Neo-Pluralism - A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II - Manley

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Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II

Author(s): John F. Manley


Source: The American Political Science Review , Jun., 1983, Vol. 77, No. 2 (Jun., 1983),
pp. 368-383
Published by: American Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1958922

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Neo-Pluralism:
A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II

JOHN F. MANLEY
Stanford University

This article is a critique of contemporary pluralist theory asfound largely in the work of Robert A.
Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom. Two different forms of pluralism are distinguished and compared
critically with Marxist class analysis. Pluralism, it is argued, fails to accountfor the reality of political
and economic inequality in the United States. As a theory, pluralism is also marked by increasing ten-
sion between the underlying values and the performance of American polyarchy. The overall result is
that pluralism's utility as a description and explanation of the American political economy is called
into serious doubt, and a case is made for the explanatory superiority of class analysis.

To anyone interested in understanding political In the past several years, however, political and
power in the United States, social scientists offer economic developments in the United States have
three main general theories: pluralism, the most placed the pluralist paradigm under a good deal of
widely accepted theory; pluralism's old antago- strain. Even inside the pluralist school, serious
nist, elitism, the next most widely accepted doubts have arisen about the theory's ability to
theory; and class or structural analysis, whose explain the American system. Strong doubts have
locus classicus is Karl Marx's Capital, which is arisen, too, about the relationship between plural-
generally not accepted at all.' ism and such central issues of democratic theory
Pluralism, elitism, and class analysis have as equality, distributive justice, and peaceful
divided students of power for decades, but there is social change. If Kuhn (1962, p. 52) is right that
little doubt that pluralism is the dominant theory scientific understanding advances when old para-
or paradigm of power among American social sci- digms are supplanted by new theories that are
entists. Although research regularly turns up evi- thought to be better able to account for strate-
dence supporting the other two theories (Higley gically important facts, it may be time to begin the
and Moore, 1981, p. 595), it is no empty boast for search for a theory that is better than pluralism at
pluralists to claim a generally favorable response explaining class and group power in the United
to their critique of elitism and class analysis States. So, at any rate, is the suggestion of this
(Polsby, 1980, p. 141).2 article.
At one time, pluralism was a reasonably
coherent theory whose claims appeared to many
'In using the term structural analysis I do not want to political scientists to be solidly supported by em-
get embroiled in contemporary controversies among pirical research. Pluralism-what we shall call
Marxists over structuralism, instrumentalism, and the pluralism I-asserts that the American power
like. By structural analysis I mean to conjure nothing structure is made up of many competing elites,
more than Marx's emphasis on the structure of classes
not just one. Different elites with low elite overlap
stemming from the division of society into those who
own and control the basic means of production, and
those who do not. Marxism is a theory that puts class
structure at the center of its analysis. Nothing more than and lower classes (Polsby, 1980, pp. 8-13). Additional
this perspective is suggested here. I would like to thank
complications are that much leading work on elite
the following people for comments on an earlier version theory has been done not on local communities where
of this article: Kennette Benedict, Sue Bessmer, Heinz pluralist research has often been concentrated, but on
Eulau, Ken Dolbeare, Nancy Hartsock, Henry Levin, the national power structure. And although some elitists
Rick Olquin, Ben Page, and Don Share. are fairly comfortable with class analysis (Domhoff,
'Assessing the pluralist paradigm is complicated by 1978, p. 140), such a leading figure as C. Wright Mills
the fact that the three theories of power are by no means takes pains to reject it (Mills, 1959, p. 277).
neatly distinguished in the literature. In Polsby's hands, Porous boundaries among the three theories, coupled
for example, pluralism rejects five central propositions with internal variations amqng those who may be iden-
of the "stratificationist literature" which embrace prop- tified with one of the three camps, make comparisons
ositions from both elite and class analysis: the upper difficult (Nicholls, 1974). But if these theories are to be
class rules local community life; political and civic useful in understanding the realities of power, it seems
leaders are subordinate to the upper class; a single necessary to identify some propositions on which
"power elite" rules locally; this elite rules in its own in- pluralists tend to agree, and to critique these proposi-
terest; and social conflict takes place between the upper tions from opposing perspectives.

368

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 369
operate in different issue areas. Political and eco- gate, persistent inflation and unemployment, the
nomic power are by no means evenly distributed forced retrenchment of the so-called welfare state,
among the population, but inequality is "non- and the deepening of gross inequalities have
cumulative," i.e., most people have some power moved such leading pluralists as Dahl and Lind-
resources, and no single asset (such as money) blom so far to the "left" that scholars now talk of
confers excessive power. something called "neo" or "postpluralism."
Pluralism I also sees the political system as That pluralism stands in need of revision causes
reasonably open to multiple interests if these in- no surprise. No theory as closely tied to the system
terests feel strongly enough about an issue to as pluralism could be unaffected by that system's
mobilize pressure. The power system is, to be performance. But it must be asked, how far
sure, untidy, but the pulling and hauling of "left" can pluralism go without exposing the need
diverse groups promotes "polyarchy." "Poly- for a new, nonpluralist theory that may better fit
archy" is Robert Dahl's and Charles Lindblom's the realities of political and economic power in the
term for systems run according to putative demo- United States?
cratic rules of the game (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, As measured by pluralism's own values, not
p. 277.)3 just Marx's, the performance of the American
When, in 1967, Dahl published the first edition political economy has been so poor that the
of his textbook, Pluralist Democracy in the theory of pluralism, in an effort to adapt, has
United States, he identified multiple centers of been thrown into confusion. The two men who
power and limited popular sovereignty as the two probably did more than anyone else in the past 30
basic axioms of American pluralism. He claimed, years to modernize the theory of pluralism, Dahl
moreover, certain advantages for such a system: and Lindblom, have been so disturbed by the
1) power was tamed and coercion minimized; 2) system's performance that they have issued
the consent of all citizens was promoted (in the radical-sounding calls for major structural
long run); and 3) the system fostered the peaceful reforms and redistribution of wealth and income,
settlement of conflicts to the mutual benefit of and have even questioned the capitalist system
most if not all the contending parties (Dahl, 1967, itself. The problem, from the theoretical point of
p. 24). Pluralism was thus offered as a theory of view, is that these changes in pluralism-which
power in America and as justification as well. are so extensive that one may now distinguish be-
In addition to the above ideas, pluralists prided tween pluralism I and pluralism II-clash with
themselves on hard, realistic analyses of politics. previously received wisdom about the nature and
Even though the basic theory tended to buttress legitimacy of power in America. As a result,
the system, many pluralists were scrupulous in pluralism II now calls into serious question much
noting the system's flaws and deficiencies. In- of what generations of American political scien-
deed, the contradiction between the theory's ten- tists have taught and believed is true about
dency to support the system and the system's in- pluralist democracy in the United States.
creasingly disturbing performance has generated In exploring these issues, I will focus mainly on
questions about the paradigm. Pluralism may be the recent work of Dahl and Lindblom, beginning
partial to the systeni, but pluralists are not neces-with their extended 1976 introduction to Politics,
sarily blind. Ironically, some of the most thought-Economics and Welfare. The appearance of this
ful pluralists are currently among the most severejoint essay marks a turning point in the history of
critics of the workings of American polyarchy. contemporary pluralist thought. In this work,
If, as Marxists and non-Marxists agree, it is im- Dahl and Lindblom set forth in summary form a
portant for system maintenance to have a number of critical revisions in pluralism that recur
coherent theory that explains and justifies the throughout their subsequent work. Lindblom ex-
system, it is cause for reflection that in recent panded on these ideas in his award-winning
years the theory of pluralism appears no more Politics and Markets (1977), and in his presiden-
healthy than the system itself. Beginning with tial address to the American Political Science
Vietnam, the American political economy has fre- Association (1982). Dahl's major contributions
quently resembled anarchy more than polyarchy.include essays published in diverse sources during
Such debilitating developments as the war, Water- 1977-1979 and, most important, his book Dilem-
mas of Pluralist Democracy (1982). From these
sources I construct and criticize the pluralist II
theory of American polyarchy.
'From here on, polyarchy will not be placed in quota-
tion marks, but this does not mean that I accept it as an A second important caveat is that the following
accurate description of the American system. Polyarchy critique relies more on the class perspective than
is a term that contains descriptive and evaluative mean-elitism. The pluralist-elitist debate has received so
ings that are, at best, highly problematic when appliedmuch attention (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963; Dahl,
to American political economy. 1958; Walker, 1966; Wolfinger, 1974), and the

