Safeguards Implementation - SVS - 33

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Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

Safeguards Implementation
Practices Guide on Provision
of Information to the IAEA
Vienna, June 2016

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA
ISSN 1816–9309 IAEA Services Series 33
SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION
PRACTICES GUIDE ON PROVISION
OF INFORMATION TO THE IAEA
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTAN GEORGIA OMAN

ALBANIA GERMANY PAKISTAN
ALGERIA GHANA PALAU
ANGOLA GREECE PANAMA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA GUATEMALA PAPUA NEW GUINEA
ARGENTINA GUYANA PARAGUAY
ARMENIA HAITI PERU
AUSTRALIA HOLY SEE PHILIPPINES
AUSTRIA HONDURAS POLAND
AZERBAIJAN HUNGARY PORTUGAL
BAHAMAS ICELAND QATAR
BAHRAIN INDIA REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
BANGLADESH INDONESIA ROMANIA
BARBADOS IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BELARUS IRAQ RWANDA
BELGIUM IRELAND SAN MARINO
BELIZE ISRAEL SAUDI ARABIA
BENIN ITALY SENEGAL
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL JAMAICA SERBIA
STATE OF JAPAN SEYCHELLES
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JORDAN SIERRA LEONE
BOTSWANA KAZAKHSTAN SINGAPORE
BRAZIL KENYA SLOVAKIA
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
BULGARIA KUWAIT SOUTH AFRICA
BURKINA FASO KYRGYZSTAN SPAIN
BURUNDI LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC SRI LANKA
CAMBODIA REPUBLIC SUDAN
CAMEROON LATVIA SWAZILAND
CANADA LEBANON SWEDEN
CENTRAL AFRICAN LESOTHO SWITZERLAND
REPUBLIC LIBERIA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
CHAD LIBYA TAJIKISTAN
CHILE LIECHTENSTEIN THAILAND
CHINA LITHUANIA THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
CONGO MADAGASCAR TOGO
COSTA RICA MALAWI TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CÔTE D’IVOIRE MALAYSIA TUNISIA
CROATIA MALI TURKEY
CUBA MALTA TURKMENISTAN
CYPRUS MARSHALL ISLANDS UGANDA
CZECH REPUBLIC MAURITANIA UKRAINE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MAURITIUS UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
OF THE CONGO MEXICO UNITED KINGDOM OF
DENMARK MONACO GREAT BRITAIN AND
DJIBOUTI MONGOLIA NORTHERN IRELAND
DOMINICA MONTENEGRO UNITED REPUBLIC
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MOROCCO OF TANZANIA
ECUADOR MOZAMBIQUE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
EGYPT MYANMAR URUGUAY
EL SALVADOR NAMIBIA UZBEKISTAN
ERITREA NEPAL VANUATU
ESTONIA NETHERLANDS VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
ETHIOPIA NEW ZEALAND REPUBLIC OF
FIJI NICARAGUA VIET NAM
FINLAND NIGER YEMEN
FRANCE NIGERIA ZAMBIA
GABON NORWAY ZIMBABWE
The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The
Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
IAEA SERVICES SERIES No. 33
SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION
PRACTICES GUIDE ON PROVISION
OF INFORMATION TO THE IAEA

VIENNA, 2016
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SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES GUIDE ON PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE IAEA

IAEA, VIENNA, 2016
IAEA-SVS-33
ISSN 1816–9309
© IAEA, 2016
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
June 2016
FOREWORD
The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the
interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of
safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement
and is furthered through a common understanding of the respective rights and obligations of
States and the IAEA. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published IAEA Services Series
No. 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding and improving cooperation in
safeguards implementation.
To meet their safeguards obligations, States may establish different processes and procedures
at the national level, and set up their infrastructure to meet their specific needs. Indeed, a
variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to differences in the size and complexity of
States’ nuclear programmes, their regulatory framework and other factors.
The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the
experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA,
acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. This SIP Guide addresses the
important topic of the provision of information by States to the IAEA. Declarations by States
form the basis for IAEA verification activities, and the quality and timeliness of such
declarations impact significantly the efficiency of safeguards implementation.
The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and their
use is voluntary. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended
to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the
IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the
Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the
Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP Guide provides
information which States may find useful in implementing their safeguards agreements with
the IAEA.
The IAEA wishes to acknowledge the many safeguards experts and practitioners from
Member States who have contributed to the creation of this SIP Guide. The IAEA appreciates
the Member State Support Programmes that participated in Task JNT C01959: Member State
Contributions to IAEA Topical Guidance on Safeguards Implementation, which facilitated the
participation of external experts in providing input to these SIP Guides. The IAEA officer
responsible for that task and for this publication was C. Mathews of the Division of Concepts
and Planning.
EDITORIAL NOTE
This publication has been prepared from the original material as submitted by the contributors and has not been edited by the editorial
staff of the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the
IAEA or its Member States.
Neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for consequences which may arise from the use of this publication.
This publication does not address questions of responsibility, legal or otherwise, for acts or omissions on the part of any person.
The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal
status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.
The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to
infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.
The IAEA has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party Internet web sites referred to in this
publication and does not guarantee that any content on such web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Purpose, scope and structure ................................................................................................. 1
1.2. The State or regional authority and the State system of accounting for and control of
nuclear material ............................................................................................................................... 2
1.3. Collecting information and providing it to the IAEA ........................................................... 3
2. OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY STATES ..................................................... 4

2.1. Types of information............................................................................................................. 5
2.2. Facilities and LOFs ............................................................................................................... 5
2.3. Nuclear Material Accounting Reports .................................................................................. 6
2.4. Imports and Exports of Nuclear Material ............................................................................. 6
2.5. Imports and Exports of pre-34(c) Material ........................................................................... 6
2.6. Information required by an AP (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) ....................................................... 7
2.7. Special reports, amplifications and clarifications ................................................................. 7
2.8. Voluntary information .......................................................................................................... 7
2.9. Provision of information to assist the IAEA in planning its activities .................................. 7
3. ESTABLISHING A STATE SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ... 8

3.1. Designing a safeguards information management system .................................................... 8
3.2. Functions and features of a State SIMS .............................................................................. 10
3.3. Consistency between facility records and the State’s nuclear material accounting
reports............................................................................................................................................ 12
3.4. Batch reporting.................................................................................................................... 13
3.5. Setting up a new State safeguards information management system.................................. 13
4. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS ............................................................................................. 14

4.1. Formal and informal communication between the IAEA and State ................................... 14
4.2. Mechanisms for submission of reports, declarations and other State information ............. 14
4.3. Electronic mailbox .............................................................................................................. 16
5. INFORMATION ON LOCATIONS OUTSIDE FACILITIES .................................................... 17
5.1. Definition of a ‘location outside facility’ (LOF)................................................................. 17
5.2. Information provision related to LOFs ............................................................................... 18
5.3. Collection of information from LOFs operators by an SRA............................................... 18
5.4. SRA guidance and assistance to LOF operators ................................................................. 20
5.5. Characterizing nuclear material at LOFs ............................................................................ 21
5.6. Methods of nuclear material accounting for LOFs ............................................................. 21
5.7. Declarations of the sites of LOFs under an AP ................................................................... 22
6. INFORMATION ON FACILITIES (DESIGN INFORMATION) .............................................. 22

6.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 22
6.2. Safeguards by design dialogue ............................................................................................ 23
6.3. Design information ............................................................................................................. 24
6.4. Early provision of design information ................................................................................ 25
6.5. Design information questionnaire ....................................................................................... 27
6.6. Facility Attachments and updates to design information .................................................... 28
7. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS ............................................................. 28

7.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 28
7.2. Material Balance Areas and Key Measurement Points ....................................................... 28
7.2.1. Reactor MBA ......................................................................................................... 29
7.2.2. Fuel fabrication plant with three MBAs................................................................. 30
7.2.3. Uranium milling and concentration plant accounting areas ................................... 31
7.3. Establishing reporting codes for MBAs .............................................................................. 31
7.4. Key measurement points and KMP codes .......................................................................... 32
7.5. Book inventories (adjusted and ending).............................................................................. 33
7.6. Material balance periods ..................................................................................................... 33
7.7. Shipper – Receiver Differences .......................................................................................... 34
7.8. Unified Uranium ................................................................................................................. 35
7.9. Nuclear loss and production................................................................................................ 36
7.9.1. Nuclear loss ............................................................................................................ 36
7.9.2. Nuclear production ................................................................................................. 36
7.10. Material unaccounted for and uncertainty calculations ...................................................... 36
7.11. Techniques for minimizing MUF at bulk facilities ............................................................. 37
7.12. Discontinuing NMA and reporting in an MBA .................................................................. 38
8. REPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING INFORMATION .............................. 39

8.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 39
8.2. Code 10 ............................................................................................................................... 39
8.3. Reporting period ................................................................................................................. 41
8.4. Batches ................................................................................................................................ 42
8.5. Tracking batches at a facility and rebatching...................................................................... 44
8.6. Material description codes .................................................................................................. 44
8.7. Inventory change codes....................................................................................................... 45
8.8. Inventory change dates ....................................................................................................... 46
8.9. Characters and alphabets..................................................................................................... 46
8.10. Physical inventory reporting ............................................................................................... 47
8.11. Reporting nuclear material quantities ................................................................................. 48
8.11.1. Measurement basis ................................................................................................. 48
8.11.2. Units for reporting quantities of nuclear material batches ..................................... 50
8.11.3. Element weights of batches of nuclear material..................................................... 51
8.11.4. Weights of fissile isotopes in enriched, natural and depleted uranium .................. 51
8.11.5. Negative weight values .......................................................................................... 52
8.12. Corrections and adjustments ............................................................................................... 53
8.13. Category changes ................................................................................................................ 56
8.14. Reporting nuclear loss and production................................................................................ 58
8.15. Returning discharged fuel to a core .................................................................................... 58
8.16. Concise Notes ..................................................................................................................... 60
8.17. Concise note indicator......................................................................................................... 61
8.18. Textual reports (labelled format) ........................................................................................ 61
8.19. Continuation entries in Fixed Format Code 10 ................................................................... 61
8.20. Empty (Null) accounting reports......................................................................................... 63
8.21. Invalid accounting entries ................................................................................................... 63
8.22. Termination ......................................................................................................................... 64
8.23. Transfers to Retained Waste ............................................................................................... 65
8.24. Measured discards............................................................................................................... 66
8.25. Exemption and de-exemption ............................................................................................. 67
8.26. Rounding Adjustments........................................................................................................ 69
8.27. Quality control reviews of NMA reports ............................................................................ 69
9. DETERMINATION OF 34(C) MATERIAL................................................................................ 70
10. INFORMATION ABOUT IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ............. 71

10.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 71
10.2. Collecting information from exporters and importers ........................................................ 71
10.3. Reporting imports and exports of pre-34(c) material.......................................................... 72
10.4. Advance notification of exports and imports of 34(c) nuclear material ............................. 73
10.5. Transit Matching ................................................................................................................. 73
11. PREPARING ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DECLARATIONS ................................................. 75

11.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 75
11.2. Summary of declarations requirements by declaration type ............................................... 76
11.3. Collecting information to generate AP declarations ........................................................... 78
11.4. 2.a.(i) declarations............................................................................................................... 81
11.5. 2.a.(ii) declarations.............................................................................................................. 82
11.6. 2.a.(iii) declarations ............................................................................................................ 82
11.6.1. Collecting information about sites ......................................................................... 83
11.6.2. How to prepare the site declaration ........................................................................ 86
11.6.3. Providing information about managed access ........................................................ 86
11.7. 2.a.(iv) declarations............................................................................................................. 88
11.8. 2.a.(v) declarations .............................................................................................................. 88
11.9. 2.a.(vi) declarations............................................................................................................. 88
11.10. 2.a.(vii) declarations............................................................................................................ 89
11.11. 2.a.(viii) declarations .......................................................................................................... 89
11.12. 2.a.(ix) declarations............................................................................................................. 89
11.13. 2.a.(x) declarations .............................................................................................................. 90
11.14. 2.b declarations ................................................................................................................... 91
11.15. Review, approval and submission of the declarations ........................................................ 92
12. FACILITY OPERATORS’ ROLE IN PROVISION OF INFORMATION ................................. 93

12.1. Responsibility of management ............................................................................................ 93
12.2. Functions of a facility safeguards officer ............................................................................ 93
12.3. Communication channels between facility, SRA and IAEA .............................................. 95
12.4. Information about the facility design .................................................................................. 95
12.5. Nuclear material accounting concepts and information ...................................................... 96
12.6. Information about imports and exports of nuclear material ................................................ 98
12.7. Preparing AP declarations................................................................................................... 99
13. OTHER INFORMATION .......................................................................................................... 100

13.1. Special Reports ................................................................................................................. 100
13.2. Amplifications and Clarifications ..................................................................................... 102
14. INFORMATION PROVIDED VOLUNTARILY BY STATES ................................................ 103

14.1. Reporting stocks of HEU and Pu to the IAEA.................................................................. 104
14.2. The IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) .................................................. 106
14.3. Americium and Neptunium reporting ............................................................................... 107
15. CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRAINING STAFF ........................................................................ 108

15.1. Training on nuclear material accounting and reporting .................................................... 108
15.2. Training operators on provision of information ................................................................ 110
16. PROVISION OF INFORMATION FROM THE IAEA TO STATES ....................................... 112

16.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 112
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 114

ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 116
Annex I. EXAMPLE DIQ FOR A RESEARCH REACTOR............................................................ 119
Annex II. GOOD REPORTING PRACTICES TO ASSIST IAEA TRANSIT MATCHING ......... 129
Annex III. CASE STUDIES OF SRA EXPERIENCES IN DEVELOPING SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ................................................................................ 131
Annex IV. DIAGRAMS DEPICTING SECURE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A STATE AND
THE IAEA .......................................................................................................................................... 138
Annex V. EXAMPLE OF INFORMATION FLOW FROM A LOF TO THE STATE AUTHORITY
FOR VARIOUS EVENTS .................................................................................................................. 140
Annex VI. ISSUES RELATED TO REPORTING DEPLETED URANIUM ................................. 142
Annex VII. CASE STUDIES ON SAFEGUARDS BY DESIGN ..................................................... 144
Annex VIII. ADJUSTMENTS TO ACCOUNTING ENTRIES........................................................ 146
VIII.1 Overview of Accounting Entries ...................................................................................... 146
VIII.2 Header Entries .................................................................................................................. 146
VIII.3 Accounting (line) entries .................................................................................................. 146
VIII.4 Addition of an accounting entry ....................................................................................... 147
VIII.5 Correction of an accounting report header ....................................................................... 147
VIII.6 Correction of an accounting entry .................................................................................... 148
VIII.7 Deletion of an accounting entry ....................................................................................... 149
Annex IX. STEPS FOR REQUESTING AND REPORTING EXEMPTION .................................. 151
Annex X. EXAMPLE OF AN AP OUTREACH BROCHURE ........................................................ 156
Annex XI. EXAMPLE OF STATE DECLARATIONS OF PLANNED FACILITIES – FROM
2.A(X) PLANS TO DESIGN INFORMATION................................................................................. 157
Annex XII. EXAMPLE FORM FOR ANNUAL REPORTING ON NEPTUNIUM AND
AMERICIUM ..................................................................................................................................... 163
Annex XIII. EXAMPLE OF STATE’S GUIDANCE ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING
AND CONTROL TRAINING ............................................................................................................ 165
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ........................................................................ 169
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND STRUCTURE
The purpose of Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guides is to share information

about effective safeguards implementation practices for the benefit of all States, particularly
with the aim of enhancing their capacity and capabilities in the area of safeguards
implementation. States with Small Quantities Protocols are advised to also refer to the
Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (IAEA Services
Series 22)1.
This SIP Guide addresses the activities undertaken by a State to collect, review and provide
to the IAEA complete, correct and timely information, including, for example, nuclear
material accounting reports, facility design information, import/export notifications, and
additional protocol (AP) declarations.
The Guide primarily addresses the activities undertaken by the IAEA and States pursuant to a
comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) and an AP based
on INFCIRC/540 (Corr.). However, States that have concluded a voluntary offer safeguards
agreement (VOA) and States that have concluded item specific safeguards agreements based
on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 could also use this Guide to facilitate the implementation of their
safeguards agreements.
SIP Guides belong to a series of guidance prepared by the IAEA with the assistance of
experts from Member States. The Guides comprising this series are shown in Figure 1. The
SIP Guides further elaborate on the content of the Guidance for States Implementing
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21).
This SIP Guide addresses the provision of information to the IAEA, primarily Sections 4
through 8 of Services Series 21, which cover:
• Provision of initial information on nuclear material;

• Provision of information on locations in the State including facilities, locations
outside facilities (LOFs), and sites;
• Initial and updated State declarations on nuclear fuel cycle-related activities;
• Nuclear material inventories, inventory changes, exports and imports; and
• Special reports, amplifications and clarifications.
This SIP Guide also addresses voluntary provision of information by States about stocks,
exports and separation of americium and neptunium. Several annexes offer case studies and
examples of good practices.
1
This publication can be found at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10493/Safeguards-
Implementation-Guide-for-States-with-Small-Quantities-Protocols, and is available in English, French and
Spanish.
1
Key points are provided in coloured text boxes such as this one.
Implementation practices and examples are contained in white text boxes with italicized text.
The diagram shown in Figure 1 indicates the subjects of each of the four SIP Guides, and
their relationship with the higher level Guidance for States Implementing CSAs and
Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21). States with small quantities protocols are
encouraged to review IAEA Services Series 22. Other IAEA Services Series such as 11 and
15 (on AP declarations and nuclear material accountancy, respectively) provide topical
guidance in a number of areas. Guidance documents and many other resources can be found
at www.iaea.org/safeguards under the ‘Assistance for States’ tab.
FIG. 1. IAEA safeguards guidance related to CSAs.
1.2. THE STATE OR REGIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE STATE SYSTEM OF

ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
The IAEA and the State must cooperate to implement safeguards. States with CSAs are
required to establish and maintain a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear
material (SSAC). The SSAC and the State2 authority with responsibility for safeguards
implementation (SRA) are described below.
2
In the rest of this document publication the word ‘State’ is used in relation to either a single State or, as
applicable, a group of States which have agreed to establish a regional organization with nuclear material
accounting and control responsibilities or other responsibilities relating to the implementation of safeguards.
2
The State authority with responsibility for safeguards implementation is the authority
established at the national level to ensure and facilitate the implementation of safeguards. In
addition to its safeguards functions, the SRA (if established within a broader nuclear
authority) may have additional responsibilities associated with nuclear safety, security,
radiation protection and export/import controls. One of the primary responsibilities of an
SRA is to establish (initially) and maintain (continuously) an SSAC.
An SSAC as a system is comprised of all of the elements that enable the State to fulfill its
nuclear material accounting, control and reporting responsibilities. These elements include
information systems (computerized or paper-based); operators of facilities and other locations
and their nuclear material accounting systems that produce accounting data; various
processes, procedures and administrative controls (such as for import and export reporting;
collection and submittal of design information); quality checks; and the SRA itself and its
oversight activities to ensure all safeguards obligations are effectively met.
It is recommended that all safeguards responsibilities (pursuant to safeguards agreements as

well as APs) be assigned to the same State authority. However, sometimes a State may assign
some safeguards responsibilities to one State authority (such as nuclear material accounting
and reporting) and some to another State authority (such as preparing and submitting AP
declarations). This could be based on legal or practical reasons related to the functions or
competencies of certain State authorities. In such a case, the responsibilities of an SRA are
fulfilled by two or more State authorities, and those authorities should coordinate with one
another as necessary to ensure effective safeguards implementation.
1.3. COLLECTING INFORMATION AND PROVIDING IT TO THE IAEA
States are required to provide information to the IAEA pursuant to their safeguards
agreements and APs. Many States also provide information voluntarily to the IAEA. The
IAEA verifies information contained in State reports and checks its consistency with facility
records and with the results of its independent verification. Information provided by States
pursuant to their APs enhances the IAEA’s ability to evaluate the consistency of State
declarations to ensure they are correct and complete.
The volume of information provided by a State to the IAEA depends mainly on, e.g. whether
or not the State has concluded an AP; the number and type of facilities in the State; nuclear
fuel cycle-related research and development (R&D) activities carried out or planned in the
State; and the frequency of nuclear material inventory changes. A State with few or no
facilities will normally submit far less information than a State with many facilities. Section 2
summarizes the main types of information collected by States and provided to the IAEA.
INFCIRC/153 Paragraph 7
The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control
of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and such safeguards shall be applied in such
a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the State's system. …
3
The Agreement should provide that, to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards thereunder the Agency
shall be provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II below, with information concerning
nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to
safeguarding such material. …
INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) Article 2

a. [The State] shall provide the Agency with a declaration…
In order to implement its safeguards obligations, each State needs to establish three
fundamental elements of its safeguards infrastructure:
1) Laws, regulations and a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material at the
national/regional level, and designation of an SRA, which ensure that the requirements
of the safeguards agreement, subsidiary arrangements and AP (if applicable) are fully
met;
2) Infrastructure to facilitate the collection, validation and provision of timely, correct and
complete reports, declarations and other information to the IAEA; and
3) Infrastructure to facilitate the provision of support and timely access, to the IAEA, to
locations and information necessary to carry out safeguards activities.
This SIP Guide focuses primarily on the second of these three elements. Please refer to the
SIP Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities (IAEA Services Series 30) and the SIP
Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure (IAEA Services
Series 31) for more information on the other two elements.
2. OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY STATES

States provide a variety of information to the IAEA pursuant to their safeguards agreements
and APs. This section provides an overview of such information and the mechanism and
timing for its submission to the IAEA. Information provided pursuant to a CSA is submitted
in accordance with requirements of the agreement and as specified in more detail in the
associated Subsidiary Arrangements. This includes information about State laws and
regulations pertaining to implementation of the safeguards agreement, and the organizational
units (at the national and facility levels) responsible for safeguards activities.
Details regarding the format of nuclear material accounting reports are specified in Code 10
of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The contents and timing for submission
of AP declarations are specified in Articles 2 and 3 of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.). The IAEA
provides detailed guidelines on preparing and submitting AP declarations in IAEA Services
Series 11. Nuclear material accounting and reporting are discussed in IAEA Services Series
15.
4
This SIP Guide provides examples, good practices and explanations regarding the various
types of safeguards related information submitted by States to the IAEA.
2.1. TYPES OF INFORMATION
Information provided by States to the IAEA can be grouped into seven main areas:
1) Information on facilities and on locations outside facilities where nuclear material is

customarily used (LOFs);
2) Nuclear material accounting information;
3) Advance notification of imports and exports of nuclear material;
4) Reports on the import and export of any material containing uranium or thorium,
which is not 34(c) material (i.e. reporting under INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) paragraphs
34(a) and (b));
5) Special reports, amplifications and clarifications;
6) Information required by an AP; and
7) Voluntarily provided information.
Information is also provided by States to the IAEA for the purpose of aiding the planning of
verification activities. Each of these is described briefly below.
2.2. FACILITIES AND LOFS
Design information is submitted and updated as necessary for each facility using a ‘design
information questionnaire’ (DIQ), including a description of the form, location and flow of
nuclear material; a general layout; description of features relating to nuclear material
accountancy, containment and surveillance; and a description of existing and proposed
procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control and the procedures for physical
inventory taking. An example of a DIQ for a research reactor can be found in Annex I.
Information concerning LOFs is submitted using a ‘LOF information template’. This includes
a general description of the use of the nuclear material and its geographic location; contact
information; and a general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear
material accountancy and control.
Basic information about a facility’s annual operational programme, including its plans for
taking a physical inventory, working schedule, holidays and processing schedule (such as
outages, refuelling, etc.) must be submitted as specified in the Facility Attachment (FA).
Facility safety requirements (training, certifications) and radiological protection are also
described. In addition, as agreed between the IAEA and the SRA, supplemental information
might be provided to enable the IAEA to implement its safeguards approach.
5
2.3. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING REPORTS
When a State brings into force its CSA with the IAEA, it submits an ‘initial report’ on its
nuclear material inventory. This information and other information is used by the IAEA to
work with the State in establishing material balance areas (MBAs) that will be used to
account for nuclear material in the State and for concluding Subsidiary Arrangements.
Thereafter, the State submits nuclear material accounting reports for each MBA as described
below.
Inventory change reports (ICRs) provide information about changes in the inventory of
nuclear material (including transfers within a State from one MBA to another) and are
submitted as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements (typically within 30 days after the end
of the month in which the changes occurred or were established).
Material balance reports (MBRs) provide a summary of the material balance in the MBA
reflecting all inventory changes in a material balance period (MBP). MBRs are submitted as
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements (typically, within 30 days of a physical inventory
taking (PIT)).
Physical inventory listings (PIL) include all batches of nuclear material separately and
specify material identification and batch data for each batch at each key measurement point
(KMP). PILs are submitted with the corresponding MBR (except for an initial PIL, which is a
standalone report).
All nuclear material accounting reports are prepared based on information contained in
facility records (general ledgers, shipping documentation, measurement data, calibration data,
material movement logs, etc.). Complete and well-organized records and documentation are a
critical component of an effective nuclear material accounting system at each MBA.
As needed, States submit corrections to nuclear material accounting reports. States also
provide important information in the form of Concise Notes or Textual Reports, which are
explanations related to, e.g. nuclear material reporting or facility operations.
2.4. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Information is submitted by States on international transfers of nuclear material. Such

transfers are reported in advance, through ‘advance notifications’ of export/import. Once the
imports or exports have occurred, they are reported to the IAEA as an inventory change.
The IAEA uses this information to match transfers of nuclear material between shippers and
receivers. The IAEA evaluates the transfers to ensure all reported exports can be accounted
for and matched with reported imports; this work is called ‘transit matching’. Annex II
describes good practices for aiding the IAEA’s transit matching efforts.
2.5. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF PRE-34(C) MATERIAL
States also submit information on imports and exports of material containing uranium or
thorium, which does not meet the conditions specified in paragraph 34(c) of INFCIRC/153
6
(Corr.). In IAEA Services Series 21, this material is referred to as pre-34(c) material.
Whether the imports or exports are specifically for non-nuclear purpose or not determines
how they are reported (under a CSA or in an AP declaration).
2.6. INFORMATION REQUIRED BY AN AP (INFCIRC/540 (CORR.))
Initial and updated information is provided by a State with an AP in force3 as specified in

Articles 2 (content of the declarations) and 3 (timing and submission) of INFCIRC/540
(Corr.). Initial declarations are provided within 180 days after a State’s AP comes into force.
Thereafter, updates are submitted annually.
In addition to the initial declarations and annual updates, information is provided quarterly on
specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.),
including, for each export of such equipment and material: the identity, quantity and location
of intended use in the receiving State. Full guidance is provided in IAEA Services Series 11,
and implementation practices are further described in Section 11 of this SIP Guide.
2.7. SPECIAL REPORTS, AMPLIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
A ‘special report’ is submitted by States to the IAEA, to report unusual occurrences of

relevance to safeguards, such as the possible loss of nuclear material. These are to be
submitted within 72 hours of the event. ‘Amplifications’ (requesting additional information)
or ‘clarifications’ (requesting the resolution of questions regarding information that was
already provided) are submitted in response to a request by the IAEA.
2.8. VOLUNTARY INFORMATION
States also voluntarily provide information, e.g. on separated americium and neptunium,
related separation activities and on certain exports. All of this information is provided
annually. Once a State joins a voluntary reporting scheme, it commits to provide relevant
information to the IAEA. States are also encouraged to participate in the IAEA’s ‘Incident
and Trafficking Database’ (ITDB) which maintains a record of seized nuclear and radioactive
material reported by States.
2.9. PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO ASSIST THE IAEA IN PLANNING ITS

ACTIVITIES
States and the IAEA may agree upon the provision of other information to support specific
safeguards activities (such as unannounced inspections and use of remote monitoring). Some
SRAs prepare an annual safeguards national audit/inspection programme that specifies when
the SRA will conduct audits of facility design documentation, nuclear material accountancy,
non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement campaigns and national inspections. When an
SRA provides this information voluntarily to the IAEA, it can help the IAEA to schedule its
in-field verification activities to take advantage of circumstances that are beneficial to the
3
Or when an Additional Protocol is provisionally applied.
7
IAEA’s objectives, including minimizing disruption to facility operations. Information is also
submitted regarding facility operational programmes and calendars showing national public
holidays.
In all cases, discussions between the SRA and IAEA are helpful in determining the kind of
information that would be useful to the IAEA.
3. ESTABLISHING A STATE
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
In order to manage all of the information described above, each SRA will need to establish a
system with which to collect, process, check, format and submit information to the IAEA.
Such a system is referred to in this SIP Guide as a State’s safeguards information
management system (SIMS). Depending on how a State sets up such an information system,
it can serve multiple purposes, including:
• Nuclear material management (accounting, import/export, transportation, storage,

bilateral supply agreements, etc.);
• Safeguards reporting and declaration requirements;
• Acquisition, use and disposition of nuclear material;
• Safety;
• Security;
• Efficiency of operations; and
• Organization of resources.
3.1. DESIGNING A SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
States are not required to set up a SIMS, but it is recommended and in practical terms, it is
necessary. States with a CSA are required to establish and maintain an SSAC; an information
management system is very helpful in fulfilling this obligation.
A SIMS may be very simple, involving a set of procedures and policies and some
spreadsheets, or may be complex, including nuclear material accounting systems at facilities
and software applications used by the SRA and by safeguards officers at facilities to transmit
and check the quality of data, with features to enable the automated production of nuclear
material accounting reports. Annex III provides case studies of States’ experiences in
designing and establishing SIMS and related software applications to support the collection
and management of information.
Each SRA should determine its functional requirements and establish a system to meet its
needs. This is discussed in general terms in IAEA Services Series 31. This SIP Guide
provides additional detailed information regarding system functionality.
8
In general terms, information management is the collection and management of information
from one or more sources (from within or outside the State) with distribution to one or more
users or recipients. The primary related functions are acquiring, organizing, formatting,
securing, validating, maintaining and retrieving information. The information system is
managed through careful planning, organization, procurement, quality assurance, evaluation,
reporting, archiving, securing and auditing.
A State’s SIMS can be designed to produce a number of useful outputs, such as:
• Describing the flow of information from facilities and LOFs (and other entities) to the
SRA (including design information, operational programme, and answers to any IAEA
requests for amplifications or clarifications, for example) and who is responsible to
provide the information (See Figures 2 and 3);
• Describing the processes and information flows in the State for the provision of nuclear
material accounting reports to the IAEA;
• Describing the reporting entities, processes and information flows for preparing and
submitting AP declarations, including the identification of new entities (i.e.
organizations with AP reporting obligations) each year;
• Evaluating consistency between facility records/reports and State reports;
• Describing how nuclear material accounting reports are produced for each material
balance area (MBA), including how any necessary corrections are made;
• Establishing and supporting quality control and quality assurance procedures;
• Supporting correspondence with facilities/LOFs operators and other reporting entities,
and with the IAEA; and
• Implementing a plan for information archiving and disaster recovery.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the flow of information in a State and the various actors involved.
FIG 2. Example of information flow in a State.
9
FIG. 3. Example of information flows within a State system and submissions to IAEA.
3.2. FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF A STATE SIMS
A State’s SIMS will serve as a national nuclear material accounting system/database, and
should have the necessary functionality and capabilities to support the State’s accounting and
reporting requirements. The accounting component of the system should be designed to meet
generally accepted accounting practices and the forms/formats set out in Code 10 of
Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part). The following functions and features may be useful
for a State to consider in developing its SIMS:
• Maintain a complete single storage (database) of every current and active MBA, its
name, nuclear material, batch types, material types and descriptions, inventory
changes (i.e. Code 10 reporting codes and formats for nuclear material in the MBA),
for relevant operating parameters that pertain to the DIQ for the facility;
• Maintain every nuclear material element/isotope, quantities and locations (MBAs and
KMPs) in the State for physical inventories and transactions;
• Maintain information on decommissioned facilities/LOFs and keep an MBA history;
• Maintain a tracking time-logged history of every nuclear material transaction;
• Use double entry accounting with transaction recording;
• Maintain ledgers of material transactions at every MBA;
• Provide for necessary reporting in advance of certain inventory changes, such as
exemption and termination;
• Facilitate proper making of corrections and ensure nuclear material accounting reports
reflect facility records;
10
• Retain documents and information for at least as long as required by the CSA (5
years);
• Assist with audits and quality control;
• Match international and domestic transfers of nuclear material;
• Support the evaluation of the material balance at the end of each period;
• Track exemptions and de-exemptions including locations, use and domestic transfers
of exempted material;
• Track material for which safeguards have been terminated, but where further
declarations may be applicable;
• Produce the NMA reports (ICRs, PILs and MBRs) and other reports and declarations
(e.g. export/import reports, advance notifications, AP declarations);
• Produce reports for the SRA for national regulatory purposes;
• Facilitate review and approval (e.g. of reports and declarations) by the SRA and other
government stakeholders prior to submission to the IAEA;
• Support other functional requirements, such as compliance with licenses, domestic
tracking of materials by country of origin4, tracking other non-nuclear materials
(controlled materials such as graphite, heavy water, zirconium, etc. and dual-use
equipment);
• Ensure robust access control, security and protection from internal and external
threats; and;
• Facilitate the receipt of data/reports electronically from operators in the State.
It is very useful for the State’s SIMS to be able to track corrections back to the MBA
documentation. A traceable ‘chain’ of the correction history should be maintained and
accessible in the system, identifying and linking to historical and/or related transactions or
inventory listings and to source records at the facility/MBA itself.
IAEA inspectors conducting physical inventory verification (PIV) appreciate receiving a

summary of all inventory changes in the MBA organized by material element, to aid their
verification tasks. The inventory change listing may also be used by an SRA or operator to
trace records back to the general ledger and other facility records.
Example: A significant unexpected material unaccounted for (MUF) was found during the PIT at a
facility. The inventory change report helped to reveal that the root cause was recording a shipment of
natural uranium fuel bundles as containing low enriched uranium.
A more sophisticated SIMS may be designed to import the operators’ reports and convert the
data into Code 10 format. Such a system could also perform a data quality check, including
allowable Code 10 formats, data validity and completeness of required data. The IAEA’s
‘quality control validation software’ (QCVS) can be used for this purpose.
4
Although not required by a CSA or AP, it may be required by bilateral agreements concluded by a State.
11
The SIMS should facilitate reconciliation of the State’s nuclear material inventory with the
IAEA’s records, as reported to the State in the IAEA semi-annual statement of the inventory.
The SRA can then work with the IAEA to resolve any differences. The IAEA statement is
provided for each MBA in the State, allowing for the State’s system to compare its MBA
values. The IAEA’s statement indicates the State reports (by number) that have been
incorporated into the figures reflected in the statement. Differences can occur if the State uses
a different accounting correction mechanism than the IAEA (which can cause a correction to
be reflected in a different time period at the IAEA than in the State). Corrections are
discussed in Section 8.12.
Example: Anticipating the introduction of nuclear power into a State, an SRA began to develop a
software system to support SSAC nuclear material reporting obligations. In addition to addressing the
reporting requirements under its CSA, the SRA intends to expand the system to also address AP
declarations, national safeguards inspections and nuclear security needs. In developing the
information system, the SRA collaborated with another State who had more experience in this area. A
joint workshop was organized to discuss and analyse various aspects, e.g. the flow of information,
sources of data, recipients of information, etc. Software was then developed by the SRA using the
Code 10 of the Subsidiary Arrangements as the basis. The aim of this software is for facility operators
to report accounting data online and then the SRA will consolidate the data into national reports with
the format and accuracy checked using QCVS. Hence, it was important to understand not only Code
10, but also the different fields of the report formats and the restrictions of each field (for example the
number of characters that one column could have). Quality control features can then be factored into
the software to auto-validate the data as much as possible.
3.3. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN FACILITY RECORDS AND THE STATE’S

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING REPORTS
A well-designed nuclear material accounting and reporting system at a facility provides the
ability to relate a nuclear material accounting entry reported to the SRA with the
corresponding facility record.
Maintaining the linkage between accounting entries and corresponding facility records is
advantageous because the accounting reports sent by the SRA to the IAEA are identified by
three data fields: MBA code, report number and line entry number. It is common that the line
number identity is not included in the facility records. Therefore, it is necessary for the State
system to be capable of relating an IAEA-numbered accounting entry to the relevant
record(s) in the State and facility information system. A numbering system is also needed at
the facility to identify the related facility records.
Figure 4 shows the three basic types of facility records, along with IAEA nuclear material
accounting reports. In the facility records, the supporting documents (inventory change
documents, internal material transfers, etc.) are those that relate to material movements
within an MBA which are not reported to the IAEA, but are important supporting documents
for the reports that are submitted (ICRs, PILs, etc.). Likewise, the physical inventory item list
in an MBA may not correlate directly to the PIL because items may be combined into one
batch in a PIL. These issues are addressed in more detail in Sections 8 and 9.
12
FIG. 4. Relationship of facility records and documents to State accounting reports.
As mentioned above, the IAEA developed a software package to assist States in performing
quality control of their reports prior to dispatch to the IAEA. QCVS validates information in
accounting reports by accepting inputs in pre-defined formats and producing the correct
format for dispatch to the IAEA.
A State may also assign this quality check function to the facility operators, so any errors can
be detected and resolved before submission to the State, which is a good practice. The
software accepts accounting records in Excel format (commonly used by facility operators)
and the records can be converted into the IAEA report format automatically. QCVS also
helps facility operators to produce high quality reporting data by validating syntax and
identifying logical errors. The syntax verification checks whether data format and codes are
correct and the logical verification checks for accounting data that are obviously incorrect.
3.4. BATCH REPORTING
Nuclear material accounting and reporting for States with CSAs is done on a batch reporting
basis. A batch is defined in INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) as ‘... a portion of nuclear material handled
as a unit for accounting purposes’. Facility accounting systems need to be able to identify and
list all batches of nuclear material in an MBA and the associated location.
3.5. SETTING UP A NEW STATE SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The SIP Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure (IAEA
Services Series 31) offers general guidance with regard to considerations and good practices
in setting up a SIMS.
13
4. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
There are several key entities (organizations) involved in safeguards communication: the
SRA; the IAEA; the State’s Permanent Mission to the IAEA and/or Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; the facility and LOF operators; and the other AP reporting entities in the State. Each
type of communication may involve two or more of these entities. Points of contact, roles and
responsibilities should be defined and communicated. When assignments change, the points
of contact need to be updated and shared with all interested parties.
4.1. FORMAL AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE IAEA AND

STATE
Formal communication channels are specified in Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part) to

safeguards agreements and are used by both the IAEA and the State when conveying such
information. Formal communication usually involves the Permanent Mission to the IAEA, or
the Embassy/Mission in Vienna, and it is important that the staff of the Mission have up-to-
date contact information for the SRA, so communications can be transmitted in a timely
manner as needed. Likewise, the Mission needs to be informed how and when to transmit
information received from the SRA that needs to be conveyed to the IAEA.
Many day to day matters are addressed through working level communication. Proactive
working level communication helps the SRA and IAEA to work efficiently together.
Example: Administrative arrangements are often established between the SRA and each facility
operator (and LOF) which specify the agreed communication channels and provide contact
information (phone number, email address) for the key personnel. These arrangements can be kept up
to date through informal communications.
The date that a report is transmitted by the SRA to the IAEA is the date with which the
timeliness of submission of reports and declarations is evaluated by the IAEA. Reporting
delays are recorded by the IAEA and significant delays are reported in the annual Safeguards
Implementation Report (SIR) and in the IAEA statements that are sent to the State. Such
delays are often caused by a lack of awareness somewhere along the review/approval chain
with regard to the process or requirements for timely submission.
It is a good practice for an SRA to follow up with the entities along the review/approval
chain as necessary to ensure reports are transmitted to the IAEA on time.
4.2. MECHANISMS FOR SUBMISSION OF REPORTS, DECLARATIONS AND

OTHER STATE INFORMATION
The content, form and formats for submitting information to the IAEA are specified in
Subsidiary Arrangements, but some specifics may evolve over time. Changes may be
documented through an exchange of correspondence as agreed between the IAEA and the
State.
14
For example, there are several options for the actual submittal of the information:
• Encrypted files submitted as attachments to email (to a specified email address);

