Tac Attack February 1967

turning the phantom.. Page 4

 for efficient tactical air power

VOL . 7 NO.2

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

THG ll HG K....__FEB-RUARY
1 9 6 - 7-

COMMANDER current interest

GENERAL GABRIEL P. DISOSWAY
TURNING THE PHANTOM Pg 4
VICE COMMANDER
- keep your speed up, Podner
LT GEH ALBERT P. CLARK

OOOPSI Pg 10
Pub Iished by the Chief of Safety - ex plosives acc idents
COLONEL HOMER C. BOLES
COMMUNICAT IONS Pg 14
-the trou bl e wit h is, is is
- th e par ab le of the six blind men

PI TY THE VI SITING FIREMAN Pg 22

- does your sho w re all y tell ?

C HI EF SAFET Y PUB LI CA TI ONS YOU BE THE J UDGE Pg 24

L T COL CARL E. PEARSON - on ap peal

HEY RUBE ! Pg 28
editor - o way- out fix
Copt John D. Shoc klock

art dire ctor

departments
Angle of ATTACK 3
Stan Hardi s on
Pilot of Dist inction 9
layout & production A 2nd Look 12
SSGT Jame s E. Fields
TAC Tips 19

editorial assistant Surveys of Places 20

SSGT Richard D. Reid Chock Talk 29

TACRP 127-1

A rti c le s , accident briefs, and associated materia l in this ma~azine are non-dir ec-
tive in nature. All s u/1/lestions and re commendation s a r e intended to remain within the
scope of existing dire c tives . Information used to brief accident s and in c ident s doe s
not identify the per sons, places, or units involved and may not be construed as in-
c riminating under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military ju s tice. Names, date s ,
and p la ces used in conjunction with accident stories are fi c titious . Air F o r ce unit s
p r in t i n g are e n cou raSed to republish the material contained herein ; however, content s a re not
for public re lease. Written pennission must be obtained from HQ TAC before material
Hq TAC Field Printing Plan t may be repub l ished b y o ther then Departme n t of De fense o rSanizations.
Contributions o f a rticles, photos, and items of inte rest from personne l in the field
are encoureSed, as are comment s and criticism. We reser ve the riSht to e dit e ll manu-
sc ripts for clarity and re adabilit y. Dire c t communic~tion is authorized with: The Edi-
tor, TAC ATTACK, HO TAC (OS P ) , Lan11, lev AFB. Va. 23365.
Distribution F, Cont ro lled by OSP • TAC Publication s Bulletin No. 22, dat e d 3
june 1 966
Angle of ATTACK
ERROR IS A VERY HUMAN THING

In the year just past, TAC lost 55 airplanes and 45 aircrew lives in 62 major
aircraft accidents. A little over one half of.these accidents were caused by human
error. Mast of the remaining accidents resulted when aircraft parts broke or com-
ponents malfunctioned. The material failure accidents have objects that you can
get your hands on as cause factors. You can do something about them. These ob-
jects usually get prompt attention.
Human error in aircraft accidents, however, is more difficult to pin down. Some-
times we even catch ourselves saying that a certain number of human error
accidents are inevitable.
I don't think we need to take this attitude. There IS something we can do about
the accident caused by personnel error .
The first step is to recognize that human error is inevitable, but that the human
error accident is nat! Errors will be with us as long as people man and service
aircraft. But errors need not cause accidents if we recognize their potential.
The second step is to insulate these errors from potential accidents. We do
th i s by insisting on rigid compliance with the standards that will produce an ef-
ficient, error-free operation. These standards are the check lists, minimums , and
limits which we have developed through experience and experiment.
Now that the standards ore established, we no longer need to experiment . But
it is only natural , when you think you ore very familiar with an operation, to con -
sider some of these standards too restricti ve. It is at this point that you must
back off. You expose yourself to possible error when you deviate from .. . or
ignore . .. the standards. When you press below minimums, omit the first few
steps of a check list, linger past bingo fuel, or bypass an inspection , you leave
yourself open . In these situations, although you "know" you c an squeeze by, a
certain number of error-caused mishaps are inev itable.
We can't afford that.
But we can afford to accept that errors are very human things.

HOMER C . BOLES , C o l o n e l, US A F
Chi e f o f S afet y
 TURNING THE PHANTOM
... to take maximum advantage of its superior qualities requires a good under-
standing of 1ts handling characteristics. Experience has shown that you n1ust keep
your speed up. Low speed maneuvering can be dangerous!

4 FEBRUARY 1967
 After four years, we are still
learning about the Phantom. A
recent review of TAC's F-4 ac-
cidents showed that the aircrew
lost control of the airplane in half
of them •.. 11 outof22. When you
line up these eleven accidents you
Four years ago this month, the Phantom II find they contain some startling
entered the T AC inventory in the form of some similarities in airspeed, fuel lo ad,
F-4Bs on loan from the Navy. By the end of 1963, external stores, and center of
the 4453rd Combat Crew Training Squadron, then gravity:
located at MacDill AFB, Florida, was operating its • we know that ten were ma-
own F-4Cs. Now, with the F-4D regularly coming neuvering ... pulling G ... when
into TAC units, the Phantom has grown to a family they got into trouble. In the re-
of highly respected airplanes. maining one we can safely call
In the process, the F-4 has racked up an im- maneuvering a possibility.
pressive set of world records and proved itself in • Eight of the eleven were at
combat as a fighter pilot's airplane. As this art- 300 knots or below. One was be-
icle was in the final stages of preparation, TAC- tween 180 and 200 knots.
trained F-4 crews racked up the biggest aerial • All were carrying external
victory to date in Southeast Asia ... seven MIG-21 stores. Nine were carrying two
kills in one day without serious damage to the 370-gallon drop tanks. Eight were
attacking Phantoms. carrying at least one other ex-
The Phantom has arrived, proving itself fast, ternal store.
efficient, and versatile to the sometimes skeptical • Seven had between 12,000
single-cockpit, single-engine crowd. The effective- and 14,000 pounds of fuel aboard.
ness of the airplane is obvious and its redundant • Eight occurred at low alti-
seats and engines are far more than just luxury. tude. There wasn't time or space
Two heads for tactical planning and another engine for recovery from post stall gyra-
to get you home when one's been hit! tions.
Although each accident was
No airplane gets there... arrives ... without
thoroughly investigated, questions
growing pains. And the F-4 was no different. There
remained when the cause factors
was a period when production of ground support
were all sorted out. Most of it
equipment hadn't caught up with airplane delivery boiled down to: WHY would apilot
rates. That was soon corrected. Pilots had to learn allow his airplane to go through
new approaches to takeoff and landing techniques. normal stall warning into uncon-
When trouble developed with the boundary layer con- trollable gyrations?
trol (BLC) system, some hardware adjustments cor- The pilots involved in thes e
rected the problem. And hydraulic problems in the accidents were not inexperienced.
utility system were dispatched by changing seals and Seven of them averaged 175 hours
lines . . . and increasing maintenance c are and in the Phantom. Two of the four
caution. with less F-4 time had plenty of
previous experience in fighters.
So we look deeper into the com-
bination of airspeed, fuel weight,
and external stores, (CG) that
seems to produce a very sensitive
bird. Is there a combination that's
more sensitive than other config-
urations and airspeeds? Our at-