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370 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77
issues now raised by DahI and Lindblom so far extended Bentley's analysis of the group basis of
transcend the normal confines of that debate, that politics. Truman (1951, p. 107) used Bentley's
it seems useful to concentrate on the somewhat idea of overlapping membership to explain the
broader and more fundamental concerns raised by lack of class appeals to such groups as Catholics,
class analysis (Lukes, 1974). Thus, no effort is and to challenge "the Marxist assumption that
made to divide the discussion equally between the class interests are primary and the more common
two major alternatives to pluralism. In my view, assumption that occupational group interests are
class analysis subsumes most of what elitism has always dominant." Many groups have what
to say while avoiding many if not all of its "in- Truman calls a "class character," but he is far
strumentalist" pitfalls. more impressed by the failure of political attitudes
to run along class lines. In Truman's account-as
Pluralism I and Pluralism 11 in the more recent work of Dahl-class is reduced
to one among several variables that explain
The far-reaching importance of Dahl's and politics. Indeed, the centrality of class to Marxist
Lindblom's revised pluralism can only be grasped theory and its subordinate status in pluralist
if pluralism and class analysis are seen in broad theory is, as I note in a later section, one of the
historical and theoretical perspective. Historical- long-standing and most fundamental differences
ly, pluralism and class analysis have disagreed between the two theories.
profoundly not only over the meaning of class, Some pluralists, such as David Riesman (1950),
but over its existence. A close reading of James acknowledge that there have been periods in
Madison (or, for that matter, Marx) shows that American history in which a ruling class existed,
there is no necessary contradiction between but most would probably agree with Riesman that
groups and class-in Federalist 10 Madison treats since the days of the captains of industry, the class
groups as subdivisions of the broad social division structure of America has become far more dif-
between those with and without property-but ferentiated and complex. In place of the business
after the rise of socialism and class analysis in theruling class there arose countless "veto groups,"
nineteenth century, pluralism and class analysis no one of which is dominant across society. Echo-
were pitted against each other. John Dewey ing these themes, Dahl (1971, p. 107) says of class:
arrayed the theories against each other in
This is not to argue that "class" differences are
philosophy, and Arthur Bentley, a close associate
unimportant. It is to say that economic class is
of Dewey's, did the same in political science. only one factor, often less important than others
Toward the end of his pioneering study of that can and quite evidently do yield distinct sub-
groups, Bentley (1908) took up the question of cultures-ways of life, outlooks, norms, identifi-
class and made it clear that group theory was in- cation, loyalties, organizations, social structures.
tended as a critique of class theory. In Bentley's
view, Marx's theory of class struggle was a crude Pluralism has traditionally downplayed class,
form of group theory. The failure of the so-called but there is a related and equally important dif-
proletariat to unite behind a common interest and ference between pluralism and class analysis.
seize power proved Marx wrong, in Bentley's These theories have historically been caught up in
view. Indeed, Bentley (1908, p. 467) says, "A pro- the battle between socialism and capitalism that
letariat class, such as Marx and Engels conceived has raged since the mid-nineteenth century. Social
it, simply did not exist." Economic groups were, scientists, however much they may claim value-
he admitted, of fundamental importance. But he neutrality in their work, can hardly deny the
likened American society to a spherical mass political implications of a position that denies
through which passes an unlimited number of either the existence or importance of social
planes, each plane representing a different princi- classes. If classes in capitalist society are so frag-
ple of group classification, such as race, religion, mented that the concept of class is of doubtful
language, or ethnicity. The result is a great confu- analytical utility, then the Marxian analysis and
sion of groups and a de facto denial of the exis- critique of capitalism are seriously undermined.
tence of class. To quote Bentley (1908, p. 101) If, on the other hand, class is found to be of prime
directly: "No one set of groups, that is, no set dis-significance, the work of Marx, and the corre-
tinguished on the basis of any one plane, will be sponding socialist critique of capitalism, take on
an adequate grouping of the whole mass." Bent- added force. As a theory of how society works,
ley goes on to develop the argument that because pluralism may claim that all it does is report, not
American society is fragmented into groups, and evaluate, the facts. In sharp contrast, class analy-
because individuals are often members of manysis openly deplores the facts it considers of para-
groups, group compromise, not class conflict, is mount importance to understanding capitalist
the modal form of American politics (p.. 102). society. Whatever one's position on the possibility
As is well known, later pluralists developed andof value-free social research, however, there is no

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 371
doubt that until recently, property dominate pluralism,
polyarchy opens up the para-in sh
trast with class analysis, rarely raised questions doxical possibility that polyarchy is tied to the
about the legitimacy of capitalism. market system not because it is democratic. but
In light of the historical connection between because it is not." Although he pronounced the
pluralist theory and capitalism, and between class radical model badly flawed, Lindblom (1982, p.
analysis and socialism, it is noteworthy indeed to 20) used the occasion of his APSA presidential
encounter the kinds of ideas Dahl and Lindblom address to critique the conventional pluralist
express in their 1976 (and later) work: model and invite new research along lines raised
"In the realm of attitudes, ideas, and ideology, by Marx and other radical theorists. "The conclu-
we Americans have an irrational commitment to sion," he writes, "is not that the radical is
private ownership and control of economic enter- superior, but only that mainstream political sci-
prises that prevents us from thinking clearly aboutence ought to bring it in from the cold."
economic arrangements" (p. xxvi). Dahl has also extended along similar lines the
"Private ownership and control is but one form ideas he and Lindblom presented in 1976. Declar-
among a vast variety of alternatives" (p. xxvii). ing independent organization as the sine qua non
"For reasons we develop in the book, the prob- of polyarchal democracy, Dahl (1982, p. 40 ff)
lem of control must be considered as prior to theexamines four harmful "defects" of pluralist sys-
problem of ownership" (p. xxix). tems: they may help stabilize injustices and in-
"To democratize the American polyarchy fur- equalities, deform civic consciousness, distort the
ther will require a redistribution of wealth and in-public agenda, and wrongfully appropriate public
come" (p. xxxii). functions. Although Dahl's exploration of these
"Because governments respond more to the defects is typically restrained, he takes a step that,
better-off than to the worse-off, they help to sus- in the historical context of pluralist theory, can
tain the cycles of political effectiveness and ins only be described as transformative: he breaks the
effectuality that in turn perpetuate the structures connection between pluralism and capitalism.
of inequalities" (p. xxxvi). Dahl openly confronts the issue of socialism vs.
"Businessmen play a distinctive role in poly- capitalism and pronounces socialism and pluralist
archal politics that is qualitatively different from democracy compatible. "If socialism by defini-
that of any interest group. It is also much more tion entails social ownership of economic enter-
powerful than an interest-group role" (p. xxxvi). prises," Dahl writes, "and unless by definition it
"Yet common interpretations that depict the must be centralized, then a socialist economy
American or any other market-oriented system as could be highly decentralized and therefore
a competition among interest groups are seriously organizationally pluralistic" (1982, p. 112). In-
in error for their failure to take account of the dis-deed, in what appear to be favorable references to
tinctive privileged position of businessmen in such experiments in workers' ownership and con-
politics" (p. xxxvii). trol as Yugoslavia's, Dahl (1982, p. 114) goes as
"An evident feature of the consensus prevailingfar as to suggest that a decentralized socialist
in all the polyarchies is that it endorses attitudes,order might generate even more organizational
values, institutions, and policies of more benefit pluralism than capitalism, and thereby approach
to the already favored groups in the society thanmore closely the democratic, pluralist ideal. In a
to the less favored" (p. xxxviii). flat declaration he asserts: "The upshot of this
"In the United States more money, energy, anddiscussion is this: The amount of organizational
organizational strength is thrown into obstructing pluralism in a country does not appear to depend
equality than into achieving it, more into con- on whether enterprises are privately or socially
straining our liberties than into enlarging them, owned."
and more into maintaining the corporate domain To be sure, neither Dahl nor Lindblom is un-
as a private preserve than into making its public mindful of the potential strains between socialism
acts public" (p. xl). and pluralist democracy, but their mature theory
"It follows from all we have said that we seems to take pluralism far toward a reconcilia-
believe that major structural reforms are required tion with Marxist class analysis. It may, therefore,
in the American politico-economic system" (p. come as something of a shock to realize that Dahl
xli). and Lindblom appear simultaneously to uphold
That these were not aberrant ideas is made most of the essential elements of pluralism l.
abundantly clear in Dahl's and Lindblom's subse- Pluralism II now tries to hold in balance severe
quent work. In Politics and Markets Lindblom criticisms of the system's performance, the need
(1977, pp. 168-169) deepened the analysis when he for major structural reforms, support for redis-
elevated business above other groups in a capital- tribution of wealth and income, and more govern-
ist society and offered such provocative sugges- ment ownership of private enterprise, at the same
tions as the "mere possibility that business and time that it supports social pluralism as necessary