• Magnetic media such as compact discs or USB sticks;
• Hard copy paper forms (pdf files as attachments to emails or sent via fax or
diplomatic pouch); and
• Any other means as may be agreed upon.
The IAEA strongly recommends that all nuclear material accounting reports be provided in
electronic format for fixed format Code 10. For States with a labelled format Code 10, the
reports must be provided in electronic format. The IAEA also prefers to receive AP
declarations in electronic format, using the current version of the IAEA ‘Protocol Reporter’
software.
Even if a State does not allow for electronic transmission of data (e.g. by email), the IAEA
strongly prefers to receive data in electronic format (e.g. saved to a compact disc or flash
drive/USB stick and sent via registered mail or diplomatic pouch). The IAEA does not
require that nuclear material accounting reports be encrypted, but many States choose to
encrypt them for their own security requirements. The IAEA does require that secure
channels be used to transmit AP declarations electronically (e.g. encrypted).
When there is a change in the format, medium or transmission mechanism, it is a good

practice to have a period of parallel reporting to ensure that all aspects of submission are
functioning before the change is implemented officially.
Submission of electronic data has the following advantages as compared with hard copy:
• SRA and IAEA can share the electronic data, reducing the transcription error and
facilitating quality control;
• SRA and IAEA are able to search text in the electronic data;
• The data can be easily copied, transferred to a database and archived;
• Notification is immediate that the data has been received; and
• Programs such as QCVS and Protocol Reporter software can be used.
Electronic data must be stored and accessed securely and protected from cyber threats, and
mechanisms may be needed for secure transmission, such as encryption.
Example: An SRA receives accounting reports from nuclear facilities in electronic format via email,
then imports the data into the State’s SIMS and resolves any syntax, logical and transaction errors.
After error checks, the accounting report file is exported from the SIMS in the format required by the
IAEA. Finally, accounting reports are submitted as an encrypted attachment to a plain-text email
message to the IAEA at the agreed email address (e.g. [email protected]). All attachments
containing confidential information are encrypted using the encryption program mutually agreed to
by the State and the IAEA. AP declarations are submitted by the reporting entities in the State to the
SRA in electronic format using MS Excel, then analysed and verified by the SRA for correctness,
completeness and internal consistency. Declarations are submitted as an encrypted attachment to a
plain-text email message sent to the agreed email address at the IAEA (e.g.
[email protected], [email protected], etc.).
15
A computer-based system helps to manage nuclear material accounting, reporting,
declarations and nuclear activities efficiently.
Example: An SRA’s information system prepares and processes reports required by the IAEA and
maintains records of national inspections. It consists of three main parts: 1) a safeguards information
database, 2) a national inspection management system, and 3) a report processing system. The
safeguards database maintains information of all facilities and LOFs. The inspection management
system facilitates national inspection activities by scheduling inspection activities, auditing and
verifying the accounting and operating records from facilities and maintaining the records of national
and IAEA inspections. The report processing system collects and maintains nuclear material
accounting data for all facilities and LOFs and prepares and processes the accounting reports and
other reports required under the SG agreement.
Example: In a State, the facility operators submit DIQs, ICRs, MBRs and PILs to the regional
authority/inspectorate who then forwards the information to the IAEA. The operators send copies of
the reports to the State authority that monitors that the facility operators are complying with the
requirements in the safeguards agreement as well as the regional authority’s regulations. The State
authority maintains a national database with all accountancy data and AP declaration data for all
facilities and activities in the State. The State authority receives and responds to regional and IAEA
inspection notifications 24/7, 365 days a year.
Typical methods of secure communication between the State and the IAEA are encryption
using PGP, PKI or S/MIME and transmission via a VPN internet line. Secure communication
channels are essential to submit States’ official information electronically to the IAEA.
A highly-protected computing environment to host sensitive data and web-based services is

under development at the IAEA, offering new possibilities for submission of State declared
information while securely hosting and processing data in a timely manner. These solutions
are envisioned to utilize a secure web-based portal that supports the transmission of State
declared information and related bi-directional communication between the SRA and IAEA.
As the system is deployed, States will be encouraged to use it as a secure and efficient
method of data transmission.
4.3. ELECTRONIC MAILBOX
An electronic mailbox refers to the use of a secure information repository into which the
operator submits various reports, as agreed in advance with the IAEA. The near real time
submittal of information into a secure electronic mailbox is an important measure taken by
the State to enable the IAEA to implement randomized routine inspections with shorter
notice.
Electronic mailboxes are not used for submitting State reports to the IAEA, but are used for
collecting and transmitting operator data, typically to facilitate the use of short notice
randomized inspections (SNRIs).
The mailbox declaration data is either transferred via secure communication channel to the
IAEA (via email, digitally signed and using S/MIME encryption) or it remains at the facility
16
for retrieval by an inspector upon arrival. Once deposited in the mailbox, the operator can no
longer change or remove the information.
The contents of the information submitted to the mailbox are agreed between the IAEA and
the SRA/facility operator on a case-by-case basis. For example, a fuel fabrication facility
operator might submit mailbox declarations with information on receipts, material in process,
product and shipments of nuclear material on a daily basis. When IAEA inspectors arrive on
short-notice to verify inventory flows, the mailbox data will reflect the inventory situation at
that point in time.
States may also arrange with the IAEA to email reports directly to an IAEA email address.
This email address, which is different from a facility electronic mailbox to support short
notice randomized inspections, may be used by an SRA to submit accounting reports (ICR,
PIL and MBR) and other information (e.g. notifications of imports and exports of nuclear
material) directly to the IAEA.
Example: A State agreed with the IAEA that all reports are submitted by email with the letter and/or
report as an attachment to the email. The email address differed for each type of submission (e.g.
ICRs, PILs and MBRs per Code 10; requests for exemptions and de-exemptions per Code 6; advance
notifications of exports per Code 7). The State and the IAEA determined in advance what information
was to be submitted to each email address. For example, non-sensitive information was submitted to
SG-ARMS, while sensitive reports such as ICRs, PILs and MBRs, reports of imports and exports of
pre-34(c) material, voluntary reports of imports/exports to nuclear-weapon States (NWSs), and
responses to transit matching requests were sent to an email address set up just for this purpose. The
data content in attachments determined whether the emails were encrypted and digitally signed or not
(this was determined by the State). If the content of the documents was deemed to require protection,
then the email with the attachments was encrypted prior to sending, thus requiring that the recipient
email address at the IAEA was capable to receive and decrypt the attachments.
Example: In a State, security requirements prohibited the transmission of sensitive data in electronic
form. The State then decided to provide data on a compact disc to inspectors during each inspection.
The CD was attached to a letter confirming that the data is provided officially by the State. Hard
copies of reports are also submitted using official channels.
5. INFORMATION ON LOCATIONS OUTSIDE FACILITIES

5.1. DEFINITION OF A ‘LOCATION OUTSIDE FACILITY’ (LOF)
LOFs are locations that are not facilities and that customarily use nuclear material in
quantities less than one effective kilogram5. Such locations include, e.g. companies that
possess equipment containing nuclear material (often depleted uranium (DU) that is used as
5
An effective kilogram is a special unit used in safeguards, and is defined in INFCIRC/153 (Corr.). See
‘Definitions’ in IAEA Services Series 21.
17
shielding for a high activity radiation source), or that use nuclear material in an industrial
process (such as uranyl nitrate as a catalyst). The radiotherapy laboratory in a hospital could
be a LOF if it contained a teletheraphy instrument with DU shielding. LOF operators often
have limited experience with IAEA safeguards requirements, so SRA communication is
important to ensure information is received in a timely manner and of high quality.
If a State has a location carrying out small-scale (bench top or pilot scale) conversion (e.g.
UF6 to UO2) or fuel fabrication activities (or any other stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, as
specified in the definition of a facility), and these locations are using nuclear material in any
amount (even less than an effective kilogram), these are not LOFs; they are facilities because
of their nuclear fuel cycle function.
There may be situations where it is not clear whether a location should be classified and
reported as a LOF or a facility; in such cases, the SRA should discuss the situation with the
IAEA, so that a determination can be made.
5.2. INFORMATION PROVISION RELATED TO LOFS
Information on each LOF needs to be submitted to the IAEA using a ‘LOF Information
Template’ (found on the ‘Assistance for States’ webpage at www.iaea.org/safeguards).
The Agreement should provide that the following information concerning nuclear material
customarily used outside facilities shall be provided as applicable to the Agency:
(a) A general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user’s
name and address for routine business purposes; and
(b) A general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy
and control, including organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control.
The Agreement should further provide that the Agency shall be informed on a timely basis of any
change in the information provided to it under this paragraph.
5.3. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM LOFS OPERATORS BY AN SRA
To be able to cooperate with LOFs efficiently, the SRA needs to have the legal authority to
impose reporting and access obligations on the LOF, which is usually done through a
license or authorization process.
The SRA will need to establish effective oversight of LOFs (discussed in more detail in
IAEA Services Series 31). The SRA should maintain updated contact information for the
individual responsible for accounting for the nuclear material at the LOF (often referred to as
a safeguards officer or chief accountant, for example) and the license should require
designation of such an individual). This SIP Guide will use the term ‘safeguards officer’ to
refer to the individual(s) with safeguards responsibility at a LOF or facility.
The SRA should ensure that nuclear material is not permitted to be shipped to, or received by,
any entity that does not possess the proper license. Such an act should be prohibited.
18
If the safeguards officer at a LOF will change, the LOF should notify the SRA of the new
contact information (this could be specified in the license). The LOF operators need to report
inventory changes to the SRA in a timely manner regarding their nuclear material inventories.
Example: In the initial stages of implementing its CSA, an SRA held outreach seminars for LOF
operators and produced a brochure explaining IAEA safeguards and the reporting and access
obligations of LOF operators. The brochure was sent to LOF operators and posted on the SRA’s
website. An example of an outreach brochure is provided in Annex X.
The safeguards officer at a LOF should have clearly defined responsibilities and sufficient
authority to carry them out. The license should require each LOF to establish clear
procedures for controlling and reporting nuclear material inventory, flow, storage, use and for
keeping good accounting records.
Annex V provides examples of situations likely to occur at LOFs and the associated reporting
for each situation, and offers suggestions for SRA quality checks. Depleted uranium is
commonly used as shielding at hospitals/radiotherapy labs; Annex VI provides some
examples of uses of depleted uranium and where to look for it in a State.
The SRA should audit/inspect each LOF periodically. The frequency of such visits will
depend on the number of LOFs in the State, the capacity of the SRA, and the logistical
complexities involved. Such contacts are useful not only to evaluate compliance with national
regulatory requirements (license conditions) but also to stay in contact with the operator and
safeguards officer, inform them of any updated requirements, and ensure they are prepared
for an IAEA inspection.
An SRA may verify multiple license conditions during a national inspection or audit at a
LOF. This can save resources and reduce impact on the operators, but requires some cross-
training of SRA staff.
For example, one inspection could address the LOF’s compliance with nuclear material
accounting and reporting, nuclear security (control of radioactive sources, for example), and
radiation protection (safety of personnel, public, environment).
Example: LOF operators often have limited experience with safeguards and benefit from support and
training on preparing accounting reports. A State authority provided training to LOF operators on
how to prepare accounting reports based on Code 10 and helped each LOF to create a general
ledger. The SRA agreed with each LOF operator that they would submit a report of the nuclear
material inventory to the SRA every month, even when no change to the inventory had occurred. This
fixed communication channel created interaction between the SRA and the LOF operators and
provides the SRA with full and updated knowledge of the nuclear material inventory in the State.
Example: A survey was issued to all LOF operators by the SRA. SRA staff then visited each LOF
operator, informing them about their safeguards responsibilities (national and international). The
SRA agreed with each LOF that any questions on safeguards related matters should be directed to the
SRA and such communications would always be welcomed. The operators described their nuclear
material and how they used it. In several cases, the nuclear material had only been in storage and
19
there were no plans for its use. Whenever possible, the LOF shipped the material to a storage location
in the State. In some cases the State also provided funding support for clean-up activities. This was an
important aspect, as it can be costly to dispose of nuclear material that no longer has any use.
5.4. SRA GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO LOF OPERATORS
LOF operators will appreciate guidance on how to meet their safeguards related obligations.
Guidance can describe good accounting practices and the reporting requirements that are
relevant to LOFs. This guidance helps LOFs to prepare procedures and to train new staff.
One area of potential confusion is exempted material. It may be useful for the SRA to prepare
a ‘Request for Exemption’ on behalf of a LOF and submit the request to the IAEA for
approval. (See Section 8.26 for more information on exemption). Once the exemption has
been approved, the SRA can notify the LOF operator using a form such as an ‘Exemption
Notification Form’ advising them about their ongoing responsibilities for storage and
labelling, the need to report any transfers, and to notify the SRA prior to shipment, etc.
It is not recommended to exempt only a portion of the nuclear material inventory at a LOF
or facility. Paragraph 38 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) clearly provides that exempted material to
be processed or stored together with safeguarded material shall be de-exempted.
The SRA may establish its own reporting requirements with regard to exempted material,
such as reports of movements of exempted material within the State, which can help to ensure
that those locations that possess exempted material maintain proper records, submit reports to
the SRA and remain prepared to grant access to the SRA as needed.
It is very important for every SRA to ensure that all exempted material continues to remain
under regulatory control in the State. SRAs must continue to oversee exempted material
and ensure de-exemption is requested when necessary.
To build awareness of safeguards at LOFs, it may be useful to organize training for their
safeguards officers. Such training could be conducted as workshops or through issuing
guidance. Workshops may focus on the aspects of nuclear material accountancy frequently
encountered by the LOF operators and could be organized for similar types of LOFs (e.g.
radiotherapy labs, users of sources, ceramics manufacturers, etc.) or organized regionally.
It is good practice to encourage LOF operators to minimize the inventory of nuclear

material at their LOFs and to transfer any material which is not used to a licensed storage or
recycle facility.
In many States, the State’s national license allows for possession of small quantities of
nuclear material in solution or powder forms by, for example, industrial waste collectors,
universities, laboratories, small fabrication shops, hospitals and medical clinics. Such
licensees may not be certain of the material composition and may not be aware of reporting
obligations. IAEA Services Series 22 provides more detail about locating and reporting
nuclear material in LOFs.
20
5.5. CHARACTERIZING NUCLEAR MATERIAL AT LOFS
The SRA should have the ability to characterize and quantify nuclear material at LOFs in the
State. Usually the LOF operator does not possess such equipment so the quantity of nuclear
material on inventory is based on shipping documentation or labels. This is usually adequate,
but in cases where the quantity and/or type of nuclear material at the location are uncertain or
new material is unexpectedly discovered, then the SRA needs to characterize the material. It
is also convenient to have measurement equipment available to be able to verify nuclear
material during national audits or inspections. Such equipment is usually based on gamma
spectroscopy.
5.6. METHODS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING FOR LOFS
Each LOF is a physical location. But for accounting purposes, the State and the IAEA may
agree to account for all nuclear material at LOFs under one MBA. It is often called a ‘catch-
all MBA’ or ‘LOF MBA’. Even when a ‘catch-all MBA’ or ‘LOF MBA’ is used, each
physical LOF will need to:
• Keep track of its inventory of nuclear material and record all changes to it;
• Meet requirements for identifying, storing and transferring safeguarded and exempted
material;
• Submit nuclear material accounting reports to the SRA (transfers, exemptions,
accidental gains, list of inventories, etc.);
• Carry out an annual physical inventory of the nuclear material on hand; and
• Grant access to the SRA and IAEA to carry out inspections and review records.
The optimal method of accounting for nuclear material at LOFs in a State depends on a
number of factors, such as the number and type of LOFs, geographical distribution, size of
the State, the reporting format under Code 10 (i.e. labelled or fixed), the
structure/organization of the SRA, and the IAEA safeguards implementation measures used
in the State (e.g. the proximity of facilities to LOFs). It is a good practice for the SRA to
discuss with the IAEA options for accounting for nuclear material at LOFs.
The SRA must maintain regulatory oversight and control on exempted nuclear material. To
assist the State in tracking this inventory of exempted material, the SRA may wish to
establish an MBA for this purpose. Of course, the State authority must ensure that exempted
material is not transferred outside of this MBA before being de-exempted, and ensure that
safeguarded nuclear material is not stored together with exempted material.
Example: A catch-all MBA is established to account for all nuclear material at LOFs, with a unique
inventory KMP code assigned to each physical LOF. If fixed format Code 10 is used and more than
26 LOFs exist in the State, then a second MBA would need to be established. With labelled Code 10, a
combination of letters can be used for the KMP codes. The LOFs can be grouped e.g. by region or
type of location or usage of nuclear material and assigned a letter with a unique number for each.
21
The SRA may wish to prepare a simple form to be used by LOFs in reporting inventory
changes and other accounting information to the SRA. The LOF can send information using
this form to the SRA, who creates the ICRs in the proper format and submits them to the
IAEA.
5.7. DECLARATIONS OF THE SITES OF LOFS UNDER AN AP
For States with an AP in force, a 2.a.(iii) declaration is required for the site of each
geographically distinct LOF (unless it possesses only exempted nuclear material). Please
refer to Section 11.6 for detailed guidance on AP site declarations.
6. INFORMATION ON FACILITIES (DESIGN INFORMATION)

6.1. INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Section 5 of IAEA Services Series 21, States are required to provide
information to the IAEA on facilities (see paragraphs 8, 42 to 45 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)).
Pursuant to paragraph 8 above, the Agreement should stipulate that design information in respect of
existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary
Arrangements, and that the time limits for the provision of such information in respect of new
facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. It should further be stipulated that such
information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new
facility.
The IAEA uses this design information and the results of its verification, inter alia, to
develop a safeguards approach for the facility. The timeliness for the provision of design
information in respect of existing and new facilities is provided in Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements (General Part). Regarding the early provision of design information for a new
facility, the modified Code 3.1 of Subsidiary Arrangements stipulates that preliminary design
information must be submitted by the State to the IAEA as soon as the decision has been
taken to construct, or to authorize construction, of such facility.
A State with an AP in force declares its ten-year approved nuclear development plan as
approved by State authorities, which includes any plans for new facilities. Annex XI provides
an example of a State’s declarations submitted each year regarding such plans as described in
the AP Art. 2.a.(x). Once the State takes a decision to construct, or to authorize construction
of the new facility, the State provides early design information and discontinues declarations
regarding this facility under the 2.a.(x) declaration. Design information continues to be
updated throughout the construction, commissioning, operation and all subsequent lifecycle
stages of the facility, until it has been determined by the IAEA to be decommissioned for
safeguards purposes.
22
Design information is submitted using a ‘design information questionnaire’ or DIQ. The
IAEA has templates of DIQs for each facility type. The appropriate DIQ template can be
requested by emailing the IAEA (the request can be directed to the relevant country officer,
or if uncertain, to [email protected] with ‘DIQ Template’ in the subject line).
6.2. SAFEGUARDS BY DESIGN DIALOGUE
The IAEA values the opportunity to engage with States and facility designers to take into
account safeguards considerations early in the facility design process. This engagement
enables cost savings to be realized for both the State and the IAEA by optimizing efficient
safeguards measures, and avoiding the need for unplanned equipment installation. To support
this dialogue, the IAEA published a series of guidance documents (e.g. IAEA Nuclear Energy
Series Nos. NP-T-2.8 in 2013 and NP-T-2.9 in 2014). This series is available on the
Assistance for States webpage under ‘Other Documents.’
Safeguards by design (SBD) is the process of considering international safeguards

features/aspects throughout all phases of a nuclear facility project, from the initial conceptual
design through facility construction and into operations, including design modifications and
decommissioning. The ‘by design’ concept encompasses the idea of preparing for the
implementation of safeguards at a facility through the management of the project in all of its
stages. Safeguards-by-design does not introduce new requirements but does facilitate the cost
effective implementation of safeguards needs. Annex VII offers two case studies describing
the application of SBD at a reactor and at a geologic repository for spent fuel.
During SBD discussions, the State is usually represented by the SRA, which is often
responsible for nuclear safety and security in addition to safeguards, and must harmonize
these requirements. The SRA may wish to prepare written guidance that explains safeguards,
safety and security requirements in a balanced way. The operator is usually responsible for
construction and operation of the facility, and can incorporate safeguards features into the
commercial bidding documents. The vendor will have then a commercial obligation to fulfill
the terms of contract concluded with the operator. The designer’s task is to design the facility
according to the specifications given by the vendor.
Meetings involving all of these entities can facilitate SBD discussions and ensure the IAEA
safeguards needs are understood by the vendor and designer, who are making actual design
decisions. The agenda of the meetings could address:
• Features/information to be included in the design information to be provided pursuant

to the safeguards agreements (this will be a primary topic of the discussion since
safeguards will probably be unfamiliar to the designers);
• Design features related to safety and security (relevant expertise from the State
authority will be needed for these discussions);
• Issues around sharing facility-confidential information among the participants;
• Experience obtained from any existing facilities; and
• Review of existing guidance on safeguards by design.
23
SBD is a voluntary process so it is important that the designer, vendor, and operator
understand the potential benefits, such as:
• avoiding costly retrofits to address safeguards needs;
• integrating safeguards equipment and systems into the plant design at an early stage;
• facilitating consideration of joint use of equipment by the operator and inspectorate;
• reducing operator burden with less inspection presence and shorter outages; and
• increasing flexibility for future safeguards equipment installation.
Example: In a State, a requirement has been established that sixty days after the ‘Decision in
Principle’ (the Government’s decision to build a new nuclear facility), the operator has to provide the
preliminary design information to the SRA. Usually the information available at that time includes the
name of the operator, the type of planned reactor and the general location of the planned site (if not
yet decided) and a tentative time schedule.
6.3. DESIGN INFORMATION
Design information is submitted and updated as necessary for each facility using a DIQ,
including a description of the form, location and flow of nuclear material; a general layout;
description of features relating to nuclear material accountancy, containment and
surveillance; and, a description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material
accountancy and control and the procedures for physical inventory taking. An example of a
DIQ for a reactor can be found in Annex I, including examples of the kind of information
provided in each of the elements of this important document.
DIQs should include significant detail in the text descriptions and be accompanied by
drawings, photographs, charts, process diagrams and other supporting documentation as
appropriate.
The DIQ is one of the most important documents for safeguards, as the information contained
in it is used to, e.g. design the safeguards approach; determine the types, locations and
configuration of safeguards equipment; verify the operator’s measurement systems; draft the
FA; determine the material balance areas; and much more. A more complete description of
the uses of design information, and activities carried out by the IAEA during design
information verification (DIV) is found in Section 3 of IAEA Services Series 30.
The initial DIQ for a new facility needs to be periodically updated as new information
becomes known, including equipment, points where measurements of nuclear material will
be made, operating schemes and records systems. Information on measurement uncertainties,
expected material held up in process and other possible contributors to MUF, will be
important for facility evaluation and should be provided in the design information as soon as
possible.
The results of calibrations and tests are also important to include, to enable the IAEA’s
analysis of measurement performance against international target values (ITVs), adherence to
the ‘Guidance on determination of uncertainties in measurements’ (GUM) and other relevant
standards, as well as to prepare for the use of verification equipment.
24
The SRA should inform the IAEA of the different stages of the facility licensing process to
help create mutual understanding of the facility construction timing and key points in the DIV
process. The DIQ requests information on the operational modes and phases of the facility.
Annex II of IAEA Services Series 30 describes the facility lifecycle or operational stages and
associated safeguards activities, and the kinds of information provided by the State to the
IAEA at each stage. For example, a facility will have a commissioning phase, an operating
phase, and periodically maintenance or modification phases. Each involves provision of
certain types of information, and various safeguards activities.
The State and the IAEA could meet periodically to discuss safeguards related aspects
regarding a planned facility, so that the SRA, operator/designer and IAEA develop a shared
understanding of the plans well in advance of preparing the submission of preliminary
design information.
6.4. EARLY PROVISION OF DESIGN INFORMATION
Early provision of design information in respect to a new facility is required under a CSA,
but it is also helpful to both the State and the IAEA. It fosters communication about what to
expect, helps the IAEA plan out its resources and describe to the State the equipment and
activities that will need to be incorporated into the facility plans. It gives more time to
accommodate each party’s needs, leading to fewer design changes and achieving overall cost
savings.
Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements stipulates the timing for provision of
design information: ‘3.1.2. Provision of preliminary design information for new facilities
[shall be provided] as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, has
been taken, whichever is earlier.’
When a State submits early design information, the IAEA will respond and discuss potential
safeguards measures for the facility with the SRA. As the facility development work
proceeds, the State will provide updated and more detailed design information, including the
type of facility, power, capacity, etc. At this point, the construction license will probably not
yet have been issued and information will not be detailed or specific, and will be updated as
more information becomes available. The designer will be creating preliminary design
concepts, and the bidding phase may involve multiple vendors and designers. If the operator
has set specifications that the facility shall incorporate safeguards features, the designers will
describe ways in which the design facilitates anticipated safeguards features.
The preliminary design information does not have to be provided in the form of a DIQ,
although it is preferred by the IAEA. To ensure updated information is provided periodically
during the construction process, the State may define ‘hold points’ or explicit points during
the licensing process at which submission of updated design information will be required.
25
Example: The timing for early provision of design information can be addressed in the license
process, e.g. by specifying when the SRA shall be provided with preliminary information and updates
on the nuclear facility (e.g. before construction starts, during construction, before commissioning,
during operation, etc).
After the preliminary design information has been provided to IAEA, the SRA should submit
updates to reflect the physical condition of the facility as it progresses through design,
construction, commissioning and begins operation. As there may be more than one supplier
responding to a request for bid, there is often a lengthy gap between the planning of a new
facility and the actual design. During this time, the preliminary information may not need to
be updated. Figure 5 shows the basic steps in providing information on facilities to the IAEA
(when an AP is in force).
As soon as the supplier of a new facility is chosen, the facility operator can start to prepare
the initial DIQ, which is submitted to the SRA and subsequently sent to the IAEA. The initial
DIQ continues to be updated as more information is known, enabling the IAEA to plan and
develop the safeguards approach. In addition, when an AP is in force, this is the point when
the State can prepare the initial site declaration to be provided to the IAEA in the next annual
update (See Annex XI).
Example: In a State planning for new nuclear power plants, a requirement has been established that
an operator wishing to build a new plant must submit a generic design assessment to the SRA
containing general information about the planned nuclear power plant. This is submitted to the SRA
well in advance of applying for a siting license. The submittal of the design assessment facilitates
discussion among the SRA and the operator and can support SBD discussions with the IAEA as well.
In addition, it is important to provide updated information to the IAEA on the project

schedule, including information on the programme of activities, current progress, any
changes that may impact safeguards implementation, and any changes to the entities involved
(such as key equipment manufacturers).
The IAEA has to plan its resources to support safeguards implementation at facilities under
construction or modification, so early discussions are important.
For a State with a modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), if a decision is taken to build a
facility, the SQP will become non-operational. Early discussion with the IAEA can help the
State and the IAEA to work together on the implementation of all safeguards procedures,
including preparing Subsidiary Arrangements. See section 13 of IAEA Services Series 22 for
more information.
26
Steps in Providing Information on Planned Facilities
1) Approved Plans AP Declaration

(2.a.(x) Declaration) SRA
IAEA SRA
2) Safeguards By
Design Dialog
Operator Vendor
3) Early Provision of Preliminary

IAEA DI SRA
Design Information Incorporating
-Resource Planning As soon as the decision is taken IAEA equipment
-Developing FA to construct or to authorize into design
construction.
4) Initial DIQ Feedback

Conducts DIV
As early as possible, not later on FA SRA
Incorporating IAEA
IAEA than 180 days prior to start of
equipment into
construction. Updated to reflect
Draft and Initial construction
progress through construction.
conclude FA DIQ schedule
Feedback on
Continues DIV
5) DIQ with As-built Updated FA
Drawings
IAEA As early as possible when the SRA
Update FA facility is built, not later than 180 Updated DIQ
days before receiving NM
Advance Notice
Continues
of Initial Fuel
DIV
IAEA
Import SRA
Updating FA with 6) Full Complete DIQ Providing
feedback to
SRA Feedback Initial PIV Initial PIL or update FA
ICR
Continues DIV 7) Updated DIQ for Updated DIQ

IAEA SRA
modifications
FIG. 5. Overview of steps taken in providing design information.
6.5. DESIGN INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Design information is submitted using a DIQ. Since DIV begins even before concrete for the
foundation of a facility is poured, it is necessary to submit a DIQ at least 180 days before
start of construction (and design information is provided earlier than that – when the decision
is taken to construct the facility or to authorize its construction).
Example: In a State, DIQs are prepared according to a prescribed procedure in the SRA’s quality
management system (QMS), which also specifies the timelines for submittal. In the QMS procedures,
design information shall include at least the following information, where applicable, for each facility
(following the DIQ):
• The identification of the facility, its description, purpose, nominal capacity and geographical
location, name and address to be used for routine business purposes;
• A description of the general arrangement of the facility with references to the form, location and
flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of process equipment which use, produce or
process nuclear material;
• A description of features relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and
27
• A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material
accountancy and control.
All of the information provided in text form is supplemented by design drawings (produced using
specialized software such as AutoCAD), process diagrams, photographs and other documentation.
The information is submitted as a package to the IAEA in electronic form, using secure channels of
communication (transmitted via official channels on CD), to facilitate its evaluation.
6.6. FACILITY ATTACHMENTS AND UPDATES TO DESIGN INFORMATION
The Code 2 of a FA specifies what kinds of changes or modifications to the facility or

systems at the facility should be reported in advance of the change. The FA is based on the
DIQ. MBAs and KMPs are specified in the FA (See Section 8.2). If a FA is not in force, any
changes to the facility or its processes which would result in inaccuracies in the DIQ should
be reflected in an updated DIQ and submitted to the IAEA, to ensure that the IAEA has
accurate information about the facility.
Updates to a DIQ should be submitted as soon as possible and sufficiently in advance of the
change to allow the IAEA to modify its safeguards approach as needed.
7. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS

7.1. INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook (Services Series 15) was published by the IAEA
for use by States in their application of nuclear material accounting. The Handbook explains
methods used to account for nuclear material and to report nuclear material accountancy
information to the IAEA. It provides a description of the processes and steps necessary for
the establishment, implementation and maintenance of nuclear material accounting and
control at the MBA, facility, LOF and State levels, and explains the relevant terms. It also
explains quality controls and audits of facility accounting systems to support correct and
complete reporting from the State to the IAEA, and to facilitate IAEA verification of the
information in the reports. Many terms and aspects of nuclear material accounting are
complex and are further amplified in this SIP Guide, with examples and good practices.
7.2. MATERIAL BALANCE AREAS AND KEY MEASUREMENT POINTS
An MBA is an area in or outside of a facility such that the quantity of nuclear material in
each transfer into or out of the MBA can be determined; and the physical inventory of nuclear
material in each MBA can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified
procedures, in order that the material balance for IAEA safeguards purposes can be
established.
The MBA is the nuclear material accounting area for related reports submitted to the IAEA.
Material crossing the boundary of an MBA must be reported to the IAEA as an inventory
change and material within the boundary must be reported as part of the physical inventory.
Movements of nuclear material within an MBA are not to be reported to the IAEA. However,
28
as noted later, certain changes to nuclear material within an MBA (e.g. nuclear
transformations, changes in uranium category and changes of batch structure) are to be
reported to the IAEA.
Most facilities comprise only a single MBA; thus, for accounting purposes, the MBA and
facility are identical. However, large, complex facilities (e.g. fuel fabrication or reprocessing
plants) frequently require additional accounting and controls that a single MBA structure
cannot support. In such cases, an arrangement with a single facility comprising two or more
MBAs may be agreed upon with the IAEA.
Four-character MBA and facility codes are defined in the FA and are required data elements
in nuclear material accounting reports. The MBA and facility codes always begin with the
IAEA’s country code for the State.
For each possible type of nuclear material batch in an MBA, the FA describes the associated
inventory changes codes, flow KMPs, inventory KMPs, material description codes (MDCs)
and measurement basis codes.
As mentioned above, although internal movements of material within an MBA are not to be
reported to the IAEA, there are internal changes to the inventory that must be reported, such
as the production of plutonium as a result of fuel irradiation in a reactor.
7.2.1. Reactor MBA
For a reactor, the IAEA inspectors will need to see separate records on the amounts of
material in the fresh fuel storage, core and spent fuel storage, but the inventory reports need
not be separated into these areas. Therefore, a reactor would typically have one MBA with
three inventory KMPs and three flow KMPs, as shown in Figure 6.
Fresh Fuel Storage

Flow
Receipts KMP 1
Inventory KMP A
Reactor Core
Inventory KMP B
Flow
KMP 2
Spent Fuel Storage Flow

Nuclear loss, Inventory KMP C KMP 3 Shipments
Nuclear
production
FIG. 6. Typical MBA and KMP structure for a reactor.
Upon discharge of the spent fuel assemblies/bundles from the core, the inventory changes
would include category change ND (natural uranium to depleted uranium), nuclear loss LN of
29
U-235 and nuclear production (NP) of plutonium. The spent fuel is normally stored in the
spent fuel pond for several years, after which it might be transferred to a dry storage
inventory KMP within the MBA or transferred to another MBA. The decay occurring during
the cooling in the spent fuel pond can be reported on a regular basis or upon shipment. Figure
7 elaborates further the inventory changes at the KMPs for a power reactor with one MBA.
FIG. 7. Example of inventory changes reported at KMPs at a reactor.
7.2.2. Fuel fabrication plant with three MBAs
The following shows an example of a basic three-MBA structure, such as for a fuel
fabrication plant. This structure is useful for separating material in item form (fuel
assemblies) from material in bulk form (pellets), and isolating the shipper-receiver
differences, MUF associated with the process, and measured discards. Figure 8 depicts such a
three-MBA structure.
Shipper/
Product
Receiver Process
Receipts Storage Shipments
Difference MBA
MBA
MBA
Batches are measured All facility material Completed items

or shipper weights are unaccounted for occurs
accepted in this MBA
All facility shipper/

receiver differences
occur in this MBA
FIG 8. Example of a 3 MBA structure to separate bulk processing from items.
30
7.2.3. Uranium milling and concentration plant accounting areas
A State may wish to establish accounting areas for milling and concentration plants to keep
track of transfers and inventories of pre-34(c) material (e.g. uranium and thorium
concentrates). A State’s SIMS can track production, holdings, imports and exports of pre-
34(c) material such as uranium and thorium concentrates by its mines and mills for reporting
shipments under the CSA and AP as applicable. The system can also maintain inventory
balances and track domestic transfers of pre-34(c) material between the mills, refineries and
other locations that are not subject to safeguards under a CSA, in addition to tracking the
nuclear material in the MBAs at facilities and LOFs.
These plants can be assigned a domestic ‘MBA code’ with distinctly different 3-alpha-
numeric characters so as to remain distinguishable from the IAEA’s MBA codes in the
system. The SRA’s SIMS can specify each location with its 3-character code and a facility
description, including permissible material types and material description codes, and
inventory change codes for import, export and domestic transfers, as required. The practice of
tracking pre-34(c) material movements into, between and exported from locations within the
State is also useful for tracking country-obligated material for reporting to partner States
pursuant to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.
7.3. ESTABLISHING REPORTING CODES FOR MBAS
The State and the IAEA work together to define the MBAs for a facility, based on evaluation
of the information in the DIQ and conduct of DIE/DIV. Each MBA is assigned a code which
is used for reporting nuclear material inventory and other information specific to that MBA.
A process for establishing applicable reporting codes in a State may resemble Figure 9.
Design Information Questionnaire SRA and facility operator submit design

(DIQ) information; IAEA creates MBA structure
and associated codes
SRA and IAEA agree on a FA with
MBA Authority Files
reporting codes specified
IAEA develops final FA with reporting

Facility Attachment (FA)
codes specified
State Safeguards Information SRA enters specified reporting codes* for

MBA into national safeguards information
Management System
management system
Facility NMAS (for SRA provides specified reporting codes

each MBA) to facility for each MBA, codes entered in
Updates as required
nuclear material accounting system
MBA submits reports and requests (e.g.
MBA reports to SRA exemption) to SRA
SRA submits reports and requests to

SRA reports to IAEA IAEA
*Codes include, e.g. inventory change, KMPs, MDCs
FIG. 9. Example of process to identify reporting codes for an MBA.
31
Once the DIQ is submitted and applicable codes are determined for the facility, the IAEA
establishes its facility ‘authority files’ and the SRA notifies the facility operator of the
reporting codes that must be used for submitting information to the SRA. The same approach
applies once information has been provided by the SRA to the IAEA in respect to LOFs. The
SRA may also enter these codes into its SIMS database, so data entries from the facility such
as inventory changes and inventory lists can be accepted from the MBA.
If the facility design or operations change, then the DIQ is updated. If the changes necessitate
revisions to the codes, the IAEA will communicate with the SRA and the facility/LOF
operator will need to be notified. The reporting codes are thus revised and the IAEA’s
authority files for the MBA are updated as well. The relevant FA may need to be revised as
well; the IAEA will communicate with the State/SRA for that purpose.
7.4. KEY MEASUREMENT POINTS AND KMP CODES
A KMP is a location where material appears in such a form that it can be measured for the
purpose of determining inventory or flow. Flow KMPs are reported only in ICRs and
inventory KMPs are reported only in PILs. Movement of nuclear material between KMPs is
not reported to the IAEA.
While the IAEA does not track material balances on a KMP basis, facility operators typically
maintain separate balances for accounting sub-areas such as a reactor core and spent fuel
pond at a reactor. Maintaining accounting at the sub-area level enables the facility operator to
localize and investigate any possible loss much more effectively than if accounting is only
maintained at the MBA level. In addition, sub-area level accounting can be quite helpful in
facilitating IAEA verification activities.
In a ‘catch-all’ LOF MBA, the KMP may be used in the PIL to reflect one physical location,
and a list of inventory KMP codes with the respective locations may be included in the LOF
Attachment.
KMP codes are used to name each KMP, and the naming convention indicates whether the
KMP is a flow KMP or an inventory KMP. Normally, numbers are used for flow KMPs
and letters are used for inventory KMPs, as specified in a facility/LOF attachment.
KMP codes are defined in fixed format Code 10: paragraph 12; or labelled format Code 10:
label 407. With fixed format Code 10, there is only one character available and, therefore, it
may be necessary to use letters as well for flow, if there is a need for more than nine flow
KMP codes. A maximum of two characters are defined for KMP codes in labelled format
Code 10, therefore a limit on numbers and letters does not pose an issue. It is the practice in
some cases to use a character other than a number or letter, such as an asterisk (*), as the
KMP code for reporting category changes or re-batching, for example.
32
7.5. BOOK INVENTORIES (ADJUSTED AND ENDING)
A book inventory is the amount of nuclear material calculated to be present in an MBA on

the basis of nuclear material accounting records. The formula to calculate book inventory can
be found in Code 10 or IAEA Services Series 15. The calculation is based on the most
recently available MBR physical inventory, plus/minus all reported inventory changes
through the date for which the inventory is to be calculated. If there is no physical inventory
with which to begin the calculation, a beginning inventory of zero is used.
There are two defined types of book inventories that can be reported in MBRs: ‘adjusted’ and
‘ending’ book inventories. The ‘adjusted’ book inventory includes shipper/receiver
differences and the ‘ending’ book inventory does not. The current model Code 10 only
requires the ‘adjusted’ inventory to be reported. Table 1 shows the difference between book
ending (BE) and book adjusted (BA).
TABLE 1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BOOK ENDING AND BOOK ADJUSTED

INVENTORIES
MBR entry name Weight (kg)