TAC ATTACK 5
tention centers on maneuvering easier to overlook ... when you g1vmg you a light stick,and stall
flight with external stores, when slow the bird down too far. warning less than you would nor-
you're slow ... below 300 knots. Although the test report mally expect, it's easy to see you
Most of our gunnery-range fingered approach configuration could get into the danger zone
configurations fall in the category subsonic and a clean airplane before you knew it ...
that re4.uires fuel management . .. transonic as the areas where light So what is the danger zone? To
emptying fuselage tanks 5 and 6 to stick forces are the most acute, us it's the wild ride we've come to
keep the CG from running too far let's look at the speeds whereour call post stall gyration ... and
aft. But there have been indica- accidents occurred. Using Figure any combination of airspeed, fuel
tions that internal wing fuel is in- 5-9 from the F-4C-1, we find that and stores load, and control action
directly feeding into cell 5. This between 250 and 300 knots CAS that leads irrevocably to post stall
means that whether we manage you'll have around 3G (plus or gyration. Airspeed below 300 ap-
fuel or not, the CG is farther aft minus one-half) available before pears to be a critical factor. That's
than we want it. And those eleven stall. (We were disappointed by the where the G you can pull before
accidents point toward aft CG absence of a V-G diagram in the stall starts to run out, and aft CG
giving us a sensitive bird. Phantom handbook. More on this appears to have the most undesir-
The results of the Category II later.) able effect. And while we're pulling
Stability and Control tests on the Gs, it's worth noting that the Dash
F-4C are revealing. In subsonic One contains a specific warning
windup turns, the test aircraft en- about abrupt entry to accelerated
countered a nose- up pitching tend- stalls. It says you can enter a stall
ency shortly after it entered buffet without noticeable buffet or wing
... stick forces decreased along rock warning when you snatch the
with a sharp increase in the angle stick back too fast. All you get is
of attack gradient. The condition moderate buffet at the stall!
was most acute in approach con- Now, about aft CG. The pilot's
figuration . And at transonic handbook allows us to load external
speeds , stick lightening became stores until CG runs back to a max
more pronounced. It occurred at of 36 percent.
G loads well below buffet. we saw from the stability and
The test report goes on to say control tests that the F-4's already
the pitch-up tendency noted on the light stick force gradient was re-
clean aircraft also exists when duced 50 percent with external
you're carrying external stores. stores. Engineers tell us that as
And external stores decreased long as a positive stick force
stick force gradients an average gradient is present, even though it
of 50 percent. The aircraft had a may be light ... or even close to
definite nose-up pitching tendency zero .•. the F-4 can be adequately
in all external-load configura- controlled under normal condi-
tions. tions. The hooker is in the "nor-
The report also pointed out that mal conditions'' bit. That's defined
external stores reduce the roll as when "the aircraft has suffi-
rate associated with pre-stall wing cient altitude that the pilot has
rock. And we know that as air- time to correct any undesirable
speeddecreases, the energy avail- flight characteristics which might
able in the aircraft to generate develop from inadvertently en-
buffet will decrease. For afighterpilot, accustomed tering a region of near zero or
Now it begins to add up ... to pulling 4 1/2 or 5G or more negative maneuvering stick force
stick lightening and pitch-up tend- with plenty of airspeed during re- gradients." In plain language that
ency increase when you carry covery from a weapons delivery means you'd better have spin re-
external stores. And stall warning pass, 2 1 / 2 or 3G isn't very much. covery altitude under you. That is,
signs become less pronounced. But with stores under the wing if you're going to honk the bird

6 FEBRU ARY 1967

 through stall angle of attack into whether internal wing fuel really Another move that is in order
that region where the nose starts goes into tanks 5 and 6. It can make is some straight talk in Section 6,
to rise and slide off to one side the difference between flying Flight Characteristics, of the F-4
. . . the wing starts to rock or around at heavy weights with CG Dash One. While it adequately
drop. almost all the way back, or midway describes stalls in a clean config-
All this adds up to the fact that between the limits of 25 to 36
as fuel or stores move the CG aft, percent. section v1
the stick force becomes lighter, Also in question is the fuel
more sensitive. To the engineer, management procedure in Section
the aircraft is still stable on paper. 7 of the Dash One. This procedure FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
But to you or me in the cockpit, is supposed to keep CG forward
it's getting difficult to handle ... during the early stages of a flight
'specially below 300 knots. by emptying tanks 5 and 6. But the
Let's take an F-4 configured CG runs back aft again once you
for a range mission and see what start to transfer from external
happens to CG. We'll hang 370s on tanks. We're not sure we've ac-
stations 1 and 9, a SUU-21 with complished much with this ''man-
six Mark 76s on station 5, and one agement.''
LAU-32 rocket pod with three Where do we go from here?
practice rockets on a TER from Two directions:
station 8. At takeoff CG is at 34 • Find 9ut just where the fuel
percent MAC. is going and learn more about
You transfer external tanks longitudinal stability ... and what
immediately. When they are empty it actually does to you in the slower
and internal wing and fuselage speed regimes. A new series of
tanks are full, the CG has moved stability and control tests are in
forward to 33.6 percent. When you the offing. By the time you read
have fuel remaining in only tanks this we hope they will be under
1, 2, 3, and 4, the CG has moved way. And we hope the results will
to 30.1 percent. Beautiful! clear up some of the confusion. uration, its warnings about stick
Now let's say you're siphoning • Make all Phantom phlyers lightening in accelerated stalls
fuel. You turn off external tanks, aware of the situation. Impress and in approach configuration are
but do not stop internal wing fuel them with the fact that aft CGs with pretty obscure. The section on
transfer. Later you turn the 370s external stores can give you a stability and control doesn't men-
back on ... you were feeding the sensitive airplane and surpris- tion increased sensitivity with
internal wings all the time. (This ingly little stall warning at speeds stores under the wing. In fact, it
non-standard fuel sequencing was below 300 knots. Even if the fuel dismisses any decrease in sta-
suspected in one accident.) With problem is straightened out, you bility with the statement that an
fuselage tanks full and external can still load the airplane to a CG adequate margin remains and
wing tanks containing 2000 pounds, of 36 percent. Any time you do maneuvering capability is not af-
the CG has moved afttoabout35.2 that, accelerated stalls will be fected.
percent ... less than onepercent touchy. we believe, however, that in
from the aft limit! One move in the right direc- fifty percent of our F-4 accidents,
Once you've finished trans- tion is the recent increase in basic the pilot lost control while he was
ferring external tanks and have all maneuvering speed for the F-4. maneuvering . . . with stores on
fuselage tanks full, internal and None of our other current fighters ..• at too low a speed!
external wing tanks empty, CG is pretend to operate efficiently at While we're looking at im-
still back at 35.1 percent! This is 300 knots or below. Now that we're provements in the Dash One that
a very normal configuration which all flying the F-4 around a basic could tell the fighter pilot more
you encounter with standard fuel speed of 350 KCAS, we won't be about maneuvering his airplane,
sequencing. flying GCI targets at 260 knots let's look at the angle of attack
So it's important to know any more . . . will we? indicator. At present the F-4

TAC ATTACK 7
manual treats this instrument al- before stall at any airspeed. It Hopefully, the current round of
most exclusively as an approach looks something like this testing will produce these im-
provements in the Phantom Pilot's
Handbook.
Until then . . . and you know
these things take time ... handle
with care. The one thing you don't
want to do whenyou'remaneuver-
ing this airplane is get it too slow.
Use some of that wonderfulpower
to get up to maneuvering speed
. . . and keep it there. Don't be
caught trying to get your speed
UOJS INDICATED AIR SPEED
back after you've already flown
into the buffet or stall.
and landing aid . But it says little Chart 5-9 looks something like Buffet tells you two things . . .
about angle of 'attack while ma- that, but it is labeled Flight you're nearing critical angles of
neuvering . Strength Diagram and is supposed attack, and you've picked up an
While you can't afford to spend to show the ''maximum accelera- impressive amount of drag.
a lot of time staring at the meter tion presently permitted ..• " It Neither one does you any good
when you're maneuvering, it can plots acceleration G- units against when you're turning the airplane.
give you some warning when you're Mach number, at sea level. We all If you pull far enough into the turn,
pulling G. It can tell you when know that an airplane stalls on drag increase causes airspeed to
you're approaching trouble in a indicated (or calibrated) airspeed, drop. Now you're just increasing
steady pull. But the time required not Mach! turn by sacrificing speed, not be-
for you and the airplane to react we would like to see a V-G cause you're pulling tighter. And
after you notice angle of attack, diagram for the F- 4 that presents after you've pulled into the stall
makes the gage of little use to you not only stall speeds for repre- . . . ? ''You play like a submarine
during abrupt attitude changes . sentative weights, but also stall and blow the klaxon and holler
We think the Dash One should warning areas, included in the next DIVE! DIVE! while you act like an
talk more about this. revision of the Dash One. This is unmaneuverable sitting duck in
Finally, the F - 4 Dash One is currently being requested. The free fall trying to regain what you
the only T AC fighter manual (be- width of the buffet, wing rock, and just threw away." That was Don
sides the A- lE) we came across pitch-up areas at varying air- Stuck's reaction in the McDonnell
that does not contain a V-G dia- speeds and G loads . . . and in Field Service Digest a couple of
gram. You might know it better as different configurations years ago.
the Operating Flight Limits dia- should be revealing. It would be a He concluded with: "Keep your
gram. It compares airspeed (V) valuable graphic aid to the guy who speed up, Podner, and you won't
on one scale against acceleration flies the airplane. It would cer- get into trouble."
(G) on the other scale, and tells tainly be a great aid to the guy And that's good advice!
how much G you have available checking out in the bird. ~

If we'1·e s tirred your interest or If you're the kind o f professional

aro used your c uriosity, may we recom- pilot who really wants to unders tand hi s
mend that you dig out a copy of the airplane and the forces that make it fly
booklet. "Tiger T alk ll ," published and for him, go back over th e lead article in
dis tribut ed by McDonnell las/ year. lf "Tiger Talk l." Don tackled "A Greek
you hal'e already read Don Stuck's trea t- named Alpha" and came away with one
ment of spin pre1•ention in the F-4, go of the most luc id and instructive dis-
back and read it again. It's call ed c u ssion s of aircra ft control and angle of
"Spin, Crash, Burn ... but . .. WHY?" attack yo u' ll run into in a long time.
and it may be the most valuable seven
pages you'll read about yo ur favorite -Ed
airplan e.

