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CONTEMPORARY GULF STUDIES
SERIES EDITORS: STEVEN WRIGHT · ABDULLAH BAABOOD
Japan and
the Middle East
Foreign Policies and

Interdependence
Edited by Satoru Nakamura · Steven Wright

Contemporary Gulf Studies
Series Editors
Steven Wright, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad bin
Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar
Abdullah Baabood, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda
University, Tokyo, Japan
Salient Features:
. The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the

competing interests of global powers and therefore publications in
the series reflect this complex environment.
. The series will see publication on the dynamic nature of how
the Gulf region has been undergoing enormous changes attracting
regional and international interests.
Aims and Scope:

This series offer a platform from which scholarly work on the most
pressing issues within the Gulf region will be examined. The scope
of the book series will encompass work being done on the member
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Oman,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait in addition to Iraq, Iran
and Yemen. The series will focus on three types of volumes: Single
and jointly authored monograph; Thematic edited books; Course text
books. The scope of the series will include publications relating to the
countries of focus, in terms of the following themes which will allow
for interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquiry on the Gulf region to
flourish:
. Politics and political development

. Regional and international relations
. Regional cooperation and integration
. Defense and security
. Economics and development
. Food and water security
. Energy and environment
. Civil society and the private sector
. Identity, migration, youth, gender and employment
. Health and education
. Media, literature, arts & culture
Satoru Nakamura · Steven Wright
Editors
Japan and the Middle

East
Foreign Policies and Interdependence
Editors
Satoru Nakamura Steven Wright
Graduate School of Intercultural College Humanities and Social
Studies Sciences
Kobe University Hamad bin Khalifa University
Kobe, Japan Doha, Qatar
ISSN 2662-320X ISSN 2662-3218 (electronic)

Contemporary Gulf Studies
ISBN 978-981-19-3458-2 ISBN 978-981-19-3459-9 (eBook)
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Preface
Since the United Kingdom ended its security presence east of Suez in
1971, the academic literature on the international relations and inter-
national political economy of the Middle East has understandably given
significant attention to the way the United States has engaged with the
Middle East region. However, case studies such as Japan offer a more
intriguing insight into how international relations can evolve without
reliance on a securitization narrative. Japan’s GDP reached the second
largest globally in 1968, and since then, Japan’s international political
and economic role has evolved progressively through international forums
such as the United Nations and the G7, but also more broadly within Asia
as a significant economic, technological, and soft-power political actor
across Asia. After the end of the Cold War, Japan’s economic power was
at its peak and becoming the largest source of Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) during the 1990s despite this period being an era of
“aid fatigue” of donors.1
For the Middle Eastern region, Japan was historically a “latecomer” in
comparison to Western countries, in addition to those from Africa and
Central Asia, yet it has been a key market for Gulf energy exports as well
as being a key investor within the Middle East. Based on an overall assess-
ment of Japan’s engagement with the Middle East, it can be considered
1 Mitsuya Araki, “Japan’s Official Development Assistance: The Japan ODA Model That
Began Life in Southeast Asia,” Asia Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2007).
v
vi PREFACE
to have played a unique role, different from that of the United States
and China, and this has progressively unfolded in a complex manner.
Using Japan as a case study offers the potential for wider comparative
studies on the international relations and international political economy
of the Middle Eastern region, in addition to feeding into the literature
on Japan’s foreign and economic relations. To this end, this volume seeks
to examine Japan’s relations with the Middle East from both interdisci-
plinary and multidisciplinary perspectives, by drawing on case studies in
bilateral relationships in addition to thematic topics that help explain the
broader evolution of relations. It also seeks to achieve this by concep-
tualizing Japan’s engagement with the Middle East and placing it in a
historical context, thereby offering a fresh perspective on this intricate
and complex relationship.
There is a rich body of exceptional scholarship concerning the various
aspects of what can best be termed Japan’s broader “geocultural rela-
tions” with the Islamic world. Persians arrived in Japan, during the Nara
Period (710–794), given that Nara was the Eastward-end of the Silk
Road. This led to trading in cultural artifacts and the formation of the
initial basis of a relationship between what were distant civilizations. This
was further supported by the Namban trade, which flourished through
regional trading entrepôts.
Later still, the Ottoman Empire became the first Muslim-majority state
to send a diplomatic mission to Japan in 1890.2 Undoubtedly, the impe-
rial character of Japan helped facilitate engagement with the Ottoman
Sultanate through royal linkages, which was a pattern to be later witnessed
in the more contemporary era with the monarchical states of the Middle
East. While the intricacies of these initial contacts are well-established
and comprehensively examined within academic scholarship concerning
Japan and the Islamic world, in the contemporary era, trade linkages have
proven to be critical in explaining the dynamics of how the relation-
ship has further developed. Indeed, it was well-established that Japan’s
relations with the Middle Eastern region grew long before oil from the
Middle East became significant in Japan’s overall energy consumption
scenario. It should not be forgotten that Japan’s trade in the first half
of the twentieth century with the Middle East centered on manufactured
2 B. Bryan Barber, Japan’s Relations with Muslim Asia (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2020), 35.
PREFACE vii
textiles as these had been a significant export to the Middle East since
the 1920s, and the sector accounted for 49% of total Japanese exports in
1950.3
Since the end of the Second World War, Japan’s energy security and
geo-political thinking has come to consider the Middle Eastern region as
strategically significant for Japan. A broad conceptualization of Japanese
foreign policy towards the region is that it has consistently sought stability
in the Middle East and has tried to achieve this through its diplomatic
initiatives. Although Japan has been a large consumer of Middle East
energy, it has maintained a dual strategy of promoting friendly relations
with the energy-producing countries while transforming Japan’s domestic
economic base to decrease dependence on hydrocarbons.
Here, it is observable that Japan’s dependence on oil declined steadily
after the first oil shock of 1973 due to energy-saving efforts and a
renewed perspective on industrialization and manufacturing away from
energy-intensive industries. This also led to an increased focus on nuclear
energy and an approach of embracing “knowledge-intensive industries”
and moving away from “energy-intensive industries.” Naohiro Amaya,
Vice-Minister of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), remarked that “the Japanese people are accustomed to crises
like earthquakes and typhoons. The energy shock was a kind of earth-
quake, and so even though it was a great shock, we were prepared to
adjust... it was a kind of blessing, because it forced the rapid change of
Japanese industry.”4 This underlines the point that the story of oil and
the Middle East, is interwoven in Japan’s overall economic development,
which emphasizes the importance of this volume’s subject matter.
As Japan was effected by instability in the Middle East, it felt
compelled to aide in conflict resolution and mitigation. The Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) was given permission to create a perma-
nent office in Tokyo after the First Oil Shock in February 1977. Then,
on its own initiative, Japan attempted to mediate the Palestine conflict.
During a visit to Saudi Arabia in September 1978, Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda (December 1976–December 1978), known for the “Fukuda
ideology” (see Chapter 11), emphasized Japan’s view that Israel should
3 Ryutaro Takahashi, “Trade Policies of the New Japan”, Foreign Affairs 30 (1951):
290.
4 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1992), 654–55.
viii PREFACE
relinquish all occupied Arab territory, including the Arab sector in

Jerusalem. Members of Japan’s parliament invited Yaser Arafat, the PLO’s
Chairman at the time, to visit Tokyo. The United States has no justifica-
tion for refusing this request. Arafat met with Prime Minister Zenkou
Suzuki (in office from July 1980 to November 1982) and Foreign
Minister Sunao Sonoda (May 1981–November 1981). Japan’s position
on Arafat was outlined by the Japanese side, who said that Japan will
work for comprehensive peace via negotiation with the United States and
the European Commission (EC). Arafat agreed to the Fahd proposal’s
eight principles, which included Israel’s right to life. The United States,
on the other hand, continued to support Israel’s human rights violations
against Palestinians. In the face of PLO politics at home, Arafat has failed
to reveal his opinion on Israel recognition.5
Up until 1993, Japan’s aid to Palestine was channeled via the United
Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine (UNRWA). Following the
First Oil Shock, the Japanese government realized that assistance to Arab
non-oil-producing nations and Palestinians would be highly valued by
Arab Gulf energy producers. In 1974, Japan started to expand its funding
to UNRWA. From US$ 1.1 million in 1974 to US$ 34.9 billion in 1993,
Japan’s yearly payout to UNRWA grew by more than three times. From
1953 through 1993, Japan provided UNRWA with a total of US$ 263.2
million in assistance.6
Following the announcement of the Oslo Accord in 1993, Western
and Middle Eastern governments created a fund in Washington, DC in
February 1994 to give financial assistance for the Oslo Peace Process.
Japan took part in it and pledged to provide $200 million to Palestine
within two years of its signing. Following the activation of the ODA
Charter in 1992, Japan started adapting its foreign assistance to disburse
aid in war zones, with Cambodia and Palestine serving as the first test
cases. After being branded a “free rider” and “Cash dispenser” in the
United States media during the Gulf Crisis in 1990, Japan saw Pales-
tine assistance as an opportunity to reclaim its prestige in the Middle
East. The Japanese government quickly overcame legal obstacles to direct
foreign assistance to Palestine, which was “an entity without sovereign
5 Wakatsuki Hidekazu, Reisen no Shuuen to Nihon Gaikou: Suzuki, Nakasone,Takeshita

no Gaikou 1980–1989 (Tokyo: Chikura publishing Co., 2019), pp .73–75.
6 Kazuo Takahashi. Chuto Wahei to Nihon. In Kohei Hashimoto ed. Senryaku Enjo:
Chuto Wahei Shien to ODA no Shourai Zou (Tokyo: PHP Interface, 1993), 95–96.
PREFACE ix
state status or governance. The Japanese government established a task

group to prepare for a rapid rise in help in programs such as hospital
rebuilding, refugee camp reconstruction, infrastructure reconstruction,
administrative support, higher education amongst other related fields.7 ”
After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, which resulted in the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the subsequent suspension of all of
Japan’s nuclear power plants for a safety review saw an increased move
towards Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a feedstock for electricity power
stations.8 This emphasizes that international or domestic circumstances
have historically shaped Japan’s energy mix and impacted its strategy for
energy security. This has proven to be a driver behind Japan’s focus on
LNG and greater engagement with Qatar in particular, given its position
as the world’s largest exporter of LNG.
Energy has clearly played a significant role in Japan’s engagement with
the oil-rich Gulf region, and has given this region special significance,
remaining a key area of interest for Japan and its energy trading compa-
nies. As both the Iranian and Arab sides of the Gulf possess the largest
global reserves of oil and are stable energy suppliers, the region has come
to play a significant role in Japan’s energy security calculations. For Japan,
the geographical location of the Gulf is attractive as an alternative source
of oil, as those within Russia or Africa are further geographically for Japan.
African oil fields have tended to be more unstable in constant produc-
tion and exposed regional conflicts than those in the Gulf. Therefore, the
Gulf region has become the rational choice for Japan given its substan-
tial reserves-to-production ratio, refining capacity, and potential role as a
swing producer through OPEC.
A well-established aspiration for the Japanese government and Japanese
oil companies during the 1950s was to obtain oil concessions, given
the goal of achieving energy security for Japan away from the interna-
tional oil majors. Despite the international oil companies (IOCs) offering
oil through the international market being a more competitive option
cost-wise; yet, this underlined the goal of having autonomy and energy
security. Remarkably, Saudi Arabia had set Japanese companies harsher
7 Mitsugu Saito. Nihon no Tai Palestina Shien no Jittai. In In Kohei Hashimoto ed.
Senryaku Enjo: Chuto Wahei Shien to ODA no Shourai Zou (Tokyo: PHP Interface, 1993).
155–182.
8 Steven Wright, “Qatar’s LNG: Impact of the Changing East-Asian Market,” Middle
East Policy 24, no. 1 (2017).
x PREFACE
conditions for an oil concession to be granted and saw Japan’s conces-