Physical beginning inventory (PB) 100
Receipts domestic (RD) 50
Book ending inventory (BE) 150
Shipper/receiver difference -2
Book adjusted inventory (BA) 152
Physical ending inventory (PE) 152
For older Code 10 documents that only require ending book inventory (BE) to be reported, it
is a good practice to report adjusted book inventory (BA) as well.
7.6. MATERIAL BALANCE PERIODS
The time between two PITs is the period for which the nuclear material balances are
determined for an MBA. The beginning date of the period is one day following the previous
PIT and the ending date is the date of the PIT at the end of the period. For the first MBP of an
MBA, the beginning date can be determined based on how the nuclear material accounts are
established. If there is an initial PIL, the period beginning date is one day after the initial PIL
date. For accounts established at first receipt of nuclear material, the beginning date must be
at least the earliest inventory change date in the relevant ICR. The beginning date in the ICR
header can be used for the period beginning date, but it should be logical, such as the first of
the month in which the first inventory change occurs.
33
FIG. 10. Material balance periods and associated report dates.
The time between PITs for most facilities (e.g. power plants, fuel fabrication facilities) is
normally about one year, but there is some flexibility in the period. (However, the IAEA
typically does not allow more than 14 months between two PIVs). The scheduling is
determined by the IAEA, taking into consideration the facility operational programme and
planned outages. There may also be closed core PIVs for power plants in cases where an
outage does not occur for more than 14 months.
7.7. SHIPPER – RECEIVER DIFFERENCES
A shipper-receiver difference (SRD) is determined when the receiver of a batch of nuclear

material performs a measurement to establish the quantity of nuclear material received. The
SRD is calculated as the shipper’s value minus the receiver’s value. A negative SRD reflects
an increase in the nuclear material accounts, and a positive SRD reflects a decrease in the
nuclear material accounts.
All receipts must be reported based on shipper’s values (measurement basis for labelled
code 10 = ‘N’). Shipper-receiver differences are then reported subsequently as necessary.
When the measurement of nuclear material is made, only the difference (shipper value minus
receiver value) is recorded with inventory change code ‘DI’. The date of the inventory
change entry is when the SRD is applied to the accounts of the MBA. It is possible that the
measurement is made after the receipt has been reported (using shipper’s values) perhaps
months or years later. In all cases, the SRD is reported with the date the difference is
accounted for and not the date of receipt of the batch.
34
It is good practice that SRD be reported using the original receipt batch name. If the
receiver needs to report its own batch name for the SRD, it should also report the shipper’s
batch name reported on the receipt (label 447 in code 10). States reporting in fixed format can
rename their batches using the inventory change codes ‘RM’ and ‘RP’.
7.8. UNIFIED URANIUM
The use of ‘unified uranium’ reporting is discussed between the SRA and the IAEA and
reflected in the relevant FA. Such reporting may be applicable in respect of nuclear material
at facilities where changes in category (between depleted, natural and enriched uranium)
occur often, such as enrichment or fuel fabrication plants.
‘Unified uranium’ reporting requires that the isotope weights are reported for each batch,
regardless of its enrichment. This can present problems for some facility operators that may
not know the exact isotopic content for batches of depleted uranium. If unified uranium
reporting is agreed between the SRA and the IAEA, then the SRA should ensure that the
facility operator determines the isotopic content of all batches of depleted and enriched
uranium (the fissile content of natural uranium is easily determined). Unified uranium
element and isotope weights should be reported in grams, as required by Code 10.
The material balance evaluation is then made using only the unified uranium category, and
the accounting reports (ICR, PIL and MBR) must be submitted using unified uranium. It is
possible that receipts and shipments will have one MBA reporting in categories (depleted,
natural and enriched) whereas the partner MBA reports in terms of unified uranium. This is
correct as each MBA must report in the categories required for nuclear material accounting in
the relevant FA.
With a unified uranium account, category changes do not apply and cannot be reported. A
batch of unified uranium bulk material may contain only items/material of the same nominal
enrichment. Fuel assemblies may have different enrichments in the individual rods and in
practice the weights are aggregated and reported with a single element weight and fissile
weight. This includes all enriched uranium pellets, as well as depleted and natural uranium
pellets, commonly used as end plugs. Depleted and natural uranium are not reported
separately but based on a nominal enrichment.
If a facility operator that uses unified uranium reporting imports natural uranium from a
supplier, the operator will need to determine the isotope weight for reporting, as the shipping
documentation may only include the element weight (but the isotopic weight for natural
uranium is calculable).
Likewise, stratification of the inventory for development of sampling plans may require that
the State or IAEA calculate the natural, depleted and enriched uranium on inventory. It is a
good practice for the SRA to produce a stratified inventory list to support stratification
needed in developing a sampling plan.
35
7.9. NUCLEAR LOSS AND PRODUCTION
Loss of material due to a nuclear reaction or decay must be reported as a nuclear loss.
Normally, nuclear loss is reported for uranium burnup in a reactor or to report the decay of
plutonium. Production of nuclear material due to a nuclear reaction is reported as nuclear
production and most nuclear production applies to plutonium production in reactors. The FA
will specify how nuclear loss and production must be reported.
7.9.1. Nuclear loss
Nuclear loss (burnup) is an ongoing process that is not reported from a nuclear material
accounting standpoint until time of discharge of fuel from the reactor or within a specified
time thereafter. The amounts reported reflect the accumulated loss for the time the material
has been burned in the reactor core.
When burning mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, there is a nuclear loss (due to burnup) of plutonium
as well as a production of plutonium. In this case, the inventory change of nuclear loss
reflects the net change in the nuclear material inventory, resulting from both processes
together. Therefore, if the amount of plutonium produced exceeds the burnup, a nuclear
production of the amount produced minus the burnup should be reported. However, if the
amount of plutonium burned exceeds the production, the amount burned minus the
production should be reported as a nuclear loss.
Nuclear loss can also occur due to decay of isotopes from nuclear material in storage. It is
also typically reported prior to shipment, rather than periodically. The possibility of nuclear
loss for each facility should be evaluated and will be specified in the FA.
7.9.2. Nuclear production
Like nuclear loss, nuclear production is not reported from a nuclear material accounting
standpoint until time of discharge of fuel from the reactor or at a specified time thereafter.
The amounts reported reflect the accumulated production for the time the material has been in
the reactor. Nuclear production does not change the physical number of items on the
inventory, but due to the production of plutonium, the number of items containing plutonium
will increase. Although nuclear production is calculated for the period during which the fuel
is in the reactor, the nuclear production will be reported on a single date in the ICR.
7.10. MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR AND UNCERTAINTY CALCULATIONS
MUF refers to the difference between an MBA book inventory and physical inventory and is
an important concept in nuclear material accountancy as it can be an indicator of the quality
of control of nuclear material. Statistically significant MUF may indicate that nuclear
material has been removed from the process. MUF is described in more detail in IAEA
Services Series 15.
At the start of an accountancy period, the accounting books are consistent with the physical
stock or inventory, i.e. the beginning physical inventory of a material balance period equals
36
the beginning book inventory for that period. As new items are brought into the inventory,
the book account is increased, and as items leave the inventory, it is decreased. At the end of
the accountancy period, the physical inventory is again compared with the book account. This
is conceptually similar to inventory taking in shops, banks, warehouses and factories.
However, the quantity of nuclear material is harder to measure than the amount of money or
number of items in stock. Measurements of nuclear material inherently have some
uncertainty, some variation from the ‘truth’. These uncertainties contribute to MUF.
MUF is calculated for each category of nuclear material in an MBA, i.e., natural uranium,
depleted uranium, enriched uranium, plutonium and thorium. A negative MUF reflects more
nuclear material present than accounted for, and a positive MUF reflects less nuclear material
present than accounted for. SRDs are not a component of MUF.
The IAEA calculation of MUF is done at the end of a MBP, between two PITs. Generally,
some level of MUF is expected at facilities that process bulk material, primarily due to
measurement uncertainties. The MUF should be randomly distributed around zero unless
there are, e.g. measurement biases or unmeasured process losses that lead to MUF being
consistently positive or consistently negative. MUF is generally expected to be zero in
facilities with only discrete items.
Following are some possible causes of MUF:
• Measurement uncertainty (weight, U/Pu concentration and fissile content by

destructive assay, NDA);
• Estimation uncertainty (e.g. underestimation of unmeasured material in waste); and
• Estimations of material in process and material held up in a glove box or other
processing equipment.
Example: At a fuel fabrication facility, each MBP resulted in an increase in MUF, such that the
cumulative MUF (CuMUF) was continuously increasing. The IAEA and the State worked together to
identify each KMP’s contribution to MUF. A project was established to reduce the contributions to
MUF, which successfully resolved the bias.
Statistical approaches are used in the evaluation of MUF to determine whether MUF can be
explained by measurement uncertainties or not. Therefore, an SRA should be familiar with
the statistical approaches used for material balance evaluation. If the evaluation of MUF
indicates that it is statistically significant, an investigation will begin to determine the cause.
7.11. TECHNIQUES FOR MINIMIZING MUF AT BULK FACILITIES
In order to help minimize MUF, physical inventories at bulk facilities are taken when the
nuclear material is consolidated into forms and at locations where the most accurate
measurement techniques can be applied.
37
For example, measurements of waste and residues (usually heterogeneous and measured
using NDA techniques) tend to have much larger uncertainties than, e.g. liquor in tanks. It is
therefore important to limit amounts of waste and residues, to facilitate accurate accountancy.
Some nuclear material will inevitably remain inside a plant (so-called hold-up) even after a
washout (e.g. plated out on the walls or pipes) but such amounts are normally small.
Unmeasured discharges to the environment should, if they exist at all, be extremely small, but
would generally put a negative bias on the MUF if they were present. Generally, unmeasured
material should be very small as it is good practice to measure all streams in a plant.
Example: Nuclear material accounting and control in an HEU processing facility were not properly
implemented, resulting in a positive CuMUF over several years that did not follow the usual/expected
pattern for that type of facility (e.g. MUF that randomly varies around zero). The escalating CuMUF
in terms of quantities of U-235 raised a concern to both the State and the IAEA.
A collaborative project was initiated involving the IAEA, the SRA and the facility operator, to
determine the origin of the problem and implement remedial actions. Process data were sent to the
IAEA to determine the error sources and trends in different stages of the process. In parallel, an
investigation was carried out by the operator to identify causes such as measurement/accountancy
biases, hold-up and unaccounted material flows and to establish a plan for corrective actions.
In this framework, a technical visit by the IAEA to the facility was organized, in order (1) to conduct
visual observations and obtain more comprehensive information about the facility’s measurement and
accountancy procedures, and (2) to agree on a time table for remedial action on the basis of the
proposals made by the facility operator in their report. An audit was also performed by the SRA to
evaluate the nuclear material accountancy, measurement error propagation and material balance
evaluations. Technical documents related to the project and other supporting documents including lab
results were reviewed. The IAEA proposed an action plan to be followed for implementing
recommendations. One of the major contributors to CuMUF was found to be the nuclear material in
waste generated by the facility that was not characterized and accounted for. The implementation of
the recommendations in the action plan resolved the issue.
7.12. DISCONTINUING NMA AND REPORTING IN AN MBA
Ending nuclear material accounting and reporting in an MBA is possible only when the
nuclear material in an MBA is no longer under safeguards (e.g. as a result of termination of
safeguards on the material, exemption or transfer to another MBA or out of the State). Before
nuclear material accounting reporting can be discontinued, the following must be true:
• The physical inventory must be zero;

• There can be no batches on the inventory;
• A book inventory calculated on the basis of facility records and State reports should be
zero for all types of material;
• There is no material in retained waste; and
• The status of the facility/LOF must be confirmed as ‘decommissioned’ by the IAEA.
38
As long as any one of the above prerequisites is not fulfilled, at least Null PIL and Null-MBR
have to be submitted to the IAEA on an annual basis. While safeguards are applied, when the
operator performs an inventory and there are no batches, a PIL and MBR must be submitted.
There is the possibility that the ending book inventory is relatively small but not zero, due to
a variety of reasons, such as rounding. Nevertheless, the physical inventory must be zero and
any differences not accounted for by an inventory change (e.g. accidental gain or loss) must
be accounted for as MUF in the final MBR, with an attached null-PIL.
In addition to confirming that the book inventory is zero, all transfers to waste need to be
analysed to ensure that there is no reported retained waste still remaining on the MBA
accounts. If so, the material needs to be returned from waste and removed from the MBA
accounts by means of the appropriate inventory change, such as a transfer to another MBA.
8. REPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING

INFORMATION
8.1. INTRODUCTION
Each State that concludes a CSA with the IAEA is required to establish and maintain an
SSAC. A cornerstone of both safeguards and the SSAC is nuclear material accounting and
reporting. IAEA inspectors verify the declared information by checking records and reports,
measuring and counting items, collecting nuclear material samples and verifying operator
measurement systems. This section describes the various reports, the information submitted
in each and the ways in which various nuclear material transactions are reported.
8.2. CODE 10
‘Code 10’ is part of the Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part) that deals with the content,
format and structure of nuclear material accounting reports to be sent to the IAEA. There are
two IAEA legacy versions of Code 10, one of which is referred to as the ‘fixed format’
Code 10 and the other is referred to as the ‘labelled format’ Code 10. A new version of Code
10 which permits the coding of NMA data in XML format is available and may be included
in the Subsidiary Arrangements for a State.
Each format provides the data elements necessary for reporting nuclear material accounting
information to the IAEA. (Labelled and fixed format Code 10 can be found on the Assistance
for States webpage at www.iaea.org/safeguards under the ‘Additional Documents’ tab.) The
initial decision regarding which format will be used is made during negotiations of the
subsidiary arrangements. If a State wishes to change their Code 10 format, the State should
contact the IAEA to initiate the process.
The fixed format Code 10 is based on 80-column punched card technology from the early
1970s. It provides for reporting electronically or on hard copy forms, defines reports that
contain a maximum of 99 line entries and specifies fixed lengths for data fields.
39
The length of each field is specified in Code 10. Due to these field limitations, procedures
may be needed to address the reporting of data that exceeds the limits. (See section 8.19 on
Continuation Entries, which are used to report the longer data.) Also, batch names are limited
to 8 characters under fixed format Code 10.
The labelled format Code 10 was developed in the mid-1970s. Labelled format allowed for
more flexibility in reporting, as preferred by some States.
The labelled format Code 10 is designed to be used with a computerized nuclear material
accounting and reporting system and has few restrictions on report and data field length.
This format requires that all reports be provided electronically. It is possible to report more
than one element in a single nuclear material accounting entry, which facilitates reporting
ICRs and PILs where batches may have more than one type of safeguarded nuclear material,
such as fuel discharged from a power reactor.
Labelled format reporting will look like a string of data delimited by labels that precede each
piece of data. Figure 11 shows the data elements and the resulting data string for reporting a
domestic receipt of irradiated fuel.
All formats of Code 10 support electronic reporting to the IAEA, and it is the
recommended means for providing nuclear material accounting reports.
The State may choose whatever coding system it prefers, but ultimately the reports submitted
to the IAEA have to conform to Code 10 (for States with a CSA). There may be accounting
events defined in the State’s codes that do not easily map to an IAEA code and this can cause
problems when preparing IAEA reports. The conversion procedure to map internal State
codes to IAEA Code 10 needs to be clear and well defined. Additionally, IAEA inspectors
are accustomed to Code 10 terms, so having the State’s and facility information systems
consistent with Code 10 can reduce inspector time in the field.
40
LABEL REPORT TYPE DATA ELEMENT
001: OI / NN ; 000015 # ICR, MBR, PIL REFERENCE NUMBER

002: 1 / 1 # ICR, MBR, PIL ENTRY NUMBER / TOTAL NUMBER OF ENTRIES
003: 20150124 # ICR, MBR, PIL REPORT DATE
006: NAME, I # ICR, MBR, PIL ENCODER'S NAME
010: I # ICR, MBR, PIL REPORT TYPE
015: 20141201 / 20141231 # ICR, MBR, PIL REPORTING PERIOD
099: / / # ICR, MBR, PIL CONCISE NOTE REFERENCE
207: NND- # ICR, MBR, PIL FACILITY CODE
307: NND1 # ICR, MBR, PIL MBA CODE
309: N / ; / # ICR, MBR, PIL ENTRY STATUS AND CROSS REFERENCE CODE
310: # ICR STATE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM RECORD IDENTIFICATION
370: NN / NN-B # ICR SHIPPER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
372: NN / NND1 # ICR RECEIVER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
390: # ICR, MBR, PIL CONCISE NOTE INDICATOR
391: # ICR, MBR, PIL TEXT OF CONCISE NOTE
407: 3 # ICR, PIL KEY MEASUREMENT POINT CODE
411: RD # ICR, MBR TYPE OF INVENTORY CHANGE, TYPE OF ACCOUNTING ENTRY
412: 20141215 # ICR DATE OF INVENTORY CHANGE
430: B / Q /1 / G # ICR, PIL MATERIAL DESCRIPTION CODE
435: // # ICR, PIL OPERATOR'S MATERIAL DESCRIPTION CODE
436: # ICR, PIL OPERATOR'S MATERIAL DESCRIPTION (TEXT)
445: # ICR, MBR, PIL NON-LATIN ALPHABET IDENTIFICATION
446: 045C8 # ICR, PIL BATCH NAME
447: # ICR, PIL SHIPPER'S BATCH NAME
469: N / / # ICR, PIL MEASUREMENT IDENTIFICATION CODE
470: 1 # ICR, PIL NUMBER OF ITEMS IN BATCH
WEIGHT DATA:
600: # 610: # 620: # 630: 163257G # 640: #
650: # 660: # 670: 1306G # 680: # 690: #
700: 1498G # 710: # 720: # 730: # 740: #
750: # 760: # 800: #
The reported data string for the above receipt domestic would be:
001:OI/NN;15#002:1/1#003:20150124#006:NAME, I#010:I#015:20141201/20141231#207:NND-#307:NND1#309:N#
370:NN/NN-B#372:NN/NND1#407:3#411:RD#412:220141215#430:B/Q/1/G#446:045C8#469:N#470:1#
630:163275G#670:1396G#700:1498G#
FIG. 11. Example of labelled format reporting.
8.3. REPORTING PERIOD
The reporting period is a field specific to each report that describes the time frame covered in
that report. It consists of ‘from’ and ‘to’ dates for ICRs and MBRs, and a single inventory
date for PILs. The data element in NMA reports ICR and MBR are:
• Fixed format Code 10: in the header information, paragraph 3;

• Labelled format Code 10: label 015.
For ICRs, the reporting period must include the dates of all original (i.e. non-correction)
entries in the report. Beyond that, there are several possibilities of what can be reported.
Figure 12 shows reporting periods when a PIT is performed in the middle of a month.
For an MBA with regular (for example monthly) transactions, a good practice is to report
inventory changes in each calendar month in which changes occur or were determined. In
a month in which a PIT occurs, it is a good practice (or required if specified in the FA) to
submit two ICRs in that month: one for the beginning of the month up to and through the PIT
date, and the second one for the day after the PIT through the end of the calendar month.
41
Nuclear Material Accounting Reports
Physical Inventory Taking Within a Calendar Month
Physical inventory
taking and PIL on
20161011
Previous Next
Period October 2016 Period
Report dates Report dates
MBR to date: 20161011 MBR from date: 20161012

PIL date: 20161011 Inventory changes in October
Inventory changes in October from 20161012 through 20161031
from 20161001 through 20161011
(through the PIL date)
FIG. 12. Reporting periods for ICR, PIL and MBR in a month when a physical inventory is taken.
It is possible to have equal ICR ‘from’ and ‘to’ dates if all of the transactions have the same
inventory change date. However, in the event that entries need to be added to the report at a
later date, then only this one day period would be covered.
For reports containing corrections, the dates in the reporting period apply only to the newly
reported entries in the report. For ICRs, the inventory change date of a correction entry needs
to be within the reporting period of the report that includes the first ICR entry reporting the
transaction. For PILs, the date of inventory in the reporting period field only applies to new
PIL entries and does not reflect the associated inventory date of the entries being corrected.
For MBRs, the material balance period only applies to new MBR entries and does not reflect
the period related to the entries being corrected.
It is possible that a report consists entirely of corrections and the corrections also may refer to
several different reports and periods. In this case, the reporting period dates of the report
providing those corrections cannot really reflect a true ‘period’. A logical solution for PILs
would be to use the date the corrections were made or, for ICRs and MBRs, the full period
covered by all of the corrections. Nevertheless, the dates for the reporting period (ICRs and
MBRs) or inventory date (PILs) must be reported.
8.4. BATCHES
Nuclear material accounting and reporting is on a batch basis under CSAs. Typical batches
for an MBA within a facility are defined in the FA for each inventory change, each inventory
KMP, each MDC and each measurement basis code. A batch may be composed of several
items, as long as the items have the same specifications as provided for in the relevant FA.
42
All batches of nuclear material must be reported, even if the amounts are so small as to result
in the weight rounding to zero. In such cases, a weight of zero must be reported, to indicate
the existence of the batch and the type of material, and in this case Concise Notes are used to
report the exact amount. A batch name is assigned to each batch of nuclear material, with the
data element in ICRs and PILs as shown below:
• Paragraph 13 in fixed format Code 10 (Batch names can have 8 characters);

• Label 446 in labelled format Code 10 (Batch names can have 16 characters).
The batch name is formed by a combination of letters, numbers and special characters and is
assigned by the organization that originally produces the batch. When the batch is shipped,
the receiver can either accept the original batch name or rename the batch (called
‘rebatching’). It is a good practice to retain the original batch name (or a portion of it in case
the shipper’s batch name is 16 characters and the receiver only allows for 8 characters). For
bulk material, it will typically be necessary to rebatch it when it is processed.
It is a good practice for a SIMS to keep track of the original batch name for any batches
which are renamed.
For imports and domestic receipts, the shipper’s batch name should be reported by the
receiver in addition to the receiver’s batch name. Labelled format Code 10 allows for
reporting in a single line entry both the shipper batch name and the receiver batch name. This
assists the IAEA in matching the shipment and receipt.
The delimiter characters used for identifying data elements in labelled format Code 10 should
not be used in a batch name (the delimiter characters are defined in paragraph 3 of labelled
format Code 10.)
In principle, batch names should be unique within an MBA. For inventories, the batch
identification should be unique within a PIL. Paragraph 67 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) requires
that the physical inventory must list all batches separately and should specify the material
identification and batch data for each batch. Figure 13 shows batch tracking for material in a
State moving between MBAs.
43
FIG. 13. Example of tracking batch names at item and bulk facilities.
It is useful for the State to have unique batch names in the State as a whole (or at least at the
MBA level), particularly for spent fuel (or other material) if it will be kept in a long-term
storage facility. It is useful to think ahead when determining the convention for naming
batches.
For inventory changes, a batch name should be unique to the reporting MBA for any
transaction on a single date. Every effort should be made to avoid repeating batch names. For
example, if a shipping container identification number is used as a batch name, it will likely
be repeated by another MBA using the same shipping container.
8.5. TRACKING BATCHES AT A FACILITY AND REBATCHING
Some FAs include a requirement for tracking a batch within an MBA or more than one MBA
at a facility. One common example is the reporting of pin exchanges in fuel assemblies at
nuclear power plants. The way this is done is to use two inventory change codes: ‘rebatching
minus’ (RM) and ‘rebatching plus’ (RP), which indicate a change in batch name or batch
structure.
These inventory change codes are the only ones that can be used to report batch structure
changes and provide information that can be used to follow a batch. In the event that batch
name or structure changes are recorded in the facility records, the RM and RP entries in ICRs
provide the mechanism for providing a corresponding report to the IAEA, noting that RM
and RP entries have no effect on the nuclear material inventory.
8.6. MATERIAL DESCRIPTION CODES
Each nuclear material batch reported in an ICR or PIL is described by a four-character MDC,
which reflects the physical form, chemical form, containment and irradiation status and
44
quality. For each material type in a facility, the corresponding MDC is specified in the
relevant FA. Operators should be fully aware of the types of material that are present in the
MBA and the corresponding MDC for each.
In the event that nuclear material is going to be introduced into the facility for which there is
no description code in the FA, the IAEA should be notified in advance, the design
information updated, and the appropriate changes made to the FA.
States may have their own MDCs that then need to be mapped to the IAEA’s MDCs. The
MDCs are also used in stratifying the inventory for the purposes of creating a statistical
sampling plan. They are also used in classification of material (e.g. irradiated or un-
irradiated) for safeguards analysis and verification. A full list of the possible MDCs is in
Code 10, paragraph 15 (fixed format) and label 430 (labelled format). Establishing a MDC is
shown in Figure 14.
It is a good practice for the SRA to assist the facility in identifying which MDC to use in
case of any uncertainty.
FIG 14. Example of how an MDC is determined.
8.7. INVENTORY CHANGE CODES
All changes to nuclear material inventories are defined in ICRs by a two-character code
specified in Code 10, paragraph 11 (fixed format) and label 411 (labelled format). Inventory
change codes are summarized and reported in MBRs as accounting entries, all of which are
defined in Code 10, paragraph 48 (fixed format) and label 411 (labelled format).
It is obligatory, and very important, to use the correct code for each ICR entry. The code
conveys key information to the IAEA about each change and its effect on the inventory.
45
8.8. INVENTORY CHANGE DATES
The inventory change date is the date within an ICR that indicates the date when an inventory
change took place or was recorded. The date should be the date when the facility operator
took possession of the material (for a receipt), relinquished the material (for a transfer) or
established the change (for other changes). It should correspond to the date entered in the
facility records and will determine the material balance period in which the entry will be
included.
• Data element in NMA reports — ICR only:

• Fixed format Code 10: paragraph 9;
For inventory changes being reported for the first time, the date of inventory change must be
within the period covered by the report as indicated in the ‘from’ and ‘to’ dates of the header
information. If the date is in an entry that is an addition, then the date must be within the
header date range of the report to which the addition is made. With respect to corrections, the
date must be within the reporting period of the report being corrected and must be the same
date as that of the record being corrected, unless the intent is to change the date. For a
deletion, reporting the date is optional.
Some inventory changes may not be directly related to a specific date but instead reflect
activity over a period of time. These will be specified in the FA, such as nuclear loss and
production during reactor operation, and specific inventory changes of small amounts
accumulated over a month, as defined in the FA.
8.9. CHARACTERS AND ALPHABETS
When reporting to the IAEA, States should not use the special symbol ‘Ø’ in any data field,
but instead report the correct character for the letter ‘O’ and for the number ‘0’.
Labelled format Code 10 is the only format that provides the possibility to report in non-Latin
characters. The only other permissible characters are Cyrillic. The use of non-Latin characters
in a report is indicated in label 445 for ICRs, PILs and MBRs as a code that refers to a
conversion table of characters; the corresponding bit configuration should be agreed between
the IAEA and the State in advance. The only data fields that can be reported in non-Latin
characters are:
• Encoder’s name (label 006);

• State accounting system identification (label 310);
• Text of concise note (label 391);
• Operator’s material description code (label 435). Cyrillic codes cannot be used if the
operator’s codes are the same as those defined in Code 10;
• Batch name (label 446); and
• Shipper’s batch name (label 447).
46
For imports and exports, reports from one trading partner may be in Cyrillic while the other
partner reports in Latin characters. This results in different batch names, requiring a manual
effort for transit matching. In this case, both reporting partners could employ a good practice
to develop a procedure to avoid Cyrillic characters; for example to use numbers only for
batch names. With label 436 (Operator’s material description text), the model Code 10 states
that only Latin characters or agreed special symbols are to be used. It is therefore not
permissible to use Cyrillic characters in this field as they are not considered as symbols.
8.10. PHYSICAL INVENTORY REPORTING
The results of a PIT are reported in a PIL and provide the basis for the beginning and ending
physical inventories for a material balance period. The PIL is a report submitted by the SRA
to the IAEA, reporting the amount of nuclear material on inventory by batch. The way that
items are aggregated into batches is specified in the FA. In some item facilities such as
nuclear power plants, it may be the case that each item is a batch, and the PIL includes all of
the items. In other cases, a batch can contain more than one item. The facility operator
prepares a ‘List of Inventory Items’ or LII, which includes all items on inventory. This report
facilitates the stratification and sampling of the inventory during verification.
Example: if a facility has loose fuel rods (not in a fuel assembly), then these rods may be aggregated
into a batch, for example a box of rods placed in storage.
The beginning physical inventory refers to the physical inventory that exists at the start of a
material balance period. It is reported in the MBR with the code of ‘PB’. The PB for each
nuclear material account must be equal to the corresponding physical ending inventory (PE)
at the end of the previous material balance period and reflects the status as of 0000 hours, the
day following the most recent PIT.
The ending physical inventory refers to the physical inventory that exists at the end of a
material balance period. It is reported in the MBR with the code of ‘PE’. The PE for each
nuclear material account must be equal to the corresponding total amounts in the physical
inventory listing at the end of the material balance period and reflects the status as of 2400
hours on the date of PIT. The PE of a material balance period becomes the PB of the next
material balance period.
Code 10 states that the physical beginning of one period must equal the physical ending of
the previous period. Rounding adjustments to the PE (RAPE) in the MBR indicate a
difference with the physical ending (PE) due to rounding as compared to the sum of the
corresponding PIL. The RAPE resolves the ending physical inventory differences due to
rounding for the MBP. However, reporting RAPE for one MBP does not mean that the
rounding can be omitted for the next period. Rounding to physical beginning (RAPB) cannot
be used to remove the need to report rounding in later MBPs. Therefore, it is possible that the
reason for the rounding will still exist at the time of the next physical inventory and, if they
continue to occur, rounding needs to be reported accordingly.
47
8.11. REPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL QUANTITIES
The amount of nuclear material in each batch must be reported in ICR and PIL entries. In
addition, quantities of nuclear material summarized over the MBP must also be reported in
the corresponding MBR accounting entries.
8.11.1. Measurement basis
The measurement basis data field (MB) is used to indicate how the value associated with an
item or batch of nuclear material was determined. The measurement basis involves only the
measurements, determinations or estimations made by the operator, not the verification
measurements made by either an SRA or the IAEA. Measurement basis indicates two aspects
of the determination of the nuclear material quantities (by batch for ICRs and PILs):
• If the nuclear material amounts in a batch have been determined in the reporting MBA
or in another MBA; and
• If the weights have already been reported in a previous nuclear material accounting
report for the reporting MBA.
The code should be reported for each batch of material and the possible code(s) to use can be
found in Code 10.
Data element in NMA reports — ICR, PIL:
• Fixed format Code 10: paragraph 21

Although the title of the data field contains the word ‘measurement’ the choice of which code
to report is based on the MBA in which the amounts are determined, not necessarily
measured. A good example of ‘determined’ is the declaration in a power reactor of nuclear
production: the amount of plutonium in an irradiated fuel assembly is reported with the code
‘M’ (measured in the MBA) even though no physical measurement is made. The plutonium
production is calculated using codes for this purpose, based on reactor operation parameters.
For some measured discards, termination for use, or transfers to retained waste, the amount
could be estimated and not necessarily measured. Because the weights have been
determined in the MBA, the measurement basis would indicate ‘measured’ or ‘M’.
There are four possible codes for the measurement basis:
• ‘M’: The batch weights have been determined by the reporting MBA and this is the
first time that the batch, with the determined weights, has been reported either in a
PIL or ICR.
• ‘T’: The batch weights have been determined by the reporting MBA and the batch,
with the determined weights, has already been reported in a previous PIL or ICR by
the reporting MBA.
48
• ‘N’: The batch weights have been determined in another MBA and this is the first
time that the batch, with the determined weights, has been included either in a PIL or
an ICR by the reporting MBA.
• ‘L’: The batch weights have been determined in another MBA and the batch, with
the determined weights, has already been included in a previous PIL or ICR by the
reporting MBA.
These codes help the IAEA to see quickly, even in a PIL with a lot of batches, all of the cases
where items have been measured (or determinations have been made) during the reporting
period.
Material shipped out and received back in the same MBA cannot be reported with ‘L’ or ‘T’.
For a batch on the inventory that is measured and no difference in quantity is found, the
measurement basis would need to be reported as ‘M’, which is the only way for the MBA to
indicate a measurement has been made.
It would be very uncommon, but not impossible, for a batch of material to be declared as ‘N’
in a physical inventory that is not an initial PIL. An example would be a batch of two discrete
items that is later divided into two separate batches where the individual item masses are
based on documentation (e.g. shipper values) from another MBA.
Figure 15 depicts an MBA ‘NNA3’ at a fuel fabrication plant, where the fuel assemblies are
produced and immediately shipped to the power plant (in other words, the first report to the
IAEA regarding these assemblies is made in the ICR reporting the ‘shipment domestic’ of
fuel from the fabrication facility to the power plant); NN-B is the power reactor and NN-D is
a separate storage facility. The measurement basis for each batch in each report is shown.
FIG. 15. Example of measurement basis for a power reactor fuel assembly.
The example shown in Figure 16 is a bulk facility with MBA ‘NNA2’ where Batch A is
divided into two batches.
49
FIG. 16. Example of measurement basis for bulk material.
8.11.2. Units for reporting quantities of nuclear material batches
All material quantities must be reported to at least the minimum level specified in Code 10.
Enriched uranium, unified uranium, plutonium and all isotope weights are reported in grams,
while natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium are reported in kilograms. The data
elements for reporting weight in ICR, PIL and MBR are:
• Fixed format Code 10: (paragraph 18), indicated by “G” for grams and “KG” for
kilograms;
• Labelled format Code 10: indicated by “G” or “KG” (in upper or lower case)
following the numeric weight, in the weight data field.
It is highly recommended that all quantities — from the facility records through the reports to
the State and the State’s reports to the IAEA — be maintained at the same level of decimal
significance, thereby minimizing the need for rounding adjustments.
Unrounded numbers should be used throughout the State and when summing individual item
weights to obtain the quantity of material in a batch.
If an amount rounds to zero grams for a batch, it is a good practice to report this batch to
the milligram level. This facilitates the evaluation of the information. The IAEA requests
that when zero amounts are reported for an accidental gain or accidental loss, the actual
amount be provided in an attached concise note. If the amount is more than one milligram,
then reporting to the milligram level will obviate the need for a concise note. All nuclear
material masses are stored in the IAEA’s information system as milligrams.
The level of reporting significance is what is important, not necessarily the unit used; for
example, a kilogram amount with three decimal places is equivalent to reporting at the gram
level.
50
Example: an item contains 0.4 grams of natural uranium in a uranyl nitrate solution. A small amount
of this solution is used in a process approximately monthly. Due to the very small amounts, the item
(which is unique at the facility) is a batch with a zero weight (rounding 0.4 grams to 0). And the
amounts removed are also very small. The facility could report the measured discard each month of
zero, resulting in a new value of the original item of zero. In such situations, it is recommended that
the SRA discuss with the IAEA the timing for reporting these changes.
To summarize, the highest significance for reporting is three decimal places at the gram level.
Amounts reported with more than three decimals at the gram level are rounded at the IAEA
to the nearest milligram.
States should avoid reporting at a greater significance than the milligram level to minimize
unnecessary rounding adjustments.
8.11.3. Element weights of batches of nuclear material
Element weight is the weight of the nuclear material (U, Pu or Th) in the batch being
reported. The amount is the actual weight of the nuclear material element, not including any
other elements that may be part of the total mass of the batch (such as the oxygen in uranium
dioxide). The data element in NMA reports — ICR, PIL, MBR is:
• Fixed format Code 10: positions 38–45 (maximum of 8 positions);

• Labelled format Code 10: one of the labels 600–630, 700 or 800, depending on the
type of element.
If a batch weight value rounds to zero, a zero still needs to be reported, and a Concise Note
used to report the exact weight.
For enriched uranium, both the mass of U-235 isotope and the mass of total elemental
uranium are reported. However, for plutonium, only the elemental mass needs to be reported
(unless otherwise agreed in the FA). Mass of U-233 isotope is reported as the mass of total
elemental uranium.
8.11.4. Weights of fissile isotopes in enriched, natural and depleted uranium
Reporting fissile isotope weight refers to the amount of the fissile isotope of the nuclear
material contained in the batch being reported. Reporting isotope weight is required for
enriched uranium, unified uranium and, in some specific cases, for natural and depleted
uranium, plutonium or other isotopes, if so required in the relevant FA.
For enriched uranium, the data element in NMA reports — ICR, PIL, MBR are:
• Fixed format Code 10: positions 48–55 (maximum of 8 positions);

• Labelled format Code 10: indicated by one or more of the labels 640 690 and 710–
780 depending on the type of material.
In some MBAs, the FA requires fissile isotope reporting for plutonium, natural and depleted
uranium (which are usually reported only in element weight). Separate accounting and
51
reporting of the depleted and natural uranium fissile content does not apply to MBAs that
report in terms of unified uranium. If fissile isotope weights for natural and depleted uranium
are required, the following applies:
• Fixed format Code 10: the isotope weights are reported in the isotope weight field,
(paragraph 19) and the element code indicates the material category (‘N’ or ‘D’);
• Labelled format code 10: labels 770 and 780 for natural and depleted uranium fissile
content, respectively;
• Accounting for the depleted uranium fissile content includes closing the natural and
depleted uranium fissile material balances.
When fissile reporting is required, the field cannot be left blank; a zero needs to be reported.
8.11.5. Negative weight values
There are situations where negative weights can be reported, but there are very few cases
where it is possible; otherwise, positive values are to be reported.
For ICRs, the effect of an inventory change (plus or minus) is determined by the inventory
change code. A + or - should not be reported with weight values except as noted below.
Possible negative values in ICRs:
• Shipper/receiver differences (shipper value minus receiver value);

• Nuclear loss and production associated with reactor fuel being reloaded into the core,
and accounting for the change by returning the weights to shipper values;
• Only for States with an older version of Code 10 that does not include an inventory
change code for accidental gains (GA), a negative accidental loss (LA) may be
reported to indicate an accidental gain. States with such a Code 10 should initiate the
process to update their Code 10 to include the inventory change code for accidental
gains (GA).
Possible negative values in MBRs:
• Shipper/receiver differences;
• Material unaccounted for;
• Rounding adjustments;
• Nuclear loss and production when associated with reactor fuel being reloaded into a
core and the material being returned to shipper values. In this case, it is possible to
have negative values in an MBR, but it is not likely as there will probably be larger
positive amounts of nuclear loss and production also included for discharged fuel;
• Book adjusted and book ending inventories; these are almost always positive, but in
some cases where a physical ending is zero (no batches on the inventory) a negative
book inventory may result due, for example, to rounding adjustments;
• Accidental losses when used to indicate an accidental gain (only for States with older
versions of Code 10).
52
For PILs, negative values are not permitted — all weights must be positive.
8.12. CORRECTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS
There are three kinds of adjustments to previously reported entries: corrections, additions,
and deletions. Corrections are used to report a change to data contained in a previous report.
Corrections and adjustments to prior accounting entries are described in detail in Annex VIII.
Nuclear material accounting requires clear and documented transactional history.