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372 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77

for democracy, denies the special importance of ists" to join pluralists in a united front behind the
class, reconfirms the inevitability and value of in- integrity of autonomous groups, pluralism re-
cremental change, and sees incrementalism as a mains profoundly at odds with class analysis. En-
way of achieving major structural reforms. The dorsement of such socialistic-sounding proposals
problem, from the theoretical point of view, is as redistribution of wealth and income seems to
that pluralism II still defends many features of theclose the gap, but this is illusory. A closer look in-
system that perpetuate the social results it now dicates that the theories are, on balance, far apart
deplores. Obviously, pluralism is not proved false on most essential questions. Pluralism and class
merely because the system does not attain the analysis, it appears, cannot be logically integrated
goals held by Dahl and Lindblom. But there is no without great distortion in the substantive integri-
doubt that the system's failure to live up to their ty of both theories.
expectations has induced them to make major To explore this theme it will be useful to ex-
alterations in the theory. amine first the issue of social vs. private owner-
Dahl and Lindblom decry the "incapacities" ship and control of property. Class analysis and
and even the "perversities" of American poly- pluralism are then shown to clash, as always, over
archy because, even after years of opportunity, it the question of equality. Pluralist political theory
failed to live up to their expectations of progressand a capitalist economy, it is argued, are more
on economic and social equality. They charge that consistent with social inequality than equality.
the politico-economic system "remains both slug- When coupled with the contradiction between
gish and feckless in advancing on problems on pluralism's attachment to incremental change and
which it has the advantage of decades of ex- the call for major structural reforms, this contra-
perience in policy making: poverty and mal- diction exposes the incompatibilities that still
distribution of income and wealth, racial in- divide the two theories. In the final analysis, I
equality, health care, public education, inflation argue, Dahl and Lindblom try to resolve the con-
and unemployment, and industrial relations, for tradictions of pluralist theory by supporting in-
example" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxi). creased incremental changes in a system with
But unless one assumes that capitalist polyarchyessential structural inequalities-inequalities that
in time will advance equality to a significant ex- they themselves increasingly realize.
tent, there is no reason for surprise (or lamenta-
tion) at its failure to do so. Class analysis and, to a Capitalism vs. Socialism
lesser extent, elitism see the maintenance of in-
equality under capitalism not as a failure of poly- Dahl and Lindblom's reconciliation of a social-
archy-not an incapacity or even a perversity- ist economy with pluralist democracy is rooted in
but as the whole point. Only liberal reformers la- their view of the limited nature of private property
ment polyarchy's failure to promote equality. rights. As they see it, the economy should be
Conservatives oppose most such efforts, whereas thought of as a social or public economy. This
those on the left see government as part of a larger shifts the primary justification of the economy
problem, the political economy of capitalism. from rights that inhere in private property to
Herein may lie part of the key to understandingdemonstrated economic performance in achieving
why pluralism II is not as radical a departure from social or public ends. From here it is but a hop to
pluralism I as it might at first appear. The critical the view that private ownership and control is
quotes from Dahl and Lindblom, all of which ex- merely one form among a large variety of alterna-
press part of what they believe, are held in tandem tives, and that this alternative has no defensible
with a logically incompatible set of ideas. Only presumption that is qualitatively superior to
out of complete context is pluralism II consistentpublic ownership and control. "Enterprises and
with such radical ideas as major structural markets are not justified by overriding personal
reform, redistribution of wealth and income, and rights to private ownership and control," they
substantive equality. Grave shortcomings of poly- write. "If they are justified at all, it is only by
archy are noted, to be sure. Once-sacred cows, in- their performance in achieving social ends" (1976,
cluding free enterprise, are seriously questioned. p. xxvii; see also Dahl, 1979b, p. 364; 1982, p.
But pluralism still holds that the system's gaps 1 1ff).
and omissions and downright failures can be cor- Although Lindblom raises serious doubts about
rected without specifying how much structural capitalism throughout Politics and Markets, the
change or redistribution of wealth and income aremore sustained critique is offered by Dahl in
needed. The system needs major structural Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy.
reform, to be sure, but, as we shall see, major What is the process by which Dahl concludes
structural reform does not mean basic alterations that socialism is compatible with that form of
in class structure or class power. Despite, an ap- democracy heretofore associated with capitalism?
peal by Dahl and Lindblom for "Marxist human- Modern democracy, no less an authority than

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 373
Schumpeter (1962, p. 297) asserts, "is a product socialism and pluralist democracy. He asks what
of the capitalist process." How, then, can social- legitimates large, privately owned corporations,
ism, capitalism's old rival, be squared with liberal and he finds legitimacy lacking. Organizational
democracy? pluralism and decentralization are essential in a
Dahl is not unmindful of the close historical democracy, but as he sees it, neither requires
relationship between pluralist democracy and private ownership. Some would cite stockholder
capitalism. Indeed, their relationship is presenteddemocracy as a legitimizing principle of private
as one of the few perfect relationships in social ownership, but Dahl rejects this because it
science history: flagrantly violates the principle of equal voting.
Are privately owned corporations justified as an
It is an arresting fact that even today in every
expression of free, voluntary individual ex-
country governed by polyarchy the means of pro-
changes? In classical theory, yes; in real world
duction are for the most part owned "privately."
Conversely, no country where the means of pro- systems, no. If all these fail, what about the main
duction are owned mainly by the state or (as legitimizing principle, the fundamental right to
under the Yugoslav constitution) by "society" is property? Does not the control of managers flow
governed by polyarchy (1982, p. 108, italics his). from the property rights of owners, thereby mak-
ing management a private, not public, affair? Not
But is there a necessary relationship between
only does Dahl reject this defense of privately
pluralist democracy and capitalism?
owned corporate capitalism, he goes so far as to
Dahl's answer turns on the lack of a relation-
suggest that by this logic the workers have a better
ship between private ownership and control in an
claim to ownership and control than capital.
age of corporate capitalism. To sum up his argu-
Referring to the fundamental rights of property
ment: If, in the past, ownership meant control,
argument, Dahl says:
this has changed. Large corporations are con-
trolled by managers, not owners, and such cor- Although this defense undoubtedly has great
porations are inherently not private; they are ideological strength, it is badly flawed theo-
social and political enterprises. They are social retically. For the justification of private property
as a natural, inalienable, or fundamental right
because they depend on joint actions that cannot
provides scant justification for the existing
be attributed to specific persons (and certainly not
ownership and control of large corporations. In-
to stockholders), and they are political because sofar as a right to property is justified by the
they have great power over the lives of people. On principle that one is entitled to use the products
the basis of this reasoning, Dahl (1982, p. 184) of one's own labor as one chooses, then surely
states: the privileged position of stockholders is un-
justified. On this principle, indeed, the em-
No one disputes today that the government of a ployees would have an even more fundamental
city or a state ought to be a public, not a private claim to own and control the firm for which they
matter. One who supports democratic ideas labor (1982, p. 201).
would also hold that people who are compelled
to obey public governments ought to control Dahl's emphasis on the public nature of cor-
those governments: no taxation without repre- porations is crucial. In his view, the effects of cor-
sentation. Should this reasoning not apply also porations are so public, and the control of private
to the government of a large economic enter- owners so minimal compared to managers, that
prise? If not, why not?
corporations should be thought of-defined as-
Dahl generally tends to eschew unequivocal public entities, not private. To some extent, of
answers to such questions, but in this case he course, corporations have always been treated as
makes his view fairly clear. Privately owned cor-public bodies. But Dahl goes beyond this level of
porations are, for him, social or public entities. argument to a more profound observation: pri-
Since they are not controlled by owners, the ques- vate ownership ensures so little control over huge
tion of control theoretically precedes the questioncorporations that it is virtually a non sequitur. In
of ownership (1982, p. 112). There is nothing in fact, private owners have so little control that
the form of ownership, then, that confers control Dahl seems to have little use for them in his
or precludes the essential condition of democracy, theory. What counts is power. Managers have it.
the maintenance of organizational pluralism. A Owners don't. Therefore corporations may be
high degree of organizational pluralism can exist defined as public, regardless of ownership, and
controlled as such by public authority.
in a system that treats giant firms as public enter-
prises and political systems (1982, p. 110). Thus It is not quite clear what becomes of owners in
the tie between capitalism and pluralist democracythis scheme, but presumably they would exist as
is torn asunder. some sort of vestigial economic class: allowed to
But this is not all. Dahl does not rest content live and live well precisely because they no longer
with making the case for the compatibility of exercise undue amounts of real power. By making

