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Ethics, Jurisprudence,
& Practice Management
in Dental Hygiene
Vickie J. Kimbrough-Walls, RDH, MBA
Charla J. Lautar, RDH, PhD
Pearson
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Notice:
The authors and the publisher of this volume have taken care that the information and technical recommendations con-
tained herein are based on research and expert consultation and are accurate and compatible with the standards gener-
ally accepted at the time of publication. Nevertheless, as new information becomes available, changes in clinical and
technical practices become necessary. The reader is advised to carefully consult manufacturers’ instructions and infor-
mation material for all supplies and equipment before use and to consult with a health care professional as necessary.
This advice is especially important when using new supplies or equipment for clinical purposes. The authors and pub-
lisher disclaim all responsibility for any liability, loss, injury, or damage incurred as a consequence, directly or indi-
rectly, of the use and application of any of the contents of this volume.
Kimbrough-Walls, Vickie J.
Ethics, jurisprudence & practice management in dental hygiene / Vickie
J. Kimbrough-Walls, Charla J. Lautar.—3rd ed.
p. ; cm.
Other title: Ethics, jurisprudence, and practice management in dental hygiene
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-13-139492-6
ISBN-10: 0-13-139492-4
1. Dental hygiene—Practice. 2. Dental ethics. 3. Dental
jurisprudence. I. Lautar, Charla J., 1949- II. Title. III. Title:
Ethics, jurisprudence, and practice management in dental hygiene.
[DNLM: 1. Practice Management, Dental—organization & administration.
2. Dental Hygienists. 3. Ethics, Dental. 4. Legislation, Dental. WU 77]
RK60.5.K563 2012
174’.96176—dc22 2010037346
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
ISBN-10: 0-13-139492-4
ISBN-13: 978-0-13-139492-6
CONTENTS
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
Reviewers xvii
Justice 25
Veracity 25
Additional Ethical Principles 26
Fidelity 26
Parentalism/Paternalism 26
Utility 27
Summary 29
Critical Thinking 29
Chapter 5 Jurisprudence 62
Objectives 62
Key Terms 62
Introduction 63
Case Study 63
Criminal Law 63
Insurance Fraud 64
Civil Law 65
Tort Law 66
Professional Negligence and Malpractice 66
Assault and Battery 69
Defamation 69
Contract Law 70
Abandonment 72
Risk Management 73
Case Law 75
Licensure 75
Educational Requirements 75
Written Board Exams 76
Practical Board Exams 76
Other Requirements for Licensure 77
Credentialing 78
Certification 78
Practice Act 78
Protection 79
vi Contents
Regulation 79
Scope of Practice 81
Supervision 81
Forensic Dentistry 84
Summary 85
Critical Thinking 85
Introduction 129
Case Study 130
Dental Hygiene Assessment 130
Thorough Patient Assessment 131
Building and Perfecting Skills 131
Preventative Home Care 132
Maximizing Skills 132
Developing Leadership Qualities 133
The Business of Dental Hygiene 135
Overhead Cost 135
Creating Daily Schedules 136
Dental Insurance and Hygiene Services 137
Common Insurance Plans 138
Insurance Billing Procedures 139
Insurance Codes 139
Excluded Treatments 139
Continuing Care and Recare Systems 141
Continuing Care Systems 141
Continuing Care Objectives 142
Time Management 143
Working with Other Dental Hygienists 144
Working as a Public Health Dental Hygienist 144
Career Alternatives 145
Six Roles of the Dental Hygienist 145
Lifelong Learning 146
Summary 146
Critical Thinking 147
The practice of dental hygiene continues to evolve in both scope of duties and changes in legis-
lation. New workforce models are currently being offered for those interested in alternative set-
tings and flexibility for providing oral health care to those with limited or no access to a dental
office. Additionally, more health care providers are being sought in the profession of forensics in
the event of catastrophes.
The information and examples in this book are designed to orient dental hygiene students
to clinical practice and its many applications in an office setting. Although dental practices and
dental hygiene procedures can be generalized, each office will be unique in its daily operations
and policies. As public health is woven through the various roles of the dental hygienist, this
book contains limited discussions regarding public health issues; however, it is not intended to
replace the community health textbook you are presently using.