Adjustments must be transparent, explained and properly recorded. Corrections are used
to record changes to previously reported nuclear material accounting entries.
The IAEA’s semi-annual statement uses the term ‘modifications’ to describe corrections,
deletions and additions. The semi-annual statement has a notification regarding timeliness of
reports, and a statement regarding all of the modifications, which reflects the time that lapsed
from the date of an original report in which an entry was included, and the date the correction
was reflected by the SRA. There is no timeliness requirement for corrections/modifications,
but corrections should be addressed as soon as the need is identified.
Corrections are used to report a change to data contained in a previous report. A State may
use a different principle for applying the effects of corrections than the method used by the
IAEA. Correction principles are agreed upon between the IAEA and the State, and it is
preferred for the State and the IAEA to use the same correction method.
Corrections are always conveyed using the same report in which the erroneous entry was
made. In other words, an ICR can only correct another ICR, an MBR can only correct another
MBR and a PIL can only correct another PIL. Code 10 does not specify a mechanism for
correcting concise notes. However, concise notes can be corrected by sending a report that
indicates a removal of a prior concise note by leaving the concise note indicator blank or by
reporting a new concise note.
PILs are prepared for a single date, and any corrections to the physical inventory will be
applied as of that date. MBRs cover the time between two physical inventory takings and any
corrections will affect the balance entries reported at the end of the material balance period.
Inventory changes that are recorded during a MBP are reported with the date when the event
occurred or was established, as defined in Code 10.
When an inventory change date needs to be modified, there are two basic methods for
making the change. The IAEA method applies a correction by replacing a previously reported
nuclear material accounting entry with the correcting entry. Therefore, the date of the original
event is also the date of the correction, even though the correction may have been made some
time later. If the date needs to be corrected, the correcting entry should report the new date. If
the new date is within a different MBP, then changes to other affected reports (MBRs and
PILs) may be necessary. Some States and facilities will apply a correction on the date the
correction is made, and not on the date of the original, corrected entry. Figure 17 shows
corrections made within a single MBP. Figure 18 shows corrections made to a previous MBP.
53
For corrections and additions, all data fields must be reported, even those that have not
changed. For corrections to a fixed format Code 10 ‘C’ (continuation) entry, it is also
required to provide all data fields, even those not corrected, in the correcting entry.
The data elements that are used to indicate the entry that is to be corrected are:
• ‘To Report Number’

• ‘To Entry Number’
The ‘To Report Number’ is the number of the report containing the entry to be corrected and
the ‘To Entry Number’ is the entry number in that report that is to be corrected.
There are some data fields used to provide the reference to an accounting entry that cannot be
corrected except by the IAEA, and the IAEA will not make a correction to any State reports
without approval from that State.
For corrections to the following fields, the IAEA and the State need to coordinate:
• Country code
• Facility code
• MBA code;
• Report period/date
• Report number;
• Line entry number;
• Report number in a correction reference; and
• Line entry in a correction reference.
In addition, corrections to the following fields can only be made by the IAEA for States with
a labelled format Code 10:
• Subfields in label 001 (type of entries, country code);

• Report type; and
• Entry status.
If the SRA or facility operator finds an obvious mistake in an accounting report such as a
transcription error, a correction will need to be submitted.
54
Correction on
Material balance Shipment domestic 20160704 to Material balance
period begins on of 100 kg shipment domestic: period ends on
20151118 (ICR change date: now 105 kg (ICR 20161205
20160220) change date:
20160220)
Previous Next
Period Material Balance Period Period
Book inventory before

250 kg 150 kg
correction
Book inventory prior Book inventory after shipment

to shipment domestic, before correction
domestic (before (20160201-20160703)
20160220)
Book inventory
250 kg 145 kg
after correction
Book inventory after applying
correction to ICR (on and after
20160704)
Physical inventory Physical inventory at end of period:

at start of period: 145 kg
250 kg The MBR entry for SD at the end of the
period includes the entire 105 kg
FIG. 17. Illustration of inventory changes occurring during the current MBP.
Previous period Correction on

Previous material Shipment domestic 20170315 to
ends on 20161205, Next period ends on
balance period of 100 kg shipment domestic:
next period begins 20171217
begins on 20151118 (ICR change date: now 105 kg (ICR
on 20161206
20160220) change date:
20160220)
Previous Material Balance Period Next Material Balance Period
Book inventory
250 kg 150 kg 150 kg
before correction
Book inventory prior to Book inventory after shipment Book inventory from beginning
shipment domestic (before domestic on 20160220 and at of next period before correction
20160220) end of period to ICR on 20170315
Book inventory
250 kg 145 kg 145 kg
after correction
Book inventory after applying Book inventory from beginning of next
correction to ICR period after applying corrections to ICR,
PIL and MBR
After the ICR correction, the

Physical inventory physical inventory must be Physical inventory
at start of previous Before correcting the ICR at end of next
changed to 145 kg; in the
period: 250 kg dated 20160220: physical period: 145 kg
MBR, change the SD entry to
inventory 150 kg, SD total in
include 105 kg, change the BA
MBR includes 100 kg
and PE to 145 kg
FIG. 18. Illustration of corrections made to inventory changes in a previous MBP.
55
It is required for the State and the IAEA to use the agreed upon correction method.
Remeasurement or change of calculation method should be discussed between the SRA and
IAEA. If the operator knows the source of an incorrect inventory change or measurement
previously reported, and knows the correct value, then the State should always report the
adjustment of incorrect data using the appropriate correction method, rather than reporting a
new inventory change.
Example: An operator initially reported the amount of nuclear material contained in several batches
(drums) without subtracting the weight of the container, due to a clerical mistake. The operator and
SRA realized the mistake several months later. The SRA and IAEA discussed the problem and the
operator submitted the corrections.
8.13. CATEGORY CHANGES
Category changes are used to report increases and decreases in nuclear material accounts as
the result of uranium changing from one category (enriched, natural or depleted) to another.
They typically occur in enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants and on-load reactors. In
nuclear material balances, the accounts of the two categories of uranium involved will be
affected; one will increase and the other will decrease by the same amount. The inventory
change codes are EN, ED, NE, ND, DE and DN; the letters indicate the types of uranium
involved (E=enriched, N=natural, D=depleted) and can be read as abbreviations where the
first character indicates the original category of uranium and the second character shows the
resulting category after the change has taken place. For example, NE is read ‘natural to
enriched’ as it indicates a category change from natural uranium to enriched uranium.
If a batch of uranium is on an inventory in one uranium category (depleted, natural or

enriched) and it is later determined that the material category is incorrect, the change is
recorded as a component of MUF and not as a category change. Category changes are only
used to report changes resulting from a process such as blending or enrichment.
Reporting category changes with fixed format:
When material changes category, only the element code with the higher enrichment (E > N >
D) must be reported in an ICR, for fixed format Code 10. However, reporting an entry for
both categories (using each element code) in an MBR is a good practice and results in
complete MBR reports for each type of material. An example for a category change ND is
shown below:
MBR for N natural uranium: MBR for D depleted uranium:

PB: 100 PB: 50
ND: -20 ND: 20
BA: 80 BA: 70
PE: 80 PE: 70
MUF: 0 MUF: 0
56
Reporting both weights in separate accounts reduces any issues arising due to possible
rounding between the original and resulting weights.
Example: when an operator has a category change from natural to enriched, the change of reporting
from kg to g may result in rounding errors that will later need to be corrected. It is a good practice
for the operator to ensure that the report of the kilogram decimals is exactly equivalent to the weight
in grams.
An example of a difference in units for a category change NE is shown below:
MBR for N natural uranium (kg): MBR for E enriched uranium (g):
PB: 100.000 kg PB: 200.0 g
NE: - 0.114 kg NE: 114.0 g
BA: 99.886 BA: 314.0
PE: 99.886 PE: 314.0
MUF: 0.000 MUF: 0.0
Reporting category changes with labelled format:
Labelled format Code 10 requires that the weights of both previous and resulting categories
be reported in the same ICR line entry. The weights for both categories reported in a labelled
format Code 10 entry should both be positive values. Therefore, the previous uranium
category weights cannot be negative, as the reduction in the original category is indicated by
the inventory change code.
Although it is technically possible in labelled format MBRs to report both categories in the
same accounting entry, it is clearer to report the categories within the corresponding
individual MBR nuclear material balances. Reporting both weights in separate accounts
reduces any issues arising due to possible rounding between the original and resulting
weights.
Example of reporting category changes:
Taking an example where 1 kg natural uranium is blended with 20000 g uranium enriched to
3% (U235 weight 600 g):
• The category change is from natural to enriched uranium (inventory change

code ‘NE’).
• For fixed format ICRs, report the element code ‘E’ with an element weight of 1000 g
and a fissile weight of 7.120 g.
• For labelled format ICRs, report label 610 (natural uranium) with a weight of 1 kg,
label 630 (enriched uranium) with a weight of 1000 g and label 670 (U-235) with a
weight of 7.120 g.
• The resulting batch after the blending operation will have an element weight of 21000
g with a U235 weight of 607.120 g, for an enrichment of approximately 2.9%.
57
• As a result of this blending activity, the natural uranium account will decrease by 1
kg; the enriched element and U-235 accounts will increase by 1000 g and 7.120 g,
respectively.
• In the corresponding fixed format MBR entry for ‘NE’, include the amount of
material (with element code ‘E’) in the total; although not strictly required, also, it is
preferable to report an entry for ‘NE’ with an element code of ‘N’.
In the corresponding labelled format MBR entry for ‘NE’, include the amount of material
(with labels 630 and 670) in the totals; also, it is required to report label 610 in the same entry
for ‘NE’.
8.14. REPORTING NUCLEAR LOSS AND PRODUCTION
Nuclear loss and nuclear production are used to reflect the transformation of isotopes during
irradiation in a reactor, for example. They are also used to reflect the change in composition
of the material in spent fuel as it cools after removal from a core (reported with ‘NL’ for PU).
The element code in the ICR entry for nuclear loss is the code of the material as it was prior
to the loss. For a fuel bundle removed from an on-load reactor, for example, the nuclear loss
would be reported as natural uranium, the resulting bundle becomes depleted uranium and a
category change of ND (natural to depleted) would be needed to account for the remaining
uranium as depleted. (Also in this example, the nuclear production would be used to report
the plutonium present in the fuel bundle.) See section 7.9 for more information on this topic.
8.15. RETURNING DISCHARGED FUEL TO A CORE
Prior to returning discharged fuel to a reactor core when the corresponding nuclear loss and
production have already been reported, an accounting change may be needed to report the
fuel with the original shipper values. If this is required, it will be stated in the relevant FA.
Another possibility is that the FA does not require the returned fuel to be accounted for based
on shipper values. For FAs that require the return of fuel to be accounted for based on
original shipper values:
• The total nuclear production to date for the assembly should be reported with a
negative value of plutonium, equal to the corresponding total positive nuclear
production most recently reported. The MDC indicates the irradiated status;
• The total nuclear loss to date for the assembly should be reported with a negative
value of enriched uranium element and fissile weights, equal to the corresponding
total positive nuclear loss most recently reported. For natural uranium fuel, only the
element weight is necessary unless accounting is required for the fissile content of
natural uranium. MDC indicates the irradiated status; and
• Upon final discharge, the latest associated nuclear loss and production reports will
reflect the entire history of the fuel assembly.
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For FAs that do not require the return to shipper values:
• Nuclear loss and production for every loading will reflect the inventory changes
(nuclear loss and production) for each time period that an assembly is in the reactor
core;
• No report should be made of negative nuclear loss and production;
• Upon final discharge, the nuclear loss will be only for the most recent period for the
assembly in the reactor; and
• The total nuclear loss and production for a fuel assembly will be the sum of the
relevant inventory changes reported for that assembly.
Taking an example in a facility where core fuel is always accounted for using shipper values,
the following is a fuel assembly history from fresh fuel (received) weights through initial
discharge from the core and subsequent reloading into the core and then a second discharge.
Table 2 shows a fuel assembly that is burned in a reactor, discharged, reported on a PIL as
irradiated and then returned to the reactor core.
TABLE 2. EXAMPLE OF REPORTING FUEL RETURNED TO A CORE USING TWO

METHODS
Uranium Irradiation
Event U235 Plutonium
element status
ICR receipt of assembly using Not
184219 5125
shipper values irradiated
ICR nuclear loss and production
5374 3045 1310 Irradiated
after first discharge
PIL assembly values in spent
178845 2080 1310 Irradiated
fuel pond
The above three events are for the first time the assembly is burned in the reactor. The
following five events are for the accounting and reporting when the assembly is reloaded
into the core, burned and discharged.
ICR negative nuclear loss and
production for assembly -5374 -3045 -1310 Irradiated
returned to core
PIL assembly values in core
184219 5125 Irradiated
(original values, as received)
After discharge, calculate
nuclear loss and production for 1027 582 250 Irradiated
second time in core
ICR nuclear loss and production
6401 3627 1560 Irradiated
for total time in the core
PIL assembly values in spent
177818 1498 1560 Irradiated
fuel pond
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8.16. CONCISE NOTES
Concise notes provide additional information to the IAEA for the implementation of
safeguards. They are reported as textual explanations related to nuclear material accounting
issues or facility/MBA operations.
Concise notes are used to provide additional information related to all nuclear material
accounting reports to explain specific accounting issues or facility operations. For inventory
changes such as exemptions, de-exemptions and accidental gains and losses, a concise note
would always be used to explain the inventory change in more detail. The FA will specify
reporting requirements for accidental losses, measured discards, and other inventory change
codes, based on the process, throughput and other characteristics of the particular facility.
A gain of nuclear material associated with a trafficking incident should indicate the ITDB
reference number in a concise note. Another use for concise notes is to provide additional
information that could assist the IAEA with transit matching, such as foreign shipper and
receiver information.
The IAEA recommends that concise notes be provided for the following types of entries:
• Exemptions;
• De-exemptions;
• Accidental gains;
• Accidental losses;
• Measured discards;
• Terminations;
• MUF (if reported in an item facility); and
• Corrections to previous reports.
Operational programme information may be submitted to the IAEA using a concise note.
Examples of good practices in using concise notes include:
• To report actual quantities of Pu and HEU for which zero amounts are reported; the
concise note specifies the actual weight using an appropriate unit (e.g. less than 0.5
milligrams).
• When a LOF operator ships nuclear material, a concise note may be used to specify the
receiver.
Concise notes are very helpful to the IAEA in maintaining information about exports where
a corresponding receipt may not be reported, such as a shipment to a NWS that may not
report the import to the IAEA in time to support transit matching.
There is no correction mechanism for fixed format concise notes as there is for nuclear
material accounting entries; however, when an accounting entry is reported with a concise
note and then that entry is later corrected, the following applies:
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• If the correcting entry does not include a concise note, then any concise note attached
to the original entry no longer applies, at least with regard to the last record of the
correction history;
• A concise note — attached to the correcting entry — can repeat the note attached to
the original entry, or provide a completely new text or a verbal reference to the
contents of the previous note;
• Since the concise note indicator means that a concise note is attached, the field should
not be repeated when making a correction unless the correcting entry itself has a
concise note attached.
8.17. CONCISE NOTE INDICATOR
A one character code in nuclear material accounting reports indicates that a concise note is
attached that refers to a specific line entry. The following information refers to the data
element in accounting reports:
• Fixed format Code 10: paragraph 22;

• Labelled format Code 10: label 390;
• If the field is non-blank, there should be a corresponding note that relates to the entry
in which the indicator is set;
• If there is a concise note at the report or entry level, the field should be left blank.
• For labelled format Code 10, the actual text of the concise note is contained in label
099, where it is possible to indicate if the note applies to a single entry or to a whole
report.
8.18. TEXTUAL REPORTS (LABELLED FORMAT)
In labelled format Code 10, textual reports are submitted under a separate record type. To
indicate a textual report, the first subfield of label 001 should contain the characters “NC”
and label 010 should contain a ‘T’. Additional labels (001, 002, 003, 099, 207, 307, 391) are
used to relay the information pertaining to the note and the entry/report to which it refers. If a
textual report refers to a line entry that is part of a set of continued entries, the text is
associated only with the single referred to entry.
Only labelled format Code 10 permits reporting separate textual reports in addition to concise
notes. Textual reports differ from concise notes primarily in that they have their own report
number which needs to be in sequence with the report numbering of ICRs, PILs and MBRs.
8.19. CONTINUATION ENTRIES IN FIXED FORMAT CODE 10
Continuation entries apply only to the fixed format Code 10. Because of field length
limitations in the 80-position ICR, PIL and MBR fixed format forms, continuation entries are
necessary to accommodate entries that take more than one line in a PIL/ICR nuclear material
batch or MBR entry. A continuation entry is indicated by a ‘C’ in position 3 of the hard copy
forms; the ‘C’ will result in certain data fields being copied from one line entry to subsequent
line entries. In cases where the fixed format Code 10 specifies that the ‘C’ procedure can be
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used, the data fields shown below can be left blank in the continuation line. In all other cases,
these fields must be completed.
• Date of inventory change;

• MBA/Country from;
• MBA/Country to;
• Inventory change code;
• KMP code;
• Batch name; and
• MDC.
Continuation entries are needed when numeric values for an accounting entry are too large
for a data field. Enough lines should be entered so that the sum of the values is the amount
that is to be reported. This applies only to the element weight, fissile weight and number of
items fields. Because the fixed format permits only one character for the element code,
continuation entries are needed when more than one nuclear element is included in the same
batch. An example of this is for spent fuel, where two line entries are needed to report the
batch: one for the uranium and one for the plutonium.
If not all numeric fields (element weight, isotope weight or number of items) need to be
continued on a subsequent entry, the other numeric fields not being continued must be
reported as zero. Continuation entries must follow sequentially in a report. It is not possible
to continue an entry from one report number to another.
For corrections to a ‘C’ entry, the continuation procedure does not apply since it is a
requirement that the correcting entry provide all data fields, even those not corrected. Thus, if
the ‘C’ was reported in position 3 of a correction entry, this would not be an error, but care
should be taken that all data fields for the line are completed. (This presents the possibility
that line entry one (1) of a report could have a ‘C’ in position 3, but only for a correction.)
If more than one line is necessary to report a nuclear material accounting entry, use of the ‘C’
procedure is not strictly required; however, if more than one entry is needed and the
continuation (‘C’) is not used, then all data fields must be repeated on the original line and on
all subsequent lines necessary to report the accounting entry.
Example: In an MBR, the weight value is more than 8 digits, including the decimal point. The
physical beginning inventory in an MBR for the enriched uranium element weight is 12345.678 g and
the fissile weight is 308.642 g. Two line entries are necessary because the element weight (including
the decimal point) has more than 8 digits. The whole number portion of the element weight (12345 g)
and the entire fissile weight (308.642 g) will be reported on the first line entry. A ‘C’ in position 3, an
element weight of .678 g (the decimal portion) and a fissile weight of 0 g will be included in the
second entry. (Note that the fissile weight of 0 g is required in the second line entry; it cannot be left
blank because it is a numeric field that must be reported for enriched uranium, even if it is 0 g.)
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For discharged (spent) fuel, there are two nuclear material elements in the batch. The first
line reports the enriched uranium component with the element and isotope weights. The
second line reports the plutonium content of the batch (element weight only).
8.20. EMPTY (NULL) ACCOUNTING REPORTS
When there are no items on an inventory or when there are no nuclear material balances,
there still is a requirement to provide the corresponding PIL and MBR to the IAEA. The
requirement for timely reporting still applies as well. A null PIL is used to meet reporting
requirements where no nuclear material batches are to be reported and a null MBR is used to
meet reporting requirements where no nuclear material balances are to be reported. There is
no mechanism for reporting null ICRs. If no activity takes place during a reporting period,
then no ICR should be submitted.
Example: For an item facility that is closed down with no nuclear material inventory, the SRA should
submit a null PIL and MBR until the IAEA has confirmed for safeguards purposes the
decommissioned status of the facility.
If there are no batches of nuclear material on the inventory of an MBA at the end of a MBP,
then a null PIL is required and must be reported. If there are batches on inventory but their
weights round to zero, the PIL should list batches with weights of zero, and include concise
notes indicating the actual weight of each batch with less than 0.5 milligrams of material.
To submit a null PIL, the following fields are used:
• Fixed format Code 10: report a header and one line entry with the letter ‘A’ in
position three; and
• Labelled format Code 10: report one PIL line entry with the letter ‘U’ in the first
subfield of label 309; the data fields that must be reported with a ‘U’ entry are labels
001, 002, 003, 006, 010, 015, 207, 307, 309 and, optionally, 310.
Example: It is possible, for example in a LOF, for some nuclear material to be present for which the
SRA has not yet been able to determine weights. In this case, a PIL should be reported that lists all
batches with weights of zero until the amounts can be determined. The corresponding MBR would
report zero weights for the beginning and ending inventories. A concise note should be included
explaining that measured quantities have not yet been determined.
8.21. INVALID ACCOUNTING ENTRIES
A reporting option in nuclear material accounting reports for both Code 10 formats is to
provide inactive entries. Except for use in fixed format Code 10 for reporting a deletion,
inactive entries are not considered by the IAEA to be official data. The mechanism for
indicating an inactive entry depends on the Code 10 format:
• Fixed format: report the letter ‘A’ in position 3;

• Labelled format: report the letter ‘U’ in the first subfield of label 309.
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In some States’ information systems, there are records in the facility’s accounting system
that are not required to be reported to the IAEA but are reported to the State by the facility
based on the needs of the State. One example is reporting changes to nuclear material
obligations (deriving from bilateral cooperation agreements), origin or ownership change.
The data fields for reporting an inactive entry are:
• Fixed format: header information plus entry number, position 3, and, if a deletion, the
To Report Number and To Entry Number fields;
• Labelled format: labels 001, 002, 003, 006, 010, 015, 207, 307, 309 and, optionally,
310.
It is possible for an inactive entry to correct an active entry as well as another inactive entry;
conversely, it is possible for an active entry to correct an inactive entry. This addresses State
needs in the event an active entry should have been reported as inactive.
8.22. TERMINATION
A State has the possibility to request termination of safeguards on nuclear material, pursuant
to paragraphs 11, 13 and 35 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), on the basis that the nuclear material
has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any
nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably
irrecoverable. The form to request termination is specified in Code 6 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements (General Part).
Paragraph 11, INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)

Termination of nuclear material in waste shall be subject to determination by the Agency that it has
been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity
relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable.

The Agreement should provide that if the State wishes to use nuclear material subject to safeguards
thereunder in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with
the Agency on the circumstances under which safeguards on such nuclear material may be terminated.

The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to
safeguards thereunder under the conditions set forth in paragraph 11. Where the conditions of that
paragraph are not met, but the State considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from
residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Agency and the State shall consult on
the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied. It should further be provided that safeguards shall
terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement under the conditions set
forth in paragraph 13, provided that the State and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is
practicably irrecoverable.
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Only after the request is granted by the IAEA, may the termination be accounted for and
reported. Therefore, it is expected that the inventory change date for the termination is on or
later than the date of IAEA approval. The inventory change code for termination is TU.
A common example of termination is for the thorium used in the manufacture of fluorescent
light bulbs, or uranium is used for coating/colouring glass. The nuclear material in its end use
form in the product is practicably irrecoverable. Thorium may also be added to magnesium
alloys, after which it is practicably irrecoverable. For nuclear material in waste (See section
8.24), the first step in pursuing a termination is for the State to consult with the IAEA and
reach agreement on the type of material for which termination may be possible. Where the
State considers that the recovery of nuclear material is not for the time being practicable, the
IAEA and the State can discuss the safeguards measures to be applied, such as for transfers to
‘retained waste’ that are awaiting conditioning (such as vitrification). Section 11.11 describes
the reporting under an AP of waste containing HEU or Pu.
The IAEA determines when safeguards may be terminated on a batch of nuclear material.
With regard to nuclear material in a waste stream, the IAEA and the State may discuss the
possibility for termination of safeguards on nuclear material contained in waste streams at a
facility rather than for a particular batch. In a FA, a KMP may be established in order to
measure nuclear material in a type of waste (such as vitrified waste for reprocessing plants).
The DIQ will describe the waste types at the facility, including the nuclear material
categories, forms, containers, and average weight per item (or range of weight). The IAEA
may then evaluate the possibility for termination of safeguards on nuclear material contained
in particular types of waste generated at a facility.
Consultations may occur between the IAEA and the State during the facility design stage and
during construction in this respect. Termination of nuclear material contained in waste only
applies to conditioned waste, which involves the use of a specific matrix, such as bitumen,
concrete or glass.
The State should always work with the IAEA to consult on possible re-application of
safeguards measures to nuclear material contained in waste on which safeguards have been
terminated, before further processing of the waste which will result in recovery of nuclear
material. Information regarding the location or further processing of waste which contains
plutonium, HEU or U-233 on which safeguards have been terminated must be declared per
Article 2.a.(viii) of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.). Information relating any further processing of this
type of waste must also be declared.
8.23. TRANSFERS TO RETAINED WASTE
Transfer of nuclear material on inventory to retained waste (inventory code TW) provides for
some reductions in reporting and verification. Retained waste still requires accounting by the
SRA and reporting of transfers from retained waste (FW) prior to any processing or
movement to another location.
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It is important to remember that nuclear material reported as transferred to retained waste
remains under safeguards, and the IAEA and the State should consult on the appropriate
safeguards measures to be applied to such material. From a safeguards point of view, the
nuclear material in retained waste is considered to be temporarily irrecoverable, while
nuclear material in waste on which safeguards may be terminated must be considered by the
IAEA to be practicably irrecoverable.
Figure 20 depicts the retransfer from waste for further processing of nuclear material for
which safeguards had been terminated and associated reporting under an AP. This would only
be necessary for medium and high active waste containing HEU or Pu or U-233 for which
safeguards had been terminated.
FIG. 20. Diagram depicting nuclear material in retained waste (‘retained waste’) and waste
containing nuclear material on which safeguards have been terminated (‘terminated waste’).
8.24. MEASURED DISCARDS
Material removed from the inventory as a result of process losses are reported as measured
discards. Measured discards may be further defined in the relevant FA, where limits could be
set for reporting the inventory change. The facility process may, routinely or occasionally,
result in some discards that cause an operational loss of nuclear material, for example
discards to the environment of gaseous or liquid effluent. These discards are clearly different
from MUF or corrections and reported with inventory change code ‘LD’ in Code 10.
A measured discard is only for process losses and, therefore, cannot be used as an
adjustment for any other changes to inventory, such as an accidental gain or loss or MUF.
Such types of discards must be evaluated as precisely as possible, and justified by operational
records, enabling the evaluation and quantification of the loss. The DIQ should provide
sufficient details describing the process steps that cause the loss to occur, and explain why
66
materials will not be suitable for further nuclear use (in many cases, it is induced by a dilution
or an operational discharge). The measured discards limit is specified in the FA for regular
operational releases. For a planned release, the SRA should inform the IAEA in advance.
Nuclear material that is captured in filters or on piping is material held up in process that can
be recovered and measured. This is not to be reported as a process loss. Process losses
account for material that is no longer present at the facility as it has gone out of or been
released by the facility, e.g. in the air or down a drain.
8.25. EXEMPTION AND DE-EXEMPTION
Nuclear material can be exempted from safeguards upon request to, and granting by, the
IAEA. A corresponding de-exemption calls for the re-application of safeguards to the
material. There are two types of exemptions defined in INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), one based on
the quantity of material (inventory change code EQ) and the other based on the use of the
nuclear material (inventory change code EU). Each type has a related de-exemption, all of
which are reported with different inventory change codes. Exempted material is de-exempted
if it is to be stored or processed together with safeguarded material.
The article numbers in States’ specific safeguards agreements may not be the same as the
paragraphs of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.). States should refer to the relevant Articles in their CSAs
which correspond either to paragraph 36 or 37 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) when requesting
exemption or de-exemption.
Material exempted based on use must also be de-exempted based on use, and material
exempted based on quantity must be de-exempted based on quantity. Material exempted in
one MBA can be de-exempted in another MBA. Exempted material has to be de-exempted
before exporting it, transferring it to waste or before processing or storing it together with
non-exempted material.
Example: A company that owns and transfers a lot of DU containers (to ship radioactive sources) has
two MBAs. One MBA is for storing containers with exempted DU which remain in this MBA. The
other MBA holds the non-exempted DU. Only the containers in the MBA holding non-exempted DU
are shipped or exported by the company.
The Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part) have a form to be used for requesting
exemption. When the SRA receives the notification from the IAEA granting the exemption,
the nuclear material can be reported using the correct inventory change codes.
The IAEA recommends that requests for exemption include the batch names and a
‘reference tracking number’ as explained in Annex IX.
Although the State’s reporting obligations on exempted material are reduced, the SRA must
continue to account for and control the material. When exempted material will be exported, it
must first be de-exempted. The only exception to this rule is for shipments of containers that
use DU as shielding material and are shipped to another State and returned without changing
67
ownership. An IAEA letter providing instructions and information in this regard can be
viewed on the Assistance for States webpage, under ‘Other Documents’.
In a State receiving a DU-shielded container, the SRA should determine whether or not the
container has been purchased or is only being used temporarily to transport a source. If it is
only being used to transport a source and is then returned to the exporting State, then the DU
in the container is considered to be in transit and should not be reported. If the container is
purchased and will remain in the State, then it should be reported as part of the inventory (as
a receipt foreign, RF). Subsequently, the receiving State can request an exemption of the
material, if it so desires.
A State has the possibility to request the exemption of material from safeguards, pursuant to
paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), on the basis of the quantity of material. The material
is recoverable and can be used for nuclear purposes. There are maximum limits that the total
quantity of exempted material (based on quantity) cannot exceed. Those limits are specified
in paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.).
Article 2.a.(vii) (a) of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)

Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted from safeguards
pursuant to paragraph 37 of INFICRC/153 (Corr.).
There is a requirement in Article 2.a.(vii)(a) of the Model AP that a State declares the
location of all exempted (quantity) material, which should be directly comparable to the
exemption (quantity) amounts for a State as reported in ICRs.
When exempted (quantity) material is domestically transferred within a State, there is no

nuclear material accounting and reporting requirement. However, the State needs to keep
track of the transfer and update the 2.a.(vii) declarations.
Likewise, when material is de-exempted, the quantity declared under 2.a.(vii) will decrease,
which should be reflected in the next update.
A State has the possibility to request the exemption of material from safeguards, pursuant to
paragraph 36(b) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), on the basis of the expected non-nuclear use of the
material. The material is recoverable and is not to be used for nuclear purposes. There are no
maximum limits specified in the CSA.
There is a requirement in Article 2.a.(vii)(b) of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) that the State declare all
exempted (based on use) material under paragraph 36(b) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) that has not
yet reached its non-nuclear end use form and whose total exceeds the limits specified in
paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153.
For any material that is de-exempted, if a new weight of the de-exempted material is
determined, any changes from that used in the exemption should be accounted for in the
facility/LOF MBA books, typically as MUF. Therefore, the material should be first de-
exempted on the basis of the original weight values, then the new weight determined and the
difference accounted for in the facility/LOF MBA as MUF with a Concise Note.
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8.26. ROUNDING ADJUSTMENTS
A rounding adjustment is used to account for differences between summarized MBR values
and the sum of amounts in the corresponding ICR or PIL entries. Rounding adjustments are
reported only in MBRs and are added to an MBR value so that the MBR amount agrees
with a consolidated sum of ICR or PIL entries. A rounding adjustment to MUF is also used to
resolve rounding issues related to calculating MUF.
If the summary values in a PIL change due to rounding (i.e. if the number of digits used in
the accounting system changes) then those changes must be reflected as a RAPE in MBRs.
The subsequent MBR should report RAPB of the same magnitude but with opposite sign,
otherwise the need to report RAPE will remain in subsequent MBRs. This is depicted in
Table 3.
Rounding adjustments can be minimized by keeping all State and facility records and reports
to the same level of decimal significance, while still maintaining the minimum reporting
level of units as required by Code 10.
TABLE 3. EXAMPLES OF ROUNDING ADJUSTMENTS
Rounding adjustment to shipments Uranium

Data type U235
domestic (SD) element
Total amount of SD in the MBR
MBR: SD 34567 864
(rounded to the gram)
Total of all ICR SD entries (summed ICR: SD
34566.3 864.1
and reported to the tenth of a gram) batches
Rounding adjustment in the MBR MBR: RASD -0.7 0.1
Rounding adjustment to physical Uranium

Data type U235
ending inventory (PE) element
Total amount of PE in the MBR
MBR: PE 67854336 1696358
(rounded to the gram)
Total of all PIL entries (summed and
PIL: batches 67854337.1 1696357.2
reported to the tenth of a gram)
Rounding adjustment in the MBR MBR: RAPE 1.1 -0.8
8.27. QUALITY CONTROL REVIEWS OF NMA REPORTS
Each SRA is responsible to ensure that information submitted to the IAEA is correct,
complete and timely. A good way to implement this requirement is to establish quality
assurance programmes as part of the SRA’s integrated management system. Quality control
of the nuclear material accounting information (and AP declarations) at all steps – from
acquiring, recording, processing, reviewing, to transmitting – will help to ensure any errors
are caught and corrected prior to submission. While no auto-validation software can replace
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an SRA’s auditing function, the IAEA offers the QCVS programme, which checks for syntax
errors in the Code 10 reports. QCVS can accept data from an excel spreadsheet and then
identify errors. The errors can be fixed prior to the SRA’s audit of the reports. But whatever
was done to correct the errors has to be reflected in the corresponding facility records.
It is a good practice for the SRA to prepare a preliminary draft MBR and PIL before
finalizing, to ensure there are no problems or discrepancies; if any are found, the SRA should
resolve these with the facility/LOF operator before submitting the State reports to the IAEA.
Many SRAs do a desktop audit of the information submitted by the operators, using the
operators’ facility reports (e.g. general ledgers, summary of inventory change ledgers,
reconciliation statements and final inventory listings) prior to compiling into State reports
(ICRs, MBRs and PILs) for the MBA and submission to the IAEA. Other SRAs submit their
operators’ reports prior to performing a QC audit; if they find any errors or missing data, they
request the MBA to submit a correction. Some operators have a nuclear material accounting
or safeguards unit responsible for checking the quality of the reports prior to sending them to
the SRA.
Example: NMA reports are sent from the facilities to the SRA using a specified email address like
[email protected]. Upon receipt, the reports are moved to the SRA NMA database by the SRA
officer responsible for NMA. When the report is moved to the database, the software automatically
performs all types of quality control and validation checks. For example, MBA names, various codes
and license numbers are checked against the list of valid ones. If the report passes the quality check,
then it is loaded into the SRA NMA database. If not the facility is contacted for explanations or
requested to submit a corrected report. A copy of the facility’s report file (original and corrected, as
applicable) is stored in a separate archive library. From the database the SRA can produce all
needed types of reports for submission to the IAEA, provision during inspections, preparing statistical
reports, and so on.
Example: To help confirm that all domestic shipments and receipts are reported, a national data field
can be introduced, called a transaction number, which assigns a unique number to each shipment
which is then to be used by the recipient. This helps the SRA to automatically check that for each
shipment, a matching receipt has been reported to the SRA. If not, a warning is indicated so the SRA
can contact the MBA that failed to report.
9. DETERMINATION OF 34(C) MATERIAL

Paragraph 34(c) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) specifies that nuclear material which is of a
composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched “shall
become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement.” Such
safeguards procedures would apply when the nuclear material leaves the plant or the process
stage in which it has been produced or imported into the State. This is often referred to as
‘34(c) nuclear material.’
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Paragraph 34 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)
The Agreement should provide that:
… (c) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being
isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such
nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is
imported into the State, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures
specified in the Agreement.
Section 10 of this SIP Guide discusses reporting obligations associated with imports and
exports of nuclear material. These requirements differ for 34(c) nuclear material and for pre-
34(c) material (material containing uranium or thorium which is not 34(c) material). The
SRA should consult with the IAEA in cases where it is unclear whether or not material meets
the conditions of paragraph 34(c). If nuclear material is exported by one State as 34(c)
material, then it should also be reported by the importing State as 34(c) material.
The State may invite the IAEA to conduct a technical visit at a location that possesses
material that contains uranium or thorium to discuss and determine if the material is 34(c) or
pre-34(c). For mines/concentration plants, the IAEA may make such determinations during
complementary access pursuant to Art. 5.a.(ii) of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.).
10. INFORMATION ABOUT

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
10.1. INTRODUCTION
Guidance on the requirements of the IAEA for reporting information on imports and exports
is provided in IAEA Services Series 21, section 7. States are required to provide advance
notification of certain exports and imports, to reflect the receipt and shipment of nuclear
material as inventory changes for the respective MBAs, and to report imports and exports of
any material containing uranium or thorium that does not meet the conditions specified in
paragraph 34(c) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (so-called pre-34(c) material). Many States also
voluntarily report exports to NPT NWSs, and States may also join the voluntary reporting
scheme to report relevant imports and exports.
10.2. COLLECTING INFORMATION FROM EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS
The SRA will need to establish mechanisms for receiving information about imports and
exports. Often, the SRA will set up a coordination mechanism with the government
organization responsible for issuing import and export licenses. The license applicant that
wants to import or export the material will be responsible for submitting the application,
which can be written in such a way as to provide all of the information the SRA needs for
reporting to the IAEA. It can also contain conditions which must be met by the licensee, such
as requiring the licensee to submit a copy of the customs declaration to the SRA that confirms
the shipment took place. This is particularly important when a State issues a general license
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that covers a larger quantity of material over a longer time period. In such a case, it is
essential that the SRA receive information about each specific export in a timely manner.
It is important that information is provided to the SRA in both the application for a license
to import or export and in the reports of actual shipments as they occurred.
The export license organization should also be responsible to ensure that the shipments are
sent only to recipients and end users that are authorized to receive the nuclear material (see
paragraph 94 of INFCIRC 153 (Corr.) for notification requirements).
The IAEA checks all international transfers of 34(c) nuclear material and pre-34(c) material
between States (using information received in ICRs, VRS reports and 34 (a) and 34(b) reports
received from all States, including those with VOAs or item specific safeguards agreements)
to determine if there are any gaps in reporting (e.g. a shipment without a corresponding
receipt).
10.3. REPORTING IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF PRE-34(C) MATERIAL
The form to report imports and exports of pre-34(c) material and instructions for completing
it can be found on the Assistance for States webpage at www.iaea.org/safeguards.
The exporter will typically be a producer of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) in a calcining
plant or a refinery. Depending on how the State sets up its reporting obligations, information
could come to the SRA from mines, mills or exporting organizations. The SRA will need to
check the sufficiency of the data coming from each entity to ensure reporting requirements of
the IAEA can be met.
Information concerning imports and exports of pre-34 (c) material should be submitted by the
operators to the SRA at least semi-annually, to ensure the SRA has sufficient time to report
the information to the IAEA. The IAEA prefers to receive the information monthly (when
such transactions occur frequently) or at least quarterly, although the requirement is that an
annual summary be submitted to the IAEA.
If uranium ore concentrate produced at a concentration plant is of a purity and composition

suitable for enrichment or fuel fabrication (i.e. meets the conditions specified in paragraph
34(c) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)), then it would be considered 34(c) material, and be subject to
full safeguards reporting.
Example: An SRA may establish a national requirement that mines and mills report domestic
transfers of UOC as well as imports and exports. This helps the SRA to track movements within the
State as well as imports and exports. The tracking and accounting of these movements also helps the
SRA to meet State obligations under bilateral supply agreements with other States.
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10.4. ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF 34(C)
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Paragraph 12 of INFCIRC 153 (Corr.)

“The Agreement …. shall provide, with respect to nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder,
for notification of transfers of such material out of the State, in accordance with the provisions as set
out in paragraphs 92-94 below.”
States are required to provide advance notification of exports that meet certain specifications.
These are not accounting reports, they are simply notifications to the IAEA sufficiently in
advance of the export to allow for the IAEA to apply some measures prior to the export,
should the IAEA choose to do so. For example, the IAEA may wish to verify the quantity,
take samples, or apply seals to the containers. The notifications are to be provided at least two
weeks prior to packaging the material for the shipment. The specifications include:
• 34(c) nuclear material (not pre-34(c) material);

• Shipments to a State that exceed 1 effective kilogram within a 3 month period;
• One shipment that exceeds 1 effective kilogram.
States may provide advance notification to the IAEA for transfers that are less than one
effective kilogram. Some States also provide advance notification for shipments of pre-34(c)
material. This is useful to the IAEA. The CSA also specifies the procedure for transferring
the responsibility for the material from the exporting State to the importing State.
It is a good practice for the SRA to notify the IAEA if a planned export for which an advance
notification was submitted is postponed or cancelled. If the SRA fails to provide such
information to the IAEA, the IAEA will likely send correspondence inquiring about the
failure to submit the associated inventory change.
When an export takes place, the transfer of the nuclear material from the exporting State’s
MBA to the importing State’s MBA is reported as an inventory change. This is addressed in
section 8.
10.5. TRANSIT MATCHING
The IAEA sends to the State periodic communications called ‘Import Communications’ and
‘Semi-Annual Statements.’ These reports request the State to provide information to assist
the IAEA to identify any unmatched transfers between States, including:
• Shipments reported by a shipping State that are not declared by a receiving State; and
• Receipts reported by a receiving State that are not declared by a shipping State.
Both circumstances are reported by the IAEA to a State – unmatched shipments and
unmatched receipts. There are several benefits of the transit matching process and the
73
resulting communication that takes place between the IAEA and the States. For example,
such communication assists the IAEA to match every export from a State with a
corresponding import by the other State. Matching transfers can increase the confidence of
timely detection, and conversely, identify a potential diversion of material.
To manage the quantity of the data, the IAEA issued a letter dated 15 February 1985
providing clarification on de minimum quantities of material of a particular type in one
transaction (import or export). Transactions at or below the de minimum quantities are
excluded from the Statement issued by the IAEA to the State. Although such transactions are
not reflected in the Statement, the transactions still must be reported in an ICR by both the
shipping and the receiving States.
Not all unmatched transactions are communicated to the State by the IAEA in the Statements
associated with transit matching. Transactions that are below an established threshold are not
reflected in the Statements. The de minimum quantities are shown below.
Material Type De Minimus Quantity in One Transaction

DU 30 kg of total element weight (currently under IAEA review)
NU 20 kg of total element weight
LEU 150 g of fissile content
HEU 50 g of fissile content
Pu 16 g of total element weight
Th 40 kg of total element weight
The IAEA can be most efficient when the transit matching can be performed automatically
using software algorithms, which is facilitated when the receiving MBA reports the receipt
in the same way that the shipping MBA reported it, i.e. the batch name and amounts match.
When nuclear material is received from two separate MBAs, and the receiving MBA
combines them into one batch (no longer sharing the same batch name or quantity as the
shipping MBAs), the IAEA must manually evaluate the information to try and determine
which batches were combined. This practice does not facilitate transit matching and should
be avoided. An example of an SRA procedure that helps the IAEA to resolve transit matching
is shown below.
1) Receive and review associated communications from the IAEA, and gather
information from:
a. NMA Database;
b. Inventory Change records or ICRs;
c. Discussion with accounting personnel, safeguards officer, clerks; and
d. Discussion with IAEA personnel in the Department of Safeguards, Division of
Safeguards Information Management.
74
2) Determine, if possible, the cause of the discrepancy and gather information for further
investigation by the IAEA with the other country involved.
3) Formulate an appropriate response to as many, if not all, of the outstanding

discrepancies as possible. Due to the lag time between declarations, (e.g. some States
may take longer to respond to the Agency) some recent discrepancies may be
addressed by the next communication. Declarations made by the State and
unconfirmed by the other party must be addressed by the Agency. Some unconfirmed
declarations may involve pre-34(c) material (e.g. UOC) reported by the receiving
State as 34(c) nuclear material (i.e. natural uranium), but not reported in an ICR by
the shipping State.
4) Submit the final version of the communication, complete with appendices where
necessary, such as import/export summaries, copies of State ICRs and/or inventory
change records from the operator or the shipper.
The IAEA prefers to receive responses to problems with transit matching early enough so
that unmatched transfers may be resolved before the next Statement is sent.
11. PREPARING ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DECLARATIONS

11.1. INTRODUCTION
Detailed guidelines on preparing and submitting AP declarations are provided in IAEA

Services Series 11. A comprehensive example describing the experience of a State in
preparing for implementation of its AP is provided below.
The IAEA recommends that AP declarations are provided in digital form and prepared using
the current version of Protocol Reporter software, which is made available by the IAEA.
States that have concluded Subsidiary Arrangements Codes 11 – 18, which pertain to
implementation of the AP, must use the specified mechanisms for preparing and submitting
declarations (and digital submission is specified.)
Example: An SRA with responsibility for all aspects of utilization of nuclear energy and ionizing
radiation (safety, security, safeguards, radiation safety and protection, export-import control,
licensing) had established a department responsible for implementation of safeguards. To prepare for
entry into force of its AP, this department investigated possible impacts on the national safeguards
framework. The areas of its responsibility that might be affected by AP implementation were
evaluated, including legislation, regulations, cooperation with other government bodies, and the
operators of facilities, LOFs and uranium mines in the State. This evaluation sought to determine
where access to information and locations, as needed for implementation of the AP, was adequate in
the legislation and where additional legal authority would be needed. The SRA analysed all of the
articles, identifying impacts on legislation, requirements imposed on facilities and LOFs, research
75
and development entities in the State, operators of uranium mines, exporters and importers, waste
processing operators, provision of access to information and locations, and provision of multiple
entry/exit visas to IAEA inspectors.
Reviewing the legislation led to the following actions. First, the AP was translated into the national
language and published in the ‘Collection of International Agreements’, which made its provisions
binding on State entities as well as the Government. Changes needed in the State’s nuclear law and
associated regulations were identified. The SRA then prepared the inputs and requests to the national
‘Legislation Plan’, which established the fundamental legislative process for action by the Parliament
and Government.
The SRA then introduced additional obligations on the facilities and LOFs operators in the State. The
number of sites was determined (which was complicated by a large number of LOFs in the State). The
SRA evaluated where all nuclear material at certain LOFs had been exempted, and excluded those
locations from the list of sites.
The SRA then met with the facility and LOF operators together with the IAEA to discuss open
questions related to implementation of the AP, including determination of site boundaries, which
R&D activities not involving nuclear material should be declared, etc. After conducting these
outreach meetings and resolving questions, the SRA reported to the Government on its readiness to
implement the AP and informed that the internal procedures for entry into force can be completed.
The Parliament then ratified its AP and the Government informed the IAEA that the internal
procedures for entry into force had been fulfilled. Upon the entry into force of the AP, the 180 day
period began for preparing the initial declarations. During that period, the SRA carried out its own
verification of the declared information at each site.
In this State with a medium size nuclear programme and a mature safeguards infrastructure, very
strict nuclear legislation and a powerful SRA, the process of preparing to implement its AP took a few
years. The activities carried out by the SRA in that time were beneficial to strengthening its control of
nuclear activities in the State.
11.2. SUMMARY OF DECLARATIONS REQUIREMENTS BY DECLARATION

