Neo-Pluralism - A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II - Manley
Neo-Pluralism - A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II - Manley
Neo-Pluralism - A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II - Manley
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JOHN F. MANLEY
Stanford University
This article is a critique of contemporary pluralist theory asfound largely in the work of Robert A.
Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom. Two different forms of pluralism are distinguished and compared
critically with Marxist class analysis. Pluralism, it is argued, fails to accountfor the reality of political
and economic inequality in the United States. As a theory, pluralism is also marked by increasing ten-
sion between the underlying values and the performance of American polyarchy. The overall result is
that pluralism's utility as a description and explanation of the American political economy is called
into serious doubt, and a case is made for the explanatory superiority of class analysis.
To anyone interested in understanding political In the past several years, however, political and
power in the United States, social scientists offer economic developments in the United States have
three main general theories: pluralism, the most placed the pluralist paradigm under a good deal of
widely accepted theory; pluralism's old antago- strain. Even inside the pluralist school, serious
nist, elitism, the next most widely accepted doubts have arisen about the theory's ability to
theory; and class or structural analysis, whose explain the American system. Strong doubts have
locus classicus is Karl Marx's Capital, which is arisen, too, about the relationship between plural-
generally not accepted at all.' ism and such central issues of democratic theory
Pluralism, elitism, and class analysis have as equality, distributive justice, and peaceful
divided students of power for decades, but there is social change. If Kuhn (1962, p. 52) is right that
little doubt that pluralism is the dominant theory scientific understanding advances when old para-
or paradigm of power among American social sci- digms are supplanted by new theories that are
entists. Although research regularly turns up evi- thought to be better able to account for strate-
dence supporting the other two theories (Higley gically important facts, it may be time to begin the
and Moore, 1981, p. 595), it is no empty boast for search for a theory that is better than pluralism at
pluralists to claim a generally favorable response explaining class and group power in the United
to their critique of elitism and class analysis States. So, at any rate, is the suggestion of this
(Polsby, 1980, p. 141).2 article.
At one time, pluralism was a reasonably
coherent theory whose claims appeared to many
'In using the term structural analysis I do not want to political scientists to be solidly supported by em-
get embroiled in contemporary controversies among pirical research. Pluralism-what we shall call
Marxists over structuralism, instrumentalism, and the pluralism I-asserts that the American power
like. By structural analysis I mean to conjure nothing structure is made up of many competing elites,
more than Marx's emphasis on the structure of classes
not just one. Different elites with low elite overlap
stemming from the division of society into those who
own and control the basic means of production, and
those who do not. Marxism is a theory that puts class
structure at the center of its analysis. Nothing more than and lower classes (Polsby, 1980, pp. 8-13). Additional
this perspective is suggested here. I would like to thank
complications are that much leading work on elite
the following people for comments on an earlier version theory has been done not on local communities where
of this article: Kennette Benedict, Sue Bessmer, Heinz pluralist research has often been concentrated, but on
Eulau, Ken Dolbeare, Nancy Hartsock, Henry Levin, the national power structure. And although some elitists
Rick Olquin, Ben Page, and Don Share. are fairly comfortable with class analysis (Domhoff,
'Assessing the pluralist paradigm is complicated by 1978, p. 140), such a leading figure as C. Wright Mills
the fact that the three theories of power are by no means takes pains to reject it (Mills, 1959, p. 277).
neatly distinguished in the literature. In Polsby's hands, Porous boundaries among the three theories, coupled
for example, pluralism rejects five central propositions with internal variations amqng those who may be iden-
of the "stratificationist literature" which embrace prop- tified with one of the three camps, make comparisons
ositions from both elite and class analysis: the upper difficult (Nicholls, 1974). But if these theories are to be
class rules local community life; political and civic useful in understanding the realities of power, it seems
leaders are subordinate to the upper class; a single necessary to identify some propositions on which
"power elite" rules locally; this elite rules in its own in- pluralists tend to agree, and to critique these proposi-
terest; and social conflict takes place between the upper tions from opposing perspectives.