sion as a new standard against the IOCs. At the same time, Saudi Arabia
imposed a total 56% tax on the profit of Japan’s Arabian Oil Company,
when its concession contract was concluded in 1957. This was beyond the
typical 50–50 profit share for contracts with Western developers. Asian
countries, including Japan, have paid an “Asian premium” for the price
of oil imported from the Middle East.
Non-energy relations have also been significant for Japan’s relations
with the Middle East. The Middle East has also shown development as a
consuming region for Japanese manufactured goods and investments. It
is also clear that since Japan transitioned its energy policy, its engagement
with the Middle East progressively evolved and became more complex.
What is clear from this volume is how Japan’s relationship with the Middle
Eastern region varies by country. While this underlines the complexity of
the relationship, it is important to appreciate that the energy trade was
the primary driver for Japan’s engagement through the Gulf region.
It also reminds us that there is a need for a degree of caution in general-
izing Japan’s overall engagement with the Middle Eastern region, as clear
variances exist in the character of Japan’s relationship with the Middle
Eastern countries. Based on this, it is therefore important to understand
the types of interdependence Japan has developed with Middle Eastern
countries. Indeed, energy-based relations, as well as non-energy-based
relations, are both drivers behind Japan’s engagement with the Middle
Eastern region.
Japan’s international relations is naturally a field that has benefited
from a rich scholarship. Takashi Inoguchi, engaged with the question of
whether there are any theories of international relations in Japan, persua-
sively identified four main traditions.9 The first identified is the German
Staatslehre tradition, which dominated international relations in Japan
from 1868 to 1945, yet remained an applied approach in scholarship in
the post-second world war era. As an approach, it is historically grounded
where particular attention was given to a rich and descriptive examina-
tion of events’ personalities and their consequences and had the benefit
of yielding policy-relevant research. It primarily engaged with the fields of
law and economics, rather than politics and sociology. The second main
9 Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?,”

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 371.
PREFACE xi
tradition identified is Marxism, which was used as a counter-narrative

to the Staatslehre approach. Inoguchi observed that this stemmed from
the origins of social science (shakai kagaku) as a discipline in Japan
being synonymous with the Marxist school of thought. The third broad
tradition was that of historicism, where Japanese scholars examined inter-
national relations as a branch of historical research. This can be contrasted
with the Staatslehre tradition, as it adopted more of a constructivist epis-
temology that focused on an accurate presentation of the facts. The final
tradition in Japanese international relations concerns the application of
American and European social scientific approaches. This has lent itself to
a focus on methodological design, theory formation, and empirical testing
of the theory.10
While each of the above-mentioned traditions in Japanese international
relations continues to yield scholarship based on the followed epistemolo-
gies, one can argue that the dominant approach has gravitated to the
application of the final approach, which requires the application of a more
positivist approach of theory construction and testing. Based on this,
international relations scholarship towards Japan has become more domi-
nated by the neorealist paradigm, given that it accounts for a mercantilist
approach in foreign policy coupled with a realist security policy. While
the United States has remained the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy
post-1945, it is also clear that relegating Japan’s foreign policy to an
“America-first” security grounded analysis often does not account for the
way Japan’s foreign policy and political economy have evolved. This has
been reflected in a domestic policy debate on what Japan’s international
role and foreign policy should be.11
It is particularly apparent that Japan’s engagement within Asia does
not always converge with that of the United States. In the post-Cold War
era, the changed regional and international context gave way to assess-
ments on the process of “Asianization” and how Japan’s international
relations and political economy should be understood within that context
of regionalization.12 The debate surrounding this context has given way
10 Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Role in International Affairs,” Survival 34, no. 2 (1992):
373.
11 Inoguchi, “Japan’s Role in International Affairs,” 74.
12 Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5
(1991).
xii PREFACE
to various interpretations of Japan’s foreign policy, which is important

in any conceptualization of Japan’s relations with the Middle Eastern
region. Kent Calder advanced an influential conceptualization of Japan
as a “reactive state,” as he observed a reluctance in the Japanese govern-
ment to take significant foreign policy initiatives.13 Moreover, there have
been other important assessments on the role of domestic politics of
Japan, in addition to the influential role of Japan’s bureaucracy, as being
a limiting factor for the government’s greater autonomy and its foreign
policy conduct, which reinforce the assessment of Japan as a reactive state.
Despite this, observations have been made to the contrary that Japan’s
foreign policy has been progressively more active, particularly in its lead-
ership role within Asia. Japan’s economic rise was worrisome in the
1980s, and its leadership was sometimes misunderstood and warned by
the United States in the 1990s. However, Japan did not challenge the
United States’ hegemonic leadership role after the end of the Cold War
era.
Considering how to conceptualize Japan’s engagement with the
Middle East, the majority of studies have sought to focus on Japan’s inter-
ests in natural resources as being the primary driver. One such example
is that of Sugihara and Allen,14 who gave particular focus to the essential
vulnerability of Japan’s dependency on oil as being the core characteristic
that has shaped Japan’s engagement with the Middle East. Observing
the opportunities that the changing context presented to Japan, it was
clear that energy politics was the dominant factor in shaping the rela-
tionship. In contrast to this, B. Bryan Barber’s study on Japan’s relations
with Islamic Asia, insightfully identified more to the relationship, noting
that several advanced factors have shaped Japan’s foreign policy towards
Muslim Asia.15
While energy resources remain a constant feature in explaining the
depth of the relationship, it is also clear that other factors are important.
Providing their hierarchy may prove difficult as it depends on the context
and case study concerned. Nevertheless, the core question remains what
13 Kent E Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the

Reactive State,” World Politics 40, no. 4 (1988).
14 Kaoru Sugihara and J. A. Allan, Japan in the Contemporary Middle East (London:
Routledge, 1993).
15 Barber, Japan’s Relations with Muslim Asia.
PREFACE xiii
would be an appropriate theoretical conceptualization for this volume’s

examination of Japan’s relations with the Middle Eastern region.
While economic linkages through energy exports are significant, as is
demonstrated in this volume, the connections that exist may be seen to
transcend oil and gas interests and vary depending on the specifics of the
country concerned, or indeed on the sector where cooperative relations
have been achieved. Although the role of the Middle East as an energy-
exporting region is a necessary and inescapable feature of both energy
security and national economic security calculations, we advance the view
that it has now progressed beyond the trade in energy. In other words,
Japan’s engagement in the Middle East is more complex and varied: it
is not only about the energy sector, and this relationship has flourished
beyond energy-producing countries.
It is accurate to see the oil and gas exporting countries from the Middle
East region as heavily dependent on Japan as a leading import market. Yet,
the way international transactions between Japan and the Middle East
are now taking place, in terms of flows of people, goods, money, and
expertise, has led to the form of human interconnectedness with Japan
that transcends the borders within the Middle East region regardless of
whether they are oil and gas exporting countries. Although the trade flows
may not be symmetrical, they are important to the countries concerned,
and any disruptions to those transactions can prove to be costly to all
parties concerned. Importantly, such relations can go beyond the realities
of economics to achieve cooperative ties in various areas and on multiple
levels.
On this basis, there is a need to move beyond traditional conceptions
that identify factors that may shape the relationship towards one that
conceptualizes the relationship based on interconnectedness and interde-
pendence. This volume seeks to examine the question of the nature of
the complex and multifaceted nature of Japan’s relations with the Middle
Eastern region, coupled with the recognition of varying levels of inter-
dependence, through its various case studies on bilateral relations and
thematic issues. On this, we see it as offering a useful conceptualization
of the relationship and its prospects for future growth.
Kobe, Japan Satoru Nakamura

Doha, Qatar Steven Wright
Acknowledgments
We would like to express our sincere gratitude to Waseda University

for allowing us to have a session entitled “Japan-Middle East Rela-
tions: Origins, Dynamics, and Pluralism” at their international symposium
“Comparative Studies of Islamic Areas: New Actors, Fresh Angles” in
September 2018 organized by Organization for Islamic Area Studies,
Waseda University (WOIAS). The insights and exchanges proved to be
the impetus behind this project, and it underlined that a new conceptual-
ization was needed to serve as a basis for future scholarship on this critical
subject.
We also express our thanks and appreciation to Keiko Sakurai of
Waseda University, whose support and encouragement allowed this
project to be achieved. We also appreciate the engagement of Shigeru
Sudo, Bahadir Pehlivantür, Yeva Harutyunyan, and Koji Muto, who
provided valuable engagement on aspects of this book’s theme.
xv
Contents
1 A Conceptualisation of Japan’s Relations

with the Middle East 1
Satoru Nakamura and Steven Wright
2 Japan’s Relations with Saudi Arabia: The
Evolution of Energy Diplomacy in Response
to the Developmental Shift in the Rentier State 27
Makio Yamada
3 Japan–UAE Relations: Establishment of Multifaceted
Interdependence Based on Energy 57
Koji Horinuki
4 The Three Cycles of Rise and Fall in Iran–Japan
Relations: From Energy Studies to Political Causal
Analysis 87
Tomoyo Chisaka
5 The Relations Between Japan and Turkey:
Three-Dimensional Diplomacy—Roles of the Imperial
Family, the Government, and Citizens 109
Yuko Omagari
6 Japan–Egypt Bilateral Relations: A Main Pillar
of Japanese Middle Eastern Policy 139
Takayuki Yokota
xvii
xviii CONTENTS
7 Beyond Power, Before Interdependence: Complex

Synergy and Japan–Israel Relations 163
Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren
8 Oil Market and Supply: From the Perspective
of Japan’s Energy Policy 207
Takeru Hosoi
9 The LNG Sector in Japan’s Relations with the Middle
East 243
Steven Wright
10 Investment and Trade Promotion Policies: Gulf
and Japan’s Non-energy Sector Interdependence 269
Jun Saito
11 Origin of Japan’s Relations with Middle Eastern
Countries by Practical Internationalism 297
Satoru Nakamura
12 Nonmilitary Contribution by Japan in the Gulf
Crisis 1990–1991: Funding, Intelligence Gathering,
Releasing Hostages, and Minesweeping 325
Satoru Nakamura
13 Empirical and Conceptual Conclusions on Japan’s
Interdependence with the Middle East 353
Glossary 379
Index 383
Notes on Contributors
Matthew Brummer is an Assistant Professor at the National Graduate

Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) and research associate at The Univer-
sity of Tokyo. His research interests include the international political
economy of science and technology, the psychology of threat perception,
and Japan–Israel diplomatic relations. He earned his M.A. from Columbia
University and his Ph.D. from The University of Tokyo.
Tomoyo Chisaka is a postdoctoral research fellow of the Japan Society
of Promotion of Science. She did a part of Ph.D. research in Iran as
a fellow of the Graduate School of Law and Political Science at the
University of Tehran from 2019 to 2020. Her research interests include
electoral management under authoritarian regimes and political institu-
tions of post-revolutionary Iran. She obtained her Ph.D. in International
Public Policy from Osaka University in 2021.
Koji Horinuki is a Senior Researcher of JIME Center at the Institute of
Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ). His main research interests are contem-
porary Arab Gulf politics, security, and social affairs. His recent works
include Asian Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States: The Growing
Foreign Population and Their Lives (Co-edited with Masako Ishii, Naomi
Hosoda, and Masaki Matsuo. Leiden: Brill, 2019). He obtained his Ph.D.
in Area Studies from Kyoto University in 2011.
Takeru Hosoi is a Professor of Economics at Kokugakuin University,
Japan. His area of research expertise is on the industrial development of
xix
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
the Arab Gulf countries, including the energy industries. He also studies
the international management strategies of Gulf companies. He obtained
his Doctor of Business Administration from Ritsumeikan University,
Japan.
Satoru Nakamura is a Professor of International Relations, and a
Professor at Kobe University, Japan. His career includes special assistant
at Japan Embassy in Riyadh, guest researcher at Japan’s Upper House of
Parliament, Qatar University, King Saud University and Graduate Insti-
tute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. His area of
research expertise is the international relations, security, and history of
the Middle East and Islamic World with focus on the Arabian Gulf.
He obtained his Ph.D. (International Cultural Studies) from Tohoku
University, Japan.
Yuko Omagari is Deputy Secretary General of the Japan–Turkey Society.
She is currently seconded from Itochu Corporation. Her main research
interests are Japan–Turkey relations, and contemporary Turkish society,
especially secularism and the veiling issue. She withdrew her doctoral
program with completion of coursework without degree at the Grad-
uate School of Social Sciences, Institute for the Study of Global Issues,
Hitotsubashi University.
Eitan Oren is Lecturer at the Japan Programme/Department of War
Studies, Kings College London. Previously, he was Research Associate
at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (Tokyo). He holds
a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Tokyo. Oren’s
research interests lie at the intersection of international security and the
human mind.
Jun Saito is an Associate Senior Researcher of Area Studies Center,
Institute Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), Japan. He used to be
a Visiting Researcher of the United Arab Emirates University. His field
of research expertise is on the Arab Gulf economy, in addition to finan-
cial development, corporate governance, corporate finance, and financial
market. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Hitotsubashi Univer-
sity.
Steven Wright is an Associate Professor of International Relations, and
an Associate Dean at Hamad bin Khalifa University, Qatar. He previously
held the positions of Associate Dean, and the Head of the Department
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxi
of International Affairs, at Qatar University. His area of research exper-

tise is on the international relations and political economy of the Arab
Gulf states, in addition to energy geopolitics. He obtained his Ph.D. in
International Relations from the University of Durham.
Makio Yamada is a Senior Adviser at King Faisal Center for Research and
Islamic Studies in Riyadh. Previously he was a Lecturer at the Institute
for Transregional Study at Princeton University, and a Teaching Fellow at
SOAS University of London. He also conducted research at University of
Tokyo and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. He obtained his D.Phil.
in International Relations and M.Phil. in Modern Middle Eastern Studies
from the University of Oxford (St. Antony’s College).
Takayuki Yokota is an Associate Professor of School of Information and
Communication at Meiji University, Tokyo. He completed the Graduate
School of Asian and African Area Studies at Kyoto University, where
he obtained a Ph.D. His specialty is Middle Eastern studies, especially
Egyptian politics and Islamic movements. He published Islam and Mass
Movements in the Contemporary Egypt (Japanese) (Kyoto: Nakanishiya,
2006) and Trend of Fundamentalism: Muslim Brotherhood (Japanese)
(Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2009).
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ADGAS Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company

ADNOC Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
ADOC Abu Dhabi Oil Company, UAE
AKP Justice and Development Party, Turkey
ANRE Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Japan
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corp
Darah King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, Saudi Arabia
DOD Department of Defense, United States
DOS Department of State, United States
EJUST Egypt-Japan University of Science and Technology, in Egypt
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GAO General Accounting Office
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GPF Gulf Peace Fund
ICDC Iran Chemical Development Co.
ICT Information Communication Technology
IEA International Energy Agency
IJPC Iran Japan Petrochemical Company
IOC International Oil Company
IPO Initial Public Offering
ISF Israel Science Foundation
JASDF Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation
xxiii
xxiv ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
JCCME Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East

JCCP Japan Cooperation Center Petroleum
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization
JGSDF Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JICE Japan International Cooperation Center
JIFA Japan-Israel Friendship Association
JIIA Japan Institute of International Affairs
JIIN Japan-Israel Innovation Network
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOCV Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JODCO Japan Oil Development Company
JOGMEC Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
JSDF Japanese Self-Defense Forces
JSPS Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
KAEC King Abdullah Economic City, Saudi Arabia
KOGAS Korea Gas Corp
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LDP Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
LICs Low-Income Countries
LMICs Lower Middle-Income Countries
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MECCJ Japanese Institute of Anatolian Archaeology of the Middle Eastern
Culture Center
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MENAP Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOCO Mubarraz Oil Company, UAE
MOD Ministry of Defense
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
Mta Million tonnes per year
NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NEXI Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, Japan
NF National Front
NGO Nongovernmental Organisation
NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyokai)
NICDP National Industrial Cluster Development Program, Saudi Arabia
NOC National Oil Company
NPC National Petrochemical Company
NPO Non-Profit Organisation
NSC National Security Council
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS xxv
OAPEC Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCI Pacific Consultants International, Japan
PIF Public Investment Fund
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
R&D Research and Development
RETI Riyadh Technical Electronics Institute, Saudi Arabia
ROE Rule of Engagement
S&T Science and Technology
SABIC Saudi Basic Industry Corporation
SAGIA Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority
SEHAI Saudi Electronics and Home Appliances Institute
SJAHI Saudi-Japanese Automobile High Institute
SPA Sales and Purchase Agreement
SVF SoftBank Vision Fund, Japan
TCF Trillion Cubic Feet
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company, Japan
TİKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve
Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı)
TJV Turkish Japanese Foundation (Türk- Japon Vakfı)
Tpa Tonnes per annum
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training, Saudi Arabia
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAR United Arab Republic
UMICs Upper Middle-Income Countries
UN United Nations
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPKO United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
List of Figures
Chapter 1
Fig. 1 Process to Deepen Interdependence 10
Fig. 2 Three Level of Channels between the ME and Japan 13
Fig. 3 Multiplying agendas that deepen interdependence 14
Chapter 3
Fig. 1 Overseas Japanese residents in the Gulf Countries
(1972–2018) 67
Fig. 2 Crude oil imports from the UAE (Source IEEJ-EDMC
Data Bank) 72
Fig. 3 UAE’s crude oil export market (1971–2017) (Source
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin [1971–2008] and UN
Energy Statistics Yearbook [2009–2017]) 72
Fig. 4 LNG Imports from the UAE (Source IEEJ-EDMC Data
Bank) 77
Chapter 4
Fig. 1 Iran’s trade with Japan before WWII (1933–1940)
(Source Shokrzadeh and Abadian [2017: 54]. Note This
graph shows the change in the amount of Iranian export
to and import from Japan before WWII) 92
xxvii
xxviii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 2 Japanese trade with Iran (1962–2004) (Source Statistic

Bureau, Japanese Ministry of International Affairs
and Communication. Note Export includes Iranian oil
produced by international oil farms) 98
Fig. 3 Japanese development investment stocks toward Iran
(1996–2017) (Source JETRO, Statistics of Foreign Direct
Investment) 104
Fig. 4 Import to Iran from Japan, China and South Korea
(2000–2005) (Source World Bank, World Integrated Trade
Solution. Note This figure indicates a comparison of export
to Iran from Japan, China and South Korea. The left graph
is Japan, the middle graph is China and the right graph is
South Korea) 105
Chapter 6
Fig. 1 The Second Japanese Embassy to Europe in front
of the statue of the Sphinx 142
Fig. 2 Steam locomotives in Egypt from Yuhei Takashima’s
Travels to Europe and the West 143
Fig. 3 The number of Japanese residents in Egypt (1972–2016),
Population Number 145
Fig. 4 Value of trade between Japan and Egypt (1970–2016, JPY
100 mn) 146
Fig. 5 FDI from Japan to Egypt (2001/02–2016/17) 147
Chapter 7
Fig. 1 Complex synergy and Japan–Israel Post-War relations 197
Fig. 2 Trade Complementary Index between Japan and Israel 199
Chapter 8
Fig. 1 Japan: Energy consumption by industry 210
Fig. 2 Japan: Energy consumption ratio by industry 211
Fig. 3 Japan: Primary energy supply by fuel 213
Fig. 4 Primary energy consumption 214
Fig. 5 Primary energy consumption per capita 215
Fig. 6 Oil consumption of major countries 217
Fig. 7 Japan’s crude oil imports and dependency rate
on the Middle East 218
Fig. 8 Asian countries crude oil imports in 2019 (’000B/D) 220
Fig. 9 Asian countries LNG imports in 2019 (Volume:MNT) 221
LIST OF FIGURES xxix
Fig. 10 Saudi Arabia’s oil exports by region 222

Fig. 11 Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar export value to Japan 222
Fig. 12 Japan’s trade balance with major Gulf countries 223
Chapter 10
Fig. 1 GCC trade partners and Japanese contribution (Source
IMF, Direction of Trade) 282
Fig. 2 Japanese trade partners and the GCC countries contribution
(Source IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics [DOT]) 283
Fig. 3 Foreign direct investment between the GCC countries
and Japan. (Source JETRO) 286
Fig. 4 Credit balances for the GCC countries, by nation (Source
BIS, consolidated positions on counterparties resident
in the GCC countries) 289
Fig. 5 Japanese companies in MENA (Source Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese
Nationals Overseas 292
Chapter 13
Fig. 1 Types of bilateral interdependence between the Middle
East and Japan (Source This author) 366
List of Tables
Chapter 3
Table 1 Major Japanese companies in the UAE (1960–1970s) 61
Table 2 Oil concessions held by Japanese oil companies in Abu
Dhabi 75
Chapter 6
Table 1 ODA provided to Egypt (USD mn) 155
Chapter 8
Table 1 Percentage of primary energy consumption by fossil energy
(2019, %) 216
Chapter 9
Table 1 Qatar LNG Shareholders and Customers 260
Chapter 10
Table 1 Free Trade Agreements (FTA) issued or being negotiated
by the GCC countries 277
Table 2 Investment Promotion Agency in the GCC countries 279
Table 3 Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) between Japan
and MENA countries 279
xxxi
xxxii LIST OF TABLES
Table 4 Progress of Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement

