Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations

Author(s): Lam Peng Er

Source: Asian Survey , Oct., 1996, Vol. 36, No. 10 (Oct., 1996), pp. 995-1010
Published by: University of California Press

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 JAPAN AND THE SPRATLYS DISPUTE
Aspirations and Limitations

Lam Peng Er

The dispute over jurisdiction of the Spratly Islands in

the South China Sea has the potential to draw in major powers who are non-
claimant states. At issue is the prospect of contention among parties to the
dispute posing a threat to maritime communications. Should such a prospect
arise, it would pose a serious threat to the interests of Japan. This article
assesses the nature of these interests and identifies the constraints on their
active pursuit.
Half a century after the end of the Pacific War, Tokyo seeks a political
status commensurate with its economic standing; it is no longer satisfied to
be merely a prime contributor to the United Nations and foreign aid pro-
grams. A desire to play a more active political role developed after the Gulf
War in the wake of domestic and international criticism that Japan engaged
primarily in checkbook diplomacy. Since the end of the Cold War and the
demise of the Soviet Union, some analysts have suggested that if the United
States were to reduce significantly its commitment to East Asia, a power
vacuum would emerge in the region, which includes the South China Sea.
China and Japan are the prime candidates to fill that vacuum. But even if the
U.S. remains engaged and the U.S.-Japan alliance is maintained, Japan may
still be expected to seek a larger role in regional affairs, one almost certainly
extending to the South China Sea.
Much has been written on the Spratlys dispute but such studies have fo-
cused on the claimant states, which is understandable because crisis manage-
ment and conflict resolution in the South China Sea require the participation
and consent of these states. Obviously, China receives most attention be-

-. Lam Peng Er is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Na-

tional University of Singapore. The author would like to thank the Japan Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs for organizational and financial assistance; and Michael Leifer, Okabe Tatsumi,
Tomoda Seki, Soeya Yoshihide, Shee Poon Kim, Lee Lai To, S. Javed Maswood, Hari Singh,
and N. Ganesan for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

3 1996 by The Regents of the University of California

995

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 996 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

cause it is by far the most powerful claimant and also has a record of employ-
ing force to pursue its various territorial claims. As the sole superpower and
the key potential balancer in the South China Sea, the U.S. has also not been
ignored. However, a detailed study of Japan and the Spratlys dispute has not
yet been undertaken, a gap in the literature that is surprising because Japan is
a major power in the Asia-Pacific region whose vital sea lanes of communi-
cation (SLOCs) might be threatened should armed conflict break out and es-
calate in the Spratlys area. Moreover, it is not in Japan's interest for any
potentially unfriendly power to dominate the South China Sea. Although Ja-
pan is not a claimant state and does not support the territorial claims of any
particular country, it is not indifferent to the dispute.1 A study of Japan's
interests and attitude toward the Spratlys dispute is also important because
the issue may be seen as a litmus test of Japanese foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era. Japan aspires to play a leadership role in world affairs, but if it
is unwilling or unable to deal actively with the potentially most destabilizing
issue in its own backyard, Tokyo will find it difficult to claim the mantle of
regional let alone global leadership.
This article addresses the following questions: what are Japan's historical,
strategic, political, and economic interests in the Spratlys? Does Japan have
a policy toward and role in the South China Sea conflict? What domestic and
international impediments are likely to be faced by Japan should it try to play
a political role in the Spratlys dispute? And what conclusions can we draw
about Japan's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era after examining the
Spratlys case?
Japan's main interests in the Spratlys dispute are the enhancement of its
security and status, two goals that can be mutually reinforcing. To have a
bigger voice in regional and international security issues would confer status
and prestige on Japan. Besides a concern for the safety of its oil tankers in
the South China Sea and the belief that regional instability is not in its na-
tional interest, Japan is closely watching China's assertiveness in the Spratlys
because it has implications for the Senkaku Islands (Dioyutai), which are
claimed by both Japan and China. The Spratlys dispute is also a litmus test
of China's peaceful intent and good neighborliness, as well as of the viability
of embryonic regional multilateral organizations to manage conflict in the
post-Cold War era. The immediate cause of Japan's greater interest and in-
volvement in the issue was the revelation of China's disputed occupation of

1. Soeya Yoshihide writes: "The South China Sea conflict is one of the few cases where
Japan's national and security interests are evidently at stake in the post-Cold War era." Yoshi-
hide Soeya, "The South China Sea Conflict: Implication for Regional Security and Japan's Re-
sponse," paper prepared for the international conference on Security Implications and Conflict in
the South China Sea: Perspectives from the Asia-Pacific, Institute for Strategic Studies and
Pacific Forum, CSIS, November 1995, Manila.