8 FE BR UARY 1967
 TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

PILOT
OF
DISTINCTION

Captain Robert A. Remey, 4453rd Combat Crew above sea level. Shortly thereafter his engine
n Air Force Base, flamed out. Upon restart the vibrations were so
Arizona, has been selecte a [cal Air Com- sev: oat he was forced to leave power at idle.
mand Pilot of Distinction. Although ,,I s, ed to 500 pounds
Climbing through 19.000 feet in a T-33 aircraft, and the ailerons began o
Captain Remey detected mild engine vibrations. He cessfully 2800 feet down the runway. Using maxi-
soon was unable to obtain full power and his wing- mum braking. and opening his canopy at 80 knots,
man observed black smoke coming from Captain he stopped before reaching the end of the runway.
Remey's tailpipe. His generator light illuminated The engine vibration had resulted from a broken
soon after he turned toward the nearest Air Force turbine blade, which caused bolts to shear on the
base, and hydraulic pressure dropped to 750 pounds. starter and fuel filter, and caused the generator and
He executed the procedures for electrical failure hydraulic failures.
and lowered the landing gear, anticipating complete Captain Remey's knowledge of his airplane and
hydraulic failure. With the engine vibrations in- ability to calmly cope with a very difficult situation
creasing, Captain Remey entered a flameout pattern qualify him as a Tactical Air Command Pilot of
for a 6820 foot civilian runway which is 5042 feet Distinction.

TAC ATTACK 9
 As soon as it happened, George
OOoops!! knew what it was.
Safety pins! No safety pins in
the pylons!
It had been a routine work
order ... arm the centerline sta-
tion of an F-4C. He and Tommy
had been assigned the job. As they
walked toward the bird, they saw
that there were no safety pins in
the left pylons. George and Tommy
didn't talk about it, but they both
figured someone must have de-
armed the pylons. Why would any-
one leave an airplane sitting on
the ramp without pins?
They hooked up external power
and George got in the cockpit.
Tommy went under the bird with
his voltmeter. The stray voltage
check on the centerline station
went smoothly. George selected
centerline station .•. Tommy con-
firmed no voltage. Then George
pressed the external stores emer-
gency release button . . . the next
step in their procedure.
That was when the outboard
pylons and the left inboard pylon
jettisoned to the ramp.
They had not been using a
check list. Had they used one ...
and started with it right from the
top, you'd be reading another story
on this page.
Another day, on another base
... a load team arrived at an F-
105 to check out a write-up on the
MN-lA control panel. They re-
moved the MN-lA and replaced it
with one from the shop. Then they
checked safety pins inserted in the
centerline MER and the MN-lA.
Next, one member of the team
headed for the cockpit to trouble-
shoot the control panel discrep-
ancy. As he sat down, he acciden-
tally de p r e s s e d the external

10 FEBRUARY 1967
stores jettison button on the left times the guy at the airplane was Eighty percent of the F-105
sub-panel. the Crew Chief, seven times it was accidents happened in the same
That was when the left and the load crew. Five times it was wing!
right inboard pylon tanks and the Egress troops. One Armament guy How about explosive accidents
left outboard p y 1on jettisoned to and two Fire-Control technicians in Reserve Forces assigned to
the ramp. The right inboardpylon were the principles on the scene TAC? Three ofthosefouroc-
didn't jettison ... it had been safe- when the action started. curred in National Guard outfits
tied in preparation for loading an Sometimes these people were in the same state!
MA-2A rocket launcher. little more than innocent by- Any time mishaps are grouped
They had not been following a standers. But often they failed to in such small segments of the
check list. Had they used one, and see if someone else had forgotten total exposure, you wonder how all
started with it right from the top, something ... like dearming initi- the rest of us escaped the same
this story wouldn't be here either. ators or inserting satety pins. In trouble. It can't all be black magic
And the other eighteen similar some cases, so many people ig- and dumb luck.
cases of ... Ooops! Safety pins! nored their check lists that you'd Lack of supervision showed up
... in the last two years could have think they are going out of style! in many ways. Sometimes local
been avoided the same way. In going through the reports, procedures weren't worked out to
Twenty times someone ... or it turns out that aircraft crew take care of every eventuality.
several people. . . forgot about chiefs take eleven counts for check Sometimes a young, well-meaning
safety pins and an accident hap- list failure. This is probably be- troop was turned loose on a job
pened. Some were serious and cause the CC is the guy who is he had no bus in e s s attempting
people got hurt. Some were less usually supposed to insert the pin without real close guidance ...
spectacular ... little more than an in the first place. Next biggest like over- the- shoulder. In other
initiator firing in disconnected safety pin offender is the load crew cases, there weren't enough safety
lines. But every one was an ac- member, who bought seven of the pins to go around ... so everyone
cidental detonation of an explosive accidents for not f o 11 owing his ignored the problem and pressed
device ... and that's dangerous!! check list. Egress troops followed ahead hoping nothing bad would
with five counts, and Armament happen.
was rapped with one. Supervisors You're right, the bad had al-
Where did it happen? were specific a 11 y singled out ready happened when they told the
twice. crew chief to go ahead and forget
In the maintenance area, Then why did we say we were about the pin. The muffled ex-
mostly. Nineteen times the air- charging supervisors as the lead- plosion, shocked faces, and ac-
plane involved was at its home ing offenders? Read on ... cusing fingers were all anti-
base, undergoing some form of climax.
maintenance by people of the home
outfit. The twentieth case was Was there a pattern?
away from home ... an F-4C pilot Does that mean everyone else is
watched his left LAU-17 jettison You bet! It was a pattern of clean?
when he turned on external power bunches.Where supervision didn't
for pre f1 i g h t. The design de- live up to its name. No, not quite. We still have
ficiency that caused this unhappy Ten of the twenty accidents two crew chiefs; three loaders;
accident has been corrected. occurred on new equipment ... the and one each fire-control, super-
F-4C. . . where the experienced visor (again?), armament, and
supervisor should be hovering seat installer ... who managed to
Who did it happen to? over every maintenance action. outsmart the whole system.
At least until he's sure his troops They didn't read THEIR check
We're going to step right understand the whole operation. lists . . . which said to play like
out and say supervisors ... Only one time did an F-100 troop everyone who went before you
altho ugh they were s e 1 do m slip ... and that bird's been around goofed, and ...
standing next to the airplane when long enough for many of us to
CHECK THE PINS!
all the excitement occurred. Four have experience on it.

