the agents who secure
subjectifying cultural processes must be concerned with the continued dis-
tribution of surplus labor to themselves and to the concrete apparatuses of
these processes. In addition, their increased demands for shares of surplus
labor must come either at the expense of other occupants of subsumed class
positions or by increasing the communal surplus labor performed and ex-
tracted. These agents may seek alliances that preserve or transform the
existing articulation of class processes in order to secure their continued
existence in their positions. Of course, these maneuvers have their effects
on the very processes they direct.
Although modes of subjectification do not mirror the ''objective
reality" of class processes, certain modes may be judged either useful or
problematic at certain historical moments for the emergence, reproduction,
or transformation of particular fundamental and subsumed class processes.
Struggles between occupants of class positions are partly directed toward
upholding, reformulating, or obliterating various subjectifying processes so
as to influence the effectivity of these processes on a determinate network
of class processes.
Conclusion
In our illustration we have tried to show that struggles over par-
ticular cultural processes-the processes of subjectifying agents in kin terms
to participate in class processes-overdetermine class struggles. Likewise,
we have suggested that struggles over the performance/appropriation and
distribution of surplus labor overdetermine these cultural processes. By not
498
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
reducing culture to power or class, or reducing class to power or culture,
we have retained the specificity of diverse social processes while showing
that a more thorough understanding of this specificity can be achieved by
using a model of overdetermination to examine the intereffectivity of these
processes. We have sought to propose a methodolgical guideline to a non-
reductionist Marxist analysis of class, power, and culture; in our illustration
we work to show how such an analysis can proceed.

Notes

1 We are most interested 1n the recent attempts to establish antiteleological and antiessentialist
Marxist notions. See L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Readmg Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (Lon-
don: New Left Books, 1975); L. Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage,
1970); L. Althusser, Essays m Self-Criticism, trans. Grahame Lock (London: New Left Books,
1976); B. Hindess and P. Hirst. Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1975); B. Hindess and P. Hirst, Mode of Production and Social Formation
(London: Macmillan, 1977); S. Resnick and R. Wolff, "The Theory of Transitional Conjunc-
tures," Review of Radical Political Economics 11 :3 (1979); S. Resnick and R. Wolff, "Classes
in Marxian Theory," Review of Rad1cal Political Econom1cs 13:4 ( 1982); S. Resnick and R.
Wolff, "Marx1st Epistemology The Critique of Economic Determinism," Social Text 6:2/3
(Fall 1982); S. Resnick and R. Wolff, Marxist Theory, forthcoming.
2 The essentialism we discuss here is what we call essentialism in discourse or theory, which
we distinguish from epistemological essentialism or essentialism of discourse or theory. We
rejeCt the epistemological notion that objects of knowledge exist independently of thought
and thus can be appropriated in thought. This notion is an essentialism ot theory. Our an-
tiessentialist position IS also incompatible with essentialism in theory, which discursively pnv-
ileges a subset of conceptual statements within theory from wh1ch others are log1cally derived.
For further discuss1on, see Resn1ck and Wolff, "Marx1st Epistemology" and Marxist Theory.
3 The concept of overdetermination initially emerged as a concept in the Freud1an theory of
dream interpretation. To our knowledge, Lukacs was the first Marxist to try to appropriate
and reformulate this concept for Marxist theory. However, Althusser was the first Marxist
both to claim that Marx's own concept of historical causality and epistemology was one of
overdeterminatiOn. See G. Lukacs, "The Tasks of Marxist Philosophy 1n the New Democracy,"
quoted in Resnick and Wolff, "Marxist Epistemology"; L. Althusser, "Contradiction and Ov-
erdetermination," 1n For Marx, pp. 89-128; Resn1ck and Wolff, "Marxist Epistemology."
4 Certainly, many noneconomists have rejected the essentialist thought built upon the epis-
temological positions of empincism and rationalism. It seems to us they approach but never
quite reach the Marx1st pos1tion of overdeterm1nation. The structural linguistics imtlated by
Ferdinand de Saussure was an attempt to show the arbitrariness of meaning, decentering
the signification of a word into the arb1trary relation of Signifier to signified. Similarly, Jacques
Derrida's deconstructionist interventions suggest the futility of trying to center a text and find
its "given" meaning (1ts ventnloquist "logos") through a process of interpretation. In place
of this logocentrism, Derrida suggests the play and dispersion of textual meamngs that are
liberated through a process of deconstruction. R1chard Rorty's discuss1on of philosophy as
"a m1rror of nature" presents a somewhat similar attack on logocentrism, but one restricted
to the philosophical dichotomy of th1nking/be1ng. F1nally, the noted critic of sociobiology,
Richard C. Lewont1n, has argued that we need to replace mechanistiC and reductionist notions
of the human organism with a new conception of the orgamsm as an intereffective totality
of determinations. For Saussure, see Course in General Linguistics (New York: McGraw-H1II,
1966). Our understandmg of Derrida is taken from Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981 ); and see especially the interview in Positions
entitled "Positions," 1n which Derrida discusses h1s problematiC relation to Marxism. For
Rorty, see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)
and "Philosophy As a Kind of Writing," New Literary History, 1978. We are particularly taken
with R. C. Lewontin's review of two texts written by the Dialectics of Biology Group. His
review, "The Corpse in the Elevator," appears in The New York Review of Books, Jan. 20,
1983.
5 In this context, it is interesting to note that Gramsci's well-known opposition to economic
determinism does not lead him to accept any form of noneconomic determinism. Instead,
he argues that the search for last instance determinisms amounts to the "search for God."
See A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. 0. Hoare and G. N.
Smith (New York International Publishers, 1971). p. 437.

499
6 Our wording here deliberately echoes that of the Marxist anthropologist Marc Auge. Auge
claims that after the in1t1al interest in but consequent rejection of "Aithusserianism," Marxism
in France was discredited. In its stead, "with the help of history and fashion ... waves of
'desire· flooded the sociological banks, and a new disembarkation threatened. This was
actually a new Holy Alliance (Nietzche, Reich, Bataille, Deleuze) and one for which the Marxists
were quite unprepared ... Auge clearly recogmzes that these newly arisen protagonists wish
to reject a "formalist" Marxism only to replace it with a social theory centered once again
on the concept of desire. See Marx Auge, The Anthropological Circle, trans. Martin Thom
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 19B2). p. 66.
7 M. Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). p.
viii; see also pp. 205-21.
8 Th1s tendency shows up quite clearly in contemporary discussions of "sexual politics" and
focuses on social "relations" rather than processes that we regard as the operation of a
theoretical humanism (an essentialism of the subject).
9 This notion of exploitation should not be confused with Marx's enunciation of the concept
of exploitation in Capital (New York: International Publishers. 1977). Marx's conception spec-
ifies the particular economic process of extracting surplus labor or "unpaid labor" and must
be differentiated from the more conventional use of the term to express a general relationship
between social agents.
10 We restrict our criticisms here to Hindess and Hirst's earlier books, Pre-Capitalist Modes of
Production and Mode of Production and Social Formation.
11 See P.-P. Rey, "The Lineage Mode of Production," Critique of Anthropology no. 3 ( 1975).
pp. 27-29.
12 See especially N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, trans. David Fernbach
(London: Verso, 1978). pp. 13-36.
13 For a detailed discussion of the concept of class process and its use in Marxist theory, see
Resnick and Wolff, "Classes in Marxian Theory" and Marxist Theory.
14 Marx begins to elaborate his notions of fundamental and subsumed class processes in the
three volumes of Capital. See Resnick and Wolff, "Classes in Marxian Theory."
15 See Marx's brief discussion of these fundamental class processes in Grundrisse, trans. Martin
Nicolaus (New York: Vintage, 1973). pp. 471-514.
16 See Resnick and Wolff. Marxist Theory, for an elaboration of the notion of the "social prev-
alence" of a fundamental class process.
17 Marx, in val. 3 of Capital, focuses on this particular development in the example of advanced
capitalism. As Marx sees 1t, in advanced capitalism managers, owners. financiers of capital
often ex1st separate from industrial capitalists. The direction and control of the capitalist
fundamental class process are in the hands of these social groups, but they do not extract
(exploit) surplus labor. See in particular chap. 23, pp. 370-90, of Capital.
18 For a detailed discussion of the concepts of class position and class struggle, see Resnick
and Wolff, Marxist Theory.
19 One of Marx's most developed discussions of such "class alliances" can be found in The
18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1968).
20 Our notion of subjectification is clearly related to Foucault's "two meanings of the word
subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity
by a conscience or self-knowledge"; and also to Althusser's discussion of the "mirror-struc-
ture" of the process of subjectification. as agents are "interpellated" simultaneously as
subjects and as subjected to a Subject (such as God or the state) See Foucault, "The
Subject and Power," which is the afterword to H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault:
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). p.
212; and Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, .. Lenin and Philosophy,
trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review, 1971). pp. 170-83.
21 Three books in which these problems are taken up are R. Williams. Marxism and Literature
(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977); R. Coward and J. Ellis, Language and Materialism
(London: Routledge and Keg an Paul, 19 77); J. McCarney. The Real World of Ideology (Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1980).
22 See also the sections of Gramsci's prison notebooks entitled "The Study of Philosophy" and
"Problems of Marxism," pp. 321-472, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks. A recent
study of Gramsci that places him within the context of an "overdeterminist" conception of
culture and ideology is Chantal Mouffe's "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in C. Mouffe.
ed., Gramsc1 and Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 16B-204.

500
 Amariglio, Resnick, and Wolff
23 See M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Shendan Smith (New York:
Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 184-86.
24 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 178-95.
25 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 178-95. See also Lecourt, Marxism and
Epistemology, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1975), pp. 199-201.
26 See especially M. Foucault, "Truth and Power," 1n Power/Knowledge, ed. C. Gordon (New
York: Pantheon, 1980).
27 See Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 208, where he d1scusses "three modes of
object1f1cat1on which transform human beings into subjects."
28 See Foucault, "Body/Power" and "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge.
29 See Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 213.
30 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," pp. 217-18.
31 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 218.
32 See Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy.
33 "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," pp. 170-77.
34 "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." pp. 162-65.
35 D. Lecourt, Marx1sm and Eptstemology, p. 210.
36 D. Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology, p. 204.
37 See J. Amariglio, '"Primitive Communism' and the Economic Development of lroquios So-
ciety," Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1983, chap. 3;
and Rolf Jensen, "The Transition from Primitive Communism: The Wolof Social Formation
of West Africa," Journal of Economic History 42: 1 ( 1982), pp. 69-76.
38 See Grundrisse, pp. 471-79.

501
 Jean Franco

Beyond Ethnocentrism: Gender1 Power1

and the Third-World Intelligentsia

Dom1nat1on has trad1t1onally been semant1c1zed 1n sexual

terms and power has traditionally been assoc1ated w1th
masculm1ty. Recent revolutionary movements have
shown us that we have to resemant1c1ze preconstructed
\Jender categor1es by takmg meanmg mto our own
hands and overcomm~) traditional assoc1at1ons of the
f(~m1n1ne w1th nature and 1mmob1l1ty

Anyone involved in Latin American studies knows

what it is to be placed last on the program, when everyone else has left the
conference. Latin America (and third-world societies) generally occupy some
exceptional and therefore awkward position in mainstream scholarship. In-
deed, they are not yet "in" it at all. "British intellectuals: Latin American
revolutionaries" was the wording of an ad I once saw in the New Statesman
in England. It summed up very nicely the separation of intellectual and
manual labor along the axis of metropolis and periphery, as well as sug-
gesting the flow of revolutionary action into areas where people know no
better than to fight. The conclusion is that the Third World is not much of
a place for theory; and if it has to be fitted into theory at all, it can be
accounted for as exceptional or regional.
That is why it is worth beginning with Fanon, whose
Black Skins White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth snatched the
leadership of revolution away from the first-world proletariat (grown fat on
imperialism) and revived the metropolis's paranoid fears of the vengeance
that pullulated in the ill-lit streets of the native quarters. For Fanon, the
whole colonized world had to be shocked out of its bewitchment. It was a
becalmed world whose inhabitants, "wasted by fevers, obsessed by ancestral
customs," formed an almost ''inorganic background for the innovating dy-
namism of colonial mercantilism." 1 The colonized fantasies of action had
to be converted into revolutionary potential. "The first thing the native
learns is to stay in his place and not go beyond certain limits. That is why
the dreams of the native are always of muscular prowess; his dreams are of
action and of aggression. I dream I am jumping, winning, running, climbing.
I dream that I burst out laughing, that I span a river in one stride or that
I am followed by a flood of motorcars that never catch up with me. " 2 Yet
it is within the power of the wretched of the earth, the fellahin, to overcome
immobility, to tum the relation of colonizer and colonized on its head, to
cleanse themselves of inferiority through violence. The native intelligentsia,
caught between the ambiguities of folklore and assimilation to the metrop-
olis, will be dragged in the wake of the fellahin, forcibly immersed in the
struggle.
503
 Clearly, Fanon's blueprint is locked in the same mind/body po-
larity that separates metropolitan intellect from the sacrificial body of third-
world peoples. The white mask woven and painted by the colonizer's dis-
course can only be broken apart by the confrontation with death. The col-
onized need recognition in order to know they exist but will only be rec-
ognized by the metropolis as a mask or a grinning skull.
From the standpoint of the present, it is easy to see that Fanon's
existentialist psychology has its limitations; he understood the alienation of
thinking in the foreign tongue of the metropolis but not the pervasive web
of discourse in which he was enmeshed. Today, we know much more about
the constitution of subjectivities within particular discursive formations; we
are aware of the dissolution of the "individual" or the "self' in subjectivities,
of the relation between power and knowledge. We can even arrive at a more
materialist version of Foucault's theorizing of power by distinguishing be-
tween comparatively transient microexercises of power and the perpetuation
of knowledge-power through institutions that reproduce both the machinery
and the discourse of domination. 3 What makes Fanon's contribution of
value is that he recognized that there was something distinct about the
colonial struggle, that the separation between manual and mental labor was
reproduced in the relationship between the fellahin and the intelligentsia,
and that this hierarchy had to be destroyed ifthe revolutionary struggle was
to succeed.
This essay attempts to delineate the constitution of the intelli-
gentsia in the Third World, their subordination of manual labor and women,
and the consquences of this for the formation of counterhegemonic dis-
courses. I am thus deliberately considering the intelligentsia not as individ-
uals, nor as class fractions, but rather as a systematically constituted group,
bound by a common habitus (to use Pierre Bourdieu's expression), that is,
by common perceptions, dispositions, practices, and institutions that ac-
count for the systematized nature of their intellectual production while si-
multaneously allowing for different discursive strategies within the intellec-
tual field. 4 Since I refer mainly to Latin America, it is necessary to emphasize
the crucial and constitutive activity of the literary intelligentsia which is
empowered by writing. Because it was blocked from making contributions
to the development of scientific thought, the intelligentsia was forced into
the one area that did not require professional training and the institution-
alization of knowledge-that is, into literature. It is here, therefore, that the
confrontation between metropolitan discourse and the utopian project of
an autonomous society takes place.
Metropolitan discourses on the Third World have generally
adopted one of three devices: ( 1) exclusion-the Third World is irrelevant
to theory; (2) discrimination-the Third World is irrational and thus its
knowledge is subordinate to the rational knowledge produced by the me-
tropolis; and (3) recognition-the Third World is only seen as the place of
the instinctual. In the discourse of exclusion, the Third World exists only
as a scenario; it is the stage for the activities of Nostromo or worse: consider
W emer Herzog, who broke down ancestral customs merely to provide Fitz-
caraldo with a dramatic movie sequence. (The discourse of metropolitan
power refuses to acknowledge the all too human smell of crushed bodies.)
In this discourse, the oppressed and exploited are outside civilization and
hence constitute its heart of darkness, the negativity against which the met-
504
 Jean Franco
ropolitan project must be defined. When the nineteenth-century intelli-
gentsia of Latin America attempted to occupy the first-person position in
this discourse, to separate "I," it could do so only by speaking as if the
indigenous peoples had ceased to exist, as if they already belonged to the
past. This discourse was interrupted and thrown into confusion whenever
the masses erupted as subjects of history, as they did during the Mexican
Revolution. 5
A second kind of metropolitan discourse, a discourse of discrim-
ination, was structured as a hierarchy in which an irrational intelligentsia
that tried to occupy the subject position in this discourse found itself forced
to embody the rich heterogeneity of its own culture and to rationalize it.
This was Alfonso Reyes's strategy when he described indigenous culture as
red clay that would be washed by the pure waters of Latin culture, or Ner-
uda's strategy when he invoked the dead laborers of the Inca empire and
called on them to speak through his lips and mouth. 6 This representative
discourse was subverted by some avant-garde writers (especially Vallejo)
but was decisively challenged during and just after the Cuban revolution
when the intelligentsia, wishing to speak for the masses, was asked to take
up the gun and fight with them.
Finally, the discourse of recognition becomes possible when het-
erogeneity is valorized by the increasingly routinized metropolis. At this
moment, the Third World becomes the place of the unconscious, the rich
source of fantasy and legend recycled by the intelligentsia, for which het-
erogeneity is no longer a ghostly, dragging chain but material that can be
loosened from any territorial context and juxtaposed in ways that provide
a constant frisson of pleasure. The intelligentsia no longer speaks for the
masses but productively transposes mythic material. But in order to do this,
it must distinguish between its properly authorial activity and mere repro-
duction, between an essentially masculine form of creativity and the fem-
inine reproductive activity. This discourse is only interrupted when the
differentiation between male authorship and female reproduction is exposed
as a socially constructed position; then women and indigenous peoples can
take the production of meaning into their own hands.
Because gender is the last category to be deconstructed in this
way, I shall concentrate on this third type of discursive formation. However,
some preliminary points need to be made. In the first place, it is important
to recognize that in Latin America there is a dislocation between the es-
tablishment of a capitalist-dominated economy and the institutionalization
of what is generally thought to be its ideology-the work ethic, individualism,
an epistemology based on exchange, and so on. That is to say, capitalism
in Latin America was articulated with the hacienda and the mine, both of
which disciplined the work force not only through direct repression but also
by using the paternalistic discourse of the Church. Furthermore, indigenous
communes in which symbolic production (artisanry, dance, fiestas), eco-
nomic production, and reproduction of the labor force were lodged in a
single institution, namely, the family, coexisted with plantation and mining
enclaves in which the family was often broken up altogether. 7 It is only very
recently, with the incorporation of new sectors into the labor force and the
instrumental use ofthe mass media, that there has been a concerted attempt
to introduce "modem" values. Thus, the belief systems of the indigenous,
blacks, and women were ofnecessity archaic, for no other options were open
505
to them. At the same time, this very anachronism provided them with
"regions of refuge," with traditions, moral rights, and spiritual bonds to
particular territories (often organized around devotion to saints) that could
be explosive when the state encroached on them. In contrast, the intelli-
gentsia was a secular group, empowered by writing and therefore isolated
from the culture of the majority of the population. Unlike Samuel Rich-
ardson in eighteenth-century England who, according to Terry Eagleton,
was "locked into the economic infrastructure ofbourgeois England" through
his printing firm, which was also "the nub of a whole discursive formation
... interlocked with every major ideological apparatus of English society," 8
the Latin American intelligentsia was interlocked only with a ghostly and
somewhat abstract "nation." By providing the spiritual webbing of the na-
tional spirit, it hoped to soar to immortality.
In the second place, the analogous position of the intelligentsia-
which was subordinated to metropolitan discourse at the same time it was
constituting the discourse of nationalism-is indivisible from the sexual
division oflabor. Domination has traditionally been semanticized in sexual
terms and power has traditionally been associated with masculinity. Social,
political, and economic power are represented through a lexicon that is
drawn from sexual relations. Hence the social and the sexual have become
intimately connected. In a famous essay published in 1950, Octavio Paz
based an analysis of Mexican national character on the contrast between
female "openness" (and therefore vulnerability to rape and domination)
and male closure (invulnerability). A critique of machismo elevated to the
level of a national madness, Paz's Labyrinth of Solitude affirms rather than
deconstructs these archetypal differences. Many novels written in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were disguised national allegories in
which social forces were represented in terms of impotence, castration, dom-
ination, and prostitution. In one well-known Puerto Rican story, the pro-
tagonist actually castrates himself. 9
The significance of the semanticization of the social as the sexual
has been discussed by Nancy Hartsock in Money, Sex and Power: Towards
a Feminist Historical Materia/ism. 10 This book sets out to show that there
is an epistemology of reproduction, just as there is an epistemology of pro-
duction (Marx) and exchange (capitalism). But there is a serious weakness
in an approach that neglects social and discursive formations and the con-
stitution of subjectivity. Ignoring the lesson of Foucault, Hartsock often
slips into a history of ideas. Even so, her book shows how the sexual division
of labor that subordinated reproduction to the lowest level of human crea-
tivity has led to the valorization of intellectual creations "born to the minds
of those not contaminated by the concerns or necessities of the body."''
Hartsock argues that from the Greeks onward public space has belonged to
the warrior hero and to the hero-citizen; both have their paradigm in the
Greek agonic hero. Intellectual life, too, follows this paradigm, since the
search for immortality, conceived as domination within public life, has,
since Plato, been associated with the distantiation of intellectual activities
from the mortal body, and hence from the "feminine," that have always
been associated with the realm of necessity. "Over and over again," Hartsock
comments, "the fear of ceasing to exist is played out"; 12 and the possibility
of fusion, and hence of the death of the self, are found to be at the source
of theoretical production and political deeds. This has serious consequences
506
 Jean Franco
since it subordinates not only the feminine but also all the positive aspects
of eros that derive from the experience of reproduction-for instance, con-
nectedness and commmunity.
In the Third World, in which mortality is not only individual
but affects entire social movements, which flourish, die, and are forgotten
like the ephemeral human body, we should expect this distantiation from
the body to be most intense. Indeed, if we take Borges as an example, we
find that the quest for immortality (which depends on metropolitan rec-
ognition) can only be realized by abstracting the fictional world from any
local connotations and turning it into the paradigmatic confrontation of the
pursuer and the pursued, the writer and the reader, which often culminates
with a male bonding at the point of death.
In Latin America, the subordination of the feminine is aggravated
by the rigid confinement of women to private spaces. The terms
masculine mobile (active)
feminine immobile (passive)
were interchangeable with
masculine public
feminine private
primarily because women were traditionally limited to the home, the con-
vent, or the brothel. From the colonial period until recent times, the mean-
ings born by the feminine can thus be illustrated by a simple semiotic
diagram (see Figure 1). The central term of the quadrangle is the phallus,
which is the bearer of meaning and the active element that determines social
reproduction. One term of the semiotic quadrangle is occupied by the mother,
who is not a virgin but is the bearer of children and whose space is the
home. Here we should keep in mind the privatized and inward-looking
Hispanic house and the fact that the virtual confinement of married women
to the home had not only been required by the Church but was also intended
to ensure the purity of blood that Spanish society had imposed after the
wars against the Moors. Thus the mother's immobility is related to racism
and to the protection of inheritable property. The opposite term to the
mother is the virgin-that is, the nun who is pure and uncontaminated and
whose space is the convent. The negation of the mother and the virgin is
the whore, whose body is open to all men. For example, in his novel The
Fox Above and the Fox Below, Jose Maria Arguedas describes a brothel in
the Peruvian port town of Chimbote where the women sit in small cubicles
in the middle of a compound with their legs apart to show their openness.

mother virgin
phallus
not virgin mother
not mother virgin
(whore) (Mary)
Figure 1.
507
 Yet the compound is also prisonlike; the "public" women are immobile
and privatized just as much as the mother or the nun. 13 Finally, there is the
impossible other, the mother who is a virgin, the mother of God who is
not only the unattainable ideal term but the woman who has given birth
to the Creator. (Consider this ironic parallel: Fidel Castro visits Chile, and
Mrs. Allende states that the highest task of Chilean women is to give birth
to sons who would be like Che Guevara.)
Certainly, what strikes us about this diagram of feminine mean-
ings is the immobility and privacy that it implies. To understand how nat-
ural this disposition appears, even to the most sophisticated of the intelli-
gentsia, we have only to read Garcia Marquez's interview in Playboy, in
which he declares that women "stay at home, run the house, bake animal
candies so that men can go off and make wars." 14 Whether this was said in
earnest or in jest is beside the point. It is along this axis that social meanings
accrue so that the madre patria in nationalist discourse is productive or
sterile, prostituted or sacred.
Yet in a society scarred by the violence and death that inevitably
accompanied capitalist penetration of Latin America, it is not surprising to
observe a certain "femininization of values" (to use Terry Eagleton's phrase).
Thus, in a poem by Vallejo, the mother's body is depicted as a house, and
the womb acquires the configuration of rooms and corridors: "Your archway
of astonishment expects me I The tonsured volume of your cares I That
have eroded life. The patio expects me 1 The hallway down below with its
indentures and its I feast-day decorations." When the father enters this
temple/house, it is on his knees. He has become the subordinate partner in
the act of creation. The mother's body, on the other hand, offers the only
unchanging territory in an uncertain world: "Between the colonnade of your
bones 1 That cannot be brought down even with lamentations I And into
whose side not even Destiny 1 can place a single finger."
This poem, written before Vallejo joined the Communist party,
is in sharp contrast to his Soviet-inspired poems, in which the miners make
history through work, or his poems of the Spanish Civil War, where the
forging of history is in the hands of the male militia. 15 We also note that
the mother can only (literally) embody certainty because of her immobility,
because she is related to physical territory. Indeed, it was the female territory
of the house that allowed private and family memory to be stored; there,
archaic values, quite alien to the modem world, continued to flourish.
In the fifties and sixties, for reasons that are too complex to
examine here, there was a radical shift in the meanings attached to the
feminine. This period was marked by two quite contrary trends. On the one
hand, the Cuban revolution aroused hopes that other countries could adopt
original versions of socialism. Marxist theory could be Latin Americanized.
Yet, during this same period, the struggle for national liberation was count-
ered by a massive onslaught of advanced capitalism. At the very moment
Latin America was asserting its difference, the armies of metropolitan cor-
porations-in the form of mass media advertising and consumer goods-
were poised, ready to destroy those very structures (urban/rural, commune,
plantation) that had for so long been an embarrassment and yet had become
the very source of Latin American originality.
The rich heterogeneity that formerly had to be subordinated as
irrational began to be proudly displayed by Latin American writers as proof
508
 Jean Franco
of cultural vitality. Writers like Asturias, Arquedas, Carpentier, Roa Bastos,
and Rulfo undertook the recycling of ancient legends, traditional cultures,
and archaic ways of life, not as folklore but as literary models of autarkic
societies. As the literary intelligentsia discovered the utopian elements in
popular culture, it also discovered in that very camivalesque pluralism the
claim on metropolitan attention that had so long eluded it. Thus, when
Mario Vargas Llosa, at the outset of his career, declared that the Latin
American novel "ceased to be Latin American," he meant that it had finally
broken out of the backwater of provincialism and regionalism and had,
indeed, become "recognizable." 16 Like Evita Peron, the literary intelligentsia
had finally entered into immortality. 17 It was not even necessary for it to
follow in Borges's footsteps and abstract plot from all regional and local
references so that it could circulate as the agonic confrontation of pursuer
and pursued, unencumbered by referentiality. The "new novelists" of the
early sixties discovered the shock value of catachresis and juxtaposition in
which those once embarrassing heterogenous elements became positive de-
vices for defamiliarization.
This valorization of heterogeneity was accompanied by the rein-
vention of a myth of authorship, which once again affirmed the difference
between natural reproduction and the masculine province of creativity. The
slogan of the sixties-liberation through the imagination, immortality through
the invention of imaginary worlds or the real autonomous societies like
Cuba-was underpinned by the resemanticization of the sexual division of
labor:
mother author
child creation
In a masculine world dominated by death and violence, the space of the
mother had come to seem utopian, the space of a community that does not
reproduce agonal relationships. Yet instead of trying to understand what
this might mean for the construction of a more humane society and for
revolutionary politics, both political leaders and writers during this period
felt compelled to reaffirm political and artistic creativity as an exclusively
male activity.
Let us take a recent transparent example. In Mario Vargas Llosa's
play La Senorita de Tacna (1981), the central character is, unusually, a
woman. Once the daughter of a prosperous family from Tacna, Mamae is
now senile, poor, and incontinent, kept alive only by her memories of the
past. In her youth, during the Peruvian/Chilean war of the 1880s, she had
been engaged to a Chilean officer. Learning of his infidelity with a married
woman, she decided not to marry him but to become the surrogate mother
of her sister's children and the weaver of romantic memories. In a traditional
semiotic arrangement, Mamae might have occupied the position of the nun.
In Vargas Llosa's play, however, she is both virgin (that is, she is not caught
in the lowly cycle of reproduction) and mother. She thus occupies the po-
sition of the Virgin Mary, the one woman who escapes mortality. Mamae
is the source of legend and fantasies that are woven out of her self-denial;
nevertheless, she cannot be an author in the true sense. That is why the
true protagonist lurks in the wings: Mamae's grandnephew, Belisario, an
apprentice writer who acts as spokesman for this figment of his past and
509
who presents Mamae to the public. Seated at his desk at the side of the
stage, he agonizes over writing, describing himself as "impotent." His im-
potence is only cured when he allows himself to be seduced by the romantic
memories of Mamae. He watches her, interrogates her on her past, and fills
the gaps in her memory with his own inventions. In the final moments of
the play, he recognizes that his material comes from Mamae, that it has
been her romantic stories that have turned into the "demons" that haunt
him as a writer and provide him with energeia. The play clearly allegorizes
a debate within Vargas Llosa himself, who is drawn to "feminine" material
(romance) and needs a surrogate masculine character to launder this ma-
terial and put it into literary circulation.
Not surprisingly, Mamae bears a family resemblance to some of
the women characters in Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude
(1967). Here, too, it is a woman, Ursula, who serves as the memory of the
Buendia family by weaving lives together in the chain of domesticity. But
it is a male, the gypsy Melquiades, who writes down the epic of the Buendia
family in Sanskrit (i.e., a literary language that needs competent decipher-
ing), and it is a male, Aurelino, who discovers how to interpret Melquiades's
manuscript and thus affirms literature as an act of communion between
male readers.
What most clearly demonstrates that the old statutes of author-
ship were problematic, however, was the recurrence in the novels of the
sixties and seventies of a topos of monstrous birth and births of monstros-
ities. Perhaps rather than a topos (i.e., a mere literary commonplace), it
would be more appropriate to call the monstrous birth an ideologeme or a
collective fantasy. As such, it was intended to resolve the problem of"fem-
inizing values" and criticizing machismo, while at the same time reserving
true creativity for the male author. Childbirth was thus depicted as horren-
dous, more akin to death than life. In Onetti's novel The Shipyard (1961),
the protagonist, Larsen, is on his way to his death and passes a cabin in
which a women he had loved is giving birth: "He saw the semi-naked woman
on the bed, bleeding, struggling, her hands clutching her head that was
shaking furiously and rhythmically. He saw the astonishing round belly,
distinguished the rapid flash of her glazed eyes and her clenched teeth.
Finally he understood and could imagine the trap he had just avoided.
Trembling with fear and disgust he left the window and began to walk
towards the shore." At the end of One Hundred Years ofSolitude, Amaranta
Ursula dies in a massive outpouring of blood, leaving the child of her
incestuous love affair "a dry and bloated bag of skin that all the ants in the
world were dragging towards their holes along the stone paths in the garden."
In the eyes of these novelists, women can never separate them-
selves from nature. Fuentes's Terra Nostra (1975) opens with a vision of
the year 2000 and a collective miracle: "women of all ages, forms, and
conditions giving birth" by the banks of the Seine. Among them walks the
one-armed writer-hero (one-armed like Cervantes), who imagines them
pleading with him to accept the paternity of their children. In Jose Donoso's
The Obscure Bird of Night (1979), the entire novel is constructed around
the writer's futile attempt to take hold of this archaic power that comes
from the creation of life, to steal it from the witches who preside over its
secrets and assert their power over it. The recurrence of this ideologeme
suggests, therefore, both the writer's ambiguous relation to an unconscious
510
 Jean Franco
that is defined as feminine and, at the same time, a reaffirmation of women's
imprisonment in nature, as if this were the only way that the preservation
of authorship as a male activity could be justified.
Yet this was not incompatible with the attribution of new and
more positive connotations of the feminine. The very immobility of women,
their "territoriality," made them the repository of an underground power
that seemed to come from the land itself. In Garcia Marquez's mythic uni-
verse, a whole prehistory of Latin America centers on the depiction of
primitive matriarchy. We know that this matriarchy already obsessed him
even before he became a novelist, for one of his early journalistic pieces is
a description of a remote area (rather like Macondo) called La Sierpe. 18 He
first heard of La Sierpe when a man from that region of Colombia arrived
at a Barranquilla hospital claiming that he was pregnant and about to give
birth to a monkey. Thus Garcia Marquez was, even at this early stage, lured
by the fantasy of male pregnancy. It led him to a veritable voyage of dis-
covery of La Sierpe, a region whose malaria-ridden inhabitants stubbornly
live out their lives in the midst of an impenetrable swamp, connected to
the outside world only by trade. What consolidates their proud refusal to
be integrated into Colombian society is the myth of the Marquesita, a myth
that accounts for their difference, their originality. La Marquesita was a
Spanish woman, a virgin who had the power to live as long as she liked
but chose to live for 200 years. She accumulated vast wealth in cattle, but
before her death she had the cattle trample the land until it became an
impenetrable morass. Her treasure was then buried under a tree, access to
which was barred by the miraculous swamp.
Garcia Marquez heard this legend from the only person ever to
approach the tree under which the Marquesita's treasure was buried; but
rather than pursue his journey to the end, this adventurer preferred to return
home and tell the story to the world, thus keeping both the legend and the
treasure intact. The story can be interpreted as the fantasy of a society of
scarcity in a region in which the once bounteous earth had mysteriously
become unproductive. By introducing the storyteller and adventurer, how-
ever, Garcia Marquez adds another element, for the treasure is associated
not only with material wealth but also with the legend itself, indeed with
the whole domain of the legendary that both consoles and consolidates the
community.
Women could not be storytellers in the age of reason except as
witches; as such, they were made into scapegoats. Witches were bearers of
the irrational and the archaic, hated and feared since they worshiped a power
that was outside the realm of official religion and culture. In contemporary
novels such as those of Donoso and Fuentes, witches are the focus of a
deep-rooted fear of all that lies outside the male-controlled spectrum of
meaning. In Garcia Marquez's legend of La Sierpe, on the other hand,
women acquire a different social significance. They are equated with territory
and code social meaning as a relationship to the land. These meanings persist
long after the material wealth of the land has been exhausted, but they can
only be recodified in this new historical stage by male storytellers.
Garcia Marquez elaborates on this myth in interesting ways. In
"Mama Grande's Funeral," he describes a territory ruled by a sterile, bloated
matriarch who has accumulated vast capital but leaves it in her will to a
nun (that is, like the Marquesita, her wealth ceases to circulate after her
511
 death). Mama Grande's funeral, which marks the end of the ..colonial"
epoch, is attended by a spectacular array of dignitaries, circus performers,
beauty queens, and relatives and is celebrated by gargantuan feasts. A car-
nivalesque society whose meanings derive from the body-territory of the
matriarch is about to wither away and be replaced by an abstract national
state. The story tries to reconstitute a society in which economy, culture,
and symbolic production are codified through the matriarchy.
In another version of the matriarchy myth, however, .. The In-
credible and Sad Story ofErendira and Her Wicked Grandmother," the two
women of the title inhabit a desert region between the frontier and the sea
(the land is thus no longer a source of wealth). The grandmother accumulates
gold ingots by prostituting Erendira because the latter has burned down her
house, in other words, has destroyed her territory. Erendira has the hero,
Ulises, kill her grandmother, and then she disappears with the gold ingots
into the land of legend. Once again myth has been salvaged from the gross
material world. In a further stage of this imaginary history, a patriarch (in
The Autumn of the Patriarch) is the absolute master of a territory that has
less and less material reality and is little more than a rhetorical slogan or
a sign in a system of exchange controlled by foreign powers.
While Garcia Marquez gives a certain importance to the precap-
italist matriarchal society, he still predicates this on a traditional separation
between feminine nature and male enterprise. Like other novelists of the
sixties and seventies, he upholds utopian values that seem to derive from
the sphere that society has designated as .. feminine." For instance, in his
Nobel prize acceptance speech, he appealed for a Utopia of love to replace
the apocalypse of death and destruction of advanced capitalism. Yet in his
Playboy interview he also showed that he regards politics as an elite activity
carried on by a group of representative males-General Torrijos, Fidel Cas-
tro, Francois Mitterand, and him.
This leads me to the connection between the literary intelligentsia
of the sixties and the oppositional politics of this same period, a politics
dominated by the guerrilla movements and their hero, Che Guevara. No
one will deny the heroism of these national liberation movements, many
of which ended tragically. Yet the literature they produced, with its ideal
of the .. new man" activated by nonmaterial incentives, bears out Nancy
Hartsock's description of a left-wing theory that is trapped within a negative
eros, one that values the violent confrontation with death over community
and life. It is only recently that women who participated in these movements
have begun to speak of their experiences and to criticize an ideal of the
militant that suppressed feelings of weakness. A former Tupamara (of Uru-
guay) writes: .. Feminine sexuality, desire to have children or not to have
them, the disposition of our bodies was not taken into account. For instance,
maternity was lived by us as an obstacle that prevented us from continuing
the struggle, especially the military struggle." 19 Even when a woman man-
aged to become a militant, she was often forced into a traditional gender
role and classified as either butch or seductress. Women "were not militants
in the true sense. " 20 These comments were made by women who admire
Che Guevara and neither regret nor reject armed struggle. Yet they are forced
to recognize the unbalanced nature of a movement in which one gender
constitutes revolutionary meaning and practice.
512
 Jean Franco
Before discussing some of the factors that have led to this kind
of criticism, let me briefly summarize my argument up to this point. In its
confrontation with metropolitan discourses that placed its members in a
traditionally female position in the play of power and meaning, the Latin
American intelligentsia attempted to speak on behalf of the nonliterate, the
indigenous, and women who, through "archaic" institutions and practices,
maintained forms of symbolic production that allowed them to deal with
and even resist capitalism. In the fifties and sixties this repressed material
and the interesting incongruities that had arisen because of the coexistence
of different modes of symbolic production led some writers-Asturias, Ar-
guedas, Roa Bastos-to incorporate these subjectivities which were alien to
capitalism into their narratives as utopian elements. In other writers, the
critique of violence and machismo similarly led to a feminization of values.
However, creativity-the active creation of real or imaginary societies that
would perpetuate the originality ofLatin America beyond the span of mortal
life-was still regarded as a masculine province. Women's sole creative func-
tion was the lowly task of reproducing the labor force.
Clearly, this state of affairs, in which one sector ofthe population
monopolizes creativity and makes it a quest for immortality, has been se-
riously challenged in recent years. The reinstallation of military govern-
ments and the breakdown of traditional political parties, as well as the
establishment of revolutionary governments in Cuba and Nicaragua, has
led to serious questioning of the past. Democratic participation has been
reevaluated and is no longer regarded as a bourgeois deception but as the
only practical basis for socialism. Such participation cannot be developed
as long as one gender continues to be subordinate.
At the same time, the violence of military governments in the
southern cone, the wars in Central America and the activities of death
squads, have all been directed at those places, like the home and the Church,
that have harbored "archaic" subjectivities. The murder of the archbishop
in El Salvador, of priests and nuns, the attack on the cathedral, the uprooting
of indigenous peoples from their homes in Guatemala, the resettlement of
working-class populations in Argentina and Chile, the sterilization of Puerto
Rican women, the rape of women in front of their husbands and children,
all represent ferocious attacks on the family and the Church by the very
forces (the military) that rhetorically invoke these institutions. By attacking
them and by appealing to more deterritorialized forms of domination-
"mass media" and electronic religion or abstract notions of nationhood-
the military governments have also unwittingly contributed to the subver-
sion of these formerly "sacred" categories. Moral rights, which formerly had
been attached to particular territories or genders, are rapidly undergoing
resemanticization, not only by the military, but also by new oppositional
forces. The present stage of"deterritorialization," which has separated women
from their traditional regions of refuge in the home and the Church, and
indigenous peoples from their communities, represents a cultural revolution
brought about by imperialism. 21 But this conservative cultural revolution
has been so radical that it has also opened up new areas of struggle; as a
consequence of these social changes, new types of power, no longer solely
identified with masculinity, have become increasingly important.
Let me give one example-the resistance of the "madwomen" of
the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. These women have not only redefined
513
public space by taking over the center of Buenos Aires on ore afternoon
every week but have also interrupted military discourse (and now the silence
ofthe new government) by publicly displaying the photographs of sons and
daughters who have "disappeared." This form of refusing a message of death
is obviously quite different from the quest for immortality that has tradi-
tionally inspired the writer and the political leader. The women interrupted
the military by wrestling meaning away from them and altering the con-
notations of the word "mother." To the military, they were the mothers of
dead subversives, therefore, of monsters. But they have transformed them-
selves into the "mothers of the Plaza de Mayo," that is, in the words of one
of them, into "mothers of all the disappeared," not merely their own chil-
dren. They have thus torn the term "mother" from its literal meaning as
the biological reproducer of children and insisted on social connotations
that emphasize community over individuality.
In using the term "mother" in this way, these women show that
mothering is not simply tied to anatomy but is a position involving a struggle
over meanings and the history of meanings, histories that have been ac-
quired and stored within unofficial institutions. While "mothers of subver-
sives" is univocal, stripped of any connotation but that of reproduction,
"mothers of the disappeared" signals an absence, a space that speaks through
a lack-the lack of a child-but also a continuing lack within the government
of any participatory dialogue, of any answer to the question of how their
children disappeared.
The activities of the women of the Plaza de Mayo are sympto-
matic of many grass-root movements in Latin America, from the comu-
nidades de base in Brazil to the popular song movements in Chile and
Argentina. These are movements in which the so-called silent sectors of the
population are forging politics in ways that no longer subordinate popular
culture and women to the traditional view of culture determined by met-
ropolitan discourse. In addition, the postrevolutionary societies of Cuba
and Nicaragua have been forced to deal with the participation of women.
Nicaragua has, indeed, recognized that creativity is not exclusive to a male
elite but is something that is dispersed among the entire population.
In countries under military dictatorship, there is a growing rec-
ognition of the importance of cultural politics in the creation ofnongendered
solidarity groups. To go back to Fanon, this involves transcending the tra-
ditional fear of the intelligentsia of immersing its members' individuality
in the masses. It also entails realizing that violence, while necessary in self-
defense, as in present-day Central America, is not the only way to be rev-
olutionary. That is why an understanding of the socially constructed nature
of sexual as well as class and racial divisions is so important, for it enables
us to recognize the ethnocentricity of knowledge/power. The fact that the
metropolis has always been the place in which knowledge is produced has
reinforced the association of domination with masculinity in the Third World
and has, therefore, restricted the balanced development of revolutionary
movements.
Marx offered an epistemological position that allows us to un-
derstand the world as if we belonged to the proletariat. Fanon forces us to
see the world as if we were people of color. One of the lessons of revolu-
tionary movements of the last several years is that we have to resemanticize
preconstructed gender categories by taking meaning into our own hands and
514
 Jean Franco
overcoming the traditional associations of the feminine with nature and the
immobile. For those of us living in the metropolis, there is another essential
process of defamiliarization. We must step outside the display window of
advanced capitalism and look through it from the point of view of societies
of scarcity. Then it may appear not only replete but also grotesquely reified.
And only then will we understand that the becalmed sea traps not the
colonized but the colonizers.

Notes

1 Frantz Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press. 1968). p. 51.
2 Fanon, p. 52.
3 For clarification of Foucault's theory and methodology, see "Two Lectures," Power/Knowl-
edge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 (New York: Pantheon, 1981 ).
4 Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1980).
5 I am extending the notion of "interruption" as it is developed by David Silverman and Brian
Torode, "Interrupting the 'I'." The Material Word (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).
pp. 3-19.
6 Alfonso Reyes, "Discurso por Virgilio," Antofogia de fa revista contemp6ranea (Mexico,
1973). pp. 163-89. The reference to Neruda is to "Alturas de Macchu Picchu," which IS
part of Canto General.
7 For the relation of this organization to indigenous culture, see Nestor Garda Canclin1, Las
culture popufares en ef capitafismo (Mexico: Nueva Imagen, 1982).
8 Terry Eagleton, The Rape of Clarissa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1982). p
7.
9 Rene Marques, "En una ciudad llamada San Juan," En una ciudad 1/amada San Juan (Mexico:
UNAM, 1960).
10 Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power: Towards a Feminist Historical Matenafism (New
York: Longman, 1983).
11 Hartsock, p. 203.
12 Hartsock, p. 253.
13 Jose Marfa Arguedas, Ef zorro de arriba y ef zorro de abaJO (Buenos Aires· Losada. 1971 ).
14 Playboy Magazine, 30:2 ( 1983).
1& "Madre, me voy manana a Santiago," in Trifce ( 1922). my translation. The Spanish Civil
War poems "Espana. aparta de mi este caliz" ("Spain. Take This Cup from Me") were
published posthumously.
16 Mario Vargas Llosa. "Novela primitiva y novela de creac16n en America Latina," Rev1sta de
fa Universidad de Mexico. 23: 10 ( 1969). p. 31.
17 This refers to a phrase that radio announcers in Argentina repeated daily at the time of Eva
Peron's death.
18 Jacques Gilard, ed., Articufos Costeflos, vol. 1 (Barcelona: Brughera. 1981)
19 Ana Maria Auraujo, Tupamaras, des femmes de Uruguay (Paris: des femmes. 1980). p.
163.
20 AurauJO, p. 145.
21 For terms such as "overcoding" and "deterritorialization." I am Indebted to Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrema (New York: Viking Press.
1972).

515
V Science, Technology, Politics, and Ethics
 Stanley Aronowitz

The Production of Scientific Knowledge:

Science, Ideology, and Marxism

Science IS a socially constituted discourse whose re-

sults are linked to a culture's economic, political, and
ideological practices. We will never achieve an alterna-
tive, critical science until we discard the myths of scien-
tific neutrality and the separation of science and ideol-
ogy.

My interest in science arose during my years as a rep-

resentative of the Oil-Chemical and Atomic Workers in the mid-sixties; at
the time, this was part of the most technologically advanced production
sector in the industrialized world. From 1950 to 1970 two-thirds ofthejobs
in that industry were abolished because of the shift to continuous flow
operation (at the time it was called automation). When I became a teacher
in the early 1970s, my earlier experience led me to try to comprehend the
relation of Marxism to technology and the problem of advanced industrial
societies in which technological transformation seemed to be the funda-
mental mechanism of capital accumulation, the linchpin of the reorganized
labor process, and a most serious problem for the labor movement. My
second attempt to deal with this was a paper called "Marx, Braverman and
the Logic ofCapital." 1 (In 1975 I wrote my doctoral dissertation on Marx,
Science and Technology; I agreed that the thesis should be left, in the words
of the old man, to "the gnawing criticism of the mice," but now the topic
keeps popping up as a continuing and growing interest). "Marx, Braverman
and the Logic of Capital," my first published work on the technological side
ofthese problems, criticized the one-sided reception of Marx himself in the
development of post-Marxian theories of the relation of labor to capital. If
we read Capital politically, especially the sections from volume 1 on ma-
chinery, modern industry, and the labor process, the contradictions in Marx's
idea of the proletariat as historical agency leap out of his relentless account
of labor and out of his argument that labor degradation is concomitant to
accumulation. 2
Harry Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital, 3 far
from being a supplement to Baran and Sweezy's almost canonical Monopoly
Capital4 in recent American Marxism, is also a reading of the lost sixth
chapter of Marx's Capital, volume 1, "The Result of the Immediate Process
of Production." Here Marx shows the dialectic between the accumulation
of capital and labor's subordination to it. My critique of Braverman's path-
breaking work-and the similarly important writing in Europe of Andre
Gorz, 5 Serge Bologna, 6 and especially Christian Palloix, 7 and others-claims
that this reading constitutes a productivist version of the Weberian bu-
reaucratic iron cage. Braverman and Gorz follow Marx in showing not only
519
 that capital reconstitutes the character of labor in ways that separate head
from hand, design from execution, intellectual from manual labor, but also
that "management" is by no means a neutral science. Braverman argues
that it is a tool of accumulation designed to reduce the power of the skilled
worker by (a) replacing him or her with a machine but, even more important,
(b) rationalizing jobs so that the autonomy of the laborer is now transferred
to the machine and to a professional manager of capital. We are led inev-
itably to raise the question of how the domination of capital, not only over
the labor process but also over society, may be overturned. Recall that
Marx's conception of the working class as historical agency was grounded
not only in the centrality of wage labor to the process of production and its
separation from ownership and control ofthe means of production, but also
in its capacity to go beyond resistance to capital's initiatives, its ability to
achieve self-management of the production process and, by extension, of
social relations in their totality.
Although the theorists of the tum-of-the-century Second Inter-
national took these characteristics for granted, for Marxists after the First
World War such optimism was no longer possible. Georg Lukacs found the
source of the workers' failure to transform a war-tom Europe, despite their
mass socialist parties and powerful trade unions, in the power of the com-
modity form to mask the real relations of society. 8 Lukacs's theory holds,
with Simmel,9 that social relations become ensconced as things, but he
situates this mystification in capitalist exchange, a conception of technology
that grasps that its material form as "progress" disguises a system of social
relations based on domination and exploitation. Extrapolating from Lu-
kacs's theory of reification, we may infer that the actually existing working
class cannot grasp that the scientifically based technologies that have in-
vaded the workplace (and either displaced it or reduced it to impotence)
are not part of the natural order but instead are a process of domination.
Technological culture, which appears as the natural outgrowth of scientific
and social progress, is actually the reified form of labor's economic and
social subordination to capital. We enter into relations with computers, for
example, perceiving them as valuable tools for calculation, communication,
writing, or material production. If Lukacs's theory is to be followed, how-
ever, this instrumental rationality only prevents us from understanding the
degree to which technology constitutes a new culture formed by capital.
Braverman follows a similar line. He regards technological de-
velopment as an aspect of capital's domination. But rather than focus on
the commodity form, that is, on problems of consciousness that arise in the
exchange or in cultural relations, Braverman goes directly to the labor pro-
cess. Here he discovers that "scientific" management and the introduction
of new machinery, indeed, the technical division of labor itself, is in the
form of domination of capital over labor. Braverman's attack against sci-
entifically based technology as a form of domination retains the basic dis-
tinction between "genuine" science and ideology. That is, capitalist "sci-
ence" becomes the shroud disguising the fact that the main managerial
ideology, Taylorism-the separation of design from execution through such
devices as the rationalization of tasks into increasingly smaller units, time
study, and repetition-is merely capital's weapon of subordination. Brav-
erman's critique leaves natural science alone; he shows, rather, that tech-
nology is a social relation and that, in the context of capitalist accumulation,
520
 Stanley Aronowitz
knowledge has political consequences to the extent that it is subsumed under
capital as a means to change the traditional labor process in which the
knowledgeable worker retained considerable control even though he or she
did not own the means of production.
Few of Braverman's commentators have interrogated the dis-
tinction between science and ideology retained in his work, even though,
after Braverman, the neutrality of technology conceived as a discourse con-
stituted by knowledge separated from its social context is generally regarded
as untenable. My concern was to demonstrate that the consequence of Brav-
erman's commentary was to problematize the dialectic of social transfor-
mation which in Marxist theory relies on the conscious subject, even if
historically constituted. Ifknowledge has become the major productive force
in late capitalism, and its subordination under capital has degraded indus-
trial and clerical labor by rationalizing their skills, then the entire project
of historical materialism is thrown into question unless social theory can
develop some kind of "new working-class" theory (as Serge Mallet 10 and
the earlier Gorz had done). We need not rehearse the bad times on which
varieties of this theory have fallen. Suffice it to say that, although capital
has subsumed knowledge and those engaged in its production, and the pro-
letarianization of once independent professional strata has increased rapidly
in the past twenty years (as new working-class theory predicted), the ra-
tionalization of intellectual labor resembles that which afflicted craft workers
during the industrialization era. The subordination of knowledge is no less
thorough since Taylorism and its variant, Fordism, 11 have imposed them-
selves universally in the workplace of advanced industrial societies. Al-
though there are differences between manual and intellectual labor, knowl-
edge itself has become fragmented, specialized, and subordinated within
specific industrial and commercial configurations. Today, knowledge is sub-
ject to a technical division of labor extended both to professionals and to
several echelons of management itself. The result, as Gorz argues, is that
society's traditional intellectual strata have been transformed into a tech-
nical intelligentsia. 12
The technical intelligentsia, ensconced within the technical and
social divisions of labor, is no more able to grasp the economic, political,
and ideological aspects of its labor than the traditional working class is. Its
proletarianization signifies the disappearance of the intellectual as a mar-
ginal figure within late capitalism. This development has deep implications
for the fate of oppositional social and political practice. As universities,
whether "private" or public, become state institutions in the literal meaning,
the space for discourse outside the dominant, instrumental, goal-directed
mode is significantly narrowed. 13 Increasingly, the professoriate joins the
technical intelligentsia, a shift signified by the ubiquity of taxonomies either
of a methodological type or of a more conventional disciplinary character.
Our entire intellectual life today is marked by its technicalization. Taxon-
omies not only subordinate knowledge to disciplines that insist on the dis-
crete character of the object of knowledge or methodologies specific to the
discipline, but they also construct separate theoretical or literary canons and
revered figures around which their specialized discourses revolve. Departure
from these models is enough to exclude an individual or a discursive practice
from the field.
521
 Taken together, the theses concerning the degradation of labor
and the subordination of knowledge and its bearers to capital constitute an
important caveat to historical materialism's theory of social transformation,
since those developments effectively mediate the formation of the auton-
omous subject. It is not merely a theoretical question concerning the via-
bility of the notion of historical agency or the subject per se. Such rumi-
nations make interesting disputations, but they are by no means conclusive
as a repudiation of the core of Marxism. More interesting are the historical
and empirical implications of studies of advanced industrial societies that
purport to find a qualitative change in the way social reproduction takes
place. The Frankfurt school, Lukacs, Braverman, and others who have
stressed the so-called counteracting causes to those that endanger the pre-
vailing order (workers' organization, economic crises, wars, social and po-
litical instability) have, in different ways, questioned the scientificity of
Marxism. 14
For Marx and, indeed, for the parties of the Second and Third
Internationals, such concepts as "total administration," "reification," and
"labor degradation" are nothing short of heresy. To focus on the repro-
ductive elements of the social process is to challenge the fundamental prem-
ise of historical materialism: the ineluctability of revolt, if not revolution.
The profound message of contemporary Marxism is the proposition that
the social process reproduces domination, however discontinuous the pro-
cess may be. Yet the postulate of rupture is inherent in any possible theory
of fundamental historical change. And for Marxism there is no automatic
procedure: the working-class process, by virtue of its centrality in the pro-
duction process and its capacity for self-organization, is the means for mak-
ing history of a different kind. The Frankfurt school (following Lukacs) and
Braverman (following both Marx and a certain reading of historical evi-
dence) have challenged the most fundamental idea in the entire theory: the
proposition that the conjuncture of economic, political, and ideological con-
ditions will constitute a new historical subject. Marxism admits that the
question of whether the subject chooses to embark on a definite path of
liberation may be indeterminate in the short run, but the theory holds that
its ultimate options are limited to those called out by the conjuncture of
crisis and self-organization.
These questions raise sharply the status of Marxism as a science
of history. Even if it refuses, except in its most orthodox incantations, the
eighteenth-century model according to which causality is linear and deter-
mination can be specified after a set of limited variables has been named
and quantified, Marx's "law of tendency" still forms the heart of the theory.
Marxism as a science expects that it can specify a determinate relation
between present and future and reads its categories into the past. In short,
Marxism claims to be an explanatory and predictive science, one for which
the Nietzschean turn of contemporary historiography is entirely reprehen-
sible.15
Throughout the twentieth century, one side of the debate con-
cerning Marxism's validity claims has turned on variants of traditional
scientific method. Sidney Hook, whose critique is perhaps among the earliest
and most prefigurative of later objections, argues that Marxism's claim to
scientific validity falls on its lack of"methodological clarity." 16 His criticism
is that Marxism looks to experience, not as a test of the validity of its
522
 Stanley Aronowitz
assertions, but only to confirm them. This Popperian view stands on the
proposition that theories are true only to the extent that they subject them-
selves to possible refutation. Further, according to Hook, Marxism has pos-
ited the economic as a priori .. fundamental in an uninterpreted sense" for
determining all other social phenomena. In effect, Marxism fails on its re-
fusal of an experimental turn of mind; its dogmatism, for Hook, marks it
as a faith analogous to a religion. And, like a religion, Marxism refuses the
.. courage to revise" its doctrines in the light of circumstances and instead
projects socialism as an absolute from which there is no retreat.
Marxism has been accused of essentialism, especially by post-
structuralists. The key term here is the a priori historical subject or the
notion of agency on which Marxism pins its theory of revolution. According
to Jacques Derrida, whose critiques of Hegel and Husserl may also be in-
terpreted as repudiations of mainstream Marxism, the problem with all
efforts to overcome the subject/object splits inherent in classical European
philosophy is the persistence of a metaphysical .. logocentrism" that inev-
itably reduces all social, historical, or cognitive phenomena and reverts to
traditional canons of scientific explanation. 17 Similarly, Foucault's departure
(but not in the double sense) from Marxist historiography consists in his
deliberate decision to study marginal social phenomena without imputing
overt political significance to what he finds (yet one suspects that the absence
of economic and political history among the Foucault school constitutes a
new center, just as ..history from below" is merely the antinomy of tradi-
tional political history). 18 These charges against Marxism are by no means
a defense of conventional science. To the contrary, Marxism is accused of
scientism, or, to be more exact, is identified with the Enlightenment tra-
dition. Its rationalism is at issue here, not, as Hook claims, its departure
from experimental versions of scientific reality.
Habermas charges historical materialism with reductionism, par-
ticularly a proclivity for productivism, and thereby argues that Marxism
ignores the entire sphere of communicative action. 19 In some ways, Haber-
mas's critique spans those who repudiate Marxism for its nonrational, re-
ligious worldview and those who regard Marxism merely as an extension
of the Enlightenment, mired in the procedures of empirical science. Ha-
bermas wishes to revive philosophical considerations, since he shares the
widespread position that the socialist project has been more or less fulfilled
by late capitalism, especially if we accept the statist version of the doctrine.
Habermas wants to pose the issue of spiritual impoverishment to replace
the essentially outmoded problematic of material scarcity. He finds the sci-
entific and technological revolution to have overcome, within and not against
the framework of prevailing social relations, most of the complaints of the
underlying populations of the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Thus
the issue is how to complete the unfinished tasks of modernity, not how to
challenge modernity itself. These tasks are created by the problems of total
administration, by the overbearing power of scientific and technological
rationality that solved many problems but suppressed others. For Habermas
the unfulfilled promise of the Enlightenment is that our humanity is still
incomplete. We are burdened by distorted communication; we are suffering
a crisis of meaning; technological rationality has deprived us of commu-
nicative competence. Habermas wants to reconstruct historical materialism
along the model suggested by speech act theory. Since the crisis of modern
523
life is that social divisions are perpetuated by misunderstandings rising out
of the excesses of rational-purposive action (i.e., instrumental rationality),
he proposes a culture that permits "context-free communication. " 20
Habermas, however, falls perhaps unwittingly into the de facto
acceptance of the two-culture thesis. This is not the thesis of C. P. Snow
alone but also the thesis of the natural sciences and the humanities. If one
accepts the notion that we live in a scientific culture constituted, as Ha-
bermas argues, as "rational purposive" activities, then the major problem
for critical theory is to generate a discourse of perfect communication that
is, if not ideology-free, at least informed by emancipatory interests. But for
Habermas the questions involved in the scientific and technological revo-
lution are more or less taken for granted-or worse, circumvented-as an
object of social and cultural inquiry. I wish to advance what should be an
unremarkable argument: If what is happening here is the case, it follows
that we cannot refuse the proposition that the scientific and technological
revolutions today constitute the hegemonic culture of advanced industrial
society. The discourses of conservatism and reaction are now heavily de-
pendent on science and technology either to persuade an entire population
economically, politically, and ideologically, or to impose themselves as nec-
essary discourses that destroy the possibility of any emancipatory-liberatory
politics. We live in a profoundly scientific as well as technological culture.
That culture is the culture. As abhorrent as that is to Derrideans, the in-
vestigation of humanistic culture (indeed, the very notion that forms of
social and cultural interaction are a proper object of critical and scientific
inquiry) is clearly subordinate to the investigation of nature; in the United
States those who study humanistic culture are virtually an oppressed mi-
nority. Therefore, the strategy for a counterattack is to interrogate science
not only as a form of culture but also as a discourse about truth, which is
what I propose to do now.
We are in the midst of a widespread debate concerning the truth
claims of science. This debate has been conducted both within Marxism,
among philosophers of science, and within organized science itself. It does
not (as in the 1930s, with the Social Relations of Science groups both in
the United States and in Great Britain) merely speak about the social func-
tion ofscience, 21 about the political and economic influence on the uses of
scientific inquiry that still are with us (especially in relation to the anti-
thermonuclear war movement); it also addresses whether what we consider
ideological discourse also permeates science, and whether the presumed
incommensurability of science and ideology, as well as that of science and
culture (i.e., general culture) is any longer defensible. It asks whether the
unified field of culture now embraces both discourses. This discussion is by
no means prompted simply by the generally recognized social uses for which
science has been employed. It also reflects what the Marxist literary critic
and philosopher Christopher Caudwell called, in the 1930s, the "crisis" in
physics, a crucial instance of the crisis in science. 22
Scientific disputes since the 1920s and 1930s show that inside
science itself the concept of unified field theory, which really reduces to the
notion of scientific truth as a consensual product (that famous position of
Thomas Kuhn and Charles Sanders Peirce, which we are all heir to), is
considered contested terrain. The contestation has many different specifi-
cations.23 Consider, from the 1930s, the dispute about wave and particle
524
 Stanley Aronowitz
theory as two alternative explanations for the nature of the physical world.
Given the conditions of scientific inquiry, these two are perfectly good ex-
planations for the same object, for the same phenomenon. Of course, along
came Niels Bohr, playing the role of rabbi, to declare the theory of com-
plementarity, as demonstrated by the following joke. A husband and wife
come to the rabbi's house to seek advice; they're having enormous fights.
The rabbi, of course, first asks the man to present his case and invites the
woman to leave; the man tells tales of his wife's horrendous behavior, her
inability to perform various wifely duties, her abuse of his patrimony and
patriarchy, and the rabbi strokes his beard and says to the husband, "You
know, you're right." Then the wife comes in and says the husband beats
her, is not good to the children, and performs heinous crimes that are vir-
tually unspeakable. The rabbi looks at the woman, strokes his beard with
the same gravity, and allows that her case is just. The rabbi's wife is watching
this performance and says, "Jake, you are a jelly fish; you are no rabbi, you
are basically a compromiser, you are someone who can't make up his mind."
He looks at her and he says, "You know, Sadie, you're right."
Niels Bohr tried to make the incommensurable commensurable
by declaring that the conditions of scientific inquiry, the experimental method
and the whole theoretical apparatus of science, were inadequate to fix on a
unified field theory; he also attempted to codify or "authorize" both theories
by arguing that they each possessed warranted assertability. Another ex-
ample: Simultaneously, much to Albert Einstein's chagrin, Werner Heisen-
berg offered his theory of uncertainty. This revision of physical science drove
the "orthodox" Einstein up the wall. He declared that Heisenberg, who was
later to write a philosophical reprise of the physical principle declaring the
uncertainty of all scientific knowledge, was basically a heathen, or at least
a heretic.
The third example is, by now, among historians of contemporary
science, a fairly well known understanding ofthe development of molecular
biology. The founding of molecular biology by Francis Crick and James
Watson was both an explicit attack on the development of Darwinian ev-
olutionary theory and a fairly self-conscious effort to make a scientific par-
adigm intrinsically instrumental to technological development and engi-
neering. 24 Gene splicing and other technological innovations are
discontinuous not only from the founding of molecular biology of the gene
but also from the very project of the foundation of science itself. The mo-
lecular biology of the gene declares a radical disjuncture from microbiol-
ogical historical concerns intrinsic to the discovery and development of
evolutionary biology and also from the entire ideal of pure science.
The fourth example, the crisis in Marxism, is but a specific in-
stance ofthe general crisis of the social sciences. Its first aspect was produced
by the apparent breakdown of the certainties of the Stalin era: the primacy
of "base over superstructure" (i.e., the determination by the economic of
the political, ideological, and cultural spheres). The second major debate
within Marxism concerns its status as scientific discourse. I refer to Louis
Althusser's effort in the 1960s (heroic as it might be) to endow Marxism
with the status of science by showing, in a rather circular way, following
Bachelard's notion of the "epistemological break," how Marxism consti-
tuted itself through self-critique. In one stroke Althusser performs two ex-
traordinarily difficult, if not contradictory or at least antagonistic, opera-
525
 tions. He declares Marxism a science on the basis of its radical break from
Hegelian ..ideology"; Marxism, he argues, reconstitutes the object of knowl-
edge, transferring it from generic man to the concrete social formation, more
specifically to the mode of production. On the other hand, he claims that
Marxism announces the radical discontinuity of knowledge itself. So Al-
thusser declares the incommensurability of science and ideology while si-
multaneously defining Marxist science in terms of its critique of all prior
social theory as ideology. Althusser conveniently stops, like E. P. Thompson,
at the moment when scientific debate rages most ambiguously, when its
status as pristine discourse is in the most difficulty. He simply says that
Hegel represents the last possible bourgeois mysticism and that Marxism is
constituted as a science by its critique of Hegel, a critique that generates a
whole new set of categories. But Althusser then proceeds to act as if Marxism
as a science is not problematic. And the only problem, therefore, by logical
extrapolation, is of the interpretation of Marxism, not the problem of Marx-
ism itself. 25
The other effort, in light of the crisis of Marxism, is much more
interesting, though not because of its intrinsic value; as a theory, it is inferior
to Althusser's. I return to Jurgen Habermas's challenge to the Frankfurt
school's theory of science, and I propose to render a brief reprise of the
critique by beginning with a discussion of the Frankfurt school's conception
of science. The Frankfurt school, in light of the rise of fascism, economic
crisis, and the Second World War, which were the constellation of events
that generated its interest in science and technology, had by the 1930s and
early 1940s developed what amounts to the first thoroughgoing critique of
scientific rationality in the late bourgeois epoch. And the fundamental text
for cultural theory of science is now celebrating its fortieth publication an-
niversary. Naturally, I refer to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, which ap-
peared originally in German in 1944. 26 Written mostly in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, it is an argument about the contradictory character of the En-
lightenment and, in the context of the hegemonic discourses of Stalinist
versions of Marxism, is clearly understandable as an explicit critique of the
Marxist conception of science itself.
The summary arguments are these. Science is the product of the
Enlightenment's attempt to elevate reason to an intervention in the social
and natural world. But it is divided within itself between its valid and
necessary critique of religion and all forms of mysticism, particularly Ca-
tholicism, and its attempt to solve humanity's problems by subordinating
nature to human ends. This preoccupation with the domination of nature
arises from our collective human fear of human emancipation, masked as
the fear of the terrors visited upon us by .. natural" disasters. The fear of
.. nature" is really as much the fear of unleashing the possibilities inherent
in human reason. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the domination
of nature marches under the flag of reason but is really grounded profoundly
in the .. irrational," desiring subject. Thus, the Enlightenment elevated em-
piricism and, later, positivism to the status of a hegemonic ideology that
became identical with what we regard as reason and science. Scientific ra-
tionality was the instrument of the epistemological break with the essen-
tialism of medieval thought. Nature was deracinated, its substantive char-
acter denied; all objects consisted, for the purposes of scientific inquiry at
526
 Stanley Aronowitz
least, in their quantitative, measurable dimensions, and qualities were as-
signed to the transcendent subject to be endowed on an indifferent ••matter."
The scientific enterprise purports to be in the service of human
emancipation. But science (and its subordinate, technology) achieve human
emancipation through the progressive domination of nature. From its very
inception, science is thus an enterprise with an interest, and that interest is
the prediction and control of what is considered to be ••external" nature.
This is separate from considerations of an epistemological character, namely,
considerations concerning nature's status (indeed Adorno, following an ear-
lier suggestion of Marx, is later on to understand fully both that nature is
historically constituted and that humans are part of natural history). 27 This
enterprise of the domination of nature has an unintended consequence. Here
we can see the wafts of Weberian theory, namely, that in its attempt to
represent the general emancipatory interest through the domination of na-
ture, science also entails the domination of humans. In other words, in order
to establish the universal interest, following a very important Marxist view
of ideology-free discourse, science purports to separate the domination of
nature from human domination and regards itself as ideologically neutral.
Neutrality here means that science sees itself as having a universal interest-
that of promoting the discourse of humanity as a whole in its effort to free
itself from nature; it does not mean neutral in the absolute sense.
Habermas is not only a product of the eroded soil of postwar
German democracy but also partly a product of critical theory itself. In the
1960s, in response to the crisis of the Left, he began his project of trying to
construct a new theory of human domination by rejecting Frankfurt theory.
••science and Technology as •Ideology'," which is a critique of Herbert Mar-
cuse's call for a new science, is a key text. Marcuse insists that the interest
of science is not the interest of humanity as a whole. Despite its beneficent
features, he claims, science serves the interests of human domination be-
cause prediction and control carry over from the domination of nature to
the domination of humanity and are implied in class relations. According
to Marcuse, there is a possibility for an emancipatory science, based on a
genuine conception of the emancipatory interest as human interest. One
can see in Marcuse's call for an emancipatory science some elements of
what has become the battle cry of the ecological movement. And, however
ideological that call may be, at the very least it admits that the interest of
emancipation entails a critique, not only of the forms ofhuman domination,
but of the domination of nature as well.
Habermas's fundamental move against Marcuse is to argue that
science and technology, rather than being interested inquiries in the sense
of social antagonism and social domination, are aspects of that sphere of
action called ••rational-purposive activity." But domination and questions
of domination may now be relegated to the realm of communication prob-
lems (i.e., problems of interaction). Yet science, technology, and the labor
process remain still mystified in his discourse. He makes the radical separ-
ation between work and interaction and argues, since he has obliterated
class antagonism, that the realm of work and the development of science
and technology are in the human interest and that the question of interested
inquiry (with respect to the question of domination) has to be confined to
areas of interaction-speech acts, communication, and language. What is
important here is that there is a curious reversion in Habermas to a relatively
527
 old notion of the neutrality of science. And therefore, for Habermas, we
cannot critically interrogate science, especially natural science or technology,
because those are clearly in the general interest to promote, since he posits
an unproblematic relation between humans and nature. Our real task is to
move in the direction of talking about intersubjectivity.
Habermas makes a powerful and irrefutable argument against
Marcuse's call for a science free of the dominating interest, but only because
Marcuse has failed to specify what the contours of such an emancipatory
science might be. From this Habermas concludes that there is no possibility
for a science other than the one that prevails, since it corresponds to a
certain type of universally valid rationality. But, like the legions of scientists,
philosophers, and lay persons who have submitted to the ubiquity of science
by asserting that its facticity corresponds to the rational, Habermas suffers
from the very absence of which Marcuse is accused. He has not looked at
science at all, for science itself is rent today. Science is undertaking the same
kind of critical self-reflection as that in which neo-Marxist, Derridean, and
Foucaultian theory is engaged. Marxism is, of course, stuck in the radical
distinction between science and ideology. It rejects the idea of a context-
free inquiry, that is, a text whose validity claims may be separated from the
interest that gave it life. Yet Marxism hopes to discover truth through the
prism of its paradigm, one relative only to the limits to inquiry imposed
by the social and historical context. Although Marxism, in principle, admits
the partial character of its discoveries, it remains tied to the primacy of the
economic (albeit in the last instance), the constitution of a revolutionary
subject as an eschatological a priori, and the categorical assertion that knowl-
edge and human interest may be simultaneously linked to the "truth" pro-
vided the interest is emancipatory.
My intention is to go beyond the distinction between science and
ideology, to "abolish" the category of ideology altogether because it implies
its antinomy-a disinterested inquiry which, through both methodological
purity and undistorted communication, can achieve something we may call
warranted assertibility, truth, validity. Since the object itself is constituted
by social interests, as Horkheimer has persuasively argued, our selections
are always subject to revision-not only the ways we see, but what we see. 28
Also, I want to assert, without for the moment engaging in detailed argu-
ment, that the traditional distinctions between science and values, emotion
and reason, subject and object, are themselves grounded in a kind of mod-
ernity that is increasingly doubtful as a methodological presupposition.
Recently, the work of Loren Graham, 29 Paul Feyerabend, 30 and
Thomas Kuhn 31 has thrown into question the status of scientific theory, if
not scientific practice, as value neutral. Kuhn's argument, which presents
itself as an account of how paradigm shifts occur, contains a major caveat
in the very means by which its central thesis is explicated. Kuhn explains
paradigm shift by reference to the inability of the old paradigm to account
for anomalies that appear in the process of performing normal science. As
these accumulate, some kind of transformation of quantity into quality
occurs. Sooner or later, some elements in the scientific community can no
longer tolerate the situation, since among the normative principles of the
community remains the ideal of a unified field theory. Kuhn's explanation
remains within the extant scientific method: experimentation and the judg-
ment of what Peirce noted as those professionally qualified to determine
528
 Stanley Aronowitz
the truth claims of any new proposition or set of propositions. Although
Kuhn acknowledges that the new paradigm bears no necessary relation to
the one it replaces-and thereby calls into question realist theories as well
as the concept of the history of science as cumulative and continuous-the
core of his explanation remains dependent on the sociological arbitrary
internal to the process: the activity of the scientific community, especially
its normative, a priori propensity to critical and self-reflexive inquiry.
Thus Kuhn's argument for historical disjunction is not rooted in
the process of scientific investigation but in the "value" or "ideological"
orientation of its (most advanced) practitioners, who have internalized En-
lightenment presuppositions concerning reasonable ways of proceeding. Still,
the procedures remain unexamined within the confines of even the most
critical history and philosophy of science. The point ofFeyerabend's Against
Method, perhaps the most self-consciously radical of the new histories and
philosophies of science, is to show that both Newtonian and contemporary
physics have no monopoly on the practices considered most radical by
scientists. Ptolemaic physics was equally rigorous in experiment, self-re-
flexive, and open to revision. Moreover, its results, Feyerabend argues, were
adequate for explaining the phenomena it investigated. Nevertheless, Fey-
erabend, Kuhn, and their common mentor, Karl Popper, 32 accept the ex-
perimental method as the most rational procedure for achieving scientific
validity, especially the injunction to frame questions and answers subject
to rules of falsifiability.
Feyerabend wants to argue for the arbitrary character of hege-
monic scientific law, and, in tum, to challenge the substantive norms that
guide its certification by the scientific community. But while he does not
dispute Kuhn's idea that framing scientific paradigms is a matter of estab-
lishing truth values independent of social interest, neither does he accept
Kuhn's assumption that there is a hierarchy of scientific adequacy. Adequacy
is self-referential. If it can be shown that a given paradigm observes the
norms of inquiry that correspond to those established by the contemporary
scientific community, and its results are valid as types of explanation within
those norms, then the whole issue of "truth" disappears. However, both
Kuhn and Feyerabend remain bounded by a realist theory of science to the
extent that the object ofknowledge remains fixed; only understanding varies.
This is, of course, a step backward from Dewey's theory of sci-
ence, which holds "that the object of knowledge is eventual; that is, it is an
outcome of directed experimental operations instead of something in suf-
ficient existence before the act ofknowing." 33 Dewey's radical link between
the means and the ends of knowledge is strikingly prefigurative of post-
structuralist notions of undecidability. Although Kuhn is closer to this per-
spective, especially emulating Dewey's and Peirce's critique of the method
of authority by which knowledge is certified, it seems to me that Dewey has
taken the argument further than most contemporary writers. He insists that
the notion of disinterested inquiry simply obfuscates the suffering investi-
gator who is infused with intentions: "only operations intentionally per-
formed and attentively noted in connection with their products give observed
material a positive intellectual value, and this condition is satisfied only by
thought; ideas are the perception of this connection." 34 Dewey goes on to
argue that "data are selected from total original subject matter which gives
the impetus to knowing; they are discriminated for a purpose: that namely,
529
of affording signs or evidence to define or locate a problem, and thus give
a clue to its resolution. " 35
We may object that Dewey gives too much weight to intention
and seems to contradict his opposite idea that the object is constituted by
practice. This apparent logical inconsistency disappears when we take these
statements as two moments in a discontinuous process. Although the se-
lection of what he calls "data" expresses interest, and this act has an influ-
ence on the constitution of the object, he also removes experimental method
from its neutral nest. The "operations" of inquiry, however conventional,
are both undecidable in their outcomes and prefigure the form of the result:
scientific discovery is framed within discourses that are normatively certified
by the prevailing scientific community, but these procedures are no more
than tendential. Dewey is straining to argue that scientific action, which
appears both rational and purposive, retains its undecidability because the
object is not fixed in advance and practice is creative. Nevertheless, the
implication is that the notion of value-free inquiry is untenable. Yet, like
many others, Dewey assumes that the experimental method, the scientific
community, and the enterprise itself, while not value neutral, have a force
of ineluctability.
I would like to propose that the weight of recent investigations
into the social relations of science, which have in various ways challenged
the separation of text from context, the separation of values from facts, and
the idea of continuity and progress in scientific development, are all germane
to my contention that the Marxist (and conventional scientific) distinction
between science and ideology is now quite spurious. For this purpose I want
to suggest four categories that bear on this contention, all of which are related
both externally and internally to scientific procedures. After discussing these
categories, I will undertake a conclusion consisting of metatheoretical re-
flections.
The four categories are: ( 1) the problem of the constitution of
the object of scientific knowledge (Is the constitution of the object, which
is a part of the very inquiry of science itself, ideologically value-free?); (2)
questions concerning the status of scientific method (Is experimental method
historically and socially constructed, and, moreover, does its historical and
social constitution inform the practice of science?); (3) questions concerning
the determination of truth claims, the warranted assertabilities of science;
and (4) the form and status of the results of science. These issues must be
examined. The failure of Marcuse, Althusser, and other critics of scientific
culture to deal with the internal constitution of science as a set of practices
is perhaps the most problematic aspect of both a Marxist theory of science
and of many other theories of science that are informed by radical intentions.
It is by now commonplace in the sociology of science to note
that governments and corporations fund certain lines of inquiry and not
others. As powerful as this argument may be, in making the argument for
the implosion of science and ideology, or at least for their partial implosion,
and their problematic separation, I do not want to dwell on the economic
and political determination of the object of scientific knowledge. Those
issues are much too well known, even if they remain too little theorized. I
wish to argue that, in the first place, in social as well as natural scientific
inquiry, the division oflabor within the scientific community, between phys-
ics, chemistry, biology, geology, psychology, sociology, economics, anthro-
530
 Stanley Aronowitz
pology, and political science-a division of labor that is a form of fragmen-
tation with consequences of professionalization-not only influences the
results of scientific inquiry but also the very constitution of the inquiry
itself.
I am not making pejorative or normative judgments at this time
concerning the validity of these moves toward a division of labor based on
presumed disciplines. That is a question for another time. What is important
to understand is that those divisions, as social scientists, biological scientists,
and certainly physicists and chemists have known for a long time, are ar-
bitrary in the sense that sciences are socially and historically constituted by
discourses, by professional discourses in particular, and by interest. The
object examined is thus inevitably ideological. What goes on when the at-
tempt is made to overcome the ideological character of that inquiry is pre-
cisely that, in linking various inquiries, new sciences are created. For ex-
ample, biochemistry, physical chemistry, physiological psychology, the new
developments in sociology, political economy, and so on, show that con-
ventional disciplines, while still with us, have become contested terrain
within the development of the scientific community.
The constitution of the scientific object, however, is also intrin-
sically connected to questions of method. The foundations of scientific
method are well known in the ordinary sense but not well known in the
critical sense. In the first place, experimentation entails the decontextuali-
zation of the object and its insertion into a laboratory situation. As a strategy
of inquiry, decontextualization is now the subject of enormous conflict and
contestation. When we examine any object separate from its "natural" (i.e.,
external, social or biological) context, the object is placed in a new controlled
environment, one that is oriented to the project of prediction and control.
Second, what is entailed by decontextualization, as well as by the division
of disciplines and the definitions of scientific objects by the disciplines, is
an intervention; that is to say, the configuration of the object is itself the
result of an interaction between the knower and the known. John Dewey
repeatedly makes that point. The constitution of the object itself is not
"objective" and detached from the process of inquiry. This is precisely what
Heisenberg argues is problematizing all the old categories of physical law.
Finally, the abstraction of quality from quantity, the point that is made by
Horkheimer and Adorno, not only mathematizes the results but also makes
the character of the object virtually quantitative. This means that the di-
vision of culture into scientific and "humanistic" (or social scientific) cul-
tures is itself defined by the notion that quantity is scientific, whether it be
in sociology or in physics, and that quality is poetic or ethical and, con-
sequently, isolated from the framework of science as such.
What the humanities and the social sciences of a critical kind
suffer from, in discursive terms, is not their marginalization because they
are ideologically oppositional but their marginalization because they are
"poetic." And that is given by the character of scientific inquiry, which is,
to a large extent, framed by the invocation to prediction and control and
by the normative imperative that measurability is the only reliable way of
verification and falsification. I repeat: division of labor, the character of
science as intervention, decontextualization, the mathematicization of sci-
ence. On the basis of any inquiry into method, we conclude that the results
of investigation are not necessarily untrue, not necessarily devoid of valid-
531
 ity. 36 Results are, however, necessarily bound up with certain social and
historical norms of inquiry. Science is a discursive field with presuppositions
that are themselves problematic.
The forms of the results, the validation of the results of science:
I must say that I find all the relevant criticisms of Kuhn and Feyerabend
unconvincing. Listen to what must be counted as the most rigorous, as well
as the latest, of defenses, not only of the realist theory of science, but also
of the correspondence theory of truth, as well as the reflection theory of
knowledge, the work of Newton-Smith. I quote from The Rationality of
Science: "There has been progress in science, this progress is best understood
as an improvement in the verisimilitude of our theories. The explanation
for the fact that science has been capturing more truth about the world is
that we have evolved evidential or epistemic procedures of some success
and that the development of science has by and large been determined by
scientists acting on the basis of the outcome of the application of these
procedures. " 37
This argument against the attempt to implode science and ide-
ology rests finally on two points: the idea that scientific method, scientific
procedure, does in fact verify or falsify, whether you are a Popperian or
not, and the notion of the rupture with common sense. Newton-Smith is
absolutely Gramscian in this sense. He understands fully that science attacks
the common sense of immediate perception and tries to unmask immediate
perception to achieve theorization. But note in the above quotation the
attempt to attack the Kuhnian notion that the scientific community, and,
in the case ofFeyerabend, its social and ideological influences, is the ultimate
court of scientific opinion; and also the response to the notion that this is
a socially, not naturally, constituted court. Newton-Smith is constrained to
remind us that the progress of science depends on the interpretation by
scientists themselves oftheir own procedures of inquiry. However, the pro-
cess of inquiry can be shown to be socially and historically constituted, not
only with respect to its appearance, but also with respect to its procedures.
Thus the notion of scientific truth and scientific progress is at least subject
to interrogation, not only on the basis of the assumed a priori validity of
the results, but also on the basis of the conditions of scientific inquiry itself.
Newton-Smith excoriates Kuhn and Feyerabend for having advanced what
amounts to historical relativism, but he fails to show how that conception,
the validation of scientific theory, has crept into his own defense of the
asocial character of scientific inquiry.
In different ways, Kuhn and Feyerabend argue that normalcy in
science is defined by the constitution ofthe scientific community. Although
Feyerabend argues that this constitution is socially constructed, he has noth-
ing to say about the social constitution of science because he is still operating
within the discourse of Anglo-American philosophy of science. This absence
must be taken as a serious critique of attempts to defend science, not only
from an Enlightenment perspective, but also from the Marxist perspective.
I contend that there is no longer a normal science, only normal technological
research. The concept of normal science is an illusion of philosophers, in-
cluding Marxist philosophers. Science is precisely characterized by its lack
ofnormalcy; in fact, the notion of normalcy itself, the notion of neutrality,
is ideologically reactionary.
532
 Stanley Aronowitz
Max Black, hardly a Marxist, has made an argument that is ul-
timately unpersuasive but has a wonderful title, Science As Metaphor. Black's
argument-that all scientific laws are based on metaphors-may be heretical
to those of a literal cast of mind, particularly those who insist that scientific
law refers to an external world that is knowable in something like the picture
sense described by Wittgenstein or even in the "approximate" connotative
sense given to the correspondence theory of truth by Lenin. For theoretical
physics, however, the validity of Black's point seems perfectly obvious. The
metaphoric character of science suggests an infinite regress of decentering;
the hard referent with which scientific law is supposed to be concerned is
itself subject to interrogation. The problem is not that of materialism, of a
world historically and epistemologically prior to and independent of human
cognition, but whether the external world is independent of our practices,
including scientific practice. Do the practices of science refer to a pristine
other which can, in principle, be known through certain kinds of procedures?
If our postulate-that science is an intervention rather than an activity of
cognition alone-makes sense, then the proposition that scientific law refers
to a pristine "other" falls away. Our procedures for knowing the world are,
simultaneously, ways of altering it. The metaphoric character of science
registers the historicity of science because the metaphors continually change.
I am arguing that the notion of the material object is itself a
metaphor that can be historically situated within a specific problematic in
the development of the capitalist mode of production-the subsumption of
all knowledge under capital and its consequent instrumentalization. (That,
of course, is a radical reinterpretation of Marxism, one that will subject me
to the charge of relativism, to which I plead guilty.) The certification ofthe
results of scientific investigation, therefore, is not only a matter of concern
to the scientific community and its cultural and intellectual norms but also
a way of examining the cultural metaphors by which scientists are formed
themselves. The notions of precision, quantification, empirical falsification,
inference, and other bromides of scientific culture constitute a normative
order that can be traced to specific historical roots. But when science digs
more deeply into its own foundations, when it begins to ask questions re-
garding its presuppositions about the natural world, such as whether it can
fathom some kind of "ultimate" material building block, it reverts to mys-
terious and sometimes mystical metaphors. What is the precise meaning of
the "black box"? This term testifies to the metaphoricity underlying the
concept of precision itself. Theoretical physics is drowning in ambiguity;
the more it knows the less does its traditional culture really hold. Heisenberg
has remarked that the further up into the level of abstraction physics reaches
(or the further down to the level of "reality"), the more ordinary language
replaces what is considered in middle-brow culture or "normal" science to
be truly rigorous language. And since philosophy proclaimed itself capable
only of clearing up the ambiguities of language, of clarifying the meaning
of scientific results rather than being capable of discovery, both scientists
and philosophers are suffering role confusion. The scientists proliferate tracts,
suited for the nonspecialist, that purport to "explain" their bewilderment,
and the philosophers become ever more narrow and mathematical in their
expression. The scientists are slightly embarrassed that their objects and
methods seem to merge with the occult, while the philosophers reaffirm the
533
realist theories as if to hope against hope that by their act offaith everything
will be made right again.
If this is true, then among the most important questions for a
new politics is the struggle for its autonomy. The "independence of science"
demand would not relieve it of social responsibility, for the scientific com-
munity would be subject to the same constraints that all citizens suffer,
though intellectual freedom would not be impaired. Of course, this question
gets fairly tricky when we consider the capital investment needed for inquiry.
Nevertheless, I see no particular advantage to the private appropriation of
the results of scientific inquiry as opposed to their appropriation by the
state: in one case, capital dominates; in the other, a public bureaucracy that
may or may not be responsive to popular pressure does. The autonomy of
science would not "free" inquiry from the epistemological consequences of
social and cultural norms, of the episteme(s) to which scientific knowledge
must conform.
Here I wish to distinguish political limits from those imposed on
knowledge by social life. We can condemn the former but cannot escape
the latter. Thus the possibility of an unmediated relation between knowledge
and the world to which it putatively refers is bound up with the dream of
scientific autonomy that derives, I think, from the political and economic
restraints imposed by capitalist and state socialist regimes on all forms of
inquiry and expression. Habermas's wish for context-free communication
resonates with the desire of art and science for autonomy, but this is not
the same as positing its possibility. As long as human life is configured by
social relations, nature will be conceived and perceived in the images of the
imaginary.
This is, of course, a radical reinterpretation that understands sci-
ence as a form of social knowledge. Consistent with ecological thinking that
has modified our views of nature over the past two decades, this does not
imply that the external world is a "projection" of our collective mentality.
Its priority to human life is a conclusion of evolutionary theories of the
cosmological and the biological kinds, and this axiom constitutes a kind of
a priori without which the entire enterprise of historical investigation is
really impossible. But the question of priority should not be confused with
the autonomy of nature. The Enlightenment project of subsuming nature
under "man" runs into difficulty when we consider that nature's rhythms
have been altered by human intervention, but not completely. There are
still moments of internal autonomy, the violation of which has already
produced a revolt of nature against such taken-for-granted assumptions as
those underlying industrialization. We have learned survival; we have learned
that "atom splitting" is not merely the next conquest but maybe the last;
we have learned that the industrialization of space may generate a coun-
terreaction.
Nevertheless, humanity seems to have an almost infinite capacity
for forgetting. We all know that, but we deny the metaphoric character of
science, on the one hand, and the degree to which science-no less than art
or the social sciences-is intimately bound up with social relations, on the
other. I am not claiming, as Young and others have done, that science is
"merely" a social relation; its procedures, while by no means separate from
cultural and social configuration, are, at the same time, specific to the form
of inquiry as well as its object.
534
 Stanley Aronowitz
Finally, there is the question of the status of science as truth,
including Marxist "science's" truth, questions of warranted assertability based
on acceptance of all conditions specified especially in the consensual agree-
ment of the scientific community. I believe that the realist theory of science,
while in some sense tenable as a kind of article of faith comparable to
Althusser's faith in economic determination in the last instance, has no
practical (and I do not mean instrumental) significance with respect to our
understanding of scientific inquiry. Therefore, science is a socially consti-
tuted discourse whose results are internally linked to the ideological char-
acter of its components and are relative to the economic, political, and
ideological practices of an episteme or an epoch. We must, of course, go
beyond this to specify the conditions for an alternative critical science. But
I contend that we will never achieve that alternative critical science until
we throw out the myths of the neutrality of science and of the separation
of science and ideology.