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 LAM PENG ER 997

Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in February 1995. However, the impulse to

adopt a more active foreign policy posture on regional issues, including that
of the Spratlys, came in the aftermath of the Gulf War. As a country seeking
great power status, Japan hopes to be consulted and engaged in regional stra-
tegic issues. Besides its security interests in the Spratlys, Tokyo is using the
dispute as an opportunity to play a larger regional role and acquire interna-
tional recognition and prestige as a great power.
To deal with the Spratlys issue, Japan has adopted two approaches: multi-
laterally through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and bilaterally via di-
rect talks with China. At present, Japan cannot play a unilateral strategic role
in Southeast Asia because of its militaristic past and its alliance with the
United States. The ARF provides it with access to a multilateral forum
through which to be involved in regional affairs. The Spratlys dispute, how-
ever, is a double-edged sword for both the ARF and Japan. On the one hand,
it provides an important justification for the existence of the forum in the
post-Cold War era; a viable ARF may help defuse regional conflict and also
allow Japan to fulfill its desire to participate in regional affairs. On the other
hand, if the ARF cannot prevent the outbreak of a serious conflict in the
South China Sea, the organization will forfeit its credibility and Japan will
lose a channel through which to play a regional role. Despite former Prime
Minister Murayama Tomiichi's diplomatic efforts to raise the Spratlys issue
with top Chinese leaders, Japanese attempts to do so have been rebuffed by
China. Beijing believes that any settlement of the dispute should not involve
Japan, a non-claimant state. Moreover, China is sensitive to any Japanese
attempts to play a larger political role in the region. This case study high-
lights the limits to Japan's quest for regional security and status.

Japan's Interests in the

South China Sea
A Japanese mining company began exploring the then uninhabited Spratlys
for mineral resources between 1918 and 1921 before temporarily occupying a
few of the islets and excavating guano for fertilizer.2 In February 1939 Japa-
nese troops occupied Hainan Island and then the Paracel Islands in the South
China Sea, and the following month, Japan annexed the Spratlys. Mastery of
the South China Sea was critical to its dream of carving out an Asian empire;
Japan also built a submarine base on Itu Abu (Taiping Dao), the largest island

2. See Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shinshutsu" [Chinese naval
advance in the South China Sea], Kokubo [The national defence], 40:12, December 1991, p. 10;
and Takeshita Hidekuni, "Minami shinakai funso no keii to ryoyuken mondai" [The details of
the South China Sea conflict and the question of territorial rights], Ajia Torendo [Asian trends],
3:59, 1992, p. 64.

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 998 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

in the Spratlys, during the Pacific War. Japan's defeat in the war and the
1952 San Francisco Treaty forced the country to surrender all of its rights to
the Spratlys. However the treaty did not specify which country should inherit
sovereignty over the archipelago. Tokyo's historical control of the Spratlys
still casts a shadow on its present interests in the dispute. Some Japanese
who do not support their country's involvement have referred to the San
Francisco Treaty and claimed that Japan is obliged by international law not to
be involved directly in the Spratlys. Moreover, they have argued that any
attempt to play an active political role in the Spratlys issue may arouse re-
gional suspicions that Japan harbors ulterior motives and is trying to resurrect
its old imperial claims to the archipelago.3
If an armed conflict in the Spratly area were to break out, it might disrupt
freedom of navigation or even endanger the safety of merchant ships and oil
tankers. Around 70% of Japan's oil imports pass through the South China
Sea, and while Japan-bound vessels conceivably could avoid conflict in the
Spratlys by sailing around the Indonesian islands and into the Pacific, such an
alternative would be costlier and more time consuming.4 It is not impossible
that a prolonged, intermittent conflict might disrupt Japan's critical oil routes
and send shock waves through its stock market, dampen producer and con-
sumer sentiment, and plunge its economy into a recession. Even if a local-
ized conflict does not cut the SLOCs, there is still the possibility that a
potentially unfriendly power may incrementally and cumulatively extend its
control and dominate the South China Sea. Such an outcome obviously
would not be in the interest of Japan.
The geographical proximity of Southeast Asia ensures Tokyo's continuing
interest in the area. Although Japan has globally diversified its sources of
energy, trade, and investment, it sees Southeast Asia as an important market
and production center, and the region is also its largest foreign aid recipient.

3. In a roundtable discussion in June 1995 with a group of retired Japanese generals and
admirals from the Defence Research Center, the author observed that most of them favored a
non-military role for Japan in the Spratlys, or even complete non-involvement; as one general
put it: "sawaranu kami ni tatarinashi" [no touch, no divine retribution, or no touch, no trouble].
Tomoda Seki writes: "Japan, who had occupied both Paracel and Spratly islands before World
War Two and abandoned all its territorial claims and rights on the islands in the Peace Treaty
signed in San Francisco, have a priori refrained from any act susceptible of inviting suspicion
from abroad of its redemptionist ambition there." See, "Factors of Tension in Southeast Asia:
How to Deal with Potential Tension in South China Sea and Cambodia," in Asia-Pacific and
Vietnam Relations, Institute for International Relations, papers from the second workshop, Ha-
noi, September 1994, p. 25.

4. Interview with a Japanese Foreign Ministry official from the Regional Policy Division,
Asian Affairs Bureau, assigned to watch over the Spratlys dispute, 23 June 1995.