TAC ATTACK 11
 LOOK
A 2nd

The B-66 with two Instructor pilots aboard drove ... the switch guard was safetied with wire almost
down final with its gear still in the well. Both pilots twice as heavy as it was supposed to be. When he
were engrossed in the simulated single engine ap- finally got the hook down, it struck a flush-mounted
proach they were making and missed the fact that runway light on the threshold and skipped over the
they had no gear. They had silenced the gear warn- BAK-9 barrier. Sixty feet further into the overrun
ing horn when they pulled one throttle back to sim- his still-charging chariot picked up the MA-lA
ulate single engine. barrier cable. It broke!
The Mobile officer fired a flare after calling on He came to a stop some 2000 feet into the desert
guard, but they didn't hear the call ... didn't see the after bouncing across a 150-foot wide ditch.
flare. When Tower finally called them on tower chan- Both of these unhappy mishaps were loaded with
nel they pushed the power up to go around. pilot problems, but a second look makes you wonder
After the B-66 scraped along the runway a little if we don't sometimes kid ourselves about the devices
way, the engines accelerated to full power and they that are supposed to save the day when everything
took off again. Next time around the pattern they used else goes wrong.
both engines, lowered the gear, and made a normal Take the flare gun in Mobile. The only reason we
landing. have it there is because we acknowledge thatonce tn
An F-105 pilot returning from a gunnery mission a while someone tries to land with his gear up. We
discovered that his drag chute had failed to deploy have a highly qualified pilot sit in Mobile day after
after he pulled the handle. He found himself scream- day, watching perfectly normal and safe landings, so
ing down the runway toward two members of his flight on that rare occasion ... once every several months
who had landed in front of him. He had lowered his • . . he can stop that inevitable gear up approach.
nose wheel to the pavement shortly after touchdown, We give him a hand-held Very pistol. And the flare
losing most of his aerodynamic braking. In the course doesn't reach far enough to attract the pilot's atten-
of steering around his flight-mates on the runway, he tion.
used differential braking and was unable to get max Remote-controlled, runway-side flare launchers
benefit from his wheel brakes. have been around on Air Force bases for years. But
Approaching the far end of the runway he tried to not on enough bases.
lower his tailhook, but that required quite astruggle The extra-heavy safety wire on the tail hook

12 FEBRUARY 1967
switch cover falsifies the security of an emergency tech data criteria). And not when the tests on a par-
system in the same manner. ticular barrier configuration are going to be run next
Or take those barriers. They, too, are an ex- year. Right now we don't know how much that par-
pression of our understanding that once in a while ticular MA-lA installation was supposed to take be-
airplanes are going to get into trouble. Sometimes fore it gave up and let the airplane through.
people or materials fail and a fighter can't stop on How many other pieces of equipment do we de-
the runway. But we're all happy about the barriers pend upon to save the day •.. that may or may not
on the end of the runway. They'll stop the airplanes do it for us? It behooves each one of us to take a good
that nothing else will stop. Or will they? look at our surroundings. When we're talking arout
Not when the cable is installed too close to an the life-and-limb-saving devices in our flying busi-
obstruction like a runway light (in direct violation of ness, a healthy curiosity is just that . . . healthy!

Several months back, an instructor leading a flight several similar, if less spectacular, incidents ...
of students had thirty minutes to burn fuel down be- makes you think about the instructors' motivation.
fore their scheduled range time. He had briefed a What led these instructors to jeopardize their stu-
simulated road recce that would terminate with a dents' lives, and sometimes their own?
mock attack on a target he would select. Cruising at Almost without exception, the instructors in our
500 feet, he spotted a hill, called it to the flight as his training programs are mature, experienced pilots.
target, and pulled up into an almost-lazy-eight. Re- Most of them have seen combat in the airplane they
versing course at the top, about 3000 feet above the are flying. They are terribly aware that their stu-
ground, he descended toward his target in a 20-de- dents are going into combat shortly after they com-
gree dive. As he pulled off he cautioned his students plete their training.
that they were still heavy ... be careful. And that leads you directly to the motivation that
Number Two found himself in the burble as he allowed them to ignore or overlook the warnings of
overshot the roll-in. Number Three lined up, pressed thei r normally good judgment. Having seen combat,
his attack , delayed his pullout, and mushed into the they realize the restrictions of a stateside training
target! program often m:lk:e training flights seem unrealistic.
More recently, an instructor in a dual aircraft The instructors cannot overlook their students' need
departed from the mission he had briefed to show for maximum experience in realistic situations be-
his student some of the tree-top flying he had done fore the chips are really down . . before someone is
in combat. He flew through two power lines 75 feet shooting at them ..
above the terrain. Luckily, he was able to fly the air- Their eagerness to provide the most effective and
plane home. productive training prompts them to lead students
Corrective action has been taken in both cases by into situations they sometimes are not prepared to
now. The training outline in the first situation is more handle. Or situations that violate stateside flying
explicit about maneuvers to be performed while the rules.
airplane is heavy. Students must fly several ground Certainly we must make our training as realistic
attack sorties on a supervised range before flying as possible. We should review it regularly to see if
target-of-opportunity type missions. In the second we can improve it. But we are defeating our purpose
case, instructors have been re-impressed with the when instructors demonstrate questionable judgment,
fact that they must stay within the outlines of the violate regulations, disregard authority .
already-adequate training outline. . or when the student is killed!
A second look into these two mishaps • . . and ~

TAC ATTACK 13
 ,..--

SECO D
OF A
SERIES ..
COMMUNICATIONS
I '-- Reprinted from Kaiser A luminum N ews

THE TROUBLE
WITH IS, IS IS B ehind the unqualified use of the word "is" lurk a
number of assumptions, each of which can lead to
trouble. (We use the word "unqualified" because there
If we were to track down and cor- certainly appear to be places in our common speech
ner in its lair what we believe to be
one of the chief causes of problems where trying to avoid using the word "is" is ... see?
in everyday communications, we ... not worth the effort it takes.)
would describe it as the misuse of So what's so bad about "is?"
the word . .. For one thing, what we consider "bad" are the
many ways in which it can be misused in everyday
speech:
"It is good . . . "
"He is lazy ... "
"That is a rock . . . "
all have one thing in common. The "is" implies that
we are describing something "out there" that has a
certain quality ... goodness, laziness , or rocklike
. • . which exists independently of our personal ex-
perience of it. And the next implication is that you
must agree because "obviously" that is what it is.
But what we really are describing is an internal ex-
perience* which may have validity only for us.
One way out of this dilemma may be to say:
"I think it is good . .• "
"I believe he is lazy • •. "
''It looks to me like a rock •
,
or, if we don't actually say it out loud, we can at least
think this way to ourselves, as a reminder that what
we describe is not ''out there' ' but an experience
inside ourselves.

*See Don Fabun's article in last month's

issue: "How Do We Know Something to
Commun icate?"

14 FEBRUARY 1967
 Tac tips

TAKES TWO decision to abort, he was whistling along at an im-

The phlyers had completed their rocket, dive, and pressive 160 to 170 knots!
skip events on the range. The aircraft commander Even with the chute out, hesawhewasn't going to
had cleared his multiple weapons control panel ... stop before the barrier. He was mighty close to it
but he left the Station Select on inboard wing. Next when he got his hook down. The bird failed to catch
time around the pattern, he set up for strafe and the BAK-9, brushed across the webbing, andstopped
placed Master Arm to Arm. Then, after lining up . • . in the dirt about 1200 feet beyond the barrier.
getting the picture he wanted •.. he pressed the bomb Late abort decision, even later hook deployment,
pickle instead of the stick trigger!! and a seat-of-the-pants approach to the whole thing
That's right, the rocket launcher smartly jet- set this one up.
tisoned from his wing!
It took two goofs to make this one. Maybe the AC WHERE'DITGO ?? WHERE'DITGO??
was a bit rushed. The unit involved has enlarged the
After a nice landing about 1000 feet in from the
range pattern a bit to allow student crews that extra
threshold after a night GCA approach, the F-100 pilot
few seconds while they're getting to know the hard-
realized that his drag chute had failed. Nothing too
ware. unusual, he tried some aerodynamic braking because
the runway was kinda wet. Rolling down the runway, he
THE BRAKES turned his radio to tower channel and started anti-
The C-123 pilot was number two in a flight of three skid braking. The bird must have been hydroplaning,
for formation training. When the formation landed at because his braking efforts didn't seem to be doing
an auxiliary field, his right main tire blew out. Ap- milch for him.
proach and touchdown had appeared normal and the When he had 2500 feet left to go he thought he
pilot had been briefed not to use brakes. could turn off safely.
When it was all over, he said he had not inten- At 2000 feet he realized he couldn't!
tionally applied brakes. But the blown tire had a large He would need the barrier ... but he had trouble
flat spot that was worn completely thru. He had been finding the tailhook button in the dark. He wasn't ex-
doing some fancy rudder-wobbling just before touch- actly sure where it was supposed to be. When he saw
down to keep it pointed down the runway. Number he was going off the end of the runway he started to
One's wake had been more turbulent than he expected. turn off the anti-skid ..• but decided to punch offhis
Only possible conclusion is that he worked his stores instead. Up to this time, the busy pilot had
boots up onto the rudder pedals without realizing it. made a total of four· transmissions on tower
frequency.
The airplane came to rest against a fence with
ABORTS AGAIN nose wheel collapsed, after crossing the perimeter
When the F-104 pilot lit burner after brake release road. It suffered substantial damage.
his nozzles, RPM, and EGT all looked correct and Lack of illumination on the tailhook button helped
proper. But as he reached his 2000 foot acceleration this pilot's confusion .•. and lack of familiarity with
check, he was about five knots shortofthe 122 he had his cockpit •.• snowball into a truly preventable ac-
computed. He felt the bird "did not appear to ac- cident.
celerate as it should." By the time he made the

TAC ATTACK 19
 ···---/ {
.'
\

Surveys •.