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374 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77

operational control count for so much more than in government-enforced property rights. Private
private ownership, Dahl virtually eliminates the ownership and control in a capitalist system is not
contradiction between owners and nonowners primarily a matter of social performance. It is
that is the centerpiece of Marx's analysis of primarily a matter of private profit. Capitalism is
capitalism. Having displaced the central problem not impervious to social effects because the mass
of ownership with the problem of maintaining of the population is not without power. Capital
decentralized organizational pluralism, Dahl and labor exist, after all, in a conflictual relation-
(1982, p. 127) is in a position to conclude that, "It ship in which capital, though by far the dominant
is fair to say that today most democratic socialists power, is by no means omnipotent. Individual
are pluralists, if not explicitly at least by implica- capitalists may be regulated and controlled or
tion." With this, the way is open for a rapproche- even expropriated if bad social effects generate
ment between pluralists and "Marxist human- enough danger to the overall system. But in
ists." The class struggle, as a barrier between general, private property rights and the profits
pluralist and class analysis of political and that flow from them are not a form under
economic power, is thus overcome. capitalism; they are essential forms. Under
From the perspective of class analysis, however, capitalism the state does not exist to give effect to
Dahl's treatment of capitalist political economy the rights of the public over private corporations.
suffers a fatal defect: it fails to give classes their The state exists for the opposite purpose: to pro-
due. This is no small omission if your theory puts tect the rights of private property from unwanted
a profit-making class at the center of its analysis, intrusion by the nonowning public. This is what
sees profit-making as inextricably linked to class analysis means when it asserts that the state
ownership rights under capitalist social relations, is not merely a state in capitalist society, some sort
and sees the essential driving force in capitalism- of superstructure above the fray, but is rather a
the pivot around which all else turns-as the pro- capitalist state. Dahl inverts these relationships
duction of profits. Just because most owners no and calls for rapprochement between pluralism
longer directly run corporations does not mean and class analysis.
they no longer control (on issues that count) those Class analysis has difficulty responding to the
who do. Dahl's argument rests on the separation call because it sees the central political economic
of ownership from control, but class analysis calls struggle under capitalism as the maintenance of
attention to return on owner equity as the all- private ownership and control and profit free
pervasive bottom line of capitalism. As long as the from the public controls suggested by Dahl and
system hinges on profit, capitalist owners cannot Lindblom. This is seen, furthermore, in terms of
be cashiered because they do not rule corpora- class (not just group) struggle. Government is not
tions directly; to do so mistakes subtle, indirect free to intervene merely because a rational cal-
power and control with their absence. If owners culation might point to certain advantages of
call the tune, they control the system even though public control. The extent of such intervention is
they may not manage it. There is, of course, no a hotly disputed matter. And as long as capitalism
doubt that the results of private enterprise are remains the dominant mode of production, the
vastly important to the public. Economic enter- extent of public control is perforce limited. It is
prises, whether publicly or privately owned, are limited by, in the first instance, the power of
properly thought of as political systems. But it is a capital, but it is also limited by the unexamined
rather large leap from these observations to the premises of a capitalist system, one of which is
view that the economy is a public economy whose that government exists not as a foil to capital, but
performance is to be judged by social effects. By as guarantor. Class analysis thus challenges one of
simply asserting the public character of the econ- the fundamental presuppositions of pluralism: the
omy, pluralism II virtually redefines the private impartiality of the state.
enterprise system into a public enterprise system. Such considerations are largely absent from
In a flash, large chunks of the American economy pluralism's analysis of political economy. Rather
are "collectivized," by definition. than seeing private ownership and control as a
Capitalist owners and managers might well ob- structural feature of capitalism, pluralism tends to
ject to such treatment. A class approach to the reduce such issues to matters of rational choice
study of capitalist political economy would never and public opinion. From a class perspective this
conclude that private ownership and control is but runs the risk of trivializing the discussion.
one among many alternative economic forms. For example, Dahl and Lindblom ask why the
Class analyses of capitalism begin with people American economy has remained more private
who own private property and the means of pro- than they expected it would in the early 1950s.
duction, who employ lesser owners and non- Their answer has nothing to do with basic struc-
owners to manage and produce goods and services tural features of the political economy. In what is
for profit, and whose power to do so is grounded for class analysis a form of blaming the victim, the

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 375

American people pushers, are


and the power relationship between
said to them have
commitment to must not be confused.
private ownersh
Contrary to Dahl's Absent a fullandappreciation for the structural
Lindblom
the American people relationships of capitalist
did political
not economy,
accep
ments in socialist pluralism thought."
II refers back to the American people
Indee
people are seen as being "addicted" to private and public opinion to explain why the system re-
ownership and control. Speaking of their 1953 mains dominantly capitalist. Public opinion is
prediction that valid elements in socialism wouldthus treated as a major independent variable, and
gain acceptance, they declare: the thrust of the critique is directed at changing
opinion through rational discourse, debate, and
We were wrong. In particular, Americans seem
education.
to suffer almost as much today from a doc-
A structural analysis recognizes that public
trinaire bias in favor of private ownership and
control of economic enterprises as they did when opinion may have an effect under certain condi-
we wrote. The fact that the dominant form of tions, but, in the argot of political science, class
business enterprise in the United States is the pri- analysts are inclined to view public opinion as a
vately owned and controlled corporation is not a "dependent variable." Under a capitalist system
product of even a moderately rational public there is no such thing as a free marketplace of
calculation of relative advantages. In fact, no ideas. Class analysis probes for the underlying
such public inquiry has taken place in the United causes of public opinion and locates them in the
States (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxviii). relationships among the classes and class fractions
(groups) that constitute capitalist society. The
Characterizing their own approach to such liberal notion underlying public opinion, that
questions as "non-doctrinaire" and "prag- ideas compete in a free marketplace and the best
matic," they assumed in 1953 that the compara- ideas win out, shifts the emphasis away from the
tive advantages of public ownership and control structuralist insistence on the connection between
would lead to an increase in the public sector. interests and ideology. Objective interest and
But, again, they acknowledge they were wrong. ideology may not coincide in all individuals, but
Private enterprise "continues to give excessive in the social aggregate there is a strong tendency
weight to the particularistic interest of managersfor ideology to be shaped in interaction with
and investors in economic decisions of great im- material life experience (praxis). When pluralists
portance to many others" (Dahl & Lindblom, treat public, opinion as an independent variable,
1976, p. xxix). they reify ideas and opinion. Under capitalism,
In follow-up studies, both Dahl and Lindblom class analysis insists, some ideas are more free and
extend their probing critique of capitalism (Dahl, equal than others, and in any event, ideas have
1982, ch. 6; Lindblom, 1977, ch. 14). Had they limited independent effect.
given less weight to public opinion, however, they Class analysis sees capitalism as a political
might not have been so surprised that the Ameri- economy objectively rooted in unequal power
can public stuck with capitalism. For one thing, based on the unequal private ownership and con-
no choice between socialism and capitalism was trol of the necessary means of social production.
offered the American people by the two major Changes in capitalism must perforce raise ques-
parties, both of which are firmly committed to tions of class conflict, not mere public opinion
capitalism. But more basic doubts can be raised formation. By failing to take such considerations
over the assertion that the problem of control fully into account, Dahl and Lindblom have from
must be considered to precede the problem of the class perspective only weakly anchored their
ownership. Under capitalism, it is just the reverse.critical analysis of capitalism. As a necessary con-
The essence of ownership is control, and just sequence, their call for reforms is likewise only
because it is indirect does not make it any less loosely based, theoretically speaking.
controlling.
Class analysis cannot consider such basic ques-
tions as ownership and control apart from the The Pluralist Theory of Equality
realization that the private stakes and power of a
class are at risk in conflicts over public vs. private Historically, pluralism and class analysis have
property. Dahl and Lindblom are no doubt aware clashed head-on over the issue of equality. Both
of the high stakes involved in such questions, but theories endorse equality and present themselves
such matters are not central to their analysis. In as ways of attaining it, but this is possible only
light of the formidable barriers to public control,because they have meant radically different things
it may be a bit excessive to place most of the by the term. Pluralist democracy, furthermore,
blame on the American people for the lack of pits equality as a value against a second great
public control. Where there are addicts, there are democratic value, liberty, and tends to see the two