(EPA) 280
Table 5 Japanese Oil and Non-oil imports (CIF) from the GCC
countries 285
Chapter 11
Table 1 Characteristics of five perspectives for Japan’s foreign policy 309
Table 2 Political trend of major prime ministers 313
Chapter 13
Table 1 Interdependence type A: Objects of promotion
of self-reliance 358
Table 2 Interdependence type B: Expectation of stabilisation
partners 358
Table 3 Interdependence type C: Strategic cooperation partners 359
Table 4 Interdependence type D: Energy security cooperators 360
Table 5 Interdependence type E: Emerging partner 360
Table 6 Technical cooperation (total of dispatch, receipt,
and dispatch of investigation team during 1954–2018) 361
Table 7 Japan’s ODA to countries in the MENAP (1954–2016)
(100 million Yen) 364
CHAPTER 1
A Conceptualisation of Japan’s Relations

with the Middle East
1 Complex Interdependence Revisited

The way states interact along national and transnational boundaries, along
with the variety of ways in which relations can evolve in an imbalanced
manner, prompted the ground-breaking seminal study by Keohane and
Nye, Power and Interdependence. The authors proposed a powerful and
coherent theory of interdependence, operating at the level of the inter-
national system, which sees realism as an insufficient explanation for state
conduct and the need to assess relations based on the specifics and context
of the relationship concerned. At its core, Keohane and Nye advanced a
theory in which states’ conducts operate on a spectrum: at one extreme,
it can be defined in more realist terms where the state is concerned with
S. Nakamura (B)
Graduate School of Intercultural Studies, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
e-mail: [email protected]
S. Wright
Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Ar-Rayyan, Qatar
e-mail: [email protected]
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
S. Nakamura and S. Wright (eds.), Japan and the Middle East,
Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3459-9_1
2 S. NAKAMURA AND S. WRIGHT
national security and survival, and if needed, will engage in warfare to

secure it. At the other end of the spectrum, they advance a conception of
“complex interdependence” where linkages between states have evolved
in a manner which, to greater or lesser extents, are mutually depen-
dent. Further development is, therefore, seen to advance their national
well-being in line with the national interest.
While traditional theories of international relations would reject the
dichotomy proposed by Keohane and Nye and how they interact based
on the particularity of the circumstances, it is proposed here that aspects
of this formula most convincingly allow for a theoretical conceptualization
of Japan’s relations with the Middle East. Moreover. The approach allows
this volume to move beyond a simple essentialising of factors that have
shaped the relationship.
In terms of the components of Keohane and Nye’s theory, at the one
end of the spectrum lies a neoliberal theory of power politics concerning
interdependence. The strength of this work rests in it being grounded in
focus on the power politics of interdependence and its ability to conceptu-
alize the way transnational actors operate and influence foreign relations.
This is important in the case of Japan, given that power politics in the
form of Japan’s relations with the United States remains a constant influ-
ence in shaping Japanese strategy and diplomacy, as evidenced by the
lasting influence of the Yoshida Doctrine. Based on the identifiable need
to incorporate a liberal focus on interdependence, coupled with a realist
focus on power politics, a neoliberal perspective on Japan–Middle Eastern
resource politics can help explain aspects of the relationship in partic-
ular circumstances. Equally, they can also help offer a perspective on the
relations between transnational actors in the form of multinational corpo-
rations and how they figure into interstate relations. This can clearly be
useful in understanding the impact of Japanese multinational corporations
in the bilateral relationship.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, complex interdependence theory
helps explain relations that are not easily explainable through the lens of
classical realism and neo-realism. Keohane and Nye acknowledged that
complex interdependence is likely to better explain the realities of the
international system, as the neoliberal theory of power politics of inter-
dependence theory largely relates to what can be seen as a theoretical
extreme. In essence, complex interdependence comprises three defining
characteristics. First, it acknowledges that there are multiple levels to the
relationship between states. It is argued here that societies are connected
1 A CONCEPTUALISATION OF JAPAN’S RELATIONS … 3
via a variety of means, including as official and informal foreign office

arrangements, face-to-face contact between non-governmental elites,
transnational organizations, and informal links between governmental
elites (such as multinational banks or corporations). Interstate, trans-
governmental, and transnational connections are three ways that these
routes might be categorized. Realists consider interstate relationships to
be the standard conduits. When we loosen the realist premise that states
behave cogently as units, a transgovernmental concept applies; yet when
we loosen the assumption that states are the sole units, the concept of
transnational applies.1
Keohane and Nye’s observations on the complexity and multifaceted
nature of connections is a convincing form of analysis when applied to
the case of Japan’s relations with the Middle East. In the subsequent
chapters of this volume, we argue that given the complexities of the
relationships that are examined, essentialising key factors would not be
satisfactory for a higher-level theoretical conceptualization of the char-
acter of the relationship and how it has progressively expanded particularly
in the contemporary post-second world war era.
The characteristics of the neoliberal theory power politics as advanced
within Keohane and Nye’s framework indicate that asymmetrical interde-
pendence is often characterized by an unequal relationship. The authors
observed that “asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power
we are thinking of power as control over resources, or the potential to
affect outcomes. A less dependent actor in a relationship often has a signif-
icant political resource, because changes in the relationship (which the
actor may be able to initiate or threaten) will be less costly to that actor
than to its partners.”2
In considering the case of Japan, the 1973 oil embargo was exempli-
fied by Keohane and Nye for the application of this framework: Japan
was explained as vulnerable to the significant resources controlled by oil-
producing states. Here, the concept of two dimensions of power within
the concept of asymmetrical interdependence sensitivity and vulnerability
1 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston:
Longman, 2012), 20.
2 Keohane and Nye, Power and interdependence, 10.
can be observed. They clarified that sensitivity involves degrees of respon-

siveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in one
country bring costly changes in another, and how great are these costs.
It can be measured not merely by the volume of flows across borders but
also by the costly effects of changes in transactions on societies or govern-
ments.”3 Indeed, they highlighted the sensitivity that the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe were affected by the oil price crisis of 1971
and in the cases of the oil price rises of 1973–74 and in 1975.
While sensitivity interdependence is clearly a useful concept, vulner-
ability interdependence can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer
costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.
Since it is usually difficult to change policies quickly, the immediate effects
of external changes generally reflect sensitivity dependence. Vulnerability
dependence can be measured only by the costliness of adjusting over a
given period. They insightfully observed that “vulnerability is particularly
important for understanding the political structure of interdependence
relationships. In a sense, it focuses on which actors are ‘the definers of
the ceteris paribus clause,’ or can set the rules of the game. Vulnerability
is clearly more relevant than sensitivity, for example, in analyzing the poli-
tics of raw materials, such as the supposed transformation of power after
1973.”4
In terms of the relationship between the two dimensions, Keohane
and Nye’s framework identifies a hierarchy of power within asymmetrical
interdependence as “vulnerability interdependence includes the strategic
dimension that sensitivity interdependence omits, but this does not mean
that sensitivity is politically unimportant. Rapidly rising sensitivity often
leads to complaints about interdependence and political efforts to alter
it, particularly in countries with pluralistic political systems.”5 For Japan,
this underlines that while it has inherent sensitivity to energy insecurity
from Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries, it also has options to miti-
gate against supply insecurity or significant cost fluctuations. Indeed, the
different aspects of asymmetric interdependence can be usefully applied to

Japan’s dependence on oil and gas imports and how it shapes its relations
with oil-exporting nations and in its engagement with oil-consuming
countries to mitigate against the challenges posed by cartel action as
highlighted by Jun’ichirō Shiratori.6
2 Critical Adoption of Complex Interdependence

in Middle East International Relations
Keohane and Nye considered Canadian–United States relations and
Australian–American relations as case studies to compare different inter-
dependences. The case of Canadian–United States relations was seen as an
“ideal case of complex interdependence” to generalize world politics. It
sets Canadian–United States relations as a proximate case and Australian–
American relations as a remote case. The authors selected Canada, the
United States, and Australia for their study, because of their cultural and
political similarities; but it is observable here that this choice fixes factors
of culture and domestic politics, and enables a comparison of the effects
of security and distance factors over interdependence.7 To research inter-
dependence, previous studies have chosen cases of advanced economies
or nations with similar cultures and political institutions. This volume is
unique in its approach in that the study of interdependence, between
Middle Eastern countries and Japan is one where there are dissimilar
cultures and political regimes.
Ray Hinnebusch combines approaches of realism, center–periphery
structure, and constructivism to interpret Middle East politics.8 His
approach discussed a broad range of regional politics in the Middle East,
and necessarily considered the United States as the main outside power
engaging in the Middle East. Building on this was Gerd Nonneman’s
seminal work on European–Gulf relations. Nonneman was critical of the
adoption of the center–periphery approach, suggesting that the autonomy
of the Middle Eastern countries is clearly observable in both energy-
producing countries and non-energy-producing countries, and also that
6 Jun’ichirō Shiratori, “Keizai taikoku” Nihon no gaikō: enerugı̄ shigen gaikō no

keisei,1967–1974-nen (Tōkyō-to Chūō-ku: Chikura Shobō, 2015).
7 Keohane and Nye, Power and interdependence, 144–45.
8 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, The international politics of the Middle East (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2003).
European diplomacy toward the Middle East can be contrasted to the

United States.9 He adopted interdependence as an alternative approach
to explain the relations of the Middle East and outside powers and applied
it for the first time to analyze Europe–Gulf relations.
2.1 The Role of Security in Complex Interdependence

Complex interdependence theory acknowledges that “military force is not
used by governments toward other governments within the region, or
on issues when complex interdependence prevails.”10 Therefore, while
conflicts without force continue to occur, the use of military force
between nations under interdependence will decrease.11 It is presented
as one of the main counter-proposals to the ideal type of realism in
international relations theory from the standpoint of interdependence.
A further aspect of complex interdependence theory concerns the
absence of hierarchy among issues. This is important in that while classical
realist international relations would focus on power as the determining
factor in interstate relations, Keohane and Nye recognized that the factors
that dominate the agenda depending on the time and contexts concerned.
Therefore, while issues relating to energy or security may have a more
dominant factor in particular bilateral relations, these would not apply in
other contexts or at other periods with the same state concerned. This
is certainly helpful when examining a broad conceptualization of Japan’s
relations with the Middle Eastern region, where there are clear variances
based on interests, contexts, and capacities, as outlined in this volume.
Keohane and Nye selected case studies in North America and the
Pacific, areas with a low incidence of violent conflict. In comparison, the
Middle East and East Asia are insecure environments. This presents a
different context in which Japan’s relations with the Middle East have
evolved and shaped the form and extent of the Middle East’s interdepen-
dence with Japan. Japan’s pacifist approach, which is enshrined in the
Japanese constitution, has acted as a framing agent for foreign policy
construction. However, after the Cold War’s conclusion, Japan started
9 Gerd Nonneman, Analysing Middle Eastern foreign policies: the relationship with
Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 15, 29.
11 Keohane and Nye, Power and interdependence, 13–23, 286–7.
considering security alternatives for dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense

Force (JSDF). Overall, the ability to apply such nuances in international
relations to complex case studies underline the value of applying Keohane
and Nye’s theoretical spectrum to the case study of this volume.
As Keohane and Nye position interdependence theory as an alternative
to realism, it has a drawback in that it does not address realism theory’s
subcategories. Complex interdependence was uninterested in doing prac-
tical research on security issues and did not build on observations of
security-related facts. One may readily recall that although nations in
interdependent relationships seldom resolve international disputes via the
use of force, they do not forsake weapons or military preparations in the
face of threats.
After all, the government does not abandon all security measures and
militaries based on a reality of strong connectivity with other states.
States displaying complex interdependence see dangers arising from non-
interdependent relationships and assess the likelihood that non-military
disputes may develop into military conflicts. Thus, the difference between
offensive and defensive realism explains how states see and behave in
the context of interdependence. In reality, states with a high degree
of interdependence maintain a defense-oriented security realism, while
abandoning offense-oriented security perceptions. A state engaged in
interdependence analysis anticipates unanticipated risks and dangers in
regional politics, prioritizes defensive alternatives when calculating secu-
rity, and concludes that abstaining from the use of military force is a
logical and lucrative decision.
Thus, interdependence and defense-oriented realism are not mutually
exclusive, but are rather complimentary from this vantage point. Thus,
although Japan and its ties with Middle Eastern nations may be explained
via the lens of complex interdependence, their security policies can be
characterized as defense-oriented realism, at least toward one another,
from a theoretical perspective.
2.2 Agenda Politics

