ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.

Combined Arms Mobility

MARCH 2016

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operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means.
This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or
operational information. This determination was made on 2 December 2015. Other requests for this document must
be referred to Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort
Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.

This publication supersedes ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, 10 August 2011.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

 FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other
commands as appropriate.

JAMES H. RAYMER ROBERT S. WALSH

Brigadier General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC
Commandant Deputy Commandant for
U.S. Army Engineer School Combat Development and Integration

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online

<https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>.
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It is also available at the U.S. Marine Corps Web site
at Marine Corps Doctrine at <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/
 *ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8

Army Techniques Publication Headquarters

No. 3-90.4 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 8 March 2016

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Marine Corps Combat Development

No. 3-17.8 Command Quantico, VA, 8 March 2016

Combined Arms Mobility

Contents
Page
PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. viii

PART ONE ENABLE MOBILITY

Chapter 1 ASSURED MOBILITY ........................................................................................ 1-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 1-1
Fundamentals ..................................................................................................... 1-8
Integrating Assured Mobility Into the Planning Process ................................... 1-10
Chapter 2 MOBILITY SUPPORT TO MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER ............................. 2-1
Movement and Maneuver Challenges ................................................................ 2-1
Obstacle Framework .......................................................................................... 2-1
Integration of Mobility Considerations ................................................................ 2-5
Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................... 2-10

PART TWO ENABLE MANEUVER

Chapter 3 BREACHING ...................................................................................................... 3-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 3-1

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only due to technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This
protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or
operational information. This determination was made on 2 December 2015. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite
270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.

*This publication supersedes ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, 10 August 2011.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 i

Contents

Tenets ................................................................................................................. 3-4

Planning ............................................................................................................ 3-14
Preparation ........................................................................................................ 3-20
Execution .......................................................................................................... 3-21
Chapter 4 GAP CROSSING IN SUPPORT OF MANEUVER ............................................. 4-1
Types .................................................................................................................. 4-1
Gap-Crossing Fundamentals .............................................................................. 4-5
Control Mechanisms ........................................................................................... 4-8
Control Elements............................................................................................... 4-12
Gap Crossing Planning ..................................................................................... 4-15

PART THREE ENABLE MOVEMENT

Chapter 5 GAP CROSSING IN SUPPORT OF MOVEMENT ............................................. 5-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 5-1
Sustainment, Maintenance, and Replacement ................................................... 5-7
Chapter 6 CLEARING ......................................................................................................... 6-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 6-1
Route Clearance ................................................................................................. 6-4
Area Clearance ................................................................................................. 6-12
Chapter 7 COMBAT ROADS AND TRAILS ....................................................................... 7-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 7-1
Planning .............................................................................................................. 7-1
Construction Procedures .................................................................................... 7-6
Chapter 8 FORWARD AVIATION COMBAT ENGINEERING ............................................ 8-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 8-1
Planning .............................................................................................................. 8-2
Construction, Maintenance, and Repair ............................................................. 8-4
Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART ...................................................................... A-1
Appendix B LANE AND BYPASS MARKING ...................................................................... B-1
Appendix C MINEFIELD REDUCTION TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT ......................... C-1
Appendix D AMPHIBIOUS BREACHING OPERATIONS .................................................. D-23
Appendix E CROSSING MEANS AND ORGANIZATIONS .................................................. E-1
Appendix F CROSSING SITE SELECTION .......................................................................... F-1
Appendix G PLANNING FACTORS FOR GAP CROSSING ................................................ G-1
Appendix H RETROGRADE GAP CROSSING .................................................................... H-1
Appendix I DELIBERATE WET GAP CROSSING ................................................................ I-1
Appendix J GAP-CROSSING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS....... J-1
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1

ii ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Contents

Figures
Figure 1-1. Types and categories of bridging ........................................................................ 1-5
Figure 2-1. Types obstacles .................................................................................................. 2-2
Figure 3-1. Breach area ......................................................................................................... 3-3
Figure 3-2. Allocating breaching assets against lane requirements using reverse
planning ............................................................................................................. 3-10
Figure 3-3. Graphics to support passage of follow-on forces.............................................. 3-18
Figure 4-1. Communication linkages ..................................................................................... 4-8
Figure 4-2. Graphic control measures ................................................................................... 4-9
Figure 4-3. Example of a BCT/RCT crossing timeline for a COA ....................................... 4-19
Figure 4-4. Example of a BCT/RCT crossing synchronization matrix ................................. 4-21
Figure 5-1. LCAC ................................................................................................................... 5-5
Figure 5-2. Landing craft, Mechanized 8, Modification 2 ...................................................... 5-6
Figure 5-3. LCU 1600 ............................................................................................................ 5-6
Figure 5-4. LCU 2000 ............................................................................................................ 5-6
Figure 5-5. AAV ..................................................................................................................... 5-7
Figure 6-1. Example organization for a route clearance mission .......................................... 6-9
Figure 6-2. Contiguous clearance method .......................................................................... 6-11
Figure 6-3. Combat clearance method ................................................................................ 6-11
Figure 6-4. Clearance site layout......................................................................................... 6-14
Figure 7-1. Expedient surface over mud (airfield matting) .................................................... 7-9
Figure 7-2. Expedient surface over sand (sand grid) .......................................................... 7-10
Figure 7-3. Combat roads and trails surface repair ............................................................. 7-11
Figure 7-4. Crater repair methods ....................................................................................... 7-11
Figure B-1. Initial lane-marking pattern .................................................................................B-5
Figure B-2. Intermediate lane-marking pattern......................................................................B-6
Figure B-3. Full lane-marking pattern ....................................................................................B-8
Figure B-4. Formation changes based on lane markers .....................................................B-10
Figure B-5. Multiple lanes used at different levels...............................................................B-11
Figure B-6. Assault force passes through tactical obstacles ...............................................B-12
Figure B-7. BCT assumes control of lanes in tactical obstacles .........................................B-13
Figure B-8. Follow-on forces begin to pass through the breach area .................................B-14
Figure B-9. BCT assumes full control of the breach............................................................B-15
Figure B-10. Nonstandard marking devices ........................................................................B-17
Figure B-11. Marking a complex obstacle ...........................................................................B-18
Figure B-12. Marking a complex obstacle system...............................................................B-18
Figure C-1. AN/PSS-12 mine detector ................................................................................. C-3
Figure C-2. AN/PSS-14 mine detector ................................................................................. C-4
Figure C-3. VMR2 mine detector .......................................................................................... C-4
Figure C-4. MICLIC .............................................................................................................. C-6

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 iii

Contents

Figure C-5. Surface danger zone for firing the MICLIC ........................................................ C-6
Figure C-6. Area F and fragmentation zone for firing the MICLIC ........................................ C-7
Figure C-7. AAV with MK-154 linear mine clearing system .................................................. C-7
Figure C-8. Armored vehicle-launched MICLIC .................................................................... C-8
Figure C-9. MICLIC employment in a minefield .................................................................... C-9
Figure C-10. MICLIC employment ........................................................................................ C-9
Figure C-11. MICLIC skip zones ......................................................................................... C-10
Figure C-12. Antipersonnel obstacle breaching system ..................................................... C-11
Figure C-13. Bangalore torpedo ......................................................................................... C-11
Figure C-14. Skim technique .............................................................................................. C-12
Figure C-15. ABV ................................................................................................................ C-13
Figure C-16. Combat dozer blade ....................................................................................... C-14
Figure C-17. Surface mine plow ......................................................................................... C-14
Figure C-18. Rapid ordnance removal system ................................................................... C-14
Figure C-19. Mine clearing blade ........................................................................................ C-15
Figure C-20. Mine clearing blade width compared to tracked-vehicle widths ..................... C-16
Figure C-21. Mine clearing roller ......................................................................................... C-17
Figure C-22. Mine clearing roller width compared to a tracked vehicle width .................... C-18
Figure C-23. Engineer squad vehicle.................................................................................. C-20
Figure C-24. M9 ACE .......................................................................................................... C-21
Figure C-25. Tripod ............................................................................................................. C-22
Figure D-1. Amphibious breach .......................................................................................... D-25
Figure D-2. LF task organization for maneuver beyond the line of demarcation ................ D-30
Figure E-1. LAV ..................................................................................................................... E-5
Figure E-2. Ribbon raft .......................................................................................................... E-6
Figure E-3. AVLB ................................................................................................................ E-10
Figure E-4. Joint assault bridge .......................................................................................... E-11
Figure E-5. Wolverine ......................................................................................................... E-11
Figure E-6. REBs ................................................................................................................ E-12
Figure E-7. MGB ................................................................................................................. E-13
Figure E-8. M18 DSB .......................................................................................................... E-16
Figure E-9. IRB ................................................................................................................... E-17
Figure E-10. Ribbon bridge design ..................................................................................... E-17
Figure E-11. Logistics support bridge ................................................................................. E-19
Figure E-12. ACROW 700XS .............................................................................................. E-20
Figure E-13. M2 Bailey bridge ............................................................................................ E-21
Figure E-14. Determining load classes for ice .................................................................... E-23
Figure E-15. Required ice thickness for wheeled vehicles ................................................. E-23
Figure E-16. Required ice thickness for tracked vehicles ................................................... E-24
Figure F-1. Salients and reentrants on the enemy shore ..................................................... F-3
Figure F-2. Measuring current velocity ................................................................................. F-7

iv ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Contents

Figure F-3. Terrain slope ....................................................................................................... F-8

Figure F-4. Gap width ............................................................................................................ F-9
Figure F-5. Amphibious drift .................................................................................................. F-9
Figure F-6. Downstream sideslip ......................................................................................... F-10
Figure F-7. Constant aim point ............................................................................................ F-10
Figure F-8. Constant heading .............................................................................................. F-11
Figure G-1. ERP layout ........................................................................................................ G-2
Figure H-1. Retrograde planning .......................................................................................... H-3
Figure I-1. Overview of a deliberate gap crossing .................................................................. I-2
Figure I-2. Advance to the gap ............................................................................................... I-3
Figure I-3. Assault across the gap .......................................................................................... I-5
Figure I-4. Advance from the far side ..................................................................................... I-6
Figure I-5. Secure the bridgehead line ................................................................................... I-8

Tables
Introductory table-1. Modified Army/Marine Corps definitions ..................................................xi
Introductory table-2. Rescinded Army/Marine Corps definitions ...............................................xi
Table 2-1. Mobility planning considerations during the planning process ............................. 2-5
Table 3-1. Breaching tenets .................................................................................................. 3-5
Table 3-2. Support, breach, and assault forces responsibilities............................................ 3-9
Table 3-3. Sample execution matrix .................................................................................... 3-13
Table 3-4. Breach planning considerations within the planning process ............................ 3-14
Table 3-5. Breach planning considerations during COA development ............................... 3-17
Table 4-1. CP tasks ............................................................................................................. 4-12
Table 5-1. U.S. and select allied LOC bridging ..................................................................... 5-2
Table 6-1. Selected units involved in clearing activities ........................................................ 6-2
Table 6-2. Selected planning considerations for route clearance ......................................... 6-5
Table 6-3. Duties of route-clearing team elements ............................................................... 6-8
Table 6-4. Rate of march during right-of-way or sanitation sweep...................................... 6-10
Table 7-1. Terrain considerations for site selection............................................................... 7-3
Table A-1. Metric conversion chart ........................................................................................A-1
Table B-1. Lane-marking levels, unit responsibilities, and trigger events .............................B-9
Table B-2. Guidelines for lane-marking devices..................................................................B-16
Table E-1. Selected nonvehicle crossing equipment characteristics ....................................E-2
Table E-2. Fording and swimming capabilities of selected combat vehicles ........................E-3
Table E-3. Typical external loads for helicopters ..................................................................E-5
Table E-4. Launch restrictions ...............................................................................................E-6
Table E-5. Allocation of ribbon bridge ...................................................................................E-7
Table E-6. Ribbon raft design, standard ribbon bridge .........................................................E-7
Table E-7. Ribbon raft design, IRB ........................................................................................E-8

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 v

Contents

Table E-8. Raft crossing capabilities ..................................................................................... E-9

Table E-9. Characteristics of the AVLB .............................................................................. E-10
Table E-10. Characteristics of the joint assault bridge ....................................................... E-11
Table E-11. Characteristics of the Wolverine ..................................................................... E-12
Table E-12. Characteristics of the REBs ............................................................................ E-13
Table E-13. Work party and construction time for the MGB on good sites ......................... E-14
Table E-14. Single-story bridge length and classification for the MGB .............................. E-14
Table E-15. Classification for the MGB double story .......................................................... E-15
Table E-16. Characteristics of the M18 DSB ...................................................................... E-16
Table E-17. Boat requirements for ribbon bridge anchorage.............................................. E-18
Table E-18. Characteristics of the logistics support bridge................................................. E-20
Table E-19. Characteristics of the ACROW 700XS ............................................................ E-21
Table E-20. Load classes for the M2 Bailey bridge ............................................................ E-22
Table E-21. Ice depth requirements.................................................................................... E-24
Table E-22. Ice color factors ............................................................................................... E-24
Table E-23. Ice strength factors .......................................................................................... E-25
Table E-24. Ice thickness versus vehicle distance determination ...................................... E-25
Table F-1. Relationship of slopes to degrees ....................................................................... F-8

vi ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Preface
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 provides doctrine on combined arms mobility missions, tasks, and activities that are
for the brigade combat team (BCT)/regimental combat team (RCT) and below. This publication provides
commanders and staffs with the doctrine needed to conduct the combined arms missions that overcome obstacles
and enable maneuver (breaching and gap crossing) and those that primarily enable movement (clearing,
constructing and maintaining combat roads and trails, constructing forward airfields and landing zones, and
conduct traffic management and enforcement).
The principal audience for ATP 3-90.4 is engineer commanders and trainers at higher echelons. This manual
forms the foundation for the engineer curriculum contained in the engineer portions of the Army Education
System. The information contained in this manual will assist multinational forces and other Services and branches
of the Army in planning and integrating engineer capabilities. This manual will also assist Army branch schools
in teaching the integration of engineer capabilities into Army and joint operations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States (U.S.), international and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that Soldiers/Marines operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart for the measurements used in this publication. For a complete
listing of preferred metric units for general use, see Fed-Std-376B.
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 uses joint acronyms and terms where applicable. The word Army or Marine Corps
(inside parenthesis) will precede the definition for clarification in cases where the Service definition elaborates
or differs from the joint definition. Terms for which ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 is the proponent publication (the
authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for
which ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions
shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 applies to the Active Army, the total force Marine Corps, Army National Guard/Army
National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 is the U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES). The preparing agency
is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate;
Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division; Doctrine Branch. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander,
MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929; e-mail the
DA Form 2028 to <[email protected]>.
Marine Corps readers of this publication are encouraged to send comments and recommendations by e-mail to
<[email protected]> or directly to Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration,
ATTN: C116, 3300 Russell Road, Suite 204, Quantico, VA 22134-5021.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 vii

 Introduction
Mobility and countermobility are subordinate tasks within the movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting
function. (See ADRP 3-0 and FM 3-90-1 for additional information.) Mobility and countermobility are
complementary opposites. Mobility is focused on friendly force mobility, and countermobility is focused on
affecting or countering enemy mobility. Both are essential in enabling a force to achieve a position of advantage
in relation to the enemy, and they are equal components of assured mobility. However, their subordinate tasks are
uniquely different and too broad to be consolidated into one publication. This publication is focused on the
framework of assured mobility and mobility supporting the movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting
function.
The current operational environment presents numerous challenges to movement and maneuver. Within the threat
dimension, potential adversaries range from irregular to modern heavy conventional forces. Adversaries will seek
to create advantageous conditions by quickly changing the nature of conflict and employing a combination of
traditional, disruptive, catastrophic, and irregular capabilities for which the United States is least prepared. The
enemy will seek to interdict U.S. forces attempting to enter any crisis area, and it will seek complex terrain and
urban environments as a way of offsetting U.S. advantages. (See ADRP 3-0.) Potential movement and maneuver
challenges range from conventional obstacles and mines employed in-depth, to booby traps or explosive hazards
(EHs) that are employed in improvised and adaptive attacks, and to challenges such as dislocated civilians that
are clogging a route.
As described in FM 3-90-1, mobility is critical to successful operations. Mobility is conducted to overcome the
effects of natural and man-made obstacles and enable movement and maneuver. Mobility and countermobility
applies the fundamentals of assured mobility (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect) as a
framework for proactive planning and execution. Assured mobility and its focused support to the movement and
maneuver/maneuver warfighting function are described in part one of this publication.
Breaching and gap crossing in support of maneuver are focused on close combat, and they are primarily conducted
using combat engineer units that have or are augmented with the necessary capabilities to support combined arms
activities. These missions may be conducted under fire. Mobility in support of maneuver is described in part two
of this publication.
A line of communications (LOC) gap crossing, clearing (route and area), the construction of combat roads and
trails, forward aviation combat engineering (FACE), and conducting traffic management and enforcement
primarily support movement and require combat engineering, general engineering, military police, and other
mobility support capabilities. Mobility in support of movement is usually not performed under fire, although the
threat of fire is always a factor. Mobility tasks in support of movement are discussed in part three of this
publication.
Mobility is a combined arms activity. As described in ADRP 3-0, commanders use combined arms to increase
the effects of combat power through complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Combined arms merge
leadership, information, and each of the warfighting functions and their supporting systems. Combined arms are
achieved through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support. Commanders synchronize combined arms
to apply the effects of combat power to the best advantage.
The mobility and countermobility capabilities organic to the BCT/RCT are limited (and in some cases
nonexistent). Augmentation through echelon above brigade engineering and other maneuver support modular
capabilities to accomplish the full range of mobility (and countermobility) tasks will likely be needed to support
mission requirements. As mobility and countermobility requirements are determined during mission analysis,
additional capabilities are added through force tailoring and task organization. Resolving this dilemma hinges on
visualizing the operational environment, applying the fundamentals of assured mobility, anticipating the effects
of the terrain and enemy intentions, and identifying the essential mobility and countermobility tasks and capability
shortfalls early in the planning phase based on the commander’s intent. Ideally, augmentation to support a
deployment by a BCT/RCT will be identified by task analysis early in the force generation cycle. This allows the

viii ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Introduction

BCT/RCT to go through that process with critical subordinate headquarters elements and potentially the modular
units that will be in its task organization.
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 is directly linked to FM 3-90-1, applies across the range of military operations, and is
intricately linked to the tactics described in FM 3-90.5, FM 3-96, and MCWP 3-17. This publication is also
directly linked to the doctrine in JP 3-02, JP 3-15, and JP 3-34, and the publication will assist U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps branch schools in teaching the integration of mobility and countermobility capabilities into the
range of military operations.
Changes that directly affect this publication include the—
 Refinement to the movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting function in FM 3-90-1 and the
associated tactical tasks in ADRP 1-03 and OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO 3500.26A/USCG
COMDTINST 3500.1B.
 Maturation of the term assured mobility.
 Development of a framework for the discussion and integration of traffic management and its
relationship to mobility.
 Restructure of engineer organizations and other mobility support capabilities within each of the three
types of BCTs and marine expeditionary forces.
 Acknowledgement of the broader combined arms context of mobility, to include the mobility-related
tasks associated with military police and other branches.
 Alignment of breaching and gap crossing (hasty, deliberate, and covert) types with in-stride as a type
of hasty breach or crossing and amphibious as a type of deliberate breach or crossing.
This publication provides guidance on integrating the fundamentals of assured mobility into planning and
executing mobility and countermobility. Specific and detailed information on clearing is contained in
ATP 3-90.37 and FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D. The chapters and appendixes in this publication are briefly
described below:
 Chapter 1. This chapter discusses assured mobility and the incorporation of the assured mobility
framework fundamentals into planning and execution to enable freedom of movement and maneuver.
It also introduces a hierarchy for the discussion of traffic management as part of mobility.
 Chapter 2. This chapter highlights the numerous challenges of future operational environments on the
ability of Army and Marine Corps units to move and maneuver in achieving mission objectives and
the roles and responsibilities within the staff for implementing the assured mobility framework.
 Chapter 3. This chapter focuses on the specifics of breaching.
 Chapter 4. This chapter discusses gap crossing in support of maneuver.
 Chapter 5. This chapter discusses LOC gap crossing in support of movement.
 Chapter 6. This chapter provides an overview of the clearing (route and area) that are detailed in ATP
3-90.37, FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D, and ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5.
 Chapter 7. This chapter discusses the construction and maintenance of combat roads and trails.
 Chapter 8. This chapter discusses the specifics of FACE.
 Appendix A. This appendix is a metric conversion chart.
 Appendix B. This appendix provides information on lane and bypass marking.
 Appendix C. This appendix highlights obstacle reduction techniques that are employed by maneuver
forces.
 Appendix D. This appendix provides an overview of information on amphibious breaching.
 Appendix E. This appendix highlights gap-crossing means that are most commonly used by Army and
Marine Corps forces.
 Appendix F. This appendix provides information on factors that are considered in evaluating potential
sites for gap crossing.
 Appendix G. This appendix provides information about specific procedures, conditions, and factors
that are considered when planning a gap crossing.
 Appendix H. This appendix highlights the tactics and techniques used by a division or BCT/RCT in a
retrograde gap crossing that differs from those used in an offensive crossing.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 ix

Introduction

 Appendix I. This appendix describes an example of a deliberate wet-gap crossing from the division
and BCT/RCT perspective.
 Appendix J. This appendix describes special environment situations that further complicate gap-
crossing activities and presents some of the factors that must be considered during planning and
execution.
When this publication uses two terms separated by a slash (/), the first term is the Army term and the second term
is the Marine Corps term. Key differences in Army and Marine Corps terms include—
 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/intelligence preparation of the battlespace (written in this
publication as IPB).
 Movement and maneuver warfighting function/maneuver warfighting function (written in this
publication as movement and maneuver/maneuver).
 Mission command/command and control warfighting function (written in this publication as mission
command/command and control).
 Protection warfighting function/force protection warfighting function (written in this publication as
protection/force protection).
 Sustainment warfighting function/logistics warfighting function (written in this publication as
sustainment/logistics).
 Sustainment/combat service support (written in this publication as sustainment/combat service
support).
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 uses the term planning process to indicate the military decisionmaking process/
Marine Corps planning process and troop leading procedures. Battalion-size and larger units use the military
decisionmaking process/Marine Corps planning process depending on their Service. Company-size and smaller
units follow troop leading procedures.
The following paragraphs, figures, and tables are considered to contain technical and sensitive information that
requires protection from unauthorized disclosure as per Title 22, DOD 5205.02M, and AR 530-1:
 Chapter paragraphs: Paragraphs 3-38, 3-39, 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 4-11, 4-40, 4-41, 4-49, 4-83, 5-13, 5-14,
5-15, 5-20, 5-23, 5-24, 6-11, 6-13, 6-13 (Note), 6-14, 6-19, 6-19 (Note), 6-20, 6-21, 6-28.
 Chapter figures: Figures 3-2 and 6-1.
 Chapter tables: Tables 5-1, 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4.
 Appendix paragraphs: Paragraphs B-4, B-12, B-13, B-19, B-20, B-25, B-26, B-27, B-32, B-33, B-
34, C-3, C-3 (Danger), C-4, C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-18, C-19, C-20, C-25, C-27, C-28, C-29, C-30, C-
33, C-34, C-35, C-36, C-37, C-38, C-39, C-40, C-41, C-42, C-43, C-44, C-45, C-46, C-47, C-48, C-
49, C-50, C-51, C-52, C-53, C-54, C-55, C-57, C-59, C-60, C-63, C-64, C-65, C-66, C-67, D-5, D-9,
E-3, E-7, E-11, E-17, E-20, E-21, E-22, E-23, E-24, E-26, E-28, E-29, E-31, E-45, E-46, F-27, F-29,
and F-39.
 Appendix figures: Figures B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, C-5, C-6, C-9, C-10, C-11, C-14, C-20, C-22, C-
25, D-1, D-2, and E-10.
The development of this publication resulted in several modified Army/Marine Corps terms and definitions (see
introductory table-1) and one rescinded term and definition (see introductory table-2).

x ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Introduction

Introductory table-1. Modified Army/Marine Corps definitions

Term Remarks
breach updated term
breach area updated term
bridgehead updated term
bridgehead force updated term
call forward area updated term
covert crossing updated term
deliberate crossing updated term
far side objective updated term
hasty crossing updated term
lane updated term
nonstandard bridging updated term
overbridging updated term
tactical bridging updated term
waiting area updated term

Introductory table-2. Rescinded Army/Marine Corps definitions

Term Remarks
ford common English usage

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 xi

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 PART ONE

Enable Mobility
Mobility tasks are performed as combined arms missions to mitigate the effects of
natural and man-made obstacles. Mobility tasks enable movement and maneuver
within an operational area. Assured mobility provides the commander (supported by
the staff) with a framework for predicting impediments to mobility and enabling mobility
and countermobility throughout the military operation to achieve mission success.

Chapter 1
Assured Mobility
Freedom to move and maneuver within an operational area is essential to the
application of combat power and achieving results across the range of military
operations. The operational environment will present numerous challenges to
movement and maneuver. These are typically overcome through the integration of
combined arms mobility and countermobility in support of mission requirements.
Assured mobility provides the framework that enables this support to movement and
maneuver.

OVERVIEW
1-1. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and
employ forces to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADRP 3-0). Direct fire
is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. The movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting function
includes the following tasks:
 Deploy.
 Move.
 Maneuver.
 Employ direct fires.
 Conduct mobility and countermobility.
 Employ battlefield obscuration.

1-2. Maneuver is (1) a movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the
enemy, (2) a tactical exercise carried out by sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war,
(3) the operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements, and (4) employment
of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of
advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0). Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects
of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace
the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. FM 3-90-1 and FM 3-90-2 provide doctrine on movement
and maneuver.

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Chapter 1

ASSURED MOBILITY
1-3. Assured mobility is a framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability
of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, to achieve the commander’s intent.
The assured mobility fundamentals (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect) support the
implementation of the assured mobility framework. This construct is one means of enabling a force to achieve
the commander’s intent. Assured mobility emphasizes proactive mobility and countermobility (supporting
protection/force protection) actions and integrates them into accomplishing assured mobility. Although
primarily aligned with the movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting function, assured mobility has
links to each of the warfighting functions, and it is enabled by those functions.
1-4. The term assured mobility does not imply that mobility for a maneuver force is guaranteed or ensured.
Freedom to move and maneuver is not an absolute, given the uncertainty of land warfare that is further
complicated by adverse weather, difficult terrain, an adaptive enemy, and the presence of civilians. However,
the effects of these factors can be reduced through timely and accurate intelligence, well-coordinated and -
executed plans, leveraged advancements in technology, and tailored forces that are flexible enough to adapt
and overcome complex challenges.
1-5. The assured mobility framework is applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to
facilitate the commander’s view of the freedom to move and maneuver. While engineers are the principal
staff integrator for assured mobility, other staff sections play critical roles in ensuring the effective application
of mobility, countermobility, and associated protection/force protection tasks. Examples would include the
regulation of traffic in an area of operations (AO) or the handling of dislocated civilians to enable movement
or maneuver. While primarily used to facilitate protection/force protection, a movement corridor is also a
tool to facilitate movement and maneuver. (See FM 3-81.) The senior engineer staff officer’s role within
assured mobility is to integrate the warfighting functions within the framework of assured mobility.

MOBILITY
1-6. Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place
while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-17). As described in FM 3-90-1, mobility is
the key to successful operations. Its major focus is to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on
the battlefield or an AO. The commander requires the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy
across a wide front. When attacking, the commander wants to concentrate the effects of combat power at
select locations. This may require the unit to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes
do not exist. The surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the
effort expended in constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles that are identified before
starting the offense instead of breaching them, when possible. However, this must be done with caution
because it might give the enemy an advantage. Bypassed obstacles are reported to higher headquarters, and
they are marked as the situation allows.
1-7. Maintaining the momentum of an offensive operation requires the attacking force to quickly pass
through obstacles as it encounters them. This involves a deliberate effort to capture enemy bridges and other
enemy reserved obstacles intact. In some cases, using air assault and airborne forces is an effective technique
to accomplish this goal. Hasty breaching is the preferred method when time and resources are unavailable to
conduct a deliberate breach. The commander plans how and where subordinate forces conduct breaching.
1-8. Rivers and other gaps remain major obstacles despite advances in high-mobility weapon systems and
extensive aviation support. Wet-gap crossings are among the most critical, complex, and vulnerable
combined arms missions. Crossings are conducted as a hasty crossing and a continuation of the attack, when
possible. Operational risk is much higher with hasty crossings, and staff planning must still incorporate the
breaching tenants and fundamentals. The size of the gap and the enemy and friendly situation will dictate the
specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used in conducting the crossing. FM 3-90-1 identifies gap
crossing as one of the tactical enabling tasks. Gap crossing includes the deliberate, hasty, and covert
capabilities. Initial combat crossings may be further developed in support of LOCs.

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 Assured Mobility

1-9. Mobility tasks are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable
freedom of movement and maneuver. Mobility includes the following primary tasks:
 Conduct breaching.
 Conduct clearing (areas and routes).
 Conduct gap crossing.
 Construct and maintain combat roads and trails.
 Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones.
 Conduct traffic management and enforcement.
1-10. Mobility tasks are conducted to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield.
Mobility tasks depend on information collection and intelligence. Breaching and gap crossing in support of
maneuver are primarily conducted using combat engineer units that have or are augmented with the necessary
gap-crossing equipment. Gap-crossing equipment includes the rapidly emplaced bridge system (REBs) that
is organic to the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) and infantry BCT (airborne) and the armored vehicle-
launched bridge (AVLB) that is organic to Marine Corps combat engineer battalions. These tasks may be
conducted under fire during close combat.
1-11. A LOC gap crossing; clearing; and the construction of combat roads and trails, forward airfields, and
landing zones primarily support movement and require combat and general engineering capabilities. Mobility
tasks in support of movement are usually not performed under fire, although the threat of fire is always a
factor.

Breach
1-12. A breach is a synchronized combined arms activity, under the control of the maneuver commander,
conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle. Breaching is a mission undertaken to execute a breach. It
allows maneuver despite the presence of the enemy reinforcing obstacles that are covered by fire. Breaching
involves the employment of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the far side of an obstacle
that is covered by fire. It is one of the most difficult combat tasks that a force can encounter.

Clear
1-13. Clear, in the context of this description, is not directly related to the tactical task of clear. Clearing is
conducted to eliminate enemy obstacle effort or residual obstacles affecting the operational area.
Commanders may order clearing to facilitate mobility within an AO based on an analysis of the mission
variables. They may also order a critical route or area cleared of EHs or other obstacles. The activity could
be conducted as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area, or it may be conducted on a recurring
basis in support of efforts to defeat a sustained threat to a critical route.

Gap Crossing
1-14. A gap is a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that
may be bridged. Gaps will exist in the operational environment and present a significant challenge to
movement and maneuver. A gap crossing is the projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet
or dry gap).
1-15. Historically, gap crossings were described only in the context of crossing rivers. A river crossing is a
special type of gap crossing required before ground combat power can be projected and sustained across a
water obstacle. A centrally planned and controlled offensive mission requires the allocation of specialized
crossing resources and a force dedicated to the security of the bridgehead. While a river crossing is still
considered one of the most challenging of gap crossings, a river is only one type of gap that can obstruct
freedom of movement or maneuver. The fundamentals of crossing any type of gap are essentially the same
as those fundamentals that have been associated with river crossing. The acknowledgment is that river
crossings are simply one focused set of challenges among all of the possible types of gap crossings. Gap
crossing encompasses wet or dry gaps in any type of environment or using organic and augmenting engineer
(and other) elements best suited to accomplish the mission.

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Chapter 1

1-16. Gap crossing normally requires special equipment or materiel that is limited or nonexistent as organic
assets in the BCT/RCT. It is imperative for planners at all echelons to identify the need to conduct gap
crossing early in the planning process to facilitate the task-organizing of gap-crossing capabilities. Depending
on mission requirements and the type of crossings, the BCT/RCT may require augmentation of at least one
additional engineer battalion headquarters with subordinated engineer capabilities and other maneuver and
support assets. The engineer battalion will assist the BCT/RCT in planning and serve as a command and
control element for the subordinate mix of mobility augmentation companies (Marine Corps mobility assault
companies (MACs), multirole bridge companies [MRBCs], and other necessary units or capabilities).
Mission analysis may identify other shortfalls or capabilities required to support the BCT/RCT in a gap
crossing (military police; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN]; aviation).
1-17. Standard bridging and nonstandard bridging are two basic types of bridging assets that are used to
cross a gap. (See figure 1-1.) While the two types could be combined as a hybrid, the bridge is normally
identified by its predominant components. Standard bridging is any bridging constructed using
manufactured bridge systems and components that are designed to be transportable, easily
constructed, and recoverable for reuse. Examples of standard bridging include a vehicle-mounted bridge,
medium girder bridge (MGB), and other panel bridges. Nonstandard bridging is bridging that is purposely
designed for a particular gap and typically built using commercial or locally available materials.
Nonstandard bridging is normally used when time permits; materials and construction resources are readily
available; standard bridging is inadequate, unavailable, or being reserved for other crossings; or the situation
allows for unique construction. These bridges are normally left on-site, even when they are no longer
necessary to support military movement. Additionally, there are nonbridging methods (rafting, ferrying,
rotary-wing airlift, fill materials [culverts, fascines, soil]) that can provide another means of crossing. The
expedient and rapid nature of some nonbridging methods aggressively supports maintaining the tempo of the
tactical force they are supporting. These methods are essentially only limited to imagination, the materials
available, and the commander’s willingness to accept higher levels of risk (tactical and operational).
1-18. The bridging categories are broadly defined by their intended purpose. (See figure 1-1.) These bridging
categories include—
 Tactical bridging.
 Support bridging.
 LOC bridging.