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 LAM PENG ER 999

The Spratlys, Senkaku, and

the "China Question"
Tokyo sees the Spratlys issue in the wider context of a more assertive and
powerful China. Increasingly, no regional issues such as stability in the Ko-
rean Peninsula, Chinese nuclear tests, tension in the Taiwan Strait, the viabil-
ity of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, and the efficacy of
multilateral organizations to manage problems including conflict in the South
China Sea can be addressed without China's co-operation. In the past few
years, Japanese opinion shapers from various political parties, the Foreign
Ministry, the Defence Agency, security think tanks, academia, journals, and
the mass media have been considering whether China will act aggressively
and unilaterally toward its neighbors once it becomes an economic power-
house.5 They ponder this question even though China today gives top prior-
ity to its domestic economic development and has a low per capita GNP of
only US$435.
Sino-Japanese relations have become prickly. Uncharacteristically, Tokyo
slashed its grant aid to China in the face of Beijing's refusal to end its nuclear
tests in 1995, and Japan also raised the issue of human rights and the Senkaku
and Spratly islands with China that year.6 To Tokyo, the South China Sea
dispute is an additional indicator for gauging the intent and direction of Chi-
nese foreign policy. To Beijing, Tokyo's new assertiveness in these issues is
an unwelcome intrusion into its sovereignty. This perception of "interfer-
ence' reinforces deeply felt Chinese suspicions that its eastern neighbor cov-
ets great power status and has not truly repented its militaristic past.7 Thus,

5. The head of the Defence Agency has expressed concern that China is modernizing its
nuclear and naval capability. Moreover, he perceives the Chinese navy as "expanding the scope
of its activities" especially in the Spratly Islands (Sankei Shinbun, 14 September 1995). The
director of the First Research Department, National Institute for Defence Studies, writes: "De-
spite the fact that China and Japan have a close relationship, it remains essentially fragile....
Japan is becoming apprehensive about China's military build-up, particularly the naval moderni-
zation, its continued supply of missiles to areas of potential conflict, and its testing of nuclear
weapons .... The evolution of the Chinese navy from a defensive coastal force into an offen-
sive blue-water fleet would be destabilizing because it would change the balance of power in the
Asia-Pacific region. This will happen if the Chinese economy continues to expand rapidly."
(Masashi Nishihara, "Japan Has Cause to Worry About Chinese Ambition," International Her-
ald Tribune, 12 July 1994). Also, the lead articles on the "China naval threat" in Gunji Kenkyu
(Japan military review), 30:10 (October 1995); and Kojima Tomoyuki, "Chugoku shudo no ajia
chitsujo o nerau" [Aiming for a Chinese-led Asian order], Toa [East Asia], no. 327 (September
1994).
6. Foreign Minister Kono Yohei expressed these concerns in his meetings with the Chinese
prime minister and foreign minister (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 December 1995).
7. For example, Liu Jiangyong, "Distorting History Will Misguide Japan: To Mark the 50th
Anniversary of the Victory over Japanese Aggression," Contemporary International Relations,
5:9 (September 1995).

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 1000 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

any future escalation in the Spratlys conflict may further complicate Sino-
Japanese relations. Chinese advances into the South China Sea would alarm
certain Japanese elites and raise the specter of a "China threat," while Japa-
nese attempts to urge China to exercise restraint in that area might antagonize
and convince many Chinese elites that Japan is attempting to act as a great
power again.
China's future direction is an enigma. On the one hand, the country pro-
vides a huge and promising market for Japanese goods, services, and invest-
ments; on the other, if China's remarkable economic growth is sustained in
the post-Deng era, it may have the means to become a regional hegemon.
However, as the Chinese economy attains greater maturity in the first quarter
of the 21st century, its spectacular growth rate may ease considerably. More-
over, the emergence of a more complex, internationalized economy and a
new urban middle class that is less easily controlled by a single communist
party-state may, in the long run, contribute to the evolution of less authorita-
rian and more transparent political institutions. If such a China emerges,
alarmist speculation about Beijing as an opaque regional bully may well be
proven wrong. But the possibility that China may turn out otherwise is wor-
risome to Japan.
Further complicating Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese interest in the
South China Sea conflict is the linkage between the Spratly and Senkaku
islands. When China seized the Paracels from South Vietnam in 1974 and a
few islands in the Spratlys from unified Vietnam in 1988, Tokyo did not react
with undue consternation. It did not appear to perceive the Spratlys dispute
as intertwined with either the Senkaku dispute or Chinese "expansionism" in
the region. Moreover, it viewed China's seizure of the islands from Vietnam
as an extension of the Beijing-Hanoi conflict against the backdrop of the
Cold War. Aligned with the U.S., China, and ASEAN, Japan was opposed to
the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and Hanoi's occupation of Cambodia. Thus,
Tokyo was not alarmed by the Chinese-Vietnamese clash in the South China
Sea in 1988.
When China promulgated its Territorial Waters Law in February 1992 that
incorporated the Spratlys, Senkaku, and other disputed islands, Japan pro-
tested against the inclusion of Senkaku. By passing the legislation, China
implicitly reserves the right to use force if necessary to defend areas deemed
to be Chinese territory, and Japan is closely watching the approaches China is
using to support its territorial claims to the islands. When China wanted Ja-
pan's participation in a united front against the Soviet Union, paramount
leader Deng Xiaoping adopted the flexible approach of deferring the Senkaku
dispute to the "next generation." With the demise of the Soviet Union and
the promulgation of the Territorial Waters Law, the Senkaku situation has
changed. Even though Japan has an alliance with the U.S. and is a bigger

