The self as social accomplishment

A second significant line of constructionist inquiry builds on the first. Ifthe self is socially constructed,
one asks, how are we to understand the processes central to this achievement? Echoing the earlier
discussion of the literary and rhetorical contributions to social construction, the major focus of this line
of inquiry has been on discourse practices. To be sure, psycholinguistic study of the relation of mind (or
cognition) to language, along with research into grammar and syntax, for example, has generated a large
corpus of literature. However, within a constructionist frame, this tradition has not been engaging. For
one, studies relating mind to language have presumed a dualism between mind and speech that many
constructionists call into question. Further, in its search for ‘the truth about language’, traditional
research was stripped of concern with political and ideological context, and thus oflittle relevance for
many constructionists. Inquiry into social achievement ofthe selfhas taken two major forms. The first is
concerned with the structure of language and the demands made by linguistic convention on the
conception ofself. The second has focused on ongoing conversational practices. In the case oflanguage
structure, for example, Sampson (2008) has drawn attention to the binary structure oflanguage and its
contribution to the self/other dichotomy. As Harre (1991) has also proposed, the existence of personal
pronouns (e.g. I, you, he, me) contributes significantly to an ontology ofseparate selves. Perhaps the
most prominent form ofinquiry linking discursive structure to conceptions of self has centered on
narrative. Drawing from a long-standing emphasis in semiotic studies on the formative influence of
narrative structure, scholars have variously explored the way in which conceptions of the self are guided
by a narrative forestructure. As MacIntyre (1984) cogently argued, one’s conception of self, and indeed
one’s moral integrity, emerges from one’s narrative of self. It is the form of this narrative, as shared
within an interpretive tradition, that underlies one’s sense of self. The work of Gergen and Gergen
(1983), Sarbin (1986), Polkinghorne (1988), Rosenwald and Ochberg (1990), and Bruner (1990) has given
the study ofnarrative a prominent place in the psychology ofthe self. The long-standing concern in
psychology with life history has also been highly congenial to narrative study. The work ofDan McAdams
(1985,1997) has underscored the centrality of narrative not only to self-understanding but to the
trajectory of one’s actions. His inquiry into ‘redemptive narratives’ has also fired interest in the
relationship ofself-understanding and spiritual traditions (McAdams, 2006). The second major line of
inquiry into the self as a social accomplishment has been concerned with ongoing interaction. Such
inquiry was initially stimulated by the work of Harold Garfinkel (1967) and the ethnomethods by which
realities are constituted within conversation. The link between ethnomethodology and the psychological
selfwas secured in JeffCoulter’s 1979 volume. The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in
Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy. Coulter’s work demonstrated the ways in which the selfis
continuously fashioned and refashioned as conversation unfolds. Inquiry into discursive positioning
(Davies and Harre, 1990; Van Langenhove and Harre, 1998) offered subsequent insight into a critical
aspect ofthis process. The concern in this case is with the way in which conversational interlocutors
position each other’s identity as they speak. However, while further work in discourse and
conversational analysis adds depth and richness to these views, such inquiry reaches a juncture at which
the specifically psychological self is no longer in focus (see e.g. Benwell and Stokoe 2006, and Buchholtz
1999). Such inquiry focuses almost exclusively on the spoken or written word, while simultaneously
placing the ‘conversational object’ at ontological risk. Thus, analysts will demonstrate how
conversational references to the self deconstruct the psychological referent. Attention is then drawn to
publicly defined identity.
Critical reflection on the psychological self
For the constructionist, the realities created by people together are functionally insinuated into their
daily relationships. The discursive ontologies and ethics are embedded within normal and normative
practices. Or, more succinctly, the discourses of daily life are constitutive of living traditions. In this sense,
scholars have been concerned with the way in which vocabularies ofthe selfboth rationalize and sustain
cultural practices. It is in this vein that many constructionists have drawn sustenance from Foucault’s
(1978,1979) writings on knowledge and power. Language, for Foucault, serves as a major medium for
carrying out relations. Because language constitutes what we take to be the world, and rationalizes the
form of reality thus created, it also serves as a socially binding force. By acting within language, relations
of power and privilege are sustained. And, by engaging in the further circulation of a form of language,
the array of power relations is further extended (see Rose 1985,1990)- In particular, as many critics see
it, there is a substantial dark side to constructing a world ofindividual and agentic selves. When a
fundamental distinction between self and other is established, the social world is constituted in terms of
differences. The individual stands as an isolated entity, essentially alone and alienated. Further, such a
view lends itselfto a prizing of autonomy—of becoming a ‘self-made man’, who ‘does it my way’. To be
dependent is a sign of weakness and incapacity. To construct a world ofseparation in this way is also to
court distrust; one can never be certain ofthe other’s motives. And given distrust, it becomes reasonable
to ‘take care of number one’. Self-gain becomes an unquestionable motive, within both the sciences
(such as economics and social psychology) and the culture at large. In this context, loyalty, commitment,
and community are all thrown into question, as all may potentially interfere with ‘self-realization’. Such
views represent an extended critique of Western individualism. (See e.g. Gelpi 1989; Hewitt 1989; Bellah
et al. 1985; Heller et al. 1986; Lasch 1978; Leary 2004.) These critiques become more pointed in their
implications when selfdysfunction is considered. At the outset, an extensive literature illuminates the
constructed character of the psychiatric concepts of mental illness, and points to the ideological and
political interests served by diagnostic categorization. Thus, for example, scholars have explored the
social construction of schizophrenia (Sarbin and Mancuso 1980), anorexia (Hepworth 1999), depression
(Blazer 2005), attention deficit disorder (Divorky and Schrag 1975), post traumatic stress disorder (Quosh
and Gergen 2008), and many other forms of ‘mental disorder’ (see e.g. Neimeyer 2000; Fee 2000). These
deconstructions of illness categories have been accompanied by critical assessments of the impact on
both clients and the society more generally. For example, diagnostic categories are variously seen as
devices used largely for purposes ofsocial control (e.g. client management, insurance justification), that
mystify the values agendas they express, and sustain the myth ofmental health practice as medical
science in such a way that problems in living are increasingly treated with pharmaceutical suppressants
(Kutchins and Kirk 1997; Szasz 1961). Further, by disseminating ‘knowledge of mental illness’ to the
culture, people cease to examine the societal conditions that may favor depression or hyperactivity, for
example, and increasingly come to construct themselves in these terms (Gergen 2006; Hare-Mustin
1994). Further, to be categorized as mentally ill frequently increases the anguish ofthose who bear the
labels. To hear voices, to be hyperactive, or to be chronically sad, for example, is not inherently to
possess an illness, and there are more beneficial constructions possible (Parker et al. 1995).