(
f '"-./ -- ~--

J:j{
'
j-··--L... ./f - .. ~ l
I r---~· 7\--
·, '
~

\.vf---.. --1~---r-----~-----< )_.~"·-~.. .

;' -+T. --.
Of .'~ . . 1 J-;:r-·
·. ,\,L... .;., .... IA~---::t--~-~~.c·c-
'1./
.
'l.. _.1--J ..
i - ., \ ;-----r \ ' ·,
-1' ' ' '
.
~ ' f
/-..'i_#
..___y:pr-
,.""".-~ .. :
r 1[
!,
j \ :
,
'

\ --~--

Places
H umor and accidents are sel- a'O'ailable . . . including that big, Two of the team recently were
dom close companions. Normally, beautiful (?),air-conditioned making a night GCA in aT-bird.
the loss is too great. However, if C-130. His training ... possibly On turn to base they suddenly re-
you could travel with TAC's safe- the toughest in the Air Force. ceived two different sets of in-
ty survey team, you would oc- These men are taught to react to structions simultaneously. Again,
casionally come across ahazard- signals like machines. Absolutely and then a third time this clutter
ous situation which would bring a no hesitation. Nerves like steel. continued. Finally one of them
chuckle. But unfortunately, it usu- Give them a green jump signal and broke in to tell the controller that
ally camouflages a serious acci- out they go! the who 1 e issue was becoming
dent potential. As the aircraft reached the thoroughly confused. The ensuing
One such occurrence resulted slow down point, the crew lowered silence lasted about ten seconds
when a Combat Control Team the rear ramp and the Ramp and followed by a frequency change ...
member was preparing to jump Door light came on. Guess what? at turn to final. Later investiga-
into a postage-stamp-size drop The Ramp and Door is as green as tion revealed a bad antenna that
zone. His equipment was the best the Jump light! Out the jumper allowed Approach Control trans-
went . • . two miles short of his missions to be broadcast when the
intended point of impact. Perhaps GCA mike was activated. (This one
some of us should start thinking we don't think of as humorous)
about changing the color of the While talking to a crew re-
Ramp and Door light. cently returned from a resupply
A mistaken green light is not mission in Central America, we
the only way to spread jumpers came across a potentially serious
all over the countryside. More problem. The situation arose when
often than not, it occurs when the crew approached the airfield
Good 01' Nav gives the signal ... servicing the capital city of a
and then finds that he computed small Central American country.
his air release point using the The tower operator told them the
wrong i m p a c t point. Complete airfield was b e 1ow minimums.
preplanning and mission oriented Since the bird had ample fuel, and
briefings are still the best meth- the tower operator promised that
ods of insuring a successful mis- the scud would soon lift, they de-
sion. cided to orbit.

20 FEBRUARY 1967
 Three hours . . . and abo u t in fact below minimums. Thanks a airman replied that it really
8,000 pounds of fuel . . . later, lot . . . but no thanks! wasn't as bad as it looked, be-
Tower was still calling the field All the goofs by no means oc- cause he had just "borrowed" the
below minimums. Moments later cur in the air, as we found by visit- drill. He was shocked to learn
a civilian airliner made an ap- ing an engine shop at one of our that others have been killed using
proach and landed. Using all the east coast bases. Wefoundayoung borrowed d r i ll s that were not
cool he could muster, the pilot airman using a high speed drill . properly grounded.
politely asked Tower why he had The drill and its wire were in fine
permitted that landing. The tower shape. It even had a three-prong See you next month . ..
operator replied that he would ac- plug. But the grounding prong had
commodate them, as he had done been filed down so that it could be LT COL BEN B. BENIGNO
the air liner, by declaring the field used with a two-wire receptacle! Chief, TAC Safety Survey
open . .. even though the strip was When we asked "how come?", the Team

Recognition
CREW CHIEF
Of THE MONTH
Stoff Sergeant James L. Litt au of the 27th
Tactical F ighter Wing , Connon Air Force Bose , New
Mexico, has been selected to receive the T AC Crew
Chief Safety Award for the month of January 1967.
Sergeant Litta u will rece ive a letter of oppreciot·ion
from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and
on engraved award .

IAINTENAIICE IAN
Of THE MONTH
Stoff Sergeant William Wilson of the 4525th
Fighter Weapons Wing, Nellis Air Force Bose,
Nevada, has been selected to receive the TAC
Maintenance Man Safety Award for the month of
January 1967. Sergeant Wilson will receive a letter
of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air
Command and an engraved award .

TAC ATTACK 21
 pity
the
visiting
fireman
. or, Do e s Your Show

Really Te ll??

by SSgt Fronk P. Nollette

USA F TFWC, Nellis AFB

W ould you fly the back seat of

a supersonic fighter you'd seen
only in magazines or n e w s re-
views, after this briefing?
''Yeah, Charley, I think you'll tighten your chute, head for the him a life raft pounding at his
like this bird. 'Memher the way the back door, pull the ripcord when nether parts? And does Senior
seat works in the T-hird? Same you're clear of the aircraft ... " know the raft will be ATTACHED
with this one ... 'cept you'll have Let's backtrack to the first to him?
to remember to pull the kit handle episode. In this instance, Com- And in the big multi-fan trans-
after you get out. If we have to get mand and Senior had flown to- port types, do your passengers
out on the ground, pull the kit gether "way back when." Com- know where the exits are, or are
handle, leap out, andmaketracks. mand assumed Senior was hep to you assuming they ' ll find them
Questions? ... Good, let's press the modern systems, now so com- when they see all the bright m ark-
on!'' monplace to Command. ings? Do they know what to do once
Unfortunately, that is a direct Obviously, Senior has enough they ' re out of the aircraft ...
quote, overheard in a squadron ops experience to rate a star over his either in the air or on the ground?
room. The players? A Command wings, but that won't help much if The last tim~ you rode in the aft
Pilot briefing a Senior Pilot for a the last ejection seat he saw was compartment of a Hercules or
one-time, visiting-fireman ride in a Fly Safe movie, and he hasn't Gooney-bird, did you look around
in the back of one of TAG's finest found a C-130 with an ejection seat and spot the exits? Chances are,
machines. since he started flying them four unless you've been in a bash be-
How about the multi- fan driver years ago. fore, you didn't. So how can you
who briefs his passengers with a Does Senior know when to de- expect the one- time passenger to
quick: ploy his survival kit? Does Senior do it?
"Keep your belts fastened on know he had better not pull the kit The extra three or four min-
takeoff and landing; no smoking at handle during ground egress if utes you spend pointing out exits,
those times; if you hear the bell, he's standing up, since it'll give escape aids, appropriate handles

22 FEBRUARY 1967
and procedures, will do a lot for But the essentials should be clear- • Do I give a show-and-tell
his confidence. It could mean the cut to the ultimate user. briefing or just a tell type?
difference between a statistic and Got your Dash-One handy? Flip • Do they (or he) know what to
another member of the Caterpiller it open to the emergency proce- do after the escape/egress?
Club. You don't have time for a dure section. Voila!! Instant Les- • Would I fly in a strange air.:.
•
show-and-tell session with the son Plan!! Pick out the key points craft after the briefing I just gave?
passenger(s)? and pass them along to your visit- The man in back is depending
MAKE THE TIME!! ing fireman. on you for a safe, secure flight,
It doesn't have to be a long Check yourself for these four but if the bird double crosses him,
discourse on the functions of the simple points: give him a break. It could be YOU
systems, or the aerodynamics of • Does my passenger know what in the back seat some day!
a falling body beneath a canopy. to do or am I assuming he knows?