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 LAM PENG ER 1001

power than Vietnam and despite Japanese annoyance and protests, China has
proceeded with its oceanographic survey in the Senkaku waters. Beijing has
also intensified its exploration for oil and other minerals in the waters adja-
cent to the island. To some Japanese analysts, Chinese actions in the Spratlys
and Senkaku vicinity reflect the emergence of China as a more assertive
power with a thirst for oil.8
Tokyo faces a dilemma in the Spratlys dispute. If it does nothing and a
conflict were to break out, its sea lanes and interests in regional stability
might be jeopardized. If it supports the shelving of the sovereignty issue and
joint economic and scientific development of the adjacent waters as a solu-
tion to the Spratlys dispute, the countries that have overlapping claims with
Japan can apply the same formula to Japanese-controlled or claimed territo-
ries. If Japan is consistent in supporting this formula, China can demand that
the same approach be applied to Senkaku, South Korea to Liancourt Rocks,
and Japan to the four northern islands (the southern Kuriles). Despite this
potential linkage, Tokyo appears willing to assist in "joint development" be-
cause it would enhance its prestige as a regional player and help to defuse
regional tension.

The ARF and Japan's Search for

Security and Status
Aspiring for status in the international system, Japan has taken a number of
unprecedented actions in recent years. It organized the 1990 Tokyo Confer-
ence to resolve the Cambodian civil war; dispatched troops for United Na-
tions peacekeeping in Cambodia, Mozambique, Zaire, and the Golan Heights;
emphasized human rights and democratization as preconditions to Japanese
foreign aid; lobbied for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council; and
suggested setting up a multilateral organization to discuss security issues per-
taining to the Asia-Pacific region. To Tokyo, the ASEAN Regional Forum is
an arena where multilateral consultation and confidence-building can take
place to address regional issues, including the Spratlys dispute. Tokyo has
taken credit for initiating the formation of the ARF, as Foreign Minister
Nakayama Taro suggested publicly in July 1991 that the ASEAN-PMC
(Post-Ministerial Conference) should provide the framework for discussing

8. For example, articles by Hiramatsu Shigeo, "Chugoku kaigun no minami shinakai shin-
shutsu: Chugoku no ryokaiho to senkakushoto mondai" [China's territorial waters law and the
Senkaku islands issue], Kokubo 41:9, 1992; "Nansashoto o meguru chuetsu funso to
chugokukaigun" [The Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the Spratlys islands and the Chinese navy]
in Mio Tadashi, Posto reisen no indoshina [Indochina in the post-cold war era] (Tokyo: Nihon
kokusai mondai kenkyujo, 1993); and "Nansashoto no jikko shihai ni noridashita chugoku"
[China embarking to seize effective control of the Spratlys islands], Sekai Shuho [World report],
7 March 1995.

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 1002 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

security issues in the region. For Tokyo, the ARF provides an insurance pol-
icy in addition to that of the U.S.-Japan alliance with which to face the uncer-
tain security environment of the post-Cold War era; it is also a potential
platform on which Japan may play a bigger strategic and political role in the
region.
Indeed, the Spratlys dispute serves as a test of whether or not Japan's re-
cent emphasis on multilateral forums to promote regional stability is viable.
In the post-Cold War era, the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy remains
the U.S.-Japan alliance, and multilateral forums in the Asia-Pacific region are
deemed a supplement to and not a substitute for the alliance. Japan's support
for multilateralism stems from the need for additional mechanisms to keep its
U.S. ally involved in the region; a regionally acceptable vehicle with which
Japan can assume a more active role without resorting to a controversial uni-
lateralism, and a way to keep China engaged in consultation and co-operation
with its neighbors. Multilateral forums are expected to enhance confidence-
building measures, boost transparency by publishing defense white papers
and joining the U.N. arms register, and engage in preventive diplomacy to
defuse tensions. Besides the ARF, Tokyo has identified the Workshops on
the South China Sea Conflict hosted annually by Indonesia as a multilateral
approach to address regional sources of instability, especially the South
China Sea conflict.9 There is the danger, however, that if multilateral organi
zations merely remain talking-shops that are unable to contain a serious flare-
up, these nascent organizations may be discredited. Such an outcome would
undermine Japan's security policy of relying on multilateral organizations to
supplement the U.S. alliance as well as its pursuit of regional leadership.

Japanese Economic Interests

Although Japan is primarily concerned about the Spratly dispute's implica-
tion for its security and status, it is not devoid of economic interest in the
South China Sea. Some Japanese trading companies and oil corporations
have already sought agreements with Vietnam to exploit the fishing and natu-
ral resources in certain areas of the sea, and Mitsubishi Oil Company has
discovered a large gas field located about 120 km from Vietnam's southern
coast. Extracting oil and gas from the South China Sea, if commercially via-
ble, would be very attractive to Japan because it could further diversify its
suppliers and permit access to energy sources from an area much closer to
home than the Middle East.