368
for democracy, denies the special importance of ists" to join pluralists in a united front behind the
class, reconfirms the inevitability and value of in- integrity of autonomous groups, pluralism re-
cremental change, and sees incrementalism as a mains profoundly at odds with class analysis. En-
way of achieving major structural reforms. The dorsement of such socialistic-sounding proposals
problem, from the theoretical point of view, is as redistribution of wealth and income seems to
that pluralism II still defends many features of theclose the gap, but this is illusory. A closer look in-
system that perpetuate the social results it now dicates that the theories are, on balance, far apart
deplores. Obviously, pluralism is not proved false on most essential questions. Pluralism and class
merely because the system does not attain the analysis, it appears, cannot be logically integrated
goals held by Dahl and Lindblom. But there is no without great distortion in the substantive integri-
doubt that the system's failure to live up to their ty of both theories.
expectations has induced them to make major To explore this theme it will be useful to ex-
alterations in the theory. amine first the issue of social vs. private owner-
Dahl and Lindblom decry the "incapacities" ship and control of property. Class analysis and
and even the "perversities" of American poly- pluralism are then shown to clash, as always, over
archy because, even after years of opportunity, it the question of equality. Pluralist political theory
failed to live up to their expectations of progressand a capitalist economy, it is argued, are more
on economic and social equality. They charge that consistent with social inequality than equality.
the politico-economic system "remains both slug- When coupled with the contradiction between
gish and feckless in advancing on problems on pluralism's attachment to incremental change and
which it has the advantage of decades of ex- the call for major structural reforms, this contra-
perience in policy making: poverty and mal- diction exposes the incompatibilities that still
distribution of income and wealth, racial in- divide the two theories. In the final analysis, I
equality, health care, public education, inflation argue, Dahl and Lindblom try to resolve the con-
and unemployment, and industrial relations, for tradictions of pluralist theory by supporting in-
example" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxi). creased incremental changes in a system with
But unless one assumes that capitalist polyarchyessential structural inequalities-inequalities that
in time will advance equality to a significant ex- they themselves increasingly realize.
tent, there is no reason for surprise (or lamenta-
tion) at its failure to do so. Class analysis and, to a Capitalism vs. Socialism
lesser extent, elitism see the maintenance of in-
equality under capitalism not as a failure of poly- Dahl and Lindblom's reconciliation of a social-
archy-not an incapacity or even a perversity- ist economy with pluralist democracy is rooted in
but as the whole point. Only liberal reformers la- their view of the limited nature of private property
ment polyarchy's failure to promote equality. rights. As they see it, the economy should be
Conservatives oppose most such efforts, whereas thought of as a social or public economy. This
those on the left see government as part of a larger shifts the primary justification of the economy
problem, the political economy of capitalism. from rights that inhere in private property to
Herein may lie part of the key to understandingdemonstrated economic performance in achieving
why pluralism II is not as radical a departure from social or public ends. From here it is but a hop to
pluralism I as it might at first appear. The critical the view that private ownership and control is
quotes from Dahl and Lindblom, all of which ex- merely one form among a large variety of alterna-
press part of what they believe, are held in tandem tives, and that this alternative has no defensible
with a logically incompatible set of ideas. Only presumption that is qualitatively superior to
out of complete context is pluralism II consistentpublic ownership and control. "Enterprises and
with such radical ideas as major structural markets are not justified by overriding personal
reform, redistribution of wealth and income, and rights to private ownership and control," they
substantive equality. Grave shortcomings of poly- write. "If they are justified at all, it is only by
archy are noted, to be sure. Once-sacred cows, in- their performance in achieving social ends" (1976,
cluding free enterprise, are seriously questioned. p. xxvii; see also Dahl, 1979b, p. 364; 1982, p.
