JULY 2017

CSIS BRIEFS
The Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue and the Maritime
Silk Road Initiative
By Jesse Barker Gale and Andrew Shearer MARCH 2018

THE ISSUE
Major geopolitical shifts in the Asia-Pacific in the last decade have led to a revitalization of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue between India, Japan, Australia, and the United States first established in 2007-2008.
China’s expanding maritime strategy and increasing assertiveness in land reclamation and territorial claims have
been a key driver of a strengthening alignment among the Quad members.
China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) offers unique concerns to each member:
o India fears encroachment on its zone of strategic interest as well as encirclement from Chinese projects in Pakistan.
o Japan is wary of China’s ability to influence the energy supply chains on which East Asia depends.
o Australia is concerned that China’s project aid could render fragile states more vulnerable to coercion.
o The United States is seeking a way to counteract Chinese influence, particularly in the vacuum left by U.S.
withdrawal from the TPP.
While an official meeting of the Quad in November 2017 included key issues like freedom of navigation, maritime
security, and respect for international law, official readouts of the meeting differed, suggesting that strategic geography,
threat perceptions, and dynamics vis-à-vis China vary among the parties.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the interests of the Quad countries are converging, and this underlying structural
dynamic provides a strong foundation on which the member countries can build an agenda for regional cooperation.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east

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O
n the sidelines of the November China in building a twenty-f irst-century Maritime
2017 East Asia Summit in Manila, Silk Road (MSR) to complement an overland Silk Road
the Philippines, officials from the to be built with Central Asian partners. Additionally,
United States, Japan, India, and the Chinese Military Strategy White Paper, released
Australia met to reestablish and in May 2015, declared that the People’s Liberation
re-conceptualize the Quadrilateral Army Navy (PLAN) would “gradually shift its focus
Security Dialogue (or Quad). These from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of
states originally came together as the “Core Group” to ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’”
provide urgent humanitarian assistance in the aftermath requiring enhanced power-projection capabilities already
of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. They then evident in increasing patrols of the Indian Ocean by
met formally just once as the Quadrilateral Security PLAN surface task groups and submarines. As with the
Dialogue in 2007 before newly elected Australian Prime overland Silk Road, establishing the Maritime Silk Road
Minister Kevin Rudd directed Foreign Minister Stephen involves significant investments in both economic and
Smith to withdraw from the nascent dialogue. Attempts security-related infrastructure around the Indian Ocean
by subsequent Australian governments to build strategic littoral, including in countries such as Burma, Pakistan,
trust with India and repair the damage to the emerging Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Djibouti. Often these
Australia-India security relationship were often rebuffed. activities involve predatory lending practices that feed
The reestablishment of the Quad a decade later points corruption and domestic political and social divisions,
to tectonic shifts in the geopolitics of the region and in contributing to wider regional concerns about China’s
the Asia policies of the members of the original Quad. long-term intentions. The revival of the Quadrilateral
Having resigned suddenly in 2007 after only a year in Security Dialogue needs to be understood in this wider
office, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—a consistent geopolitical context.
proponent of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategic
concept—has mounted a highly successful return to office
INDIA
The Modi government’s opposition to the Maritime Silk
since 2012 and has emerged as a key leadership figure
Road Initiative reflects two interlocking concerns. The
in the region. The Obama administration announced the
f irst is that it perceives the MSRI as a means to extend
U.S. “Rebalance to Asia”, and the Trump administration
Beijing’s strategic influence deep into India’s zone of
has officially labeled China as a strategic competitor to
strategic interest. Reinforcing India’s concern are the
the United States. Ambivalence in India about closer
efforts of the Chinese government to partner with
strategic ties with the United States under Prime
regional institutions over which China exerts significant
Minister Manmohan Singh has been replaced under his
influence. The second concern relates to India’s tense
successor Narendra Modi by a commitment to strengthen
relationship with Pakistan. New Delhi views both aspects
the U.S.-India security relationship as pressure over
of the Silk Road Initiative—the maritime and overland
China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region increased. In
routes—as attempts to “encircle” India. Compounding
Australia revelations of Chinese interference in domestic
this concern is the Chinese development of the Gwadar
politics and higher education and Beijing’s increasing
Port, a deep-sea port in the Southwest Balochistan
international assertiveness have triggered increasing
Province of Pakistan. Close to the critical energy lanes
public concern and more forthright government moves
from the Persian Gulf and the hydrocarbon-rich states of
to counteract growing Chinese influence in the region—
Central Asia, Gwadar is intended to form a natural link
including by rejoining the Quad.
between the overland and maritime components of the
China’s expanding maritime strategy and the increasing Chinese Belt and Road strategy. In addition, elements of
assertiveness of its land reclamation and territorial the overland Silk Road pass through disputed territory
claims in disputed areas in the South and East China in the Kashmir region—leading to Indian reservations
Seas over the past decade have been a key driver of this on the grounds of perceived threats to sovereignty and
strengthening alignment among the Quad members. territorial integrity. Although Gwadar is touted as a
Undaunted by the international arbitration judgment commercial project (as indeed are all the investments
invalidating many of Beijing’s legal claims in the South connected to the Belt and Road initiative), the increasing
China Sea or by international pushback, President Xi Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean raises
Jinping has outlined an ambitious regional maritime questions about this assertion.
agenda, encouraging Southeast Asian states to assist