Notes

Stanley Aronowitz, "Marx, Braverman. and the Log1c of Capital," Insurgent Socwlog1st (Fall
1978)
2 Karl Marx, Capital, val. 1, especially chaps. 12-15.
3 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1974).
4 Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).
5 Andre Gorz, "The Tyranny of the Factory: Today and Tomorrow." in Andre Gorz, ed . The
Division of Labour: The Labour Process and Class Struggle in Modem Capitalism (London:
Harvester Press, 1976).
6 Serge Bologna, "Class Composition and the Theory of the Party at the Ong1n of the Workers
Councils Movement," in Gorz, ed., The DIVision of Labour.
7 Christian Palloix, "The Labour Process from Fordism to Neo-Fordism," 1n Gorz, ed .. The
Division of Labour.
8 Georg Lukacs. "Re1ficat1on and the Consciousness of the Proletanat," History and Class
Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971 ).
9 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). Rei-
fication for Simmel is a property of an economy in which money dom1nates all soc1al relations.
In contrast, Lukacs locates the phenomenon in a specific histoncal context and a particular
soc1al formation, namely, capitalism. It IS only when the commodity form penetrates all social
relations that reification comes to dominate consc1ousness, according to Lukacs.
10 Serge Mallet, The New Working Class (London: Spokesman Books, 1975)
11 According to Palloix, "we must emphasize that Fordism, wh1ch still charactenzes the labour
process today, is not the same as Taylorism; it is a real innovation. . Ford took over the
essential aspects of Taylorism (separation of design and innovation from execution, divis1on
and sub-division of jObs, each movement allowed a spec1fic time) but he also went further
1n introducing two further pnnciples: a new method of controlling labour-power, the intro-
duction of the flow-line pnnciple (conveyors) 1n the concrete shape of the assembly line" (in
Gorz, ed., The Division of Labour, p. 59). The new method of control of labor-power was
the day-wage system (1n place of piece rates), "thus making it possible to 'regulate' the
externally-Imposed control of labour-power." Th1s day rate-the famous five-dollar day-
" assured capital of an unmterrupted supply of labour" and dampened militancy. It is inter-
esting to note that dunng the rise of the CIO (1935-41 ), Ford was the last major automaker
to be unionized. The company combined terror w1th relatively h1gh wages to prevent the self-
organization of workers.
12 Andre Gorz, "Technology, Technicians, and the Class Struggle," in Gorz, ed .. The Division
of Labour.
13 See Stanley Aronow1tz and Henry Giroux. Education under SeJge (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergm
and Garvey, 1985). espec1ally chap. 8, "Neo-conservative Ideology and the Crisis in Higher
Education."

535
14 See especially Max Horkheimer, Cntical Theory(NewYork: Seabury Press, 1972); and Stanley
Aronowitz, The Cnsis in Historical Matenalism (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey,
1981)
15 Here we must dist1nguish Marx, who made th1s claim once m The German Ideology, and the
Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals, which never tired of presenting itself in the
guise of a natural sc1ence. following Engels's suggestion in Anti-DDhring. The writings of
Lemn and Kautsky are especially Important in mak1ng the case for Marxism as a "natural
science." See V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirical Criticism; and Karl Kautsky The Class
Struggle (Ann Arbor: University of M1chigan Press, 1975).
16 Sidney Hook, Reason, Social Myth. and Democracy (New York: John Day and Co., 1940),
p. 107.
17 See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press,
1970)
18 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).
19 JOrgen Habermas, "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism." Communication and the Ev-
olution of Soc1ety (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979)
20 JOrgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
21 For an excellent collective study of the British group, see Gary Werskey, The Visible College
(New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1978) No such history exists of the Americans,
but a good starting point is Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement
in America (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1970) The latter volume deals with the postwar effort
of some Amencan phys1c1sts to respond to the decis1on of the Truman administration to use
the atom1c bomb as an instrument of war. Werskey' s study deals principally with British Left
sc1ent1sts 1n the 1930s. See also Ronald Clark, Haldane (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1984). Sadly, th1s biographer, fundamentally hostile to J. B. S. Haldane's political views,
makes l1ttle effort to understand his Marxism and the Social Relations of Science movement
of which he was a part, although not the most theoretically interesting member. See J. D.
Bernal, The Social Function of Science (London, 1939). for a fuller explication of the attempt
of this fascinating group to comprehend science in soc1al terms.
22 Christopher Caudwell, The Crisis in Physics (London: Bodley Head, 1950). This work, orig-
inally published in 1939, was perhaps the most sophisticated effort by any English-speaking
Marxist to deal w1th science as a discourse, hence subject to ideological influences. That is,
as Hyman Levy, one of the leading figures in the Social Relations of Science movement notes
in the Introduction to the volume, "any scientific theory IS necessarily the specialized de-
velopment of a general social view, even although those who init1ate the theory may be
profoundly unaware of the connection" (p. vi1i).
23 See especially Charles Sanders Peirce, "The F1xation of Belief," in Justus Buchler, ed., The
Philosophy of Pe1rce: Selected Writings (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1940); and
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962)
24 Francis Crick, Life Itself (New York: Touchstone Books. 1982).
25 Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York: V1ntage Books, 1970).
26 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Seabury Press.
1973)
27 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press, 1974).
28 Max Horkhe1mer. Critical Theory (New York: Continuum Books, 1972).
29 Loren Graham, Between Science and Values (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981 ).
30 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1970).
31 Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970); and, more recently, The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979).
32 Karl Popper, The Log1c of Sc1ent1fic Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1961 ).
33 John Dewey, "Ouest for Certainty," in John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 4, ed. J. Ann
Boyleston (Carbondale: Southern lllino1s University Press, 1984). p. 136.
34 Dewey, "Ouest for Certainty," p. 142.
35 Dewey, "Ouest for Certainty," p. 142.
36 Ludwig Fleck, The Genesis of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
See also Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Los Angeles: Sage Publications,
1980); and Arthur Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad(NewYork: Vintage Books, 1973).

536
 Stanley Aronowitz
All of these writers. in quite different ways, show the social constitution of what counts as
scientific knowledge. In particular. these works demonstrate the power of the scientific com-
munity in determining the truth value of the experimental and theoretical work itself. One
could also add the controversy surrounding the observations and theones of Immanuel Ve-
likovsky for ev1dence that Peirce was right: truth is defined by those professionally certified
to name 1t.
37 W. Newton-Smith. The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981 ).
Newton-Smith has made the most serious defense of the realist theory of science in many
years. His polemic against the relativ1sm of Popper. Kuhn. and Feyerabend is ably argued.
Yet this work. an internalist theory of scientific progress. remains unreflective about the way
in which sctentific rnethod is constituted socially. The charge that the Popperian school IS
an irrationalist theory stmply stacks the deck against every nonrationalist effort to challenge
the truth claims of science. As I have indicated above. this school remains. for the most
part. rationalist even if 1t does not accept a realist account.

537
 Discussion
Question
Since Husserl, European philosophy of science has recog-
nized the social and historical constitution of the objects, methods, and communities
of scientific inquiry. Even in Anglo-American philosophy of science, at least in the
current postempiricist phase, these claims are no longer controversial. The question
is, what follows from this? Does it follow that we cannot distinguish between sci-
entifically warranted assertions and ideological ones? Second, what do you mean by
ideology here? Third, how would you constitute scientific inquiry so that it is not
oriented to prediction and control?
Aronowitz
Let me start by saying that we have a different perception
of both Anglo-American philosophy of science and Marxist attempts to analyze the
question of scientific method. I have not encountered one critique of scientific method
as socially and historically constituted by activities that themselves may be construed
ideologically. Although Feyerabend studied the constitution of the scientific object
and the plurality of theories, Kuhn studied the constitution of scientific communities,
and Black studied the form of scientific results, they all ultimately defend the neu-
trality of science by appealing to the status of scientific method. I would argue that
scientific method-a method characterized by decontextualization and by the sep-
aration of quality from quantity-is itself a social activity. Furthermore, the issue
of intervention, which is an epistemological as well as a historical issue, has not
been addressed systematically. Finally, although European philosophy of science is
concerned with the effects of rationality, it does not challenge the nature of that
rationality. What we have are piecemeal defenses of plurality. For example, Fey-
erabend ultimately accepts the scientific method and shows that two theories, in-
commensurable with respect to their results, nevertheless refer rigorously to the same
object by means of their procedure. That procedure is held to be historically correct
because he never challenges the Popperian view of falsifiability, a view grounded in
the project of prediction and control.
Your second question addresses the concept of ideology. I
mean to suggest that there is a hegemonic discourse that is socially and historically
constituted. This ideology refers to its own conditions of discursive competence, on
the one side, and to a prevailing set of practices, on the other. The validity of science,
grounded in a theory of correspondence, depends upon the ability of scientific dis-
course to appear in a relation of verisimilitude with its own practices. Even the
Kuhnian theory of paradigm shifts never questions the relation between scientific
practices and what science calls the "real."
Your third question is how to reconstitute the object of sci-
entific knowledge. One example would be Ernesto Laclau's attempt to reconstitute
society as a set of discourses. A second example is Althusser's insistence that Marx
transferred the focus of scientific inquiry from people to society and the mode of
production. Once we recognize that we are constituting a counterhegemonic dis-
course whose relation to the real is forever problematic and linked to our own
political, social, and cultural practices, then we are free to do genuinely ecological
science, to do genuinely social science. Then the integration of linguistic theory, or
for that matter discourse theory, with the ongoing social practices of a putatively
radical movement can actually take place. As long as we insist on the closed system
of scientific inquiry, one in which both the object of knowledge and the methods
by which we know the world are fixed, we can never evolve into a critical science.
Thus the first task is a deconstruction that is ruthless, pitiless, and thoroughgoing,
including a deconstruction of our own scientific paradigm, which we call Marxism.

Question
Gramsci's Prison Notebooks-particularly the tenth and elev-
enth-deal with the question of science by responding to Vico's notion of scientific
certainty. What place does Gramsci's work have in your definition of science?
538
 Stanley Aronowitz
Aronowitz
I have attempted to avoid defining either science or ideology
because I think that such definitions become problematic by fixing the limits of this
kind of discourse. This refusal is a methodological, not a rhetorical, move. The
attempt to define them involves an infinite regress of the relationship between specific
hegemonic discourses and historically evolving social interests. We define as certain
those discourses that fix particular relations of the so-called natural and social worlds
and achieve thereby a kind of aesthetic elegance: as Christine Delphy suggests in
her paper, both scientific philosophy and science seek the utmost simplicity and the
greatest scope in the explanation of the world.
In this context, let me invoke Dewey, since, although I'm
interested in international Marxist and post-Marxist discussions, I want us to get
used to thinking and working with Americans. Otherwise we aren't going to make
any political progress in this country. John Dewey's Quest for Certainty discusses
the Gramscian point about hegemonic discourses and the relation between thought
and action. (I realize many people would think pragmatism old-fashioned. But wait
another five years and analytic philosophy of language will be relegated to the dust
bin temporarily because Rorty is raising questions about the role of warranted as-
sertability and pragmatic relations in the constitution of scientific discourse.) The
"quest for certainty" is always linked, particularly as a definition of science, to
moments of crisis. Certainty, as distinct from the actual practice of science, becomes
a kind of religiosity scientists invoke to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.
But Humpty Dumpty is rent; he will be put together again only temporarily. Our
temporary certainties will present themselves as science, when, in fact, they will be
hegemonic ideologies for a particular era.
This has important implications for reconstituting a critical
science, which must confront the necessity to understand itself and which can only
produce temporary certainties. In the old Frankfurt dialogue this is called "reflex-
ivity," not deconstruction: practices reflect upon and continually modify themselves
in recognition of their relativity and historicity in relation to social discourses and
social struggles.

Question
You are not denying-or are you-the claim of realism in
the last instance, that there is a moment that belongs to the world, a moment that
is being interrogated by scientific practices?
Aronowitz
I'm arguing something entirely different. It is evident that
there is a natural history prior to human development. It is evident that both physical
and biological states or levels of reality have an existence prior to the appearance
of human beings. Realism as a theory refers to the status of the referent and of
knowledge about the referent. I am arguing that the world of things, our world of
referents, is constituted by the practices and discourses of social life. This is no
different from Marx's notion of the humanization of nature and the naturalization
of "man." This applies not only to the world of everyday life, culture, and work,
but also to the world of the natural sciences. Most scientists and philosophers of
science do not accept this notion-that the referent is itself the product of historically
constituted activity. Once this becomes the new common sense, we can tum our
attention toward the new critical science I am talking about, a science devoted to
constructing a world out of utopian discourses.

Question
Would a critical science counteract the intrusion of techno-
logic into the moral-practical sphere of society?

539
 Aronowitz
The project of critical science is informed by the interests
of a counterhegemonic discourse. But the first task is to reduce the privileged space
that scientific and technological discourses occupy within social affairs. We need to
reintroduce ethical and moral considerations into social and discursive practices. As
long as science presents itself as anormative (outside the realm of ethical judgment),
we are caught in a circle of having to validate Marxism, feminism, or other oppo-
sitional practices in the terms set by the Enlightenment; that is, they are outside
rationality, even nonrational, with less claim than science to speak of the real. Science
presents itself as a neutral discourse, yet it is a mechanism of subordination; it
subordinates women, working people, black people.
There is, however, an antagonism within science. This mo-
ment of difference is, as Laclau has argued, produced by the confrontation between
two blocks of scientific discourse. Too many Marxists have apparently decided that
we need not struggle to produce this second, counterhegemonic science because they
have assumed that there is only one science. That's Habermas's argument.
Now let's talk about the technological element of this con-
flict. Technology is a system of reifications and discourses, one that hides a broad
range of ideological interests, including those of science. Marxists have always wanted
to separate the scientific from the technological in order to preserve the former and
appropriate it for themselves. That cannot be done. One has to make a thorough-
going, fundamental critique of the presuppositions ofboth, to show that the Greek
notion of techne as human practice has been radically disjoined from the notion of
technology. Technology, in turn, has become a new religion.

Comment (Ernesto Laclau)

I would like to comment on the Habermasian view of techno-
logic implicit in the question. I don't think that everything that happens in society
is the superstructural effect of an underlying technological reality. Such an assump-
tion is merely the return of a base/superstructure model. It assumes that everything
that is complex in society is so because we are only looking at the surface of social
life; but if we go to the ultimate ground or core of society, which in this case would
be technology, then we could reconstruct all surface diversity in terms of a system
of mediation. I don't think that either society or technology operates in such a way.
Technology itself is a discursive ensemble that depends on particular social and
historical conditions for its development. There are conditions of possibility of tech-
nology itself. The very idea of technology is a scientific abstraction, an analytic
abstraction, that combines many phenomena of a very different nature. I am not
saying that such abstractions are necessarily wrong. But I don't know whether sub-
suming these very different discursive practices under the term "technology" and
concluding that this hypostatization produces a unique domain of effects provides
a sound analysis. This is not to deny that these technological processes have a
tendency to autonomize themselves, to constitute a point de capitan, a nodal point
in society from which a plurality of effects with vast repercussions flow. But this
does not make technology an underlying mechanism of determination.

Question (Christine Delphy)

Our preoccupations seem to run along very similar lines. I
too am concerned with claims for scientific neutrality. I am particularly concerned
with the tendency for Marxists and radicals to take up this idea of the neutrality of
science for themselves, appropriating it and claiming they are the scientists. Would
you agree that one of the negative effects of Althusser's rereading of Marx in terms
ofthe epistemological break in his thought is that Marxism took the place of"bour-
geois" science by claiming its own scientific detachment from social practices? This
denies one of the basic findings (I prefer this term to "tenet," which has religious
overtones) of what I will call materialism, rather than Marxism, namely, that ideas
are socially situated. We cannot found a radical science on the claim that we are
540
 Stanley Aronowitz
not socially situated. This would contradict what a radical science would discover
about the world. Consequently, we must avoid assuming that it would be a good
thing if science were not socially situated.
Aronowitz
I would agree. Althusser's fundamental strategy for estab-
lishing the neutrality of science was the attempt to establish its objectivity, com-
mensurable with the objective status of any other possible science. One can also see
science as a secular activity. This would certainly not exempt it from the critique
of secularity from the perspective of historicity. That is the major move we have to
make, in which case we never make the claim that we are appropriating scientificity
in the old sense. At the same time I do not want to lose the word "science." What
I want to do is talk about a critical, interested, ideologically and ethically grounded
science that speaks for more than itself; it speaks for an emancipatory moment. (This
obviously raises questions of representation.) This is a different kind of epistemo-
logical break because we are not in the Enlightenment problematic. Then we can
talk about a new emancipation. But before we actually start to be technicistic about
it, we'd better ask what Habermas does of Marcuse: Show me your science. Don't
ask me to have a critical science unless you can show it to me. We need a Bacon
before we can have a Copernicus, and I don't mean this in terms of individuals. I
mean this now in terms of a whole new collective project.

541
 Sue Golding

The Concept of the Philosophy of Praxis

in the Quaderni of Antonio Gramsci

By argum~J that the philosophy of prax1s 1s 1tself the sc1

ence of h1stoncal process, Gramsc1 was able to g1vc
new depth and power to our not1ons of pol1trcs Indeed,
he emphas1zed that people create, 111 the conwxt of a
dynam1c history, rwt only what 11 IS to be human but
also what rt ouqht to be. The realm of revolutron<Hy
possrbtl1ty thereby lwcorll!;s ach1cvabl{~

That Gramsci chose to refer to marxism as the "phi-

losophy of praxis" rather than continually use the more colloquial expres-
sions "dialectical materialism" or "historical materialism"-or even the term
"marxism" itself-usually has been attributed to one of two reasons, some-
times both. The more common of the two dismisses the phrase as a strategic
camouflage necessary to divert the censorial gaze of the prison guards whose
duty it was-should they find proof that Gramsci's mind was still working
in any way, but particularly in an antifascist, pro-left way-to end, and end
abruptly, that mental activity. 1 The other reason cited, almost as frequently
and often in conjunction with the first, is that for Gramsci, whose intellectual
background was in classical German and Italian philosophy, marxism could
best be represented as a philosophy of "action" and, more specifically, a
philosophy whose improvement was bound up with revitalizing (in a slightly
refurbished form) its idealist and speculative roots. Hence, on the one hand,
we have long testimonials to the difficulty of reading the "real'' meanings
behind his strategically placed metaphor; and on the other, whole debates
are erupting over how "marxist" or "hegelian" (or crocean, gentilean, berg-
sonian, sorelian, even kantian) was the "real" philosophy of the Gramsci
prison notebooks. 2
But there is another way of grasping the fullness of
that expression, and that is to accept that when Gramsci tendered lengthy
or fragmented explanations of what he meant by the "philosophy of praxis"-
as he did repeatedly by way of direct or inferential comment-he meant
what he wrote. We shall discover that if we accept the development of his
arguments, which begin by dismissing notions of "man-in-general" and go
on to reformulate "science," "creativity," and "movement," we will be able
to understand more fully what makes the philosophy of praxis peculiarly
gramscian; and, more to the point, why that particular rendering is such a
vital contribution toward the notion of "progress" or, indeed, of "politics"
itself. It will be argued that what makes the philosophy of praxis so peculiarly
gramscian is not simply the fact that Gramsci relied on, or indeed found
refuge among, an entire set of philosophical inquiries that were partly at
odds with each other's systematic assumptions. Nor it is simply the fact
543
that his prison work included a vague form of shadowboxing with the great
novelists, artists, and political militants of the time. What makes Gramsci's
analysis "gramscian" is the kind of systematic answer he attempted to give
to a very basic question: what does it really mean-philosophically and
politically-to build a better society, as such, and for whom?
If we take that question as a starting point and read his frag-
mented commentaries not as a set of literal (and seemingly contradictory)
prescriptions about tactics or strategy, but rather as a discursive intervention
that attempts to address the problem from a variety of angles, we will find
that Gramsci's analyses detailing "reality" and "man's" place in it stand as
a crossroads, a transitional point as it were, to the more contemporary (and
no less controversial) debates erupting on the left today, debates that en-
compass, by way of Foucault, on the one hand, or Derrida, on the other,
movements of resistance, liberation, or change.
The Meaning of the "Political"
For Gramsci that discursive intervention begins, in part, by rais-
ing two rather old philosophical debates. The first had more to do with the
question of objectivity: that is, "can one write philosophy outside history,"
can it be autonomous from history, can there be a "general philosophy"
about philosophy-can it be objective? The second, while following closely
on the heels of the first, had a more particular focus: how does one reconcile,
or better, resolve once and for all, the age-old opposition between "man"
and nature, posed also as that between "man" and society, and now, in
twentieth-century terms, posed as an opposition between "man" and sci-
ence. It was in the context of attempting to determine what a "better" society
would (or ought to) be that the whole weight of philosophical tradition
tended to rely on these seemingly self-evident paired oppositions, which
sought "objectively" to grant to the Homo sapien a generalized essence,
distinct from and therefore focused around, God, the market, and, later,
science. Hence it was in this context, too, that when Gramsci asked, "In
what sense can one identify politics with history and hence all life with
politics?" he was searching for a way to end that continual philosophical
quest for the "objectivity" of the "external world" 3 which had brought with
it all those fossilized or preset conceptions around the so-called nature of
"man." 4
But if, as Gramsci rhetorically proposed, there could be no pol-
itics outside history, and hence no human activity outside politics-includ-
ing creating the human itself-how could this systematically be proposed
without appearing simply as a self-evident "truth" gleaned from Marx's
eleven Theses on Feuerbach? In attempting to answer that question, Gram sci
turned to, among others, the philosophical proposals of Vico and Croce
regarding their systematizing of "knowledge," "science," and the "aes-
thetic." And in attempting to "cleanse" these systems of their metaphysical
and idealist content, 5 Gramsci used them to make more precise the con-
ceptualizations proposed by Labriola and Marx: that history was no more
less than the practical-political activity of "man"; that philosophy was no
more nor less than the historical methodology of that practical-political
activity. 6
Like Croce, Gramsci took two points from Vico's New Science:
the first regarding "man's" ability to produce and comprehend knowledge,
544
 Sue Golding
encapsulated in Vico's well-known expression verum ipsum factum ("the
truth is what is done"); the second regarding Vico's argument that human
knowledge could only approach Truth, not equal truth per se. 7 To put it
another way, "truth" or "law" was something relative, always created, rather
than something static, dogmatic, or "carved in stone." In this context, Gram-
sci agreed with Croce that Vico's New Science broke with the "self-confi-
dence," as Croce called it, of cartesian philosophy, replacing Descartes's
ahistorical identity ''I think therefore I am" 8 with the controversial "history
is equal to science. " 9
However, Gramsci was attracted both to Croce's accent on phi-
losophy and science as that which incorporated Vico's verum ipsum factum
(philosophy, as a scientific methodology of the Real), as well as his insistence
against an "abstract" or "generalized" Philosophy, against, that is to say, a
philosophy without history, against a so-called neutral weltanschauung. 10
But what Gramsci found useful from Croce's work, in fact what he found
crucial for a philosophy of praxis, can be narrowed to three points: ( 1) the
concept of immanence/becoming (that is to say, creativity) as central to
"concrete" progress, which Gramsci linked to a democratic ideology;'' (2)
the concept of the "will" as a rational expression; that is, as a practical
expression of theoretical intellectual activity; and (3) Croce's insistence on
the ethical-political as the site of struggle, the point of arrival for progress
and change. 12
But in order to accept that there could be no such thing as a
"neutral" law or science or philosophy without raising the spectre of a dual
reality or lapsing into some sort of subjectivist idealism, these "borrowed"
arguments would have to be placed in their proper context. 13 For Gramsci,
that proper context was the realm of the political, where politics would be
understood not as the final moment of Spirit but as the point of departure,
the "first" moment, as it were, in the making of history. 14 It meant giving
real (i.e., objectively concrete) substance to political activity which had thus
far been hypostasized by crocean idealism as the point of arrival in the
unfolding of a "scientific" and "rational" (read: predictable) history. It meant
incorporating into a notion of politics the by-now cliched, machiavellian
insight that politics meant "the act of the possible"-strategically under-
standing and implementing progress and development. In short, it meant
breathing a dynamic, active-using Gramsci's specifically hegelian term, im-
manent-conception of politics into history and one of history into politics,
while maintaining their equivalence at the level of an "identity-in-distinc-
tion."15
More important, though, it meant that the very notion of progress
or development was dynamic rather than static; it did not have, ipso facto,
a set definition or prescription but rather involved a struggle, a political
struggle, to determine precisely what would be considered a "betterment"
of society, "progress" as such and for whom.' 6 In other words, what actually
constituted development or progress for Gramsci was not simply to be
conceived in terms of a logical (and linear) attribution of philosophical
reason; nor was it to be conceived simply in terms of a technological or
scientific "advance," or even as a "result" of technical and bureaucratic
foresight. 17 Rather, the meaning of "progress" was constituted as an active
elaboration and reconstruction of our theoretical and practical activity; or
545
to put it in Gramsci's words, an elaboration precisely mediated by, and as
a result of, politics. 18
The converse held true for Gramsci as well: not only that history
and philosophy must be placed in this proper context of the "political," but
that any and all philosophical/historical discourse entailed or expressed
political discourse-not a fixed or immutable politics, but a discourse arising
from specific circumstances borne out of specific relations between people
living in and acting on a particular society. So that in Machiavelli's Dis-
courses and The Prince, for example, we would find, following this line of
reasoning, not "abstract" suppositions about a "general" people and a so-
ciety, but a particular historical and political position regarding the rising
bourgeois classes and the formation of a new (in this case, liberal) society.' 9
The same could be said of Hegel, of Croce, even of Voltaire: their philo-
sophical and literary works, taken as a whole, elaborated a specific, though
not unitary or homogeneous, conception of humanity and society, as well
as specific theoretical and practical suppositions regarding progress and
change. 20
Gramsci would emphasize a similar point throughout his Quad-
erni: that the work of Marx and Engels, also that of Labriola (and to a lesser
extent Bergson and Sorel), initiated, or at least contributed to, a different-
and specific-theoretical and practical discourse concerning people and so-
ciety, progress and development. Gramsci contended that this "different
and specific" theoretical and practical discourse provided both a philo-
sophical and a political avenue, not only to disengage the notions of progress
and development, the will, and the ethical-political from Croce's speculative
(and, some would argue, liberal) logic, but also to acknowledge them as
central features of a "philosophy of praxis."
Gramsci was able to forward this argument about the centrality
of these notions precisely because of this deliberate conceptual slippage
around the notion of "the political" as being, at one and the same time,
creativity, immanence, mediation, and strategy. That is, he was able to
develop the argument on the basis of what he considered to be Marx's "real
dialectic," one that was based on "objective possibilities," one that coun-
terposed philosophy with history to bear as its fruit political struggle. 21 Using
Croce's language but Marx's dialectic, Gramsci arrived at what might first
appear an ingrown tautology: politics became the first, the last, and the
mediating moment of the Real.ZZ
That very conception of politics, slippery though it might be and
imbued as it was with speculative and idealist logic, committed the philos-
ophy of praxis to a theoretical and practical discourse distinct from-but
having been produced out of-its idealist, transcendentalist (one also could
say positivist) predecessors. If we turn now to the prison notebooks and
guide our attention by two further questions, we shall see how Gramsci
drew on Marx and Engels, less so on Labriola, Bergson, and Sorel, to detail
what has come to be known in contemporary debates on the philosophy of
praxis as the "specificity ofthe political," 23 and how that specificity marked
the conceptualizations of the "will," the ethical-political and historical
movement or progress as marxist expressions. The two questions are simply
these: What is science or the word "scientific"? What is the meaning of this
so-called real dialectic?
546
 Sue Golding
What Is Science/Scientific?
For Croce, science above all meant methodology, a "rational"-
that is, distinct and predictable-methodology capable of underwriting the
logic inherent in "pure" or "objectively" concrete Reality, outside of which
there could be no meaningful concept or knowledge. He named that meth-
odology Philosophy, the science of all pure expression, with the logical
proviso that his philosophy did not mean a "philosophy-in-general"-or,
for that matter, a "science-in-general"-but always entailed the specificity
of the (pure) historical moment. Indeed, speculative philosophy was pre-
cisely its "expression." But as Gramsci had recognized, this was a mechan-
ical teleology of prediction and evolution, which presented as ethical-polit-
ical an always already made "progress" neatly unfolding in history.
And yet Gramsci was not adverse to the point Croce was at-
tempting to make and resolve "from the speculative point of view": that
the concept of progress or development was something "rational" and hence
understandable; something "scientific" and therefore in some way both pre-
dictable and within the realm of possibility, that is, "obtainable." 24 The
question of science and scientific methodology was not an idle question
divorced from leftist political philosophy or practical politics. On the con-
trary, debates around the concept of science had long since crystallized on
the left between the so-called scientific marxists, on the one hand, and the
utopian socialists, on the other. 25 Indeed, the former brandished the all too
familiar "economic science" (reminiscent of the Second International) which,
as Gramsci would argue in his prison notes, conflated the "natural" sciences
with that of the "social" and thereby gave credence to the somewhat un-
fortunate mixed metaphor of the economy as the "anatomy" or "backbone"
of society. 26 This led to the equally unfortunate political analysis that not
only did society split rigidly along two "scientifically determined" class axes,
but also that the strategies to overcome, or better, overthrow, that persistent
split could best be calculated "with the precision of the natural sciences";
that is, according to carefully outlined predictions regarding the immanent
collapse of capital exchange, circulation, and its addendum, "bourgeois de-
cadent" life-style. 27
On the other hand, the utopian socialists-Proudhon, Owen, and
others (and one might include among this number the latter-day social
democrats)-were not ignorant of, nor antagonistic to, the ongoing debates
around "science" and its relation to leftist political practice. Indeed, it was
Marx who pointed out that the essential flaw in their "utopianism" lay
precisely in having conflated the concept of science with that of the Absolute,
that is to say, "value-free" Truth. 28 This equating of an absolute knowledge
with an absolute science committed the twin errors of regenerating in more
contemporary language the pre-vichean, or at best neo-kantian, assumptions
around the appropriation of a knowledge existing outside of history, while
at the same time it advanced as "progressive" the argument that a value-
free society (i.e., one based on "scientific certainty" devoid of any historical
specificity or "bias") could exist-in fact ought to exist-as the aim of dem-
ocratic struggle. 29 In this context, and in the name of scientific and tech-
nological objectivity, the rigid class reductionism of "scientific marxism"
was exchanged, mixed metaphors and all, for the empty abstraction of a
philosophical science and society sui generis.
Finally, there was one other appropriation of science that Gram-
sci criticized thoroughly and dismissed as "vulgar sociology," namely, the
547
scientism best represented by Bukharin's Popular Manua/.· 30 the attempt to
pose society as a system, system as science, and science as the search for
laws of causality (i.e., for the "eternal truths") or the single ultimate cause-
the age-old "search for God." 31 On a theoretical level, the assumptions of
the Manual lead to separating, and posing as distinctly opposite poles, phil-
osophical materialism which Bukharin described as the only "true philos-
ophy" -and the philosophy of praxis, or as Bukharin was inclined to call
it, "subjectivist sociology. " 32 For Gramsci, this meant that the worst aspects
of "scientific" and "utopian" marxism had been exhumed and recombined
for popular consumption, once again in the name of science, so that now
the "iron-clad laws" of historical movement found their raison d'etre with
the absolute truth of formal, positivistic logic. Decrying this mixture, Gram-
sci pointed to the major flaw in Bukharin's philosophical assumptions: the
conflation of "revolution" with "evolution," 33 or, more to the point, the
impossibility of revolutionary praxis, indeed, the impossibility of politics:
"The philosophy implicit in the Popular Manual could be called positivistic
Aristotelianism, an adaption of formal logic to the methods of physical and
natural science. The historical dialectic is replaced by the law of causality
and the search for regularity, normality and uniformity. But how can one
derive from this way of seeing things, the overcoming, the 'overthrow' of
praxis? In mechanical terms, the effect can never transcend the cause or the
system of causes, and therefore can have no development other than the
flat vulgar development of evolutionism. " 34
Gramsci then comes directly to the point: conceived as a way to
"predict" future events, or as a "logic" necessary to illuminate as fixed or
causal the chain of human history, or even as a "technology" promising a
value-free future, the concept of science has little to do with science properly
speaking.

The situating of the problem as a search for laws and

for constant, regular, and uniform lines is connected
to a need, conceived in a somewhat puerile and in-
genuous way, to resolve in a peremptory fashion, the
practical problem of the predictability of historical
events. Since it "appears," by strange inversion ofthe
perspectives, that the natural sciences provide us with
the ability to foresee the evolution of natural processes,
historical methodology is "scientifically" conceived [it
is thought] only if, and in so far as, it permits one
"abstractly" to foresee the future of society. Hence the
search for essential causes, indeed for the "first" cause,
for the "cause of causes." But the Theses on Feuerbach
had already criticized in advance this simplistic con-
ception. In reality, one can "scientifically" foresee only
the struggle, but note the concrete moments of the
struggle, which cannot but be the result of opposing
forces in continuous movement.... In reality one can
"foresee" to the extent that one acts, to the extent that
one applies a voluntary effort and therefore contrib-
utes to creating the result "foreseen."
548
 Sue Golding
... [Consequently] it is necessary to pose
in exact terms the problem of predictability of histor-
ical events in order to be able to criticize exhaustively
the conception of mechanical causalism, to rid it of
any scientific prestige and reduce it to a pure myth
which perhaps was useful in the past in a backward
period of development of certain subaltern social
groups.
But it is the concept itself of "science," as
it emerges from the Popular Manual, which requires
to be critically destroyed. It is taken root and branch
from the natural sciences, as if these were the only
sciences or science par excellence. ... [But] to think
that one can advance the progress of a work of sci-
entific research by applying to it a standard method
to which it was naturally suited, is a strange delusion
which has little to do with science. 35
Gramsci's conception of science and, more important, his em-
phasis on "scientific method" as the fundamental method for a philosophy
of praxis, at first glance, may not have appeared altogether different from
the positions he was challenging, for it, too, focused on logic, predictability,
"laws" ofhistorical movement, "economic science," even "truth." The dif-
ference, of course, lay in the manner in which he reinterpreted Hegel's posing
of the "rational" and "real" and the dialectic of that unity. That is, the
difference lay precisely in the way Gramsci posed the unity of logic, truth,
economics, law, and movement as the dialectic between history, philosophy,
and politics; a unity he named "science" (rather than Spirit) or, to use the
phrase Gramsci borrowed from Vico, "the new science." 36 However, this
apparent self-defining (and hence seemingly transparent) definition of sci-
entific method = philosophy/history/politics = science37 actually encom-
passed a rather specific and meaningful content, for Gramsci had recon-
structed the "rational" and the "real."
On the one hand, the "rational" appropriately entailed "theo-
retical activity." Indeed, it entailed both "intuitive" or commonsensical and
intellectual reasoning, closely related to what Gramsci often suggested was
Ricardo's methodological approach: the method of logical deduction based
on the premise of"supposing that." 38 On the other hand, the "real" entailed
"practical activity," that is, the "sensuous, objective [gegenstandlichej ac-
tivity" embodied in the first Theses on Feuerbach. 39 It was this "real" activity
that Gramsci would elaborate upon as "necessary,"40 useful, 41 created out
of human will; 42 indeed, as an expression of "life" itself. 43 In this context,
the "rational" gave way to science (i.e., science as reason and/or method);
whereas the "real" implied all human action, that is, history. But this "ra-
tional" activity, although distinct from the "real," was the logical premise
without which the "real" had no "concrete" meaning. That is to say, the
rational and the real were not negations of each other, nor were they op-
posites. Rather, they were distincts; the distincts of "science and life," 44 of
"philosophy and history," 45 where that active unity of"the rational and real
becomes one," where that unity forms a "historic bloc," that is, entails a
specific, necessary history, "necessary" precisely because it is created out of
549
the relation between the "thoughts and actions" of humankind and our
environment. 46 Relying on the third Theses on Feuerbach, Gramsci con-
cluded: "The unity of science and life is precisely an active unity, in which
alone liberty of thought can be realized; it is a master-pupil relationship,
one between the philosopher and the cultural environment.... In other
words, it is the relationship between philosophy and history." 47
This active unity of theoretical and practical knowledge is what
Gram sci named "science." But he was referring to "science" -indeed, to
politics as well-in two different senses: "science" as discovery (i.e., "cre-
ation") and "science" as methodology (i.e., as traditional philosophy):
Is not science itself "political activity" and political
thought, in as much as it transforms men and makes
them different than what they were before? If every-
thing is "politics," then it is necessary-in order to
avoid lapsing into a wearisome and tautological cat-
alogue of platitudes-to distinguish by means of new
concepts between, on the one hand, the politics which
corresponds to that science which is traditionally called
"philosophy" and, on the other, the politics which is
called political science in the strict sense. If science is
the "discovery" of formerly unknown reality, is this
reality not conceived of, in a certain sense, as tran-
scendent? And is it not thought that there still exists
something "unknown" and hence transcendent? And
does the concept of science as "creation" not then
mean that it too is "politics"? Everything depends on
seeing whether the creation involved is "arbitrary," or
whether it is rational-i.e., "useful," to men in that it
enlarges their concept of life, and develops life itself
to a higher level. 48
In this context, there is no longer a "science-in-general," nor even the "sci-
ence" of crocean speculative history-philosophy. It is the science of a specific
history and politics, a politics-as-science, as it were, a "political science,"
the methodology of philosophical-political activity or, more precisely, of
"praxis." 49 It is out of this unity, in other words, that a philosophy of praxis
emerges.
But it is in Gram sci's readdressing and reposing of the problem
of "scientific truth" that he consolidated the complexity (and importance)
ofhaving recouped as fundamental to the concept of a philosophy of praxis
this active unity of the rational and the real. In the briefly sketched criticisms
around the uses of science in terms of philosophical method and political
practice, Gramsci already had pointed out that "scientific truth" often is
taken to mean three separate things: (1) "orthodoxy," meaning that which
is or should entail a philosophically systematic "purity"; (2) "objectivity,"
meaning that which is cleansed of historical "bias" or, to apply Gramsci's
term borrowed (again) from Croce, something free from "error"; and (3)
"prediction," meaning, in this context, a rational interpretation of a present
or future practical activity according to the laws of historical movement.
Yet, although Gramsci's conception of"scientific truth" within a philosophy
550
 Sue Golding
of praxis included these three elements, their meanings were altered radically
by incorporating the "rational" and the "real" in the way outlined above.
Thus, as marxist theory had as its origin "the three cultural move-
ments" of French materialism, German idealism and English political econ-
omy-indeed, since it had emerged as the synthesis of these movements and
could be called the "coronation of modem culture" 50-orthodoxy, as applied
to marxist theory and understood in this "pure" sense, could only produce
a contradiction in terms. Developing his position in part from Labriola's
arguments around the "scientificity and autonomy" of the philosophy of
praxis, Gramsci considered "orthodoxy" to mean philosophic "totality,"
"self-sufficiency," that is, a break from traditional culture, without which a
theory could not be revolutionary.
Orthodoxy is not to be looked for in this or that ad-
herent of the philosophy of praxis, or in this or that
tendency connected with currents extraneous to the
original doctrine, but in the fundamental concept that
the philosophy of praxis is "sufficient unto itself," that
it contains in itself all the fundamental elements needed
to construct a total and integral conception of the world,
a total philosophy and theory of natural science, and
not only that but everything that is needed to give life
to an integral practical organization of society; that is,
to become a total civilization.
This concept of orthodoxy, thus renewed,
helps to give a better definition to the attribute "rev-
olutionary.... " 51
Consequently, "orthodox" as applied to the philosophy of praxis means not
only that its origins are "impure" but also that if it indeed produces a new
weltanschauung, a new world outlook, that outlook can never be "pure" or
"neutral" or "general." It always entails error, namely, historical specificity.
So, although this orthodoxy is presented as an autonomous or
totalizing rupture from tradition, it is not meant as a break from history.
Gram sci's conception of "objectivity" or "objective truth" -meaning that
which can only be "humanly objective" 52-put into question the attempts
to find refuge in pure systems, pure philosophies, or pure technologies,
indeed, pure "truths" devoid of specificity or error. 53 What makes "truth"
real, that is, what gives it any meaning, is its subjectivity to history-a point
Marx clearly outlined in his Preface and one to which Gramsci continually
referred: '"My investigation,' to quote Marx, 'led to the result that legal
relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves
nor from the so-called development of the human mind, but rather have
their roots in the material conditions of life.' ... " 54 And so, relying here on
Vico's verum ipsum factum, insisting on the importance of Croce's theory
of distincts, denying the kantian supposition of an external objectivity to
reality, and grounding "objectivity" itself in the unity of the theoretical and
practical activity (i.e., the "rational" and the "real") as expressed in both
the Preface and Theses on Feuerbach, Gramsci argued that truth is never
"pure," never devoid of (or negated by) error, and never exists outside of
historical, that is to say, human, construction:
551
 Objective always means "humanly objective." ... [for]
what would North-South or East-West mean without
man? ... Obviously East and West are arbitrary and
conventional, that is, historical, constructions, since
outside history every point on earth is East and West
at the same time .... And yet these references are real;
they correspond to real facts, they allow one to travel
by land and by sea, to arrive where they have decided
to arrive, to "foresee" the future, to objectivize reality,
to understand the objectivity of the external world.
Rational and real become one.

Without having understood this relationship [of ob-

jective identified with universal subjective, rational
identified with real], it seems one cannot understand
the philosophy of praxis, its position in comparison
with idealism and mechanical materialism.... 55

Because we can only "know" reality, can only "know" what exists
(otherwise we would return to some form of transcendentalism or mysti-
cism), the argument that "objective truth" entails historic specificity also
bears on Gramsci's concept of "prediction": it can never be "scientific"; it
can never be an act of knowledge as such. "And how could prediction be
an act of knowledge?" Gramsci remarked rhetorically; "one knows only
what has been and what is, not what will be, which is something 'non-
existent' and therefore unknowable by definition." 56 In Gramsci's estima-
tion, "prediction" has been confused with "science" precisely because the
concept "law," and more particularly "law of historical movement," has
been rigidified, itself confused with "permanency" and "automatism" and
equated to formal logic. But, if we again follow Vico on this point, law can
be nothing other than tendency, probability, regularity. Indeed, it is with
Ricardo's scientific discoveries in the field of political economy that this
connection between law and history is made more specific; that is, in the
"concept and fact of determined market: i.e., the scientific discovery that
specific and permanent forces have risen historically and that the operation
of these forces presents itself with a certain 'automatism' .... " 57
But the question for Gramsci is not one, as he puts it, "of 'dis-
covering' a metaphysical law of'determinism', or even establishing a 'gen-
eral' law of causality." 58 The question is precisely how relatively permanent
forces are constituted and maintained in history. This is where "prediction"
reenters. Prediction, if not an act of knowledge, was for Gramsci a "practical
act," the practical politics of creating consensus, of creating the result "fore-
seen"; the practical politics of establishing a collective will, of creating virtue
as both "vital impulse" and "fortuna." 59 In other words, it is the practical
political activity of creating "what ought to be," of creating the realm of
possibilities. In this sense prediction is a part of the ethical-political moment,
indeed, a part of progress. 60 Moreover, because prediction is practical ac-
tivity (i.e., "real," and not a metaphysical event), it is connected to the law
of tendency, necessity, even change. But the more complex answer to the
question ofhow prediction constitutes (at least in part) development, praxis-
552
 Sue Golding
indeed, what is meant by this notion of change and progress-was detailed
by Gramsci through the concept of immanence and by what he called the
"real" dialectic.
The "Real" Dialectic
Gramsci reasoned that science means both creative discovery and
the methodology of that creation (i.e., the methodology of history in the
making). Thus he proceeded with a notion of science that operates on two
levels: as theoretical or practical activity, 61 and as the unified expression of
that activity-as the "organic unity of history, politics and economics" or
the unified expression of the "rational and real," outside of which there is
no meaningful concept or knowledge. Accordingly, because Gramsci situ-
ated-as did others before him-the rational and real within history, as a
part of history, as well as an expression of history itself, that theoretical-
practical activity is always "man-made" necessary, rational. 62 This led
Gramsci to conclude that there can be no omnipotent truth devoid of human
activity or historical specificity, nor can there be an underlying, arbitrary,
or general logic to knowledge or scientific methodology. Indeed, it allowed
him to argue that there can be no "science-in-general" and that, in this
context, scienza (science/knowledge) is "political."63
But to reason as Gramsci did-that is, to acknowledge and em-
phasize as continuous this "organic unity" while developing these arguments
about science and philosophy in terms of a creativity and method "rooted"
in history-is not what divorces Gramsci's philosophy of praxis from the
difficulties encountered either in Vico's dualist development of truth and
certainty as science or from the transcendental metaphysics of the kantian
categories of knowledge. Nor is it that emphasis which divorces the phi-
losophy of praxis from the speculative "history" of Croce's idealist Spirit,
or even from the "vulgar evolutionism" of mechanistic or reductionist ma-
terialism. Finally, it is not simply this emphasis on science as history or
politics that prevents the subsequent equivalences of history, politics, sci-
ence, and philosophy from becoming an indistinguishable swamp of con-
ceptual identity. What separates the philosophy of praxis from these so-
called philosophical errors and, moreover, what prevents it from lapsing
into simple tautological reasoning is the way in which the "historical" in
"historical materialism" is understood. 64
For Gramsci, this "knowing how" meant not only conceptual-
izing history as an active unity of theoretical and practical activity, or as
the synthesis ofthe rational and real, or even as an expression of movement,
but also conceptualizing concretely what the terms "active unity," "syn-
thesis," expression," and "movement" actually mean in the philosophy of
praxis. It is thus the full comprehension of what it means to "take" the
hegelian dialectic and "stand it on its feet"; the full comprehension of how
the "real" dialectic is conceptualized in the philosophy of praxis, what it
means to say that it is the heir of German philosophy, French cultural
politics, and English political economy, and why that conception removes
it from its transcendentalist, materialist, idealist, even positivist roots-
namely, why it is "orthodox," totalizing, a break from tradition. In short,
knowing how the "historical" of historical materialism is conceptualized is
precisely knowing the meaning of immanence or becoming, and why Gram-
sci often emphasized that that is the central conception in the philosophy
of praxis or, indeed, is the philosophy of praxis itsel£ 65
553
 Gramsci wrote in a fragment called Speculative Immanence and
Historicist or Realist Immanence,
it is affirmed that the philosophy of praxis was born
on the terrain of the highest development of culture
in the first half of the nineteenth century, this culture
being represented by classical German philosophy, En-
glish classical economics and French political litera-
ture and politics.... But in what sense is the affir-
mation to be understood? That each of these
movements has contributed respectively to the elab-
oration of the philosophy, the economics, and the pol-
itics of the philosophy of praxis? Or that the philos-
ophy of praxis has synthesized the three movements,
that is, the entire culture of the age, and that in the
new synthesis, whichever "moment" one is examin-
ing, the theoretical, the economic, or the political, one
will find each of these three movements present as a
preparatory "moment"? This seems to me to be the
case. And it seems to me that the unitary "moment"
of synthesis is to be identified in the concept of im-
manence, which has been translated from the specu-
lative form, as put forward by classical German phi-
losophy, into an historicized form with the aid of
French politics and English classical economics. 66
This "unitary" moment, this so-called synthesis, conditioned as it were by
its distinct "preparatory moments," is not a starting point of investigation
or knowledge; it is not a "point of departure." 67 Nor is it unitary in the
sense of an indivisible, static, or eternal subjectivity, a "thing-in-itself."
Rather, it is a unitary moment in the sense of representing the epoch or
bloc of a "history in the making," where that historical epoch, bloc, spirit,
or culture of the age is precisely and always an expression of our theoretical
and practical creativity or, to use Gramsci's phrase, an expression of absolute
historicized immanence. 68
But for the fuller, more developed meaning of this "arrival," this
so-called absolute historicized immanence, Gramsci directed our attention,
once again, to the Theses on Feuerbach. He commented that, in the first
thesis, the unity of the theoretical and practical activity referred to by Marx
is precisely the dialectical unity of matter and "man," where matter is under-
stood to mean the material forces of production, the "economic elements, " 69
whereas "man" is understood to mean "the complex social relations" or,
"more exactly, the process of his actions." 70 But as we have seen, since
Gramsci acknowledged that for the philosophy of praxis there is no such
thing as an objective truth free from error, no truth outside history, no
thing-in-itself, this suggests that the meaning of both matter and "man" is
constructed in and by reality and that, consequently, there neither exists a
general or pure economic science nor a natural "man" or "man-in-general."
In other words, the meaning of "what is man" is always subject to history;
it is historically created, "changes with changes in the circumstances," is
the "synthesized" unitary moment of our theoretical and practical activity.
554
 Sue Golding
It is a meaning that Gramsci argued is always, consequently, in the process
of becoming. 71 This led him to conclude, as well, that not only is the meaning
of"what is man" a historical creation, but that meaning itself is a historical
creation. 72 Meaning is also, in other words, the synthesized unitary expres-
sion of our creation, our theoretical and practical activity. It implies dis-
covery, possibility, change-but not of an arbitrary kind, that is, not of a
kind without foundation in the distinct preparatory moments of the rational
and real. Meaning, which changes continually with changes in the circum-
stances, is constructed out of both the realm of necessity and the realm of
possibility, where necessity is not opposed to possibility. Rather, necessity
is the condition without which the realm of possibility could not exist; or,
more to the point, meaning is always an expression of historicized imma-
nence, of becoming.
By rendering Vico's verum ipsumfactum into the "real" dialectic,
meaning was, for Gramsci (as he claimed it was for Marx), rational, nec-
essary, the "universal-subjective," always in relation to (and created out of)
this process of change, this process called history. 73 Science, then, is the
methodology of this "coherent unitary expression" of the rational and the
real; it becomes linked with the notions of regularity, law of tendency, ne-
cessity, certainty. Even humanity itself is this coherent unitary expression
(or synthesis) of a people acting in, acting on, and creating anew, not only
themselves, but "the inherited living nightmares of the dead," or, in a word,
society. This coherent unitary expression, this active unitary or process, was
Gramsci's historicized immanence, his "absolute humanism," his "becom-
ing," the "critical act," making the rational and real more "coherent"; in
short, a return to the terrain of politics.
But it is a politics that includes on its terrain not only a histo-
ricized rationality and necessity but the realm of the possible, where pos-
sibility is connected to necessity. If, as Marx concluded in the Theses on
Feuerbach, the "critical act" is the politics of creating from the unity of
theoretical and practical activity "changes in the circumstances," then pol-
itics is also, to quote Gramsci's reference to Machiavelli and sleight-of-hand
to Croce, "the art of the possible." It is this politics as the art of the possible-
or the dialectic it implies-that became for Gramsci the cornerstone of his
attack against Bukharin's "flat, vulgar evolutionism" of mechanical mate-
rialism and the "pure historical movement/progress" of Croce's "scientific-
utopianism." Scorning the fact that both Bukharin and Croce (he included
here the "actual idealists" as well as other "scientific" and "orthodox" marx-
ists) acknowledged that material conditions change with changes in the cir-
cumstances, they did so by "forgetting" that it is people who change cir-
cumstances; and they did so neither out of arbitrary speculation nor out of
carefully developed predictions around the iron-clad laws of historical de-
velopment. "The uneducated and crude environment has dominated the
educator," conceded a sarcastic Gramsci, "rather than the other way around.
If the environment is the educator, it too must be educated, but the Manual
does not understand this revolutionary dialectic. " 74
What is so revolutionary about the real dialectic is precisely this
point about becoming and change as not only linked to necessity, the rational
and real (i.e., history) but as linked to possibility, to freedom; as a result,
the realm of possibility is not simply conceivable, it is obtainable. 75 More-
over, in so historicizing immanence, Gramsci was able to reemphasize that
555
the power to overcome or overthrow, change or make society better, does
not materialize out of the air but is born from the old society itself-from
human activity, knowledge, science, in all its impure senses. That "no new
society ever emerges without the seeds of its development having first been
planted in the old" means precisely that the old is the necessary condition
without which the new cannot be realized, and that the passage from ne-
cessity to freedom is always a political-or critical-act, the synthetic unity
of theory and praxis.
But it also means that the struggle to create society, and what it
means to talk about, develop, and maintain a better one, a progressive
society as such and for whom, is also and always a political struggle, a
struggle of becoming, a struggle around potentiality, a struggle to unite the
"preparatory moments" of the rational and real into a "unitary moment,"
one that is never permanent, static, or arbitrary but forms instead a "historic
bloc." It is a struggle that involves making more coherent both concrete
will (as the first moment of our practical-political activity) and the ethical
morality appropriate to it, that is, the articulating of and/or creating anew
the ethical assumptions underlying any conception of the world. And that
making "more coherent" the synthetic unitary moment-which, as we have
seen, is always actively political and one not divorced from history-marks
the "passage" or "catharsis" from the old society to the new. Its realization
is precisely what Gramsci called "ethico-political hegemony": the political
battle to transform society.
The proposition contained in the "Preface to a Con-
tribution to the Critique of Political Economy" ...
should be considered as an affirmation of epistemo-
logical and not simply of psychological and moral
value. From this, it follows that the theoretical-prac-
tical principle of hegemony has also gnoseological sig-
nificance, and here it is that Illich's greatest theoretical
contribution to the philosophy of praxis should be
sought. ... The realization of a hegemonic apparatus,
in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, deter-
mines a reform of consciousness and of methods of
knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical
fact. In Crocean terms: when one succeeds in intro-
ducing a new morality in conformity with a new con-
ception of the world, one finishes by introducing the
conception as well; in other words one determines a
reform of the whole of philosophy.
[Moreover] structure and superstructures form an
"historical bloc," that is to say the complex, contra-
dictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures
in the reflection of the ensemble of social relations of
production.... that is, that the "rational" is actively
and actually real. This reasoning is based on the nec-
essary reciprocity between structure and superstruc-
ture, a reciprocity which is nothing other than the real
dialectical process. 76
556
 Sue Golding
[Finally it can be said that] the term "catharsis" can
be enployed to indicate the passage from the purely
economic (egoistic-passional) to the ethico-political
moment.... This also means the passage from "ob-
jective to subjective" and from "necessity to free-
dom." Structure ceases to be an external force which
crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him
passive; and it is transformed into a means of freedom,
an instrument to create a new ethico-political form
and new sources of initiatives. To establish the "ca-
thartic" moment becomes, therefore, it seems to me,
the starting point for all the philosophy of praxis, and
the cathartic process coincides with the chain of
syntheses which have resulted from the evolution of
the dialectic. 77
Gramsci himself did not, because he could not, develop a the-
oretical framework for detailing the cathartic moment, for while able to
redress the problems of reductionism and dogmatic orthodoxy by incor-
porating into the marxist dialectic a notion of science as philosophy of
praxis, he did so, in the end, by reintroducing a teleological notion of the
economic moment. Thus, while emphasizing people's participation in cre-
ating permanency and change, while emphasizing that we create, in the
context of that dynamic history, not only the very notion of what it is to
be human but also what it ought to be, as such and for whom, his analytic
discussion could not readily account for why certain popular movements
might emerge (or the forms they might take) without having to reintroduce
a self-contained, homogeneously defined economic notion of class. It is as
if, by posing this double entendre of science as both creativity and law,
Gramsci was able to take us to a precipice over which he himself could not
leap, namely, the entire rethinking of politics. But the leap he could not
make was the very terrain of what, in contemporary terms, has been labeled
"discourse theory" -that is to say, the very terrain of reanalyzing the mi-
croprocesses of how the political may be constructed; how meaning is es-
tablished, made permanent, or changed.
To put it slightly differently, Gramsci's concept ofthe philosophy
of praxis provides the necessary-but not sufficient-conditions for analyzing
and intervening in the processes of social construction. Unlike the work of
Foucault, Gramsci's framework cannot explain the movement of how, per-
haps even why, for example, societal norms became "medicalized" or even
how the advent of changing sexual attitudes resulted in the emergence of
various sexual categories and laws regulating their proliferation. Only in the
most general terms can Gramsci's nonreductionist notion of the political
account for the wide range of social movements that have been named
"liberation" movements-the women's movement, the black civil rights
movement, or even the gay movement.
This gap, as it were, in Gramsci's work should not blind us to
the importance of his insights, particularly for the contemporary debates
erupting on the left around notions of science, indeed, politics itself. By
arguing that the concept of the philosophy of praxis is itself the "science"
of the absolute historicized dialectic, Gramsci was able to begin to reem-
phasize and relocate all the various manifestations of the political. It be-
557
comes a complete denial of a dual reality, the complete historicization of
the rational and the real, the posing as "active" of the synthesis of their
unity, an activity that is nothing less than politics. And therewith comes
the complete recognition that it is people, and people alone, who possess
the ability to intervene in and change that process called history.

Notes

This is not to imply that censorship or, indeed, prison life itself did not take an exacting toll
on Gramsci's ab1lity to think, let alone write. But it is to suggest that some scholars writing
on Gramsci's Ouaderni have been somewhat sidetracked by the fact as well as the brutality
of his imprisonment. so that it becomes an explanatory feature of his code names for Lenin
[lllich] or Trotsky [Bronstein]; indeed, it becomes an explanatory feature in which unfamiliar
concepts are attributed as, at least in part, code names. See, for example, "General Intro-
duction,·· 1n Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trans. and ed. Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Noweii-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). pp. xxi-xxv.
References to the official Italian edition, Quaderni del carcere: Edizone dell' lnstituto Gramsci,
ed. Valentino Gerrantana, 4 vols. (Torino: Einaudi, 1977). are by volume number (roman).
notebook (QC) number, section, page numbers, and cross-reference (cr.) or further citation
to the earlier or later versions by Gramsci himself.
2 The attempts to "uncover" the "real" Gramsci are scattered throughout the literature. The
well-known attempts to explain the Ouaderni as leninism par excellence are by the Italian
Communist Party (PCI). Less bold but equally sympathetic to the leninist interpretations are,
for example, Palmira Togliatti, On Gramsci and Other Writings, ed. Donald Sassoon (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1979); Christine Buci-Giucksmann, Gramsci and the State, trans.
David Fernbach (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975). In the backlash against official
translations of the PCI, and in part to recuperate the complex meaning obscured by those
translations, several articles appeared that replaced the various forms of leninism with various
forms of idealism. See, for example, Maurice A. Finachiaro, "Gramsci's Crocean Marxism,"
Telos. 41 ( 1979). pp. 7-32; Paul Piccone, "Gramsci's Hegelian-Marxism," Political Theory,
2:1 (1974), pp. 32-45.
3 Quaderni Ill, QC 13 [1 0]. p. 1569; Prison Notebooks, p. 137, for first quote; Ouaderni II,
QC 10 [40], pp. 1290-91; Prison Notebooks, pp. 367-68.
4 Gramsci argued in the philosophical fragments of the Ouaderni that the "answer" to the
question "What is man?" always carries with it historically constructed assumptions on the
nature of humankind. But the question for Gramsci was not "What is man?" Rather, the
question was "What can man become?" This implies a notion of potentiality and possibility,
not only for every individual, but for society as well-the "terrain" on which our "becoming"
is realized. In short, it implies a notion of politics that deals with the "art of the possible."
Although this point is central and will be elaborated further in the second part of this essay,
cf. Ouaderni II, QC 10 [54] and Prison Notebooks, pp. 351, 354-5 7.
5 "Cleanse" is precisely the word Gramsci used when referring to a resystematizing of idealist-
even transcendental and positivist-philosophy for use in a philosophy of praxis. Cf. Ouaderni
II, QC ii [301]. p. 1443 and Prison Notebooks, p. 466.
6 See, for example, Ouaderni II, OC, 7 [33]. "Posizone del problema," p. 881, and QC 11
[70]. "Antonio Labriola," pp. 1507-9; Ouadernilll, QC 16 [2]. "Ouistioni di metoda," pp.
1840-44; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 361, 386-88, 382-86, respectively.
7 Vico's most well known work, The New Science, went through several editions where major
changes occurred in the logic. The most profound break was the difference between his
1725 version and that of 1730 (later merely updated in 1744). For his earlier dualist for-
mulation dividing knowledge between that of "man" and that of God, see excerpts contained
in Vico, Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Leon Pompa (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982). pp. 81-158. His later formulations are collected from the ( 1744) third edition,
The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas G. Bergen and Max H. Fisch (New
York: Cornell University Press. 1948). hereafter referred to as The New Science (Ill). Cf.
Ouaderni II, QC 11 [54]. p. 1482; earlier version, QC 8 [199]. "Unita della teoria e della
practica," p. 1060; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 364.
8 Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, trans. R. G. Collingwood, (London: Howard
Latimer. 1913), pp. 2, 5.
9 Croce, pp. 32, 33-35; see also Alfonsina A. Grimaldi, The Universal Humanity of Giambattista
Vico (New York S. F. Vanni, 1958). pp. 247-53.

558
 Sue Golding
10 It should be pointed out here. of course. that Gramsci was not strictly relying on Croce's (or
even Vico's) debat1ng pomts about sc1ence, a point I will clarify shortly. Suffice 11 to quote
Gramsc1 himself on his reference to Lenin (lllich) and Marx: "Statement of the problem:
Product1on of new Weltanschauugen to fertilize and nourish the culture of a historical epoch.
and philosophically directed production according to the original Weltanschauugen. Marx IS
the creator of a Weltanschauug. But what is lllich's position? Is it purely subordinate and
subaltern? The explanation is to be found in Marxism itself as both sc1ence and action. The
passage from utopia to science and from science to action. The foundation of a directive
class [classe dingente] (i.e. of a state) is equivalent to the creation of a Weltanschauung."
Prison Notebooks. p. 381; cr. Ouaderni II, OC 7 [33]. p. 881.
11 Although this point will be clarified directly, I refer the reader to Ouaderni II, OC 10 [48. 11].
pp. 1335-36, and OC 10 [40]. pp. 1290-91; cr. Prison Notebooks. pp. 35 7-58, 367-68,
for a general indication of the direction the argument will follow.
12 Cf. Ouaderni II, OC [6]. pp. 1244-45.
13 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [59]. p. 1486; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 346.
14 Ouaderni Ill, OC 13 [1 0]. pp. 1568-69; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 137.
15 The precise mean1ng of "immanence" as Gramsc1 used it will be developed more fully later.
But for the general outline of the argument. see "Immanence and the Philosophy of Praxis,"
Prison Notebooks, pp. 449-52. Cr. Ouaderni II, QC 11 [28]. pp. 1438-39; cf. OC 11 [24].
"lllinguaggio e le metafore," pp. 1426-28; OC 11 [22.1V], pp. 1424-26; cr. Prison Note-
books, "The Dialectic," pp. 434-36. For a brief reference to "d1stincts" (universal concepts
that hold their separate 1dentit1es when originally developed by Croce to refute Hegel's po-
sitioning around dialectical synthesis). see Ouaderni Ill, OC 13 [1 0]. pp. 1568-70; cr. Prison
Notebooks, pp. 137-38.
16 See in particular Quaderni II, OC 10 [48.11 L pp. 1335-38; cr. Prison Notebooks. "Progress
and Becoming," pp. 350-57. See also Gramsc1's "Che cosa e l'uomo?" QC 10 [54]. pp.
1343-46; cr. Pnson Notebooks, pp. 357-60.
17 A brief but concise statement can be found in Ouaderni II, OC 6 [135]. "Pasato e presente.
II fordismo," pp. 799-800.
18 This a complex point which draws on Croce's usage of "concordia discors" as well as on
the Theses on Feuerbach regarding pract1cal and theoretical act1vity and the1r dialectical un1ty.
It forms a basis upon which the notion of organic intellectual and ethical-political hegemony
can be further articulated. For an indication of the direction 1n which Gramsci developed it
in terms of "organic Intellectuals" and hegemony, see Ouaderni II, OC 11 [12]. nota 1, pp.
1385-87; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 334-35. For general comment on the theory praxis
nexus and its relation to science, see Ouaderm II, OC 8 [199]. p. 1060; updated version
OC 11 [54]. p. 1482; cr. Prison Notebooks. For Croce's development of "concordia discors"
in relation to pract1cal act1vity, cf. What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel.
trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan, 1915). pp. 15-17; and The Philosophy of Spint.
vol. 1: Aesthetic m Science of Express1on. trans. D. A1nslie (London: Macmillan, 1909). pp.
220-22
19 In general, this is a point clearly articulated and elaborated upon in the work of C. B. Mac-
pherson. For his well-known arguments regarding the specificity of the assumptions in theories
of liberalism, see The Theory of Possessive Individualism· From Hobbes to Locke (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1962). esp. "The Roots of Liberal-Democratic Theory," pp. 1-8,
and pp. 166-67, 192-93 regarding (in brief) the assumptiOns of Machiavelli.
20 For example, cf. Ouaderni Ill, OC 20 [4]. "Azione Cattolica, ecc.," pp. 2101-3; also cf.
Ouaderni I, QC 5 [141]. "Cattolici integrali, gesuiti, modernisti," p. 672.
21 Ouaderni 11, OC 10 [48.11]. p. 1338; cr. Prison Notebooks, "Progress and Becoming," p.
360.
22 This IS to point out the following: ( 1) that Gramsci argued for a conception of politics as
"practical activity," which he equated with "will" and deposited as the first moment or bas1s
of philosophy (e.g., cf. Quaderni II, OC II [59]. p. 1485; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 345); (2)
that history/philosophy has not only its basis as political act1vity but activity produces "politics"
(e.g., QC 11 [12], nota 11-IV, pp. 1376-80; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 324-27; see also
Gramsci's arguments concerning the "realm of possibility" and "prediction" as political. in
Ouaderni II, OC 10 [48.11], p. 1338; cf. Pnson Notebooks, p. 36; and OC 11 [15]. pp.
1404-5; cf. Prison Notebooks, pp. 438-39); and (3) that the unity of philosophy-history
(included in the identity is also "economics") as that which is mediated (or "assured") by
politics. Th1s allowed Gramsci to argue later that not only is the "realm of necessity" and
the "realm of freedom" pol1t1cal-philosophical activity, but that the very passage from the
realm of necessity to the realm of freedom 1nvolves struggle, IS political. indeed, is the very
basis of ethical-political hegemony (see Ouaderni II, OC, p. 1383; cr. Prison Notebooks, p.
331; and OC 8 . Egemonia e democraz1a," p. 7056). See also Ouaderni II, OC 8 [195].

559
 "La proposizone che 'Ia societa non si pone problemi per Ia cui soluzione non esistano gia
le premesse materiali.'" pp. 1057-58.
23 The term "specificity of the political" is taken directly from Laclau's intervention in the Pou-
lantzas-Miliband debates. See in particular "The Specificity of the Political.'' Politics and
Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism (london: New Left Books. 1977).
pp. 51-80.
24 Ouadernill, QC 11 [15). pp. 1403-6; QC 10 [48.11). pp. 1335-38; QC 11 [59). pp. 1485-
86; cr. Prison Notebooks. "The Concept of Science.'' "What Is Man." and '"Creative'
Philosophy,'' pp. 437-40, 357-60. 345-46.
25 See, in particular. Frederick Engels. "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.'' MESW. val. 3, pp.
95-151. Aside from the familiar targets (DOhring. Owen. and. one could include among this
number. the nonsocialist Proudhon). Gramsci's arguments around science, political practice,
and the debates that ensued also engaged the work of Bornstein. Kautsky, Plekhanov. even
Loria, since these theorists represented, albeit in different ways, the interpretation of historical
materialism as reducible to an "economic science" (cf. Quaderni II, QC 10 [26). pp. 1264-
65; Ouaderni Ill, QC 15 [74]. pp. 1833-34; QC 17 [40). p. 1942; Letter #42 in Prison
Letters. p. 163 and its addendum note). But an additional point must be made concerning
Gramsci's attack on Plekhanov's Fundamental Principles of Marxism. Although the point
concerning Plakhanov's notion of science as that which is "pure" demands longer attention.
it raises an interesting point in the debates between scientific and utopian marxism: the
tendencies that fight against Plakhanov' s assumptions (notably in the work of Otto Bauer)
end by posing a utopian v1ew of science itself. That is to say, the debate no longer becomes
one between either/or po1nts but is moved onto the terrain of "science" as the value-free
rationalized attempt to construct a more democratic society. To some extent, but from equally
different assumptions, the work of Sorel and Bergson, even that of Gentile, tends to cling to
a notion of science that allows a reading of activity as that which ought to be more "scientific"
(read: rational/progressive). This po1nt will not be addressed here in greater detail given the
constra1nts of space, but since much of Gramsci's subsequent analysis drew on these various
posings of "science,'' it is important to give an initial indication of the variety of positions
that were produced in the debates on science and political practice. For an initial reference
to Gramsci's criticisms regarding, 1n particular. Plekhanov and the way in which he used the
work of Antonio Labriola to refute it, see Ouaderni II, OC 11 [70). pp. 1506-9; cr. Prison
Notebooks. pp 386-88.
26 Ouaderni II. OC 11 [50]. "Storia della terminologia e della metafore.'' pp. 1473-76; see
also QC 10 [27). "Punti di meditazione per lo studio dell'economia. A propos1to del cost
detto homo oeconomicus,'' p. 1265. In the Prison Notebooks, see, for example, p. 400,
n.39.
27 This is particularly in reference to A. Loria, who wrote, accordingly, "For if, as the new
apostles of force contend, the proletariat masses can at any moment annihilate the prevailing
economic order, why do they not rise against the capitalism they detest. and replace it with
the long cooperative commonwealth for which they long? Why is it that after so much noisy
organization, the utmost they are able to do is tear up a few yards of railway track or to
smash a street lamp? Do we not find here an irrefragable demonstration that force is not
realizable at any g1ven moment, but only in the historic hour when evolution shall have
prepared the inevitable fall of the dominant economic system?" In Karl Marx. trans. E. Paul
and C. Paul (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1920). pp. 88-89.
28 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the "Philosophy of Poverty" by M. Proudhon
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975). particularly pp. 96-118.
29 D. Suvin, "On Two Notions of 'Science' in Marxism," in Brave New Universe. ed. Ron
Henighan (Ottawa: Tecumseh Press, 1980). pp. 27-43.
30 Popular Manual (Saggio popolare) was the abbreviated title used by Gramsci in the Ouaderni;
its full t1tle cited in the Prison Notebooks is Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual
of Marxist Sociology. The authorized English translation from the third Russian edition notes
the title as Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology (New York: Progress Publishers,
1925) All subsequent references will use Gramsci's annotated title.
31 Ouaderni II, QC 11 [31]. "La causa ultima," p. 1445; cr. Prison Notebooks, "On Meta-
physics,'' p. 437. See Ouaderni 11, QC 9 [59]. "Nozioni enciclopediche. Empirisimo.'' p.
1131, for an assault on "empiricism" as a category of truth. Criticizing Bukharin directly,
Gramsci wrote that h1s "vulgar contention is that science must absolutely mean 'system',
and consequently systems of all sorts are built up wh1ch have only the mechanical exteriority
of a system and not its necessary coherence" ("Science and System.'' in Prison Notebooks,
p. 434; cr. Ouaderni II, QC 11 [22.1V]. "Ouistioni generali.'' p. 1424)
32 Ouaderni II, QC 11 [17]. p. 1412; cr. Prison Notebooks, "The So-Called 'Reality of the
External World.'" pp. 441-42.