Chapter Format
Each chapter is consistent in its presentation of information and includes the following:
Objectives are statements designed to inform the student about the overall knowledge
gained from chapter information.
Key Terms are listed at the beginning of each chapter and you will find them bolded and
italicized in the text as you read through the chapter. They emphasize important concepts
or major points of chapter content. These terms are also found at the end of the book in the
glossary.
xi
xii Preface
Case Studies The case studies present short scenarios that introduce and highlight chapter
content. Some include a task or ask you to consider applying the chapter to the case in
order to better understand how it applies to you as a dental hygiene professional.
Critical Thinking questions are found at the end of each chapter. These questions help
you to insure your knowledge of the chapter content is correct, and some can be used for
classroom discussion.
SPECIAL FEATURES
This third edition includes information regarding the practice of dental hygiene in Canada
and internationally. Canadian dental hygienists are similar to American dental hygienists in
many ways but differ in that the majority of them practice under self-regulation. In this global
economy and transient society, it is important to be prepared for the opportunities of one’s
profession.
Also new to this edition is information on the new workforce models being offered and
developed in the United States such as dental therapists, the registered dental hygienist in alter-
native practice, collaborative practice, and most recently, unsupervised practice in Maine.
Aspects of practice management have expanded to include production goal setting, more busi-
ness planning for dental hygiene, and identifying characteristics for leadership skills. You will
find additional case studies located on MyHealthProfessionsKit along with many more resources
designed to prepare you for entering the dental hygiene profession.
to include on quizzes or tests. There is also a teaching tip component that offers suggestions
for classroom activities and assignments. For additional information, please go to www.
myhealthprofessionskit.com.
To my sons, Kris, Lenny, and Rik—you continue to become my best friends and appreciate my
pursuits in higher education, my mom Joanne, for her continuous pride in my achievements, and
my, husband Mick—thank you for understanding my responsibilities and being patient as I jug-
gle all these balls in the air.
I appreciate the many educators I have been in contact with during my career and respect
the collaborative efforts to advance dental hygiene in all aspects of its potential. Special thanks to
my fellow faculty at Truckee Meadows Community College for having open minds and the will-
ingness to try new ideas that contribute to our positive learning environment and continued
achievements.
Vickie J. Kimbrough-Walls, RDH, MBA
Thank you to Dr. Mohamed Elsamahi for his support and advice throughout the writing of the
third edition. I would also like to thank those individuals and fellow dental hygienists who con-
tributed case studies for this text and previous editions, including the Instructor’s Manual, which
are now on the website MyHealthProfessionsKit. In particular, I would like to recognize Teri
McSherry for her case study in chapter four and to thank fellow dental hygiene educators Debbie
Boyke and Judi Thomas for their prewriting encouragement with this edition.
Charla J. Lautar, RDH, PhD
xv
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REVIEWERS
xvii
xviii Reviewers
Introduction to
Moral Philosophy
and Moral Reasoning
OBJECTIVES
After reading the material in this chapter, you will be able to
■ Define the term ethics.
■ Define the terms deontology (deontological approach) and teleology (teleological approach).
■ Distinguish between the ethical theory of utilitarianism and Kant’s ethical theory.
KEY TERMS
Act utilitarian Ethics Rights
Consequentialist theory Normative ethics Rule utilitarian
Deontology Prima facie Teleology
Duty Privilege Virtue ethics
INTRODUCTION
Throughout our personal and professional lives, we make judgments and behave according to
moral principles. These actions may be perceived as right or wrong based on their consequences,
an individual’s duties, and virtues or character traits. These perceptions have a profound effect on
our view, as health care providers and as ordinary citizens, of access to health care and other
social justice issues. This chapter serves as a knowledge foundation for decision making and
actions in dental hygiene practice.
1
2 Chapter 1 • Introduction to Moral Philosophy and Moral Reasoning
Case Study
After a conversation with your supervising employer dentist about universal health care, you
tell her that covering every individual should be the aim. She argues against this proposition
because this kind of health care coverage will lower the incomes of dentists and the entire
office staff working with them.
As you read this chapter, consider the following: Which ethical theory has guided you
position?