But pluralism still holds that the system's gaps 1 1ff).
and omissions and downright failures can be cor- Although Lindblom raises serious doubts about
rected without specifying how much structural capitalism throughout Politics and Markets, the
change or redistribution of wealth and income aremore sustained critique is offered by Dahl in
needed. The system needs major structural Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy.
reform, to be sure, but, as we shall see, major What is the process by which Dahl concludes
structural reform does not mean basic alterations that socialism is compatible with that form of
in class structure or class power. Despite, an ap- democracy heretofore associated with capitalism?
peal by Dahl and Lindblom for "Marxist human- Modern democracy, no less an authority than
operational control count for so much more than in government-enforced property rights. Private
private ownership, Dahl virtually eliminates the ownership and control in a capitalist system is not
contradiction between owners and nonowners primarily a matter of social performance. It is
that is the centerpiece of Marx's analysis of primarily a matter of private profit. Capitalism is
capitalism. Having displaced the central problem not impervious to social effects because the mass
of ownership with the problem of maintaining of the population is not without power. Capital
decentralized organizational pluralism, Dahl and labor exist, after all, in a conflictual relation-
(1982, p. 127) is in a position to conclude that, "It ship in which capital, though by far the dominant
is fair to say that today most democratic socialists power, is by no means omnipotent. Individual
are pluralists, if not explicitly at least by implica- capitalists may be regulated and controlled or
tion." With this, the way is open for a rapproche- even expropriated if bad social effects generate
ment between pluralists and "Marxist human- enough danger to the overall system. But in
ists." The class struggle, as a barrier between general, private property rights and the profits
pluralist and class analysis of political and that flow from them are not a form under
economic power, is thus overcome. capitalism; they are essential forms. Under
From the perspective of class analysis, however, capitalism the state does not exist to give effect to
Dahl's treatment of capitalist political economy the rights of the public over private corporations.
suffers a fatal defect: it fails to give classes their The state exists for the opposite purpose: to pro-
due. This is no small omission if your theory puts tect the rights of private property from unwanted
a profit-making class at the center of its analysis, intrusion by the nonowning public. This is what
sees profit-making as inextricably linked to class analysis means when it asserts that the state
ownership rights under capitalist social relations, is not merely a state in capitalist society, some sort
and sees the essential driving force in capitalism- of superstructure above the fray, but is rather a
the pivot around which all else turns-as the pro- capitalist state. Dahl inverts these relationships
duction of profits. Just because most owners no and calls for rapprochement between pluralism
longer directly run corporations does not mean and class analysis.
they no longer control (on issues that count) those Class analysis has difficulty responding to the
who do. Dahl's argument rests on the separation call because it sees the central political economic
of ownership from control, but class analysis calls struggle under capitalism as the maintenance of
attention to return on owner equity as the all- private ownership and control and profit free
pervasive bottom line of capitalism. As long as the from the public controls suggested by Dahl and
system hinges on profit, capitalist owners cannot Lindblom. This is seen, furthermore, in terms of
be cashiered because they do not rule corpora- class (not just group) struggle. Government is not
tions directly; to do so mistakes subtle, indirect free to intervene merely because a rational cal-
power and control with their absence. If owners culation might point to certain advantages of
call the tune, they control the system even though public control. The extent of such intervention is
they may not manage it. There is, of course, no a hotly disputed matter. And as long as capitalism
doubt that the results of private enterprise are remains the dominant mode of production, the
vastly important to the public. Economic enter- extent of public control is perforce limited. It is
prises, whether publicly or privately owned, are limited by, in the first instance, the power of
properly thought of as political systems. But it is a capital, but it is also limited by the unexamined
rather large leap from these observations to the premises of a capitalist system, one of which is
view that the economy is a public economy whose that government exists not as a foil to capital, but
performance is to be judged by social effects. By as guarantor. Class analysis thus challenges one of
simply asserting the public character of the econ- the fundamental presuppositions of pluralism: the
omy, pluralism II virtually redefines the private impartiality of the state.