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376 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77

as trade-offs. In the nineteenth century, as Lind- able. " It is so intolerable, in fact, that he has kind
blom (1977, p. 163) notes, "Marx and the social- words to say for central government tax and
ists became the spokesmen for equality, liberals transfer payments to reduce inequality, as long as
the spokesmen for liberty." Since then, as he also individuals are free to spend as they choose.
notes, the value of equality has been subordinated There are, however, three major defects in
to liberty in liberal democratic theory. pluralism's treatment of equality. First, pluralism
Marx and later socialists deny the contradiction has no clear criteria or standard for assessing what
between equality and liberty. True liberty is im- is just or unjust about the distribution of values in
possible without equality; to be truly free, in- society. Second, pluralism treats public opinion as
dividuals in society must be roughly equal in the the explanation of inequality in the United States
means necessary to exercise freedom. Far from and as the vehicle for future egalitarian changes.
being opposed to liberty, equality is its necessary Third, not all groups in the pluralist United States
condition. are equal, as pluralism grants in the privileged-
For Dahl (1982, p. 108) "Democracy is and has position-of-business argument, but the special
always been closely associated in practice with place of business has not yet been fully integrated
private ownership of the means of production." into a theory rooted in multiple, independent, and
By democracy, of course, Dahl means liberal or autonomous groups as the necessary building
bourgeois democracy, not democracy in the blocks of pluralist democracy.
socialist sense. But the close connection between
capitalism and liberal democracy raises the knotty Just and Unjust Distribution
issue of substantive equality vs. equality of oppor-
tunity. If the means of production are privately Pluralism's discussion of equality is curiously
and unequally owned under capitalism, capitalism indeterminate because pluralism lacks a clear
seems to be based on substantive economic in- principle or theory for assessing just and unjust
equality, from which flows, as Dahl admits, a cer- distributions of wealth, income, and property. It
tain level of political inequality. The only form of lacks a theory of value. Consider the issue of
equality that is logically compatible with sub- political equality. Because political equality is ob-
stantive inequality is equality of opportunity viously undermined to some degree by economic
which, as Scharr (1967) and others have argued, is inequality, pluralism's call for redistribution
really the equal opportunity to become unequal. makes good logical sense. But in the past,
From Thomas Jefferson's defense of the natural pluralism has not set equality of conditions as its
aristocracy of talent, through social Darwinism's goal. Without an underlying theory of value, it is
defense of the survival of the fittest, to present- impossible to assess clearly and logically why a
day exaltations of individualism and competition, particular distribution is just or unjust. "Inequali-
liberal democracy has consistently defended equal ties in distribution are, of course, not inherently
opportunity and the inequalities in the distribu- unjust" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxi). In
tion of rewards that flow naturally from it. The other words, inequality is not in principle bad;
question this raises is, of course: Can pluralist or ceteris paribus, some inequality is in principle
liberal democracy be reconciled with class or just. Inequality, then, is not a matter of principle
socialist democracy if the two theories conflict so but of pragmatics: the degree of inequality ex-
profoundly over the priority and meaning of ceeds any principle of distributive justice Dahl
equality? and Lindblom find acceptable. They therefore
The decisive shift of pluralism II is toward sub- deplore the gross level of inequality and call for
stantive equality and away from equal opportuni- (unspecified) egalitarian changes.
ty as the preferred democratic ideal. Having called When Dahl and Lindblom endorse the redis-
for the redistribution of wealth and income, Dahl tribution of wealth and income, they endorse sub-
and Lindblom (1976) logically break the historical stantive equality, not mere equality of opportuni-
connection between capitalism and liberal democ- ty. When they endorse structural reforms, the
racy. They also partially correct pluralism's suggestion is made that structural reforms should
tendency to separate political and economic be made to promote substantive equality. But
equality by noting that, "We cannot move closer when they simultaneously argue that inequality is
to greater equality in access to political resources not unjust per se and do not confront the key
without greater equality in the distribution of, issue of degrees of inequality, they cloud the case
among other things, wealth and income" (p. for equality. The flip side of the question of how
xxxii). Dahl (1982, p. 117), writing separately a much equality pluralism supports is how much in-
few years later, concludes that the "distribution equality it is willing to tolerate. In Dahl's case the
of advantages and disadvantages is often arbi- argument for redistribution and equality leads to
trary, capricious, unmerited, and unjust, and in a box canyon of an indefinite number of prin-
virtually all advanced countries no longer toler- ciples that might be used to allocate incomes, no