Ethics
The discipline of ethics consists of thoughts and ideas about morality. Ethics (or moral thinking)
is concerned with studying human behavior, particularly toward other human beings, and the
principles that can regulate it. Most ethical thinkers are philosophers, and philosophy differs
from social sciences in its tendency to suggest or recommend standards, or norms, of behavior.
For example, a sociologist may study the phenomenon of aggression, focusing on the causes of
aggression and how some members of society become aggressive under certain circumstances.
Similarly, a psychologist may explain why some people fail to develop normal empathic atti-
tudes to others and become indifferent and insensitive to human suffering. A philosopher, on the
other hand, would deal with aggression and insensitivity to suffering as violations of several
moral values and would propose arguments to support the importance of peaceful and mutually
respectful attitudes to human life and to other people.
Normative Ethics
The difference is that science, whether social or physical, is mainly descriptive, while moral
philosophy is mainly normative. Science analyzes phenomena in depth and explains them. It
may also predict future events on the basis of present observations. Ethical philosophy goes
beyond studying phenomena at a descriptive level and proceeds to recommend desirable atti-
tudes. Because desirable attitudes are commonly called norms, ethical thinking that purports to
guide human behavior is called normative ethics.
Traditionally, the ethical studies that explore the nature of moral judgments and the struc-
ture of moral concepts are called metaethics. Metaethical studies investigate, for example, the
meaning or the significance of what is right or wrong (good or evil) and whether moral judg-
ments are objective or subjective (Honderich, 1995, p. 555). Normative ethics is the branch of
metaethics that is concerned with moral recommendations about which acts are right and which
are wrong. The study of normative ethics that is relevant to health care ethics can be divided into
two major groups of theories: deontology and teleology. Virtue ethics is also an important nor-
mative position and will be discussed later in another section of this chapter.
negotiation. A duty is an obligation, an act that has to be done or ought to be done regardless of
its consequences. In that way, deontological ethics shares with religions the concept of absolute
obligation. A deontologist, for example, would expect people to tell the truth no matter what hap-
pens as a result. This is similar to the attitude of a religious person who never lies because lying
is against the Ten Commandments. Ethical duties are derived from ethical principles and con-
cepts. Some of these duties (e.g., truthfulness) are adopted by health care professions and stated
in codes of professional ethics. Other duties (e.g., respect for private property) are incorporated
into the legal system, while others (e.g., respect for personal privacy and helping the poor or eld-
erly) are incorporated into social traditions and customs (Weinstein, 1993, p. 84). Purtilo (1999)
defines three basic duties: absolute, prima facie, and conditional (p. 60). An absolute duty is
binding under all circumstances. For example, the duty not to kill an innocent person is absolute
because we know of no situation in which such killing would be permissible. It is important to
notice here (or in that respect) that having to defend oneself against a non-innocent aggressor,
which may result in killing in self-defense, is not a violation of deontology.
Prima facie duties differ in that they are determined by the present situation. The term
prima facie means “at first glance,” and a prima facie duty is a duty that is made obvious by the
circumstances surrounding it. In dentistry, a scenario to illustrate this is treating the patient who
is in pain before treating the patient who has come for a routine scheduled appointment. Treating
the patient in pain seems to be the right decision even though it may upset the scheduled patient
because of unexpected waiting.
A conditional duty is a commitment that comes into being after certain conditions are met.
For instance, our society has a duty to support unemployed persons only after they try to learn
new skills that may enable them to find jobs, or after it becomes obvious that they have no chance
to find employment. Similarly, we have a duty to support medical research only after ensuring
that it is well designed, feasible, and concerned with major health problems rather than with aca-
demic curiosities. Duties are further discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 2.
TELEOLOGY Thus far, we have discussed the deontological group of theories. Let us examine
the second group of normative theories, which is called teleological theories. The term teleology
is derived from the Greek word for “end,” or “goal.” A teleologist will consider the consequences
of telling the truth versus the consequences of lying and may find that lying is morally justified
in a specific circumstance. This position, which is also called consequentialism, is based on the
notion that what matters for morality is the result, or consequence, of an action. Telling a “little
white lie” that will do more good than telling the truth counts, for teleologists, as a good action.