1-19. These bridging categories are subordinate to the bridging types and, therefore, can be standard or
nonstandard. Tactical bridging is bridges employed under the threat of direct or indirect fire for the
immediate mobility support of combat maneuver forces in close combat and are intended to be used
multiple times for short periods. Tactical bridges are often employed under the threat of direct or indirect
fire, and they are intended to be used multiple times for short periods. Support bridging is bridges used to
establish semipermanent or permanent support to planned movements and road networks. Support
bridges are normally used to replace tactical bridging when necessary. High use can be expected by tracked
and wheeled traffic. Replacement of tactical bridging by support bridging should be considered to allow the
tactical bridge asset to be repositioned in support of the maneuver force mobility. Line of communications
bridging is bridges used to establish semipermanent or permanent support to road networks. A LOC
bridge is generally constructed in areas free from the direct influence of enemy action, although this does not
mean that protection against attacks by air and ground forces is not considered. Generally, their emplacement
is not time constrained in a tactical sense.

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 Assured Mobility

1
Constructed from locally available, suitable materials.
2
While most bridging systems are designed for use in a particular category, it may be appropriate to use the REBs, MGB,
IRB, and Bailey as shown:
• REBs/MGB/IRB: Primary—Support; Secondary—Tactical
• Bailey: Primary—LOC; Secondary—Support
3
Wet bridges can only be used over wet gaps. Some dry bridges can be used over wet or dry gaps.
Legend:
AVLB armored vehicle-launched bridge
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
DSB dry support bridge
IRB improved ribbon bridge
JAB joint assault bridge
LOC line of communications
LSB logistics support bridge
MGB medium girder bridge
REBs rapidly emplaced bridge system
SRB standard ribbon bridge

Figure 1-1. Types and categories of bridging

Combat Roads and Trails

1-20. Combat roads and trails facilitate the movement of personnel, equipment, and essential supplies
throughout the AO to achieve the commander’s intent despite terrain restrictions. Combat roads and trails

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 1-5

Chapter 1

enable movement through otherwise untrafficable areas, and they allow forces to bypass obstacles (natural
and man-made), including populated areas and areas with cultural, historical, or religious significance.
Combat roads and trails are a combat engineering mission because they are typically performed in close
support of ground maneuver forces. However, combat roads and trails are built by combat and general
engineers. Combat roads and trails are usually characterized by expedient construction methods intended to
handle low volumes of traffic for a short duration to meet immediate requirements. High-level roadwork
performed by general engineers is described in ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7.

Forward Airfields and Landing Zones

1-21. FACE describes the engineering capabilities that are employed for the hasty construction or repair of
aviation facilities (landing strips, landing zones, forward arming, and refueling points) that support
fixed-, rotary-, and tilt-wing aircraft (manned and unmanned). FACE missions are employed to shorten the
distance between an aviation unit objective area, improve unit sustainment, reduce turnaround times, and
enhance availability and responsiveness of aviation assets. The level and focus of general engineering support
to aviation facilities are significantly more specialized than the combat engineering skills employed in
conducting FACE missions. FACE is defined as a combat engineering task because it is typically performed
within a BCT/RCT AO.

Traffic Management and Control

1-22. While traffic management and control is an important component of mobility, not all tasks associated
with traffic management and control is aligned with the movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting
function. Traffic management and control are conducted to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel
and resources along road networks in the most efficient manner possible. Although focused on supporting
movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Traffic management and
control also contributes to the commander’s protection/force protection efforts. Reconnaissance is an
essential component of effective traffic management and control.
1-23. Traffic management and control is the direction, control, supervision, and execution of the activities
required to enable freedom of movement for persons, vehicles, and resources. Traffic management
holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. The four
primary components of traffic management and control are—
 Movement control (a transportation task under sustainment). (See ATP 4-16 for an in-depth
discussion of movement control.)
 Traffic management and enforcement (performed by military police as part of their military police
disciplines). (See ATP 3-39.10 and ATP 3-39.12.)
 Main supply route (MSR) and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement (performed by
military police as part of security and mobility support discipline). (See ATP 3-39.30.)
 Engineering support focused on traffic engineering (primarily general engineering tasks under
sustainment). (See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7.)
1-24. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements
over LOCs; includes maintaining in-transit visibility of forces and material through the deployment and/or
redeployment process (JP 1-02). The functions of movement control consist of planning, allocating, routing,
coordinating, and in-transit visibility of transportation assets. See ATP 4-16 for an in-depth discussion of
movement control.
1-25. Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement
collectively include active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations,
investigate traffic collisions, and enable safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic
management and enforcement focuses on mitigating traffic disruptions created by threats, dislocated
civilians, and congestion due to breakdowns, weather, and degradation of road surfaces. Traffic control
elements coordinate with movement control teams to update and share information on MSR interdiction,
traffic congestion, or other situation influencing movement in the AO. Military police provide temporary
traffic control through manned traffic control posts (TCPs) and emplace temporary traffic control devices
(signs, roadblocks, traffic cones, warning devices, other traffic control measures). Traffic management and

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 Assured Mobility

enforcement and MSR and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement conducted by military police
may include—
 Supporting movement associated with tactical missions, such as traffic control in support of
breaching and gap crossing (TCPs, defiles, temporary route signing).
 Supporting movement control priorities through execution of published traffic control plans and
enforcing highway regulations.
 Supporting passage of lines (forward or rearward) mobility support through traffic control (to
include management of dislocated civilians, stragglers, and detainees) for stationary and passing
units.
 Enforcing traffic laws and building host nation police capacity to perform traffic control and
enforcement tasks consistent with the rule of law.
1-26. Military police trained as traffic management and collision investigators can conduct traffic surveys
to assess traffic problems on specific existing road structures. Based on these assessments, they can provide
recommendations for implementation of traffic control measures to mitigate acute traffic flow problems. (See
ATP 3-39.10.) Traffic flow problems that require major construction or cover large road networks (such as
those found within large cities) require comprehensive traffic studies and expertise from traffic engineers
supported by transportation, military police, and other technical specialties.
1-27. Engineering support to traffic management and control can range from repair and clear roads to
improving trafficability and facilitating movement, to major construction projects to design and build
highways. In support of traffic studies, engineers also provide technical expertise on the design and
installation of permanent traffic control devices into the road network.

COUNTERMOBILITY
1-28. Countermobility tasks are those combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural
and man-made obstacles to deny an enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. Countermobility includes
the following tasks:
 Site obstacles.
 Construct, emplace, or detonate obstacles.
 Mark, report, and record obstacles.
 Maintain obstacle integration.
1-29. Countermobility tasks help isolate the battlefield and protect the attacking force from enemy
counterattack, even though force mobility in the offense normally has first priority. Obstacles provide
security for friendly forces as the fight progresses into the depth of enemy defenses. Obstacles provide flank
protection/force protection and deny the enemy counterattack routes. Obstacles assist friendly forces in
defeating the enemy and can be vital in reducing the amount of forces required to secure a given area. The
commander ensures that the use of obstacles is integrated with fires and fully synchronized with the concept
of operations to avoid hindering the attacking force mobility. Control of mines and other obstacles and
accurate reporting to all units are vital to prevent fratricide. (See ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 for additional
information on obstacle integration; see FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for additional information on mine
warfare.)
1-30. Countermobility tasks during the offense rely on flexibility and rapid emplacement. Engineer support
must keep pace with advancing maneuver forces and be prepared to emplace obstacles alongside them and
in support of engagement areas (EAs). Obstacles are employed to maximize the effects of restrictive terrain
(such as choke points), since time and resources will not permit developing the full defensive potential of the
terrain. The commander considers likely enemy reactions and plans how to block enemy avenues of approach
or the withdrawal with obstacles. The commander also plans the use of obstacles to fix bypassed enemy
elements and prevent the enemy from withdrawing. The plan may include situational obstacles to use on
identification of the enemy counterattack. Speed and interdiction capabilities are vital characteristics of the
obstacles employed. The commander directs the planning for targets (including the authorized use of
ground-, air-, and artillery-delivered scatterable mines [SCATMINEs]) and their observers on enemy
counterattack routes. Rapid cratering devices and ground-emplaced SCATMINE systems provide other
excellent capabilities.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 1-7

Chapter 1

FUNDAMENTALS
1-31. The framework of assured mobility follows a continuous cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and
assessing decisive, shaping operations and sustainment. The framework of assured mobility also hinges on
the application of fundamentals that enable friendly forces to move and maneuver while denying the enemy
the ability to move and maneuver. Commanders implement assured mobility by applying the fundamentals
within the planning process, integrating process, and continuing activities. The fundamentals of assured
mobility are―
 Prediction.
 Detection.
 Prevention.
 Avoidance.
 Neutralization.
 Protection.

PREDICTION
1-32. Commanders must predict potential obstacles accurately and continuously by analyzing enemy
mobility and countermobility capabilities and assessing the effects of the population (people, traffic patterns,
events), terrain, and weather. This also includes identifying and assessing man-made structures (dams,
industrial chemical plants) for potential catastrophic results from a force of nature, terrorist act, or combat
operations and understanding the potential for human obstacles (and casualties) resulting from such a
catastrophic event. This prediction occurs as part of IPB, which is a continuous activity.

DETECTION
1-33. Commanders use the intelligence staff officer (S-2)/assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) and
operations staff officer (S-3)/assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) to synchronize and integrate
surveillance assets and reconnaissance missions with the commander’s requirements to form an information
collection plan integrated with the operation. The information collection plan links acquisition (detection)
assets to specific requirements needed to support decisionmaking. The information collection plan is
developed during the planning process. Answering the commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs) is the focal point for the information collection plan.

PREVENTION
1-34. The prevention aims at countering the adversary ability to affect the movement and maneuver of
friendly forces. Forces apply this fundamental by executing countermobility tasks that shape enemy
maneuver and by preemptively attacking enemy critical requirements and vulnerabilities (high-value target
analysis) for creating or emplacing obstacles that may affect friendly movement and maneuver. This includes
denying adversaries the ability and opportunity to attack critical transportation infrastructure that supports
mobility (airfields, roads, bridges) and other man-made structures (dams, chemical production or storage
facilities) with the potential for catastrophic effects. Aspects of this function may overlap with
protection/force protection considerations. Mitigating the effects of human obstacles on movement or
maneuver (such as those caused by civilian populations residing in or transiting the AO) is also included as
part of prevention.
1-35. Prevention actions aim to―
 Disrupt enemy mobility and countermobility capabilities and operations.
 Deny critical mobility and countermobility supplies (such as mines) to the enemy.
 Increase awareness of enemy TTP and their effectiveness.
 Increase awareness of population activities and movement patterns.
 Deny the enemy the opportunity to emplace situational obstacles by fixing, disrupting, or
destroying enemy countermobility systems.

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 Assured Mobility

 Deny the enemy from repositioning and interfering with friendly breaching.
 Mitigate the effects of human obstacles.
 Enforce movement control priorities and traffic control plans.

AVOIDANCE
1-36. If prevention fails, commanders move or maneuver forces to avoid impediments to mobility if this is
viable within the scheme of movement and maneuver. Avoidance activities include―
 Increasing shared situational understanding of the operational area and continuously refining the
mobility portion of the common operational picture (COP).
 Ensuring timely and accurate status reporting of bypasses.
 Developing and rehearsing branches and sequels to plans based on the presence of unexpected
obstacles (situational obstacles, human obstacles, catastrophic incidents caused by forces of nature
or acts of terrorism) or the inability to bypass obstacles.
 Adjusting movement and traffic control plans, and rerouting friendly force traffic, as necessary
to avoid human (or other) obstacles.

NEUTRALIZATION
1-37. Commanders plan to neutralize, reduce, clear, or overcome obstacles as soon as possible to allow
unrestricted movement of forces. The breaching tenets and fundamentals apply to the fundamental of
neutralize.
1-38. Engineer Soldiers and Marines may be authorized to conduct limited reduction or clearing of mines
and other EHs as part of route and area clearance. In built-up areas where traffic is already severely congested,
it is important to remove the hazard as soon as possible and get civilian traffic moving again. Explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities may be required to accomplish this.
1-39. Human obstacles (traffic congestion, crowds, dislocated civilians) are mitigated by the employment
of military police, civil affairs, and other assets and capabilities. This could include establishing alternate
routes and creating bypasses (including the employment of tactical bridging) to enhance traffic flow,
persuading the populace to avoid certain areas at certain times, and providing public information to facilitate
a controlled response to a catastrophic event or counter adversary efforts to manipulate the population.

PROTECTION
1-40. Commanders plan and implement survivability and other protection/force protection measures aligned
with the protection/force protection warfighting function that will prevent detection and reduce the adversary
ability to inflict damage or otherwise interfere with friendly forces as they move and maneuver. This may
include countermobility missions to deny the enemy maneuver and provide protection/force protection to
friendly maneuvering forces.
1-41. Protection/force protection activities include―
 Establishing critical friendly zone (CFZs) for forces conducting breaching or gap-crossing
activities.
 Using obscuration to protect maneuvering forces and create surprise through diversion.
 Employing electronic warfare systems, such as counter-radio controlled improvised explosive
device (IED) electronic warfare systems. (See ATP 3-36.)
 Conducting breaching and gap crossing under the cover of darkness.
 Emplacing situational obstacles to isolate breaching and crossing sites against enemy
reinforcement.
 Using unmanned platforms and robotics to minimize personnel exposure to hazards.
 Dispersing forces and using natural terrain for cover and concealment.
 Employing techniques (such as the movement corridor) to facilitate trafficability and movement
through an AO. (See FM 3-81.)

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Chapter 1

 Establishing communications networks along stretches of road to ensure constant communication

along the entire distance.
 Identifying and ensuring protection/force protection of critical sites (such as bridges on a MSR),
which would have a significant effect on mobility. This could include establishing convoy support
centers, patrol bases, or other friendly safe havens at critical locations along MSRs, routes, or other
road networks.

INTEGRATING ASSURED MOBILITY INTO THE PLANNING

PROCESS
1-42. The Army framework for exercising mission command is the operations process (planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing the operation). Commanders use the operations process to drive the
conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational
environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.
1-43. The Marine’s framework for exercising command and control is the Marine Corps planning process.
The Marine Corps planning process is a six-step method that organizes the thought processes of the
commander throughout the planning and execution of military operations. The Marine Corps planning
process focuses on the mission and the threat, and it is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver
warfare. Commanders use the framework of assured mobility as a tool of operational art and design; it drives
the planning process. The six steps consist of—
 Problem framing.
 Course of action (COA) development.
 COA analysis.
 Comparison and decision.
 Orders development.
 Transition.

INFORMATION COLLECTION
1-44. Assured mobility is integrated into information collection planning and running estimates. The staff
collectively determines mobility and countermobility information requirements (IRs) during the IPB. The
senior engineer staff officer is responsible for integrating those requirements within the information
collection plan. This includes ensuring that the S-2/G-2 and S-3/G-3 are provided with the necessary
information on CBRN, engineer, military police, and other specialized reconnaissance capabilities available
and how best to employ them. Military police, civil affairs, and other applicable elements are incorporated
into the information collection plan since they are often in a unique position due to their missions, dispersion
across the AO, and close contact with the local population to obtain relevant information on people and events
and their potential effects on mobility.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD/INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLESPACE
1-45. The prediction fundamental of assured mobility is primarily applied during IPB. The staff collectively
determines how, where, and to what extent the operational environment (with a focus on adversaries and the
terrain) will affect friendly mobility. Engineers focus on assessing enemy countermobility capabilities based
on threat patterns, threat TTP, time and resources (manpower, equipment, and materials) available, and the
effects of terrain based on weather and vehicle and equipment performance characteristics. Intelligence,
military police, and civil affairs staff elements provide assessments on the effects of the population on
mobility. This includes analyzing the population normal traffic patterns and predicting the effects of surges
resulting from cyclical events (festivals, religious and cultural holidays, agriculture cycles, school patterns)
and the effects of combat operations (such as the creation of dislocated civilians). An additional resource is
the sustainment preparation of the operational environment that includes information on geography, supplies
and services, and transportation. This would be provided by the supporting sustainment unit S-2/G-2. The
resulting information forms the mobility portion of the COP when combined with a common map background

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 Assured Mobility

within mission command/command and control systems. The mobility portion of the COP (or real-time
modified combined obstacle overlay [MCOO]) is continuously updated based on changes in the situation
(mission variables) and new information resulting from information collection (such as obstacle information),
requests for information (RFIs), geospatial engineering (geospatial information and data generation), and
staff analysis. An accurate mobility picture facilitates decisionmaking. The obstacle framework serves as an
aid in considering the possible impediments to mobility and organizing the results of this analysis within
running estimates and staff updates or presentations.

TARGETING
1-46. Forces apply the assured mobility fundamental of prevention within the targeting process by
preemptively attacking adversary critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (high-value target
analysis). Consideration must be given to fires, which create obstacles that affect friendly movement and
maneuver. (See ADRP 3-09 and ATP 3-09.12 for additional information on the targeting process and high-
value target analysis.)

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
1-47. Knowledge management is applied to effectively share knowledge on impediments to mobility that
may reside in several different functional areas or staff elements. (For example, knowledge on traffic patterns
may exist in military police and civil affairs elements.) Organizations must break down information
stovepipes and provide multiple users with rapid accessibility and retrieval of relevant information and
intelligence on obstacles. The staff exploits information systems, knowledge networks, and tactical Web
portals to facilitate a near real time collaborative information sharing environment.

RISK MANAGEMENT
1-48. Forces implement the assured mobility fundamentals of protect and avoid through assessing
operational risk to friendly forces as they move or maneuver. Risk management is an integrating process and
the overarching process for integrating protection/force protection into operations, and it occurs during
operations process activities. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling
hazards (risks) that arise from operational factors and balancing that risk with mission benefits. (See
ATP 5-19 for additional information.) Risk management helps to preserve the force and is integrated
primarily through the planning process during planning and through protection/force protection cells or
working groups throughout the rest of the operations process. During mission analysis, the focus is on
performing the first two steps, which are assessment steps. Hazards are identified using mission variables as
a standard format.

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 Chapter 2
Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver
The range of military operations depends on freedom of movement. Freedom of
movement seeks to avoid enemy strengths and focus efforts on enemy weaknesses,
when possible. The ability to move and maneuver in relation to the enemy is primarily
affected by enemy fire, obstacles (natural and man-made), and force mobility. Force
mobility is largely a function of the characteristics of the movement assets that are used
(hauling or lift capacity, vehicle weight, overall dimensions, speed, range, on- and off-
road performance capabilities) and their relative ability to overcome trafficability
issues. The current operational environment presents numerous challenges to
movement and maneuver, ranging from conventional obstacles and mines employed
in-depth, to EHs employed in improvised and adaptive attacks, to the effects of the
local population. Mobility tasks are employed to overcome natural and man-made
obstacles and enable movement and maneuver.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER CHALLENGES

2-1. Adversaries will seek refuge in terrain that challenges movement and maneuver. An adversary will
use complex terrain and urban areas to offset U.S. advantages. Overcoming challenges to maneuver is
primarily accomplished through breaching and tactical gap crossing; although, to a degree, route clearance
and the construction of combat trails and landing zones can enable maneuver. Overcoming challenges to
movement is primarily accomplished through route and area clearance, LOC gap-crossing support, and traffic
management and enforcement.
2-2. The BCT is dependent on the augmentation of echelon above brigade engineering and other maneuver
support capabilities to accomplish mobility (and countermobility) tasks that are likely to be needed to support
mission requirements. Similarly, the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) must draw from engineer
capabilities across the ground, logistics, and aviation combat elements. This requires commanders and staffs
at all echelons to fully understand force mobility requirements (essential mobility tasks) early on during
planning to ensure the necessary allocation and prioritization of mobility assets throughout the operational
area.
2-3. Just as roads, trails, and aviation operating facilities depend on engineering expertise, maneuver and
mobility support and associated traffic control rely on expertise that resides primarily within the military
police community. As with mobility support functions or activities, coordinated and synchronized actions as
part of a combined arms team are essential for effectiveness.

OBSTACLE FRAMEWORK
2-4. An obstacle is an impediment to movement and maneuver. (See figure 2-1, page 2-2, for the categories
of obstacles within the obstacle framework.) Obstacles can exist naturally, be man-made, or be a combination.
In the current operational environment, given persistent conflict, the view of obstacles must be broadened to
realize the effects that people will have on movement and maneuver just by their existence. (See ADRP 3-0
for additional information.)

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-1. Types obstacles

NATURAL OBSTACLES
2-5. Natural obstacles are inherent aspects of the terrain (vegetation, water features, soil composition,
surface configuration) that impede movement or maneuver. Natural obstacles can be existing (river,
mountain) or consequential (resulting from a force of nature [torrential rain, hurricane, earthquake]).
Examples of consequential obstacles include flooded areas resulting from a failed levee, gaps resulting from
a washed out road, and debris. Although the terrain or a certain area may not physically impede mobility, it
can pose an obstacle based on its religious, political, historical, or environmental significance.

Vegetation
2-6. Vegetation includes trees, shrubs, scrubs and grasses, and crops (cultivated areas). Vegetation will
affect vehicle and foot movements. The effects of vegetation will vary based on the tactical mobility of a
force. For example, small diameter trees offer little resistance to large tracked vehicles.

Water Features
2-7. Water features include rivers, streams, and flooded areas or areas that are prone to flooding (such as
wadis). Their effects will vary based on their characteristics (water velocity and depth, gap width) and the
performance capabilities of vehicles and equipment.

Soil Composition
2-8. Soil composition includes soil type, drainage characteristics, and moisture content. Soil composition
has direct and indirect effects on movement and maneuver. It can directly affect trafficability and the ability
to conduct cross-country movements, while indirectly affecting movements by inhibiting road and airfield
construction. Precipitation is an important factor to consider, since certain soils (such as silt) offer excellent
trafficability when dry, but can quickly turn to deep, soft mud when wet. Conversely, loose, dry sand hinders
movement while wet, compacted sand can offer excellent trafficability.

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 Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver

Surface Configuration
2-9. Surface configuration is the physical shape of the terrain and includes slope, dry gaps, and surface
roughness. Slope is the rate of rise or fall of a terrain feature that can affect the speed at which vehicles and
dismounted personnel can move. Surface roughness can include uneven surfaces, jagged rocks, and debris
that can affect aircraft landings, vehicle movements, and foot marches.

MAN-MADE OBSTACLES
2-10. Man-made obstacles can be nonexplosive or explosive. Man-made obstacles (other than structures,
cultural obstacles, or human obstacles) are also referred to as reinforcing obstacles since they are generally
designed and employed to take advantage of the natural restrictiveness of the terrain. Reinforcing obstacles
are categorized as tactical and protective. Tactical obstacles help shape engagements, while protective
obstacles provide close-in protection/force protection. The effectiveness of obstacles is enhanced
considerably when covered by fire. (See ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 for additional information on tactical
and protective obstacle classification.) Man-made obstacles can also be existing battlefield debris, abandoned
minefields, or unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) from towns or remnants of past conflicts. (See
appendix C for additional information on minefield reduction techniques and equipment.)

Nonexplosive
2-11. Nonexplosive obstacles (road craters, abatis) do not contain explosives, although explosives may be
used in creating them.

Structures
2-12. Structures are man-made features (bridges, canals, railroads, embankments) that were not specifically
designed or intended as an obstacle, but have or can have an obstacle effect based on existing characteristics
or the results of combat operations or a catastrophic event. Structures such as bridges and overpasses present
an inherent impediment to mobility based on weight and clearance restrictions. Other structures such as dams
and industrial chemical plants have the potential to create extensive hazards or generate large amounts of
damage when failure occurs due to a force of nature or an act of man.

Cultural
2-13. Cultural obstacles (religious tracts of land, nature or wildlife preserves, historical sites) are man-made
structures or areas that unintentionally pose as obstacles based on their religious, political, historical, or
environmental significance.

Human
2-14. The category of human obstacles captures the effects that the presence of people (friendly, adversarial,
or neutral) can have on mobility. These effects can occur incidentally or intentionally. Examples of incidental
occurrences include congestion along a route created by large crowds of people celebrating or during rush
hour traffic. An intentional occurrence is a deliberate act by an adversary to use the presence of
noncombatants (compounded by restrictive terrain) to generate obstructions and complicate the movement
of friendly forces. This includes instigating riots or demonstrations, creating traffic jams by disrupting road
networks, or using terrorism to generate a large-scale evacuation.

Constructed
2-15. Constructed obstacles (wire obstacles, antivehicle [AV] ditches, similar construction that typically
involves the use of heavy equipment) are created without the direct use of explosives.

Demolition
2-16. Demolition obstacles (bridge or other structure demolition, road craters) are created using explosives.

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Chapter 2

Other
2-17. Other nonexplosive obstacles may be created using explosives but typically are not. One example is
the nonexplosive booby trap. A booby trap is an explosive or nonexplosive device or other material
deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act
is performed. Booby traps are employed to cause unexpected and random casualties to create an attitude of
uncertainty and suspicion, thereby lowering morale and inducing a higher degree of caution. Adversaries will
use booby traps to offset U.S. advantages and to add difficulty when executing mobility tasks. The type and
quantity employed is only limited by the imagination of the creator.

Explosive
2-18. Explosive obstacles include mines, IEDs, and UXO. Besides their immediate explosive effect, they
may leave behind residual effects that become a nonexplosive obstacle.

Mines
2-19. A mine is (1) in land mine warfare, an explosive or other material, normally encased, designed to
destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate
personnel and designed to be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled
means; (2) in naval mine warfare, an explosive device laid in the water with the intention of damaging or
sinking ships or of deterring ships from entering an area (JP 3-15). Mines can be employed in quantities
within a specific area to form a minefield, or they can be used individually to reinforce nonexplosive
obstacles. (See JP 3-15 and MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15 for a discussion of sea mines.) Land mines fall into
the following general categories:
 Conventional mines.
 SCATMINEs.
2-20. The mines and munitions within each of these categories can be further defined as antivehicle
landmine (AVL) or antipersonnel (AP). Land-based mines and munitions are hand emplaced, remote
delivered, air delivered, or ground delivered. Whether buried conventionally in patterns, laid on the surface
in a seemingly random fashion, or intentionally scattered, land mines will likely be present in prolific
numbers on the battlefield. Potential adversaries with conventional military capabilities will employ large
numbers of land mines to offset U.S. maneuver advantages. Conventional employment of mines will typically
be with other obstacles (wire, AV ditches) to create complex obstacles that will normally be covered by fire
and observation. A complex obstacle is a combination of different types of individual obstacles that require
more than one reduction technique (explosive, mechanical, or physical) to create a lane through the obstacle.
(See FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for additional information on land mines and other EHs.)

Improvised Explosive Devices

2-21. An IED is a significant threat to U.S. forces. The IED threat presents several operational dilemmas
due to the varied types, means of employment, and detonation characteristics. IEDs are easily manufactured
due to the availability of explosive and detonation materials. The manner of emplacement can be hasty or
deliberate, phased in compartmentalized actions over several days, or involve several personnel. An IED can
be command-detonated by remotely activated devices or hard-wired by a mechanical detonator. An IED is
usually focused on low-threat convoys, vulnerable vehicles, and large concentrations of civilians or political
leaders. An IED may be used in combination with small arms and indirect fire to increase their tactical effects.
(See ATP 3-90.37 and FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for additional information on IEDs.)

Unexploded Explosive Ordnance

2-22. UXO includes ordnance items that have been fired, projected, dropped, or placed in such a way that
they could become armed and detonate. Whether in an area by design or accident, these items have not yet
fully functioned or detonated and are hazards. UXO poses the risk of injury or death to personnel, but UXO
can also pose a challenge to maneuver along a key route or within an area of military interest.

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 Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver

Other
2-23. Other EHs include the explosive booby trap. Adversaries will use booby traps to offset U.S.
advantages and to add difficulty in performing mobility tasks. To prevent explosive booby traps from being
crafted, remove common explosive remnants of war from areas where they would be found and repurposed.

INTEGRATION OF MOBILITY CONSIDERATIONS

2-24. As described in ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1, the operations process consists of the major command
and control activities performed during operations. The operations process is driven by the commander’s
intent. The cyclic activities of the operations process may be sequential or simultaneous. They are usually
not discrete, and they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Throughout the process, the fundamentals
of assured mobility are continuously applied to integrate mobility considerations. The senior engineer staff
officer performs as the primary staff integrator for mobility and works together with other staff members to
ensure the inclusion and integration of all aspects of mobility.

PLANNING
2-25. Mobility considerations can be addressed by incorporating the fundamentals of assured mobility
within the planning process (and associated troop leading procedures) described in ADRP 5-0 and
MCWP 5-1. Mobility and countermobility requirements and the tasks necessary to fulfill them are
synchronized primarily through integrating processes and continuing activities. (See ADRP 3-0 and
ADRP 5-0.) The planning process provides the framework for integrating the actions of the commanders,
staffs, and others. Table 2-1 provides some of the necessary mobility planning considerations linked to the
steps of the planning process.
Table 2-1. Mobility planning considerations during the planning process
Steps of the Steps of the
Mobility Planning Considerations
MDMP MCPP
• Gather the geospatial information and products (mobility corridors,
combined obstacle overlays) needed to understand the terrain.
• Request geospatial engineers (or Marine Corps geographic intelligence
specialists) to generate the geospatial data needed to fill gaps and
ensure the accuracy of digital map backgrounds on mission command/
command and control systems.
Receipt of the • Gather intelligence products on adversary mobility and countermobility
Mission ways and means.
• Gather information on the local population to determine its effect on
mobility.
• Determine the availability of existing obstacle information.
• Gather information on road characteristics and trafficability.
Problem
Framing • Update running estimates (status of friendly mobility assets).
• Understand the unit mission, commander’s intent, and scheme of
movement and maneuver (two levels up).
• Complete the following as part of the initial IPB—
 Develop the geospatial intelligence and terrain products (mobility
corridor, combined obstacle overlay) to form the mobility portion of
Mission the COP (real-time MCOO).
Analysis  Evaluate the effects of terrain and weather on friendly and enemy
mobility and countermobility capabilities.
 Assess enemy mobility and countermobility capabilities (manpower,
equipment, materials), and determine strengths and weaknesses.
 Template enemy obstacles based on threat patterns, terrain, and
time available.

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Chapter 2

Table 2-1. Mobility planning considerations during the planning process (continued)
Steps of the Steps of the
Mobility Planning Considerations
MDMP MCPP
• Identify specified and implied mobility tasks and recommended essential
mobility tasks, determine obvious shortfalls in the mobility assets, and
initiate requests for augmentation as early as possible during planning.
Mission • Develop information requirements related to mobility (terrain restrictions
Analysis and mobility restraints, obstacle information, enemy countermobility
(continued) capabilities, population considerations) and draft requirements as
possible CCIR.
• Integrate information collection tasks or other necessary specialized
reconnaissance capabilities into the information collection plan.
• Predict impediments to mobility for each COA based on terrain and the
enemy SITEMP, and determine mobility requirements (refine essential
tasks for mobility as necessary).
COA COA
• Determine countermobility requirements based on the scheme of
Development Development
movement and maneuver of each COA.
• Allocate mobility and countermobility assets (troop-to-task analysis)
based on identified requirements.
• War-game the task organization of mobility and countermobility assets.
Consider the attrition of assets resulting from maintenance problems or
combat actions and the efforts needed to repair or redistribute (cross-
COA War level) assets.
COA Analysis
Gaming • War-game changes in the terrain due to natural or human influence.
• War-game (action/reaction) enemy use of mobility or countermobility
assets (such as SCATMINEs) that will impact the friendly scheme of
movement and maneuver.
• Analyze and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages for each COA
in relation to the ability to execute mobility. Consider the—
COA  Ability (time-distance factors) to shift mobility assets between units
Comparison beyond the line of departure.
COA  Ability to reinforce mobility in response to enemy counterattacks
Comparison (use of a reserve).
and Decision
• Gain approval for changes to the essential tasks for mobility.
COA • Gain approval for recommended priorities of effort and support.
Approval • Gain approval for requests for mobility augmentation to be sent to higher
headquarters.
• Ensure that the task organization of mobility and countermobility assets
Orders
is accurate and clear, to include the necessary instructions for effecting
Orders Development
linkup.
Production
• Ensure that the quality and completeness of subunit instructions for
Transition performing mobility and countermobility tasks.
Note. The Army uses the MDMP, and the Marine Corps uses the MCPP. The processes are similar, although the steps
are different. The MDMP is described in ADP 5-0, and the MCPP is described in MCWP 5-1.
Legend:
ADP Army doctrinal publication
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
COA course of action
COP common operational picture
IPB (Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield/
(Marine Corps) intelligence preparation of the battlespace
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCPP Marine Corps planning process
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP military decisionmaking process
SCATMINE scatterable mine
SITEMP situation template

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 Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver

Receipt of Mission/Problem Framing

2-26. During this step, the staff gathers existing geospatial information and geospatial products for the AO
and the area of interest. Products may include standard products (maps, studies, reports) and tailored products
(mobility corridors, combined obstacle overlays). The staff also gathers available intelligence products on
adversary mobility and countermobility capabilities (ways and means), threat patterns, and any available
information or intelligence on existing obstacles. Information on local traffic patterns, cultural and religious
holidays, festivals, and other events should also be gathered to help predict obstructions due to human
presence and interference. The staff updates running estimates based on the current situation. The engineer
running estimate is the primary source of information on the status of friendly mobility and countermobility
assets.