TYPE
Table 4 reviews the content and timing of the declarations under each of the sub-paragraphs
of AP Article 2. Article 3 specifies the timing for submitting declarations. Each column of the
timeliness in the table corresponds to subparagraphs 3.a through 3.g of Article 3. Annual
updates have to contain a beginning and an ending date to which the information refers.
76
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF DECLARATION CONTENT AND SUBMISSION
Timeliness
180 days
before
further Country
Within By 15 May proces- and IAEA
180 days of each year sing, and 60 days fo shall agree Within 60
of entry covering by 15 May the end of on timing days of On consul-
into force previous of each each and IAEA's tation
Article 3 of of AP year year quarter frequency request with IAEA
INFCIRC/540 3.a. 3.b./3.c. 3.e. 3.d. 3.f. 3.g.
Declarations
Info Only on Only on
Article 2 of Sub- Quar- identified request of request of
INFCIRC/540 Article Required information Initial Annual terly by IAEA IAEA IAEA Comments
NFC R&D Activities not involving

theoretical or basic
NM ‒ authorized or controlled by scientific R&D not
2. a.(i) government x x included
Operational Activities at Facilities on the basis of
expected gains in
and LOFs where NM is customarily effectiveness and
2.a.(ii) used x efficiency
use, contents,
approx. size, map
2.a.(iii) Buildings on sites x x required
Scale of operations of each
2.a.(iv) location ‒ Annex I Activities x x
location, operational
status, estimated
2.a.(v) Mines and Concentration Plants x x prod. capacity
quantities, chemical
comp., use or
(a) Source Material ‒ x x intended use
2.a.(vi)
(b) Exports of Source Material x
(c) Imports of Source Material x
complements
(a) Exempted NM ‒ Quantity par.37/INCIRC153
2.a.(vii) x x complements
(b) Exempted NM ‒ Use par.36(b)/INCIRC153
2.a.(viii) Intermediate and High-Level Waste x
Exports ‒ Specified Equipment and

(a) NN-Material specified in Annex II x
2.a.(ix)
Imports ‒ Specified Equipment
and NN-Material specified in
(b) Annex II x
2.a.(x) NFC plans ‒ 10 year period x x
NFC R&D Activities not involving State shall make
every reasonable
NM ‒ NOT authorized or effort to provide
2.b.(i) controlled by government x x information
State shall make
every reasonable
effort to provide
2.b.(ii) Activities identified by the IAEA x information
2.c. Amplifications and Clarifications x
DECLARATIONS MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE IAEA EVEN IF THERE IS NO ACTIVITY RELATING TO ANY OF THE ARTICLE(S)
NFC=Nuclear Fuel Cycle
NN-Material=Non-Nuclear-Material
NM=Nuclear Material
R&D=Research & Development
Note: For Article 2.a.(v), once the IAEA has requested the State to provide information about
the actual production of a particular uranium mine, it is helpful to the IAEA when the State
continue to provide updates to this information in subsequent 2.a.(v) declarations without
being requested.
77
11.3. COLLECTING INFORMATION TO GENERATE AP DECLARATIONS
Communication with entities that may need to submit information for an AP, but who are not
licensed, can be complex. These entities need to be informed of their responsibilities under an
AP, including provision of information and facilitating complementary access (CA). These
provisions should be addressed in the State’s legislation, to give the SRA the authority
needed to collect the data. Informative open meetings, publication of information on a
website, and providing explanations of the various declaration elements and other concepts in
the national language, are useful means of communication. A brochure produced and
circulated by a State to its AP reporting entities is provided in Annex X. To collect
information for AP declarations, it is good practice for the SRA to:
• Conduct an open source search initially and periodically during updates;

• Incorporate reporting obligations into regulatory requirements;
• Conduct outreach to potential reporting entities and relevant ministries;
• Set up the needed communication channels to collect the information;
• Provide guidance through a brochure or a website for reporting entities; and
• Communicate with the IAEA about any questions, inconsistencies or uncertainties.
It may be helpful for an SRA that is preparing for AP implementation to contact peers from
other States who have experience, and take advantage of their lessons learned.
To update the declaration, the SRA should communicate with each organization that provided
information in the prior year’s declaration. These organizations can be asked to update their
declaration, include any new activities, and also notify the SRA of any other organizations
which may be partnering with that organization in carrying out activities that are declarable.
Example: An SRA distributed official letters informing relevant institutions (such as universities,
research institutions, industrial radiography companies, hospitals, etc.) about a recent publication:
‘Instructions on the conditions and procedures for the collection and provision of information and
maintenance of records of activities relating to the application of nuclear safeguards and non-
proliferation’. This document was posted on the SRA’s website for public comments and contained
detailed instructions on safeguards requirements reflected in the license application process.
Example: Before bringing into force an AP, one SRA communicated with the relevant organizations in
the State, including existing facilities and non-licensees (such as universities), who acquired new
reporting/access requirements associated with the AP. The SRA worked to prepare these entities by
advising them of the new requirements and the likely issuance of a modified regulation, and informed
them of the consultative process that would take place during the development of those regulations.
The SRA could communicate directly with potential reporting entities to collect declaration
information for an AP. This strategy, shown in Figure 21, puts all of the responsibility on the
SRA for identifying these entities and making contact with them.
A second strategy (shown in Figure 22) would involve the SRA reaching an agreement with
the other ministries in the State. The other ministries would collect the relevant information
from the entities with which the ministry is affiliated, and submit it to the SRA. Those
78
ministries would have some responsibility to confirm the completeness and correctness of the
information prior to transferring it to the SRA.
Finally, the SRA could agree with the other ministries that each ministry would communicate
the relevant requirements to the entities under their regulatory control. The entities would
then submit relevant information directly to the SRA. In this scenario, it would be very
important to determine who and how the completeness and correctness of the declaration
submittals is assured. It is also important to ensure the necessary relationship/contact is
established between the Ministries, reporting entities and the SRA (See Figure 23.)
FIG. 21. SRA communicates directly with potential reporting entities.
FIG. 22. Other ministries collect relevant information and submit to the SRA.
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FIG. 23. Ministries communicate the requirements but the entities submit data to the SRA.
Example: In preparing for entry into force of its AP, a State reviewed its legislation to see what
regulatory power was needed to contact AP reporting entities with no license. The SRA also visited
the licensed nuclear facilities informing them of the declaration requirements. The SRA provided
IAEA PR software to each facility. No license was required to produce Annex II items, so the SRA
conducted a survey to identify potential locations of relevant manufacture or export. Universities and
research laboratories were contacted to determine what relevant R&D was being carried out and
with whom the organizations collaborated. This State had some legacy activities related to a former
nuclear weapons programme and contracted a university to research that past programme and
prepare a report describing the facilities involved and their current status, and the State attached the
report to the initial AP declaration.
Example: A State conducted outreach activities at facilities and other organizations that might be
affected by entry into force of the State’s AP. These activities included training in activities that are
declarable under an AP, a review of AP declaration requirements and the relevant national
legislation and regulations. Survey questionnaires were distributed to those who conducted R&D in
the nuclear field. For those who had conducted activities that needed to be declared, workshops on
how to use PR software were provided in cooperation with the IAEA and an experienced Member
State (through its Support Program). To prepare the initial declarations, the SRA visited each facility
and provided assistance in using the PR software. The SRA then merged the separate declarations
into the national declarations. This resulted in good quality and comprehensive declarations. One
problem that was encountered was that data from some of the facilities could not be merged, which
required some manual data entry. In preparing the updated declarations in the subsequent year, the
SRA established a requirement that updated declarations are to be submitted by 31 January to allow
for checking the data and consolidating it into the national declarations. The SRA held another
workshop on AP requirements, including relevant research activities, and a review of how to prepare
a declaration. The workshop also described how to prepare for an IAEA CA.
AP Article 2 specifies the information to be included in declarations. The declaration which

causes most confusion about what should be declared, as it requires some judgement, is under
Article 2.a.(i) on nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities that do not involve the use of
nuclear material and which are authorized or controlled by the State. It is helpful to guide the
80
reporting entities to ask useful questions, especially as many researchers may consider their
research to be basic in nature (and basic research is not declarable).
A simple software application is available online that asks questions intended to help
determine whether or not a particular activity is declarable. It is designed to be used prior to
using the IAEA’s Protocol Reporter software to prepare the declaration. This pre-declaration
analysis tool is called ‘AP declaration helper’ and is found at http://www.aphelper.doe.gov/.
Helpful questions to be asked may include:
• “Is this activity contributing to the development or improvement of any process of

conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, critical facilities, reprocessing, or
processing of intermediate or high level waste containing Pu, highly enriched
uranium, or U-233?”
• “Does this activity involve the use of nuclear material?”
• “Which institutions in other countries are involved in this research?”
Example: An SRA prepares a template in Excel or MS Word which is sent to the reporting entities
along with instructions. The reporting entities provide their input into this file and send it to the SRA
by email sufficiently in advance of the deadline for submitting it to the IAEA. The SRA then reviews
the input, determines what needs to be provided in the draft declaration to the IAEA, and prepares a
declaration for the State. The SRA sends the final version of the reporting entities’ input back to them
to be used in updating the information in the following year. The template that is sent may be tailored
to the particular declaration type. For example, the template sent to a uranium mine will differ from
the template sent to an organization who would provide information for the 2.a.(i) declaration.
Example: Every year in February, the SRA undertakes to prepare an update for all AP Article 2.a
declarations. A project coordinator is appointed to liaise with all reporting entities, receive the
updates, follow-up on questions and prepare a draft submission. Meetings are scheduled every week
and 25% progress reports are expected weekly. The team members visit every facility to confirm
updates and report findings to the project coordinator. When all updates are received, the team
reviews the draft for corrections, consistency and completeness. The final version is provided to the
authorities for approval and submitted to the IAEA before 15 May.
11.4. 2.A.(I) DECLARATIONS
The 2.a.(i) declarations describe nuclear fuel cycle related R&D activities not involving
nuclear material which are funded, authorized, controlled or carried out on behalf of the
State.
A State may wish to provide information to the IAEA about legacy activities, such as prior
research and associated locations, in the initial AP declaration. This information can be
provided in an attachment (‘legacy nuclear activities’). These activities may show up in open
source searches or their signatures may be revealed through environmental sampling.
Providing the explanation with the declaration avoids having to respond to a request.
81
The declarations are not intended to address fundamental science, but rather research focused
on the seven nuclear fuel cycle stages listed in the AP, and the research should be applied
rather than fundamental basic science. If there is some uncertainty regarding whether the
research is basic or applied, the State is encouraged to declare it.
One of the aspects of the declaration is the involvement of other States in each research
activity. The IAEA prefers to receive some details regarding the role of the States that are
involved and the particular scope undertaken by each, as possible.
Example: Both basic and applied research may be carried out in multiple States collaborating
together in an international project. One State may be conducting experiments using nuclear
material, while other States are performing mathematical calculations or simulations not involving
nuclear material. One State may be involved only in basic research, while other States are focused on
applications to the nuclear fuel cycle. It is a good practice to include all States participating in a
cooperative project, regardless of whether or not their contributions to the project would be declared
and irrespective of whether the States are NWS or non-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS).
Example: After signing an AP, a survey was conducted of organizations that might be potential AP
reporting entities. Those that were likely to have declarable activities were contacted and given
instructions as to how and when to submit declaration information to the SRA. They were instructed
to report research projects even if it was unclear whether the research should be declared. The SRA
then made a determination before compiling the final declaration. Every year the SRA sends out a
reminder letter to the previous year’s declarants and also asks them if they have any knowledge of
other institutions that might have projects that should be declared.
11.5. 2.A.(II) DECLARATIONS
This declaration provides for information to be submitted by the State about the operations at
a facility or LOF for the purpose of aiding the implementation of safeguards, e.g. by
achieving efficiencies. For example, the IAEA and the State could reach agreement that more
timely information would be submitted under the 2.a.(ii) declaration, with respect to, e.g.
nuclear material transfers, crane movement records, movements of empty spent fuel casks,
isotope production programmes. The IAEA would use that information to more efficiently
schedule its verification activities, or to facilitate the use of randomized short notice
inspections.
11.6. 2.A.(III) DECLARATIONS
It is important to recognize that 2.a.(iii) declarations, often called ‘site declarations’, are
required for the site of each facility and the site of each LOF (unless the inventory of nuclear
material at the LOF has all been exempted from safeguards by the IAEA). Each facility and
LOF in the State must submit a site declaration until such time as its decommissioned status
has been confirmed by the IAEA for safeguards purposes. Once that occurs, a site declaration
is no longer required to be submitted for that respective site. Site declarations must be
updated each year.
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[The State] shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing:
(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent from that
description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site.
a. Information identified in 2.a.(iii) shall be provided within 180 days of entry into force of the
additional protocol.
b. Annual updates to the information provided under a should be sent by 15 May …
Site declarations are used by the IAEA to better understand the activities going on at or near
places where nuclear material is present. Many buildings on sites directly support nuclear
operations, so they are important components of the nuclear fuel cycle capabilities of the
State. These buildings are significant to safeguards because they could be readily used for
nuclear activities, benefitting from the same infrastructure and expertise available at the site
for the declared facility.
The ownership or administrative responsibility for each building is not a factor when
determining whether a building should be included in the site. It is expected that many sites
will contain buildings owned or administered by different parties. Generally, a site should be
a geographically coherent area.
11.6.1. Collecting information about sites
The SRA will need to interact with the site personnel to acquire the needed information to
prepare the site declaration. It is a good practice to identify a ‘site representative’ who is
responsible to interact with all of the organizations present on the site to collect the
information and work with the SRA. The SRA can then prepare the complete site declaration.
The SRA could also work with the personnel at the facility on the site which is responsible
for safeguards implementation at the facility. These personnel would then need to interact
with others on the site (other companies or organizations) to collect the information.
A nuclear research centre might have a few buildings that are carrying out nuclear research
activities on a site where there are also a very diverse collection of activities going on in
many other buildings. The initial site declaration will provide a description of the use and
contents of all buildings (see IAEA Services Series 11 for specific guidance) on the site.
Updates to the site declaration need to include information to reflect changes to the site that
occurred since the initial declaration. The information that has not changed does not need to
be included in the updates, but if there are no changes at all, this should be stated in the
header note field. The use of Protocol Reporter software (version 3) will facilitate the
updating of initial declarations.
An important component of this declaration is a detailed, annotated map of the site, which
clearly indicates the site name, site code, site boundary, geographical coordinates, scale and
orientation and labels the buildings with their names so that they can be matched with each
entry in the declaration. The boundary should surround all of the buildings, structures and
83
other relevant features which are located within the site boundary. If a building is excluded,
an explanation should be provided. To facilitate use of its internal ‘Geospatial Exploitation
System’ (GES), the IAEA prefers that maps be submitted digitally, in the geographic
information system (GIS) format of a geodatabase (.gdb) or a shapefile (.shp). Although these
are ideal formats, it is also possible to convert most computer aided design (CAD) drawing
files (.dwg or .dxf) which have geospatial information to a format compatible with the GES.
The use of Protocol Reporter (version 3) allows map files to be attached in GID, CAD, pdf or
any other image file.
The definition of a building may cause some confusion. Buildings may include power
stations, pump houses, storage buildings, warehouses, and many other kinds of dedicated
areas or structures. Features of a site, such as a piece of land used for storage of items or
equipment should be described despite not being a ‘building’. Any location within the
boundary of the site that is visible in a satellite image should be described. Underground
structures, even though these will not be visible, should also be included.
There may also be temporary structures or tents erected to support activities from time to
time. If these will remain in place for a substantial period of time, such as a year, they should
be reported in the site declaration. If they are erected and removed within a year, they would
not need to be included. While the declaration is supposed to reflect the situation as of the
end of the calendar year, if a temporary building that was there on the 31st of December but is
taken down when the site declaration is being prepared (several months later), it does not
need to be included.
Example: While the definition of the site boundary is fairly straightforward in the case of, e.g.,
nuclear power stations, it is less clear in the case of sites used for R&D activities involving nuclear
material. Many buildings on the site of a research centre may have an obvious connection to the
nuclear fuel cycle. But many other buildings may be used by companies for non-nuclear activities.
The variation in the tenants each year can complicate access. Initially, the SRA included all of the
buildings on the campus in the site declaration, separately listing those with no relation to nuclear
fuel cycle-related activities. These buildings were used for office complexes, automobile garages,
conventional storage buildings and basic research.
Discussions between the SRA and the IAEA in determining the boundaries of a site are
helpful when the situation is not fully clear.
When the site has buildings that are very far from the main facility, it is a good practice to
submit two maps so that the details of each map can be clearly seen. The 2nd map will
include only those buildings located a long distance from the main facility.
New facilities can be on a new site or may be part of an existing site. If a new facility is part
of an existing site, as in case of building a new reactor facility at an existing nuclear power
plant site, then the existing site boundaries will typically need to be expanded. In the case of a
new facility in a new location, a new site declaration will need to be prepared. To develop the
declaration, the SRA should discuss plans with the forthcoming facility operator to identify
where boundaries and fences will be established. After site boundaries have been identified,
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the facility operator will need to define the purpose and activities for all buildings located in
the site boundaries. This information provided by the facility operator to the SRA will be
evaluated and incorporated into the 2.a.(iii) declaration.
The site boundary should realistically represent the physical limits of the working site, with
no areas artificially or arbitrarily separated by fencing to limit verification access. Several
facilities (MBAs) or LOFs may share the same site. Sites should normally not be smaller than
one building, and must include ‘installations co-located with the facility or LOF for the
provision of essential services’, such as hot cells, waste treatment and manufacturing
activities.
While the determination of a site boundary is fairly straightforward for most facility types, it
can be more difficult in the case of sites used for training, research and development. Several
buildings of such a site have evident relation to the use of nuclear material and to the nuclear
fuel cycle, while other buildings could be used for unrelated purposes or leased to companies
with no nuclear activities at all. If the site boundary is chosen to be the physical boundary, all
the buildings must be included into the declaration, separately listing those that are not
related to the nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA inspectors can request access to any buildings
included in the site declaration with 24 hours notification, or with 2 hours notification if the
request is made during the conduct of an inspection or DIV carried out on the site.
If the non-nuclear-related buildings on a site are occupied by different companies from year
to year, it may be necessary to provide updated information to the SRA at the time of signing
of a lease, so that the declaration can be updated. Alternatively, the owner or property
manager of these buildings may be listed as a permanent contact point with the generic
description of the building being given (e.g., ‘leased office space’ or ‘leased warehouse
space’). However, the SRA will need to ensure that the property manager is prepared to grant
access to the IAEA upon request.
Names of buildings: it is a good practice to use the names of the buildings that the
organization uses, rather than inventing new building names. In this way, updates to
information on buildings that is provided from the site representative, which will refer to the
building identification used by the organization, will be clear to the SRA as to which building
it refers to. Also, the point of contact for each building should be identified and known to the
SRA, so that the SRA can inquire regarding any changes to the building, which can be very
important during decommissioning or other modifications being undertaken at the
building/site. The site working hours are required to be declared.
If the IAEA considers that a building that is not within the physical boundaries of a facility’s
campus might be ‘functionally related’ to the site of that facility, the IAEA can request
information about the general activities and the person carrying out such activities under
Article 2.b.(ii). Examples could be buildings housing scientific activities, fabricating
equipment, providing computer services or personnel. Difficulties can arise if buildings are
not included in the site declaration so the IAEA has limited ability to judge whether or not the
building is ‘functionally related’. Thus, the IAEA may have to judge by geographic
85
proximity, appearance, history, etc. It is good practice to discuss the buildings and their
function with the IAEA and jointly agree whether or not to include them in the site
declaration.
Example: After a State brought into force its AP and on the recommendation of a partnering State, a
core “AP Team” was set up. The team included representatives from organizations concerned with
and affected by the implementation of the AP, such as the operating organization of the research
reactor and the nuclear and radiological safety authorities. The first activity carried out by this team
was the preparation of the initial AP declarations. The team received training and assistance on the
preparation of the initial AP declarations through workshops focused on preparing the declaration
and using Protocol Reporter software. The majority of declared activities concerned a ‘Nuclear
Studies Centre’. After the submission of the declaration and during an IAEA DIV, just before
performing a CA at this site, the IAEA discussed the initial declaration with the State authority,
identifying any needed enhancements.
11.6.2. How to prepare the site declaration
Site declarations for sites of facilities are often sensitive from the security point of view as
they describe the content and use of buildings on the site. Site declarations are therefore
typically submitted using secure transmission and encryption. The site declaration should
reflect the site name and site code. Subsidiary arrangements pertaining to an AP (Codes 11 to
18) may require that site codes be reflected in the declaration. The site name can simply be
the name of the facility or LOF or primary organization on the site. However the name of the
organization might change from time to time, so using a consistent site code is useful for
analytical and consistency reasons.
A site code may be created by using some characters from the LOF or facility code. For
example, a LOF code could be ABC and the site of a LOF could be ABC1. A site code could
also be created by using the first 3 letters of the name of the State, followed by three letters of
the facility code. The SRA and the IAEA can agree on the site code through an exchange of
correspondence, or it may be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
New sites are typically added in the annual declaration updates which must be submitted to
IAEA each year by the 15th of May (covering the previous calendar year). However, new site
declarations can be submitted at any time of the year. The declarations and attachments to
declarations (e.g. maps and diagrams) should be submitted in electronic format and
transmitted using encryption.
11.6.3. Providing information about managed access
Managed access refers to arrangements to be made for CA to prevent the dissemination of

proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical security requirements, or
protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. For example, a storage location
that is very infrequently visited may have a safety requirement where ventilation systems
have to be activated at least 24 hours prior to accessing the location. In this case, it is
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recommended that the 2.a.(iii) declaration associated with this location describe this situation
in the comments.
Managed access arrangements that are anticipated can be described in the associated
declaration line item. In other cases, managed access may not be foreseen and would then be
declared when an inspector arrives. An example could be an unusually high radiation field or
a contamination spill which has just occurred or is in the process of being cleaned up. In these
cases, there should be discussions to determine what information and access can be provided
to enable the inspectors to fulfill the objectives of the access.
In preparing the initial AP declaration, the State may wish to request that the operators of
facilities and LOFs and other locations describe any foreseen need for managed access, the
reason for the managed access and the measures envisioned to address it. A brief description
of the managed access can be included at the end of the specific line entry, and updated
annually as necessary.
When discussing managed access arrangements with the operator of a facility, LOF, or other
location, the State should ensure that the managed access is reasonable to address the
underlying concerns but is arranged such that the IAEA can be granted sufficient access to
information and locations to fulfill its objectives.
Example: A contaminated area with a high dose rate requires e.g., special permits, safety protocols,
safety equipment and specific training for IAEA staff and/or specific personnel. The time required to
put these measures in place should be specified in the declaration.
Example: A shut-down facility requires more than 24 hours for activation of ventilation or heating
systems to enable safe access to the location.
Example: When a linear accelerator is turned off, there may be residual radiation and the safety
interlocks will not release the door to the accelerator vault until the radiation level has reached an
acceptable level. This may take a number of hours to achieve.
Access to a location in a remote area may require specific logistical arrangements (i.e. the
flight to the location may need to be coordinated with the facility and may include the
inspectors going to the location on the regularly scheduled facility plane or a private plane
may need to be hired.) The State should inform the IAEA of such logistical arrangements in
the declaration for that location.
There could also be a situation where a specific building on a site belongs to another owner,
and that owner is rarely on-site. It is a good practice for the SRA to ensure that someone at
the site has a key to access the building, such as the security force.
Example: In requesting managed access, the declaration stated ‘for health and safety reasons,
additional time will be required for accessing Building 6 to establish a method of protection for staff
and visitors with respect to radiation and industrial hazards.’ In another declaration, managed access
requirements were needed to create a work plan for appropriate equipment and staff to be
assembled due to radiological hazards at the location.
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11.7. 2.A.(IV) DECLARATIONS
Activities contained in Annex I of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) are to be declared under 2.a.(iv). To

ensure that companies that may undertake such activities are aware of the reporting
obligations, the SRA may need to carry out a communication campaign. The SRA may wish
to engage organizations such as the radiation protection authority, customs authority, industry
organizations and security ministries.
Example: An SRA requested that the State’s Export Control Authority provide a list of firms that had
exported the relevant items in the past. The SRA communicated with the firms about the
manufacturing activities. The SRA also requested the nuclear industry in the State to submit a list of
their suppliers for AP Annex I items.
Example: A separate set of regulations was prepared to require companies that conduct activities
listed in AP Annex I to report the required information to the SRA. To identify these companies, the
SRA searched open sources, inquired with the nuclear industry regarding their suppliers, and worked
with State Customs to get a list of exporters. Companies were identified that produced centrifuge
components, hot cell components (windows, manipulators, etc.), and spent fuel flasks.
Example: An SRA issued a survey to companies in the State, inquiring about capabilities for
conducting activities listed in AP Annex 1. The survey was adapted from one provided by another
State that had developed it earlier.
11.8. 2.A.(V) DECLARATIONS
This declaration reports annual estimated production of uranium ore concentrate from
uranium mines operating in the State. IAEA Services Series 22 provides detailed information
regarding reporting from uranium mines. The information about uranium production in mines
is typically collected and controlled by a regulatory body in the State, such as a Ministry of
Energy or a Ministry of Mines. It may be the same body as the SRA or a different body, in
which case the SRA can coordinate with this body to collect the information for the 2.a.(v)
and 2.a.(vi) declarations. Often the person responsible for tracking the necessary information
is not a radiation protection officer at a mine but rather a logistics/transportation/export
officer.
If uranium is extracted as a byproduct from another type of ore, like gold ore or phosphate,
then the organization that tracks the uranium should be aware of such activities and be able to
report any uranium obtained as a byproduct in the State. For example, the uranium byproduct
could be produced at a calcining facility, or a copper or gold concentration plant or a mill.
The IAEA may request information on actual production for a specific mine. If this
information is requested, the SRA should continue to provide annual updates to this
information in subsequent years in the 2.a.(v) declaration.
11.9. 2.A.(VI) DECLARATIONS
These declarations report holdings of source material (pre-34(c) material) in quantities

exceeding ten metric tonnes.
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Example: In a case where UOC is sometimes stored awaiting transport, for example in a
warehouse near a shipping dock, the State should be declaring either the stocks (if the
material is in the warehouse at the end of the calendar year) or the exports (if the material
has left the warehouse and is being exported).
11.10. 2.A.(VII) DECLARATIONS
These declarations refer to exempted material. Nuclear material should always be declared
under a CSA before it is exempted by the IAEA, and subsequently declared under an AP as
required. If no material is exempted in the State, then this declaration will contain ‘nothing to
declare’. For the initial 2.a.(vii) declaration, the SRA can use the accounting records to
identify the total quantity of exempted material to be reported.
If the quantities declared by the State for its 2.a.(vii) declaration do not match with the
records of the IAEA, the IAEA will communicate with the State to resolve the difference.
11.11. 2.A.(VIII) DECLARATIONS
These declarations are made in advance of changing the location, or planning for further
processing, of intermediate or high level waste containing Pu, HEU or 233U, on which
safeguards have been terminated. Such material might be located, e.g. at a reprocessing plant
or a waste conditioning facility. The SRA should work with such types of facilities to make
them aware of these reporting obligations. A vitrification plant might ship material containing
HEU or Pu and therefore change its location. The national regulations and/or licenses for
these kinds of facilities may include a requirement that all plans for further processing, and
all movements, of waste material containing HEU, Pu or 233U, be reported to the SRA well in
advance, so that the SRA can determine what should be included in the 2.a.(viii) declaration
each year.
Typically, safeguards on this material is terminated under paragraph 11 of INFCIRC/153

(Corr.) and reported to the IAEA in an ICR with inventory change code TU (termination use).
Monitoring the nuclear material for which safeguards was terminated using the TU code can
assist the SRA in tracking this material.
If the conditioned waste containing HEU or Pu is moved, or if further processing is planned,

it must be reported in the declaration at least 180 days in advance.
11.12. 2.A.(IX) DECLARATIONS
The items for which information regarding import and export is declared pursuant to Article
2.a.(ix) are found in Annex II of INFCIRC/540 (Corr.). To prepare the initial declaration, it
may be useful to contact any facility operator that requested during the past year an export
license for an Annex II item. Names of potential entities concerned can be provided by
nuclear operators too, and some others by the ministry of industry, economy or trade if a
national registry of companies is maintained. The national regulation should provide
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sufficient legal power to the SRA to require the submission of information and provision of
access from such companies.
It is a good practice for a State to include at least all of the items in the AP Annex II in its
listing of controlled nuclear commodities. Some States may include only the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) listed items (single use and dual-use), but there are a few items in the
AP Annex II that are not included on the NSG lists, such as fuel flasks, and there are also
items on the NSG list that are not listed in AP Annex II.
Another solution is to introduce in the national regulation the AP requirements, to ensure that
information provided during the export license process can be directly transferred to the State
authority to establish the declaration.
Some operators declare exports of items that are not listed in Annex II, to be sure that they do
not miss or evade their legal obligations. The State authority may then need to clarify the
requirements for the declarants, perhaps through a brochure, website, or training course.
The Protocol Reporter version 3 will enable the report of exports of any piece of equipment,
even items not contained in Annex II, to simplify for the State the analysis and assessment of
this declaration and enable reporting based on the lists used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
In addition, the software will offer lookup tables containing the items in Annex I and Annex
II of the AP.
11.13. 2.A.(X) DECLARATIONS
The 2.a.(x) declaration of the State’s approved ten-year nuclear development plans is updated
each year. A State without an AP in force is welcome to provide this information on a
voluntary basis. The information should be conveyed formally, rather than through an
advisory mission team or a technical cooperation project meeting. The approved nuclear
development plans are typically not formulated by the SRA within the State, but rather by a
Ministry responsible for nuclear energy or technology promotion. Therefore, coordination is
required and a mechanism for communication should be established by the SRA.
When a plan for nuclear development has moved into a phase of implementation, or has been
cancelled or modified, the changes should be reflected in the updated declaration. Annex XI
provides a series of examples of updates to a 2.a.(x) declaration, progressing from a
conceptual plan for a new nuclear power plant through to early provision of design
information, using a fictitious State.
INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) Article 2.a.

(x) General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle
(including planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by the
appropriate authorities in [the State].

a. [The State] shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a (x)… within 180 days of the
entry into force of this Protocol.
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As the nuclear development plans are implemented, the updates to the 2.a.(x) declaration can
include additional details which become available from year to year, until the preliminary
design information or a first DIQ is prepared and submitted. Annex XI includes examples of
increasingly detailed 2.a.(x) declarations leading to the preparation and submittal of a DIQ.
To ensure a cohesive set of information, it is important that the designers, operators and
companies involved in the nuclear development project transfer the necessary information to
the SRA. This can be achieved through, e.g. establishing a legal obligation linked to the AP
implementation in the State’s regulations or in the license conditions.
Example: The planning and design of a nuclear reactor facility is a long project. The 2.a.(x)
declaration is submitted when the State authority has authorized the plan for a new facility. The
location of the new facility may not be known, nor the exact type, but a license may be issued first for
siting, and later for allowing the invitation of bids. The safeguards considerations can be reflected in
the bid specifications.
As updates are due in May, the State may wish to initiate the information collection process
by sending letters to the relevant ministries or other organizations (uranium mines, licensees,
relevant State and private companies) reminding them to provide information on any changes
to the approved 10 year nuclear development plans. The official declaration is prepared for
submission, reviewed by the appropriate ministry and submitted to the IAEA.
Example: The nuclear development plans in a State are often determined by a ministry (e.g. the
ministry of energy, economy, trade or industry). The SRA coordinates with those bodies to update the
2.a.(x) declaration and submit it to the IAEA.
11.14. 2.B DECLARATIONS
The State is required to make ‘every reasonable effort’ to provide the IAEA with the
information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities not involving
nuclear material which are specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or
the processing of intermediate or high level waste containing plutonium, high enriched
uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in the State but which are not funded,
authorized, controlled or carried out on behalf of the State.
Regulations can be enacted which create a requirement that privately funded nuclear fuel
cycle-related R&D not involving nuclear material be reported to the SRA by commercial,
private (or other) organizations as applicable. Other ‘reasonable efforts’ could include issuing
a questionnaire to universities, companies and research organizations which may carry out
the R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle (identified by searching open sources,
science and technology publications and professional societies). The questionnaire would
help to identify organizations performing nuclear fuel cycle R&D activities which are not
funded, authorized, controlled or carried out on behalf of the government. In addition, the
SRA can confirm the consistency between declarations and open source information
including organizations’ web sites.
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The State could also review nuclear-related patent applications to identify companies to reach
out to. Research organizations could also be requested to provide information about research
which is transitioned to a commercial entity, such as through a spin-off company.
11.15. REVIEW, APPROVAL AND SUBMISSION OF THE DECLARATIONS
To ensure that the information provided by the operators is correct and complete it is
necessary to review, assess and verify the provided information. Reviewing of information
(by the SRA) is performed to ensure that the format is correct, that all necessary sections are
completed fully and in an appropriate level of detail. The SRA can also evaluate if the
information is coherent and consistent with the previous declarations, and can verify the
information during other activities, such as confirming the accuracy of 2.a.(iii) site
declarations. The SRA should not simply forward the information submitted by the reporting
entities but review, assess and validate the completeness and correctness of the information
prior to submittal to the IAEA. In case of corrections and omissions, feedback should be
conveyed to these entities to support continuous improvement.
Example: An SRA receives submittals from reporting entities, analyses them and checks for
correctness, completeness and internal consistency. If errors are found, the reporting entity is
contacted and requested to submit a correction. After all corrections are received, the SRA inputs the
declarations into Protocol Reporter software and exports the declarations for review. The SRA
reviews and proofreads the whole set of declarations. Finally, the declarations are submitted to the
IAEA via encrypted email.
Example: At the SRA, one officer has primary responsibility for AP declarations, handles
communication with reporting entities, manages the AP database and is responsible for compiling
and submitting the AP declarations to the IAEA. Assigning the responsibility to one person (while
also identifying a backup) helps to ensure that the declarations will be correct, complete and timely.
It is recommended to check the quality of AP declarations using Protocol Reporter software

so that the format is consistent with the IAEA’s system and the declaration can be correctly
uploaded into the IAEA’s database. If an error is found after submitting the declaration, it is a
good practice to submit a correction immediately and not wait for the next annual update.
Attachments to AP declarations, such as maps, photos, notes or any attachment to any AP

declaration, can be submitted separately to the IAEA using Protocol Reporter. It is
recommended to encrypt AP declarations and associated attachments prior to submission to
the IAEA. Version 3 of the Protocol Reporter software will facilitate the attachment of files
(such as maps, photos, diagrams, reports) to AP articles to enhance the preparation and
submission of AP information to the IAEA.
Example: At a nuclear research centre with several different buildings (research reactor,
radioisotope production, waste management and storage, non-destructive testing, environmental
applications), a Nuclear Material Control Unit was established. The functions of this unit are
separated from operational and overall facility management. The unit acts as the site representative
for safeguards purposes, collects and manages the information necessary for AP declarations, and
compiles and submits the declarations to the SRA.
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12.FACILITY OPERATORS’ ROLE IN PROVISION OF
INFORMATION
Much of the information provided by States to the IAEA regarding facility design, nuclear
material inventories and transfers of nuclear material within or outside of a State originates at
facilities and is produced by facility operators. Facility operators also generate information
for preparing site declarations under an AP.
This section is provided for facility operators, and shares experiences and good practices
of facility operators in providing information to the SRA and IAEA.
12.1. RESPONSIBILITY OF MANAGEMENT
The facility management should ensure that safeguards-related responsibilities are clearly
defined and that each is assigned to an appropriate position/unit within the organization (e.g.
nomination of Safeguards Site Officer, implementation of nuclear material accountancy and
control system, communication with SRA, etc.). These responsibilities should be defined in
the organization operating manual. Management is responsible for defining the safeguards
high level programme of activities and team structure (strategy, quality check,
responsibilities, etc.). Interfaces requiring coordination, such as between compliance,
operations and security, need to be defined and mechanisms established for this purpose.
Primary responsibility is often assigned to a particular role, which may be a ‘Facility
Safeguards Officer (FSO)’, an ‘Accountancy Officer’, a ‘Site Safeguards Officer’ or other
title, depending on the nature of the facility and the associated safeguards activities.
The remainder of this section will refer to the position with primary safeguards
responsibilities at a location as a ‘facility safeguards officer’ or FSO. In reality, this role
could have a variety of titles, and such a position should also be established at a LOF.
Management should communicate the contact details of the FSO and alternate to the SRA.
12.2. FUNCTIONS OF A FACILITY SAFEGUARDS OFFICER
The FSO is the primary facility contact person for the SRA, and liaises with the IAEA and
facility management as necessary. Routine business can be discussed at a working level
during inspections or by email exchange (e.g. announcement of IAEA inspectors performing
the inspection, follow-up actions, submission of the sampling plan to the facility, preparation
of shipments from IAEA to facility or vice versa). Communication that occurs through
official channels is discussed between the SRA and the FSO.
Good practice: Assign all safeguards responsibilities associated with the facility to one
person: i.e. the FSO is responsible for the facility safeguards activities, preparing the site
declaration and facilitating CA at the site.
The FSO should be trained on safeguards in general and the individual agreements and
protocols which are in force in the State and also, importantly, the FA. Additionally, health
93
and safety, radiation protection and quality assurance of safeguards arrangements
implemented at the facility should be included in the training and familiarization programme.
The FSO should be responsible for the supervision of the timely submission of safeguards-
related information to the SRA (e.g. declarations, reports, records, accountancy documents,
operational programs) as required by the SRA. If the information is submitted by other
departments within the facility, the FSO should supervise the correctness of the information
and advise the departments concerning questions.
The FSO and the facility management should have close communication and the FSO should
be involved in all safeguards-related discussions and discussions of changes with the
potential to impact safeguards. The FSO should participate in discussion regarding new
safeguards measures considered for the facility, e.g. to improve implementation effectiveness
or efficiency, and also to consider the conditions of the facility with regard to the IAEA
safeguards requirements. For example, to support the IAEA’s establishment of a new
safeguards approach for a storage facility on the site, the FSO would discuss the issue with
management, hold working level discussions with the SRA, and participate in discussions
between SRA and IAEA. Such proactive planning and coordination helps to ensure all
conditions and requirements are mutually understood, concerns raised and the path forward
communicated to all parties.
The FSO should manage the procedures to facilitate IAEA access at the site, such as:
• Arrangements that access for inspectors is granted on facility site (contact between the
FSO and site Security);
• Information exchange in an “initial meeting” between the FSO, SRA and IAEA
inspectors to discuss activities to be performed during inspections, DIVs or CA;
• Preparation and handover of all necessary records, reports, source documents and
other information to inspectors;
• Act as contact person for safeguards inspectors in case of questions which can be
addressed at the working level, and reference of other issues to the SRA by the FSO
for resolution;
• Act as the interface between facility staff and inspectors (or SRA if a representative is
present), particularly where information or support from other facility departments are
necessary for the inspection;
• Be responsible to introduce new inspectors to health & safety requirements and other
arrangements at the site, and ensure that all inspectors seeking access possess the
needed training/certification;
• It is good practice for the FSO to document and circulate procedures for safeguards
activities to all affected staff, and ensure they are adhered to during inspections; and
• It is a good practice for the FSO to hold a “close out meeting” after an inspection to
review performed safeguards activities, try to clarify any open questions, provide
source documents or other non-restricted or sensitive documents as necessary to
resolve issues, and review any lessons learned. For continuous improvement, the FSO
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may wish to discuss corrective actions with staff as needed, following the
inspection/access.
In general, the FSO should be available to address any requests or needs of the IAEA
inspectors or SRA, and well prepared to assist the IAEA to successfully complete the
inspection and assure objectives can be achieved.
12.3. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS BETWEEN FACILITY, SRA AND IAEA
Contact persons on safeguards-related matters should be clearly defined for all entities. To
enable a reasonable workflow during inspections, direct communication among the parties is
helpful. Mutual arrangements in writing about detailed communication needs/expectations
are also useful to avoid misunderstandings or delays. Clear communication protocols should
be defined for working level and official communication, identifying who will be informed,
about what, by whom, and when.
The Subsidiary Arrangements specify the timing, content and format for reports. The AP
defines the reporting requirements and timing for associated declarations. See the relevant
sections of this SIP Guide for details in this regard. The submission of reports and
declarations in electronic format is highly preferred by the IAEA. It is a good practice for the
FSO to attach an official letter signed by the facility management or by the FSO (as specified
by the facility management) to the email transmitting official information to the SRA from
the facility.
Security requirements will need to be followed by the FSO in submitting information.