560
 Sue Golding
33 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [14]. "Sulla Metafisica"; cr. Prison Notebooks, "On Metaphysics," p.
437. Clearly Gramsci was referring not only to Marx's Poverty of Philosophy but to the
"Theses on Feuerbach" as well.
34 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [14].
35 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [15]. pp. 1403-5; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 437-39.
36 Ouaderni II, OC 8 [176]. "La 'nuova' scienza," pp. 1047-48; see also OC 11 [36.111]. "La
scienza e le ideologie scientifiche," pp. 1451-55; cr. Antonio Gramsci, "Science and 'Sci-
entific' Ideologies," trans. Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Telos, 39(1979), pp. 151-55.
37 Ouaderni II, OC 10 [2]. "ldentita di storia e filosofia," pp. 1241-42. Gramsci stated that
while this cla1m seems similar to Croce's identity of philosophy and history, for the philosophy
of praxis it is "mutilated" if it does not also include the identity of history with politics and
therefore make that identity "also equal to the identity of politics and philosophy" (p. 1241).
He argued that this is what (in part) differentiated his claim of equivalences from that of
Croce. See also Quaderni I, QC 11 [12]. "Aicuni punti preliminari di riferimento," pp. 1375-
95; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 323-43.
38 Ouaderni II, QC 11 [52]. p. 1479; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 412.
39 Marx. "Theses on Feuerbach," MESW, 1:1. p. 13.
40 "History and Anti-History," Prison Notebooks, p. 369; cr. OuaderniJJ, QC 10 [II 28.11]. p.
1266.
41 Useful meaning "practical" (as in "efficient"). See Prison Notebooks, p. 365; cr. Ouaderni
Ill, QC 15 [22]. "lntroduzione alia studio della filosofia," p. 1780.
42 Ouaderni II, QC 7 [35]. "Materialismo e materialismo storico," p. 886.
43 Ouaderni II, QC 11 [62]. pp. 1488-89; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 406-7.
44 Ouaderni II, OC 10[44]. "lntroduzione alia studio della filosofia," p. 1332; cr. Prison Note-
book, pp. 350-51. For the connection to the notion of "distincts" the reader is referred to
Ouaderni Ill, QC 13 [10]. pp. 1568-70; cr. Prison Notebooks, "Politics as an autonomous
science," pp. 136-38.
45 Ouaderni II. QC 10 [44]. p. 1332; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 351.
46 OuaderniJJ, QC 11 [20]. "Oggettivita e realta del mondo esterno," p. 1420. The emphasis
on the unity of (and identity with) "the real and the rational" is not meant to bring Hegel
through the back door, as Gramsci wrote: "Without having understood this relationship [that
the "rational and real become one"] it seems that one cannot understand the philosophy
of prax1s, its position in comparison with idealism and with mechanical materialism. the
importance and significance of the doctrine of the superstructures. It is not exact, as Croce
maintains. to say that in the philosophy of praxis the Hegelian 'idea' has been replaced by
the 'concept' of structure. The Hegelian 'idea' has been resolved both in the structure and
in the superstructures and the whole way of conceiving philosophy has been 'historicized,'
that 1s to say, a whole new way of philosophizing which is more concrete and historical than
went before it has begun to come into existence" (cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 448). The concept
of "historic bloc" was developed in the work of Sorel. It suffices to note at this point Ouaderni
II. QC 8 [182]. pp. 1051-52; cr. Prison Notebooks, "Structure and Superstructure,'' pp.
365-66.
47 Prison Notebooks, pp. 350-51; cr. Ouaderni II, OC 10 [44]. p. 1332.
48 QuaderniJJJ, OC 15 (II) [10]. pp. 1765-66; Prison Notebooks, pp. 244-45, translation slightly
altered.
49 Ouaderni II, OC 7 [35]. pp. 883-86; OC 11 [14]. pp. 1401-3; QC 11 [15]. pp. 1403-6;
cr. Pnson Notebooks. pp. 354-57,436-37, 437-40.
50 Ouaderni 11, QC 10 [II] [9]. p. 1246; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 399; see also Ouaderni Ill,
QC 16 [9]. p. 1855; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 388.
51 Ouaderni II, QC 11 [27]. p. 1434; Prison Notebooks, "Concept of Orthodoxy,'' p. 463; see
also Ouaderni II, OC 11 [70]. pp. 1507-9.
52 Ouaderni II, QC 11 [17]. pp. 1415-16; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 445.
53 The problem. or rather the importance, of error is one to which Gramsci continually referred.
Often he used it as a play on the idealist notion of "pure" knowledge or truth(s). He inflated
Croce· s own use of "error" or falsity in itself to argue. for example. that life can never be
only and totally "life" but must consist of both life and death. The same could be said of
Being (being and nothing constituting Being, etc.). Error in this sense comes to mean "spec-
ificity," even "history,'' where history is all life itself in all its "impure" activity. In that sense
the philosophy of praxis becomes precisely the "philosophy of act (praxis, development).
but not of the 'pure' act. but rather to the real 'impure' act. in the most profane and worldly
sense of the word" (Prison Notebooks, '"Objectivity' of Knowledge,'' p. 372; Ouaderni lA,
oc 11 [64]. p. 1492)

561
 The use of "error" by Gramsci was also an attack on Gentile's attempts to
revise the Crocean "practical activity" as a "pure act" devoid of intellectual/theoretical ac-
tivity. Cf. Gentile, The Theory of Mind as Pure Act, trans. Wildon Carr (london: Macmillan,
1922); also cited in Pnson Notebooks, p. 372, n. 66. See also Ouaderni Ill, OC 13 [1 0],
pp. 1568-70; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 136-38.
54 "Preface to A Contribution to the Cntique of Political Economy," MESW, 502-3; cf. Quaderni
II, OC 10 (II) [12], pp. 1249-50; OC 11 [29], p. 1439; Ouaderni Ill, OC 13 [1 0], p. 1570;
cr. Pnson Notebooks, pp. 365, 458, 138.
55 Ouaderm II, OC 11 [17], p. 1415; OC 11 [20], pp. 1419-20; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp.
445, 447-48.
56 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [15], p. 1404; cr. Pnson Notebooks, 438.
57 See further Ouaderni II, OC 11 [52], p. 14 77; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 410.
58 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [52], p. 1479; Prison Notebooks, p. 412.
59 Ouadernilll, OC 13 [1], pp. 1555-61; cf. Prison Notebooks, pp. 125-33; see also OC 11
[52], pp. 1480-81; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 413-14.
60 Although this pomt will be developed later, the reader is referred to Gramsci's arguments
on progress/development and "becoming," outlined in Ouaderni 11, OC 10 [48.11], pp.
1335-38; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 357-60.
61 Ouaderni II, OC 11 [301], pp. 1442-45; cr. Prison Notebooks, "Matter," pp. 465-68.
62 An argument developed in part of Gramsci's attack on the equating of history with "natural"
history. See, for example, Ouaderni I, OC 3 [33], "Aicune cause d'errore," pp. 310-11.
63 See also Ouaderni I, OC 4 [41], "La SCienza," pp. 466-67; cr. OC 11 [37], pp. 1455-56.
64 Gramsci writes, "It has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression [historical
materialism] one should put the accent on the f1rst term-'historical' -and not on the second,
which is metaphysical in origin. The philosophy of prax1s is absolute 'historicism,' the absolute
secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute human1sm of history. It IS along this
line that one must trace the thread of the new conception of the world" (Prison Notebooks,
"Concept of Orthodoxy,'' p. 465; cr. Ouaderni II, OC 11 [27], p. 1437).
65 Cf. Ouadernill, OC 10 [14], pp. 1401-3; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 436-37.
66 Prison Notebooks, "Speculative Immanence and Historicist or Realist Immanence," pp. 399-
400; cr. Ouadernill, OC 10 II [9], pp. 1246-47.
67 "What the idealists call 'spint' is not a point of departure but a point of arrival; it is the
ensemble of the superstructures movmg towards concrete and objectively universal unification
and it is not a unitary presupposition" (Prison Notebooks, pp. 445-46; cr. Ouaderni II, OC
11 [17], p. 1416)
68 Ouadernill, QC 10 II [17], pp. 1255-56; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 344-45; see also Ouaderni
II, OC 11 [27], p. 1437; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 465.
69 Cf. Gramsci's fragment on "matter,'' Ouaderni II, OC 11 [30], pp. 1442-45; cr. Prison
Notebooks, pp. 465-68.
70 Cf. Ouaderni II, OC 10 [54], "lntroduzione allo studio della filosofia. Che cosa e l'uomo?,"
pp. 1343-46; OC 7 [35], pp. 883-86. These fragments are two of the most powerful
developments by Gramsci of Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach. They present the argument
that not only is "man" a historical product, created by "man" himself, but it is "man" alone
who determmes "what we are and what we can become, whether we really are, and if so
to what extent, 'makers of our own selves,' of our own life and our destiny." Cr. Prison
Notebooks, pp. 351-5 7.
71 Prison Notebooks, p. 355; cr. Ouadernill, OC 7, [35] p 884 (altered slightly from the English
translation).
72 For a brief reference, cf. Ouaderni II, OC 11 [28], "L'immanenza e le f1losofia della praxis,''
pp 1438-39; OC 11 [24], "lllinguaggio e le metafore,'' pp. 1426-28; cr. Prison Notebooks,
"Immanence and the Philosophy of Praxis,'' pp. 449-52.
73 Cf. Ouaderni II, OC 11 [16], "QuistiOni di nomenclatura e di contenuto,'' p. 1411; cr. Prison
Notebooks, pp. 456-57.
74 Pnson Notebooks, "The Dialectic,'' p. 436; cr. Ouaderni II, OC 11 [22.1V], "Ouistioni ge-
neral!,'' p. 1424.
75 In his "Progresso e diven1re," Gram sci connected the concept of "progress" with becoming
and the concept of "freedom" with possibility (Prison Notebooks, p. 360; cr. Ouaderni II,
oc 10 (48.11], p. 1338)

562
 Sue Golding
76 The first quoted passage is from Ouadernill, OC 10 [12]. pp. 1249-50; cr. Prison Notebooks,
pp. 365-66 (translation slightly modified). The second passage is from OC 8 [ 182]. "Struttura
e superstrutture," pp. 1051-52; cr. Prison Notebooks, p. 366.
77 Oaderni II, OC 10 II [6. 1L "II termine di 'catarsi.'" p. 1244; cr. Prison Notebooks, pp. 366-
67.

563
 Richard Schacht

Marxism, Normative Theory, and Alienation

Marx qenerally arques that ex1stmq moral 1cieas are

lmkeci mseparably to speCific soc1al systems, class mter
ests, anci antagonisms Ynt Marx's thouqht also has a
qenu1nely norrnat1ve character, wh1ch 1t nef)cis 1f 1t 1s to
serve as a qu1cie to revolutionary prax1s

For many years, in English-speaking countries, ethical

theory and moral philosophy have consisted chiefly in the kind of inquiry
that has come to be called "meta-ethics." In keeping with the basic spirit
of analytic philosophy more generally, our moral philosophers in the post-
war generation seem to have decided that their proper primary task was to
analyze the nature of moral language and moral concepts as people ordi-
narily use them, rather than to assess them critically, develop and defend
improvements upon them, and apply such revised ethical principles and
norms to general social and concrete interpersonal situations and issues. In
recent years, however, many moral philosophers have once again become
interested in normative ethics, venturing to undertake such tasks as these.
This may be at least in part because they have become increasingly aware
of the problematic character of conventional moral concepts and beliefs,
and also of the inability of meta-ethics to contribute significantly to the
resolution of real and pressing problems in personal and social life. The
same remarks also apply with respect to social philosophy and value theory,
which likewise have begun again among us to have a genuinely normative
rather than a merely analytic-descriptive character.
Few of these philosophers are at all well acquainted
with Marxian philosophy. Many of them are aware, however, that Marx's
thought has what at least appears to be a strongly normative character; and
some have actually been moved to wonder whether in fact it has any rel-
evance to their concerns. This is a question, however, to which it is difficult
to give a simple answer. In some sense Marx obviously had normative
pretentions. On the other hand, it is far from clear what these pretentions
actually come to, and even how seriously they are to be taken. Thus, in
recent years a number of important and influential books have appeared,
by writers such as Louis Althusser and Bertell OHman, in which it is argued
that there is not and cannot be anything like a genuinely Marxian ethics or
normative theory, on the grounds that the thought of the mature Marx
precludes the possibility of this sort of philosophical inquiry.
So, for example, Althusser allows that the early Marx
did subscribe first to a Kantian-Fichtean outlook and then a Feuerbachian
way of thinking, each "humanistic" and with a strong ethical component
based upon a "philosophy of man" appealing to a notion of our "essence."
He contends, however, that Marx broke radically with all such views and
565
 notions around 1845 and henceforth rejected any "recourse to ethics" and
every "humanistic ideology," relegating all ethical and valuational schemata
entirely to the realm of"ideology," which became for him merely an object
of scientific analysis and an instrument of social organization rather than
a component of Marxian theory itself. According to Althusser, the mature
Marx radically distinguished his form of ("scientific") theory from-and
opposed it to-"ideology" generally, inclusive of any sort of ethics, allowing
only that "ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable
in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond
to the demands of their conditions of existence." 1
Althusser maintains that for the mature Marx the only "real prob-
lems" encountered in such human contexts "are organizational problems
of the forms of economic life, political life and individual life," which are
given a merely "imaginary treatment" when a "recourse to ethics" is made
in dealing with them. 2 "Historical materialism cannot conceive that even
a communist society could ever do without ideology, be it ethics, art, or
'world outlook'," he writes. 3 But that, for Althusser, still leaves no place
whatever for normative ethical theory in Marxist theory proper.
Ollman similarly contends that " 'Marxian ethics' is clearly a
misnomer in so far as it refers to Marx, " 4 even though he grants that Marx
"expresses feelings of approval and disapproval in his works," is "motivated
... by some idea of the 'good'," 5 and "sided with the proletariat and incited
them to overthrow the system. " 6 "I prefer to say that Marx did not have
an ethical theory," Ollman writes; 7 for in his view, Marx not only does not
do any of the things one must do to qualify as having or elaborating such
a theory, 8 but moreover excludes the possibility of doing so through his
adoption of a "philosophy of internal relations" in which there is no room
for anything of the sort. Ollman tells us, "In this perspective, what is called
the fact-value distinction appears as a form of self-deception"; and "judg-
ments can never be severed, neither practically nor logically, from their
contexts.... " 9
Like Althusser, Ollman argues that we not only will be disap-
pointed but also misguided if we look for anything like a normative ethical
theory in Marx (or continue the search after we have read and learned our
lesson from him). In a curious way, the two thus join hands with such less-
sympathetic interpreters of Marx as Robert Tucker and Eugene Kamenka,
who also deny that Marx has anything of the sort to offer. Rather, Tucker
suggests that Marx was "a moralist of the religious kind" in whose thought
ethical inquiry had no place. 10 And Kamenka contends that Marxism "has
left behind it a legacy of 'reminders' rather than a foundation for moral
philosophy or a key to the solution of ethical disputes," going on to observe
that "the importance of these reminders at any particular time is directly
proportionate to the social naivete and lack of historical sense of these who
write about ethics." 11
I shall attempt to contribute to the clarification of this issue by
distinguishing between some of the different things that a Marxian ethical
and normative theory might involve and, in my opinion, does involve in
Marxian thought. I shall argue that there is at least one sense in which Marx
undeniably has such a theory, which is interestingly similar in certain im-
portant respects to the analytic meta-ethics that was long the fashion in
Anglo-American philosophical circles, even if different in the particular
566
 Richard Schacht
manner of the analysis given. I shall also suggest, however, that it is a kind
of theory that is no more helpful and satisfactory in the treatment of nor-
mative issues than is meta-ethics. And I shall further argue that while Marx
seems to have operated with a further kind of normative theory, and perhaps
assumed that yet another kind is possible and desirable, his right to do so
is far from clear. This circumstance, I shall contend, raises serious problems
that must receive better solutions than they have so far if Marxian thought
is to make good its apparent claim to have genuine normative significance,
both as critical social theory and as a theory relevant to the way we live
our lives and deal with each other.
One of the things that might be meant by a Marxian ethics or
moral philosophy is the elaboration of an account ofthe sort Marx suggests
ofthe way in which existing moralities are to be conceived and understood,
together with the undertaking of the indicated type of analysis of such mor-
alities as they are to be found in human societies past and present. This
would be a kind of theory of morality or ethics and a kind of genuine and
useful philosophical inquiry, bearing a resemblance to Hegel's approach to
ethics as well as to analytic meta-ethics. And this is something Marx clearly
envisions and calls for, perhaps inspired by Hegel, but also going beyond
him (or at any rate diverging from him).
Here I have in mind Marx's contention that moralities, along
with religions, philosophies, and other such products of human thought, are
to be conceived as parts of the ideological outgrowths and machinery of
social systems, reflecting their structures and the interests of the classes
dominant in them. Engendered as devices by means of which these systems
are sustained, they serve to induce their members to act in a manner con-
ducive to the systems' functioning and preservation (and thereby to the
promotion of the interests of the classes in question). So Marx writes that
"religion, family, state, morality, science, art, etc. are only particular modes
of production, and fall under its generallaw." 12 They are but "the ideological
reflexes and echoes" of the "real-life process" of "definite individuals who
are productively active in a definite way" and who therefore "enter into
[corresponding] definite social and political relations." 13 Marx continues:
''Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their forms of
consciousness thus no longer retain their semblance of independence. They
have no history, no development [oftheir own]; but men, developing their
material production and their material intercourse, alter along with their
real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking." 14
Marx grants that, owing to the "division of material and mental
labor" and the complexity of subsequent developments, it may happen that
"theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. come into contradiction with the
existing social relations"; but he contends that "this can occur only because
existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces
of production." 15 In this way he proposes "to explain all the different the-
oretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics,
etc., etc. and trace their origins and growth from that basis," as well as to
take account of "the reciprocal action of these various sides on one an-
other."16 Nearly always, when Marx speaks of ethics or morality, it is as
part of the same litany and to the same effect: the reality of"religious, moral,
philosophical and juridical ideas" is granted but linked inseparably to spe-
cific social systems, class interests, and class antagonisms. 17 Moral/ethical
567
"ideas" are treated simply as elements of "ideologies" and analyzed ac-
cordingly, in broad strokes and with no tentativeness or qualifications.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that

man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's
consciousness, changes with every change in the con-
ditions of material existence, in his social relations and
social life?
What else does the history of ideas prove,
than that the intellectual production changes its char-
acter in proportion as material production is changed?
The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas
of its ruling class.
When people speak of ideas that revolu-
tionize society, they do but express the fact, that within
the old society, the elements of a new one have been
created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps
even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions
of existence. 18

The burden of Marx's repeated assertions to this effect and as-

similation of existing moralities to ideologies so conceived is that we must
learn to view and understand them within this very human, practical, his-
torically variable but always specific context, rather than as though they are
or could be "pure" or absolute or of universal and unconditional validity.
They are real enough; but their reality is that of historical phenomena con-
stituting contingent and conditioned elements of specific social totalities to
be analyzed and reckoned with theoretically and practically, rather than
assessed in terms of their general justifiability and normative force. (This
task and approach may remind one of Nietzsche's "genealogy of morals"
even more than of the Hegelian treatment of ethics to which it has some
affinity.) 19 It is undeniable that we may learn a good deal when we think
about and analyze existing moralities in this way, and we have much difficult
and delicate work to do if we are to do it properly. 20
As in the case of Nietzsche, however, Marx does not stop with
this. He further engages in a kind of normative discourse to which this view
of morality cannot coherently be applied (and is not meant to apply), when
he undertakes not merely to analyze but also to evaluate and pass critical
judgment upon the kind of society with which he found himself confronted,
to call for its radical transformation, and to argue for the establishment of
a different set of social, economic, and political arrangements. The critical
social theory of the mature as well as the early Marx has a strongly and
strikingly normative dimension that cannot be ignored or eliminated with-
out depriving his entire enterprise of what was to him its supreme purpose
and significance for human life. It is reflected in his use of moral language,
which owes much more to Kant than to Hegel, as when, for example, in an
early essay, having asserted that "the criticism of religion ends with the
doctrine that man is the supreme being for man," he writes: "It ends, there-
fore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in
which man is an abased, enslaved, contemptible being." 21
568
 Richard Schacht
The normative character of Marx's thought is no less clearly
evident in his later writings, from the Manifesto to the final volume of
Kapital. From the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach ("The philosophers have
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change
it"), 22 to the appeal at the conclusion of the Manifesto ("The proletarians
have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working
men of all countries, unite!"), 23 to his invocation in the third volume of
Kapital of the prospect of"the true realm of freedom" in which "begins the
development of human energy which is an end in itself' (and which is said
to have "the shortening of the working day" as "its basic prerequisite"), 24
Marx makes no secret about his normative concerns. He thus declared, in
1872, that "all the rest of my life will be, as have been all my efforts of the
past, dedicated to the triumph of the social ideas which-you may be as-
sured!-willlead to the world domination by the proletariat." 25 He consid-
ered "a revolution" to be not only historically inevitable but also "neces-
sary" -"not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other
way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution
succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of the ages and become fitted to
found society anew." 26
Marxian thought must have a genuinely normative character if
it is to serve as an impetus and guide to revolutionary praxis. And its
normative dimension cannot be conceived as amounting to nothing more
than another particular morality of the sort his analytic moral theory rel-
egates to the status of an element of the ideology attendant upon and sub-
servient to the functioning of some specific existing socioeconomic system,
without depriving it of its social-critical and revolutionary significance. It
would hardly seem, for example, that this is all Marx meant to express in
writing, "only in community [with others has each] individual the means
of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore,
is personal freedom possible"; that "in a real community the individuals
obtain their freedom in and through their association"; 27 and that "the pro-
letarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, will have to abolish
the very condition of their existence hitherto" and "must overthrow the
State." 28
Similarily, Marx concludes the second part of the Manifesto by
saying: "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class
antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development
of each is the condition for the free development of all." 29 Thus, it is not
only in his early writings that Marx evinces normative concerns, even though
in his later writings he seldom approaches the rhetorical level of such earlier
passages as the following panegyric to the final stage of communism, de-
picted as "the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human)
being-a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth
of previous development. This communism, as fully-developed naturalism,
equals humanism, and as fully-developed humanism equals naturalism; it
is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between
man and man-the true resolution of the strife between existence and es-
sence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and
necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle
of history solved, and it knows itself to be the solution." 30
569
 Here, then, we find a second type of ethical or normative theory
in Marx's thought, very different from the first and of major importance.
The question that must be answered, however, is not only what the nor-
mative principles are that Marx embraces and employs in this connection,
but what justification he is able to give for selecting and employing these
principles in this way. After all, it is not enough in philosophy or social
theory merely to have and affirm and act upon such principles; it is also
necessary to make a coherent and convincing case for adopting them. Marx-
ian theory therefore has the task of any normative rather than merely an-
alytic or meta-ethical theory of establishing such a case.
Marx himself actually does very little along these lines. He would
appear to accept principles that have a certain appeal and have had their
philosophical champions (e.g., Kant, Schiller, and Hegel); but he does not
have their right to them, since he does not subscribe to their grounds for
holding them. Yet, he does very little by way of establishing his own right
to them in any other way. By omission, he left this task to those who came
after him; but this task remains largely to be accomplished-if indeed it can
be. And he made its accomplishment difficult, at the very least, by advancing
a general philosophical position containing very little upon which the sort
of case required might be built, and by ruling out traditional ways of doing
so. The most promising possibility would seem to be that offered by the
conception he tentatively suggests here and there of our fundamental human
nature and potentialities. It is far from clear, however, whether this con-
ception will emerge from critical assessment-including his own criticisms
of the notions of "man" and the "human essence" in his later writings-
rich and substantial enough to support normative principles of the sort his
critical and revolutionary social theory would seem to require.
For example, Marx subscribes to and valorizes notions of human
freedom, dignity, community, activity, and development that make it pos-
sible for him to distinguish between "dehumanized" and "genuinely hu-
man" forms oflife. These notions enable him to identify practices and social
arrangements conducive and detrimental to both; and he draws upon them
in detailing the damage wrought by capitalism and bourgeois society, and
in targeting certain of their basic features as the focus of revolutionary
change. But he wants and needs to be able to do more than show what the
contours of different forms of human life are and may be expected to be
under different social and economic conditions, or to argue that some are
more beset by contradictions and therefore more unstable than others, or
to observe that survival is possible under some and not under others, or to
suggest (or appeal to the purported fact) that some do or would tend to
make people more miserable or more happy than others.
Marx is concerned above all with the quality of human life under
different actual and actually attainable social and economic conditions.
However, he rejects all appeals to religious or metaphysical considerations,
which might be invoked either to privilege some forms of it over others or
to justify the attribution to human beings of an essential nature that would
do so, and insists that human nature takes differing shapes in differing
historical circumstances. This, it would seem, leaves only a general consid-
eration of the fundamental characteristics of human existence and their
capacity for development (in ways setting human beings increasingly apart
from other merely natural creatures and from their own kind on a level of
570
 Richard Schacht
mere subsistence) as a possible basis for a normative theory capable of
generating the sorts of qualitative distinctions Marx draws. While he seems
to take for granted the possibility of a "philosophy of man" or philosophical
anthropology sufficing for this purpose in his early writings, invoking suit-
ably naturalistic notions of "man" and our human "essence" quite freely,
he is so critical of the use of such expressions in his later writings that it is
far from clear whether he remains committed to any conception of a general
human nature sufficient to do more than demarcate our species from others.
It is not possible to pursue this question here; but it would seem that it is
a question that must be pursued, and that the manner in which it is answered
will be crucial to the issue of what is to be made of the normative features
of Marx's social theory.
There is yet a third important kind of notion that might be meant
by a Marxian ethics or moral philosophy and that might constitute another
part of a full Marxian ethical theory. Unfortunately, so much attention has
been given to the first two notions I have distinguished that it has been
largely neglected. It is crucial, however, not only to the development of
Marxian humanism, but also to the extension of the relevance of Marxian
philosophy to concrete human life as we now live it and as it might be lived
after the kind of transformation of human social life Marx sought. It is this
sort of thing that philosophers generally have in mind when they speak of
normative ethics. Here the focus is not upon the critical assessment of social
systems and the revolutionary praxis needed to transform them but rather
upon our conduct and interactions as particular human beings, as we lead
our daily lives and face the kinds of personal and interpersonal problems
that call for decisions and choices.
Marx was not content, as Hegel had been, to refer all questions
of this sort to the established norms prevailing in the society in which one
lives. There are many respects in which he found the norms people generally
have come to live by to be wanting. This pertains both to how people treat
each other and also to what they do with their own lives. So, for example,
Marx is repeatedly critical of"the egoistic man ... , an individual separated
from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with pri-
vate interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice." 31 It may
be that this is the norm in bourgeois society, that those who act in this way
do so with a good conscience owing to the way their conscience has been
educated, and that Marx accordingly does not see fit to criticize them for
doing so, since under the circumstances they could hardly be expected to
do otherwise. But this does not lead him to conclude that their manner of
acting is unobjectionable. "Human emancipation will only be complete,"
he writes, "when as an individual man, in his everday life, in his work, and
in his relationships, he has become a species-being." 32
There is something fundamentally amiss, Marx holds, when
"within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in
accordance with the standard and position in which he finds himself as a
worker." 33 Even if, according to prevailing standards, we live our lives and
relate to others in a morally acceptable or prescribed manner, we are "iso-
lated" from "human morality," and "human activity, human enjoyment,
human nature" as well. 34 "Real community" is lacking; and it is only in
such "community" with others, as has been observed, that Marx considers
the individual to be able to "cultivate his gifts in all directions" and even
571
to achieve "personal freedom. " 35 The depersonalization, antagonism, brutal
competition, and callous exploitation so characteristic of human relation-
ships in bourgeois society, countenanced and even encouraged by bourgeois
morality, never ceased to distress Marx; and they are among the central
features ofbourgeois society upon which he seizes in criticizing it and calling
for its revolutionary transformation.
What is at issue here, however, is not merely his stance in relation
to prevailing modes of morality on the personal and interpersonal level but,
rather, whether there is anything of the sort with which he would have them
replaced. It would be a great failing of Marxian theory if it simply had
nothing to say along these lines; and it would be absurd if it were to be
suggested that on this level what each of us ought to do in any situation,
according to Marx, is simply to consult either conventional wisdom or the
dictates of conscience or sheer self-interest to discover what the right thing
to do might be.
It is perhaps conceivable that a significant Marxian ethic might
be developed through an extension and elaboration of the kind of general
normative principles that would be needed to render Marx's critical social
theory viable, if they could be justified (e.g., on the basis of a sufficiently
rich Marxian philosophical anthropology). Marx would seem to have taken
for granted the validity and superiority of something like Kantian morality,
however, to the defense of which such a strategy would not seem to lend
itself at all readily, since it presupposes a picture of our nature very different
indeed from Marx's. Here again, however, he neither has Kant's right to
this morality nor undertakes to establish his own. His polemic against ex-
ploitation, for example, echoes and concretely expresses the "supreme prac-
tical principle" Kant takes to be one of the ways of stating the "categorical
imperative" of morality: namely, "act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." But for Kant
"the ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. " 36
And that is a "ground" to which Marx nowhere indicates that he is prepared
to subscribe, or for which there would even appear to be room in his scheme
of things.
This conception of our essentially rational nature, transcending
and contrasting with our mundane nature and possessing intrinsic value,
likewise underlies many of the other notions that figure prominently in
Kant's ethics-for example, dignity, autonomy, self-legislation, the idea and
ideal of "a kingdom of ends" as "a systematic union of different rational
beings under common laws" oftheir own making, and their essential equal-
ity and equal worth 37-and that reappear in Marx as the heart of the sort
of ethics to which he appears to be committed. But Marx neither undertakes
to supply anything along the lines of the "Metaphysic of Morals" Kant
provides (in the work cited) in order to render his use of them coherent
and justifiable, nor would he seem to have any way of doing so. In his early
writings Marx makes some remarks that appear to be intended to indicate
the way in which he proposes to go about establishing a naturalistic basis
for a normative ethics of the sort he favors. So, for example, he asserts that
"the direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation
of man to woman" -by which he appears to mean love-and goes on to
contend that "one can therefore judge man's whole level of development"
572
 Richard Schacht
by reference to this paradigmatic type of "relationship," discerning in this
way "the extent to which man's natural behavior has become human ... ;
the extent to which, therefore, the other person as a person has become for
him a need-the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same
time a social being. " 38
Clearly, however, the paradigm Marx appeals to is both prob-
lematic and incapable of bearing the burden he assigns to it. The same also
applies to his direct appeal to the notion of the "human" itself, as when he
writes: "Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a
human one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust." 39
Marx seems to have thought that the idea of a "return of man ... to his
human, i.e., social mode of existence," resulting in "the positive transcend-
ence of all estrangement," 40 can also be turned around, enabling one to
ground a conception of social existence with normative import for our man-
ner of relating to other people in the underlying conception of our true
human nature. But again, this places more weight on the notion of the social
character of human life than can be borne by the general meaning Marx
gives it in introducing it; and it is far from clear how one might go about
extracting from it or adding to it what he would need to be able to justify
his rather Kantian ethical views by reference to it.
It must be admitted that, with the exception of a few such in-
adequate gestures in his early writings, Marx has little to say with respect
to the way in which one might go about fleshing out and justifying a morality
of a sort that would transcend those associated with previous and present
forms of social organization and class interest and that would be more
appropriate to our humanity. His proposed interpretation and analysis of
existing moralities, along the lines ofthe first sort of ethical theory identified
above, is of no help in this connection, even though it may be granted to
constitute an important and illuminating form of inquiry, for the suggestion
ofwhich Marx deserves considerable credit and praise. If normative think-
ing for us is ever to be more than the sort of thing to which that sort of
analysis is entirely appropriate, it may be necessary for us first to learn to
see and understand existing moralities-our own inherited morality in-
cluded-in that manner.
If we cannot find our way to a kind of normative thinking with
respect to both social formations and personal conduct that does go beyond
this sort ofthing and beyond its analysis, however, then Nietzsche may well
have been right in his proclamation of the advent of nihilism. Or a least,
if one cannot do so within the context of Marxian philosophy (in the event
that it turns out to afford no way of justifying the aims of human eman-
cipation, community, and the free and full development of each and all that
Marx espouses, and of establishing and elaborating moral principles), one
will have no effective reply to make to interpreters like Althusser, OHman,
Tucker, and Kamenka. And there will be nothing to say to philosophical
outsiders who wonder whether Marxian philosophy has anything to offer
along normative-ethical lines that they have not heard before and from
which they might profit.
It thus may be that, in the end, the only real service of Marxian
philosophy in this context is to help break the grip of traditional and pre-
vailing ideologically motivated moralities, thereby perhaps clearing a space
(as it were) in which we then-not as Marxian philosophers but simply as
573
philosophers and human beings-may proceed to rethink the whole matter
of personal and interpersonal morality, inventing or resolving upon other
forms of morality to live by. It would be premature to conclude from the
preoccupation of Marx and others with different matters that Marxian thought
is incapable of engendering a significant moral theory on this level, for which
a case might be made that would enable it to lay claim to our philosophical
acceptance and personal adherence. But it is far from obvious that it can
do so.
One point that can be made in Marx's defense (or at any rate in
mitigation ofhis reticence on this topic), and that is also of no little interest
and relevance in this connection, is suggested by Engels in Anti-Duhring.
After observing that "morality has always been class morality," whether
feudal, bourgeois, or even "proletarian," he remarks, "A really human mo-
rality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of
them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only over-
come class antagonisms, but has even forgotten them in practical life." 41
This suggests that, while it is meaningful to speak of such a morality in
connection with Marxian theory, and while Marxian theory is a least capable
of saying something about the conditions under which such a morality would
be possible and might be expected to emerge, it is too soon to be able to
say what it would be like and what it would involve.
Here, again, Marxian moral theory (as far as it goes) would seem
to echo that of Kant in taking a significant sort of freedom not enjoyed by
human beings as long as they are ensnared in the toils of natural/historical
necessity to be a fundamental condition of the possibility of a genuine
morality that would be more than a reflection and subtle device of such
necessity. And it is of no little interest and significance for the understanding
of Marx's thought that he would seem to have envisioned the dawning of
a "realm offreedom" under altered social conditions in which the character
of human existence itself would be fundamentally transformed, thereby
bringing about a state of affairs representing a naturalistic approximation
to Kant's attribution to human beings of an essential nature transcending
the natural order. 42 But it still would seem to lack any content that would
enable one to derive moral principles of any sort from it, by which human
conduct might be guided even after this envisioned ultimate emancipation
of humanity were to be reached, let alone at the present time.
Indeed, an injunction to act as though one were a member of
such a human community would be not only rather meaningless to us at
this juncture of human development but also misguided, even if somehow
provided with appropriate content, for Marx would appear to consider hu-
man beings at present to be so constituted as to be largely incapable of
responding in the manner called for and exposed to the likelihood of dis-
astrous consequences if they were to do so. Such a morality, he might well
say, could it be elaborated, would not be at all well suited to the conditions
under which we live and to the necessity of bringing about their transfor-
mation. So he might consider the only sort of personal morality deserving
of serious commendation at present to be one subordinated and adjusted
to the requirements of a program of revolutionary praxis aimed at the trans-
formation of society along the lines he took to be necessary. This, however,
would doubtless be disappointing to most moral philosophers, who would
find it a very unsatisfactory substitute for a normative ethic.
574
 Richard Schacht
My conclusion is not that this is the end of the matter. It may
well be that one can do more than this, for example, by seeking to extract
principles with normative import for interpersonal relations-which might
be meaningfully applicable to human life under present as well as future
conditions-from Marx's conception of a "species-being," or from his notion
of a classless society, or from his idea of "an association in which the free
development of each is the condition of the free development of all. " 43 And
one might be able to construct an argument of some sort for doing so that
would be persuasive enough to render this line of thinking convincing. But
it remains to be seen whether anything ofthe sort can be done. My intention
here is to issue a challenge and an appeal to Marxian philosophers who
have not already cast their lot with dogmatic or orthodox and neo-orthodox
Marxism or social scientism, to place normative theory high on their phil-
osophical agenda, ceasing merely to pledge allegiance to the normative com-
mitments expressed in Marx's writings, and undertaking to see whether a
viable normative theory in the spirit of Marx can be developed and de-
fended.
I now wish to turn briefly to the implications of what I have had
to say up to this point for alienation theory in Marxian thought. A moment's
reflection should suffice to make clear that these implications are significant,
at least for the possibility of preserving the strong link between alienation
theory and normative theory that is evident in Marx's early writings and
that continues to characterize a good deal of the literature in the Marxian
tradition. 44 It may be that the concept of alienation is sufficiently flexible
that it can be given a place and meaning of some sort in any kind of Marxian
theory, even if that theory is developed in such a way that all normative
theorizing is entirely excluded from it, and that the only type of ethical
theory countenanced is of the analytic-interpretive variety I first identified.
It should be obvious, however, that the meaning and practical significance
of the concept will be greatly affected by the way in which these larger issues
are resolved and the theoretical context in which the concept of alienation
is situated.
If follows very straightforwardly, for example, that in any version
of Marxian theory in which all normative theorizing is excluded, the concept
of alienation can have no normative import and thus its applicability cannot
be taken to warrant any conclusions of a practical nature. It would not
matter that it is commonly taken to convey the idea that something has
gone wrong in human relations to which it is applicable. If the concept is
to have a legitimate place and role in the context of a theory within which
no normative principles are permitted or can be justified, the price of its
appropriation and use is the disavowal of any such implication and a stead-
fast refusal to be seduced into making unwarranted evaluative judgments
by its extratheoretical associations and connotations.
This point may be illustrated more concretely. Suppose that it is
decided to employ the concept of alienation in connection with the occur-
rence of one of the kinds of separation to which it is often applied, namely,
that which consists in a relation of indifference to or rejection of prevailing
standards of acceptable social behavior on the part of a nominal member
of society. Just as one may analytically identify these standards and what
constitutes departures from them, and may even speak of "ethical norms"
in this connection, one may also speak of "deviant behavior" in relation
575
 to them and may characterize the disposition to engage in such behavior
in terms of "alienation" from them. If the only sort of ethical or normative
theory one is prepared to countenance or is able to justify consists in the
ascertainment of whatever these norms happen to be in any given society
and their interpretation as elements of the ideological apparatus of that (type
of) society, one is in no position to pass any judgment upon those who do
or do not conform to them. One likewise is in no position to pass any
judgment upon the society itself, in light of the relative incidence ofbehavior
and dispositions of one kind or the other. Normative criteria are required
in order to pass judgments of either sort. Without such criteria, one may
identify and interpret the kinds of judgments passed by members of the
society, internal to it; but one cannot proceed to any critical evaluation of
them.
If such things as the relative incidence of the sort of alienation
and related forms of unhappiness in question are to have not only analytic-
theoretical but also practical social-critical interest, a different and richer
type of Marxian theory with an explicit normative dimension is required.
And if the idea expressed by Marx in the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach (to
the effect that whereas philosophers previously have only interpreted the
world, the point is to change it) conveys something essential to Marxian
thought, then such a richer type of Marxian theory would indeed seem to
be called for. Otherwise the eleventh thesis is turned on its head, and the
concept of alienation along with the rest of the Marxian conceptual arsenal
is completely defused, contrary to Marx's clear intentions.
We have, how~ver, here identified one possible conception of
alienation that may be elaborated and given a place and use in connection
with one Marxian way of thinking about ethics and norms. And however
inadequate this conception and this approach may be for Marx and many
Marxian theorists (along with many other philosophers), they need not and
should not be rejected for this reason-especially since it may turn out in
the end that there is no satisfactory way of coming up with anything more
along both lines within the context of Marxian theory (or even more gen-
erally). Here alienation may be construed very generally as a relation of
indifference to or rejection of the ethical-normative order prevailing in some
society on the part of people who are otherwise to be reckoned members
of that society. The applicability of this conception, once again, is evalua-
tively neutral, at least within the context of the first form of ethical-nor-
mative theory. If it is possible to identify something that might be considered
the ethical-normative order prevailing in a society, and if it is also possible
to distinguish between embracing and living in accordance with it and not
doing so, then it is possible and appropriate to speak of this sort of alienation
in the latter connection and to mean and convey and imply nothing more.
And this, it would seem, is exactly as some Marxian theorists and their
analytic-philosophical counterparts would have it.
Suppose, however, that it turns out to be possible to do what
many other Marxian philosophers seem to be committed to trying to do,
namely, develop a normative theory rich enough to ground a critical social
theory enabling them to bring forms of society, social institutions, and social
practices before the bar of evaluative assessment and to justify the advocacy
of modifications of or alternatives to them. In this context an importantly
different conception of alienation could be framed and elaborated, the appli-
576
 Richard Schacht
cability of which would have significant normative and practical implica-
tions-as it does in the hands of Marx, most clearly in his early writings.
This conception could have derivative applications to such things
as one's labor and one's sensuous and communal life; but its fundamental
focus would be upon the quality of the life one lives. It would have the
basic significance of self-alienation, construed in terms of a disparity between
the character of one's life as it is shaped and structured by the social system
in which one lives and a kind of human life that is not only alternative but
also arguably superior to it. One's relation to the ethical-normative order
prevailing in one's society, which is decisive for obtaining the first sort of
alienation distinguished, might still be of relevance here; but if so, this would
only be to the extent that one's relation (of either alienation or unity) to
that particular ethical-normative order, and the relation to the particular
social system it mediates, affects whether one is thereby rendered either
more or less able to live the kind of human life envisioned and valorized.
If alienation is so conceived, a certain form of society might be
considered "alienating" precisely to the extent that its socialization mech-
anisms were successful in keeping the incidence ofthe first sort of alienation
distinguished low-if, that is, the kind of life people were thereby brought
to lead was radically at variance with the kind of life held to be preferable.
Of course, if the kind of life people are enabled to lead by embracing the
existing ethical-normative order and participating fully in the social system
with which it is associated comes closer to this valorized kind of life than
any other they might actually lead by doing otherwise, then as Hegel long
ago suggested, their alienation of the first sort would have the significance
of the kind of self-alienation presently under consideration and so would
require them to overcome it through the transformation of their relation to
that order. 45 Such self-alienation, however it might be concretely conceived,
is in the nature of the case lamentable if it is acknowledged to be a possibility
at all. It thus differs in this respect from alienation of the first sort, which
(as has been observed) may tum out to be either a bad thing or a good thing
or merely an evaluatively indifferent human possibility, depending upon
what if anything of an evaluative nature one adds to its conceptualization.
There is yet another conception of alienation that might also be
usefully conceived in this general connection and must be distinguished
from both of those identified above. It may be introduced and elaborated
in the context of the form of normative-ethical theory which focuses upon
concrete human conduct and undertakes to work out normative principles
appropriate to one's manner of relating to other people. Let it be supposed
that one reaches the conclusion that there are some such principles, con-
stitutive of a philosophically defensible interpersonal morality. (Their status,
it may be noted, would thus be different from and superior to that of the
established rules of various existing normative-ethical orders as such.) Al-
ienation here might then be conceived as a certain sort of interpersonal
estrangement, consisting in one's encountering and dealing with others as
though that morality had no application to one's relations with them.
This conception of alienation is obviously linked to the idea of
immorality. It is not simply synonymous with the latter, however, for its
focus is not upon the particular content of this morality (whatever that
might be) but rather upon one's relation to other human beings, whom one
treats other than as deserving to be brought within the compass of moral
577
consideration. It is, of course, quite possible that the idea of such a morality
will tum out to be an empty human and philosophical ideal, akin to and
as untenable as the metaphysical and theological schemata criticized and
repudiated by Marx, Nietzsche, and others. If the tenability of something
of the sort is established or supposed, however, then it would make good
and interesting sense to differentiate between interpersonal relations that
are and are not mediated and informed by the associated moral sensibility.
Here one could be conceived to be alienated from others in a special and
particularly profound way if one fails to accord them the respect and treat-
ment due them as beings to whom one is related morally. This way of
thinking would seem to be reflected in the Marxian polemic against ex-
ploitation of some human beings by others. To regard and treat other human
beings as but so much exploitable material (whether as laborers or as con-
sumers), and nothing more, would seem to be one of the cardinal sins of
Marxian morality, if there is any such thing. And it likewise is singled out
by Marx and many Marxian theorists as a relation constituting one of the
most acute and lamentable forms of alienation in need of being identified
and overcome.
Three different forms of alienation have thus come to light, as-
sociated with the three varieties of Marxian ethical and normative theory
I have distinguished. One need not choose among them, since they are one
and all available to Marxian theorists, and to others as well. But each has
its theoretical presuppositions and contexts, and one is entitled to any of
them only if one is willing and able to supply them with the theoretical
contexts and underpinnings appropriate to them. Doing so may or may not
prove to be possible, as was earlier observed. The exploration of this pos-
sibility is one of the main tasks falling alike to Marxian theory, and to
philosophy more generally at the present time. The outcome of this explo-
ration will have a great deal to do not only with the future course of alien-
ation theory, ethical-normative theory, and Marxian theory but also with
future approaches to the entire matter of the way in which human conduct,
practices, and institutional arrangements are to be reckoned with. The jury
is still out on Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.
It must be allowed that these are by no means the only uses that
have been and may be found for the concept of alienation in Marxian theory
and in other theoretical contexts. Others are familiar and possible, inde-
pendent of any connection with any sort of Marxian (or other) ethical and
normative theory. 46 It seems to me, however, that notwithstanding their
limitations and the problematic character of at least several of them, these
are among the most interesting and potentially significant. Alienation theory
and ethical-normative theory can both benefit if pursued in more explicit
association than is common, at least in many philosophical circles.
Marxian philosophy, as carried on by at least some of those who
conceive of themselves as proceeding in the spirit of Marx, has long been
something of an exception to this general rule; and so it is of particular
interest in this connection-for which reason I have paid particular attention
to it here. In it, both many of the problems and much of the promise
associated with a number of important lines of inquiry come to light and
admit of being brought into clearer focus. I earlier suggested that the future
of Marxian theory is at stake as long as these problems remain unresolved.
I would now suggest that the same is true where alienation theory is con-
578
 Richard Schacht
cerned. The two may not stand or fall together; but the fate of each, and
the future course of ethical and normative theory as well, undoubtedly can
and should be significantly influenced by inquiry relating to the other. And
such inquiry must come to terms with the issues to which I have sought to
draw attention.

Notes

1 Louis Althusser. For Marx. trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 235.
2 Althusser. p. 247.
3 Althusser. p. 232.
4 Bertell Oilman. Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1971). p. 51.
5 Oilman. p. 44.
6 Oilman, p. 47.
7 Oilman, p. 47.
8 Oilman, p. 46.
9 Oilman, p. 48.
10 Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1972). p 21.
11 Eugene Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1969). p. 3.
12 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," The Marx-Engels Reader,
2d ed .. ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton. 1978). p. 85.
13 Marx. "The German Ideology," The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 154.
14 Marx. "The German Ideology," pp. 154-55.
15 Marx. "The German Ideology," p. 159.
16 Marx. "The German Ideology," p. 164.
17 Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," The Marx-Engels Reader. p. 489.
18 Marx. "Manifesto of the Communist Party," p. 489.

19 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J.
Nottingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). esp. the first and second essays; and G. W. F.
Hegel, Philosophy of Right. trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1942). esp. the
preface and the third part. For an extended discussion of Nietzsche in this connection. see
Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). chap. 7. On Hegel,
see W. H. Walsh, Hegelian Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1969).
20 Cf. Alan Wood, Karl Marx (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 ). chap. 10, "Morality
and Ideology."
21 Marx. "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right." The Marx-Engels Reader.
p. 60.
22 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 145.
23 Marx, "Manifesto," The Marx-Engels Reader. p. 500.
24 Marx. "Capital," vol. 3, The Marx-Engels Reader. p. 441.
25 Marx. speech delivered in Amsterdam. The Marx-Engels Reader.
26 Marx. "The German Ideology," The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 193.
27 Marx, "The German Ideology," p. 197.
28 Marx, "The German Ideology," p. 200.
29 Marx. "Manifesto," p. 491.
30 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," p. 84.
31 Marx, "On the Jewish Question." The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 43.

579
32 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," p. 46.
33 Marx, "Manuscnptsof 1844," p. 97.
34 Marx, crit1cal marg1nal notes on the article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform," The
Marx-Engels Reader, p. 131 .
35 Marx, "The German Ideology," p. 197.
36 Immanuel Kant. The Moral Law (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals}, trans. H. J. Paton
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961). p. 96.
37 Kant, pp. 98ft.
38 Marx. "Manuscripts of 1844," pp. 83-84.
39 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," p. 105.
40 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," p. 85.
41 Friednch Engels, "Anti-Duhring," The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 727.
42 Cf. Marx, "Capital," The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 441.
43 Marx, "Manifesto," The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 491.
44 Cf. Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, trans. Olgierd Wojlasiewicz, ed. Robert
S Alen (New York McGraw Hill, 1970); GaJo Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1967); Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism:
The Founders, trans. P. S. Falla (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); also Richard Schacht,
AlienatiOn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1971).
45 Cf. Schacht, A!Jenatwn, esp. chap. 2.
46 Schacht, Alienation, chap. 7.

580
 Armand Mattelart

Communications in Socialist France:

The Difficulty of Matching Technology
with Democracy
Translated by Andrew Ross

If we are to understand and Intervene in the contentious

state of the relat1on between communication and de-
mocracy, we must rethink sc1ence and technology as
funct1ons of a new set of relations among the diverse
components of c1vil soc1ety. The nght to communiCate,
defmed as the nght to be mformed, has largely prevailed
over the nght, wh1ch should be JUSt as mal1enable, to
produce one's own mformat1on

This study is an attempt to lay out the contradictions

faced by the French socialist government in its plan for a "strategy of com-
munication" within the reality of advanced capitalism, where "technological
choice" has become a major question of "democratic choice." Communi-
cations, or rather the communications industry, is now central to any plans
for reindustrialization. Big industrial powers like France see the new com-
munications technologies (the hardware and software industries, respec-
tively producing systems and programs) as a potential means of recovery
from the economic crisis. They are also viewed as a possible way out of the
political crisis, through restoring the "consensus" (cf. the Nora-Mine Re-
port). The plans for reindustrialization are increasingly becoming society's
way of reconstituting power relations between nations, between classes and
social groups, and among individuals. Within the solution offered by high
technology, the logic of industry is often at odds with the logic of the socius,
a fact that emphasizes the importance of any discussion about public par-
ticipation in ''technological choices" to be made in this domain. Such a
debate is part of the larger problematic of examining the transformation of
the state and its relation to civil society, the fragile balance between public
and private sectors, and the specific growth of the private sector, both com-
mercial and noncommercial. It is also a debate that revives certain questions
that have long lain dormant in leftist thinking.
Conflicting Lines of Action
In various ways, whether in the shape of simple vows
of faith or as a sign of new emergent realities, the question of the relation
between democracy and the new communications and information tech-
nologies has been the subject of numerous discussions, proposals, and plans,
both official and unofficial, ever since the socialist victory in the elections
of 1981. "Democratize information" rather than "inform society," as Pres-
581
ident Mitterand announced in the fall of 1981, in contrast to the policy of
the previous administration. By developing new research and new com-
munications services, we would no longer be subject to the determinism of
technological supply; the electronic directory would no longer be imposed
upon everyone but would be proposed; users would be allowed telematics
choices; workers could be assured that the introduction of new technologies
into the workplace would be to their benefit. In short, we were to rediscover
that "in order to thrive, technology must have a favourable social environ-
ment."'
In a more concrete way, the national colloquium for research and
technology, a widespread consultation of the scientific community that took
place before the legal direction and planning of research and technological
growth had been worked out, was calling for a "renewed alliance between
science and democracy." 2 Between November 1981 and the end ofJanuary
1982, thirty-one regional groups across the country each hosted one day of
this national colloquium in accord with the principle that "consultation
before action is a procedure proper not only to the scientific method but
also to the very spirit of democracy itself. ... " 3 The thousands of contri-
butions made by research groups, universities, trade unions, and profes-
sional organizations created a reflective mood unprecedented in the history
of French research and helped to work up a state of conscientiousness as
much on the part of those who work in scientific technology as those who
actually use or could use it. By opting to draw upon all those who effectively
have a share in technological choices, the colloquium was trying to make
technological research and development into "a national issue about which
everyone feels concerned."
The relations between science, technology, and the
other great spheres of social activity cannot remain
the sole province of those specialists who assume re-
sponsibility for its development. Obviously, scientists
are in the best position to know about the most prom-
ising lines of research, and this is no less the case when
it comes to judging how knowledge should be applied
in the industrial and commercial fields. Any dialogue
between specialists and non-specialists, however, must
observe two conditions. The first is to clarify the con-
troversies which spring up internally within the sci-
ences and technologies. For it is clearly there that pos-
sible alternatives appear and are discussed; it is there
that we must begin by properly establishing an initial
form of democratic expression-on the question of sci-
entific and technical ideas and plans. The second con-
dition is to allow neither the scientists nor the engi-
neers the exclusive role of making major decisions
which could affect the future of the country. The Gov-
ernment, Parliament, regional bodies, trade unions,
associations-the list is not inclusive-must, each ac-
cording to its responsibilities, be provided with access
to the information they require in order to participate
in an enlightened manner. In fact, the idea that the
582
 Armand Mattelart
entire national community, through its qualified rep-
resentatives, should be put in "charge" of these de-
cisions, is predicated upon a populace fully informed
of the implications of each choice. 4
Let us say this much at the outset. Such a point of view, which
defines the democracy/technology relation in terms of the appropriation of
the new technological tools by the whole of society, has not always been
included in those discussions or plans that have focused, in other institu-
tional contexts, on the new tools of information and communications. This
problematic, for example, is hardly even considered in the report by the
Commission on the Future of Audiovisuals (the MOINOT Report), pub-
lished in mid-October 1981. 5 Although its proposals do point toward a
decentralization of the audiovisual media, and are full of vague references
to more democratic access to the airways, the general assumption of the
report is that of the right to communicate, a right based too unilaterally
upon the inalienable right of professionals to communicate and thus to
improve their efficiency. Professionalist ideology seems to have fixed the
discursive limits for the "democratization" of information.
Clearly, the great poles of the debate about research-the need to
rethink science and technology as functions of a new set of relations among
the diverse components of civil society-have little or no place in the first
official report on audiovisuals. The right to communicate, defined as the
right to be informed, has largely prevailed over the right, which should be
just as inalienable, to produce one's own information. Moreover, there is
scarcely any evidence in the report of thinking about the multiple experi-
ences of video and cinema, which, outside of the big commercial or mo-
nopoly circuits of radio/television, have advanced other ways of defining
the communication/democracy relation over the last fifteen years, even if
they have taken an irregular and often contradictory path. There is no sign
in the report of anything equivalent to the "right to social research" claimed
by certain sectors-though not all, unfortunately-at the time of the national
colloquium: a right that would deny specialized professional circles the priv-
ilege of regarding research as their exclusive prerogative; a right that would
allow different social groups to instigate research on their own social and
material environment or on social equalities, with the choice of deciding
for themselves whether or not to take on the services offered by the profes-
sionals.6
The parliamentary debates on the new audiovisual legislation
that took place in May/June 1982 failed to do away with this corporatist
logic. The real questions were ignored at the cost of a completely institutional
and legalistic debate, one that was clearly necessary but hardly conducive
to addressing the essential question under discussion. In privileging inter-
ventions about the independence of information from the Right and Left
alike, the forum was reduced to dealing with the democracy/communication
problem only in terms of the short-term political issues and consequently
glossed over the cultural issues, namely, the effects of a communications
model upon the very forms of society. Indeed, this unquestioned assumption
of the independence of the professionals has put the parliamentary socialists
on the defensive and allowed the amnesiacs of the Right to designate and
impose their own terrain as the exclusive ground for all discussion. In seek-
583
ing refuge under the aegis of freedom (the journalist's sanctuary), equality
was sacrificed. And, as a result of insisting solely on the need to preserve
the independence of the media professionals with respect to political power,
the idea of their independence with respect to social relations earned a
certain credibility. All of this followed from the assumption that, if the
political pressures exerted on journalists were eased, then information and
journalistic practice would become transparent. By the same token, all other
issues became superfluous: the basic question, for example, of determining
how a relation to reality (a relation to the totality of the social body, if not
a specific conception of legislating the world of each and every one) is
reproduced through social practices, professionally codified within a par-
ticular mode of producing information. 7 What is more serious for us is that
the result of confining discussion about communication to the corporate
sphere or the ideology of journalism, the result of reinstating the golden
rule of facts and transparent meanings, is not only to advance the idea of
the neutrality of "journalistic technique" but also to sanction an approach
to communications technology that points in the same technocratic direc-
tion.
These introductory notes are not designed to lose us in conjecture
over the issue of the politics (whether categorical or not) of using com-
munications in France right now. We are so used to the idea of giving up,
having played Cassandra's part so often. On the contrary, I have tried to
give some preliminary idea of the contentious state ofthe relation between
communication and democracy, a state that cannot be ignored if we are to
examine the realities of communication and information and thereby de-
velop a fully theoretical reflection on the research topic-communication/
democracy. To achieve this, we must be prepared to question a number of
received ideas about what constitutes the field of observation proper to
communication as a scientific discipline. This is no small task. Like it or
not, the polyvalence of new networks of communication and information
demands not only interdisciplinary approaches but also multisector analysis.
Democracy and Industrial Planning
It would be fatal to resort to economism as a way of escaping
the culturalism of the prophets of the new electronic marketplace or of a
democracy on line (sur console) that does not give a fig for democracy at
all. However, it must not be forgotten that a necessary condition (though
certainly not the only one) of the effective functioning of democracy is the
state of its economy. By this I mean the way in which a nation manages its
heritage of material and symbolic production, the cumulative result of which
has been lived and struggled for by individuals, groups, and classes; the way
in which a national "community," affected by antagonistic social planning,
attempts to recover its needful heritage by constructing or reconstructing
it; the way in which this "community" employs the creativity, innovative-
ness, and inventiveness of its diverse constituent groups as part of a social
plan.
To further describe such a national plan involves venturing into
unresearched areas like that of national culture and its dialectical relation
to the process oftransnationalization. These days, when national culture or
identity has a global tendency to be transformed into one of those poles of
discourse associated with projects that are most antithetical to its existence,
584
 Armand Mattelart
it is important to rethink this concept within the concrete context of the
power relations responsible for the construction and reconstruction of na-
tional culture. It is unfortunate, nonetheless, that "nationalism" or national
independence, more often than not, only becomes an operational term of
reference whenever popular sentiment needs to be whipped up against an
enemy or aggressor (whether commercial or military). At such moments,
the terms become symbols of more than just group unity, and consequently
class conflict is played down. Obviously it is not my intention here to delve
too far into what ought to tum into an important field of critical research.
So far, I have suggested that if we are to speak about democracy,
it is difficult to avoid examining the way in which a country mobilizes its
energies around an industrial plan for restoring its technological indepen-
dence. With the political changes of May 1981 and the subsequent nation-
alizations, this plan has been at the forefront. Can France, along with Europe,
maintain its autonomy in the face oftransnationals emerging from America
and Japan? In pointing to the international competition for leadership in
scientific and technological know-how, the steering group responsible for
the colloquium on research echoed the words of then presidential candidate
Francois Mitterand on the major elements of the politics of research and
technology he promised to implement after the election: "The question to
be asked now is a simple one: What is the place of France in this inter-
national competition? At the front or at the back? In fifth place, after the
U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, and West Germany, or in first place? Hireling or
pioneer? My choice is made. Over the next seven years I want France to
be a front runner in the scientific field. " 8
Rather than wonder what response these claims would elicit from
a Brazilian, Chinese, or Indian scientist who did not share this Western
view of the world, let us content ourselves with pointing out how industrial
planning is overestimating its technological potential in order to bring an
end to the crisis. Thus, the cutting-edge technologies of information pro-
cessing, communication, semiconductors, robots, and biotechnology are taken
up as a way out of the crisis, a way, given the requisite political will, that
would sanction a concerted development of the world economy. What is at
stake in this crisis is the redefinition of economic and political relations
among different nations and the redistribution of power relations at the
international and domestic level. In his report on Technology, Employment,
and Growth presented at the Versailles summit in June 1982, the French
president was confident: "Where is technical progress today, and what effect
will it have, in the coming decade, on the crisis we are going through? ...
Not only do we need to look for common solutions to the problems posed
by the crisis, and to do that we must agree about its nature and its causes,
but we must also look toward those wide open fields which can still be
explored together. Science and technology is one of those fields, and its
rapid growth will hasten on the upheaval of our societies, and threaten to
tum against man himself unless he has established firm control over its
development. " 9 The same leitmotif was in evidence at the national collo-
quium on research: "To rely on scientific research and technological progress
as the dynamic components of recovery, means not only employing them
against the direct effects of the crisis, but also assigning them a far-reaching
mission, that of providing the bases for another model of social develop-
585
ment, one capable of accommodating existing models in making knowledge
and its rational deployment the privileged instruments of renewal." 10
One could easily feel uncomfortable with this way of looking at
things and prefer to fall back on the results of the struggles of those various
movements, peoples, or individuals who, throughout the industrialized or
developing world, object to this vision of a "new model of development";
those who think that the only way of reorganizing the planet is to attack
radically the assumptions of growth and needs and to bring an end to the
equation of technical progress with social progress. It is this alternative
experience, after all, that keeps the social body running, whether overtly or
indirectly. But would this not mean giving short shrift to, or even ignoring,
a debate that is much more complicated than simply disembarking while
the big guns are trained on those who submit to the constraints of this
growth (the constraints ofthe expansion of capital)? To follow such a course
would be to neglect any political discussion on the subject and the oppor-
tunity to compare opposing judgments on power relations; we would then
risk repeating what has happened, for example, with the nuclear question
generally. When one goes to law, one should know how the law is made
up, and this is not always so easy.
As the French minister for research and technology observed,
"the objective at this point in time is not socialism." Obliged to defend
himself against those who accused him of turning socialism into a vague
and distant point of reference, he added: "For socialists of any stamp, I ask
only one thing: that they are judged by their actions. Socialism lights our
way; it is the complete ideal of democracy; it is self-management; democracy
spread widely over all areas of life, politics, and economics. We cannot,
however, expect it to be achieved in one day, and more to the point, in one
country isolated from the rest of the world. Consequently, we have to con-
sider the problem of the development of the other powers and of interna-
tional relations over the next decade. We must prove that a government of
the Left constitutes a response to the crisis, and then allow for changes to
be made elsewhere, in other countries." 11 The important thing here is not
so much to judge the merits of the philosophy of development and progress
that sustains the explicit objectives of the socialist regime as to go on and
iron out the contradictions that pass through them.
Electronics as a Technology Base
Although this topic has scarcely been the subject of considerable
public debate, it is clearly on the question of industrial planning in the
electronics field that we have been able to see how the coming recovery in
the shape of a technology politics will be governed by tensions and tactical
limits. I shall lay out a few points of reference, culled from the proposals
contained in the report on the "Electronics Industries Network" 12-the FAR-
NOUX Report, prepared for the Ministry of Research and Technology in
March 1982 and published in May 1982.
1. Electronics has become a technology base. No domain of eco-
nomic activity is untouched by it. It is integral to all planned products, from
military defense systems to communications systems. The control of these
products will, in short, determine the future of technological independence
as an essential element of national independence. Electronics is all the more
strategic because of the very nature of the material it processes and chan-
586
 Armand Mattelart
nels-information. It is bound up in a cultural model that "will either be
our own model or else one determined by foreign penetration in the elec-
tronics field."
2. Unless self-sufficiency is proclaimed, and France is cut off from
technological changes elsewhere, a massive diffusion of electronics products,
services, and systems throughout the economy is inevitable. The outcome
of this, however, is difficult to predict. "The real choice for our country, in
actual fact, is between a future that would only enjoy a portion ofthe benefits
of the development of the Network (Filiere) and all of its faults-because it
would be content with consumption, allowing the inevitable rise in imports
to lower national employment-and a future in which we would draw in the
maximum of positive returns-as a result of our will to produce." 13
3. All of the electronics sectors are interdependent, from the hard-
ware and software systems (including data banks), office equipment, tele-
communications and robotics, to large-scale public products. The electronics
network thus constitutes a whole and must be examined globally. This sy-
nergetic trend will only get bigger; the unity of the electronics network will
only get stronger. "This unity," claims the report, "is, and increasingly will
be, a technical one: expansion will regularize processed information and
homogenize components: borders between software, telecommunications,
telematics, office equipment, and public electronics, will be abolished, all
of which will lead to the emergence of a vast communications sector. At
the heart of this network, complementary links will be strengthened between
large-scale technology-like big computers or satellites-and smaller units-
like personal computers or private telephone systems; software will circulate
through the entire network, increasing its relative worth. This unity also
has its industrial side, since companies will expand or diversify their field
of activity." 14
4. Insofar as this unified network is concerned, France will not
benefit from a siege politics. A global plan for its reestablishment is required,
one that relies on the two pillars of the electronics industry (professional
hardware, including arms systems, and telecommunications along with te-
lematics), where France has already succeeded in capturing a share of the
world market in recent years.
Reviving the unreliable sectors-components, for example-re-
quires the development of a large public sphere of electronics: "Public elec-
tronics is the natural market for producers of components. Unless there is
a national public electronics industry of some proportions, French com-
ponents producers will have no real competitive power." 15 France devotes
twenty-five times less funds than Japan to the research and development
of public electronics products.
Recommending an integrated plan will not, of course, mean a
"free for all. A clear conscience about the important technological sites, the
present state of the French network, and the potential effects of training,
will enable us to concentrate on the 'problem areas' where an extra effort
is needed." 16
(Table 1 presents market and business figures for the electronics
networks of the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and the rest of the
world in 1980.)
5. The industrial plan proposed by France for the "electronics
network" involves a strategy for liberating research and industry which, as
587
Table 1.

Share of
Commercial Network in
Country Production• Market• Sales• GNP(%)
United States 668 ( 46%) 648 ( 45%) +20 3.5
Japan 228 ( 16%) 164 ( 11%) +64 3.7
Western Europe 379 ( 26%) 409 ( 28%) -30
West Germany 113 ( 8%) 113 ( 8%) 3.3
France 83 ( 6%) 82 ( 6%) - 1 3.0
Great Britain 74 ( 5%) 75 ( 5%) - 1 3.8
Othersb 175(12%) 229 ( 16%) -54
Worldb 1450 (100%) 1450 (100%)
•Figures are in millions offrancs; five francs = one dollar.
•Excluding COMECON and China.
Source: DIEHL-FIEE-FARNOUX Report.

the American journal Business Week (May 31, 1982) notes, draws its lessons
from the experience of rivals, especially Japan. With nationalization, public
companies now account for 49 percent of the network, while the private
French companies, including small and medium-sized outfits, represent 21
percent, and foreign groups 30 percent (13 percent for IBM and 7 percent
for Philips). The laboratories and national research centers are completely
public. Ninety percent of the research, study, and development of the elec-
tronics network is therefore under state control today.
One major aspect of this liberationary plan is a new scheme for
relations between private and nationalized industry, between industries of
the same sector (to avoid domestic rivalry), between local industry and
academe, and also between designers and users. The launching of flexible
national products proves that there is a commitment to ensuring the fluency
of the horizontal transfers of technology by bringing together teams of public
and private researchers, both industrial and user-oriented, in order to pro-
mote new products. All this serves to foreground the need to integrate no-
tions of industrialization and commercialization within the very conception
of a new product.
The Redistribution of Transnational Economy
This industrial plan implies that the siting of French companies
and their optimum markets should be reconsidered. Because of the size of
its market (half of the world, and ten times larger than that of France) and
its technological wealth, the United States is a priority site for the inter-
nationalization of French firms. Since the European market constitutes close
to a third of the world market, economic recovery by way of high technology
can only come about in a Europe that is technologically united. Hence the
need for a dynamic of alliances and cooperation to aid the development of
new products, especially those in the large public domain. On the other
hand, the potential for automating the process of production of electronics
products "favors the siting, or even the re-siting, of network production in
the most developed countries." 17
Surely there is enough here for us to acknowledge that any dis-
cussion of the relation between democracy and communications technology
588
 Armand Mattelart
should involve an examination of the logic of redistribution in the inter-
national economy, a logic that appears to be inherent in the recovery model
offered by high technology. What are the long-term consequences of this
twofold movement of relocalizing-a strengthening of industrial ties with
the United States and a predictable falling-off of relations with the under-
developed countries-for the state of the north/south balance? Does the
structure of industrial alliances (which follows the lines of the Atlantic mil-
itary alliances) not reduce to a bare minimum the space for economic ne-
gotiation with the Third World? The attitudes ofthe Western powers in the
wake of recent world events (since the Falklands war, for example) tend to
prove that Europe as a whole still believes, perhaps wrongly, that the prin-
cipal contradictions are aligned on an eastjwest axis, whereas the third-
world countries think that they are already aligned, and each day increasingly
so, on a north/south axis, and that it is precisely the reorientation of the
east/west axis that is really at stake. The case is far from closed. The growing
commercial rivalry between the Common Market and the United States is
quite capable of causing another fracture in a bloc that is thought of as too
good to be true.
There is another question: What could be the impact of the in-
dustrial planning of several European countries on an independent French
industrial plan that did not tally with their individual ideas about what
constitutes a national plan for reindustrialization? The rapid growth of neo-
liberal economic models in countries like Great Britain has pushed it to the
European forefront. Is such a model of development based on the trans-
national logic not likely to interfere with the unfolding of a national strategy
aimed, across numerous contradictions, at circumventing the Japanese and
American empires? The rapidity with which the new communication tech-
nologies can be installed (Great Britain will be the first in Europe, for ex-
ample, to have a private telecommunications system run on optical fibers,
in direct competition with the nationalized network) should warrant further
reflection upon the new deals that determine the concrete structure for form-
ing and shaping technical advances in Europe. One sign, among others, of
the leading role played by Great Britain is in its transborder data flows: 66
percent of all data flows from Western Europe to the United States come
out of Great Britain. Transatlantic data flows, in fact, account for two-thirds
of the transborder data flows of that country, against an average of 10 percent
for all the other Western European countries. 18
Moreover, in 1977-78 the large electronics firms chose as their
priority target for launching the home video recorders in Europe, Great
Britain and then West Germany. Several reasons, insufficiently analyzed in
my opinion, led them to act in this way. These reasons drew as much on
the patterns and modalities of audiovisual consumption (the importance,
for example, of a network of sited installations in Great Britain compared
to the French equivalent) as on the structure of the industry of televisual
production (in the two chosen countries, an extremely disparate national
industry that fell further apart when the video recorder arrived); reasons
that were similarly related to the nature of the televisual system in each of
these countries. In short, to be able to describe the factors that have had
some bearing upon the case of the video recorder, we would need access to
a comparative history, which scarcely exists, ofthe communications systems
of Europe; a history that ought to help explain why Great Britain has out-
589
stripped the rest of Europe in introducing audiovisual technology ever since
the advent of the radio. A comparative study of this kind would be obligatory
for anyone who wants to answer this essential question: Why in 1962 did
France have one of the smallest television audiences in Europe?-27 percent
of all French homes had a television aerial against 29 percent in Italy, 37
percent in Belgium, 41 percent in Germany, 50 percent in the Netherlands,
and 82 percent in Great Britain. Another question should be addressed in
the same way: Why is there such a disparity today among the European
countries in the ownership of video recorders?-in 1982, 2.5 percent of
French homes against 10 percent in British homes. Unless we rest easy with
a unilateral, mechanistic response that would be a throwback to an analysis
of income range, a much more complex study must be taken up.
Some Poles of Cultural Production?
In one way or another, certain problematic features of French
planning regarding what are called the "hardware industries" appear again
in their own specific way when it comes to drawing up plans for the "software
industries." This is unavoidable, since the latter are equally bound up within
a similar kind of unifying movement. This movement no longer must be
proved, either in the field of information merchandising, where the logic of
the interdependent chain of electronics services works toward integrating
the various participants (gatherers-producers-carriers), or in the leisure field,
which is often confused with the former (multimedia conglomerates, etc.).
The factors involved in programming, software, and network planning are
at once economic, industrial, social, and cultural.
Although it is relatively easy to sketch the outlines of a plan for
developing the electronics technologies-even if they are only in an embry-
onic phase-it is much more difficult to isolate the features of a correspond-
ing plan for cultural production.
It is clear that this problem arises out of the need to name various
partners in order to provoke a national response in the face of the hegemony
of transnational productions (television series, video games, videocassettes,
etc.). The real differences emerge, however, when those partners have to be
identified. Listen to the director in charge of new projects at Hachette, the
fifth largest publishing company in the world:
Because of its position, Hachette has been among the
first to be implicated in a process of change that in-
volves all the participants in the cultural sector. The
handicaps of French audiovisual production and dis-
tribution, compared to that ofthe U.S., are such that
the challenge is posed not so much in terms of the
competition between French publishers or producers,
as in terms of their solidarity and complementarity.
This is one of the active issues which we are address-
ing. With a view to establishing the bases of a politics
of publishing in this area (particularly its legal aspects),
we hope that an allied commitment on the part of the
principal French groups in audiovisual production can
be developed and extended to other groups, and other
publishers. 19
590
 Armand Mattelart
However, the obstacles in the path of effectively building up this
understanding between different publishers or producers are much more
complex in the case of electronics. There is no evidence of any kind of
understanding between a public sector heavily involved in audiovisuals and
the big private groups. Not only do these private groups have a very limited
experience of televisual production because of public sector domination,
but, more to the point, their relations with the state are often at loggerheads.
There are quite definite reasons for this, and I will come back to them,
reasons suggested here by A. Lefebure, the director for the development of
new technologies at Havas, the large, partially state-controlled multimedia
group:
Everything which is not in the public sector suffers in
France from a real lack of symbolic legitimacy wher-
ever audiovisuals are involved. So it is no surprise
that negotiations between the State and private enter-
prise, or even a mixed economy, are so fraught with
conflict when it comes to managing audiovisual affairs.
Since they are accused of only being interested in com-
mercial growth inasmuch as it is linked to a market
logic (a familiar danger in itself in this domain), the
French communications groups are unable to declare
their real ambitions. The field is therefore left open
for other transnational groups to establish their pub-
lishing interests before going on to tackle the audio-
visual market by using processes of deregulation that
are becoming so familiar in a number of countries in
Europe. 20
According to the same Havas executive, who is clearly speaking
in a personal capacity, the search for a new legitimacy in the affairs of
audiovisual broadcasting outside of the public sector "can only take place
through a reasoned and voluntary act of support for the creative opportun-
ities that exist in France in this field." This kind of diagnosis points toward
the constitution of a new socioindustrial substructure; it advocates relying
on some ofthe complementary poles of creation and production (Hachette,
Havas, Sofirad, local radio and public television networks) to promote growth
capable of competing closely for international audiences and using these
poles to create new relations between multiple partners. 21
A. Lefebure points to some of the other groups with a potential
to be involved: "For well-known reasons, there are many difficulties in-
volved in the development of small, ambitious, and innovative audiovisual
structures. There is no shortage of designers, journalists eager to shape the
future of the press, technicians capable of important innovations (software,
high frequency systems, hi-fi, video), all of them hoping for a chance to
realize their potential. Clearly it is up to the State, along with the big com-
panies in the field, to give this kind of initiative a chance, since it is likely
to bring commercial success, and will also be a privileged way of winning
legitimacy in the public mind, all too easily impressed by events in this
domain. " 22
Similar proposals ventured on behalf of the television channels
point in the same direction, and thanks to new rulings on audiovisuals, they
591
are hoping to find other partners: "I also hope," declared the programming
head of Channel One (TFl ), "with the help of various partners, to be able
to create an offshoot committed to producing alternatives and thus increas-
ing our audience potential. The channel should make its presence felt in all
ofthe markets of audiovisual creation (teledistribution, video-cassettes, etc.)
through direct contact with the manufacturers. " 23
The future of this set of alliances (big/small, national/local, cen-
tral/provincial apparatus, private/public, commercial/associated sector) will
be crucial, since it will determine the form of power relations between part-
ners of unequal strength who do not necessarily have the same idea of
national independence, let alone the same idea of democracy as it applies
to the field!
The State in All of Its States
Poor state! So much is asked of it and in the form of demands
that are difficult to reconcile: it is required not only to set itself up as an
arbiter, by coming to the rescue of the big shots, so to speak, the large
companies in a bad way, but also to concern itself with the whole base of
the pyramid, all of the small-fry responsible for winning credibility for the
new solidarity. Perhaps the time has come to question the function of the
state, for that is precisely where we shall find the essentials regarding the
relation between technology, communication, and democracy.
For those who cared, the socialist victory in many ways repre-
sented an opportunity to deliver France from the logics at work in the
majority of the large advanced capitalist countries. To work its transfor-
mation into the whole restructuring of the world economy, a socialist France
would bracket off those fundamental movements that continue to affect its
neighbors or its partners. For example, it would not have to face up to those
painful questions that plague neo-liberals in England and the United States
as part of their obligation to take on the role of "thinkers of the state."
France would be concerned only with those logics of privatization that paved
the way for a welfare state, given its second wind under the socialist plan.
A simple electoral victory has not put an end to these logics; for
those who believe it has, nothing could be further from the truth. These
logics continue to shape French society, using the appropriate channels to
reintroduce familiar problematics.
1. In the field of communications, there are numerous signs that
the redistribution of modes of administrating the public/private relation
was stepped up during the late seventies. To make up for its loss of legit-
imacy, the state, and its administrative logics, sought the kind of support
provided by procedures at work in the private sector. By contrast, the private
sector was rethinking the "social" and thus taking up where the state had
left off. To check the crisis of the state, which is also the crisis of an image,
management was called upon to provide the state with a means of ration-
alizing itself, a way of avoiding wasteful expenditure, while marketing tech-
niques were recruited to cater to other areas of public relations. As a result,
we experienced the explosion of "public communication." The total state
expenditure for advertising space in the media rose from 39.7 million francs
in 1977 to 62.3 million in 1979, of which half was borne solely by the
Ministry of Labor and Industrial Relations. In comparing these figures we
must take into account the lowering of tariffs granted to campaigns certified
592
 Armand Mattelart
as being in the public interest (for television time, the administrations only
paid a quarter of the commercial rate.) This sum would thus correspond to
a budget of 128 million francs, a figure much closer to that of the two or
three biggest private advertisers: L'Oreal, Colgate-Palmolive, or Unilever. 24
The second clear evidence was the telematics campaign, sched-
uled to take off in 1976. With the general head of telecommunications at
the Ministry of PTT as its director, this campaign clearly represented a
major intervention in state administration at the level of managerial plan-
ning. The commercial logic that accompanied the promotion of the new
technologies had made its effects felt as much in the advance of the domestic
market as in the fundamental movements of the international markets (es-
pecially in the large Latin American countries). As there has been very little
analysis of the transformation of state practices from this point of view, it
is difficult to properly place the malfunctions and asynchronies that are
unfailingly produced within one section of the state apparatus-in this case,
the Ministry ofPTT-by the modernization of some of its branches. It would
be incorrect to think that what is rightfully the process of commodifYing
administrative action infiltrates the state apparatus in a uniform fashion.
Resistances of every sort crop up (from those that spring up in the defense
of public service to those that prevail in professional or institutional cor-
poratism, not to mention the terra incognita of users) and frequently give
rise to conflict and dislocation.
Another example of change in the management of the public/
private relation is what seemed to be the first large move in France to bring
together a hardware producer (the electronics firm Matra) and a producer
of programs (Hachette). We cannot, however, fully appreciate this merger
at the end of 1980 without knowing about the subtle pressures that were
involved as a result of a spontaneous act on the part of the government of
Giscard d'Estaing in its anxiety to redefine the alliance between the state
and the large multimedia groups as the new technologies were being ushered
in.
Finally, and on a more global level, the ideological debate around
the role of the intellectuals (and their relation with the media) has also, in
its own way, provided evidence of an epistemological rupture. As part of
the transitory epiphenomenon of the "new philosphers," and their inse-
parability from a media image, a new mode of disseminating (and thus of
producing) knowledge made its appearance just as the law of value was
stepping up its influence on the intellectual scene. Aside from rumors, this
was the first concrete sign of the necessary redefinition of relations between
the petit bourgeoisie, the bureaucrats of knowledge (whose diversity has not
been examined closely enough because our concept of them-an all too
quickly hallowed concept-was narrow and ill-adapted to the new historical
conditions of the intellectual), the state apparatus, and the logic of the mar-
ket.2s
2. Similarly, in the late seventies the legitimacy of the state was
put to the test by other forces in a shake-up not only of relations between
the state and civil society but also of the different modes of action of various
elements of civil society. The forms of state legitimacy are crumbling fast,
from the center outward. The defense of decentralization has become an
issue marked by social confrontations and, consequently, much ambiguity.
In "decentralizing" themselves, some sectors hoped to find new forms of
593
legitimizing the center by working from the edges; others saw this return to
the local as a special way of broadening the dimensions of democracy in
the sense of real power sharing. Any number of struggles, not to mention
fantasies, about the democractic virtues per se of the whole structure of
decentralization, revolve around this issue of the "local." 26 One very rele-
vant example in this context is the "free-radio" movement and its equivalent
in the movements for reclaiming alternative forms of expression, less well
advertised because they do not involve the new technology.
In the face of this interrogation of the workings of civil society,
a monolithic and manipulatory conception of the state collapses. The state
is no longer perceived as a site for the endless reproduction of power but
as the site of the production of power: a site marked by power relations
between groups, classes, and social projects, where the affirmation of a he-
gemony coexists with strategies of evasion and deviation. Also on trial in
this inquiry are our ways of conceiving party action and its relation to party
militants.
The Private/Public Relation
What is the state of the fundamental movements under the so-
cialist government? The tendency to entrust the advertising sector with large
public interest campaigns has been borne out, for example, in the first cam-
paign to promote reading. In addition to short broadcasts entitled "Reading:
the Roads to Freedom," programed over two months of television time,
the campaign has been pursued through posters in bookshops. The cost of
backing these campaigns has increased considerably: in 1982 it rose to an
estimated 150-160 million francs, compared to 62 million in 1979. There
is every reason to ask, as Bernard Miege does, whether "public commu-
nications lends itself to the process of manipulating public opinion, a process
all the more dangerous inasmuch as it takes the place of democratic channels
of debate." 27 Perhaps in the course of asking too much of marketing, one
forgets to expect civil society to provide the requisite ethic for instilling in
each citizen a degree of conscientiousness about such issues as reading,
contraception, solidarity, and so on. As it is, the marketability of a technique
(in this case, for the launching of a supposedly social product) seems to
have already been established prior to any serious questioning of the vertical
forms of social relation that it perpetuates. This is one more item to be
added to the catalog of technical perversions.
The debate about the state and the public/private relation in the
field of communication is, however, more complicated now than it was
before May 1981. The statements from Hachette and, in particular, from
Havas seem to suggest this much. And for those faced everyday with the
more concrete search for democratic alternatives, the ways of living out the
public/private relation have become less straightforward. One thing at least
can never be overstated: there exists in France a true "public culture," lived
as a legitimate culture of excellence within certain sectors, especially those
whose upward mobility depends on the statist or parastatist apparatus. This
culture, which has its repressed underside-a genuine repugnance for the
private-is no mean obstacle to the rethinking of the alliance of science,
research, and industry as it was formulated by the national colloquium-
all the more so since it is constructed on a paradox. Because of this "public
culture," the relation to the state is lived on a sadomasochistic level. We
594
 Armand Mattelart
expect the state to act as protector and arbiter, and then we rush to accuse
it of conditioning with a venom that matches our level of indebtedness. In
the domain of symbolic production, the chances of any critical discussion
of the question of a rapprochement between public and private are even
rarer, for this "public culture" is curiously distinguished by its hyper-in-
dividualized and aestheticized idea of creation-manifest in some as a con-
stitutional mistrust of anything that could give rise to an industrially re-
producible matrix. It is not easy, moreover, to decide between the positive
and negative sides of this show of reticence, no more so in the case of the
actual process of internationalizing the culture industries than in the de-
ployment of mechanisms of resistance to the normalization of ways ofliving,
thinking, and creating.
That some of the large multimedia groups have made tacit de-
mands on the question of official political support testifies clearly to de-
velopments in relations between the state and private enterprise. This only
makes sense, however, if we see it in the much larger context of a change
in relations between private enterprise and the whole of society, and es-
pecially in the domain that interests us, with its vital resources of social
creativity and innovation. So how do we interpret the "open letter to the
innovators" from Matra-Hachette, published on one whole page of Le Monde
on February 17, 1982, and addressed to "all innovators, designers of hard-
ware and software in each sector: personal computers, video games, business
organization, office equipment, telecommunications, or scientific instru-
ments"? The letter continues:

The development of privately-accessed information

on a large public scale is irrevocable. The economic,
cultural, and social stakes are very high. In spite of
current foreign pressure, France has the resources to
play a leading role in this sector. This will only come
about if the development of this public market is gov-
erned by clearly defined plans, and is dependent upon
tried and tested industrial and commercial structures.
The plans have been drawn up. The structures exist.
Through its mastery of leading technologies-from
components to telecommunications-Matra is build-
ing up the technical and industrial potential needed
for the development of the personal computer on a
large public level in France.
Through its experience in the domain of
publishing and broadcasting, Hachette is supplying its
share of the conditions necessary to the success of this
project.
That is why Matra and Hachette have jointly
decided to create a group for research, development,
and distribution in the field of this large circulation
personal computer.
This group has an "open" structure: open
to all those-individuals or companies-with a crea-
tive, imaginative spirit, who can and want to help put
595
 France in the top ranks of the international compe-
tition for this field.
For those faced with the promotional problem of simply acquir-
ing creative individuals, there is a lot here to think about. As I have noted
recently elsewhere, in an attempt to generalize from observations made
about other national situations:
If the question of the relation between the so-called
culture industries and the rest of society (institutions,
associations, groups, individuals) as a source of crea-
tivity for nurturing production ha:; always occupied
an important place in the operations of various sectors
of this industry, then it goes without saying that the
increasing intervention of capital, through informa-
tion systems, in the most diverse spheres of the ev-
eryday life of collectivities and individuals, risks mak-
ing the industry/civil society into a dominant global
issue. The prospective social use of the new infor-
mation technologies acutely exposes the connexions
between the "information industry" and the sites of
social innovation, and it does so in political and eco-
nomic terms qualitatively different from those hith-
erto recognised. New sets of relations between indus-
trial and non-industrial partners that are being formed,
reflect in each case specific relations of force. 28
The ways in which the transnationals are trying everywhere to circumvent
resistance from national education apparatuses is already very revealing on
the subject. Given this, we should feel uneasy about the glaring contrast
between the extraordinary flexibility of the transnationals in their "open-
door" plans for experimentation and the extreme rigidity of the institutional
structures.
Clearly we need to to examine the particular way each national
corporation organizes and takes advantage of cultural innovations (or resists
them), using them as a passport to the new age of electronics. Recently, the
head of programming at Channel One was bemoaning the lack of thought
given to problems of technical growth: "The engineers and technicians have
taken an unparalleled lead over the programming people, and we spoil our-
selves on cable and satellite without understanding that the new media must
be matched by new programming. Few countries have brought forward a
political prospectus in this area, and we are suffering now from a real lack
of imagination. " 29 This lack of imagination should not be confused with a
lack of creative resources. A country can easily be abundant in ideas and
yet fail to provide opportunities for realizing them. 30 This reflects the specific
national history offorms assumed by the expansion of capital in the cultural
sphere as well as the history of modalities of articulation between designers
and the totality of structures of cultural production (either public or private).
Social Demand and Social Research
One of the preoccupations of the research colloquium was over
the vaguely defined concept of social demand. There was talk of a "social
596
 Armand Mattelart
lag in research" and even braver talk of the distance between research and
the demand of popular sectors. The following extract from the report of the
first commission is especially relevant:
It is still imperative that the objects to which our sci-
entific efforts will be devoted are chosen in a pertinent
fashion. The State will name its priorities, starting with
the most obvious, which is to help our country recover
from the crisis. Industry, better equipped with new
experience and know-how, will reveal new needs. The
scientists themselves will find new solutions, new ex-
perimental fields, and new theoretical paradigms, each
in keeping with the logic of their own disciplines. These
three activities, however-and they should be more
closely related-come nowhere near to meeting the en-
tire social demand in a sufficiently satisfactory way.
The fact is that the unions, associations,
and social movements (ecology, feminism, consumer
groups, etc.,) are still poorly equipped, and do not pos-
sess, at this point, either the power or the resources to
be able to present new demands to the scientific in-
stitutions, or to develop their own research-but their
needs must be recognized all the same. The fact is that
any future committment to decentralization, with the
establishment of new centers of decision-making, will
give rise to the emergence of new demands that ought
to be satisfied, even anticipated. The fact is that we
still lack sufficiently scientific studies of large areas of
social life: the problems of everyday life, the awkward
social integration of youth, procrastination in finding
a new pedagogical balance, labor conditions constantly
being transformed by the new technologies, urban
growth, those arts which foster new scientific interests,
etc. We will have to support research on such areas,
even if it involves major institutional reorganization.
The fact is that there is a large-if not excessive-gap
between the given wisdom of political affairs and the
knowledge accumulated by the social sciences, and this
in spite of the potential lessons that the latter could
offer the former. In general, the fact is that research is
only doing a small part of what it could do.
It is therefore important to bridge this gap
by any means: by privileging new breakthroughs, by
encouraging the analysis of latent needs on the part of
the scientific institutions themselves, by widening our
contacts and experiences, by establishing social com-
munications between diverse public demands and
agencies specializing in research. In short, by trying to
speed up the social retardation of research.
This ambitious call for new research to an-
swer to new demands will undoubtedly be hampered
597
 by errors, failures, and undue caution. Two victories,
however, are sure to come of it: a victory on the part
of science, through its surveying at least a part of this
unknown field, and a victory for science inasmuch as
it will provide society as a whole with new proof of
its social usefulness. 3 '
Communication sciences in France are not set up in such a way
as to be immune to the tropism encountered by other social sciences. Certain
research problems are accorded a status out of all proportion, while others
are neglected; and this occurs in a context in which the study of commu-
nication occupies a negligible position in the hierarchy of political, eco-
nomic, and social sciences. The list of deficiencies with respect to this idea
of "social demand" would be a long one. Here are some examples (in each
case, all or nearly all of them have still to be examined):
-A lack of relations between semiological research and the gen-
uine latent demand for discourse analysis on the part of journalists looking
for a redefinition of their practices; this gap contrasts with the fluid exchange
between semiology and the advertising industry.
-A lack of any detailed understanding of the modes of reappro-
priating media discourse on the part of the various social categories that
constitute the "grand public."
-A lack of any analysis of the strategies of evasion and deviation
directed by multiple social agents against the apparatuses of power.
-A lack of any study on the articulation, in a dialectical model
of analysis, of the so-called experiments in social intervention (cinema,
video, radio) and the functioning of the central apparatuses, the academic
experiments with audiovisuals and their practical results. I am thinking, for
example, of the importance of scientific film (through the work ofPainleve)
in the growth of the French cinematographic avant-garde.
-A lack of any dialectical analysis of exchange, or absence of
exchange, between university research on cultural production and the field
of criticism (newspapers, reviews, magazines, etc.). In many apparently un-
related fields, it is the references and accomplishments of academic research
that, one way or another, fix the limits of tolerance for any discourse. Vulgar
discourse, or at least one version of it, is no longer acceptable in the analysis
of film, while it is still looked on as the dominant mode of analyzing popular
music. The notable absence of research in this field (there are only one or
two serious French studies of the musical culture industry and even they
are inspired by an anthropological vision of the phenomenon of popular
music) means that credence is given there to the most idealizing and mys-
tificatory discourses to be found in the whole range of media reporting.
Similarly, if one considers the low symbolic legitimacy enjoyed in France
by the private (marketing) research circles embarrassed by their relation to
profit, do academic references come to be powerful tools of legitimation
and exoneration with respect to the logic of the market?
-A lack, so to speak, of any research on the role of inventors,
their relation to the culture industries, and to civil society.
-And, above all, the lack of a critical account of the manifold
experiments in alternative communication that have been socially active
598
 Armand Mattelart
for more than fifteen years now.
These lacks, which are often read as a resistance to research, are difficult to
explain without taking account of the institutional obstacles that have seg-
regated research but also, and more specifically, the great currents of material
thinking that have affected, if not governed, any kind of relation to society
as a whole.
Social Experimentation
Where the need for an industrial dynamic for developing the new
technologies intersects with the need to involve hitherto excluded social
partners in the application of these technologies, the concept of social ex-
perimentation makes its appearance, with its mission of catering to "social
demand" in the field of communications. As the minister for research and
technology recalled at the time that the campaign "Technology, Culture,
and Communication" was being launched: "Any number of failures have
resulted from the past practice of not giving precedence to the distribution
of new products over research on their social and cultural impact: prototypes
have not got beyond the laboratory stage, and technical experiments have
not been absorbed into the social fabric." 32 To test out the sociocultural
reception of new technologies entails adjusting technological supply to pub-
lic demand, trying to bypass the "logic of economic production" and striving
to establish some kind of social and democratic control over the tools of
technology. It also involves a commitment to eliminating holdups or delays
in the socialization of the new by the market.
Clearly, if social experimentation is not to embark once again
upon strategies of commercialization, such as the creation of needs through
marketing, or be reduced to providing social protection for showcase tech-
nology, if it is to have any credibility as a strategy for social change, then
it must involve itself in the polemical process of redefining the state. In this
regard the essential question is, Which social partners are involved? This
leads to others: How is a social demand inaugurated? How is it produced?
And how is it picked up? Surely not at the instigation of the great state
institutions. Surely not as a result of the market's need to expand, or at
least not exclusively. It is here that we should find the limits of the debate
about the public/private (state/private) enterprise. The only way beyond
these limits is to examine a third pole-private and noncommercial-that
some already call the "third sector," while others prefer to stick with the
expression "civil society" (without taking stock, from time to time, of the
new logics that throw the state into confusion). This new sector should put
a check on both the reproduction of "good Samaritan attitudes" fostered
by the welfare state and the ascendancy of capitalist valorization.
According to a proposal that went with the grain of the emergent
preoccupations of the colloquium,
In spite of the introduction of new systems of media-
tion, and in spite of the fact that the majority of current
socialist leaders appear to have thrown off the old cen-
tralist conceptions about fashioning change in accord-
ance with pre-established ideological models, there is
still a grave risk that the "raisons d'Etat," translated
599
 into the sluggishness of the apparatus will lead to the
same bureaucratic neutralization of ideas for manag-
ing social change by the interested parties themselves,
and also to the strengthening of collective attitudes
about dependence on the Welfare State .... The "third
sector" will continue to be marginalized and denied
any role as an agent of change, unless it succeeds in
establishing an institutional market, inserted between
the capitalist market and the State-controlled sys-
tems-a market of the sort that can be tested and con-
trolled by other systems of valorizing human affairs,
other ideas about the ends of social production. 33
In another document, the problem of technological and social innovation
is posed in a more precise way: "Both the policies of the government and
the big parties have to recognize the classic erosion of power and novelty.
This process, which could lead to the total exhaustion of social measures,
will only be checked by encouraging the free expression of new propositions,
and by setting aside a space for innovation and information-sharing among
different social groups. If this does not happen, we will see an increasing
decline in the legitimacy of the State, an erosion caused by the growing
distance between technostructure and citizen in all of the major sectors:
industry, administration, unions, media, etc. The only way to stop this rot
is to take the risk of basing the social consensus on the recognition and
expression of multiplicities." 34
For those who clearly do not share the mythical vision of this
"third sector," conceived as a sanctuary for values, these observations point
to a profound analysis of the complexity and contradictions of the social
fabric and its associated structures. Although it is the object of frequent
appeals, there is seldom any common agreement about the content of this
diverse fabric, for without abstracting it from the long history of the for-
mation of French civil society, the tendency is to accept that the old char-
tered, almost parapublic companies are as visible in the pattern of this fabric
as the new organizations that have risen from recent social struggles outside
the workplace and even those, like some groups of parent or family asso-
ciations, that have recently launched their own critique of the media from
outside all the recognized circuits.
At the risk of prolonging a discussion that should be taken up
elsewhere, but is rarely posed in these terms, we should not underestimate
the vogue for "social experimentation." The current debate in France about
this subject, rightly or wrongly, and despite the in vitro connotations of the
very term "experimentation," has established itself as one of the major
stakes in the democratic redefinition of communication research (among
others). It is to this way of perceiving science and its relation to social
movements that the researcher must now be committed.
So, too, does this idea deliver us from the narrow-mindedness
of the exclusive claim for independence from "all forms of power" that is
often confused-as in the case of the journalist-with a belief in the inde-
pendence of research into social relations: all those acts of faith that win
researchers immunity (often for life) from questions about the conditions
of productions of their investigations, their reasons for choosing one topic
600
 Armand Mattelart
rather than another, and the consequences of their research-in short, the
ethics of their practical function. From this point of view, we need only
contrast the trajectory of the communication sciences in France with this
notion of"social demand" to reveal how much the vast majority of research
only pays lip service to the willful demands of power. 35
Whether one accepts the concepts of social demand and social
experimentation or prefers to substitute "social intervention" for the latter,
it is clear that there are open-ended issues at stake here. Either they will
lead, through new plans for encouraging and soliciting social and techno-
logical innovation, to a real democratic surplus in a society that perceives
and accepts communication technology as an integral part of social relations
and general benefits, or they will give rise to the creation of a body of experts
in social engineering and systems theory, which would be the very opposite
of what social science should be, in its true anti-elitist colors. The stakes
are high, since it is difficult to divorce this issue from the more general
question of the redistribution of power among the various classes and social
groups that make up French society; for it is in the context of political
recovery from the crisis that the professional technician classes (some will
call them the new petit bourgeoisie) have expressed increasingly hegemonic
aspirations on the subject of the management of society as a whole.
Restoring to Social Experimentation Its Contradictions
The following notes are a contribution to the burgeoning debate
on the need to "antagonize" the notion of social demand and all that it
entails.
1. Any political project that is no longer content merely to pro-
claim the prophylactic virtues intrinsic to technology, but elects instead to
examine the relation between technology and democracy, or technology and
social demand, must, in the context of the current politics of recovery chosen
by the socialist regime, contend with powerful internal tensions. It must
attempt to reconcile two logics, or injunctions, that seem to be irreconcilable.
On the one hand, this means allowing industries to win a market, a plan
that actually involves increasing the interfaces between people and machines
while encouraging the electrification of the modes of communication be-
tween individuals; on the other hand, it means accepting that the expansion
of this market is ultimately contained by a social demand, namely, the
expression of needs that cannot easily be satisfied by a mode of commu-
nication based on electronics. In short, the industrial keynote-or, to recall
the words of the president of the French Republic at the Versailles summit,
"the mainstay of the demand for encouraging the development of markets
for new consumer goods and services that make use of technological
advances" 36-risks running up against the imperative of democracy itself.
What this reveals are the true motives and potential drawbacks
of a certain conception of social experimentation, for not all social logics
necessarily lead to technological solutions. The introduction of technology
to social experimentation already involves a reclassification of realityY In
effect, we must face up to the basic question, Do people really need tech-
nology?
To gauge social demand in this way means reevaluating those
experiments in alternative communication carried out through technical
601
means (video, radio, telematics systems), for the side-effects of those ex-
periments are not necessarily technological ones (or at least not in the tech-
nological mode that has been privileged from the start): the extension of
community television to community radio in Quebec, or the movement
from video experiments in selected urban areas to original methods of pe-
dagogical practice with audiovisuals in the lycees. 38 These are new ways of
estimating the effects of social interventions that tend, when they run aground,
to be jettisoned according to the theory of the fatal recuperation of social
(so-called marginal or alternative) innovations by the Establishment. One
scarcely needs to add that this interpretive schema, inasmuch as it only
views social innovation in a regulatory or transitory capacity, frequently
crops up in the nick of time for the various national or local powers. The
result of treating these alternative experiments as nothing but failures-
without even questioning the nature of the failure or the social agents at
fault-is to strengthen the cause of all the enemies of a democratic decen-
tralization, not only of the networks of distribution, but also of those that
subtend the production of communication and culture. In such a situation,
caught between innovation and integration or recuperation (by either the
administrative or classical market circuits), there is no room for the debate
about the real possibility of the democratic redefinition of civil society men-
tioned earlier. It is a good thing that our society harbors pockets of resistance
outside the purview of these manipulatory, "dualist" concepts of power.
2. A few final observations about the danger of "autonomizing"
the current debate on new communication technology in France, and es-
pecially the risk of dismissing as redundant any discussion about the nature
of democracy:
a. The obsession with technology-inspired by its endemic neo-
positivism-is a dangerous phenomenon, one that can even bring on fresh
symptoms of the technical perversions. The universe of "communication"
becomes a privileged space for neutralizing all politics, a specious universe
devoid of conflicting interests, power relations, and sociological separatism
or resistance. In his study on the introduction of audiovisuals to the book-
store, J. C. Passeron appropriately invokes

a discretionary expedient, in order to avoid the usual

lapse into deception: thinking twice before banking
everything on the trump card of a distributionist op-
timism. We are used to seeing the latest thing in tech-
nological progress serving to puff up the the scientistic
hope that an increase in cultural goods or in their ac-
cessibility will magically bring about the "cultural sal-
vation" of the masses. No technological innovation,
by the simple fact of its medium, has ever justified the
cultural inequalities repeatedly produced by the well-
worn game of social structures and hierarchies: the
technical characteristics of a means of communication
never predetermine its social effects to the extent of
excluding any effect bound up with the social relations
that govern the application of the technical knowl-
edge.39
602
 Armand Mattelart
In certain circles, it is as if the mere fact of being in power, of
no longer belonging to an eternal opposition, had come to represent the
triumph of a good technological conscience, or, rather, a technological le-
gitimacy. The reasons for this obsession are deeply rooted in a history at
once old and new. To begin with the old: the forces ofthe Left never actually
came to terms with the instrumentalist conception of technology and have
essentially revalidated their belief that the political questions addressed to
technology were resolved at the level of the relative efficiency of the tools
offered by technical progress. Given this, it is difficult to stage a properly
critical inquiry about the relation, for example, between technical knowledge
and the reproduction of social divisions in the workplace, the segregation
of owners of knowledge/information from the others. Now this inquiry
would be particularly strategic at a time when France must respond to a
technological challenge closely linked to the political challenge of restruc-
turing the relations of power between groups and classes; at a time when
information, the potential to produce it and control its means of application,
is increasingly becoming central to both the reorganization of all forms of
power and the deepening of social divisions.
As for the new history, one hardly needs to point out that there
is no effective way of accounting for the asylum offered by technology with-
out putting it into a global context: a crisis of legitimacy among the great
traditional movements that have determined their logics of domination ever
since the organization of the working class, and a crisis of the great social
ideas (including the very idea of equality). These are both elements of a
profound crisis of "politics," of the ways of practicing politics-a crisis that
an electoral victory can only displace and that returns with all the more
force since it was believed in some circles that the heady nights of the Bastille
were back for good.
b. One technology follows hard on the heels of another, and the
law of obsolescence is the law of a certain technological progress. What we
risk losing as a result of this technological obsession is the long and cu-
mulative history of former practices of resistance in the field of commu-
nications, a history that risks being wiped out by the latest gadget simply
because the logic of the market only operates from moment to moment.
This amnesia works on two levels: time (each new technology is a return
to zero hour) and space (we lose even the memory of a position of solidarity
built up out of multiple and interacting social practices).
By ignoring the accomplishments and failures of previous ex-
periments, by not reevaluating these failures and finding links among them
all, we are passing up the chance of constructing a theory of communication
that could absorb the lessons of other research, other disciplines, and other
experiments that have been studied in different fields. I am thinking, for
example, of those communicologues who tum up their noses at everyone:
from researchers on social reproduction in the schools and those who ap-
proach the politics of democratization through cultural activity and cam-
paigning, to the pioneers in planning urban space, to those coming from
anthropology, literature, and history who have tried to embrace the field of
popular culture, past and present.
c. It is in this global context that we find another obsession at
work-an obsession with the local. Tired of the great grinding machines of
specificity and particularity, the local has, in certain sectors, and for quite
603
some time now, come to be defined as synonymous with a nostalgia for
intimacy and communality. Now that the watchword of decentralization
has been officially implemented, the local has been reappraised as an im-
portant site for redefining the state, a site of confrontation, hitherto uni-
maginable, for outright contradictory projects. 40
Clearly, the question of decentralization falls between the accel-
eration of the process of elimination and dispersal in the face of a tete-
centered power and the introduction of new forms and new structures of
solidarity. Just as we were beginning to feel less strongly about the need for
a debate on the national/transnational question with a view to formulating
a politics of independence and reconstruction of national identity, now we
are faced with the new urgency of the local/national question and the need
to formulate a politics of the redistribution of power. It is here that the idea
of "kinship networks" becomes useful when trying to avoid the localist
traps. 41

Notes

1 J. P. Chevenement (minister for research and technology), in Le Monde. Sept 23. 1981.
p.1
2 Ministry for Research and Technology, Recherches et technologie. Actes du colloque na-
tional. 13-16 janvier 1982 (Paris: La Documentation Franc;:aise. 1982). p. 7.
3 Recherches et technologie. p. 7.
4 "Annexe 1: Note d'orientation." Recherches et technologie. p. 41.
5 MOINOT Report. published by La Documentation Franc;:aise. 1982.
6 See F. Guattari, "Note concernant un projet de fondation pour les initiatives locales, les
innovations 1nstitutionelles. Ia recherche en science sociale, !'animation et Ia creation cul-
turelles ... Paris. Feb. 1982, mss. In the same spirit of incorporating local collectives, as-
sociations. and unions within this "research action ... see the interview with Philippe Barret
(representative for the social sciences at the Ministry for Research and Technology). "Les
sciences de l'homme et de Ia societe.'' Revue NON! (Reperes pourle socialisme). 12 ( 1982).
pp. 114-22.
7 On this po1nt. see my A. Mattelart. Mass Media, Ideologies and the Revolutionary Movement
(Atlantic Highlands. N.J.: Humanities Press. 1980).
8 Mitterand. in Recherches et technologie. p. 15.
9 Technologie. emploi. et croissance (report by President Mitterand at the summit meeting of
the industrial powers). Versailles. June 5. 1982. See Le Monde. June 6-7. 1982.
10 Recherches et technologie. p. 39.
11 J. P. Chevenement. in Temoignage chretien, Paris. June 14-20, 1982.
12 Mission Filiere Electronique. In French. the term fi/Jere electronique has recently begun to be
used for all eleven sectors of industrial electronics production: components. products for the
general public. computers. automated office equipment. software and data banks. robotics.
medical electronics. sc1entlfic instruments. telecommunications. professional electronics (civil
and miltary). space technology.
13 Ministry for Research and Technology, Extraits du rapport de synthese de Ia mission filiere
electronique. Paris. mimeo. Mar. 1982. annexe 7. p. 3.
14 Extraits. annexe 5. p. 12.
15 Extraits. annexe 4. pp. 7-8.
16 Extraits. annexe 4. pp. 7-8.
17 Extraits. annexe 5. p. 12. Let us recall some of the aims of the manifesto for technological
growth advanced by F. Mitterand at the Versailles summit: "Priority action for technological
co-operation between pnvate and public companies. and between nations ... ; the pro-
gressive creation of a world market for technology (standards. patents); a joint initiative to

604
 Armand Mattelart
assure that the Southern nations master the new technologies." See Technologie, emploi,
et cro1ssance.
18 Un1ted Nations, Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data Flows: A Technical Paper
{New York: U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations, 1982)
19 In Livres-Hebdo, Paris, Sept: 22, 1981.
20 A. Lefebure, "Mass media, groupes de communication et societe," a personal contribution
to the commission on "Technologie, diffus1on de Ia culture et communication," June 1982.
21 Here are some figures to help gauge the internationalization of the French culture industnes.
In 1980, the sale of French films abroad was only a tenth of book sales and a half of the
number of records sold. The sale of television programs itself was only one-fifth of film sales,
and the foreign television market represented almost a third of that purchased from abroad.
In additiOn, exports for the publishing industry for the same year were less than 20 percent
of its turnover and were concentrated on the Francophone countries, which accounted for
80 percent of this export flow {see J. Rigaud, Les relations culturelles exterieures, [Pans: La
Documentation Fran<;:aise, 1980]). In 1980, the French television network {TF1, A2, FR3,
INA-commercial sale, SFP-Ioss of franchise) had foreign sales of 5,596 program-hours,
against 1 ,567 in 1978. Also in 1980, 6,000 program-hours were del1vered as part of cultural
aid to twenty-nine countnes, fifteen of which were 1n North Afnca (3,500 hours) and the
rest to Mahgreb, Haiti, and several Arabophone and Anglophone nations. The number of
coproductions in 1980 rose to 94 hours for TF 1 and 36 hours for A2 (for the period 1979-
80, an estimated 60 hours were coproduced for FR3). Otherwise, the coproducers were
still the traditional partners {Francophones and RFA). with the exception of FR3 {Japan,
Mexico) {figures taken from a report by the study group "Action internationals" on the
MOINOT Commission, August, 1981)
22 A Lefebure, "Mass media, groupes de communication et societe."
23 Interview with Andre Harris, "Le deficit de 1'1mag1nat10n," Le Monde, May 27, 1982.
24 On the crisis of the image of the state, see the several contributions to the colloquium ''Where
Is PubliC Management Go1ng?" (May 28-30, 1980). organized by the University of Paris-
Dauphine and the Center for H1gher Education in Business Studies (CESA). especially those
by J. Lendrevie and R. Laufer. Also see J. L. Albert et al, Production de Ia ville et amen-
agement du discours, Grenoble Ill, GRESEC, Jan. 1980, mimeo.
25 See Regis Debray, Teachers, Wnters, Celebrit1es. The Intellectuals of Modern France {lon-
don: New Left Books, 1982); F. Aubral and X. Delcourt, Contre Ia nouvelle philosophie {Pans:
Galhmard, 1977).
26 See L 'objet local: colloque dirige par Lucien Sfez {Paris: collection 10/18, 1977)
27 B. M1ege, "Le pouvoir et les systemes d'information: S'interroger sur les enjeux fondamen-
taux," paper delivered at the Third French Congress on Communication and Information
Sc1ences, May 1982, mimeo.
28 A. Mattelart, " Introduction," Communication and Class Struggle {New York: International
General, 1983), val 2, pp. 17-67.
29 Interview with Andre Harris, Le Monde, May 27, 1982.
30 One can think what one wants about programs like "Ulysses 31" as models of television
for children, but the history of its production is, from an industrial point of view, quite in-
structive. Conceived by a Frenchman, the series was not taken up in France, and after many
ups and downs, like the majority of animated cartoon senes, was produced in Japan thanks
to a coproduction agreement. The study group on the politiCS of the image set up by the
pnme minister has noted that in th1s case, as in many others, all of the necessary elements
for 1ts production were there, albe1t scattered throughout university laboratories and the
electronics industry, but the "honzontal" relation between technology and individual talent
was sadly lacking. Conv1nced, then, that the state should not itself create an animated cartoon
Industry but only develop the conditions for it to expand and flourish, the director for children's
broadcasts at TF1 wrote: "We have thousands of professionals with the talent and the
capacity to properly establish animated French cartoons in the world of modern television,
if only they were salvaged from their working isolation, encouraged and supported by man-
agement with experience in the affairs of the new industry, and above all, if their own en-
thusiasm were rewarded by concrete measures." (J. Mousseau, "Piaidoyer pour une in-
dustrie fran<;:aise du dessin amme," Communication et langages, no. 52 [1982])
31 "Commission no. 1. L'apport culture! de Ia recherche scient1fique et technologique" {re-
porter: Robert Fossaert). Recherches et technologie, pp. 92-93.
32 Letter from J. P Chevenement to the presidents of the commission on "Technologie, diffusion
de Ia culture et communication" {A. Mattelart andY. Stourdze), Mar. 1982, in Technologie,
communication et culture (Pans La Documentation Fran<;:aise, 1982).

605
33 F. Guattari, "Note," pp. 114-22.
34 M. J. Carrieu-Costa and M. Calion, Pro}et d'un centre de recherche et de formation sur les
mnovations technologiques et sociales. Mar. 1982. mimeo.
35 See. for example, the dossier "Pour un autre television," NON! (reperes pour le socialisme)
( 1982). w1th contributions from A. Sp1re and D. Goldschmidt; Y. de La Haye and 8. Miege,
"Les socialistes fran9ais aux prises avec Ia question des media," Raison presente, Paris,
Winter 1982; P. Flichy, "Pour une politique de !'innovation sociale en audiovisual," Le monde
diplomatique, May 1982.
36 President Mitterand, Versailles summit.
37 See C. Collin, "Villeneuve; de Ia videogazette au centre de ressources," Sonovision (1978).
The Italian experiment with free radio and television deserves a special mention here, not so
much in itself, but inasmuch as it fosters a number of myths sustained by the enemies of
the democratization of communication. How many times here in France have we seen those
who support restricted democracy in the media block a whole discussion by invoking the
situation in Italy as one characterized by audiovisual "anarchy."
38 The study group for social experimentation on the MOINOT Commission noted quite correctly,
in July/August 1981, that it was possible to adopt two different experimental approaches:
"The first. beginning with the technological system, involves the desire to test and observe
the way in which an environment adopts, rejects, or transforms the system. If 1t is necessary
for an organism vital to the future of communications to keep itself informed about these
experiments, even to be in some way associated or intimate with their ways, then we should
ask ourselves how the question could be turned around in order to accommodate different
forms of experimentation; instead of starting with technique and then examining its applic-
ability, starting with innovative social practices and then examining what kind of technical
response can be brought to the material needs of communication. New means can certainly
be utilized but only inasmuch as they would appear to respond better than the current media,
and eventually, in conJunction with these media, to the needs articulated by the users. Such
expenments could be carried out by using the existing networks and would not have to wait
for the installation of new ones."
39 J. C. Passeron, Images en bibliotheque. images de bibliotheque (Paris: Documents du Gides,
1982), pp. 46-47.
40 On the "local" question, see A. Mattelart and J. M. Piemme, Television: Enjeux sans fron-
tieres (Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 1980); in English by the same authors, see "New
Means of Communication: New Questions for the Left," Media, Culture, and Society, no. 2
a
(1980). pp. 321-38; J.P. Garnier, "De Ia crise d'une gestion Ia gestion d'une crise ou le
charme discret de Ia decentralisation," Cahiers Secteur Public (Paris, 1982).
41 This is where some reflection on experiments like that of the ANTELIM network, which has
steadily established radio links between the families of sailors, might provide ballast for the
boundless enthusiasm for local radio that has been officially Inspired by the plan for decen-
tralizing the public monopoly of radio-television.

606
 lain Chambers

Contamination, Coincidence, and Collusion:

Pop Music, Urban Culture, and the
Avant-Garde

It is necessary to take seriously the hypothe-

sis according to which only an excess of
imagination seizes the profundity of the
real... .
Henri Lefebvre

What might Lefebvre's statement, made in the context

of a discussion of surrealism, mean in the context of the triad pop music,
popular culture, and the avant-garde? In seeking an answer, I will be talking
about the relationship between an excess of imagination and popular cultural
tastes. I want to identify where the project of the historical avant-garde and
important tendencies in contemporary urban popular culture meet, as it
were, at the periphery of an existing cultural hegemony or cultural block.
This involves looking at the struggle for the sense and direction of urban
culture that takes place in the "dailyness" of routines, habits, and the sub-
consciously exercised expectations of common sense in order to see how
an _excess of imagination is translated into a practical jolting of common
sense, which permits previously mute areas and relations to begin to speak.
To think more concretely about this potentiality, we
need to consider the spaces in which diverse social forces are brought to-
gether-forces that are gendered, racial, and further differentiated in both
major and microscopic fashion. This will render, one hopes, slightly more
articulate what is quite clearly a long-standing critical silence in discussions
about both pop music and contemporary urban popular culture. While I
will be referring here to realities found in advanced capitalist societies, I
would also suggest that these tendencies have effects in urban centers
throughout the world. The effects are different, but they are, in a very com-
plex way, related to developments within advanced capitalist urban culture.
In The Art of Noises, published in 1916, the Italian
futurist Luigi Russolo drew attention to the "voluptuous" sonorities of the
new metropolitan environment: an infinite combination of sirens and horns,
crowds and trams, engines and machinery. He proposed a new music to be
produced by specially constructed machines, considered himself to be a
"noise tuner," and wrote compositions for these instruments bearing such
titles as "A City Wakes Up" and "A Conference for Cars and Planes." 1 This
futurist provocation usefully serves to isolate a set of significant themes: the
607
 machine, mechanical reproduction, and what Antonio Gramsci once called
the "directive function" of the city in national life.
The avant-garde's "explosion of dissent" (Andre Breton) in the
early decades of the twentieth century signaled a divide between a contem-
plative attitude toward art (/'art pour /'art) and a radical activism that sought
to overcome the "divorce between action and dream" (Breton). Futurism's
frantic embrace of modernity and the "machine epoch," Dada's direct re-
fusal of"art" and its proclamation of the victory of daily life over aesthetics,
and the surrealist project to give free rein to the unconscious through the
liberty of "automatic writing," profoundly undermined the traditional de-
mand for artistic "authenticity." This had now become a false request, an
irrelevancy; not, as Adorno was fond of repeating, because the world had
grown "false," but because the conditions of perception, reception, and
artistic production had irreversibly changed. It was now the epoch of the
photograph, the gramophone, the radio, and the cinema: the epoch of me-
chanical reproduction.
As though to drive this last point home, several tendencies in
the avant-garde, particularly in the visual arts, borrowed humble objects
from everyday life and simply copied them, or, more provocatively still,
presented them unchanged to the public. Marcel Duchamp takes a bicycle
wheel and signs it as his own "work." Half a century later, Andy Warhol
updates this gesture with his silk-screen reproductions of Coca-Cola bottles
and Elvis Presley, Campbell's soup cans and Marilyn Monroe. In both cases,
ironic queries were raised about the status of "art" and about the nature of
its cultural reproduction in the context of the contemporary urban world.
Cigarette ends, newspaper clippings, and "spilt" paint coalesce
on a canvas; Russolo's "noise machines"; Duchamp's "ready-mades"; the
whole manifesto of pop art: all form part of a twentieth-century collage
suggested and sustained by the metropolis. The mutual "contamination" of
the ruptural perception of the avant-garde and the expansion of daily urban
culture steadily grows. It touches its logical conclusion when subway graffiti
enters the art gallery and the pop video reactivates the surrealist cinema
(i.e., David Bowie's "Ashes to Ashes" video, 1980). There are no longer
any fixed "sources," no "pure" sounds, no untainted "aura" (Walter Ben-
jamin) against which to evaluate the continual combination, reproduction,
and transmission of sounds, images, and objects that circulate in the het-
erogeneous flux of the modern city. 2 The distance between the gestures of
the different artistic avant-gardes and the street blast of a passing portable
cassette player balanced on a T-shirted shoulder is today actually a lot
smaller than we might think.
The portable cassette player, like the electric guitar, the pro-
grammed synthesizer, and the drum machine, but, above all, the record,
underscores the importance of mechanical transformation (machines) and
reproduction in the formation of pop music. Pop music is "designed for
reproducibility" (Walter Benjamin), and one of its possible histories is a
history of the development and effects of its technical reproduction.
Toward the end of 1948, recording tape was introduced; until
then, recording music had involved registering the acoustic sound directly
onto a lacquer-coated disc. This extremely rigid system-for instance, an
error in the musical execution meant discarding the disc and starting again-
608
 lain Chambers
certainly did not encourage the exploration of the sonorial extensions po-
tentially available in the recording situation. But with the introduction of
tape, music could be completely constructed inside the studio. By editing,
cutting, and splicing, a final sound could be built up from fragments of
recording. A fifty-second demo-tape could be turned into a record lasting
more than two minutes: this is how Little Richard's "Keep A-Knockin"'
was produced. The result was that "recording tape shifted the record from
the status of a frozen snapshot to that of a musical montage. " 3
Recording tape represented the first major innovation in postwar
recording procedures. The second, occurring in the late 1960s, involved the
introduction of multitrack recording facilities. The use of echo and double-
tracking in the 1950s and early 1960s in order to "beef up" the sound had
already pointed in this direction. But with the introduction of stereo records
and then, in rapid succession, four-, eight-, sixteen-, twenty-four-, and thirty-
two-track recording, the sonorial framework was vastly extended. Adding
recorded track to track, piling up diverse sounds, a four-person group, for
example, could produce eight or sixteen "voices" to be simultaneously mixed
in the final recorded form.
Multitrack recording permits many musical directions, some
seemingly diametrically opposed. While the "artistic" aspiration of parts of
"progressive music" now found the space for their rock operas and suites,
in the very different reality of reggae, "dub" was able to phase instruments
and voices in and out, suspend the pulse and then intensify it, chop up the
sound and then enrich it with further effects, while stretching the whole
swirling pattern across a stuttering "roots" bass-drum "ridim."
Technology has been central to pop from its beginnings. It is
impossible to discuss the music without referring to it: whether it is Elvis
working on his sound in the tiny Sun studio in the early 1950s, or the
mesmerizing dance floor success of disco twenty years later. Pop music has
never existed apart from technological intervention; this only draws further
attention to the daily tensions involved at the technological "interface where
the economies of capital and libido interlock. " 4
The fact that the recording studio, with its technology and ac-
companying financial requirements, is the central site of pop's sonorial pro-
duction by no means implies a simple technological determinism. The his-
tory of pop reveals other, often unsuspected tendencies, among them the
story of a continual appropriation of pop's technology and reproductive
capacities. This has resulted in diversified cultural investments, involving
different fractions of white metropolitan youth taking up guitars and syn-
thesizers and adopting various imported sounds, as well as black youth "re-
signifying" the use of the microphone and the turntable (the deejay's "toast"
and "rap") and studio console ("dub"). Both maintain the fruitful paradox
of subordinated, frequently oral-centered cultures mastering and extending
the electronic medium of pop and, in the process, re-presenting their
"selves" in the heartlands of contemporary urban life.
In the exclusive reality of the historical avant-garde, the attempt
was undertaken to produce new languages that subtracted themselves from
the dulled continuity of past acceptance and present expectation. An anal-
ogous case might be made for pop: rock 'n' roll and punk are both obvious
occasions when particular musical proposals tore apart an earlier syntax
and associated cultural attitudes.
609
 I want to add to these stark examples the suggestion that what
such eruptive symptoms expose has its daily currency in mechanical re-
production, in its ingression into the web of sonorial reality where records,
borrowing an expression from Susan Sontag, "democratize all experiences
by translating them" into sounds. 5 Today, we no longer confront "organic"
expressions but a cultural "cut-up," a series of fragments-New York rap,
London punk, Nigerian "juju," soul, country-and-western ballads, white
funk. We subsequently select from these sounds a meaningful bricolage, an
environment of sense. The fragmentation of the eye and ear, so self-con-
sciously pursued by the avant-garde in its desire to liberate new experiences,
new horizons, is overtaken by the permissive circulation of possibilities
permitted by radio, film, television, records, cassettes, video.
This situation both augments and, in an important sense, disrupts
the more obvious connections between pop and the recent musical avant-
garde. From the late 1960s onward, the music of Frank Zappa, of such
German groups as Can, Amon Duul II, and Tangerine Dream, and in En-
gland Henry Cow, Brian Eno, and even David Bowie, can be linked to the
experiments in serial composition, repetition, and incidental "noise" found
in the work of Van!se, Stockhausen, Cage, Riley, LaMonte Young, Glass,
and others. But the 1970s were also characterized by an increasing attention
to pop's own internal languages and the subsequent basis for a self-generated
pop avant-gardism. The elements of this second tendency can be found in
the whimsical musical bric-a-brac of Roxy Music, the neurotic funk exper-
iments ofDavid Bowie, and the studied ruptural aesthetics of such postpunk
groups as Public Image Ltd and the Gang of Four. In particular, it was punk
and its aftermath that clarified the possibility of reassessing pop's existing
musical languages and suggested a sonorial collage in which the joins were
left exposed as the signifiers of"noise" and "sound" or "din" and "music,"
were shifted back and forth along the cultural reception of the acoustic
spectrum.
The most interesting reflection to be made here is the one I hinted
at above-of how mechanical reproduction sweeps away the separate status
of the historical avant-garde (which also explains my use of the adjective
"historical" up to this point). The previous distance between the avant-
garde and daily urban culture is overcome as the former becomes enveloped
by the visual and sonorial languages of the latter. Inside the metropolitan
plasma of today, the concentrated moment of attention that once accom-
panied the response to both traditional and subversive art is replaced by
Benjamin's concept of "distracted reception." The fabric of tradition is
absentmindedly unstitched and a deritualized culture, invaded by the pro-
fanity of diverse tastes; it is gradually mastered "by habit under the guidance
of tactile appropriation. " 6
In the case of pop music, tactile appropriation-the physical re-
ception of the tangible-is concentrated in the differentiated presence and
signification of the body. Let me explain. While the apparently nebulous
zone of romance is the privileged domain in pop's emotional empire-and
I am referring not only to that usually associated with juvenile girls building
fantasies around the pin-ups and records of male stars but, in particular, to
the dominant male romanticism of an imaginary street life-it is the body
that is its principal focus and carrier.
610
 lain Chambers
The musical languages of pop-the wrenched sentiments of soul,
the exuberance of rock 'n' roll, the verbal contortions of rap, the screeched
angst of punk-all tend to propel the body through the sensorial "grain"
(Roland Barthes) ofthe music to the center of the stage. There, in dancing
and the immediacy of performance, it is this physical sense of the musical
"now" that is pivotal, for it "is the body that ultimately makes, receives
and responds to music; and it is the body that connects sounds, dance,
fashion and style to the subconscious anchorage of sexuality and eroticism. " 7
It being here, where romance and "reality" are fused together, that common
sense is often taunted, twisted, and tom apart.
So, my concluding suggestion is that the avant-garde project of
purposefully mismatching perception and the taken-for-granted in order to
release perspectives from the fetish of common sense tends to find a con-
temporary realization in the daily culture of the metropolis. Here, the once-
researched shock of the historical avant-garde, the transitory immediacy of
perpetual sonorial and visual reproduction, and the '"dense and concrete'
life" of subordinated cultures-"a life whose main stress is on the intimate,
the sensory, the detailed and the personal"-are indiscriminately mixed to-
gether.8
Further, this urban complexity forces into an extensive, if still
frequently unsuspected, dialogue the once-separated episodes of the avant-
garde, of popular culture, and a politics based on the detailed possibilities
of the everyday: on its class, racial, sexual, local and national construction,
variation, peculiarity. As these trajectories cross each other's path and dis-
solve in the fervent flux of metropolitan life, they increasingly gesture toward
a new project. Whatever its eventual shape, that project will need to inter-
rogate existing cultural hegemony and subtract itself from the tired logic of
the predictable if it is to challenge successfully existing definitions of daily
life. But to do this it will have to be constructed inside this present com-
plexity.

Notes

Luigi Russolo, L'arte dei rumori (Milan: Edizioni Futuriste di "Poesia," 1916). Republished
as a supplement in Alfabeta. no. 43, Milan. Dec. 1982.
2 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Illuminations.
trans. Harry Zohn (london: Fontana. 1973). All references to the essay are to this edition.
3 lain Chambers, Urban Rhythms (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 14.
4 Peter Wollen. Readings and Writings (London: Verso. 1982). p. 176. It is worthwhile recalling
a note of Benjamin's on the relation between film and technology: "In the case of films.
mechanical reproduction is not. as with literature and painting. an external condition for mass
distribution. Mechanical reproduction is inherent in the very technique of film production.
This technique not only permits in the most direct way but virtually causes mass distnbution"
(Benjamin, p. 246) The same can be said for the contemporary production of pop music.
5 The context of this quotation is, "The subsequent industrialisation of camera technology only
carried out a promise inherent in photography from its very beginnings: to democratise all
experiences by translating them into images" (Susan Sontag, On Photography [Harmond-
sworth: Penguin, 1979]. p. 7). The history of recorded music. where we all have the possibility
of indulging our tastes and becoming "experts," leads toward similar conclusions.
6 Benjamin, p. 242.
7 Chambers. p. 210.
8 Richard Hoggart. The Uses of Literacy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958). p. 81.

611
 Discussion
Comment (Dick Hebdige)
In your paper I hear a displaced, fragmented, overdeter-
mined discourse, a discourse undermined by libido. I hear description in the sense
of de-scription, a talking out. I hear logic escaping, limits acknowledged, transgressed,
and reinscribed.
Chambers
Perhaps the best way to begin responding to your suggestive
metaphors is to lay out what I see as some of the premises of my work. The closer
we move to the different experiences of pop music and popular culture, the more
we are forced to acknowledge certain limits. There is a limit in being English and
white and writing about black music; there is a limit to what I can say about a
female experience of rock music. This is not necessarily an impoverishment. The
recognition of limits is also the recognition of differences, of heterogeneity: the rec-
ognition of voices that were previously unheard, unacknowledged. As you have put
it: "a reflexive awareness of the knowledge/power relation." The presence of these
voices, these relations, these possibilities, these powers, registers a series of tensions
that have to be worked into a "sense" where previously there was silence.
Taking urban culture as my referent and mechanical repro-
duction as its privileged mode of cultural production, I have tried to provide a
framework-which extends well beyond the physical environs of the actual city-in
which the presence and specificity of popular musics and cultures could be discussed.
Obviously, details were overlooked, there were many gaps, but I would like to think
that the outline of a suggestive project managed to come through.

Comment
Rock has been defined as a blanket modality that rips off,
incorporates, and cannibalizes many other styles, the styles of other cultures. One
of the things it does is to eliminate many of the differences that have been socially
constructed in those other cultures. Perhaps one of the reasons why some of the
Latin music, specifically Salsa, which is also a global style, hasn't had a major impact
on rock is because there is little awareness that 25 million Latino people live in the
United States. I would argue that rock, as a phenomenon created in the metropolitan
centers of the world-the United States, England-has a function of eliminating
difference and inscribing indifference imperialistically throughout the world.
Chambers
Let me take the example of Hispanic culture in the United
States, of Latin musics in the context of U.S. rock music. This gives me an oppor-
tunity to say something more about the idea that the details and differences of
particular cultures, musics, and minority tastes come to be systematically cancelled
in the logic of present-day urban culture, come, to use an expression, to be "co-
opted." The argument runs like this: subaltern cultures, alternative and oppositional
forces, are progressively sucked into the hungry urban machine where, their original
powers and identities now nullified, they are reproduced among the vacuous choices
of metropolitan taste.
It's neat, but beyond its linear simplicity and a suspect ro-
manticism-the "corruption" of"origins," the corruption of the city-it reduces cul-
tural differences to a series of simple antagonisms: "non-co-opted"/"co-opted,"
"original"/"false." As Ernesto Laclau pointed out, it is a form of reasoning that is
forced to treat "meaning" as fixed; "society" as a stable, conceptual "totality"; and
"power" as the exercise of a unilateral, direct domination. Naturally, the co-optation
thesis can acquire a flexible tone; I wouldn't deny that. But the way it is generally
used does suggest that an underlying conceptual rigidity prevents it from acknowl-
edging the real complexity that can be recognized in the cities, in the sights, sounds,
and sense of popular urban culture.
612
 lain Chambers
Question
I want to build on the last question and redirect it to ques-
tions about gender, sexuality, and the body. In Latino culture, for example, one
immediately notices a concern about the body and what it signifies. Indeed, I think
cultural differences involve kinesic differences, including styles of dance and move-
ment. Moreover, on the issue of the body, I thought it strange that disco was not
mentioned. One of my students argued that in rock music the body that is being
expressed and activated has to do with genitality, but in disco the heartbeat is at
the center. In any case, the materiality of the body in its modalities in rock 'n' roll
does create different significations. Finally, I wonder if we don't have to examine
the ways the body in rock 'n' roll works in a gender-specific manner.
Chambers
I made the body one of the central themes in my talk because
I think it is a central semantic zone in pop or rock music. It is, if you like, the site
of the senses: of the sexual as well as the more obviously social, of the cultural as
well as the corporeal. It is a space-a critical one, a material one-crisscrossed by
many forces, including race, gender, and class experience. I tried in passing to suggest
some of these, but others were not mentioned. So the criticisms made about the
gaps in my paper-the absence of Hispanic music and culture; of gendered subjec-
tivities and rock music; of disco music, which, I thoroughly agree, is the music of
the 1970s to be considered when talking about musical languages organized around
the body-are right.
The discussion of all these aspects could certainly be taken
further. It can be argued, for instance, that disco's repetitive cycle and pulse disrupts
the ubiquitous sequential logic of rock music and its progression toward climax.
Richard Dyer, discussing the importance of disco music in gay culture, has argued
that disco breaks down phallocentricity; that is, it celebrates the whole body rather
than restricting its attention to genital satisfaction. This possibility, if initially based
on formal musical distinctions, acquires conviction as it is related and connected
back to the effects and presence of disco in the repertoire of pop, to its history on
the dance floor, to its place in gay culture, to its presence as a possibility in contem-
porary urban culture.
Finally, I think we must come to terms with the specificity
of the feminine experience, which has been largely silenced, hidden beneath the
dominant ways of talking about pop music and the dominant ways in which pop
music is experienced. That is why I wanted to emphasize that the major romantic
mode in pop music is that of a masculine, imaginary street life.
Comment
One of the things that really interested me in your paper is
how much it depended on what I would take to be a specifically modernist project.
You began by quoting the futurist exhaltation of the "voluptuous" sonorities of the
new urban environment. It seems to me that one of the things we might do is to
look at words like "voluptuous" when they appear in a futurist or modernist project
and think about what kind of landscape they codify. From that point of view, the
constant appropriation and bricolage that you talked of appear less as a liberatory
space and more as a symptom of the immense "tedium of ownership" in a highly
developed society and of its need to incorporate and then obliterate difference. In
the Hungarian film Time Stands Still, kids use music to make open spaces for
themselves, but only in the context of a larger defeat. And I would maintain that
in the case of people of color, colonized people, and women, the meanings and the
liberational spaces are real, but only within a larger structure of oppression.
Chambers
A significant part of that complexity to which I have just
referred arises in the transitory, mobile, expansive urban culture in which we all
live. Puerto Ricans in New York City, like West Indians in Birmingham, England,
613
have their culture. But this culture is not a sealed testament. It echoes with everyday
experience; it comes out ofliving your presence in the present; it comes out of New
York, out of Birmingham.... This culture also exists as a part ofthis city, this time,
these conditions. Such proximities have indeed usually heightened racial and cultural
identities rather than reduced them.
Question
I want to question your apparent assumption about the lib-
erating potential of rock as a source of meaning to youth subcultures. Personally,
I'm just a little bit fearful, and not at all celebratory, about the energizing potential
of what is perhaps a rather nihilistic form of music and social energy.

Comment
I'd like to respond to that before lain does. I think there are
differences between the music and the people who are listening to it, and these
differences may enable us to understand some of these questions about the effects
of the music in the Third World-about the homogenization of culture. It seems
true that this music is used as an imperialistic form of culture, but it can also be
used by the people who listen to it as an element of youth rebelliousness. I want to
defend rock 'n' roll against charges of nihilism and retreat. There are points where
rock 'n' roll serves as a focal point for young people's rebelliousness, mixed up with
all their ideas of conscience. And in some cases this inchoate rebelliousness may
take active political dimensions.
Chambers
What I have been trying to suggest is that cultural powers,
arising through differences, choice, heterogeneity-whether Jamaican, Hispanic, or
of a more local variety-are reproduced in new forms in the expanding, increasingly
electronic context of contemporary urban culture. It is the powers and possibilities
of these new forms, where the "meanings" are by no means fixed, where there is
still a confusing "order," that is important. If we are not willing to accept this reality-
and its particular forms of power, of knowledge-then we are left out in the cold,
facing a very grim scenario. On the defensive, desperately seeking to preserve our-
selves and our choices from "co-optation," critical intelligence is concentrated in
the doomed task of delaying the inevitable: the moment when we pass into the
Langian citizenship of Metropolis.
Question
On the issue of art and politics, and particularly the politics
of rock 'n' roll, I thought you made some very provocative remarks at the very end
of your talk. You suggested that there is a conjuncture in advanced capitalist cities
between some of the demands of the Left and some of the demands of youth culture
to change life, to restructure society. Could you elaborate on this?
Chambers
I think it is very important to begin thinking through, in the
here and now, the full implications of this expanded, urban culture; that is, to
construct a project that can effectively meet its terms. That is why I insist on its
rich complexity. It is all very well to say, "We just gotta live it" -everybody is already
doing that! The problem is how to live it most effectively, how to grasp the potential
that is already in play, how to widen the political project without reducing the possible.
This is the Gramscian task, although one might want to say post-Gramscian, of
creating a "hegemony" adequate to the present. That, for me, is the real question.
To conclude, I would also insist on a very wide sense of the
term "politics." I am not simply talking about the relationship between the political
party and culture. I'm referring to the heterogeneous and different possibilities that
presently circulate within urban culture. These are frequently not commensurable.
There is, as Emesto Laclau suggested, a "surplus of meaning," an "open" discourse
614
 lain Chambers
where differences, distinctions, and particulars do not necessarily find an equivalence.
But it is there, and not in an assumed conceptual order, that the everday struggle
for recognition, meaning, direction, prospects, hegemony, occurs. As Larry Grossberg
said, discussing the analysis of pleasure and rock music, something is always left
over, left out. I think that "left over" has to do with the threshold, the limits, of
analysis. There is something left out of the stilled order of writing, analysis, and its
conceptual frames. But it is important that this "left-over" is recognized, is inscribed,
in the re-presentation, in the analysis, for what it signals are precisely those trans-
formatory powers that threaten to make our present analysis redundant by producing
something new: a new reality.

615
VI The Politics of Theory and Interpretation
 Terry Eagleton

The Critic as Clown

Is there an implicit cultural politiCS in William Empson's

effort to negotiate between intellectual activity and the
wisdom of everyday life? Can Marxism recover anythmg
of use from Empson's way of understanding concepts
like "pastoral" and "ambiguity"?

All propaganda or popularization involves a putting

of the complex into the simple, but such a move is instantly deconstructive,
for if the complex can be put into the simple, then it is not as complex as
it seemed in the first place; and if the simple can be an adequate medium
of such complexity, then it cannot, after all, be as simple as all that. A
mutual transference of qualities between simple and complex takes place,
forcing us to revise our initial estimate of both terms and to ponder the
possibility that a translation of the one into the other was made possible
only by virtue of a secret complicity between them. If one has a cultural
form in which simple characters are made to voice highly wrought rhetorical
discourse, or sophisticated figures to articulate simple feelings, then the
political effects of the form are likely to be ambiguous. On the one hand,
it will obviously enact a certain class collaborationism: how reassuring that
aristocrats have common human emotions (how much more real and cred-
ible it makes them seem) and, conversely, how complimentary to ruling-
class discourse that even peasants, once gripped by fundamental passions,
can rise spontaneously to such eloquence. On the other hand, the class
structure is momentarily destabilized by such dialogism: if the simple can
discourse refinedly without detriment to their simplicity, then they are equal
to aristocrats in their sophistication-not as simple as we thought-and su-
perior to them in what simplicity they do have. And if the refined speak a
language of simple feeling, then their suavity elevates such common passions
at the same time as its ironic excess of them threatens to render it redundant.
You cannot really have this dialogic situation other than ironically, since
we know that Cockneys do not actually speak like Etonians, but the irony,
once more, is a politically unstable one. For the very self-conscious artifice
that allows us to bracket all this as a charming fiction also threatens to
spread over into, and put in question, the artifice of upper-class discourse
itself, which is estranged by its earthy contents at precisely the moment it
seeks to defuse and appropriate them. The strange, solemn children of Ivy
Compton-Burnett's novels speak exactly the grave, measured, juridical dis-
course of their elders and betters, which at once confirms that language's
authority-even the children speak it!-and threatens to discredit it-even
a child can speak it!
The name of the cultural form I am describing is of
course "pastoral"; and William Empson's classic study, Some Versions of
619
Pastoral, culminates precisely with a chapter on the child (Lewis Carroll's
Alice). Children are a type of critic in all kinds of ways: because of their
incessant questioning; because they are parasitically dependent on a lan-
guage they nonetheless find baffling and alien; because, being outsiders, they
can see both more and less than insiders; because they are isolated "intel-
lectuals" not fully conversant with common practices of feeling yet also
more emotionally sensitive than most; because their social marginality is
the source at once of their blindness and insight. Pastoral is Empson's way
of coming to terms with the fraught relations between critic and text, in-
tellectual and society; its ironic interchanges of refinement and simplicity
are an allegory of the critic's own dilemma. This is evident enough in Emp-
son's literary style, a version of pastoral all its own. His airy, flattened,
colloquial prose, with subclause slung casually onto subclause, at once re-
produces a distinctively English ruling-class tone-brisk but genially sub-
dued, cavalierly unbuttoned, the garrulous, gossipy, faintly facetious dis-
course of throwaway brilliance appropriate to an Oxbridge High Table-and
at the same time subverts in its insistent ordinariness the belletristic pre-
ciosities or metaphysical solemnities of orthodox critical writing. The racy,
underplayed speech of the patrician, in a familiar English paradox, makes
implicit alliance with the tongue of the "people" over the heads of a lin-
guistically pretentious bourgeoisie. Reading Empson, one is meant to gather
the impression that he understands you rather as the daredevil landlord
understands the poacher, as opposed to the petit-bourgeois farm bailiff; the
Etonian (or in this case the Wykehamist) is not, after all, so remote from
the Cockney. In a characteristically English way, Empson's style enforces
its own brilliance by casually disowning it, only occasionally betraying itself
by a too studiously placed quip or epigram; his writing is strikingly depthless,
plucking insight after insight from a text in an inexhaustible metonymic
movement but notably nervous of metaphoric density. He is like us in
everything except that he is more clever, but even the cleverness is of the
kind we could aspire to; and there is perhaps an ironic implication, shad-
owing the prose, that he is clever because he is like us only more thoroughly
so, more shrewdly versed in our common wisdom than we are ourselves.
If there is a "pastoral" irony between critic and reader,
the same can be said of the relationship between critic and text. Empson's
outrageously rationalistic paraphrases of sacred literary documents, which
I distill here by parody, are intended in one sense to parade the grotesque
disparity between literary and critical discourses in a flamboyant gesture of
dissociation:
Oh go not to the war, my love,
For you will ne'er return.

The sense is: "I am telling you not to have your head
turned by military glory, you little idiot, not because
you will take my advice, since the fact that I have to
plead with you in the first place reveals just the in-
sensitivity which will deafen you to it, but because if
I do not advise you thus you will impute to me just
the kind of indifference I am asking you not to impute
to yourself, and so give yourself an excuse for denying
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 Terry Eagleton
your own finer instincts, which you have anyway done
by putting me in this humiliating situation in the first
place." (There is probably some sort of smack here at
Puritanism).
The interplay between poetic statement and critical commentary forms a
kind of pastoral indeterminacy in which the question of which party has
the upper hand is left deliberately ambiguous. In one sense the prose com-
mentary humbly flattens itself before the poetry, caricaturing in its breezy
colloquiality its helpless incapacity to adequate it, wryly acknowledging an
unsurpassable rift between the two registers. In another sense the commen-
tary is considerably more elaborate than the text, tempting us by its com-
monsensical tone to believe that its own subtle turns are merely derivative
of the poem in the very act of outdoing it in intricacy. The two discourses
seem at once continuous and incommensurate: the literary text is both
enriched and demystified by the criticism; left poorer but more honest in
one sense, but impressively complicated in another. A pastoral transference
of qualities has been effected: "If my criticism can have something of the
subtlety of the text, then the text may have something of the straightfor-
wardness of my criticism, in which case neither piece of writing is exactly
what we thought it was." The critics are both richer and poorer than the
poem, something of the jester in their heavy-footed cavortings before the
majesty of the literary yet also superfluously cerebral and refined in contrast
with the simple, passionate spontaneity they analyze.
All cultural critics for Empson are pastoralists, since they cannot
escape the occasionally farcical irony of being fine, delicate, and excessively
complex about a writing whose power lies ultimately in its embodiment of
a "common humanity." The critics are continually haunted by the irony
that the very instruments that give them access to those powers also threaten
to cut them off from them. This, for Empson, is a permanent rather than
a historical condition: Some Versions of Pastoral opens with a chapter on
proletarian literature which denies the real possibility of the genre since "the
artist never is at one with any public." But this liberal-romantic mystifi-
cation (What exactly is meant here by "at one"?) is surely undercut by a
glance at the social history that produced the early Empson. Seven Types
of Ambiguity was published between the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the
financial collapse of Austria and Germany, when British unemployment
stood at around two million; Some Versions of Pastoral appeared in 1935,
the year of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the formation of a national
government in Britain, and the founding of the Left Book Club. It is not
difficult, in this situation, to see why the literary intellectual might have felt
somewhat less than at one with the public, or why one fascinated by the
verbal cavillings of minor seventeenth-century poets might have experi-
enced some slight need to justify his or her enterprise. Thus, pastoral is, in
a sense, Empson's political self-apologia, a form that exposes the ironic
contradictions of intellectual sophistication and common wisdom; it is an
implicit reflection on the dazzling pyrotechnics of Seven Types ofAmbiguity
in a darkening political scene. The real swains, now, are the hunger marchers.
Insofar as the pastoral form is generously capacious, good-humoredly con-
taining the conflicts it dramatizes, it is, of course, as Raymond Williams
has protested, a flagrant mystification.' But what Williams fails to see (un-
621
derstandably enough, for one from the rural proletariat) is that this spurious
harmonization of class struggle is the heavy political price Empson mo-
mentarily has to pay for a politically well intentioned aesthetic which, in
the epoch of wars and revolutions, seeks to return the increasingly fine-
drawn analyses ofliterary critics to their roots in a practical social wisdom.
Empson's life-long guerilla campaign against the whole portentous gamut
of formalisms and symbolisms, his brusque dismissal of all metaphysical
poetics, is the fruit of a profoundly sociable theory oflanguage, which grasps
the literary text as discourse rather than langue, refusing purely textual (or
"organically contextual") notions of meaning for an insistence that meanings
are inscribed in practical social life before they come to be distilled into
poetry. The literary text for Empson is no organicistic mystery but a social
enunciation capable of rational paraphrase, open to the routine sympathies
and engagements of its readers, turning around terms that crystallize whole
social grammars or practical logics of sense.
The Empsonian reader is always an active interpreter: ambiguity
itself is defined as any verbal nuance that "gives room for alternative re-
actions to the same piece oflanguage, " 2 and the act of reading depends upon
certain tacit social understandings, certain "vague rich intimate" apprehen-
sions carried in collective social practice. Interpretation rests upon the hu-
manist-rationalist assumption that the human mind, however baffled, com-
plex, and divided, is essentially "sane"; to interpret is to make as large-
minded, generous allowance as one can for the way a particular mind, how-
ever self-broodingly idiosyncratic, is striving to work through and encom-
pass its own conflicts, which can never be wholly inscrutable precisely be-
cause they inhere in a shared social medium-language itself-inherently
patient of public intelligibility. If criticism is a mug's game, it is because
such conflicts, "life" being the multiple, amorphous affair it is, will never
endure definitive formulation, never submit to the boundaries of a single
sense. But this "pastoral" sense of the loose, incongruous character ofhistory
dignifies, rather than tragically defeats, human reason, providing it with the
most recalcitrant materials on which to exercise its powers and arrive at
the most fulfilling type of (in)adequation. The "aristocratic" refinements of
complex analysis, that is to say, are at once at odds with and enhanced by
the basic, unfinished stuff on which critical acumen goes to work-just as
that "common" stuff at once ironizes the critical gesture itself and, in being
revealed by it as in truth inexhaustibly subtle, comes to be on terms with
it. Empson, like the Freud by whom he is nervously fascinated, is the kind
of rationalist who constantly allows reason to press up against its own strin-
gent limits without for a moment ceasing to trust in its force. In this sense
he fits awkwardly into the straw-target category of rationalism ideologically
requisite for the fashionable irrationalisms of our own time.
Responding to a question about his attitude toward Leavis and
New Criticism, Raymond Williams makes an acute comment on the politics
of English criticism:
I said to people here at Cambridge: in the thirties you
were passing severely limiting judgments on Milton
and relatively favorable judgments on the metaphys-
ical poets, which in effect redrew the map of 17th-
century literature in England. Now you were, of course,
622
 Terry Eagleton
making literary judgments-your supporting quota-
tions and analysis prove it, but you were also asking
about ways of living through a political and cultural
crisis of national dimensions. On the one side, you
have a man who totally committed himself to a par-
ticular side and cause, who temporarily suspended what
you call literature, but in fact not writing, in that con-
flict. On the other, you have a kind of writing which
is highly intelligent and elaborate, that is a way of
holding divergent attitudes toward struggle or toward
experience together in the mind at the same time. These
are two possibilities for any highly conscious person
in a period of crisis-a kind of commitment which
involves certain difficulties, certain naiveties, certain
styles; and another kind of consciousness, whose com-
plexities are a way of living with the crisis without
being openly part of it. I said that when you were
making your judgments about these poets, you were
not only arguing about their literary practice, you were
arguing about your own at that time. 3
The dilemma outlined by Williams here-one between a highly specialized
mode of critical intelligence, which in foregrounding ironic complexity evades
certain necessarily univocal social commitments, and a plainer, committed
writing that is prepared to sacrifice such ambivalences in the cause of po-
litical responsibility-is a modern version of the contradictions which, as I
have argued elsewhere, fissure the English critical institution throughout
much of its history. 4 Criticism has lurched between a "professional" so-
phistication that sequesters it from collective social life and a political in-
tervention into the life that, at its best (as with Milton), lends it a substantive
function, and at its worst (as with Arnold) degenerates into an ineffectually
"amateur" liberal humanism.
Williams, one suspects, would place Empson's work firmly on
the second side ofhis antithesis, and there is much truth in such a judgment.
But this would overlook the ironies of pastoral, which, while conscious of
the socially determined distance between the language of developed con-
sciousness and a common Lebenswelt, nevertheless seeks a basis of dialogue
between them. If Empson's pastoral model is transferred, as it would seem
to ask to be, from the anodyne artifice of a courtly drama to the problem
of the critical intellectual in modern bourgeois society, it can be made to
yield up significances akin rather than alien to Williams's own political case.
The author of Seven Types of Ambiguity, that supposed classic of New
Criticism, is also the author of Milton's God, a work quite prepared to
negotiate its way in most un-Eliotic or un-Leavisian fashion through the
twists and turns of Milton's religious ideology, powered as it is by a fero-
ciously debunking Voltairean humanism but steadfast in its acknowledg-
ment of Milton's magnificence. One can trace, indeed, in the radically di-
vided character of Paradise Lost-its rational humanism and religious
transcendentalism-a veritable allegory ofEmpson's own critical battles with
literary reaction. Empson the ironist and ambiguist is, after all, the critic
who writes in Milton's God that he feels he can well understand the God
623
Lost from the inside, having been a propaganda specialist himself during
the Second World War. The insult is directed against the Christian God,
not against propaganda or political rhetoric.
Empson's criticism, that is to say, offers a partial deconstruction
ofWilliams's polarity. That the deconstruction is only partial is surely plain:
he is obviously not a "committed" critic in the style of a Milton or a
Williams. But those features of his critical approach that look most lemon-
squeezingly Wimsattian are in fact nothing of the sort; his relentless un-
raveling of finer and finer shades of verbal meaning is no aridly evasive
enterprise of the kind Williams is right to denounce, but is itself a political
position, inscribed by a whole range of militantly humanistic beliefs-trust
in the intelligibility and sense-making capacities of the mind even at its
most divided; a dogged refusal of symbolistic mystifications; a recognition
of conflicts and indeterminacies-which are a necessary, if not sufficient,
condition of any more politically radical criticism. Christopher Norris, in
his excellent study of Empson, describes his pastoral as "lift[ing] the sub-
tleties of poetic argument into a larger, essentially social air"; 5 but while
this is true, "ambiguities" for Empson were in a way this all along, not
sealed structures of New Critical ambivalence but interpretative struggles
and enigmas consequent upon language's ineradicable sociality and correl-
ative roughness, its multipurpose functioning in practical life, its intrinsic
openness to alternative social histories and tonalities. Poetry is not, for
Empson, as for New Criticism and some contemporary deconstruction, the
privileged locus of ambiguity or indeterminacy; all language is indetermi-
nate, and this, precisely, is how it is fruitful and productive. Empson's
Cambridge is also the Cambridge of Wittgenstein, who reminds us in the
Blue and Brown Books that "we are unable clearly to circumscribe the con-
cepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because
there is no 'real' definition to them." 6 Those who seem suddenly to have
discovered that the essence of "literary" language lies in its indeterminacy
have obviously not been listening for some years to how the people around
them actually talk.
Empson's ambiguities, moreover, have never been purely rhe-
torical affairs. They root down into conflicts of impulse and allegiance, in
what seems to him the mixed, contradictory character of social being itself,
in the friction of competing ideologies and social valuations. Paul de Man
is not wrong to claim that Empson's work thus manifests a "deep division
of Being itself'; he is mistaken, rather, in appearing to assimilate Empson's
category of"contradictory meanings" (the seventh type of ambiguity) to his
own model of semantic deadlock (Empson, in fact, writes breezily that "any
contradiction is likely to have some sensible interpretations") 7 and in ap-
propriating the English critic's esentially social notions of conflict to his
own ontologizing impulse. Summarizing Empson's famous account of Mar-
vell's The Garden, in which the mind, having first discovered a delightful
unity with Nature, then moves to transcend and annihilate it, de Man in-
forms us with enviable authority that "the pastoral theme is, in fact, the
only poetic theme, that it is poetry itself." 8 What he means is that pastoral
enacts just that ironic dissociation of consciousness from its objects, which
is for him the properly demystified condition of all literature. Pastoral as-
suages de Man's early-Sartrean horror of "inauthenticity" and "bad faith,"
that dismal state in which the etre pour soi cravenly congeals into the etre
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 Terry Eagleton
en soi. ''What is the pastoral convention, then," he asks, "if not the eternal
separation between the mind that distinguishes, negates, legislates, and the
originary simplicity of the natural?" To which the only answer, even on de
Man's own account, is: a good deal more. A few lines earlier de Man notes
that in Marvell's poem the thought that annihilates Nature is "green"; in
the very act of dissociation, an equable correspondence between conscious-
ness and the world is ironically reintroduced by this softly intrusive modifier,
along with the sense, in Empson's words, of a "humble, permanent, un-
developed nature which sustains everything, and to which everything must
return." De Man actually quotes this phrase, but he does not allow it to
qualify his own Sartrean dogma of eternal alienation; he seizes the moment
of pastoral that best fits his own denial of all productive interchange between
consciousness and its surroundings and then redefines the whole genre-
and, for good measure, poetry itself-solely in these terms.
It is amusingly typical of de Man that he should find even pastoral
depressing, and for reasons quite other than Williams's. Marvell, himself,
as Empson sees, has no such puritanical inhibitions: the wit and courage of
his poem here lie in its refusal to absolutize even the moment ofthe mind's
annihilating transcendence, confident and humorous enough in its own fic-
tions to be able to reinvoke and indulge the notion of harmonious liaison
between Nature and mind even at this point of mystical fading and dis-
solution of the real. De Man's attempt to appropriate both Marvell and
Empson, in short, presses him into self-contradiction: he acknowledges the
greenness of the thought but then instantly erases its significance, for pastoral
is not only a demonstration of the division between mind and Nature but
also, across that acknowledged rift, a continuous sportive interplay in which
each puts the other into question. Fulfilling correspondences between both
terms can be delightedly pursued once the myth of any full identity between
them has been dismantled. De Man's doctrine of eternal separation, for him
the absolute truth of the human condition, is for the pastoralist no more
than one truth among several, an ironic reminder not to take one's own
fictions too seriously, which then therapeutically clears the way for a fruitful
alliance with the sensuous world. It is Empson, or Marvell, who is the
deconstructionist here, and de Man is the full-blown metaphysician.
De Man's puritanical fear of entanglement in the world of ma-
terial process, so different from Marvell's deliciously masochistic yearning
to be chained by brambles and nailed through by briars, finds a paradoxical
echo in the very Marxism de Man (as we shall see in a moment) is out to
worst. Few words have rung more ominously in Marxist ears than "natural,"
and we have all long since learned to rehearse the proper objections to it
with Pavlovian precision. Having learned that lesson, however, it is surely
time to move on rather than remain, like de Man, fixated in the moment
of bleak recognition that aardvarks are not people, repeating that traumatic
moment compulsively. Once the consolations of identity have been un-
masked as mythical (and pastoral, wrenched by a certain reading, can con-
tribute to that end), we are liberated to inquire what fertile pacts and al-
legiances between Nature and humanity might in fact be generated, as the
ecology movement has for some time been inquiring. The work of Sebas-
tiano Timpanaro, Raymond Williams, and Norman Geras, not to speak of
the drama and prefaces of Edward Bond, 9 does not cancel the important
caveats of historicist Marxism on this score, but at its best takes us through
625
and beyond them, to the point where the concepts of Nature and human
nature are not merely to be dismissed as ideological fictions but are to be
theoretically reconstructed. Pastoral asserts that some conditions and styles
of feeling are more natural than others, and provided we do not absolutize
the term, there is no reason why it should not remain, as it has long tra-
ditionally been, an integral part of radical social criticism. There seems
something strangely self-thwarting about a culturalist or historicist Marxism
that sternly forbids itself to describe as "unnatural" a wholly reclusive life
or a society that finds sunshine disgusting.
The political implications of de Man's misreading of Empson are
ominous: if the ironies of pastoral are allegorical of the critic's relation to
society, or indeed of the relation of all intellectual to manual labor, then it
is the uncrossable gulf between them that de Man wishes to reaffirm. This
is one reason why his reflections on Empson culminate abruptly, though
not wholly unpredictably, in an assault on Marxism, which is, of course,
for de Man (if not for 90 percent of Marxists) a poetic dream of utter
reconciliation between world and mind. Insofar as Empson himself criticizes
this drive as "premature" in his chapter on proletarian literature, he has
laid himself wide open to such enlistment; but one cannot imagine that he
would support the tragic philosophy that is de Man's only alternative to
the loss of the impossible. "The problem of separation," de Man writes,
"inheres in Being, which means that social forms of separation derive from
ontological and metaphysical attitudes. For poetry, the divide exists for-
ever."'0 It is very hard to see why, ifthe idea of some total identity between
Nature and society is plainly absurd, the absence of it should be considered
somehow tragic. Many human beings would quite like to live forever, but
not all of them find it tragic that they will not. Some people feel repulsed
and alienated by staring at the roots of trees, while others just sit down and
have a picnic. The nonidentity of consciousness and being is a fact, which
may be construed tragically or not depending on how far you are still secretly
in thrall with a vision of unity. The sharpest difference between de Man
and Empson on this point is that for Empson the noncoincidence of mind
and world, the sophisticated and the simple, is not in itself tragic at all,
though it may from time to time involve tragedy. It is true that, in his
remark that the poet is never at one with his or her public, Empson suggests
a transhistorical estrangement upon which de Man can then pounce, turning
the point for good measure against the early Marxian Barthes; but for Emp-
son, the writer's lack of identity with an audience is simply a fact, not the
basis of some melancholic ontology. For de Man it is an unquestioned good
that consciousness should keep free of its objects, that the critic refuse all
definitive identifications; for Empson, the typically pastoral attitude is a
more ambiguous one: "I (the artist/critic/intellectual) am in one way better
(than the worker/peasant), in another way not as good." Or, as he puts it
more accurately elsewhere: "Some people are more delicate and complex
than others, and . . . if such people can keep this distinction from doing
harm it is a good thing, though a small thing by comparison with our
common humanity."''
The fact that in a given society some individuals have the means
and opportunity to be more cultured than others is not to be guiltily re-
pressed; this, indeed, would be the Sartrean bad faith or false identification
whereby intellectuals seek to empty themselves into the etre en soi of the
626
 Terry Eagleton
masses. Part ofthe implicit courage of Some Versions of Pastoral, one feels,
is exactly its ironic resistance to the romantic versions of this thirties-style
thesis, which was powerfully in the political air and from which the opening
chapter on proletarian literature immediately takes its distance. But this is
not to leave oneself with no option but romantic alienation, endorsing the
eternal isolation ofthe refined critic and the unchangeable lowliness of the
common people. Some Versions of Pastoral begins with a brilliant critique
of Gray's Elegy, which demonstrates just how the poem's imagery tries to
trick us into accepting the obscurity of the rural poor as somehow inevitable.
Though distinctions of sophistication and simplicity exist, Empson's crucial,
most un-de Manian point is that they are a poor thing in contrast with our
"common humanity." Pastoral, in manifesting such distinctions, is more
than a ruling-class conspiracy because it also reveals them as continually
ironized and encompassed by a wider ambience, a general sustaining Nature
as it were, which transcends them in its importance. What makes us uniquely
different individuals, as Derek Parfit argues in his Reasons and Persons, is
just not important enough a basis on which to build an ethics-or, one might
add, a politics. 12 Pastoral knows a moment of (potentially tragic) separation
of mind from world, the cultivated from the simple, self-reflexivity from
spontaneity; but it includes this moment within a richer, more complex
relationship in which it is recognized that the intellectual must be taught
by the masses, that the mind is, after all, a part of Nature and not just its
other, that the rich are poorer as well as richer than the common people,
and that even the intellectuals-hard though it sometimes is to credit them-
share a common humanity with others, which ultimately overrides whatever
demarcates the two. The critic who recognizes all this is the critic as clown,
and one of his several names in our time is William Empson. Paul de Man,
for his part, inherits from Nietzsche a notion of action as mindless spon-
taneity (practice as "pure forgetting"), which however qualified (de Man
goes on to deconstruct that "pure") puts it eternally at odds with the com-
plexities of theory. 13 It is a nineteenth-century irrationalist current that
emerges at its most disreputable in such writers as Conrad and leaves its
mark on the work of Althusser.
De Man's epistemology of dissociated spirit most certainly entails
a politics of intellectual elitism. Among the objects of consciousness are, of
course, mass movements and political commitments, and modem bour-
geois-liberal critics can attain some negative authenticity only in that ironic
gesture by which, in separating themselves from such empirical engage-
ments, they name them all as ineradicably inauthentic. "The ironic language
splits the subject into an empirical self that exists in a state ofinauthenticity
and a self that exists only in the form of a language that asserts the knowledge
of this inauthenticity." 14 In one sense, the intellectual has been discredited:
he or she can no longer speak an authentic discourse to a society that has
no particular desire to know about Holderlin. In another sense, such an
intellectual retains much of his or her traditional authority-retains, indeed,
much of the classicalform of relationship between liberal intelligentsia and
society as a whole, and so is able to deliver an authoritative message. That
message, however, is now wholly empty and negative: it consists of the
ceaseless act of naming the inauthenticity of all empirical engagements. In
a way, the form of the intellectual's relation to modem society-the act of
rigorous self-separation-has become the content of the enunciation. That
627
the intellectual should still be honored but should really have nothing to
say is the material basis of de Man's metaphysical dislocation of mind and
being. It is not difficult to see how this doctrine grew up in the United States
of America. The intellectual's own discourse is inevitably contaminated by
inauthenticity (even Yale is situated in New Haven), constantly threatening
to congeal into the reified beliefs of the unreflexive masses and constantly
recovering itself only in the blank space it keeps establishing between itself
and such entanglements. Thus, when the intellectual's own discourse speaks,
it is untrue; and when it is true it must be silent. Meaning and being are
ceaselessly at odds, and it is easy to see why this Lacanian doctrine has an
appeal when one is trying to teach Kleist in Reagan's America. But if the
intellectual's own discourse is inauthentic, it is also because his or her ide-
ological interests are, on the whole, at one with the very society his or her
ironic self-distancing seeks to shut out. Only by the form of the intellectual's
statements can such interests be momentarily transcended; ..irony" is the
device whereby the modern bourgeois critic can at once collude with and
privately disown the ideological imperatives of the modern state.
This is not the case with Empson's mode of irony. Whereas de
Man is the patrician who ironizes the ideological doxa of the peasant, Emp-
son views the matter in a kind of Bakhtinian reversal: it is the canny sense
of the peasant that must keep the ideologizing clerk in check. In a deeply
Wittgensteinian gesture, the intellectual's fatal penchant to ride hobbyhorses
(a saddening feature, it must be confessed, of the later Empson himself)
must be prised open to the therapeutic influence of how language is prac-
tically used, exposed to the resources of that collective social wisdom crys-
tallized in its key terms (.. complex words"). It is, as it were, the common
people, or at least common readers, who live ambiguously, innately sus-
picious of ideological formalisms that would prematurely synthesize such
inconclusiveness; and Empson, as critic, is the spokesperson of this ..good
sense." Pastoral is a form of the people not because it is written or read by
them, or because it figures them other than in absurdly or offensively stylized
ways, but because it has about it a kind of .. productive looseness" (Chris-
topher Norris), which is the structural mark of this state of ideological
conflict and division. The phrase .. productive looseness" has a Brechtian
ring to it, and the connection seems less surprising once we remember the
two men's fascination with John Gay's Beggar's Opera . .. Putting the com-
plex into the simple" is, after all, a snap enough definition of Brecht's plurnpes
Denken. Looked at in one light, Empson's liberal humanism, his constant
striving to give what credit he can to beliefs (such as Milton's) that are
deeply repugnant to him, involves an ironic provisionality of attitude not
far from de Man's. Both critics can, in this sense, plausibly be construed as
baffled, somewhat self-agonizing bourgeois liberals. But there is also a sense
in which Empson's ironies carry him to a point closer to the sensibility of
a Brecht, for whom irony denotes the necessarily unfinished, processual,
contradictory nature of historical affairs, a fact usually more obvious to the
ruled than the rulers. There is even a possible link through to Brecht in
what Empson learned from his Far Eastern experience: what he reads as
the tolerant, ironic magnanimity of the Buddha is very close to the .. Chinese"
Brecht's sense of the need to maintain a kind of cheerful impassive equipoise
in the difficult business of negotiating contradictions.
628
 Terry Eagleton
Contradictions for Brecht were not only sometimes intolerable
but also, as he once said with reference to Hegel, a "joke." The jokiness of
both Brecht and Empson-the one self-consciously plebeian, the other icon-
oclastically English-strikes a quite different social tone from the high Eu-
ropean humorlessness of de Man. Empson writes in Some Versions of Pas-
toral of a Soviet performance of Hamlet (that most de Manian of dramas)
that the audience spontaneously decided was a farce. Such people, Empson
reflects, "may well hold out against the melancholy of old Russia, and for
them there may be dangerous implications in any tragedy, which other
people do not see." 15 I think Christopher Norris is right to suggest that
Empson may well have approved of such a response to the play. Tragedy,
for Empson, is a heroic mode associated with aristocratic absolutism and
ascetic self-renunciation, deeply at odds with his own ironic humanism; and
in this humanistic suspicion of tragedy he is again very close to Brecht. Like
Brecht, the alternative form Empson offers is not some crass triumphalism
but, as Norris argues of the quality of his "complex words" ("fool," "dog,"
"honest," and so on), "a down-to-earth quality of healthy scepticism which
. . . permits their users to build up a trust in human nature on a shared
knowledge of its needs and attendant weaknesses." 16 This, too, is a pastoral
mode of feeling: you must love and admire the "high" human qualities of
truth, beauty, virtue, and courage, but you must not be too downcast if
people fail to live up to them, or terrorize them with these ideals to a point
that makes their weaknesses painful to them. Tragedy moves within the
high-minded terrorism of such ideals; however "deep," it is arguably nar-
rower, more violent in its implacable expectations than the large-minded
plebeian wisdom that, without a breath of cynicism (the mere flip side of
such idealism) knows when not to ask too much of others. Empson's own
companionable literary style is antiheroic in this sense, designed not to
intimidate a reader; Milton's God pushes raciness and iconoclasm to the
very brink of academic indecorousness. Brecht's antitragic awareness that
there are always other possibilities parallels Empson's reading of the "Meta-
physical" poets as constantly entertaining further possible levels of meaning,
ironically including within a poem its acts of exclusion. Brecht's belief that
an effective play ought always to convey a sense of the (potentially contra-
dictory) meanings it excludes, the pressure of a further possible productivity,
is classically Empsonian.
The fact that there is always more productivity where that came
from should not be confused with the infinite regress of a certain mode of
deconstruction. For Empson, interpretation is certainly, in principle, inex-
haustible, and the limitation of the various types of ambiguity to a mere
seven is more a joke at the expense of magical numbers than a serious
taxonomy. That there is some continuity between Empson the liberal hu-
manist and the antihumanist deconstructionist is signaled in Norris's sum-
mary of his critical "method": "He seems constantly on the verge of defining
the complex implications, verbal or generic, which might satisfy, by some-
how pinning down, his sense of the poem's richness. Yet he constantly
relegates this purpose, detecting behind these provisional structures a series
of ironies and 'placing' attitudes which prevent their treatment as an in-
tegrating function of form." 17 This could clearly be said of Derrida or de
Man; indeed, the affinity is well enough mapped in Christopher Norris's
own evolution from a sympathetic critic of Empson to an exponent of
629
deconstruction. Yet such a trajectory tends also to impoverish Empson's
work, isolating him as the author of Seven Types ofAmbiguity and pruning
away (or conveniently repressing) the more "sociable," proto-political later
writing.
The shift from Seven Types of Ambiguity to The Structure of
Complex Words, from "Metaphysical" to "Augustan," "wit" to "sense,"
reflects a growing recognition on Empson's part that wit and ambiguity,
however idiosyncratically "brilliant," are nurtured by collective contexts of
tacit significances, as in that Popean "good sense" that marks the inscription
of social logics within individual "wit." All discourse for Empson is in-
scribed by such social rationalities, however much it may disrupt and trans-
gress them; and this is why he turns in Complex Words to a period (the
eighteenth century) in which the inherent sociableness of language, for all
its normative violence, is more clearly apparent than in the seventeenth-
century ofNew Criticism. His appeal here is to "common sense," but though
his work is shot through with the limitations of this most English of vices
(it lacks, for example, almost any concept of ideology); it also goes some
way toward refurbishing the concept. "Common sense" in Empson is often
enough his airy impatience with theory, a brisk plain-minded reliance on
"what the author probably meant"; if he is one of the few English critics
to have taken the pressure of Freud, he does so with notable unease and
discomfort. Yet at its best his writing demonstrates just how thin a line
there can be between such anemic commonsensicality and the richer Grams-
dan idea of proletarian "good sense," the routine practical wisdom of those
who, more intimate with the material world than their rulers, are less likely
to be mystified by high-sounding rhetoric. When Empson declares his pas-
toral faith that "the most refined desires are inherent in the plainest, and
would be false if they weren't," 18 he is very close to a kind of Bakhtinian
populism; indeed, the remark is made in the context of discussing one of
Shakespeare's clowns. For Empson, it is Swift who presses this deconstruc-
tion of body and spirit, savagery and sophistication, to an extreme limit-
significantly enough, a limit to which Empson cannot quite follow him.
Empson the rationalistic humanist really does feel that Swift is "blasphe-
mous," rattled as he is by this virulent insistence that every generous human
motivation can be rewritten in terms of a degrading vulgarity. For "Swift,"
here, one might well read "Freud." To attempt to "refunction" the works
of Empson in Brechtian spirit cannot be to overlook his egregious limits.
Empson is a self-ironizing upper-class liberal rationalist with an exasper-
atingly commonsensical stance, trapped in a largely tedious form of nine-
teenth-century atheism and sometimes dangerously sanguine, in typically
English style, about human decency. His trust in a "common human nature"
can be ideological in the most negative sense of the term and needs to be
carefully distinguished from the more positive, materialist senses of that
concept to which Marxism has recently begun to tum. What can be retrieved
for socialism from Empson's work by a certain tendentious reading must
be retrieved against the grain of these evident blindnesses.
To contrast Empson with a later middle-class critic like de Man
is, most crucially, to compare a prefascist liberal intellectual with a post-
fascist one. Two of Empson's most seminal works were written before the
full fury of European fascism had been unleashed; and we might well wonder
whether his belief in the essential sanity and generosity of the "human mind"
630
 Terry Eagleton
is not in part dependent on that chronology. De Man, as I have argued
elsewhere, is most interestingly viewed in the light of a bitter "postideo-
logical" scepticism belonging to the postfascist epoch; 19 and Empson's buoy-
ant Enlightenment rationality is just what he is out to embarrass. IfMarxism
cannot accept either position as it stands, it remains true that Empson poses
for us the more serious challenge, at least in this sense: that he reminds us
forcibly, with what he himself might call a "pastoral flatness," of just what
complexity and ambiguity any program of social transformation must en-
compass, without regarding that transformative end as in any sense un-
worthy. At the same time it is part of Empson's courage, and evidence of
the seeds of socialism that can be detected in his work, that he finally refuses
the liberal fetishizing of difference and ambivalence that still serves the cause
of liberal oppression. To paraphrase his own version of pastoral, with a
materialist sense of "common humanity" in mind: some people are more
delicate and complex than others, and this need not matter; indeed, it is a
positive enrichment, provided such distinctions do no social harm. But the
most seductive subtleties, the most dazzling displays of heroism, virtue, and
intelligence, are a poor thing compared to our shared humanity; and when-
ever we are forced to choose, it is always better to choose the latter.

