Lapaz Mark

Materialism had already appeared in ancient India by the sixth century B.C.
This is the
period which immediately follows primitive times. This period of primitivity is also called the
period of the Vedas, because the Vedas, the oldest religious poems of ancient India, afford
the best reflection of this period. The time in which materialism made its appearance is
called the epic period of India, because then the great popular epics, the Mahabharata and
the Ramayana, emerged. It was a time of great religious and philosophical agitation;
Buddhism then made its appearance as the new world religion and with it an allied religious
reform called Jainism. It was thus a time of profound crisis for ancient religious views, a
crisis for the ancient religion which bore the name Brahmanism. The members of the
ancient priestly caste of India were called Brahmans. It was a time of broad mass
movements against the authority of this Brahman caste and against the religious views on
which the authority of the Brahmans rested.
Pragmatism and conceptual pluralism

Having considered some of the epistemological aspects of Pragmatist thinking wemust
turn to the question of the selection of theoretical resources for analytical-criticalstudies,
together with some ontological issues connected with this. We noted earlier (p.) that
Mills associated with the sociological imagination a willingness to combine ‘ideas that no-
one
expected were combinable’ (1970: 232). This provides us with a Pragmatist escape
fromworries about ‘paradigm incommensurability’ (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Jackson and
Carter2007Burrell 2002, Keleman and Hasard 2003). A pragmatic pluralist strategy,
which ishelpful in this respect, involves the investigator of a particular sphere of social
activity, likeHR practices, drawing upon concepts and ideas from various disciplines or
perspectives to
build a conceptual framework suitable for that area of research (Watson 1997). In line
with Pragmatist principles, theoretical resources are selected on the criterion of
relevance to the issues arising in the investigation. It is vital, however, that the resulting
conceptual framework has its own ontological, epistemological and methodological
integrity. If one were studying HRM in business settings, for example, one could not, at
one stage of the analysis, treat those
businesses within the ontological assumptions associated with a ‘negotiated order’ (see
below
p ) view of the organisation and, at a later stage, adopt the wholly incompatible
ontological
position associated with the view of businesses as goal-pursuing systems or decision-
making
entities (‘the firm then decided to increase its production to further its goal of increasing
market share’).
To illustrate some of the principles and proposals that have been put forward so far,
we now turn to a small case study of an HR manager and some of the dilemmas she is
facing
in her work. The initial focus is on an individual, precisely as we would expect from a
piece
of work carried out in the spirit of the ‘sociological imagination’ and its concern to link
the
‘personal troubles’ of individuals to issues at a more structural level (in this case, both
organisational and global). The attention being paid here to the personal troubles of a
managerial employee in no way suggests that the problems of people in such relatively
comfortable positions in society are more significant than those of the relatively
disadvantaged. It is simply a matter of expedience and the result of the particular
research the
present author has been doing. The principles being applied are no different from those
that
would be followed were the focus to be on the ordinary workers in the two factories that
we
now turn to examine. The information used in the following narrative was mainly
supplied by
the individual research subject, Lena Marker, in the course of a number of informal
conversations and a formal interview in the setting of the business in which she was
employed
(an occasion which made possible a degree of direct observation of the business and
conversations with other managers and workers, one of the latter being a union
representative)
. Idealism
Jump to: navigation, search

This article is about the philosophical notion of
Idealism. Idealism is also a term in international
relations theory and in Christian eschatology.
For the Digitalism album, see Idealism (album).
Idealism is the doctrine that ideas, or thought, make up either the whole or an
indispensable aspect of any full reality, so that a world of material objects containing
no thought either could not exist as it is experienced, or would not be fully "real."
Idealism is often contrasted with materialism, both belonging to the class of monist
as opposed to dualist or pluralist ontologies. (Note that this contrast between
idealism and materialism has to do with the question of the nature of reality as such
— it has nothing to do with advocating high moral standards, or the like.) Subjective
Idealists and Phenomenalists (such as George Berkeley) hold that minds and their
experiences constitute existence. Transcendental Idealists (such as Immanuel Kant)
argue from the nature of knowledge to the nature of the objects of knowledge--
without suggesting that those objects are composed of ideas or located in the
knower's mind. Objective Idealists hold either that there is ultimately only one
perceiver, who is identical with what is perceived (this is the doctrine of Josiah Royce),
or that thought makes possible the highest degree of self-determination and thus the
highest degree of reality (this is G.W.F. Hegel's Absolute Idealism). Panpsychists (such
as Leibniz) hold that all objects of experience are also subjects. That is, plants and
minerals have subjective experiences--though very different from the consciousness
of animals.
Idealism in general is the metaphysical doctrine sketched in the previous

paragraph. A separate doctrine, epistemological idealism (also known as the "way
of ideas"), asserts that minds are aware of or perceive only their own ideas, and
not external objects. This was held by (for example) John Locke, who was certainly
not a metaphysical idealist. Berkeley's argument for his metaphysical idealism
was indeed built around the difficulties in Locke's epistemological position. But
other influential metaphysical idealisms, such as those of Plotinus, Leibniz, and
Hegel, are not based primarily on epistemological considerations. So "idealism" in
general--that is, metaphysical idealism--should not be defined in a way that makes
it depend on epistemological considerations.
The approach to idealism by Western philosophers has been different from that of
Eastern thinkers. In much of Western thought (though not in such major Western
thinkers as Plato and Hegel) the ideal relates to direct knowledge of subjective
mental ideas, or images. It is then usually juxtaposed with realism in which the
real is said to have absolute existence prior to and independent of our knowledge.
Epistemological idealists (such as Kant) might insist that the only things which can
be directly known for certain are ideas. In Eastern thought, as reflected in Hindu
idealism, the concept of idealism takes on the meaning of higher consciousness,
essentially the living consciousness of an all-pervading God, as the basis of all
phenomena. A type of Asian idealism is Buddhist idealism.
[edit] History
Idealism names a number of philosophical positions with quite different