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 377
one seeming or
of which is clearly acceptance of greater substantive equality
theoretically supe
as a social goal.
the others (Dahl, 1982, pp. 135-137). Econo
to which Dahl turns How for does class analysis approach
help, lacks equality
a theo
value that can addressunder capitalist
just social
andrelations?unjust
Such questions dist
tions (1982, p. 134). raise
The a host of complex issues that cannot
marginal theory be dis- o
does not traffic in cussed
such here, but the starting point of any com- issu
philosophical
hence is of no help. parison
Unless would have to be Marx's
and untilaudacious plurali
claim
dresses the question in volume
of 3how of Capital that
much he had uncovered the
equality
innermost
or unjust, the critical secret, the hiddenof
question basis of the entire
degree go
ging. Calls for more socialequality,
structure of capitalism, and with it the
however att
political form of the capitalist
they -may sound politically, remainstate. What wasunsup
the
theoretically. key that could unlock so much knowledge? It was
The obvious candidatethe relationship
for between
an capitalists and workers
egalitarian s
"in which unpaid surplus
dard is Rawls's difference labour is pumped out
principle; of
which
fends "inequalities direct
ofproducers,
wealth land which]and determinesauthori
the rela-
tionship of rulers
just only if they result in and ruled, as it grows directly
compensating b
for everyone, and inoutparticular
of production itself and, for
in turn, reacts
the upon least
taged members of society" (Rawls, 1971, pp. it as a determining element" (Marx, 1967, III, p.
14-15). Neither Dahl in Dilemmas of Pluralist 791).
Democracy (1982) nor Lindblom in Politics and Marx was quick to recognize that although he
Markets (1977) makes much of Rawls. At firstsaw the surplus-labor relationship as the key to
glance, Rawls's principle would seem attractive to understanding capitalism, the same economic
pluralists: it defends inequality as just as long as, base could give rise to infinite variation depending
somehow, everyone-most particularly the least on innumerable different empirical circum-
advantaged-are made better off. Yet even if stances, natural environment, and racial relations,
Rawls were integrated into pluralist theory, theamong other determinants. But the important
fundamental dilemma of substantive equality point for this discussion is that Marx's claim
would remain. Not only is Rawls's principle diffi- points up a key difference between pluralism and
cult to apply in specific areas; it does not addressclass analysis: class analysis proceeds from an ex-
specifically the overall shape of a just social divi- plicit theory of value; pluralism does not.
sion (for discussion see Amdur, 1980). Marx anchors Capital in a theory of value for a
A related problem with pluralism's treatment ofvery good reason. Without a theory of value, he
equality is the theory's tendency, still, to separate was at a loss to present a principled attack on
political equality from economic equality, a capitalism. He might personally deplore inequal-
separation which, for class analysis, makes little ity, but he needed a theory of value to establish
sense. Pluralism is quite clear that economic in-socialism as qualitatively superior to capitalism.
equality frequently undermines political equality,His answer was the labor theory of value and, for
but in Dahl's work, for all the apparent supportall the debate that has surrounded that theory of
for redistribution, the theory actually shies away value, at least he had one.
from making an unequivocal endorsement. In his For Marx, concentrating on equality of distri-
essay on liberal democracy, Dahl (1979a, pp. bution was a superficial level of analysis. No
65-66) rejects direct redistribution on grounds that amount of reform in distribution could alter the
it would require a major historical commitment to fundamental inequality of capitalism: those who
distributive justice, and such major changes are own the means of production stand in an ex-
unlikely in the American system where intense ploitative relationship to those who don't. This
minorities are powerful. These pragmatic objec- was objectionable to Marx not primarily because
tions, however valid, should not be allowed to everyone in society should have exactly the same
mask the logical dilemma: if, as pluralism now wealth or income. Marx felt that bourgeois
grants, economic resources are often directly con-theories of distribution obscured the central issue
vertible into political resources, it seems to followof social class that underlies distribution; in effect
that political equality requires the redistributionsuch theories negate the one thing all commodities
of economic resources. Dahl, however, refuses to have in common: their origin in human labor
go this far. He prefers regulating the political ef-power (Meek, 1956, p. 229). However flawed
fects of economic inequalities, a position that, atMarx's labor theory may be, future comparisons
best, deals only indirectly with the problem. Regu-of pluralism and class analysis await the former's
lating the political effects of economic inequality attention to a theory of value that can address the
(e.g., by controlling campaign contributions) may question of just and unjust distribution. Until
promote equality indirectly, but it seems a major that theory is offered, the two theories cannot
concession and a move away from pluralism II's join clearly on the most fundamental question of

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378 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77

(Dahl &women
all: why, if everywhere men and Lindblom, 1976,
arep.born
xxxvi). This pluralism
equal, are the many everywhere regularly chained
acknowledges.
in submission to the few? A related inegalitarian feature of polyarchy is
the privileged position of business. Business is not
Public Opinion just anther interest group. True, it plays a power-
ful interest-group role. But it also transcends such
A second problem with the pluralist treatment a limited role. As Dahl and Lindblom describe it,
of equality is that, again, the problem is laid at the the American political economy is co-directed un-
doorstep of the American people. Speaking of equally by business and government, and in that
their call for a "fairer" share of income and order. Great public decisions are left to the
wealth: "Until more Americans accept this view market; government's job is to induce (not com-
and act on it, the United States will not be the pro- mand) business to perform its functions. Pluralist
gressive society we wrongly assumed it to be at the theories that stress balance and countervailing
time we wrote. Polyarchy may continue to exist at power among interest groups, and fail to take into
the present level, but democracy will still remain a account the unique advantages enjoyed by
long way off" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. business, are thereby impeached by Dahl and
xxxii). Both Dahl and Lindblom repeat these Lindblom.
arguments in their post-1976 work. Having thus arrived roughly at where Marx
There are dangers in conceptualizing the prob- began, Dahl and Lindblom nevertheless continue
lem in terms of public opinion. One danger is that to endorse the theory and practice of pluralism.
one of the best known surveys on equality in Indeed, they even detect a lessening of antipathy
America shows that the mass of the American toward pluralism among European "Marxist
people has been more supportive of economic humanists" and suggest an emerging consensus
equality than the elites (McClosky, 1964, p. 369). on the need for autonomous groups as a bridge
But public opinion is notoriously volatile, and this between the two opposing theoretical camps. As
is not the main point. Far more significant, from Dahl and Lindblom see it, the rigidly antipluralist
the class perspective,.is the unreality of relying on Marxism of Stalin is on the way out, so the door is
public opinion to advance equality. These are open to a reconciliation between pluralism and
matters that, under capitalism, are systematically"Marxist humanism."
excluded from the American political arena. It is "But what about equality?" the skeptic may
hardly the American people's fault that wealth well ask. If even pluralists agree that business oc-
and income are highly concentrated. Nor will cupies a superior position in capitalism, if plural-
public opinion necessarily bring about more ists recognize that differential group power may
equality. In a capitalist setting economic equality act as an obstacle to democratization, and if
is not even a virtue, let alone a matter to be de- pluralist politics tends to reflect and reinforce the
cided by public debate. The realization of equality advantages of the better-off, business-oriented
requires fundamental changes in the system that groups may so impede equality that some central-
makes inequality a virtue, a system strengthened, izing, democratic, public force may be necessary
perhaps inadvertently, by theories of distributive to advance the egalitarian cause.
justice which, in the name of equality, justify its Dahl and Lindblom admit this possibility, but
opposite. reject it. In fact, they offer no solution to the ten-
sion between unequal social pluralism and demo-
cratic equality, but they are clear about defending
The Imperfect Balance of Group Power groups, and while rejecting one form of Marxism,
they extend an olive branch to another. In their
If the level of equality is viewed as a structural words, "Whatever the best solution to this prob-
feature of the political economy and not a matter lem (of equality) may be, for Americans, at least,
of public opinion, what is the relationship be- it is not to be found, in our view, in destroying
tween equality and another feature of the Ameri- organizational autonomy and replacing autonomy
can system, the existence of groups? According to with centralization, command, hierarchy,
Dahl and Lindblom, social pluralism, defined as abureaucracy, and domination by an enlightened
diversity of autonomous social organizations, is a elite" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxvi).
necessary condition of polyarchy. But pluralism Portraying the alternative to social pluralism as
sees two nagging flaws in polyarchy. First, not all "domination by an enlightened elite" may not ex-
groups are equal; not everyone organizes at the haust the possibilities, but it is less important here
same rate, and power resources are not evenly to debate the point than to note that pluralism II
distributed. Specifically, the better-off participateis as ideologically committed to social pluralism as
more. "As a consequence, government decisions was pluralism I. Pluralism puts considerable em-
reflect and reinforce a structure of inequalities" phasis on the social and economic inequalities that