enterprise system into a public enterprise system. Such considerations are largely absent from
In a flash, large chunks of the American economy pluralism's analysis of political economy. Rather
are "collectivized," by definition. than seeing private ownership and control as a
Capitalist owners and managers might well ob- structural feature of capitalism, pluralism tends to
ject to such treatment. A class approach to the reduce such issues to matters of rational choice
study of capitalist political economy would never and public opinion. From a class perspective this
conclude that private ownership and control is but runs the risk of trivializing the discussion.
one among many alternative economic forms. For example, Dahl and Lindblom ask why the
Class analyses of capitalism begin with people American economy has remained more private
who own private property and the means of pro- than they expected it would in the early 1950s.
duction, who employ lesser owners and non- Their answer has nothing to do with basic struc-
owners to manage and produce goods and services tural features of the political economy. In what is
for profit, and whose power to do so is grounded for class analysis a form of blaming the victim, the
as trade-offs. In the nineteenth century, as Lind- able. " It is so intolerable, in fact, that he has kind
blom (1977, p. 163) notes, "Marx and the social- words to say for central government tax and
ists became the spokesmen for equality, liberals transfer payments to reduce inequality, as long as
the spokesmen for liberty." Since then, as he also individuals are free to spend as they choose.
notes, the value of equality has been subordinated There are, however, three major defects in
to liberty in liberal democratic theory. pluralism's treatment of equality. First, pluralism
Marx and later socialists deny the contradiction has no clear criteria or standard for assessing what
between equality and liberty. True liberty is im- is just or unjust about the distribution of values in
possible without equality; to be truly free, in- society. Second, pluralism treats public opinion as
dividuals in society must be roughly equal in the the explanation of inequality in the United States
means necessary to exercise freedom. Far from and as the vehicle for future egalitarian changes.
being opposed to liberty, equality is its necessary Third, not all groups in the pluralist United States
condition. are equal, as pluralism grants in the privileged-
For Dahl (1982, p. 108) "Democracy is and has position-of-business argument, but the special
always been closely associated in practice with place of business has not yet been fully integrated
private ownership of the means of production." into a theory rooted in multiple, independent, and
By democracy, of course, Dahl means liberal or autonomous groups as the necessary building
bourgeois democracy, not democracy in the blocks of pluralist democracy.
socialist sense. But the close connection between
capitalism and liberal democracy raises the knotty Just and Unjust Distribution
issue of substantive equality vs. equality of oppor-
tunity. If the means of production are privately Pluralism's discussion of equality is curiously
and unequally owned under capitalism, capitalism indeterminate because pluralism lacks a clear
seems to be based on substantive economic in- principle or theory for assessing just and unjust
equality, from which flows, as Dahl admits, a cer- distributions of wealth, income, and property. It
tain level of political inequality. The only form of lacks a theory of value. Consider the issue of
equality that is logically compatible with sub- political equality. Because political equality is ob-
stantive inequality is equality of opportunity viously undermined to some degree by economic
which, as Scharr (1967) and others have argued, is inequality, pluralism's call for redistribution
really the equal opportunity to become unequal. makes good logical sense. But in the past,
From Thomas Jefferson's defense of the natural pluralism has not set equality of conditions as its
aristocracy of talent, through social Darwinism's goal. Without an underlying theory of value, it is
defense of the survival of the fittest, to present- impossible to assess clearly and logically why a
day exaltations of individualism and competition, particular distribution is just or unjust. "Inequali-
liberal democracy has consistently defended equal ties in distribution are, of course, not inherently
opportunity and the inequalities in the distribu- unjust" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxi). In
tion of rewards that flow naturally from it. The other words, inequality is not in principle bad;
question this raises is, of course: Can pluralist or ceteris paribus, some inequality is in principle
liberal democracy be reconciled with class or just. Inequality, then, is not a matter of principle
socialist democracy if the two theories conflict so but of pragmatics: the degree of inequality ex-
profoundly over the priority and meaning of ceeds any principle of distributive justice Dahl
equality? and Lindblom find acceptable. They therefore
The decisive shift of pluralism II is toward sub- deplore the gross level of inequality and call for
stantive equality and away from equal opportuni- (unspecified) egalitarian changes.