Not long ago a TAC pilot , feeling secure under radar control as heap-
LOOK ... proached his home base , was momentarily terrified when he looked out the
front window of his airplane . There , almost directly in front of him , almost
filling his windshield .. . was a civilian sport parachutist!
Before Later , after the catastrophe had only narrowly been averted , the home
base folks did some checking. Sure enough , they found the approach route
this pilot had been following drove right through an established jump are a.
You 'r e To their utter dismay , they learned when they did further checking in the
Airman's Information Manual (AIM , for short) , that there were eleven des-
ignated jump areas on , or within five miles of, their low level routes. There
Leaped was one in their Military Climb Corridorl
If you haven't checked recently , don't wait for an experience like this
before you break out the AIM. Sure , it's a civilian manual, but it contains
goodies the Enroute Supplements and FLIP Planning sometimes omit ...
Upon like where to expect sport 'chutists!
Take a look at the radius of their jump zones , the approaches, altitudes
they use, and when you can expect to see them out there. It's all in the book.
Then , it might be a good idea to get in touch with these jumpers . . .
they're aviation enthusiasts, too , and happy to coordinate on common prob-
lems.
Now ... you're ready to call all the aircrews in the outfit together ...

adapt ed from a 9th AF

Safety Al ert Lett er

TAC ATTACK 23
 YOU
be the
JUDGE

by LtCol Carl E. Pearson

Chief, Safety Publications
Hq TAC
"T
lhey didn't have to die," the with seat belts fastened . . . for a of all their other mistakes, seat
State Highway Patrolman snapped couple of days. belts would've kept them alive.
his notebook closed, sorted out his My scene-surveying andsolil- They'd be hurtin', but they'd still
accident reports on his clipboard oquizing was interrupted by the be among the living. The interior
and continued, "Throwing your Highway Patrolman, "Andinspite of that car is in good shape. If
life away just doesn't make sense
. . . and this one's pretty typi-
TAC FATALITIES (POV) 1966
cal."
"Here's a couple of young air- GRADE DISTRIBUTION
men, barely out of their teens, out
on the town. They've had a few
beers too many ... driving back GRADE NO. NO .
to base after the joints close ...
and in a hurry to get back before A3C 12 2Lt
they all go to sleep. The beer,
speed, and fatigue catches up with A2C 19 1 Lt
'em. Look around. The end of the
AlC 7 Capt 0
story is scattered around the land-
scape." SSgt 9 Maj
It wasn't a pretty picture ...
it never is. This was the kind of TSgt 0 Lt Col
a bash that makes you think back 2
MSgt 0 Col
over your own close ones. You
remember the times you dozed off SMS 0
... almost fell asleep. You think:
There but for the grace of some- CMS _Q_
body ...
You drive slowly, soberly, and TOTAL : 47 TOTAL: 6

24 FEBRUARY 1967
they had only stayed in it ... How this all -TAC problem is spiralling heaviest concentration appeared
can people be so stupid?" rapidly upward! in the 18 thru 22 year groups. They
Seeing the blue suit he added, For your info and comparison: accounted for 64 percent of TAC's
"If you're smart enough to send TAC aircrew losses in flight ac- fatalities. The 21 and 22 year
people to the moon why can't you cidents in 1966 totaled 45. groups were hardest hit . . . they
get them to drive sensibly ... and represent one-third of the fatal-
wear seat belts?" With that part- WHO'S INVOLVED ities. This suggests that the free-
ing dig he left. dom to buy alcoholic beverages
I'm glad he did. I didn't have TAC fatalities in POV acci- that goes with the magic number
any answers . . . right then. dents ranged from senior officers 21 carries with it a price to pay.
His comments about Air Force to our most junior airmen. A look Instant maturity is not a certainty
types being something less than at the table below shows the grades on the calendar day that legally
smart still rankled me on the way involved in TAC fatalities in 1966. makes you a man.
to work the next day. Not just any- The 11 percent of the total suffer- It was a surprise to find the
body can serve in the Air Force. ed by officers approximates the 26-year-olds suffering four
He should know that! He couldn't ratio of officer to airmen in TAC. losses. Comparing it to the 1000 -
handle some of the jobs these Forty-seven of the fatalities were hour pilot, 26 must be the age of
"kids" are holding down. staff sergeants and below . .. air- car complacency. The o v er-40
All you have to do is give Blue men second class were hit the group, with life just beginning,was
Suiters all the facts. Their native hardest. Well over half the fatal- involved in about 10 percent of the
intelligence and common s en s e ities, 31, were in the first two losses. With them it appears that
takes it from there. They're smart grades. slowing reaction times and failing
enough to figure it out for them- The senior NCOs did an out- vision are starting to take their
selves. standing job . . and deserve a pat
. toll. The 30 to 40 age group is the
So, I decided an appeal to your on the back. Now, if they could only best, but there is no permanent
common sense was the route to impart some of their driving wis- guarantee for the "middle ages."
travel. dom, maturity, and experience to Their exposure to hazard is real
Read on . . . you be the judge! the junior airmen. and continuing. But the figures
Fatalities by age groups fol- suggest that the defensive driving
THE BIG PICTURE lowed the pattern suggested by the ability of the 30 to 40 year group
grade level distribution. The is highly developed.
Take a look at TAC's recent
history of privately owned vehicle
fatalities. TAC FATALITIES (POV) 1966

It's pretty grim. CALENDAR DISTRIBUTION

In 1964 we lost 33; in 1965 it MONTH SUN MON TUE WED THUR FRI SAT TOTAL
jumped to 47 lives; in 1966 we suf-
Jan 3
fered the loss of 53 TACmen. We 2 1

lost them in 51 accidents . . . two Feb 1 1 1 3

accidents resulted in multiple Mar 1 1 2

deaths. Forty-one were dr ivers Apr 1 1 2

and 12 were passengers. May 3 1 4

Seven motorcycle accidents Jun 2 1 1 3 7

accounted for seven deaths. Two -
Jul 2 6
wheelers make up 2.5 percent of 3 1

TAC's registered vehicles and Aug 2 1 2 1 6

contributed 13 percent of the POV Sep 3 2 1 6

fatalities. Oct 3 1 1 1 6

These figures do not include Nov 1 2 1 1 1 1 7

deaths or injuries incurred by ci- Dec 1 1

vilians in either the primary or

secondary vehicle. Tragically, 16 9 3 3 6 6 10 53

TAC ATTACK 25
WHEN DID THEY OCCUR? TAC FATALITIES (POV) 1966
Let's look at the distribution ROAD CONDITIONS
of T AC fatalities thru the months
of the year and the days of the
Dry, straight, level
week. Fatalities start to climb in
May and continue at a high rate
fOry, curve, level
thru November. June and Novem-
z
ber, with seven deaths, a re the 0
Dry, straight, hill
highest months in TAC history. 1-
0
Understandably, the weekends z Dry, curve, hill
0
have been hard to live with (should u
we s ay . . . in ?) Monday accidents Wet, straight, level
a r e mostly weekend travelers re"-
turning after midnight. Friday Wet, curve, level
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

TAC FATALITIES (POV) 1966

DISTANCE FROM BASE night thru Monday m o r n in g ac- table, think about 66 percent of the
counted for three-£ our t h s of fatalities occurring within a 50
NO . OF t AC's fatalities throughout the mile range. These are our most
DISTANCE ACCIDENTS
year. Makes you wonder if you dangerous miles. Also, think about
should really TGIF. your habit of not using your seat
On Base 2
Examining the time of occur- belt for that short haul . . . it's
0-2 rence, it's apparent the hours of just a couple of minutes away. So
darkness took their to ll. The is a bash!
2-4 4 period from 2030 to 0430 hours In thinking about where our ac-
registered two-thirds of TAC's cidents happen, we also looked at
4-6 4
fatalities. Coincidentally, the ro ad conditions. If you've been
6-8 5 hours of darkness reduce driver thinking that poor roads, curves,
visibility by about two-thirds. The rain, snow, or ice are the problem
8 - 10 4 two hours after midnight tallied 30 • . . you're wrong! Two-thirds of
percent of the total. They are the the fatalities occurred when the
10 - 15 3 most hazardous hours in T AC's road was dry, straight, and level.
15 - 20 0 POV day. Only 14 percent of the accidents
involved rain and reduced visibil-
20- 25 WHERE DID THEY OCCUR? ity with a slick road surface ...
and less than half ofthesewereon
25- 50 ll The majority of TAC's fatal- curves. The primary hazards to
50 - 75 4 ities occurred close to base. Two- navigation were reduced visibility
thirds of the fatalities happened at night and impaired driver capa-
75- 100 within 50 miles. Forty-three per- bility.
cent were within 15 miles. That long, straight highway is
100 - 150 0 Nine of those killed were on by far the most dangerous. It of-
150 - 200 2 leave. Two were on weekend pass fers several temptations . . . to
. . . operating at long range. One get there in a hurry and to fall into
200 - 250 0 traveled 285 miles and the other long-lasting sleep.
354 miles on a two-day weekend.
250- 300 Neither left enough time to get WHAT ARE WE DRIVING?
300 - 400 back and both were fatigued before
they started their return trip. A look at the rolling stock in-
On Leave 9 When you look at this distance volved in TAC's fatal accidents