Mission Analysis/Problem Framing

2-27. The staff evaluates the effects of terrain and weather on friendly and enemy mobility and
countermobility capabilities by incorporating the assured mobility fundamental of predict. The engineer staff
coordinates with the S-2/G-2 for geospatial engineering support in analyzing the terrain and generating
geospatial information and the corresponding terrain-visualization products (mobility corridor, combined
obstacle overlay) to help form the mobility portion of the COP. (See ATP 3-34.80 for information on
geospatial engineering.)
2-28. The staff develops an understanding of adversary and enemy mobility and countermobility capabilities
(ways and means) by analyzing enemy engineering units (manpower, equipment, materials); threat patterns;
TTP; and support mechanisms with consideration for terrain effects and the availability of time and resources
to forecast specific adversary and enemy mobility and countermobility actions. During mission analysis and
the initial IPB, the staff attempts to—
 Identify obstacles and ways to mitigate them.
 Identify and assess adversary mobility and countermobility capabilities (strengths and
vulnerabilities) based on system and weapon performance characteristics and the effects of terrain
based on weather.
 Identify emerging threats and TTP.
 Predict adversary mobility and countermobility intentions and actions.
 Determine and prioritize RFIs that are fulfilled through—
 Information collection activities (including CBRN, engineer, and military police
reconnaissance and geospatial intelligence [GEOINT]).
 Terrain analysis through geospatial engineering.
 Requests for information to higher, lower, and adjacent units.
 Reachback.
 Identify enemy mobility and countermobility high-value targets and recommend high-payoff
targets for targeting.
2-29. Any uncertainties associated with the operation become IRs that are fulfilled through information
collection efforts, RFIs, and reachback. An IR that is of high importance to the commander is nominated as
a CCIR. (See ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1.) Some examples of mobility-related IRs include:
 Enemy capability and intentions to employ air-, ground-, and artillery-delivered SCATMINEs.
 Composition, capabilities, and strength of enemy engineering units.
 Enemy direct and indirect fire capabilities that can cover obstacles at a breaching or gap-crossing
site.
 Operational status and location of selected mobility assets (friendly forces IRs).
 Status of the population and whether it is mobile (presence of dislocated civilians) or static.
2-30. As part of mission analysis, the staff analyzes the unit mission, commander’s intent, and scheme of
movement and maneuver two levels up to identify specified and implied mobility and countermobility tasks.
Each staff section and its elements within functional and integrating cells in the command post (CP) may
generate mobility and countermobility requirements (tasks) as a result of analyzing the operational

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Chapter 2

environment and assessing the situation from its individual perspective. From these tasks, combined with the
maneuver commander’s guidance, the staff collectively develops recommended essential tasks for mobility
and countermobility.
2-31. Essential tasks for mobility and countermobility are those tasks that the unit must conduct to meet the
commander’s intent and accomplish the mission. The staff recommends essential tasks for mobility and
countermobility during the mission analysis brief. At the conclusion of the mission analysis brief, the
commander approves those essential tasks for mobility and countermobility considered relevant. The staff
determines obvious shortfalls in mobility and countermobility assets (units and special equipment) based on
the current task organization. The staff initiates requests for augmentation as early in the planning phase as
possible to facilitate early movement, timely arrival, and linkup of augmenting units. The staff makes
assumptions on expected augmentation to facilitate the continuation of planning. (See ADRP 5-0 and
MCWP 5-1 for additional information on using assumptions.)

Course of Action Development

2-32. After essential tasks for mobility and countermobility are approved, the staff integrates them into COA
development. They develop associated methods to complete the essential tasks for mobility and
countermobility by allocating resources and recommending priorities based on the commander’s guidance.
The methods are then synchronized to produce the desired effects.
2-33. During COA development, planners consider the predicted impediments to mobility that were
developed as part of the initial IPB during mission analysis as they array forces and begin creating the scheme
of movement and maneuver for each COA. Planners ensure that the necessary mobility assets required for
executing essential tasks for mobility and countermobility (based on troop-to-task analysis) are included in
the groupings of forces being arrayed. This allows the COAs to be feasible (from a mobility perspective)
while they are being developed.

Course of Action Analysis/War Gaming

2-34. War gaming is critical to refine the COA, to include—
 Validating the composition (forces and equipment) of mobility support units.
 Refining tasks that will be executed by subordinate units in performing mobility and
countermobility tasks.
 Identifying decision points and triggers for critical tasks (employing obscuration, emplacing
situational obstacles).
 Refining and incorporating the CCIRs and IRs into the information collection plan.
 Refining the fires plan in support of mobility and countermobility tasks.
 Refining command and control requirements for maneuver support elements.
2-35. Mobility support planners should identify critical events or aspects of mobility and countermobility.
Mobility support planners should ensure that the staff war-games these events or aspects, at a minimum,
when time for more extensive war gaming is limited. Some examples of critical actions associated with
mobility and countermobility include—
 Shifting mobility (or countermobility) assets to reinforce the main effort.
 Committing the breach force.
 Reacting to enemy SCATMINEs, especially at choke points and where bypasses are unlikely.
 Considering timing and synchronization requirements for employing situational obstacles along
an exposed flank.
 Employing obscuration in support of breaching and gap-crossing activities.
 Passing follow-on forces through lanes created in obstacles.
 Committing traffic control elements to divert dislocated civilians and other human obstacles.
2-36. Once war gaming and COA refinement is complete and a final task organization has been determined,
a mission command/command and control system can be planned to support the operation. Establishing
effective command and control for mobility or countermobility assets, especially low-density specialized

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 Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver

units and equipment, ensures that units remain responsive to the commander’s needs as unexpected situations
arise and ensures that their effects can be massed at the right time and location to achieve the desired results.

Orders Production/Development
2-37. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of
operations, and the staff provides the necessary detailed information that is required by subordinate units for
execution. The detailed information that subordinate units will need that is not within the base order is placed
in an attachment (annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits). Attachments are prepared in a form that best
represents the information (text, matrix, trace, overlay, overprinted map, table). (See ADRP 5-0 and MCWP
5-1 for additional information on orders and attachments to orders.)
2-38. The decision support template, synchronization matrix, or other staff tools used for planning and
developing the order may be included as an attachment to the order. These tools also support the commander
and staff during execution.

Preparation
2-39. Preparation consists of activities performed by the unit before execution to improve their ability to
conduct the operation. Successful mobility depends on preparation as much as planning. Key preparation
activities for mobility include—
 Planning refinement based on IPB updates and answering IRs.
 Redirecting information collection assets to focus on the most important unknowns remaining,
while emphasizing the CCIR.
 Conducting combined arms rehearsals.
 Implementing the task organization, to include coordinating the linkup of mobility assets (units
and equipment) with the supported unit.
 Performing precombat checks and precombat inspections.
2-40. The rehearsal is the most effective synchronization tool available to commanders. Rehearsals help
staffs, units, and individuals to better understand their specific role in upcoming operations, practice
complicated tasks before execution, and ensure that equipment and weapons function properly. The execution
matrix is an excellent tool to drive and focus rehearsal. Commanders must ensure that subordinate units have
enough time to conduct combined arms rehearsals.
2-41. Commanders must ensure that subordinate units have enough time to implement the task organization
and conduct a combined arms rehearsal. Linking up mobility assets (units and equipment) with the supported
unit is an important and challenging activity. The staff (in the headquarters directing task organization)
initiates the coordination effort by ensuring that the necessary linkup instructions are in the operation order
or a fragmentary order. The information needed to conduct linkup includes the date-time group, primary and
alternate linkup points, digital and voice communication procedures, and recognition signals (vehicle
markings and panels). The parent unit of the mobility asset or the controlling headquarters (such as an
engineer battalion) conducts the required additional coordination with the gaining unit as early as possible
and provides further instructions (not contained in standard operating procedures [SOPs]) to the subordinate
unit on the linkup procedures in their unit fragmentary order or operation order. The unit conducting the
linkup should report to its parent unit or controlling headquarters when it departs for linkup and when linkup
with the gaining unit is completed. See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on linkup. The loss of space-
based communications due to enemy activity remains a major concern for U.S. forces conducting deployment
operations. Whether communications interruption is caused by enemy action against satellites or with
intermittent jamming or spoofing, the resulting blackout will require U.S. forces to adapt and adjust until
communications are restored. Short-term losses or disruptions of satellite communications will have to be
mitigated through alternative communications methods and courier networks. A primary, alternate,
contingent, and emergency means of communications should be considered for military operations.
2-42. Executing task organization changes of critical mobility assets during mission execution may be
required. This situation presents even more challenges, especially with regard to terrain management, as unit
positions and fire control measures may have shifted. War gaming these actions during mission planning and

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Chapter 2

rehearsals (and implementing the necessary control measures and coordinating instructions) are critical to
avoid fratricide.

EXECUTION
2-43. Execution involves monitoring the situation, assessing the operation, and adjusting the order, as
needed. Commanders continuously assess operation progress based on information from the COP, running
estimates, and assessments from subordinate commanders. The decision support template, synchronization
matrix, and other staff tools used during the planning process also support the commander and staff during
execution.
2-44. When the situation deviates from the order, commanders direct adjustments to exploit opportunities
and counter threats. The fluidity of conditions affecting mobility, particularly during breaching, often requires
rapid adjustment and the synchronization of forces and the warfighting functions. In these situations,
commanders use the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process to make those adjustments and
rapidly synchronize forces and warfighting functions. (See ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1.) If a subordinate unit
reports the failure of a breach, a change to the current order is required. This is a situation where the rapid
decisionmaking and synchronization process might be appropriate. In this situation, adjustments will likely
require shifting mobility assets to reinforce the breaching unit or to enable another unit to conduct a breach
at an alternate location.

ASSESSMENT
2-45. Commanders monitor the current situation for unexpected success and failure or enemy action that
can prevent the operation from progressing to the desired end state. Staffs continuously assess the impact of
new information during the conduct of operations. Staffs update their running estimates and determine if
adjustments are required. The focus of assessing mobility varies during—
 Planning. Assessment centers on developing situational understanding, establishing measures of
effectiveness and performance, and evaluating COAs for the commander’s decision during
planning.
 Preparation. Assessment is focused on determining the friendly unit readiness to execute
mobility tasks and implementing any refinements to orders based on changes in the threat situation
or civil considerations during preparation.
 Execution. Assessment is aimed at identifying any variances between the current situation
and forecasted outcomes during execution. The lessons that units learn while executing mobility
are conveyed in TTP.
2-46. The mobility portion of the COP (real-time MCOO) and running estimates are the primary tools for
assessing mobility. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendation from the
perspective of each staff section. Running estimates help refine the mobility COP and supplement it with
information not readily displayed. (See ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1 for information on running estimates.)

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-47. Although primarily aligned with the movement and maneuver/maneuver warfighting function,
mobility missions are enabled by (and potentially enable) all of the warfighting functions. Commanders may
cross functionally organize the staff within CPs into functional and integrating boards, cells, centers, and
working groups. Functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function.
The senior engineer staff officer is the principal integrator of mobility (and countermobility) within the staff.
In lower echelon organizations where certain functional cells may not exist, the staff still applies the tasks
associated with that particular warfighting function assigned task focus area.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER/MANEUVER

2-48. The movement and maneuver/maneuver cell coordinates activities and systems that move forces to
achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. This includes tasks associated with employing forces
in combination with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection (movement) related to gaining

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 Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver

a positional advantage over an enemy, and assured mobility (mobility and countermobility). The S-3/G-3
leads this cell. The movement and maneuver cell (supported by and in coordination with other staff members)
performs the following tasks that are directly related to mobility:
 Understand the full range of mobility and countermobility capabilities available to the force, and
integrate and synchronize those capabilities to meet the needs of the commander.
 Implement the fundamentals of assured mobility, formulate ideas, and implement actions to
facilitate freedom of movement.
 Coordinate through the S-2/G-2 for GEOINT, geospatial information, and products needed to
form the mobility portion of the COP.
 Develop and recommend essential mobility or countermobility tasks and priorities of support
based on the commander’s guidance.
 Provide the necessary detailed information within plans, orders, and attachments that subordinate
units need to plan and execute them.
 Make time-sensitive recommendations to the commander on requests for immediate mobility and
countermobility support from subordinate units.
 Determine and evaluate critical aspects of mobility and countermobility.
 Determine what unit and subordinate unit tasks must be accomplished to support essential
mobility and countermobility tasks and the commander’s intent.
 Develop a scheme of movement and maneuver to support the concept of operations.
 Monitor and assess the execution of mobility and countermobility tasks, and make
recommendations on the required adjustments.
 Identify shortfalls based on mobility and countermobility requirements, and make
recommendations in support of requests for augmentation of the necessary assets.
 Advise the commander on mobility and countermobility capabilities, limitations, and
employment considerations.
 Task-organize mobility and countermobility assets to achieve the commander’s intent.
 Plan and coordinate for fires in support of mobility and countermobility.
 Provide information on enemy mobility and countermobility capabilities, to include developing
and updating template enemy obstacles and other impediments on the enemy situation template
(SITEMP).
 Maintain respective staff running estimates and the status of mobility and countermobility assets.
 Track planned and emplaced friendly obstacles to ensure that the mobility portion of the COP is
accurate and current.
 Integrate CBRN, engineer, military police, and other specific reconnaissance into the information
collection plan to help generate obstacle information.
 Coordinate future mobility and countermobility requirements. Include identifying shortfalls and
requesting augmentation for—
 Improving lanes through reduced obstacles.
 Improving roads and aviation operating facilities.
 Replacing tactical bridging with more permanent bridging.
 Clearing areas of EHs to support future operations and request replacement or sustainment of
expended or committed materiel and supplies.

INTELLIGENCE
2-49. The intelligence cell coordinates activities and systems that help commanders understand the
operational environment, to include enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. The S-2/G-2 is
responsible for ensuring that the commander receives relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored information
in a timely manner. The S-2/G-2 is also responsible for the geospatial engineer team organic down to the
brigade level and works together with the engineer staff officer in generating the geospatial information and
products needed to facilitate situational understanding, enable decisionmaking, and help the staff realize the
combined effects on mobility and enemy countermobility efforts. Army geospatial engineering units

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Chapter 2

available to the commander may become part of the command GEOINT cell. The GEOINT cell is composed
of the people and capabilities that constitute the GEOINT support, to include the imagery and geospatial
assets. The cell ensures that GEOINT requirements are coordinated through appropriate channels as
applicable and facilities shared access. (See ATP 2-22.7 for additional information on the Army GEOINT
cell.) The electronic warfare officer coordinates with the S-2/G-2 to integrate electronic warfare capabilities
into the information collection plan and facilitate a greater understanding of the operational environment. As
part of the intelligence function, the staff performs tasks that are directly related to mobility. These tasks
are—
 Use IPB results to identify impacts on friendly, enemy, and third-party movement and maneuver.
 Use IPB to determine impacts on friendly and enemy mobility and countermobility capabilities.
 Integrate geospatial engineering (terrain analysis and terrain visualization products) to facilitate
planning and decisionmaking. (See ATP 3-34.80 for additional information.) Examples of terrain
visualization products include—
 Cross-country mobility.
 Mobility corridors.
 LOCs.
 Soil trafficability.
 Combined obstacle overlay.
 Field of fire.
 Line of sight analysis.
 Integrate requirements into the information collection plan, to include—
 Critical details of obstacles (gap width, river velocity, obstacle composition).
 Conditions and capabilities of roads, bridges, and other infrastructure that may affect
movement and maneuver.
 Location and disposition of high-value enemy mobility and countermobility assets.
 Withdrawal and counterattack routes for enemy forces.

FIRES
2-50. The fires cell coordinates activities and systems that are focused on integrating and synchronizing the
effects of lethal fires and nonlethal enablers through the targeting process. Fires enable maneuver by
destroying enemy forces and restricting enemy ability to counter friendly actions. Swift and fluid maneuver
based on situational understanding complements fires. The fires cell consists of fire support elements, Air
Force (or air component), and electronic warfare staff section. The unit chief of fires (or fire support officer
brigade and below) leads this cell. (See ATP 3-09.12 or ATP 3-60 for additional information on the targeting
process and respective staff responsibilities.)
2-51. The fires cell synchronizes physical attacks, electronic warfare, and computer network attacks against
enemy and adversary command and control capabilities. Key electronic warfare tasks within the fires function
include—
 Detection and location of enemy targeting systems.
 Denial and destruction of enemy counter-information collection systems.
 Conduct of counter-IED actions.

SUSTAINMENT/LOGISTICS
2-52. The sustainment/logistics cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support and services to
ensure the freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The sustainment/logistics
staff integrator (normally the assistant chief of staff, logistics [G-4] at corps and division, and the logistics
staff officer [S-4] at BCT/RCT and battalion) identifies the mobility requirements needed to enable
sustainment/combat service support activities, to include positioning sustainment/combat service support
units to maximize support. Movement control and its relationship to the overall traffic management effort
must be included as part of the integrating efforts of this cell. (See ATP 4-16 for additional on movement
control.)

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 Mobility Support to Movement and Maneuver

2-53. Army health system operations must be task-organized to provide versatile, adaptive, and responsive
medical care to supported units. This is especially vital to operating forces in close combat. Mobility and
survivability of medical units and medical platforms must be equal to the forces being supported.
2-54. Creating, maintaining, or restoring the transportation infrastructure in the operational area is central
to economic recovery and enables freedom of maneuver, logistics support, and the movement of personnel
and materiel to support ongoing operations.
2-55. Important tasks within the mission command/command and control function specifically related to
enabling mobility include—
 Integrating the fundamentals of assured mobility throughout the operations process.
 Integrating obstacle information and intelligence resulting from the information collection effort
into planning and using it to build and maintain an accurate mobility portion of the COP (real-
time MCOO).
 Integrating obstacles being planned and executed by friendly forces (obstacle control measures)
into databases and displays (overlays) to ensure an accurate mobility portion of the COP.
 Synchronizing information related capabilities, especially Soldier/Marine and leader engagement,
to mitigate the effects of the population on friendly force mobility.
 Conducting straggler control to gain control of U.S. or multinational personnel separated from
their units or organizations, prevent them from disrupting ongoing movements, and facilitate
reintegration into the force.

PROTECTION/FORCE PROTECTION
2-56. The protection/force protection cell coordinates the activities and systems that preserve the force
through the risk management process. (See ATP 5-19.) This includes tasks associated with protecting
personnel, physical assets, and information. The protection/force protection cell is composed of elements
from the air and missile defense, CBRN, engineer, operations security, personnel recovery, force health
protection, and provost marshal staff sections. Additionally, a safety officer is assigned to the theater army,
and the safety officer is often augmented as required down to the brigade level.
2-57. While the focus of the protection/force protection cell is on protecting personnel and assets and not
on support to movement and maneuver, activities of key elements within the cell are complementary to direct
efforts supporting movement and maneuver. The provost marshal within the protection/force protection cell
provides trafficability and traffic control considerations (coordinated with the sustainment/logistics cell) into
the planning process to protect civilian populations and mitigate the effects of human obstacles. The provost
marshal and civil affairs staff must work closely to coordinate and synchronize actions regarding civilian
populations, their protection/force protection, and efforts to prevent civilian disruption of military operations.
The provost marshal staff element responds to acute disruptions by human obstacles. Civil affairs help the
commander to understand important aspects of the local population in predicting and mitigating the effects
of human obstacles and in implementing measures that mitigate longer term disruptive activities. Mitigating
human obstacles emphasizes nonlethal, constructive actions. Commanders synchronize information-related
capabilities, shaped by intelligence, to inform domestic audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral,
adversary, and enemy audiences. The electronic warfare officer plans, assesses, and implements electronic
security measures to protect friendly information systems and protect against electromagnetically triggered
IEDs. (See ADRP 3-37 for additional information on the protection/force protection warfighting function
and respective staff responsibilities.)

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 PART TWO

Enable Maneuver
Maneuver is enabled by reducing obstacles through combined arms breaching and
gap crossing and employing obstacles through combined arms obstacle integration
that are focused on isolating the battlefield and protecting against enemy
counterattacks. Mobility missions in support of maneuver are primarily combat
engineering tasks (although combat and general engineer units can perform them,
especially when conducting deliberate gap crossings) that are conducted in close
support of ground maneuver forces in close combat.

Chapter 3
Breaching
Breaching activities are conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of enemy
reinforcing obstacles that are covered by fire and used to shape EAs. Breaching is an
inherent part of maneuver and is one of the most difficult combat tasks to perform.
Breaching activities are characterized by thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning,
extensive preparation and rehearsal, and a massing of combat power.

OVERVIEW
3-1. A breach is a synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver
commander conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle. It is a synchronized combined arms
mission under the control of the maneuver commander. Breaching begins when friendly forces detect an
obstacle and begin to apply the breaching fundamentals. Breaching ends when battle handover occurs
between follow-on forces and the unit conducting the breach. A breaching activity includes the reduction of
minefields, other EHs, and other obstacles. Generally, breaching requires significant combat engineering
support to accomplish.
3-2. Reduction is the creation of lanes through a minefield or obstacle to allow passage of the attacking
ground force (JP 3-15). A lane is a route through, over, or around an enemy or friendly obstacle that
provides passage of a force. The route may be reduced and proofed as part of breaching, constructed as part
of the obstacle, or marked as a bypass. The number and width of lanes vary depending on the enemy situation,
the size and composition of the assaulting force, and the scheme of movement and maneuver. Proof is the
verification that a lane is free of mines or explosive hazards and that the width and trafficability at the
point of breach are suitable for the passing force. Proofing can be conducted visually, electronically, or
mechanically. Some mines are resistant to reduction assets and may require a combination of breaching
techniques; for example, magnetic and double impulse mines may resist a mine clearing line charge
(MICLIC) blast. Proofing is an important component of breaching considering the wide variety of explosive
obstacle threats in use today. (See JP 3-15.)
3-3. Most combined arms breaching is conducted by a BCT/RCT or a battalion-size task force (TF) as a
tactical mission, but higher echelons may also execute operational-level combined arms breaching tasks.
Significant engineer augmentation from echelon above brigade is typically required to enable a BCT/RCT

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Chapter 3

breach or a battalion TF hasty or deliberate breach. In the Marine Corps, MAGTF commanders will task-
organize using organic assets from the ground, logistics, and aviation combat elements to support an RCT or
a battalion-size breach. Depending on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-
time available (METT-T); a Marine expeditionary force or Marine expeditionary brigade-size MAGTF may
request and receive additional force augmentation from an operational-level command.
3-4. Bulling or forcing through is not a preferred breaching technique. Bulling or forcing through is a
decision made when a commander (based on a rapid risk assessment) must react immediately to extricate the
force from an untenable position within an obstacle and no other breaching assets are available. When a force
is in a minefield receiving fires and taking heavy losses, the commander may decide to immediately bull
through the minefield as the lesser risk to the force rather than withdraw or reduce the obstacle. For breaching,
a unit develops a scheme of movement and maneuver specifically designed to neutralize the effects of the
obstacle and continue a mission. Maneuver company teams, TFs, and BCTs/RCTs conduct the breach.
Normally, a TF executes a breach and the company teams are assigned as support, breach, and assault forces.
Higher echelon units will conduct a breach when the force-allocation ratio indicates that a confirmed enemy
situation is beyond the subordinate unit capabilities to successfully conduct a breach. When a subordinate
unit cannot successfully conduct a breach, the higher echelon unit will task organize to conduct the breach.
It will also conduct a higher-level breaching activity when a subordinate unit has failed in its attempt to
breach enemy tactical obstacles.

AREAS
3-5. The breach area is a defined area where a breach occurs. It is established and fully defined by the
higher headquarters of the unit conducting the breach. Within the breach area is the point of breach (POB),
the reduction area, the far side objective, and the point of penetration (POP). Their definitions follow:
 Point of breach is the location at an obstacle where the creation of a lane is being attempted.
Initially, POBs are planned locations only. Normally, the breach force determines the actual POBs
during the breach. The symbol for a POB is shown in figure 3-1.
 Reduction area is a number of adjacent points of breach that are under the control of the
breaching commander. The commander conducting the attack determines the size and location
of the reduction area that supports the seizure of a POP. The reduction area is indicated by the area
located between the arms of the control graphic for breach. (See FM 3-90-1). As shown in
figure 3-1, the length and width of the arms extend to include the entire depth of the area that must
be reduced.
 Far side objective is a defined location oriented on the terrain or on an enemy force that an
assaulting force seizes to eliminate enemy direct fires to prevent the enemy from interfering
with the reduction of obstacles and allows follow-on forces to move securely through created
lanes. A far side objective can be oriented on the terrain or on an enemy force. The higher
headquarters assigns the objective; however, the attacking unit normally subdivides the objective
into smaller objectives to assign responsibilities and to control and focus the assault of subordinate
forces. When breaching as part of a larger force, seizing the far side objective provides the
necessary maneuver space for the higher unit follow-on forces to move securely through the lanes,
assemble or deploy, and continue the attack without enemy interference.
 Point of penetration is the location, identified on the ground, where the commander
concentrates their efforts at the weakest point of the enemy to seize a foothold on the far side
objective. This is achieved along a narrow front through maneuver and direct and indirect fires
that are accurately placed against enemy forces. A commander conducting a breach establishes a
POP that supports planning locations for the reduction area and the seizure of the far side objective.
The symbol for POP is shown in figure 3-1.

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 Breaching

Legend:
BHL battle handover line
PL phase line

Figure 3-1. Breach area

3-6. The breach area must be large enough to allow the attacking unit to deploy its support force and extend
far enough on the far side of the obstacle to allow follow-on forces to deploy before leaving the breach area.
One technique is to establish the breach area using phase lines (PLs) or unit boundaries. The PL defining the
far side of the breach area may be established as a battle handover line (BHL).

TYPES
3-7. Attacks take place along a continuum based on the knowledge of enemy capability and disposition
and the intentions and details of friendly force planning and preparation. (See FM 3-90-1.) The following
terms refer to the opposite ends of that continuum and describe characteristics of the attack:
 Deliberate attack. During a deliberate attack, friendly forces have more knowledge of the enemy
situation and have more time to plan and prepare for the enemy. With this knowledge, friendly
forces conducting a deliberate attack can develop detailed plans, task-organize to accomplish the
mission, and execute rehearsals down to the lowest levels.
 Hasty attack. During a hasty attack, the enemy situation is vague or changes rapidly. Friendly
forces have little or no time to plan or prepare for this type of operation. Because the primary
purpose of the hasty attack is to maintain momentum or take advantage of the enemy situation, it
is normally conducted only with the resources that are immediately available.
3-8. Breaching may be required to support an attack anywhere along this continuum. Breaching activities
must be adapted to best exploit the situation. The level and type of planning distinguish which of the three
general types of breaching (deliberate, hasty, and covert) are used to meet mission variables.

Deliberate
3-9. A deliberate breach is the creation of a lane through a minefield or a clear route through a barrier or
fortification, which is systematically planned and carried out. A deliberate breach is used against a strong
defense or complex obstacle system. It is similar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailed knowledge of the
defense and obstacle systems. It is characterized by the most planning, preparation, and buildup of combat
power on the near side of obstacles. Subordinate units are task-organized to accomplish the breach. The

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Chapter 3

breach often requires securing the far side of the obstacle with an assault force before or during reduction.
Amphibious breaching is an adaptation of the deliberate breach intended to overcome antilanding defenses
to allow a successful amphibious landing. (See appendix D for additional information on amphibious
breaching operations.)

Hasty
3-10. Hasty breach (land mine warfare) is the creation of lanes through enemy minefields by expedient
methods such as blasting with demolitions, pushing rollers or disabled vehicles through the minefields when
the time factor does not permit detailed reconnaissance, deliberate breaching, or bypassing the obstacle
(JP 1-02). A hasty breach is an adaptation to the deliberate breach and is conducted when less time is
available. It may be conducted during a deliberate or hasty attack due to lack of clarity on enemy obstacles
or changing enemy situations, to include the emplacement of SCATMINEs.
3-11. An in-stride breach is a type of hasty breach used to describe the situation when a subordinate unit is
expected to be able to organize for and conduct a hasty breach with its organic or task-organized assets,
without affecting the higher unit scheme of movement and maneuver or commander’s intent. For example, a
BCT/RCT is considered to be conducting an in-stride breach when a subordinate battalion is able to organize
for the breach (support, breach, assault forces) and breach an obstacle without affecting the BCT/RCT scheme
of movement and maneuver or the commander’s intent. In-stride breach is generally not used below the
company level since a platoon is unable to form effective support, breach, and assault forces with its squads.

Covert
3-12. A covert breach is the creation of lanes through minefields or other obstacles that is planned and
intended to be executed without detection by an adversary. Its primary purpose is to reduce obstacles in an
undetected fashion to facilitate the passage of maneuver forces. A covert breach is conducted when surprise
is necessary or desirable and when limited visibility and terrain present the opportunity to reduce enemy
obstacles without being seen. It uses elements of deliberate and hasty breaching, as required.
3-13. A covert breaching is characterized by using stealth to reduce obstacles, with support and assault
forces executing their mission only if reduction is detected. Through surprise, the commander conceals their
capabilities and intentions and creates the opportunity to position support and assault forces to strike the
enemy while unaware or unprepared. The support force does not usually provide suppressive fire until the
initiation of the assault or in the event that the breach force is detected. Covert breaches are usually conducted
during periods of limited visibility. A battalion is the principal unit to conduct a covert breach. The covert
breach requires a level of detailed planning, intelligence collection, and command and control that is normally
beyond the capability of a company. A BCT/RCT is usually too large to maintain the level of stealth necessary
to conduct a covert breach. The covert breach is ideally suited for foot-mobile forces.

TENETS
3-14. Successful breaching missions are characterized by applying breaching tenets. (See table 3-1.) These
tenets are integrated into the planning process. The tenets are—
 Intelligence.
 Breaching fundamentals (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault [SOSRA]).
 Breaching organization.
 Mass.
 Synchronization.

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 Breaching

Table 3-1. Breaching tenets

Breaching Tenets Actions
• Template enemy obstacles on the SITEMP for each enemy COA during IPB based
on—
 The enemy ability to emplace obstacles based on its capabilities (manpower,
equipment, and materials) and time available.
 The effects of terrain and weather.
Intelligence  The range of enemy weapon systems covering obstacles and emplacing
scatterable mines.
• Develop information requirements on enemy engineer units, equipment, activities,
and obstacles (location, composition, and mine types).
• Integrate information requirements and engineer reconnaissance capabilities into
the information collection plan.
• Implement fire control measures to allow the support force to provide effective
direct and indirect suppressive fires (suppress).
• Determine the placement (wind condition), density, and timing of placing
obscurants on enemy positions and placing screening obscuration between the
enemy and the reduction area (obscure).
Breaching • Resource the breach force based on the combat power of enemy forces
fundamentals overwatching the obstacle (secure).
(SOSRA) • Determine the number and width of lanes based on the scheme of movement and
maneuver (one lane per company and two lanes per battalion), determine
reduction methods (explosive, mechanical, or physical), and establish a lane-
marking system (reduce).
• Complete the breach by destroying the enemy on the far side of the obstacle
(assault).
• Suppress enemy direct fire and observed indirect fires on the reduction area
(support force).
• Control indirect fires and obscuration within the breach area (support force).
Breaching • Prevent the enemy from repositioning or counterattacking to place direct fires on
organization breach force (support force).
• Create and mark lanes for the breach element (breach force).
• Secure the obstacle near side and far side for the security element (breach force).
• Report lane status and location (breach force).
• Assault through the obstacle and destroy the enemy on the far side (assault force).
• Mass combat power to create enemy weakness at the POB.
Mass
• Prevent enemy from massing combat power at the POB.
• Conduct detailed reverse planning.
• Communicate clear instructions to subordinate units.
Synchronization
• Provide effective command and control.
• Perform combined arms rehearsals.
Legend:
COA course of action
IPB (Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(Marine Corps) intelligence preparation of the battlespace
POB point of breach
SITEMP situation template
SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault

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Chapter 3

INTELLIGENCE
3-15. Successful breaching missions are dependent on the commander’s ability to see the battlefield and
realize how the enemy is using the terrain and the integration of natural and man-made obstacles to shape
engagements. Accurate intelligence disseminated quickly by information systems allows friendly forces to
maneuver around enemy EAs while massing the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.
3-16. During IPB, a SITEMP is developed for each threat COA to graphically depict the expected
disposition of enemy forces based on threat templates and the effects of the operational environment. The
engineer staff officer and the S-2/G-2 template enemy engineer capability and capacity. The engineer staff
officer assists in describing the effects of terrain on mobility. The GEOINT cell templates enemy tactical and
protective obstacles and analyzes obstacle reports to use in SITEMP development. Enemy countermobility
effort unknowns become IRs (and possibly priority intelligence requirements) and are synchronized and
integrated into the information collection plan. The engineer staff officer shows template enemy obstacles on
the SITEMP based on—
 Threat patterns based on past operations and emerging TTP.
 Enemy countermobility capabilities (based on manpower, equipment, materials, and time
available), to include SCATMINEs.
 Terrain and weather effects.
 The range of enemy weapon systems covering obstacles and emplacing SCATMINEs.
3-17. To allow the timely completion of the SITEMP, template enemy obstacles can initially be shown as a
trace instead of individual obstacles. The length of the obstacle trace should reflect the enemy
countermobility effort, described in kilometers per hour, based on its capabilities and time available. The
obstacle trace is situated based on the range of enemy direct-fire weapons systems within template defensive
positions that cover obstacles and the effects of terrain. The enemy obstacle template is updated (to include
the identification and composition of individual obstacles) to the MCOO.
3-18. Protective obstacles may include a combination of wire, AP and AVL mines, fortifications, and
entrenchments. Mines may be surface-laid or buried and well camouflaged. Mines can be deployed with
antihandling devices, and they can be command-detonated or trip-wire activated.
3-19. The collection of information on obstacles (and subsequent creation of obstacle intelligence) is critical
to breach planning and determining the necessary reduction techniques that offer the best chance for success
while minimizing the risk to the breach force. This information is especially important when conducting
breaching missions in complex or restrictive terrain to ensure that reduction assets are arranged in the right
order in the movement formation, since the ability to reposition reduction assets within the formation may
be limited due to the constricting nature of the terrain. Validating obstacle information also confirms or denies
the template obstacles, helps verify an enemy SITEMP (intent and defense strength), and leads to refined
maneuver and breach planning. An unverified enemy SITEMP can lead to disaster because the force may
aim an attack at the wrong place. This can lead to attacking units deploying early to reduce expected obstacles,
wasting time attempting to discover nonexistent obstacles, or blundering into an unexpected obstacle or an
enemy EA. The S-2/G-2, S-3/G-3, and engineer staff work together to establish effective collection of
obstacle information (and subsequent generation of obstacle intelligence) by determining specific obstacle
RFIs. (See FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4 for additional information on obstacle reconnaissance.) Examples of
obstacle-related IRs include the following:
 Location, composition, orientation, frontage, and depth of obstacles.
 Mine types, fuzes, and method of employment, such as AVL or AP (buried or surface-laid)
antihandling devices, and depth of buried mines.
 Lane and bypass information.
 Interval between successive obstacle belts.
3-20. Obtaining information on obstacles may require a combination of information collection assets.
Committing engineers (engineer reconnaissance teams [ERTs]) as part of the reconnaissance effort can
improve the collection of technical information about the obstacle. Engineers can provide technical insight
on recommended reduction methods that may be necessary when unusual obstacles are encountered in
complex or restrictive terrain. These reduction measures include the use of rubble, boulders (such as a rock

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 Breaching

drop), and field-expedient or booby-trapped obstacles. (See ATTP 3-06.11 for a broader discussion of
breaching during urban operations, to include close-quarters clearing techniques.) An ERT moves with scouts
or a patrol and conducts dismounted reconnaissance of template or confirmed obstacles. This team has the
flexibility to dismount and develop the details of the obstacle. Personnel engaged in a reconnaissance mission
for obstacle information should rarely, if ever, be used to reduce obstacles because an inadvertent detonation
during reduction may compromise the reconnaissance mission. It may also compromise the entire attack.
Engineer reconnaissance team can serve as guides to breach forces for subsequent breaching.
FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4 describes capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations of ERTs.
Satellites, unmanned aircraft systems, airborne platforms, and similar means are also used to detect obstacle
emplacement activities through imagery (change detection) and help focus ground reconnaissance efforts.
3-21. Competing demands for information collection assets will affect the ability to focus specifically on
collecting obstacle information. Planners must creatively integrate obstacle information collection effort
within the overall information collection plan. Relevant information may be obtained through RFIs submitted
to higher or from another military unit or a nongovernmental organization that may have previously operated
in the area.