Classification of the documents (reports, declarations, operational programme information)
should be clarified in the facility procedures in advance as needed. The period of retention
and methods for destruction and archiving should also be specified. See Section 4.2 for more
information about means for secure electronic communication channels between the facility,
State and SRA.
12.4. INFORMATION ABOUT THE FACILITY DESIGN
The facility management creates a DIQ based on the templates made available by the IAEA.
The FSO should be familiar with the features of the facility which are relevant for the initial
preparation of the DIQ and be involved early with regard to any planned modifications. As
specified in the FA, some modifications will need to be reported in advance. To ensure the
FSO receives the needed information about the facility design features and any planned
modifications, some possible strategies include:
• The FSO could arrange with the facility management to be invited to participate in
recurrent technical meetings, where potential facility modifications would be
discussed;
• The minutes from such recurrent meetings could be shared with the FSO; and
• The FSO can raise awareness among relevant staff about the existence and content of
the DIQ and their role in ensuring the FSO remains informed accordingly.
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Example: Steps in preparation of the DIQ by FSO:
• The FSO is assigned responsibility for the preparation of the initial DIQ and
subsequent updates.
• The FSO requests the SRA to send the appropriate DIQ template, to be used in
preparing the design information. The FSO may also wish to request the SRA to
obtain additional guidance from the IAEA to assist in preparing the DIQ (the SRA
could email the IAEA to request such guidance).
• Additional to the answering of the questions in the DIQ, the FSO requests from
relevant facility staff, copies of floor plans and overview maps of the buildings and
areas on the site and submits them in an annex to the DIQ.
• MBAs and KMPs of the facility are reflected in a diagram. The flow of nuclear
material through the facility (bulk or item) is demonstrated in a separate flow
diagram.
• Examples of the facility source documents (e.g. weighing form, transport sheet,
analysis form, advice note, and calibration certificate of measurement equipment) for
the nuclear material accountancy and control system is provided in an annex to the
DIQ with reference to the associated DIQ section.
• Health and safety, security and radiation protection information valid on facility site
and to be followed by inspectorates is described in the DIQ.
• The FSO provides the draft DIQ to facility management for review and approval. The
facility manager signs the DIQ. The FSO prepares an official letter of transmission of
the DIQ to the SRA.
• The DIQ is retained at the facility and made available to inspectors upon request, to
support design information verification.
• Updates of the DIQ are prepared as required, following a similar approach as was
undertaken to prepare the initial DIQ.
12.5. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS AND INFORMATION
The facility’s nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) system will include the
procedures, processes, databases, forms, measurement methods and instruments, quality
control programmes, records, source documents, reports and other elements. The accounting
software used at the facility could be provided by the SRA or could be developed by the
facility operator or purchased from a third party. In any case, the entire NMAC system will
need to be designed to meet all relevant national requirements, including those related to the
submission of information to the IAEA. The complexity and functionality of the NMAC
depends mainly on the nature of the facility.
Example: A facility operator has been enhancing NMAC systems throughout more than 35
years of operations. The NMAC system is tailored to the needs of each plant and is based on
the relevant regulations for the State in which the plant operates. In every case, the system
meets the functional requirements of the IAEA. Fundamental changes and modifications in
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the NMAC systems are reported in the DIQ for each facility. The NMAC systems are
developed and improved based on a continuous dialogue with the SRAs and the IAEA.
The facility management should decide which department of the facility will be responsible
for the functioning and use of the NMAC. On the one hand, the FSO may be responsible for
the execution of nuclear material accountancy. In this case the FSO can also supervise the
correctness of the accounting entries in line with requirements and also produce the
accountancy reports to be submitted to the SRA. On the other hand, most of the information
relevant for nuclear accountancy is produced in other departments of the facility (e.g.
logistics/shipments or quality control). In this case, logistics staff could input entries into the
NMAC, which supervision and advice are the responsibility of the FSO.
Example: At a facility, much of the relevant information for nuclear material accountancy (weighing,
analysis, transfers between MBAs, export- and import-documents, information for concise notes,
advance notifications) is generated in the Operations section. The FSO is not part of Operations, in
order to ensure the independent function of safeguards. The well-trained employees working on
nuclear material accountancy in Operations enter information into the NMAC system which is used to
generate the routine safeguards reports and records. To ensure the high quality and correctness of
such records and reports, they are checked by two Operations employees and then the quality and
correctness is audited by the FSO. This system (depicted in Figure 24) produces reports that can be
directly generated in Operations, validated by the FSO and submitted directly from the NMAC system
to the SRA with the approval of the FSO.
Good Practice: The accountancy reports should be submitted in electronic format to

facilitate the IAEA’s processing of data and avoid transcription errors. An official letter
should convey the submission.
Source data for nuclear material accountancy should be as far as possible processed in real
time in the NMAC system to obtain a situation in the nuclear material accountancy books
which is identical with the physical situation of nuclear material inventory at the site. The
source data are based on source documents which are archived by the operator (as long as
necessary). The source data used to prepare the accountancy reports (ICR, MBR, PIL) should
be available for the IAEA during inspections.
The preparation and submission of the nuclear material accountancy reports should be subject
to a quality control process which also meets the time limits of submission. It is preferable
that several people (in case of absence of the principal accountant) are able to prepare and
submit the reports.
In case of any questions regarding nuclear material accounting the FSO should always have
the opportunity to get in contact with the prior defined contact persons (see communication
channels) to resolve any questions.
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FIG. 24. Nuclear material accounting concepts at a facility/site.
Good Practice: all safeguards accountancy reports should be generated by the operator using
information generated in the same NMAC system to avoid transcription errors or
implementation errors from transfer of information from one system to another.
Changes to the facility’s NMAC system need to be described in an updated DIQ. It is a good
practice for the facility’s accounting system to facilitate the SRA’s preparation of reports to
the IAEA (i.e. consistent with Code 10).
12.6. INFORMATION ABOUT IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR

MATERIAL
Reporting and notifications related to the import and export of nuclear material is discussed
in Section 10 of this SIP Guide, where the general requirements are described. It is
recommended that the advance notification (AN) of a planned export (or import) be prepared
in the relevant department where the data is generated. However, the FSO will play an
important supervisory role in reviewing and approving the final AN to be submitted.
Good Practice: Send the AN to the SRA as soon as the shipment date is available.
Good practice: It is good practice for the AN to include detailed information which is
typically quite helpful for the IAEA’s evaluation. Some of these details are specified in the
Subsidiary Arrangements and therefore obligatory, so the FSO should be familiar with the
requirements for his or her facility.
• Reference Number: to track the status of shipment notified on the AN.

• Amendment number: specify if there are changes of shipment which have to be notified
on the AN (it is preferable that the amendments are submitted directly as soon as the
information becomes available); and apply an identification system that enables tracking
of related previous notifications.
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• Number of items (Import/Export AN) and Batch number (only Export AN due to
unavailability in advance of batch numbers from shipper).
• Last date when material can be identified (only Export AN) due to the fact that exported
nuclear material is packed in special overpacks, and after packaging verification is
difficult. Nuclear material would have to be unpacked again which would significantly
delay the shipment process.
• Date when material is unpacked (only Import AN). This information is useful for
inspectors to know when the nuclear material will be available to perform ad hoc
inspection to verify the material (reference INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), Paragraph 96).
As with all official submissions to the SRA, the AN should be signed by the authorized
person at the facility, and transmitted with an official letter from the FSO. Additionally, the
AN should be sent in accordance with timeliness requirements and using the communication
channel agreed between the IAEA and the SRA.
12.7. PREPARING AP DECLARATIONS
For States with an AP in force, declarations are submitted for each site (sites are associated
with both facilities and locations outside facilities or LOFs). It is a good practice for the FSO
of a facility to also act as the site representative (or closely liaise with the site representative)
and to be responsible for the preparation and updating of the AP declarations associated with
the facility and site. For example, manufacturing activities of items specified in AP Annex I
could occur on the site that must be declared under AP article 2.a.(iv). The facility could be
involved in the processing of waste containing Pu, and the FSO should be familiar with the
reporting requirements associated with AP article 2.a.(viii). All FSOs will need to prepare a
2.a.(iii) site declaration, which is described in detail below.
Example: Preparation of 2.a.(iii) site declaration by the FSO:
• The FSO’s reminder in his/her electronic calendar alarms well in advance of the deadline
for submitting the declaration to the SRA. Updated site declarations must be submitted by
the State to the IAEA by the 15th of May each year.
• The FSO collects all relevant information for the declaration.
• The general information to be reported are described in Article 2.a.(iii) of the AP.
Declarations are usually prepared using either IAEA’s Protocol Reporter software or
‘CAPE’ for EURATOM States. On the basis of the software, the FSO can easily prepare
the site declaration. The IAEA’s Protocol Reporter version 3 software will facilitate this
exchange of information between the FSO and the SRA, and enable attachments such as
site maps (see section 11.6.1) to be attached to the declaration and submitted
electronically.
• The FSO collects all the relevant information (buildings, site specific holidays,
attachments to building, status of building, description of building, site representatives,
site map, managed access areas arrangements) from the individual departments on-site
(see Figure 25).
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FIG. 25. Collection of relevant information for a 2.a.(iii) site declaration.
• After collection of all relevant information, the FSO fills in the site declaration form
using IAEA Protocol Reporter or other SRA provided software, and requests its
review by appropriate facility management or other experts.
• An official letter signed by the management confirming the correctness of the site
declaration is attached to the site declaration.
• If the site declaration is prepared with declaration software, the declaration can be
submitted by email. If confidential information is included in the site declaration, the
email or the declaration file should be encrypted and securely transmitted. It is
preferable that the site declaration is submitted by email and also as hard copy with
the official letter enclosed to the SRA.
• The site declaration is retained by the FSO in accordance with document management
procedures and archived as appropriate.
• The SRA makes arrangements with the IAEA as necessary to plan for and implement
managed access.
13.OTHER INFORMATION
States provide other reports to the IAEA, albeit relatively infrequently. These are described
below with examples of some situations which have taken place in States that necessitated a
report.
13.1. SPECIAL REPORTS
Paragraph 68 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)

The Agreement should provide that the State shall make special reports without delay:
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(a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been
loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits to be specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary
Arrangements; or
(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements
to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible.
The special reports are to be sent as quickly as possible to the IAEA, but in any case within
72 hours from the discovery of the event. The official report transmission may be preceded
by a direct exchange by phone or mail to inform immediately the IAEA of the event. In case
of loss (or suspected loss) of nuclear material, the special report should describe:
• Estimated amount of nuclear material which has been lost;

• The loss circumstances, indicating clearly when the loss has been established or
discovered;
• Explanations on the causes of the incident, and the experience drawn from this
analysis; and
• Modifications and countermeasures implemented to avoid any reoccurrence.
If a FA has been concluded, it will specify limits associated with accidental losses, measured
discards, and other inventory change codes, for the particular facility, based on its
characteristics, throughputs and processes. When the relevant inventory changes are within
those specified limits, they are reported routinely in an ICR with a concise note.
Another common case for special report may be the unexpected breaking of an IAEA seal.
The reporting to the IAEA must be immediate, to ensure better conditions for knowledge
recovery on the involved material. In this particular case, the report should indicate:
• When the seal has been broken (and where, if the seal is broken during an internal
transfer or a shipment).
• Why the seal has been broken (inadvertently cut by an operator, ripped off during
handling, seal wearing during time, etc.).
• What countermeasures have been implemented immediately to facilitate knowledge
recovering (e.g. immediate information to the IAEA, SRA sealing to freeze the
situation in the facility, transfer to an area under IAEA C/S system).
• What has been modified in the process/procedures to avoid breaking in the future
(changes in items routes within the facility, evolution in sealing procedure, protection
from shock, etc.).
Every special report must be kept by the SRA and the facility to support discussions during
the inspections which may be carried consequently to the report (special inspection as
provided for by paragraph 73.a of INFCIRC/153).
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Example: In a State, the implementation of safeguards is regulated by the Ministerial Decree on the
rules of accounting and control of nuclear material. The Decree regulates the submission of special
reports: “The organization possessing nuclear material shall report in writing to the Authority of
Nuclear and Radioactive Materials without delay, if:
a) any loss or gain has been found in the physical inventory of nuclear material;
b) accidental loss of nuclear material has occurred or may occur, or a well-grounded suspicion
exists;
c) such accidental event has occurred or may occur, which will affect the ability to control the
nuclear material.”
Example: in a State, a special report was submitted regarding an accidental loss of a small amount of
nuclear material. The ICR contained a ‘loss accidental’ line for a Pu source with 0.0 g of Pu-239. The
Pu source was used as a sensing component in an instrument for soil moisture measurement. During
the inventory taking process, one day before the PIV, the operator notified the SRA that the batch was
missing. The operator was very cooperative during and after the inspection and tried to find the
source and its relevant documents. The documents showed that that there was a gap in the continuity
of knowledge on the physical presence of the source, since it was stored and closed in the instrument.
During the annual PIT - due to the difficulties in opening the equipment - only the presence of the
equipment was checked but not the nuclear material itself.
Example: A State submitted a special report on an accidental gain of a small amount of nuclear
material. A plutonium source was found with a weight of 0.059 g. The source was entered in the
State’s inventory and the inventory change was reported to the IAEA with a concise note. The State
did not need to submit a special report in this case; the ICR with a concise note was sufficient.
Natural uranium in powder form and shielding containers with depleted uranium are very
common items at many companies and laboratories. SRAs are faced with accidental gains of
nuclear material, which are found during cleaning of old production halls, storage sites or
former laboratories. The national legal framework should require that anyone who finds
nuclear material must inform the police and the national regulatory body without any delay.
The SRA will need to verify the possible discovery and according to the results (i.e. if the
material is U, Pu or Th), add the nuclear material to the State’s inventory by submitting an
ICR for the appropriate MBA with the inventory change code, ‘GA’ and include a concise
note. If the State participates in the IAEA’s ITDB, which is highly recommended, the SRA
would also send the report to the ITDB. In case the nuclear material is found at an unsecure
location (such as in an abandoned building or a forest), the SRA will need to arrange
transport to a secure facility, such as a radioactive waste repository.
13.2. AMPLIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
Both CSAs and APs have provisions for the IAEA to request amplifications (additional
information) or clarifications (resolution of a question or inconsistency) with regard to
information provided by the State or information obtained by the IAEA.
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If it will not be possible to quickly respond to an IAEA request for amplification or
clarification, it is a good practice to quickly acknowledge receipt, ask questions if the
request is unclear, and inform the IAEA of the anticipated time needed to respond to the
request.
Example: A State’s nuclear act specifies that the SRA may request data from an entity regarding its
activity independent of whether the SRA obtained its information from the organization performing
the activity or from another authorized source. The requested person or organization shall provide
the requested data within the deadline determined by the SRA.
Example: The IAEA requested clarification with regard to a State’s AP declaration. The SRA had
informed the IAEA that fuel assembly cladding made from zirconium alloy had been exported and that
these items had previously been imported for use at an NPP. The IAEA requested clarification on the
date on which these items were imported by the State and the quantity, use and location(s). The
zirconium tubes were transported to a research centre with the purpose to analyse the formation of
oxide layers on the zirconium tube samples and their behaviour under high temperature. Material test
analyses were performed only on two zirconium tubes because in course of the research it was found
that the specifications of the zirconium tubes were different from the ones required by the NPP.
Therefore the remaining 18 zirconium tubes were shipped from the research centre to the NPP and
shipped back from the NPP to the manufacturing company.
Example: The IAEA requested clarification based on open source information regarding the restart of
uranium mining in a State. The State informed the IAEA that a Government decision on restarting
uranium mining had been adopted and a feasibility study begun on impacts of restarting uranium
mining activities.
14. INFORMATION PROVIDED VOLUNTARILY BY STATES

The voluntary reporting scheme (VRS) for nuclear material and specified equipment and non-
nuclear material such as heavy water and nuclear grade graphite was endorsed by the Board
of Governors in 1993 as a means to strengthen safeguards. Information which is received
pursuant to the VRS is being used on a routine basis as part of the more systematic analysis
by the IAEA of information about States’ nuclear activities - a safeguards-strengthening
measure. The conclusion of an AP has no connection to participation in VRS. A State with or
without an AP can participate in the VRS. Importantly, concluding an AP does not affect the
reporting commitment undertaken through participation in the VRS.
The participation of a State to the VRS is effected through an exchange of letters with the
Agency.
Where an AP is in force, the SRA should ensure consistency between declarations under the
VRS and relevant to articles 2.a.(vi) and 2.a.(ix) under its AP. States with CSAs and APs
provide regular detailed reports on imports and exports of pre-34(c) material as required.
Participation in the VRS provides for reports on exports of pre-34(c) material to NPT NWSs
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for nuclear purposes, which is not required under an AP. Table 5 summarizes the reporting
mechanisms regarding imports and exports by States with a CSA.
TABLE 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IMPORT AND EXPORT OF PRE-

34(C) MATERIAL
Nuclear Weapons State Non-Nuclear Weapons State

Nuclear Use Non-Nuclear Use Nuclear Use Non-Nuclear Use
Exports by VRS* INFCIRC/540 INFCIRC/153 INFCIRC/540
NNWS to: Article 2a.(vi)(b)** Article 34(a) Article 2a.(vi)(b)**
Imports of INFCIRC/153 INFCIRC/540 INFCIRC/153 INFCIRC/540
NNWS from: Article 34(b) Article 2.a.(vi)(c) Article 34(b) Article 2a.(vi)(c) **
**
* VRS provides for this information, because INFCIRC/153 paragraph 34(a) does not require exports
to NPT NWSs for nuclear purposes to be reported, unless the material is intended to be trans-shipped
to a final destination which is a NNWS. A State that has not joined the VRS can also simply report
such exports in the 34(a) report on a voluntary basis.
** Reporting of exports/imports of pre-34(c) material for specifically non-nuclear purposes under
INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and 2.a.(vi)(c) is required if a single or the total of successive
exports/imports of such material exceeds 10 metric tons of uranium or 20 metric tons of thorium.
There may be circumstances, particularly the first export to a particular end user, where the
State may need to work with the shipper and/or the recipient, to determine the specific
purpose (nuclear or non-nuclear). Nuclear purpose involves the use of the nuclear properties
of the element (e.g. ability to fission), while non-nuclear purpose involves the use of other
characteristics of the element (e.g. density, colour).
States are encouraged to report all imports and exports of pre-34(c) material to the IAEA.
Information not required to be submitted pursuant to an AP should continue to be provided
under the VRS. States may report all imports and exports of pre-34(c) material in 34(a) and
34(b) reports, regardless of nuclear or non-nuclear purpose, and regardless of whether the
other State is a NPT NWS or NNWS.
14.1. REPORTING STOCKS OF HEU AND PU TO THE IAEA
The Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium, published for the information of Member
States as INFCIRC/549 in 1998, introduce in Annexes B and C, a declaration by participating
States of their national inventory of civil plutonium.6 Participation in such reporting is
voluntary.
The reporting of civil stocks of plutonium is divided between unirradiated and irradiated
plutonium of seven types:
6
In 1998, the IAEA published the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549). These guidelines, agreed
to by the five NPT NWSs and Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, increased the transparency of the management of
civil plutonium by publishing annual statements of each participating State's holdings of civil plutonium.
104
Annex B:
• Unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants;

• Unirradiated separated plutonium in the course of manufacture or fabrication and
plutonium contained in unirradiated semi-fabricated or unfinished products at fuel or
other fabricating plants or elsewhere;
• Plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabricated products at reactor
sites or elsewhere; and
• Unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere.
Annex C:
• Plutonium contained in spent fuel at civil reactor sites;

• Plutonium contained in spent fuel at reprocessing plants; and
• Plutonium contained in spent fuel held elsewhere.
In addition, Annex B includes:
• Plutonium belonging to other States;

• Plutonium held in locations in other States and therefore not included above; and
• Plutonium which is in international shipment prior to its arrival in the recipient State.
The annual figures sent by Member States are published on the Agency website.
The categorization above is clearly different from Code 10 requirements. The SRA will need
to track such information to calculate this annual balance. This could be accomplished by
categorizing facilities, MBAs, or operational areas within facilities. However, the reports will
be expected to be consistent with the State’s accounting reports. Some States also provide a
statement for HEU, similar to the plutonium statement but with adapted categories:
• HEU stored at enrichment plants;

• HEU in the course of fabrication at enrichment plants;
• Unirradiated HEU at fuel fabrication or processing plants;
• Unirradiated HEU at civil reactor sites;
• Unirradiated HEU not located at enrichment plants, fuel fabrication or processing plants,
or civil reactors (for example: laboratories, research centres);
• Irradiated HEU at civil reactor sites; and
• Irradiated HEU at locations other than civil reactor sites.
The IAEA publishes this information together with the statements on stocks of civil
plutonium.
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14.2. THE IAEA’S INCIDENT AND TRAFFICKING DATABASE (ITDB)
In the recent past, increased emphasis has been placed on the prevention and detection of
illegal trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. States should be capable to
prevent, detect and respond to any illegal activities in connection with nuclear and other
radioactive materials that take place on their territory, or have a plan in place to request
assistance from States with such capabilities.
In 1995, the IAEA established the ITDB system to track incidents of illicit trafficking and
other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material
outside of regulatory control. The ITDB is a unique asset that assists the IAEA, participating
States and selected international organizations to combat illicit nuclear trafficking and
improve nuclear security.
The ITDB contains a growing collection of authoritative information on the subject.
Reporting to ITDB is voluntary, but the IAEA recommends that all Member States join and
participate in it.
When a State seizes nuclear material (uranium, plutonium or thorium), it must report
such material to the IAEA through an ICR with the code ‘accidental gain’ or GA. The
quantity of nuclear material should be based either on measured values or an estimate. At the
same time, the State is encouraged to report the seizure to the ITDB.
Regulations regarding seizure of nuclear or radioactive material should contain aspects for
prevention, detection and response. The elements of the prevention are: (i) establishment of
adequate legal authority, (ii) accountancy of nuclear and other radioactive materials, (iii)
prevention of nuclear and other radioactive materials escaping regulatory control.
Specifically, the State’s efforts in the following areas contribute to prevention: maintaining a
national registry of nuclear and other radioactive material; export/import controls; regulation
of transport and packaging; regulation of physical protection; and licensing of all activities in
relation to nuclear and other radioactive materials. Border control that incorporates the use of
radiation detection also contributes to detection of illegal transport.
Regulations will also need to assign tasks and duties of the various State organizations
involved in a seizure - from the initial reporting of the seizure to the accurate identification
and characterization of the material to its storage and accounting.
Example: To prepare for and test the State’s procedures and protocols, a simulation exercise may be
useful. A State held such an exercise as part of a comprehensive national review of its nuclear and
radiological security provisions. The one day exercise took place on the site of a research reactor and
simulated the case of an abandoned foreign-licensed car found in a forest by a passer-by. Two
packages were in the trunk and the front seat of the car. In the trunk there was a radioactive source of
11,8 GBq 60Co inside of a depleted uranium container with a radiation symbol. On the front seat was
a glass jar containing low enriched uranium (2.6 %) pellets. Several national authorities participated
in the exercise, and followed the steps outlined in the relevant decree complemented by an action plan
for seized/found radioactive or nuclear material. The evaluation of the exercise highlighted some
weak points of the model plan, and it was revised based on the results.
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The response to an event involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory
control will differ based on the type of incident. For example, missing material would include
those incidents involving the disappearance of material through, e.g. theft or loss; discovery
of material involves finding material where it is unexpected and thus out of control; seizure
and confiscation involve putting discovered material back under regulatory control.
In case of discovery, seizure and confiscation, the nuclear or radioactive material is
transported to a dedicated nuclear forensics laboratory for secure storage of the material and
detailed investigation as requested by a competent authority.
Example: A steel factory received a scrap metal shipment by rail from a company. During the routine
check of two train cars, high levels of radiation were detected at the entrance of the factory by the
radiation portal monitors. The steel factory sent the two cars back to the shipping company. The State
radiation laboratory analysed the source of the radiation, which was found to be six Ra-226 sealed
sources. The activity of one source was about 1.5 to 2 million Becquerels. The sources were
transported to the State’s radioactive waste treatment and disposal facility.
14.3. AMERICIUM AND NEPTUNIUM REPORTING
For many years the nuclear community has recognized that some transuranic elements other
than plutonium, in particular Np and Am, if available in sufficient quantities, could be used
for nuclear explosive devices. These elements are found in spent fuel and may be separated
through a reprocessing process. However, Np and Am are not covered by the definition of
special fissionable material7 in the Agency’s Statute and are not subject to safeguards.
Based on a report by the Director General on the proliferation potential of Np and Am, a
monitoring scheme for separated Np and Am was approved by the Board of Governors in
1999. States that have agreed to report separated* Am and Np should report annually to the
IAEA the following specific information:
i. The inventory, to the nearest tenth of a gram, of “previously separated” neptunium-
237, in any form, on 31 December of the previous calendar year. Inventories of less
than 1 gram of such material need not be reported.
ii. The inventory, to the nearest gram, of “previously separated” americium-241, -242m,
or -243, in any form, on 31 December of the previous calendar year. Inventories of
less than 10 grams of such material need not be reported.
iii. Receipts and exports of quantities greater than 1 gram of “previously separated”
neptunium-237, in any form, during the previous calendar year.
iv. Receipts and exports of quantities greater than 10 grams of “previously separated”
americium-241, -242m, or -243, in any form, during the previous calendar year.
* Separated Np and Am means separated to a point where these materials are not mixed with fission
products or safeguarded nuclear material.
7
The term “special fissionable material” is defined in Article XX.1 of the Statute as “plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium
enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable
material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term ‘special fissionable material’ does not
include source material”. The terms “uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233” and “source material” are defined,
respectively, in Article XX.2 and 3 of the Statute.
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Information on each receipt should specify the quantity and origin of material concerned and
the date of receipt. Information on each export should specify the quantity of material
concerned, the date of export and the destination and end user and intended end use.
‘Previously separated’ means the application of any process intended to increase the
concentration of neptunium-237 or americium-241, -242m or -243. Example reporting forms
can be found in Annex XII.
The monitoring approach includes provision of annual information about current inventories
of separated Np and Am; past, current and planned activities to separate Np or Am; and past
and future exports of separated Np or Am. Flow sheet verification for neptunium at nuclear
facilities is also provided for. Some information regarding Am and Np is provided annually,
as shown below:
• Current inventories of separated Np and Am (indicating the element, the location,

name of facility or laboratory, and the quantity of material);
• Past, current and planned activities to separate Np or Am (indicating the location,
name of facility, time periods, separation process involved, and the amount of
separated material); and
• Export of separated Np or Am (indicating the recipient State, the date, quantity, end
user, intended use and any remarks).
Flow sheet verification is performed at nuclear facilities having a function to separate the
neptunium more than 100g per year and to separate actinides (including pyro-processing).
The IAEA confirms the declared operational status such as operational parameters,
equipment status and determination of Np (usually through routine destructive analysis
samples taken for verification of nuclear material inventory or flows). The detailed
monitoring scheme is discussed and agreed between the IAEA and the State.
Example: In order to facilitate flow sheet verification, the SRA investigated the candidate nuclear
facilities and assessed the technical capabilities to separate the americium and neptunium. The SRA,
IAEA and operator carefully assessed the technical function for separation of Np and held technical
discussions to determine where flow sheet verification would be applied. The SRA requested the
relevant operators to voluntarily provide the information about Np distribution data in the process for
flow sheet verification and requested the nuclear facilities to report Np separation annually.
15. CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRAINING STAFF

15.1. TRAINING ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
Training of personnel responsible for accounting and control of nuclear material at State and
facility levels is critical for the successful operation of an SSAC. Procedures identifying
training needs for personnel performing measurements to determine the quantities of nuclear
material should be prepared. Annex XIII describes a training and certification programme
used by a Member State for its nuclear material accounting and control officers.
108
The relevant staff should be qualified on the basis of appropriate education, training and
experience, as required. Appropriate records of training should be maintained. It should be
stated that the best techniques, method or equipment cannot ensure a quality result without a
trained and experienced person performing the measurement.
The first line of training should be the staff of the State authority itself. IAEA training
courses, workshops, fellowships and scientific visits are possible. It is suggested that the
IAEA be contacted for the necessary training resources available, including an IAEA SSAC
advisory service (ISSAS Mission). Once the training of State authority staff is completed, the
facility personnel can also make use of the training offered by the IAEA at their headquarters,
at international courses or in specific States. Such training should be a continuing activity.
The State should facilitate the provision of adequate technical assistance from external
sources, if necessary, to the facility operators in nuclear material accounting and control in
order to enable the operator to fulfill requirements relating to the State. This could include
help in establishing adequate record and measurement systems which may incorporate data
processing and analysis procedures.
Assistance should also be given toward meeting international standards and establishing
containment and surveillance measures. In bulk-handling facilities, for instance, considerable
technical assistance to the operator may be necessary to establish complex measurement
systems and programmes to control measurement that could ensure the success of the SSAC.
Also, the evaluation of such SSAC programme results could be complex.
Example: An SRA can hold a training session periodically, such as once per year, on NMA and
reporting, and invite the operators and new staff to participate.
The State authority is advised to seek the assistance, guidance and recommendations of the
IAEA whenever needed and especially in ensuring that effective nuclear material accounting
and control systems are developed, implemented and applied at the State and facility level.
A regulatory document may be prepared that provides guidance for “Accounting and
Reporting Nuclear Material” which all effected operators/facilities must follow. These
requirements cover accounting and reporting of nuclear material by the operators to the SRA
to comply with requirements to prepare and submit reports and declarations, and the
oversight undertaken by the SRA to ensure such reports and declarations are correct and
complete and submitted in a timely manner. The SRA can use such regulations as the basis
for a training programme for facility operators.
Some States use outreach sessions to explain reporting requirements to licensees. These may
take the form of a course for staff of one facility or to particular facility types. Webinars and
video conference presentations may be offered to multiple facilities a long distance from the
SRA. Extensive use of practical examples is very helpful in such outreach.
AP training courses can address to three types of audience: regulators and National
Authorities, nuclear operators and entities without nuclear activities (universities,
109
research…). It is necessary to take into account the different level of knowledge and
involvement in safeguards. Below is an example of a training module for AP new declarants:
1. International safeguards: agreements, protocols, objectives and legal framework

2. Requirements for States and the IAEA
3. SRA structure and missions
4. Declarations
a. National requirements for statements
b. Software for declaration
c. Examples
d. Relevant data, evaluation and submission of information to national Authorities
e. Clarification requests
f. Good practices
5. CA to resolve a question upon a statement
a. Management of the CA by the SRA
b. Management of the CA by the verified entities
c. Timeline
d. National requirements for entities
e. Good practices
f. Evaluation and conclusions
6. CA to assure the absence of undeclared activities
a. Management of the CA by the SRA
b. Timeline
c. National legal framework
d. Evaluation and conclusions
7. Examples from the field / National CA exercises
Example: In a State that carried out training courses for safeguards officers, feedback from several
years of training and close cooperation with AP declarants showed a significant improvement in the
completeness and correctness of information received by the SRA.
Courses can be supported by a national guideline or reference manual which is distributed to

all declarants, to sustain knowledge after the course and to provide responses to frequently
asked questions. The relevant information can also be shared on the SRA’s website. The site
can provide an overview of non-proliferation, the relevant national legal framework including
the regulations and related forms and templates, and provide ready access to all reference
manuals (including AP).
15.2. TRAINING OPERATORS ON PROVISION OF INFORMATION
Examples of contents for a comprehensive training course on provision of information for

facility operators might include:
• Overview of the safeguards agreement and domestic law.

• Requirements for the operator on NMA reports, record keeping and supporting
documentation.
• Procedures to prepare AP declarations including details on site map and drawings.
110
• Overview of nuclear material accounting reports (ICR, PIL and MBR) and accountancy
concepts such as MBA, KMP, batch and item, material description codes and
measurement basis codes (using graphics such as the two examples shown in Figure 26).
FIG. 26. Examples of diagrams used to train facility safeguards officers.
• Exercises for preparing nuclear material accounting reports (ICR, PIL and MBR).
• Procedures for preparing advance notification for import/export and operational semi-
annual plans.
• Exercise on preparing the General Ledger and List of Inventory Items for the IAEA book
examination.
SRAs can also encourage operators to participate in training courses offered by the IAEA.
It is a good practice to form a network of safeguards practitioners in the State who meet
together periodically, share their experiences, exchange information, answer questions and
work as peers. The SRA can attend these and provide updated guidance, and the IAEA can be
invited to attend and share information on updates, changes, developments as needed. This is
also a good way for new staff to quickly learn about safeguards.
111
16. PROVISION OF INFORMATION FROM THE IAEA TO STATES
16.1. INTRODUCTION
The IAEA communicates with the State regarding the information provided by the State.
Some correspondence acknowledges receipt of information, others may request further
clarification, or request a correction be made. Table 6 summarizes the communication
initiated by the IAEA, and the expected response of the State, including the timing of such
responses.
TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF IAEA COMMUNICATIONS RELATED TO INFORMATION

PROVIDED BY THE STATE
Issue Purpose Response and Timing
Reminder letter Remind a State of an obligation Acknowledge receipt of the letter as
which has not been met, e.g. an soon as possible, and respond with
overdue initial inventory report or information about the obligation (e.g.
AP declaration when it will be submitted), or submit
the report or declaration in question
Request Request a State to undertake an Respond to the letter as soon as
action, such as correcting an error possible and take action to fulfill the
in a report, facilitating the receipt of request
IAEA equipment, or nominating a
person to participate in a training
course
Request for Request amplification or Respond to the request in a timely
amplification or clarification about the content of a manner, providing the additional
clarification (CSA) State’s report information (States with Subsidiary
Arrangements must respond within
the time period defined therein)
Import/export Notify a State regarding any Inform the IAEA of any errors or
notifications exports or imports which were not omissions in the report of exports or
reported by the other party imports as soon as possible
Semi-annual Notify a State of the book inventory Respond as soon as possible if issues
Statement of on record at the IAEA for nuclear exist; inform the IAEA of specific
consolidated book material in the State differences; respond if there is
inventory agreement with the inventories
Semi-annual transit Notify a State on the matching As soon as possible, provide the
matching Statement status of shipments and receipts, IAEA with information on possible
where the State is indicated as the matches; also respond if there is
shipper agreement with the Statement
Quarterly Notify a State on the matching As soon as possible, provide the
communication on status of shipments and receipts, IAEA with information on possible
transit matching where the State is indicated as the matches; also respond if there is
Statement receiver agreement with the communication
Semi-annual Inform a State on the timeliness of Inform the IAEA of agreement or
Statement on dispatch for nuclear material disagreement with the timeliness
timeliness of reporting accounting reports Statement
112
Issue Purpose Response and Timing
Summary of NMA Provide a summary of NMA reports As soon as possible, provide the
reports received at the received and information on any IAEA with responses to issues or
IAEA issues identified that may require a indicate if there is agreement with the
correction or adjustment summary
Summary of AP Provide a summary of AP As soon as possible, provide the
declarations received declarations received and any IAEA with responses to issues or
at the IAEA issues noted indicate if there is agreement with the
summary
Request pursuant to Request amplification or Respond in a timely manner,
article 2.c. (AP) clarification about content of an AP providing the additional information
declaration
Request pursuant to Provide the State with an Respond in a timely manner with
article 4.d. (AP) opportunity to clarify and facilitate information to facilitate resolution of
resolution of a question or the question or inconsistency
inconsistency identified by the
IAEA
113
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Agreement on the Privileges and

Immunities of the Agency, INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, IAEA, Vienna (1967).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Agency’s Safeguards System,
INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, IAEA, Vienna (1968).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/140, IAEA, Vienna (1970).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Structure and Content of
Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), IAEA, Vienna (1972).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Standard Text of a Protocol to an
Agreement, GOV/INF/276/Annex B, IAEA, Vienna (1974).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Model Text of Subsidiary
Arrangements (General Part) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, (1974).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Model Protocol Additional to the
Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), IAEA, Vienna (1998).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Design Measures to Facilitate
Implementation of Safeguards at Future Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA
Technical Reports Series 392, Vienna (1998). http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/trs392_scr.pdf.
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Training the staff of the regulatory
body for nuclear facilities: A competency framework, IAEA-TECDOC-1254, Vienna (2001).
http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/training/rgbd_trg.pdf.
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Handbook on Nuclear Law, IAEA,
Vienna (2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidelines and Format for the
Preparation of Declarations Pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Model Protocol Additional to
Safeguards Agreements, IAEA Services Series No. 11, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Modified Text of the Protocol to an
Agreement Concluded on the Basis of GOV/INF/276, Annex A, GOV/INF/276 Mod 1 and
Corr. 1 Annex B, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Statute, as amended up to 23
February 1989, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Nuclear Material Accounting
Handbook, IAEA Services Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (2008).
114
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Handbook on Nuclear Law –
Implementing Legislation, IAEA, Vienna (2010).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safeguards Implementation Guide for
States with Small Quantities Protocols, IAEA Services Series No. 22, IAEA, Vienna (2013).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safeguards Implementation Practices
Guide for Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities, IAEA Services Series No. 30, IAEA,
Vienna (2014).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Safeguards in the Design
of Nuclear Reactors, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NP-T-2.9, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safeguards Implementation Practices
Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure, IAEA Services Series
No. 31, IAEA, Vienna (2015).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidance for States Implementing
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services Series No.
21 (updated), IAEA, Vienna (2016).
Note: Many of these documents can be found for convenience at www.iaea.org/safeguards under the
Assistance for States webpages.
115
ABBREVIATIONS
AN Advanced Notification (of a planned export or import)

AP Additional Protocol
APRS Additional Protocol Reporting System
BA Book Adjusted (adjusted book inventory)
BE Book Ending (ending book inventory)
CA Complementary Access
CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
CUMUF Cumulative Material Unaccounted For
DA Destructive Analysis (or Assay)
DIQ Design Information Questionnaire
DIV Design Information Verification
DU Depleted Uranium
EEL Essential Equipment List
EIF Entry Into Force
EQ Exempted based on quantity (inventory change code)
EU Exempted based on use (inventory change code)
FA Facility Attachment
FSO Facility safeguards officer (generic term for the person with primary
responsibility for safeguards implementation at a particular facility)
FW Transfer from retained waste (inventory change code)
GA Accidental gain (inventory change code)
GIS Geographic Information System
GES Geographic Exploitation System
GUM Guidance on the Determination of Uncertainties in Measurements
ICR Inventory Change Report
ID Identification
INFCIRC Information Circular
ISSAS IAEA SSAC Advisory Service
ITDB Incident and trafficking database
ITV International Target Values
KMP Key Measurement Point
LA Accidental Loss (inventory change code)
LD Measured Discard (inventory change code)
116
LII List of Inventory Items (or List of Itemized Inventory)
LN Nuclear Loss (inventory change code)
LOF Location Outside Facility
MB Measurement Basis (a code reported in an ICR)
MBA Material Balance Area
MBP Material Balance Period
MBR Material Balance Report
MC&A Material Control and Accounting
MDC Material Description Code
MOX Mixed oxide fuel
MUF Material Unaccounted For
NDA Non-destructive Analysis (or Assay)
NMAC Nuclear Material Accounting and Control
NNWS Non-nuclear-weapon State (party to the NPT)
NP Nuclear Production (inventory change code)
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWS Nuclear Weapon State (party to the NPT)
OJT On the job Training
PB Physical Beginning (beginning physical inventory)
PE Physical Ending (ending physical inventory)
PIL Physical Inventory Listing
PIT Physical Inventory Taking
PIV Physical Inventory Verification
QCVS Quality Control Validation Software (IAEA software)
RAPE Rounding Adjustment to Physical Ending (related to MBRs)
RAPB Rounding Adjustment to Physical Beginning (related to MBRs)
RD Receipt Domestic (inventory change code)
R&D Research and Development
RM Rebatching Minus (inventory change code)
RP Rebatching Plus (inventory change code)
SBD Safeguards by Design
SD Shipment Domestic (inventory change code)
SF Shipment Foreign (inventory change code)
117
SIMS Safeguards Information Management System (of a State)
SIP Safeguards Implementation Practices (i.e. SIP Guides)
SIR Safeguards Implementation Report
SNRI Short Notice Random Inspection
SQP Small Quantities Protocol
SRA State or Regional Authority (with responsibility for safeguards
implementation)
SRD Shipper-Receiver Difference
SSAC State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
UOC Uranium Ore Concentrate
VOA Voluntary Offer Agreement
VRS Voluntary Reporting Scheme
118
Annex I.
EXAMPLE DIQ FOR A RESEARCH REACTOR
EXAMPLE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED IN A DESIGN
INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A NUCLEAR
REACTOR
THIS FORM IS TREATED AS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED AND
SUBMITTED BY THE STATE TO THE IAEA AND ALL PAGES ARE SO MARKED
RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS Date: ...............................
GENERAL REACTOR DATA
13. FACILITY DESCRIPTION GENERAL FLOW DIAGRAM(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.
Attach General Flow Diagrams, these diagrams present the

general layout of the facility and the location of the reactor
core, fresh fuel storage room and spent fuel storage room.
14. RATED THERMAL OUTPUT, ELECTRICITY

OUTPUT
(for power reactors) Indicate the steady state thermal power
15. NUMBER OF UNITS (REACTORS) AND

THEIR LAYOUT IN THE NUCLEAR POWER Not Applicable
PLANT
16. REACTOR TYPE

Example : TRIGA, MNSR,...etc
17. TYPE OF REFUELLING

(on or off load)
On or off load
18. CORE ENRICHMENT RANGE AND Pu
CONCENTRATION Example : LEU Standard TRIGA fuel elements
(at equilibrium for on-load reactors, initial Enrichment: 19,9% of U235
and final for off-load reactors)
19. MODERATOR
Example : TRIGA : Zirconium Hydride and light Water
20. COOLANT
Example : Light water
21. BLANKET, REFLECTOR

Example: Graphite
NUCLEAR MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
22. TYPES OF FRESH FUEL

Example : Standard TRIGA Fuel Element UZrH1.6
23. FRESH FUEL ENRICHMENT (U-235)

AND/OR Pu CONTENT Example : Standard TRIGA Fuel Element UZrH1.6 U 8,5% by
(average enrichment per each type
weight enriched at 19,9%
of assembly)
24. NOMINAL WEIGHT OF FUEL IN ELEMENTS/

ASSEMBLIES
(with design tolerances) Fuel element of 8,5%: XXX g of U (average)
25. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL FORM OF

FRESH FUEL The Fuel is a solid, homogeneous mixture uranium-
(general description)
zirconium hydride alloy
121
RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS Date: .................................
NUCLEAR MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
26. REACTOR ASSEMBLIES* DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

(indicate for each type)
— types of assemblies;
— number of fuel assemblies, control
and shim assemblies, experimental
assemblies in the core, in blanket zone(s);
— number and types of fuel rods/elements** Example : NA for TRIGA Mark II RR
— average enrichment and/or Pu content
per assembly;
— general structure;
— geometric form;
— dimensions;
— cladding material
27. DESCRIPTION OF FRESH FUEL ELEMENTS DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.
— physical and chemical form of fuel;
— nuclear material and fissionable material The active part of each fuel moderator element is
and its quantity (with design tolerances); approximately XXX cm in diameter and XXX cm long.
— enrichment and/or Pu content;
— geometric form; The cladding is stainless steel.
— dimensions; Two sections of graphite are inserted, one
— number of slugs/pellets per element;
— composition of alloy; above and one below the fuel, to serve as top and bottom
— cladding material (thickness, reflectors for the core. Stainless steel and fixtures are
compositon of material, bonding)
attached to both ends of the can, making the overall length of
the fuel element approximately XXX cm
Attach drawings showing mainly:
- configuration of the core (position of fuel elements,
control rods, In-core experimental devices,...),
- geometry, main parts and dimensions of fuel elements
and control rods
28. PROVISION FOR ELEMENT EXCHANGE IN

ASSEMBLIES OF EACH TYPE
(indicate whether this is foreseen to become Example : e.g. NA – facility and fuel not designed for element
a routine operation) exchange
29. BASIC OPERATIONAL ACCOUNTING DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

UNIT(S)
(fuel elements/assemblies, etc.) Example: fuel element unit
30. OTHER TYPES OF UNITS

e.g. targets (describe in detail)
31. MEANS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL/FUEL
IDENTIFICATION Each Fuel Element has an identification code, and composition
is based on shipper values
32. OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE
FACILITY Example : Fission Chambers
(each separately identified)
* Assembly is the combination of elements or handling units such as cluster or bundle.

