BERNARDITA R.

MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
respondent.
114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case
3010 which became final for lack of an appeal. One of the parties in that case was
Macariola. On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion
which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November
11, 1963.

Lot 1184-E, which is one of the lots involved in the partition, was sold on July 31, 1964
to Dr. Arcadio Galapon. On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a
portion of the said lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion.

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged

respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte with "acts
unbecoming a judge." The complainant alleged that that respondent Judge Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010 decided by him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said provision.

HELD:

The Court finds that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola. The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment
of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For
the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

When the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period;
hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.

Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October
23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16,
1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become
final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, the respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon.

Therefore, the respondent Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals is hereby reminded
to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
MUTUC v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
NO. L-32717
Fernando, J:

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On Oct. 29, 1970, petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent, Commission on Elections, sent him
a telegram five days earlier informing him that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers.

Mutuc claimed that the prohibition violates his constitutional freedom of speech.
COMELEC answered that it does not deny the factual allegations in the petition but it
justified its prohibition that it is premised on the provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act (CCA). COMELEC contends that the jingle proposed to be used by the
petitioner is a recorded voice of a singer and thus a tangible propaganda material under
the CCA subject to confiscation. The Court issued a minute resolution granting the writ
of prohibition (prayed for by the petitioner) on the ground of the lack of statutory
authority to impose such a ban on the part of COMELEC in the light of the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, and that it is an infringement on the right of free speech of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not recorded or taped jingle is classified as an electoral propaganda

gadgets similar to the enumerated items banned by the Constitutional Convention Act.

HELD:

No. It is not classified as an electoral propaganda similar to the banned enumerated

items.

1. Following the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words

following any enumerated being applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifically referred to. What was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain
a favourable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. Also, the
enumerated items were more tangible than a campaign jingle such as flashlights,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches and cigarettes.

Respondent is also in violation of a cardinal principle of construction that a

statute be interpreted in a way that is in harmony with the Constitution. The
objective is to reach an interpretation that is free from constitutional defects.
 2. In its prohibition, COMELEC, in effect, imposed censorship on the petitioner.
Following respondent’s prohibition on taped jingles would negate indirectly what
the Constitution expressly guarantees/assures i.e. Free speech/free press
Taped jingles during campaigns is tantamount to freedom of dissemination of
information which makes more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.

3. The power of decision of COMELEC is limited to purely ‘administrative

questions’. Thus, COMELEC cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or
outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.

IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS

Constitutional Convention Act – makes unlawful for candidates “to purchase,

produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether domestic or foreign
origin.”
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Citation: GR No. 122156

FACTS

Facts:

Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine
government’s privatization initiative under Proclamation No. 50.

According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

Only two (2) bidders participated:

a. petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to

buy 51% of the corporation or 15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, and
b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad’s bid price of P44.00 per
share, pending the designation of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder partner and the
execution of the relevant contracts.

In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager’s check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid

Security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent refused to accept.

Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on
prohibition and mandamus. The SC issued a TRO enjoining respondents from
consummating and perfecting the said sale.

The petitioner hinged its arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution. It argued that :

a. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical
monument for the Filipino nation; and
b. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporation’s shares,
the hotel business of GSIS, which is part of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a
part of the national economy. Hence, the petitioner claimed that the corporation is
clearly covered by the term national economy under the contemplation of Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:

a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation

b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony

c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands

d. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place
if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the
Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing and minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is complete and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

Summary of Principles:

1) A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a

nation— it is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a

nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. lt
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded.

The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

2) A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

3) Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-performing. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes
of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.

4) Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.
Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

5) The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be
self-executing—the rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of
such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

6) A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in

another. Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph,
and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language
require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

7) When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. On the other hand, Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall
be preferred.

8) When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject—such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance.

9) When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel
has become a landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest;
its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.

10) Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision
is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the
bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the
land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO , together with 6,327,952
registered voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160

Carpio, J.