Notes

1 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.
21.
2 William Empson. Seven Types of Amb1guity (New York: New Directions, 1947), p. 1.
3 Raymond Williams, Politics and Letters (New York: Schocken, 1979). p. 335.
4 See Terry Eagleton. The Function of Criticism (New York: Schocken, 1984).
5 Chnstopher Norris, William Empson and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (Atlantic High-
lands, N.J.: Humanities Press. 1978), p 64.
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper and Row), p. 25.
7 Empson, Seven Types of Amb1gwty, p. 197.
8 Paul de Man, Blmdness and Insight (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). p.
239.
9 See in particular Sebastiana Timpanaro. On Materialism (New York: Schocken, 1980). chap.
1; Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature (New York: Schocken, 1983). See also Terry
Eagleton, "Nature and Violence: The Prefaces of Edward Bond," Critical Quarterly 26:1-2
( 1984). Perry Anderson has remarked that the question of Nature is one Marxism must
confront in the future; see In the Tracks of H1storical Materialism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1984). pp. 56-84.
10 de Man, p. 240.
11 William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (New York: New Directions, 1960). p. 23.
12 See Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1984).
13 See Paul de Man, "Literary History and Literary Modernity," in Blindness and Insight.
14 de Man, p. 214.
15 Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral, p. 13.
16 Norris. p. 86.
17 Norris, pp 46-4 7.
18 Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral. p. 114.
19 Eagleton, The Function of Criticism, p. 101.

631
 Michel Picheux

Discourse: Structure or Event?

Translated by Warren Montag, with Marie-Germaine
P§cheux and Denise Guback

The status and significance of a historical event-like

the 1981 Social1st victory in France-is mseparable from
the equ1vocal discourses that traverse it. Thus, we must
reJect both Marxism's sc1ent1sm and structuralism's
theoretic1sm, for events like the Soc1al1st victory are not
systems of "things~to~be~known." We need, instead, to
learn to listen to the often silent speech of the masses.

I can think of several quite different ways to open this

paper. One way would be to take a sentence as a theme and to work on it:
for instance, On a gagne ("We won"), as it spread over France on May 10,
1981, a few minutes after 8 P.M., marking the event in which memory and
topicality meet. Another way, perhaps more classical-but what is classicism
today?-would be to begin with a philosophical question: for instance, the
relationship between Marx and Aristotle apropos the idea of a science of
structure. But I am soon threatened by a multiplicity of disciplines looming
from the horizons of philosophy and the human and social sciences. They
remind me that I am not a specialist in Marx or in Aristotle or in the history
of philosophy, and that I do not have before me a specially constructed path
into the boundless archive about May 10, 1981, one that has been growing
daily.
What then? Would it not be wise-a third possible
way-to remain in the field of specialization in which I am now trying to
find my bearings: the field of discourse analysis in the French tradition. 1
For instance, I could take up, within the set of theoretical and procedural
problems with which the discipline is now confronted, the relationship be-
tween analysis as description and analysis as interpretation. But if I take
refuge in this tactic of intervention, how do I escape a long list of prere-
quisites for a minimal adjustment or "tuning" of what I wish to say to what
will be heard of it? Today, a mode ofwork cannot be fixed merely by calling
forth some proper names (Saussure, Wittgenstein, Althusser, Foucault, La-
can) or by mentioning areas of the real (history, language, the unconscious).
Will I not be compelled to begin with a series of points to be defined in
order to ensure that they will not function throughout the discussion as
opaque signs of recognition or as theoretical fetishes? Or should I be your
guide on a visit-an ultra-quick one, necessarily-to a construction site that
displays the tools and technical procedures proper to discourse analysis?
Or, further, should I present you with the results of these procedures, in an
attempt to convince you of how pertinent and interesting they are? Yet,
633
ongoing research tends to set new problems rather than to illustrate the
supposed quality of the "answers."
We say in France that someone does not need four ways to go
directly to the essential point. But in these circumstances, what would this
magic way to the main point be? Agreeing that such a way is nothing but
a religious myth, I think it better to go on crisscrossing among the three
ways I have just indicated (the event, the structure, and the tension between
description and interpretation within the field of discourse analysis). Thus,
each way will be improved through the partial intervention of the other
two.
"We Won"
Paris, May 10, 1981, 8 P.M. local time. Simplified and recomposed
through electronic devices, the face of the future president of the French
Republic appears on the television screen. Everyone is amazed, whether
through delight or dread: it is the figure of Fran~ois Mitterand. At the same
time, commentators report voting estimates provided by several institutions
that specialize in election information processing: they all declare Mitterand
the winner. A "special election" program begins: tables of percentages, first
reactions of politicians, piping-hot remarks by political experts. All of these
(the new fact, the statistics, the first statements) begin to "shape" the event
in its immediate context and in the field of memory the event invokes and
has already begun to reorganize: French socialism from Guesde to Jaures,
the Congress of Tours, the Popular Front, the Liberation. The event on the
"front page" of the great TV machinery, the final score of a political Super
Bowl or World Series (Mitterand wins the French championship), the major
news item refers to a sociopolitical context that is at the same time perfectly
transparent (the verdict of numerals, the outcome of a score) and deeply
opaque.
The discursive struggle over the naming of the unlikely event
began long before May 10 through the tremendous work of formulations
(reported, shifted, turned over from one side to the other of the political
field), constituting a discursive prefiguration of the event, shaping and fash-
ioning it, with the secret hopes of hurrying or hindering it. This process
goes on, marked by the novelty of May 10, but this novelty does not rule
out the opacity of the event, inscribed in the oblique play of its denomi-
nations. None of these sentences is a paraphrase of the other-Fran~ois
Mitterand is elected president of the French Republic. The French Left wins
the day in the presidential elections. Socio-communist coalition takes hold
of France. They refer (bedeuten) to the same event, but they do not construct
the same significations (sinne): the discursive struggle goes on through the
event.
In the midst of this circulation-confrontation offormulations that
does not cease to unfold across the television screen throughout the entire
night, a news flash appears that is both a report and a call: all Parisians for
whom this event is a victory are to gather on the Place de Ia Bastille to
shout for joy. The others will not be there on such a night. The same will
happen in many other French towns. Among the cries of victory, there is
one that was taken up with a particular intensity: On a gagne!-"We won!"-
repeated endlessly, as an inexhaustible echo of the event. The discursive
materiality of this collective utterance is most peculiar: neither its content
634
 Michel Pecheux
nor its shape nor its enunciative structure are those of a slogan at a dem-
onstration or a political meeting. 2 On a gagne, sung with a determinate
rhythm and melody (on-a-ga-gnejdo-do-sol-do), constitutes the deployment,
in the field of political events, of the collective chant of fans at a game when
their team has just won. When that chant fills the stadium, the passive
participation of the audience is reconverted into a collective motor and
vocal activity, materializing the celebration of the team's victory the more
intensely as it was the more unlikely. 3
May 1981 was the first time that sport offered itself as the popular
metaphor most adequate to the French political field. Such an event requires
an elaborate critical study of the links between the mode of functioning of
the media, on the one hand, and of professional politicians, on the other,
especially since the 1970s. 4 What may be said, in any case, is that the me-
taphoric play around the utterance "We won" overdetermined the event in
underscoring its equivocation. The obviousness of sports results is sup-
ported by their presentation in logical tables (team X defeated team Y and
is therefore qualified to play team Z, etc.). The results of the game will, of
course, become the object of strategic commentaries and reflections by team
captains and sports commentators, since there are always other games on
the horizon. But all the same, the result as such appears within a discursive
universe that is logically stabilized; that is, it is based on relatively limited
sets of arguments, predicates, and relations, and it can be comprehensively
described through a series of univocal responses to factual questions (the
main one of which is, of course, As a matter of fact, who won, X or Y?).
Questions such as Who actually won, really, beyond appearances,
in the eyes of history? are irrelevant and even absurd when asked about the
results of a game. This may be explained by the fact that what is at stake
in a game is logically defined as being contained in its result: "team A won"
means "team A defeated team B in a game that took place at such and such
a site," and no more. Symbolic marks and objects that may be associated
with that victory (and therefore may be appropriated by supporters who
identify with the team) are only secondary consequences of the result. It is
not certain that what has been won by the winners may be shown or de-
scribed.
Electoral results, when considered according to the way they are
displayed by the media, show the same logical univocation. The universe
of percentages, provided with rules to determine victory, is all the same a
set of predicates, arguments, and relations. From this point of view, we may
say that on May 10, 1981, after 8 P.M., the proposition "Francois Mitterand
has been elected president of the French Republic" became true, and no
more. But at the same time, the statement On a gagne is deeply opaque:
its lexicosyntactic materiality (an indefinite pronoun as the subject, the tense
and aspectual markers of perfective form, the verbal lexical morpheme "win,"
and the absence of any object) immerses the utterance in a network of
implicit associative relations-paraphrases, implications, commentaries, al-
lusions, and so on-that is, in a heterogeneous series of statements, func-
tioning at various discursive levels, with a variable logical stability. 5
It follows that the conflation of politics and sport described above
functions as a stabilized proposition (indicating an event localized as a point
in an area of logical disjunctions) only if we do not ask what the subject of
the verb "win" refers to, or what the missing objects refer to. 6 By 1983, the
635
question can no longer be excluded from political debate. On a gagne!-we
rejoiced in the same way at each victory of the Left: May 1936, Liberation,
and so on. Others before us shouted the same words. And every time it has
been an "experience" that did not last long. Willingness and enthusiasm
wasted; a sudden blaze, but a flash in the pan: the fall, the bog, and the
accepted defeat.

...On A Gagne': What Has Been Won, How, and for Whom7 .. 7

Concerning the Subject of the Statement: Who Won?

French syntax permits, through the use of the indefinite pronoun
on, the omission of the subject utterance in "who wins." Is it "we," rank-
and-file members of a leftist party? Or the people of the Left? Or those who
always supported the perspectives of the Common Program? Or those who
first supported it and then suddenly gave up? Or those who, quite at sea in
the Left/Right categorization in Parliament, nevertheless felt sudden release
through the departure of Giscard d'Estaing and all he represents? Or those
who never had anything to do with politics and are amazed and enthusiastic
because at last things are changing?
The effacement of the agent induces a complex feedback, inter-
mingling different forms of activism with the passive participation of the
electoral spectator, reluctant and skeptical up to the last minute ... when
the incredible happens: the critical touchdown is scored and the supporter
rushes to the aid of victory. The statement On a gagne brings together "those
who still believed in it" and "those who no longer believed." 8

Concerning the Objects of the Statement: What Is Won, How, and for
Whom?
Let us consult the dictionary about the verb "to win," gagner.
We see it can be constructed:
a. with a live subject (an agent endowed with will, feeling, in-
tention, etc.)-to earn one's living, to earn so much per month; to win a
competition, to be the winner; to win a game of chance, to win the first
prize; to overtake (on land, in space or time) an opponent; to be promoted;
to reach a place; to win someone's sympathy, (men, allies, friends); or
b. with a lifeless subject (a thing, a process without any proper
will, feeling, or intention.) These "agents" become objects: heat, cold, en-
thusiam, sleep, illness, joy, sadness overtake us (take hold of me, of him,
of us.)
What part did each of these lexicosyntactic ways of functioning
play in the equivocal unity of the reverberated chant? "We won": joy of
victory is enunciated without an object, but objects are not far away-we
won the match, the game, the first set (before legislative elections); but at
the same time (see above), we won by chance, as the first prize is won when
no one dared to hope for it, and, of course, ground is gained over the
opponent, with the anticipation of places to be filled, above all the place
from which France is governed, the place of governmental and state power.
"The Left takes power in France" is a plausible paraphrase of the formula-
statement "We won" as an extension of the event. Assuming power: at last
something that may be shown as the object of the verb "to win."
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 Michel Picheux
It is not at all certain that the verb "to win, to take power" may
be explained univocally. 9 "Power" may in a way be considered as an ac-
quired object, the deserved fruits of a long effort, or as unexpected good
fortune; in any case, the symbolic first prize to be managed for the good of
everyone. In another way "power" may be seen as a resistant space to be
conquered in an ongoing struggle against the bastions of capitalism (which
did its best to prevent it and continues to resist). In still another way, power
is a performative act to be upheld (to do what was promised) or even a new
set of social relations to be constructed.
On a gagne: for two years, the equivocation of this formula has
troubled leftists in government posts as well as other layers of the population;
it troubles those who believe in it as well as those who do not, those who
are waiting for a large popular movement and those who are resigned to a
generalized apoliticism, officeholders and ordinary people. Therefore, there
are two distinct temptations: (1) to deny the ambiguity ofthe event of May
10, for instance, by bringing it down to the logically stabilized level of
political institutions (Yes or no, is the French Left in or not? If yes, then
let us be consistent with the will of the people.); (2) to deny the event as
such, by behaving as if the problems were the same as if the right wing were
in power (Nothing really happened. What has been won?). 10 Yielding to
either of these temptations would ultimately divide the two Lefts from each
other and surrender both to the opponent. If the right wing were to come
back into power in France, one would see-too late-what one has lost.
My intention in taking the event of May 10, 1981, as an example
has been to raise the question of the status of the discursivities that traverse
an event, interweaving propositions that seem logically stabilized and there-
fore may be univocally responded to (yes or no, X or Y) with those for-
mulations that are irredeemably equivocal. Discursive objects that seem to
be stable, that seem privileged by a relative logical independence in relation
to statements produced about them, exchange their trajectories with other
kinds of objects whose mode of existence is governed by the very way they
are spoken about. Is one type of object more "real" than another? Is there
an underlying space common to the deployment of such dissimilar objects?
Science, Structure, and Scholasticism
To suppose that, in certain circumstances at least, an object is
independent in relation to any discourse about that object is equally to
suppose that, in the interior of what appears to be the physical-human
universe (things, living beings, persons, events, processes), "there is some-
thing of the real." That is, there are points of impossibility determining
what cannot fail to be thus. The real is (the) impossibility ... that things
could be otherwise. Therefore, one does not discover the real; one bumps
into it, meets it, finds it.
Thus, the domain of mathematics and the natural sciences has
to do with the real, insofar as one can say of a mathematician or of a physicist
that he or she has found the solution to a problem that had remained up
to that point unsolved. Also, we say that a student, facing math or physics
homework, has solved such and such part of the problem, that he or she is
"right" (if "a bon'') on such and such a question, while as far as the rest is
concerned he or she is "lost" (if seche).
A very great number of material technologies that produce phys-
ical or biophysical transformations "have to do with" the real, in opposition
637
 to the techniques of divination and interpretation. The point is to find, with
or without the aid of the natural sciences, the means of obtaining a result
in the most effective possible fashion, while taking into account the ex-
haustibility of nature~ the means to use natural processes, to instrumentalize
them, to direct them toward the sought-for effects. To this series is added
a multiplicity of techniques of the social management of individuals: they
are marked, identified, classified, compared, placed in order, in ranks and
tables. They are reassembled and separated according to defined criteria in
order to put them to work, to teach them, to give them dreams or hallu-
cinations, to protect them and maintain surveillance over them, to lead
them to war, to induce them to have children.
This administrative (juridical, economic, and political) space pre-
sents the appearance of a disjunctive logical constraint. It is "impossible"
that one is both a bachelor and married, that one has a diploma and does
not have a diploma, that one works and is unemployed, that one earns less
than x dollars per month and more than that sum, that one is both a civilian
and in the military, that one is elected to such and such a function and is
not, and so on. These spaces, through which the possessors of knowledge
are placed, the specialists and officials of diverse existing orders (all of them
functioning as agents and guarantors of these multiple operations), have a
very specific property: they essentially forbid interpretation. This interdic-
tion is implied by the ordered usage of logical propositions (true or false)
with disjunctive interrogations (Is the state of affairs A or not A?). Correl-
atively, this interdiction implies the refusal of certain marks of discursive
distance, 11 such as "in a sense," "if you like," "we might say," "to an extreme
degree," "properly speaking." In particular, these spaces imply the refusal
of all quotation marks of an interpretative nature that would displace the
categorization. For example, the statement "Such and such a person is very
military in civilian life" is prohibited, even though this statement, of course,
makes perfect sense.
In the discursive spaces designated above as logically stabilized,
a given speaking subject is supposed to know what is being talked about;
every statement produced in these spaces reflects structural properties that
are independent of the enunciation of the statement. These properties are
transparently inscribed in an adequate description ofthe universe, such that
this universe is discursively grasped in the spaces. The apparent unifying
factor of these discursive spaces is a series of logical-practical evidences at
a very general level, such as: the same object X cannot be at the same time
in two different places; the same object X cannot have at the same time
property P and property not P; the same event E cannot at the same time
have occurred and not have occurred; and so on. The logical homogeneity
that conditions the logically representable as a set of propositions capable
of being true or false is traversed by a series of equivocities (in particular
concerning such terms as Law, Rigor, Order, Principle, etc.), which covers
at the same time, like a patchwork, the domains of the exact sciences, tech-
nologies, and public services. 12
This "logical" cover (couverture) of the heterogeneous regions of
the real is too massive and systematic a phenomenon to be seen simply as
a deception, constructed piecemeal by some mystifying Prince: before this
false semblance (faux-semblant) of a natural and sociohistorical real, covered
by a network of logical propositions, everything happens as if it were not
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 Michel Picheux
in anyone's power totally to escape, even-and perhaps especially-those
who believe themselves not to be duped by it ("non-dupes"), as if this in-
evitable inclusion would come to be realized in one way or another.
If we put aside all explanations that are not explanations, insofar
as they are only the commentaries of this inclusion itself, there is perhaps
a crucial point to consider from the direction of the multiple exigencies of
everyday life. But to call this point into question supposes the suspension
of the position of the universal spectator as the source of logical homo-
geneity; it necessitates the interrogation of the "pragmatic" subject in the
Kantian sense, as well as in the contemporary sense. 13 The idea that these
logically stablilized spaces could be imposed from the exterior, like the
constraints placed on the pragmatic subject, through the sole power of people
of science, specialists, and administrators, becomes, once it is seriously con-
sidered, indefensible.
The pragmatic subject-that is to say, ordinary people faced with
the diverse exigencies oftheir lives-has itself an imperative need for logical
homogeneity, marked by the existence of a multiplicity of small, portable,
logical systems: from the management of everyday existence (for example,
in our civilization, wallet, keys, schedules, calendars, papers), to the great
decisions of social and private life (I decide to do such and such and not
something else, to respond to X and not to Y), to the whole sociotechnical
environment ofhousehold appliances (the series of objects that we acquire,
that we learn how to work, that we throw away or use, that we break or
repair or replace). In this space of equivocal necessity, in which are inter-
mingled things and persons, technical processes and moral decisions, in-
structions for use and political choices, any conversation (from the simplest
request for information to discussions, debates, and confrontations) is ca-
pable of putting into play a logical bipolarization of statable propositions-
with, from time to time, the insidious impression of a univocal simplifi-
cation, which could eventually be deadly for oneself and/or for others.
It does no good to deny this need (or desire) for the appearance
of homogeneity bearing logical disjunctions and categorizations: the uni-
versal need for a "semantically normal (i.e., normalized) world" begins with
the relation that we each maintain with our own body and our immediate
environment (beginning with the distribution of good and bad objects, ar-
chaically figured by the disjunction between food and excrement). Nor does
it do any good to deny that this need for boundaries coincides with the
construction of links between multiple "things to be known" (choses a sa-
voir): we say "things to be known" and "things ofknowledge"; we say "things
of beauty." These "things to be known" can be considered as reserves of
accumulated knowledge that we depend on, 14 machines of knowledge against
threats of any kind: the state and institutions functioning most often-at
least in our societies-as privileged poles of response to this need or demand.
Thus, such "things to be known" stand for things that might be
lacking for the happiness (and ultimately for the simple biological survival)
of the pragmatic subject; that is, anything that threatens him or her by the
very fact that it exists (the fact that it is part of the real, whatever grasp the
subject in question has of the structure of the real). It is not necessary to
have a phenomenological intuition, a hermeneutic grasp, or a spontaneous
apprehension of the essence of typhus to be affected by this malady; 15 in
fact, it is quite the contrary: there are "things to be known" (knowledges to
639
be socially managed and transmitted), that is, descriptions of situations,
symptoms, and acts (to be performed or avoided) associated with the mul-
tiple threats of the real for which ignorance of the law is no excuse-because
the real is without pity.
The project of a knowledge that would unify this multiplicity of
"things to be known" into a homogeneous representable structure, the idea
of a possible science ofthe structure ofthe real, capable of making it explicit,
outside of any false semblance, and of assuring the control over this real
without the risks of interpretation (therefore a scientific self-reading of the
real, without fault or lack)-this project obviously corresponds to an urgency
so vivid, so universally "human," tied (knotted) so well (around the same
stake of domination/resistance) to the interests of successive masters of this
world, as well as to those of the wretched of the earth, that the phantasm
of such an effective, manageable, and transmissible knowledge could not
fail historically to use any means to make itself materialize.
The promise of a royal science as conceptually rigorous as math-
ematics, as concretely effective as material technologies, as omnipresent as
philosophy and politics-how could humanity resist such a godsend?
-There was the moment of Aristotelian scholasticism that marked
the beginning of the deployment of the categories that structure language
and thought, fashioning the model and organon of any systematization:
disjunctive questions en utrum ("either ... or") considering divinity, the
sex of angels, celestial and terrestrial bodies, plants and animals, all things
known and unknown .... How many catechisms have been structured by
the networks of such scholastic questions and responses?
-There is the modem-contemporary moment of positive rigor
which has appeared in the historical context of the constitution of physics,
chemistry, and biology as sciences, a moment associated with the emergence
of a new form of Law (organized into a set ofpropositions), as well as with
a rebirth of mathematical thought. The result is a new organon, constructed
in opposition to Aristotelianism and based on a reference to the exact sci-
ences, beginning in its tum to homogenize the real, from mathematical logic
to social and administrative spaces, from the experimental hypothetical-
deductive method to the "techniques of the proof."
-And, last but not least, there is the moment of marxist ontology,
pretending for itself to produce the dialectical laws of history and matter;
another organon, partially resembling the two preceding organa and in any
case sharing with them the desire for omnipotence: "the theory of Marx is
all powerful because it is true" (Lenin). As a whole, the workers' movements
have visibly been unable to resist this extraordinary gift of a new unified
philosophy capable of institutionalizing itself efficiently as a critical/orga-
nizational component of the state (whether the existing state or the state to
come). And the basic apparatus of marxist dialectical ontology (with Capital
as the absolute weapon: "the most powerful missile ever thrown at the head
of the bourgeoisie") has shown itself to be capable-like all knowledges of
this unified and homogeneous appearance-of justifying anything in the
name of urgency. 16
Neo-positivism and marxism thus form the major episteme of our time,
entangled in a partially contradictory manner around the stake of the human
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 Michel Picheux
and social sciences, with the question of history at the center, that is, the
question of the possible forms of existence of a science of history.
The point here is not to decide whether or not Capital and the
research that has derived from Capital have produced what I have called
"things to be known." Even for the fiercest adversaries of marxism, the
process of capitalist exploitation, for example, incontestably constitutes a
"thing to be known," and the owners of capital have learned to use it as
much as, and perhaps better than, those they exploit. 17 The same goes for
class struggle and several other "things to be known." The question is, rather,
to determine if the "things to be known" that have emerged from marxism
are capable or not of being organized into a coherent scientific space, in-
tegrated into a systematic montage of concepts, such as the productive forces,
relations of production, social-economic formations, social formations, in-
frastructure and ideological, juridical and political superstructures, state
power, and so on, in the sense that, for example, the Galilean discovery was
capable of constituting the coherent scientific matrix of physics, in the cur-
rent sense of the term. 18
The moment of the Galilean rupture opened the possibility of a
construction of the physical real as a process, following the track of the
impossible proper to this real through the ordered relations combining the
construction of conceptual writings and experimental devices (thus em-
ploying a part of the register of material technologies evoked above). Ac-
cordingly, the first instruments (inclined planes, winches, etc.) used by Gal-
ilean physics were inevitably imported from pre-Galilean technological
spaces; and it is in the development itself of physics that the aforementioned
instruments were transformed, in order to be adapted to the intrinsic ne-
cessities of Galilean physics, with, as a retroactive effect, the indefinitely
enlarged production of industrialized technical objects associated with a
new technical-social division of labor ("scientists," engineers, and techni-
cians), which made physics appear also as a "social science." 19
The intellectual consequences of the Galilean discontinuity are
marked by the fact that for no physicist today is Aristotle a colleague or
even the first physicist: Aristotle is simply a great philosopher. Another
mark of this discontinuity is that Galilean and post-Galilean physics do not
interpret the real-even if, of course, the movement they initiate, the con-
struction of the physical real as process, incessantly becomes the object of
multiple interpretations.
The question I am posing here is that of knowing if Marx may
or may not be considered the Galileo of the "continent ofhistory." 20 Is there
an impossible specific to history, marking structurally that which constitutes
the real? Is there an ordered relationship between the formulation of con-
cepts and the construction of instruments capable of grasping the real? And
can we discern, with the emergence of Marx's thought, a discontinuity such
that the historical real ceases to be the object of divergent interpretations
in order to be constituted in its tum as a process (for example, a "process
without subject or end[s]," according to the famous formula of Althusser)?
The fact ofthe "crisis of marxism" is today sufficiently acknowl-
edged. I can be brief and say that everything leads us to think that the
epistemological discontinuity associated with Marx's discovery has become
extremely precarious and problematic. Marx is neither the first historian
nor the first economist, in the sense that Galileo could be the first physicist:
641
 Thucydides, who is apparently not a colleague for the contemporary prac-
titioners of historiography, 21 is without doubt a historian before as well as
after Marx. All we can suppose is that eventually Thucydides would not be
read in the same manner, according to whether or not the reading takes
into account the work of Marx (that is to say, in fact, such and such a
reading of such and such a text signed by Marx, or by Marx and Engels,
etc.). But can we not say exactly the same thing about any great thought
that has emerged out of history? Failing to be the founder of a science of
history, let us say that Marx would be a very great philosopher, as important
as Aristotle.
What would have (and to a certain extent has) happened is that
Marx would be considered the first marxist theoretician, in spite of the
famous phrase with which he rejected the categorizing adjective derived
from his proper name that certain of his contemporaries had already coined
in his lifetime. And the fact that Marx thus refused to recognize himself in
the initial effects associated with the social-historical "reception" of his work
has almost always been understood as a denegation, signifying, in fact, ••I,
Karl Marx, am effectively a marxist, but not in the sense in which it is
commonly understood." It seems to me that the aristocratic thematic of the
"good" reading as opposed to "bad" (banal or fallacious) readings, of the
correct interpretation always held in reserve under erroneous interpreta-
tions, of the truth as a telos of a potentially infinite process of rectification,
begins at this precise point.
The scholastic effects of the division of reading (exoteric/esoteric
reading, Marx read by X/Marx read by Y, etc.), of which marxism had been
the site from the very beginning, with a quasi-indefinite postponement of
the moment of the decisive experience would not be especially surprising.
The impossible proper to the structure of the historical real-that is, the
specific real considered by marxist theory-is probably literally ungraspable
in the "applications" of the aforementioned theory. The same aporetic point
appears in another way: the question of "instruments." If we consider (as
was the case for a century for a not-negligible part of humanity) marxism
as the science of history put into practice by the proletariat, we must admit
that the practitioners of the science in question were constrained to "bor-
row" from the existing (and therefore pre-marxist) social-historical world a
whole series of instruments (institutions, or "apparatuses," forms of orga-
nization and practices, etc.) in order for this science-practice to be consti-
tuted simultaneously as a space of knowledge and a means of intervening
in history.
Insofar as it is a question of intervening in history by obeying
its law (which incidentally presupposes that the "things to be known" con-
cerning history, society, and politics have the structure of laws of the sci-
entific-Galilean type), it is clear that, like the inclined planes and winches
of Galileo, the first "instruments" utilized have been, up to this point,
dissimilar to their new "scientific" goals, inadequate to their transforma-
tional function, in a word, crude (only inveterate utopians can believe that
it is possible to construct ex nihilo such social-political instruments by mag-
ically denying the weight of the past). But the crucial problem is that the
development of the applications of marxism as a science-practice, the new
instruments or apparatuses constructed under its scientific auspices, con-
tinue to resemble, grosso modo, earlier structures-sometimes with aggra-
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vations that are more than accidental: in particular, the same patchwork,
the same false appearance oflogical homogeneity, telescoping the discursive
stability proper to the natural sciences, to the material technologies and to
procedures of administrative management and control, has not ceased to
dominate the different variants of marxism. In other words, to speak bru-
tally, the instruments have not followed theory in its "applications," which
can also be understood as an indication that the science-practice in question
has not (yet?) been correctly applied.
To speak this way is, again, to suppose a "true" marxism in
reserve, a marxism introuvable, 22 that is, basically, to repeat Marx's own
denegation of the interpretation ofhis work; it is to be identified with Marx's
gesture, in what is most defensive about it. So, let us stop protecting Marx
and protecting ourselves through him. Let us stop supposing that the "things
to be known" concerning the social-historical real form a structural system,
analogous to the conceptual-experimental coherence of the Galilean sys-
tem. 23 And let us try to comprehend what this systematic phantasm implies
as a kind of link to "specialists" of all kinds and to the institutions and
state apparatuses that employ them, not in order to place ourselves out of
play, or out of state (!), but so we may think the problem outside of a marxist
denial of interpretation, that is, by facing the fact that history is a discipline
of interpretation and not a physics of a new type.
To Read, To Describe, To Interpret
To raise the question of the existence of a real specific to the
disciplines of interpretation requires that the non-logically stable not be
considered a priori as a lack, or simple hole, in the real. This assumes that-
"the real" understood in various ways-there could exist a real other than
that already evoked, as well as another kind of knowledge that is not re-
ducible to the order of "things to be known" or to a network of such things.
Thus, we have a real that is constitutively foreign to logical univocation
and a knowledge that is not transmitted, learned, or taught but nevertheless
exists in the production of effects.
The intellectual movement that was named "structuralism" (as
it developed, in particular, in France in the sixties, around linguistics, an-
thropology, philosophy, politics, and psychoanalysis) may be considered,
from this point of view, an antipositivist attempt to take into account the
real that thought "bumps into" at the intersection of language and history.
New reading practices (symptomatic, archaeological, etc.) applied to textual
monuments, and initially to the Great Texts (cf. Reading Capital), have
emerged from this movement. The principle on which these readings are
based consists, as we know, in disengaging what is being said "here" (at a
precise place in a text)-said in such a way and no other-from what is being
said elsewhere and in another way, in order to be able to "hear" the presence
of the "unsaid" within what is said.
Assuming that "any fact is already an interpretation" (an anti-
positivist reference to Nietzsche), structuralist approaches made it a point
to describe the textual discursive constructions in their material imbrication.
And paradoxically, they, in this manner, set aside the production of inter-
pretations (of representations of contents, of Vorstellungen) in favor of de-
scription per se (Darstellung) of these constructions. It was in this way that
structuralist approaches expressed their refusal to be constituted as a "royal
643
 science" of the structure of the real. Nonetheless, we will see in a moment
how they were able, in their tum, to be seduced by this phantasm, only to
end up appearing as a new "royal science." But first it is necessary to stress
the fact that in the names of Marx, Freud, and Saussure a new theoretical
foundation, politically heterogeneous, took shape, leading to a critical con-
struction that shattered the literary evidence of"lived" authenticity, as well
as the "scientific" certitudes of positivist functionalism.
I recall how, at the beginning of Reading Capital, Althusser marked
the encounter of these three fields: "Only since Freud have we begun to
suspect what listening and hence what speaking (and keeping silence) means
(veut dire); that this 'meaning' (vouloir-dire) of speaking and listening dis-
closes, beneath the innocence of speech and hearing, the specifiable depth
of a hidden level, the 'meaning' of the discourse of unconscious-that level
whose effects and formal conditions are thought by modem linguistics." 24
The subversive effect of the trilogy Marx-Freud-Saussure was an intellectual
challenge that held out the promise of a cultural revolution that would call
into question the evidence of the human order as a strictly biosocial order.
To restore something of the specific work of the letter, the symbol,
and the trace was to begin to open up a fault within the compact block of
pedagogies, industrial and biomedical technologies, and moralizing hu-
manisms or religions. It was to call into question the direct articulation of
the biological and the social (an articulation that excluded the symbolic and
the signifier from the real). It was an attack on the individual and the
collective narcissism of human consciousness (c£ Spinoza in his time), an
attack on the eternal negotiation of the "self' (as master/slave of its action,
speech, and thought) in its relation to the other self. In a word, the struc-
turalist cultural revolution never ceased to attack the psychological register
(and the psychologies-of the "self," of "consciousness," of "behavior," or
of the "epistemic" subject). This attack was not engendered by the hatred
of humanity that was often attributed to structuralism. It was only the
consequence of the recognition of a structural fact proper to the human
order: that of symbolic castration.
But at the same time, this antinarcissistic movement (whose po-
litical and cultural effects have obviously not been exhausted) turned toward
a new form of theoretical narcissism-a narcissism of structure. This the-
oretical narcissism may be marked in the structuralist tendency to reinscribe
its "readings" in the unified space of a conceptual logic. Thus, the suspension
of interpretation (associated with the descriptive gestures of the reading of
textual constructions) topples over into a sort of structural overinterpre-
tation of the montage as the effect of the whole: this overinterpretation used
the "theoretical" level as a kind of metalanguage, organized in a network
of paradigms. Structuralist overinterpretation then functions as a translating
device, transposing "common empirical statements" into "conceptual struc-
tural statements." The mode of functioning of structural analysis (and in
particular of what could be called structural materialism or political struc-
turalism) remains secretly governed by the general model of interpretative
equivalence. To schematize this, take the empirical statement PI (for ex-
ample, "The face of existing socialism is distorted"): ... PI, in fact, means
nothing else but ... theoretically comes to say that ... in other words ...
that is to say ... the theoretical statement P2 (for example, "Bourgeois
ideology dominates marxist theory"). It is above all this state of theoretical
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overhang, the allure of a discourse without a subject simulating mathe-
matical processes, that conferred on structuralist approaches the appearance
of a new "royal science," denying, as usual, its own interpretative position.
The paradox of the early 1980s is that the bogging down ofFrench
political structuralism, its breakdown as a "royal science" (that nevertheless
continues to produce effects, notably in Latin America), coincides with the
growing acknowledgment of the works of Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Der-
rida, and Foucault in the Anglo-Saxon countries-in England, West Ger-
many, as well as in the United States. By a strange seesaw effect, at the
precise moment that America discovers structuralism, the French intelli-
gentsia "turns the page" by developing a massive ressentiment ofthe theories
suspected of having spoken in the name of the masses, while producing a
long series of inefficient symbolic acts and unhappy political performatives.
This ressentiment is the effect of a profound movement "from below," a
sort of ideological backlash necessitating reflection, and must not be con-
fused with the cowardly relief of many French intellectuals who react by
discovering retroactively that "theory" has "intimidated" them.
The· biggest strength of this critical reexamination is that it calls
into question the theoretical "heights" of political structuralism, the am-
bition to construct a relation to the state (eventually, its identification with
the state-and especially with the party-state of the revolution). This back-
lash has forced us to look toward what is happening "below," in the infra-
ecstatic space that constitutes the ordinary of the masses, especially in a
period of crisis. It is becoming increasingly obvious that-in history, soci-
ology, and literary studies-we must learn to listen to this often silent speech
enclosed within the urgency of survival. We must do more than read (or
reread) the Great Works (of science, law, and the state). We must hear the
articulations embedded in the "ordinary way" ofmeaning. 25 But at the same
time, the risks of this movement are quite clear, especially the risk of fol-
lowing the greatest ideological slope, of conceiving the "ordinary way of
meaning" as a natural psychobiological process inscribed in a logically sta-
bilized discursivity. Hence, the risk of a tremendous regression toward pos-
itivism and the philosophies of consciousness.
A meeting such as this could be an opportunity to evade some
ofthese risks, if we can determine the stakes involved and situate the major
points of encounter. As far as I am concerned (but I am expressing a point
of view here that is not mine alone: it is a working position that is developing
in France today), I will point out the strong interest of a theoretical and
procedural rapprochement between practices of "ordinary language analy-
sis" (within the antipositivistic perspective that may be drawn from Witt-
genstein's work) and "reading" practices derived from structuralist ap-
proaches. 26 Taken seriously (i.e., other than as a mere "cultural exchange"),
this rapprochement involves, in a concrete manner, ways of working on the
discursive materialities implied in ideological rituals, philosophical dis-
courses, political statements, and aesthetic and cultural forms, through their
relations to everday life, to "the ordinary" of meaning. This project can
only become consistent if it prudently avoids any present or future "royal
science" (either positivism or marxist ontologies).
This work pattern imposes a certain number of necessities that
must be explained in detail and that I can only mention briefly in closing.
The first necessity consists in giving priority to descriptions of discursive
645
materialities. According to this perspective, description is not a phenome-
nological or hermeneutical apprehension in which it indiscernibly becomes
interpretation; such a conception of description implies, on the contrary,
the recognition of the specific real on which it leans: the real of langue (cf.
J. C. Milner, especially in L'amour de Ia langue). And I say Ia langue, that
is, neither language, speech, discourse, text, nor conversational interaction
but rather what has been put forward by linguists as the condition for ex-
istence (in principle), in the form of the existence of the Symbolic as Ja-
kobson and Lacan understood it.
Certain recent tendencies in linguistics are rather encouraging
from this point of view. Beyond Harrisian distributionalism and Chom-
skyan generativism, trends have emerged that question the primacy of log-
ical proposition as well as the limitations imposed on linguistic analysis as
sentence analysis. Thus, linguistic research might begin to free itself from
its obsession with ambiguity (meant as the logic of "either ... or") in order
to reach what is proper to langue through the role of equivocity, ellipsis,
lack, and so on. This play of differences, alternations, and contradictions
cannot be seen as the softening of some logical hard core: the equivocation,
the "constitutive heterogeneity" (J. Authier) oflangue corresponds to Mil-
ner's "declarations of faith" 27 : "Nothing of poetry is foreign to Langue";
and "No language can be completely thought out without integrating the
possibility of its poetry." This imposes on linguistic research the construc-
tion of procedures (the modes of questioning facts and the forms of rea-
soning) capable of explicitly approaching the linguistic fact of equivocity as
a structural fact implied by the symbolic order; that is, the necessity of
working up to the point at which logical representations (inscribed in the
"normal world") cease to be consistent. This is also the argument Francois
Gadet and I developed in La langue introuvable.
The object of linguistics, that which is proper to langue, thus
appears to be traversed by a discursive division between two spaces: that
ofthe manipulation of stabilized significations, normalized by a pedagogical
hygiene of thought, and that of the transformation of meaning escaping
from all a priori assignable norms, the work of meaning on meaning, grasped
in an indefinite "rebirth" of interpretations. The frontier between the two
fields is difficult to determine in that there exists a whole intermediate zone
of discursive processes (related to the juridical, to the administrative, and
to the conventions of daily life) oscillating around it. And it is in this in-
termediary discursive region that the logical properties of objects cease to
function: objects both have and do not have such and such a property;
events both have and have not occurred according to the discursive con-
structions within which the statements that support these objects and events
are found to be inscribed. 28 The fluctuating and paradoxical character of the
ordinary register of meaning appears to have almost completely escaped the
philosophical perception of the structuralist movement. This register has
been the object of a theoretical aversion that has enclosed it globally in the
inferno of the dominant ideology and practical empiricism. It has been
considered as the blind point of a pure reproduction of meaning. 29
In doing so, the structuralists were giving credence to the idea
that the process of transformation internal to symbolic and ideological spaces
is an exceptional process: the solitary, heroic moment of theory and poetry
(Marx-Mallarme) as the "extraordinary" work of the signifier. This aristo-
646
 Michel Pecheux
cratic conception, giving itself, de facto, a monopoly on the second field
(that oflogically nonstabilized discursivities), remained the prisoner-even
in its "proletarian" reversal-of the old elitist certitude that the dominated
masses never invent anything because they are too absorbed in the logic of
everyday life. Ultimately, the proletariat, the masses, the people, have such
a vital need for logically stabilized universes that the play of the symbolic
order does not concern them at all! On this precise point, the theoretical-
poetic position of the structuralist movement is insupportable. 30 And in
failing to discern how humor and poetry are not the "Sunday of thought,"
but belong to the fundamental elasticity of political and theoretical intel-
ligence, this movement had already given in to the populist argument of
urgency, since it implicitly shared its essential presupposition: the proletariat
has no (time for the luxury of the) unconscious!
From what precedes, it follows that any description (it does not
change anything whether it is a description of objects or events, or a de-
scription of a discursive-textual construction, as long as we hold firmly that
"there is no metalanguage") is intrinsically exposed to the equivocity of
langue: any utterance is intrinsically able to become other than itself, to
split discursively from its meaning, to be diverted toward another (except
if the prohibition of interpretation proper to the logically stable is applied
to it). Any utterance or sequence of utterances is thus linguistically describ-
able as a series (lexico-syntactically determined) of possible points of di-
version, leaving room for interpretation. It is in this space that discourse
analysis claims to work.
It is here that one finds, once again, the matter of disciplines of
interpretation: because there is something of the "other" in societies and in
history, a link (identification or transference) corresponding to this "other"
proper to discursivity is possible, that is, a relation that opens up the pos-
sibility of interpretation. And it is because this link exists that historical
filiation can be organized into memories and social relations into networks
of signifiers. Hence the fact that the "things to be known" mentioned before
are never visible from above like the historical transcendentals of the ep-
isteme in Foucault's sense. They are always entangled in memory networks
that lead to identificatory filiations and never to a learning through inter-
action: the transference is in no way an "interaction," and the historical
filiations in which individuals are inscribed are by no means "learning ma-
chines."
From this perspective, the main point is to determine in the
practice of discourse analysis the place and time of interpretation in relation
to description. To say it is not a question of two successive phases, but
rather of an alternation or a pulsation, does not imply that description and
interpretation are condemned to lose themselves in the indescernible. On
the other hand, to say that any description opens onto interpretation is not
necessarily to assume that it opens onto "anything." The description of an
utterance or a sequence necessarily involves (through the detection of empty
syntactical places, ellipses, initiation of negations and interrogation, of var-
ious forms of indirect discourse) some "other" discourse as the virtual space
of a reading of the utterance or sequence. And it is this discursive otherness
as virtual presence within the describable materiality of the sequence that
marks from within this materiality the insistence of the other as the law of
social space and historical memory, and thus as the very principle of the
647
 social-historical real, a fact that justifies the use of the term "discipline of
interpretation" a propos of disciplines working within this register.
The crucial point is that, within the transferential spaces of iden-
tification, constituting a contradictory plurality ofhistorical filiations (through
speech, images, stories, discourses, texts, etc.), the "things to be known"
coexist with objects about which no one can be sure of "knowing what one
is talking about" for the very good reason that these objects inscribed within
a filiation are by no means the products of learning-and this happens in
the secrecy of the private sphere of the family as well as at the "public"
level of institutions and state apparatuses. The phantasm of "royal science"
is precisely what comes to deny-at all levels-this equivocity by giving the
illusion that one may always know what one is talking about-that is, if you
understand what I mean-by denying the act of interpretation at the very
moment it occurs.
This point leads to the final question of discursivity as structure
or event. From what precedes, one may say that the act that consists in
inscribing a given discourse in a series, in incorporating it in a corpus, always
risks absorbing the event of this discourse into the structure of the series
insofar as this series tends to function as a historical transcendental reading
grid or anticipatory memory of the discourse in question. The notion of
"discursive formation" borrowed from Foucault has too often drifted toward
the ideas of a discursive machine of subjection fitted with an internal semi-
otic structure and therefore bound to be repetitive. At the limit, this struc-
tural conception of discursivity would lead to an obliteration of the event
through its absorption in anticipatory overinterpretation.
One should not pretend that any discourse would be a miraculous
aerolite, independent of networks of memory and the social trajectories
within which it erupts. But the fact that should be stressed here is that a
discourse, by its very existence, marks the possibility of a destructuring-
restructuring of these networks and trajectories. Any given discourse is the
potential sign of a movement within the sociohistorical filiations of iden-
tification, inasmuch as it constitutes, at the same time, a result of these
filiations and the work (more or less conscious, deliberate, and constructed
or not, but all the same traversed by unconscious determination) of dis-
placement within their space: there is no completely "successful" identifi-
cation; that is, there is no sociohistoricallink that is not affected in any way
by an "infelicity" in the performative sense of the term-in these circum-
stances, by a "tragic error" about the other as object of identification. This
may even be one of the reasons why such things as societies and history
exist instead of merely a chaotic juxtaposition (or a perfect supra-organic
integration) of human animals in interaction.
The working position that I evoke here in reference to discourse
analysis by no means implies the possibility of some calculation of the
displacements of filiation or of the conditions of factual felicity or infelicity.
It merely supposes that, through ordered descriptions of discursive con-
structions, it is possible to detect moments of interpretation as acts that
emerge in the form of explicit viewpoints recognized as such; that is, as
effects of identifications that are assumed and not denied. Before boundless
interpretations in which the interpreter acts as an absolute point, without
any other or real, it is for me a matter of ethics and politics: a question of
responsibility.
648
 Michel Picheux
Notes

1 This tradition is represented in a series of publications in particular in the review Langages

and the recent collection Materialites discursives (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille. 1981).
2 This 1s in contrast to the classical political chants of the sixties and seventies which were
based on a marching rhythm: Ce n'est I qu'un debut I continuons leI combat! ("'t's just a
start. let's keep on fighting!"); or Nous voulons I nous aurons I sa I tJsfaction! ("We want,
we will have satisfaction!).
3 In spite of the cheers. the music. and the fanfare that accompany the action of the players.
the d1rect nonparticipation of the spectators in this action remains the condition of the sports
event.
4 It is. above all. a question of political stardom which. voluntarily or not. is determined by the
mass-media. electoral bipolarization of parliamentary confrontations: the psychologizing of
conflicts through the rhetoric of disputation. suspense. and reconciliation goes hand in hand
with the fact that constituencies receive information more rapidly through the television chan-
nel than through the hierarchical internal channels of their political or trade union organizations.
All of this must be placed within the context of a profound crisis of the Left. of which the
crisis of marxism is only one echo. From the "New Philosophy" to the attitude of "it's all
over" that appeared in 1978. there emerged a subjective and objective derision of "the
political" which opened the way to its carnivalisation: for example. the role of the popular
comedian Coluche. who announced his candidacy in the presidential elections of 1981. with
the ironic and despairing support of a section of the intelligentsia.
There were several stages in the evolution of the French High Intelligentsia.
Intellectuals in the sixties were engaged in their work in the way that one engages in war
(ultimately, a civil war). Gradually, the central metaphor shifted from "political" struggle to
that of wrestling with the angel in the solitary space of ecriture. Today we think in terms of
"performance" (most often solo. rarely in a team). To the athletic sense of "performance"
is added the connotation of entertainment. of the spectacle. Such an evolution will not
improve the rather uneasy relation that a substantial part of the American intelligentsia has
traditionally maintained with those "incomprehensible" French intellectual productions. a
relation marked by an equivocal oscillation between a reverence for the high priests of the
intellect and a fascination with the comedy (deliberate or not) of the clowns of culture.
5 The object of discourse analysis. as it actually developed on the basis described above. is
prec1sely to explain and describe the construction and soc1ohistorical ordering of constella-
tions of utterances.
6 We may observe here the implicit effect of a paraphrastic translation of "M1tterand elected
president" as "We won!" (On a gagne). In passing, the "we" is identified with Mitterand.
7 Jacques Mandrin, Le socialisme et Ia France (Paris: Le Sycamore. 1983). p. 19.
8 In the celebration of the birth of the event of May 10, 1981. there was (among other strange
gifts) the paradox of the involuntary role of facilitator played by the leadership of the PCF. as
if in unleashing a sudden polemic against the Socialist party, the Communist leadership
accentuated its own loss of influence (as well as its ability to mobilize). thereby liberating the
Left from the hypothesis of a seizure of power dominated by a more or less openly avowed
pro-sovietism (a reference to the "positive global balance sheet" of the "actually existing
socialism"). What follows is a government of the Left that engages in an audacious politics
of deep structural reforms but without the mobilizations that should (according to classical
marxist politics) support and control the implementation of these reforms-as if the PCF and
the CGT had largely lost their historical capacity for mobilization; and as if other organizations
and movements of the Left were unable to take over this function. As a result. in France
today it is largely the Right that is mobilizing.
9 Mandrin. Le socia!Jsme et Ia France. p. 19.
10 I leave to the side the positions of the Right. amply illustrated in Jean Baudrillard's writings
on the "socialist trance." On a gagne is interpreted as "We are treating ourselves to the
Left" (for a laugh) and then as "We are overcome by the Left" (as by a disease): "it is a
monstrous protuberance which expends. which destroys." exactly like the monster in Alien.
See In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities (New York: Semiotext[e]. 1983). p. 80.
11 I refer here to the notion of .. distance markers." which has been the object of recent research.
a
In particular. cf. Jacqueline Authier. "Paroles tenues distance." in Materialites discursives.
Ct. also Dan Sperber's analysis of the notions of reproduction. description. and interpretation
in Les savo1rs des anthropologues (Paris: Hermann, 1982).
12 The natural sciences grasp the real through the impossible that emerges at the intersection
of regulated conceptual writing and technically verified experimental construction. From this
point of view. it is trivial to recall that mathematics is also an experimental science whose

649
 constructions are found to be writing itself. The real of the material technologies partially
overlaps wiih the real of the natural sciences insofar as these technologies constitute an
indispensable element in experimentation. At the same time, the massive use of technical
objects surpasses the real of natural science: the relation to logical disjunction turns away
from magical gestures (with their rites, taboos, and prohibitions). Concerning the real of the
managerial sciences, which often presents itself as a technical real of a particular type (the
"social technologies"). it is fundamentally a prohibition even if it is based, especially in
industrialized societies. on the real of the technologies, as well as that of the sciences of
nature, find1ng there the means to manage both the immense register of production and the
register of destruction.
13 "The practical law. derived from the motive of happiness, I call pragmatical (rule of prudence)"
(Kant, Cntique of Pure Reason).
14 For work on the art of memory, cf. F. Yates. The Art of Memory (London, 1966).
15 Once the barn is set on fire. the conflagration spreads according to the structure of the
building and its openings, according to the nature and disposition of the objects and materials
that the building contains. to the direction of the wind, and so on, not according to the desire
of the arsonist (for revenge, etc.).
16 "To JUStify" is not the same things as "to produce." Scholasticism did not produce the
Inquisition; marxism did not engender the Gulag; nee-positivism did not invent voluntary
servitude or the desire for universal scientific domination. But the capacity of such philo-
sophical systems for JUStification is incontestible.
17 It little matters. in passing, that these knowledges are denied: everyone takes them into
account, just as a pedestnan crossing the street takes the cars into account in order to avoid
being hit. even 1f he or she is a professed philosophical idealist!
18 Cf. the discontinuist perspective inaugurated by the work of Alexandre Koyre in opposition
to the continuism of Duhem.
19 Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond. L 'esprit de set (Pans: Fayard, 1981 ).
20 This quest1on received an explicitly affirmative response in the framework of "historical struc-
turalism" from Althusser's early work. which posed historical materialism as "the science of
history."
21 I am alluding here to a recent art1cle by h1storian N1cole Loraux. "Thucydide n 'est pas un
collegue, " Ouaderni d1 stona 12, 1980. pp 51 -81 .
22 This expression takes up the title of a book by D. Lindenberg, Le marxisme introuvable (Paris,
1975). wh1ch surveys some of the historical avatars of this game of hide-and-seek between
the "scientific marxism" of the university and "vulgar marxism" (which produces catechisms
for mass consumption). What is called "Anglo-American neo-marxism" is largely, in 1ts pres-
ent state. an academic phenomenon (linked in large part to the collapse of European political
structuralism), that is, a marxism "without organs," except intellectual organs-which is not
to say that with the help of the "pragmatic" spirit of Anglo-American culture, this phenom-
enon will be Without repercussions in the cultural, ideological. and political fields. and that it
does not hold some surprises for those who are celebrating "the end of marxism!"
23 An expression like "the logic of capital" refers to a real about which there are "things to be
known." But 1s 1t conceivable to respond with a "yes" or "no" to total questions such as.
Is the current French government attacking the logic of capital? or even, Have we in the
exact sense of the term "seized power"? See Jacques Mandrin, Le socialisme et Ia France.
24 L. Althusser, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1979). p. 16.
25 Cf. Michel de Certeau, L 'invention du quotidien (Paris: 10/18, UGE, 1980).
26 For more on current developments in discourse analysis in France, see the review Mots (4:6)
and the collection Materia/ites discoursives (m part1cular. J. J. Courtine and J.-M. Maradin,
"Que/ objet pour !'analyse de discours," and A. Lecomte, "La frontiere absente'}.
27 Jean-Claude Milner, Ordre et raisons de langue (Paris: Seuil, 1983). p. 336.
28 Cf. earlier remarks concerning the possible associable referents of the statement On a gagne.
We might develop Similar remarks about such expressions as "the will of the people,"
"freedom" (of thought or of the market), "austerity" versus "rigor," and so on.
29 This problem constitutes one of the weak points of the Althusserian reflection on the ideo-
logical state apparatus, as well as of the initial applications of this reflection in the domain
of discourse analysis m France.
30 A hatred of the ordinary gives rise to an anti-intellectual cult of this same ordinary: a certain
esoteric structuralism nourished the hatred of philosophy expressed, for example, in the
sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.

650
 Hugo Achugar

The Book of Poems as a Social Act: Notes

toward an Interpretation of Contemporary
Hispanic American Poetry
Translated by George Yudice and Marfa Dfaz de
Achugar

Both as a physical obJect and as a discursive proJect, a

book of poems IS intricately articulated to the social and
h1stor1cal conditions of 1ts production. Yet, at certain
moments in history, a book of poems can also destabi-
lize the hegemonic discourses of 1ts time.