FUNDAMENTALS
3-22. Breaching fundamentals are integrated into the planning process and applied when a defended obstacle
must be reduced. This includes breaching, gap crossing, and route clearance missions. The fundamentals are
described by the memory aid SOSRA—
 Suppress.
 Obscure.
 Secure.
 Reduce.
 Assault.

Suppress
3-23. Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a
force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish its mission (FM 3-90-1). The purpose of
suppression during breaching is to protect forces reducing obstacles and maneuvering through the reduction
area.
3-24. Suppressive fires in sufficient volume serve to secure the reduction area. Successful suppression
generally triggers the rest of the actions at the POB. Fire control measures ensure that all fires are
synchronized with other actions at the POB. The mission of the support force is to suppress the enemy
overwatching the obstacle. The breach force also provides additional suppressive fires as the situation
dictates; however, its primary focus is on reducing the obstacle.
3-25. In complex or restrictive terrain, effective suppression may have to be achieved through close-in
fighting. Defenders will tend to be more fortified when defending in urban terrain and may be more difficult
to suppress. Forces tasked with suppressing the enemy may find it necessary to seize terrain at or on the far
side of the obstacle to achieve their mission. Fighting to achieve enemy suppression will likely be
decentralized, and the ability to use indirect fires will be restricted due to the close proximity of friendly and
enemy forces and civilians.

Obscure
3-26. The breach force conducts breaching using available natural cover and concealment. They employ
battlefield obscuration, which hampers enemy observation and target acquisition of the breach force as it
reduces the obstacle and the assault force as it passes through the obstacle. Obscuration requires close
coordination, control, and detailed planning to maximize the desired effects on the enemy while not degrading
friendly capabilities. This is especially important when conducting breaching in complex or restrictive terrain
due to the close-in nature of the fighting. In urban areas, indirect delivered obscuration and suppressive fires
will be more restricted. In some situations, using mortars (because of the ability to fire high-level trajectory),

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Chapter 3

smoke pots, and smoke grenades rather than artillery-fired obscurants may be more effective. Planners
consider the effects of wind and the time and assets required to build and maintain effective obscuration for
the desired duration. Using indirect fire to provide obscuration often competes with other mission
requirements and requires priorities to be established. Obscuration employed in multiple locations and at
various times can confuse the enemy on the specific location and timing of breaching. (See ATP 3-11.50 for
additional information on obscuration.)

Secure
3-27. Secure is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from
being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action (FM 3-90-1). Forces conducting a breach secure the
reduction area to prevent the enemy from interfering with obstacle reduction and the passage of the assault
force through the created lanes. The reduction area must be secured before attempting to reduce the obstacle.
The higher headquarters breaching unit is responsible for isolating the breach area by fixing enemy forces in
their current positions, attacking enemy reserves in-depth, and providing counterfire.
3-28. Identifying the extent of the enemy defense is critical in selecting the appropriate technique to secure
the POB. The POB must be secured before reducing the obstacle.
3-29. The breach force must be resourced with sufficient maneuver assets to provide local security against
the enemy that the support force cannot adequately engage. Elements within the breach force that secure the
reduction area may also be used to suppress the enemy once reduction is complete.

Reduce
3-30. Reduce is a mobility task to create and mark lanes through, over, or around an obstacle to allow
the attacking force to accomplish its mission. Normally, engineers and reduction assets (mobility
capabilities) are used to reduce an obstacle. The number and width of lanes needed depend on the enemy
situation, terrain, size and composition of the assault force, and scheme of movement and maneuver. The
lanes must allow the assault force to pass through the obstacle rapidly. In complex or restrictive terrain, the
assault force may be constrained to a single lane and the assault force commander must ensure that the
sequencing of forces through the lane is appropriate to achieve the mission. The breach force will reduce,
proof, mark, and report lane locations and the lane-marking method to higher headquarters. Follow-on units
will further reduce or clear the obstacle, as required. Reduction begins when effective suppression and
obscuration have been established, the obstacle has been confirmed, and the reduction area is secure.

Assault
3-31. A breach is complete when the attacking force has assaulted through the obstacle, seized the far side
objective, eliminated enemy direct and observed indirect fires on the reduction area and, if planned, the battle
handover with follow-on forces has occurred.

ORGANIZATION
3-32. The commander organizes the following three forces to conduct breaching:
 Support.
 Breach.
 Assault.
3-33. Establishing the breach organization facilitates the application of the breaching fundamentals.
Table 3-2 shows the responsibilities of the support, breach, and assault forces.

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 Breaching

Table 3-2. Support, breach, and assault forces responsibilities

Breach
Responsibilities
Organization
• Suppress an enemy capable of placing direct fires on the reduction area to protect the
breach force as it reduces the obstacle and the assault force as it passes through the
Support force created lane.
• Fix enemy forces to isolate the reduction area.
• Control obscuration.
• Reduce, proof, and mark the necessary number of lanes through the obstacle.
• Report the status and location of created lanes.
• Provide local security on the near side and far side of the obstacle.
Breach force
• Provide additional suppression of enemy overwatching the obstacle.
• Provide additional obscuration in the reduction area.
• Assist the passage of the assault force through created lanes.
• Seize the far side objective.
• Reduce the enemy protective obstacles.
• Provide clear routes from the reduction area to the battle handover line for follow-on
forces.
• Prevent the enemy from placing direct fires on follow-on forces as they pass through the
Assault force created lanes.
• Conduct battle handover with follow-on forces.
• Provide reinforcing fires for the support force.
• Destroy the enemy on the obstacle far side that is capable of placing direct fires on the
reduction area.

Reverse Planning
3-34. The size and composition of the support, breach, and assault forces (breach organization) are
determined during COA development using reverse planning. (See figure 3-2, page 3-10.) Reverse planning
begins with actions on the objective and moves backward to the line of departure, since seizing an objective
is typically the decisive point at the tactical level and directly tied to mission accomplishment. Maneuver
planners use reverse planning and force ratios to determine the size and composition of the maneuver forces
that will perform the tasks that support the decisive and shaping operations for each COA. Actions on the
objective drive the size and composition of the force that conducts the final assault onto the objective as part
of an attack, which dictates lane requirements (the number and location of required lanes). Lane requirements
and the composition of obstacles drive the amount and type of reduction assets needed by the breach force.
The engineer staff officer and other planners use reverse planning to determine how best to allocate mobility
assets within the arrayed forces to facilitate the scheme of movement and maneuver for each COA. The
engineer staff officer focuses on the allocation of reduction assets. The SITEMP depicting enemy direct- and
indirect-fire coverage of template enemy obstacles determines the size and composition of the support force.
Reverse planning for breaching is performed using the following steps—
 Step 1. Identify available reduction assets.
 Step 2. Template enemy obstacles.
 Step 3. Understand the scheme of movement and maneuver.
 Step 4. Identify the number of required breach lanes.
 Step 5. Identify the assets required to reduce, proof, and mark lanes.
 Step 6. Task-organize reduction assets within the maneuver force.

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Chapter 3

Legend:
ACE armored combat earthmover
BHL battle handover line
M mark
MCB mine clearing blade
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
R reduce
P proof
PL phase line

Figure 3-2. Allocating breaching assets against lane requirements using reverse planning

Step 1: Identify Available Reduction Assets

3-35. This step begins during receipt of mission and continues into mission analysis. Available reduction
assets are determined based on the current task organization and running estimates. Examples of reduction
assets used for breaching include combat engineer squads, MICLICs, armored combat earthmovers (ACEs),
mine plows, mine rollers, and assault breacher vehicles (ABVs). The engineer running estimate is the primary
source of information on the status of on-hand breaching equipment and the effective strength of combat
engineer platoons or squads. The results of this step are monitored throughout the planning phase for any
changes.

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 Breaching

Step 2: Template Enemy Obstacles

3-36. This step is performed during the initial IPB as part of mission analysis and is continually refined
based on new information resulting from information collection efforts. Templating enemy obstacles are part
the intelligence breaching tenet.

Step 3: Understand the Scheme of Movement and Maneuver

3-37. This step begins as schemes of movement and maneuver are created for each COA being developed
during the planning process. Engineer planners must fully understand the mission, the commander’s intent,
and the scheme of movement and maneuver (to include distances between lanes). They also consider risk
that is stated in the commander’s guidance in determining the redundancy of breaching systems in step 5.
Engineer planners use the maneuver COA sketch that is created for each COA as the basis for graphically
depicting the scheme of movement and maneuver. Template enemy obstacles are added to this sketch
(roughly to scale) to show relative location with the scheme of movement and maneuver.

Step 4: Identify the Number of Required Breach Lanes

3-38. Using the sketch developed in Step 3, engineer planners indicate the number of breach lanes that will
be required to support the scheme of movement and maneuver. Included in this analysis is the consideration
of proper distance between lanes. They start with protective obstacles at the objective and work back to the
line of departure using the following planning factors at a minimum:
 One lane for company-size units (tactical obstacles).
 Two lanes for battalion-size units (tactical obstacles).
 One footpath per assaulting platoon (protective obstacles).
 One engineer or infantry platoon can create a footpath (redundancy is already included).

Step 5: Identify the Assets Required to Reduce, Proof, and Mark Lanes
3-39. Planners identify primary and alternate reduction means for each lane identified during Step 4 (starting
with the main effort) based on the known or suspected composition of the obstacle, the enemy, and the effects
of the terrain (for example, the effects of hard or uneven ground on mine plows). Planners use the available
reduction assets (from Step 1), planning factors, and operational experiences to allocate the appropriate assets
needed to reduce, proof, and mark each lane, to include any redundancy directed by the commander based
on acceptable operational risk. Generally, commanders should expect to lose 50 percent of their reduction
assets during a breach. Planners also consider the effects of enemy direct and indirect fires to determine
where best to employ certain assets (including dismounted troops) based on survivability characteristics and
other risk considerations. Additionally, planners consider the unique effects that certain reduction assets may
have in specific situations. For example, the MICLIC is an effective breaching weapon that can also produce
desirable effects against dismounted enemy overwatching protective obstacles from unfortified positions.
3-40. Planners identify shortfalls and request augmentation through higher headquarters as early in the
planning phase as possible. When shortfalls cannot be fulfilled through augmentation, planners develop
options to maximize the assets available. This can include conducting more frequent resupply or increasing
the combat basic load of breaching systems (such as MICLIC reloads), planning for the redistribution of
assets between units, and assuming risk on the redundancy of reduction assets. Another trade-off might be
taking risk on the number of required lanes if that is a viable option. Planners coordinate the resupply of
breaching systems within the scheme of sustainment/logistics and the shifting of breaching assets within the
scheme of movement and maneuver. Planners consider time distance factors for reloading, moving, and
linking up assets within the supported unit to ensure that the generated options are feasible. They must
anticipate the challenges in shifting and linking up breaching assets once actions commence, address them
during war gaming, and ensure that the necessary detailed information needed for execution is placed in the
order (or contained in SOPs) and included in rehearsals.

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Chapter 3

Step 6: Task-Organize Reduction Assets Within the Maneuver Force

3-41. Based on the assets needed to reduce, proof, and mark each lane and command and control
considerations, planners determine the best arrangement of those assets within the task organization for each
COA being developed. Planners strive to keep breaching assets within their parent organization as much as
possible to facilitate command and control but without sacrificing the principal of mass. Creating an
appropriate task organization requires understanding the risks inherent with the plan. (See ADRP 5-0 and
MCWP 5-1 for information on the fundamentals of task organization.)

MASS COMBAT POWER

3-42. Breaching activities must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions
of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. Forces seek to conduct
a breach at a point of their choosing through the deliberate synchronization and employment of combined
arms. When conducting a breach in complex or restrictive terrain, the ability to achieve mass may be more
difficult and time-consuming since the number of lanes that can be created may be limited and the assault
force may take longer to build up the desired combat power on the far side of the obstacle.
3-43. A POB is planned where the enemy can be isolated, fixed, or disrupted to prevent them from massing
their effects and where converging fires on obstacles are minimized based on the terrain and disposition of
the defending force. A POB (lane) should be separated by a sufficient distance to prevent the enemy from
massing fires on two adjacent lanes simultaneously (and reduce traffic congestion). The distance between the
lanes depends on the enemy, the terrain, the composition of the breaching force and the maneuver plan.
Simultaneously breaching at separate locations prevents the enemy from concentrating fires and defeating a
breaching force. The skillful employment of surprise and tactical deception can also prevent the enemy from
massing effects at the POB.

SYNCHRONIZATION
3-44. Breaching activities require the precise synchronization of breaching fundamentals by support, breach,
and assault forces. Failure to synchronize effective suppression and obscuration with obstacle reduction and
assault can result in rapid, devastating losses of friendly troops at the obstacle or enemy EA. A combined
arms breach is a complex mission by nature. Support, breach, and assault forces must apply breaching
fundamentals (SOSRA) within a short time and distance, which is further complicated in complex or
restrictive terrain. The support force masses its direct fires and controls indirect fires in concert with breach
and assault force maneuvers. The commander must employ obscuration at the right time and place to
maximize its effectiveness or risk hampering target acquisition and command and control. The breach force
must be task-organized with the necessary reduction assets (based on the composition and location of
obstacles) and have them properly sequenced in the movement formation. Commanders must ensure that
they do not prematurely exhaust their reduction assets needed to reduce subsequent obstacles. The
commander ensures synchronization through proper planning and force preparation. Fundamentals to achieve
synchronization are—
 Detailed reverse planning.
 Clear subunit instructions.
 Effective command and control.
 Combined arms rehearsals.
3-45. Subordinate units must clearly understand the mission, how the mission relates to the phases of the
operation, and what role the adjacent units play in the overall plan. The commander may use an execution
matrix to synchronize forces. An execution matrix is a superb synchronization tool, and it lists subunit
instructions sequentially in relation to key events or the sequence of the attack. It also provides subordinate
commanders with an understanding of how the mission and those of adjacent units fit into the overall plan.
More importantly, it allows subordinates to better track the battle and coordinate their own maneuver with
that of adjacent units. This is critical to achieving unity of effort between support, breach, and assault forces.
Table 3-3 shows a sample execution matrix for a breaching mission.

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 Breaching

Table 3-3. Sample execution matrix

Breach Force
Units Support Force Security Reduction Assault Force
Element Element

Phase or
Critical
Event
9 Move along Trail Team Sapper. Lead movement Be prepared to
Axis Horse. along Axis Main. follow Team A.
PL Austin to Occupy SBF 15 Occupy SBF 20. Identify the point of On order cross the
PL Houston and 25; be penetration. LD.
prepared to
occupy SBF 20.
Obstacle SBF 25 orients SBF 20 orients TRP 09. Create and mark Occupy CP 16 and
reduction TRP 09, on two lanes (vicinity of identify lanes.
order TRP 27. AB123456).
SBF 15 orients
TRP 09.
OBJ Bird SBF 15 shift Move through lanes to Assist passage of Occupy SBF 20 and
attack fires to TRP 33. seize OBJ Bird on Team A. Secure orient TRP 27.
order; occupy SBF 35 lanes.
and orient TRP 27.
OBJ Cat attack SBF 15 orients Lift fires on order; Secure and improve Pass through lanes
TRP 33. On continue to orient lanes. and OBJ Bird to
order SBF 25, CP 27. seize OBJ Cat on
shift fires to order; be prepared
TRP 33. to occupy SBF 45.
OBJ Dog On order, lift Be prepared to assume Move to OBJ Bird Seize OBJ Dog on
attack fires. SBF 25 Company D mission to vicinity TRP 09, order.
orient north. seize OBJ Dog. orient southeast.
SBF 15 orient
south.
Consolidation SBF 25 orient SBF 35 orient Support hasty OBJ Dog orient
north. SBF 15 southeast. defense. northeast.
orient south.
Legend:
CP checkpoint
LD line of departure
obj objective
PL phase line
SBF support by fire
TRP target reference point

3-46. Command and control is integrated into the plan using maneuver and fire control measures and the
positioning of key leaders to see the battlefield. Maneuver control measures enable the commander to convey
the intent, scheme of movement and maneuver, and subunit instructions graphically.

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Chapter 3

3-47. The commander must synchronize the critical events of a breaching activity. These critical events may
include—
 Occupying support by fire positions.
 Suppressing the far side objective.
 Employing obscuration.
 Reducing the obstacle.
 Assaulting the far side objective.
 Consolidating on the far side objective.
 Passing of follow-on forces through the breach lanes.

PLANNING
3-48. Breaching activities are planned by incorporating the breaching tenets within the planning process.
Table 3-4 shows breach planning considerations in relation to the planning process steps. The need to conduct
a breach is determined based on the identification of specified, implied, and essential tasks for mobility as
part of mission analysis. A unit may be tasked to conduct a breach in support of the higher headquarters
mission, the commander’s intent, and the scheme of movement and maneuver; or it may be implied based on
the enemy situation, the terrain (mobility corridors), and the commander’s intent.
Table 3-4. Breach planning considerations within the planning process
Steps of the Steps of the
Breach Planning Considerations
MDMP MCPP
Receipt of the Problem • Gather geospatial information and products (mobility corridors and
Mission Framing combined obstacle overlays) for the AO.
• Gather intelligence products on threat countermobility capabilities and
patterns.
• Determine the availability of obstacle information.
• Update running estimates (status of breaching assets).
Mission • Understand the unit mission, commander’s intent, and scheme of
Analysis movement and maneuver (two levels up).
• Complete the following as part of the initial IPB—
 Develop terrain products (mobility corridor and combined obstacle
overlay).
 Evaluate the effects of terrain and weather on friendly mobility and
enemy countermobility and survivability capabilities.
 Assess enemy countermobility capabilities (manpower, equipment,
and materials), and template enemy obstacles based on threat
patterns, terrain, and time available.
• Identify specified and implied mobility (breaching) tasks and determine
any obvious shortfalls in breaching assets engineer forces and special
equipment and initiate requests for augmentation as early as possible.
• Develop information requirements related to breaching (terrain
restrictions and mobility restraints, necessary or desired obstacle
information, enemy countermobility and survivability capabilities), and
recommend draft requirements as possible CCIRs.
• Integrate information collection tasks and engineer or other necessary
specialized reconnaissance capabilities into the information collection
plan.

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 Breaching

Table 3-4. Breach planning considerations within the planning process (continued)
Steps of the Steps of the
Breach Planning Considerations
MDMP MCPP
COA COA • Identify the need to conduct a breach for each COA based on mobility
Development Development corridors and template enemy obstacles.
• Allocate reduction assets (engineer units and breaching equipment)
based on the results of reverse planning.
• Develop tasks that implement the breaching fundamentals (SOSRA).
• Determine breach organization requirements (support, breach, assault
force) and ensure that arrayed forces have been adequately resourced.
COA Analysis COA War • War game the breach organization—
gaming  Force ratios against variances in the enemy disposition.
 Array of breach assets based on losses or variances in the
composition of obstacles.
• War-game changes in the planned point of breach, locations of SBF
positions, and wind effects on obscuration.
• War game friendly reactions to enemy counterattacks within the breach
area and enemy use of SCATMINEs to isolate forces and repair
breached obstacles.
• Refine the plan based on results of war gaming.
COA COA • Analyze and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages for each COA
Comparison Comparison and in relation to the ability to execute the breaching:
Decision  Ability (time-distance) to shift breaching assets between units
beyond the line of departure.
 Ability to reinforce the breaching forces or respond to enemy
counterattacks within the breach area (use of a reserve).
COA Approval • Gain approval for any changes to the essential tasks for mobility.
• Gain approval for recommended priorities of effort and support.
• Gain approval for requests for engineer augmentation to be sent to
higher headquarters.
Orders Orders • Ensure that the task organization of engineer forces and critical breach
Production Development equipment is accurate and clear, to include the necessary instructions
for effecting linkup.
Transition • Ensure the quality and completeness of subunit instructions for
performing breaching.
Note. The Army uses the military decisionmaking process, and the Marine Corps use the Marine Corps planning process.
The processes are similar, but the steps are different. The MDMP is described in ADRP 5-0, and the MCPP is described in
MCWP 5-1.
Legend:
ADRP Army doctrinal reference publication
AO area of operations
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
COA course of action
IPB (Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(Marine Corps) intelligence preparation of the battlespace
MCPP Marine Corps planning process
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP military decisionmaking process
SBF support by fire
SCATMINE scatterable mine
SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault

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Chapter 3

RECEIPT OF MISSION/PROBLEM FRAMING

3-49. During receipt of mission, the staff gathers existing geospatial information and geospatial products
for the AO. Products may include mobility corridors and combined obstacle overlays. Planners also gather
existing intelligence products on enemy countermobility capabilities and patterns and any information or
intelligence on existing obstacles. Planners update running estimates based on the current situation. The
engineer running estimate is the primary source of information on the status of reduction assets.

MISSION ANALYSIS/PROBLEM FRAMING

3-50. During mission analysis and as part of the initial IPB, planners focus on incorporating the intelligence
breaching tenet. The staff evaluates the effects of terrain and weather on friendly mobility and enemy
countermobility and survivability capabilities. The engineer staff officer coordinates with the S-2/G-2 for
terrain products (mobility corridor, combined obstacle overlay) that are created by geospatial engineers (or
Marine Corps geographic intelligence specialists). The engineer and intelligence staff sections work together
to assess enemy countermobility capabilities (manpower, equipment, and materials) and template enemy
obstacles on the SITEMP.
3-51. During mission analysis, the staff identifies specified and implied breaching tasks and recommends
those that are essential tasks for mobility. The staff determines any obvious shortfalls in breaching assets
(engineer forces and special equipment needed for obstacle reduction) based on the current task organization.
It initiates requests for augmentation as early in the planning phase as possible to facilitate early movement
and timely arrival and linkup of augmenting units.
3-52. The staff develops RFIs that are needed to successfully conduct breaching. Typical IRs for a breaching
may include—
 Enemy capability to employ air-, ground-, and artillery-delivered SCATMINEs to shape EAs and
reconstruct reduced obstacles.
 Enemy countermobility capabilities (units, equipment, materials) and TTP.
 Terrain and weather effects on emplacing mines and employing reduction assets.
 Enemy direct and indirect fire capabilities that can cover obstacles within the reduction area.
 Operational status and location of all breaching assets (friendly force IRs).

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

3-53. The staff integrates the breaching fundamentals during COA development. (See table 3-5.) The breach
organization is established with the grouping of forces for each COA being developed. The size and
composition of support, breach, and assault forces are based on the results of the reverse planning.
3-54. Each COA should identify which force is the main effort throughout the breach. For example, the
COA should define when the main effort shifts from the support force to the assault force. The scheme of
fires for each COA must address suppressive fires and obscuration. The sequence of follow-on units to be
passed through lanes and the criteria to begin passing follow-on units through lanes that the assault force
created should also be addressed for each COA.

Command and Control Considerations

3-55. Due to the inherent complexity of breaching, effective command and control is critical to success.
Centralized planning and decentralized execution is integrated into the plan. The use of maneuver and fire
control measures and the positioning of key leaders facilitates a common operating picture of the AO.

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 Breaching

Table 3-5. Breach planning considerations during COA development

Breaching
Planning Considerations
Fundamentals
• Identify enemy elements that can place direct and indirect fires onto the proposed
reduction area or that can reinforce or counterattack into the breach area (based on the
SITEMP developed during IPB).
• Identify direct and indirect fire capabilities needed by the support force to suppress the
Suppress and breach area and achieve desired effects on the enemy.
secure
• Determine the best place to position the support force so that it can support (the breach
and assault forces) by fire, based on observation and fields of fire, and cover and
concealment, while avoiding its fires being masked by friendly forces.
• Establish CFZs for SBF positions and the reduction area.
• Identify available assets that can employ obscuration, and determine where best to
position them to achieve desired results.
Obscure • Determine where best to employ obscuration based on the SITEMP; predicted wind
conditions; planned reduction area; and positioning of the support, breach, and assault
forces.
• Describe obstacle intelligence, which defines the weaknesses in the defense where
reduction occurs.
• Allocate breaching assets (plan for redundancy) to the breach force based on lane
Reduce requirements (number and width) and the composition of the obstacle.
• Allocate maneuver forces to the breach force security element based on the SITEMP
and the ability of the support force to eliminate enemy direct fires on the reduction area
based on fields of fire.
• Designate a far side objective based on the SITEMP, the terrain, and the necessary
maneuver space on the far side of the obstacle.
• Determine size and composition of the assault force based on the SITEMP or the size of
Assault the far side objective (if terrain oriented).
• Identify secondary tasks (reinforcing fires for the support force, blocking enemy
counterattacks into the breach area) for the assault force.
Legend:
CFZ critical friendly zone
IPB (Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(Marine Corps) intelligence preparation of the battlespace
SBF support by fire
SITEMP situation template

3-56. Maneuver control measures enable the commander to convey their intent, the scheme of movement
and maneuver, and subunit instructions graphically. Relating subunit actions to the terrain is critical to
successful execution. The commander uses PLs to initiate the breach and to control actions on the objective.
The commander uses target reference points on obvious terrain features to orient, focus, and shift suppressive
direct and indirect fires.
3-57. Key leaders must be able to see the battlefield to make informed decisions. The commander is
positioned where they can best control the battle. Since effective suppression is normally the most critical
event during a breach, the commander may elect to move with the support force. This enables the commander
to personally influence fire control and facilitate the necessary cross talk between breach and assault forces.
It also typically keeps the commander uncommitted and free to move and influence other aspects of
movement and maneuver. The S-3/G-3 may initially move with the breach force to track the progress of
obstacle reduction and anticipate the commitment of the assault force. A commander who feels that a personal
influence is required forward with the breach or assault force must acknowledge the trade-off in ability to
track the entire battle and influence other aspects of the breach.

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Chapter 3

3-58. Command and control requirements for the support, breach, and assault forces are addressed during
COA development and are refined during war gaming. Depending on the scale of the breach, these forces
may be composed of more than one unit. For example, in a battalion-size TF breach, the support force may
be composed of two company teams. Based on the mission requirements and size of the support force, the
TF commander or S-3/G-3 could serve as the support force commander to provide the necessary experience
and command and control in coordinating the actions of both company teams and determining when the
conditions have been met for committing the breach force.
3-59. The command and control requirements for the breach force must also be considered since it contains
two subordinate elements (security and reduction). Depending on the size of the security and reduction forces,
the number of lanes required, and experience levels, a company team commander might serve as the breach
force commander and the security element commander for a battalion-size TF breach, with an engineer
platoon leader as the reduction element commander. Likewise, an engineer company commander might serve
as the breach force commander and the reduction element commander while a maneuver platoon leader serves
as the security element commander.
3-60. The command and control requirements for the passage of follow-on forces through the breach area
must be addressed during war gaming. During the passage, two parallel chains of command are operating in
one area simultaneously, and the possibility of confusion exists. The complexity associated with such task
areas as fire support coordination, traffic control, and communications requires close coordination between
stationary and moving forces. The higher headquarters of the forces involved is responsible for exercising
overall command and control of the passage. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on planning and
executing a forward passage.) Figure 3-3 shows an example of the graphic control measures that may be
established to facilitate the efficient movement of forces through a reduced obstacle. In this example, TCP 8
is located at the far-recognition marker. These control measures can be initially established by the higher
headquarters, but these control measures will need to be refined by the unit conducting the breach based on
its scheme of movement and maneuver.

Legend:
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RP release point
TCP traffic control post

Figure 3-3. Graphics to support passage of follow-on forces

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 Breaching

Traffic Control Considerations

3-61. The unit conducting the breach is responsible for controlling traffic movement throughout the breach
area until battle handover with a follow-on force occurs, at which time the higher headquarters will assume
control. Military police play an important role in controlling movement. At a minimum, potential military
police support to breaching includes—
 Establishing TCPs along routes leading to or departing from the reduction area and throughout
the breach area to expedite traffic flow.
 Establishing holding areas.
 Assisting engineers with temporary route signs.
 Performing straggler control.
 Conducting area security to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces.
3-62. Military police units conduct close coordination with the breaching force to determine where best to
employ traffic control efforts. When multiple lanes branch off from a single far-recognition marker, military
police units assist in directing the formation through various lanes. They also assist in modifying the traffic
flow when lanes are closed for maintenance, expansion, or follow-on clearance. Military police units enable
the commander to make required changes in traffic flow due to the tactical situation. As in gap crossing,
military police support to breaching provides an efficient and orderly flow of forces into and through the
reduction area. (See FM 3-39 and MCWP 3-34.1 for additional information.)

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS/WAR GAMING

3-63. During war gaming, the staff analyzes projected enemy actions that could affect the scheme of
movement and maneuver for each COA (for example, enemy use of SCATMINEs or repositioning of enemy
forces) and determines friendly actions based on the array of reduction assets. The staff makes the necessary
adjustments to ensure that the COA remains feasible. This may include reallocating reduction or other
mobility assets within the proposed task organization or developing the tasks needed to cross-level assets
within and between units after the mission commences. Redistribution and placement of breach assets after
the breach starts becomes increasingly difficult. The staff will be required to develop additional coordinating
instructions to produce synchronized results that are reinforced through rehearsals. War gaming is critical to
refine the COA, including—
 Validating the size and composition of support, breach, and assault forces.
 Identifying decision points and triggers to support obscuration, committing breach and assault
forces, and shifting fires.
 Refining the CCIRs and IRs and incorporating them into the information collection plan.
 Refining the fires plan, including the obscuration plan.
 Refining tasks for the support, breach, and assault forces.
 Refining command and control requirements for the breach organization.
3-64. The critical events of a breach are addressed during war gaming, to include—
 Occupying support by fire positions.
 Suppressing the far side objective.
 Employing obscuration.
 Reducing the obstacle.
 Assaulting the far side objective.
 Consolidating on the far side objective.
 Passing follow-on forces.

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Chapter 3

3-65. The commitment of the breach force is a critical decision point that must be included in the decision
support template. The commander must thoroughly analyze what criteria must be met before the breach force
begins obstacle reduction and identify how the commitment criteria will be verified. Commitment criteria
elements may include the following:
 Destruction of certain vehicles or a certain number of vehicles.
 Effective suppression of the enemy by the support force.
 Effective isolation of the reduction area.
 Effective obscuration of the enemy.
 Strength of the remaining support force.
 Reduction assets available to the breach force.
 Activation of CFZ.
 Air-defense assets in position.

Note. A plan must exist on how information will be gathered to verify the commitment criteria.