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JAPAN Australia’s participation in the twenty-first-century
Japan’s concerns about the MSR initiative relate mostly Maritime Silk Road.” Australia’s decision to participate
to the risk it could be employed to limit or block energy in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
shipments to East Asia. Japan imports some 90 percent and the subsequent sale of the Port of Darwin to a
of its energy, leaving it highly vulnerable to supply-chain company linked to the One Belt, One Road strategy in
disruption. As noted above, the Gwadar Port project is late 2015 ruffled feathers in Washington and seemed
intended to function as a link between the continental to indicate that Australia was open to Xi’s entreaty.
and maritime strands of the Belt and Road strategy. Notwithstanding these decisions and China’s importance
China has already shown preparedness to exploit Japan’s as a trading partner, however, Australia’s response has
dependence on imported rare earths in pursuit of its been ambivalent. Australia has not formally joined the
political objectives. This precedent suggests it is not Belt and Road Initiative, while successive Australian
implausible that Beijing could seek at some point in the governments have refused Chinese requests to link the
future to play to Japan’s energy insecurity by routing a infrastructure aspects of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative
larger proportion of energy supplies through the Gwadar with the Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility,
Port, ultimately to be stored or resold by China, limiting citing concern over China’s assertiveness in the South
the amount of energy that passes through the Strait of China Sea. Recent unguarded comments by an Australian
Malacca. Japan’s sensitivity to this vulnerability can be minister responsible for development assistance show
seen in the comments of former Vice Foreign Minister that Canberra also casts a wary eye at China’s increasing
Akitaka Saiki that Japan sees no difference regarding project aid in the Pacif ic Islands to Australia’s near
security issues in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South north, fearing it could undermine governance and render
China Sea, or East China Sea. It is also a factor in Japan’s fragile states more vulnerable to coercion.
active effort to maintain and diversify its access to
facilities and resources, such as its partnership with India UNITED STATES
to create the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which aims to Like Australia, the United States lies outside the direct
promote development and connectivity between Africa route of the Maritime Silk Road, but not outside its reach.
and Asia for “realizing a free and open Indo-Pacif ic.” The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) originally offered an
Indeed, at the 2016 Tokyo International Conference on attractive U.S.-led alternative to China’s economic vision
African Development in Nairobi, Kenya, Prime Minister for the region, limiting the attractiveness of Chinese
Abe stated, “Japan bears the responsibility of fostering economic overtures in the Indo-Pacific. It would also have
the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of acted to reinforce the international rules-based order
Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the and the Trump administration’s proclaimed objective of
rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or a “free and open” region. Instead, the U.S. withdrawal
coercion, and making it prosperous.” The 2016 conference from this important, high-quality trade pact has hobbled
in Nairobi was the first in the series to be held outside American strategy in Asia and provided an opportunity
Japan. Not coincidentally, Kenya is home to the Port for the spread of Chinese influence. China even invited
of Mombasa, the only international port in Kenya, the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to join
largest port in East Africa, and a key target for the the One Belt, One Road initiative, underscoring Beijing’s
Maritime Silk Road. willingness to challenge the United States in its backyard
in the Americas. In his recent testimony before the
AUSTRALIA Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Kurt Tidd,
In 2011 President Barack Obama addressed the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, highlighted
Australian Parliament, declaring that the United States that the extension of One Belt, One Road to Central and
was a Pacific power and “here to stay”—underlined by the South America would create security vulnerabilities for
announcement that U.S. Marines and military aircraft the United States likely to “compromise communication
would henceforth rotate through bases in northern networks, and ultimately constrain our ability to work
Australia. Three years later, during a visit to Australia to with our partners.” Today U.S. officials responsible for
attend the Brisbane G20 Summit and finalize a bilateral fleshing out the administration’s vision for a “free and
free-trade agreement, President Xi Jinping told the open Indo-Pacific” are struggling to come up with a
same Parliament, “Oceania is a natural extension of credible alternative to TPP as the vital economic pillar of
the ancient maritime Silk Road, and China welcomes an effective regional strategy.