ty as the preferred democratic ideal. Having called When Dahl and Lindblom endorse the redis-
for the redistribution of wealth and income, Dahl tribution of wealth and income, they endorse sub-
and Lindblom (1976) logically break the historical stantive equality, not mere equality of opportuni-
connection between capitalism and liberal democ- ty. When they endorse structural reforms, the
racy. They also partially correct pluralism's suggestion is made that structural reforms should
tendency to separate political and economic be made to promote substantive equality. But
equality by noting that, "We cannot move closer when they simultaneously argue that inequality is
to greater equality in access to political resources not unjust per se and do not confront the key
without greater equality in the distribution of, issue of degrees of inequality, they cloud the case
among other things, wealth and income" (p. for equality. The flip side of the question of how
xxxii). Dahl (1982, p. 117), writing separately a much equality pluralism supports is how much in-
few years later, concludes that the "distribution equality it is willing to tolerate. In Dahl's case the
of advantages and disadvantages is often arbi- argument for redistribution and equality leads to
trary, capricious, unmerited, and unjust, and in a box canyon of an indefinite number of prin-
virtually all advanced countries no longer toler- ciples that might be used to allocate incomes, no
(Dahl &women
all: why, if everywhere men and Lindblom, 1976,
arep.born
xxxvi). This pluralism
equal, are the many everywhere regularly chained
acknowledges.
in submission to the few? A related inegalitarian feature of polyarchy is
the privileged position of business. Business is not
Public Opinion just anther interest group. True, it plays a power-
ful interest-group role. But it also transcends such
A second problem with the pluralist treatment a limited role. As Dahl and Lindblom describe it,
of equality is that, again, the problem is laid at the the American political economy is co-directed un-
doorstep of the American people. Speaking of equally by business and government, and in that
their call for a "fairer" share of income and order. Great public decisions are left to the
wealth: "Until more Americans accept this view market; government's job is to induce (not com-
and act on it, the United States will not be the pro- mand) business to perform its functions. Pluralist
gressive society we wrongly assumed it to be at the theories that stress balance and countervailing
time we wrote. Polyarchy may continue to exist at power among interest groups, and fail to take into
the present level, but democracy will still remain a account the unique advantages enjoyed by
long way off" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. business, are thereby impeached by Dahl and
xxxii). Both Dahl and Lindblom repeat these Lindblom.
arguments in their post-1976 work. Having thus arrived roughly at where Marx
There are dangers in conceptualizing the prob- began, Dahl and Lindblom nevertheless continue
lem in terms of public opinion. One danger is that to endorse the theory and practice of pluralism.
one of the best known surveys on equality in Indeed, they even detect a lessening of antipathy
America shows that the mass of the American toward pluralism among European "Marxist
people has been more supportive of economic humanists" and suggest an emerging consensus
equality than the elites (McClosky, 1964, p. 369). on the need for autonomous groups as a bridge
But public opinion is notoriously volatile, and this between the two opposing theoretical camps. As
is not the main point. Far more significant, from Dahl and Lindblom see it, the rigidly antipluralist
the class perspective,.is the unreality of relying on Marxism of Stalin is on the way out, so the door is
public opinion to advance equality. These are open to a reconciliation between pluralism and
matters that, under capitalism, are systematically"Marxist humanism."
excluded from the American political arena. It is "But what about equality?" the skeptic may
hardly the American people's fault that wealth well ask. If even pluralists agree that business oc-
and income are highly concentrated. Nor will cupies a superior position in capitalism, if plural-
public opinion necessarily bring about more ists recognize that differential group power may
equality. In a capitalist setting economic equality act as an obstacle to democratization, and if
is not even a virtue, let alone a matter to be de- pluralist politics tends to reflect and reinforce the
cided by public debate. The realization of equality advantages of the better-off, business-oriented
requires fundamental changes in the system that groups may so impede equality that some central-
makes inequality a virtue, a system strengthened, izing, democratic, public force may be necessary
perhaps inadvertently, by theories of distributive to advance the egalitarian cause.