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 379
undermine political cratic character of capitalist regimes.
equality. ItClassnow
the unique position analysis, of
of course,
oneasserts that the power of busi
elite,
American political business in- a capitalist system makes
economy. liberal
But, as
schneider put it years ago, the "flaw in the democracy a contradiction in terms. On this
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings point, as on so many others, the two theories
with a strong upper-class accent" (Schattschnei- stand so far apart that they are best seen as im-
der, 1960, p. 35). One has to ask whether or not placable opponents than as potential partners for
Dahl and Lindblom have faced up to the contra- a merger.
dictions they increasingly perceive among social
pluralism, equality, and polyarchy. Their faith in Structural Reform
the superiority of social pluralism and polyarchy
over currently available alternatives remains One area of agreement between pluralism II
strong, but the special place accorded business has and class analysis is the dismal performance of the
not yet been squared with a theory emphasizing a American political economy in the past few
multiplicity of groups as a precondition of decades. Both theories support major "structur-
pluralist democracy. al" changes. But on close inspection, they mean
The central question, of course, is can the privi- very different things by structural reform. In fact,
leged position of business be squared with plural-pluralism's call for structural reform is so condi-
ist democracy? Lindblom suggests it can't. Dahl's tional and narrowly defined that the two theories
answer is less clear. remain fundamentally divided over this question.
For Lindblom, the corporation is at risk in "Structural reform" is, of course, an idea
pluralist democracy because it is too powerful. closely associated with social democratic critiques
Implicit in this view is the assumption that of capitalism. The basic idea is that transforma-
pluralist democracy requires some sort of balance tional changes can be made in capitalism to reduce
of power among contending groups. After survey- or eliminate such serious capitalist "perversities"
ing the power of corporations, Lindblom con- as inequality. The endorsement of structural
cluded that on several counts they are dispropor- reform apparently brings pluralism and class
tionately powerful. He thus concludes Politics analysis, capitalism and socialism, closer together.
and Markets with the comment: "The large pri- But here Dahl and Lindblom take a step that
vate corporation fits oddly into democratic theoryradically alters their course and demonstrates the
and vision. Indeed, it does not fit" (1977, p. 356). continuing split between the two theories. It
Dahl is also troubled by the privileged positionoccurs when they question a feature of polyarchy
of business, but to date he has spent more time with which they are prominently associated: in-
refuting the claim that pluralism contends that all crementalism.
groups are equal or substantially equal in power Having observed that "the (U.S.) distribution
than in integrating the outstanding power of of income and wealth . . . remains pretty much
business into a pluralist framework. In his book, where it was at the time we wrote (1953)," they at
Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, Dahl critiques another point declare that "in most decades and
the rather "absurd" claim that pluralists work on in most of the polyarchies, incremental change
the assumption that each and every interest is has worked its effects over the distribution of in-
equally capable of defending itself (1982, p. 207). come and wealth, property rights, corporate
But if it is true that pluralism has always recog- structure, industrial relations, social security,
nized that not all groups are equal, it is also true resource use, energy conservation, and inter-
that pluralism seems to require the assumption of national negotiation" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976,
at least some rough equality among groups for a pp. xxxi, xxix). Not even the critics of incremen-
system to be a polyarchy. Unless power is de- talism deny that incrementalism may aid rational-
centralized among many groups, pluralism is ly calculated change, Dahl and Lindblom say on
falsified, and some form of elite theory or class behalf of incrementalism. "What has been
analysis better fits the empirical facts. The achieved in redressing the wrongs of inequality,
balance may be imperfect, but it is hard to see for example, should have been achieved many
how pluralism can dispense with the notion of decades earlier and is still inadequate" (Dahl &
some sort of balance, some sort of rough parity or Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxix).
countervailing power, without sliding over into Far from abandoning incrementalism, however,
elite or class explanations of power. So far Dahl and Lindblom, in their joint work and in
pluralism has not specified the parameters or subsequent individual publications, argue
levels of power distribution necessary for a systempragmatically that to propose nonincremental
to be judged a pluralist democracy. But if business changes in a society only capable of incremental
is as privileged and as powerful as pluralism now change is virtually a waste of time (Dahl, 1982,
says, vexing questions are raised about the demo-pp. 120-126; Lindblom, 1977, ch. 19). No one

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380 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77

knows, they assert, how to design a political "At the very least, there is a need to search for
system regularly capable of more than incremen- and to introduce new forms of economic enter-
tal change. Societies do change. Reforms do price.. .." (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxix).
occur. But the weight of experience convinces I think it is fair to conclude that Dahl and Lind
them that "incremental policymaking is an intelli- blom's endorsement of government ownership as
gent adaptation to features of society that make a means of public control is, at most, limited.
change difficult and slow rather than a cause of More broadly, the case for major structural
that difficulty and slowness" (Dahl & Lind- reforms concentrates on defects in the existing
blom, 1976, pp. xl-xli). More change will come decision-making and policymaking institutions of
about from accretion of small changes than ad- society, not class structure. Perhaps most surpris-
vocacy of large changes. "What is required," they ing of all, when Dahl and Lindblom face the ques-
conclude, "is not the fruitless advocacy of non- tion of how such reforms are to be brought about,
incremental reforms (as distinguished from a they answer-by the institutions themselves. "For
highly strategic advocacy of it in rare appropriate all our discontent with contemporary politico-
circumstances), but social inventiveness to in- economic institutions we are reduced to believing
crease the frequency with which incremental that it is through these very institutions that
alterations are made" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, society can build better institutions" (Dahl &
p. xli). With the removal of some veto powers, Lindblom, 1976, p. xlii).
they promise, incremental change will work its ef- Exactly how major structural reforms will ema-
fects on various problems confronting American nate from the very institutions that are so defec-
society. tive as to need major reform is not discussed in
From the reaffirmation of incrementalism, great detail, but it is addressed. Dahl and Lind-
which by definition ensures at best slow changes blom are aware that their position leaves them
in the status quo, one might expect Dahl and open to the charge that they suffer from a
Lindblom to caution against major reforms, but "residual naive optimism of liberalism." But
they do not. They believe major structural social institutions, they reply, do change. Reforms
reforms follow from their analysis: "It follows do occur. And what is the best and most common
from all we have said that we believe that major method by which these necessary changes occur?
structural reforms are required in the American Incrementalism.
political-economic system" (Dahl & Lindblom, Pluralism II resoundingly affirms incremen-
1976, p. xli). talism as the preferred method of achieving major
It might be asked, however, that if incremen- structural reforms in polyarchy. How does plural-
talism is a rational aid to change, if incremen- ism II arrive at this conclusion? It detects in in-
talism assures progress (albeit slow) on social crementalism a hitherto overlooked capacity to
problems, and if in any event nonincremental undermine the status quo. By increasing the pace
change occurs so rarely, why the call for required of incremental change, small accretions, far from
structural reforms in the American politico- being ways of ensuring modest changes in the
economic system? As defenders of incrementalism status quo, will transform the system. Incremen-
and incremental change, do Dahl and Lindblom talism emerges as a clever way of "smuggling"
mean by structural reform what most people social reform into society. In their words, "With
mean? Does structural reform mean the replace- its indirections, incremental change is a method of
ment of capitalism by a dominantly socialist 'smuggling' social reform into society. If that fact
political economy? Or is structural reform were more widely understood, there would be
another name for incremental change-souped- more smugglers at work as well as some learning
up incremental change, but nonetheless incre- of the smuggler's skills" (Dahl & Lindblom,
mental? 1976, p. xlii).
The fact is that pluralism II's support for It is certainly arguable how much structural
government ownership and control is softened by reform can be smuggled into the American system
several caveats: the issue of control precedes the through incremental methods, but further com-
issue of ownership, so if other control mecha- plications arise from a related contention.
nisms can be found, they may supersede govern- Although affirming the need for major structura
ment; government ownership is declared to be reform, Dahl and Lindblom oppose any changes
definitely not a sufficient means to public control;in the "general values" for which the American
in many cases it is probably not even a necessary system stands. Changes in general values are
means; and in some cases it may be a hindrance. neither necessary nor desirable. Structural
Immediately after the call for increased govern- reforms, then, are limited to those features of the
ment ownership, almost as if one were bargaining system that inhibit changes in "proximate goals,"
With capitalists and had just issued a threat, the not general values.
bold thrust is followed by a compromise offer: When Dahl and Lindblom discuss general