For example, a teleologist would say that lying to a known killer about the hiding place of his
potential victim is morally good. So the difference between deontologists and teleologists is that
the former are concerned with the principle behind an action, while the latter are concerned with
the results of an action.
Utilitarianism
UTILITY AND CONSEQUENCES The first utilitarians were the British philosophers Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who lived in the nineteenth century. They argued that the aim of
4 Chapter 1 • Introduction to Moral Philosophy and Moral Reasoning
morality is attaining the greatest amount of utility for human beings and identified utility (or use-
fulness) with happiness. Their theory, which became popular during much of the twentieth cen-
tury in Britain and North America, is a consequentialist theory. Consequentialist (teleological)
theories are based on the results of actions rather than on the nature of actions. For instance, if
telling a lie can lead to saving an innocent life in a particular situation, it is morally good to tell a
lie in that situation. That is, an action is morally right if it leads to desirable results and is wrong
if it leads to undesirable results. Utilitarianism defines the “good consequence,” or “desirable
result,” as the maximal happiness in the world (i.e., happiness for most people). According to
utilitarianism, suffering is the ultimate evil and happiness the ultimate good, and the role of
morality is to guide us to eliminate suffering and maximize happiness.
HAPPINESS Utilitarianism does not recommend that every person pursue only what promotes
his or her happiness. Instead, it recommends that all persons act in a way that leads to the least
misery and the most happiness (including personal happiness) in the world. The utility principle
recommends that we seek the “general” or “total” happiness in society rather than our own per-
sonal happiness. However, utilitarians do not ask us to ignore our own happiness but rather to view
it as a part of total happiness. In that respect, utilitarianism adopts the principle of beneficence,
which is discussed in Chapter 2. The beneficence principle requires one to do what is good for
others without expecting a reward for doing so. Box 1-1 gives an example of utilitarianism.
BOX 1-1
Example
To understand utilitarianism, consider this example. A healthy man knows that his neighbor’s daugh-
ter needs a kidney transplant to survive after a disease has destroyed both her kidneys. He volunteers
to have his tissues tested for compatibility with the girl’s tissues, and the result turns out to be posi-
tive. If he donates his kidney to save the girl’s life, he exposes himself to a major surgical operation.
He also knows that if he lives with only one kidney, there is a small chance of having a disease in that
kidney in the future that may be severe enough to kill him. Donating his kidney would cost him at
least some peace of mind. Should he accept this price (i.e., some anxiety about future health) and
give the girl one of his kidneys? Utilitarians would encourage him to do so as long as he is unlikely to
be significantly harmed. By saving her life, he makes her and her family and friends happy. He also
makes people who advocate benevolent actions happy by giving a good example of benevolent
behavior that may inspire others. The outcome of his action, then, would be more happiness in the
world, and this agrees with the utility principle.
But utilitarians would not encourage a person who is likely to be harmed by a surgical opera-
tion to donate his kidney. As soon as the girl and her family realize that the benevolent man has
exposed himself to a great danger, they would feel sorry rather than happy and thankful. At the same
time, the man’s own family and friends would be unhappy if he is harmed. In the end, his action
would not add to the total happiness in the world and is therefore unethical on utilitarian grounds.
So utilitarianism does not expect from any individual sacrifices that would not maximize happiness
and minimize suffering for the greatest number of people.
Chapter 1 • Introduction to Moral Philosophy and Moral Reasoning 5
When utilitarians discuss happiness, they do not mean any form of happiness. Happiness can
be shallow, short lasting, significant, long lasting, hedonic (in the form of pleasurable feeling), or
intellectual (e.g., enjoying an artwork). Short-term happiness is not the aim of utilitarianism. No
utilitarian, for example, would encourage a student fond of sports to abandon school to satisfy the
passion for sports or an art lover with limited resources to spend most of her income collecting
paintings. It is also important to recognize that utilitarianism does not construe happiness merely as
pleasure. Satisfaction in general, whether it derives from meeting one’s basic needs, reading inter-
esting novels, or helping the poor, would count as happiness for utilitarians. Another important
point is that utilitarians regard reducing suffering (or decreasing unhappiness) equivalent to
increasing happiness in the world. A dental hygienist who donates time to a public aid clinic think-
ing that the consequences will bring happiness to others is guided by the utility principle. If the den-
tal hygienist who donates time to the public aid clinic instead of working for a salary is not able to
provide for his or her children, then he or she is not following the utilitarian principle.