justice which, in the name of equality, justify its Dahl and Lindblom admit this possibility, but
opposite. reject it. In fact, they offer no solution to the ten-
sion between unequal social pluralism and demo-
cratic equality, but they are clear about defending
The Imperfect Balance of Group Power groups, and while rejecting one form of Marxism,
they extend an olive branch to another. In their
If the level of equality is viewed as a structural words, "Whatever the best solution to this prob-
feature of the political economy and not a matter lem (of equality) may be, for Americans, at least,
of public opinion, what is the relationship be- it is not to be found, in our view, in destroying
tween equality and another feature of the Ameri- organizational autonomy and replacing autonomy
can system, the existence of groups? According to with centralization, command, hierarchy,
Dahl and Lindblom, social pluralism, defined as abureaucracy, and domination by an enlightened
diversity of autonomous social organizations, is a elite" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxvi).
necessary condition of polyarchy. But pluralism Portraying the alternative to social pluralism as
sees two nagging flaws in polyarchy. First, not all "domination by an enlightened elite" may not ex-
groups are equal; not everyone organizes at the haust the possibilities, but it is less important here
same rate, and power resources are not evenly to debate the point than to note that pluralism II
distributed. Specifically, the better-off participateis as ideologically committed to social pluralism as
more. "As a consequence, government decisions was pluralism I. Pluralism puts considerable em-
reflect and reinforce a structure of inequalities" phasis on the social and economic inequalities that
knows, they assert, how to design a political "At the very least, there is a need to search for
system regularly capable of more than incremen- and to introduce new forms of economic enter-
tal change. Societies do change. Reforms do price.. .." (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxix).
occur. But the weight of experience convinces I think it is fair to conclude that Dahl and Lind
them that "incremental policymaking is an intelli- blom's endorsement of government ownership as
gent adaptation to features of society that make a means of public control is, at most, limited.
change difficult and slow rather than a cause of More broadly, the case for major structural
that difficulty and slowness" (Dahl & Lind- reforms concentrates on defects in the existing
blom, 1976, pp. xl-xli). More change will come decision-making and policymaking institutions of
about from accretion of small changes than ad- society, not class structure. Perhaps most surpris-
vocacy of large changes. "What is required," they ing of all, when Dahl and Lindblom face the ques-
conclude, "is not the fruitless advocacy of non- tion of how such reforms are to be brought about,
incremental reforms (as distinguished from a they answer-by the institutions themselves. "For
highly strategic advocacy of it in rare appropriate all our discontent with contemporary politico-
circumstances), but social inventiveness to in- economic institutions we are reduced to believing
crease the frequency with which incremental that it is through these very institutions that
alterations are made" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, society can build better institutions" (Dahl &
p. xli). With the removal of some veto powers, Lindblom, 1976, p. xlii).
they promise, incremental change will work its ef- Exactly how major structural reforms will ema-
fects on various problems confronting American nate from the very institutions that are so defec-
society. tive as to need major reform is not discussed in
From the reaffirmation of incrementalism, great detail, but it is addressed. Dahl and Lind-
which by definition ensures at best slow changes blom are aware that their position leaves them
in the status quo, one might expect Dahl and open to the charge that they suffer from a
Lindblom to caution against major reforms, but "residual naive optimism of liberalism." But
they do not. They believe major structural social institutions, they reply, do change. Reforms
reforms follow from their analysis: "It follows do occur. And what is the best and most common
from all we have said that we believe that major method by which these necessary changes occur?
structural reforms are required in the American Incrementalism.