Another element of complex interdependence theory is its discussion of
“agenda politics.” Here, an acknowledgment is made that a national
agenda may be shaped by a variety of levels and circumstances. While
conventional international politics assumed that governments set their
agendas mainly in response to security concerns or balance of power
calculations, Keohane and Nye demonstrate that domestic politics may

and do dominate the agenda and drive foreign policy. As discussed before
in relation to the 1973 oil crises in the Middle East and Japan, the social
unrest produced by high levels of inflation had a direct effect on how
the government reacted to what became a national cause for worry. As
the Middle East’s interdependence with Japan grows, the scope of inter-
action expands beyond energy transactions and aid delivery to include
the formation of partnerships, investments, advanced forms of educa-
tional cooperation, high-quality infrastructure building construction, and
cultural activities.
2.3 The Role of International Actors

The function of international organizations is a last fundamental compo-
nent of complex interdependence theory. From a traditional realist
perspective, international organizations (IOs) are seen as small players
with little influence and strength, particularly in terms of military might.
In contrast, Keohane and Nye believe that international organizations are
critical actors capable of developing and shaping agendas, and forming
coalitions. Jun’ichir Shiratori has convincingly demonstrated how Japan’s
participation in the establishment of the International Energy Agency
(IEA) in the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo demonstrates how Japan
collaborated with the United States and other Western powers to coun-
terbalance the Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC)’s influence oversupply and price.12 This is significant because it
challenges the conventional wisdom that Japan adopted a pro-Arab stance
despite its relations with the United States. A more accurate reading of
Japan’s behavior at the time indicates that it employed a sophisticated
foreign policy strategy to maximize its national interests.
Regional organizations in the Middle East seem to have had little
influence in fostering Japan’s complicated interdependence with Middle
Eastern nations; however, it was multinational corporations that encour-
aged the diversification of commercial ties, acted as sponsors of friendship
organizations, and served as bridges during political crises between
Middle Eastern nations and Japan.
12 Jun’ichirō Shiratori, “Keizai Taikoku” Nihon no Gaikō: Enerugı̄ Shigen Gaikō no

Keisei,1967–1974-nen (Tōkyō-to Chūō- ku: Chikura Shobō, 2015).
Finally, by defining the connection between Japan and Middle Eastern

nations as one of interdependence via the lens provided by Keohane
and Nye, we can see the diverse nature of the relationships that exist
throughout the Middle East area, as shown in this book. While this
is true in certain instances, it is an oversimplification on the part of
research focusing on this subject to reduce Japan’s ties with the Middle
East to be a result of energy relations. While it is undeniable that
Japan’s energy interests are critical for understanding its contemporary
engagement with the Middle Eastern region, this does not account the
way the Japanese government, or indeed transnational actors in former
multinational corporations, have engaged with non-energy-producing
states throughout the region. Furthermore, such an analysis obscures
the complexity and richness of how Japan’s bilateral relationship with
each country has grown and evolved to take on a significance that either
transcends the bilateral relationship or positions it for the post-oil era,
which is becoming increasingly important as Japan gradually transitions
to renewable energy.
In a final analysis, by conceptualizing Japan’s relationship with the
Middle East through an interdependence lens, we can move away from
the tendency to analyze the relationship in terms of essentialising factors
and toward one that can be more convincingly explained through a theo-
retical and empirical framework. Thus, complex interdependence theory
is pushed with the knowledge that it will be updated in light of the diver-
sification of agendas, the identification of numerous channels, the precise
function of defense-oriented realism, and the accompaniment of cultural
understanding.
3 Methodological Approach
This book establishes a fresh understanding of Japan’s bilateral ties with
Middle Eastern nations. It is intended to be the first analytical research
to conceive Japan’s ties with concept of adopted complex interdepen-
dence. The case studies of Japan’s ties with Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel provide a variety of bilateral
case studies. After WWII, the Middle East–Japan relationship developed
in three stages. Bilateral interdependences are shown when they progress
beyond energy to non-energy economic ties, strategic collaboration, and
cultural exchanges. Their interconnectedness has evolved across three

tiers: royal, governmental, and through people-to-people contacts.13
3.1 Complex Interdependence through Intercultural

Communication
Japan’s connections with the Middle East extend back to pre-World War
II, but the steady process of dependency creation via government and
public involvement began after Japan’s independence in 1951. The first
phase is Restart or Opening of Ties (Post-1945) (1950s–1960s), during
which diplomatic relations were reestablished or opened for the first time,
and private sector or citizen exchanges began. The second phase is Fric-
tions and Stabilization (1970s–1990s), of which the First Oil shock and
regional wars harmed bilateral relations, but both parties overcame them.
The third phase is Diversification of Relations (post-2000s), during which
multilevel and multifaceted relationships evolved. At this point, many
Middle Eastern nations have formed strategic alliances with Japan.
Each instance of Japan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, Iran,Turkey, Egypt, and Israel is unique in terms of timing and
type of procedures. For example, the most of the Gulf Emirates gained full
independence in 1971 (with Kuwait in 1961, and their establishment of
formal ties with Japan took longer than that of other Middle Eastern
nations (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Process to Deepen Interdependence
13 Satoru Nakamura, “Challenges for Qatar and Japan to Build Multilayered Relations,”
Gulf Monographic Series, no. 2 (2016).
MOFA, Japan applied a concept named “multilayered relations” to

describe relations with some countries in the 2000s. “Multilayered rela-
tions” connotes polysemous to apply international relations. This volume
defines this as “Multifaceted relations” as being diversified to multilevel
channels and agendas in multiple areas. Diversification of communica-
tion channels and expansion of agendas facilitate concurrent processes
associated with the development of complex interdependence. Increasing
communication channels means that specialists from a broader range of
areas engage in the process of establishing interdependent relationships,
which naturally expands agendas.
In January 2001, then-Foreign Minister Yohei Kono visited the Gulf
States and reached an agreement with their leaders on Japan’s “New
Initiative toward multifaceted relations with the Gulf States” (so-called
Kono Initiative). The Kono Initiative’s first pillar was “Civilisational
Dialogue with the Islamic World.” Arab and Islamic worlds were eager
for opportunities to dialogue with the world after the September 11th
incident, and Japan offered them an avenue. Building cultural and reli-
gious understanding had world-class significance at the time in integrating
Muslim intellectuals into the global community.
The Japanese government can be interpreted as having had a clan-
destine objective of restoring diplomatic and commercial ties with Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait to the level they were before the failure of the Arabian
Oil Company’s oil concession renewal negotiations in January 2000. The
“Dialogue of Civilizations” conference between the Islamic World and
Japan began in March 2002 in Manama and continued annually until
2010. At the 6th “Civilisational Dialogue” in March 2008 hosted by
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud announced
an initiative for world interreligious dialogue, which resulted in the World
Conference on Dialogue in Madrid, Spain, in July 2008.
By April 2006, during the visit to Tokyo of then-Saudi Crown Prince
Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, he signed a joint statement titled,
“Towards construction of Japan Saudi Arabia strategic multilayered rela-
tion.” Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in December 2005, reaffirming its
commitment to diversifying the Saudi economic structure. Japan’s procla-
mation of a “multifaceted relationship” with Saudi Arabia underlined
Japan’s desire to contribute to Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification.
Shinzo Abe was arguably Japan’s most active prime minister in terms of
diplomacy. During his second premiership (December 2012–September
2020), he traveled overseas 176 times. He fully recognized that strategic
relationships and interdependence must be founded on shared values and

an appreciation for the cultures of others.
The Abe government announced the Open India-Pacific Strategy in
August 2007. Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, paid a visit to India
and delivered a speech before the Indian parliament. He argued for
the dynamic coupling of the two Oceans for liberty and prosperity. He
suggested establishing a strategic relationship between India and Japan
based on mutual respect for each other’s values, cultures, and history. He
referred to Dara Shikoh (1615–1659), a prince of the Mughal Empire
who embodied the era’s pluralistic thinking and tolerant administration.
Abe’s premiership advanced recognition of the importance of Islam in
Japan’s diplomacy. He made a policy speech at his visit to King Abdul
Aziz University in May 2013. He stated that Saudi Arabia and Japan
share common values of “Coexistence and Co-prosperity (al-tacāish),”
“Collaboration (al-tacāun),” and “Harmony and Tolerance (al-tasāmuh
in Arabic or Wa in Japanese).” This implied that the Muslim World and
Japan could build interdependence over multiple agendas since he meant
that “Coexistence and Co-prosperity (al-tacaish)” is for economic value,
“Collaboration (al-tacāun)” is a value for politics and security, and “Har-
mony and Tolerance (al-tasāmuh)” is a cultural value. At his visit to Egypt
in 2014, he stated that Japan and the Muslim World share values of
“moderation (middle way, wasat).”
3.2 Interdependence through Numerous Channels and Different

Agendas
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) used the term “multilay-
ered (multifaceted) relation” to characterize its ties with many nations in
the 2000s. The term “multifaceted relationship” refers to international
connections that are diverse in nature. This book defines a “multi-
faceted relationship” as “relationships that are diverse in terms of channels
and agendas across many domains.” Diversifying the agenda of inter-
dependence beyond energy transactions to other areas such as politics,
non-energy economic connections, culture, and security are examined in
the context of Japan–Middle East relations.
In the case of Japan’s ties with the Middle East, the channels of
communication for interdependence are classified into three main cate-
gories: royals, government, and civilians. Monarchs of the Middle East
exercise political authority, while the Emperor of Japan is a symbol of
the state of Japan and the people’s unity, since Japan is a constitutional
monarchy. The disparity in power and prestige between such royals does
not hinder royal ties between the Middle East and Japan, since both play
significant diplomatic roles. The Emperor of Japan practice of “impe-
rial diplomacy.” Although the Emperor cannot speak on diplomatic or
political matters, he serves as a conduit for Japan’s dignity and cultural
promotion overseas. In the Middle East, governments and people do not
have the same historical animosity against Japan’s Emperor as in East Asia,
so the impact is positive given the monarchial character of the GCC states.
Citizens may act as conduits for interdependence in a variety of ways,
including as employees of multinational corporations, members of inter-
national organizations, NGOs, artists, intellectuals, students, journalists,
and athletes (Fig. 2).
The three-tiered pathways of interdependence may also be thought
of as “three-tier diplomacy.” Government-to-government interactions are
considered “regular” diplomacy, while the royal role is referred to as
“imperial diplomacy” and the citizen role as “citizen diplomacy” (Fig. 3).
Diversification of agendas between Japan and the Middle East’s energy-
exporting nations is described as expanding energy transactions to include
political collaboration, non-energy commerce, investment promotion,
Official Development Assistance (ODA), cultural exchanges, and security
Fig. 2 Three Level of Channels between the ME and Japan

Fig. 3 Multiplying agendas that deepen interdependence
cooperation. With regards to Japan’s involvement with non-energy-

exporting nations in the Middle East, such as Egypt and Turkey, Japan
assessed their strategic position in a broader regional context as a cross-
roads for Continentals upon the resumption of ties after WWII. Their
connections thereafter became more diverse in terms of ODA, bilateral
relations, economics, and culture.
3.3 The Emergence of Japanese Interests and Security in the Middle