Kantian Ethics
MORALLY RIGHT ACT OR A DUTY According to Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century
German philosopher, certain acts are morally right because they are intrinsically right regardless
of their consequences or results. Consequences, he asserts, should not matter when the moral
value of an action is assessed. Kant even argues that consequences are relevant to practical mat-
ters, not to ethics. In the practical realm, one has to ask will this action can lead to good results and
act accordingly. For example, a student may decide to study engineering because engineers have
good careers. Such a decision is based on consequential (teleological) considerations: studying
engineering qualifies one to enter a stable and rewarding career. When that student decided to be
an engineer to enjoy the benefits that result from this decision, he or she was making a consequen-
tialist but purely practical decision. But the situation is different in the moral realm.
In the moral field, there are acts that must be done whether or not they lead to desirable or
undesirable results. Therefore, these acts are moral duties, Kant asserts. These acts lose moral
worth when they are done to attain an aim. For example, if you do not tell lies because you want
to impress people and get their support or votes, you are either acting practically (from practical
motives) or immorally (by trying to exploit ethical principles for material gain). However, if you
do not tell lies because you believe that lying is morally wrong, you are acting morally. In other
words, you are performing a moral duty. Because Kant’s ethics is concerned with duties and
reduces moral principles to duties, it was called deontological (from the Greek deon, meaning
“obligation”).
MORAL PRINCIPLES Kant opposed deriving moral principles from accidental events and con-
tingencies because that could lead to formulating contradictory principles. Suppose that a free-
dom fighter in Poland during World War II gave the Nazi officers who were interrogating him
false information about the identities of his partners. By doing that, he saved their lives and
served a good cause. But can we derive from that circumstance a principle that justifies telling
lies when it is convenient to do so? Kant’s answer is an unequivocal no. For him, ethical princi-
ples cannot be subjected to negotiation, nor should they be modified to adapt to new situations
when it appears useful to modify them. It is wrong, he believes, to modify one’s commitment to
truth telling in light of the present circumstances. Moral principles, Kant insists, should be based
on solid foundations then followed with total disregard for the context. If we believe that truth
telling is good, we must always tell the truth even if that leads to great harm in a particular con-
text. Thus, the Polish freedom fighter did not act according to sound moral principles when he
lied to the Nazis, in Kant’s opinion.
Kant acknowledged that it is sometimes harmful to follow moral principles faithfully. He
knew very well that, at least in exceptional cases, we might do better by violating moral princi-
ples. But he argued that repeated violations could send a harmful message to people. Violations
(or variations) may suggest that one is encouraged to violate moral principles when it seems use-
ful to do so. Kant believed interpreting moral principles in a relative way permits us to lie today
and then tell the truth tomorrow and opens the door for moral confusion and chaos.
Consequently, moral principles should be absolute (unmodifiable). So the main issue in Kantian
ethics is that there are categorical (absolute) imperatives (duties) that are inescapable. They can
be inferred by reason and should be generalized.
MORAL DUTY Kant’s contention that duties are categorical is disputable. However, his view
that we must treat all people as ends in themselves, not as means, is widely respected. How does
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Beethoven entitled the next movement ‘a devout song of praise,
offered by a convalescent to God, in the Lydian mode.’ It probably
owes its origin to the fact that Beethoven was taken seriously ill while
at work on this and the B-flat major quartet. It seems likely that
before this illness he had other plans for the quartet, and that the
Danza tedesca before mentioned was to find a place in it.
The short march which follows calls for no comment. The final
allegro is introduced by recitative passages for the first violin, gaining
in passion, culminating in a dramatic run over the diminished
seventh chord which bears some resemblance to the opening of the
allegro of the first movement. There is a passing sigh before the last
movement begins, Allegro appassionato.