political-economic system" (Dahl & Lindblom, Pluralism II resoundingly affirms incremen-
1976, p. xli). talism as the preferred method of achieving major
It might be asked, however, that if incremen- structural reforms in polyarchy. How does plural-
talism is a rational aid to change, if incremen- ism II arrive at this conclusion? It detects in in-
talism assures progress (albeit slow) on social crementalism a hitherto overlooked capacity to
problems, and if in any event nonincremental undermine the status quo. By increasing the pace
change occurs so rarely, why the call for required of incremental change, small accretions, far from
structural reforms in the American politico- being ways of ensuring modest changes in the
economic system? As defenders of incrementalism status quo, will transform the system. Incremen-
and incremental change, do Dahl and Lindblom talism emerges as a clever way of "smuggling"
mean by structural reform what most people social reform into society. In their words, "With
mean? Does structural reform mean the replace- its indirections, incremental change is a method of
ment of capitalism by a dominantly socialist 'smuggling' social reform into society. If that fact
political economy? Or is structural reform were more widely understood, there would be
another name for incremental change-souped- more smugglers at work as well as some learning
up incremental change, but nonetheless incre- of the smuggler's skills" (Dahl & Lindblom,
mental? 1976, p. xlii).
The fact is that pluralism II's support for It is certainly arguable how much structural
government ownership and control is softened by reform can be smuggled into the American system
several caveats: the issue of control precedes the through incremental methods, but further com-
issue of ownership, so if other control mecha- plications arise from a related contention.
nisms can be found, they may supersede govern- Although affirming the need for major structura
ment; government ownership is declared to be reform, Dahl and Lindblom oppose any changes
definitely not a sufficient means to public control;in the "general values" for which the American
in many cases it is probably not even a necessary system stands. Changes in general values are
means; and in some cases it may be a hindrance. neither necessary nor desirable. Structural
Immediately after the call for increased govern- reforms, then, are limited to those features of the
ment ownership, almost as if one were bargaining system that inhibit changes in "proximate goals,"
With capitalists and had just issued a threat, the not general values.
bold thrust is followed by a compromise offer: When Dahl and Lindblom discuss general
values, they seem to be referring to such abstract capitalism, pluralism either takes no such clear-
values as freedom, democracy, political equality, cut stand or affirms the opposite. This crucial dif-
and majority rule. These values are sacrosanct ference, when added to class theory's insistence
(though not absolute). The biases of American in- on nonincremental changes in class structure, and
stitutions against changes in these values should pluralism's clear preference for incremental
be maintained. Faster incremental change is there- changes not in class structure but in social institu-
fore restricted to "proximate goals." Here they tions, clarify crucial differences between the two
endorse not only the removal of barriers against theories.
change, but their replacement by biases toward Clearly pluralism and class analysis mean very
change. To give their views a full airing, a final different things by the term "structural reform."
quotation: Marxist class theory and even social democratic
theories use the term to apply to changes in
A bias against change in the aspirations or
capitalism and the class structure embedded in
general values to be pursued in the system is
worth preserving. But the bias against reformula- capitalist social relations., In sharp contrast, re-
tion of proximate goals and against institutional cent pluralist theory does not address the question
and policy change to attain liberal and of class structure in contemplating structural
equalitarian values is obstructive. The bias needs reform. Indeed, pluralism contends that struc-
to be removed. Indeed a contrary "irrational" tural reforms may emanate from the market
bias toward change is required to offset the system that structural analysis means to trans-
powerful forces that operate throughout society
form. In assessing pluralism's call for structural
to obstruct these changes that approach, but all
reform, therefore, it is crucial to note the singular
too slowly, the aspirations still to be prized (DahI
interpretation given the term. When pluralists
& Lindblom, 1976, pp. xliii-xliv, italics theirs).