East
Japan’s national interests have been addressed in policy circles and in
official papers, but they remain difficult to grasp unambiguously, in
part because each politician, bureaucrat, scholar, and document have a
different perspective on what constitutes Japan’s national interests. It’s
difficult to think that beyond a basic grasp of energy security, Japan’s
national interests in the Middle East have been generally understood
among Japanese citizens and intellectuals overseas.
Complex interdependence adapted to the above observations on
numerous channels and different agendas serve as the foundation for this
volume’s examination of Japan–Middle East relations. Then, has Japan’s
sensitivity and fragility remained the same as they were during the First Oil
Shock? Is Japan implementing effective strategies to address its vulnera-
bility? Although the Japanese government has no territorial or military
aspirations in the Middle East, how does the private sector in Japan
evaluate commercial and investment possibilities there? Is the Japanese
government taking adequate steps to safeguard Japanese nationals’ lives
and property in the Middle East? Does cultural value intersect with
national interests in any way? Complex interdependence theory does not
imply a particular response method to all of the above-mentioned aspects
of individual situations.
3.3.1 Energy Security

Japan’s energy security policy has an inherent contradiction in the after-
math of the Oil Shock; Japan views Middle East reliance as dangerous
and opposes efforts to spread the risk. On the other hand, MITI and
the Agency of Mineral Resources and Energy seek to improve bilateral
relations with energy-producing nations to ensure supply sources and
to encourage Japanese companies to invest in the development of oil
resources in these countries.
The Japanese government and business sector seek low-cost energy
supply, but they must also address energy conservation and expand clean
energy and renewable energy facilities, which demand significant invest-
ment. Japanese policymakers continue to see renewable energy as a more
challenging energy source of which production depends on climatic or
technological advancements. Thus, there is cause for this book to address
what path has Japan’s dependency on the Middle East taken. Does energy
security concern on the part of energy users and producers converge to
promote energy interdependence?
3.3.2 Economic Interests

Japan’s national interests regarding developing nations are stated in the
ODA Charter, which was revised in 2003. It affected Japan’s national
interests in part because Japan’s economic strength had peaked, and the
Japanese government was tasked with justifying the financial burden of
ODA to Japanese people. In 1992, Japan’s first ODA Charter included
no reference to Japan’s national interests. From 1991 to 2000, Japan’s
ODA expenditure was the biggest in the world. In 1997, the tied aid
ratio of Japan’s ODA distribution reached 0%, indicating that Japan’s
ODA money was allocated for the development of other countries’ pros-
perity. However, Japan’s productive age population peaked in 1995, and
the financial burden of supporting an aging society compelled all financial
expenditures, including ODA, to be evaluated and amended.
The ODA Charter amended in 2003 stated, “Japan proactively
contributes the stability and development in developing countries
through ODA,” and followed with, “it is related to security and pros-
perity of Japan, and furtherance of Japanese nationals’ interests.”14 These
phrases may be construed in a variety of ways. Japan’s national interests
are defined in terms of interdependence with developing nations, since
the declared goals of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and
development of developing country communities, thus assisting Japan’s
security and prosperity.
The Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s
Role and World Order in the 21st Century, is a non-governmental orga-
nization comprised of private sector executives, academics, and former
government officials that presented the idea of Japan’s national inter-
ests as “common interests of the respective states.”15 In 2015, Japan’s
ODA Charter was renamed the International Cooperation Charter, which
states, “a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community is
increasingly intertwined with the national interests of Japan.”16 Again,
this indicates that Japan’s interdependence with emerging countries is in
its national interest.
Japan’s Economic White Paper issued in 2012 pointed out that Japan’s
trade balance deficit in 2011 was the first after 31 years. The Great East
Japan Earthquake that occurred in March 2011 was the most serious
and inescapable factor which damaged Japan’s trade. The rising oil price
and increased LNG import were the main factors to increase imports.17
14 MOFA. Seihu Kaihatsu Enjo Taikou no Kaitei ni tsuite, Heisei 15 Nenn 8 Gatsu 29
Nichi Kakugi Kettei. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/taikou/taiko_
030829.html.
15 Report of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s
Role and the World Order in the 21st Century. August 6, 2015. p. 5. https://www.kan
tei.go.jp › singi › pdf › report_en.
16 MOFA, Japan. Development Cooperation Charter. November 2, 2015. https://
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html.
17 METI, Japan. Tsuusho Hakusho 2012 (PDF Ban). 233. https://www.meti.go.jp/rep
ort/tsuhaku2012/2012honbun_p/index.html.
As a result, Japan’s strategy in the 2010s emphasized interdependence

with developing nations through ODA and corporate development in
emerging markets. This volume aims to evaluate Japan’s interdependence
with the Middle East through the lens of energy security and non-energy
economic ties. It is worth noting that the second Abe administration
pursued measures to foster mutual understanding while simultaneously
promoting infrastructure export to the Middle East.
3.3.3 Protection of Nationals

The Iran–Japan Petrochemical Company (IJPC) sustained the biggest
loss in the Middle East for a Japanese company. It was founded in
1973 as a joint venture by Iran Chemical Development Co. (ICDC) and
Iran’s National Chemical Company (NPC). ICDC’s biggest investor was
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. However, the Islamic Revolution in Iran happened
before the complex’s completion, but the Japanese government pressed
for its continuance and completion. Then, in September 1980, during the
Iran–Iraq war, Iraq launched an air assault on it, severely destroying the
project and preventing it from being finished. Mitsui & Co. agreed in
1991 to abandon its investment of 75 billion yen and loan of 125 billion
yen, and paid 130 billion yen (about 1 billion US$) as settlement money.
Mitsui finished its payment in 1991.18
The JSDF refrained from protecting Japanese citizens by evacuation
from the Middle East, despite the fact that this would be detrimental
to Japan’s national interests there. The Arabian Oil Company Ltd. did
not evacuate its Khafji oil field, which is in the neutral zone between
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
and remained there until the ground battles erupted in January 1991
to demonstrate their solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Later still,
in 1995, Japanese business remained despite there being a coup d’état
in Qatar. In January 2013, an attack by an Islamic terrorist organization
kidnapped over 150 workers at a building site in Algeria for a natural gas
refining facility, and ten Japanese employees were held hostage and killed.
In 2017, Japan had over 11,000 citizens residing in Middle Eastern
nations. The UAE was home to the biggest Japanese population, with
over 4,000 residents, followed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt,
and Qatar. Following the “Arab Spring,” many countries reduced their
18 Hitoshi Suzuki, “IJPC Purojekuto wo Saikou Suru,” Ajiken World Trend, 211
(2013): 32–33.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Herrensitze der Lößnitz
Von Oberstaatsarchivar Dr. Hans Beschorner
Manch guter Dresdner, der in seinem Leben oft nach der Lößnitz
hinausgekommen ist und auf diesem schönen Fleckchen Erde
Bescheid zu wissen glaubt, kennt zwar den Russen, die Meierei, das
Bilzsche Lustbad, den Pfeifer, die Friedensburg und die Sektkellerei,
aber die Hoflößnitz und Wackerbarths Ruhe sind ihm fremd;
allenfalls weiß er von ihnen durch Hörensagen, mehr nicht. Und
doch sind beide nicht nur landschaftlich und künstlerisch von
großem Reize, sondern auch Marksteine der kulturgeschichtlichen
Entwicklung des ganzen Lößnitzgebietes. Erstere liegt in seiner Mitte
unterhalb des weithin sichtbaren Spitzhauses, das leider bei dem
Umbau im Anfang unseres Jahrhunderts seine bezeichnende
Gestalt eingebüßt hat, auf einem Bergabsatze rechter Hand am
Eingange zum Lößnitzgrunde, letztere zwischen Kötzschenbroda
und Zitzschewig, also ganz im Westen der Lößnitz, überragt von
dem sogenannten Jakobstein, 1743 von dem Hofböttchermeister
Jakob Krause auf dem Weinberge »der Fliegenwedel« erbaut und
1799 mit Wackerbarths Ruhe vereinigt. Das auf einem
Felsenvorsprung äußerst geschickt in die Landschaft hineingestellte
und auch in seinen Formen fein empfundene Tempelchen (s.
Abbildung 1) kann sich mit den anderen berühmten
Aussichtspunkten der Nachbarschaft getrost messen, dem Hohen
Hause (durch Gerhart Hauptmanns »Jungfern vom Bischofsberg«
besonders bekannt), der Wettinshöhe, der Mätressen- oder
Friedsteinburg (die ersten Namen noch weniger verdient, als
letzteren, da das luftige Häuschen in den Teuerungsjahren 1771/72
von dem biederen Kaufmann Ehrich als »Denkmal der
Wohltätigkeit« erbaut wurde), der Friedensburg oberhalb der alten
»Lezenitzberge«, die ihren Namen allmählich der ganzen Gegend
liehen, der Sängerhöhe, der Sennhütte, dem Paradies, dem Pfeifer,
dem Spitzhaus und der Wilhelmshöhe. Wohl von keinem hat man
einen umfassenderen Blick auf die Elbniederung und die Hänge des
Erzgebirges von der Sächsischen Schweiz bis nach Meißen und
darüber hinaus. Großartig! Entzückend aber der Blick auf die
Lößnitzortschaften, die, nach Osten hin von dem türmereichen
Dresden begrenzt, eine einzige Gartenstadt bilden. Eine Perle darin
Wackerbarths Ruhe, das sich von dem Jakobsturm aus dem
Beschauer so darbietet, wie die Abbildung 2 zeigt. Nach der
Dresden–Meißner Straße zu dehnen sich herrliche Parkanlagen: in
der Mitte große, ruhige Rasenflächen, rechts und links davon
schattige alte Baumbestände und zwei prächtige Alleen (s.
Abbildungen 9 und 10). Hinter dem Herrenhause aber steigt, in
mehrere Terrassen gegliedert, ein mit zugespitzten Buchsbäumen,
Rosenhecken und Putten geschmückter Garten in französischem
Geschmack empor. Er wird von zwei je vierzig Meter langen und
zehn Meter breiten Wirtschaftsgebäuden eingefaßt. Das rechte
enthält die Weinpresse und den schönen, tiefen Keller. Das linke
diente einst als Küchengebäude. Dahinter, nach Zitzschewig zu,
liegt, lauschig in Obstanlagen gebettet, das sogenannte
Traiteurgebäude, das im vorigen Jahrhunderte lange Zeit ein
beliebter Ausflugspunkt der Dresdner war. Die Krönung der
französischen Gartenanlage bildet das Belvedere, wegen seiner
Gestalt im Volk allgemein als »Kapelle« bekannt, in Wahrheit aber
als Stätte ländlichen Genießens und ausruhenden Schauens
gedacht (s. die Abbildung 3). Der heitere Bau, dem nur die allerdings
von Anbeginn vorhandene Blechuhr nicht recht steht, leitet zu den
ausgedehnten Weinbergterrassen über, die heute wieder mit
dreißigtausend Stöcken bestanden sind und manchen edlen Tropfen
liefern (s. Abbildung 4).
Aufnahme von Josef Ostermaier, Dresden-Blasewitz
Abb. 1 Der Jakobsturm
Lange war das Grundstück bös verwildert. Auch hatten ihm
ungeschickte Umbauten schwer geschadet und seinen Charakter
verwischt. Glücklicherweise setzte sein jetziger Besitzer seinen
Ehrgeiz hinein, dem Ganzen einigermaßen wieder sein
ursprüngliches Aussehen zu geben (s. Abbildung 5 und 6) und die
Innenräume vornehm auszugestalten (s. Abbildung 7 und 8).
Denken wir uns den auf vier Säulen ruhenden Balkonvorbau über
dem Haupteingange, die beiden kleinen Eckanbauten und die
Mansarde mit dreieckigem Giebel weg, so haben wir das Haus
ungefähr so wieder vor uns, wie es der Generalfeldmarschall
Reichsgraf August Christoph von Wackerbarth 1727 bis 1729 schuf.
Dieser hervorragende Mann, der August dem Starken über dreißig
Jahre lang als Hofmann, Verwaltungsbeamter, Staatsmann und
Soldat ausgezeichnete Dienste leistete, war auch Baumeister von
Beruf. Seit 1748 betraute ihn deshalb auch sein königlicher Herr und
Gönner mit dem wichtigen Amt eines Generalintendanten der Zivil-
und Militärgebäude. Dadurch aber gewinnt die Vermutung an
Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß er selbst die Pläne zu seinem Alterssitze
entwarf, in Gemeinschaft mit seinem Lieblingsarchitekten Johann
Christoph Knöfel (1686 bis 1752, seit 1730 Oberlandbaumeister),
dem er auch die Ausführung anvertraut haben mag. Beide
zusammen schufen etwas Ganzes, in seiner Art Einzigartiges. Was
der alte Wackerbarth damit bezweckte, hat er selbst in der Inschrift
zusammengefaßt, die er 1729 an der Aufmauerung unter dem
Belvedere anbringen ließ:
»Der Weinberg, den Du siehst, heißt Wackerbarthens Ruh.