The theme itself is in the form of a dialogue between first and second
violins. It merges into the first variation without perceptible break in
the music. Here the theme is carried by the second violin, the first
filling the pauses with a descending figure. This clause of the theme
is then repeated by the viola, the 'cello taking the rôle of the first
violin. The second clause of the theme is similarly treated.
The remaining six variations are clearly set apart from each other by
changes in the time signature. There is a variation marked piu
mosso, really alla breve, which is a dialogue between first violin and
'cello, accompanied at first monotonously by the other two
instruments, later with more variety and animation. The next is an
andante moderato e lusinghiero, in which the theme is arranged as a
canon at the second, first between the two lower instruments, later
between the two higher. This leads to an adagio in 6/8 time, in which
the theme is broken up into passage work. The next and fifth
variation (allegretto, 2/4) is the most hidden of all. The notes of the
theme are separated and scattered here and there among the four
parts. But the sixth, an adagio in 9/4 time, is simpler. The seventh,
and last, is a sort of epilogue, a series of different statements of the
theme, at first hidden in triplet runs; then emerging after a long trill, in
its simplest form, in the key of C major; then in A major with an
elaborated accompaniment; in F major, simple again; and finally
brilliantly in A major.
The following Presto in E major, alla breve, is very long, but is none
the less symmetrical and regular in structure. It is in effect a scherzo
and trio. The scherzo is in the conventional two sections, both of
which are built upon the same subject. The second section is broken
by four measures (molto poco adagio!); and there is a false start of
the theme, following these, in G-sharp minor, suddenly broken by a
hold. This recalls the effect of the very opening of the movement, a
single measure, forte, by the 'cello, as if the instrument were starting
off boldly with the principal subject. But a full measure of silence
follows, giving the impression that the 'cello had been too precipitate.
The Trio section offers at first no change of key; but a new theme is
brought forward. Later the key changes to A major, and the rhythm is
broadened. A series of isolated pizzicato notes in the various
instruments prepares the return of the Scherzo (without repeats).
The Trio follows again; and there is a coda, growing more rapid, after
the Scherzo has been repeated for the second time.
After the C-sharp minor quartet, the last quartet—in F major, opus
135—appears outwardly simple. It shares with the first of the series
simplicity and regularity of form; and is, like the quartet in E-flat
major, calm and outspoken, rather than disturbed, gloomy, or
mysterious. It is the shortest of all the last quartets.
The first movement is in perfect sonata form. The first theme (viola)
has a gently questioning sound, which one may imagine mocked by
the first violin. The second theme, in C major, is light, almost in the
manner of Haydn. The movement builds itself logically out of the
opposition of these two motives, the one a little touched with
sadness and doubt, the other confidently gay. The Scherzo which
follows needs no analysis. Two themes, not very different in
character, are at the basis. The second is presented successively in
F, G, and A, climbing thus ever higher. The climax at which it arrives
is noteworthy. The first violin is almost acrobatic in the expression of
wild humor, over an accompaniment which for fifty measures
consists of the unvaried repetition of a single figure by the other
three instruments in unison. Following this fantastical scherzo there
is a short slow movement in D-flat major full of profound but not
tragic sentiment. The short theme, flowing and restrained, undergoes
four variations; the second in C-sharp minor, rather agitated in
character; the third in the tonic key, giving the melody to the 'cello;
and the fourth disguising the theme in short phrases (first violin). To
the last movement Beethoven gave the title, Der schwer gefasste
Entschluss. Two motives which occur in it are considered, the one as
a question: Muss es sein? the other as the answer: Es muss sein.
The former is heard only in the introduction, and in the measures
before the third section of the movement. The latter is the chief
theme. Whether or not these phrases are related to external
circumstances in Beethoven’s life, the proper interpretation of them
is essentially psychological. The question represents doubt and
distrust of self. The answer to such misgivings is one of deeds, not
words, of strong-willed determination and vigorous action. Of such
the final movement of the last quartet is expressive. Such seems the
decision which Beethoven put into terms of music.
FOOTNOTES:
[70] The famous Schuppanzigh quartet met every Friday morning at the house of
Prince Lichnowsky. Ignaz Schuppanzigh (b. 1776) was leader. Lichnowsky himself
frequently played the second violin. Franz Weiss (b. 1788), the youngest member,
hardly more than a boy, played the viola. Later he became the most famous of the
viola players in Vienna. The 'cellist was Nikolaus Kraft (born 1778).