propose structural reforms they are not talking
Pitching the discussion of values at such a high about egalitarian changes in the class structure of
level of abstraction reduces the conflict between American capitalist society. They are not talking
class analysis and pluralism. Class analysts are at about "phasing out" the capitalist class through
least as likely as pluralists to endorse such general redistributive taxes, controls on inheritance, or a
values as democracy and freedom. At this level, levelling of work hierarchies and rewards. Major
the debate between the two theories reaches empty structural reform for Dahl and Lindblom means
agreement. It is rhetoric. changes in the existing decision-making institu-
The real conflict over general values takes place tions of society; moreover such changes are to be
around what Lindblom, in his 1977 work, calls brought about slowly through incrementalism. It
"grand issues," and which he says business nor- is hard to see how class analysis and pluralism can
mally keeps off the political agenda: the private be brought closer together unless and until they
enterprise system itself, a high degree of corporate agree that such "grand issues" as the private
autonomy, protection of the status quo on dis- enterprise system itself, and the class structure
tribution of income and wealth, close consulta- that goes with it, should not only be placed on the
tion between business and government, restriction political agenda but resolved in such a way that
of union demands to those consistent with nonincremental progress is made toward true sub-
business profitability, among others (Lindblom, stantive equality.
1977, p. 205). Pluralism now seems willing to
place such issues on the political agenda, and this A Note on Class vs. Group
is indeed a change. But, again, unless pluralism
faces squarely how much change in the private "Furious controversies descend like swarming
enterprise system or in the distribution of wealthwasps on anyone who pokes the nest of class,"
is necessary to achieve such values as freedom andLindblom writes (1977, p. 222). But for all the ap-
equality, the basic questions go begging. In con- parently radical revisions of pluralism II,
trast, class theory asserts a contradiction between pluralism and class analysis remain fundamentally
Lindblom's grand issues and the general values divided over the "nest" of class. For Dahl, social
for which pluralism and class analysis both stand. class is "not unimportant" in political conflict,
The pluralist position is much less clear. Pluralism but in most democratic countries it "is only an
now admits some connection between grand element, albeit a significant one, in a pattern of
issues and general values, but is fuzzy about the political conflict that is rarely polarized" (1982, p.
crucial question of whether or not there is a con- 65). "We need to caution ourselves," Lindblom
tradiction, and how much change in the grand says, "against overestimating the effect of class in
issues (e.g., private enterprise) is needed to pro- retarding a fuller democracy" (1977, p. 355). The
mote the grand values (e.g., political equality). reduction of class to just one among many factors
Class or structural analysis insists that the grandinfluencing social life is still a major difference
values cannot be attained within the confines of between class analysis and pluralism.
As we have seen, pluralism was developed by ners and a large number of losers is Orwellian
Bentley as an alternative to and critique of Marx's newspeak. It defends inequality in the name of
class analysis. From Bentley forward, a long line equality (Scharr, 1967, p. 234), and helps induce
of pluralists have rejected Marx for exaggerating mass acquiescence in the perpetuation of an un-
the importance of class (Nisbet, 1959), for failing equal social order. To the extent that pluralism
to offer a clear and consistent definition of class does the same, it belies the espousal of substantive
(Aron, 1950), and for generally failing to ap- equality through the redistribution of wealth and
preciate the importance of cross-cutting cleavages income.
in reducing class solidarity and class conflict In the structural view, inequality under capital-
(Dahl, 1982, pp. 61-65). Pluralism and class ism is not a by-product of the system that is
analysis remain split, therefore, over the basic amenable to polyarchal corrections. It is a struc-
unit of analysis for society. In pluralist theory, tural imperative. It is one of the things that makes
classes have merely a nominal existence compared capitalism capitalism and distinguishes it from
to groups; in class analysis, groups are seen and socialism. From the class perspective, inequality is
analyzed as fractions or sub-parts of classes. Untilas likely to be significantly reduced or eliminated
some reconciliation of this conflict is offered, it isunder capitalism as the meek are to inherit the
hard to see how class analysis and pluralism can earth. The fundamental reason this is so is the
be joined along the lines attempted by Dahl and essential, structural relationship between capital
Lindblom. and labor in a capitalist society: they are, by
definition, unequal. Perhaps Marx, who drew at-
tention to this relationship with acid humor,
should be allowed to speak here. He describes the
root inequality, after the establishment of capital-
Summary and Conclusion ism, this way:
be redirected in favor of explorations in class States and Australia. American Political Science
analysis. Review, 1981, 75, 581-597.
Kuhn, T. The structure of scientific revolutions.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
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