Facts:

Petitioners filed a Petition for Initiative and Referendum with the COMELEC to amend
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly Articles VI and VII to replace the present
Presidential-Bicameral system of government to Parliamentary-Unicameral system
using Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Petitioners claim that their petition was
signed by 6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same constitutes over
12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more than 3% of the
registered voters in every legislative district signed the same in accordance with Section
2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. The petition to change the Constitution involves sections
1-7 of Article VI; Sections 1-4 of Article VII and an Article XVII entitled “Transitory
Provisions”. The petitioners prayed with the COMELEC that after due publication of
their Petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for
the voters’ ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL BICAMERAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

The COMELEC dismissed the petition citing SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA
106 where it was held that:

RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the

Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system under Section 2, Art.
XVII of the Constitution. x x x .
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be
cured by “empowering” the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry the purposes of this act.

Considering the said dismissal, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on
Certiorari and Mandamus alleging rave abuse of discretion and to set aside the
COMELEC’ Decision and to compel the latter to give due course to their initiative
petition.

The Issues:

1. WHETHER THE LAMBINO GROUP’S PETITION COMPLIES WITH SECTION 2,

ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
THROUGH PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE;

2. WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS RULING IN

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, DECLARING THAT RA NO. 6735
“INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE OR WANTING IN ESSENTIAL TERMS AND
CONDITIONS” TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVE CLAUSE ON PROPOSALS TO
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION; and

3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE LAMBINO GROUP’S PETITION.

H E L D:

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. As
such, there is likewise no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This Section
provides:

“Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be DIRECTLY PROPOSED

BY THE PEOPLE through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum (12%)
of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.”

The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention vividly explain the meaning of the
amendment “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition”. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose
a constitutional amendment. IS THE DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT READY TO BE SHOWN TO THE PEOPLE WHEN THEY ARE ASKED
TO SIGN?

MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign? Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President…As it is envisioned, any

Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before they sign
such proposal”. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare the proposal and pass it around
for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” IS THAT THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL ON ITS FACE IS A PETITION BY THE
PEOPLE. This means two (2) essential elements must be present:
1. The people must author and must sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign for and on their behalf;

2. As an initiative upon a petition, THE PROPOSAL MUST BE EMBODIED IN A

PETITION.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who will express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETIITON “ ONLY IF THE PEOPLE SIGN
ON A PETITION THAT OCNTAINS THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS.

The petitioners bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures—that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition a copy of the document
containing the proposed amendments and as such, the people signed initiative
petition without knowing the actual amendments proposed in the said initiative. Instead ,
the alleged 6.3 million people who signed the petition had to rely the representations of
Atty. Lambino. Clearly, Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories,
and even the entire nation.

2. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the

Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress and a Constitutional
Convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. This is
clear under Section 1 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.

Where the intent and language of the Constitution under Section 2 of Art. XVIII clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people
cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. The
two are distinguished as follows:

“Revision” is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document

[Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater
portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the
revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original
intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must
contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which
one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.

“Amendment” of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a few
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of
changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is
to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,
1997 & June 10, 1997

RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the

Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system. Section 2 Art. XVII
is not self-executory and unless Congress provides for its implementation , it would
remain in the cold niche of the Constitution. RA 6735 in all its 23 sections mentions the
word “Constitution” only in section 2 and Section 3 as compared to the initiative on
“statutes” and local legislation. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735
is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry the purposes of
this act.

Enumerate the steps to be followed and the requisites to be met in order that the people
may proposed the amendments, repeal, amend or enact a law or provision of the
Cnstitution.

3. What are the different modes of amending the constitution? Distinguish “Revision”
from “amendment” of the Constitution.
“Revision” is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document
[Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater
portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the
revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original
intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must
contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which
one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.

“Amendment” of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a few
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of
changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is
to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. (SINCO, Vicente, PHILIPPINE
POLITICAL LAW).
Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate
opinions, 1 filed separate opinion

Facts:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the
elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on
account of alleged irregularities in their election.

The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although
they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been
introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted
upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in
the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the
necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths
vote in either branch of Congress.

The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives,
and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine
Youth Party.
Issue:
Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions
are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities.
The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled
bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification."
There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expedient scrupulous attention of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial
inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28196
NOVEMBER 9, 1967

FACTS:
The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to
the Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives
from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180.
The second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative
district, to be elected in the general elections. In addition, the third, proposing that the
same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House
of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently,
Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic Act
No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the
Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for
the holding of a constitutional convention.