26 FEBRUARY 1967
 is revealing. They were not driv- much hope to OC()upants of a com--
ing jalopies. pact. Recognize the limitations of CAUSE FACTORS NO .
Seven of the accidents were the compact and don't start slug- Speed 39
motorcycle crashes. Six of the ging it out with the big boys!
seven cycles were less than a year Alcohol 34
old. The seventh cycle had been HOW DID IT HAPPEN?
roaring around for 13 years and
Fatigue 26
was the only mechanically unsafe What caused TAC's 53 fatal- lna"ltention 5
two-wheeler identified. In five ities in 1966? The cause factors
cycle accidents we found that two aren't simple, rtirect, and easy to Emotional Problem 5
drivers wore helmets and three identify. The complicated combi-
nation of man, machine, and oper-
Other Vehicle 5
did not. The investigators didn't
evaluate survival chances of the ating environment makes true or Mechanical Failure 4
three without helmets. The only single cause identification a dif-
opinion offered suggested that two ficult, sometimes baffling, prob- Inexperience 2
of them might have reduced head lem. However, careful investiga-
Weather
injuries and swung the balance tion has identified common factors
toward life by using helmets. in the majority of TAC's fatal ac- Carbon Monoxide
Eighty percent of the cars in cidents.
T AC fatal accidents were seven When you list these factors Self Medication
years old, or less. Over one-third they start lumping in the areas in-
of the cars were less than one year dicated below. There are more maining ... if his alcohol-dulled
old! Only two of the vehicles were factors than accidents because faculties were still capable of re-
labeled as mechanically unsafe ... most accidents result from a com- acting .
and it wasn't the one car that was bination of factors.
SEAT BELTS, HOW GOOD?
eighteen years old! Here's the sad story. There's
Borrowed cars create special not much left to say. The seat belt story is the sad-
problems in fatal accidents. Over Single car accidents were re- dest part of all. Completed inves-
one-third of the cars belonged to sponsible for over half of the fatal- tigations are available on 43 of the
"other people." This makes you ities. The great majorityfollowed fatal accidents at this writing ...
wonder how much experience or an identical pattern: Late hours, enough to establish the pattern.
lack of familiarity with the equip- high speed, the depressing effect Out of 41 vehicles involved in the
ment was involved in the bash. of alcohol, and loss of control. 43 deaths, seven cars were not
Every car has its little differences Most of the cars left the road with equipped with seat belts. That
in handling, response, and road- the driver sound asleep ... never leaves us 34 seat-belt equipped
ability . Just moving up or down in to re-awaken. Or the driver lost cars. In the 34 cars that had belts,
horsepower requires the driver to control momentarily when there only four sets were being used.
adjust lead time and planning as he wasn't m:meuvering room to avoid The accident reports on the 43
drives. What may be a small de- an obstruction. fatalities contained the following
ficiency in brakes or steering to Two and three-car collisions conclusions on seat belt effective-
the regular owner can cost the life accounted for 16 fatalities and in- ness: 23 lives would have been
of the borrower. cluded the same cause factors. saved; 14 accidents were non-
The compact-size car figured The car encountered on-coming surviveable; 6 could not be deter-
in forty-five percent of the fatal traffic before it left the road with mined.
automobile accidents. In some in- the driver asleep . . . or out of Twenty-three T ACmen killed
stances the compact was pushed control. In one instance the car in automobile accidents in 1966
beyond its safe operating limits. struck two cows on the highway. did not have to die!
The small car has many advan- The cows weren't visible until he That's the story. It's an appeal
tages to offer the driver in aeon- topped a rise ... at 90 miles per!! to the thinking man. All the facts
trolled environment. But the high The legal and safe speed was 45. you need are listed.
speed collision or loss of control At that speed he could have stopped YOU BE THE JUDGE!
at turnpike speed does not offer or gone around in the space re- .-::::::......
TAC ATTACK 27
 and a barber pole where a nose
wheel should appear. The main
gear came down OK. With 4600
pounds of petrol, he set up max
endurance power and put the crew
to work on the no-good nose gear.

HEY RUBE! They ran thru a full assortment

of normal and emergency proce-
dures from the Dash One. They
pulled and tugged on the nose gear
up lock release handle without
success. About the third time thru
the flight manual the handle sep-
arated from the uplock release
cable. Tired of all the pulling and
hauling, the cable disappeared
behind the bulkhead ... safe for
L/ Col Carl E. Pearson
a time.
Chief, Safety Publications
Hq TAC
The pilot radioed for profes-
sional maintenance advice. Main-

"0 rville, I've been thinking

about the design of our airplane of
''I don't know about that, Orv.
If we cut a hole here, pass a chain
tenance Control c am e up and
suggested they chop a couple of
holes in the gear well bulkhead.
the future." thru there, run it over a pulley up They reached the cowardly cable
"Aw c'mon, Wilbur, we've just there, fasten it here and hang a after some fancy fire-axe work
gotten off the ground with this one. weight on it there, then kick it off and tied a nylon cargo strap to it.
The neighbors are talking to us the back ... " Mustering all available hands, they
again. It's been a week or two How many of you are betting gave it the old heave-ho. The nose
since someone suggested we see on Wilbur? We were on Orville's gear didn't budge. They lost the
a headshrinker. Let's leave well side •.. he had to be kidding. How tug-of-war with the uplock. Now
enough alone and fly it like it is for could you expect a Rube Goldberg they realized that brute strength
a while." contraption like that to move land- with cunning was the answer.
''But Orv, if we could figure ing gear?
They tied additional c argo
out a way to move the undercar- Time, and an ingenious C-123
straps together and routed them
riage up and down in flight. I'll bet crew proved us wrong. And again,
from the uplock release cable,
you a new straw hat we can reach Wilbur proved himself to be a man
thru floor tie-down rings, to a
a sizzling 30 mph." of genius with a gift of prophecy.
tie-down point on the aft cargo
"That's a cinch, Will, just hang A Provider crew in SEA came
ramp. After :snugging it up with a
a pulley on the tail. Run a rope up with rare inventiveness born of
chain ratchet, they stood back to
over it and tie the undercarriage necessity, a reward for perse-
watch the results of their handi-
to one end. At the other end we verance, and the joy of a comfort-
can tie a big weight. When we want able fuel reserve. Fighter types work. Hopes high, they lowered
to move the undercarriage, kick will shake their heads in disbelief. the hydraulically-powered cargo
the weight off the back end of our How can any bird have a fuel re- ramp .•. and stretched the cargo
heavier-than-air aircraft." serve that allows this kind of in- straps three feet!
''You're right, Orv! That'll flight modification to get a wheel That kind of stubborness sug-
work. Let's try it!" down . . • four and one-half hours gested a hydraulic lock was foiling
''Will, you're out of your linen- later? their efforts to release the up lock.
picking mind! I was kidding. It all started with the C-123 A search of the flight mechanic's
They'll really ship us off to the pilot calling, "Gear down," as he tool bag turned up a couple of
funny farm if you tell folks about rolled out on base. In the space of wrenches that fit the nose strut
this one!'' a few seconds he saw a red light actuator hydraulic couplings. They