ORDERS PRODUCTION/DEVELOPMENT
3-66. Once the COA is approved, the commander specifies the command and control structure for the breach
organization based on the scheme of movement and maneuver. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning
the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations and providing the necessary detailed information
required by subordinate units for execution. The detailed information that subordinate units will need that is
not within the base order is placed in an attachment (annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits). Attachments
are prepared in a form that best portrays the information (text, matrix, trace, overlay, overprinted map, table).
(See ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1 for additional information on orders and attachments to orders.)

PREPARATION
3-67. Successful breaching depends on preparation and planning. During preparation, the commander
continues to review IPB products against the current situation and redirect information collection assets to
focus on the most important requirements remaining, while emphasizing the CCIR. Plans are continuously
refined based on IPB updates and reporting from information collection assets.
3-68. Key preparation activities for breaching include—
 Planning refinement based on IPB updates and reporting from information collection assets, to
include adjustments to the breach organization (support, breach, and assault forces), the scheme
of movement and maneuver, and the fire support plan.
 Implementing the task organization (breach organization), to include coordinating the linkup of
breaching assets (units and equipment) with the supported unit to allow combined arms breaching
rehearsals to be conducted.
 Performing precombat checks and inspections.
3-69. A breaching rehearsal site should reflect the actual obstacle system in as much detail as possible based
on obstacle intelligence. At a minimum, rehearsals should include a leader and key personnel walk-through
and individual rehearsals by support, breach, and assault forces. As time permits, full-scale rehearsals should
be conducted. When possible, friendly forces rehearse the mission under the same conditions (obscuration
and darkness) expected during the actual mission. Rehearsals should also include contingencies such as
enemy counterattacks and attacks by enemy indirect-fire systems, attack helicopters, other air assets, and
enemy use of CBRN material. If updates become available after the last possible rehearsal, the information
should be immediately passed on to affected elements.
3-70. Executing task organization changes of critical reduction assets during mission execution may be
required. This situation presents even more challenges, especially with regard to terrain management, because
unit positions and fire control measures may have shifted. War gaming these actions during mission planning
and rehearsals and implementing the necessary control measures and coordinating instructions are critical to
avoid fratricide.

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 Breaching

EXECUTION
3-71. Execution involves monitoring the situation, assessing the mission, and adjusting the order as needed.
When the situation deviates from the order, commanders direct adjustments to exploit opportunities and
counter threats. Adjustments that may be necessary during breaching might include—
 Allocating additional assets to the support, breach, or assault force due to attrition.
 Changing the location of the POB or POP.
 Modifying the scheme of movement and maneuver and changing the order of the units passing
through the created lane.
3-72. For breaching, the commander focuses on monitoring, assessing, and adjusting the critical events of a
breach that were war-gamed. (See table 3-5, page 3-17.) The following paragraphs describe the critical events
that are generally associated with a breach and some of the adjustments that may be required as the breach
progresses.

OCCUPYING SUPPORT-BY-FIRE POSITIONS

3-73. As the support force moves from the line of departure to its support by fire positions, the support force
must be prepared to respond (bypass or breach) to enemy SCATMINEs along its axis of advance. The support
force may also need to adjust its planned support by fire position based on the actual conditions on the ground
(such as poor observation and fields of fire or changes in the enemy situation). Adjustments made to the
support by fire position are coordinated with the higher headquarters to facilitate the clearance of indirect
fires and establish CFZ. The breach force commander ensures that the positioning of the breach and assault
forces does not mask support force fires.

SUPPRESSING THE FAR SIDE OBJECTIVE

3-74. After the support force has occupied its support by fire positions and the commitment criteria of the
breach force have been met (achieved necessary suppression and obscuration), the higher commander orders
the breach force to begin reduction. The movement of the breach force to the POB is coordinated with the
support and assault forces to ensure that fires are lifted and shifted.

EMPLOYING OBSCURATION
3-75. The support force commander is responsible for controlling obscuration in the breach area.
Obscuration is adjusted based on variances between planned and actual positions of the support, breach, and
assault forces and the location of POBs. As obscuration is a critical event, it should be accounted for with
consideration given to weather and other environmental effects during each phase of the operation and linked
to a decision support matrix. Obscuration is typically limited to projected (artillery delivered) or manual
(hand emplaced) employment.

REDUCING THE OBSTACLE

3-76. When suppression criteria have been met, the breach force commander maneuvers the breach force
toward the reduction area, leading with the security element. This allows it to establish near side security to
protect the reduction element as it moves to the POB. As the security element occupies its position, the
reduction element commander conducts a reconnaissance to confirm the POB and composition of the obstacle
and refines the scheme of reduction as necessary. The actual location of the POB and the estimated time to
reduce, proof, and mark the obstacle are reported to the higher headquarters. This information is also shared
with the support and assault force commanders. Simultaneously, the breach force commander assesses the
effectiveness of the suppression and obscuration and determines if and how to reinforce or adjust support
force fires.
3-77. The assault force occupies assault positions and makes final preparations for assaulting the far side
objective. Final preparations include coordinating any adjustments made in the plan and reorganizing to
adjust to combat or mechanical losses. The support force continues its suppressive fires as long as the assault
force remains in the assault position.

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Chapter 3

3-78. As the reduction continues, the support and breach force commanders provide updates to the higher
headquarters, including the status on unit strength, ammunition, effectiveness of obscuration and suppression
efforts, and the overall progress of the reduction effort. The breach force commander verifies who will be the
assault force and where it will approach from so that they can assist in its passage. As the reduction effort
nears completion, the breach force commander reports the grid coordinates of the far-recognition marker to
allow the assault force to begin its advance from its assault position to the lane. When reduction is complete,
the breach force commander—
 Reports lane completion.
 Confirms grid coordinates of the far-recognition marker.
 Confirms and reports the lane-marking pattern and material.
 Establishes far side local security and assists in the assault force passage.
3-79. The reduced obstacle continues to be a choke point and danger area even after the assault force has
passed through created lanes. The created lanes are monitored and maintained or improved to support the
movement of follow-on forces. Additional lanes are constructed to increase traffic capacity and facilitate the
timely passage of follow-on forces. Breaching assets are positioned near the POBs in case the enemy employs
SCATMINEs to reconstruct the reduced obstacle. The lane-marking pattern is upgraded to intermediate.
There are many ways this can be accomplished; the higher headquarters—
 Takes command of the POB and has some or all of the reduction element revert to its control and
continue creating or expanding lanes in the obstacle for follow-on forces.
 Takes command of the POB and has additional reduction assets follow closely behind the assault
force and create additional lanes to allow the reduction element to remain under unit control.
 Tasks the breaching unit to maintain lanes in tactical obstacles.
 Widens lanes to allow two-lane traffic through obstacles. The lanes are marked with the full lane-
marking pattern. Deliberate marking and fencing systems are installed, and military police
establish necessary traffic control. Eventually, follow-on engineer forces clear obstacles and
eliminate the choke point.

ASSAULTING THE FAR SIDE OBJECTIVE

3-80. When obstacle reduction is complete and the lanes have been reported or signaled as open for traffic,
the assault force passes through the created lanes and assaults the far side objective. The support force
continues to support by fire and lifts and shifts its fires to support the maneuver of the assault force. The
assault force breaches protective obstacles as necessary and assaults through the objective. Once the assault
force reaches the far side of the objective, selected elements clear the remaining pockets of resistance while
the bulk of the assault force prepares for a possible enemy counterattack. After the assault force reaches the
objective, the support force leaves its support by fire positions and rejoins the assault force or moves to a
blocking position to counter possible enemy counterattacks. Once the far side objective is secured, the assault
force establishes clear routes from the reduction area to the BHL. The assault force must control and secure
the AO far enough to its front that the follow-on force can pass through and reform into a maneuver formation
before contact with an enemy force. The breach force is prepared to breach in support of the assault force
seizure of the far side objective. The breach force is also prepared to assist in clearing routes established by
the assault force.

CONSOLIDATING ON THE FAR SIDE OBJECTIVE

3-81. Once the assault force seizes the objective, they clear it of enemy forces and then occupy firing
positions to prepare for an enemy counterattack. The assault force commander should preplan the location of
each element. The assault force accomplishes reorganization actions (cross-leveling supplies, weapons, and
equipment; recovering, treating, and evacuating casualties, enemy prisoners of war, and damaged equipment)
during consolidation, and reports the unit status to the next higher commander.

PASSAGE OF FOLLOW-ON FORCES

3-82. The assault force, assisted by the breach force, clears and marks routes from the far-recognition marker
to the BHL according to the plan. Just like any passage of lines, the stationary force is responsible for

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 Breaching

controlling traffic and, depending on the situation, may employ military police or other assets to support that
effort. The passing unit is prepared to help maintain (or improve) these routes and positions the necessary
mobility assets within its formation as appropriate. The higher headquarters of the forces involved exercises
overall command and control of the passage and is responsible for keeping the lanes open, improving lanes,
creating more lanes as necessary, upgrading lane markings to the intermediate lane-marking pattern, and
controlling traffic. (See appendix B for additional information on lane and bypass marking.) (See FM 3-90-1
for information on planning and executing a forward passage.)

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 Chapter 4
Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver
Gap crossing in support of maneuver is similar to a breach in that the force is
vulnerable while moving through a lane or across a gap. Maneuver units are forced to
break movement formations, concentrate within lanes or at crossing points, and reform
on the far side before continuing to maneuver. While much of the terminology and
planning associated with gap crossing is the same as that used in a breach, gap crossing
and breach differ in scope. The amount and type of assets involved also differ.
Combined arms breaching sometimes includes gap crossings as a reduction method.
Since the primary focus of planning and preparation is on the breach, they are typically
discussed as a subordinate part of the breach rather than as a separate gap crossing. The
examples presented in this chapter are centered on a division wet-gap crossing since it
tends to be more complex and demanding than a dry-gap crossing.

TYPES
4-1. The gap crossing types are―
 Deliberate.
 Hasty.
 Covert.
4-2. Each gap crossing type has a general list of conditions that help define the category. The planning
requirements for each type of gap crossing are similar. However, the required degree of detail and necessary
conditions for a high degree of success will vary based on the type and the unique features associated with a
crossing mission. In all cases, the ability to conduct any type of crossing begins by providing a crossing force
with the necessary gap-crossing means and control elements and identifying those requirements early during
planning. (Gap-crossing means are discussed in appendix E.)

Note: A retrograde gap crossing is not a fourth type of gap crossing. In reality, it is merely a
variation of a deliberate or hasty gap crossing, and it is typically performed as a deliberate gap
crossing. It may be performed with or without enemy pressure on the crossing force. Clearly, it is
more difficult when performed under enemy pressure. (Retrograde crossings are discussed in
appendix H.)

DELIBERATE
4-3. A deliberate crossing is the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that requires
extensive planning and detailed preparations. A deliberate gap crossing is classified as wet or dry, and it
is usually accomplished with one or more bridge companies in support of combat maneuver. It is normally
accomplished when a hasty crossing is not feasible or has failed. Any deliberate crossing requires detailed
reconnaissance, detailed planning, coordination of fire plans, extensive preparations and rehearsals, and
significant engineer assets. While a BCT/RCT is capable of making a deliberate crossing, this type of crossing
normally requires a higher headquarters to assist in planning and command and control since it generally
involves more than one BCT/RCT. Deliberate crossings can involve general and combat engineering
elements. Some additional considerations for conducting deliberate gap crossings include the—
 Complexity and the assets required to accomplish the crossing.
 Opposition from a defending enemy and obstacle severity.

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Chapter 4

 Necessity to clear entry and exit crossing points of enemy forces.

 Clarification if the situation allows and time permits thorough preparations.
4-4. Generally, deliberate crossings involve gaps that are greater than 65 feet. A gap of this length limits
the effectiveness of tactical bridging assets, and the gap will typically require other bridging assets. Crossing
gaps of this magnitude normally require support bridging in the form of float bridging (wet-gap) or other
types of standard bridging.

Deliberate Wet-Gap Crossing

4-5. The deliberate wet-gap crossing (see the example in appendix I) is one that requires the use of rafting
(nonbridging) and bridging assets. The use of assault craft (boats and helicopters), rafting, or ferries and the
emplacement of bridging assets may occur sequentially or concurrently. The objective in deliberate wet-gap
crossings is to project combat power to the exit bank of a river or other type of significant water obstacle at
a faster rate than the enemy can concentrate forces for a counterattack. Typically, wet-gap crossings are one
of the most difficult types. They generally require significant augmentation of mobility support assets.

Deliberate Dry-Gap Crossing

4-6. Deliberate dry-gap crossings are usually determined by the strength of the enemy defense and the
magnitude of the gap. Generally, the M9 ACE, Wolverine, or AVLB are preferred in the armor BCT and
infantry BCT. The REBs is organic to and normally serves the basic immediate needs of the SBCT with
augmentation of other assets as required. Other bridging, to include the logistics support bridge, the dry
support bridge (DSB), the MGB, and the M2 Bailey bridge are used to span larger dry gaps. (See appendix E
for military load classification [MLC] information.) These assets are labor intensive and expose personnel to
enemy fire during construction, while providing stable gap-crossing support for continuous mobility. The
Marine Corps employs the AVLB for hasty gap crossings (wet or dry) depending on the distance to be gapped
and the MGB for deliberate gap crossings.

HASTY GAP CROSSING

4-7. A hasty crossing is the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap using the crossing means
on hand or those readily available, and made without pausing for elaborate preparations. Hasty gap
crossings are usually focused on a combined arms activity to project combat power across a terrain feature
(wet or dry) that can be overcome by self-bridging assets within the BCT/RCT. These assets may be organic,
provided to the BCT/RCT as augmentation, or found as expedient crossing materials within the AO.
Typically, a hasty gap crossing is a gap that is 65 feet or less in width. They are normally accomplished with
tactical bridging (AVLB, Wolverine, REBs). A hasty gap crossing may also include support bridging and the
use of expedient bridging or gap crossing by other means.
4-8. Hasty gap crossings are most often used when enemy resistance is weak and the gap is not a severe
obstacle. Hasty gap crossings also feature decentralized control at the BCT/RCT and below level, using a
task-organized mobility augmentation company, organic assets, or expedient crossing means at multiple sites
along a broad front. Due to the limited organic crossing assets, additional support in the form of mobility
augmentation companies and MACs from echelons above the BCT/RCT is often necessary. That support is
only available when those headquarters have taken purposeful action to position the assets at the right time
and place and integrate them with the maneuver force to make a hasty gap crossing feasible. Coordination
for these assets must be made early in the planning phase. Some additional considerations for conducting
hasty gap crossings include the—
 Size of the gaps in the maneuver area.
 Availability of existing bridges, fords, bypasses, or expedient crossing materials.
 Recovery of assets.
 Aviation (rotary-wing) asset availability.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

4-9. A hasty crossing is conducted in an effort to maintain the momentum of the maneuver force by quickly
massing combat power on the far side of the gap with no intentional pause. This promotes speed, facilitates
surprise, and provides a continuation of maneuver momentum. The planning process is critical to identify
gap locations and their dimensions and request or allocate the necessary assets to ensure unimpeded
movement.
4-10. Hasty crossings are planned, organized, and executed much like a hasty breach. The unit must consider
the integration of the crossing assets in its movement formation, redundancy in crossing means, traffic flow
across the gap, and the recovery of the crossing assets. The BCT/RCT task-organizes in a manner that
supports the overall mission and facilitates a successful gap crossing followed by a quick recovery. To
accomplish gap crossing efficiently, bridging assets should be located in a position within the maneuver
formation where positive control can be maintained. This is an important consideration, as all gap-crossing
equipment does not have the necessary communications means to maneuver effectively as a part of a
BCT/RCT or maneuver battalion formation. Additionally, some of the gap-crossing equipment is less
maneuverable and slower than the combat vehicles support and it is also less survivable in some cases. This
may slow down the movement speed for the maneuver elements. In spite of these challenges, proper planning
and command and control can minimize these negative impacts.
4-11. Two other considerations are the desirability for redundancy of crossing equipment and the capability
to rapidly recover the crossing means. Tactical bridging is designed with these considerations in mind.
Commanders should plan on the use of multiple crossing means, depending on the criticality of the crossing
and the time available. While the Wolverine can be launched in less than 5 minutes and recovered in less
than 10 minutes, sometimes extenuating circumstances will dramatically increase the launch and recovery
times. The terrain, transporter and bridge maintenance, and crew experience can impact bridge launch and
recovery.
4-12. The recovery of crossing assets and transition after the crossing is important to the BCT/RCT to
sustain its momentum. Typically, BCTs/RCTs will expect crossing assets to recover and join the maneuver
force on the far side of the gap. The BCT/RCT has at least two options including: The BCT/RCT can halt
movement on the far side of the gap and wait for the crossing asset to recover the bridge. The BCT/RCT can
continue movement and leave an adequate security force during the recovery, which can also assist the
crossing asset in rejoining the maneuver force. If the assets are intended to stay with the BCT/RCT,
consideration must be given to follow-on support or LOC bridging assets to ensure that support or follow-on
forces can adequately continue to follow the maneuver force. The higher headquarters may direct the
BCT/RCT to keep its crossing assets in place for follow-on forces to use, which will degrade or eliminate the
BCT/RCT ability to cross any subsequent gaps unless it has been resourced with sufficient tactical bridging.
If the division intends for tactical bridging to remain in place, the BCT/RCT must be augmented with
sufficient assets to accomplish this task while retaining sufficient tactical gap-crossing capability to facilitate
continued maneuver and movement.
4-13. Because a gap crossing constricts and splits the maneuver force at the crossing site, the plan must be
flexible enough for the commander or their designated representative to execute decisions based on
acceptable opportunity and threat variances. The BCT/RCT tactical CP can assist the command group by
controlling the execution of the crossing and maintaining a status of the location and operational readiness
of the crossing assets.

Hasty Wet-Gap Crossing

4-14. The depth and width of the wet gap, bank conditions, and the current velocity are major factors that
impact the ability of a maneuver unit to conduct a hasty wet-gap crossing. These factors will determine if the
maneuver force can cross by fording or swimming, if expedient materials can be used, or if specific bridging
assets are required. Identifying wet gaps early and deploying the required resources allow hasty crossings of
known or anticipated gaps to occur.

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Chapter 4

Hasty Dry-Gap Crossing

4-15. An AV ditch, crater, dry riverbed, partially blown bridge, or similar obstacle is normally what
maneuver forces encounter as a dry-gap crossing obstacle. Maneuver forces can use the M9 ACE or the
deployable universal combat earthmover to push down the sides of ditches or fill in craters. Substantial fill
material placed in the dry gaps allows the passage of combat tracked vehicles. The crossing site can be
improved and maintained for wheeled traffic use by follow-on forces. The AVLB, Wolverine, or the REBs
are also well suited for hasty dry-gap crossings. (See appendix E for bridge MLC information.) As with any
hasty crossing, consideration must be given to the need for replacement bridging so that the maneuver unit
can maintain its assets for subsequent gap-crossing requirements.

In-Stride Gap Crossing

4-16. The in-stride gap crossing is a variant of the hasty gap (wet or dry) crossing that consists of a rapid
gap-crossing adaptation conducted by forces organic to (or task-organized with) the attacking force. It
consists of preplanned, well-trained, and well-rehearsed gap-crossing battle drills and the use of the unit
SOPs. The in-stride gap crossing takes advantage of surprise and momentum to bridge or defeat gaps and
relies on good and timely reconnaissance for its success as well. The force uses the in-stride gap crossing
against weak defenders or very simple gaps and executes the battle drills on the move. Attacking maneuver
forces generally move configured to be able to execute an in-stride gap crossing, except when a deliberate
gap crossing is planned. In-stride gap crossings may occur when a gap is not the same as the unit planned or
anticipated. To conduct an in-stride crossing, the unit must be well trained, have established SOPs, and be
task-organized with the necessary tactical bridging assets and capabilities.
4-17. The battalion is the principal unit to plan, coordinate, and control an in-stride gap crossing; but a
company will normally conduct the actual crossing. The battalion will normally designate specific support
forces, and it is responsible for synchronizing the breaching fundamentals (SOSRA) as they apply to a gap
crossing through detailed planning and well-rehearsed immediate action drills.
4-18. The commander planning for an in-stride gap crossing must also plan for a transition to a deliberate
gap crossing should an in-stride gap crossing be unsuccessful. An unclear situation (enemy and exact gap
dimensions and conditions) will make it necessary for several lead company-size units to be capable of
conducting independent gap crossing. Accurate and timely reconnaissance of the gap (obstacle) and the
enemy force that defend the gap set the condition for properly focusing the location of the in-stride gap
crossing.

COVERT GAP CROSSING

4-19. A covert crossing is a planned crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that is intended
to be undetected. The primary purpose of the covert crossing is to facilitate undetected infiltration of the far
side of a gap. A covert crossing is normally conducted by battalion and smaller forces. It is used when surprise
is essential to infiltrate over a gap and when limited visibility and terrain present the opportunity to reduce
or defeat the enemy obstacle (gap) without being seen. Through surprise, the commander conceals
capabilities and intentions and creates the opportunity to position support and assault forces to strike the
enemy unaware or unprepared. Like a covert breach, it is normally conducted by a battalion or smaller unit
(dismounted or in wheeled vehicles). A BCT/RCT is typically too large to maintain the level of stealth
necessary to conduct a successful covert gap crossing. A covert gap crossing requires a level of detailed
planning, intelligence collection, and command and control that is normally beyond the capability of a
company.
4-20. A covert gap crossing can be used in a variety of situations to support various missions, but should be
considered (as opposed to deliberate or hasty) only when there is a need or opportunity to cross a gap without
being discovered. The covert crossing can be used to cross forces that will support a follow-on crossing of a
larger or similar size element; however, it is planned and conducted as a separate mission. If conducted as a
mission that does not involve crossing additional elements, planning and consideration should be given to
the recovery of the crossing assets. If the crossing is a precursor to a larger, follow-on crossing, recovery of
the crossing assets may be accomplished as part of that follow-on task. If the covert gap crossing is being
used as a precursor to a deliberate crossing and is detected by the enemy, the higher headquarters may need

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

to reevaluate other potential crossing sites before conducting the deliberate crossing. A contingency plan
must always be included in the planning of covert missions in the event that the mission is compromised. A
covert crossing should not be confused with the assault phase of a deliberate gap crossing.
4-21. Common crossing means to facilitate a covert crossing include the use of rope bridges, infantry foot
bridges, RB-15s and rigid inflatable boats, fording, swimming, or aerial insertion. Consideration must be
given to recovering the crossing assets no matter which means is used.

GAP-CROSSING FUNDAMENTALS
4-22. Successful gap crossing is characterized by applying gap-crossing fundamentals. These fundamentals
are applied when a gap is encountered in the operational area. These fundamentals are—
 Surprise.
 Extensive preparation (less for hasty crossing).
 Flexible planning.
 Traffic management.
 Organization.
 Speed.

SURPRISE
4-23. The range and lethality of modern weapons allow a smaller force to defeat a larger exposed force
while caught in a position of having to cross a gap. A gap provides this possibility by—
 Limiting a force to a small number of crossing sites.
 Splitting the force combat power on both sides of the gap.
 Exposing the force to fires while crossing the gap.
4-24. Surprise minimizes disadvantages and prevents the enemy from massing forces or fires at a crossing
site. Factors that contribute to surprise during gap crossing include deception and ensuring operations
security. A deception plan reinforces the enemy predisposition to believe that the force will take a particular
COA. The enemy usually expects a crossing; however, it does not know where or when. A deception plan
that employs reconnaissance, site preparations, force buildup, and preparatory fires at a time or location other
than the intended crossing area may delay an effective enemy response to the true crossing. Commanders
enforce security measures (camouflage, noise, thermal, electromagnetic, light discipline). In particular,
commanders closely control movement and concealment of gap-crossing equipment and other obvious gap-
crossing preparations. Despite modern technologies, the skillful use of night obscurants can still be effective.

EXTENSIVE PREPARATION
4-25. Comprehensive intelligence of the enemy composition and disposition and crossing area terrain must
be developed early since planning depends on an accurate and complete intelligence picture. Supporting
forces (some may not be present in hasty gap crossing) that typically include MRBCs, mobility augmentation
companies and MACs, air and missile defense and artillery elements, CBRN units with obscuration
capabilities, and military police companies must link up. They immediately begin crossing preparations and
are available to train with the crossing force during rehearsals. Full-scale rehearsals are essential to clarify
roles and procedures, train personnel, inspect equipment, develop teamwork, and ensure unity of effort.
4-26. Commanders plan and initiate a deception plan early to mask the actual preparation. These activities
should conceal the time and the location of the crossing, beginning before and continuing throughout the
preparation period.
4-27. Work necessary to improve routes to handle the traffic volume of the crossing should occur early as
to not interfere with other uses of the routes. This requires a detailed traffic plan carefully synchronized with
the deception plan.

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Chapter 4

FLEXIBLE PLANNING
4-28. Even successful crossings seldom go according to plan. A flexible plan enables the crossing force to
adapt rapidly to changes in the situation during execution. It allows the force to salvage the loss of a crossing
site or to exploit a sudden opportunity. A flexible plan for a gap crossing is the result of thorough staff
planning, not chance. Such a plan features—
 Multiple approach routes from assembly areas to crossing sites.
 Lateral routes to redirect units to alternate crossing sites.
 Alternate crossing sites and staging areas to activate if enemy action closes the primaries.
 Alternate gap-crossing means.
 Crossing equipment held in reserve to replace losses or open alternate sites.
 Multiple crossing means or methods.

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
4-29. Gap crossings force units to move in column formations along a few routes that come together at the
crossing sites. Traffic management is essential to cross units at the proper locations, in the sequence desired,
and as quickly and efficiently as possible to maintain momentum. Traffic management prevents the formation
of targets that are susceptible to destruction by artillery or air strikes. Effective traffic management also
contributes to the flexibility of the plan by enabling commanders to change the sequence, timing, or the site
of crossing units.
4-30. The crossing area commander (CAC) at each echelon is responsible for the movement and positioning
of forces within the respective crossing area. The CAC coordinates and synchronizes the staff’s collective
efforts in managing traffic to ensure that the flow of forces to the gap is balanced with the crossing rate across
the gap.
4-31. The transportation officer develops the unit movement plan according to movement priorities S-3/G-
3 and S-4/G-4 (based largely on the estimated crossing rates developed by engineer and other planners). Each
unit movement officer, normally the S-4, provides the unit vehicle information to the planning headquarters.
The movement plan normally consists of a traffic circulation overlay and a road movement table found in the
sustainment/logistics annex to orders and plans.
4-32. The provost marshal section develops the traffic control plan. Military police implement the traffic
control plan and play a vital role in supporting gap crossings by assisting the commander in controlling traffic
at crossing sites and throughout the crossing area to reduce congestion and promote the efficient movement
of vehicles. The employment of military police for gap crossing is influenced by the mission variables. The
number and placement of military police units supporting a gap crossing vary with the size of the crossing
force, the direction of the crossing (forward or retrograde), and the degree of enemy resistance expected or
encountered.
4-33. Military police direct the crossing units to their proper locations using staging areas, holding areas,
and TCPs to control movement within the crossing area according to the traffic control plan. In most gap
crossings, TCPs and engineer regulating points (ERPs) are located on both sides of the gap to improve
communication and coordination between units. Military police also provide mobile patrols to operate along
primary routes to control traffic, spot problems, guide and escort vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary.
They may operate collection points or holding areas to temporarily secure dislocated civilians and detainees
until they can be evacuated to the next higher echelon holding area to ensure that they do not impede the gap
crossing. For retrograde movement, these personnel (and perhaps their personal items) will typically need to
be included in the crossing timelines. Military police can also conduct area security to the rear and flanks of
crossing forces to enhance security of the crossing unit flanks and rear. (See FM 3.39 and MCWP 3-34.1 for
additional information.) Military police units operating inside the crossing areas are typically under the
operational control of the CAC for the duration of the mission. Military police units operating outside of the
crossing area are under the command of its appropriate echelon commander.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

ORGANIZATION
4-34. Commanders use the same organic command and control nodes for gap crossings as they do for other
missions. These nodes, however, take on additional functions in deliberate gap crossings. For this reason,
commanders specify which nodes and staff positions have specific planning and control duties for the
crossing. Division and BCT/RCT commanders designate a CAC, engineer, and headquarters to specifically
focus on the efforts needed to cross the gap. Additional engineer or maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB)
headquarters may also provide commanders with additional command and control nodes depending on the
size and complexity of the gap crossing. This may require some temporary collocation of headquarters cells
(or individual augmentation) and an increase in communication means. Commanders conducting a deliberate
gap crossing organize their units into assault, assured mobility, bridgehead, and breakout forces.
4-35. Assault forces seize the far side objective to eliminate direct fire on the crossing sites. Assured
mobility forces (such as combat engineer companies, mobility augmentation companies and MACs, bridge
companies, military police, and CBRN units) provide crossing means, traffic control, and obscuration. These
supporting units are task-organized to perform specific tasks and are controlled using specified procedures
that are clear, simple, and rehearsed by all elements to ensure responsive support of the plan and unity of
command and effort.
4-36. A bridgehead force is a force that assaults across a gap to secure the enemy side (the bridgehead)
to allow the buildup and passage of a breakout force during gap crossing. The bridgehead is an area
on the enemy side of the linear obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of the
crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security of crossing
forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack. The bridgehead line is the
limit of the objective area in the development of the bridgehead. Breakout forces attack to seize objectives
beyond the bridgehead as a continuation of the offense.
4-37. The communications network that supports a deliberate crossing is critical to the success of the gap
crossing. The communications network should be planned, and it should support the five phases of the
deliberate gap crossing. Gap crossing is divided into phases for planning purposes only, with no intentional
pauses during execution. This will require early planning and a redundancy of communications. It may even
be desirable to include wire as one of the redundant means of communication. The selected modes of
communications depend on what is available; however, all sites involved in the command and control and
execution (CPs, waiting areas, engineer equipment parks, TCPs, ERPs) should have communication means
capable of monitoring and sending information to every other element that has a role in the crossing. This is
an important consideration to ensure efficient vehicle positioning, traffic flow, and proper crossing sequence.
Figure 4-1, page 4-8, provides a graphic depiction of the minimum communications linkages to support a
deliberate crossing during phase three of the operation. Regardless of the phase, it should be understood that
each node must have a similar communications structure for proper command and control.

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Chapter 4

Legend:
CAE crossing area engineer
CSC crossing site commander
EEP engineer equipment park
ERP engineer regulating point
TAC tactical
TCP traffic control post

Figure 4-1. Communication linkages

SPEED
4-38. A gap crossing in support of maneuver is typically a race between the crossing force and the enemy
to mass combat power on the far side. The longer the force takes to cross, the less likely it will succeed; the
enemy will defeat the elements split by the gap. Speed is so important to crossing success that extraordinary
measures may be justified to maintain it. The commander prevents interference with the flow of vehicles and
units once the crossing begins. Speed, in the context of a deliberate or a hasty crossing, is focused on the
execution of the crossing itself, not necessarily on the rapidity of getting to the gap. Rather, it is focused on
the speed of execution and not allowing crossing units to be defeated by the enemy.

CONTROL MECHANISMS
4-39. A major control mechanism category is graphic control measures. The commander uses graphic
control measures to delineate areas of responsibility for subordinates and to ease traffic control. Figure 4-2
provides a simplistic illustration of the graphic control measures described in the following paragraphs.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

RELEASE LINE
4-40. As used in gap crossing, a release line is used to delineate the crossing area. Release lines are located
on the far side and near side and indicate a change in the headquarters that is controlling movement. Release
lines are normally located within 2 to 2.5 miles of the gap and on easily identifiable terrain features (if
possible). Typically, release lines are graphically identified as PLs. The release line on the near side is usually
out of the range of enemy direct-fire weapons. The release line on the far side delineates an area large enough
for forces to occupy battalion-size attack positions. Collectively, the crossing area is about 4 to 5 miles.

Legend:
CFA call forward area
EEP engineer equipment park
ERP engineer regulating point
PL phase line
RL release line
TCP traffic control post

Figure 4-2. Graphic control measures

CROSSING AREA
4-41. The crossing area is a number of adjacent crossing sites under the control of one commander. It is a
controlled access area for a gap crossing used to decrease traffic congestion at the gap. The crossing area is
defined on both sides of the gap by a release line. In a division crossing, each lead BCT/RCT has a crossing
area that is defined by brigade boundaries and release lines. Crossing areas normally extend 2 to 2.5 miles
on each side of the gap, depending on an assessment of the mission variables. The near side portion of the
crossing area must be large enough to stage the optimal number of units to facilitate a speedy crossing while
preventing congestion and an undesired massing of assets. The far side must provide enough space for the
buildup of sufficient combat power to establish the bridgehead.

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Chapter 4

WAITING AREA
4-42. A waiting area is locations on both banks (or sides) that are adjacent to the route or axis used
for the concealment of vehicles, troops, and equipment while an element is waiting to resume
movement. Commanders use the following waiting areas to conceal vehicles, troops, and equipment while
waiting to resume movement or to make final crossing preparations:
 Staging area.
 Holding area.
 Call forward area.
 Attack position.
 Assault position.
 Assembly area.
4-43. While units are in waiting areas, the unit leadership should take advantage of the time available to
make necessary preparations for the crossing and the mission. Additionally, activities may include anything
extending from the troop leading procedures inherent with the particular mission. For example, if the situation
is defensive in nature, the leadership may review priorities of work. If the situation is offensive, the leadership
may focus on rehearsals. Finally, depending on the time and space available, leaders may want to conduct
some final maintenance checks on vehicles, ensure that items are loaded and secured properly, and conduct
refueling.