Kein Fluch drückt diesen Ort, tritt leiser nur herzu.
Hier wiedmet er sich selbst, den Rest von seinen Jahren,
Entbürdet von den Hof-, Welt-, Staats- und Kriegs-Gefahren.
Hier ist es, wo von Neid und Anlauff er befreyt,
Zwar seinen Tod nicht sucht, jedoch ihn auch nicht scheut.«
Abb. 2 Wackerbarths Ruhe Blick auf das
Herrenhaus vom Jakobstein
Wackerbarthens Ruh! Ausruhen wollte hier der viel geplagte Hof-,

Welt-, Staats- und Kriegsmann, dem Neide und der Mißgunst, die
ihn so viel verfolgt hatten, aus dem Wege gehen. Daß »kein Fluch
den Ort drückt«, bezieht sich offenbar auf das Gerede, das die
Entstehung von Wackerbarths Ruhe mit der Ermordung des
Dresdner Pastors Hahn durch den Trabanten Franz Laubler 1726
und der Hinrichtung des in die Sache mit verwickelten Kanoniers
Gottfried Mittag in Verbindung brachte.
Abb. 3 Wackerbarths Ruhe Das Belvedere
Abb. 4 Weinberge von Wackerbarths Ruhe
Die Inschrift ist heute nicht mehr da. An ihrer Stelle stehen die
Worte: »Menschengeschlechter, die ziehen vorüber wie die Schatten
vor der Sonne.« Sie stammen von dem Großgroßneffen des
Generalfeldmarschalls: August Ludwig von Wackerbarth, der das
Grundstück 1809 von dem Bankherrn Christian Friedrich Freiherrn
von Gregory kaufte. 1733, nach dem Tode des
Generalfeldmarschalls, hatte es zunächst sein Adoptivsohn Graf
Joseph Anton Gabaleon von Wackerbarth-Salmour besessen, der
bekannte Mithelfer des Prinzen Friedrich Christian bei Beseitigung
der Brühlschen Mißwirtschaft. Nach dessen Tode, 1761, aber hatte
es oft seine Besitzer gewechselt. 1764 bis 1776 gehörte es der
gräflich Rexschen Familie, 1776 bis 1789 der Gräfin Hohenthal,
geborene von Rex, 1789 bis 1798 einem Kaufmann Hetzer aus
Leipzig, von dem es an den genannten Freiherrn von Gregory
überging. Der »Rauhgraf«, wie sich August Ludwig von Wackerbarth
gern, aber ohne jede Berechtigung nannte, und damit sein
Sonderlingswesen traf, übernahm den alten Wackerbarthschen
Familienbesitz dem Rate folgend, den ihm seine Großmutter auf
dem Sterbebette gegeben hatte. Er verband große Hoffnungen
damit. Hier dachte er sein Leben zu genießen inmitten seiner auf
weiten Reisen gesammelten Kunstschätze (namentlich Bilder), in
eifriger schriftstellerischer Tätigkeit und in anregendem Verkehre mit
geistig hochstehenden Menschen. Er brachte aber sich selbst um
den ruhigen Genuß durch sein verschrobenes Wesen und seine
Zügellosigkeit. Trotz seines großen Reichtums von Haus aus immer
in Geldnöten, die namentlich durch die wahnwitzige Verfolgung einer
in die Hunderte von Millionen gehenden Schuldforderung an die
Rechtsnachfolger der Herzöge von Lauenburg hervorgerufen waren
und 1811 sogar zum offenen Konkurs führten, mußte er seine
geliebte Wackerbarths Ruhe zeitweise verkaufen oder vermieten.
1816 bis 1823 war sie infolgedessen Knabenerziehungsanstalt unter
dem bekannten Jugendschriftsteller Carl Lang und seinem
Schwiegersohn Dr. Carl Vogel (dem Vater des Afrikaforschers
Eduard Vogel und der Schriftstellerin Elise Polko) und von 1835 ab
Privat-Irrenanstalt, erst unter Dr. Bräunlich, dann unter Dr. Matthiae,
der die Anstalt 1864 nach dem Lindenhof in Neu-Coswig verlegte
(seit 1888 in Dr. Piersons Händen). Durch seine kostspieligen
Liebhabereien, seinen Leichtsinn in Geldsachen, seine blinde
Vertrauensseligkeit an den Bettelstab gebracht, starb dieser
Sonderling mit dem goldenen Herzen, aber eisernen Starrsinn 1850
in der Nähe von Wackerbarths Ruhe.
Abb. 5 Wackerbarths Ruhe Blick auf das Herrenhaus vom Park aus
Aufnahme von P. Georg Schäfer, Dresden
Nun folgten wieder bis zum Jahre 1916, wo die ganze

ausgedehnte Besitzung mit dem Haupthause, dem Belvedere, den
zwei Wirtschaftsgebäuden, dem Traiteur, dem Böhmeschen
Winzerhause und dem Jakobstein durch den heutigen kunstsinnigen
Eigentümer zusammengekauft wurde, fortwährende Besitzwechsel.
Sie trugen die Schuld daran, daß das Grundstück noch mehr
herunterkam, als dies schon unter dem bedauernswerten
Rauhgrafen der Fall gewesen war. Von der einstigen ländlichen
Pracht, wie sie der Generalfeldmarschall, auch im Innern des
Hauses, geschaffen hatte, war nicht mehr viel zu spüren. Zur Zeit
ihres Schöpfers war Wackerbarths Ruhe zweifellos der schönste
Familiensitz in der Lößnitz. In ihr spiegelte sich klar die Zeit August
des Starken wieder mit ihrer Genußfreudigkeit und ihrem
künstlerischen Geschmack.
Abb. 6 Wackerbarths Ruhe Blick auf das Herrenhaus vom Belvedere aus
Abb. 7 Der Gartensaal in Wackerbarths Ruhe
Wieviel einfacher dagegen, deshalb aber in ihrer Eigenart nicht

minder anziehend wirkt die Hoflößnitz, die sich Johann Georg I.
1650 von seinem Landbaumeister Ezechiel Eckhart bauen ließ.
Mitten in die sonnigen Weinberge ist das einfache Fachwerkhaus mit
hohem Walmdach gesetzt, das 1913 auf Veranlassung des leider
nur kurze Zeit bestehenden Hoflößnitzvereins stilgerecht
wiederhergestellt wurde und dabei auch zum größten Leidwesen
mancher Lößnitzer und Lößnitzfreunde das erst 1899 aufgesetzte
stilwidrige Blechtürmchen auf dem Dach und unten herum die
störenden Balustraden verlor (vergleiche hierüber Högg in diesen
Mitteilungen III, 1913, Seite 64 bis 66). Parkanlagen fehlten. Nur
Weinberge und zwei Höfe gehörten dazu, der sogenannte Holzhof
an der Grundstraße und oben der Herrenhof, von der
Bergverwalterwohnung, dem geräumigen Preßgebäude (mit
schönem Keller) und Schuppen nach dem Lößnitzgrunde zu flankiert
(s. Abbildungen 6 und 7). Auf diesem Hofe, der später mehrfach,
wenn auch nicht in der von August dem Starken geplanten
großartigen Weise, umgestaltet und 1747 bis 1750 durch die große,
von Pöpelmann entworfene dreihundertfünfundzwanzigstufige
Treppe mit dem Spitzhause verbunden wurde, fanden die Aufzüge
und ländlichen Lustbarkeiten (Ringelrennen mit dem
Wassermännchen, Bauer-, Damen-Rennen, Hahneschlagen,
Pferderennen nach der Gans, Sack-, Bettelmanns-,
Schießkockeltanz und andere Tänze) statt, wenn der Hof,
namentlich zur Weinlese, anwesend war und sich von dem
fröhlichen Winzervölkchen huldigen ließ, wie dies unter anderem in
den Dresdner Geschichtsblättern XIII (1904), Seite 209 bis 226, 239
bis 247, dazu noch XVIII (1909), Seite 30 bis 35, und in der
Wissenschaftlichen Beilage der Leipziger Zeitung 1905 Nummer 142
und 143, Seite 565 bis 567 und 569 f., nach zeitgenössischen
Quellen geschildert ist. Daselbst und in den »Bau- und
Kunstdenkmälern des Königreichs Sachsen« XXVI (1904), Seite 136
bis 149, lese man auch die Beschreibung des Inneren nach, wie es
sich heute noch dem Auge darbietet und aus alten
Sachverzeichnissen vervollständigen läßt.
Abb. 8 Der Speisesaal in Wackerbarths Ruhe
Abb. 9 Teilbild aus dem Park von Wackerbarths Ruhe
Nachdem wir einen flüchtigen Blick in die gewölbten Räume des