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 381

values, they seem to be referring to such abstract capitalism, pluralism either takes no such clear-
values as freedom, democracy, political equality, cut stand or affirms the opposite. This crucial dif-
and majority rule. These values are sacrosanct ference, when added to class theory's insistence
(though not absolute). The biases of American in- on nonincremental changes in class structure, and
stitutions against changes in these values should pluralism's clear preference for incremental
be maintained. Faster incremental change is there- changes not in class structure but in social institu-
fore restricted to "proximate goals." Here they tions, clarify crucial differences between the two
endorse not only the removal of barriers against theories.
change, but their replacement by biases toward Clearly pluralism and class analysis mean very
change. To give their views a full airing, a final different things by the term "structural reform."
quotation: Marxist class theory and even social democratic
theories use the term to apply to changes in
A bias against change in the aspirations or
capitalism and the class structure embedded in
general values to be pursued in the system is
worth preserving. But the bias against reformula- capitalist social relations., In sharp contrast, re-
tion of proximate goals and against institutional cent pluralist theory does not address the question
and policy change to attain liberal and of class structure in contemplating structural
equalitarian values is obstructive. The bias needs reform. Indeed, pluralism contends that struc-
to be removed. Indeed a contrary "irrational" tural reforms may emanate from the market
bias toward change is required to offset the system that structural analysis means to trans-
powerful forces that operate throughout society
form. In assessing pluralism's call for structural
to obstruct these changes that approach, but all
reform, therefore, it is crucial to note the singular
too slowly, the aspirations still to be prized (DahI
interpretation given the term. When pluralists
& Lindblom, 1976, pp. xliii-xliv, italics theirs).
propose structural reforms they are not talking
Pitching the discussion of values at such a high about egalitarian changes in the class structure of
level of abstraction reduces the conflict between American capitalist society. They are not talking
class analysis and pluralism. Class analysts are at about "phasing out" the capitalist class through
least as likely as pluralists to endorse such general redistributive taxes, controls on inheritance, or a
values as democracy and freedom. At this level, levelling of work hierarchies and rewards. Major
the debate between the two theories reaches empty structural reform for Dahl and Lindblom means
agreement. It is rhetoric. changes in the existing decision-making institu-
The real conflict over general values takes place tions of society; moreover such changes are to be
around what Lindblom, in his 1977 work, calls brought about slowly through incrementalism. It
"grand issues," and which he says business nor- is hard to see how class analysis and pluralism can
mally keeps off the political agenda: the private be brought closer together unless and until they
enterprise system itself, a high degree of corporate agree that such "grand issues" as the private
autonomy, protection of the status quo on dis- enterprise system itself, and the class structure
tribution of income and wealth, close consulta- that goes with it, should not only be placed on the
tion between business and government, restriction political agenda but resolved in such a way that
of union demands to those consistent with nonincremental progress is made toward true sub-
business profitability, among others (Lindblom, stantive equality.
1977, p. 205). Pluralism now seems willing to
place such issues on the political agenda, and this A Note on Class vs. Group
is indeed a change. But, again, unless pluralism
faces squarely how much change in the private "Furious controversies descend like swarming
enterprise system or in the distribution of wealthwasps on anyone who pokes the nest of class,"
is necessary to achieve such values as freedom andLindblom writes (1977, p. 222). But for all the ap-
equality, the basic questions go begging. In con- parently radical revisions of pluralism II,
trast, class theory asserts a contradiction between pluralism and class analysis remain fundamentally
Lindblom's grand issues and the general values divided over the "nest" of class. For Dahl, social
for which pluralism and class analysis both stand. class is "not unimportant" in political conflict,
The pluralist position is much less clear. Pluralism but in most democratic countries it "is only an
now admits some connection between grand element, albeit a significant one, in a pattern of
issues and general values, but is fuzzy about the political conflict that is rarely polarized" (1982, p.
crucial question of whether or not there is a con- 65). "We need to caution ourselves," Lindblom
tradiction, and how much change in the grand says, "against overestimating the effect of class in
issues (e.g., private enterprise) is needed to pro- retarding a fuller democracy" (1977, p. 355). The
mote the grand values (e.g., political equality). reduction of class to just one among many factors
Class or structural analysis insists that the grandinfluencing social life is still a major difference
values cannot be attained within the confines of between class analysis and pluralism.

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382 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77

As we have seen, pluralism was developed by ners and a large number of losers is Orwellian
Bentley as an alternative to and critique of Marx's newspeak. It defends inequality in the name of
class analysis. From Bentley forward, a long line equality (Scharr, 1967, p. 234), and helps induce
of pluralists have rejected Marx for exaggerating mass acquiescence in the perpetuation of an un-
the importance of class (Nisbet, 1959), for failing equal social order. To the extent that pluralism
to offer a clear and consistent definition of class does the same, it belies the espousal of substantive
(Aron, 1950), and for generally failing to ap- equality through the redistribution of wealth and
preciate the importance of cross-cutting cleavages income.
in reducing class solidarity and class conflict In the structural view, inequality under capital-
(Dahl, 1982, pp. 61-65). Pluralism and class ism is not a by-product of the system that is
analysis remain split, therefore, over the basic amenable to polyarchal corrections. It is a struc-
unit of analysis for society. In pluralist theory, tural imperative. It is one of the things that makes
classes have merely a nominal existence compared capitalism capitalism and distinguishes it from
to groups; in class analysis, groups are seen and socialism. From the class perspective, inequality is
analyzed as fractions or sub-parts of classes. Untilas likely to be significantly reduced or eliminated
some reconciliation of this conflict is offered, it isunder capitalism as the meek are to inherit the
hard to see how class analysis and pluralism can earth. The fundamental reason this is so is the
be joined along the lines attempted by Dahl and essential, structural relationship between capital
Lindblom. and labor in a capitalist society: they are, by
definition, unequal. Perhaps Marx, who drew at-
tention to this relationship with acid humor,
should be allowed to speak here. He describes the
root inequality, after the establishment of capital-
Summary and Conclusion ism, this way:

He, who before, was the money-owner, now


Pluralism II updates pluralist theory in light of strides in front as capitalist; the possessor of
such incapacities and perversities as Vietnam, labour-power follows as his labourer. The one
Watergate, and persistent economic and political with an air of importance, smirking, intent on
inequality. Despite an opening to the left, how- business; the other, timid and holding back, like
one who is bringing his own hide to market and
ever, pluralism II remains a theory that is logically
has nothing to expect but-a hiding (Marx,
more compatible with, and supportive of, a
1967, I, p. 176).
capitalist political economy than a socialist one.
Class analysis and pluralism are profoundly It might be judged excessive to contend that
split over equality (Dahl, 1979b; Green, 1979). pluralism is in danger of imploding from internal
Pluralism now pays attention to the problem of contradictions, but in light of the difficulties
economic and political inequality, but it falls raised above, it might not be excessive to suggest
short of endorsing full substantive equality as a that pluralist theory is in need of some clarifica-
social goal. As Bell has noted, the claim for tion.
equality of result is a socialist ethic, as equality A ofclass or structural analysis of American
opportunity is the liberal ethic (Bell, 1972, p. 48). political economy seems more consistent with the
Marxian socialism points toward substantive fact of gross inequality in wealth, income, and
equality because it is rooted in a theory of valuepower under capitalism. Capitalism makes a
that stresses the collective involvement of all fetish of commodities, not equality. Indeed, it
members of society in producing social goods. presumes unequal natural talents and abilities and
Pluralism lacks a clear theory of value, but its his- rewards, and justifies them under the theory of
toric attachment to equality of opportunity seems equal opportunity. Pluralist theories would be
to ensure the acceptance of more social inequality more consistent if they dropped the untenable
than is tolerable in class theory. This seems true, adherence to substantive equality and faced up to
moreover, even if pluralism accepts Rawls's the reality of inequality in the system of which the
theory of distributive justice as its own. It bears theory of pluralism is an integral part. Class
repeating that the difference principle defends in-analysis not only conforms better to many of the
equalities as just as long as they make everyone empirical realities of American political economy,
better off; it is not a straightforward argument for which saves it from wounded surprise over the
substantive equality. system's performance, but it clearly and con-
Pluralism I and II, then, despite the call (at least sistently adheres to egalitarian standards that flow
by Lindblom) for redistribution, seem more com- from its analysis of the class structure of capital-
patible with equality of opportunity than equality ism. If American social science means to explain
of results. Equal opportunity to compete in a race better, let alone help change the American politi-
that necessarily results in a small number of win- cal economy, the pluralist-elitist debate might well

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1983 Neo-Pluralism 383

be redirected in favor of explorations in class States and Australia. American Political Science
analysis. Review, 1981, 75, 581-597.
Kuhn, T. The structure of scientific revolutions.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
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