tendencies and implications.
[edit] Idealism in the East
Several Hindu traditions and schools of Buddhism can be accurately characterized

as idealist. Some of the Buddhist schools are called "Consciousness-only" schools
as they focus on consciousness without any deity.
This short section requires
expansion.
[edit] Idealism in the West
[edit] Antiphon
In his chief work Truth, Antiphon wrote: "Time is a thought or a measure, not a
substance". This presents time as an ideational, internal, mental operation, rather
than a real, external object.
[edit] Plato
Main article: Platonic idealism
In common discussion, Plato is often referred to as an "idealist," because of his

doctrine of the "Forms," which are certainly "ideals," in a broad sense. But Plato
doesn't describe the Forms as being in any mind. Instead, he regularly describes
them as having their own, independent existence.[1] So it seems clear that Plato is
not, at any rate, a "subjective" idealist, like Berkeley.
Plato's Allegory of the Cave is sometimes interpreted as drawing attention to the

problem of knowing "external objects"--the problem that concerned Descartes,
Locke, Berkeley, and other modern philosophers. But the Forms that the Cave-
dwellers are ignorant of aren't "external" to them in the way that material objects
are for these modern thinkers. The Forms are the true realities, but they aren't
spatially outside us, as material objects are. So the issue that Plato's allegory
addresses--which is, roughly, how can we know what is truly real (and truly
good)?--is quite different from the modern issue of our knowledge of the "external
world."
However, even if Plato doesn't share the specific concerns of modern philosophy,
and of George Berkeley, in particular, Plato could still be a non-subjective idealist.
He could believe that matter has no independent existence, or that full "reality"
(as distinct from mere existence) is achieved only through thought. Bernard
Williams and Myles Burnyeat have maintained that Greek philosophers never
conceived of idealism as an option, because they lacked Descartes's conception of
an independently existing mind.[2] But Williams and Burnyeat didn't consider the
possibility that Plato could have held an idealism like Kant's, which argues from
the nature of knowledge to the nature of the objects of knowledge, or like Hegel's,
which denies that matter is fully "real"--without (in either case) reducing material
objects to ideas in a mind or minds.
The German Neo-Kantian scholar, Paul Natorp, argued in his Plato's Theory of
Ideas. An Introduction to Idealism (first published in 1903)[3] that Plato was a non-
subjective, "transcendental" idealist, somewhat like Kant, and Natorp's thesis has
received support from some recent scholars.
Criticism of Idealism
[edit] Immanuel Kant
In the 1st edition (1781) of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant described Idealism as
such.
We are perfectly justified in maintaining that only what is within ourselves can be
immediately and directly perceived, and that only my own existence can be the
object of a mere perception. Thus the existence of a real object outside me can
never be given immediately and directly in perception, but can only be added in
thought to the perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus
inferred as its external cause … . In the true sense of the word, therefore, I can
never perceive external things, but I can only infer their existence from my own
internal perception, regarding the perception as an effect of something external
that must be the proximate cause … . It must not be supposed, therefore, that an
idealist is someone who denies the existence of external objects of the senses; all
he does is to deny that they are known by immediate and direct perception … .
– Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f.
Enlightenment Materialism to Feuerbach
Gassendi, Pierre
1981 Institutio Logica (1658): a critical edition with translation and introduction.
Howard Jones, ed. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum.
Materialism languished throughout the medieval period, but the Epicurean

tradition was revived in the 17th century in the atomistic materialism of the
French Catholic priest Pierre Gassendi (1592 – 1655). Gassendi rejected the innate
ideas of Descartes and emphasized the inductive method and the senses as
primary sources of knowledge. However, as a mathematician, he also accepted
deductive reasoning. Gassendi also argued for a mechanistic explanation of
nature and sensation. Gassendi's theories are considered to have prepared the
way for modern empirical methods, anticipating those of the English philosopher
John Locke and the French philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac.
“About my imotion”
I’m just a simple person who have undiscovered mental behavior.

Do I really love dancing do I really love singing and so more things
that I belong inthis world. I cant imagine that all of environment
that I usually do is more different to others I so impressed to all of
them.. about my imotion….

Lapaz Mark

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lapaz Mark

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lapaz Mark

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Materialism had already appeared in ancient India by the sixth century B.C.

Pragmatism and conceptual pluralism

Jump to: navigation, search

Idealism in general is the metaphysical doctrine sketched in the previous

Idealism names a number of philosophical positions with quite different

[edit] Idealism in the East

Several Hindu traditions and schools of Buddhism can be accurately characterized

This short section requires

[edit] Idealism in the West

In common discussion, Plato is often referred to as an "idealist," because of his

Plato's Allegory of the Cave is sometimes interpreted as drawing attention to the

[edit] Immanuel Kant

– Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f.

Enlightenment Materialism to Feuerbach

Materialism languished throughout the medieval period, but the Epicurean

I’m just a simple person who have undiscovered mental behavior.

You might also like