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QUAD 2.0 power shifts and the regional order comes under
Formal discussions regarding a revival of the Quad began increasing strain. Together with their shared values,
to percolate publicly in the latter half of 2017 as China high-end capabilities, and complementary geography,
expanded its security exercises into the eastern and this underlying structural dynamic provides a strong
western quadrants of the Indian Ocean. On October foundation on which the member countries can build a
25, 2017, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kano publicly practical, functional agenda for regional cooperation that
proposed the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Security embraces economic and diplomatic elements as well as
Dialogue in an interview with The Nikkei. Two days later, robust security collaboration. In the process they can
on October 27, Ambassador Alice Wells, the U.S. acting contribute to a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
assistant secretary for South and Central Asian affairs,
pushed back against concerns that China might see
Jesse Barker Gale is a research associate in the CSIS Alliances
the concept of a quadrilateral dialogue as a maneuver to
and American Leadership Project. Andrew Shearer is senior
contain China, noting, “[I] think it’s hard to see a meeting
adviser on Asia-Pacific Security and director of the Alliances and
of diplomats from four countries as a plan to contain
American Leadership Project.
China. I think it’s a natural expression and convergence
of interests between democratic countries in the Indo-
Pacific region and it’s a natural stepping stone from the Part of “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and
very productive trilateral conversations, exercises, and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region.”
cooperation that we’ve seen between India, Japan, and the
United States.”
The first Quad meeting on November 12, 2017, addressed
seven core themes: the rules-based order in Asia,
freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime
commons, respect for international law, enhancing
connectivity, maritime security, the North Korean threat
and nonproliferation, and terrorism. However, the official
readouts of the meeting differed in emphasis and specificity.
The Indian statement omitted any reference to freedom of
navigation and overflight, respect for international law, or
maritime security; the Japanese statement demurred on
any mention of “connectivity”; and only the statements
from Australia and the United States utilized the term
“quadrilateral”. These omissions and divergences are
relatively minor, but they do underscore that strategic
geography, threat perceptions, and dynamics vis-à-vis China
vary among the parties to the security dialogue. Managing
them will require careful management if Quad 2.0 is to
prosper, as will the sensitivities of countries in the Indo-
Pacific who could resent their exclusion from the grouping
unless it is seen to serve broader regional interests.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the interests of the
Quad countries — and likeminded partners throughout
the Indo-Pacific — are converging as the balance of

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focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific
policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to
be solely those of the author(s). © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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