[71] Förster (1748-1823) forms an important link between Haydn and Beethoven.
[74] Only Schuppanzigh himself, and Weiss, the violist, remained of the original
four who first played Beethoven’s quartets opus 18 at the palace of Prince
Lichnowsky. The second violinist was now Karl Holz, and the 'cellist Joseph Linke.
CHAPTER XVII
THE STRING ENSEMBLE SINCE
BEETHOVEN
The general trend of development: Spohr, Cherubini, Schubert—
Mendelssohn, Schumann and Brahms, etc.—New developments:
César Franck, d’Indy, Chausson—The characteristics of the
Russian schools: Tschaikowsky, Borodine, Glazounoff and others
—Other national types: Grieg, Smetana, Dvořák—The three great
quartets since Schubert and what they represent; modern
quartets and the new quartet style: Debussy, Ravel, Schönberg—
Conclusion.
I
There is little history of the string quartet to record after the death of
Beethoven in 1827. It has undergone little or no change or
development in technique until nearly the present day. The last
quartets of Beethoven taxed the powers of the combined four
instruments to the uttermost. Such changes of form as are to be
noted in recent quartets are the adaptation of new ideas already and
first put to test in music for pianoforte, orchestra, or stage. The
growth of so-called modern systems of harmony affect the string
quartet, but did not originate in it. A tendency towards richer or fuller
scoring, towards continued use of pizzicato or other special effects,
and a few touches of new virtuosity here and there, reflect the
general interest of the century in the orchestra and its possibilities of
tone-coloring. But it is in the main true that after a study of the last
quartets of Beethoven few subsequent quartets present new
difficulties; and that, excepting only a few, the many with which we
shall have to do are the expressions of the genius of various
musicians, most of whom were more successful in other forms, or
whose qualities have been made elsewhere and otherwise more
familiar.
Less perhaps than any other form will the string quartet endure by
the sole virtue of being well written for the instruments. Take, for
example, the thirty-four quartets of Ludwig Spohr. Spohr was during
the first half of the nineteenth century the most respected musician in
Germany. He was renowned as a leader, and composer quite as
much as he was world-famous as a virtuoso. He was especially
skillful as a leader in quartet playing. He was among the first to bring
out the Beethoven quartets, opus 18, in Germany. He was under a
special engagement for three years to the rich amateur Tost in
Vienna to furnish chamber compositions. No composer ever
understood better the peculiar qualities of the string instruments;
none was ever more ambitious and at the same time more serious.
Yet excluding the violin concertos and an occasional performance of
his opera Jessonda, his music is already lost in the past. Together
with operas, masses, and symphonies, the quartets, quintets, and
quartet concertos, are rapidly being forgotten. The reason is that
Spohr was more conscientious than inspired. He stood in fear of the
commonplace. His melodies and harmonies are deliberately
chromatic, not spontaneous. Yet shy as he was of
commonplaceness in melody and harmony, he was insensitive to a
more serious commonplaceness.
But the point is that Spohr’s quartets have not lived. In neatness of
form and in treatment of the instruments they do not fall below the
greatest. They are in these respects superior to those of Schumann
for example. The weakness of them is the weakness of the man’s
whole gift for composition; and they represent no change in the art of
writing string quartets.
Ludwig Spohr.
Another man whose quartets are theoretically as good as any is
Cherubini. Of the six, that in E-flat major, written in 1814, is still
occasionally heard.
On the other hand, Schubert, a man with less skill than either Spohr
or Cherubini, has written quartets which seem likely to prove
immortal. Fifteen are published in the complete Breitkopf and Härtel
edition of Schubert’s works. Of these the first eleven may be
considered preparatory to the last four. They show, however, what is
frequently ignored in considering the life and art of Schubert—an
unremitting effort on the part of the young composer to master the
principles of musical form.
II
We may say that Schubert applied himself to the composition of
string quartets with a special devotion and ultimately with great
success; that certain qualities of his genius were suited to an
expression in this form. Mendelssohn applied himself to all branches
of music with equal facility and with evidently little preference. Most
of his chamber music for strings alone, however, belongs to the early
half of his successful career. This in the case of Mendelssohn does
not mean, as in the case of almost every other composer, that the
quartets may not be the expression of his fully-matured genius.