ISSUE(S):
1. Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
2. WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution
and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?

HELD:

YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the
Constitution, is different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly
propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional
Convention to propose amendments.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as
ours— to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants
such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the
very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to
the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR,
and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA
III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO
SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
GR. NO. L-34150
OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all
elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending
section one of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines to lower the voting age to
18. Said resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which
refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice
to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire
Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no
force and effect as laws as far as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the
Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE:
WON the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional.

HELD:
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying
therewith are null and void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has
finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to
formulate, the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that
there should only be one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people
to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article
XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but
together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is
evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be
concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there
are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed
amendment. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the
constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not
have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant
value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide
for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country
into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on
the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part
and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the
effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions, which the
Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly,
there is improper submission.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
73 SCRA 333
October 12, 1976

FACTS:
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies (―Barangay) to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers.

Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of P.D.
229 applicable as to the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in barangays for the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued,
declaring therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will be submitted for
referendum at the same time as the submission of his (President) proposed
amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, 1976.

Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin
the COMELEC from holding and conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis
that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President
to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution;
hence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.

Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to propose
amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution. A
similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that even
granting him legislative powers under the martial law, the incumbent President cannot
act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, and that a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. The
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment
of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent COMELEC, maintains that
Petitioners have no standing to sue and that the issue raised is political in nature,
beyond judicial cognizance of the court. At this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power. The
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUES:
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and
1033 political or judicial?
2. Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the
procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the absence of an interim
National Assembly?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed therefore a sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:
1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by
the State for executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds. It is a judicial question.

2. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions
of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is
but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not to say
that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that
nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim Assembly
not convened and only the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the
urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.
 Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no
capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the
President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending
process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people.

3. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when
the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that ―it shall be held not later than
3 months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The period from
September 21 to October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The issues are not
new. They are the issues of the day, and the people have been living with them
since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the
contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous
plebiscites for constitutional amendments

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
270 SCRA 106
MARCH 19, 1997

FACTS:
Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a ―Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People‘s amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission
of this proposition to the people—―Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of all
elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.
VII and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?

The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the
IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator
Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory party
cognizable by the COMELEC.

Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and Delfin‘s
Petition to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following
arguments:
1. The constitutional provision on people‘s initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed.
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law after the
publication in print media indicating that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification
and not after publication.
3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the
―conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to the
Constitution are concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules
and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
law.
4. The people‘s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is
therefore outside the power of the people‘s initiative.
5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people‘s initiative, neither
the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office of the government has
realigned funds for the purpose.
The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for
Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator
Roco.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said
constitutional provision?
3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials as
proposed would constitute a revision, or an amendment to the Constitution?

HELD:
1. NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

2. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and
duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of sec.2, Art. XVII of
the Constitution. Although said Act intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system
and accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing Constitutional
changes.

3. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on

the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void, as expressed
in the Latin maxim ―Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In every case of
permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid.

4. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the

proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and national officials is an
amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition was
granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
64 PHIL 201
March 13, 1937

FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the respondent
publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for
printing.

ISSUE:
Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?

HELD:
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
stamps in question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase
“advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property
for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.

In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not
inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations.
The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2
of the petitioner’s complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
“to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country.” The officials
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance “to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people”. It is significant to note that the stamps
as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7, 1937.” What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila,
the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the
issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with
an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of
the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply
because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.

There is no violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The issuance
and sale of the stamps in question maybe said to be separably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church,
was not the aim and purpose of the government (to promote tourism).
Cayetano V. Monsod
GR No. 100113
September 3, 1991

FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments.
Commission on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and
challenged the nomination and the subsequent confirmation of the Commission because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:
W/N Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of COMELEC.

HELD:
Yes. Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In the instant case, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with the grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. After passing the Bar, he worked in his
father’s law office. Monsod also worked as an operations officer for World Bank Group
(1963-1970). Upon his return to the Philippines, he worked as Chief Executive officer of Meralco
Group, and subsequently rendered service to various company either as legal and economic
consultant or as chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary General (1986), and
National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers. Atty. Monsod’ s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Lawyer's Oath

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I
will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion,
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.