9. Yanai Shunji, "Reisengo no wagakuni no anzen hosho seisaku" [Japan's security policy in
the post-cold war era], Gaiko Forumu [Diplomacy forum], no. 82 (July 1995), p. 48. Yanai is
chief, Comprehensive Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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 LAM PENG ER 1003

However, if significant energy resources were discovered in that area, the

Spratlys dispute would become even more volatile. Great powers who are
non-claimant states, including the U.S. and Russia, would probably be inter-
ested in any bonanza and question the attempts of other powers seeking to
control oil production in the South China Sea. Tokyo's interest in the area
would concomitantly increase with the intensity of great power rivalry.
However, Japanese businessmen are likely to rush in despite economic and
political risks; Tokyo would probably rationalize its economic activities as
being distinct from the question of sovereignty and adopt the well-worn
formula of separating economics from politics.

Japan's Role in the Spratlys Dispute

Japan's role in the Spratlys, meant to enhance the nation's quest for status
and security, is inhibited by the burden of history. As a result of its militaris-
tic past, defeat in the Pacific War, and legacy of democratization by the U.S.
occupation, Japan has a pacifist Constitution and dovish public opinion that
constrain the country from being involved in any military conflict abroad.
Moreover, the ruling coalition is unlikely to change the official interpretation
that Article 9 of the Constitution permits Japan to defend itself but not to
dispatch its troops abroad, even for United Nations peace enforcement opera-
tions, or engage in collective security to resolve international disputes. Even
though it jettisoned its pacifist doctrine to join the ruling coalition, the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) is temperamentally against committing Japan to any
foreign policy venture with any hint of military entanglement. It cannot
adopt the politically sensitive military option of resisting an interdiction of
the sea lanes in the South China Sea. Although the ruling LDP and the oppo-
sition Shinshinto are led by forceful and nationalistic leaders who advocate a
bigger political role for Japan, they continue to face the constraints of the
pacifist constitution, dovish public opinion, coalition politics, party factional-
ism, and a cultural norm that inhibits top leaders from acting decisively and
unilaterally.
The passage of half of a century since the end of the Pacific War has not
significantly eroded the suspicions of China, the two Koreas, and to a lesser
extent, the Southeast Asian countries that Japan has not sincerely repented of
its imperial past and will repeat its mistakes. The unprecedented post-World
War Two dispatch of Japanese peacekeeping troops to Cambodia in 1993,
even under the aegis of the United Nations for non-combat activities, initially
aroused considerable disquiet in Japan and among its neighbors. While some
ASEAN countries are supportive of an American presence in the South China
Sea to balance the Chinese, they do not welcome direct Japanese participa-
tion in the regional military balance.

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 1004 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

In February 1995 Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, during a Diet interpella-

tion about Japan's official position on the Spratlys dispute, pointed out the
importance of the South China Sea to Japan as the link between the Indian
Ocean and Northeast Asia. While urging dialogue and self-restraint on the
claimant states to resolve the dispute, Kono did not propose any concrete role
for Japan.10 Kono was asked whether Japan would slash its foreign aid if
China were to advance farther into the South China Sea. Not wishing to
offend Beijing, Kono declined to address the question as speculative and hy-
pothetical. When asked whether Japan would exercise leadership and place
the Spratlys issue on the agenda for discussion at the Osaka APEC meeting in
November 1995, Kono replied that Japan would not do so. This did not indi-
cate the country's indifference to the dispute but that Tokyo felt it was more
appropriate to discuss the problem at the ARF, the Workshops on the South
China Sea Dispute, and directly with the Chinese rather than at an economic
forum.
Japan indirectly plays a critical role in maintaining the balance of power in
the Asia-Pacific region through the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Only the U.S. has
sufficient weight to balance the Chinese in the South China Sea but the
Americans are unlikely to play that role without the logistics and financial
assistance that Japan provides. Because Japan has committed itself to the
defense of its sea lanes only up to 1,000 nautical miles from its capital, any
disruption to its shipping in the South China Sea would be beyond the strate-
gic mission of the Japanese navy. 11 Tokyo would then have to rely on Wash-
ington to maintain the safety of navigation in the Spratlys vicinity. In any
hypothetical conflict that interferes with international shipping in the South
China Sea, Tokyo can still play an indirect role by doing its part to protect its
sea lanes up to 1,000 miles and freeing the U.S. 7th Fleet to show the flag in
more distant waters.
Some Japanese analysts have proposed a more direct strategic role for Ja-
pan in the South China Sea. One group of academics has suggested that
Japan and the ASEAN countries co-operate in joint maritime policing activi-
ties, while another analyst has advocated a deterrent role for the Japanese

10. Yosan iinkai dai ni bunkakai giroku [Diet's second budget subcommittee proceedings], 21
February 1995.
11. Ha Hong Hai writes: "In case an emergency situation involving armed conflicts occurred
there [South China Sea], it would pose to Japan difficult problems concerning sea-lanes protec-
tion. Most of the disputed sea areas, however, lie beyond the 1,000 nautical mile limit set by
Japan for the purpose of naval and air operations to protect the SLOCs. Any military option by a
party concerned would be far more serious for Japan than any regional disputes in the recent
past." Ha Hong Hai, "Major Powers' Attitudes Toward Spratly Disputes and Their Implications
for the Solution," paper delivered at ASEAN-ISIS Conference, Hanoi, October 1995, p. 5.