Erdgeschosses geworfen haben, zur Linken in die sogenannte
Tafelstube, zur Rechten in die Marschall- oder Bacchusstube, die für
das herrschaftliche Gefolge bestimmt waren, steigen wir in dem
helmgekrönten Treppenturme, der, nach der Hofseite zu angebaut,
das Haus nur wenig überragt, die einst mit Geweihen reich
ausgestattete, ziemlich enge Treppe empor und betreten im ersten
Stock durch die niedrige, mit grellen Ornamenten ziemlich auffallend
bemalte Türe den Festsaal (siehe Abbildung 13). Welche
Farbenfreudigkeit lacht uns hier entgegen! Welche Fülle
verschiedenartigster Bilder, die in die Decke und in die Wände dicht
nebeneinander eingelassen sind, stürmt von allen Seiten auf uns
ein! In erster Linie wird unsere Aufmerksamkeit gefesselt durch die
Decke, die durch buntbemalte Balken und Leisten in achtzig
quadratmetergroße Felder geteilt ist. Jedes Feld zeigt eine prächtig
in Öl gemalte Vogeldarstellung, lauter brasilianische Arten. Wie
mögen Johann Georg II. und seine Zeitgenossen über diese bis
dahin in Europa ganz unbekannten Vertreter der südamerikanischen
Vogelwelt gestaunt haben! Nicht anders als wir werden sie sich
weidlich über alle die schwierigen Namen, die auszusprechen meist
eine besondere Zungenfertigkeit erfordert, belustigt haben, über den
Guirapotiapirangaiuparaba, den Guiraacangatara und wie sie sonst
alle heißen. Ein holländischer Maler, Albert Eyckhaut aus
Amersfoort, der an der niederländischen Forschungsreise des
Grafen Johann Moritz von Nassau-Siegen 1636 bis 1644 nach
Brasilien im Auftrage der Westindischen Kompagnie teilnahm und
1653 bis 1655 in Dresden als Hofmaler wirkte, schuf die Bilder nach
seinen aus der Neuen Welt mitgebrachten Skizzen. Von einem der
anderen damaligen Hofmaler, etwa Centurio Wiebel oder Christian
Schiebling, mag der bildnerische Schmuck der Wände stammen, der
nicht auf der künstlerischen Höhe der Eyckhautschen Vogelbilder
steht, aber doch auch seinem Zwecke vollauf genügt: erheiternd und
unterhaltend zu wirken. In den heute leeren Rahmen über dem etwa
in Schulterhöhe ringsum laufenden Simse waren fünfzig
Fürstenbildnisse eingelassen, die der Hof 1889 bei der Veräußerung
des Grundstücks in eines seiner Schlösser bringen ließ. Unter dem
Simse aber sind die wichtigsten Herrschertugenden durch
Frauengestalten versinnbildlicht: die Güte, die Wachsamkeit, die
Tapferkeit usw. Die übrigen kleineren Bilder, die sich in buntem
Gemisch über die Wände verteilen, predigen in teils ernster,
meistenteils aber drolliger Weise Lebensart und Lebensklugheit.
Christus auf Golgatha ist als »Ziel des Lebens« (Scopus vitae meae
Christus) bezeichnet. Eine Landschaft mit Weinberg und Kornfeld
erinnert daran, daß »die Obrigkeit so nötig ist als Wein und Brot«.
Ein Mann, der ein Pferd am Schwanze zieht und dafür mit einem
tüchtigen Huftritte bedacht wird, erhält die gute Lehre »Gehe ja
vorsichtig und behutsam mit denen umb, so große Macht und
gewaldt haben«, während ein weinbekränzter Bacchus auf einer
Tonne, der einem auf ihn zuspringendem Flügelpferde zutrinkt,
sagen will »Der Wein zwinget manchem oft mehr Stärke und
Weisheit ein, als er kann und vermag« (siehe die beiden
letztgenannten Bilder auf Abbildung 13 über und unter dem Fenster.
Die auf dem Simse stehenden eingerahmten Blätter aus dem Werke
über den Wettinfestzug von 1889 denke man sich weg. Sie stören
den Gesamteindruck).
Aufnahme aus dem Heimatschutzarchiv

Abb. 10 Die Lindenallee in Wackerbarths Ruhe
Diese wenigen Proben mögen genügen. Man gehe selbst hin,
schaue, lese und freue sich! Die Gemeinde Oberlößnitz, die das
Schlößchen von dem erwähnten Hoflößnitzverein übernahm,
gestattet gern die Besichtigung. Hat man sich aber an der seltsamen
Pracht des Saales, dessen Fenster einst wie alle andern dieses
ersten Stocks, mit grünen Vorhängen versehen waren, über dessen
steinernem Estrich weiche Teppiche lagen und dessen übrige
Einrichtung aus zwei langen, grün überzognen Tafeln, vierunddreißig
Lehnstühlen, einer Standuhr und kleinerem Hausrate bestand, satt
gesehn, so versäume man nicht, auch die vier Nebenräume, deren
Ausstattung zu der des Hauptraums stimmte, zu besichtigen. Durch
die erste Türe rechts gelangen wir in einen kleinen, von zwei Seiten
durch Fenster erhellten Raum, der einst dem Kurfürsten als
Schlafzimmer diente. Auch hier überall unmittelbar in die Decken
und Wände eingelassene Bilder, durch buntbemalte Leisten, Simse,
Pilaster und dergleichen mehr miteinander verbunden als
voneinander getrennt. Die in des Kurfürsten Schlafzimmer stellen
allerhand Seegetier und Seeungeheuer dar oder Meerjungfrauen,
die mit solchen Ungetümen im Kampfe liegen. Leider sind sie nicht
mehr vollzählig; es fehlen z. B. alle bildlichen Darstellungen oberhalb
des Simses. Ähnlich liegen die Verhältnisse in dem anstoßenden
Wohnzimmer des Kurfürsten. Diana und ihre neun Jagdgefährtinnen
unterhalb des Simses sind noch erhalten. Dagegen sind die
Schildereien über dem Simse samt und sonders verschwunden. Wir
wissen nur aus alten Sachverzeichnissen noch, was sie darstellten:
Landschaften, Schlachten, Fruchtstücke, Tiere, die Festung
Königstein. Besonders beachtenswert ist auch in diesem Raume die
Decke. Sie zeigt außergewöhnliche Jagdbeuten Johann Georgs I.
aus den Jahren 1625 bis 1652, meist mit genauer Angabe von
Größe, Gewicht, Tag und Ort der Erlegung (vgl. das Nähere in den
»Bau- und Kunstdenkmälern« a. a. O.).
Abb. 11 Die Hoflößnitz vom Weinberg aus gesehen
Abb. 12 Die Hoflößnitz
nach dem Titelbilde zu J. P. Knohllen Kleinem Vinicultur-Büchlein 1667
Diese beiden Zimmer des Kurfürsten, die heute weiter keinen

gerade behaglichen Eindruck machen, waren einst sehr wohnlich
eingerichtet. Weiche, blaugelbe Teppiche bedeckten den Boden. Für
Tische mit kostbaren Tischdecken und lederbeschlagene Stühle war
reichlich gesorgt. Schöne silberne Leuchter standen auf den Tischen
und hingen an den Wänden. Auch waren zwischen den Gemälden
zierliche Rehköpfchen in Menge befestigt. Namentlich konnte man
sich in dem Schlafzimmer wohl fühlen. Schwere, grüne, geblümte
Damastvorhänge mit Spitzen und silbernen Fransen wehrten dem
eindringenden Tageslichte. Das mit weichen Polstern, Kissen und
Decken verschwenderisch ausgestattete Bett stand unter einem
ebenfalls aus grünem Damast hergestellten Betthimmel. Alles, was
der Kurfürst zu seiner Bequemlichkeit brauchte, war da: ein
Waschtisch mit dem nötigen Geschirr, ein Schreibtischchen mit
eigenartigem Schreibzeug und Abreißkalender, ein Fernrohr, damit
er gleich früh beim Aufstehen die herrliche Aussicht aus seinen
Fenstern genießen konnte, usw. Ja, selbst ein gründamastener
Schlafrock mit silbernen Besätzen und Knöpfen nebst dazu
passender Nachtmütze fehlten nicht! Zum Überflusse stand noch in
dem Raume, gewissermaßen unter persönlicher Aufsicht des
Kurfürsten, ein Glasschrank mit allerhand Kunstwerken, die heute
zum Teil im Grünen Gewölbe aufbewahrt werden: aus Holz,
Elfenbein und Edelmetallen gebildete Winzer und Winzerinnen, ein
silbernes Fäßlein mit dem Bacchus darauf, Schalen, Gläser und
Krüge der verschiedensten Arten.
Die entsprechenden Zimmer auf der andern Seite des Saals
waren für die Kurfürstin bestimmt. Die Decken dieser beiden
Gemächer sind einheitlich mit pausbäckigen und rundgliederigen
Genien bemalt, die Blumen in ihren dicken Händchen halten. Auch
die Wände der Schlafstube sind unten herum mit sechzehn
Amoretten und allerhand Obst- und Blumenornamenten geziert,
während oben herum zwölf Amazonenbrustbilder laufen. Der
Wandschmuck des Wohnzimmers spielt, teilweise wenigstens, auf
den Namen der ersten Kurfürstinnen an, die hier wohnten oder
wohnen sollten. Da nämlich sowohl Johann Georgs I. beide
Gattinnen, als auch Johann Georgs II. Gemahlin Sibylla hießen,
wählte der Künstler für die Felder über dem Simse die zwölf
römischen Sibyllen, während er unten herum neun Künste und
Wissenschaften (Arithmetik, Musik usw.) in Putten verkörperte. –
Auch diese Zimmer waren natürlich mit Fenstervorhängen,
Teppichen und verschiedenartigem Hausrat ausgestattet, wenn auch
viel einfacher, als die des Kurfürsten. Hervorgehoben seien ein auf
Leinwand gemaltes »Fastnachtsspiel« und ein ebenfalls gemaltes
»Königsspiel« (Schachbrett).

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Japan and the Middle East.

Foreign Policies and

Edited by Satoru Nakamura · Steven Wright

. The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the

Aims and Scope:

. Politics and political development

Japan and the Middle

ISSN 2662-320X ISSN 2662-3218 (electronic)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023

Cover design by eStudio Calamar

relinquish all occupied Arab territory, including the Arab sector in

5 Wakatsuki Hidekazu, Reisen no Shuuen to Nihon Gaikou: Suzuki, Nakasone,Takeshita

state status or governance. The Japanese government established a task

conditions for an oil concession to be granted and saw Japan’s conces-

9 Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?,”

tradition identified is Marxism, which was used as a counter-narrative

to various interpretations of Japan’s foreign policy, which is important

13 Kent E Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the

would be an appropriate theoretical conceptualization for this volume’s

Kobe, Japan Satoru Nakamura

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to Waseda University

1 A Conceptualisation of Japan’s Relations

7 Beyond Power, Before Interdependence: Complex

Matthew Brummer is an Assistant Professor at the National Graduate

of International Affairs, at Qatar University. His area of research exper-

ADGAS Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company

JCCME Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East

OAPEC Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

Fig. 2 Japanese trade with Iran (1962–2004) (Source Statistic

Fig. 10 Saudi Arabia’s oil exports by region 222

Table 4 Progress of Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement

A Conceptualisation of Japan’s Relations

Satoru Nakamura and Steven Wright

1 Complex Interdependence Revisited

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

national security and survival, and if needed, will engage in warfare to

via a variety of means, including as official and informal foreign office

can be observed. They clarified that sensitivity involves degrees of respon-

3 Keohane and Nye, Power and interdependence, 10.

2 Critical Adoption of Complex Interdependence

6 Jun’ichirō Shiratori, “Keizai taikoku” Nihon no gaikō: enerugı̄ shigen gaikō no

European diplomacy toward the Middle East can be contrasted to the

2.1 The Role of Security in Complex Interdependence

considering security alternatives for dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense

2.2 Agenda Politics

calculations, Keohane and Nye demonstrate that domestic politics may

2.3 The Role of International Actors

12 Jun’ichirō Shiratori, “Keizai Taikoku” Nihon no Gaikō: Enerugı̄ Shigen Gaikō no

Finally, by defining the connection between Japan and Middle Eastern

cultural exchanges. Their interconnectedness has evolved across three

3.1 Complex Interdependence through Intercultural

Fig. 1 Process to Deepen Interdependence

MOFA, Japan applied a concept named “multilayered relations” to

relationships and interdependence must be founded on shared values and

3.2 Interdependence through Numerous Channels and Different

Fig. 2 Three Level of Channels between the ME and Japan

Fig. 3 Multiplying agendas that deepen interdependence

cooperation. With regards to Japan’s involvement with non-energy-

3.3 The Emergence of Japanese Interests and Security in the Middle