The present essay has several goals. First, it offers a

theoretical position and some critical-analytic tools that together provide
for a more adequate approach to the social dimensions of contemporary
poetic discourse in Hispanic America. The aim here is to credit the social
constitution and power of this poetry while avoiding a reductive method
that merely paraphrases poetic content. Second, it offers a general descrip-
tion of what can be called the "enlightened" or "learned" system of Hispanic
American poetry after the fifties, as well as of the mediations through which
this system operates on the social meaning of the book of poems. 1 While
the connection between the two parts of this essay is not necessarily organic,
I hope that each part will complement and clarify the other.
Poetry has not yet received much attention from those
who study the relations between literature and society in Hispanic America.
Moreover, both critically and theoretically the question of poetic production
has been set, almost without exception, at the level of the individual poem,
without taking into account its articulation within the book of poems. Lim-
ited to content paraphrases of individual poems, criticism has ignored the
political force of the book itself as a meaningful unit. Consequently, criticism
has been unable either to describe or analyze the social meaning of poetry. 2
I should point out that I am concerned only with the
consciously articulated book of poems that, at least in Hispanic America,
was rarely produced as such before the nineteenth century. Although this
has not yet been proven, it is worth hypothesizing that its emergence is
linked to the developing capitalist market. The book of poems distinguishes
itself from the mere gathering together of individual poems into a book.
Moreover, it breaks with the closed world in which author and readers were
members of a limited, named circle. The Academia Antartica, articulated
among the many coteries and in the court or palace of colonial Peru at the
beginning of the seventeenth century, is a good example of an earlier form
of poetic communication; there, the "happy few" ruled a largely illiterate
651
population. 3 The book of poems of modernity, by contrast, imagines its
reader as an anonymous human being who must be seduced, conquered,
and convinced. It even takes for granted the existence of a system shaped
by other books of poems also searching for a place in the market. But this
mercantile metaphor does not imply a reduction to problems of distribution
and consumption; on the contrary, it points to the dynamics of a society
in which the book of poems aims to persuade, seduce, or indoctrinate.
As an ideological form, the book of poems is marked in its very
discourse by the process and the conditions of production. Thus, these do
not operate as simple external forces acting on a book of poetry. The analysis
of the relation between poetry and society must presuppose that all elements
of the book of poems are ideologically and aesthetically pertinent at more
than simply the level of content.
The textual totality of the book of poems is comprised not only
of the poems themselves, as has been traditionally maintained, but also of
those elements-such as title, epigraph, date, place of publication, visual
design and choice of typography, illustrations, and printer's mark-that lit-
erary hermeneutics has typically ignored or despised. For instance, the first
edition of Espana, aparta de rnf este ca1iz, illustrated by Pablo Picasso's
drawings, was done-as its cover states-by "soldiers of the republic [who]
manufactured its paper, composed the text and operated the machines" for
••literary editions of the Commisariat, Army of the East," during the "In-
dependence War in the Year of 1939." The historical enunciating situation,
or situation d'enonciation, verbalized on the cover is an important element
in our understanding of a book's meaning. 4 Rather than emphasize its pub-
lication as an artistic event, marked by the presence of Picasso's illustrations,
the text on the cover foregrounds the book as an attempt to continue "the
political war by other means," by opposing other poetic formalizations. This
struggle or dialogue between formalizations is a fundamental part of the
scene of aesthetic and ideological enunciation that determines the social
meaning of the book of poems.
At this point, two different approaches must be distinguished.
One position would lead us to think that we can reconstruct the process
and the conditions of production of poetic discourse simply with the support
of internal textual elements. In other words, internal evidence is sufficient
to establish the social and historical situation within which and out of which
the book of poems is uttered. By comparison, my own approach-in addition
to attempting to avoid the reductive emphasis on content that overlooks
the semantic function of the totality of elements constitutive of the book
of poems-considers verbal and social contexts external to the book itself.
Thus, when Pablo Neruda's Canto general is issued in Mexico in 1950, it
becomes part of an enunciating situation set in motion the year before with
Octavio Paz's Libertad bajo palabra, a situation in turn shaped by Neruda's
own Residencia en Ia tierra, by Gorostiza's exquisite Poesie pure, by Jorge
Guillen's writings, and by the black poetry of Nicolas Guillen. The book of
poems, in short, enters an enunciating and reading situation that cannot be
understood exclusively in terms of its internal poetic specificity. Moreover,
within both modernity and contemporaneity, neither authors (nor, in effect,
their books) are themselves necessarily naive about their social relations,
though books enact those relations whether their authors wish them to or
not.
652
 Hugo Achugar
The first edition of Espana, aparta de mi este caliz, published by
the soldiers of the republic, is an example that history seems to have tailor-
made for us. In this case, reading the book independently of its editorial
presentation implies silencing the aesthetic and ideological project that it
performs. As we accumulate a whole critical tradition of such silences, we
end by silencing the entire history of efforts to shape the impact of books
and the corollary effort to influence future practices. Of course, especially
in examples less obvious than Vallejo's book of poems, there is a risk of
overemphasizing the material presentation of poetic discourse. Neverthe-
less, to ignore these elements is to continue a critical tradition that fails to
recognize the way modem poetry communicates and consequently blurs
distinctions between modernity and the past.
At the time of its appearance, Espana, aparta de mi este caliz
was immediately inserted into a marginal system of circulation and, more
important, an articulated poetic system of aesthetic and ideological con-
ventions and propositions that located it in social life. Thus the book was
separated from the "destiny" dreamed for it by its author. The cover and
printer's marks function as elements marked by the sociohistorical process
and conditions of production. They are at once tied to the ideological and
aesthetic project of the book of poems and socially articulated to its time.
These marks-eloquent even in their infelicity-are part of the formalization
of an explicit project, but they could also correspond to an implied project
in conflict with the intentions of the real author. This makes it particularly
risky to limit an analysis to overt thematic content (which may more closely
match an author's intentions), as we may see later when we consider Roque
Dalton's book of poems.
The book of poems is a unity whose motive is indivisibly artic-
ulated with social processes. It has a syntax that draws together poems,
epigraph, dedications, and so on, overdetermining and sometimes rese-
manticizing them. Thus it proposes a particular reading of the whole, and
the isolated poem should be read in such a way that its integration into the
whole of the book changes its meaning. This syntax, violated each time we
read the book at random, disregarding the proposed organization, is a for-
malization of voice. This basic speaker's voice 5 is shaped for this syntax
and is informed by an aesthetic-ideological perspective. We can consider
both the syntax and the perspective as the products of a process by which
a textually made and executed choice points to its own existence. 6 The
canonic version of this syntax would be the linear movement-from left to
right-that confers a fundamental meaning on the order of the poems. By
visualizing the dialogic structure constituting the poetry book, we can, at
least in part, describe its formalized project. 7 The description of the book's
syntax is, in a way, the description of a perspective on and within the
sociohistorical process. 8 The choices implied in the book's syntax presup-
pose its articulation to an enunciating situation constituted by a dynamic
of other perspectives. It is this dynamic that poetically formalizes the so-
ciohistorical process.
Inserting the book of poems into an ideological cultural system
makes visible its existence as a social act. Precisely as a social act, the book
of poems constitutes a response and a proposition vis-a-vis the enunciating
situation in which it is developed. The meaning of the book of poems is
fully realized in the totality configured by the system of answers and prop-
653
 ositions uttered at precise historical stages of the development of a society
where the author and reader are unknown to one another. This totality
mediates the relation between the book of poems and society. Thus the book
of poems, because it is in a dialogic relation with other books of poems or
even groups ofbooks of poems, becomes an element ofwhat we call a poetic
system. In this system, the book of poems works as a social act-both a
critique of the social and a proposal for a different universe. The book of
poems is an utterance that constitutes a social act; the utterance itself is a
social act.
The book of poems is a fact, finished in itself, which simulta-
neously refers to the entire social and historical process. 9 The ideological
universe proposed can be seen as a representation or complex imago of the
sociohistorical processes in which the enunciation of the book of poems is
produced. This poetic formalization of a cultural and ideological universe
is implicitly a reevaluation of a system of values and representations, whether
dominant or potential. This interaction of present and absent elements sug-
gests a way of constituting the symbolic character of poetic discourse as a
nonabsolute totality. The book's reference to the extratextual universe is
partially processed by the universe it shapes. This does not imply that its
actual constitution as a partial, selective, and thus nonabsolute totality for-
bids it from being ideologically uttered or presented as the whole.
These social effects function independently of the will ofthe real
author, and, for that reason, they are necessarily involved in relations with
the rest of the signs uttered by a society. This does not depend on the receiver
being conscious of the process. Indeed, the presence of the poetic system is
usually perceived in a very confused way in everyday life. This allows us
to understand, for instance, the inclination to portray the literary world as
merely an indecisive and indefinite movement within the historical devel-
opment of a society, for it confuses the world of perception with reality
itself.
The necessary relationship between the artistic sign and other
similar signs in force at the moment of its publication forms the poetic
system. Such a system implies a critical structuration of the relationship
between books, permitting them to acquire a particular meaning or value
because of their situation at a definite moment in literary production. The
poetic system is, of course, nothing but an abstraction resulting from syn-
chronic consideration of a historical process, and its transformation is never
independent of the total process of social production. Yet each poetic system
acts out its particular perspective on literary value and also presupposes its
own notion of what is literary.
The coherence of a book of poems is often not absolute, and the
heterogeneity of projects supporting a particular performance is related to
the presence of implicit projects that may be in conflict with both the explicit
project and the textual formalization. It is in the dialogic situation of the
poetic system that this heterogeneity is resolved through struggles that si-
lence particular characteristics of discourse.
The description of a book (or group of books) of poems related
to a precise poetic system can only be valid if the total system of artistic
production in which it is performed is taken into account. Two prefatory
remarks need to be made. First, I assume, even though I will not carry it
654
 Hugo Achugar
out, that the description of a poetic system presupposes the description of
the syntax of the book of poems and its aesthetic and ideological charac-
terization. Second, my concern is with the "learned" poetic system. I am
thus ignoring the popular poetic system and its relations with the former. 10
The learned Hispanic American poetry that emerged at the be-
ginning of the fifties can be understood as a poetic system constituted by
two basic and rather different trends: first, the universalist claims of the
avant-garde, which minimize the natural and the regional, and, second, a
poetic system that centers its discourse in a local reality underwritten by
history, whether national, continental, or racial. Both systems were already
present at the end of the nineteenth century and continued to hold sway
until the beginnings of "contemporaneity": Pablo Neruda's Canto general
is from 1950 and Octavio Paz's Libertad bajo palabra from 1949. In the
following decades the picture does not seem to have varied substantially,
although it appears that Hispanic American poetry has become almost schiz-
ophrenically polarized: the enumerating delirium of Canto general does not
shy away from the accidents of geographic, urban, social, and political real-
ity. By contrast, Paz's questions regarding manhood, the earth, and everyday
life are based on a referential austerity within which sensual observation
designates a culturally interchangeable space operating in every nook and
cranny of both the dream and waking states.
Even though all attempts to organize a diverse literary production
risk oversimplification, I believe these broad trends provide a valid model
for understanding contemporary Hispanic American poetry. The ideological
formalization of these projects can be briefly characterized as follows:
1. Books of poems within the universalizing trend typically show
(a) playful language and the decisive presence of metaphor; (b) an ahistoric
introspection into the anguish generated by urban modernity and the sudden
attack of technology; (c) the assumption that the quotidian reveals dimen-
sions of permanent essence; and (d) the use of irony as a reflection on
language. All these characteristics maintain the hegemony of the definition
of the "poetic" that survives from the preceding period.
2. By contrast, the emerging trend in this struggle for hegemony
proposes (a) the "novelization" of lyric discourse; (b) the socialization of
those experiences that produce solidarity with local or world liberatory strug-
gles; (c) a tendency toward the linguistic quotidian (i.e., colloquialism) and
to everyday experience without projecting their transcendence; and (d) the
use of irony to demystify elements of the prestigious-poetic, the historic-
canonic, and the devalued-sentimental.
There are those, mechanically following Hugo Friedrich, who
argue that it is the first of these trends that embodies modernity: "the dis-
sonant tension" is its touchstone. It is tempting to see this as the hegemonic
position that battled for a historic avant-garde during the twenties. In that
sense, as E. Sanguinetti has suggested, "every artistic product, sooner or
later, will find its precise museum" or its precise canonization. 11 Thus, the
historic avant-garde of the twenties, in its universalizing trend, functions
as the canonic form of learned poetry from the forties on. Furthermore, we
might point to the importance and power held by groups and magazines
such as Sur and Poesia Buenos Aires in Argentina, Vuelta in Mexico, Sardio
in Venezuela, and Origenes in Cuba, as well as the larger number of studies,
articles, and Ph.D. theses that consolidated the hegemonic position of this
655
kind of poetry in Europe and the United States. This description of the
learned poetic system presupposes that the universalizing trend is canonic,
at least for the Garden of Academus, while the second trend represents the
opposition or heterodoxy.
Ifwe think ofthe whole poetic production of a society, however,
we must distinguish not only the canonic and the heterodox but the official
as well. Of course, literary production, and poetic production as part of it,
constitute only one of several kinds of production. They do not exclude
class considerations. Thus, the same notions of canon and heterodoxy can
be related ideologically and socially. We shall have as many canons and
heterodoxies as there are class-conscious social groups acting in the historical
process. (In this way, handbooks, anthologies, and histories of literature
operate as canons defining, for a determining class or class fraction, the
valid aesthetic-ideological system.)
This offical canon, as Alaistair Fowler points out, "is institu-
tionalized through education, maecenas and journalism" and, it might be
added, through the publishing industry as well as other ideological state
apparatuses. 12 In the total authoritarianism of extreme dictatorship, or the
hardest moments of Pinochetism, ideological coherence becomes absolute
in the aesthetic realm as well. If there are opposed or underground norms-
Marta Traba speaks of a "cultural resistance" -the hegemony of the ruling
norm is the only one that can circulate publicly and officially within society. 13
Yet at certain historical moments the multiplication of proposed norms and
canons is a verifiable fact. Then it becomes evident that literary production
is not entirely fixed by a social class and that power is shared, or at least
disputed. These canons or norms acquire their value, to some extent, by
virtue of their placement and configuration but mainly because of the ab-
sence of alternatives. Anthologies "ignoring" certain authors or the pro-
duction of a particular sector of society (e.g., songs or the mislabeled "social"
or "protest" poetry) make "evident" a canon in agreement with Friedrich's
ideal or, in its Hispanic American version, with the canon of modernity
proposed by Octavio Paz and Guillermo Sucre. We must, then, speak of a
poetic system in someone's interest.
This poetic system does not correspond to the total literary pro-
duction nor to what has been called the potential canon as "the literary
canon, which in a wide sense comprehends the entire corpus of what has
been written, together with the surviving oralliterature." 14 In fact, it has
nothing to do with the potential canon but with the accessible canon, because
it is difficult, if not impossible, to have access to material controlled by the
Hispanic American ruling class. The distinction between the potential and
the accessible canons points to a problem of particular relevance in the
study of poetic production, that of perishable or discarded or nonofficial
material: the lack of institutionalized critical editions of marginal works and
their very reduced circulation are perpetuated by those who build the canon.
For instance, to what extent can we read the anarchist or socialist poetry
of the last century in Latin America? We are not talking about the produc-
tion, accepted willingly or unwillingly, by the ruling class, but of the invis-
ibility of books the literary historian and anthologist have discarded because
they were not considered literature or belles lettres; that is, they were dis-
carded because the aesthetic-ideological horizon of the hegemonic system
of values made their inclusion impossible.
656
 Hugo Achugar
The recent edition of a P/aquette-Poemas de Ia dzrcel-is really
exceptional in this regard. Issued by the Convenci6n Nacional de Traba-
jadores, C.N.T. (in exile) from Uruguay, it evidently does not exist for the
anthologists, critics, and historians, whether official or canonical, whether
from Uruguay or the rest of the continent. The problem is not merely
political; it implies an aesthetic and ideological choice most often couched
in the euphemistic "bad faith" of the slogan "This is not poetry." So it
seems that in the Hispanic American case through the end of the fifties, the
poetic production that engaged its social milieu represented the learned
opposition to the canonic or universalizing tendency. Yet its development
brought a growing inclusion of heterodox materials traditionally margin-
alized. Here it is worthwhile to compare the anthology Poesia en movimiento
(1966), sponsored by Octavia Paz, and the later Omnibus de poesia Mexi-
cana (1971) by Gabriel Zaid. We observe, in this case for a single country,
Mexico, how the aesthetic-ideological hegemony operates by proposing what
poetry is and can be.
The system of learned poetry changed in the sixties and an al-
ternative to the hegemonic system emerged. It aimed to share power by
transforming the conditions ofbook production and distribution in Hispanic
America. Prior to this, poetry that engaged both its social context and the
poetics of naming history represented the opposition; while it included such
relevant personalities as Neruda, it was an opposition poetry nonetheless.
It was during the fifties and especially after the Cuban Revolution that such
poetic projects developed-the Pan Duro group in Argentina (including Juan
Gelman), the antipoesia of Nicanor Parra, the exteriorismo of Coronel Ur-
techo and Ernesto Cardenal, and the poetry of Fernandez Retamar, Bene-
detti, and A. Cisneros. The ascendance of this trend was proportional to
the revolutionary process in Cuba and, later, Nicaragua.
In the last three decades the enunciating situation has changed
so that both trends function as hegemonic, if we think in terms of the
continent and of the relation between the ruling social and cultural forces
in different countries. In fact, what has happened is a qualitative transfor-
mation operating on the pragmatic level of the publishing industry. This is,
nonetheless, only a variation in the correlation of forces that bestow power
in the cultural field.
Before World War II the Hispanic American publishing industry
had three centers: one, based in the Iberian Peninsula, made the Civil War
into a recognized landmark; another was divided between Mexico and Bue-
nos Aires; 15 and one was in Santiago. The printing ofbooks of poems, leaving
aside political sponsorship and vanity press publication, was supported, at
the continental level, by a few publishing houses and magazines 16 which
assumed the function of readers and selectors of Hispanic American poetic
discourse. The aesthetic and ideological filters of these publishers and mag-
azines defined, in part, which poetic trends were granted value. Sometimes
small areas conceded to poetry became hegemonic, thanks to the publishing
industry. During the period between the wars and up to the forties, the
publication, centered in Spain, of the work of the republican Spanish pub-
lishers in Hispanic America was concentrated in Buenos Aires and Mexico.
In this period the Argentinian publishers had an undeniable preponderance,
with 50 percent of the Hispanic American market. 17
657
 This particular Hispanic-Argentinian-Mexican predominance, as
well as the relocation of Spanish republicans in Hispanic America, suggests
publishers' support for a certain poetry, which ranged from Girondo to
Neruda. 18 (That is, from a poetic affiliated to the Hispanic American avant-
garde or the Peninsular Generation of 1927 to the explicit "social" expres-
sions at the other end ofthe spectrum.) In any case, the broad popular front
of the forties had its expression within an aesthetic-ideological pluralism
within the poetic system. 19 This did not, however, entail a critique of the
hegemonic power of a certain poetic trend.
After the fifties and the consolidation of the Cuban Revolution,
the picture shifted substantially: the creation of Casa de las Americas in La
Habana, with its literary prizes, and the proliferation of new magazines and
publishers. 20 This was also the period in which already existing means for
the publication of poetry that engaged its sociohistorical context reached its
apogee. These new formations functioned to bestow prestige and to dispute
the hegemony of the former trend. The literature provoked by the Cuban
Revolution on a global level reinforces what was said before: more an-
thologies and translations of the so-called revolutionary poetry were being
published by publishing houses and magazines that belonged to the tradi-
tional centers of power. It is also true that, since the beginning of the sev-
enties, this set of phenomena has not maintained the strength it showed in
the sixties.
Nevertheless, changes in the enunciating situation around the end
of the fifties transformed the way in which books of poems have been
inscribed in the Hispanic American learned poetic system. It even altered
the meaning of several books of poetry whose public reception began then.
In Neruda's Odas elementales (1954), for instance, his earlier poetics, nec-
essary to Residencias en Ia tierra, is exchanged for an explicit, socially ori-
ented, didactic project. Indeed, the poetic system can impose its polariza-
tions and thereby silence the heterogeneity of particular books. In Jose Emilio
Pacheco's No me preguntes como pasa el tiempo (1967), conflicting ideo-
logical aesthetic projects allow either a strong or a weak political reading,
depending on which elements are foregrounded.
Roque Dalton's Las historias prohibidas del Pulgarcito (1975)
offers a rather different case. Its inclusion of historical texts and references
prevents us from pretending that poetry is exclusively self-referential. Dal-
ton's book of poems-as well as those by Pachecos, Gelman, Fernandez
Retamar, Cardenal, and others-struggles against a system of values that
limits poetry to a linguistic adventure with no historical function beyond
the development of the imagination. A somewhat more detailed consider-
ation of Dalton's book of poems and its syntax will illustrate my argument.
The historias prohibidas are both histories and stories and thus
play with the relation of literature and society. Dalton's book attempts to
shape a history of El Salvador that might work as an alternative to the
official history of the country. To accomplish this, the book is organized as
a collage that mixes up history and fiction. Indeed, the historicity of the
discourse does not emerge only from the historical texts or from texts whose
narrativity contributes to the development of the book, since the book gath-
ers indigenous songs, lists of names, proverbs, and other similar texts, where
the narrative function is minimal or absent. The historicity of the discourse
emerges from the overall syntax of the book, which has numerous elements.
658
 Hugo Achugar
For example, the book of poems has a historical order: it starts with the
Spanish conquest and arrives at the 1969 war against Honduras. On another
level, the numbering in Antologia de poetas Sa/vadorenos, worked into the
text, establishes an implicitly temporal sequence. More broadly, the book
evokes many different aspects of culture and life and inserts them into the
historical and social development of El Salvador.
History in Las historias prohibidas del Pulgarcito is obviously a
thematic element. But it also exists in the form of what the book proposes
as a new history of discourse. By the end of the book, we have participated
in a certain epic dramatization of poetic discourse itself. The reader inte-
grates the book-whether encountering a poem, proverb, popular song or
bomba, essay, elegy, song, story, dialogue, or letter-into a whole, blurring
by this its fragmentary nature and including each element in a sequence
that then becomes a plot and a story, one that dramatizes the transformation
of discourses into a critical totality. The reader who, after the first text-
where a fragmentary version of the sixteenth-century Spanish conquest is
counterpointed against a report from the current (1983) major-general of
El Salvador-reads the proverb "Ideas want war," discovers a relation that
is both ideological and aesthetic. In pointing to the ideological nature of
the preceding texts and their function in masking reality (as well as in
justifying repressive action), the proverb carries the contrast to other levels:
popular knowledge versus authoritarian rhetoric; the transparency of pop-
ular discourse versus the masking opacity of authoritarian discourse. This
relationship becomes even more apparent when one continues reading and
comes upon the third text-a fragment from 1576-that purports to describe
Salvadorean nature and the evil depths of the earth!
Discourse in this book of poems is dramatized from a class per-
spective, that of class struggle. Indeed, the book of poems assumes that
discourse from the Salvadorean ruling class also implies a linguistic and
poetic domination. For that very reason the book performs a polyphonic
desacralization and linguistic disassembling of the hegemonic discourse. In
the best subversive tradition, a number of different verbal elements are
juxtaposed: humor, celebrations of the linguistically dominated stratum,
narrativity, variations in syntax, and colloquial diction in many of the poems.
This collage effect-when confronted intertextually by fragments from the
dominant or hegemonic discourse-creates a critical cacophony of voices.
These voices are themselves a material part of the class struggle within
Salvadorean society.
The deconstructive effects of this polyphony, sometimes sar-
donic, help to explain the very mixed tone of the book. For example the
speaker in the Bib/iografia, which closes the book, after mentioning a list
of books and authors, writes: "Aside from the texts and original poems,
three other texts have been modified in order to achieve the effects intended
by the author; and two texts, which apparently have been taken from other
publications, are apocryphal; they, too, were originally written by the author.
It is up to the readers to find them" (p. 232). Playfully, the book states, at
a certain level, that the author is not responsible for his work, that he is
not an individual but a collective author. Thus the ironic tone does not
serve to minimize the book's scope. On the contrary, it constitutes a curious
counterpoint to the sometimes tragic history the book narrates. The mixed
character of the book's project is, in fact, implied in the surrealist politics
659
of the epigraph by Gabriela Mistral: "El Salvador, Tom Thumb of Amer-
ica.... " From the first poem, "Guerra de guerrillas en El Salvador (Con-
trapunto)" (Guerrilla warfare in El Salvador [Counterpoint]), to the last,
"Ya te aviso ... " ("I'll keep you posted ... "), the book in fact relates a
history of El Salvador, though one whose chronology is partly unconven-
tional.
The book's ironic questioning of hegemonic discourse includes
a rejection of the dominiant class's notion of poetry. "Poemita con foto
simbOlica, dedicado a/ mAc/eo de Ia clase interna lacayo-dominante, que
incluye una apreciacion nada personal sabre lo que cabe esperar de su amo,
a juzgar por los vientos que sop/an" ("Little poem with symbolic photo,
dedicated to the internal servant-ruling class, that includes as per the veering
winds, a not at all personal appreciation about what is expected from its
master") is a good example:
Oh Oh
ligarchy ligarquia
step ma
mother drasta
with a murderer husband con marido asesino
dressed in cotton vestida de pique
as a vulturess como una buitra
lying in wait on the branches acechante in las ramas
of the tangle of History del enredo en Ia Historia
ridiculous like everything evil ridicula como todo lo malo
we must do away with the fat lady hay que acabar contigo gorda
The exclamatory "Oh," extracted from "oligarchy," satirizes not
only the ruling class but also a kind of poetic discourse inherent to that
class. Furthermore, it satirizes the image of poetry as a sentimental, self-
expressive, and individualistic expression of a spiritual vision ofthe world.
The fact that the poem is placed between a text evoking the 1932 slaughter
and "Two portraits of the fatherland" means that its grotesque nature is
not a fictional product; it arises from bringing together what is real and
unreal. The class struggle within the society is also the poetic, linguistic,
and ideological struggle in the book of poems. Las historias prohibidas del
Pulgarcito, as a book of poems, appears within a discursive situation con-
stituted by two levels-one, the most obvious political, social, and economic
conditions of El Salvador and of Central America generally, and, two, the
situation of Latin American poetic discourse since the 1950s; both help
construct the social meaning of the book of poems.
Despite the eventual evidence of Las historias prohibidas del
Pulgarcito, it would be possible to try to explain the changes that began to
take place in the learned poetic system during the fifties as an autonomous
literary evolution, one that, when considered autonomously, seems to have
led to a certain chaotic diversity. 21 This chaos, in fact, emerged out of a new
reality: the social subject as the wielder of the enunciating power of poetry
was not unique in its dispersion. Yet the book of poems, despite its social
utterance by aesthetically and ideologically differentiated and polarized sub-
jects, is nonetheless located within the hegemony of enunciation. Thus, the
conflict between the two ideological projects in contemporary Hispanic

660
 Hugo Achugar
American poetry reinserts itself into the aesthetic hegemony. This joint
social enunciation of projects, in either its explicit or implicit versions, in
the last three decades has provoked a resemanticization ofbooks of poems.
Consequently, the aesthetic-ideological norm to which it responds (and which
is proposed to the Hispanic American reader) acquires a rigidity and co-
herence more orthodox than what seems to occur in isolated books.
The contemporary Hispanic American book of poems seduces,
convinces, indoctrinates, and conquers anonymous readers through an ar-
ticulation of the poetic system that does not always succeed in foregrounding
the peculiarities of heterogeneous discourses. In this sense, the book of
poems does not succeed in escaping the sociohistorical enunciating situation.
Yet this failure reveals it to be a social act within the real (i.e., not symbolic)
struggle for what Marti has called "Nuestra America."

Notes

1 I use "book of poems" as a translation for the Spanish word poemario, which emphasizes
the notion of wholeness.
2 I could also mention other than Hispanic American authors who have written on poetic
production, such as Heidegger, Pfeiffer, Cohen, Della Volpe, Thompson, Adorno, Friedrich,
Riffaterre, and Easthope. These authors and the Spanish Americans Reyes and Portuondo
speak at two levels: ( 1) considering the poem as a self-sufficient or independent entity, and
(2) at the level of the general poetic discourse (i.e., a precise poet's complete work or the
poetic language), as different from the colloquial, narrative, or scientific language.
3 See Raquel Chang Rodriguez, "Epistola inedita de Pedro Carvajal, poeta de Ia Academia
Antartica," Revista de critica literaria Latinoamericana, 3 ( 1976).
4 The term is from Volosinov's 1/linguaggio come pratica soc1ale (Bari: Dedali Libri, 1980). in
wh1ch he uses the notion of situazione di enonziazione. For a more complete discussion of
the notion of "situation," see Claude Germain, The Concept of Situation in Linguistics (Ot-
tawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979).
5 I have used the term "basic speaker" (hablante basico) before, in ldeologias v estructuras
narrativas en Jose Donoso: 1950-70 (Caracas: Celarg, 1979). At that time, I referred to
Booth's "implied author" and to similar notions proposed by Jan Mukarovsky and Miroslav
Cervenka. In Latin America the same notion has been used by Antonio CorneJo Polar, Nelson
Osorio, and lately by Jav1er Lasarte, who has proposed the use of "basic enunciator" (en-
unciador bilsico).
6 It could also be said, considering the heterogeneity of a discourse or its polyphony, that the
book of poems offers a multiplicity of not always coincidental perspectives.
7 Even the chronological organization, apparently innocent and naive, of the book of poems is
a special case of syntax and never its denial. In the event of poesia permutante (permutating
poetry). which Cortazar includes in Ultimo round, we might talk about a heterodox syntax.
Its own condition of "violation of pattern" syntax allows us to discover a peculiar syntactic
project. See Ultimo round (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1972). pp. 272-73.
8 It is this syntactic order, for instance, that bestows a special significance on the introductory
poem or group of poems and becomes a sort of "reading art." Whether its function is to
train the reader or to design a particular cultural-ideological unit this syntactic order will
function within the book of poems as the "rule" to be developed or deconstructed. In this
view we could even talk about .. catalytic poems," borrowing Barthes' s terminology, perhaps
drawing attention to the function of the final poem or group of poems, which often provide
a syntactic closure to the book of poems.
9 See Umberto Eco, Trattato generale di semiotica (Milano: Bompiani. 1975); Thomas Lewis,
"Notes toward a Theory of Literary Referent" PMLA. 94:3 (1979). pp. 459-75.
10 Although it is not explicitly described, this work does take into account the characteristics
of a popular poetic system (e.g., songs, children's literature, rural traditions. and workers'
poems) where it proposes notions of poetry effective within the social totality of the enun-
ciating situation in which the learned system makes itself.
11 Cf. Edoardo Sanguinetti, Vanguardia, ideologia v lenguaje (Caracas: Monte Avila, 1969). p.
13.

661
12 Ala1stair Fowler. "Genre and the Literary Canon," NLH, 11: 1 ( 1979). p. 98.
13 Marta Traba, "La cultura de Ia Resistencia," Ltteratura v praxis en Amenca Latina (Caracas:
Monte Avila, 1974).
14 Fowler, p. 98.
15 This situation was not free from the particular developments of the productive apparatuses
of the nations as well as of their national literatures.
16 One could mention Atlantida, Claridad, Revista de Occidente, Porrua, Espasa Calpe, Sur,
Emece, Zig-Zag, Tor, Nasctmento v Ercilla. Losada deserves to be pointed out as particularly
open-minded, in both ideological and aesthetic terms.
17 The statistical data place the hegemonic period of the Argentinian publishing houses in the
forties. During 1950, 50 percent of the Latin American market was supported by Argentina,
a status that would drastically change by 1972 "when its participation becomes 15%." See
Argentina, Brasil, Mexico (Bogota: Cerlai-UNESCO. 1980). pp. 7-8.
18 The importance of the publishing work in this period becomes evident in the fact that pub-
lishers held conferences in 1946 (Santiago, Chile). 1948 (Buenos A1res). and 1964 (Mexico)
to create cohesion and organization in support of the "principle of copyright of books in the
Spanish language for countries that speak that language" (Argentina, Brasil. Mexico, p. 35).
While this was an anti-imperialist defense. 1t was brought about by a kind of Hispanic "Monroe
doctrine" of culture that eliminated transnational competition. Competition remained relative
since some of the major publishers. such as Espasa-Calpe, had parent companies in Madrid.
Buenos Aires, and Mexico.
19 The surrealist axis, Buenos Aires-Mexico-Santiago, also had its part, though less important.
20 I could also mention Area, La Rosa Blindada, Galerna, Joaquin Mortiz, Techo de Ia Ballena,
and Marcha from Montevideo.
21 Santiago Luppoli asserts that "the systematic study of the current poets becomes more
difficult every time, since the logical task-ranging them according to their stylistic, ideological,
and renewal patterns-Is almost unapproachable.·· See Handbook of Latin American Studies:
Humanities. no. 36 (Gamsv1lle: University of Florida Press, 1974). p. 411.

662
 Darko Suvin

Can People Be (Re)Presented in Fiction?:

Toward a Theory of Narrative Agents
and a Materialist Critique beyond
Technocracy or Reductionism

People-in the bourgeois individualist sense-cannot be

represented 1n fiction. They become, on the one hand,
exempla and, on the other, shifting nodes of narration.
Nonetheless, pertinent and crucial relationships among
people can be represented, allowing the reader to rearti-
culate human relationships to the world of people and
th1ngs.

I believe that fiction is differentiated from other types

of social discourse (journalism, scientific texts, philosophy, etc.) by the pres-
ence of two necessary and sufficient formal factors: narrative space/time (so
far best analyzed by Bakhtin's chronotope), which is a transposition and
reelaboration of preceding-largely extraliterary-concepts of space and/or
time; and narrative agents, which are a reelaboration and transposition of-
largely extraliterary-concepts about people. These two factors are perhaps
two faces of the same coin; they are certainly, to a great degree, consub-
stantial. For a first approach to an already very complicated matter, I shall
in this essay reluctantly but entirely forget about the chronotope and con-
centrate on agents as fictional simulacra of people.'
The Lay of the Land: the Political Stakes

1.1
Before getting into the inevitably somewhat special-
ized arguments, I want to discuss their intertext, which I suggest in my title
by way of the possibilities lurking within both "people" and "(re)present."
This intertext, or practical context, is situated at the interface between fic-
tional and other ways of viewing, interpreting, and constructing reality.
1.2
"People" (gens, Leute) means, of course, something
like women plus men plus children; it does not denote THE people (le peuple,
das Volk). This essay will focus on the images of people rather than on the
interests ofthe people that can be found (re)presented in fiction. Nonetheless,
these overlapping connotations are an important signal, for the way people
are presented in literature will intimately codetermine what interests that
literature might re-present. The stakes, therefore, are very high-both for
Marxian critics dealing with culture and for the fate of fiction itself. This
subject is a privileged way of entering into and indicating an answer to these
radical democratic and socialist questions: Is fiction more than opium for
663
(the) people? Is it also-as this usually truncated text of Marx continues-
the heart of a heartless world? Is fiction only ideology or also Utopia and/
or cognition? Is there, then, a cognitive (and thus politically usable and
ethically justifiable) reason for a radical critic to investigate fiction-be it
Shakespeare or "Dallas," Homer or science fiction, Proust or Piercy, comic
strips or Brecht-especially when that will involve a halfway conscientious
critic in the indispensable mediations of the meta-meta-discourses of mod-
ern criticism, thus leaving less time for more direct radical action?
Many radicals throughout the years have come, with reluctance
or enthusiasm, to share with pragmatists and philistines the conclusion that
there is NO such reason, that a radical cultural critic is an oxymoron of the
order of fiery ice or planned disorder. Nikolai Chernyshevsky, the leader of
Russian revolutionary populism, said somewhere (the image was to recur
in the Soviet debates) that sausages came before Shakespeare. From a vulgar
materialist (bourgeois as well as "socialist") point of view, this is undeniable:
people cannot exist without eating; they can exist without fiction.
Yet, can they? In the depths of the 1930s depression, did not
Hollywood thrive on perverting the pennies of millions of jobless people
into profits from soap-opera movies? Does not every halfway intelligent
regime in economic-political difficulties buttress itself through the most pop-
ular forms of fiction at the same time (if not before) it tries political solu-
tions? The genres vary: in Elizabethan times it was theater, street ballads,
or preachings (even technically speaking these are largely fictional); in the
nineteenth century, popular novels; today, TV. The orientation remains
constant. The biblical author had better food imagery than Chernyshevsky:
not by bread alone but also by fictional images-which explain why bread
is or is not there, why pie in the sky will come by and by-liveth man and
woman.
Thus, to continue with examples from revolutionary leaders, it
was not only Che Guevara who might have thought that machine guns were
more important than speeches, nor only Mao Tse-tung that working in
peoples' actions (in the sense that a sculptor works in marble) was more
important than working in poems. Many pragmatists with less flair for
insurrection or liberating politics take such an attitude unthinkingly. Let
me call this operative attitude (or gesture, in Brecht's sense of Gestus) by
the name of, arguably, the greatest nineteenth-century poet, also a Com-
munard, who very early on abandoned poem writing for gunrunning: it is
the Rimbaud Syndrome. I do not maintain that Che or Mao took the wrong
decisions for themselves-that would be ignorant and presumptuous. But I
do maintain that when the Rimbaud Syndrome is adopted as a norm im-
posed on all possible future Rimbauds, it is pernicious. All of us who have
worked within movements aspiring to radical democracy and economic
justice, including movements claiming Marxist ascendancies, remember well
how our eccentric involvement with not immediately operative sign sys-
tems-in particular with fiction-met in general with two responses: either
with hostility, or, in the case of our most well meaning and shrewd comrades
outside the cultural (wordsmithing, picture making, and similar) trades, with
the pitying smile of forbearance for childish pursuits. (Indeed, I seem to
detect some echoes of the Rimbaud Syndrome in this conference, where
according to my count one can find one and one-third session out of thirteen,
or 10 percent, devoted to fictional communication.)
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 Darko Suvin
Yet kulturshchiks (the Russian term from such debates) have a
good deal of historical irony to fall back upon. Thus, Chemyshevsky's main
positive influence was not in his failed revolutionary action but in his writ-
ings, in particular in a fictional text called What Is to Be Done? (1865),
which forty years later inspired a young man called Volodya Ulyanov to
write a nonfictional text of the same title, setting out the theory of a future
Leninist party (hardly an ineffective text). Ten years after the second What
Is to Be Done? its author, then already V. I. Lenin, would interrupt his
possibly most important and certainly most utopian piece of wordsmithing
(called The State and the Revolution) with a concluding statement that it is
better to make a revolution than write about it. What I am arguing is not
that he was wrong but that he was (necessarily) oversimplifying: that without
Chemyshevsky's fiction as well as Chemyshevsky's organizational tradition
(which led to Ulyanov's elder brother being executed by tsarism) many
central features of the united theory and practice of Leninism would not
have existed in the same form. And one thing a good look at fiction and
art in general-which fuses conceptualization with sensuality-can teach us
is that phenomena only exist in given forms: not to exist in a given way
means not to exist.
Let me go on with the historical record, to Che Guevara and
Mao Zedong. I cannot even hint at the richness of their lives' work, but I
wish to isolate one important lesson to be drawn from them: what survives
after a generation. A large part of what survives from such lives are narrative
images, agents with actions. Che is in this domain surviving as something
like a Marxist version of an Arthurian or Spenserian Knight of Justice,
giving his life for the cause, a revolutionary Christ-like intercessor for the
oppressed. This image is so potent that even Hollywood felt compelled to
attempt co-opting and neutralizing it. Similarly, Mao is increasingly becom-
ing a twofold narrative agent: the writer of certain kinds of texts and an
imaginary type within global political discourse (the leader of the Long
March, the speaker at Yenan, the swimmer in the Yangtze, etc.). It is not
that the practice or praxis of fiction is better than, but merely that it is
indispensable for and indispensably allied with, the praxis of revolutionary
change. Indeed, fiction or narrative (in the wide sense of telling a story with
agents and space/time, which englobes equally what the old theories called
epic, lyric, and dramatic fiction) is inextricably enmeshed with all social
practice. If any ideology or movement pretends to kick narrative and images
borrowed from fiction out the front door, they will return by the cellar
window. Surely it would be better to do knowingly what you have to do
anyway; for only thus, as Hegel said, do you truly do that. Furthermore,
only thus can what you do be consciously controlled and corrected.
1.3
This is not to deny that the Rimbaud Syndrome remains a very
important and open, particular historical (as different from general theo-
retical) question. But it, too, is an important question because, before the
gunrunning, Rimbaud had an unsurpassed way with words, in his case
organized into verse images and narratives.
It might have become apparent that my title conceals some basic
choices. Along with the connotational resonance between people (plural)
and the people (collective singular), another, more polarized choice is whether
665
 either is being-is to be-" re-presented" or "represented," or indeed simply
••presented."
Re-presenting I take to refer to a supposed copying from or re-
flection of a supposedly otherwise known external reality. Two minutes'
thought suffices to render this untenable in any literal form, so it is quickly
provided with a codicil to the effect that a subjective prism is interposed
between the objective reality and the image of (the) people. Then it turns
out that a norm for the rightness of that prismatic refraction must be found
in order to obviate the possible multiplicity of prisms (say, avant-gardist or
mystical as against "realistic") and that the normative prism is that of the
ruling ideology-be it socialist-realism or the awful capitalist-realism we can
see in the halls of any U.S. university in the form of paintings of presidents
and board chairmen. This, in short, is a static, conformist, Philistine theory
of artistic mimesis, banal and without much interest.
However, if people are represented in fiction as a selection, con-
densation, and displacement of surface empirical events and the ruling ide-
ological way of seeing them, if they are seen as in a partially steerable
daydream, then representation or mimesis is not to be understood as simple
copying. No doubt, any thinking is based on models. But representation in
fiction is then a process of taking model images of people from nonfictional
ways of understanding and of reconstructing social reality into a process
that (in ideal cases) develops roughly as follows: The new images go about
subverting the heretofore received fictional norms of agential structuring,
but as this is happening, the images themselves are in turn modified in and
by some autonomous principles of fictional structuring. All of this together
enables the resulting views of relationships among people, elaborated by the
restructured piece of fiction, to return into our understanding of reality or
ideology with a cognitive increment. This better understanding permits what
Brecht called interventionary, effective, or engaged thinking (in the technical
sense of meshing or being in gear). For Brecht, an image or model of a
person can be drawn up, into which might be inserted attitudes that the
person observed might not have found by him/herself: "but these imputed
ways of behavior do not remain the observer's illusions; they turn to real-
ities: the image has become productive, it can change the person modelled,
it contains (realizable) proposals. To make such an image means to love"
(Brecht, 20: 170). The great Brechtian, and indeed Marxian, theme of a pro-
ductive or creative eros has been formulated before and better than in all
the privatized jouissances.
Indeed, at this point the mimetic ambiguity of "representing"
(which dominates present-day views) should probably be abandoned for the
more productive and communicative two-way duplicity of "presenting":
presenting images taken from outside fiction as propositions or formative
hypotheses for a narrative, but also presenting images transmogrified within
fiction as proposals to the pragmatic world. Even in the best case of "re-
alism," representing suggests standing in for something that already exists,
as a democratic binding mandate represents the opinions of the mandate-
givers. Presenting may in the best, Brechtian case suggest instead erotic
increment and plasticity. The roundabout route of art and fiction could thus
hide a long-range operativity, intervention, or use value after all. That it
does so, and that a horizon can be indicated within which it does so, is the
argument of my essay. For if it does not, if people cannot be represented
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 Darko Suvin
in fiction, a great part of the humanist and radical passion that is inalienably
allied to a need of changing people's lives, of modifying the relationships
among people, would be irrelevant to fiction, and fiction would indeed be
irrelevant to it. To expand a remark of Brecht's about drama: if people do
not fit (let me add what Brecht presupposed: in however autonomous ways)
into the worlds of fiction, then fiction does not fit into the world of people.
1.4
Perhaps I could cap my introductory argument by two axioms
and their respective corollaries.
First axiom: We need a materialist approach. Our matter is in
this case social discourse provisionally fixed in texts that interact with frames
of acceptance and nonacceptance (ideologies). Therefore, any hypothesis to
be tried out has to be verifiable through ensembles oftexts in interaction with
"reading" frames. This verifiability implies (a) that there exists both a pos-
sibility of falsification and a need for a readiness to alter the hypothesis;
and (b) (an application of Occam's razor) that the explainability ofthe text
by means of the initial hypothesis is either equal or superior to the explain-
ability by means of any previous, insufficiently materialist hypothesis. In
short, hypotheses and text-ensembles-cum-reading-frames are partners or
use values.
First corollary: An anecedote has it that Matisse once showed a
painting of his to a visitor, who exclaimed he/she had never seen a woman
like that, to which the painter answered: "It is not a woman, it is a picture."
The material pertinent to re-presenting people in fiction (and all texts) is
not people but words, sentences, and what they imply in interaction with
reading frames. More particularly, this material is (some equivalent of) a
nominal syntagma with a given place in the story-just as the pertinent
materials in Matisse's painting are colors and lines with a place inside a
frame. Paradoxically, all the lessons of Russian formalism, without which
we cannot begin making sense of fiction, belong here under the heading of
materialism (albeit a partial and inconsistent, not yet a dialectical one).
Formalism is the A and B of any integrally materialist approach to art, from
which we should then proceed to C, D, and so on.
Second axiom: We need a dialectical approach. If social discourse
is provisionally fixed in texts that interact with reading frames or ideologies,
then all texts are incomplete products that freeze an ongoing intertextual
process. Such textual and metatextual dialogues form unceasing strategies
of discourse between large human groups within a society. Therefore, no
text can be even correctly read without filling in the concavities it designs
by its own convexity, without taking into account the significant presup-
positions present within the textual positions. In matters pertinent to the re-
presentation of people in fiction, these presuppositions are attitudes toward
people that are possible at the historical moment of the text's freezing. In
the first axiom and corollary, materialism means the central position of a
material consisting of words and propositions combined in "transphrastic"
(more than sentence-length) text-ensembles; in this second axiom dialectic
means socially, ideologically precise historical differentiation.
Second corollary: The narrative agents of fiction (to be defined
more closely in part 3) will be re-creations not of actual or imaginary people
but of given historically possible attitudes toward animate and active en-
667
tities. Just as in painting, where such attitudes are subject to the possibilities
of color, line, and their disposition in two-dimensional space pretending to
a third dimension, so in fiction the transposition of extraliterary attitudes
will be shaped not only by given ideological interests but also by longue
duree rules of language material, textual coherence, as well as fictional and
general ideological conventions. Longue duree does not mean ahistorical:
it just complicates our materialist analysis with welcome historical dialectics
of culture. In strange and imperfectly understood ways, Homer's sun still
shines on us. Paradoxically, images of people can be modified out of all
empirical or naked-eye recognition-for example, into gods, talking animals,
allegorical notions or disembodied narrative voices-yet still remain fabular
transpositions and re-creations of possible relationships between people.
These image clusters or agential constellations can be both decoded and
transposed back into relationships between historical people (in significant
cases, with an increment in understanding and a possibility of intervening
into them).
1.5
In order to pass to my argument about a theory of narrative
agents, I shall attempt to draw some conclusions from this first part. It
seems to me that we are faced with two main alternatives for envisaging
the presentation of people. Individualist atomism talks about the individ-
ual's mysterious essence, by definition not to be further analyzed; it is a
competitive mystification. Structuralist collectivism talks about abolishing
personality and substituting for it a camera eye; it is a static mystification.
The first, or subject-bound, mystification implies the liberalism of the "free-
enterprise" market; the second, or object-bound, mystification implies the
technocracy of state-capitalist intervention and multinational corporations.
Both finally see society as a stable, vertical class system, this layered stability
being its fundamental condition and supreme value ("law and order"). If
we instead posit the historical and axiological priority of a dynamic and
open horizontal system (which can then accommodate dynamic stability
and of which even temporary closures are special cases), a system in which
meaning is not preexistent and located either in individual(ist) atoms or in
the nodes of a structural(ist) grid but constituted in the interaction of the
general and the singular-then we can begin instituting a materialist and
dialectical discourse about narrative agents.
It seems necessary, therefore, to proceed along two lines. First,
we must induce from historical evidence the possible forms of narrative
agents and therefore of agential analysis. This means we must reconsider
at least two approaches that have pioneered a sophisticated analysis of fic-
tional agents: (a) the biblical and the Lukacsian notions of types; (b) the
Greimasian notion of actants. I shall here be able only briefly to discuss
Greimas's and Lukacs's approaches. Second, we must put these analytic
tools into practice and see whether they illuminate it. In the following ar-
gument, drama will be used as an example of all narrative. However, in
principle most descriptions and discussions in this essay (e.g., the sum-
marizing table in sect. 3.1) should be applicable to the theory ofnondramatic
narrations, too.
1.6
I shall conclude this first, introductory part with an operative
definition and a division of my further argument. Narrative agents can be
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 Darko Suvin
in a first approximation defined as all nouns or nominal syntagmas that
can be imagined as independent entities potentially able (in contrast to the
objects) to carry out independent action in a narrative's imaginary universe
or possible world. However many central questions this still begs, its mixture
of intuitive and verifiable elements seems sufficient for a first approach. The
necessary linguistic and semiotic elements in this definition function within
a "possible world" whose structures are largely borrowed from practical life.
In other words, when not modified by new propositions, the presuppositions
of dominant ideological ways of understanding everyday reality are retained
in narratives. Narrative agents therefore both derive their traits from ad-
jectivized cultural commonplaces and value judgments (such as brave, mi-
serly, amorous) and structure the traits differently from empirical practice
for the purposes of a better cognitive overview.
The study of narrative agents is seriously underdeveloped and
labors under two grave disadvantages. First, it is still largely naively im-
pressionistic and positivistic. In the 1920s the very well informed Bakhtin
noted bitterly that this field was in "a complete chaos": "character, type,
personnage, story hero, the famed classification of scenic emplois: the lover
(lyrical, dramatical), the reasoner, the simpleton, etc.-all such classifications
and determinations of the geroi [Bakhtin's term for something like a nar-
rative agent] are given no common basis or common denominator, nor is
there a unified principle extant for their reasoned ordering. Usually the
classifications are uncritically contaminated to boot.... " More than half a
century later, Chatman's synthetic survey of structuralist narrative analysis
quotes with approval a lament about the scandalous blanks in even a theory
of surface-level agents (the characters), a lament that maintains that the
latest advance in this field was E. M. Forster's distinctions from 1928, no-
tably between round and flat characters. 2 Indeed, the illusionistic confusion
of narrative agents and people from everyday life is still very much with
us.
Second, in the last twenty-five years there has appeared a sym-
metrical obverse of positivistic empiricism, the abstract apriorism of de-
ducing agents from eternal psychobiological structures sundered from social
history. Given that among the most interesting developments in cultural
studies today is a sociohistorical semiotics, in parts 2 and 3 I sketch a critique
of both ahistorical semiotics and asemiotic history and offer my own pro-
posals for a socioformal theory of agential analysis centered on the key
category of "type," as well as for some possibilities of its application to
textual agents in general, including in part 4 characters (principally in drama).
This might lead, in part 5, to some provisional answers to the question
posed in my title.

2. For a Sociohistorical Semiotics of Narrative Agents: A Critique

What does anyone tell me by saying "Now I
see it as . .. '? What consequences has this
information? What can I do with it?
L. Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations

669
2.1
Barthes defined apophantic semiotics as a semiotics that denies
the necessity and possibility of "attributing to the sign positive, fixed, a-
historical, a-corporeal, in brief: scientific characteristics." Though the rest
of part 2 may explain his skepticism toward certain kinds of "science," I
would prefer to his sweeping farewell to scientism and metalanguage a more
nuanced approach, which would still keep those terms on condition that
they were subverted from within in order to approach the horizon he de-
sires-that is, on condition that the apophantic science and metalanguage
acknowledge and respect their own sociohistorical constitution, in the dou-
ble sense of sociohistorical coming into being and sociohistorical function-
ing. This condition could reconcile our technical needs, involving metalevels
and formalized analysis, and Barthes's salutary warning that "all relation-
ships of exteriority between one language and another are, a Ia longue,
untenable.... " 3 Respecting the intimately sociohistorical character of all
semiotics means acknowledging that in language any meaning of a term is
a matter of historical semantics and pragmatics, and in nonverbal com-
munication it is another variant of, as Eco put it, a "cultural unit." In
agential analysis this means returning to the Aristotelian-Proppian orien-
tation and inducing from what Marc Angenot calls "such historical ideal-
types as are the genres and the discursive traditions [within] the general
economy of social discourse." To indulge instead in supposedly pure de-
duction and ahistorical universalism leads to a glossocracy that offers little
result and that, moreover, is homologous to the technocracies of contem-
porary monopoly capitalism and monopoly pseudosocialism. Adapting Levi-
Strauss, it can be said that simply to understand the meaning of a term one
must permutate it in the context of all the discourses pertinent to it. 4 The
sociohistorical discourses constitute at the very least one large pertinent
group; freezing them out of the permutating process produces an impov-
erishment of great ideological significance but no scholarly justification.
As I noted in a study written in 1980 (to which I refer the reader
for a fuller discussion of all matters in part 2), the analysis of narrative
agents was relatively little developed by structuralism and the structuralisant
semiotics and narratology. 5 Apart from the forgotten Bakhtin, systematic
work in agential analysis began only in the wake of Levi-Strauss, with the
works of Greimas and the Communications authors. It is their problems
that will be considered in this section, and I shall limit myself to the dilem-
mas and aporias of their basic ideological premise, glossocratic universalism,
only in the domain of the number and nature ofagential levels in narratology
(including dramaturgy). Since this was most authoritatively developed by
A. J. Greimas, I shall concentrate on the part of his work that provides a
generally recognized framework for most later structuralism dealing with
narrative agents. I shall first briefly argue for a different articulation of the
deepest level of narrative functions (the actants) and then at greater length
for a different, "pragmatic" nature and hierarchy of the other levels.
2.2
Aristotle and Propp had, in their different ways, both distin-
guished two levels of agents (ethos vs. pratton, or dramatis persona vs.
function, respectively). The first of them is to be read off immediately from
the surface elements of the text; the second is not but is to be found by
670
 Darko Suvin
further analysis (it is usually called metatextual). They also stressed that
this second, more general and abstract level was the strategically more im-
portant one. Propp concentrated in his functions on actions, which only
secondarily define six or seven "spheres of action" by as many main agents:
hero, villain, donor or provider, helper, sought-for person (and her father),
dispatcher or mandator, false hero. Obviously, this is both too much and
too little: false hero and villain are both antagonists, the term "hero" con-
taminates narrative function and ethical approval (e.g., Tartuffe is thenar-
rative but not at all the axiological "hero" of Moliere's play), the "sought-
for" agent can instead of a princess be any value (e.g., the Grail), and so
on. Just as interestingly, though discussing the opposite pole of individualist
dramaturgy of the last four centuries in Paris, Souriau worked out six "dra-
maturgic functions." Somewhat confusingly he identified them with as-
trological signs, which he fortunately disambiguated by adding clear defi-
nitions and persuasive examples. His six functions were the Thematic Force,
the Value or Wished-for Good, the Beneficiary (of that Good), the Adver-
sary, the Arbiter (who attributes the Good), and the Helper, who is always
a ''redoubling" of one of the first five functions. Both Propp and Souriau
were also perfectly clear about the possibility of distributing participation
in metatextual agents among several textual ones, as well as about the ob-
verse possibility: thus, whether the magical object given to a hero be one
horse or a ring out of which issue three youths, this will always represent
the Helper's "sphere of action" (Propp, pp. 19-20, 79); the Adversary may
be single or divided into eight, as in Moliere's Les Facheux (Souriau, pp.
95-100). Greimas's first attempt in Semantique structurale did not go much
beyond reactualizing (be it said in his praise) the multilevel agential analysis
of Propp and Souriau into the two levels of actants and acteurs.
It should be clear that Propp's Morphology of the Folktale is not
a synthesis but a halfway house between his scrupulous and brilliant his-
torical induction and a pioneering formalizing deduction. (Propp's later
works then established a more convincing balance, unfortunately not ex-
plicitly applied to narrative agents.) The attendant weaknesses were noted
by Levi-Strauss and Greimas, who rightly attempted a more consistent for-
malization. But in the process, Greimas, at least, lost sight of Propp's strengths
based in historical feedback and misused him by transferring the debate
onto the domain of universalist syntax, a dubious advantage. Greimas pro-
posed a basic scheme of agential functions applicable to all narratives, which
he divided into Subject, Object, Addressor, Addressee, Helper, and Oppo-
nent (sujet, objet, destinateur, destinataire, adjuvant, opposant). His pseu-
dosyntactic terminology and organization of this deepest level of agential
functions "offers little evidence how this model [of actants] would work in
practice ... " (Culler, p. 234). The most useful course is, then, a return to
a nonindividualist widening and grounding ofSouriau's narrative functions.
I propose to translate his articulation into the more historical and theater-
based vocabulary of the independent functions of Protagonist, Antagonist,
Value, Mandator, Beneficiary, and the dependent function of Satellite. 6
Greimas's breakthrough came in his essay "La structure des ac-
tants du recit. " 7 The existence and narratological status of the two levels
he called actant and acteur are from that time on generally accepted in
agential theory (so that this essay will take them for granted, while not
treating exhaustively their outstanding problems, from ontological basis to
671
 predicative articulation). In between them, he tentatively and without sys-
tematic explanation added a third level called roles, defined as "elementary
actantial units which correspond to coherent functional fields" ("unites ac-
tantielles elementaires correspondant aux champs fonctionnels coher-
ents")-for example, pere or pretre. 8 Greimas's final refinement on the agen-
tial theory came in the essay "Les actants, les acteurs et les figures," where
he worked out eight roles actantiels. I have analyzed in great detail (Suvin,
"Per una teoria," pp. 91-92) the resulting unclear oscillation between binary
and ternary typologies, culminating in the Greimas-Courtes attempt to sys-
tematize such contradictions. 9 Greimas's first approach had in 1966 been
accompanied by engaging modesty-bearing disclaimers such as "Cette in-
terpretation vaut ce qu'ele vaut" (This interpretation is given for what it's
worth). He also acknowledged that his actants were "extrapolated from
French Syntax," which fifty pages later became "extrapolated from the syn-
tactic structure" ("extra-polees en partant de la syntaxe francaise"-
"!'extrapolation de la structure syntaxique," Semantique structurale, pp.
134, 185). In his essay from Semantique narrative et textuel/e, this had
already advanced to "a structure . . . that appears more and more able to
account for the organization of the human imagination ... " ("La structure
actantielle apparait de plus en plus comme etant susceptible de rendre compte
de }'organisation de l'imaginaire humain ... ")! His latter ending-and that
of many followers-forgets the beginning.
What is the basis of such hesitations and contradictions? It would
be both ungracious and silly to seek it in personal incompetence: Levi-
Strauss, too, hesitates between affirming with equal imperturbability two
opposite and contradictory positions. On the one hand, he says, there exist
some "universal laws which make up the unconscious activity ofthe mind,"
while on the other hand, "the physical universe [is a] projection of the social
universe": as far as the linguistic model in general is concerned, the error
of formalism lies in forgetting "that there is no language whose vocabulary
can be deduced from the syntax." Perhaps Levi-Strauss's corollary that "to
tackle first the grammar and to leave the vocabulary for later means to
condemn oneself never to create anything but an anemic grammar and a
vocabulary that used anecdotes in place of definitions" should be subject
to some clarification ofthe level of analysis envisaged; nonetheless, I would
agree with the particular application he then proceeds to make, namely, this
interlocking is indissoluble in narrative entities such as myths and tales,
where grammar and vocabulary do not even operate on distinct levels (as
he acknowledges they do in language) but "adhere to each other on their
whole surface and completely overlap," so that in narrative texts everything
is simultaneously both syntax and vocabulary. 10 It is, at any rate, obvious
that overarching ideological causes must be sought for such fundamental
epistemological oscillations in such leading theoreticians.
2.3
In order to get at such causes, a metatheoretical detour is una-
voidable, for it is only the ideologies of technocracy that believe they can
formalize their own truth, can lift themselves up by their own bootstraps
without paying the price of a dependence on a hierarchically superior system
or context (an epistemological version of their belief in quick economic-
political fixes that take into account neither transcendental values nor the
672
 Darko Suvin
deeper demands of practice). 11 This is the meaning of Greimas's agnostic
stance, that whether we think the semantic organization of meaning(s) is
inscribed into social reality, or whether we postulate such an organization
for heuristic purposes, the practical consequences will be the same (" ... soit
qu'il existe une structure semantique organisant l'univers du sens, soit qu'une
telle structure est postulee en vue de !'investigation de l'univers seman-
tique.... Les consequences pratiques seront les memes.... "). This allows
him to conclude that, in any case, the investigator will find given "universes"
for investigation. Even in that essay, dealing with the relation of semiotics
and natural sciences, Greimas systematically avoids committing himself as
to whether such a "universe of meaning" is one of discourse only or of
other practices too-for example, it is unclear whether "semantic" in this
passage, as in his whole essay, refers to natural or formal languages. It is at
this price that Greimas's investigation proceeds to construct formal models
supposedly in conformity with such an unexplained "preexisting structure"
(Du sens, p. 39). This is not a stance that necessarily arises from semiotics:
Peirce, who thought that both our interests and our experience of objects
were extrasemiotic, would have denied it.
Since all happens within language anyway, Greimas is implying
that the "world of meaning" is going to be linguistic-here, "semantic"-in
any case. Yet this is a technocratic blanking out of some fundamentals of
his model-discipline, for nowhere is the existence of hierarchical levels of
analysis clearer than in linguistics, where the formal or syntactic meaning
of any element (e.g., a phoneme) is its function as an integral meaning of
a superior level (e.g., a morpheme). By that token, then, the question im-
mediately arises, What is the hierarchically superior level to the uppermost
linguistic level, that of the sentence? When they do not refuse to answer,
most linguists concede this is the (or a) pragmatic level of extralinguistic
reality. 12 Only the semantic-pragmatic meaning is usable and to be used in
the sense that is current outside of specialized linguistic usage. Greimas's
famous title, Du sens (On Meaning), plays with this ambiguity. So far as I
can see, he never explicitly argues that syntactic meaning is to be substituted
for semantic meaning beyond the sentence-that is, in narratives. However,
his whole proceeding presupposes this hidden theoretical claim, which nec-
essarily turns out to be untenable in practice.
It may be becoming apparent, then, that the root of the Grei-
masian contradictions is to be found in the orthodox structuralist glosso-
cracy, best expressed by his reliance on the very peculiar Hjelmslevian lin-
guistics as his epistemology. Greimas takes Hjelmslev as his authority for
founding the actantial model in the syntactic structure of natural languages,
equated with the organization of human imagination. 13 This is cognitively
improper, in the above bad sense of an ideological sleight-of-hand, for a
formal system is defined by its signs not having any independent meaning
outside the system, so that in order to speak about anything it must be in
a second moment interpreted in the sense of finding a meaning for its signs.
If the system then claims to be "wholly independent of any prior theory, it
is in fact constructed ad hoc. Thus, if the logician subsequently pretends to
search for its interpretation, he is as one who is asked a riddle for which
he already knows the answer, and who delights in feigning ignorance!" 14
Greimas's typical proceeding is a structuralist bricolage in fundamentals,
followed by a relentless scientistic and combinatory logic in consequences:
673
a proceeding vaunted by his followers as elasticity and broadmindedness.
The other way around, firm foundations and elastic applications, would
have been much more sympathetic. Yet whenever he is analyzing actual
narrative texts, Greimas finds-to my mind not too surprisingly-that de-
ductive and universalist syntax is an insufficient fundament, and he hastens
to supplement it with semantics: a crack through which the social history
of peoples' relationships with each other and with the world of things, kicked
out of the main door, partially and inconsistently oozes back by a cellar
window. In his first book, Greimas started out by hesitating between what
he then called the "syntactic actants proper" and "semantic actants," even
connecting the actants with a Freudian investment of desire. In Du sens,
his analyses of a group ofLithuanian folktales required a Proppian recourse
to the specific social semantics and, indeed, pragmatics of authority. And
in his final development of actants, while allotting them an entirely syntactic
nature, he stressed the semantic (or at least mixed) nature of the acteurs
and the roles thematiques. 15
Thus, the ideological horizon of glossocracy contradicts actual
scholarly necessity. I believe this obscurely felt contradiction is the key to
Greimas's shifting, overlapping, uneconomic, and often confusing cate-
gories, which becloud his undoubted flair for spotting strategic Gordian
knots and his pioneering boldness (only in view of which are further at-
tempts-such as this critique-becoming possible). It seems, therefore, im-
perative to say, today, that if we are to have a viable agential theory, the
hesitation between universalist syntax and shamefaced semantics-cum-prag-
matics is to be resolved in favor of sociohistorical contextuality and inter-
textuality in (say) Bakhtin's and Mukarovsky's, and sometimes Levi-Strauss's
and Barthes's, "marxist" sense of a dialogic tension between the worldviews
of specific societal groups. It is high time to recognize Hjelmslev's rigidly
deductive approach as simply a misleading analogy and to depose it from
the narratological hegemony it has illicitly enjoyed. 16 While the conceptual
rigor of linguistics is an admirable example, when sundered from social
verisimilitude and historical semantics, it easily leads to "a rigorous irre-
levance" (Culler, p. 257).
2.4
One witty way of clinching the necessity of an integration of
formalized linguistics or semiotics with investigation into socialized actions
might be to note that the integration has become increasingly recognized
as unavoidable in linguistics itself. It has taken the name of pragmatics,
defined already by Charles Morris as the domain of relationships between
the signs and their interpreters, which clarifies the conditions under which
something is taken as a sign. From Peirce, G. H. Mead, and Karl Buhler,
through BakhtinjVoloshinov, Morris, Carnap, and the Warsaw school, to
(say) R. M. Martin, Leo Apostel, and John R. Searle, pragmatics has slowly
been growing into an independent discipline on a par with syntactics (the
domain of relationships between the signs and their formally possible com-
binations) and semantics (in this sense, the domain of relations between
the signs and the entities they designate). Moreover, there are, since the late
1950s, strong arguments that pragmatics is a constitutive and indeed en-
globing complement of both semantics and syntactics. The basic-and, to
any materialist, unexceptionable-argument for it has been suggested in
674
 Darko Suvin
section 2.3: an object or event (word, text, shape, color, change, etc.) becomes
a sign only in a signifying situation; it has no "natural" meaning outside of
it. This situation is constituted by the relation between signs and their users.
A user can take something to be a sign only as it is spatiotemporally concrete
and localized and as it relates to the user's disposition toward potential
action; both the concrete localization and the user's disposition are always
sociohistorical. Furthermore, they postulate a reality organized not only
around signs but also around subjects, in the double sense of a psycho-
physical personality and a socialized, collectively representative subject. The
entry of potentially acting subjects reintroduces acceptance and choice, tem-
poral genesis and mutation, and a possibility of dialectical negation into the
frozen constraints of syntax (in fact, by the most orthodox structuralist
standards, only such dynamics can make the-temporary-stability of any
structure meaningful). It also regrounds semantics: even in language, "one
cannot tell the meaning of most words without observing how the word is
used, and what effects it seems to have on our behavior." All words have
a pragmatic value based on an implicit classification "that follows the kind
of interest which they evoke [in the subject], the advantages or inconven-
iences, pleasures or sufferings, which they suggest." 17 Thus, each and every
semantic presupposition is also a pragmatic one (though the contrary does
not obtain).
The signifying situation as the basic cell of pragmatics is clearly
the theoretical locus of the hierarchically superior system that must finally
allot significations and validate all other investigations into signs (including
natural languages). Or, at the very least, pragmatics is the mediation between
semiotics and an even more general theory of action or practice. Only prag-
matics is able to take into account the situation of the text producers and
its social addresses, 18 as well as the whole spread of their relationships within
given cognitive (epistemological and ideological) presuppositions, conven-
tions, economical and institutional frames, and so on. And only a semantic-
pragmatic decision about pertinent presuppositions and levels of reading
can make sense of an at-all-complex text (from, say, a proverb or parable),
whose presuppositions, levels, and connotations would otherwise be prac-
tically infinite. Realizing much of this, the early Levi-Strauss (structuralism
with a somewhat uneasy conscience) claimed his method could exhaust all
the pertinent presuppositions because his texts-the myths-came from a
supposedly less complex, "cold" (tribal) society in which the presuppositions
were presumed to be frozen and finite (which I doubt, too). These pragmatic
presuppositions about the signs' possible uses by their users, then, neces-
sarily inscribe historical reality, as understood by the users, between the
lines of any text (in the widest sense). Semiotics is either informed by an
open historicity or it is, on its own methodical terms, truncated.
Equally, the sciences are, no doubt, texts (though not purely ver-
bal ones), but the book of science is also-for all its partial autonomy-an
interpretation of the book of nature, which is the presupposition of all
scientific propositions. Furthermore, what exactly are the pertinent cate-
gories that constitute any object of investigation (in the widest sense, in-
cluding a whole discipline) in the first place? This delimitation, which con-
stitutes not only the cognizable domain but also the possible ways of
envisaging and cognizing it, cannot be established from the object alone but
only from its interaction with the social subject whose pragmatic point of
675
view or approach is defining the pertinence and by that token constructing
the object's cognitive identity. 19 To return to the terms oflogics, linguistics
cannot be its own epistemology, because no natural language can be wholly
formalized without incurring semantic contradictions-as Greimas inevit-
ably does, on a theoretical level, when he is not being fuzzy. Therefore,
linguistics cannot and does not provide the criteria valid for every type of
cognition but, on the contrary, needs itselfto be justified by an epistemology
external to it.
Thus, for any pursuit of systematic knowledge, as semiotics, the
formal logic of syntax is clearly indispensable. But it is not sufficient, for if
the analysis of a text must be begun, it cannot be concluded by an under-
standing of its syntax. This does not mean that for given, clearly delimited
exercises syntactic rules could not be treated as an autonomous object of
cognition. But it means that "a well definable (autonomous) syntax is only
the syntax of syntactic categories as a purely formal syntax." 20 A syntactically
valid analytic system cannot be used to prove anything about an empirical
object unless and until the system is related to a semantic interpretation
and a pragmatic situation, as was demonstrated in the case of Greimas's
actants used to explain narration.
2.5
In conclusion, then, if (and insofar as) Greimas's system of ac-
tants is taken as a claim for full interpretative validity with a solid episte-
mological basis, one would have to apply to it Piaget's evaluation of the
philosophical school that (through Hjelmslev) underpins it: logical positiv-
ism. "Logical Positivism has committed the imprudence of transforming
method into doctrine, in other words of wanting to codify formalizing anal-
ysis and of making it co-responsible for a dogmatism ... " (Piaget, p. 84).
I would not go quite so far-as do a number of critics, for example, Tim-
panaro-as to call Greimas's method objective idealism, since it does not
quite Claim that the categories of the given sign-system determine what there
is but "only how anything is." I would, rather, call it a medium-rare semiotic
idealism-a cross between agnosticism and thoroughgoing idealism. 21 Of
course, no idealism or-to give it a historically suggestive name-medieval
realism can account for changes in our cognition of the world (never mind
changes in an external world). Greimas's attempt is simply one of the most
developed-and the dominant one in agential analysis-to investigate the
meanings of a text by means of a text "linguistics," "grammar," or "syntax"
(all of which are, in fact, shamefacedly founded on the quite exceptional
digital model of phonetics). This seems to me, in all cases, a dangerously
ambiguous metaphor, and in the worst case it is a positive guarantee of
wrong theorizing. The only safe course is to avoid both the thing and the
name. 22
Nonetheless, I have suggested the presence of some undoubtedly
stimulating aspects in Greimas-mainly those taking off from Propp. Grei-
mas addressed the crucial dilemma in studying narratives, namely, into
which system a text must be integrated in order to become meaningful (i.e.,
such that an interpreter may explain it). Positivism had answered this by
putting its object simply into a quantitatively larger set of texts (an author's
opus, a genre tradition, etc.). Structuralism was right to react against this
in the direction of qualitatively different levels of analysis, but structuralism
676
 Darko Suvin
was wrong-as is all scholastic realism-in radically sundering deductive and
formal cognition (a self-sufficient, closed system of signs) from experiential
cognition based on reference to the extrasignific reality of social bodies. 23
In cultural studies, structuralism's answer-to apply to the investigated text
a "grammar of narration"-explains texts in terms of a universal structure
of the human (or, in Greimas, Indo-European?) mind, as evidenced in lan-
guage. In a nicely sterile Hegelian antithesis, both positivism and structur-
alism bypass the actual historical situations in culture, its pragmatic hier-
archy. Cultural texts may be analyzed into cognitive levels only by seeing
how those levels are intimately molded by precise societal values and ten-
sions.
Greimas's multilevel schema of agents should, therefore, be sep-
arated out of his unacceptable system and then reworked in a way that
incorporates the semantic and pragmatic dimension, namely, societal his-
tory and mutability. It should then become possible to use this reworked
form within the epistemic axioms of my part 1, within a need for observing
material practice as well as the dialectical interrelations that obtain between
the synchronic and the diachronic, structure and history, subject and object.
True, no historical situation is fully formalizable, but it can (and I believe
must) be investigated through a series of formalizations open to practice
and focusing on strategic stages frozen for synchronic investigation. Thus,
I will present a sketch of such a sociohistorical semiotics of narrative agents:
a study of sign, necessarily, but signs given meaning by choices within
societal histories. No doubt, the sociohistorical concreteness of my proposed
new system will have to be inversely proportional to the area it is designed
to cover. But it will use semiotics in the proper epistemological hierarchy
dominated by relationships of people in signifying situations and not by
glossocracy: "It is essential that one does not confuse the systematic order
in semiotics: syntactics-semantics-pragmatics, with the epistemological or-
der of the dimensions of semiosis: pragmatic-semantic-syntactic dimen-
sion. The pragmatic dimension of semiosis is epistemologically of primary
importance.... the pragmatic aspects always appear at the beginning and
at the end of the study of semiosis. " 24
3. For Sociohistorical Semiotics of Narrative Agents: A Proposal
(with Types as the Key Level)

After all, Kafka is a realist/

(reputed exclamation by Lukacs when he
saw the Romanian castle where he was
being interned in 1956)

3.1
I cannot provide here a lengthy inventory of extant narratological
contributions to a clear definition and delimitation of the third, intermediate
level of agential analysis. Besides Aristotle, Propp, Souriau, Bakhtin, and
Levi-Strauss, one should reevaluate the use of agents in the Marxian tra-
dition, from The Eighteenth Brumaireto Brecht and Benjamin. 25 One should
also sift and integrate the contributions of structuralists (Barthes, Todorov,
Greimas, Rastier, Hamon, Chatman, etc.) and of some other precursors.
The structuralists are perhaps best represented by Alexandrescu's book on
Faulkner, situating between personnages and actants a level of roles: in
677
Faulkner's opus (itself a concrete refashioning of a historical and history-
oriented genre), Alexandrescu found the roles of Indian, black, mulatto,
farmer, aristocrat, Yankee, businessman, and intellectual (and I think other
"roles" could be found, too). However, since my present concern is to help
build a theory of narrative agents, I cannot here give a detailed overview
of work in this field. I shall content myself with acknowledging that I used
hints from the older authors mentioned in part 2, as well as from those in
the preceding two paragraphs, and also from Simmel, the Russian formalists
(Eikhenbaum, Balukhatii, etc.), Ubersfeld, and Doutrepont, in order to pro-
pose Table 1.26
I should stress that the agential levels are cumulative and not
exclusive. The two basic ones-actants and types-are to be found in every
fictional text, while the uppermost one-characters-may or may not be
present in any given text (this depends on the historical epoch and literary
genre). Where characters are present, "each is a type but also at the same
time a definite individual, a 'this one,' as old man Hegel expresses it. ... " 27
This points to the key function ofthe second, or intermediate, level of types,
on which I shall now focus.
I suggested in part 2 that different scholars have used various,
sometimes confusing terms: figure, role, and emploi in Vol'kenshtein; role
or role pur in Souriau; "basic characters" in Eco's discussion of James Bond
(p. 85); role and role actantiel in Greimas (if I have understood him and
when he uses them); role in Alexandrescu and (much less usefully) in Bre-
mond; role forme/ in Rastier; emploi in Hamon (p. 106); role and personnage-
type in Ubersfeld (pp. 113-14, 131, 150). Perhaps the actual term used is
not of primary importance if the level is clearly delimited and articulated,
but it is of some importance: language speaks us as much as we speak it.
Thus, I would not favor "role" in French or English because it invites
confusion both with an actor's role in the theater and with the sociological
theory of role playing. 28 "Type,'' however, is both suitably Anglo-French
and able to draw sustenance from a confrontation with its wide use in literary
criticism and in the theater tradition, which (in English more than in French)
draws on such associations as "type of role,'' "typecast,'' "stock types,'' and
so on.
3.2
It seems necessary to confront here Lukacs's pioneering use, sym-
metrically inverse to the formalists and structuralists, ofterms such as "typ-
ical character." I have sufficient space here only for a first sketch of the
splendors and miseries in his approach to narrative agents. I shall use for
that purpose mainly his early Theory of the Novel, the essay on "intellectual
physiognomy,'' and, as his crowning achievement, The Historical Novel and
the essays on Balzac. 29
The Theory of the Novel may not be thought fair game, since
Lukacs himself declares in his 1962 preface that its writer's world view "tended
toward a fusion of 'left-wing' ethics and 'right-wing' gnoseology (ontology
etc.)" (p. 16). I would add to this a right-wing or bourgeois aesthetics fixated
on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century "realism,'' from Cervantes to Thomas
Mann, and evident in his lifelong, sincere hatred of Dada, photomontage,
Brechtian dramaturgy, and so on. A deep interest in Baroque drama or
novel, as in Benjamin and Bakhtin, is beyond Lukacs's ken-not to mention
678
 Table 1.

Predicative Narratological Verbal status and Visualizing Historical

Agential level articulation locus deep structure status Definition duration
3 CHARACTER A great (though Always textual Proper name; d.s. Necessarily figur- Individuality as Almost point-
(personnage or theoretically not and a dramatis = illusion of ative (depicta- presupposed by like-changeable
personnage-per- unlimited) num- persona (when it large number of ble); necessarily bourgeois prac- for each different
sonne; "round"); ber of possibly exists) not fully fixed at- individual tice (e.g., eco- ensemble of spec-
0) not obligatory conflicting predi- tributes, only im- nomics) and ide- tators
-...!
CD cates/traits perfectly to be re- ology (e.g.,
constituted from psychology)
text + all the
contexts
2TYPE A small num- Metatextual or Common or ge- Necessarily figur- Societal type (by Courte duree gen-
(type or person- her-usually 2-6- textual-accord- neric noun, can ative; not neces- age+ sex + erations or centu-
nage-type; "flat"), of compatible ing to whether be proper name sarily individual profession, and/ ries
e.g., Vice, Panta- predicates/traits level 3 exists or raised to that sta- or social group,
lone, Miser, Fa- not tus; d.s. = noun and/or tempera-
ther, Soubrette; +one or a few ment, etc.)
obligatory attributes, or
nominal syn-
tagma
1 ACTANT One predicate as Always metatex- Common noun; Not necessarily Function in dra- Longue duree-
(substitute for common denom- tual; no discrete d.s. = surface figurative; neces- maturgic action epochs or millen-
Greimas's syntac- inator of a bun- appearance as ( = "force which sarily not indi- nia
tic terms those of die of semic dramatis persona does what is in- vidual
Protagonist, An- predicates dicated by the
tagonist, Value, noun")
Mandator, Bene-
ficiary, and Satel-
lite); obligatory
farther times, places, and less canonic genres (as Shelley's poem of allegorical
satire used against him by Brecht). Thus, for all ideological changes, I think
his basic stance is in some ways not altered from this phase until the end
ofhis opus.
The "left" ethics are here, as always in Lukacs, unexceptionable.
They identify, first, the novel's form as "the mirror image of a world out
of joint" (p. 12), as the form that expresses a "lost utopian home" (p. 92),
a "transcendental homelessness" that comports "the homelessness of the
soul in the mandatory order of the supra-personal value-system" (p. 59):
"Thus, this first great novel of world literature [i.e., Don Quixote] stands
at the beginning of the age where the God of Christianity is beginning to
leave the world; where Man is becoming lonely and may find meaning and
substance only in his soul which is nowhere at home; where the world has
been cast loose from its paradoxical moorings in a present Other World
and given over to its immanent meaninglessness; where the might of the
existing ... grows to unheard-of proportions ... " (p. 103). As opposed to
the Greeks, and to the Middle Ages, empirical life under the bourgeoisie
has split off from the absolute necessity (So/len), or Essence (Wesen), which
united all figures of Hellenic tragedy or epic. The modem novel must pain-
fully "dig up and build up the hidden totality of life." Therefore, the pro-
tagonists of the novel "are seekers ... [to whom] neither goals nor ways
can be immediately supplied ... " (pp. 57-58); "the hero of the novel grows
out of this alienness to the outer world" (p. 64). An allegorical struggle
results, a psychomachia in which a "problematic individual" is opposed to
but also conditional upon a "contingent world" (p. 76). So far, so good-
except for the idealization of prebourgeois times, a reasonable though in-
sufficient polemic strategy. 30 Indeed, the realization that in all significant
senses there were no individuals in classical epic and tragedy-that isolated
individualities only come about when the context for the dramatis personae
is reduced to "a hierarchical competition" (p. 39)-is a major breakthrough.
It was in fact first, and better, explained in his 1908 long essay "On the
Sociology of Modem Drama" (not yet fully available in English) and later
best summarized by Arnold Hauser's still indispensable Social History of
Art [and Literature]. It remains, in my opinion, the basis for historical
typologies of the last 700 years of European (and later global) culture.
However, when Lukacs comes to speak not of overall historical
typology (his forte) but of what I here call "narrative agents"-that is, of
the actual texture of any novel-the hydra heads of the "right-wing" ontology
and aesthetics rear up again. The novel form is correlative to "the epoch
of perfect sinfulness" (p. 157)-which is why Dostoevsky, who does not
presuppose such an epoch anymore, is not a novel writer! If so, then Man's
"soul"-Lukacs's main agential term-does not fit into its epoch any more:
"the soul is either narrower or wider than the external world, which is given
unto it as the stage and substratum of its deeds" (p. 96)-one sees why
Thomas Mann portrayed Lukacs as the Jesuit Naphta in The Magic Moun-
tain. From Cervantes to Dickens and Balzac, one main current of the novel
presupposes the "narrowing down of the soul" (p. 111). Another current in
the nineteenth century evidences a soul wider than the fate empirical life
offers it, so that the novel grows lyrical and actionless (F1aubert, Goncharov).
It is not only that the philosophy of history has almost completely smothered
feedback from particular novel analyses. Regardless of quite thinkable par-
680
 Darko Suvin
ticular objections, Lukacs's terms would not allow anybody who might wish
to apply or supplement his historiosophy to distinguish between people in
everyday life and novel protagonists or other narrative agents. The abundant
use of the term "form" remains quite metaphysical, situated within a kind
of scholastic vitalism. Lukacs is, in fact, entirely innocent of the signific
nature of narratives. Just like his great model Hegel, in Aesthetics (and like
the neo-Kantians), he still uses the crude idealist ontology of form versus
content. Finally, his Feuerbachian lay religiosity shows through this un-
mitigated discourse in capitals, about Man and the World, poles apart from
any societal or materialist (i.e., class-oriented) historicity. "Man" is here a
"left-ethical" version of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, fallen from classical Eden
into the bad times of bourgeois competition. If one compares this to the
praise of the bourgeoisie's achievement in The Communist Manifesto, the
incompatibility between early Lukacs and Marxism becomes palpable.
What The Theory of the Novel calls "soul" becomes in the 1930s
"The Intellectual Physiognomy in Characterization." Lukacs's militant de-
velopment toward Marxism and his involvement first in the German and
then in the Soviet ideological debates have, no doubt, given him some
further tools and cleaned out the overtly religious terminology. Yet from
Hegel to Goncharov, the continuities of this orientation are striking. The
vitalist confusion of life and art, allied with some Soviet cultural factions'
slogan of "the living man" to be represented in literature, lead him to posit
that "the intellectual physiognomy ... is the chief factor in creating living
personality" (p. 150). Having come out ofthe Exile from Eden, we are now
back at a Genesis whose Adam is created by a reader of Hegel. The major
advance is, however, represented by the insistence that the creative approach
hinges on the writer's relating the individual to the universal. Lukacs was
certainly one of the philosophically best trained major critics of our century.
Nonetheless, he retains the "right-wing epistemology"-the short-circuiting
of empirical and aesthetic phenomena, of people and their fictionally dis-
placed and condensed simulacra. The fusion of individual and typical is
explained in the old confusion of domains: "Universal, typical phenomena
should emerge out of the particular actions and passions of specific indi-
viduals" (p. 154). Furthermore (here the Soviet scientistic context may be
strong), "typical" is defined as what relates to "the objective general prob-
lems of the age" (p. 154). "Typical characters" such as Don Quixote arise
out of the writer's having correctly defined "the basic issues and movements
of his time" (p. 158)-at best, an ahistorical extrapolation from the neces-
sities of the Russian experiment in the 1930s. It is also necessary to put the
characters into extremely intensified (i.e., again typical) situations-though
I am not sure whether this is a second requirement or the reformulation of
the first one in line with Engels's famous letter on "typical characters in
typical circumstances" from which the term seems to stem. 31 Goncharov's
protagonist Oblomov is thus not an " 'average' man" but an intensified
"social type," and it is very suggestively noted that this is obtained "through
the intensification of a particular character trait," namely, sloth (p. 165)-
how one wishes Lukacs had met Propp! In fact, both the average Philistine
and the abstractly extreme superman are types divorced from significant
social conflicts (pp. 168-69). But such hints are not followed up. It is never
explained, first, whether "typical" is to "character" as "universal" is to
"particular," or whether the typicality is the result of a successful fusion
681
 between the universal and the particular; second, what are the criteria for
the successful fusion of typical and characteristic (i.e., for defining the basic
issues and movements of one's time) beyond the messianic assumption from
History and Class Consciousness (and, more important, from Stalin's era)
that the workers' party necessarily knows this. It may not have been Lukacs's
fault that formal systematizations were taboo at that time, but neither is it
ours that we cannot do without them today.
The Historical Novel may well turn out to be Lukacs's master-
piece in cultural analysis, like History and Class Consciousness in political
philosophy. Both works contain bad mistakes-the latter, the theory of the
party, and the former, the Hegelian definition of drama. Nonetheless, having
worked in its domain and used the book for a quarter-century, I find it still
fundamental: for example, though Scott critics have added other aspects,
nobody has bettered Lukacs's chapter and his theory of Scott's "average
protagonist" as a nationally typical character. Lukacs here manages to cap
his tortured development from Hegel and Dilthey to Engels and Lenin with
a populist class analysis in the creative spirit of the antifascist Popular Front.
Thus, he can relate the protagonist (e.g., Frank Osbaldistone in Rob Roy)
to the general outline of the plot, including the fictionally peripheral "ex-
treme" agent or great historical personality (Rob Roy himself). Laws of
literary constellation having to do with historical forces but operating by
specific fictional transposition and condensation (what Freud called Ver-
dichtung und Verschiebung), thus come to the fore in some chapters and
are energetically developed, if never systematized, across the book as a
whole. True, Lukacs was more comfortable with condensation or intensi-
fication-"that is, the singling out of the significant factors from the entire
complex of reality, their concentration, and the creation out of their con-
nexions of an image of life upon a heightened level" (p. 147)-than with
anamorphic transpositions, where "factors from reality" might be so coded
that one would have to take into account the signific reality of the coding,
too. He can therefore still say that "the great historical figure, as a minor
character, is able to live himself out to the full as human being ... " (p.
47)-the fuzziness of the agential terms (figure, character, and human being)
making this sentence almost unreadable today. But elsewhere Lukacs talks
of "the relation of the agent's individuality to the universality of the prob-
lem" (p. 125), or ofthe lower-class protagonists in a number of plays from
Calderon to Hebbel as having "within themselves that combination of in-
dividual passion and social substance which characterizes the 'world-his-
torical individuals"' (p. 120). His best pages in Balzac and French Realism
and in some other postwar writings then carry on in more detail and on a
better known corpus the insights arrived at with these tools: the discussion
of the two protagonists in Lost Illusions repeats the pattern of inversion
arrived at for Scott (Frank versus Rob Roy). In some formulations (e.g., in
the preface), he even begins to dissociate type from character and to explain
their-necessarily societal-interaction. Only the lack of necessary formali-
zation in the direction of multilevel analysis separates these results from
Table 1.
I should hope, therefore, that a properly developed theory of types
would accept Lukacs's "left" ethical passion, philosophical depth, and his-
torical richness, while rejecting his frequent "right" ontology, epistemology,
and aesthetics resulting in instrumental oversimplification-symmetrical to
682
 Darko Suvin
the structuralists' overcomplication. For Marxian literary and cultural critics
Lukacs is a Great Ancestor. But piety apart, we must sorrowfully note that,
though parts of his work remain classical, much of it-in particular the
theoretical skeleton-needs large-scale refunctioning.
3.3
Type itself is, then, perhaps best defined as in Whewell: "A type
is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is
considered as eminently possessing the characters ofthe class. " 32 This means
that such a typicality gains its authority from the specific sociohistorical
intertext with its ideological premises. It can and must be based on any
categorization that has been taken in cultural history (right or wrong from
a present-day point of view) to classify people or agents. It will, then, include
as important historical cases biblical and other theological typologies as well
as Lukacs's political-economic one, but it will certainly embrace a larger
domain. Thus, types can be and have been classified by sex-cum-age, na-
tionality, profession, social estate or class, physiology, and moral philosophy
(Aristotle's ethos; the Galenic "temperaments" or "humors"), often by what
we would feel are combinations of these categories (Diderot's conditions,
e.g., Father or Judge, seem to contaminate profession, class, and social role),
and so on.
In that light, the very useful term emploi, or (more clumsily)
"stock character," "stock figure," or "line (ofbusiness)"-for example, in-
genue, jeune premier, pere noble, raisonneur, villain, heavy, walking gentle-
man-is a particular though historically crucial case of my "type": a type
with supplementary theatrical-historical codification, one that has largely
survived the rise of my third agential level-the character-though at the
price of retreat from textual surface.
To give just two series of examples:
1. A hypothetical Morality (or Roman de Ia Rose) dramatis per-
sona called True Love has two traits: lovingness and its qualitative place
in the courtesy system; Shakespeare's Rosalind, in As You Like It, is not at
all exhausted by half a dozen ideologically compatible predicates or traits
such as young, female, well-born-she is also capricious or coquettish, cruel,
and so on; as different from both of these extremes, the type and Maschera
of"amorosa" can be exhausted by half a dozen traits, for example, "young,
female, beautiful, not too shrewd, amorous." This is not only a property of
the Commedia de/l'arte: the soubrette is exhausted by something like "fe-
male, young, vivacious, lower-class," whereas the ingenue is "girl (i.e., fe-
male plus still younger), pure, middle-to-upper class." Of course, all traits
such as well-born, pure, vivacious, and so on, are culturally (i.e., socio-
ideologically) coded, much as the Noh mask of "the somewhat sad young
woman" or "the red-faced sake drunkard."
2. The agential semantic field of "warrior/warring" may be ar-
ticulated as an ideal (but also largely historical) sequence traversing the scale
of predicative complexity indicated by the second column in Table 1. At
its lower end would be found a mythological personification of War or Ares
in Antiquity, or an analogous agent in theater outside Europe (e.g., the
Peking Opera), or an allegorical personification such as the medieval Ira
(Wrath). All such agents are predicatively poor (though not at all necessarily
ineffective) types, since they have, I think, two traits only: the warlike char-
683
acteristic (wrathfulness, aggressiveness) and the relational position or Stel-
lenwert in the system of polytheism, cardinal sins, or something similar.
The Commedia del/'arte Maschera of "Capitano" has already about half a
dozen traits: say, officer, middle-aged, braggart, coward, indigent, and Span-
ish (though the ethnic trait varies according to local history and prejudice).
It seems to me to be constitutive of any type that it possess a relatively
small number of traits (I have not found more than half a dozen in any so
far examined, but this field remains to be further investigated) that are all
culturally congruent or compatible. This compatibility should be explainable
in every particular historical case as the result of a feedback interaction
between the social definition of reality from which the traits are taken and
the criteria of verisimilitude shared by the audience for which the drama-
turgic narration is intended.
A whole historical typology of narrative agents and their various
levels could be done on the basis of the hypothesis tabulated above. If
fruitful, it could serve as a beacon for research into narratological agents in
general, from mythological tales through the individualist novel to the pres-
ent.
3.4
Some other lines of reasoning also speak in favor of finding types
in all fictional narrative-on the textual surface or underneath the characters
of individualism. Northrop Frye puts this succinctly and stimulatingly: "All
lifelike characters, whether in drama or fiction, owe their consistency to the
appropriateness of the stock type which belongs to their dramatic function.
That stock type is not the character but it is as necessary to the character
as a skeleton is to the actor who plays it" (p. 172). Other postindividualistic
critics of diverse persuasions have noted that in any given culture there
exist mental stereotypes, what Kant called "schematisms," for given con-
cepts-cum-images represented in art (and, generally, used in social practice).
In Auden's poem "The Truest Poetry Is the Most Feigning," the problem
of the poet-lover oscillating between empirical reality and fiction meant for
a reading frame is, I think, addressed very realistically (italics mine):
The living girl's your business (some odd sorts
Have been an inspiration to men's thoughts):

We cannot love your love till she take on,

Through you, the wonders of a paragon. ...