** Element is the smallest contained fuel unit.
122
NUCLEAR MATERIAL FLOW
33. SCHEMATIC FLOWSHEET FOR NUCLEAR DIAGRAM(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.
MATERIAL
(identifying measurement points, Example of areas:
accountability areas, inventory locations,
etc.) 1 Fresh fuel storage room
2 Reactor Tank
3 Spent fuel storage pool
Attach a drawing showing these areas
34. INVENTORY
STATE QUANTITY RANGE, NUMBER OF
ITEMS, AND APPROXIMATE URANIUM
ENRICHMENT AND PLUTONIUM CONTENT
FOR
(under normal operating conditions): i) Example: number of fresh fuel elements in storage and
their enrichment,
i) Fresh Fuel Storage ii) Example: number of fuel elements in the core and their
ii) Reactor Core

enrichment, fission chambers
iii) Spent Fuel Storage iii) Example: number of irradiated fuel elements in the
iv) Other Locations spent fuel storage and their enrichment, Pu content
iv) Fission chambers storage
35. LOAD FACTOR (power reactor only)
N/A (for research reactor)
36. REACTOR CORE LOADING

(number of elements/assemblies) Indicate the number of fuel elements in the core (e.g. 60 fuel
elements)
37. REFUELLING REQUIREMENTS

(quantity, time interval) Refuelling intervals and quantities will vary based on usage of
the reactor. Estimated time interval is XX months.
38. BURN-UP
(average/maximum) Burn up will depend on the utilization of the reactor (which will
be operated in pulsing and steady-state modes).
39. IS THE IRRADIATED FUEL TO BE

REPROCESSED OR STORED?
Examples: temporarily stored (~10 years); shipped back to
(if stored, indicate site)
the vendor; reprocessed
123
NUCLEAR MATERIAL HANDLING
40. FRESH FUEL DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

i) packaging (description) i.) Example : B(U) transport package
ii) layout, general arrangements and ii.) Example: Attach a drawing presenting the layout of the
storage plan
storage room
iii) capacity of store iii.) Indicate the store capacity (e.g. 6 fuel elements)
iv) fuel preparation and assay room, and iv.) In some cases a preparation room is not required and the
reactor loading area (description and
indication of layout and general
loading area is located at the top of the reactor
arrangement)
41. FUEL TRANSFER DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

EQUIPMENT (including
refuelling machines) Examples of Fuel element handling tool and transfer cask
Attach drawings of these pieces of equipment
42. ROUTES FOLLOWED BY

NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Indicate in the drawings these routes
(fresh fuel, irradiated fuel, blanket,
other material)
43. REACTOR VESSEL DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

(showing core location, access to vessel,
vessel openings, fuel handling in vessel)
Attach a figure showing the tank, core location, support
structures of fuel elements
44. REACTOR CORE DIAGRAM

(showing general disposition, lattice, form, pitch,
dimensions of core, reflector, blanket; location,
Example: attach a drawing that shows the reactor core,
shapes and dimensions of fuel including the lattice of the core and the reflector assembly
elements/assemblies; control
elements/assemblies; experimental
and the experimental devices.
elements/assemblies)
45. NUMBER AND SIZE OF CHANNELS

FOR FUEL ELEMENTS OR ASSEMBLIES There are XXX channels for fuel elements (indicate size) and
AND FOR CONTROL ELEMENTS IN THE
CORE
xxx for control rods (indicate size).
46. AVERAGE MEAN NEUTRON FLUX IN

THE CORE:
A table can be attached to present the thermal and fast flux
thermal: in different positions in the core (mainly in the
fast:
experimental devices)
47. INSTRUMENTATION FOR MEASURING

NEUTRON AND GAMMA FLUX
XXX fission chambers and XXX ionisation chambers
124
NUCLEAR MATERIAL HANDLING
48. IRRADIATED FUEL DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

i) Layout, spent fuel storage plan and
general arrangements (internal and
external)
i) Example: Include a drawing of a storage tank
ii) Method of storage ii) Example: Wet Storage
iii) Design capacity of storage iii) The storage racks can receive XXX spent fuel elements
iv) Minimum and normal cooling period prior
to shipment
iv) E.g. 120 days minimum; 200 days typical
v) Description of irradiated fuel transport v) To be completed, shown in drawings/diagrams

equipment and shipping cask (if no
information on site, where is it held?)
49. MAXIMUM ACTIVITY OF FUEL/BLANKET

AFTER REFUELLING XXX rem/h at the surface of spent fuel element
(at the surface and at a distance of 1 metre)
The calculated dose rates after 30 days of decay are XXX
mRem/h at the surface of the transfer cask and XXX mRem/h
50. METHODS AND EQUIPMENT FOR

HANDLING IRRADIATED FUEL
(except for that already given under To be completed, shown in drawings
Qs. 41, 48.v)
51. NUCLEAR MATERIAL TESTING AREAS DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.
(except as already given under Q. 40)
For each such area briefly describe: To be completed, explained in drawings
i) Nature of Activities
ii) Major Equipment Available

(e.g., hot cell, fuel element decladding
and dissolution equipment)
iii) Shipping Containers Used

(main material, scrap and waste)
iv) Storage Areas for both unirradiated

and irradiated materials
COOLANT DATA
52. FLOW DIAGRAM DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.
(indicating mass flow, temperature
and pressure at major points, etc.) Include a figure that presents the general layout of the
cooling systems (primary and secondary systems, heat
exchanger) with mass flows, temperature and pressures.
125
PROTECTION AND SAFETY MEASURES
53. BASIC MEASURES FOR PHYSICAL

PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL Example: e.g. perimeter fencing, intrusion alarms and
cameras; inspectors will be briefed on physical security
54. SPECIFIC HEALTH AND SAFETY RULES FOR
INSPECTOR COMPLIANCE
e.g. Inspectors will receive a health and safety briefing; an
(if extensive, attach separately) escort trained in radiation protection will accompany
inspectors
NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL
55. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SPECIMEN FORMS USED IN ALL PROCEDURES ATTACHED

Give a description of the nuclear material UNDER REF. Nos.
accounting system, of the method of
recording and reporting accountancy data,
the procedures for account adjustment
after inventory, and correction of mistakes,
i) Example:
etc., under the following headings: - The general and subsidiary ledgers that will be used are
i) General the IAEA templates,
(This section should also state what
general and subsidiary ledgers will be - the responsible of the NM accountancy is the reactor
used, their form (hard copies, tapes,
microfilms, etc.) as well as who has the
manager and his deputy (attach organization chart).
responsibility and authority. Source data - The Safety and Security Department has the
(e.g. shipping and receiving forms, the
initial recording of measurements and responsibility of independent follow-up,
measurement control sheets) should be
identified. The procedures for making
- source data: supplier of the NM (Reactor vendor).
adjustments, the source data and
records should be covered as well as
how the adjustments are authorized and
substantiated.) ii.) Example: Number of fuel elements, their identification
and the amount of NM is based on data given by the
ii) Receipts
supplier.
iii) Shipments
iii.) Example: Shipments of cooled spent fuel, possible

return of fresh fuel to vendor
iv) Physical Inventory
Description of procedures, scheduled
frequency, methods of operator’s iv.) Frequency of physical Inventory: up to now the frequency
inventory taking (both for item and/or is fixed for each year or immediately after the following
mass accountancy), including relevant event:
assay methods and expected accuracy, - After receiving or shipping NM.
access to nuclear material, possible
verification method for irradiated
- Any movement between the 3 areas.
nuclear material, methods of verification Attach procedure for performing physical
of nuclear material in the core
inventory of storage, core and spent fuel pond.
v) Nuclear loss and production (estimation
of limits)
v.) Example: e.g. estimated using burnup
calculation code (name) for each element
vi) Operational records and accounts

(including method of adjustment or vi.) Example: e.g. core monitoring system, core
correction and place or preservation
and language)
map and physical check of fuel element
location recorded
126
56. FEATURES RELATED TO CONTAINMENT

AND SURVEILLANCE MEASURES
(general description) Example: e.g. describe characteristics of physical
containment (walls, doors) and means for material movements
57. FOR EACH MEASUREMENT POINT OF IF NECESSARY, ATTACH DRAWING(S)

ACCOUNTABILITY AREAS, IDENTIFIED
IN PARTICULAR UNDER QS. 13, 33, 34, Example: Attach a table indicating the information in 57 (i)
GIVE THE FOLLOWING (IF APPLICABLE)*
through (xv) for each KMP location and transaction (e.g. fresh
i) Description of location, type, fuel receiving, core, storage) and inventory change type (e.g.
identification inventory/flow).
ii) Anticipated types of inventory change

and possibility to use this measurement
Example: E.g. flow
point for physical inventory taking
iii) Physical and chemical form of nuclear Example: fresh fuel elements, irradiated fuel elements
material
(with cladding materials description)
iv) Nuclear material containers, packaging

Example: Fresh fuel container
v) Sampling procedures and equipment used

Example: often N/A
vi) Measurement method(s) and equipment

used (item counting, neutron flux, power Example: fresh fuel shipper (.1%); estimation based on burnup
level, nuclear burn-up and production, etc.) calculations (+/- 10%); item count
vii) Source and level of accuracy

Example: example indicated in (vi)
viii) Technique and frequency of calibration of

equipment used Example: often N/A
* For each measurement point fill in separate sheet.
127
FOR EACH MEASUREMENT POINT OF IF NECESSARY, ATTACH DRAWING(S)

ACCOUNTABILITY AREAS, IDENTIFIED
IN PARTICULAR UNDER QS. 13, 33, 34, Example: e.g. vendor comparison; ITVs
GIVE THE FOLLOWING (IF APPLICABLE)*
(continued)
ix) Programme for the counting

appraisal of the accuracy of
methods and techniques used
x) Methods of converting source Example: often N/A

data to batch data (standard
calculative procedures, constants
used, empirical relationships,
etc.)
xi) Anticipated batch flow per year

Example: specific to each reactor, based on estimates
xii) Anticipated number of items per

flow and inventory batches
Example: Items per batch typically 1, for fuel elements
xiii) Type, composition and quantity

of nuclear material per batch Example: e.g. fuel element
(with indication of batch data,
total weight of each element of
nuclear material and, in the case
of plutonium and uranium, the
isotopic composition when
appropriate; form of nuclear
material)
xiv) Access to nuclear material and

its location
Example: e.g. visual, hands-on
xv) Features related to containment- Example: e.g. possibility for placement of seal on core
surveillance measures
58. OPTIONAL INFORMATION

(that the operator considers relevant Example: information about hot cells and glove boxes used in
to safeguarding the facility) the site (hot cells that can be used for radio-isotope
production)
* For each measurement point fill in separate sheet.
Signature of Responsible Officer
Date
128
Annex II.
GOOD REPORTING PRACTICES TO
ASSIST IAEA TRANSIT MATCHING
Transit matching is the process for relating or “matching” nuclear material shipments and
receipts (domestic and foreign) reported to the IAEA. The IAEA currently receives ~900,000
line items of reports annually, of which internal software can automatically match (“machine
match”) about 75% of the domestic transfers and 25% of the foreign transfers. The remaining
transfers are manually matched by IAEA staff. It is desirable to reduce manual matching as
much as possible.
States can assist in this regard by implementing good practices for reporting relevant
transactions, such as those described in this Annex, and by making their facility operators
aware of relevant good practices as well.
Internal SRA Policies and Procedures
SRA submittal of timely ICRs is very important for transit matching. The reporting of
receipts using shipper-declared values and batch names is also helpful. SRA efforts to resolve
unmatched transfers listed in the IAEA’s ‘Quarterly Import Communications’ and ‘Semi-
Annual Statements’ are also very important. The longer a transfer remains unmatched, the
harder it is to resolve. Timely resolution is aided by clear and prompt communications.
SRA outreach to operators is also helpful, including on any relevant national software or
reporting protocols. Some States provide a certificate of completion to participants of such
training. Improving the awareness and capabilities of the people responsible for reporting
such transactions will improve the quality of the reports submitted by the SRA.
It is a good practice for an SRA to establish a single point of contact (with backups) to
address transit matching issues. A dedicated email address could be set up for this purpose,
such as [email protected], with access to the account granted to the responsible
safeguards officer(s). This address should be shared with the IAEA and reflected in the
States’ contact information in the IAEA’s ‘Transit Matching National Authority List for
States/Euratom Reporting to the IAEA’.
Good communications between the SRA and its operators is helpful for avoiding issues with
transit matching, and resolving those that do arise. Face-to-face meetings can be very helpful
in facilitating the resolution of open issues. If possible, an SRA may consider meeting with
their operators periodically to discuss topics such as reporting. This enables an SRA to stress
the importance of timely and high quality reporting by facilities.
Similarly, it is helpful for an SRA to meet periodically with the IAEA. As appropriate, the
SRA may also contact the IAEA’s Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM),
e.g. by video- or teleconference, to discuss topics related to reports and declarations.
129
Finally, discussions between SRAs of States that frequently ship and receive nuclear material
to one another can be very helpful in establishing good reporting practices and
communication channels for resolving issues. The SRAs can discuss similar challenges and
can share lessons learned with each other as well. Such partners could also specify provisions
for advance notifications and keep one another informed on related reporting actions to the
IAEA, potentially facilitating coherent reporting and aiding in reconciling issues.
It is important to remember that receipts should be reported using the shipper-declared

weights. Shipper-receiver differences are then used to report differences between shipper
values and the measured value of the recipient State. Reporting the receipt using the shipper’s
batch name in the corresponding receipt report is also a significant help for transit matching.
Quality Control
Unmatched transfers can be reduced when an SRA performs systematic quality checks and
validations of domestic transfers, to ensure such transfers in the State match prior to
submitting the reports to the IAEA. Software systems can help to generate error reports,
helping to identify reporting issues, including unmatched domestic transfers, before reports
are submitted, and can help with submitting report formats which can facilitate machine-
matching by the IAEA. More information on State safeguards information management
systems can be found in Annex III.
130
Annex III.
CASE STUDIES OF SRA EXPERIENCES IN DEVELOPING
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Case Study AIII-1. A State with a relatively small nuclear fuel cycle programme went
through the process in 2012-2013 of commissioning a major upgrade to the database used by
the SRA for administering licence holder details, accounting for nuclear material in the State
and preparing reports to the IAEA. This system is referred to herein as the State Safeguards
Information Management System (SIMS) for this SRA. In planning the update of the SIMS,
the range of functions was mapped and prioritized so that the project could be managed
within the assigned budget. A representative range of functions identified is listed in Table
AIII-1 with indications of which functions were incorporated into the SIMS design. An
explanation of the basis for decisions on what to include in the database follows.
TABLE AIII-1. FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE’S SIMS

Function Function
Included
Included
Licence holder inventory of 34(c) Y Licence holder of pre-34(c) material Y
nuclear material
ICR, MBR, PIL preparation Y Database of past ICRs, PILs, MBRs Y
Licence holder particulars (e.g. name, Y Preparation of pro forma reports and Y
address, licence number, MBA, KMP) correspondence to permit holders
Preparation of 34(a) export reports Y Preparation of 34(b) import reports and N
and database record of past reports database of past reports
Preparation of para 92 advance notice N Preparation of para 95 advance notice N
reports of exports greater than 1 effkg reports of imports greater than 1 eff-kg
National inspector details Y IAEA inspector details Y
Log of basic particulars from Y Full details of inspection activities and N

inspections (e.g. dates, location or inspection findings
MBA, inspectors, type of inspection)
IAEA seal application and removal N DIQ preparation and database record of N
details past DIQs
Log of all IAEA correspondence and N AP declarations N
decision
As the list above shows, not all functions were included in the database. The budget was not
sufficient to cover all aspects of safeguards so priorities were set. The highest priorities were
management of the licence system, accounting for nuclear material and preparing IAEA
reports. The AP reporting functions were not incorporated in the database because the IAEA
Protocol Reporter served this purpose. Most of the other functions that were not included in
131
the database involved reports or activities that were not frequent and therefore could be
managed through the standard record keeping system in place in the SRA.
At the beginning of the project, some observations were made regarding the basic structures
of the database, to characterize the activities in support of fundamental decisions. For
managing the details of licence holders, standard database structures were deemed sufficient.
However, there were some complexities with nuclear material inventory management. It was
determined that there were two database structural options for managing inventory: (1) a
database of ICRs, PILs and MBRs from which licence holder inventory could be derived; or
(2) a database of licence holder inventory from which ICRs, PILs and MBRs could be
derived.
The first option had the advantage that licence holder inventory reports and ICRs could be
uploaded directly into IAEA reporting formats. But in reviewing all of the functions the
SIMS needed to support for the SRA, it was decided to use the latter of the two options. The
fundamental obligation was for the SRA to account for and control nuclear material in the
State, with IAEA reports deriving from this accounting. A database of licence holder
inventory was considered to provide for greater overall oversight in the State. Structuring the
database around inventory would also be easier for each licence holder to report through a
web interface. This database structure could facilitate:
• Updating inventory details at any time, rather than at PIL reporting time;
• Maintaining an inventory of nuclear material not included in ICRs or PILs (e.g.
material exempted from safeguards, and material with attributes that don’t meet the
INFCIRC/153 para 34(c) requirements for full IAEA safeguards), and;
• Managing inventory location information at a greater specificity than required in PILs
(which list locations at the level of MBAs and inventory KMPs).
There were several lessons learned through the process of developing this database. The most
important lesson was the need for considerable and frequent consultations between
specialists in the SRA and the database development team. The Code 10 reporting
requirements are not intuitive to developers. Another important lesson was that engagement
with the primary stakeholders (i.e. the users of the database and the licence holders that
submit reports for the database) was necessary to ensure the database was ‘user friendly’. For
example, interface aspects of the various database views related to formatting, data field
locations and data entry functions were critically important to the overall usability of the
database and therefore needed to be tested by the primary users of the database prior to full
deployment. And lastly, when deciding on which of many available database management
systems to use, consideration should be given not just to the attributes of the system that may
support the required functions, but also the on-going maintenance requirements. In the case
of the project described above, the system chosen was supported by the IT division so as to
ensure that maintenance and adjustments were provided for.
132
Case Study III-2. Figure AIII-2 shows a diagram representing the flow of information
between a regional authority (EURATOM) and the IAEA.
EURATOM Safeguards Information Management
Receipt of accountancy Euratom member Euratom reporting

reports from operators state trainings software ENMAS
Registration and loading
XML format check and validation of

Euratom Regulation
content
No302/2005
Accountancy treatment and QC Request for

corrections or
NMA verification and follow up clarifications
Euratom transit
matching Euratom NMA
verification
Receipt of IAEA Quarterly Import

Filtering and translation of NMA Communication Statement
records, MBR calculations
INCIRC193, INCIRC 290,

Receipt of IAEA Semi-annual
INCIRC263 Statement of Open Transit
Matching
Produce Reports
For IAEA (Code 10)
Transmission to IAEA
(Email Encrypted)
Treatment of IAEA statements
Treatment of IAEA feedback
Transmission of
IAEA
clarifications to the
Feedback
IAEA open transit
FIG. AIII-1. Information flow between EURATOM and IAEA.
Case Study AIII-3: This case study describes the approach taken by the United States in
developing software tools and the associated processes and procedures to support the
preparation of its AP declarations. Collecting, managing, and submitting AP declarations
involves the consolidation of data from the US Department of Energy (DOE) National
133
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and the US Department of Commerce (DOC), with DOC acting as the central coordinating
organization. The role of each organization
is illustrated in Figure A2-3.1.
To meet its reporting obligations,

DOE/NNSA undertook development of the
AP Reporting System (APRS) with the
intent of automating the DOE/NNSA
process as much as possible.
Development of the APRS software

components involved numerous
stakeholders and presented many
challenges. The U.S. AP and the obligations
that accompany it were new, so there was
no established declaration process to model
and the system and business requirements Figure AIII-2: US AP Declaration Hierarchy
were largely undefined. As a result, early
APRS development proceeded in an iterative manner along with development of DOE/NNSA
policies and business rules. The IAEA’s Guidelines and Format for Preparation and
Submission of Declarations Pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Model Protocol Additional to
Safeguards Agreements (IAEA Services Series 11) and the DOC’s information tool under
development at the same time informed the data structure and transmission requirements.
The APRS includes two desktop applications (the Declaration Decision Assistant (DDA) and
the Declaration Writing Assistant (DWA)) and a web application (Declaration Review
Assistant (DRA)). These are the primary tools with which the users identify declarable
activities and create, review, and submit declarations.
DDA is a Windows-based desktop application designed to help declarants identify local

activities and locations that may be declarable under each article of the AP. It uses an
automated interview process in which the user identifies some activities and answers a series
of “yes/no” questions about each one. Based on the answers, the DDA suggests the activities
that are potentially declarable under each article of the AP. It is similar in function to the AP
Declaration Helper, an open access software tool available on NNSA’s website.
DWA is a Windows-based desktop application used by declarants to develop their local

declaration data, which is then submitted to the DRA for DOE/NNSA HQ review. The DWA
imports information from the DDA and provides entry forms to assist in gathering detailed
data required for each one. It also provides file management tools to assist local AP
coordinators in organizing DWA files, distributing them for local review, and submitting
them to DOE/NNSA HQ after all necessary local approvals have been granted. The DWA is
similar to the IAEA’s Protocol Reporter.
134
DRA is a web application used by DOE/NNSA HQ to manage the declaration process,
conduct reviews, provide feedback, and transmit approved declaration data to and from DOC.
The broad range of stakeholder interests and lack of precedent required a multi-tiered
approach to creating the APRS, taking into account not only the software development
component but also organizational policy, roles/responsibilities, inter- and intra-
organizational interfaces, administrative oversight, and training/outreach. APRS was
therefore designed, developed, and deployed using an iterative approach with periodic
validation by involved parties. The final product, though complex, was a well-tested tool with
which users were familiar, resulting in a smooth preparation of NNSA’s initial declarations.
Some of the more important aspects of information management and how each was addressed
in building the APRS are described below.
Scope: Initially, the APRS was envisioned as a database to collect and manage AP
declaration data. As the AP and DOE/NNSA’s reporting obligations were better understood,
the scope expanded to include workflow and process management. As is often the case when
developing systems such as this, new business rules were defined and eventually became
organizational policy, with the definition, approval, and implementation of formal processes
occurring in parallel.
Legislative Considerations: The status of AP ratification was monitored closely as it moved

through the government approval process. Adjustments to the project were made as necessary
to take the timing into consideration.
Data Flow, Timelines, and Schedules: As the workflow was defined, process steps became
clear and timelines were derived. Additional steps had to be added to allow for time for DOC
to receive DOE/NNSA submissions, consolidate the data with NRC and other DOC data, and
move the final submission through the remaining review/approval chain. Working backwards
from the 180 day period between Entry into Force (EIF) and the Initial Submission due date
determined the final schedule. Timelines and schedules were a part of every briefing and
training event provided to stakeholders.
Quality Assurance and Quality Control: Initially, QA and QC were done on an informal
basis as APRS software releases were deployed. It soon became apparent, however, that more
attention was needed and a structured process was put in place. Results were immediate,
lowering post-release bug fixes to near-zero.
Iterative Process: To test the system, a mock declaration process was conducted, involving
all stakeholders. Three data calls were conducted, with each resulting in improvements and
corrections to the APRS. This allowed for issues to be addressed prior to the actual
declaration being prepared. A second benefit of the preparatory data calls was that they
increased AP awareness for declarants, improved the declaration data with each iteration, and
allowed the declaration preparation to become a routine activity of the declarants.
135
Exchanges of Information: Data transmission processes between the DWA and the DRA
are fully automated, allowing two-way exchange of declaration data. In coordination with
DOC, a formal interface document was developed to describe how the NNSA system and the
DOC system would exchange data.
Technical/Administrative Reviews: Technical and administrative reviews were performed

by each declarant prior to submitting data to the relevant NNSA Field Office. Each Field
Office conducted similar reviews before forwarding the data to NNSA where a third review
took place prior to transmittal to DOC. Any reviewer had the option to reject an entry or send
it back to the source for revision. Reviews include checks for accuracy, redundancy and
omission.
Data Ownership: Although NNSA was ultimately responsible for its AP data, each declarant
was required to state in writing that the submitted data is correct and complete to the best of
the provider’s knowledge. Each NNSA Field Office was required to provide a written
statement to NNSA HQ that the data being submitted was complete and correct.
Training/Documentation: Onsite training on both the AP and the APRS was provided for
and funded by NNSA prior to entry into force. Additional onsite training was conducted
when necessary. Web-based training videos describing the US AP process were made
available to individuals with user accounts, and three APRS guidance documents were
published: The AP Handbook, the APRS Technical Manual, and the APRS How To Guide.
The DRA also contains an extensive library of AP-relevant material. Each year, NNSA
invites all stakeholders to participate in a video teleconference prior to the start of the data
collection process for the annual AP update. A typical agenda includes the upcoming
timeline, preparatory activities (such as updating points of contact and obtaining software
user accounts), reviews software changes, and holds a question and answer session.
Auditing: The DRA incorporates a robust transaction logging mechanism that tracks data
transactions at the entry level and user information at the account level. One result is that,
upon request, the entire multi-year history of an entry can be reported, including such items
as upload/download dates, and reviewer assignments/recommendations. Another is the ability
to track user logins and reasons for failed login attempts (such as incorrect password or a
deactivated account.)
In conclusion, the effective implementation of a system such as the APRS is achieved by

viewing the system as a whole – using system engineering principles to evaluate when and
how the data is collected and managed from origination through final disposition and
archival.
Case Study AIII-4: Developing a new safeguards information management system
Recognizing that a SIMS is broader than a record of accounting reports and should include
information on procedures and policies, AP declarations, national inspections and nuclear
security, A State took an initial step in developing software to prepare nuclear material
accounting reports for the IAEA. The aim of this software was for nuclear facilities to report
136
their material accounting information online to enable the SRA to consolidate or merge the
facility reports into the State’s accounting reports, in a format suitable for quality checking
using QCVS provided by the IAEA.
In order to develop the system, data sources, information receivers, data flows, stakeholders,
and relational organization of all key elements of the SSAC were analysed. A comprehensive
assessment was conducted, including all elements that can affect the quality, completeness,
timeliness, and integrity of the reports. Aspects that were considered include:
• Technical Information Flow

• Administrative Information Flow
• Legislative Considerations
• Quality Control and Quality Assurance
• Issue Resolution
• Information Systems
• Communication and Correspondence
The accounting reports are based on the fixed format Code 10, so it was necessary for the
developers to understand specifications on the format, description, content and business rules
for those reports, which are specific to each type of report, including ICR, PIL, MBR and
Concise Note.
In addition to preparing nuclear material accounting reports, design specifications for nuclear
material accounting and reporting algorithms were also necessary. For example, the
procedures for application of the correction principle, calculating shipper/receiver
differences, determination of material unaccounted for and specific considerations for
inventory change codes were considered.
137
Annex IV.
DIAGRAMS DEPICTING SECURE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A
STATE AND THE IAEA
Diagram AIV-1 illustrates an SRA’s electronic submission system.

Diagram AIV-2 illustrates a secure communication channel by encrypted email.
Diagram AIV-3 illustrates the secure communication channel through virtual private network.
FIG. AIV-1. Electronic submission of information to the IAEA.
FIG. AIV-2. Secure communication channel for data submission.
138
FIG. AIV-3. Example of electronic mailbox for data submission by the facility operator.
139
Annex V.
EXAMPLE OF INFORMATION FLOW FROM A LOF TO THE STATE
AUTHORITY FOR VARIOUS EVENTS
Action at LOF Information to be provided to SRA by LOF Reports provided by State to

IAEA
A sample is • Receipt of nuclear material from abroad ICR not later than 30 days after
ordered by a (reference import license) the end of the month in which the
researcher and • date of receipt change took place
received from • country of origin
abroad (imported) • composition of material ‘RF’ to be reported
(liquid/solid/powder/container
size/irradiated/un-irradiated)
• weight (+fissile weight if appropriate)
• type of element
• Concise Note if needed
nuclear material is • the portion of nuclear material that is ICR not later than 30 days after
dissolved used for the experiment/analysis has to the end of the month in which the
(changing form) be reported change took place
o if a portion of the material is
dissolved and kept on the inventory, RM, RP, LD to be reported as
it is reported rebatching minus (RM) applicable
and rebatching plus (RP)
o if a portion of the material is Note: If the whole batch is
dissolved and discarded dissolved no new batch name has
(irrecoverable), measured discard
(LD) is reported for that portion to be reported. Only the change of
o if all of the batch is dissolved and material description code is
discarded, then LD is reported for reported.
the whole batch
• date when the action took place
• batch-name and item number
a solution (e.g. vial • date of transfer no need to issue an ICR because it
of uranyl nitrate) is • name of receiving location is a movement between two
transferred by a • batch-name and item number KMPs in the same (national) LOF
university to • composition MBA
another KMP in • weight (+fissile weight if appropriate)
same LOF MBA (a
laboratory that can
use the material)
a solution (e.g. • date of measured discard LD is reported for the material in

small vial of • batch-name and batch data, item the next ICR for the KMP/MBA
diluted uranium for number
analysis) becomes • composition
irrecoverable and • weight (+fissile weight if appropriate)
• information about the plan to transfer
is transferred to a
the terminated material to the repository
national low level
140
waste repository
a jar of material is • date ICR with Concise Note of

found in one of the • name of location explanation, submitted not later
LOFs • type of element than 30 days after the end of the
• weight of nuclear material (+ fissile month in which the change took
weight, if appropriate) place
• composition of material
• number of batches Note: Check first if the material
• number of items was received from abroad –
• Concise Note with explanation supplier’s papers, import
authority, etc.
‘GA’ to be reported
a sample is taken • the portion of nuclear material that is ICR not later than 30 days after
by the IAEA used for the IAEA sample has to be the end of the month in which the
inspectors reported change took place
• rebatching of the sample before
shipment (RM for the original batch; RM, RP and SF to be reported
RP for the remaining batch and the with Concise Note as needed
sample)
• date when the action took place
• information of sending the sample to
the IAEA
Physical Inventory • List of Inventory Items (LII) should be The SRA produces a PIL and
Taking (PIT) for produced for each LOF KMP, which MBR that reflect all of the IILs
each LOF KMP in includes the following: submitted by the LOF KMPs in
an MBA (there o number of items the MBA and updates the General
o number of batches
may be several Ledger to reflect the new physical
o weights (+fissile weights, if
LOF KMPs in one appropriate) ending inventory
MBA) o composition of material
o element type The PIL and MBR are to be
submitted to the IAEA not later
than 30 days after the day the PIT
took place
All LOF KMP locations in an

MBA must be reported with the
same PIT date
Note: Check if batch names,

numbers of batches and number
of items, weights and KMP codes
correspond to the previous
reports sent to the IAEA.
Physical Inventory • Same as for PIT Same as for PIT but SRA gives
Verification (PIV) General Ledger to IAEA.
141
Annex VI.
ISSUES RELATED TO REPORTING
DEPLETED URANIUM
Depleted uranium’s high density and shielding properties are beneficial for use in many
industrial and medical applications, including shielding of radiation in shipping containers
designed to transport high energy radioactive sources and substances, radiography cameras
for weld joint inspections, and medical teletherapy heads used for treatment of cancer.
DU is nuclear material which must be declared by the original owner (usually the instrument
supplier) in a State. Once the shield is manufactured into a finished device (e.g. a transport
container, radiography camera or medical teletherapy head shield), the DU component should
be reported as a one item batch and assigned with a unique batch name that stays with the DU
during its lifetime. It is useful to reflect the manufacturer/owner model number and serial
number of the equipment’s shielded body in the batch name for the DU shield. The batch
name stays with the DU throughout its use, and the weight and physical/chemical form are
not expected to change.
Some examples of non-nuclear uses of DU are provided below.
DU-Shielded Transport Containers: There are often locations in a State that own transport
containers which are fabricated with DU shielding permanently embedded within the package
body, used to transport radioactive substances, both domestically and internationally. The
manufacturer, importer or owner will usually exempt the DU in such containers based on
non-nuclear use (i.e. as a shield). These containers may be shipped abroad (internationally)
without de-exemption as long as the ownership of the container does not change, and such
imports and exports need not be reported to the IAEA. The containers may also be transferred
domestically, without reporting them to the IAEA, and without requesting de-exemption.
However, it is necessary that the SRA maintain control over its inventory of exempted
material.
Teletherapy Shields: Some States may have hospital and clinic licensees who possess medical
teletherapy units fabricated with a DU shield to contain the radiation from the sources when
not in use. These units may have been supplied by a domestic manufacturer or imported from
a foreign supplier. The original manufacturer usually retains detailed records of each
teletherapy headshield containing the DU, including serial number, DU mass, date of
manufacture, customer name and address, shipping records and exemption records (for the
units that remained in the State). Some manufacturers may accept return of the teletherapy
unit at the end of its useful life and recycle the DU for future use or dispose of it in a
radioactive waste disposal facility.
DU that is returned from customers to suppliers in a State for disposal must first be de-
exempted before being introduced into a safeguarded recycle/disposal facility.
142
Radiography devices: Radiography cameras used in industry contain high activity gamma
radioisotope sources for radiography of weld joints and metal for defects, etc. Similar to
shipping containers discussed above, radiography units are often DU shielded for use in the
field and as transport packages. These devices are commonly used by small companies and
the cameras are often moved around in everyday use. For this reason, it is efficient to request
exemption for the DU based on its non-nuclear use within an MBA in the State prior to
delivery to the customer. Otherwise, each location to which the DU is transferred will need to
be established as a LOF and all relevant obligations under a CSA and AP will apply.
In the case that an exempted DU container needs to be exported temporarily back to a foreign
manufacturer for repair or reload, and returned to the owner, they can be treated as transport
packages and the DU would not have to be de-exempted. However, if they are returned
(exported) for final disposal, the DU must first be de-exempted, safeguards re-applied and
then reported as an export. If the DU is shipped to a national waste site for disposal, then if
the waste site contains nuclear material under safeguards, the DU should first be de-
exempted.
Example 1: A hospital needs to dispose of an old DU shielded teletherapy head. The hospital calls a
waste or metal collection service company to retrieve the device. The hospital can identify the unit
from original history and shipping records (e.g. original manufacturer, supplier country, quantity of
DU, etc.) and the SRA can produce the relevant exemption records.
Example 2: During an outreach event conducted by an SRA at a nuclear research centre, some DU
was being used in instruments for non-destructive testing and radioactive source containers.
Accounting data for this DU was not being kept by the LOF operator. Therefore, the LOF reported it
to the SRA using an inventory change report with the ‘accidental gain’ (code GA).
Counterweights (e.g. crane, aircraft): Counterweights are rarely encountered, as DU has

gradually been replaced by tungsten and other dense materials in the past few decades. The
DU in these historic applications was usually exempted based on non-nuclear use.
Occasionally, a DU counterweight is found in a scrap yard or retrieved from a scrapped
aircraft. In such cases, the DU can be added to the State’s inventory through an ICR with the
code for accidental gain (GA) and requested for exemption by the IAEA.
143
Annex VII.
CASE STUDIES ON SAFEGUARDS BY DESIGN
An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional and
performance requirements at the beginning of the project and enables the project to achieve a
reasonable balance between competing requirements in a time and cost effective manner. An
effective approach to safeguards by design (SBD) is to consider IAEA safeguards measures
as a standard part of the design and licensing of nuclear facilities.
Specific considerations for each nuclear fuel cycle facility type are summarized in the
IAEA’s guidance series on SBD (found on www.iaea.org/safeguards). Figure AVI-1
illustrates the inclusion of all relevant requirements in the early stages of the design.
Safeguards
Design Guide
Safety Design
Guide
Security
Requirements Designer
Design Guide
Codes &
Standards
Operational
Goals
FIG. AVII-1. Inclusion of all relevant requirements in the early stages of the design.
A research reactor project considered the implementation of SBD from early phases of design
and construction of the reactor. The requirements considered in the design process included:
- Appropriate physical and visual access for inspectors to verify fresh fuel by item
counting and measurement using NDA equipment;
- Provision for Cerenkov viewing in the core and spent fuel racks; and
- Provision for design information verification.
A project for long-term disposition of spent nuclear fuel in bedrock has actively pursued a
SBD dialogue with the IAEA and relevant State and regional authorities. Access to the stored
fuel for verification will be very limited, which creates unique requirements for safeguards in
all parts of the process. All fuel has to be verified prior to placement in the repository and
continuity of knowledge will need to be meticulously maintained. Technical and scientific
discussions on how to safeguard the final repository have been going on in various forums for
more than twenty years.
A very important milestone for SBD discussions is the preparation of early design
information. This was based on building plans submitted by the operator to the State
authorities when applying for a construction license. The design information was reviewed by
144
the IAEA and SRAs, and planning of safeguards activities in detail began. Several technical
meetings were held with all of the stakeholders. The information exchanged during these
meetings enabled the IAEA to plan activities to be as efficient and minimally disruptive to
facility operations as possible. It also enabled the operator to plan for the safeguards
equipment well in advance of any construction work. The encapsulation process is planned to
continue for more than 100 years, so the design has to ensure smooth operation of the plant.
The most important design modifications to the encapsulation plant that have arisen from the
SBD process are provisions for NDA measurements and camera surveillance in the hot cells
at the encapsulation plant, as these include penetrations to the cell. These would have been
very costly and difficult to add once the hot cell had been built. The maintenance and
foreseen upgrades of the equipment have been taken into account when optimising the
cabling and locations of the equipment. Without early operator involvement and a positive
attitude of the operators, this process would not have been possible. Continued interaction is
essential during construction and operation, particularly since the repository will change its
shape and volume during its operation, and the IAEA equipment for containment and
surveillance will likely need to be maintained and even relocated during the exceptionally
long lifetime of the repository.
145
Annex VIII.
ADJUSTMENTS TO ACCOUNTING ENTRIES
VIII.1 Overview of Accounting Entries
Nuclear material accounting reports contain entries that report inventory changes (ICRs),
inventory batches (PILs) and balances (MBRs). The basic structure of accounting reports and
entries varies based on the Code 10 format (fixed or labelled), but the contents of both
formats meet the needs of IAEA safeguards.
PILs, ICRs and MBRs contain common information (called a header) and nuclear material
information (called an accounting entry or line entry). Depending on the Code 10 format, the
header information is reported as a separate record (fixed format) or is contained within the
line entry data fields (labelled format).
VIII.2 Header Entries

For each nuclear material accounting report the IAEA records general information pertaining
to the relevant report. This information is specifically reported as a report “header” in fixed
format Code 10. The primary reason for the use of header entries is because of the 80-column
card format limitations of fixed format Code 10. Also, with the information processing
technology when Code 10 was first developed, every effort was made to reduce the need for
storage space. Labelled format Code 10 does not provide for separately reported header
information.
Header entries with fixed format Code 10:
The header record for fixed format reporting contains information that applies to all line
entries in the report, such as the MBA code and report number. The header information is
recorded in the IAEA’s information system and also contains the number of accounting line
entries in the report, which can be cross-checked with the actual number of entries reported.
Header entries with labelled format Code 10:
Labelled format Code 10 does not provide for separately reported header information; the
IAEA retrieves header information from the lines entries in an accounting report. Even
though a separate header record is not defined, the IAEA uses information from labelled
format Code 10 accounting entries to generate an internal IAEA header record, which ensures
consistency between the two Code 10 formats in the Agency information system.
VIII.3 Accounting (line) entries

Nuclear material accounting reports must contain at least one accounting line entry. For
ICRs and PILs, each entry (or entries, depending on Code 10 format) represents a batch of
nuclear material. In MBRs, each entry reports summarized nuclear material accounts, as
reflected in the corresponding facility ledgers.
In the normal process of nuclear material accounting and reporting, situations will arise
where an accounting entry or header information will need to be corrected. The following
describes the processes and procedures to follow when modifying a nuclear material
accounting report. Modifications include additions, corrections and deletions.
146
VIII.4 Addition of an accounting entry
A State has the option of reporting nuclear material accounting entries that are to be added to
a previously submitted report. An MBA may only add lines to reports of the same type for
that MBA; i.e. an MBA may not add lines to the reports of another MBA and only an ICR
can add lines to another ICR, only an MBR can add lines to another MBR and only a PIL can
add lines to another PIL.
The data elements indicating where an entry is to be added are the ‘To Report Number’ and
the ‘To Entry Number’:
• The ‘To Report Number’ is the report number in which the entry is to be added;
• The ‘To Entry Number’ should be the next available entry number in the ‘To Report
Number’.
For fixed format Code 10, there is a limit of 99 entries in a report, and if a report already has
that many lines (original entries plus all prior additions), it is not possible to add another
entry. In this case, either a new report number needs to be used to report the addition without
reference to an earlier report or the entry could be added to another report that has less than
99 lines (original entries plus all prior additions). With labelled format Code 10, the limit of
line entries in a report is 999999 so there is essentially no problem with having enough entry
numbers available for use as an addition to a report.
For adding inventory change entries, the date of the inventory change must be within the
reporting period (date from/to) of the report to which the entry is added. The inventory
change date is not required to be within the period of the report containing the addition entry.
When PIL or MBR entries are added, they belong to the inventory date or material balance
period, respectively, of the report to which the entry is added.
Figure AVIII-1 indicates the addition of two entries to a report.
FIG. AVIII-1 Adding two entries to a report.
VIII.5 Correction of an accounting report header