Staging Area
4-44. A staging area is a battalion TF-size waiting area outside the crossing area where forces wait to enter
the crossing area. The BCT/RCT traffic control cell handles unit movement into staging areas. The CAC
controls movement from the staging areas into the crossing area. Military police operate TCPs at staging
areas according to the crossing and traffic circulation plans. They emplace temporary signs along the route
from the staging area through the crossing area to guide convoys. Units make crossing preparations and
receive briefings on vehicle speed and spacing in the staging areas. Staging areas—
 Are located to support the crossing concept.
 Are far enough back to permit the rerouting of the battalion along other roads or to alternate
crossing sites.
 Are easily accessible from major routes.
 Have sufficient area for dispersing a battalion-size unit.
 Provide concealment.

Holding Area
4-45. A holding area is a waiting area that forces use during traffic interruptions or deployment from an
aerial or seaport of embarkation. (See FM 3-39.) Units move into these areas when directed by TCP personnel
and disperse rather than stay on the roads. Holding areas are battalion-size areas outside of the crossing area
and company-size areas within the crossing area. Near side holding areas are used to organize return traffic.
Military police and engineers, if available, operate holding areas according to the crossing and traffic
circulation plans. In restrictive terrain, military police platoons and squads may operate defiles, which are
special circulation control measures conducted to keep traffic moving smoothly through a narrow
passageway. (See FM 3-39 and MCWP 3-34.1.) Holding areas are established as needed on both sides of the
gap. Holding areas—
 Are used as call forward areas for return traffic from the far side.
 Are located to support the crossing plan.
 Are easily accessible from routes.
 Have sufficient area for dispersion.
 Provide cover and concealment.
 Are defensible.
 Optimize traffic flow with minimum control.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

Call Forward Area

4-46. The call forward area 1. (Army) in gap crossing, the final preparation waiting area within the
crossing area. 2. (Marine Corps) The area at the departure airfield where plane loads are assembled
in a ready condition before being directed to the loading ramp area. The joint inspection is conducted
in this area. Call forward areas are company-size waiting areas that engineers use to organize units into raft
loads or that crews use to make final vehicle swimming or other crossing preparations depending on if the
unit is crossing a wet or dry gap. The CAC controls movement from the staging area to the call forward area.
The crossing site commander commands the engineers operating the ERPs at the call forward areas for their
site. Call forward areas—
 Are located to support the crossing plan.
 Are easily accessible from designated routes.
 Are planned with a minimum of one per crossing site.
 Have ERPs colocated with them.
 Are used to organize units into crossing means (rafts in a wet-gap crossing) loads.
 Are the final preparation areas before going to the crossing site.
 Are normally operated by engineers.

Attack Position
4-47. An attack position is the last position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing the line of
departure. Within the bridgehead, the attack position is the last position before leaving the crossing area.

Tactical Assembly Area

4-48. An assembly area is an area that is generally out of the reach of light artillery and the location where
units make final preparations (precombat checks and inspections) and rest before moving to the line of
departure. (See JP 3-35.) As such, it should have good road access, offer cover and concealment, and be
positioned so that it supports follow-on tactical maneuver.

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT PARK

4-49. An engineer equipment park is an area located a convenient distance from crossing sites for
assembling, preparing, and storing bridge and other crossing equipment and materiel. They are at least 0.6
miles from the gap and hold spare equipment and empty trucks that are not required at the crossing sites.
Engineer equipment parks should be located where they do not interfere with the traffic to the crossing sites
and where equipment can be concealed and dispersed. Ideally, routes leading from engineer equipment parks
to the crossing sites are not the same routes used by units crossing the gap.

TRAFFIC CONTROL POST

4-50. A traffic control post is a manned post used to preclude interruption of traffic flow or movement along
designated routes (FM 3-39). A TCP is used to support law and order or maneuver and mobility support tasks
when required to facilitate movement. In deliberate gap crossings, TCP personnel assist the crossing area
headquarters in traffic control by reporting and regulating the movement of units and convoys. TCP personnel
relay messages between the crossing area headquarters and moving units. The provost marshal identifies
locations that need or require TCPs. Military police or engineers, if available, operate TCPs on both sides of
the gap to control traffic moving toward or away from the gap. TCPs are additionally operated at major or
critical crossroads and road junctions, staging areas, holding areas, and ERPs. If necessary, military police
may also establish a detainee or dislocated civilian collection point to prevent traffic interruption. Additional
military police augmentation may be needed from a higher military police command, depending on the
amount of traffic and numbers of detainees and dislocated civilians in the area.

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Chapter 4

ENGINEER REGULATING POINT

4-51. An engineer regulating point is a checkpoint to ensure that vehicles do not exceed the capacity
of the crossing means and to give drivers final instructions on site-specific procedures and information,
such as speed and vehicle interval. See appendix I for additional information on the ERP layout. An ERP
helps maintain traffic flow. Vehicles that will not be allowed to cross are removed so that they do not cause
a traffic backup at the actual crossing site. Engineers operate the ERPs and report to the crossing site
commander. TCPs are colocated with the ERPs to ensure that the vehicles clear the call forward areas. At a
minimum, each crossing site requires an ERP at its own call forward area. If sufficient engineer assets are
available, ERPs may be established at far side holding areas to regulate rearward traffic. The ERP may be
used to issue crossing-specific safety equipment and information. Safety equipment may need to be recovered
on the far side to sustain the operation. (See appendix G for additional information on ERPs.)

CONTROL ELEMENTS
4-52. Commanders organize their staffs and subordinate commanders to help them control the crossing.
Division and brigade/regimental headquarters operate from a command group, main CP, and tactical CP. The
CP tasks associated with a deliberate gap crossing are shown in table 4-1 in relation to the five phases of a
deliberate gap crossing.
4-53. Key leaders and CPs are positioned where they can best control critical aspects of the crossing without
losing the ability to respond to changing situations. Some hasty dry-gap crossings may not require all of the
control elements discussed.
Table 4-1. CP tasks
Phases
Advance to the Assault Across Advance From Secure the Continue the
CPs Gap the Gap the Far side Bridgehead Line Attack

Division • Coordinates • Continues to • Coordinates • Coordinates • Coordinates

Main CP operations coordinate operations operations operations
in-depth to operations in-depth to in-depth to in-depth to
isolate the in-depth to isolate exit isolate the isolate the
crossing area isolate the bank and bridgehead. enemy attack
and far side crossing area intermediate • Sustains the against corps
objectives. and far side objectives. fight. objectives.
• Sustains the objectives. • Sustains the • Sustains the
• Synchronizes
fight. • Sustains the fight. the overall fight.
• Synchronizes fight. • Synchronizes traffic • Synchronizes
the overall • Synchronizes the overall management the overall
traffic the overall traffic effort. traffic
management traffic management management
effort. management effort. effort.
effort.
Division • Coordinates • Coordinates • Assists the • Coordinates • Directs the
Tactical CP the division the division BCTs/RCTs the lead attack and
seizure of dismounted in the BCT/RCT integrates
near side assault of the transition to seizure and follow-on
objectives. gap to attack seize and securing of BCTs/RCTs
positions on secure the bridgehead into the attack.
the far side. exit bank, objectives.
intermediate,
and
bridgehead
objectives.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

Table 4-1. CP tasks (continued)

Phases
Advance to the Assault Across Advance From Secure the Continue the
Gap the Gap the Far side Bridgehead Line Attack
CPs
Engineer • Coordinates • Facilitates • Coordinates • Manages • Manages
Brigade, marking, BCT/RCT marking, crossing crossing.
Maneuver control, and assault control, and activity.
Enhance- improvement crossings. improvement
ment of routes from • Coordinates of routes and
Brigade, or the staging the the
different areas to the preparation of establishment
BCT/RCT crossing far side exit of holding
(Division sites. sites. areas in the
Crossing • Lays out far side
• Begins rafting
Area HQ) staging, crossing area.
and bridging.
holding, and • Manages
CFAs. crossing
• Establishes activities.
ERPs and
TCPs.
BCT/RCT • Coordinates • Coordinates • Coordinates • Coordinates • Prepares to
Tactical CP the lead TF the the TF attack the TF seizure reorganize and
seizure and dismounted to seize and and securing of follow the
securing of assault secure exit bridgehead breakout force
near side crossing of bank and objectives. attack out of
objectives. the gap to intermediate the bridgehead
secure the far objectives. toward the
side division
objectives. objectives.
BCT/RCT • Positions to • Coordinates • Controls • Controls the • Passes
Main CP best control assault follow-on TFs passage of the crossing area
(BCT/RCT traffic, crossing passing BCT/RCT units control to
Crossing crossing means for through the through the division
Area HQ) means, and dismounted crossing area crossing area crossing area
obscuration. TFs and into attack and prepares headquarters
controls positions. to cross or the division
obscuration of breakout main CP as
the crossing forces. directed.
sites.
Legend:
BCT brigade combat team
CP command post
CFA call forward area
ERP engineer regulating point
HQ headquarters
RCT regimental combat team
TCP traffic control post
TF task force

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
4-54. The division tactical CP (as an extension of the main CP) controls the lead BCT/RCT (bridgehead
force) attack across the gap. This CP coordinates and synchronizes movement from the attack positions on
the far side of the gap. As the battle develops, the division tactical CP may identify the need to reallocate
crossing means between units and adjust movements along routes. These adjustments are coordinated through
the division crossing area headquarters.
4-55. The division main CP, normally supported by an engineer brigade or MEB, prepares the gap-crossing
plan. It also directs the division operations in-depth to isolate the bridgehead from enemy reinforcements and
counterattacking formations. The division main CP controls movement from its rear boundary up to the near

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Chapter 4

side release line. The movement cell within the main CP must work closely with the division crossing area
headquarters (normally the headquarters of the engineer brigade or MEB that is supporting the crossing) to
facilitate synchronized overall traffic management and prevent traffic congestion in the crossing area. As a
rule, the main CP typically waits to displace across the gap until after the division reserve has crossed.

Crossing Area Commander

4-56. The division commander typically designates one of the deputy commanders as the division CAC.
The division CAC focuses on the activities involved in getting the division to and across the gap. The CAC
is responsible for the movement of forces approaching the gap and within the division crossing area. Terrain
management within the crossing area is critical to ensure that the staging of units is supportive of the crossing
plan. The CAC ensures that the overall traffic management effort is synchronized to ensure the flow of forces
to the gap is balanced with the crossing rate across the gap. This aims to achieve a speedy crossing while
preventing congestion and an undesired massing of assets.

Crossing Area Engineer

4-57. A division conducting a deliberate crossing will normally be task-organized with an engineer brigade
or MEB to assist in planning and executing the crossing. The commander of this engineer brigade or MEB
will normally function as the division crossing area engineer, and their headquarters typically serves as the
division crossing area headquarters.
4-58. The primary function of the crossing area headquarters is to control the crossing means within the
crossing area and ensure that the execution of the crossing plan supports the scheme of movement and
maneuver and the commander’s intent. The crossing area engineer provides additional staff planners for the
division main and tactical CPs, as required. The crossing area engineer coordinates engineer support to the
BCT/RCT CACs.
4-59. The division crossing area headquarters remains functional until the division has completed the
crossing or is relieved by a follow-on force. If an MEB is tasked as the division crossing area headquarters,
a second MEB will generally need to be assigned to the division to focus on the other recurring MEB missions
in the division AO.

BRIGADE/REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS
4-60. The BCT/RCT tactical CP controls the assault across the gap and the movement from the attack
positions on the far side of the gap. It displaces across the gap as soon as practicable after the assault to
control the fight for the exit side and the intermediate and bridgehead objectives.
4-61. The BCT/RCT main CP, typically supported by an engineer battalion, prepares the brigade crossing
plan. The main CP controls an assured mobility force that consists of an engineer battalion headquarters with
bridge companies and other engineer capabilities, military police, and perhaps CBRN units with obscuration
capabilities. This headquarters provides the staff nucleus to control the battalion TF movement from the rear
boundary up to the bridgehead line. For brigade crossings, the S-4/G-4, assisted by the supporting military
police platoon leader, the company commander, or the BCT/RCT provost marshal or engineers (if available),
organizes a small, temporary traffic control cell colocated with the BCT/RCT main CP. This cell conducts
coordination with the division movement center for movement control and overall traffic management.

Crossing Area Commander

4-62. The BCT/RCT CAC, normally a deputy commander or an executive officer, focuses on the activities
involved in getting the BCT/RCT to and across the gap. The CAC is responsible for the movement and
positioning of elements transiting or occupying positions within the crossing area. The BCT/RCT CAC is
also responsible for security elements at crossing sites. The CAC works closely with the BCT/RCT crossing
area engineer and movement control cell to ensure that the staging and flow of forces to the gap is balanced
with the crossing rate across the gap to achieve a speedy crossing while preventing congestion and an
undesired massing of assets.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

Crossing Area Engineer

4-63. Each lead BCT/RCT will normally be task-organized with an engineer battalion headquarters and
subordinate assured mobility elements to support a deliberate crossing. The engineer battalion commander
normally functions as the BCT/RCT crossing area engineer, and their headquarters serves as the BCT/RCT
crossing area headquarters (which is typically colocated with the BCT/RCT main CP).
4-64. The crossing area engineer is responsible to the CAC for moving the BCT/RCT forces across the gap.
To accomplish this, the crossing area engineer is assigned control of the engineer crossing means and sites
within the supported unit crossing area. While unlikely, if multiple engineer battalions are required to
accomplish a BCT/RCT deliberate crossing, an engineer brigade (or perhaps an MEB) would typically
provide command and control, and the engineer brigade commander would serve as the crossing area
engineer. The crossing area engineer informs the CAC of changes due to equipment, operator difficulties, or
threat variances that render a crossing means inoperable or reduce its capacity. The crossing area engineer
only commands those engineers tasked to move the BCT/RCT forces across the gap, not the engineers that
are organic to the BCT/RCT or those that are task-organized to support the BCT/RCT after it crosses the gap.

Crossing Site Commander

4-65. A crossing site commander is designated for each crossing site. The crossing site commander is
responsible for all crossing means at that site and for crossing the units that are sent there. This officer
commands the engineers operating the crossing means and the ERPs at the call forward areas for that site.
The crossing site commander is normally an engineer officer and, typically, the company commander or
platoon leader for the bridge unit operating the site. The crossing site commander maintains the crossing site
and decides on the immediate action needed to remove broken or damaged vehicles that interfere with
activities at the site. The crossing site commander is responsible to the crossing area engineer and keeps the
crossing area engineer informed on the status of the site.

MARINE CORPS
4-66. When conducting MAGTF gap crossing, Marine Corps bridging units will task-organize their
headquarters to provide supported units with a single point for coordination of crossing sites and procedures.
The core of this organization will come from the engineer support battalion of the Marine logistics group that
is providing the bridging assets. The engineer support battalion is not traditionally organic to the ground
combat element. Therefore, each maneuver unit requiring a deliberate gap-crossing capability will coordinate
support through the RCT headquarters where the crossing area engineer (engineer support battalion bridge
company commander) may reside.

GAP CROSSING PLANNING

4-67. The discussion in chapter 2 on planning mobility applies to gap crossing; however, force allocation
against enemy units has an added dimension of time as affected by the crossing rate. Friendly forces can only
arrive on the battlefield at the rate at which they can be brought across the gap. This rate will change at
various times throughout the crossing. The rate at which combat forces need to cross will directly affect the
number of crossing sites. This requires commanders to balance tactics with the crossing rate.
4-68. It is important to verify accurate calculations are presented to planners for gap crossing resourcing.
For initial planning, simple calculations and standards are typically used to produce quick but useful force
buildup information. Iterative calculations are done after the commander selects a specific COA and engineer
planners proceed with the detailed crossing calculations necessary to produce the crossing plan. Crossing
calculations are critical to COA evaluation and are required to ensure that force buildup supports the COA.
4-69. An engineer battalion headquarters will typically be task-organized to support each BCT crossing and
assist with the development of the detailed crossing plan. In the Marine Corps, a bridge company from an
engineer support battalion will typically be task-organized (and reinforced) to provide this support for an
RCT crossing. Once the RCT has crossed the gap, the task-organized bridge company, in conjunction with
the remainder of the engineer support battalion, will operate the crossing site to meet the mobility

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Chapter 4

requirements of the remaining MAGTF elements. Subordinate battalions within the BCT/RCT will further
develop the tactical plans necessary to seize their respective assigned objectives.

MISSION ANALYSIS/PROBLEM FRAMING

4-70. During mission analysis/problem framing, the staff identifies the requirements for gap crossings based
on its analysis of the unit mission, the commander’s intent, the scheme of movement and maneuver two levels
up, the identification of specified and implied tasks, and the presence of gaps (obstacles) within the AO as
part of IPB. The staff exploits terrain analysis to identify gaps along the maneuver routes to provide
subordinate units the resources to conduct the necessary gap crossings.
4-71. Identifying the location of gaps and the purpose of the crossings assists the commander in determining
potential crossing sites. For example, if it is possible to bypass a site, the commander may choose to alter the
movement route to prevent the need for a crossing. Likewise, if it is proven that the gap must be crossed, it
will provide clarity as to the type of crossing (deliberate, hasty, or covert [wet or dry]) and the assets required.
Reconnaissance is critical in supporting the commander’s decisionmaking.
4-72. Once a gap-crossing requirement is identified, the staff must—
 Determine the crossing means (type and amount of crossing assets required) based on gap
characteristics, the capabilities of available crossing assets, and the size and type of units
conducting the crossing.
 Determine the focused type of crossing (deliberate, hasty, or covert) based on the commander’s
guidance and the projected operational situation.
 Select crossing sites based on the scheme of movement and maneuver (to include the projected
number and type of vehicles), the enemy disposition, terrain considerations, and the capabilities
of available crossing assets (see appendix H for retrograde movement).
 Estimate crossing rates (force buildup) based on the available crossing means and the number of
crossing sites.

Determine Crossing Means

4-73. Crossing means are determined based on the characteristics of the gap and the capabilities and
availability of crossing assets. (See appendix E for information on crossing means and organizations.)
Additionally, the number and type of vehicles (tracked and wheeled) making the crossing can impact the type
of crossing equipment involved and the emplacement duration. The ability to swim or ford certain vehicles
may provide a reduction in the use of other gap-crossing means. Aviation (rotary-wing) support may also
provide a crossing means. (See FM 3-04.111.)

Gap Characteristics
4-74. Detailed knowledge of the gap and adjacent terrain (near side and far side) is critical to tactical
planning (number and location of crossing sites) and engineer technical planning (crossing means). The
characteristics of gaps are those variables that affect gap crossings, to include gap size (width, depth, length),
soil composition (soil stability, banks and river/stream bottoms), and water conditions (depth, current
velocity).
4-75. The senior engineer staff officer at each echelon works together with the S-2/G-2 and the organic or
supporting geospatial engineer element to obtain the necessary geospatial data to generate the geospatial
information to facilitate planning and enable decisionmaking. (See ATP 3-34.80 for additional information
on geospatial engineering and the generation of geospatial data in support of terrain analysis.)
4-76. Any uncertainties about gaps and the adjacent terrain become IRs that are fulfilled through the
execution of the information collection plan, including engineer reconnaissance. (See FM 3-34.170
/MCWP 3-17.4.) Imagery can be used to generate geospatial information concerning the depth and turbidity
of the water. Engineer light diving teams may be available to provide far side, near side, water bottom, and
underwater obstacle information. Local inhabitants can also be a source of information about existing bridges,
flow, bank stability, road networks, ford sites, and other gap conditions.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

Availability of Crossing Assets

4-77. The engineer staff officer determines the amount of bridging, the number of possible heavy rafts, and
the number of likely assault boats needed for each lead BCT/RCT. The engineer staff officer uses the
planning factor of two vehicle swim or assault boat (for dismounted battalions) sites and two rafting or
bridging sites (at a minimum) for each lead BCT/RCT. Based on these requirements, the engineer staff officer
identifies obvious capability shortfalls to perform a gap crossing and submits augmentation requests to the
higher headquarters as early in the planning phase as possible. Requests for augmentation include the
necessary supporting information that outlines the amount and type of assets needed based on gap
characteristics and the number of crossing sites needed.

Select the Crossing Site

4-78. Crossing site selection is one of the most important planning considerations for a successful gap
crossing. The crossing site must support the desired scheme of movement and maneuver, the size and type
of units and types of vehicles (tracked and wheeled) conducting the crossing, and the available crossing
means. In some cases, the preferred crossing sites in terms of the gap crossing are not located in an area that
best supports the larger tactical operation. Other times, the preferred crossing site does not support the
available crossing means. The enemy disposition along the gap can also limit options for the commander. To
resolve these challenges, planners must understand the complexities associated with selecting a crossing site.
4-79. Reconnaissance, specifically engineer reconnaissance, is critical to the success of crossing site
selection. (Selecting crossing sites is discussed further in appendix F.) The IRs that are deemed important
enough to the commander are recommended as priority intelligence requirements. The following are
examples of IRs for gap crossings:
 Location of enemy positions that can place direct or observed indirect fires on crossing sites and
approaches.
 Location and type of enemy obstacles, particularly mines, in the water (wet gap) or internal to the
ditch and on entry or exit banks and approaches.
 Location of enemy reserves that can counterattack assault units.
 Location of enemy artillery that can range crossing sites, staging areas, and approaches.
 Location and condition of existing crossing sites.
 Width, depth, and water velocity (of a wet gap).
 Condition and profile of the gap (wet or dry) bottom.
 Height, slope, and stability of the banks.
 Condition of near side and far side road networks (access and approach roads).
4-80. Because the gap physically splits the crossing force, gap crossings are conducted where the enemy is
most vulnerable or least able to react. As part of the IPB, the S-2/G-2 ensures that the enemy SITEMP extends
along the entire gap that the unit must cross to help determine possible areas of weakness, enemy
counterattack forces, artillery, and potential close air support. The engineer staff officer templates enemy
obstacles on the SITEMP and provides updates based on obstacle intelligence generated from information
collection efforts.
4-81. In coordination with the crossing area engineer (who is responsible for controlling crossing means),
the engineer staff officer works together with the S-2/G-2 and the geospatial engineer team to determine
potential crossing sites.
4-82. Potential crossing sites are then evaluated based on technical and tactical considerations, including—
 Entry and exit road networks (accessibility).
 Cross-country movement.
 Width, depth, and velocity (wet gap) of the gap.
 Conditions of the banks (as they support each of the four types of sites).
 Vegetation along the shores (wet gap).
 Obstacles in or along the gap.
 Obstacles immediately affecting the approaches to or from potential crossing sites.

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Chapter 4

 Possible attack positions and routes to the gap.

 Possible call forward areas.
 Projected weather conditions and the potential impacts.
 Environmental considerations as appropriate.

Estimate Crossing Rates

4-83. During mission analysis, the engineer staff officer quickly converts raw geospatial data (gap
characteristics of potential crossing sites), available (and likely) crossing means, and friendly force
information into initial estimated crossing rates to facilitate the generation of supportable schemes of
maneuver during COA development. The engineer staff officer also identifies the effort (tasks) needed to
open or use potential crossing sites. The following planning factors are used for the number of crossing
sites—
 Two vehicle swim sites or two assault boat sites for dismounted battalions.
 Two rafting or bridging sites for each lead BCT/RCT
4-84. The engineer staff officer identifies the crossing sites required for each subordinate unit based
primarily on the number and type of vehicles. This calculation is based on simple assumptions of vehicle
densities within the task organization of subordinate units at full strength. From it, the engineer staff officer
determines the approximate time necessary to cross the entire unit by using the crossing capacity for each
site (raft loads per hour for rafting and vehicles per hour for bridging). The engineer staff officer ensures that
crossing requirements of each lead BCT/RCT and breakout force are adequately resourced to satisfy each
COA. Other crossing means (such as rotary-wing assets) should also be factored into the calculations.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

4-85. COAs are developed by incorporating the results of mission analysis and the gap-crossing
fundamentals. The staff combines its understanding of the effects of terrain (observation and fields of fire,
avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment [Army]/key terrain, obstacles, and
cover and concealment, observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach [Marine Corps]) and the enemy
disposition along the gap (and along selected approaches) with its knowledge of crossing means, potential
crossing sites, and estimated crossing rates to sketch out possible COAs with crossing objectives. The
S-3/G-3 ensures that each COA being developed includes the—
 Assigned crossing area or crossing site and the order of crossing.
 Crossing timeline for each COA (developed by the engineer staff officer). (See figure 4-3.)
 Boundaries (include terrain that is necessary to defend the bridgehead against enemy
counterattacks).
4-86. Looking two levels down, the staff plans an assault crossing site (vehicle fording or assault boat) for
each anticipated assault battalion in a BCT/RCT area. A BCT/RCT should also have two bridging or rafting
sites within its boundaries as a norm.
4-87. The S-3/G-3 looks closely at the avenues leading to mission objectives, particularly at crossing sites
feeding the avenues. Developing COAs is normally an iterative process. The staff develops a scheme of
movement and maneuver to take the final objective and verifies that the force buildup rate across the gap is
adequate for the scheme of movement and maneuver. If so, the S-3/G-3 expands the COAs to include the
tactics required for the crossing.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

Legend:
BEB brigade engineer battalion
BN battalion
H hour
TF task force

Figure 4-3. Example of a BCT/RCT crossing timeline for a COA

4-88. The tactics required for the crossing are based on enemy defenses near the crossing sites, enemy
reaction forces and earliest employment times, and crossing rates at each site. The COAs must include exit
bank, intermediate, and bridgehead objectives.
4-89. The S-3/G-3, working with the engineer staff officer and crossing area engineer, develops the control
mechanisms, crossing graphics, crossing timeline, and crossing area overlay for each COA. This planning
assists the higher headquarters in refining the overall plan by providing the specifics necessary for their
portion of the crossing. The crossing overlay shows the crossing areas, the crossing sites, the routes leading
up to them from waiting areas, and the control measures necessary for the crossing. Gap crossing as part of
a retrograde movement, especially if under enemy pressure and across a wet gap, will impose additional
considerations for the commander.
4-90. The engineer staff officer—
 Recommends sites.
 Determines vehicle swimming, assault boat, rafting and bridging configurations, and bank
preparation requirements.
 Task-organizes engineer units for each COA.
4-91. During COA development, the engineer staff officer addresses requirements for—
 Recovering. The recovery of tactical bridging after the crossing enables the continuation of
movement. Typically, tactical bridging assets that are task-organized to a BCT/RCT are recovered
on the far side of the gap and remain task-organized within the BCT/RCT to facilitate future gap-
crossing requirements. If the situation does not allow the BCT/RCT to recover those crossing
assets, plans must be adjusted to determine how its future gap-crossing requirements will be met.
The recovery of support and LOC bridging assets is more resource intensive and time consuming
and generally requires a large, open area to stage and maneuver the necessary recovery equipment.
Support and LOC bridging is generally not recovered until the tactical operation is complete
because of the vulnerability of the personnel and equipment needed to perform recovery.
 Sustaining. Sustaining crossing equipment depends on the type of crossing means. In addition to
normal maintenance and inspections of the crossing equipment, bridge transport vehicles must

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Chapter 4

also be serviced. While each type of bridge has its own criteria to ensure that it operates effectively
and in a safe manner, there are other considerations to ensure that the crossing equipment is not
damaged while in service. Maintaining access roads, abutments, shorelines, piers, anchorage
systems, and bridge roadway surfaces helps minimize stress on the bridge, lengthen the overall
lifespan, and ensure that the load capacity is not compromised. Divers assist in installing impact
booms, antimine booms, and antiswimmer nets to prevent damage caused by waterborne
munitions and collision by floating debris. Antiswimmer nets are placed upstream and
downstream to protect bridges from enemy swimmers or underwater demolition teams.
 Replacing. There are no absolute rules concerning bridge emplacement duration; however, each
bridge has a primary purpose and a finite number of tracked and wheeled crossings that it can
safely support. Tactical bridging is intended to support maneuver forces. Its duration of
emplacement is generally brief, since it is typically recovered to be able to support other immediate
requirements to maintain the momentum. Tactical bridging is usually replaced by support bridging
if the crossing is to be maintained for a period after the maneuver elements are across the gap.
However, contingency operations may require that tactical crossing assets be used for longer
periods because support bridging may not be feasible or readily available. In these instances,
engineer units must implement techniques that allow long-term use of tactical bridging assets
without negatively impacting missions or damaging equipment. Support bridging generally
remains in place until it is determined that it is needed elsewhere, it is no longer needed, or it
becomes clear that the bridging is located on a LOC route. LOC bridging should be considered as
a replacement if the bridge is located on a primary movement route, supports a considerable
amount of traffic, or is intended to serve for an extended period.
4-92. The crossing synchronization matrix is a tool to adjust the crossing plan as the battle develops. (See
figure 4-4.) It shows crossing units in relation to their planned crossing times and locations. The crossing
overlay, in conjunction with the crossing synchronization matrix, provides critical information to
commanders as they depict the locations of critical command and control nodes and detail unit crossing
schedules and locations while they are within the crossing area.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS/WAR GAMING

4-93. The staff war games each COA against likely enemy actions and unexpected events and adjusts the
plan as necessary by incorporating such things as alternate sites, routes, and crossing means. War gaming
should address actions to take if—
 Bridging equipment fails or is lost to enemy action.
 Crossing sites take longer than expected to open.
 Damage slows progress over entrance and exit routes.
 Conditions of the gap change (water depth, current velocity).
 Enemy actions shut down a crossing site or force it to be relocated.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON/COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

4-94. The staff compares each COA against requirements for immediate and follow-on missions, including
the movement of reserve and sustainment/combat service support forces. The staff considers the ability of
each COA in handling enemy responses, dealing with dislocated civilians, and allowing for crossing
redundancy.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Maneuver

Legend:
BN battalion
BSB brigade support battalion
BSTB brigade special troops battalion
CAB combined arms battalion
FA field artillery
H hour
RECON reconnaissance
SQDN squadron

Figure 4-4. Example of a BCT/RCT crossing synchronization matrix

COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL AND ORDERS PRODUCTION/DEVELOPMENT

4-95. Once the commander has selected and approved a COA, the staff converts the selected COA into a
plan with sufficient detail for synchronized execution. Concurrently, the engineer staff officer immediately
issues a fragmentary order or warning order to the engineer headquarters executing the crossing and refines
and fully develops the crossing capability chart, crossing timeline, crossing site overlay, and crossing
synchronization matrix. Collectively, these documents support dissemination of the commander’s approved
COA and permit the S-3/G-3 to monitor its execution. The engineer staff officer works together with the
S-3/G-3, S-4/G-4, transportation officer, and the provost marshal in developing a crossing synchronization
matrix, movement schedule, and traffic control plan.
4-96. While detailed planning continues, the crossing area engineer coordinates through the engineer staff
officer and the S-3/G-3 of the supported unit for far side and near side reconnaissance to generate the detailed
information needed to facilitate planning refinement and to enable subordinate unit planning. The crossing
area engineer develops a detailed engineer task list and an engineer execution matrix to synchronize the task
list. The crossing plan is as detailed as time permits. Much, but not all, of the crossing plan is integrated
within the supported maneuver unit operation order.

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 PART THREE

Enable Movement
Mobility that overcomes obstacles and enable movement require combat engineering,
general engineering, military police, and other mobility support capabilities. These
missions are generally not in close support of ground maneuver forces in close combat
and are usually not performed under fire, although the threat of fire may exist. Mobility
tasks in support of movement include—
 Gap crossing in support of movement (primarily LOC gap-crossing
support).
 Clearing (route and area).
 Building combat roads and trails.
 Performing FACE.
 Conducting traffic management and enforcement.

Chapter 5
Gap Crossing in Support of Movement
The LOC bridging is employed primarily to support the movement of the forces
outside of BCT/RCT AOs to enable sustainment and other movement. A LOC gap
crossing must be capable of effectively and efficiently supporting the uninterrupted
flow of forces, equipment, personnel, supplies, and support for sustained ground
operations for U.S. and multinational forces, host nation forces, and dislocated
civilians.

OVERVIEW
5-1. The LOC bridges are generally constructed in areas free from the direct influence of enemy action,
although this does not mean that protection/force protection against attacks by air and ground forces is not
considered. Generally, their emplacement is not time constrained in a tactical sense. Thorough
reconnaissance, planning, and site preparation are essential because of the load to be carried, the potential
length of service (relative to tactical or support bridging), and the longer spans (usually) of LOC bridges.
5-2. While LOC gap crossings vary in size, scope of work, and bridge type, their purpose is primarily
sustainment of the force. To ensure sustainment/combat service support and that other forces are able to move
freely and without delay throughout the operational area, it is imperative that LOC crossings support the
movement plan, are able to handle high volumes of various types of traffic, and do not require levels of
maintenance or replacement that would impede traffic flow for extended periods. There are two principle
methods to accomplish LOC gap crossings:
 Military or contracted panel bridging.
 Nonstandard bridging.

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Chapter 5

5-3. Contingency-purchased, commercially procured panel bridging is better maintained than the Bailey,
but it normally requires special training to emplace and sustain. New construction LOC nonstandard bridging
involves general engineering units and requires weeks instead of days to complete. Generally, nonstandard
bridging is built in areas free from the direct influence of enemy action; however, this does not mean that
protection/force protection against attacks by air and ground threats is not considered. This is an important
factor; it requires a large organizational footprint of manpower and equipment. Additionally, nonstandard
bridging is built with the assumption that once emplaced, it will not be removed until a more permanent
structure can replace it or it is no longer needed.
5-4. The scope of work required for LOC bridging is based on the gap size and type (wet or dry), enemy
activity, terrain, site preparation requirements, entry and exit routes, the type of bridge to be installed, loads
to be supported, and the availability of resources. A detailed reconnaissance early in the process should
identify as much of this information as possible to assist the staff engineer in planning and resourcing the
bridge construction.