These mental schemes are most palpably demonstrable in paint-

ing, and they have been persuasively demonstrated by Ernst Gombrich. All
painting, he argues, comports the interaction of such schemata in the paint-
er's mind with the possible innovations (which go from zero in, say, ancient
Egypt to the continuous care about strengthening the impression of mime-
tism in the nineteenth century). All thinking passes necessarily through
"sorting, classifying; all perceiving relates to expectations and therefore to
comparisons. " 33 A useful philosophical collocation for such classifications
is to say, in the medieval tradition, that they partake of universa/ia such as
684
 Darko Suvin
the Young Man, the Temptress, and so on. In more modern language, we
could say that these are agential perceptions and social constructions of
reality; a portrait is the "construction of a relational model [which] can be
constructed to any required degree of accuracy [in accordance with] its
purpose and the requirements of society in which the given visual language
gains currency." 34
In this view, no painterly motif can be truly seen-that is, not
only optically registered on the retina but also made into a culturally com-
prehensible unit-"unless one has learned how to classify and catch it within
the network of a schematic form. " 35 The motif is not necessarily-is usually
not-exhausted by being subsumed under a class of generic stereotypes, but
unless this first identification is effected to begin with, the motif as motif
will simply not exist for an audience, which will then see merely unrelated
figures or, indeed, blotches of paint. Even the notoriously "realistic" Dutch
genre-painting "created from a limited number of types and gestures, much
as the apparent realism of the picaresque novel or of Restoration comedy
still applies and modifies stock figures which can be traced back for cen-
turies. . . . The artist . . . needs a vocabulary before he can embark on a
'copy' of reality" (Gombrich, p. 87; cf. p. 140). Thus, to envisage agents
(also) in terms of universalia, in terms of cultural units or classifications
which then provide a basis for comparison for any new agents, leads to the
agential unit and analytic level of stock figures or types. Even the indivi-
dualized character, if and when present in a narrative, will gain its full
significance when seen as arising out of a more general level of types. As
Culler notes, " ... our cultural codes contain models [of various stock fig-
ures]: ... the senex iratus or heavy father, the miles gloriosus or braggart,
the fop or coxcomb, the pedant.... these models guide the perception and
creation of characters, enabling us to . . . attribute to each an intelligible
role" (Culler, p. 236).
This is, of course, quite consonant with the basic approach of
semiotics (unfortunately, as yet little applied in its practice), for in semiotic
theory all imaginatively visualized elements of narration, including textual
agents, do not signify their supposed mimetic equivalents from life: for
example, characters do not signify people from the street. Instead, an agent
signifies the class of entities of which it is a member: not an "essential"
class, of course, as implied by Frye and sometimes even by Gombrich, but
an "existential" one within a given sociohistorical paradigm. As holds for
any semiotic entity, the primary condition of a narrative agent is to be
"representative of its class, so that the audience is able to infer from it the
presence of another member of the same class ... in the [imagined narrative]
world." 36 This also explains all the "mimetically" unexplainable "non-literal
signifiers" in the agential domain, such as the two-dimensional cutouts in
Piscator's Schweyk, the dishonest statesman in Chinese theater signified by
the blue mang robe he wears, or any sufficiently non-mimetically presented
(e.g., masked) agents. Thus, the upper-class characters in Brecht's Caucasian
Chalk Circle performance do not represent people who in medieval Trans-
caucasia went around masked; they signify instead the typical quality of
that class, the "suppression of their human face" or impulse (e.g., moth-
erliness) under the sway of the power and splendor inscribed in the masksY
Semiotically considered, a dramaturgic agent is always within
"quotation marks" (Elam, p. 89): it stands for or signifies a type-on which
685
further traits are then grafted in the case of characters. This connects, ev-
idently, with Brecht's theory of estrangement (Verfremdung), as well as with
his theory of the unit of dramaturgic semiosis, the gestural kinesic set-cum-
attitude he called Gestus. Brecht defined Gestus as being "sociohistorically
significant (typical)," as partaking of some basic "social relationship pre-
vailing between people of a given period" (Brecht, 16:86, 139; see also Elam,
p. 76ff.). In dramatic and other narrative this is always a transposition of
typical "features of social movement ... heightened or exaggerated, so as
to increase their very 'sociability"' (Elam, p. 78). Semiotics today is con-
firming that Brecht's basic theories, such as that of Gestus, have "only" the
huge merit of explaining perennial dramaturgic practice. The stage figure
and Gestus of Galileo, for example, does not centrally stand for either the
historical or any other imaginatively modified individual who had such-
and-such a biography but for a parabolic type one can perhaps call "the
great but socially flawed scientist." In parables and similar allegorical or
quasi-allegorical genres-that is, in almost all the literary and art genres
before the rise of individualism-the particular, surface vehicle always in-
timately interacts with the universal, depth tenor. This holds also .for their
agents: types are always at or near their surface.
In sum, as a general philosophical proposition, any "unrepeatably
individual" feature can only be recognized and analyzed within some net
of general concepts and categories. The "individual" phenomenon "in art
does not testify to the lack of a system but to the intersection of several
diverse systems in one single point." 38 A character can only be understood
in dialectical interrelationship with historical concepts and categories of
types, which shape the norms of verisimilitude shared by the author and
his/her social addressee.
4. Some Indications for Situating "Character"

4.1
I can only briefly suggest here a program of at least book-length
research needed to verify the usefulness of a historical-cultural theory of
narrative agents. If the hypothesis developed earlier is correct, the answer
to the question, Which agential level is to be found on the surface of a text
and which is to be found in the presuppositions or depths of a text (i.e.,
what is textual and what is metatextual)? is neither single nor eternal. It is
not given once and for all by the structure of the human brain or unconscious 39
and/or by a universal syntax; on the contrary, it is a changing answer, based
on dominant aspects of sociohistorical relationships among people-both
the relationships of which and to which that text speaks. Such changes
happen, no doubt, within a longue duree measured in epochs, yet they are
nonetheless part of the major "geological" shifts in human relations. One
clear instance of such a wholly new (in principle) narrative level is the rise
of the individualist character in the period between Boccaccio, Shakespeare,
Cervantes, and Moliere, in whose works its coming into being can be pal-
pably traced.
Of course, this does not mean that agents with conflicting and
sufficiently numerous traits (i.e., characters) cannot be found before or out-
side the European fourteenth or sixteenth century. Basic epistemological
shifts in a culture and in social practice come neither overnight nor out of
686
 Darko Suvin
nowhere. If we knew more about different cultures, we could speak with
more confidence about controversial matters such as a possible antique or
Hellenic individualism arising somewhere between Aeschylus and Euri-
pides. I shall have to leave this aside, as it is for my theoretical purposes
indifferent whether to postulate the rise and coming into existence of bour-
geois individualism only or of several individualisms that came and went
(though I would be inclined to argue with Aristotle that in most Hellenic
plays there is no character, only ethos, a Hellenic variant of type under the
sign of constant categories from moral philosophy, physiology, etc.). 40 I shall
similarly leave aside the non-European cultures-though I am again hard
put to find characters in the dramaturgies of Noh, the Peking Opera, the
Javanese wayang-topeng (where the principal actors cannot even speak), or
the classical Chinese novel. 41 But in European art, from the Middle Ages
on, it seems clear that the deviation from universalia toward individuality
"is a comparatively recent development." 42 Character in the individualist
sense was born together with the bourgeoisie, capitalist money economy,
economic rationality, atomization, quantification, and reification of human
relationships, including equality before the law, and the whole well-known
historical cluster accompanying the rise of this new episteme. Character is
the fictional equivalent of private property in the process of production and
circulation, of independent individuals in the market "who are the posses-
sors of commodities [and who] place themselves in relation to one another
as persons whose will resides in these objects."43
Historical semantics can prove that this is precisely the time when
the modern meanings of key terms such as individual, personality or char-
acter, and subject arose. In English, "individual" originally meant the op-
posite of what it does after the sixteenth-seventeenth-century watershed,
namely, an indivisible unity or community in multiplicity (e.g., the Christian
Trinity), or "the individual Catholicke Church" (as Milton was still writing
at this late date). The singular noun "individual" emancipated itself from
explicit and subordinate relation "to the group of which it was, so to say,
the ultimate indivisible division" only in the late eighteenth century-a
characteristic example of the new usage being in Adam Smith's political
economy! The fully fledged ideology of "individualism" emerged, then, in
the nineteenth century and was recorded in the English translation of
Tocqueville, who characterizes it as "a novel expression, to which a novel
idea has given birth." Similarly, the use of "character" for fictional agents
dates from the mid-eighteenth century; earlier, if applied to people at all,
it had meant their more or less fixed nature, their reputation, or the fixed
type and literary genre popularized by Theophrastus, La Bruyere, and Over-
bury. Finally, "subjective" also changed into its opposite: for the Schoolmen
it meant "as things are in themselves," that is, according to their substance.
It is "especially from Descartes" that "subject" came to mean the opposite,
that is, the thinking, isolated self. Correspondingly, "objective" metamor-
phosed from the meaning "as things are not in themselves" to "as things
are in themselves," beheld by but deduced as independent of the thinking
self. In English, the use of "subject" in grammar came in the seventeenth
century, and of "object" in the eighteenth century. The modern philosoph-
ical distinction "subject-object" (tacitly imported into the earlier syntactic
use by Greimas et al.) developed, of course, in and after classical German
philosophy. 44
687
 To verify this in terms of dramaturgic agents (see Table 1): the
kind or category of behavior-though not necessarily the concrete behavior
itself-of a type (as explained in part 3, e.g., a miles g/oriosus or a La Bruyere
caractere) is wholly predictable. As different from type, a character must
possess more than, say, half a dozen traits, of which at least two are even-
tually found to be contradictory or otherwise incompatible. Thus, in a char-
acter even the kind of behavior is not wholly predictable. In that sense, this
character or personnage-personne is an upstart and newfangled kind of agent.
It is limited not only by epoch but also by genre 45-for example, the psy-
chological novel and piece bien faite as against fairy tale, paraliterature, and
most of the avant-garde ofthe last century (which in this hypothesis is the
beginning of the postindividualist epoch).
I should make clear that none of my arguments have spoken to
the historical necessity or value of the rise of individualistic character. My
provisional opinion-on a huge subject that requires more investigation
willing to admit and, if warranted, compensate for its initial ideological
bias-is that the rise of the character as an agential level (just as the rise of
its economic and social analogues and bearers, the market and the bourgeoi-
sie) has brought both great advantages and great limitations. The advantages
were principally apparent during the ascending historical phase, in Europe,
say, up to Balzac, George Eliot, and Tolstoy. In that phase, the character
was the agential formulation of the freedom to break through the consensual
constraints of hierarchically frozen social types and dogmatic normative
systems-connected with despotic monarchism and a stagnant subsistence
economy-toward larger horizons of life. The multiplication of traits and
their conflictuality, the illusion of agential "roundness" and "three-dimen-
sionality," connoted that human agents and actions were not explained,
foreseen, and fixed. Their richness allowed these freshly conceived agents
to slip through the insufficient-clumsy and restrictive-net of old univer-
sa/ia. In particular, the highly significant chronotopic analogues to this new
structure of agents should also be investigated: where the types were timeless
and set against a fixed background, so that they pretended to eternal and
ubiquitous validity, a character can and does evolve in time and environ-
ment. But all such aspects tum into their contraries with the contraction
and exhaustion of individualism in our century. On the one hand, the price
of its particular kind of freedom begins to weigh more heavily than its
achievements as the bourgeoisie shifts from personal competition to ficti-
tious corporative "individualities"; on the other hand, this shift, as well as
the failure (so far) of radical alternatives to bourgeois rule, threatens all
freedom (in the sense of enlarging possibilities of life), bringing about new
monopolistic and stereotype-producing networks-the Leviathans of states,
corporations, armies, culture industry, and so on. 46
4.2
Let me then take, at the end, the trajectory of one typologically
and probably historically coherent sequence, whose extreme ends would be
the allegorical figure of Avarice (in a hypothetical morality play) and a
realistic miser, say Balzac's Gobseck. The two traits of Avarice (the hom-
onymous predicate and its Stellenwert in the system of sins) expand in a
Renaissance or post-Renaissance type into roughly half a dozen: the type
Pantalone can be characterized by the traits "merchant," "old," "male,"
688
 Darko Suvin
"Venetian," "amorous," and "miserly." Without that last predicate and
trait, there would be no Pantalone; that is what dooms his amorous ventures
to failure and makes him a permanent butt. Equally, however, it is the new
fusion of this trait with the unambiguous class identification of Venetian
merchant that makes for both a recognizable and a popular hyperbole of
"a precise historical function, as a representative of an industrious bourgeoi-
sie"-"the satire of commercial power" (together with homologous satires
of the military power in the Capitano and of sterile learning in the Dottore)Y
The biological age of Pantalone is highly significative: the fact that there is
no type of the young merchant before bourgeois drama (though well-known
in everyday life, and even in prose fiction from the Novellino and Boccaccio
on) shows that the physical coding is an ideological hyperbole, a plebeian
(and possibly also aristocratic) adverse judgment on the vitality of a new
class, episteme, way of behaving-in short, of a new type. One step further
and we are at Moliere's Harpagon, who has a similar ideological profile but
is already part of the way from type to character (though not quite a con-
tradictory character), probably by way of contamination of several types.
The watershed toward character is passed in Shylock, precisely in his speech
"Hath not a Jew eyes? ... " (III.i): there is no type, I think, that can see
itself simultaneously through the eyes of antagonists and through its own
interiority, since this provides a union of contradictory traits par excellence.
Though Shylock may for long stretches be a type, he is no longer only or
primarily such (the same would hold for Richard III as against the Medieval
Vice). Finally, the usurers and misers of realism, such as Gobseck, draw
their strength from the interplay of characterological richness and the steel
backbone of the old type, never totally buried under the surface of indi-
vidualistic character.
Indeed, it is remarkable that characters-verbally bound up with
a proper name-can revert to social type and tum their name into a common
or generic noun simply by adding an article or a suffix. Moliere's Tartuffe
became "les Tartuffes" in his first placet to the King (August 1664); Don
Juan turns into "donjuanism" or Les Don Juans de village (title of a play)
as readily as Tartuffe does into "a tartuffe" or into "tartufferie. "48 This
measures the oftentimes small distance between the character and type levels
in much literature since Moliere: in dramaturgy, it is enough to mention
the melodrama (that matrix of all romantic plays), the vaudeville, or even
the boulevard comedy whose art consists precisely in pasting the newest
traits of the marketplace on the good old masks-a Commedia dell'arte
inverted, so to speak. As for modem drama, say from Jarry and Chekhov
to Brecht and Genet, one could show that part of its strength consists in
ironically violating those same type expectations hidden behind the char-
acters (e.g., in Brecht's Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder the miles gloriosus
for Eilif, the ingenue for K.attrin, the niais, benet, or simpleton for Swiss
Cheese, and, of course, the miserly merchant for Courage herself).
5. In Lieu of Conclusion
In parts 2-4 of this essay I have argued two points. First, that to
understand narrative agents it is necessary to take into account the inter-
action within each dramatis persona between the three levels of actantial
function, sociohistorical way of categorizing people or type, and often also
the particular-individual but no less sociohistorical-characterization. In
689
this "spatial-form" (i.e., paradigmatic) textual interaction, hegemonies will
shift between the three levels according to given historical periods (as well
as given analytic goals). 49 Second, I have argued that the most formalizing
analysis can become precise, instead of formalistic, if and only if it enters
into a feedback relation to the sociohistorical actuality of the field under
scrutiny. That is why, instead of a "pure" technocratic and idealistic birth
of agential theory (or, indeed, semiotics) from the spirit of syntax, I pleaded
in part 2 for this relation. To speak from within semiotics, such a feedback
is, after all, built into its foundations-in Aristotle, in Propp, and at least
theoretically even in Levi-Strauss, as well as in the best practitioners such
as the latter Barthes and Eco. This could add the dialectics of historic mut-
ability to the mechanistic atomism of the formalists or the computerized
statics of the structuralists and neutralize their respective metaphysics.
However, there is more than a particular (much less fashionable)
method of narrative and cultural analysis at stake here. As I argued in part
1, the reply to my title question is hugely important, and I hope my ar-
gumentation may lead toward two complementary conclusions: First, em-
pirical individuals, people in the bourgeois individualist sense, cannot be
represented in fiction; they necessarily become, on the one hand, exempla
(Auden's paragons) and, on the other hand, shifting nodes of narration.
Second, pertinent and crucial relationships among people-not atomic or
pointlike but as a rule dyadic or differential-nonetheless can be represented
in fiction; in fact, fiction consists in their representation and reformulation,
which allows the reader to pleasurably verify old and dream up new alter-
native relationships, to re-articulate (in both senses of the word) human
relationships to the world of people and things. As Aristotle argued in Pol-
itics (1.2), humans necessarily live in communities (polis); they are "political
animals." Thus, all central human relations are, in this widest sense, polit-
ical, and significant fictional re-presentation of relations among people rear-
ticulates our political relationships.

Notes

I trust the current cultural theories discussed in this part of the essay are readily identifiable.
Therefore, I will use as few references as possible for the general intertext, here and else-
where. lndispensible titles and quotes will be footnoted at the first mention and after that
referred to by author's name and page number in parenthesis within the body of the essay.
In another essay, "On Metaphoricity and Narrativity in Fiction," Sub-Stance 48( 1986): 51-
67, I argue that the chronotope is, in fact, specific only to narrative texts as opposed to
metaphorical ones. For part 1, the classical discussion of re-presentation 1s in Henri Wallon.
De l'acte a Ia pensee (Paris: Flam marion, 1970), especially pp. 162-67; I am also abundantly
using Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, vols. 15-20 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973). I am
bound to note that the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada has,
from 1981 to 1984, consistently refused to fund research connected with this paper.
2 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Avtor i gero1 v estet1chesko1 deiatelnosti," in Estetika slovesnogo tvor-
chestva (Moscow: lskusstvo. 1979), pp. 10-11; Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1978), pp. 107-8, where three other laments rangmg
from 1936 to 1966 are also quoted; E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel ( 1928; Har-
mondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1962). Translations from Bakhtin (as from all other non-English
texts. unless they are cited from English titles) are mine.
3 Roland Barthes, Lecon inaugurale (Paris: College de France, 1977). pp. 35-36. The other
quotes in this paragraph are from Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana
Universtiy Press, 1977), pp. 66-68 pass1m; Marc Angenot, "La notion d'actant comme
categone genologique," paper presented at CSRA meeting, Montreal, May 1980. I am
deeply indebted to discussions w1th Angenot, as well as to remarks, md1cations. and obJec-

690
 Darko Suvin
tions of William Dodd, Irwin Gopnik, Cary Nelson, Maria-Luisa Nunes, Patrick Parrinder, Patrice
Pavis, and Maria Vittoria Tessitore.
4 Claude Levi-Strauss, "La structure et Ia forme," in Anthropologie structurale deux (Paris:
Pion, 1973). p. 162, trans. by C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf as Structural Anthropology
(New York: Basic Books, 1976).
5 Darko Suvin, "Per una teoria dell'analisi agenziale," Versus 30( 1981 ): 87-109. in particular
pp. 87-94. Cf. Achim Eschbach and Wendelin Rader, Semiotik-Bibliographie I (Frankfurt:
Antoren-und Verlagsgesellschaft Syndikat, 1976). and Jonathan Culler's judgment in Struc-
turalist Poetics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975). p. 230. True, as always we
can refer to Aristotle (Poetics, 1449b-1450a, 1451 b, in the edition by L. Golden and 0. B.
Hardison, Jr. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968]; and ct. his Ethics and Rhetorics);
to Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974).
chaps., 2, 6; and to Brecht (see note 1). See also Etienne Souriau, Les deux cent mille
situations dramatiques (Paris: Flammarion, 1950). pp. 65-81; and for some hints in
Vol'kenshtein, Bogatyrev, and Frye, see note 8.
6 A major problem here is the initiating, overarching, or "transcendental" actant that Greimas
calls destinateur(see the critique by Culler, pp. 233-34) and Souriau calls balance (=Arbiter);
the Proppian denomination of Mandator seems to work better than either of these but has
to be verified by further inductive analyses.
7 The four main works on actants by Greimas to be focused upon are: "Reflexions sur les
modeles actantiels," in Semantique structurale (Paris: Larousse, 1966); "La structure des
actants du recit," in Du sens (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970)-cf. for agents especially pp,
254ft.; "Les actants. les acteurs et les figures," in Claude Chabrol, ed., Semiotique narrative
et textuelle (Paris: Larousse, 1973); and, with Joseph Courtes, Semiotique (Paris: Hachette,
1979). For other works of his, see notes 9 and 22.
8 Greimas had already, in Semantique structurale (p. 188). hinted at a third agential category
and level in his account of psychocriticism (e.g., Baudelaire's porteur de chimere). Possibly,
he based the introduction of this third level on a few hints in Souriau's role and role pur (pp.
69, 71 ), but more probably on analytic necessity. Ct. also a few hints about such a possible
level, called respectively figure and emploi, type, and stock type, in Vladimir Vol'kenshtein,
Dramaturgiia ( 1923, Moskva: Sovetskii pisatel', 1960), pp. 106, 111-12, 124-25; Petr
Bogatyrev, "Les signes du theatre," Poetique 5( 1971 ): 524 (first published in 1938); and
Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Critic1sm (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp.
172ft.
9 Ct. for the two incompatible types of roles actantiels the Greimas essay in Chabrol, pp. 165-
66, 167, and for roles thematiques, pp. 171-75; for agents assigned to discours versus
recit in Du sens. pp. 255-56; and for Greimas-Courtes (e.g., entries for actant, acteur, role
thematique). The differentiations between collective and individual as well as paradigmatic
and syntagmatic actant in Greimas's Semiotique et sciences sociales (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1976) do not seem either illuminating or pertinent to the present essay. Claude Bremond,
Logique du recit (Paris: Editions due Seuil, 1973) attempted to inventory all the principal
"narrative roles·' into eternal agents. such as protecteur and frustrateur, or patients. such
as beneficiaire and victime.
10 First quote by Levi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale (Paris: Pion. 1958). p. 75; quotes in
following sentences: ibid., p. 201, and Anthropologie structurale deux, pp. 168-69, 172.
11 I will summarize and apply in the following two sections only some of the most basic and
pertinent issues of extremely complex and largely unfinished epistemological debates. The
handiest brief discussions of preconditions for knowledge may be found in Jean Piaget, ed.,
Logique et connaissance scientifique (Paris, 1967). in particular the essays by Piaget. Jean-
Biaise Grize, Leo Apostel, and Jean Ladriere. Since Greimas claims for his approach the
authority of a formal system, one could also apply to him the strictures of Kurt Godel, "Ueber
formal unenthscheidbare Satze ... , " Monatshefte f. Mathematik u. Physik 38( 1931 ): 173-
98 (in English: On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related
Systems [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962]); and of Alfred Tarski, "Der Wahrheitsbegriff
in den formalisierten Sprachen," StudJa philosophica 1(1935): 261-405; "On Undecidable
Statements in Enlarged Systems of Logic and the Concept of Truth," Journal of Symbolic
Logic 4( 1939); and Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1949). that such a system can only be validated by
another, higher and more potent system (in Marxism: practice). I will here simplify by giving
Greimas the benefit of the doubt that his approach may rather be used as a model; but if
so, claims made for it have to be scaled down sharply.
12 Ct., e.g., Emile Benveniste, "Les niveaux de I' analyse linguistique," Proceedings of the Ninth
International Congress of Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). pp.
266-93. The followers of "text linguistics" would deny this, but I do not think they have
proved their case.

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13 See Semantique structurale, pp. 133, 185, and Du sens, pp. 162 passim. Cf., however,
even from the standpoint of Brondal·s linguistic philosophy, the critique of Greimas's tacit
transmogrification of the concept of actant in Svend Erik Larsen, "Le concept d'actant:
Gre1mas et Brondal,'' Journal Canadien de Recherche Semiotique 3(1975): 16-35, esp. pp.
24-26.
14 Grize, "Historique," in Piaget, p. 169.
15 Greimas, Semantique structurale, pp. 130, 185ft.; Du sens, p. 257; "Les actants, les acteurs
et les figures," pp. 169-76. Similar hesitations can be found in many others, not excluding
the interesting Franc;:ois Rastier, Essais de semiotique discursive (Tours: Marne, 1973), pp.
95-96, 173, 214, or even Barthes. Culler, pp. 76-94, is, I believe, getting at the same
problem in his persuasive cntlque of Greimas's "structural semantics"; further on (pp. 213-
14, 233-34) Culler 1s JUStly severe about Greimas's arbitrary classifications and tentative
speculations elevated into methodology. Cf. also the critique of Greimas's inconsistent syn-
tactic-cum-semantic terminology in K. Bartoszynski, "0 badaniach ukladow fabularnych," in
H. Markiewicz and J. Slawinski, eds., Problemy metodologiczne wspolczesnego literaturoz-
nawstwa (Krakow: Wydawn. Literackie, 1976), p. 181, and of Greim as's "occultation of the
enunciating subject" m Timothy J. Reiss, "Semiology and Its Discontents: Saussure and
Greimas," Canadian Journal of Research in Semiotics 5(1977): 85-97. A general critique
of the ahistorical structuralist "syntacticism" ism Paul Ricoeur, Le confilt des interpretations
(Paris: Editions du Seuil 1969), pp. 31-63; and cf. Ricoeur, "La grammaire generative de
Greimas," Documents [de recherche du groupe de linguistique] 15( 1980); and two further
sociohistorically oriented critiques in Henri Lefebvre's beautiful L 'ideologie structuraliste (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1975) and Pierre Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977). Let me not fail to note that an engaging bricolage-type
modesty coexists strangely in Greimas with blind H]elmslevian dogmatism in fundamentals,
on which I unfortunately have to focus.
16 Cesare Segre, Semiotics and Literary Criticism, trans. J. Meddemmen (The Hague: Mouton,
1973), p. 67, puts 1t more politely: "Clearly Hjelmslev's highly suggestive scheme is not up
to the complexity of literary models"; he notes that valid semiotic criticism should not be
limited to a mere defining of matrices. Segre passes the same judgments on Greimas's
actants in his entry "Narrazione/narrativita," in Enciclopedia Einaudi, vol. 9 (Torino, 19BO),
p. 696. But Hjelmslev's dichotomy between "pure form" and social substance is very dubious
within linguistics itself. Perhaps the most famous critique in that discipline is by Andre Mar-
tinet, "Au sujet des Fondements de theorie linguistique de L. HJelmslev," Bulletin de Ia
Soci{ne de Linguistique de Paris 42, fasc. 1( 1946): 19-43; it has been often repeated in
French linguistics. Prieto notes that Hjelmslev's abstract formalization is an "illusion sym-
metrical and inverse" to naive empiricism (Pertinence [see note 19], p. 125; cf. pp. 66-69,
122-26). Claude Chabrol discusses incisively HJelmslev's "dizzying failure" in "De Ia semio-
tlque en question,'' m Claude Chabrol and Louis Marin, eds , Le recit evangelique (Paris:
Aubier Montaigne, 1974), pp. 193-200, 205-9; he notes also that Hjelmslev's claim about
the translatability of all other "languages" into natural language was based on unclear con-
cepts and has since been falsified by all attempts to find linguistic forms in music, body
gesture and movement, fine arts, and so on. For a general argument on the cognate uni-
versalism in analytical philosophy and Whorfian linguistics, see Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Se-
miotica e 1deologia (Milano: V. Bompiani, 1972), pp. 154ft.; and for objections more directly
pertinent to Greimas's domain, see Barthes's critiques of the basic syntactic dyad subject-
predicate and the "logic" of actions if taken outside the cultural conditions in SIZ (Paris,
1970), pp. 82-83, 88-89, 209-10 pass1m, as well as cntiques of Bremond and Greimas in
Culler, pp. 208-11 and note 15, and in Rastier, pp. 218-21.
17 First quote: John C Condon, Semantics and Communication (New York: Macmillan, 1975),
p. 3; second quote: Albert Carnoy, La science du mot (Louvain: Ed1tions Universitas, 1927),
p. 43. One of the great pioneers of pragmatics is Bakhtin, for whom situation implies the
space and time as well as the object or theme of utterance and the evaluative relation of
the interlocutors to that utterance and its context-ct., e.g., BakhtinNoloshinov's "Stylistics
of Artistic Discourse" (1930), forthcoming in Wlad Godzich, ed., Writings of the Circle of
Bakhtin (University of Minnesota Press); and also Marxism and the Philosophy of Language
(New York: Seminar Press, 1973) and Estetika (see note 2).
18 On that concept see Darko Suvin, "The Social Addresses of Victorian Fiction," Literature
and History 1( 1982): 11-40, with large bibliography.
19 I am following here the fundamental approach by Luis J. Prieto. Cf. "Entwurf einer allgemeinen
Semiologie," Ztschr. f. Semiotik 1( 1970): 261, and Pertinence et pratique (Paris: Editions
de Minuit, 1975), pp. 147-50 passim, attempting to pursue the epistemological implications
of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach (though I disagree with some points in Prieto, e.g., his stark
Althusserian break between natural and human sciences, between subject and object of
cognition).
20 Janos Petofi, cited m Achim Eschbach, Pragmasemiotik und Theater (Tubingen: Narr, 1979),
p. 69.

692
 Darko Suvin
21 Sebastiana Timpanaro, "Structuralism and Its Successors," 1n On Materialism (London: NLB,
1975); cf. also the general argument of David Savan, "Towards a Refutation of Semiotic
Idealism," Semiotic Inquiry 3(1983): 6.
22 I cannot enter here into Greimas's evolution after the peak of h1s actantial theory in the
1970s. I should mention that parallel to the development of linguistic pragmatics he has
been attempting to somewhat mend his fences but without basically changing his approach.
In his study of a "passion" ("De Ia colere," Documents [du groupe de recherches semio-
linguistiques de 1'E.H.E.S.S.] 27( 1981). the subtitle of "semantique lexicale" seems to me
crucial. To paraphrase calif Omar, it raises a dilemma in both of whose horns it is untenable.
Either the "lexical" is contained in semantics, since in a way all meanings of words are also
lexical, and it is redundant; or it is not so contained, and it is an oxymoron on the order of
Brecht's "planned disorder," where the adJective purports to redefine the noun, so that
meanings of words are henceforth to be understood only as lexical and not also as referential,
extrasemiotic in Peirce's sense. Thus, the familiar oscillation between agnosticism and Ide-
alism is retained and applied to new domains. Similar IS Greimas's interest 1n the per se not
uninteresting attempts at the study of modalities, which amount to a recuperation of ideo-
logical studies in a dehistoricized fashion; cf. the latest propositions I know of in his interview
with Hans-George Ruprecht. "Ouvertures metasemiotiques," Semiotic Inquiry 4( 1984): 1-
23. His conclusion is that pragmatics. and even "somatic passions," might perhaps be
admitted if it stays within (his kind of) sem1Dt1cs.
23 One of structuralism's most important epistemological precursors and shapers (by way of
logical positivism) is Ernst Mach. If my argument about the usable versus useless faces of
structuralism is correct. then-for all of Mach's lack of clarity and sometimes sheer agnos-
ticism-Lenin overreacted in Materialism and Empiriocrit1cism (and especially, in the heat of
what was centrally a political battle, against Bogdanov. a thinker to be reevaluated). Today,
in view of both political and Ideological developments during the intervening eighty years. it
is impossible to bypass the clarifications of epistemology from Mach and Russell on. However,
as my critique indicates. I think these can be accepted only on condition that (as Lenin also
insisted) they be refunctioned within a materialist and dialectical horizon. I have approached
this huge problem, attempting to use Gramsci, Bloch, Timpanaro, and Habermas, in "On
Two Notions of 'Science' in Marxism," in Tom Henighan. ed., Brave New Universe (Ottawa,
1980). pp. 27-43. For developed epistemological considerations. ct. Piaget, especially his
brilliant essay "Les methodes de l'epistemologie."
24 Doede Nauta, The Meaning of Information (The Hague: Mouton, 1970). p. 42.
25 For this different and unduly neglected tradition. which seems to begin with Marx's Eighteenth
Brumaire, see Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1953); Jutta Matzner, "Der Begriff der Charaktermaske bei Karl Marx,"
Soziale Welt 15(1964): 130ff.; Eduard Urbanek, "Roles, Masks and Characters," in Peter
Berger, ed., Marxism and Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969); and the
essays by John Coombes and Stanley Mitchell in Francis Barker et. al., eds., Literature,
Society, and the Socwlogy of Literature: 1848 (Colchester: University of Essex, 1977).
26 See notes 5, 8, 15, 16, 48; see also Georg Simmel, Soziologie (Munchen: Duncker and
Humblot. 1923); Sarin Alexandrescu, Logique du personnage; Roland Barthes, "Introduction
a !'analyse structurale des rec1ts," Communications 8( 1966; Pans: Editions du Seuil, 1981 ):
7-33. and S/Z; Philippe Hamon, "Pour un statut semiologique du personnage," Litterature
6(1972): 86-110; Tzvetan Todorov. "Personnage," in Oswald Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov,
eds., Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972).
pp. 286-92, and Poetique de Ia prose (Paris: EditiOns du Seuil, 1971 ); Anne Ubersfeld, Lire
le theatre (Paris, 1977). Cf. Umberto Eco, "James Bond: Une combinatoire narrative,"
Communications 8 ( 1966): 83-99.
27 Friedrich Engels, letter to Minna Kautsky, Nov. 26, 1885, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Ueber Kunst und Literatur ([East] Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1953). p. 120. Cf. Lidi1a Ginzburg,
"0 strukture literaturnogo personazha," in lskusstvo slova [Festschrift D. D. Blag01] (Moskva,
1973), pp. 376-88, and 0 psikhologicheskoi proze (Leningrad: VKP, 1971), for the most
sophisticated approach to the relations between type and character that I have found (un-
fortunately, too late for this study). After my hypothesis of the three agential levels had been
given as a lecture at several conferences and universities, Patrice Pavis kindly sent me proofs
of his Dictionnaire du theatre (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980). where he (s.v. "actantlel
[modele]") briefly 1ndicates his own "Theorie des niveaux d'existence du personnage." Pavis
postulates the existence of four agential levels, the two middle ones being actants and
characters; between them, he somewhat tentatively but very interestingly postulates a "ni-
veau intermediaire" of roles defined as "entites figurat1ves, animees, mais generales et
exemplaires (ex: le fanaron, le pere noble, le traitre)." I am delighted with this convergence-
it recurs apropos our evaluation of Brecht's key theoretical concept of Gestus, which Pavis
deals with at more length in "On Brecht's Not1on of Gestus," Languages of the Stage (New
York, 1982). pp. 39-49-and only wish he would develop this insight at more length and
into a full analytic level having the same rights as his other two. Pavis's deepest level of

693
 "structures elementaires de Ia signification" seems to me an unnecessary reverence toward
Greimas; his fourth level pertains to staging, which seems to me another metalanguage
altogether.
28 However, a developed narratological theory of agents will have to seriously confront this
theory, both to point out its serious deficiencies and to see what elements may still be usable.
Its principal sources are Ralph Linton. The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: D.-
Appleton-Century, 1945) and The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964);
G. H. Mead. Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Jacob L.
Moreno. Who Shall Survive? (Beacon, NY.: Beacon House, 1953); and Georg Simmel (see
note 26). Cf. also Michael Banton, Roles (London: Tavistock, 1965); Erv1ng Goffman, En-
counters (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961) and other titles to Frame Analysis (New York:
Harper and Row, 1974); Georges Gurvitch, ed., La vocation actuelle de Ia sociologie, vol.
1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957); Marcel Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie
(Pans: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950); J. Milton Yinger, Toward a Field Theory of
Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). See also Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas,
eds., Role Theory (New York: Wiley, 1966); Hans Joas, Die gegenwartige Lage der soziol-
ogischen Rollentheorie (Frankfurt: Athenaum-Verlag, 1973); and Anne-Marie Rocheblave-
Spenle, La notion de role en psychologie sociale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1962). For interesting critiques, cf. Dieter Claessens, Rolle und Macht (Munchen: Juventa-
Verlag, 1970); Uta Gerhardt, "Toward a Critical Analysis of Role," Social Problems 27( 1980):
556-67; and Frigga Haug, Kritik der Rollentheorie (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag,
1972). I am grateful to my master's student Hanneke van Schaik for bringing some of these
titles to my attention.
For attempts at bridging social and theater roles, see much of the Burns book;
see also Jean Duvignaud, L 'Acteur(Paris: Gallimard, 1965), pp. 12-20; Anne-Marie Gourdon,
"Role social et role theatral," Travail theatral 10(1973): 76-86; Uri Rapp, Handeln und
Zuschauen (Neuwied, 1973); and Bruce Wilshire, Role Playing and Identity (Bloomington:
lnd1ana University Press, 1982).
Another whole field to be surveyed is that of an analytic philosophy of action;
cf. for a first introduction Robert W. Binkley et. al., eds., Agent, Action and Reason (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1971), with an extensive bibliography on pp. 169-99; and R. Tanaka,
"Action and Meamng in Literary Theory," Journal of Literary Semantics 1( 1972): 41-56.
29 Georg Lukacs, Die Theorie des Romans (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1965); "The Intellectual
Physiognomy in Characterization," in Writer and Critic and Other Essays, ed. Arthur D. Kahn
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1971 ); The Historical Novei(Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin,
1969); Balzac und der franzosische Rea!Jsmus (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1952); cf. also the
splendid "Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas," Archiv f. Soz1alwiss. u. Soz1alpol. 38(1914):
303ft., so far as I know not yet fully published in English. The title of The Specificity of
Aesthetics testifies to Lukacs's interesting attempts at delving deeper into that crucial subject.
though I think still on the same "right" ontological basis of subject versus object, form versus
content, and so on.
30 Cf. Darko Suvin, "Looking Backward at Lukacs," To Brecht and Beyond (Brighton and Totowa,
N.J., 1984). pp. 75-79.
31 Draft of Engels's letter to Miss Harkness of Apr. 1888, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Ueber Kunst und Literatur, ed. Michael Lifschitz (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1953), p. 122.
However, I believe that at the back of Lukacs's mind is Simmel's discussion of all individuals
being also types (e.g., Soziologie, pp. 24-28). and probably some Russian nineteenth-century
criticism (for this last point I am indebted to discussions with Regine Robin, Le realisme
socialiste. forthcoming from Payot, Paris).
32 William Whewell, The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences (London: J. W Parker, 1840), 1:476-
77, quoted approvingly in T. H. Huxley, Man's Place in Nature, and Other Essays (London,
1906). p. 272; emphasis is mine. Appropriately, it was Whewell who coined the typifying
term "sc1entist." Very sim1lar is Balzac's definition in his preface to Une tenebreuse affaire:
"Un type ... est un personnage qui resume en lui-meme les traits caracteristiques de tous
ceux qui lui ressemblent plus ou moins, il est le modele du genre" (paraphrased in present-
day terms: A type is a narrative agent who blends characteristic traits of all characters of the
same category; he is the model of his genus).
33 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, Bollingen Series XXV-5 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1972), p. 301.
34 Gombrich, p. 90; see also the psychological theories of Bruner and Postman as summarized
by Floyd H. Allport, Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure (New York and
London, 1955), pp. 376ft., and with further bibliography; also the well-known works of Jean
Piaget and S. L. Vygotsky on perception.
35 Gombrich, p. 73. When applied to dramatis personae. any such approach necessarily issues
in discussions of typification as allegory; cf. the stimulating remarks of Fredric Jameson,

694
 Darko Suvin
Marxism and Form (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1971 ). pp. 398-400. and
The Political Unconscious (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1981 ). pp. 160-64 passim.
36 Keir Elam, The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London: Methuen, 1980). p. 8.
37 This whole matter of masks and masking warrants special invest1gat1on as. I thmk, a theo-
retically crucial point in agential analysis.
38 Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. UspenskiJ, "'lntroduzione ... in Ricerche semiotiche (Torino. 1973).
p. xxvi.
39 As Levi-Strauss often also seems to believe; cf .. e.g., Anthropologie structurale, pp. 67.
106-not to speak of Chomsky's approving reference to the .. assumption that linguistic and
mental processes are virtually identical"' 1n Cartesian LinguistiCS (New York: Harper and Row.
1966). p. 31.
40 Aristotle, Poetics (see note 5. also the editor's comments on pp. 124-26, 202); ct. also
Rhetorics 11.12-17 on types by age and status. and Politics 1.2 on the polis versus the single
person. as well as Chatman. pp. 108-9, and Gombnch, p. 142. on types in Greek art.
41 Ct. Darke Suvin. "'On F1ction as Anthropology: Agential Analysis, Types. and the Classical
Chinese Novel, .. in J. Hall. ed .. Proceedings of the 1983 Conference on Literature and
Anthropology, University of Hong Kong Press (forthcoming).
42 Gombrich, p. 148, and esp. pp. 148-52. V. M. Zhirmunsk1i, Sravnite/'noe /iteraturovedenie-
Vostok i Zapad (Leningrad: Nauka. 1979). is one of the latest major scholars who notes how
1n both medieval and oral literature "'the typical dominates ... over the individual"' as creativity
is enclosed within literary genres that are bearers "'not of an individual and Idiosyncratic but
of a socially typical world view and style"' (pp. 161-62). The protagonist's behavior. too. is
here determined by norms of etat. mundane ritual. etiquette (p. 170)
43 Karl Marx. Capital, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage. 1977). p. 178. See Marx's whole key argument
on commodity fetishism. in which-very interestingly for further discussion of relations be-
tween agents and objects in fiction-he adds that reification of human relations is the obverse
of a personification of things. Cf. also Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge.
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1971)
44 All the examples and quotes of historical semantics in th1s paragraph come from Raymond
Williams. Keywords (London: NLB. 1976). s.v. "'Individual ... "'Personality"' (for references
to "'character"'). and "'Subjective ... See also on the (bourgeo1s) legal framework as enforcing
individuality instead of a "'person-in-role"' or of "'role-slices ... Gottman, Encounters. p. 142;
and for the opinion that the subject/object division has been imported 1nto linguistic theory
from formal logic, the inventor of the term "'actant"' himself, Lucien Tesniere, Elements de
syntaxe structurale (Paris: C. Klincksieck. 1959). pp. 103-5.
45 Barthes. "'Introduction ... p. 16: "'une forme purement historique. restreinte a certains genres
(il est vrai les mieux conn us de nous) ..... ; ct. also the longer discussions in S!Z, pp. 141-
42, 153-54, 183-84. Propp has some very similar h1nts. On character requiring a number
of possibly contradictory traits, I am expanding from Chatman, pp. 121-22, who is indebted
to Forster (whose discussions derive in turn-just as Lukacs's do-from Hegel's Aesthetics,
perhaps the major source on individuality 1n art). Some of the most fascinating discussions
on the sense of the Self before individualism (both in tribal soc1et1es and in the Latin concepts
of res and persona) are to be found in Mauss. pp. 232-79, 337-62.
46 On culture industry, the pioneering text is Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's vigorous
(if one-sided) Dialectics of Enlightenment (London: Continuum. 1979); see in particular, for
the evacuation of individuality. pp. 154-56. 84-86. 144.
47 Vito Pandolfi. II teatro del Rinascimento e Ia Commedia deii'Arte (Roma: Lerici, 1969). pp.
176. 180. Pantalone is. of course. a Commedia de/l'arte Maschera. and as such a type by
theatrical convention physically overcoded into a narrow range of looks and behaviors. Finally,
in the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie hit back and changed the nature of dramaturgic
agents: "'In the Commedia de/l'arte poor Pantalone was [ridiculed and deluded]; but in my
character Comedies I restored the reputation of this good figure. who represents an honest
Merchant of my Nation ... reported Goldoni; he therefore changed a dell'arte scenario with
a "'libertine. stupid, and ridiculous"' Pantalone into "'a moral comedy ... instructive for those
who are seduced by Interest or fnendship to entrust their cap1tal to suspect persons .
called The Bankruptcy"'; Carlo Goldoni. II teatro comico-Memorie ita/fane (Milano: Marsilio.
1982). pp. 189, 218.
48 My discussion of the onomastics of type uses the naive but rich work by Georges Doutrepont.
Les types populaires de Ia litterature franc;aise (Bruxelles. s a ) I am Indebted to John Ripley
and Charles Shattuck for counsels on English "'stock characters"' or theater types. It should
be noted that naming is a privileged p01nt of entry into discussions about individualistic fiction.
too; see. e.g., Barthes SIZ. pp, 74-75, 101-2. 196-97; Todorov. "'Personnage.'' with further
bibliography; Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. UspenskiJ, "'Myth-Name-Culture,"' in Daniel P.

695
 Lucid. ed., Soviet Semiotics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1977). pp.
233-52; and the disagreements a propos the eighteenth century between ian Watt, The
Rise of the Novel (London: Chatto and Wind us, 195 7). pp. 18ft .. and Joan Rockwell. Fact
in F1ction (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1974). pp. 105ft.. as well as Wolfgang lser's
discussions of Fielding in Der implizite Leser (Munich: W. Fink. 1972) and "Die Wirklichkeit
der Fikt1on.'' 1n Rainer Warning, ed .. Rezeptionsasthetik (Munich: W. Fink. 1975). pp. 308ft.
49 Furthermore, when our understanding wishes. as IS proper. to embrace the temporally var-
iable agent1al system of any text or macrotext (ensemble of texts). agential hegemonies will
shift not only paradigmatically but also syntagmatically. In this essay I do not discuss syn-
tagmatic interaction. which is both more frequently studied then and yet logically posterior
to the paradigmatic interaction. and which can best be shown in estenso by applications to
particular texts.

696
 Michele Barrett

The Place of Aesthetics in Marxist Criticism

Marxist theoretical and cr1t1cal work typ1cally reduces

culture e1ther to 1deology and mean1ng or to an antihu-
manlst concern for the production of meanmg In e1ther
case, exammations of the nature of aesthetic experience
and quest1ons of aesthetiC value are 1gnored. Th1s has
senous pol1t1cal consequences, 1n part because 1t fails to
engage popular conceptions of art

Aesthetic questions have never been particularly

prominent in Marxist approaches to culture, but they are increasingly rel-
egated to an extremely marginal position in both theoretical and critical
debates. Even the very broad title of the conference on which this volume
ls based-Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture-was apparently not
broad enough to include considerations of the aesthetic, rather than the
sociological and ideological, dimensions of culture. It is not that Marxism
has failed to develop a tradition of work on aesthetics but rather that such
concerns are currently out of fashion and, indeed, are often seen as politically
reprehensible.
If this description is correct, the situation poses major
theoretical and political problems because it has left Marxists unable to
engage with bourgeois criticism, dominant educational practices, and pop-
ular sentiment. By evading the questions of aesthetic pleasure and value,
Marxist criticism and radical cultural intervention place themselves in a
relatively weak position. For this reason, I think it is necessary to reconsider
the question of a materialist aesthetics and the strengths and dangers in-
herent in such a project. I shall elaborate on this in the second half of this
essay through a critical consideration of the work of the art critic Max
Raphael.
Aesthetic Value and Pleasure in Marxist Theory
"Aesthetic" is commonly given three definitions or
meanings: (1) received by the senses; (2) referring to beauty; (3) superior
taste. The last need not concern us here since sociological approaches have
forcefully demonstrated the historical vulnerability of"taste." 1 We can use-
fully translate the other two meanings into the questions of pleasure and
value. When someone says that a piece of music or a poem makes their
hair stand on end, or when Cezanne records in his diary that he feels his
eyes bleeding as he looks at what he is painting, they refer to sensations
that might be called an "aesthetic mode of feeling." A possible equivalent
to these heightened sensory perceptions is sexual pleasure, and, indeed,
certain "pleasurable" features of art (abundance, extravagance of expression,
the tension and resolution characteristic of much Western classical music,
697
 for example) can readily be interpreted in more directly sexual analogies.
In general, however, the advocates of an aesthetic mode of sensation see it
as a separate faculty. The object in this mode of perception is not necessarily
identical to "beauty," since a work of art could be recognized to have "great
value" without being tied to a particular definition of beauty.
The questions raised by the term "aesthetic" are, briefly: Can we
say that there is a distinctive "aesthetic" faculty or mode of perception,
and, if so, what is the nature of the pleasure it affords? Can we identify
objects or works to which universal aesthetic value adheres? It is difficult
to formulate these questions in a noncircular way, and the history of at-
tempts to come to grips with them is, perhaps surprisingly, very sparse.
Aesthetics, as a minor subfield of philosophy, considers the questions in the
abstract (e.g., What is beauty?) rather than in respect to the claims of par-
ticular instances. Art history, the place where one would expect to see aes-
thetic matters considered, is startlingly silent, often preferring to trace in-
fluences or to delight in obscure attributions. Art criticism tends to emphasize
the formal properties of the work in question rather than address more
general questions of aesthetic pleasure and value. This situation seems cu-
rious, since art and literary history and criticism are not reticent to assess
and grade their objects of study. However, in a large number of instances
the ranking of the works depends upon criteria that are not aesthetic (a work
is stoical, uplifting, cathartic, illuminating, or whatever). What is often not
shown is how and why the particular formal properties ofthe work (situated
in an understanding of the different dimensions of particular art forms) can
account for the value assigned.
The question might be looked at another way by saying that the
aesthetic properties of a work can be differentiated from its meaning. Un-
fortunately, this works in two ways. Poetry, for instance, is often charac-
terized by a condensation of language (in a non-Freudian sense): a multi-
plicity of meanings arise from one signifier. Many regard this surplus of
meaning as distinctively aesthetic. Yet the reverse is also held: that the
aesthetic is precisely constituted in the excess of the signifier over the sig-
nified. As Terry Eagleton puts it, "If you approach me at a bus stop and
murmur 'Thou still unravished bride of quietness,' then I am instantly aware
that I am in the presence of the literary. I know this because the texture,
rhythm and resonance of your words are in excess of their abstractable
meaning." 2 Further, formulations of this kind do not necessarily help in
that they are equally applicable to situations in which no question of the
aesthetic arises. Many of Oscar Wilde's epigrams can be said to generate
surplus meaning without being regarded as an instantiation of"the literary"
or of aesthetic value. Many conference papers flaunt a "texture, rhythm and
resonance of [language] in excess of their abstractable meaning," but they
are not deemed to be works of "literature." The unresolved relationship
between the categories of meaning and the aesthetic underlies the vexed
position of the latter in Marxist criticism today.
In fact, neither of the two major critical and theoretical ap-
proaches currently applied to the analysis of cultural products adequately
addresses the questions of aesthetic pleasure and value. The first theoretical
tendency that blocks serious consideration of aesthetic questions has been
the dominant influence of the concept of ideology in critical studies. The
ghost of Lukacs has yet to be laid to rest. While this critical tradition may
698
 Michele Barrett
have rejected class reductionism, it has been content to argue about whether
a given work is really about class conflict or gender difference, for instance.
Criticism of many classic texts often takes the form of an eternal procession
of"readings" that claim to have uncovered the essential ideological message
of the text. That such readings, whether by Marxists or bourgeois critics,
are children of their time has been demonstrated by Ronald Frankenberg
in his history of Marxist criticism of Wuthering Heights. 3
Works of art and literature are still seen as the passive and in-
nocent terrain on which ideological armies go about their usual battles. This
is not wrong, but it is limited. Of course, works of art do encode ideological
positions, but we do not exhaust their significance by decoding their ide-
ological content; nor do we explain how the reception and consumption of
works sharing comparable ideological ground may vary dramatically over
a period of time. Moreover, this "art-as-ideology" perspective tends to con-
sider aesthetic value only insofar as it can be attributed to supposedly "pro-
gressive" texts. The problems of this tortured relationship need not detain
us here, although they are legion. The point is that an exclusive emphasis
on ideology necessarily denies the aesthetic dimensions of the text. As Terry
Lovell suggests, it involves treating the cognitive/ideological axis in the work
as primary when this should be seen as secondary in imaginative works. 4
The second major tendency I want to discuss is the very broad
one of structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstructionism. The break
with classical theories of representation that are exclusively concerned with
a pregiven signified has rightly led to a reconsideration of the means of
representation. A theory of signification that emphasizes the text's internal
powers of meaning construction, and stresses the multiplicity of readings
available in consumption, has both strengths and weaknesses. One major
strength of the approach is that it enables us to transcend the boundaries
of bourgeois categories: high art and mass culture, literature and popular
fiction, the various academic disciplines. To subject the objects and texts
ofthe categories of Art and Literature to the same processes of examination
that are applied to those relegated to the sphere of Popular Culture is to
deconstruct the categories themselves. This basic egalitarianism, this refusal
to categorize according to a supposed attribute of aesthetic status, gives
structuralist approaches their subversiveness. However, this radical and de-
mocratizing challenge to the definition of art necessarily has its own con-
sequences. If we apply the same conceptual tools to a cartoon or a postcard
as we do to a Picasso, we must, by definition, concentrate on their common
features (those that our concepts can address) rather than on those that
differentiate them. Although this is in itself iconoclastic, it inevitably leaves
a range of important questions connected with cultural and aesthetic ex-
perience to the unchallenged pronouncements of bourgeois cultural pundits
and critics.
Structuralism's rejection of the salience of aesthetic value is an
integral part of its project, and its political thrust depends upon its decon-
struction of the pretensions of"the aesthetic" as a separate realm. But there
is another reason for its rejection of the question of aesthetics: the intran-
sigent antihumanism of structuralist discourse. The idea of a human aes-
thetic faculty or mode of sensation is in fact more problematic for a struc-
turalist perspective than the question of aesthetic value itself.
699
 This can be seen by looking at the respective fortunes of the
notions of aesthetic value and pleasure in contemporary cultural studies
and Marxist criticism. "Value" may be out, but "pleasure" is definitely in.
This body of work has attempted to construct an antihumanist discourse
of pleasure comparable to Roland Barthes's project in The Pleasure of the
Text. It is the deconstruction of the human subject that underlies the re-
construction of the text as subject: "The text you write must prove to me
that it desires me. " 5 This notion of the desiring text is built upon a rejection
of the subjectivism-seen in this discourse as the product of an essentialist
theory of the subject-characteristic of most accounts of the experience of
aesthetic pleasure. The desire to avoid formulations that smack of vulgar
humanism leads to the extraordinarily cerebral and skeletal character of
"the body" in these new theories of pleasure. Fredric Jameson, for instance,
reluctantly defines pleasure in physical terms: "Pleasure is finally the consent
of life in the body, the reconciliation-momentary as it may be-with the
necessity of physical existence in a physical world. " 6 This is a curiously
grudging description (consent, reconciliation, necessity) that makes one
wonder what would constitute un-pleasure.
Claire Pajaczkowska, in an extremely interesting article on semi-
otic and psychoanalytic theories of art, argues that the psychoanalytic de-
velopment of linguistic theory facilitates a consideration of the text in its
relation to the reader. Although much of what Pajaczkowska has to say
concerns visual forms and the analysis of processes such as color, her con-
clusion makes it clear that art must be understood in psychic rather than
aesthetic terms. What is interesting about the following passage is that it
clarifies the necessary marginality of pleasure within a deconstructionist
theory of the subject: "Or in other words the function of the work of art is
to represent the dialectic of the subject, split and triangulated through the
exigencies of the incest taboo, to represent and contain this splitting; to
represent it as a doubling which is the process of negotiating an imaginary
identity, the ego. This process of identification requires the negotiation of
sexual difference, it is perhaps the most important function, and pleasure
and meaning (the two tenents of bourgeois concepts of art) are simply by-
products of this socially prescribed and biologically inscribed process of the
organization of energy" 7 (emphasis added).
This psychoanalytic conception of art and its "functions" is less
mystifying than the Barthesian emphasis on the text as subject. But it is
methodologically analogous to sociological readings of art that exclude aes-
thetic aspects in favor of the social content or determinants of the work in
question. And just as sociological accounts can cope best with representa-
tions of manifestly social themes, so this approach tends to analyze figurative
representations of obvious psychic interest-for example, the madonna and
child image. (In this respect, the antihumanist appropriation of psycho-
analysis is surprisingly similar to the belligerently humanist Kleinian ap-
proach taken in the work of Peter Fuller. Here, works are reconstructed
from the point of view of their psychic functions-the negotiation of re-
paration with the mother in the case of the Venus de Milo, for example-
and aesthetic considerations are subordinated to explanations in terms of
the viewer's needs. 8 )
I mention these debates simply to draw attention to the way in
which questions about aesthetic sensation, experience, pleasure, and value
700
 Michele Barrett
have been defined as irretrievably contaminated by "bourgeois humanism."
Yet the question of a Marxist humanism is not closed, and the claims of
humanism persist most strongly in the area of culture. There is a widely
held popular assumption that the dividing line between animals and human
beings is marked by "civilization," by considerations beyond those of mere
survival, by an appreciation of the realm of the aesthetic. It may well be
that such beliefs are historically explicable and/or wrong, but their preva-
lence cannot be doubted. So, at the very least, we should expect some en-
gagement with them rather than a distanced dismissal of the problem. For
those of us who do not recoil with horror from humanism, the fact that
questions of aesthetic pleasure and value can only be posed within a hu-
manistic perspective does not render them illegitimate or irrelevant.
It seems to me that much of what is known as "cultural studies"
and much of what is seen as Marxist or radical criticism operates within
these two tendencies. The major legacy from Marxism is the concept of
ideology, and the major legacy from structuralism is the rejection of the
subject. These two traditions, incompatible as they undoubtedly are in some
respects, have been immensely influential on contemporary work in the
general field of culture. Singly or jointly, they account for the marginalization
of aesthetic questions in the interpretation of culture.
The rejection of aesthetic questions is one that criticism shares,
in fact, with many practitioners and art educators. The notion of serving
an apprenticeship in order to acquire skill in an art form has been abandoned
in favor of criteria that are, by and large, nonaesthetic. For instance, the
judges in a recent poetry competition, filmed as they worked, articulated
the notion of "truth to experience" as the main criterion for the winning
poem. "Social relevance" is an equally influential basis of judgment. The
lack of interest in aesthetic training is surprisingly marked among profes-
sionals. The assessment criteria they use, in public examinations, for in-
stance, are often reduced to vague formulations about relevance and con-
viction.
Although I have said that aesthetic questions are often ignored,
it should be emphasized that this must be seen as a rejection rather than
an evasion. A principled relativism of the aesthetic is an often argued, and
now hegemonic, stance of the Left. Nevertheless, while taking for granted
the reasons why this relativism has developed, and fully accepting the spirit
of the critique of bourgeois criticism, we cannot afford this relativism be-
cause it carries with it serious political and theoretical problems.
First, this relativism is simply unconvincing; it leaves the more
plausible position-that we can say a Rembrandt is "better" than an Angelica
Kaufmann-to popular and reactionary ideologues. Although we rightly pro-
test the (undoubted) class, race, and gender bias of much criticism and of
the definitions of whose work shall be studied and on what assumptions,
this does not close the issue. Is it really only because of male dominance
in art history that we consider Rembrandt the better painter? Is the limerick
I compose on the back of my cigarette packet indistinguishable from one
of Shakespeare's plays in terms of its value? We need to engage with the
widely held belief that one work is "better" than another and produce con-
vincing arguments either about why this is not so or about what it is based
upon.
701
 Second, the denial of the aesthetic ignores the fact that the works
analyzed in radical criticism are works of the imagination; they are fictional.
I do not mean to suggest that this gives them any form of historical or social
transcendence, but it does mean that they do not reflect, mediate, or encode
in any direct way the content and position frequently attributed to them by
virtue of their social origin. This makes the conflation of author and ide-
ology, so common in the content analysis type of radical literary criticism,
particularly fraught with dangers. And this leads to a third problem: that
this imaginative element and the ambiguity of aesthetic codes allow con-
siderable play in the meaning of the work. Meaning is not immanent; it is
constructed in the consumption of the work. Hence, no text can be inher-
ently progressive or reactionary; it becomes so in the act of consumption.
There may be an authorial "preferred reading" but the effects may be dif-
ferent from, even opposite to, those intended. Whatever the formal prop-
erties of a work, its ideological content, its "political" implications, are not
given. They depend upon the construction that takes place at the level of
consumption.
Perhaps the most important theoretical-political danger of ig-
noring questions of aesthetic pleasure and value is that we give up ground
to a mystificatory view of art. It is precisely the mystique of art, the separ-
ation between art and work in our society, that demands that we abandon
the rational criteria we apply to all other forms of social production. In this
we reproduce the traditional bourgeois ideology of art. In what other work
would we deny or evade the question of skill? These attitudes aid a tran-
scendent and nonmaterialist understanding of art. As Max Raphael says:
"I might also point out that inspiration is nothing but an illusion on the
part of the most barren class in modem society, an illusion which rests upon
the distinction that arose in the nineteenth century between socially mech-
anized production of material goods and individual craft production of
spiritual goods. It is a petit-bourgeois fiction which has degraded art to a
substitute for religion." 9 Paradoxically, it is through a consideration of skill,
technique, and formal properties of art that we can escape mystical and
mystificatory assumptions about art and move toward a more democratic
understanding. In this context an emphasis on aesthetic skills is, in fact,
democratizing rather than elitist. After all, skills may be acquired, whereas
the notion of an artistic "genius" forbids the aspirations of anyone outside
a small and specialized group. This is true even if we accept different degrees
of individual aptitude. 10
Few critics, Marxist or otherwise, have closely attended to the
detailed formal and technical issues that develop in their interpretations of
works of art. By and large a gulf has been created between those who interpret
a work in terms of its "background," the "life" of its creator, or its "con-
ditions of production," and those who stick to close textual analysis. The
latter tend to argue-as does, for example, the doyen of "internal" analyses
of artworks, Heinrich Wolftlin-that external considerations are irrelevant. 11
Marxists have traditionally rejected the internal approach, seeing the ide-
ological character of a work as demanding that it be socially and historically
situated. And Marxist structuralist critics tend to analyze the text to the
exclusion of the consumer. There is, however, a minority tradition in Eu-
ropean Marxist cultural thought, represented in Adorno's work on music,
Della Volpe's work on poetry, and Max Raphael's work on art. Raphael's
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 Michele Barrett
efforts to combine detailed analyses of the composition of specific works
with a broader Marxist interpretation offer us an opportunity to assess the
project and judge its strengths and difficulties. 12
Max Raphael's Aesthetics
Before looking at his analyses of specific paintings, I need to
recapitulate some of the central assumptions of Raphael's approach to art-
works as aesthetic compositions. This will include his definitions of key
terms, his method, his concept of aesthetic value, and his theory ofviewing.
Raphael understands the aesthetic as a human faculty, and his
bold efforts to define the work of art and the criteria of aesthetic excellence
are built on that assumption. Aesthetic feeling is regarded as a process in
which individual sense perceptions are exteriorized. Feeling becomes rela-
tively independent of individual emotional experience and is assimilated
to more universal categories through which the world is appropriated. Art
is thus produced by a union of faculties, rather than one faculty. The aes-
thetic attitude is more general than specific aesthetic feelings: "It is not
important how the particular part of the world looks that releases our aes-
thetic vision. What is important is to see it whole, in such a way that we
extinguish all our momentary, individual concerns as well as the facticity
of things outside us. We may find ourselves in harmony or disharmony
with the world, we may feel the sublimity of the cosmos in relation to our
tragic finitude or the ridiculous pettiness of our individual selves. Such an
experience gratifies and purges us because in it our conflicts, whether with
ourselves or with the world, are resolved" (DA, p. 190).
Within this framework of aesthetic perception, Raphael argues
that aesthetic feeling has a historical and normative aspect, particularly in
that the ways in which people constitute a relationship to the world will
depend, for instance, on epochs of religious belief or romantic humanism.
In this insistence on the historical character of aesthetic feeling, Raphael
concurs with his former teacher, Wolfflin, who writes that "beholding is not
just a mirror which always remains the same, but a living power of appre-
hension which has its own inward history and has passed through many
stages." 13
According to Raphael, a work of art connects a sensual appro-
priation of the world to an ideational or cognitive model of apprehension:
a "work of art is reality enhanced, which engages the sense both as a whole
and in every one of its details and is yet a symbol of nonsensory meanings
which extend down to still deeper layers without ever ceasing to appeal to
our senses" (DA, p. 191 ). Artistic excellence is characterized, on the one
hand, by an engagement of the senses and the intellect and, on the other,
by a fusion of materials and imagination. Raphael illustrates the first in
saying, "The place in history of such unities as the Gothic cathedral or the
Doric temple proves that the richest artistic sensibility was achieved not in
periods of pure sensualism, but in periods in which sense perceptions were
most readily combined with the other human faculties of cognition-the
body, the intellect, and Reason" (DA, p. 216). Quoting Goethe's view that
"that artist will be the most excellent in his genre whose inventiveness and
imagination are, so to speak, directly fused with the material in which he
has to work" (DA, p. 215), Raphael also emphasizes that artistic materials
are not contingent or extraneous but are the necessary condition of artistic
existence.
703
 Raphael's view of the purpose of art history entails a historical
and relativist understanding of judgments of taste. The task of art history
is to show the extent to which assignations of artistic value, and the nor-
mative status attributed to particular works, are historically bounded. With
characteristic confidence he declares that "norms of this type are simply the
mistakes an epoch makes about itself, in as much as relative, period factors
are usually absolutized along with others. Art history demonstrates this by
showing to what extent such predilections vary, and the sociology of art,
which shows the economic and social causes that account for each given
selection, confirms it." 14
Raphael's insistence on a historical approach leads him to argue
that Marx's thesis on art-as ultimately (though not solely) determined by
economic factors-is fruitful not as a universal thesis but in given historical
contexts: "It is disclosed only in the course of a specific analysis" (PMP, p.
77). Raphael re-poses Marx's famous question about Greek art (Why do we
still like it when its foundations are a dead mode of production?) because,
he argues, it cannot be answered as it is too general: "Let us formulate the
problem concretely: Why could Greek art repeatedly take a normative sig-
nificance at various epochs of Christian art?" (PMP, p. 105).
Raphael's method is encapsulated in the remark he quotes from
Rodin: "If you want to write a good book about me, just study one of my
sculptures. All that matters is my method. A work that never came offwill
suit your purposes better than a good one, for it will show the limitations
of my method. Should you be unable to discover my method from study
of a single work, then you'll never write a decent book either about me or
about art. Of course, art critics write about everything under the sun except
art" (DA, p. 22). Raphael believes that the first task involves describing a
work though the closest possible examination. Such a description is a con-
ceptual reconstitution of the work involving the following considerations,
each of which represents the artistic method as concrete phenomenon (DA,
p. 198).
1. The constitution of the individual form in terms of material
and space.
2. The constitution of the work as a whole-externally (format,
immanent structural lines, lines of orientation) and internally (mode of
reality, individual idea, aesthetic feeling, motif, etc.).
3. The constitution of the relations between individual forms
within the work (internal and external composition, logic of the structure,
etc.).
4. The realization of the individual forms as well as of the con-
figuration as a whole.
Raphael is most clear about the first of these considerations-the
constitution of individual form. Materials (paint, wood, and so on) are
translated into the mean of representation (in the visual arts: color, light/
shadow, line), which in turn are transformed into means offiguration through
the unique way in which they are blended or contrasted. In adddition to
considering means of representation, "reconstitutive description" also ex-
plores the artistic form as a spatial structure, examining the number of planes
and the tensions generated among them. Raphael's discussion of compo-
sition and realization is more diffuse and less clear than his elaboration of
the earlier stages of artistic production because he is concerned now with
704
 Michele Barrett
meaning; he uses concepts of expressive value, psychic content, worldview,
mode of reality, mode of life. It is here, in the reconciliation of formal and
historical-ideological considerations, that his theory of aesthetic value be-
gins, and it is to this that I now tum.
Although Raphael rejects mystificatory views of art as inspira-
tion, he develops a view of artistic originality (understood etymologically
as "getting to the root") and argues for universal aesthetic value. He believes
that value lies in the artist's ability to create a form appropriate to the
content, to express a reality in the only possible representational form, which
requires that the work be organic and dialectical. By "organic" Raphael
means that the configuration could not be constructed differently: "We speak
of an organic or quasi-organic configuration when every individual form is
determined by all the others and serves a specific purpose in relation to the
whole (Poussin, Leonardo, Houdon, etc.). Such a configuration is self-con-
tained, self-sufficient, speaks for itself-in order to understand it we need
not refer to nature or to the artist's personal experiences. It is autonomous,
more accurately, has become autonomous as a result of the process of artistic
creation" (DA, p. 232).
The dialectical dimension of great works of art can be approached
in terms of their ambiguity. According to Raphael, "Art frees us from en-
slavement to words, concepts and false moral values by showing us that
life knows differentiations that cannot be reduced to concepts as well as
situations which cannot be judged by accepted moral standards" (DA, p.
201). This dialectical aspect is crystallized in art's ability to "enhance reality"
and extend its meaning. The world of things is undone and a new world is
constituted through the construction of the world of values; the more the
artist can accomplish this-the more symbolic the work-the greater that
work is. Value lies, therefore, in the work that can encompass polarization
and harmony, determination and playfulness, diversity and unity, tension
within a logical structure. Raphael posits a scale of relative values that does
not place absolute (perfect) value on the agenda (DA, p. 196-97). His own
judgments are often quite sweeping, and he argues that these desiderata
enable us to distinguish between "facetious and true works of art" (PMP,
p. 84). Before turning to these contentious claims, I want to consider Ra-
phael's theory of the artist-viewer relation and to look at some illustrations
of his method.
It is this theory and its connection to Raphael's formal analysis
that locates his greatest contribution to Marxist aesthetics. Raphael instan-
tiates my earlier point about the paradoxically democratizing effects of an
emphasis on artistic skill and argues that it is through the reconstitutive
description articulated by the art critic but experienced by each viewer that
the energy in the work is released. The viewer shares the work of the artist
insofar as he or she reconstructs the work, which is why Raphael emphasizes
that "art leads us from the work to the process of creation": "We see how
form is constituted by a specific artistic method and how form follows
necessarily upon form. That is what I meant when I said that art leads us
from the work to the process of creation. The icy crust of mere presence
has melted away and we experience the creative process itself in the new,
enhanced reality which both appeals to our senses and suggests an infinite
wealth of meanings" (DA, p. 191 ).
705
 The artist must compel the viewer to recreate the process by
which the form of the work was made effective; if not, the viewer passes
over the work. Raphael argues, "The extent of the viewer's participation in
the work varies. In the case of works that do achieve effective form, we are
impelled to view them over and over, re-creating them each time; the process
may go on indefinitely. In the case of an inferior work, we feel no such urge.
This is how the artist gives a finished work the quality of continuing life:
he gives the finite the character of infinity, activating the viewer's own
infinite aspirations, awakening them and keeping them awake by certain
features present in the actual form itself: tensions between opposites and
their resolution" (DA, p. 224). Hence, the artistic energy locked in the work
is only released by this reconstitution in consumption.
Raphael is not only espousing a theory of the active viewer (re-
conciling aesthetic production and consumption) but also rejecting a re-
flectionist theory of art in favor of a more active, somewhat Brechtian view:
Whatever the deficiencies in Marx's theoretical atti-
tude toward art may have been, he was perfectly aware
that after the economic, social, and political revolution
the most difficult revolution would still remain to be
made-the cultural one. Nowhere did he ever exclude
art, as he excluded religion, on the ground that there
would be no place for it in a classless society. The
pseudo-Marxists who put art on the same footing with
religion do not see that religion sets limits to man's
creative capacities, diverts him from the things of this
world, and reconciles class antagonisms by obviously
imaginary and frequently hypocritical theories oflove,
whereas art is an ever-renewed creative act, the active
dialogue between spirit and matter; the work of art
holds man's creative powers in a crystalline suspen-
sion from which it can again be transformed into living
energies. Consequently, art by its very nature is no
opiate; it is a weapon. Art may have narcotic effects,
but only if used for specific reactionary purposes; and
from this we may infer only that attempts are made
to blunt it for the very reason that it is feared as a
weapon. (DA, p. 187)
While this passage defines Raphael's position as a Marxist aesthetician, it
is only in his substantive analyses that we can test the validity ofhis method.
Raphael's approach is best illustrated in his comparison of two
different treatments of the subject of the Last Supper. He shows that the
artists differed in both their ideas of the meaning of the subject and their
representation of it. What they share, however, is that each painter found
a visual form that in itself expressed the meaning the subject had for him.
Leonardo da Vinci expressed degradation, betrayal, and collapse in the drop-
ping of the table below the line of vision and in the clustering of the apostles
in confused groups. For Tintoretto, the dominant meaning of the subject
is not betrayal but the doctrine of transubstantiation that emerges from the
Last Supper. To express this movement between the terrestrial and other-
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 Michele Barrett
worldly spheres, Tintoretto uses a table placed along a wall that stretches
into infinity, with light and shadow playing along its length. His discovery
of this most appropriate artistic form is all the more striking in that, as
Raphael shows, he spent fifty years painting the subject in different ways
before finding the particular form that matched his understanding of the
theme. Raphael's point is that these artists used figuration (including means
of representation) in different ways to render their idea in a material form.
The Demands of Art largely consists of detailed analyses of in-
dividual paintings. All I can do here is to sketch out, for purposes of dis-
cussion, some examples of Raphael's "reconstitution" of specific works.
Raphael greatly admires Cezanne's Mont Sainte- Victoire of 1904-6, which
he claims is the only one of the seven treatments of this subject by Cezanne
that balances tension and arrives at true greatness. He stresses its radical
rejection of the conventions of perspective in painting: instead of repre-
senting empty space receding to infinite depth, Cezanne gives us filled space
with the back of the picture tightly closed. Raphael sees the painting pri-
marily in terms of its use of planes: the back/top plane is pushing forward
and inward into the picture; the bottom/front plane is pushing outward to
the back of the picture; and the tension is balanced, held in check by the
middle plane. Raphael explains in detail how the use and juxtaposition of
color contributes to this division of the picture into planes.
Although it is widely known that Cezanne's theme is taken from
the countryside around Aix-en-Provence (and, indeed, people visit Mont
Sainte-Victoire to "see the original"), the picture is not based on any one
viewpoint. No photograph can correspond to what is shown in the painting,
since (in Raphael's words) Cezanne has subordinated visual perception to
pictorial figuration. This, according to Raphael, is Cezanne's greatest
achievement: he uses some aspects of natural appearance but not others.
The painting is not a landscape, but nature has provided a model, and
Cezanne has "refashioned the classical and given nature a classical solidity."
Raphael's analysis of Picasso's Guernica concludes that the pri-
mary effect of the painting is shock and that it conveys the "destructiveness
of a disintegrating society with a power no other artist has equalled." He
describes its figuration as constituted by the use of black and white, rather
than color, and by line. The former expresses the most ultimate and general
while the latter exemplifies individual emotion. But, Raphael argues, the
real world is composed of objects, nature, society, and history; it does not
operate with these extremes of abstraction and individuality. Picasso's ex-
clusive reliance on black and white and on line restrict the painting to the
category of a private allegory; hence, the understandable confusion among
critics as to what, for example, the bull stands for. The pictorial vocabulary
is limited and the codes used (e.g., triangles and angles referring back to
earlier representational conventions) are not universally accessible.
Raphael argues that the content of Guernica-a world without
hope, humankind reduced to a scream-is not expressed or achieved in the
figuration but remains a private intellectual and emotional motivation of
the painter that can be seen through the figuration. There is, therefore, an
arbitrary rather than a necessary relation between form and content in this
work. It offers no progression, development, or resolution and has no ref-
erence point in its ordering of space. Hence, although Raphael recognizes
the power of the painting in terms of shock, he concludes that it is an outright
707
failure as a picture since Picasso could find no figuration suited to his idea
and had to resort to allegory.
Raphael's view that the formal characteristics of a painting can
be linked to social or sociological considerations is illustrated in his dis-
cussion of a painting with a more straightforward social content, The Peas-
ant Family, by the seventeenth-century painter Le Nain. 15 This, he argues
is a "materialist text" in that it views the ruled class from its own point of
view, by its representation of both oppression and resistance. John Tagg's
summary of Raphael's interpretation conveys most clearly this dialectical
dimension of the painting:
The first feature of Le Nain's painting to which Ra-
phael draws attention is the eye level, denoting the
height from which the spectator views the scene. He
observes that it runs through the eyes of almost all the
sitting and standing figures in the picture, just a little
below the upper edge of the canvas. The spectator,
therefore, sees everything from above looking down-
wards, so that one's descending glance seems to de-
press the human figures; an effect which is reinforced
by the sensation of weight in the clothing, especially
of the two principal women. Not only, therefore, are
the figures hemmed in at the top by an invisible fron-
tier, but one's very way of seeing "binds them to the
ground like a chain, and this condition of being bound
on all sides, this narrow dependence, is more than just
a sign of their poverty: it strikes us as its inescapable
cause."
Yet the picture Le Nain gives of the plight
of the peasants is not one sided. In their very abject
state, one sees the peasants' strength and their struggle
for existence. One sees, too, that the formal and sen-
sory means by which this strength is expressed are
closely linked with the means used to convey their
poverty. Whereas the viewer's line of sight depresses
them, each of the figures seems to rise up from the
hips, as if protesting against its repression. Each in-
dividual is constituted by a double and conflicting force:
a sinking down and a rising up which embodies that
unity of poverty and strength, exploitation and will
for freedom which no present-day work has been able
to show. "Only by expressing this unity," Raphael de-
clares, "is it possible to avoid the one-sidedness of
sentimental pictures about the poor on the one hand,
and of falsely heroic, hero-worshipping pictures about
workers on the other." 16
As this example shows, Raphael's primary concern is with the ways in which
an artist finds a pictorial form that inherently and inevitably expresses the
idea or content of the work. This integral relation of form and meaning is
the necessary condition of artistic excellence and aesthetic value. Yet this
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 Michele Barrett
approach to the analysis of art has significant difficulties, some of which I
now want to discuss.
Raphael claims that his method amounts to a science of art in
which laws could be formulated. The appendix to The Demands ofArt starts
with a bold declaration: "This work sets itself the task of making art an
object of scientific cognition." Raphael describes his theory as "empirical"
because it is based on a study of works from all periods and nations. He
goes so far as to make the extraordinary statement that "I am convinced
that mathematics, which has travelled a long way since Euclid, will someday
provide us with the means of formulating the results of such a study in
mathematical terms" (DA, p. 207). Yet, as with so many art critics, many
of Raphael's interpretative comments are entirely devoid of qualitative jus-
tification, let alone scientific validation. Many of the examples he uses,
particularly when illustrating passing points, are ideological readings rather
than formal analyses; indeed, this slippage is part of his method. There is
a difference between uncontentious observations (e.g., that line is dominant
in Guernica, or that Mont Sainte- Victoire is composed of more than one
plane) and statements such as the following: "In The Virgin and Child with
St. Anne Leonardo da Vinci embodies an idealistic conception of Reason
in sensory qualities, which are most fully expressed in the shoulder line"
(DA, p. 217). Indeed, it is not self-evident that da Vinci's dropping of the
table in The Last Supper expresses collapse or degradation, or that the raising
of the line of vision in Le Nain's The Peasant Family inevitably conveys
poverty. Such judgments veer perilously toward the reefs on which much
bourgeois art history and criticism often founder-the claim that such-and-
such a feature inevitably expresses stability or resignation or whatever the
critic reads into it. Yet, Raphael insists that these judgments, based on
technical observation, must be neutral and impersonal. The question of
value should only be considered at the end of the analysis (DA, p. 198).
However, he himself does not accomplish this, although in my view his
technical analyses provide some openings for a less ideological art criticism.
The underlying reason for Raphael's failure to achieve more neu-
tral and objective positions is an unresolved conflict in his theoretical frame-
work between an emphasis on artistic production (in the spirit of Walter
Benjamin) and a profoundly Lukacsian subsumption of art to the category
of ideology. Raphael is an early exponent of the "relative autonomy" ap-
proach to art. At times he categorizes art as a subset within ideology and
sees types of artistic work (expressive, dogmatic, skeptical, etc.) as ideolog-
ical. By and large he regards art as a battleground of ideological struggle,
although he tries to insist that (to put it crudely) the ideological content is
less important than the extent to which the artist can find an appropriate
form in which to express it: "what matters in a work of art is not this specific
'something' contributed by the subject matter but the intensity with which
the over-all meaning is conveyed by the figuration and for the sake of which
whatever might create discrepancy between meaning and content is elimi-
nated" (DA, p. 196).
Raphael's position on the classic problem of the economic de-
termination of the cultural is unclear and contradictory. Although, as quoted
earlier, he describes cultural revolution as the most difficult of revolutions,
he concludes The Demands ofArt with the following rather orthodox view:
"Creative instinct manifests itself with greater freedom in art than in any
709
 other domain. A creative, active study of art is therefore indispensable to
awaken creative powers, to assert them against the dead weight of tradition,
and to mobilize them in the struggle for a social order in which everyone
will have the fullest opportunity to develop his creative capacities. The
details of this social order cannot be anticipated without falling into utopian
dreams. We can and we must be satisfied with the awareness that art helps
us to achieve the truly just order. The decisive battles, however, will be
fought at another level" (DA, p. 204).
In addition to this general orientation, Raphael's interpretations
are often based on specific Lukacsian concepts, of which the most important
is totality. Raphael's understanding of dialectic is rooted in the Lukacsian
balance between particularity and totality and in the notion of the histor-
ically typical individual: "I believe that it would not destroy but enlarge
scientific method in the domain of art to pair the concept of particularity
with the concept of totality-a totality which combines the same factors of
form, content, and method at a higher level" (DA, p. 208).
As I have already suggested, it is uncertain that Raphael's judg-
ments of aesthetic value really do wait, as he demands, for the end of the
analysis. In fact, although I have glossed his specific analyses in such a way
as to minimize it, much of his interpretation is grounded in the familiar
and tedious rhetoric of support for realism and hostility to modernism that
vitiates so much of Lukacs's own work. To illustrate this I now turn to the
"value" element of Raphael's analysis of Cezanne and Picasso.
It is characteristic of Raphael's originality that, although a Marx-
ist aesthetician, he can regard a Cezanne landscape as one of the greatest
artworks ever produced and castigate Guernica, for decades a symbol of
antifascism, as "ineffective propaganda." The substance of Raphael's case
is that allegorical painting (of which Guernica is an example) is always
inferior to painting in which the content is realized in the form, 17 a demand
that is tied closely to a realist aesthetics such as Lukacs's. Raphael's strictures
on Monet's paintings echo, often in detail, those of Lukacs on writers such
as Joyce or Eliot. Raphael writes that "for all their lyricism they remain
bound up with the description of a localized atmosphere. In their contents
the here-and-now takes precedence over the universal, the momentary over
the enduring. Reason and the human body are alike eliminated as cognitive
faculties; the intellect serves only to analyze and differentiate sharpened
sense perception, and the feeling accompanying it is vague" (DA, p. 232). 18
Raphael's unstinting praise for Cezanne and his unswerving crit-
icism of Picasso are difficult to comprehend, especially when some of the
very features under discussion are shared. Both, Raphael agrees, reject the
conventions of perspective and render space as filled rather than empty. It
is almost as though a little bit of modernism is acceptable as long as it is
compatible with pictorial coherence. Raphael does not engage with the ar-
gument that Cezanne and Picasso were engaged in comparable challenges
to representational conventions. 19
The classic position of any realist aesthetics is that the means of
representation must be concealed, and the Brechtian and modernist chal-
lenge to realism is principally concerned with this desideratum. Raphael's
insistence that meaning must be realized in form goes hand in hand with
the orthodox realist view. His approval of the Le Nain painting mentioned
earlier rests partly on the fact that the composition of the work is "concealed
710
 Michele Barrett
and made as far as possible invisible, so as not to interfere with an impres-
sion of easy and accidental naturalness. " 20
Insofar as such realist precepts inform Raphael's reconstitution
of the work, as well as his final evaluation, his criticism elevates a particular
aesthetic to universal status. Many Marxist aestheticians have claimed that
realism is the natural companion to historical materialism, but the case is
far from made. Terry Lovell's Pictures ofReality argues that, although Marx-
ist thought is based on a realist epistemology, there are no grounds for
assuming that Marxist aesthetics should support realism. Such an assump-
tion confuses the goals of art with those of knowledge. 21 Raphael, for all his
insistence that the work of art be apprehended in aesthetic terms, tends to
concur with Lukacs that "great art" embodies the truths of historical ma-
terialism.
Raphael's objection to Guernica is that it only shocks and does
not point to any resolution. Yet Marxism is not a theory that resembles the
eighteenth-century ideal of balance, stability, and the inevitably resolved
chord. Nor is its politics that of the "realist" happy ending-waiting for
history to make a revolution. Insofar as Marxism is an active theory and
politics, calling upon us to make our own struggle, it requires a less dogmatic
and complacent aesthetic.
Nonetheless, however unsatisfactory Raphael's interpretations of
particular works may be, his method exposes some problems that we need
to confront. His precept, drawn from Rodin, of "study the work" and the
theory he elaborates of the "active" viewer's role in the reconstitution of
the work are useful. But they are limited by the degree to which they exclude
social and historical considerations. Raphael does not recognize that mean-
ing is, at least partially, constructed in the history of a work's reception; we
cannot view a Rodin sculpture with an eye that is innocent of all knowledge
ofRodin's place in a "canon" of works. Raphael does not really acknowledge
the social constitution of the body of work he scrutinizes; he does not add
to his detailed visual descriptions an adequate description of the class, gen-
der, and race factors that structure the status of the works he chooses to
study. And just as each work is located in a cultural-historical context, so
our modes of apprehension are specific to the concerns of a particular con-
juncture. Although Raphael recognizes the fact of"vision having a history,"
he tends to relate it to epochal characteristics such as religious belief and
to ignore its more local purchase. Raphael's interpretations show the weak-
nesses of ignoring the social dimensions of reception. He rules by fiat that
Guernica is ineffective propaganda when as a matter of fact the absence of
an allegorical key to the painting has not hindered the polemical manipu-
lation of this powerful work in a propaganda campaign against fascism.
Indeed, many would argue that the subject of Guernica is treated more
effectively through ambiguous and allegorical means than it ever could have
been in a realist mode.
Raphael's main difficulty is that he tries to tie form and meaning
too closely together. We do not have to espouse a totally relativist position
of meaning (which would say that any given work is completely open to
the construction of an infinite range of meanings) to argue that the meaning
of a work cannot be contained by simple formulae such as meaning should
be realized in form, or that reconciliation and synthesis are an essential
element of aesthetic value. Raphael's theory of the active viewer tends to
see the only possible appropriation of the work as a recreation of the author's
711
 work and ties meaning too closely to the question of authorial intention
and imagination.
Raphael's work has, for us, a certain methodological innocence.
He fails to see that definitions of beauty and aesthetic value are constructed
from theoretical tools that have a history, just as vision and modes of
aesthetic apprehension have histories. Yet this does not render his work
uninteresting. The concepts we use and the subjects we scrutinize are also
historically constituted, and we need to beware of assuming that our own
methodologies are somehow purer than the old ones. Terry Eagleton points
to this by putting a sting in the tail of his characterization of"the aesthetic"
as an ideology fostered by psychic fragmentation (and, we could add, the
separation of art from work in capitalism). He comments that psychoanal-
ysis, too, is a symptom of psychic fragmentation: "The very analytic in-
struments we deploy are in this sense ideologically guilty." 22 My point is
that we should avoid the assumption that there are historically specific
categories such as "the aesthetic" which are reactionary and bourgeois, while
our new categories, such as "signification" and "pleasure," are in some way
purged of these limitations.
Raphael's usefulness, in my view, lies in the fact that he tries to
explore the ways in which meaning is connected both to aesthetic form and
to the senses. This project is difficult, and one that few contemporary writers
address in its complexity; it is not currently considered very important. The
dominant interest in cultural studies at the moment is in a conception of
meaning stripped oftraditional aesthetic questions, one that does not engage
with the issue of the senses. The very definition of"culture" that is effective
tends to be exclusively concerned with meaning. The fact that signification
theory-the analysis ofthe meanings constructed in systems of signs-is now
a consensual position in various debates is further evidence of this. The
insistence that culture is a field of production and that its product is meaning
was radical at a time when we were trying to wrest the definition of culture
from the grip of reflection theory. That battle, however, is now over, and
the exclusive emphasis on meaning in the analysis of culture needs further
thought.
Insofar as Raphael tries to explore the connections between
meaning and the senses, and between meaning and aesthetic form, his work
should be of current interest. Although his interpretations of particular works
are often dogmatic or contentious, this does not make his overall project
any less important. If we are to continue to try to understand cultural ex-
perience as well as signifying practice-if we are to move beyond the often
remarked polarization of "culturalism and structuralism"-we must ques-
tion this reduction of culture to meaning. This reduction has provided a
definitional basis for agreement between adherents of very divergent the-
oretical positions, and for this reason we are perhaps too cautious in stepping
out from its protection.