Mendelssohn never wrote anything better than the overture to
‘Midsummer Night’s Dream.’ This before he was twenty! But having
put his soul for once into a few quartets he passed on to other works.
There are six in all. The first, opus 12, is in E-flat major. The slow
introduction and the first allegro have all the well-known and now
often ridiculed marks of the ‘Songs Without Words’: short, regular
phrases; weak curves and feminine endings; commonplace
harmonies, monotonous repetitions, uninteresting accompaniment.
The second movement—a canzonetta—is interesting as
Mendelssohn could sometimes be in light pieces; but the andante
oozes honey again, and the final allegro is very long.
The first movement of the next quartet (in F major) likewise suggests
the quintet. The style is smoothly imitative and compact; and the
theme beginning in the fifty-seventh measure casts a shadow before.
The Andante quasi Variazioni is most carefully wrought, and is rich in
sentiment. The Scherzo which follows—in C minor—is syncopated
throughout. The final allegro suggests the last movement of the B-
flat major symphony, the joyous Spring symphony written not long
before.
The last quartet (in A) may rank with the finest of his compositions.
Whether or not in theory the style is pianistic, the effect is rich and
sonorous. The syncopations are sometimes baffling, especially in the
last movement; but on the whole this quartet presents the essence of
Schumann’s genius in most ingratiating and appealing form. The
structure is free, reminding one in some ways of the D minor
symphony. But there is no rambling. The whole work is intense.
There is an economy of mood and of thematic material. One phrase
dominates the first movement; the Assai agitato is a series of terse
variations. There is a sustained Adagio in D major; and then a
vigorous finale in free rondo form, the chief theme of which is
undoubtedly related to the chief theme of the first movement.
The first sextet, in B-flat major, has won more popular favor than
many other works by the same composer. The addition of two
instruments to the regular four brought with it the same sort of
problems which were mentioned in connection with Mozart’s
quintets: i.e., the avoidance of thickness in the scoring. The group of
six instruments is virtually a string orchestra; but the sextets of
Brahms are finely drawn, quite in the manner of a string quartet.
Especially in this first sextet have the various instruments a like
importance and independence.
The first theme of the first movement (cello) is wholly melodious. The
second theme, regularly brought forward in F major, is yet another
melody, and again is announced by the violoncello. A passage of
twenty-eight measures, over a pedal point on C, follows. This closes
the first section. The development is, as might be expected, full of
intricacies. The return of the first theme is brilliantly prepared,
beginning with announcing phrases in the low registers, swelling to a
powerful and complete statement in which the two violins join. The
second movement is a theme and variations in D minor. The theme
is shared alternately by first viola and first violin. The variations are
brilliant and daring, suggesting not a little the pianoforte variations on
a theme of Paganini’s. There is a Scherzo and Trio. The main motive
of the Scherzo serves as an accompaniment figure in the Trio; and
the Trio is noteworthy for being entirely fortissimo. The last
movement is a Rondo.
In these sextets and in the three quartets, written many years later,
we have the classical model faithfully reproduced. The separate
parts are handled with unfailing polyphonic skill; there is the special
refinement of expression which, hard to define, is unmistakable in a
work that is properly a string quartet.
Opus 51, No. 1, is in C minor. The first theme is given out at once by
the first violin; a theme characteristic of Brahms, of long phrases and
a certain swinging power. Within the broadly curving line there are
impatient breaks; and the effect of the whole is one of restlessness
and agitation. This is especially noticeable when, after a contrasting
section, the theme is repeated by viola and cello under an agitated
accompaniment, and leads to sharp accents. There is no little
resemblance between this theme and Brahms’ treatment of it, and
the theme of the first movement of the C minor symphony,
completed not long before. There is throughout this movement the
rhythm, like the sweep of angry waves, which tosses in the first
movement of the symphony; an agitation which the second theme
(B-flat major, first violin) cannot calm, which only momentarily—as
just after the second theme, here, and in the third section of the
movement—is subdued.