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 LAM PENG ER 1005

navy against China were it to advance its interests further.12 But these pro-
posals are quite fanciful and are not politically acceptable to Japanese public
opinion nor to Japan's neighbors. The Japanese navy currently cannot adopt
any autonomous role because its force structure dovetails into U.S. naval
strategy and missions. On its own, it lacks aircraft carriers, independent air
cover, target acquisition, and sufficient anti-submarine capabilities to play an
autonomous strategic role in East Asia.13

Quest for an Active Diplomatic Role

The catalyst in Japan's desire to play an active political role in defusing the
Spratlys dispute was the Mischief Reef incident, although the impulse to
adopt an active foreign policy arose in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Even
though Japan had aspired to play a global political role commensurate with
its economic status even before the Gulf War, its foreign policy toward "high
politics" (strategic, military, and political issues) was best characterized as
reactive, passive, and economistic. Its foreign policy initiatives were concen-
trated on financial and economic issues such as financing for the U.N., Ja-
pan's ODA, and World Bank and Asian Development Bank activities. The
Gulf War was a turning point; despite its hefty contribution of US$13 billion,
Japan was roundly criticized and humiliated for practicing only checkbook
diplomacy. A lack of national consensus and weak political leadership about
an appropriate non-monetary contribution to the U.N.-endorsed, U.S-led mul-
tinational force against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resulted in paralysis of
Japan's decision-making process. Thus, Tokyo's interest in the Spratlys dis-
pute is, in part, an offshoot of its desire to play a more active political role in
world affairs.
The press reported that the Philippines discussed the Mischief Reef Inci-
dent with Japan at a vice-ministerial meeting in late February 1995 and re-
quested Tokyo to "persuade" Beijing to act with restraint. Subsequently, a
Japanese deputy vice-foreign minister asked China to resolve the problem
peacefully at a bilateral vice-ministerial meeting held in Beijing on March
2.14 Even though Beijing does not welcome third-party involvement in the
Spratlys, Tokyo was prepared to act as a bridge between Manila and Beijing,
demonstrating Japan's willingness to deal directly with a serious security

12. Sekai [World], December 1994, p. 39; Koichi Sato, "The Japan Card," Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, 13 April 1995. See also Sato Koichi, "Tonan ajia no anzen hosho to nihon no
koken" [The security of Southeast Asia and Japan's contribution], Gaiko Jiho [Revue diploma-
tique], no. 1318 (May 1995), pp. 80-83.
13. Interview with Kimura Kazuo, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defence Stud-
ies, JDA, 20 June 1995.

14. Sankei Shinbun, 8 March 1995.

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 1006 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

problem and in so doing enhance its prestige as a great power involved in

defusing regional conflict.
The press also reported in March that Prime Minister Murayama intended
to discuss the Spratlys issue with Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng at the U.N.
Social Development Summit in Copenhagen, the first time the press men-
tioned the Japanese prime minister taking a direct interest in the dispute.
That discussion did not take place,15 but in April Murayama met Qiao Shi,
chairman of China's National People's Congress, in Tokyo and expressed
Japan's concern about a peaceful resolution of the conflict.16 When
Murayama met Li Peng in Beijing in May, he again placed the Spratlys issue
on the agenda for discussion. Foreign Minister Kono reiterated Tokyo's de-
sire for the safety of navigation and a peaceful resolution of the Spratlys
dispute at the ARF meeting in Brunei in August 1995, where Japan was nom-
inated as co-chair of the intersession group on confidence-building measures.
Kono also took the opportunity to offer Tokyo as a venue for the intersession
group to begin its work, which may be interpreted as an initiative to gain
international recognition of Japan's major power status. Nevertheless, if
China refuses to discuss the dispute within the framework of the ARF, Japan
has little leverage to change its mind.17
Despite Japan's interest in participating in the annual Indonesian-initiated
Workshops on the South China Sea Conflict, it has not been invited to attend
these quasi-governmental meetings. It appears odd that land-locked Laos is a
participant while maritime Japan is not. Certain ASEAN countries support

15. According to the Sankei Shinbun (8, 15 March 1995), there were two schools of thought
within the Foreign Ministry about the appropriateness of raising the issue in Copenhagen. One
opinion stated that Murayama should express Japan's concerns about the Spratlys to China. An-
other said that the planned meeting of only 20 minutes between the two PMs was too short and
could not accommodate a discussion on the Spratlys; Japan should instead discuss the issue of
suspected North Korean nuclear development.

16. Japan Times, 12 April 1995.

17. Beijing made the following statement at the first ARF meeting in 1994: "The Chinese
side has taken note of the suggestion by some countries that the question of South China Sea be
included in the agenda of the forum its senior officials meeting. The position of the Chinese
Government on this question is well-known as consistent. The Nansha Islands (Spratlys) have
since ancient times been a Chinese territory, and China has indisputable sovereignty over the
islands and its adjacent waters. Some countries do not agree with us on this question. These
differences can be settled through bilateral negotiations. If they cannot be resolved for the time-
being, the parties concerned may shelve the dispute while going for joint development. The
Chinese government is always opposed to internationalizing the question of the Nansha Islands.
Consequently, we do not believe that the Forum or its senior officials should discuss this ques-
tion." (Press release, 4 April 1994). However, at the ARF meeting in Brunei in August 1995,
China agreed to limited multilateral discussion of the Spratlys between itself and ASEAN mem-
bers only.