28 FEBRUARY 1967
disconnected the up and down lines locked. With a sigh of relief they Certainly can't argue with that
to the actuator and tried again. installed the ground lock pin for decision. Proving emergency ge ar
The cargo-strap-to-cargo-ramp insurance. extension systems at periodic in-
combination failed again. The up- Four and one-half work-filled tervals makes good sense. Some-
lock held! hours after his first landing at- how, we thought we were checking
Now hours later, but still un- tempt, the pilot ma.de a strictly emergency system reliability all
daunted, our persevering Pro- routine landing. The sweat was along. You cru1't depend on a four
vidars moved on to Plan Y • . • over. Waiting maintenance troops and one-half hour fuel reserve for
saving Plan Z as a last resort. found problems in the inner work- inflight repairs every time.
The cargo straps with the live- ings of the nose gear hydraulic Somewhere off in the shadows
action stretch were replaced by actuator. That explained why is a barely audible convers ation:
10,000-pound-c ap ac i ty cargo normal operation wasn't normal. ''Orv, I sure wish Plan Y hadn't
chains they had borrowed from Why had the emergency system worked for them!''
their spray tank tie-down. The failed? ... the em-9 rgency release "Aw c'mon, Will, they knew
gang of chains followed the same cable was one and one-half inches their job, used their heads, didn't
route from ::10se gear uplock to too long! give up. They deserved to win.
rear cargo ramp thru the cargo No one was really certain when Why make them go to Plan L:: ?"
tie-down rings on the floor. the emergency gear extension sys- ''Orv, this has bugged me all
Almost afraid to face another tem was last checked. Everyone these years. This was my first
failure, the loadmaster m',)Ved the had assumed it would work when real chance to prove to you I was
cargo ramp selector lever to the they needed it. To avoid the future right. Now, if they had tied tha t
LOWER position. It worked! The problems that assum:,:> tions l ead spray tank on the end of the chain
stubborn uplock surrendered and to, quality control decided to re- and kicked it off the cargo r amp
the nose gear fell free. The gear quire checking the emergency re- ... I would've gotten credit for the
position indicator changed from lease, gear free fall, and emer- idea instead of Rube Goldberg!"
barber pole to wheel down and gency retraction on all FCFs. __::::....

chock talk

there's a difference ing. They came to a stop 3000 feet from the end with
half of the right brake ground off.
When the F-105F landed at home base after a The condition of the brake made it impossible for
cross-country flight, the pilot in the front seat investigators to learn what had caused thatproblem,
couldn't get the drag chute handle to come out. He had but they soon found out what was the matter with the
landed about 7 50 feet down the runway, and about the drag chute. The one they found in the compartment
time they were 2800 feet down the runway, their right was designed for an F-105~. There's a difference!
main wheel froze and started burning rubber. It finally Proper inspection by supervisors and complete
blew at 3200 feet. operational checks can eliminate this kindoffailure.
After quickly turning off anti-skid, the pilot man- But better yet, let's brief all our Transient Alert
aged to keep the big bird pointed down the runway thru types that the drag chutes forB and F model '105s are
some skillful use of left brake and nose wheel steer- not interchangeable.

TAC ATTACK 29
materiel failure pulled the throttle back to idle ... and received the
shock of his life!
The Provider pilot checked power balance about
15 minutes after takeoff. He puzzled over the spread His trusty J-57 flamed out!
between number one and two . . . five inches MAP A little checking after the airplane was towed
and nine pounds of torque pressure. After five min- back to the ramp revealed that the idle detent was out
utes of normal lean cruise, number one started of adjustment. When the throttle was overhauled, the
shaking on the mounts. This forced a qul ck abort detent had been left binding and misaligned on the
decision and he requested straight-in clearance to throttle quadrant.
an alternate. He feathered number one on final when By some happy coincidence, the pilot had not
torque dropped to zero and oil smoke appeared. pulled his throttle to idle during the one-plus-twenty
Engine specialists found the exhaust valve rocker that he was airborne.
arm and intake pushrod broken in number three
cylinder. They submitted a UR requesting metal gently, with feeling
analysis to determine why the broken parts in an
Shortly after takeoff the F-100 pilot noticed a
engine with only 230 hours since overhaul.
binding in fore and aft movement of his control stick.
With that much tim8 on the engine local engine
Handling it gently, he managed to get it around the
conditioning procedures may be the real problem.
pattern and on the ground without further incident.
When Quality Control investigators dug into it
they found the left elevator cable was misrouted and
binding on a bracket. The aft section had been pulled
the day before this flight. During either removal or
re-installation, slack in the cable allowed it to catch
on the bracket.
The supervisor who inspected and signed off the
aft section installation was "counseled" on his re-
sponsibilities.

oversized orifice
As the Gooney Bird started her takeoff roll on a
night transition ride, the IP heard a strange chattering
coming from the hydraulic regulator valve. He made
a quick selector valve change to his alternate source.
In the process he felt and smelt the hydraulic fluid
oozing from the regulator valve fittings. He chopped
power and aborted the takeoff. The IP accepted a
short, not sweet tow back to the ramp . . . no brakes.
The report was curt and to the point: Maintenance troops found the pipe assembly to
Fork lift being loaded on C-130. Aft wheels of the regulator valve cracked around the flared end.
fork lift left lead-in tracks and fell on aircraft. Skin They knew the vibration cracked the pipe flare, but
damage to aircraft ramp, right of center dual rail. had to dig deeper in finding the reason for the chat-
Man-hours to repair, 36. Crews being re-briefed to tering. They were sharp and discovered an oversized
monitor all loading operations more closely. orifice in the regulator valve. When they installed
Doesn't leave much more to be said, does it? a new regulator with the proper orifice the pounding
in the plumbing stopped.
Through the years most of the hydraulic system
unwanted overhaul components had been replaced on the old Goon. They
When the F-100 pilot returned from a training submitted a quality control deficiency report on the
mission, he pulled off the runway into the de arm area. hydraulic pressure regulator that started the chatter.
His guns safe, he pushed the throttle up and started Does your Gooney Bird have a new song? Could
to turn into the taxiway. Once he was rolling, he be whistling thru an oversized orifice!

30 FEBRUARY 1967
wrong handle landing, they found that station 3 on the SUU-21A had
not been fully locked. The Mark 76 had vibrated loose
The F-100 parked for the night at a many-motor
and released before the doors opened.
base, with an electronics write-up that required at-
The unit has briefed its loading troops to physical-
tention. Transient Alert asked a radar specialist from
ly shake all Mark 76 and Mark 106 bombs to insure
the field maintenance squadron to check it over . The
they're properly locked ...
A1C who responded to the call found the canopy
closed. He had walked all the way around the airplane
... trying to find a way to get in ... when he spotted torque torque
some instructions stenciled on the fuselage . He fol- About 50 minutes after takeoff on a night navigation
lowed them carefully. training mission, the C- 12 3 crew noticed torque pres -
With the canopy open, he went about his business, sure dropping on Number Two . The flight engineer
cleared the discrepancy, and returned to the shop. soon found the engine was losing oil so they shut it
It wasn't until one of the transient alert troops down and landed at the closest field .
went back out to the airplane that they learned what In the investigation, maintenance folks discovered
had happened to the canopy. The radarman hadjetti- the torque oil pressure pump plug was missing. Dur-
soned it! Somehow, it had come to rest in the normal ing maintenance prior to that flight, the plug had been
open poE;ition. removed to permit a direct pressure reading from
The outfit involved took a look at their procedures the torque oil system. When the plug was re-installed,
with transient aircraft. They decided that in the future it apparently was not correctly torqued .
they'd escort all specialists while they worked on
strange birds.
Although it may seem inconceivable to many of us
like late!
that anyone could make this mistake ... we'd prob- As the F-4D crew started to accelerate to run-in
ably do even worse if you turned us loose inside a speed they noticed airframe vibration . At 480 knots
radar set without a little guidance. it was heavy and didn ' t stop until the bird had
slowed to 420 knot s. The vibrations started again when
they climbed away from the target. This time they
shake'em didn't go away until the bird was down to 300 knots.
On downwind in the gunnery pattern the F - 105 All this time, both control sticks felt abnormally
pilot opened the doors on his SUU-21A bomb dis- loose.
penser and a Mark 76 practice bomb fell out! When specialists checked it out on the ground, they
Just like that! bled air from all the hydraulic systems!
When the Armament types looked into it after ~

PEANUTS
THE !illRU> ~f( I FLYING AcE "~llllTCH OFF" YELLS THE MECHANIC ...
I 1 ,
CLIMBS INTO 1-115 ~OPWITH CAMEL .. "COflfEZ" I REPLY.."CONTACT?"
IllI :;d " j·
• '
1 I '

I
'• THIS IS 1-115 M00 OANGEROU5 Mi%10N!
AN AMMUNfTIONTRf>JNMU5TBf~
"CONTACT IT I~!" THE MOTOR
CATCHES WITH A ROAR!
AND ONE LONEPLANE MU5T !XJ THE JOB!

i ,, /!i/ /1.1! I :
r++=~..._'-"1 i .: I( ;.
Courte sy of Daily Press, Newport News, Vo .
@ United Feature Syndicate, Inc. 1966

TAC ATTAC K 31
INVESTIGATIONS CONCLUDE :

23 TAC MEN DID NOT

HAVE TO DIE !!

You Be The Judge ... page 24