BRIDGING TYPES
5-5. A LOC bridging is normally nonstandard-fixed or commercially procured bridging. It can, however,
include the Bailey bridge (standard-fixed bridge), rafting, or ferrying for limited durations. Considerations
for bridge selection include bridge availability, time constraints, access to the bridge site, amount and type
of crossing vehicles, and the number of crossings. Table 5-1 depicts those bridges that are currently being
used (or could temporarily serve) as LOC bridging by U.S. and multinational forces.
Table 5-1. U.S. and select allied LOC bridging
Country Name or Nomenclature Span in Feet MLC
United States M2 Bailey 80 Triple Single 80T/85W
M2 Bailey 110 Triple Double 90T/90W
M2 Bailey 170 Triple Triple 70T/70W
LSB 200 80T/110W
Canada MGB—
• SS 30 70
• DS 100 70
• DS with LRS 160 70
Acrow® 700XS 157 60
Germany Faltfestbruke 148 70
United Kingdom BR 90 184 70T/105W
M3 Bailey 200 80
LSB 200 80T/110W
MGB—
• SS 30 70
• DS 100 70
• DS with LRS 160 70
Legend:
DS double story MLC military load classification
LRS link reinforcement set SS single story
LSB logistics support bridge T tracked
MGB medium girder bridge W wheeled

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Movement

Nonstandard Bridging
5-6. Engineers design nonstandard bridges to match specific conditions of a particular site when standard
bridges are not available, the bridge is unable to handle the volume and weight of the anticipated traffic, the
bridge is needed forward of the proposed bridge site, or the bridge is expected to remain in place indefinitely.
Available structural materials, site details, proposed traffic, and time will influence the design. The design of
military nonstandard-fixed bridges is similar to that of civilian fixed bridges. Military methods, however,
include several simplifications and assumptions about the loads to be carried, type of construction, and
material types available. For nonstandard bridging, steel stringers are desired with laminated, plank, or
concrete decking and plank or asphalt as a wearing surface. (See TM 3-34.22/MCRP 3-17.1B.)
5-7. Before considering new construction, engineers should conduct a reconnaissance to determine if there
are existing bridges that are intact, if a detour or bypass is available, or if there are existing bridges that can
be reinforced or repaired. If one of these options exists, it is generally more economical and less time
consuming to use one of these alternatives. If an existing bridge is acceptable, it must be classified using
normal military classification procedures. Some examples of nonstandard-fixed bridges that may be
encountered include a timber trestle bridge, steel stringer bridge, composite steel-concrete stringer bridge,
steel girder bridge, truss bridge, reinforced concrete slab bridge, reinforced concrete T-beam bridge,
reinforced concrete box girder bridge, prestressed concrete bridge, arch bridge, suspension bridge, moveable
bridge, or expedient ice bridge. (See TM 3-34.22/MCRP 3-17.1B for detailed information concerning
classification and repair.)

Standard Bridging
5-8. In some cases, it may be necessary to use the Bailey bridge (see TM 3-34.21/MCRP 3-17.1A) or a
DSB (see TM 5-5420-212-10-1) as temporary or semipermanent LOC bridging. If using one of these bridges,
careful consideration must be given to MLC and the volume of traffic to ensure that the bridge can withstand
the desired weight and number of crossings required. Currently, the Bailey bridge is not organic to the
MRBC; however, they are capable of emplacing the bridge. The DSB is organic to the MRBC, and if the
bridge can satisfy the weight and volume requirements, it usually is an option for temporary service.
5-9. Railroad bridging is a LOC bridge and is classified as a standard-fixed or nonstandard-fixed bridge.
The Army does not currently have design criteria for nonstandard railroad bridges nor does it maintain
railroad float bridge equipment. Many variables of standard railroad bridges are available through the Army
Facilities Components System. Construction details and bills of material are given in the TM 5-302 series
(TM 5-302-1, TM 5-302-2, TM 5-302-3, TM 5-302-4, and TM 5-302-5), which supports the Army Facilities
Components System. (See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7 for additional information.)

Rafts, Ferries, and Landing Craft

5-10. Rafts, ferries, landing craft, and other equipment or assets may provide the best solution to crossing a
wet gap. Rafts, ferries, and landing craft are normally used when time is critical, float bridging is unavailable
or impractical, support of a larger deliberate wet-gap crossing is required, or ship-to-shore activities are
involved. Rafting, ferrying, and ship-to-shore activities essentially have the same purpose, to cross a gap.
Unlike bridging that closes the gap, these activities use floating equipment to move between two points across
a wet gap. Each solution for dealing with a gap has advantages and disadvantages, which typically center on
gap specifics; equipment, supplies, or personnel available; equipment types and other items to be crossed;
and the threat situation.

Rafts
5-11. Rafting is most often used as the sole crossing means, although it may be used in conjunction with
other crossing means when it is employed for gap crossing in support of maneuver. Rafting can also serve as
an alternative or temporary solution for LOC bridging. Rafting is typically accomplished with improved
ribbon bridge (IRB) assets that are organic to the MRBC. (See appendix G for additional information on
rafting.)
5-12. Units begin preparations for rafting at a staging area where they receive briefings, conduct inspections,
and rehearse rafting tasks. Personnel will be issued life jackets and given instructions on what to do while

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Chapter 5

loading onto the raft. When ordered to begin rafting, the site commander directs personnel at the ERP in the
call forward area to begin sending raft loads forward. Units proceed from a staging area to the call forward
area where engineers at the ERP organize them into raft loads and send them down to the river. Any points
along the route that may cause confusion (such as intersections) are manned with a guide or marked to ensure
that vehicles do not get lost.
5-13. Once a raft load nears the river, the engineer platoon leader directs it to the appropriate centerline. The
platoon leader controls the flow of traffic to the centerlines to ensure that there is a smooth flow of traffic
and that centerlines are not congested or underused. The platoon leader establishes the timing required so
that raft loads leave the call forward area and match up with a returning empty raft. When a raft load reaches
the riverbank, it is met by an engineer centerline guide. The platoon leader stops the raft load 10 feet from
the edge of the water and holds it there for the raft commander. The raft commander guides the vehicles of
the raft load onto the raft. The raft crew chocks the vehicles and ensures that all passengers are wearing life
jackets. The passengers do not dismount from their vehicles. The hatches are opened to allow quick exit of
the vehicle in case of an emergency. Upon reaching the debarkation point, the raft commander guides the
vehicles off the raft. After the raft load debarks, the raft commander checks with the centerline guide for
return vehicles and returns to the embarkation point. Once on the far side, the centerline guide directs the raft
load to the far side holding area where it reforms. The passengers remove their life jackets, which are
collected and returned by an engineer team to the staging area for future loads.
5-14. Rafts require stops for refueling, preventive maintenance, and minor repairs. The efficiency of the
crossing depends on the rafts having enough fuel and minimal lost time for refueling and normal maintenance.
This efficiency requires the bridge company to intensely manage raft maintenance and to operate the
maintenance area much like a pit crew in an automobile race. When directed, a raft pulls off the centerline
and moves to the crossing site maintenance area. With the raft secured, the crew begins refueling and
maintenance. Mechanics assess and repair any minor damages to the raft and the boats. Fuel handlers run
fuel lines from the fuel source to the bridge boats and fuel them simultaneously. If no major deficiencies are
identified, the entire process requires 20 minutes. If major deficiencies are identified on the boat, it is removed
from the raft and replaced with a spare. The boat will then be removed from the water and sent back to the
engineer equipment park for repair. When refueling and maintenance are finished, the raft returns to its
centerline and another raft is directed in for maintenance and refueling.
5-15. Since the maintenance and refueling is continuous and requires removing a raft from the area for up
to 30 minutes, it is important to account for this reduction in capabilities when planning the mission.
Generally, it is unnecessary to refuel for the first 2 hours after rafting begins. Once raft maintenance and
refueling begin, one of the six rafts in each bridge company is unavailable for carrying vehicles across the
river at all times.
5-16. When a raft becomes damaged and needs immediate repair, the raft commander moves it to the
maintenance area. If a raft loses a boat and cannot make it to the maintenance area without assistance, the
raft commander contacts the maintenance supervisor. The maintenance supervisor sends the maintenance
boat out to assist. If a raft is still carrying a load, the raft commander decides on which bank to disembark
the load. Once the raft is in the maintenance area, mechanics determine the extent of the damage. If the
damage requires significant repair, the raft will be removed and replaced with a spare. Lengthy equipment
repairs are done at the engineer equipment park.

Ferries
5-17. Ferry crossing is similar to rafting with the primary difference being the volume of equipment being
ferried, and they are less likely to be used in support of maneuver. Generally, ferries are used in lower threat
areas, are conducted for extended periods, and have designated crossing times that may be developed into a
standard schedule. Ferries may provide the best crossing solution when bridging assets are unavailable or the
gap is so large that bridging is not feasible. When conducting ferry crossing, it may be necessary to conduct
riverine crossing in conjunction with ferry crossing. In a riverine area, watercraft is the principal means of
transport. In such areas, indigenous personnel often settle along the waterways because they are the primary
means of travel between villages.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Movement

5-18. Civilian traffic, ferrying crossing, and settlements can conceal enemy movement. (See ATP 4-15 for
additional information on riverine crossing.) Ferries are a likely means of supporting LOC requirements in
operational areas that are characterized by the need for riverine support.

Landing Craft
5-19. This section describes a variety of vessels used by the Army and the Marine Corps when conducting
amphibious operations. (See MCWP 3-13 and JP 3-02.) They may also be applicable in support of other
selected wet-gap crossings. Typically, Navy and Marine Corps assault units conduct amphibious operations
and Army amphibians and watercraft are used as floating platforms for on-call supply movement after the
amphibious objective has been secured. The Army can be a part of the assault landing force (LF) in an
amphibious operation.
5-20. The landing craft air cushion (LCAC) is a high-speed, fully amphibious craft capable of carrying a
60-ton payload (75 tons in overload), at speeds in excess of 40 knots, at a nominal range of 200 nautical
miles. (See figure 5-1.) Its primary mission is to land heavy vehicles, equipment, personnel, and cargo in
amphibious assaults. The LCAC offers flexibility by its ability to operate independent of tides and
hydrographic constraint. In some cases, the LCAC will have a significant ability to influence operations
beyond the beach. Weather can affect LCAC operations, but it is less of a factor than for other ship-to-shore
delivery means.

Figure 5-1. LCAC

5-21. The landing craft, Mechanized 8, Modification 2, is an Army vessel that is primarily used for
command and control, moving personnel, or light salvage. (See figure 5-2, page 5-6.) It is normally used in
harbors, inland waterways, and as a command and control vessel for ship-to-shore movements. (See
ATP 4-15 for information on landing craft, Mechanized 8, Modification 2 characteristics and capabilities.)

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 5-5

Chapter 5

Figure 5-2. Landing craft, Mechanized 8, Modification 2

5-22. The two classes of landing craft utility (LCU) (1600 and 2000) are used to land heavy vehicles,
equipment, personnel, and cargo in an amphibious assault. (See figure 5-3 and figure 5-4.) The LCU is a
highly versatile craft. Like other landing crafts, it has been adapted for many uses, to include salvage,
ferryboats for vehicles and passengers, and underwater test platforms. (See ATP 4-15 for information on
LCU characteristics and capabilities.)

Figure 5-3. LCU 1600

Figure 5-4. LCU 2000

5-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Gap Crossing in Support of Movement

5-23. The amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) is an armored assault amphibious full-tracked landing vehicle.
(See figure 5-5.) The vehicle carries troops from ship-to-shore or from shore-to-shore, through rough water
and surf zones. It also carries troops to inland objectives after it comes ashore. The amphibious capability of
the AAV makes it unique among the military land combat systems. The primary responsibility of the AAVs
during an amphibious operation is to spearhead a beach assault. The AAVs disembark from the ship and
come ashore, carrying infantry and supplies to the area to provide a forced entry into the amphibious assault
area for the surface assault element. Once AAVs have landed, they can take on several different tasks.
5-24. Generally, no more than 18 Marines are assigned to a vehicle since more would require precise staging
and seating arrangements that can degrade the ability of embarked personnel to respond to tactical situations.
No more than 21 Marines should be contemplated for ship-to-shore movement.
5-25. The standard AAV comes equipped with an MK-19 grenade launcher and an M2 .50 caliber machine
gun. With a 10,000-pound capacity, the AAV can also be used as a bulk refueler or a field expedient
ambulance. The vehicle has a water speed of 6 to 8 miles per hour and can travel up to 45 miles in the water.
On land, it can travel 15 to 20 miles per hour with a range of 300 miles. (See MCWP 3-13 for additional
information about AAVs.)

Figure 5-5. AAV

SUSTAINMENT, MAINTENANCE, AND REPLACEMENT

5-26. Engineer horizontal and MRBCs, usually under the command and control of an engineer battalion, are
normally responsible for LOC bridge sustainment, maintenance, or replacement depending on the amount
and type of work to be done. Engineer divers provide critical support by providing inspection and repair of
standard and nonstandard bridging while the bridging is in place at the crossing sites. Divers conduct
underwater and surface reconnaissance of bridges to determine structural integrity and capacity. Divers may
be used to repair or reinforce bridge structures and neutralize underwater obstacles in and around the bridge.
(See ATP 3-34.84/MCRP 3-35.9A/NTTP 3-07.7/AFTTP 3-2.75/CGTTP 3-95.17 for additional information.)
Military police control and reroute traffic, as appropriate, around damaged bridges being repaired or while
bridge maintenance is being conducted.
5-27. Organic and special engineer equipment may be augmented from depot stocks, supply points, or other
units or may be commercially procured. Captured equipment, parts, and materiel should also be considered
as possible resources. When speed is essential, stock items are best for efficient maintenance. The responsible
commander should determine the best resources and methods for obtaining materiel. (See
TM 3-34.43/MCRP 3-17.7H/NAVFAC MO 330/AFH 32-1034 for additional information.)

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 5-7

Chapter 5

DECKS
5-28. Decks or roadway surfaces of bridges should be free of stones, mud, ice, and debris to decrease wear
on the surface. Keep flat decks clear with a patrol grader, which throws mud, ice, and debris to the curb where
it can be removed by hand shoveling. A scarifier may help remove ice. If patrol grading is impractical,
shoveling and hand removal of large debris are necessary. A thin tar or asphalt coating densely covered with
sand, pea gravel, or stone chips will reduce the danger of fire on wooden decks. Loose sand, chemical fire
extinguishers, water pumps for river water, or barrels of water are effective resources for fighting bridge
fires.
5-29. Misalignment (caused by simple shifting or structural failure) can be repaired by pulling the deck back
into place with wire cable and tractors. Mechanical or hydraulic jacks may be effective. Misalignment of
major superstructure members is usually caused by movement of the footings. Since this type of
misalignment is difficult to repair, the bridge may have to be reconstructed.
5-30. The principles of firefighting, shifting, and stringer replacement in highway bridges also apply to
railroad bridge decks. Replace burned or damaged ties promptly. Check the rail alignment and guardrails for
shifting and correct any problems. The maintenance patrol or gang should also tighten loose rail spikes, end
joints, hook bolts, and tie-spacer connections. Bridge deck maintenance includes checking the following
items:
 Fastenings. Wooden decks tend to shift under a load. Correct this problem by adding adequate
fastenings to the curb rail, tread, or stringers. If the stringers shift, draw them back into position
and secure them with drift bolts (for timber stringers) or steel bolts (for steel stringers). Redrive
loose nails or add new nails to loose planks. Drift pins or lag screws might be needed in
troublesome spots. Ensure that the clamps for the curbs and handrails are secure.
 Timber treads. Timber deck bridges should have timber treads. Bolt timber treads onto steel grid
floors if the grids show signs of excessive wear. Replace the treads when 10 to 15 percent of the
original surface has worn. A tar or an asphalt coating covered with sand, fine gravel, or stone chips
will prevent excessive splintering and rapid wear.
 Wearing surfaces. Asphalt concrete best protects wearing surfaces of concrete or masonry.
 Stringers. Replace bent, crooked, or rotten stringers by removing and replacing the flooring
planks. Correct stringer bearing is essential for the bearing cap and the flooring. Placing metal
shims between the stringer and cap is the best way to correct the bearing. Securely fasten shims in
place to prevent them from dislodging. Do not use small shims between the flooring and stringers.
 Curbs and handrails. Replace curbs and handrails only when they have been damaged by
accidents.

FOUNDATIONS
5-31. Foundation settlement is usually caused by scour or structural failure. Correct minor settlement by
jacking up the structure and inserting steel shims between the stringers and the cap or between the bearing
plates and the pedestal. Use hardwood shims under wooden members.

ABUTMENTS
5-32. Treat abutment scour and settlement the same as foundation settlement. However, since an abutment
also acts as a retaining wall, it is subject to horizontal earth pressures. If the abutment is unstable, shore it or
hold it in place with guy lines from anchors on shore.

TIMBER
5-33. Decay, excessive loads, structural defects, fires, or explosives may cause timber members to fail.
Untreated timbers that are alternately wet and dry or only partly saturated decay quickly. Timber that is under
water or otherwise continually wet does not decay, but may be attacked by marine borers. Replace (preferably
with masonry or steel) all timber showing decay or structural damage, especially if the timber is in contact
with the ground. One method of repairing piling is to splice new members to solid members with butt joints
and scabs.

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 Gap Crossing in Support of Movement

5-34. To allow timber to breathe, leave at least a 1/8-inch clearance between the timbers (where possible).
Keep all bridge timber clear of debris. Remove the bark from native logs if this was not done during
construction. Green or wet timber shrinks considerably when seasoned. Repeated wetting and drying also
cause dimension changes as great as 5 to 10 percent, parallel to the grain. Unseasoned timber may require
frequent renailing and tightening of the bolts.

STEEL
5-35. Intense heat that raises steel temperatures above 1,000°F is particularly serious when the steel
members are under stress. Steel members under tension that are heated to this extent will permanently
elongate and buckle under compression. Intense heat will also destroy the temper and extra strength in certain
types of steel (especially cold-rolled sections and high-strength wire). Replace damaged steel or reinforce it
by welding new members onto the damaged sections.
5-36. Bending (due to accidents or explosions) is not as serious in steel members that are under tension as
it is in those that are under compression. Straighten the bent compression steel members to their original
shape. If possible, weld or bolt steel plates or shapes onto the bent steel member to increase its stiffness.
When essential steel members are severed, other steel members assume added stresses. Relieve overstressed
steel members by adding bolted or welded plates or structural sections across the gap.
5-37. Military loads and design stresses are high, with impact adding to the severity of steel stresses. Fatigue
failure is caused by repeated stressing and may result in sudden collapse. Fatigue failure is usually preceded
by small hairline cracks around the rivet holes, welds, and other surface irregularities. Since these cracks
usually do not get large before ultimate failure, reinforce the affected components immediately with steel
plates.
5-38. Rusting on bridges seldom requires special attention unless these structures are subject to salt spray
or are located in humid climates. Keep steel clear of debris, and limit timber-steel contact to a minimum to
prevent rusting due to moisture retention. Loose rust is not serious, but deep pitting should be investigated.
Paint areas that are subject to severe rusting and coat them with tar, asphalt, or thick grease. Before painting,
remove rust with a wire brush or by sandblasting.

CONCRETE
5-39. Correct surface spalling on concrete with plaster or with a low-water content mortar applied with a
pneumatic sprayer. Extensive frost damage is usually not repairable. Rust flakes on reinforcing steel can exert
considerable pressure when confined and will spall concrete along bars that are too close to the surface.
Although seldom serious, repair this condition by chipping away the concrete, cleaning most of the rust from
the bar, and grouting the area. Fires of 1,200°F and above that last for an hour or more cause spalling and
cracks and reduce strength. Replace the concrete if the damage is serious. Patch holes and gaps that are caused
by accidents or explosions.
5-40. Maintenance of concrete structures includes checking the following:
 Tension. Concrete tensile strength is negligible since resistance to tension is furnished by the
reinforcing steel. Tension cracks crossed at right angles by reinforcing steel are not serious unless
they are more than 1/4-inch wide, depending on the structural details.
 Compression. Compression creates a crushing failure that crumbles concrete, especially in
columns. Connections between steel tension and compression members are usually made with
splice plates that are welded, riveted, or bolted to the members.
 Shear. Repair concrete shear failure in rectangular members with tight steel bands. Do this only
under the supervision of a structural engineer.

APPROACHES
5-41. Correct the settlement of approaches immediately. The grade line of unpaved approaches should be
1 inch above the grade of the deck. The grade line of paved approaches should be the same grade as the deck.
Patch potholes immediately. When settlement occurs on railroad bridges, add ballast to the track (shorewards
of the abutment) to keep the track from dipping.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 5-9

Chapter 5

5-42. Some waterways with flat grades and floodplains have a tendency to shift channel locations. Such
shifts may deposit eroded material against the piers or erode the pier foundations or approaches. These
problems can be controlled by earth or rock dikes or by piles strung with brush mats woven into wire cables.

5-10 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Chapter 6
Clearing
Based on an assessment of the mission variables, maneuver commanders may order
clearing activities to facilitate mobility within the AO. They may order a critical route
or area to be cleared of mines, EHs, or other obstacles. The activity could be conducted
as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area or may be conducted on a recurring
basis in support of efforts to defeat a sustained enemy threat to a critical route. This
chapter provides an overview of clearing activities (route and area) that are detailed in
ATP 3-90.37 and FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D.

OVERVIEW
6-1. Clearing is a mobility task that involves the total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle
that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. It is generally accomplished
by destroying, altering or removing obstacles. Clearing of a route or an area is often performed by a
combined arms force built around an engineer-based clearance unit. Clearing is conducted when the
commander orders enemy obstacles to be cleared within an assigned area or along a specified route. A route
clearance may include a transition to an in-stride combined arms breach if the encountered obstacles are
covered by fire and an effective breach organization is available within the task organization or can be
established. Once the in-stride breach is completed and the enemy ability to interfere with route clearing
has been neutralized, the clearing force would revert to the primary mission of route clearance. A clearing
mission would not be limited to reducing a lane or lanes through the identified obstacles as would be the
case in a breaching, since it is focused on movement along the route or within an area rather than supporting
the maneuver of a combat assault force. In route and area clearance, engineer and EOD units destroy or
remove explosive obstacles that are a threat to mobility along the route or within the specified area. Routes
and areas cleared will be considered cleared only if they remain controlled by friendly forces.
6-2. Within the counter-improvised explosive device framework described in ATP 3-90.37, commanders
employ route clearance as one tool to enable the overall counter-improvised explosive device mission.
Clearing focuses on EHs or IEDs. The device is merely the end product of a complex set of enemy activities.
An IED attack is the result of a planned tactical operation with several key elements that work in a coordinated
and synchronized manner to attain a desired result (such as damage to equipment or injury to personnel in
order to restrict access and limit use of a route or area).
6-3. Table 6-1, page 6-2, shows select units that are involved in clearing. (See ATP 3-90.37 for agencies
and organization involved in counter-improvised explosive device.) The organic structure of the BCT has
limited engineering and other mobility support capabilities (military police, EOD, CBRN, aviation). The
commander must correctly identify capability shortfalls and request the appropriate augmentation early in
the planning process. Engineer, military police, CBRN, aviation, and other required capabilities determined
during mission analysis are task-organized to conduct route or area clearance.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 6-1

Chapter 6

Table 6-1. Selected units involved in clearing activities

Unit Mission Capabilities/Planning Factors
• Conducts detection • Provides training readiness and oversight of assigned route
and neutralization of and area clearance platoons.
EHs along routes • Provides command and control for three to five route, area,
and within areas in or sapper platoons operating as an engineer team in the
Clearance
support of the execution of route or area clearance missions.
company
BCT/RCT.
• Clears 159 miles of two-way routes per day (three routes of
53 miles each).
• Clears 2 acres per day (two 1-acre areas).
• Performs EH search • Detects metallic and nonmetallic mines (buried and
and detection in surface-laid) and other EHs.
support of route and • Conducts minefield extraction, combat patrols, building
Engineer area clearance. searches (disruptive and nondisruptive), vehicle searches,
squad and cave clearances.
(canine)
• Searches open areas, fields, woods, hedgerows, and
embankments.
• Proofs along roads, tracks, and railways.
• Establishes and • Provides EH battle tracking in the theater.
maintains an EH • Establishes, maintains, and shares the EH tracking
database. database within the JOA.
• Conducts pattern • Consolidates and conducts an analysis of requests for
analysis. modifications to the JOA UXO supplemental list.
• Investigates EH • Provides training updates to field units.
EHCC strikes and UXO
• Coordinates site evaluations and strike incident
hazard areas.
investigations (four sites simultaneously) or conducts unit
• Provides technical training (four sites simultaneously).
advice and TTP on
• Assists intelligence and planners with EH pattern analysis
the mitigation of
and intelligence collection management.
EHs.
• Provides updated TTP and guidance for clearing.
• Provides terrain • Performs geospatial pattern analysis for tracking and
Geospatial analysis and locating IEDs.
engineering geospatial support • Provides geospatial information and products for the IPB
team to the field. process.
• Executes M/CM/S • Provides training readiness and oversight of assigned route
tasks and provides and area clearance platoons.
support to general • Provides command and control for three to five sapper,
engineering assault, obstacle, clearance, or tactical-bridge platoons
missions in support operating as an engineer team in the execution of M/CM/S
of the BCT/RCT. missions.
• Executes 75 miles of route clearance per day.
Sapper • Executes six dismounted or urban breach lanes.
company • Executes three mounted breach lanes.
• Improves lanes and marking in the BCT/RCT area of
operations.
• Employs engineer units to emplace LOC bridges.
• Receives and analyzes ground or airborne standoff mine
detection system data from other units.
• Provides 660 man-hours per day for general construction
labor tasks.

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 Clearing

Table 6-1. Selected units involved in clearing activities (continued)

Unit Mission Capabilities/Planning Factors
• Conducts assault gap • Provides training readiness and oversight of assigned
crossing and route and area clearance platoons.
mounted and • Provides command and control for three to five assault,
dismounted obstacle, or sapper platoons operating as an engineer
breaches. team in the execution of mobility and countermobility
• Emplaces obstacles missions.
Mobility in support of the • Enables a BCT to conduct four assault gap crossings.
Augmentation BCT.
• Enables an IBCT or SBCT to conduct four mounted
Company breaches.
(Army)
• Enables an ABCT to conduct two mounted breaches.
• Enables a BCT to conduct four additional dismounted
breaches.
• Emplaces 2.7 miles of fix or disrupt tactical obstacle
frontage without reloading.
• Employs two breach platoons to execute route clearance.
• Conducts— • Provides training readiness and oversight of organic route
 Mechanized, reconnaissance and clearance, assault breaching and
explosive and assault bridging platoons.
mechanical • Provides mobile route reconnaissance and clearance
breaching capabilities for the ground combat element.
operations. • Provides mechanical breaching to breach lanes for ground
 Short gap combat element maneuver.
bridging • Provides armored bridging to conduct short-span gap
Mobility operations. crossings for ground combat element maneuver.
Assault  Mobile route
Company clearance
(Marine operations.
Corps)
 Engineer
reconnaissance.
 Specialized
demolitions
mission.
• Emplaces obstacles
in support of the
RCT.
• Performs limited • Performs detailed reconnaissance of a suspected EH.
battlefield • Performs limited identification of the items listed in the
neutralization of EHs engineer explosive clearance agent identification guide.
as outlined in the
• Marks the EH area according to unit standard operating
EOCA identification
procedure.
guide.
Engineer • Provides the blast and fragmentation danger area of
• Assists explosive
explosive identified EH; may provide the estimated blast and
ordnance disposal
clearance fragmentation danger area for items similar to but not
personnel in
agent included in the guide or list.
disposing of other
EHs as requested. • Advises the on-scene commander of personnel and
equipment protective measures.
• Recommends and supervises the appropriate protective
works to be completed.
• Destroys individual EH by detonation when authorized.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 6-3

Chapter 6

Table 6-1. Selected units involved in clearing activities (continued)

Unit Mission Capabilities/Planning Factors
• Conducts detection • Conducts route/area reconnaissance.
Route
and destruction of • Conducts route/area clearance in support of the ground
reconnaissance
EHs along routes combat element maneuver.
and clearance and within areas in
platoon (Marine support of the
Corps) RCT.
Note. The EOCA is not a unit; it is a specially trained combat engineer Soldier.
Legend:
ABCT armor brigade combat team
BCT brigade combat team
EH explosive hazard
EHCC explosive hazards coordination cell
EOCA explosive ordnance clearance agent
IBCT infantry brigade combat team
IED improvised explosive device
IPB (Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(Marine Corps) intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JOA joint operations area
LOC line of communications
M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and survivability
RCT regimental combat team
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UXO unexploded explosive ordnance

6-4. Combat engineers within the task-organized clearance force detect and mark, reduce the hazard, or
allow an EOD unit to respond appropriately based on mission variables and the supported commander’s
guidance. Combat engineer personnel do not possess the technical skills or equipment required to render
safe explosive ordnance, IEDs, explosive booby traps, and UXO. EOD units are task-organized in support of
the operation when this level of support is required. In select cases, specially trained combat engineer
Soldiers designated as engineer explosive ordnance clearance agents or specially trained combat engineer
Marines can be employed to supplement the capabilities of EOD. Engineer explosive clearance agent
Soldiers are trained to perform limited battlefield disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. The Marine
Corps’ institutionalized EH ordnance identification and reduction programs of instruction are the
equivalent in training to the Army Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent Course. Resident courses meeting
Army explosive ordnance clearance agent equivalency are the Marine Corps Engineer School Combat
Engineer Noncommissioned Officers Course, Combat Engineer Platoon Sergeant Course, and Combat
Engineer Officer Course.

Note. EOD personnel have specialized capabilities. Proper coordination and planning by the EOD
staff cell are imperative to employ these capabilities at the right time and place. (See
ATP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32 for additional information on EOD
capabilities.)

ROUTE CLEARANCE
6-5. Route clearance is the elimination of obstacles along a defined route to allow a military operation to
continue with reduced risk. It is a combined arms activity that relies on a reconnaissance of the route to be
cleared. It can be conducted to open a new route for vehicular traffic or to maintain confidence in the

6-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Clearing

trafficability of an established route. It can be conducted to open a route for the necessary traffic or on a
recurring basis to minimize the risk along selected routes.
6-6. Route clearing is normally not conducted under direct enemy fire. Planning should provide sufficient
flexibility to address the possibility of encountering direct or indirect enemy fire. The composition of a route
clearance team should have a combined arms task organization. The task-organized route clearance team is
prepared to employ the breaching fundamentals (SOSRA) at any point along the targeted route. If the risk
of engagement during clearing is high, then the task organization may contain more ground maneuver forces
than for other clearing missions in anticipation of a need to transition to an in-stride breach. At the completion
of the breach, the mission reverts to clearing. While these actions may not be executed during a route
clearance, they are planned for if intelligence suggests that the risk is significant enough to justify increasing
the size of the task organization. If a combined arms breach is required as part of clearing, selected combat
engineer elements and other forces are task-organized specifically for the in-stride breach. Bypassing or
avoiding the obstacle is preferred over an in-stride combined arms breach; however, when clearing, the
objective is to eliminate any enemy force or enemy emplaced obstacles. (See ATP 3-90.37.)

PLANNING
6-7. Route clearing requires extensive planning and coordination. Planning considerations for route
clearing in relation to the warfighting functions are shown in table 6-2.
Table 6-2. Selected planning considerations for route clearance
Warfighting
Planning Considerations
Functions
Identify choke points, bridges, tunnels, critical road junctions, and built-up areas as likely
locations for obstacle emplacement.
Maintain a situation map that reflects the most current intelligence information.
Maintain an incident map with a graphics overlay to facilitate a pattern analysis.
Review historical data related to enemy countermobility TTP.
Develop an information collection plan that—
• Focuses information collection assets on likely enemy ambush sites.
• Uses Air Force, unmanned aircraft system, and Army/Marine Corps aviation
assets to provide aerial information collection of the route.
Intelligence • Integrates reporting by civil affairs and potentially military police teams. Civil
affairs teams can interact with the local populace to garner resources and
information that enable friendly mobility.
Coordinate with host nation organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and special
operations forces for additional information on the area of operations.
Provide detailed obstacle information and obstacle intelligence, including—
• Description of EHs most likely to be encountered.
• Composition and pattern of obstacles.
• Enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures used during obstacle emplacement.
Provide current intelligence updates to team leaders before departure.
Coordinate for the establishment of traffic control posts.
Movement and Secure flanks (at least 300 feet) and the far side of suspected and known obstacle
Maneuver/ locations.
Maneuver Close the route to traffic during route clearing to minimize the target presented to enemy
forces. Develop a traffic control plan if unable to close the route.