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 LAM PENG ER 1007

Japan's participation but China has opposed it,18 preferring that the disput
be addressed bilaterally and that certain non-claimant states (especially big
powers like Japan) should not be involved in the issue (although it does not
oppose the presence of Laos). By dealing separately with individual and
weaker ASEAN claimant states, this "one-giant, one-pygmy" formula is ob-
viously an advantage to China. Some ASEAN countries believe that the par-
ticipation of non-claimant states like Japan would balance China and perhaps
dissuade it from acting unilaterally. In the 1993 Workshop, some delegates
suggested that non-claimant states should be allowed to participate in areas
that do not impinge on the sovereignty issue. Thus, a non-claimant state like
Japan, if invited, could assist with various financial and technical assistance,
including oceanographic surveys of the archipelago, marine biology, weather,
and tides. Among the claimant and non-claimant states that are interested in
the Spratlys, Japan probably has the best financial, skilled scientific, and
human resources to assist in joint research and development of the South
China Sea. Moreover, because of its long-standing exploration and activities
in the Spratlys between 1918 and 1945, it is likely to have accumulated valu-
able information and knowledge that will be helpful for such activity. Thus
far, Japan has yet to receive an official invitation to join the annual work-
shops in Indonesia.
When given an opportunity to be involved in regional discussions about
the South China Sea conflict, Japan has seized it. In November 1995, the
Philippines's Institute for Strategic and Development Studies and the U.S.
Pacific Forum/CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) organ-
ized a Workshop on the South China Sea Conflict in Manila that was opened
by President Fidel Ramos and attended by government officials, members of
thinktanks, and academics from the Asia-Pacific region.19 Japan sent a dele-
gation but China was conspicuously absent, probably because it could not
agree to the participation of non-claimant states, especially Japan and the
United States, in a conference that was co-sponsored by the Americans. Its
boycott also meant that nothing related to the Spratlys could be resolved.
Indonesian Ambassador Hashim Djalal, who has been responsible for the In-
donesian-led workshops, intimated at Manila that Tokyo had floated a trial
balloon to the Indonesians by offering to cover the cost of hosting the work-
shops, paid for so far by the Canadian International Development Agency, on

18. See Sato Koichi, "Minami shina kai o meguru kokusai kankei: Taito suru chugoku kyoi
ron to ASEAN" [International relations concerning the South China Sea], Kokusai Mondai [In-
ternational issues], October 1993, pp. 41, 45-48. Even though participation in the Workshops is
not on a governmental basis but in principle "track two," China has rejected any Japanese partici-
pation.
19. For the view of an organizer of the Manila Conference, see Ralph A. Cossa, "A Ripple
Effect in the South China Sea," Japan Times, 7 December 1995.

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 1008 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

the condition that the workshops be held in Tokyo.20 The Indonesians de-
clined on the grounds that the Chinese were unlikely to support this proposal.

Japan's Future Role in

the South China Sea
Unless Japan's sea lanes are seriously threatened or disrupted in the South
China Sea, Tokyo is unlikely to move significantly beyond its present posture
of attempting diplomatic initiatives to defuse regional tension within bilateral
and multilateral frameworks. If these efforts fail to prevent serious strife in
the Spratlys, Japan would have to rely on the United States to maintain the
balance of power in the South China Sea. Although the U.S. does not support
the territorial claims to the Spratlys of any particular country, it has indicated
that it will not remain indifferent to any disruption of freedom of navigation
in that area.21 Any country that disrupts the sea lanes around the Spratlys
cannot assume that the U.S. would not intervene militarily, and if the U.S.
becomes militarily involved in a South China Sea conflict, Japan would prob-
ably provide logistics and financial assistance to its ally but refrain from di-
rect military involvement.
The April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration called for closer co-
ordination to include "studies on bilateral cooperation dealing with situations
that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an im-
portant influence on the peace and stability of Japan."22 A disruption of the
sea lanes in the South China Sea would be considered an emergency in Ja-
pan's region. The Japanese media reported that "along with the planned re-
view of the Japan-U.S. defense co-operation guideline, the government on 17
May firmed up an intention to replace "Far East emergencies" in the guide-
line with "emergencies in Japan's neighboring regions." The existing guide-
line stipulates defense co-operation between the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
and U.S. forces in case of Far East emergencies. The change would make it
possible for both Japan and the U.S. to examine joint military measures so
that the SDF can provide logistic support to U.S. forces not only in a Korean

20. Information received from Professor Soeya Yoshihide, a member of the Japanese delega-
tion to the November 1995 Manila Workshop, who learned of it in discussions with Ambassador
Hashim Djalal.
21. According to a U.S. Department of Defense publication: "Contested claims to islands and
territorial waters in the South China Sea are a source of tension in Southeast Asia that could
carry serious consequences for regional stability.... [T]he United States regards the high seas
as an international commons. Our strategic interest in maintaining the lines of communication
linking Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean make it essential that we resist any
maritime claims beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention" (emphasis added).
Office of International Security Affairs, DoD, United States Security for the East Asia-Pacific
Region, February 1995, pp. 19-20.
22. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, 96-075, 17 April 1996.