Notes

I would like to thank Cora Kaplan and Mary Mcintosh for their help with this paper; also John
Tagg for his work in making more of Max Raphael's writings available in English.

712
 Michele Barrett
Janet Wolff. Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983). pp. 18-
19.
2 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). p. 2.
3 Ronald Frankenberg. "Styles of Marxism; Styles of Criticism. Wuthering Heights: A Case
Study," Sociological Review Monograph, no. 26 (1978).
4 Terry Lovell. Pictures of Real1ty: Aesthetics. Politics, Pleasure (London: British Film Institute,
1980)
5 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text. trans. Richard M1ller (London: Cape, 1976).
6 Fredric Jameson, "Pleasure: A Political Issue," Formations of Pleasure (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1983).
7 Claire Pajaczkowska. "Structure and Pleasure," Block, no. 9 (1983). p. 13.
8 Peter Fuller, Art and Psychoanalysis (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative,
1980)
9 Max Raphael, The Demands of Art, trans. Norbert Guterman (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul. 1968). p. 207. Hereafter cited in the text as DA.
10 I d1scuss this in "Feminism and the Definition of Cultural Politics," in Feminism, Culture and
Politics. ed. R. Brunt and C Rowan (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983).
11 See, for example, Heinnch Wolfflin, Classic Art (Oxford: Phaidon, 1980): "There is a con-
ception of art-history which sees nothing more in art than a 'translation of life' (Taire) into
pictorial terms. and which attempts to interpret every style as an expression of the prevailing
mood of the age Who would wish to deny that th1s is a fruitful way of looking at the matter?
Yet it takes us only so far-as far. one might say, as the point at which art beg1ns" (p. 287).
12 Max Raphael was born in Prussia 1n 1889 and educated in Germany. He lived in various
cities. including Paris, and in 1941 settled in New York, dying there in 1952. Much of his
work has been published posthumously and some of it is still not available in English. The
maJor works available are The Demands of Art; Proudhon, Marx, Picasso: Three Studies in
the Sociology of Art (trans. lnge Marcuse, ed. John Tagg [London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1980; New York: Humanities. 1980]). The latter contains a bibliography of Raphael's pub-
lished and unpublished work, compiled by John Tagg. My exposition is drawn largely from
The Demands of Art. wh1ch deals principally with aesthetic questions. Proudhon, Marx,
P1casso is more theoretical and sociological in 1ts focus.
13 Heinrich Wolfflm, Principles of Art History (New York: Dover, 1950). p. 226.
14 Raphael. Proudhon, Marx, Picasso, p. 83. Hereafter cited in the text as PMP.
15 An English translation of the relevant part of Raphael's Arbeiter, Kunst und Kunstler(Frankturt:
Fischer Verlag, 1975) by Anna Bostock appears under the title "Workers and the Historical
Heritage of Art," 1n On Art and Society, a supplement of Women and Art, Summer/Fall 1972
(New York).
16 John Tagg, "The Method of Criticism and Its Object in Max Raphael's Theory of Art," Block,
no. 2 (Spring 1980).
17 Raphael writes in The Demands of Art, "Were Picasso to prov1de an allegorical key to Guer-
nica. 1t would still be true that what he produced is ineffectual as propaganda and dubious
as a work of art" (p. 153).
18 Lukacs's view that in modernism "man IS reduced to a sequence of unrelated experiential
fragments" 1s summarized in "The Ideology of Modernism," The Meaning of Contemporary
Realism (London: Merlin, 1972)
19 See, for example. Anton Ehrenzweig, The Psycho-analysis of Artistic Vision and Heanng (New
York: Braziller. 1965). Ehrenzweig compares Cezanne's challenge to the convention of con-
stant peripheral v1sion with Picasso's challenge to that of constant localization.
20 Quoted in Tagg, "The Method of Criticism," p. 6.
21 Lovell, Pictures of Reality, chaps. 4, 5.
22 Terry Eagleton, "Poetry, Pleasure and Politics," Formations of Pleasure (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1983). p. 64

713
 Fengzhen Wang

Marxist Literary Criticism in China

Ch1nese literary criticism has come to recognize that lit-

erature need not only conform to our political philoso-
phy but also serve the spiritual needs of the masses.
Th1s is not possible without emphasizing formal and
aesthetic criteria.

In the past thirty years and more, since the founding

of the new China, literary criticism in China has accomplished a great deal,
but it has also encountered many problems. The main difficulty was brought
about by slogans like "Political criteria first, artistic criteria second," which
launched political movements in literary circles from the mid-fifties to the
mid-seventies. These aimed to apply the demands of a mass political move-
ment directly to literary art, requiring the latter to be a tool or weapon of
the class struggle; they denied that literature and art have their own aesthetic
rules and thus ignored the exploration of form, style, and technique. More
important, these movements refused to recognize that the broad masses in
fact have various spiritual needs, to which art can respond. As a result, the
full range of necessary standards in literary criticism were reduced to only
one-political-and artistic criteria became at best a subordinate factor. When
evaluating a concrete literary work, the political content was the only im-
portant element. If it was politically acceptable, it was considered a good
work; otherwise, no matter how artistically valuable it might be, it was
treated as inferior. Politics essentially replaced art or made it invisible, which
led critical writing into oversimplified and formalized generalizations that
verged on propaganda.
How did such a situation arise? The first reason, I
think, was the widespread misunderstanding of Mao Zedong's speech at the
Yanan Forum on Literature and Art in 1942. "Politics cannot be equated
with art," he said. "Each class in every class society has its own political
and artistic criteria. But all classes in all class societies invariably put the
political criterion first and the artistic criterion second." 1 Perhaps what he
said was appropriate for that historical moment, but later practice has proved
that it is neither so easy nor necessarily appropriate to say which criterion
is first and which is second. In any case, the attempt to set these priorities
provoked a general misunderstanding of art; and problems in criticism inev-
itably followed. It is important to remember that Mao also said, "What we
demand is the unity of politics and art, the unity of content and form, the
unity of revolutionary political content and the highest possible perfection
of artistic form .... Therefore, we oppose both works of art with an incorrect
political view-point and the tendency toward the 'poster and slogan' which
is correct in political view-point but lacking in artistic power." 2 While this
seems to reject a flat reduction of art to politics, the importance Mao gave
715
to politics in his speech probably made it impossible to avoid these reductive
influences on criticism.
The second factor seems to me to have been the influence of
Soviet literary criticism, especially the theories ofPlekhanov and Zhdanov.
In his preface to the Twenty- Year Essays, Plekhanov insisted that the first
task of criticism was to transfer the thought of the work from an artistic to
a social language so as to find the social equivalent for literary phenomena;
the second task was to make judgments about the aesthetic value of the
work. It is clear that he meant to place political thought before and above
questions of artistry and aesthetics. Zhdanov followed Lenin's remark that
"literature must become Party literature" in his address to the First Soviet
Writers Congress of 1934 and defended such reductionism by saying that
"our Soviet literature is not afraid of the charge of being 'tendentious.' "
Literature, he argued, must become "a small cog" in the social-democratic
mechanism. Clearly he meant that literature belonged to the Communist
party, hence to politics. Both Plekhanov and Zhdanov had a strong influence
on Chinese critics: their theories were first introduced into China in the
thirties, and by the fifties most Chinese critics followed them; and they also
had an impact on the younger generations of critics in China. Thus it is not
untrue to say that literary criticism in China was, for over thirty years,
mainly defined by Zhdanovism and the so-called orthodox school of Marx-
ism.
Since the end of the cultural revolution there has been an en-
ergetic and continuing series of discussions on the criteria that should govern
literary criticism. The prevailing viewpoint has been to replace the ortho-
doxy defined by the statment "Literature is subordinate to and must serve
politics" with a less reductionist position, namely, "Literature serves the
people and socialism.'' This change is not only a matter of theory but also
of practice. While it is the result of theoretical arguments on the relations
between literary art and politics, it also sums up the historical experiences
of the past thirty years. The change in these slogans is based as well on a
Marxist view of historical materialism and dialectics. According to Marx,
"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into def-
inite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material
forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a
legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions
the general process of social, political, and intellectuallife.'' 3 In other words,
the legal, political superstructure and the corresponding forms of social
consciousness (including literature) are autonomous; politics and literature
cannot be subordinated to the substructure of the social relations of pro-
duction. Considering current Chinese conditions, this has two implications:
( 1) Literature has a variety of functions and can serve people of different
societies and meet diffenmt political contingencies; for instance, Chinese
classic poems, Shakespeare's plays, and Balzac's novels were not only good
for the people of their own time but also can be beneficial to people at the
present time in all countries. (2) Literature and politics also influence each
other; moreover, though literature can serve politics in certain social con-
716
 Fengzhen Wang
ditions, as happened in China and the Soviet Union, it cannot be limited
or reduced to this role.
The change in slogans is, therefore, fundamentally significant for
the Chinese people. As a result, Chinese critics are using a dialectical method
to rethink and reestablish the criteria appropriate to literary criticism. Engels
said in his letter to Lassalle in 1859, "You see I judge your work from an
aesthetic and historical point of view, a high criterion, maybe the highest,
and only by this gauge can I raise some disagreements, which is the best
proof that I admire this work of yours. " 4 In fact, in an earlier comment on
Karl Grun, Engels said, "We have never criticized Goethe from a moral or
a partisan point of view, but from an aesthetic and historical point of view;
we do not judge him by the moral, political and human scale." 5 Most critics
in China now see Marxist literary criticism as including two perspectives:
the aesthetic and the historical. What is the Marxist aesthetic viewpoint?
What is the Marxist historical viewpoint? What is their relation? These are
the questions that have been and continue to be addressed.
Careful study of the works of Marx and Engels shows that their
aesthetic principles are truthfulness and typification. In a comment on Eu-
gene Sue, Marx said that writers should "describe human relations truth-
fully." When he explained why Greek art had permanent force, the first
thing he mentioned was truthfulness. He treated ancient Greece as an early,
formative stage of humankind and thought Greek art represented that stage
truthfully. Truthfulness, however, is not to be identified with naturalism's
attempt to reflect the social world "photographically." Truthfulness tran-
scends such particular conventions; it can be established in (and can ground
the evaluation of) such diverse work as Greek epic and myth, the literature
of the Middle Ages, Shakespeare, Goethe, and Balzac.
Artistic truthfulness is different from the surface reality of the
world. It is the product of a dialectical relation between social life and its
essence. In our world, there is both a given reality of events and visual
surfaces and some order or rule that governs such events-the essence of
things, the soul of existing reality. Literature should not merely copy or
imitjlte the surface reality but try to show its essence by the way it describes
concrete matters. Thus, literature differs from philosophy, for it depicts the
essence of reality through a description of the events of social life and thereby
suggests the relationship between essences and phenomena, whereas phil-
osophical explanations tend to leap immediately from observed phenomena
to their essential nature. As Lukacs said, ••Balzac's greatness lies precisely
in the fact that in spite of all his political and ideological prejudices he yet
observed with incorruptible eyes all contradictions as they arose, and faith-
fully described them. " 6
Some people may take this position to be nothing more than
traditional or even nineteenth-century realism. But one should not forget
that modernism is not so modem as it seems; it is at least 200 years old.
There is a direct continuum from the realists who tried to make narrative
meaningful to modem critics who define themselves by their separation
from realism and even from narrativity itself. The nineteenth-century realist
novelists were aware of the possibilities of indeterminate meaning and so-
lipsism, but they wrote against the very indeterminacy they tended to reveal.
Their narratives do not acquiesce to the conventions of order they inherited
but struggle to reconstruct a coherent world out of a world being decon-
717
structed all around them, like modernist texts. With remarkable regularity,
these realist novelists were alert to the arbitrariness of the reconstructed
order and believed that their fictions could bring us at least a little closer
to recognizing what is not true to ourselves and not in our best interest,
and not merely bring us closer to language. For instance, both Balzac and
Dickens viewed bourgeois society as overwhelming and inescapable, and
their novels presented visions ofthe fate of subjectivity in that world. Balzac,
in the 1842 preface to La comMie humaine, saw his effort as a panoramic
history portraying a few thousand character types with their passions embed-
ded in everyday life. Each novel in the series focuses on an aspect of that
world, whether provincial or Parisian, upper or lower class. Balzac empha-
sized the interrelations within that world by having some characters appear
and reappear in different novels. Dickens, by contrast, in his social novels
ofthe 1850s, saw a schism between human nature and contemporary social
life. For him, human beings were like orphans in an urban, industrialized
society, one that was hostile and confused, that reduced human beings to
stereotypes. Dickens enhanced his somber picture by using certain recurrent
symbols, such as the "fog" in Bleak House, the "fact" in Hard Times, and
the "prison" in Little Dorrit. Balzac's characters are driven by monoman-
iacal passions; the world is an object of their desire. Dickens's characters
are metaphysical personae for worldly values. Both authors have been charged
with creating fixed and one-dimensional characters, but it is more appro-
priate to say that they portrayed the reduction of subjectivity by the material
forces of bourgeois society.
In literature, typification has a direct connection with truthful-
ness. The notion of typification, or typicality, may be thought old-fashioned
in Western literary theory and criticism, but it still has an important place
among Chinese critics and writers. As I understand it, it is a means of
representing the process of development from essence to phenomena with
concrete, vivid, and sensible images. Marx said in his letter to Lassalle that
he felt sorry he could not see any "particular" description of characters.
(The concept of "particularity," one of Hegel's significant aesthetic concep-
tions, is very important in Marxist literary thought.) Engels expressed sim-
ilar concerns in his letter to Minna Kautsky: "As for the characters in those
two situations, I think you created them with your usual vivid characteristic
description; each is typical and individual ... and it should be so. " 7 Marx
and Engels stressed that the general is implied in the individual while the
typical individual is the centralized expression of the general. That is why
Engels said, "It seems to me that the meaning of realism, except for the
details of the reality, is the representation of the typical character in typical
situations." According to Engels, typification is different than Horace's ty-
pology, than Zola's photographic realism, than Schiller's dissolution of char-
acter into abstract rules.
Typification is a whole, consisting of general and special features
of time, society, and humankind. It is also a shift of focus from the large
to the small, from the general to the particular, but it does not stay at that
reduced scale. Lukacs said that typification weaves the social, moral, intel-
lectual, and spiritual contradictions into a vivid body. Don Quixote's mad-
ness is not capricious but corresponds to a reality in the outside world.
Therefore, typical characters stand for something larger and more mean-
ingful than themselves, than their isolated individual destinies: they are
concrete individualities that at the same time maintain a relationship with
718
 Fengzhen Wang
some more general or collective human substance. Hamlet's most obvious
characteristic is hesitation and delay; he knows his responsibility is to make
a vital change, but he does not know how to accomplish it. Don Quixote
is the opposite. He sees his illusion as truth, tries every unrealistic way to
realize it, and finally exp~riences strange disasters. Lukacs's writings on
Goethe and Balzac, on Schiller and Hegel, and on the rise of the historical
novel, are classic critiques of realism and show clearly how important typ-
ification is in literary works.
Marxist aesthetics also stress the importance of the unity of form
and content. Artistic form is the means to express content, and content must
be represented through artistic form; form is useless without content and
content is not apprehensible without form-the two cannot be separated.
Content includes theme, characters, settings, and situations, while form
includes genre, language, structure, rhythm, tone, and color. For a social
theory of literature, the problem of form is a problem of the relations be-
tween social modes and historical theory, based on the materiality of lan-
guage and the related materiality of cultural production. It is a problem of
the description of these variable relations within specifiable material prac-
tices. Form depends on its perception as well as its creation. In the past, as
a result of the primary commitment to politics, Chinese critics have given
too much attention to content. But now they have taken up the dialectical
viewpoint in their critical practice. As a Chinese critic once said, "Literature
is like a river. The form is the river-bed and the content is the water. If the
river-bed is deep and solid, it can hold more water and make it clear; but
there cannot be any real river without water." Good literary works unite
content and form in a perfect whole.
Marxist literary criticism must also take a historical point of view.
Accordingly, literary criticism should be based on the reality described in
concrete works: if the work is about life in the eighteenth century, it should
not be criticized according to life in the nineteenth or twentieth century; if
the work is about some events in England, it should not be criticized on
the basis of events in other countries. In their criticism of Lassalle's Franz
Von Sickingen, Marx and Engels stated that the critique of the work, whether
it is judged to be good or bad, deep or shallow, should be grounded in
sixteenth-century German life, for the work represents the revolt led by
Sickingen at the beginning ofthat century. When criticizing Paul Ernst, who
believed that the life of the urban petite bourgeoisie expressed in Ibsen's
works was the life of that class everywhere, Engels pointed out that he
imposed his perception of the German urban petit bourgeoisie on that in
Norway. Similarly, Greek myth is a source of Greek art; and the Egyptian
myth can never be the "mother's womb" of Greek art. The heroes in Greek
myth can only live in that ancient time.
Marx said, "Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on
what he thinks of himself, so we cannot judge such a period of transfor-
mation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must
be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing
conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of produc-
tion."8 If we apply this to literary criticism, our judgments of a literary work
must be based on the content expressed in the work. We must analyze the
work in terms of the time, social life, and situation of the work itself, as
Engels did in analyzing the City Girl on the basis of the movement of the
719
working class in England in the 1880s. In examining historical reality, we
must not forget the historical context. History is a continuum; no event in
history is independent. Literature as a whole has the task of depicting social
determination, of suggesting the basis of transition, and of pointing to tend-
encies toward change, whether it does so consciously or unconsciously. Cao
Zueqin's Dreams of the Red Chamber, which shows the demise of Chinese
feudal society through the description of a large family, must be understood
in its social context; otherwise, its significance is completely lost.
The history of humankind is a history of class society over the
past several thousand years. Even today, although there are countries that
no longer have such class distinctions, the reflection of different classes in
thought and ideology still exists. Thus, Marxist literary criticism must still
include the question of class viewpoints. Marx said that "the human essence
is no abstraction inherent in each single individual; in reality, it is the
ensemble of the social relations. " 9 And class relations are the most basic
and pertinent relation in class society, one of the decisive factors for human
nature. All people who live in a class society bear the stamp of their own
class. As Lu Xun once said, "In Dreams of the Red Chamber Jiao Da in
Jia's mansion can never fall in love with sister Lin. Jiao Da is a servant
while sister Lin is the daughter of a high ranking official and the grand-
daughter of Grandma Jia, the oldest in Jia's family. They belong to different
classes and their thoughts, ideals, language and manners, their ways ofliving
... all are different. There is no common ground for their falling in love."
In his criticism of Sickingen, Engels argued that the play is faulty because
the intellectual flaw Lassalle stressed is not the real cause of Sickingen's
downfall. The real cause is not a moral but a social one: Sickingen could
never have had the support of the revolutionary peasants because his basic
social aim was utterly different from theirs, focused not on liberating the
land but on reestablishing the petty nobility, which itself suffered from the
domination of the great princes and the church. For Marx and Engels,
Sickingen does not typify the real historical dilemma; the situation of the
play does not give a genuine picture of that period. Sickingen's failure comes
from his class position: he has no common interests with the peasants and
thus is doomed to failure. Marx and Engels saw the play from a historical
class viewpoint. Though there are no longer class distinctions in China,
people recognize that different class thoughts and ideologies still exist. The
traditional class viewpoint of Marxism is thus still an important and nec-
essary part of Chinese literary criticism.
In recent years, Chinese critics have tried to enlarge and develop
their study and interpretation of Marxist doctrines. They have broken the
limits of the old criteria and begun to pay attention to the interior, psy-
chological realities ofliterature. A recent essay on Wang Meng, for example,
argues that Wang Meng's stories have a large proportion of psychological
description. Psychology has become an important focus for literary criticism,
while characters' actions, narrative events, and the outer world have become
the background. Deviating considerably from traditional realism, some of
Wang Meng's stories include characters that undergo physical metamor-
phosis; in "Mixed Colour," for example, a horse and a man become one
character. Although Wang Meng's stories have transcended traditional time
and space and moved in a new direction, somewhat like stream-of-con-
sciousness, they are quite different from pure descriptions of self-conscious
720
 Fengzhen Wang
or sub-conscious mental processes, which tend to disregard the reader's
sensations and experience. Wang Meng treats feelings and descriptions al-
most like notes and rhythm in a musical composition; they are certainly as
important as plot in some of his work. Now that his attempt to develop his
own style of realism has attracted critical attention, the critics may develop
an expanded conception of realism.
Not long ago there were some debates on "cloudy poems" (poems
using an impressionistic technique); these were, in fact, debates on realism.
Some said that such poems were an experimental effort to express interior
reality; others said they were bad literature and definitely antirealistic. I
would like to quote two poems by Gu Cheng, a leading cloudy poet, to give
some sense of the typical form.
A Feeling
The Sky is a gray color,
The Road is gray-colored,
The Buildings are gray color,
The rain is gray-colored,
Within a strip of deadly gray,
Two children walk by,
One is bright red,
One is bright green.
Far and Near
You,
In a little while look at me,
In a little while look at the cloud.
I feel that
When you look at me, you are very far;
When you look at the cloud, you are very near.
These poems certainly have moved away from traditional conceptions of
realism. Though most critics have severely criticized them, they have stim-
ulated others to reconsider the notion of realism.
Generally speaking, however, realistic modes of representation
still prevail in Chinese literature. It is thought that the basic truths of life
can be told through the vehicle of individual stories and individual plots.
But in the modern Western world, realism has become relatively rare; life
is experienced as a kind of waiting without end. The only reality of human
experience seems to be the blind routine and drudgery of daily work. People
become a part of the social machine. Thus, it is natural that there are
differences in how Marxism is applied "according to different concrete con-
ditions." The present approach in China is to restore a Marxist aesthetic
and historical viewpoint as both suitable and workable.

Notes

Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: People's Press, 1968). p 871.

2 Ibid.
3 Marx, "Preface," A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy ( 1859).

721
4 Marx. Engels. Lenin. and Stalin. On Literature and Art (Beijing: People's Literature Publishing
House, 1980). p. 101.
5 lb1d. p. 40.
6 Lukacs, Studies m European Realism (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964). p. 21.
7 Marx et al., On Literature and Art, p. 130.
8 Marx. "Preface." p. 390.
9 Marx. Theses on Feuerbach.

722
 Notes on Contributors
Hugo Achugar
Hugo Achugar was born in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1944,
and received a Ph.D. in Latin American literature from the University of Pittsburgh.
He has taught at the Catholic University of Andreas Vello (Venezuela), the Central
University of Venezuela, and is currently at Northwestern University. He is the
author of more than ten books, including Textos para decir maria (1976) and Los
mariposas tropicales ( 1985).

Jack L. Amariglio
Jack L. Amariglio was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1951.
For many years he was involved in community organizing in the working-class,
ethnically diverse neighborhood in which he grew up. He received his B.A. in history
from the City College of New York in 1973, his Ph.D. in economics from the
University of Massachusetts in 1984, and is currently teaching economics at Franklin
and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. He has published on the philos-
ophy and methodology of economics, economic history, economic anthropology,
and Marxist social theory, and is presently writing a book on different historical
forms of "primitive communism" in the pre-twentieth-century United States.

Perry Anderson
Perry Anderson was born Francis Rory Peregrine Anderson
in London in 1938 and was educated at Eton College and Oxford University, where
he received a B.A. in French and Russian literature. After serving for almost twenty
years as the editor of New Left Review, he remains the primary voice on the editorial
committee. He has done research and taught at the Maison des Sciences de L'Homme
(Paris), the University of Manchester, and the Central University ofVenezuela. His
books include Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism ( 197 4), Lineages ofthe Absolutist
State (1974), Considerations on Western Marxism (1976), Arguments within English
Marxism ( 1980), and In the Tracks ofHistorical Materialism ( 1984). His many essays
include several important ones published in NLR: "Components of the National
Culture," "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," and "Trotsky's Interpretation of
Stalinism."

Stanley Aronowitz
Stanley Aronowitz was born in New York City in 1933 and
received his Ph.D. from the Union Graduate School. In the sixties he was a labor
and community organizer and coedited Studies in the Left; in the seventies he co-
founded the New American Movement (NAM). He is the author of many books,
including False Promises: The Shaping of American Working-Class Consciousness
(1973), The Crisis in Historical Materialism (1981), and Working-Class Hero: A New
Strategy for Labor (1983). His articles have appeared in The Nation, Village Voice,
and the Los Angeles Times, as well as numerous academic journals. He is currently
professor of sociology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York
and the Center for Worker Education and is coeditor of Social Text.

Etienne Balibar
Etienne Balibar was born in Avallon (Yonne), France, in
1942 and studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure and the Sorbonne (with Jean
Hyppolite and Georges Canguilhem). He worked with Louis Althusser for many
years, coauthoring Reading Capital, and has taught at the University of Algiers, the
Sorbonne, and presently at the University of Paris; he has also taught in the Neth-
erlands, Cuba, and Mexico. After coorganizing the movement Pour L'union dans
les Luttes from 1978 to 1981, he was excluded from the Communist party for criti-
cizing its position on the question of immigrant workers in France. He has published

723
numerous books and articles, including Sur Ia dictature du proletariat (1976) and,
most recently, Spinoza, philosophie politique (1985).

Michele Barrett
Michele Barrett was born near London in 1949 and studied
sociology at the Universities of Durham and Sussex. She coedited Ideology and
Cultural Production (1979), edited Virginia Woolf: Women and Writing (1980),
authored Women's Oppression Today (1980), and coauthored The Anti-Social Fam-
ily (1982). Since 1977 she has taught sociology at the City University of London.
She is a member of the editorial collective of Feminist Review.

lain Chambers
lain Chambers was born near Manchester, England, in 1949,
and brought up near Bristol. He studied history and American studies at the Uni-
versity of Keele and did research at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
of the University of Birmingham. He is the author of Urban Rhythms (1985) and
Popular Culture: The Metropolitan Experience (1986) and currently teaches at the
University of Naples and publishes widely in both English and Italian.

Christine Delphy
Christine Delphy is a research fellow at the Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique. She was a cofounder, with Simone de Beauvoir, of the
journal Questions Feministes and remains an editor of Nouvelles Questions Fem-
inistes. Her publications include The Main Enemy ( 1977) and Close to Horne: A
Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression (1984).
Terry Eagleton
Terry Eagleton was born in Salford, England, in 1943. Ed-
ucated at Cambridge University, he currently teaches at Wadham College, Oxford.
He is the author of nine books, including Myths of Power: A Marxist Study of the
Brontes (1976), Criticism and Ideology (1976), Walter Benjamin, Or Towards a
Revolutionary Criticism (1981 ), and Literary Theory (1983). Most recently some of
his essays have been collected in Against the Grain ( 1986).

A. Belden Fields
A. Belden Fields was born in Chicago in 1937 and attended
the University of Illinois (A.B., 1960) and Yale University (M.A., Ph.D.). He teaches
political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His books in-
clude Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de
France ( 1970) and Trotskyism and Maoism: Studies of Theory and Practice in France
and the United States ( 1983).

Jean Franco
Jean Franco was born in Durkinfield, England, in 1924 and
teaches in the department of Spanish and Portuguese at Columbia University. She
received a B.A. and M.A. in history from the University of Manchester and a second
B.A. and a Ph.D. in Spanish from the University of London. She has taught at
London, Essex, and Stanford universities and is a founding editor of Tabloid and a
member of the editorial collective of Social Text. She has published numerous articles
and books, including The Modern Culture of Latin America: Society and the Artist
(1967) and Cesar Vallejo: The Dialectics ofPoetry and Silence(l976). She is currently
working on a book on the relations between high, mass, and popular culture in Latin
America.

Simon Frith
Simon Frith was born in England in 1946 and received his
B.A. from Oxford University and his M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from the Uni-

724
versity of California at Berkeley. A leading scholar on popular music, he teaches at
Warwick University. He is also a leading rock critic, frequently writing for Rolling
Stone, Village Voice, New Society, and other popular magazines. He served for four
years as rock critic for the Sunday Times (London) and is currently writing for The
Guardian. A founding member and for many years the chair of the British branch
of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music, his books on pop
music include The Sociology ofRock ( 1978) and Sound Effects ( 1981 ). He is currently
working on a book on the "art school connection" in British popular music.

Sue Golding
Sue Golding was born in New York in 1954 and has studied
at the University of Maryland (B.A.), Cambridge University, and the University of
Essex. She is completing her Ph.D. in politics at the University of Toronto and has
written on the concept of democracy in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks. She teaches
political science at Trent University and is a longtime activist in gay and feminist
politics, especially in struggles for sexual freedom.

Lawrence Grossberg
Lawrence Grossberg was born in New York City in 1947
and attended the University of Rochester, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies of the University of Birmingham, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, from which he received his Ph.D. in communications in 1976. He spent
a number of years traveling and performing in Europe in an itinerant anarchist
theater commune. The author of many articles in the areas of contemporary phi-
losophy and literary theory, cultural studies, philosophy of communication, and
popular music, he has served as assistant director of the Unit for Criticism and
Interpretive Theory at the University of Illinois and was the assistant director of
the summer program Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. He is currently
completing a book with Stuart Hall and Jennifer Daryl Slack entitled Cultural Studies
and is also working on a book about postmodernism, cultural studies, and popular
culture called Another Boring Day in Paradise.

Stuart Hall
Stuart Hall was born in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1932 and
attended Oxford University as both a Rhodes Scholar and a Jamaica Scholar. A
founding member of the New Left Club and the first editor of New Left Review, he
also helped shape the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University
of Birmingham, as a research associate and, from 1969 to 1979, as its director, and
is currently professor of sociology at the Open University. He has been active in a
variety of political struggles and is regarded by many as a leading spokesperson for
the British Left. Coeditor of many volumes of the Centre's research (e.g., Culture,
Media, Language [1980]), numerous Open University readers (e.g., Politics and Ide-
ology [1986]), and a number of books on the New Right and the state of the Left
(e.g., The Politics ofThatcherism [ 1983]), he also coauthored The Popular Arts ( 1964),
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (1978), and Cultural
Studies (forthcoming). His essays are currently being collected in a number of vol-
umes, including Reproducing Ideologies.

Eugene W. Holland
Eugene W. Holland was born in Princeton, N.J., in 1953 and
received his Ph.D. in French from the University of California at San Diego. He
has taught at Rice University, the University of Iowa, and currently in the depart-
ments of romance languages and humanities at Ohio State University. He has written
articles on nineteenth-century French literature and critical theory, including "The
Suppression of Politics in the Institution of Psychoanalysis" and "Narcissism from
Baudelaire to Sartre."

725
 Fredric Jameson
Fredric Jameson was born in 1934 and has come to be re-
garded as perhaps the leading Marxist literary critic in the United States. Since
receiving his B.A. from Haverford College and his Ph.D. in French from Yale Uni-
versity, he has taught at Harvard and Yale universities, the University of California
at San Diego and at Santa Cruz, and currently at Duke University. He is coeditor
of Social Text and the author of many articles and books, including Sartre: The
Origins of a Style (1961), Marxism and Form (1971), The Prison-House ofLanguage
( 1972), Fabies of Aggression ( 1979), and The Political Unconscious ( 1981).

Ernesto Laclau
Emesto Laclau was born in Argentina in 1935 and was ed-
ucated at the University of Buenos Aires and Oxford University. He teaches in the
department of government of the University of Essex and in the department of
history at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Politics and Ideology in
Marxist Theory (1977) and coauthor, with Chantal Mouffe, of Hegemony and So-
cialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1985).

Henri Lefebvre
Henri Lefebvre was born in 1901 in Hegetman, Gascony,
and studied with Maurice Blonde! at the university in Aix-en-Provence and with
Leon Brunschvicg at the Sorbonne. He was, and remains, one of the most influential
figures in modem French Marxist theory. In the twenties, he cofounded the Philo-
sophies Group, which was initially closely allied with the surrealists. After joining
the PCF in 1928, the group began publishing La Revue Marxiste, which is often
described as the first serious French journal of Marxist theory. In the thirties, he
cotranslated the first selections of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts into French. He served
in the Resistance during the Second World War, and as a leading member of the
anti-Stalinist group within the PCF, he published an internal dissident journal, Voies
Nouvelles. In 1958 he was expelled from the party and became the moving force
behind the dissident Marxist journal Arguments. He has taught at the universities
of Strasbourg, Paris at Nan terre, and the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes and has
published many books, ranging from his early readings of the more humanistic Marx
(e.g., Dialectical Materialism [ 1968], to his analysis of the events of 1968 (The Ex-
plosion [ 1969]), to his highly influential Everyday Life in the Modern World (1971).
Lefebvre currently lives in Paris and continues to write.

Julia Lesage
Julia Lesage is cofounder and editor of Jump Cut: A Review
of Contemporary Cinema, as well as the author of A Research Guide to Jean-Luc
Godard (1979). She has taught film theory, criticism, and production at many uni-
versities, including Northwestern, the University of Illinois at Chicago, Indiana Uni-
versity, and the Pontifical Catholic University (Lima, Peru). She has lectured and
published widely on a broad range of topics in contemporary cinematic theory and
practice, Marxism, and feminism.

Catharine MacKinnon
Catharine MacKinnon was born in 1947, attended Smith
College, and received her M.Phil. and J.D. (1977) from Yale University. She has
been active, as a scholar and lawyer, in many key court battles around issues of
gender, particularly in the areas of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and por-
nography. Her first book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination (1979), helped to establish and define sexual harassment as a legal
injury. More recently, she has been a visible leader and spokesperson for the anti-
pornography movement. In addition, she has published a number of articles in
feminist theory (e.g., "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State") which have

726
placed her at the center of current theoretical debates. Her new book, Feminism
Unmodified, will be published shortly. She has taught at the law schools of the
University of Minnesota and Harvard and Yale universities and is currently a vis-
iting scholar at Stanford University Law School.

Armand Mattelart
Armand Mattelart was born in Belgium in 1936 and received
his doctorate in law and political economy from the University of Louvain. From
1962 to 1973 he taught at the university in Santiago, Chile, where he worked closely
with the Allende government in the attempt to create new initiatives in popular
communication. Between 1975 and 1983 he was a professor at the University of
Paris, VII and VIII. He has carried out frequent missions for the governments of
France, Belgium, and Mozambique, and for the United Nations, in the area of
communications policy. Founder and coeditor of the journal. Comunicacion y Cui-
lura, which moved from Chile to Argentina and then to Mexico (in 1977), he is
currently professor of information sciences and communication and head of the
department at the University of Upper Brittany (Rennes II). He is the author of
many articles and books, including (with Ariel Dorfman) How to Read Donald Duck
(1975), Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture (1979), Mass Media,
Ideologies and the Revolutionary Movement (1980), Transnationals and the Third
World: The Struggle for Culture (1983), and Communication and Information Tech-
nologies: Freedom of Choice for Latin America? ( 1984).

Michele Mattelart
Michele Mattelart was born in France in 1941 and studied
at the Sorbonne and the University of Paris. She is presently doing research at the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. From 1963 to 1973 she lived
in Chile, teaching at the Catholic University of Chile and helping to found a center
for national study. During Allende's rule she was involved with both the national
television service and publishing for youth. Frequent trips and official missions since
then have maintained her close ties with Latin America. She has written many articles
and books, including La cultura de Ia opresion femenina (1977), Women and the
Cultural Industries ( 1981), and (with A. Mattelart and X. Delcourt) La culture contre
Ia democratie? (1985).

Franco Moretti
Franco Moretti was born in Italy in 1949 and is professor
ofEnglish literature at the University of Salerno. He is editor of the journals Calibano
and Quaderni Piacentini, has edited an anthology of criticism on T. S. Eliot ( 197 5),
and has written a study of English left-wing intellectuals in the thirties (1976). His
book, Signs Takenfor Wonder, was published in 1983.

Chantal Mouffe
Chantal Mouffe was born in 1943 in Baulet, Belgium, and
attended the Catholic University ofLouvain (B.A.), the University of Paris, and the
University of Essex (M.A.). She has taught at the National University of Colombia
and City University of London and is currently teaching at Westfield College of the
University of London and writing for various popular periodicals (e.g., The Guard-
ian, New Statesman, El Pais). She has written extensively on problems of ideology
and hegemony and has edited a collection of essays, Gramsci and Marxist Theory
(1979). Most recently, she coauthored Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics (1985).

Oskar Negt
Oskar Negt was born in Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad) in
1934. He has studied and taught at the Universitat Frankfurt am Main, where he

727
was closely associated with the Frankfurt school of critical theory. He is currently
professor of sociology at the University of Hannover and has published numerous
articles and books, including Struckturbeziehungen Zwischen den Gesellschafislehren
Comtes und Hegel (1964), Universitat und Arbeiterbewegung(1968), and (with Alex-
ander Kluge) Offentlichket und Erfarhrung zur Organisationsanalyse (1972).
Cary Nelson
Cary Nelson was born in Philadelphia in 1946. Educated at
Antioch College and the University of Rochester, he is currently professor of English
and founding director of the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The author of The Incarnate Word:
Literature as Verbal Space (1973) and Our Last First Poets: Vision and History in
Contemporary American Poetry (1981) and the editor of several books, including
Theory in the Classroom ( 1986), he is presently completing Reading Criticism: The
Literary and Institutional Status of Critical Discourse, chapters of which have ap-
peared in numerous books and journals, and Modern American Poetry and Literary
History.

Paul Patton
Paul Patton was born in Australia in 1950 and studied phi-
losophy at the University of Sydney, where he participated in the struggle for the
introduction of a women's studies course, which eventually led to the splitting in
two of the philosophy department. After receiving an M.A., he completed a Doctorat
d'Universite at the University of Paris at Vincennes in 1979. Since returning to
Australia he has taught social theory, epistemology, and the philosophy of science
at Macquarie and Griffith universities and the University of Sydney and is currently
at the University of New South Wales. A member of the Intervention Collective,
he has published essays and edited collections on, as well as translating, the work
of various contemporary French theorists, especially Foucault, Deleuze, and Baud-
rinard.
Michel Picheux
Michel Pecheux was born in France in 1938 and studied
philosophy under Louis Althusser at the Ecole Normale Superieure, participating in
Althusser's famous course for scientists (1967-68), out of which came Sur l'histoire
des sciences. His later works, including Language, Semantics and Ideology (1982)
and La langue introuvable, critically extend the theory of ideology in light of recent
developments in linguistic, psychoanalytic, and Marxist theory. Until his death in
1983 he was research director at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique.

Gajo Petrovic
Gajo Petrovic has long had a prominent place in philosophy
in Yugoslavia and in the development of a humanistic "neo-Marxist" alternative
to orthodox Marxism in Eastern Europe. Born in the town ofKarlovac in 1927, he
was educated at the University of Zagreb (Ph.D. 1956), where he subsequently was
appointed to the philosophy faculty and for many years has been professor of phi-
losophy. The course of his philosophical development and career is reflected in the
changing nature of the books he has written. His first book, a study of the thought
of the orthodox Marxist Russian philosopher Plekhanov (The Philosophical Views
of G. V. Plekhanov, 1957), was followed seven years later by two books on matters
central to the Western analytic tradition (From Locke to Ayer and Logic, both 1964).
Petrovic then began publishing a series of books reinterpreting Marx's thought along
humanistic lines, departing markedly from the orthodox ("Stalinist") tradition: Phi-
losophy and Marxism (1965), Why Praxis? (1972), and Philosophy and Revolution
(1979). These books and other writings from the mid-1960s onward brought him to
the attention of philosophers in the West and established him as an important
728
contemporary interpreter of Marx. He also served as editor-in-chief of the journal
Praxis, in which a remarkable group of like-minded Yugoslav philosophers found
their voice and gained wide attention through their vigorous and bold contributions
to a new human-centered understanding of Marxism. During the first part of this
period, Petrovic and his colleagues focused their criticisms on the theory and practice
of Stalinist Marxism, valorized the Yugoslav alternative, and enjoyed the favor of
the political authorities in Yugoslavia. As they became disenchanted with and in-
creasingly critical ofYugoslav institutions and practices, however, they lost this favor
and eventually became the target ofharsh political criticism and repressive measures.
At various times they were forbidden to teach and publish in Yugoslavia; the regime
also sought to deprive them of their academic positons and to bring about their
exile. Petrovic led the resistance to these pressures, and he and his colleagues some-
how managed to weather the storm, refusing either to abandon their philosophical
and critical course or to quit their positions and their country. His and their position
remains a difficult and tenuous one; but, with his colleagues, Petrovic continues to
teach and write in Yugoslavia and to contribute to the further development of
Marxist philosophy.

Fred Pfeil
Fred Pfeil was born in 1949 in Port Allegany, Pennsylvania,
"a white rural factory town." He "escaped to Amherst College, there to receive equal
doses of Civilization and Snobbery" and to work with Tillie Olsen, his first mentor
as a fiction writer. While working on a master's degree in creative writing at Stanford
University, he labored in a variety of"mainly bottom-line jobs" and was employed
by the Navy to teach sailors aboard the USS Agerholm in the Pacific. He has taught
English at Stephens College in Missouri and currently teaches in the departments
of English and twentieth-century studies at Oregon State University at Corvallis. He
was a member of NAM and is currently active in Central America solidarity work
and the construction of the Rainbow Coalition. Since 1982 he has been coeditor of
The Minnesota Review, a "journal of committed writing." He has written a number
of essays on literature, criticism, and music, in addition to a large body of fictional
work. His novel, Goodman 2020, was published in 1986, and a collection of his
short stories is due out shortly. He is presently working on a documentary novel
about the relationships between patterns of masculinity and corporate capitalism in
late-nineteenth-century America.

Stephen A. Resnick
Stephen A. Resnick was born in 1938 and received his Ph.D.
in economics from M.I.T. in 1964. He has taught at Yale University and City College
of New York and currently teaches economics at the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst. He has published on such topics as imperialism, international trade and
the European Common Market, and economic history. A cofounder, in 1983, of the
Association for Economic and Social Analysis, his books include Colonial Devel-
opment: An Econometric Study (with Thomas Birnberg, 1975) and Marxist Theory:
Epistemology, Class, Enterprise and State (with Richard Wolff, forthcoming). He
has also coedited Rethinking Marxism: Struggles in Marxist Theory (1986).

Fernando Reyes Matta

Fernando Reyes Matta is a journalist and director of the
Division of Communication and Development of the Instituto Latinoamericano de
Estudios Transnacionales (ILET). He was professor of broadcasting at the Catholic
University of Chile and has taught at Stanford University. He serves as an consultant
to numerous international organizations, including UNESCO and the MacBride
Commission, and has published many articles and books on Latin American affairs
and communication policy, including Communication and the New Order: The Eco-
nomic-Technological Crossroads (1983), The Concept of Peace and the Influence of

729
Mass Media upon It: A Latin American Perspective (1977), and Cuba: Diez anos de
revo/ucion ( 1969).

Andrew T. I. Ross
Andrew T. I. Ross was born in 1956 and educated in Scot-
land, where he spent some time working in the North Sea oil fields. After doing
doctoral research at the University of Kent, Indiana University, and the University
of California at Berkeley (receiving his Ph.D. in English and American literature
from the University of Kent at Canterbury), he worked at Illinois State University
and is currently teaching English at Princeton University. A member of the editorial
collective of Social Text, he has published on a wide range of topics, including
cultural theory, sexual politics, psychoanalysis, television, modem literature, and
literary criticism. The author of The Failure of Modernism: Symptoms ofAmerican
Poetry (1986), he is also the cotranslator of Jacques Aumont's Montage Eisenstein
( 1986) and is currently working on a study of intellectuals and mass culture.

Michael Ryan
Michael Ryan was born in Ireland in 1951 and received a
B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from the University oflowa. He has taught at the University
of Virginia and currently at Northeastern University and is the author of Marxism
and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation (1982) and coauthor (with Douglas Kell-
ner) of The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary American Film. He is also the
cotranslator of Antonio Negri's Marx beyond Marx (1984).

Richard Schacht
Richard Schacht was born in Racine, Wisconsin, in 1941,
and received a B.A. from Harvard University, an M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy
from Princeton University, and did postgraduate work at Tiibingen University. He
is currently professor and chair of the philosophy department at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and has published widely in European philosophy
since Kant, philosophical anthropology, social theory, value theory, and the philos-
ophy of art. His books include Alienation ( 1970), Hegel and After: Studies in Con-
tinental Philosophy between Kant and Sartre ( 1975), Nietzsche ( 1983), and Classical
Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant (1984). He is currently working on a book
on human nature.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak was born in Calcutta, India, in
1942 and received a B.A. in English from the University of Calcutta in 1959. She
came to the United States in 1961 and received a Ph.D. in comparative literature
from Cornell University in 1967, under the supervision of Paul de Man. She spent
1963-64 as a research student at Girton College, Cambridge, and taught at the Uni-
versity of Iowa from 1965 to 1978, serving as chair of the comparative literature
department from 1975 to 1977. She was professor of English at the University of
Texas at Austin from 1978 to 1984, Longstreet Professor of English at Emory Uni-
versity until1986, and is currently at the University of Pittsburgh. She has published
extensively on topics relating to deconstruction, the critique of imperialism, and
feminist-Marxism in Asia, Africa, Australia, Eastern and Western Europe, and the
United States. In 1974 she published Myself Must I Remake: Life and Poetry of W.
B. Yeats "in a deliberate response to a certain challenge articulated by the U.S.
undergraduate movement in the sixties." In 1976 she published "what by many is
considered a text of the other extreme": a translation with critical introduction of
Jacques Derrida's De Ia grammato/ogie. Her most recent book is In Other Worlds:
Essays in Cultural Politics (1987).

730
 Darko R. Suvin
Darko R. Suvin was born in 1930 in Zagreb, Yugosalvia,
and studied at the University of Bristol, the Sorbonne, and Yale University, in
addition to receiving a B.A., M.S., and Ph.D. from Zagreb University. He is ex-
tremely active in many organizations concerned with both theater and science fiction
(e.g., he served as coeditor of Science Fiction Studies from 1973 to 1981) and is
currently professor of English and comparative literature at McGill University and
vice-president of the International Brecht Society. He has edited numerous volumes
on Brecht and science fiction, and in addition to his many academic contributions
he writes theater criticism. He has published many books on a diverse range of
topics, most recently Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History
of a Literary Genre (1979), Victorian Science Fiction in the U.K.: The Discourses of
Knowledge and of Power (1983), and To Brecht and Beyond: Soundings in Modern
Dramaturgy (1984).

Fengzhen Wang
Fengzhen Wang, an editor, critic, and translator, was born
in 1942 to a farmer's family in north China. His early schooling, "directed in ac-
cordance with the mottos 'carefully read and write, do physical exercises every morn-
ing,'" included studies at Lincheng High School and Peking University. Wang's
talent for literature was exhibited in high school when he won the local award for
poetry in 1958. From 1968 to 1977 he worked as a businessman and interpreter in
a foreign trade company in Beijing. Since 1978 he has been an editor of World
Literature, a leading magazine in China for translations of foreign literary works
and critical essays, and a lecturer at the Institute of Foreign Literature of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. "During the Cultural Revolution I was sent to a farm
to do physical labor for a year, which enriched my experience of life. With the
difficulties facing intellectuals at that time, I managed to get some science fiction
books to read and later became a well-known critic in that field." Since the end of
the Cultural Revolution he has written essays on foreign writers such as John Keats,
Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, as well as on the practice
of Western literary criticism. He has translated the works of Rene Wellek, Northrop
Frye, Erskine Caldwell, John Wain, and others, and has compiled a number of
anthologies of English and American stories and critical essays. He has been a visiting
scholar at UCLA and is now working on a book about his visit to the United States,
as well as on a brief history of Western literary criticism.
Cornel West
Cornel West was born in 1953 and received a B.A. from
Harvard University and an M.A. and Ph.D. (1980) in philosophy from Princeton
University. He has taught at the Union Theological Seminary and is currently teach-
ing the philosophy of religion at the Divinity School of Yale University. He is a
member of the editorial collective of Social Text and has been involved for many
years in Afro-American and socialist politics. The author of Prophesy Deliverance!
An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity (1982), he has written extensively on
the relations of Afro-American experience, theology, and Marxism, as well as on
contemporary hermeneutic and Marxist philosophy.

Richard D. Wolff
Richard D. Wolff was born in 1942 and attended Harvard
University and Stanford University, receiving his Ph.D. in economics from Yale
University in 1969. He has taught at Yale University and City College ofNew York
and currently teaches economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He
has published widely on such topics as colonialism in Africa, imperialism, and the
theory of economic crises. He has also been active in the U.S. labor movement and
socialist community organizations since the 1960s. In 1974 he published The Eco-

731
nomics ofColonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930. His recent work with coauthor
Stephen Resnick on certain basic theoretical problems in the Marxist tradition cul-
minated in the forthcoming Marxist Theory: Epistemology, Class, Enterprise and
State. He has also coedited Rethinking Marxism: Struggles in Marxist Theory (1976)
and was a cofounder of the Association for Economic and Social Analysis.

732
 Index

Acker, Kathy, 369 Benjamin, Jessica, 393, 395

Adorno, TheodorW., 3, 28n, 71, 83, Benjamin, Walter, 3, 5, 220, 272-73,
130, 132, 339, 367, 339,367-68,376,412,
461, 608; and Max 611 n
Horkheimer, 526-27, Bennett, Tony, 469
531; Negative Dialectics, Berger, John, 6
84 Berman, Marshall: All That Is Solid
Alea, Tomas Gutierrez. 435 Melts into Air, 317-24,
Alexandrescu, Sorin, 677-78 329-31, 334-35; The
Allen, Donald, and Warren Tallman, Politics of Authenticity,
364 330
Allen, Woody, 443n Bernheimer, Alan, 375
Allende, Salvador, 432 Bernstein, Charles, 361, 372-73
Althusser, Louis, 50, 67, 69, 76, 129, Bernstein, Richard, 28-29n, 175
141 ' 143' 146' 161 ' Black, Max, 249, 533
192, 203, 206n, 209n, Bloch, Ernst. 3, 219,246, 248n
242, 252-53, 271' Bloch, 0., 205n
273-74, 309n, 353-54, Bohr, Niels, 525
366, 378n,412,424, Bond, Edward, 625
477, 494-95, 499, Bookchin, Murray, 28n
500n, 525-26, 530, Bottomore, Thomas. 248n
538, 540, 541, 565-66, Bove, Paul, 280, 291
627; For Marx. 7; "Ideol- Bradley, F. H., 252, 253
ogy and Ideological State Braverman, Harry, 519-22
Apparatuses," 46-49; Brecht, Bertolt. 3, 5, 346, 348, 362,
Reading Capital, 644 377, 378n, 628-29,
Alvarez, Jorge, 454-55 666, 685-86
Anderson, Laurie, 382, 384, 385, Breitman, George, 19, 26n
386, 394, 399-400, Breton. Andre, 363
401n Brittan, Samuel, 47
Anderson, Perry, 291-92, 359, 360, Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 97, 437
366, 379n Bukharin, Nikolai, 548-49, 555
Arguedas, Jose Maria, 507-8 Burnham, Linda, 20-21
Aristotle, 78, 213, 220, 670, 690 Byrne, David, 383-84, 385
Aronowitz, Stanley, 21, 28n, 31, 108,
Callinicos, Alex, 123-24, 124-25,
114, 130, 132, 134,
125-26, 129, 137
135n, 358-59, 360; The
Camus, Albert, 145
Cris1s in Historical Materi-
Canguilheim, G., 206n
alism, 125, 130-32, 134
Carroll, Lewis, 81
Atkinson. Ti-Grace. 421 Caudwell, Christopher, 524, 536n
Auge, Marc, 500n Cezanne, Paul, 707
Avakian, Bob, 19, 26n Chambers. lain, 4 71, 4 72
Chatman, Seymour. 669
Babeuf. Fran<;:o1s Emile, 168, 171 Chaudhury, Ajit K , 285-86
Bahro, Rudolf, 218 Cheng, Gu, 721
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 45, 669 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai, 664-65
Bakunin, Mikhail, 78 Childs, Lucinda, 384
Balbus, Isaac, 393, 395, 402n, 403n Chinchilla, Norma, 311 n
Bali bar, Etienne, 9-1 0 Chodorow, Nancy, 109,393, 403n
Balzac, Honore de, 83, 341, 718 Colletti, Lucio, 255
Baraka, Amiri, 19, 26n Conrad, Joseph, 627
Barrera, Mario, 21, 27n Coomaraswamy, Ananda, 301
Barrett. Michele, 110, 268-69 Corbusier, Le, 409
Barth, Karl, 31 Cox, Oliver C., 21
Barthes. R~and, 626, 670, 690, 700 Crick, Francis, and James Watson.
Baudelaire, Charles, 319, 363 525
Baudrillard, Jean, 352. 366, 368, Croce, Benedetto, 545-46, 547, 555
372,411 Culler, Jonathan, 295-96, 685, 692n
Beauvo1r, Simone de, 111
Becker, Ernest. 31 Dalton, Roque, 658-60

733
Dante (Dante Alighieri). 83 tory of Primitive Christian-
Darwin, Charles. 177 ity," 186-88, 193-94;
Daughtry, Rev. Herbert. 26n, 28n Dialectics of Nature, 173.
Davagnino. Miguel. 454 174-77, 178; History of
Davis. Mike, 290-91 Natural Creation. 177-
Day, Jen. 374 80; "Juridical Socialism,"
Debord, Guy, 352, 411 183-86; Ludwig Feuer-
Debray, Regis, 329 bac~ 180-83, 192-93.
Debs. Eugene. 19 See also Marx, Karl. and
Deleuze. Gilles. 25, 28-29n, 123-24. Friedrich Engels
129.138,151.285, Engels. Stephanie, 396
308; "Intellectuals and Enzensberger. Hans Magnus. 363,
Power," 272-80, 282- 378n
83, 286, 289-90 Ewald. Francois. 129
Deleuze. Gilles. and Felix Guattari, 28n;
Anti-Oedipus. 126-27. Fa non. Frantz. 17. 426-28. 503-4,
137. 273-74, 279. 514-15
310n, 312n,405-8, Ferguson. Adam. 167
410-11.414-15. 415n; Feuerbach. Ludwig, 164, 168. 235
Mille Plateaux, 124, Feyerabend. Paul. 135-36n. 138-39,
127-28. 135n; "Rhi- 264. 529, 532, 538
zome," 125. 127, 132 Fink, Eugene. 248n
Delphy, Christine. 135n, 539, 540-41 FitzGerald. Edward. 306
de Man. Paul. 624-31 Flaubert. Gustave. 342
Denby, Edwin, 386 Forman, James, 19-20, 26n
Derrett. J. M .. 298 Forster. E. M .. 669
Derrida, Jacques. 17-18, 23, 25, 52, Foucault, Michel, 11,17-18,23,25,
138,271,284.297, 27n. 28n. 51-53, 56.
308, 309n, 310n, 379n, 68,70-71, 123-24.
413-14,499n, 523. 125. 128. 132-33, 138,
629; Of Grammatology, 143-46, 147-49. 151.
291-94, 311n; "Struc- 226. 285, 292. 294,
ture, Sign, and Play in the 308.349.392-93.414.
Discourse of the Human 415n,489, 504,523.
Sciences," 254 64 7; The Archaeology of
Descartes. Rene. 113 Knowledge, 51-53,
Dewey, John, 529-30, 531. 539 492-95, 500n; Discipline
Dews. Peter. 313n and Punish, 52. 126-27,
DiBianco. Doug, 338 129.132-33; TheHis-
Dickens. Charles. 718 torv of Sexuality, 52; "In-
Dilthey, Wilhelm. 205-6n tellectuals and Power,"
Dinnerstein, Dorothy, i09, 393, 395. 272-80, 282-83, 286.
403n 289-90; Power/Knowl-
Donoso. Jose. 51 0-11 edge, 274, 280-81.
Dovjenko. Alexandr P.. 435 285, 290-91, 298,
Du Bois, W. E. B.. 17 309n
Durkheim, Emile, 52-53. 71 Fowler. Alaistair, 656
Dworkin, Andrea. 118. 120 Fox-Genovese. Elizabeth, 295
Dyer. Richard. 613 Frankenberg, Ronald, 699
Fraser, Nancy, 138, 358
Eagleton. Terry, 291. 377. 698 Friedrich, Hugo, 655
Eastman, Max. 29n Freud, Sigmund. 50, 76, 78, 84,
Eco. Umberto. 690 108-9, 204n, 205n,
Eisenstein, Sergej M .. 364 228, 234, 252-53.
Elser. Jon, 255 296-97. 309n,424
Empson. William. 619-31 Fromm. Erich, 224-25
Engels. Friedrich. 6, 76, 85, 86, 162. Frye, Northrop, 684, 685
205n. 206n, 207n. Fuentes. Carlos. 51 0
208n. 223-24. 232. Fuller. Peter. 700
242-44, 717; Anti-DOh-
ring, 172-77, 198, 574; Galbraith. J. K.. 431
"Contribution to the His- Gamble, Andrew. 39

734
Gandhi, Mahatma, 302 196,201,211,213,
Garcia, Ricardo, 456 221, 228, 252
Garcia Marquez, Gabriel, 508, 510, Heidegger, Martin, 87, 207n
511-12 Heisenberg, Werner, 113, 525, 533
Garvey, Marcus, 20 Hejinian, Lyn, 373, 377
Genovese, Eugene, 28n Henley, Nancy, 421
Gems, Norman, 331,625 Henry, Paul. 49
Geschwender, James A., 21 Herr, Michael, 351
Giddens, Anthony, 156n Herzog, Werner, 504
Ginsberg, Allen, 364 Hindess, Barry, and Paul Hirst, 149,
Glass, Philip, 382, 401 n; and Godfrey 151,253, 311n, 354,
Reggio, 398-99 489
Glucksman, Andre, 128 Hjelmslev, L., 673, 674
Godard, Jean-Luc, 328-29 Hobbes, Thomas, 59, 164
Godoy, Alvaro, 453 Hook, Sidney, 522-23
Godwin, William, 95 Hooks, Rev. Benjamin, 28n
Goethe, Johann von, 83, 319, 341- Horkheimer, Max, 367, 526-27
42, 343 Husser!, Edmund, 538
Goldmann, Lucien, 248n
Gombrich, Ernst. 684-85 lnglehart, Ronald, 149
Gorz, Andre, 519-20, 521
Graff, Gerald, 381 Jackson, Jesse, 28n, 425
Graham, Loren, 528 Jacoby, Russell, 124
Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 24-25, 33, 38, Jakobson, Roman, 377, 646
47, 53-57, 59, 63, 69- Jameson, Fredric, 31 On, 311-1 2n,
70, 99, 102-3, 103-4, 327, 372, 377, 382,
184, 190, 191, 192, 385,387-88,391,397,
201, 206n, 207n, 246, 402-3n,403n, 700
252, 283, 326, 332, Jay, Peter, 47
366, 477, 499n, 538; Jefferson, Thomas, 59
The Modern Prince, 55; Joseph, Sir Keith, 38, 46-47, 62
Prison Notebooks, 3; Joyce, James, 79,339,342-44,362
Ouaderni, 543-58, 558-
62n Kafka, Franz, 339
Greimas, A. J., 670, 671-77, 691n, Kamenka, Eugene, 566
693n Kane, P. V., 300-304
Grlic, Danko, 239 Kangraga, Milan, 239
Grossberg, Larry, 615 Kant, Immanuel, 164, 168, 202, 211,
Guattari, Felix. See Deleuze, Gilles, and 216-17, 255, 572
Felix Guattari Kautsky, Karl, 175, 183-86
Guevara, Che, 664-65 Kedrov, B., 206n
Guha, Ranajit. 283-85, 288 Kenner, Hugh, 362, 378n
Kern berg, Otto, 41 0
Habermas, Jlirgen, 145-49, 213, Kerouac, Jack, 137
248n, 523-24, 526, Keynes, John Maynard, 76
527-28, 534; Legitima- Kierkegaard, S0ren, 343
tion Crisis, 145-46, 148; Kilson, Martin, 21
"New Social Move- King, Martin Luther, Jr., 155
ments," 146-49, 150, Kirk, Richard, 20
151-53, 154 Klein, Melanie, 391-92
Haeckel, Ernst, 177 Kofman, Sarah, 296
Hall, Stuart, 28n, 96, 120, 135n, Kohut. Heinz, 41 0
358-59,477 Korsch, Karl, 3, 5
Harryman, Carla, 374 Kramer, Hilton, 381
Hartsock, Nancy, 506-7, 51 2 Krauss, Rosalind, 387, 40 1-2n
Hassan, lhab, 359 Kuhn, Thomas, 524, 528-29, 532
Hayek, Friedrich A., 97, 100
Haywood, Harry, 19 Labriola, A., 246
Heath, Edward, 37-38 Lacan, Jacques, 48-49, 49-51, 67-
Heath, Stephen, 477 68, 90, 132, 255, 389,
Hebdige, Dick, 4 71, 612 390, 392, 395, 402-3n,
Hegel, G. W. F., 78, 85, 86, 87, 164, 406, 410, 424, 482,
177, 178, 181, 193, 646

735
Laclau, Ernesto, 25, 49, 56, 66, 134, 84-87,99, 106, 126,
149-50, 151,360,538. 12 9' 14 1' 160' 16 7'
540, 612, 614-15 173. 204n. 208n, 209n.
Lasch, Christopher. 395, 397, 403n, 213-14,215-16,217,
405-6, 410-12 218,220-21,227,
Lassalle, Ferdinand, 78, 223 229-31, 234n, 235,
Lautreamont. Le Comte de, 340 241-44,245-47, 268,
Le Bon. Gustave, 207n 271,279,285, 295-96,
Lefebure. A., 591 309n. 310n, 330-31.
Lefebvre. Henri. 5, 6, 246, 351. 607 334, 336, 368, 372,
Leibn1tz, Gottfried Wilhelm von. 253, 394, 406, 424, 522,
255 565, 567-73, 576, 577,
Le Nain. Louis, 708 642, 717; Capital. 162,
Lenin, V. I., 76, 85, 86, 160, 184, 175-76, 191-92, 194,
190,191,200-201, 222-23, 230, 231'
207n, 211, 212,243, 232-33, 408, 500n.
247, 251-52, 349, 366, 51 9. 641 ; The Critique of
665 the Gotha Program. 76,
Levi-Strauss, Claude. 67. 291, 384- 78,185. 197; The Eigh-
85, 672 teenth Brumaire of Louis
Lewontin, Richard C.. 499n Bonaparte. 42, 162,
Llosa, Mario Vargas. 509-1 0 222,276-78,285,411,
Loria, A., 560n 677; Grundrisse, 162,
Lorde, Audre. 31 233, 322, 330-31'
Lovell. Terry, 699, 711 495-96; Preface to A
Lowery, Rev. Joseph, 28n Contribution to the Cri-
Lukacs, Georg, 3, 3-4. 4-5, 5. 43, tique of Political Economy,
83, 114, 202, 219, 246, 551; Theses on Feuer-
323-24, 335, 337, 366, bach, 549-50, 554. 555
377, 409, 499, 520, Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, 2-3,
535n, 678-83, 717, 76, 189-91, 194-203,
718-19 204n. 205n, 208n, 211,
Luxemburg, Rosa, 3. 26n, 80. 244- 212-13, 223, 225,
50 227-28, 232. 719; The
Lynch, Kevin, 353 Communist Manifesto,
43, 166, 167, 170-72,
Lyotard. Jean-Franc;:ois. 300
205n, 231,318,320-
22, 416n, 681; Eco-
Macaulay, Thomas Babington. 282
nomic and Philosophical
MacCabe, Colin. 345
Manuscnpts, 3, 13n.
MacDiarmid, Hugh, 362
141 ; The German Ideol-
Mach, Ernst, 693n ogy, 41-42, 43-45, 46,
Macherey, Pierre. 286-87, 377 161, 163-70, 172, 174,
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 164, 181. 546 180-81, 197, 204n,
Macmillan, Harold, 36 372, 536n
Mclaren, Malcolm, 465-66 Masaryk, Thomas, 249
MacPherson, C. B., 102 Mathieu, Mireille, 434
Mallet, Serge, 248n. 521 Matisse, Henri, 667
Malraux, Andre, 431 Mayakofsky, Vladimir, 365
Mandel, Ernest. 4, 350 Mayer, Arno, 324-25
Mann, Thomas, 76,341 Menger, Anton, 183
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). 190, Miege, Bernard, 594
202,211,664,665, Miller, J. Hillis, 414
715-16 Miller, Jacques-Aiain, 280
Marcuse, Herbert, 92, 117, 248n. Mitterand, Franc;:ois, 431, 581-82,
367, 368, 379n, 527- 585-86, 604-5n
28, 530 Montesquieu, Baron de, 330
Mariategui, Jose Carlos, 27n Moore, Barrington, 31
Marquez, Enrique, 455 Moore, Charles, 413
Marsh, Dave, 462 Moretti, Franco, 328, 335
Marvell, Andrew, 625 Morris, Charles, 674
Ma~. Karl, 11, 45, 68,72-73,75, Mouffe, Chantal, 138, 149-51, 152,
76, 77-79, 80, 82, 83, 360

736
Nandy, Ashis, 300 Rodriguez, Silvio, 449-50
Negri. Tony, 208n, 416 Rorty, Richard, 28-29n
Negt, Oskar, 9, 205n Rose, Peter, 137
Neruda. Pablo, 652, 655, 658 Rosselson, Leon, 473-74
Newton-Smith, W., 532, 537n Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 104, 182,
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 76, 130, 235, 330
406, 568, 578, 627 Rubin, Gayle, 265-66, 402n
Norris, Christopher, 624. 628, 629 Russel, Charles, 387
Nozick, Robert, 152 Russell, Bertrand, 252, 253
Russolo, Luigi, 607-8
Offe. Claus, 93 Ryan, Michael, 137, 416n
O'Hara, Frank, 372
Oilman, Bertell, 566 Sahlins, Marshall, 489
Olson. Charles, 363 Said, Edward, 280, 283, 292, 306
Omvedt, Gail, 311 n Sanguinetti, E.. 655
Oppen, George, 361-63, 378n Sartre, Jean-Paul, 6, 145, 391, 405,
Owens, Craig, 384,387, 401n 415n
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 7, 49, 499n
Pacheco, Jose Emilio, 658 Schiller, Jon, 389, 392, 403n
Pajaczkowska, Claire, 700 Schmitt, Carl, 341, 343
Palloix, Christian, 535n Schumpeter, Joseph, 76
Palomares, Gabino, 454, 457 Scola, Ettore, 440
Parfit, Derek, 627 Segre, Cesare, 692n
Passeron, J. C., 602 Sennett, Richard, 340
Patterson, Orlando, 28n, 31 Shastri, Mahamahopadhyaya Harapra-
Patton, Paul, 70, 151-54 sad, 282
Pavis, Patrice, 693-94n Shklovsky, Viktor, 371-72
Paz, Octavia, 506, 652, 655, 657 Silliman, Ron, 369, 372, 379n, 380n
Pecheux, Michel, 49, 208n Simmel, Georg, 340, 535n
Peery, Nelson, 19, 26n Smith, Adam, 46, 166
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 524 Snowden, Frank, 30
Peralta, Eduardo, 457-58 Sohn-Rethel, Alfred, 248n
Perelman, Bob, 374 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 337
Perloff. Marjorie, 381, 400n Sontag, Susan, 431
Petrovic. Gajo, 334 Souriau, Etienne, 671
Piaget, Jean, 145 Souza, Chico Mario de, 454, 457
Picasso, Pablo, 652, 707-8 Sowell, Thomas. 21
Plato. 78 Spinoza, Benedict, 204n, 253
Plekhanov, G. V., 202, 243, 247, Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 10-11,
251, 253, 716 110,111,113,117,
Poggioli, Renata, 41 2 423-24
Polsby, Nelson W., 156n Stalin, Joseph, 4, 20, 76
Ponge, Francis, 363 Stein, Gertrude, 375
Popper, Karl, 215, 529 Stendhal, 345
Poulantzas, Nicos, 42, 69, 489 Stevens, Wallace, 414
Pound, Ezra, 361, 362, 363 Stirner, Max, 164
Powell, Anthony, 326, 337 Surkin, Marvin, and Dan Georgakis,
Powell, Enoch, 38 351-52
Propp, Vladimir, 670-71 Suvin, Darko, 346, 348, 359
Swift, Jonathan, 630
Rank, Otto, 31
Raphael, Max, 702-12, 713n Tagore, Rabindranath, 301
Rasu~.Jed, 370, 379n Thatcher, Margaret, 36, 38, 40, 47,
Raulet, Gerard, 135n 60, 62, 65, 98
Reagan, Ronald, 65, 98, 154, 462. Thompson, E. P. (Edward), 6; The Pov-
628 erty of Theory, 35
Reich, Wilhelm, 71-72, 228, 274 Thompson, Edward: Suttee, 282, 301,
Rey, P.-P., 489 305-6
Reyes, Alfonso, 505 Thurley, Geoffrey, 363
Ricardo, David, 68, 552 Timpanaro, Sebastiana, 625
Richardson, Samuel, 506 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 89, 94, 101
Rimbaud, Arthur, 665 Tolstoy, Leo, 83

737
Tourraine, Alain, 98 Williamson, Judith, 389-91, 402-3n
Trotsky, Leon, 251 Willis Ellen, 117-19, 120, 121
Tucker, Robert, 566 Wilson, Harold, 36-37
Tzara, Tristan, 76 Wilson, Robert, and Philip Glass, 384,
397-98, 399
Vallejo, Caesar, 508, 652-53 Wilson, William Julius, 21
Van Eyck, Aldo, 356 Wing, Bob, 20-21
Vian, Boris, 434
Wiseman, Frederick, 143
Vico, Giambattista, 544-45, 558n
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 254, 669
Volosinov, V. N., 45, 669
Wollstonecraft, Mary, 95
Wainwright, Hilary, 130
Washington, Harold, 425 Xun, Lu, 720
Watten, Barrett, 361, 373, 375-76
Weber, Max, 234, 409
Yeats, William Butler, 345
Welles, Orson, 443n
West, Cornel, 337, 360
Wickham, Gary, 52 Zaid, Gabriel, 657
Wilde, Oscar, 698 Zhdanov, Andrei, 716
Williams, Raymond, 6, 382-83, 400- Zueqin, Cao, 720
401n, 621-24, 625 Zukofsky, Louis, 363, 364-65

738