It is not possible for a State to correct header information by means of reporting a correction
and having the correction applied as it would be for a nuclear material accounting entry.
147
Corrections to header records can be made only by the Agency, on the basis of information
provided by the State. As with all Agency-assisted corrections to State reports, changes can
be made only with the written approval of and in cooperation with the reporting State. A
common correction to the header is changing the reporting period (date from, date through, or
both) of an inventory change report.
VIII.6 Correction of an accounting entry

A State has the option of reporting corrections to previously reported nuclear material
accounting entries. An MBA may correct entries only in reports of the same type for that
MBA; i.e. an ICR can correct another ICR entry, an MBR can correct another MBR entry and
a PIL can correct another PIL entry.
A correction may be needed to resolve the closing of a material balance period or it may
cause a previously closed period to be opened. Therefore, there could also be the need to
correct other corresponding nuclear material accounting reports. Changing the value of an
inventory change entry may result in a previously closed material balance period being
opened, thereby requiring changes to the associated PIL and MBR reports. It is also possible
that a correction will provide the necessary values that are needed in order to close a material
balance period.
Some States have changed from a fixed format Code 10 to a labelled format. In this case, if a
labelled format Code 10 entry corrects an entry reported under fixed format Code 10, there
are some considerations, depending on the entries reporting the batch.
• A single entry in labelled format may correct an accounting entry that, under fixed
format, needed more than one line entry (e.g. a spent fuel batch, with one line entry for
the plutonium and one for the uranium or an entry continued because of size limitations
on a numeric field). In this case, delete all of the corresponding fixed format entries and
report an addition entry to the corrected report.
• Problems may also arise with regard to continuation entries; what may have needed
several entries to report a single weight under fixed format can be reported in one
labelled format entry.
FIG AVIII-2 shows an entry that has been corrected twice. Taking an example, a SD of 100
kg is reported on 1 October 2016 in ICR number 126, entry 32. One month later it is realized
that the entry was incorrect and should have been reported as 105 kg. To correct the weight,
the State reports in another ICR (e.g. report 127, entry 1) the same batch data field content
that was in report 126 entry 32, but the weight is reported in the new entry as 105 kg. The
data fields ‘To Report Number’ and ‘To Entry Number’ are filled in for report 127 with the
values 126 and 32, respectively. Once processed in the IAEA’s information system, entry 1 in
report 127 is used for providing information about the shipment instead of entry 32 in report
126.
148
FIG. AVIII-2. Multiple corrections and appropriate references to entries.
VIII.7 Deletion of an accounting entry

A State has the option to delete any previously reported nuclear material accounting entry.
An MBA may delete entries only in reports of the same type for that MBA; i.e. an ICR can
delete another ICR entry, an MBR can delete another MBR entry and a PIL can delete
another PIL entry. A deletion may be needed to resolve the closing of a material balance
period or it may cause a previously closed period to be opened. Therefore, there may also be
the need to correct other corresponding nuclear material accounting reports. The procedure
for indicating the deletion of a record differs according to the Code 10 format. However, in
both cases, the record is not physically deleted in the IAEA information system but kept
available for possible use — a similar approach is a good accounting practice for States as
well. The reference data elements are the ‘To Report Number’ and ‘To Entry Number’.
• The ‘To Report Number’ is the report number containing the entry to be deleted;
• The ‘To Entry Number’ is the entry in the ‘To Report Number’ to be deleted.
Fixed format deletions are accomplished by reporting an invalid entry that refers to the entry
that is to be deleted:
• ‘Continuation’ (position 3) contains an ‘A’;
• The ‘To report number’ and To report entry’ fields contain the report and entry
number to be deleted;
• The remainder of the line entry fields are not required.
Labelled format deletions are accomplished by reporting a deletion entry with a reference to
the entry to be deleted:
• The first subfield of label 309 contains a ‘D’;
• The ‘To report number’ and To report entry’ subfields of label 309 contain the report
and its entry number to be deleted;
• The minimum fields needed for reporting a deletion are labels 001, 002, 003, 006,
010, 015, 207, 307, 309 and, optionally, 310.
149
FIG. AVIII-3. Deletion of an entry.
Example: a shipment foreign (SF) was accidentally reported twice by a State (with a fixed format
Code 10) as entries 34 and 35 in ICR number 254. One of the line entries needs to be deleted. Upon
noticing the mistake, the State decided to delete entry 35 in ICR 254. From a nuclear material
accounting point of view, it does not matter which of the two entries is deleted.
In the next ICR sent to the IAEA for that MBA, an entry is reported with the letter ‘A’ in position three
of the record and with a ‘To Report’ of 254 and a ‘To Entry’ of 35. The ICR entry that reports the
deletion needs to contain only this information; other data fields may be reported if desired, but are
not required.
In the above example, depending on the effected material balance period, corrections to the
associated MBR may be necessary, especially if the shipment was reported twice in the MBR
entry total for all exports during the period.
Example: Using a labelled format Code 10, a SF was reported twice by a State as entries 171 and 172
in ICR number 542. One of the line entries needs to be deleted. Upon noticing the mistake, the State
decided to delete entry 172 in ICR 542. In the next ICR for that MBA that is sent to the IAEA, an entry
is reported with the letter ‘D’ in the first subfield of label 309. The rest of the label 309 subfields
should be completed to indicate a back reference to report 542, entry 172. In addition, the other
subfields mentioned above should be reported.
Depending on the effected material balance period, corrections to the associated MBR may be
necessary, especially if the shipment was double counted in the MBR entry total for all exports during
the period.
150
Annex IX.
STEPS FOR REQUESTING AND REPORTING EXEMPTION
The granting of exemption by the IAEA temporarily exempts the batch of nuclear material
from full safeguards reporting requirements. Exemption is temporary and the material will
eventually be de-exempted and returned to safeguards (e.g. prior to export or co-location with
safeguarded material). Section 8.25 addresses exemption in more detail; this Annex offers an
approach for an SRA to assist licensees in requesting exemptions, and for tracking exempted
material. The SRA has the obligation to keep track of the exempted material in the whole
State, e.g. to ensure that the amount of material exempted under paragraph 37 of
INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) does not exceed the thresholds specified in that paragraph. It can be
very helpful for the SIMS to track all exemptions/de-exemptions under the relevant
paragraphs (36 and 37) to assist the State in meeting this obligation.
Example of an Exemption Procedure established by an SRA
A request for exemption may be initiated by the SRA or by the facility operator. The SRA
will need to convey the request to the IAEA in either case. A request for exemption usually
results from consultations between the facility or LOF operator and the SRA. The facility
may initiate a request for exemption by informing the SRA which batches on its inventory are
being requested for exemption. An example of a ‘Request for Exemption’ form is provided at
the end of this Annex.
Example: SRAs may require MBA operators to submit a “Request for Exemption” which provides
specific batch information for the nuclear material being requested for exemption. The batch ID will
convey all the necessary information for the SRA to complete the Code 6.2 form and submit to IAEA.
The SRA then evaluates the request to ensure that the requesting MBA possesses the batches
on its inventory that are being requested for exemption.
It is a good practice for the SRA to assign each exemption request a reference number used
for tracking purposes. The reference number can be conveyed on the cover letter from the
SRA to the IAEA, which may be attached to multiple Code 6.2 forms. This reference number
may contain, e.g. the year and a sequential number (e.g. 2015/1). Once the exemption is
granted, the reference number is included in the Concise Notes in the ICR that reports the
exemption for each batch.
The SRA then submits a request to the IAEA on a Code 6.2 form (see Subsidiary
Arrangements) using the data provided by the operator. The IAEA will assess the application
from the State. Once the IAEA completes their review, and notifies the SRA that it has
granted the exemption and the associated conditions/obligations, then the SRA informs the
operator of the decision, again referencing the tracking identifier. (An example of a letter
conveying information to the operator is provided at the end of this Annex). The operator
must then submit an ICR to the SRA that includes the exemption (using inventory change
151
code ‘EU’ or ‘EQ’ as described in section 8.25), with the reference number mentioned in the
concise notes. This information is conveyed to the IAEA in the next ICR for that MBA.
If EQ, the SRA reports its location annually (as of December 31st) under AP Article 2.a.(vii).
If EU, the SRA evaluates the use and quantity of the material to determine if a declaration is
necessary under AP Article 2.a.(vii).
Example of a de-exemption procedure established by an SRA
A request for de-exemption (also sometimes referred to as a request for re-application of

safeguards) may be initiated by the SRA or by the facility operator. The SRA will need to
convey the request to the IAEA in either case. A request for de-exemption is typically
submitted following consultations between the LOF or facility operator and the SRA.
Example: Similar to the Request for Exemption form, the SRA may request operators to submit a
form, “Request for De-Exemption,” which describes the nuclear material to be de-exempted and
other information necessary to complete the Code 6.3 form. The information may include material
and batch data, the batch name of the exempted material that was originally reported (e.g.EU or EQ
batch), the tracking reference number, current location, intended disposition and location for
transfer, if applicable.
The SRA evaluates the request to check that the batch was already exempted in a prior ICR
(either EU or EQ); that the de-exemption is requested using the same code (DU or DQ); that
the requesting MBA is an active MBA; and the quantity in the batch does not exceed the
quantity of exempted material in that MBA. (Material can be de-exempted in an MBA that is
different from the one where the corresponding exemption occurred.) The SRA submits the
Code 6.3 form (see Subsidiary Arrangements), including the reference tracking identifier
described above.
Once IAEA notifies the SRA that it has granted the de-exemption, the SRA informs the
operator of the decision, again referencing the tracking identifier. The operator then submits
an ICR reflecting the de-exemption DU or DQ transaction and immediately removes any
previously applied labels that identify it as exempted material. The SRA submits an ICR to
report the de-exemption (DU or DQ as appropriate) to the IAEA.
If a large amount of nuclear material is to be de-exempted at one time, it is a good practice to

inform the IAEA in advance and explain the circumstances. This is particularly true when
information is notified in advance to the IAEA in an annual plan of activities for LOFs, for
example.
Example: In one State, a company that recycled nuclear material purchased the entire inventory of
unused shielding containers from a storage repository at one time. This amounted to approximately
20 tonnes of depleted uranium being de-exempted at once. The SRA contacted the IAEA in advance
and described this transaction, which was not foreseen at the beginning of the year.
152
Disposing of exempted material when a company goes out of business
In case a company which uses exempted nuclear material is going to go out of business, or is
going to file for bankruptcy, it is necessary for the company and the SRA to work together on
the disposal of the nuclear material.
To be prepared for such situations, it is a good practice for the SRA to include conditions in a
license with regard to the disposition of the material in cases of death, bankruptcy or
dissolution of a company. The State’s nuclear law should also specify that nuclear material is
to be handled using a separate process from other materials that may arise from criminal
activities (e.g. smuggling, theft, etc.).
Some considerations include the process of liquidating the assets of the company, and how
the nuclear material will be dealt with; the responsibilities of the liquidating agent or the
executor of a deceased person’s estate; and the payment for costs associated with disposal.
153
Example Letter from SRA Conveying IAEA Exemption to a Licensee
Reference #__________
<Date>
Contact Name
Position
MBA Organization Name.
Street Address
City, Province Postal Code
SUBJECT: Exemption approval for Tracking Identifier: _____________________
Dear Contact:
I am pleased to send you the attached exemption approval(s) received from the IAEA. Please
note that the material is not exempted from safeguards until you report the exemption
transaction to the <SRA> via an Inventory Change Document (ICD). Therefore, please ensure
that the exemption transaction(s) for each material batch is/are implemented by:
1) reporting the exemption to the SRA via an ICD for each material exemption (please include
the exemption tracking identifier in the reporting form);
2) entering the exemption transaction onto the General Ledger to decrease the quantity of
safeguarded material on the ledger;
3) entering the exemption transaction into the Exempt Material Ledger to increase the quantity
of exempt material on the ledger; and,
4) physically separating the newly exempted material from the safeguarded inventory, and
updating both the safeguarded LII and the exempted LII.
Note that this exempted material may only be used or transferred within <State>, and <cite regulatory
requirement> requires that you must use an ICD to notify the <SRA> of any transfer of exempted
material to or from your MBA. If the exempted material is to be exported, irradiated, or stored or
processed with safeguarded material, you must submit an application to de-exempt the material, and
receive approval for the de-exemption, before doing so.
Attached is a sheet entitled “Guidelines for possession and transfer of Nuclear Material which has
been exempted from safeguards in <State>” – please store a copy of this sheet with the exempted
material or the container it is in, so that the sheet is accessible to anyone who may be working with
the material. If you are transferring this material to another party, please include a copy of this sheet
for their reference.
SRA Name
Attachment: Guidelines for possession and transfer of nuclear material which has been exempted
from safeguards.
154
Guidelines for Licensees holding Exempted Nuclear Material
Every SRA licensee shall “take all necessary measures to facilitate State’s compliance with any
applicable safeguards agreement.” The nuclear material stored with this sheet has temporarily been
exempted by the IAEA from some safeguards measures to reduce reporting and access requirements;
however there remain several restrictions and controls, as follows:
- A ledger must be maintained for each type of exempted nuclear material on-site, showing any
shipments or receipts and showing the total mass of each exempted material type present;
- If this material is to be shipped to another party, that party must be licensed by the SRA to
possess the material in question, and Inventory Change Documents must be filed with the SRA
by both the shipper (on shipment) and receiver (upon receipt);
- This material must be clearly labelled with a unique identifier, and it may not be processed or
stored together with nuclear material which is not exempted from safeguards;
- This material may not be fissioned, used to breed fissile or fissionable substances, enriched,
reprocessed, or converted into nuclear fuel, or used in research and development activities related
to enrichment, reprocessing, or conversion into nuclear fuel;
- Safeguards can be reapplied on this material only by request, and only if the material is
physically located in an MBA; and,
- Depending on the type of exemption, the IAEA may have the right to access this material with 24
hours notice, regardless of its location.
Please store this sheet with the exempted material, to ensure that anyone who accesses this material is
aware of these restrictions. Information regarding the specific material you possess has been included
below, to facilitate the eventual re-application of safeguards. If the material is to be divided, please
keep a copy of this sheet with each portion, and manually update the mass information below as
necessary. If the exempted material is to be transferred, please ensure that a copy of this sheet is
given to the receiver with the material. If full safeguards are reapplied to the material (i.e. the material
is de-exempted), this sheet can be discarded.
Exemption Identifier:
Date of IAEA approval
Physical/chemical form
and mass, units:
Exempting MBA:
155
Annex X.
EXAMPLE OF AN AP OUTREACH BROCHURE
This brochure is reprinted with the kind permission of the author.
156
Annex XI.
EXAMPLE OF STATE DECLARATIONS OF PLANNED FACILITIES –
FROM 2.A(X) PLANS TO DESIGN INFORMATION
A key aspect of safeguards implementation is the transmission of relevant information about

facilities from the SRA to the IAEA in accordance with INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), particularly
paragraphs 8 and 42 to 45. Knowledge of relevant information concerning facilities enables
the implementation of effective and efficient safeguards approaches, which benefits the
operator, the State and the IAEA. Provision of information about planned facilities is
submitted with gradually increasing granularity, and begins very early, under an AP article
2.a.(x) declaration (for States with an AP in force).
This declaration is based on a 10-year evaluation, so the information may be very limited and
basic. However, some key elements can already be included, for example the type of facility,
the targeted power and flow capacity, the potential operator, the cooperation with other States
or companies and the licensing process.
Below are examples of 2.a.(x) declarations for a hypothetical planned nuclear power plant
construction project, showing how more detailed information is progressively provided until
the submission of early design information.
Name of State (or Party): Ruritania

Safeguards agreement INFCIRC: 000 Protocol article: 2.a.(x)
Declaration number: 1 Declaration date: 2010-05-15
Declaration period: 2009-05-15 to 2010-05-15
Comment:
Entry Ref. Fuel Cycle General Plans for development of the General Plans for Comments
Stage Nuclear Fuel Cycle Nuclear Fuel Cycle-
Related Research
and Development
Activities
1
2 Reactors Ruritania plan to construct a nuclear
power station of 3 PWRs of 900 MWe.
3 candidate sites will be selected for the
NPP and a public consultation and
feasibility studies will determine the site,
design and the vendor of the reactors.
3

Comment:
157
Entry Ref. Fuel General Plans for development of the General Plans for Comments
Cycle Nuclear Fuel Cycle Nuclear Fuel Cycle-
Stage Related Research and
Development
Activities
1
2
3
4 1-2 Reactors Ruritania plan to construct a nuclear
power station of 3 PWRs of 900
MWe.
2 sites could already be chosen for
the NPP. RURITANUC will provide
the reactor design, which will be
evaluated by the National regulatory
Authority.
RURITELEC will operate all the
facilities on-site.
5

Comment:
Entry Ref. Fuel General Plans for development of General Plans for Comments
Cycle the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Nuclear Fuel Cycle-
Development Activities
1
2
3 2-4 Reactors Ruritania plan to construct a
nuclear power station of 3 PWRs of
900 MWe.
The site of the NPP is Easternia.
RURITANUC will provide the
reactor design, which will be
evaluated by the National
regulatory Authority. The NRA
made available its first safety
evaluations.
RURITECH will construct the
structural part of the reactors.
Some equipment will be imported
in 2016 such as steam generators
and vessel. The licensing
procedures have begun.
facilities on-site.
4
158
Comment:
Entry Ref. Fuel General Plans for development of General Plans for Comments
Cycle the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Nuclear Fuel Cycle-
Development Activities
1
2
3 4-3 Reactors Ruritania plan to construct a Reactors
nuclear power station of 3 PWRs of controls rod
900 MWe. The site of the NPP is will be
Easternia. manufactured
The RURITANUC reactor design in Ruritania
has been validated by the National (see article
regulatory Authority. The 2.a.(iv)
construction of the first reactor will declaration
begin in January 2017 and the two
other units in November 2017.
RURITECH will construct the
structural part of the reactors.
Some equipment will be imported
in 2016 such as steam generators
and vessel. All licences requirement
have been obtained.
facilities on-site.
4

Comment:
Entry Ref. Fuel General Plans for development of the General Plans Comments
Cycle Nuclear Fuel Cycle for Nuclear Fuel
Stage Cycle-Related
Research and
Development
Activities
1 5-3 Reactors Ruritania plan to construct a nuclear power Reactors
station of 3 PWRs of 900 MWe. The site controls rod
of the NPP is Easternia. will be
The RURITANUC reactor design has been manufactured
validated by the National regulatory in Ruritania
Authority. The construction of the first (see article
reactor will begin in January 2017 and the 2.a.(iv)
two other units in November 2017. declaration)
RURITECH will construct the structural
part of the reactors.
Some equipment will be imported in 2016
such as steam generators and vessel. All
licences requirement have been obtained.
RURITELEC will operate all the facilities
159
on-site.
A first DIQ draft has been sent to the
Agency by the national SRA. A meeting
between the SRA, the SSAC, RURITECH
and RURITELEC regarding national and
international legal framework and
safeguards implementation will be hosted
in Easternia in October 2016.
2

Comment:
Stage Cycle-Related
Research and
Development
Activities
1 6-1 Reactors Ruritania currently constructs a nuclear
power station of 3 PWRs of 900 MWe.
The site of the NPP is Easternia.
The RURITANUC reactor design has been
validated by the National regulatory
Authority. The construction of the first
reactor will begin in January 2017 and the
two other units in November 2017.
RURITECH constructs the structural part
of the reactors.
The steam generator, the pressure vessel
and the pressurizer will arrive on-site from
Pointsmoria in November 2016.
on-site.
The first DIQ has been sent to the Agency
by the national SRA. The MBA code for
the first unit will be sent in July.
A meeting between the SRA and
RURITELEC regarding national and
international legal framework and
safeguards implementation will be hosted
in Easternia in August 2017.
2

Comment:
Stage Cycle-Related
Research and
Development
Activities
160
1 7-1 Reactors Ruritania currently constructs a nuclear Last
power station of 3 PWRs of 900 MWe. declaration
The site of the NPP is Easternia. for Unit 1 in
Article
The RURITANUC reactor design has been
2.a.(x) due
validated by the National regulatory
to the
Authority. The construction of the first
allocation of
reactor will begin in January 2017 and the
facility
two other units in November 2017.
status (MBA
Due to technical delays, the construction RNP1).
began in March 2017 for the first unit.
RURITECH constructs the structural part
of the reactors. The steam generator, the
pressure vessel and the pressurizer arrived
on-site directly from Pointsmoria in
November 2016.
on-site. The first DIQs for the other units
have been sent to the Agency by the SRA.
The MBA code for the second and third
unit will be sent in June.
2

Comment:
Stage Cycle-Related
Research and
Development
Activities
1 8-1 Reactors Ruritania currently constructs a nuclear Last
power station of 3 PWRs of 900 MWe. declaration
The site of the NPP is Easternia. of the NPPs
The construction of all reactors will end in in Article
2018. Construction of units 2 and 3 began 2.a.(x) due
in January. RURITELEC operates all the to the
facilities on-site. The first DIVs for all allocation of
units have been sent to the Agency by the facility
national SRA and MBA codes have been status (MBA
allocated. RNP1,
RNP2 and
RNP3).
2
Early provision of design information is required when the decision is taken to construct, or to
authorize construction, of the facility, whichever is earlier. When early provision of design
information occurs, the declarations of the planned facility under 2.a.(x) will cease.
161
Early provision of design information helps to:
• Identify any technical issues sufficiently early to incorporate into final facility design;
• Highlight operating and design concerns that may impact the safeguards approach (radiological
hazards, black-box processes, personnel radiation protection requirements, access limitations);
• Discuss and prepare elements of the FA; and
• Provide the basis for the IAEA to develop the safeguards approach and plan for the verification
effort.
After the initial early provision of design information, the SRA needs to submit updates and revisions
as more details become known. For many cases such as large-scale facilities, the national legal
requirements and the technical design aspects will set the schedule for producing design information
very early in the process.
As the DIQ is updated, new information will be added, related to choices of equipment, measurement
points, operating schemes or records systems. All relevant elements, including those related to
measurement uncertainties and material held up in process (both important aspects of the safeguards
approach) should be submitted as soon as they are known. The results of calibrations and tests can
also be presented to the IAEA to enable evaluation of performance with respect to international target
values and standards, and support the design/selection of verification equipment and related material.
The licensing process for a new facility is quite variable from State to State. The SRA should inform
the IAEA of the different steps, ensuring a correct understanding of the design option timing.
162
Annex XII.
EXAMPLE FORM FOR ANNUAL REPORTING ON NEPTUNIUM AND
AMERICIUM
Reporting Organization
A- Neptunium
1 – Inventory as of 1 January 20XX (in grams, to the nearest tenth of a gram8):
Please also provide a brief of summary of the nature of this inventory (e.g. oxide in powder form,
sealed sources etc.) – and an explanation for any differences from the information provided as of 31
December of the prior year (Use separate sheet as necessary).
2 – Receipts and Exports during 20XX
Date Issue or Weight Origin or Designation, description and intended use

Receipt9 (g) Destination
3 – Inventory as of 31 December 20XX (in grams, to the nearest tenth of a gram10):
sealed sources etc.).
Signed _______________ Company Position __________________________
Print Name ___________ Dated ____________
8
only inventories comprising 1 gram or more of ‘previously separated’ neptunium need be reported
9
only receipts or issues of 1 gram or more of ‘previously separated’ neptunium need be reported.
10
only inventories comprising 1 gram or more of ‘previously separated’ neptunium need be reported
163
B- Americium
1 – Inventory as of 1 January 20XX (in grams, to the nearest gram11):
sealed sources etc.) – and an explanation for any differences from the information provided as of 31
December of the prior year (Use separate sheet as necessary)
2 – Receipts and Exports during 20XX
Date Issue or Weight Isotope(s)13 Origin or Designation, description and intended use
Receipt12 (g) Destination
3 – Inventory as of 31 December 20XX (in grams, to the nearest tenth of a gram14):
Please also provide a brief of summary of the nature of this inventory (e.g. neptunium oxide
in powder form, sealed sources etc.).
Signed _____________ Company, Position _________________________________
Print Name _________________ Dated ______________________________
11
only inventories totalling 10 grams or more of ‘previously separated’ americium-241, 242m and/or-243 need be reported
12
only receipts or issues of 10 grams or more of ‘previously separated’ americium need be reported.
13
whether americium-241, 242m and/or-243
14
only inventories totalling 10 grams or more of ‘previously separated’ americium-241, 242m and/or-243 need be reported
164
Annex XIII.
EXAMPLE OF STATE’S GUIDANCE ON
NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL TRAINING
A State has produced national guidance on safeguards and nuclear material accountancy
systems for its nuclear facilities and LOFs. The guidance is made available on the SRA’s
website, and contains specific information about training for facility operators in nuclear
material accounting and control. The guidance resulted from extensive consultation with and
input from those involved in nuclear material accountancy at nuclear facilities. It reflects a
broad consensus on how best to satisfy safeguards and nuclear material accountancy
requirements and includes numerous examples of good practice as identified by the industry.
The document also contains information on relevant international and national legal
obligations, and other undertakings to which organizations may subscribe voluntarily, such as
typical site/organizational roles in a nuclear material accountancy system and safeguards and
nuclear material accountancy terms and definitions. The guidance is designed to complement
related regional regulations on the implementation of a nuclear material accountancy and
control system by operators of nuclear installations.
SRA training
The SRA has developed a set of competency areas to ensure safeguards staff are suitably
trained and qualified in their relevant area of responsibility:
Safeguards – Skills and Expertise Framework
Knowledge and Experience
Specialism
1 – Knowledge of the legal framework for the application of safeguards in the State
2 – Knowledge of SRA’s safeguards remit and legal powers
3 - Appreciation of the regional and global non-proliferation basis and context for the
application of regional and IAEA safeguards in the State and more widely
4 – Knowledge and experience of arrangements for nuclear materials and accountancy at nuclear
facilities
5 – Knowledge of safeguards tools and techniques
6 – Knowledge and experience of tools and techniques for destructive and non-destructive
measurement of nuclear materials and the nature of the associated uncertainties
7 - Understanding of regional safeguards application for nuclear material at locations outside
nuclear licensed sites
8 - General appreciation of the civil nuclear industry, and awareness of plants/processes of
safeguards relevance
9 - Understanding of the sensitivity of safeguards and nuclear materials and accountancy-related
information, including requirements for its security classification and handling
165
10 – Understanding of the origins, objectives and specific requirements of the State’s reporting
obligations under the AP to the State’s Safeguards Agreement for which the SRA is responsible
11 – Understanding of the origins, objectives and specific requirements of other State reporting
obligations to the IAEA for which SRA is responsible, and experience of the processes involved
12 – Understanding of the policies and experience of the processes for State responses to
requests for the approval of new regional and IAEA safeguards inspectors
13 – Knowledge and experience of State safeguards-related reporting obligations arising from
nuclear co-operation/transfer agreements with other States
14 – Knowledge and experience of State reporting and publication of information on inventories
of civil plutonium and uranium
15 – Knowledge and experience of the publication of nuclear materials balance information for
sites processing nuclear material
Rating Scheme for Technical Skills and Knowledge Management Process
1 Limited
– limited experience and/or knowledge of the area
– some technical oversight may be appropriate over and above normal due process
2 Capable
– can work in this area routinely
– able to act as intelligent customer for routine work commissioned in this area
3 Lead
– a “go to” person for advice or work on this area
– capable of supervising or training others & representing SRA at international level
– able to act as intelligent customer for all work commissioned in this area
National Occupational Standards and Training Standards
SRA produced a set of occupational and training standards related to Nuclear Material
Accountancy, Control and Safeguards (NMAS). National Occupational Standards (NOS)
describe what an individual needs to do, know and understand in order to carry out a
particular role or function, together with specifications of the underpinning knowledge and
understanding. NOS are a suite of standards which cover the activities carried out by
individuals working within and on behalf of nuclear site licensed companies to meet NMAS
requirements.
For example, the NOS covering compilation of NMA and safeguards reporting requires that a
nuclear licensed site ensure that nuclear materials are accounted for, controlled and
safeguarded in order to demonstrate good governance arrangements; meeting international
safeguards commitments; and complying with legal requirements and voluntary undertakings.
It describes the standards expected of individuals who are responsible for producing and
reporting nuclear material accounts in the NMAS system and applies primarily to the Nuclear
Material Accountants and their NMAS Managers within nuclear site license companies who
are responsible for managing compliance with NMAS requirements for nuclear material
accounting and reporting at a site or an organizational level. The main outcome of this
activity is correctly maintained and compiled system of nuclear material accounts and
safeguards reporting.
166
The Safeguards Awareness Training Standard is shown below.
Title Awareness of International Safeguards

Details
Learning outcomes Assessment Criteria
The learner will: The learner can:
LO2.1 Understand 1. Explain the meaning, intent and objectives of nuclear safeguards.
the purpose and 2. Explain the importance of nuclear safeguards to the nuclear non-proliferation
objectives of regime, to your stakeholders, to your organization and to your job context
nuclear safeguards 3. Distinguish between safeguards , security, and safety and explain their fundamental
commonalities and differences
4. Explain the scope of nuclear safeguards – (materials, plant and equipment, etc).
5. Explain the inspector’s rights of inspection
6. Explain the IAEA strengthened safeguards and AP measures relevant to your
organization or job context
7. Explain the differences between IAEA and regional safeguards
L02.2 Understand 8. Understand the IAEA safeguards agreement and related State laws.
the legal and 9. Understand the regional safeguards requirements, powers, and sanctions, and
regulatory how these are enacted in State law.
framework for 10. Explain the roles of the regional institutions associated with safeguards
nuclear safeguards
11. Understand the requirements for meeting the obligations of international
nuclear co-operation agreements
12. Explain State government policy and oversight arrangements for safeguards
13. Understand the security and safety requirements for regional inspectors and
information exchange
L02.3 Know the 14. Describe the safeguards diversion concerns and detection goals and their
technical basis of relevance for your nuclear fuel cycle activities and your job context
safeguards 15. Describe the types of inspections
16. Understand what material tracking and independent measurement techniques
are deployed by the safeguards inspectorates
17. Explain the requirements for providing information on plant technical
characteristics (design) and for its verification
18. Explain the requirements for advance notification and special reports
19. Understand the importance of operating and accountancy records and the
difference between them
20. Understand the concepts of material balance, physical inventory taking,
Material Unaccounted For and its testing for significance
21. Understand the effects on operations of safeguards verification and for re-
verification.
LO2.4 Know the 22. Understand the personnel security requirements for escorting inspectors and
appropriate protective marking requirements for sensitive information exchanges.
arrangements to 23. Understand the protocols for inspectorate’s safety and radiation protection
follow when on nuclear licensed sites
interacting with
24. Explain the points of contact and channels of communication with the
safeguards
inspectorates inspectorates
25. Explain safeguards by design and the importance of early engagement with
the safeguards inspectorate on new plants and major modifications
26. Explain the principle of safeguards in-depth and utilization of operator’s
systems by the safeguards inspectorate
27. Understand the logistical arrangements to support safeguards inspections
28. Explain the arrangements to formalize agreed safeguards approaches and
actions.
29. Explain the process for dealing with inspection findings, letters and
requests.
30. Understand the safeguards reporting requirements and the communication
channels
LO2.5 Understand 31. Describe the roles and responsibilities for managing safeguards compliance,
the organization performance and resourcing at a site or organizational level and governance
167
and governance at an executive level
structures that exist 32. Understand the main safeguards performance measures and expectations and
for the management the systems for deficiencies
of safeguards 33. Understand the arrangements for safeguards awareness
34. Explain what constitutes a good safeguards culture
35. Understand safeguards emergency response and risk management
arrangements
Aim & Purpose Aimed at those who interact with safeguards inspectorates or provide systems and features
important to safeguards compliance. This would include all those handling nuclear material
whether site employees or contractors and those involved in design, construction and
commissioning of plants which will handle nuclear materials.
Provides an awareness and development of knowledge of requirements of international

safeguards within their working environment and an overview of the regulatory and
inspections measures in place to provide positive, independent safeguards assurance of
peaceful nuclear use and good material management.
Assessment The purpose of assessment is to ensure that effective learning has taken place. Assessment
methodology of the candidates’ performance will be against the stated learning outcomes:
Other Details This training standard has been developed against the suite of national occupational
standards for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards
State’s ‘Nuclear Passport’
NMAS is included in the State’s ‘Nuclear Skills Passport’, which is a system which offers all
nuclear organizations instant secure web access to information on the nuclear skills base,
offering a detailed overview of the training completed by their workforce as well as
contracting organizations. The Nuclear Skills Passport was designed by nuclear employers,
specifically for the requirements of the nuclear sector. It is an effective vehicle for the
introduction of industry agreed standards and inter-site recognition of internal and external
skills development training, which reduces duplication of training common to nuclear sites.
The Nuclear Passport comprises five key elements:
1. A web based accessible learner database that provides a registry of training records for
individual passport holders and facilities and generates a skills passport card.
2. Dataset repository for Job Contexts, which are agreed common job roles across industry
with which associated competencies are aligned.
3. Benchmarking tool that supports and enables up-skilling and workforce mobility across
the sector – enables existing employee’s skills to be recognized and mapped against defined
standard industry Job Context roles, highlighting gaps in skills and/or training.
4. Training sign-posting tool which supports up-skilling by sign-posting learners to Skills
Academy Quality Assured training provision (courses/programmes/qualifications) to meet
any identified Skills Gaps. This offers a simple modular approach to closing skills gaps
through continuous learning and development, with accreditation against national industry
standards.
5. A reporting suite that generates statistics at industry, regional and corporate levels.
168
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Braunegger-Guelich, A. International Atomic Energy Agency

Bopape, A. Nuclear Energy Commission of South Africa
Bqoor, M. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Jordan
Cisar, V. International Atomic Energy Agency
Coenen, G. International Atomic Energy Agency
Dahlin, G. Consultant, Sweden
Davainis, M. International Atomic Energy Agency
Dias, F. Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil
Franklin-Saburido, E. International Atomic Energy Agency
Gibson, W. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Goto, Y. Nuclear Material Control Centre of Japan
Hamalainen, M. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland
Idinger, J. International Atomic Energy Agency
Johnson, L. Office of Nuclear Regulation of the United Kingdom
Jraut, A. CNESTEN, Morocco
Khabir, K. International Atomic Energy Agency
Kral, P. European Atomic Energy Commission
Kaulich, R. International Atomic Energy Agency
Lieskovsky, M. International Atomic Energy Agency
Lyons, M. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
Martikka, E. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland
Mathews, C. International Atomic Energy Agency
Meyering, A. URENCO Ltd, Germany
Morin, M. Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute, France
Mukhametshina, N. International Atomic Energy Agency
Munoz, S. International Atomic Energy Agency
Nagy, H. Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, Hungary
Nguyen, H. V. Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Oakberg, J. Consultant, United States of America
Renis, T. International Atomic Energy Agency
Seguis, J. Philippines Nuclear Regulatory Institute
Shim, H. W. Korean Institute for Non-proliferation and Control
Stastny, O. State Office for Nuclear Safety of Czech Republic
Stepanek, T. International Atomic Energy Agency
Steinmaus, K. International Atomic Energy Agency
Suseanu, I. International Atomic Energy Agency
Vez Carmona, M. L. International Atomic Energy Agency
Zhang, S. International Atomic Energy Agency
169
@ No. 24
ORDERING LOCALLY
In the following countries, IAEA priced publications may be purchased from the sources listed below or
from major local booksellers.
Orders for unpriced publications should be made directly to the IAEA. The contact details are given at
the end of this list.
BELGIUM
Jean de Lannoy
Avenue du Roi 202, 1190 Brussels, BELGIUM
Telephone: +32 2 5384 308  Fax: +32 2 5380 841
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.jean-de-lannoy.be
CANADA
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd.
22-1010 Polytek Street, Ottawa, ON K1J 9J1, CANADA
Telephone: +1 613 745 2665  Fax: +1 643 745 7660
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.renoufbooks.com
Bernan Associates
4501 Forbes Blvd., Suite 200, Lanham, MD 20706-4391, USA
Telephone: +1 800 865 3457  Fax: +1 800 865 3450
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.bernan.com
CZECH REPUBLIC
Suweco CZ, s.r.o.
SESTUPNÁ 153/11, 162 00 Prague 6, CZECH REPUBLIC
Telephone: +420 242 459 205  Fax: +420 284 821 646
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.suweco.cz
FRANCE
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Telephone: +33 1 42 01 49 49  Fax: +33 1 42 01 90 90
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.formedit.fr
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GERMANY
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Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.goethebuch.de
HUNGARY
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Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.librotrade.hu
INDIA
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Telephone: +91 22 4212 6930/31/69  Fax: +91 22 2261 7928
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.alliedpublishers.com
Bookwell
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Telephone: +91 11 2760 1283/4536
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.bookwellindia.com
ITALY
Libreria Scientifica “AEIOU”
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Telephone: +39 02 48 95 45 52  Fax: +39 02 48 95 45 48
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.libreriaaeiou.eu
JAPAN
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Telephone: +81 3 4335 9312  Fax: +81 3 4335 9364
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://maruzen.co.jp
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Scientific and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety
107140, Moscow, Malaya Krasnoselskaya st. 2/8, bld. 5, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Telephone: +7 499 264 00 03  Fax: +7 499 264 28 59
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.secnrs.ru
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bernan Associates
4501 Forbes Blvd., Suite 200, Lanham, MD 20706-4391, USA
Telephone: +1 800 865 3457  Fax: +1 800 865 3450
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.bernan.com
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd.
812 Proctor Avenue, Ogdensburg, NY 13669-2205, USA
Telephone: +1 888 551 7470  Fax: +1 888 551 7471
Email: [email protected]  Web site: http://www.renoufbooks.com
Orders for both priced and unpriced publications may be addressed directly to:
IAEA Publishing Section, Marketing and Sales Unit
16-20611

Vienna International Centre, PO Box 100, 1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: +43 1 2600 22529 or 22530 • Fax: +43 1 2600 29302
Email: [email protected] • Web site: http://www.iaea.org/books
@
Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

Safeguards Implementation
Practices Guide on Provision
of Information to the IAEA
Vienna, June 2016

VIENNA
ISSN 1816–9309 IAEA Services Series 33

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Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

Vienna, June 2016

AFGHANISTAN GEORGIA OMAN

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Marketing and Sales Unit, Publishing Section

For further information on this publication, please contact:

Strategic Planning and External Coordination Section

SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES GUIDE ON PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE IAEA

2. OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY STATES ..................................................... 4

3. ESTABLISHING A STATE SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ... 8

4. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS ............................................................................................. 14

6. INFORMATION ON FACILITIES (DESIGN INFORMATION) .............................................. 22

7. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS ............................................................. 28

8. REPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING INFORMATION .............................. 39

9. DETERMINATION OF 34(C) MATERIAL................................................................................ 70

10. INFORMATION ABOUT IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ............. 71

11. PREPARING ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DECLARATIONS ................................................. 75

12. FACILITY OPERATORS’ ROLE IN PROVISION OF INFORMATION ................................. 93

13. OTHER INFORMATION .......................................................................................................... 100

14. INFORMATION PROVIDED VOLUNTARILY BY STATES ................................................ 103

15. CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRAINING STAFF ........................................................................ 108

16. PROVISION OF INFORMATION FROM THE IAEA TO STATES ....................................... 112

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 114

The purpose of Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guides is to share information

• Provision of initial information on nuclear material;

FIG. 1. IAEA safeguards guidance related to CSAs.

1.2. THE STATE OR REGIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE STATE SYSTEM OF

It is recommended that all safeguards responsibilities (pursuant to safeguards agreements as

1.3. COLLECTING INFORMATION AND PROVIDING IT TO THE IAEA

INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) Article 2

2. OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY STATES

2.1. TYPES OF INFORMATION

1) Information on facilities and on locations outside facilities where nuclear material is

2) Nuclear material accounting information;

3) Advance notification of imports and exports of nuclear material;

5) Special reports, amplifications and clarifications;

6) Information required by an AP; and

7) Voluntarily provided information.

2.2. FACILITIES AND LOFS

2.4. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Information is submitted by States on international transfers of nuclear material. Such

2.5. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF PRE-34(C) MATERIAL

2.6. INFORMATION REQUIRED BY AN AP (INFCIRC/540 (CORR.))

Initial and updated information is provided by a State with an AP in force3 as specified in

2.7. SPECIAL REPORTS, AMPLIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS

A ‘special report’ is submitted by States to the IAEA, to report unusual occurrences of

2.8. VOLUNTARY INFORMATION

2.9. PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO ASSIST THE IAEA IN PLANNING ITS

• Nuclear material management (accounting, import/export, transportation, storage,

3.1. DESIGNING A SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

FIG 2. Example of information flow in a State.

3.2. FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF A STATE SIMS

IAEA inspectors conducting physical inventory verification (PIV) appreciate receiving a

3.3. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN FACILITY RECORDS AND THE STATE’S

3.4. BATCH REPORTING

3.5. SETTING UP A NEW STATE SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

4.1. FORMAL AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE IAEA AND