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 LAM PENG ER 1009

Peninsula crisis and a China-Taiwan dispute, but also in a military conflict in

the Spratly Islands, pirate activities in the SLOCs, and a possible outbreak of
"the second Persian Gulf War." The Japanese government considers that the
regions go beyond the Far East stipulated in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,
although "we cannot specify the extent of the regions." Specifically, the gov-
ernment source said that "the region includes the Middle East, the Malacca
Straits, and the Spratly Islands, where a crisis could pose a serious threat to
Japan."23 If such a scenario were to take place, a segment of U.S. public and
elite opinion might accuse its ally of being a free-rider and perceive that
Washington was risking American lives to protect Japanese oil-tankers in the
South China Sea. This would be similar to the situation during the Gulf War
when some Americans claimed that their troops were shedding blood to pro-
tect Japan-bound oil in the Middle East.
Even if Beijing does not interfere with freedom of navigation while engag-
ing in creeping advancement in the South China Sea, Tokyo would view
these moves with great disquiet. Many Japanese decision-makers would
view any further Chinese advancement in the Spratlys and Senkaku waters as
proving their suspicions that their giant neighbor is a rising hegemon. Do-
mestic pressure to slash Tokyo's ODA to China would arise, and it would be
difficult for the government to justify to taxpayers why Beijing should remain
the largest beneficiary in Japan's foreign aid program while it devotes re-
sources to a nuclear arsenal and asserts China's claims in the Spratlys.24 If
China becomes more assertive and channels more resources to support its
ambitions in the South China Sea, Japan's military and certain politicians will
use the "China threat" to justify a larger increase in defense spending. For-
mer Prime Minister Murayama, the Defence Agency, and political parties
have already cited the Spratlys dispute as a prime example of instability in
the Asia-Pacific that necessitates sustained defense spending in the post-Cold
War era and maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.25 The Okinawa rape

23. Ibid., 96-101, 23 May 1996; also, 96-114, 12 June 1996.

24. Interview with a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Southeast Asia Second Division,
Asian Affairs Bureau, 23 June 1995.
25. A joint Defence Agency and LDP defense policy group highlighted the Spratlys as an
example of conflict in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region that makes it difficult for Japan to
reduce its defense budget (Sankei Shinbun, 18 July 1995). The Spratlys have also seeped into the
consciousness of Japanese air force officers. When the air force conducted a poll among its
officers about hardware requirements, the preference was for "AWACs that has a range that can
fly to the Spratlys." The newspaper reported that this did not mean that the air force planned to
expand its scope to the Spratlys (Asahi Shinbun, 2 December 1995). Shinshinto, the main oppo-
sition party, prepared its "Outline on Security Policy Towards the New Century," mentioning the
following as issues for concern: North Korea's suspected nuclear development, instability in the
Korean Peninsula, China's nuclear development, and the Spratlys problem (Sankei Shinbun, 28
November 1995).

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 1010 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVI, NO. 10, OCTOBER 1996

incident ignited mass demonstrations against American bases and

reawakened Japan's domestic debate about the role of U.S. forces in the
country. In its aftermath, especially when U.S.-Japan relations are subjected
to further strain, Japanese leaders can use potential instability in East Asia,
including the Spratlys, to justify sustaining the alliance.
A worst-case scenario would be the end of the U.S.-Japan Alliance fol-
lowed by a disruption of Tokyo's sea lanes in the South China Sea. If the
alliance were to be terminated because of mutual acrimony and mismanage-
ment, the country would have to consider seriously how to defend its sea
lanes beyond the 1,000-nautical-mile range. Both Northeast and Southeast
Asian countries would probably be very jittery in such a situation; greater
security for Japan would mean greater perceived insecurity for its neighbors.
This would have a deleterious effect on multilateral organizations such as the
ARF and APEC and the vision of a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific
region. Paradoxically, a unilateral approach to security would probably un-
dermine the confidence of Japan's neighbors and its own security environ-
ment.

Conclusion
Contrary to the persistent image that Japan's foreign policy is essentially re-
active, even in the post-Cold War era, the country has actively addressed the
Spratlys issue to enhance its quest for security and status. That Japan pursues
these goals is not remarkable; no state in the international system is indiffer-
ent to such objectives. What is remarkable from a historical viewpoint is that
unlike other great economic powers, Japan is not a political and strategic
heavyweight. The Spratlys case study has demonstrated this imbalance in
Japan's foreign policy. However, Japan's persistence in raising the issue
with China has reminded Beijing that non-claimant states, especially regional
great powers, also have a stake in the peaceful resolution of the Spratlys
dispute. Beijing will have noted that further advances into the South China
Sea at the expense of other claimants would incur the loss of political good-
will from its largest ODA donor.
The Spratlys case study has shown the limits of Japanese foreign policy.
Not underpinned by autonomous military power nor forgiven by its neighbors
for its militaristic past, its foreign policy is restricted to diplomacy and finan-
cial incentives that are subject to acceptance by claimant states, especially
China. Ironically, the largest single recipient of Japanese ODA, Beijing, con-
tinues to exercise a veto over Tokyo's participation in the annual Workshops
on the South China Sea. And unless China relents or until the sea lanes are
directly threatened, Tokyo is likely to remain an interested outsider with re-
pressed and unfulfilled ambitions to play an active role in the Spratlys dis-
pute.

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