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Chapter 6

Table 6-2. Selected planning considerations for route clearance (continued)

Warfighting
Planning Considerations
Functions
Identify and clear potential sniper positions before beginning obstacle clearance.
Provide security for the cleared route.
Plan for the establishment of static security points along the cleared route to reduce the
likelihood of another enemy force returning to the area or reseeding obstacles.
Report, clear, and mark obstacles and EHs to facilitate unimpeded movement.
Ensure that lane marking meets the standards directed by the supported commander
and those materials and patterns are standard throughout the route.
Movement and
Maneuver/ Block uncleared roads and trails that branch from the route being cleared to protect units
Maneuver from inadvertently using an uncleared route.
(continued) Conduct debriefings and submit combat reports regarding the location, composition, and
orientation of obstacles cleared and encountered to facilitate pattern analysis.
Provide detailed obstacle intelligence, including—
• Description of EHs most likely to be encountered.
• Composition and pattern of obstacles.
• Enemy actions or techniques used during obstacle emplacement.
Plan for in-stride breaching as appropriate based on the current enemy activity and
intelligence on known or suspected obstacles.
Position mortars to ensure continuous coverage of friendly forces (one technique is
moving under the control of the security force).
Plan fire support based on the rules of engagement.
Designate obstacle clearance sites as critical friendly zones and no-fire areas.
Fires Plan suppression fires on enemy elements capable of placing direct or indirect fires on
the points of breach.
Request and incorporate electronic warfare assets to defeat improvised explosive device
threat, disrupt enemy information collection efforts, and detect enemy use of the
electromagnetic spectrum for targeting purposes.
Plan for air and ground evacuation of casualties (the preferred evacuation method is by
air and the routine method is by ground).
Conduct an air mission brief with air ambulance assets, including pickup zones and
markers and signals.
Rehearse procedures for casualty and medical evacuation procedures.
Provide medical support to the security force, to include ground ambulance assets.
Sustainment/ Identify ambulance exchange points along the route to be cleared.
Logistics Ensure that vehicles have tow cables on the front and the rear.
Develop a plan for the employment of recovery assets for extraction purposes.
Ensure that vehicles used for transporting personnel have been hardened (sandbags on
floors and sides).
Provide military working dogs and explosive detection dogs to help in route clearing.
They may also be used to provide security for convoys during and after clearing
missions.
Designate a controlling, coordinating, and supporting headquarters for route movement.
Mission
Command/ Designate a reserve force that is capable of rapid deployment by either ground or air
transportation.
Command and
Control Plan and conduct rehearsals. (At a minimum, the team should rehearse actions at the
obstacle, actions on enemy contact, casualty evacuation, and controlling civilians.)

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 Clearing

Table 6-2. Selected planning considerations for route clearance (continued)

Warfighting
Planning Considerations
Functions
Ensure all personnel of the clearance team have a clear understanding of the mission,
intent, and end state.
Ensure that the team—
• Controls the movement of personnel and equipment along the route.
Mission • Controls/restricts access so personnel stay within the minimum safe distance
Command/ when EHs are being destroyed.
Command and • Prepares a risk assessment as part of mission planning.
Control • Tracks the status of routes based on the amount of time since the route was
(continued) cleared and the intelligence and enemy situations.
• Tracks and reports the progress of the clearing mission.
• Determines the route length, using clearly definable start and end points.
• Coordinates with adjacent units and other nonmilitary organizations within the
area of operations.
During clearing, keep radios, electronic equipment, and aviation assets at a safe
Force distance from the clearance team.
Protection/force Consider capabilities and limitations of available equipment. (See FM 3-34.210/
protection MCRP 3-17.2D.)
Control the distance between vehicles based on mission variables.
Legend:
EH explosive hazard
FM field manual
MCRP Marine Corps warfighting publication
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

6-8. The commander determines which routes or route sections must be cleared and establishes priorities
for the routes within the AO. The staff analyzes the threat, obstacles, use of and emplacement of EHs, and
ambush tactics on or along those routes to develop threat templates and models. Threat information is based
on information gathered from IPB, running estimates, COP, and the information collection plan. Military
police, transportation, and other units that have recently moved on the route of interest may be able to provide
valuable information. Event analysis is conducted to determine where the threat may emplace obstacles or
EHs and conduct ambushes.

ROUTE CLEARANCE PHASES

6-9. Given the commander’s requirement and priorities for routes in the AO and threat information, the
engineer clearance unit and EOD team chief provide advice to the supported commander on the
recommended composition of the clearance team, method of route clearance, and support requirements. The
clearance effort is organized based on the following two phases:
 Right-of-way clearance. This phase includes the removal of rubble, debris, berms, holes,
trenches, vegetation, and trash from the medians and shoulders of routes to eliminate the
concealment of EHs and munitions caches and to aid in the visual and sensory detection of EHs.
Simultaneously, a route reconnaissance is performed to identify and record the location of man-
made objects (such as buried pipe, drain culverts and underground cable), and investigates
suspicious areas. Based on the situation, this phase may include transition to a hasty breach before
resuming the route clearance.
 Route maintenance and sweep. This phase includes systematic, random detection sweeps of the
cleared areas and progresses to detection and deterrence sweeps along the cleared route. Visual
detection sweeps are focused on changed conditions. Investigations of suspected devices are
performed remotely with a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle or other system, as required.

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Chapter 6

6-10. The route is reported as clear after the right-of-way clearance phase has been conducted. When there
is a sustained EH threat, the route requires persistent surveillance to ensure the enemy does not reoccupy
or reseed EHs. Unless the route is secured and under continuous surveillance, each route clearance mission
must be conducted as if it is the initial clearance. With persistent surveillance and a reasonable level of
security maintained along the route, the commander may weigh the risks and order route maintenance
and sweep. Surveillance data will be used to guide the scheduling of route maintenance sweeps.

TEAM COMPOSITION
6-11. The route clearance team is organized into the following elements (see table 6-3):
 Command and control element.
 Security element.
 Detection and clearing element.
 Improvement element.

Table 6-3. Duties of route-clearing team elements

Element Duties
• Integrates the activities of the security, detection and clearing, and
improvement elements.
Command and control
• Maintains communications with higher headquarters and with the
element battlefield/battlespace owner or supported unit.
• Travels with the security element (usually).
• Provides traffic control, crew-served weapons support, and
protection/force protection.
• Observes oncoming traffic for threats, identifies hazards or obstacles in
the route, and contains suspect vehicles identified by other elements
(forward security section).
Security element
• Protects the flank of the main body from threats or from oncoming traffic,
• Forward security
observes vehicles passing through, and provides traffic control within the
section
area being searched or cleared (flank security section).
• Flank security section
• Observes approaching traffic for threats, provides visual warning to
• Rear security section approaching traffic, contains suspect vehicles, and provides limited traffic
control (rear security section).
• Provides overwatch for detection and clearing element.
• Provides immediate, long-range engagement against threats to the
clearance team.
• Scans the medians and shoulders of a route and sweeps them for EHs.
• Pinpoints the location and remotely investigates a suspected EH to identify
Detection and clearing and classify it.
element
• Marks and reports EHs.
• Reduce or clear and report EHs.
• Removes concealment for EHs from the entire width of the median and
from the shoulders of the route to a minimum distance of 25 feet (when
Improvement element terrain allows).
(as required) • Secures and reports the discovery of EHs.
• Includes two dozers, two scrapers, bucket loader, and 20-ton dump truck if
Legend:
EH explosive hazard

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 Clearing

6-12. The necessary assets are allocated to the route clearance team based on the mission variables,
route characteristics, and the type of clearance to be conducted. Commanders must anticipate losses of
clearance team assets and include the necessary redundancy. Assets generally allocated to the route
clearance team include—
 Combat engineering. Combat engineers (route clearance platoon, sapper platoon, EH teams, and
engineer squad [canine]) provide detection of EHs and destruction of mines and booby traps.
Engineer ordnance clearance agents or specially trained Marines in these units can remotely
identify and dispose of (by detonation) those designated UXO for which they are specifically
trained and authorized.
 General engineering. General engineers typically provide the personnel and equipment for the
improvement element during the right-of-way clearance phase of route-clearing activities.
 Ground maneuver assets. These assets include maneuver, engineer, military police, and other
elements with ground maneuver capability that are appropriate based on the threat (mission
variables will dictate specific requirements). These assets provide reconnaissance and intelligence
information on routes in the AO and provide security elements to the route clearance team as
required. They may also become primary elements of the breach organization that are needed to
conduct a combined arms breach.
 Aviation support. Aviation support provides reconnaissance and surveillance information on
routes in the AO. They may also provide security and aviation fires to the route clearance team as
required.
 Medical support. Medical support is task-organized to provide medical treatment and evacuation
of casualties.
 Explosive ordnance. EOD teams provide the technical expertise to render safe and dispose of
explosive ordnance, IEDs, and UXO.
6-13. Figure 6-1 shows an example organization for a route clearance mission.

Legend:
ESV engineer squad vehicle
MMD mounted mine detector
MMPV medium mine-protected vehicle

Figure 6-1. Example organization for a route clearance mission

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Chapter 6

Note. The vehicles depicted in figure 6-1, page 6-9, are generic in nature. FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-
17.2D contains additional vehicle specific information and a description of the tools and functions
associated with each of the four elements of the route clearance formation. The placement of
additional combined arms assets is not reflected in figure 6-1, page 6-9; such elements must be
integrated based on an assessment of the mission variables.

RATE OF MARCH
6-14. Table 6-4 provides basic combat planning factors for right-of-way or sanitation sweeps conducted
in light, moderate and heavy vegetation situations. The typical rate of march during a right-of- way or
sanitation sweep is 159 miles per day for two-way routes. The actual sweep rate will vary depending
upon the equipment available, enemy activity, weather and terrain, type and quantity of EHs encountered,
traffic, length and width, surface composition, and median or shoulder condition of the route.
Table 6-4. Rate of march during right-of-way or sanitation sweep
Two Dozers, Two Scrapers, Bucket
Vegetation Two Dozers
Loader, and 20-Ton Dump Truck
Light 1.8 miles per day 6 miles per day
Moderate 1.2 miles per day 5 miles per day
Heavy 0.6 miles per day 2.5 miles per day

METHODS
6-15. The two methods of route clearance are contiguous and combat. Since each poses a degree of risk and
requires a thorough analysis of mission variables should be performed before selecting a clearance method
(or combination) to use.

Contiguous
6-16. In contiguous clearance, the deliberate clearance begins at Checkpoint 1, and it is complete at
Checkpoint 2. (See figure 6-2.) This method provides the best assurance of route clearance. Although
effective, it is not the most secure method in a high-threat environment. It is also time-intensive and constrains
the maneuver commander’s flexibility due to movement of sustainment/combat service support assets and
patrols during contiguous clearance mission.

Combat
6-17. Whereas contiguous clearance focuses on a specific route, combat clearance focuses on specific points
along a route. (See figure 6-3.) As mentioned previously, the IPB or running estimates can identify locations
where the enemy will be most likely to emplace obstacles or establish ambush positions. These areas become
named areas of interest or objectives for combat clearance missions. These areas become named areas of
interest or objectives for combat clearance missions. The combat clearance method divides a route into
sections according to the number of suspected high-threat areas. Once the clearance team clears these
sections, the route is considered clear. Combat forces can patrol the route from these high-threat areas to
ensure that the route is secure and, if necessary, a route clearance team can clear an identified section where
an EH is suspected. Following the seizure of these objectives, the commander must assume a moderate risk—
that the S-2/G-2 and the engineer staff officer have identified all high-threat areas and that the route is clear
of EHs.

6-10 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Clearing

Legend:
MSR main supply route

Figure 6-2. Contiguous clearance method

Legend:
MSR main supply route
NAI named area of interest

Figure 6-3. Combat clearance method

Dismounted
6-18. Although mounted route clearance is generally preferred, because it offers the greatest level of
protection for personnel and speed certain situations (mission variable dependent) may warrant a dismounted

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Chapter 6

or manual route clearance. Casualty extractions and missions in restrictive terrain or in areas requiring a high
degree of assurance may demand dismounted route clearance. Task organization for dismounted route
clearance is similar to mounted route clearance, except that the improvement element is not included. The
time required for the clearance may be greater. The security element must be prepared to assist the detection
element in disengaging from enemy contact.
6-19. The detection element consists of personnel with mine detectors or other available detection
equipment (handheld sniffers, mobile jammers, military working dogs). The required number of mine
detector operators varies with the width of the route to be cleared and the sweep width of the detector. For
example, the sweep width for the Army-Navy/portable special search (AN/PSS)-14 mine detector is 5 feet.
Divide the width of the road to be cleared by 5 for feet (1.5 for meters), and round up to determine the number
of AN/PSS-14 mine detector operators needed. The Marine Corps uses the Vallon VMR-2/VMR-2.5
(Minehound) dual sensor mine detector.

Note. The commander may reduce the sweep width to 3 feet to ensure the proper sweep technique
and to increase the probability of detecting low metallic devices/objects. The AN/PSS-14 is an
Army-only mine detector.

6-20. The sweep team must ensure that redundancy of effort is done by the mine detector operators so that
no gaps exist in multiple clearance lanes. The leader should consider mission variables and the individual
Soldier/Marine fatigue level and state of mind to determine the maximum amount of time an individual can
operate a mine detector. As a general rule, 20 to 30 minutes is the maximum amount of time an individual
can use an AN/PSS-14 or similar mine detector effectively.
6-21. The sophistication and reliability of the detector used will determine the amount of investigation that
needs to be performed to confirm the identity or to classify an EH. A dedicated prober using appropriate
techniques must investigate each suspect object identified by the mine detector operator. Local policy and
procedures will determine the type of marking device used. During dismounted sweeps, the dispersal distance
between personnel will vary depending on mission variables.

AREA CLEARANCE
6-22. Based on an assessment of the mission variables, the maneuver commander may order a critical area
to be cleared of obstacles. The commander should identify the clearance depth and level of clearance
required so their supporting engineer unit leader can match personnel and equipment to the assigned task.
Area clearance is a combined arms mission. For engineer units, area clearing is normally limited to landmines
and booby traps. To clear areas of other explosive obstacles, such as UXO, EOD team augmentation may
be required. Area clearing of landmines includes the detection, marking, identification, destruction,
proofing, recording, and reporting. engineer units clear landmines by either destruction or removal. EOD
units are responsible for the render safe, exploitation, and destruction of EHs.
6-23. For engineer units, area clearing is normally limited to landmines and booby traps. To clear areas
of other explosive obstacles such as UXO may require the augmentation of EOD personnel. For engineer
units, area clearing of landmines includes the detection, marking, identification, destruction, proofing,
reporting and recording. Area clearing operations are combined arms operations with engineer units
performing the actual clearing of the landmines by the methods of destruction or removal. The maneuver
commander must clearly direct the location of the operational area to be cleared of explosive obstacles.

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 Clearing

6-24. Area clearance is not normally conducted under fire or during periods of reduced visibility
(nighttime, adverse weather). Leaders and planners must strive to limit the areas that require clearance to
only those areas necessary to support military operations. When possible, areas not required for military
operations and not an immediate threat to friendly forces will be permanently marked and avoided. Some
situations where area clearance could be required include—
 Airfield clearance.
 Equipment retrieval.
 Runway construction.
 Logistics or maintenance facility construction.
 Air and seaport recovery.
 Forward arming and refueling point.
 Personnel extraction.
6-25. Depending on the size of the area that must be cleared and the duration of the clearance effort, multiple
or rotational units may be involved and enter the operational area at different phases. Other matters that
require prior coordination include:
 Specifying the area to be cleared and the depth of clearance in tasking orders.
 Specifying the standards and guidelines for the clearance mission.
 Accrediting a unit ability to conduct clearance activities.
 Maintaining an EH database of cleared and uncleared areas, and showing the clearance status for
each EH area.
 Establishing and maintaining a system to monitor current clearance activities and follow-on
clearance inspections of cleared areas.
6-26. Area clearance missions consist of the following three phases (see FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for
additional information):
 Technical survey.
 Information collection (detailed technical and geospatial information of known or suspected
hazardous areas).
 Reconnaissance (visual or aerial, including the use of imagery).
 EH survey (defines the area in terms of size and describes through measurements and
azimuths).
 Clearing.
 Planning (establish safe lanes, access lanes, and clearance boxes or lanes).
 Site layout
 Recognition (physical detection, verification, and technical survey update).
 Clearance.
 Proofing.
 Final marking.
 Transfer/handover (conducting a walk-through of the area with the occupying unit leaders).
6-27. In the clearance phase, explosive obstacles from a specified area to a specified depth are completely
eliminated or removed. The commander of the unit that will occupy the cleared area must be confident that
cleared areas are safe for use. This requires management systems and clearance procedures that are
appropriate, effective, efficient, and safe. These procedures need to have an internal audit mechanism to
ensure that the area cleared is safe. The quality of clearance must be acceptable to the using units and must
be measurable and verifiable.

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Chapter 6

PLANNING
6-28. Before undertaking a new area clearance task, a plan is developed to establish safe access lanes and
the location of clearance boxes (if using mine detection dogs) or clearance lanes. Safe lanes are prepared to
provide access for personnel and equipment to a box or an area. Safe lanes also provide safe start lines for
the clearing, and they may be used for casualty evacuation. Safe lanes will be 6 feet wide to allow safe
passage for personnel and equipment and to allow casualty evacuation.

SITE LAYOUT
6-29. A site layout is an important component of area clearance planning. Its design must address
critical features such as fencing and marking hazardous areas, controlling the movement of unit personnel
and visitors, enforcing safety distances, and providing responsive and effective medical support. This requires
the clearance unit to develop and maintain appropriate local policies and procedures. (See figure 6-4 for an
example of a clearance site layout.)
6-30. A clearance worksite is designed to—
 Provide a clearly visible separation of hazardous areas (blast and fragmentation zones, cleared
areas, useable areas, and unknown areas in and around the worksite).
 Control the movement of all unit personnel.
 Limit the number of unit personnel and visitors allowed into the blast and fragmentation zones.
 Take reasonable precautions to exclude unit personnel and visitors from blast and fragmentation
zones during the controlled destruction of EHs or provide suitable protection/force protection
inside buildings, bunkers, or mobile structures.
 Include measures to prevent collateral damage to structures and the environment.

Legend:
BM benchmark
MF minefield
RP reference point
SP start point
TP turning point

Figure 6-4. Clearance site layout

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 Clearing

6-31. The effective control of the worksite will be achieved by establishing and clearly marking a number
of areas for safety and administration. Such areas should be outside the relevant safety distances from
contaminated areas, clearance activity, and explosive storage. The terrain will determine the site layout of an
area clearing activity.

METHODS
6-32. The clearance phase is the direct application of an asset to remove a specific threat. Mines are cleared
by mechanical mine-clearing systems, demolitions, or incendiary devices. EHs are destroyed by EOD
personnel, engineer explosive ordnance clearance agents, or specially trained combat engineer Marines using
appropriate techniques. Based on the recognition of threat locations, leaders match the best clearing method
and equipment to the threat.

Note. The safe execution, highest possible effectiveness, and impacts on proofing methods in
future operations need to be considered.

6-33. Clearance procedures vary depending on the type of clearance capabilities available. (See
FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for examples of clearance techniques and to view clearance equipment.)
Progressive marking is also done during the clearance phase.
6-34. The results of a clearing action may have adverse effects to nearby cleared areas. Certain pieces of
equipment, like flails, may displace EHs into previously cleared areas, as far as 300 feet from the flail.
Proofing must clear this area (usually by visual inspection, but at times mine dog detection teams are
required) and the specified area. The end state of a clearing phase means the area is ready for proofing.

PROOFING
6-35. Proofing involves checking the entire cleared area. Using a different type of asset than what was used
in the clearance phase assures that the area is reasonably clear of all EHs and safe for use. The end state of
the proofing phase means the area is ready for use.

FINAL MARKING
6-36. Permanent marking systems should be used to indicate the outer edge of EH areas that are not
cleared. Marking systems should employ a combination of markers, signs, and physical barriers.

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 Chapter 7
Combat Roads and Trails
Combat roads and trails are built primarily as a hasty supplement (bypass) to an
existing route that is impacted by natural and man-made obstacles. They fulfill
immediate requirements to move personnel, equipment, and supplies throughout the
AO to achieve the commander’s intent despite terrain restrictions.

OVERVIEW
7-1. A combat road is a traveled way that has been cleared of obstacles and temporarily surfaced with
material (gravel, crushed rock) or by an expedient means to increase its trafficability. Combat roads usually
do not have an asphalt or concrete surface. Combat roads are generally needed to support wheeled vehicles
that are unsuited for rugged terrain. Combat roads require more effort to build than trails, but they support a
broader range of vehicles and tend to last longer. Building combat roads (and trails) is a combat engineering
task that is conducted in close support to ground maneuver forces that are in close combat. Higher-level
roadwork is a general engineer task (see ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7) and the specific application of that
level of road construction is detailed in FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013. The primary difference between
combat roads and conventional roads is the degree of permanence and the characteristics of the traffic they
are designed to support. Combat roads are built to handle low volumes of traffic for a short duration.
7-2. A combat trail is a traveled way that has been cleared of obstacles, but has not been temporarily
surfaced. A trail may be roughly graded by combat earthmoving equipment (ACE, deployable universal
combat earthmover) to provide a relatively smooth surface. Combat trails are usually adequate for tracked
and wheeled combat vehicles.
7-3. A commander’s requirement for combat roads or trails is generally determined by the characteristics
of the intended traffic, the duration of the requirement, and the inherent trafficability of the existing ground
surface based on its soil characteristics and weather conditions. In flat, desert areas with dry conditions, for
example, once a pathway is cleared of obstacles and marked, the resulting trail can usually support a low
volume of most types of vehicular traffic for a short duration without any additional effort.
7-4. Based on the intended traffic, a road or trail will have different design criteria, but the road or trail is
built using the same basic principles as those used for conventional road construction. Roads and trails built
in close combat conditions are usually characterized by expedient construction methods that are intended to
handle low traffic volumes for a short duration to meet immediate mission requirements.

PLANNING
7-5. During mission analysis, the staff determines mobility requirements based on the mission, the
commander’s intent, the scheme of movement and maneuver, and the effects of the terrain and weather.
Planners consider the need for new combat roads and trails for those mobility requirements that cannot be
supported by existing road or trail networks. In some cases, an existing road or trail may only require quick
and simple improvements or upgrading to meet requirements.
7-6. Requirements for roads and trails may be identified during reconnaissance, based on the discovery
that a proposed route is untrafficable due to obstacles (excessive gradients, overhead clearance restrictions,
other aspects of terrain). Requirements for roads and trails are also generated by the continuous application
of the assured mobility framework and the monitoring and assessment of changes in the situation that are
reflected in the mobility portion of the COP.
7-7. The senior engineer staff officer is responsible for coordinating the resources and requirements for
constructing, repairing, and maintaining roads and trails within the headquarters and works through engineer

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Chapter 7

channels to coordinate engineering requirements with higher headquarters and subordinate units as necessary.
Teleengineering (reachback) may also be used for gaining technical engineering and construction advice.
The engineer staff officer updates the engineer running estimate and provides mobility input to the COP
based on new information. The engineer staff officer ensures that the appropriate tasks and detailed
information needed by subordinate units to construct, repair, and maintain roads and trails are coordinated
and included in orders, plans, or SOPs.

AVAILABLE RESOURCE EVALUATION

7-8. As part of mission analysis, planners evaluate available resources (manpower, equipment, and
materials) and assess capabilities for building roads and trails. Planners identify shortfalls in engineer forces,
special equipment, and materials based on requirements. The planners initiate requests for augmentation as
early in the planning phase as possible to facilitate early movement and timely arrival and linkup of
augmenting units.
7-9. Depending on the scope of work required and the tactical situation, augmentation of combat or general
engineer capabilities may be necessary. Combat engineers have limited capability to build, repair, or maintain
roads, but they are outfitted and trained to provide close support to maneuver forces in close combat. General
engineers (with horizontal construction capabilities) have more robust capabilities that allow them to build,
repair, or maintain roads more efficiently than combat engineers. However, general engineers are not
normally outfitted and trained to provide close support to ground maneuver forces that are in close combat.
7-10. The senior engineer staff officer is responsible for prioritizing the engineer effort, identifying
engineering capability shortfalls, and generating the necessary information needed to support requests for
engineer augmentation. Planners must also address force requirements for providing worksite security. Based
on the threat, the appropriate forces are allocated specifically for the worksite security mission to allow the
unit constructing the road or trail to focus on construction tasks.

SITE SELECTION
7-11. Once a requirement for a road or trail is identified, planners focus on site selection. Sites are selected
based on analysis of the mission variables, with added focus on terrain considerations. (See table 7-1).
Planners attempt to select sites that take advantage of the existing terrain to minimize required engineering
efforts, in terms of time and resources. Planners generate the information needed for site selection by studying
existing maps, imagery, terrain analysis products, and the terrain-related information contained in the higher
headquarters plan or order. Any remaining uncertainties that require clarification for site selection become
IRs that are fulfilled through terrain analysis and the information collection plan.

Terrain Analysis
7-12. Planners first attempt to answer site selection IRs through terrain analysis that is supported by
geospatial engineers (or Marine Corps geographic intelligence specialists). Army geospatial engineer teams
are organic within the modular support and functional brigades and the BCT. Requests for geospatial
engineering support are coordinated through the S-2/G-2. Depending on the availability and accuracy of
geospatial data for the operational area, terrain analysis can reveal areas that are suitable for road and trail
construction based on characteristics of the terrain. Terrain analysis can help narrow down the areas being
considered and help focus reconnaissance efforts.

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 Combat Roads and Trails

Table 7-1. Terrain considerations for site selection

Terrain
Site Selection Considerations
Characteristics
• Slopes that affect trafficability, which varies based on weather conditions.
• Slopes that exceed vehicle capabilities require cut and fill (more earthwork).
• Ravines and reverse slopes offer concealment.
Surface • Concealment is not a consideration (with the exception of snow, ice, or frozen-soil
configuration roads) when roads on the sunny and exposed side of valleys or hills—
 Allow road surfaces and subgrades to dry faster.
 Minimize the chance of freezing.
 Ease road maintenance efforts.
• Soil type.
• Trafficability characteristics.
Soil composition • Drainage characteristics.
• Moisture content.
• Sources of fill material.
• Surface water (such as rivers) should be avoided to prevent any requirements for
gap crossings.
• Subsurface water (such as areas with high water tables) should be avoided when
possible.
Hydrology (surface
• Existing surface drainage features and drainage patterns should be analyzed.
drainage)
Take advantage of existing drainage features to minimize the need to construct
drainage structures.
• Long stretches of flat ground, valley bottoms, and depressions should be avoided
because of potential drainage problems.
• Areas with rock outcroppings and large boulders should be avoided.
Obstacles • Cultural, religious, and historic sites and environmentally sensitive areas should be
avoided.
• Cover and concealment effects.
Vegetation
• Clearing and grubbing effects (tree diameters, root type).

Surface Configuration
7-13. Slope affects trafficability and the amount of earthwork required for cut and fill. Excessive slopes
should be avoided when possible. If very steep hills must be crossed, the route should run along the side of
the hill rather than directly over it. This may result in a longer route, but it generally reduces the overall effort
required to construct and maintain roads and trails and ensure trafficability.

Soil Composition
7-14. Planners consider soil composition (soil type, drainage characteristics, and moisture content) and its
effect on construction design (strength and stability), and the efforts that will be needed to remove any
undesirable soils as part of site preparation. (See TM 3-34.64/MCRP 3-17.7G for additional information on
soil characteristics and predicting soil behavior under varying conditions.) Depending on the availability of
existing geospatial data for the operational area, geospatial products (such as surface material and
construction resources overlays) may be available that depict areas that are suitable for road and trail
construction based on soil composition and availability of construction materials. (See ATP 3-34.80.) Terrain
analysis can also yield useful information on the probability of encountering rock outcroppings and large
boulders that can affect construction efforts.
7-15. Generating detailed soil data normally requires extensive field sampling and the expertise of soil
analysis; however, hasty field identification of soil can be made during construction surveys to determine

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Chapter 7

basic soil characteristics. (See TM 3-34.64/MCRP 3-17.7G.) Soils are divided into the following three
general groups on the basis of drainage characteristics:
 Well-draining or free-draining soils. This includes soils that may be drained by gravity systems
(clean sands, gravels). Open ditches may be used within these soils to intercept and remove surface
water that originates from the surrounding area. These ditches, when dug to the proper depth, can
also be effective in draining groundwater from the base of the subgrade.
 Poorly draining soils. This includes inorganic and organic fine sands and silts, organic clays of
low compressibility, and coarse-grained soils that contain an excess of nonplastic fines (particles).
Surface water control of these soils is the same as for well-drained soils; however, subsurface
drainage may be difficult due to the relative impermeability of the soils.
 Impervious soils. This includes fine-grained, homogeneous, plastic soils and coarse-grained soils
that contain plastic fines. Subsurface drainage is extremely slow and of little value in these soils;
however, surface drainage is the same as with other soils.

Reconnaissance
7-16. Reconnaissance is used to gather the detailed information needed to design and construct roads and
trails that cannot be derived from maps, imagery, and terrain analysis. Reconnaissance is critical to protect
the force constructing the site, verifying the actual conditions of the proposed site, and planning refinement
to ensure that the necessary assets are allocated to accomplish the task. Aerial reconnaissance can provide
valuable information; however, the detailed information needed for construction is generally obtained
through ground reconnaissance.
7-17. The engineer staff officer works with the G-3/S-3 to ensure that the necessary engineer reconnaissance
assets and tasks are integrated within the information collection plan to facilitate the collection of the
technical information needed to construct roads and trails. The reconnaissance types and their applicability
to roads and trails include the following (see FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4 and FM 3-90-2 for additional
information):
 Route reconnaissance. This is focused along a specific route and all adjacent terrain (including
lateral routes) from which movement along the route could be negatively influenced.
 Route classification. This is typically a specified task as part of an assigned route reconnaissance
and is focused on the traffic-bearing capabilities and conditions of a select route to support
decisions on route improvements needed to support the desired traffic flow.
 Road reconnaissance. This is a component of route classification and is focused on the
engineering details of the road to support its upgrade or repair.
 Area reconnaissance. This is focused on locating a new road or trail in an area that will hold up
under anticipated traffic and meet mission requirements. It includes possible route layouts to
ensure selection of the best route.
7-18. The FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4 describes capabilities, limitations, and employment concepts
specific to route reconnaissance. The principles of reconnaissance can be found in FM 3-90-2. For more
permanent road construction, an assessment or survey team will typically be needed to conduct specific site
investigations to collect the detailed technical information required for road design and construction planning.
Site investigation requires a thorough knowledge of soils engineering, hydrology, and technical design
requirements. A detailed site investigation will serve as the foundation behind the design of a new road or
the upgrade, repair, and maintenance of an existing road.
7-19. The ERT or the engineers augmenting a maneuver unit reconnaissance mission are briefed as to the
anticipated traffic (wheeled, tracked, or a combination) and the anticipated traffic flow. Single-flow traffic
allows a column of vehicles to proceed while individual oncoming or overtaking vehicles pass at
predetermined points. Double-flow traffic allows two columns of vehicles to proceed simultaneously in the
same or in opposite directions.

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 Combat Roads and Trails

7-20. The reconnaissance team may also be asked to determine the grade and alignment, horizontal and
vertical curve characteristics, and other aspects of the terrain that can affect mobility, to include—
 Restricted lateral clearance, to include traveled way width (bridges, built-up areas, rock falls or
slide areas, tunnels, and wooded areas).
 Restricted overhead clearance, to include overpasses, bridges, tunnels, wooded areas, and built-
up areas.
 Sharp curves.
 Excessive gradients.
 Poor drainage.
 Snow blockage.
 Unstable foundation.
 Rough surface conditions.
7-21. Existing bridging may require special attention, because they are often weak links. A bridge
reconnaissance may be necessary to determine the classification.
7-22. If it is determined that movement cannot be supported by the existing route during a route
reconnaissance, ERTs can perform an area reconnaissance to quickly evaluate adjacent terrain for cross-
country movement or road and trail construction. Engineers performing reconnaissance may also collect soil
data at the proposed site and at possible borrow pits and quarry sites along the proposed route for further soil
analysis to determine soil properties.

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
7-23. Mission requirements, equipment and materials available, and the time available for planning and
construction are the driving factors in designing roads and trails. Combat roads and trails are designed and
built to fulfill an immediate need. Trails are built quickly and are intended to last only a few days. Combat
roads are generally more deliberate than trails and are built to last until a more durable conventional road can
be built by follow-on forces with more robust horizontal construction capabilities. Planners balance technical
engineering design and construction considerations with the urgency of the situation to generate options that
are optimized for effectiveness, while being as efficient as possible.
7-24. Roads and trails are designed and built with the understanding that future improvements will be
necessary to sustain continued use and to accommodate higher volumes of traffic. Based on anticipated future
needs and the characteristics of the expected traffic, plans are developed to progressively improve roads and
trails as time becomes available and the situation allows. Requirements for those improvements are
incorporated into future planning, and shortfalls are submitted to higher headquarters as early as possible to
allow coordination for the necessary augmentation of capabilities or to identify a requirement for follow-on
forces.
7-25. Soil properties, grade and alignment, and horizontal and vertical curve characteristics are considered
when designing roads and trails. Planners use the information contained in
FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 and TM 3-34.63 as a basis for designing and constructing roads and trails
that are tailored to the situation. Planners also consider TTP that may be found in construction-related
observations, lessons-learned, and after action reviews from previous operations.
7-26. Earthwork is the largest single task within road and trail construction, and it is resource intensive.
Minimizing earthwork requirements greatly reduces the overall effort required for constructing roads and
trails. Earthwork can be minimized by following the natural contours of the terrain and avoiding requirements
for deep cuts or high fills. When cut and fill are necessary, earthwork requirements should be balanced so
that the excavated material from cuts can be used for fills. When excavated material cannot be used, roads
should be located near a source of construction materials to reduce hauling requirements.
(See TM 3-34.62/MCRP 3-17.71 for information on earthmoving activities.)

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Chapter 7

CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES
7-27. Combat roads and trails are constructed using the same basic procedures that apply to conventional
roads, with an emphasis on expedient construction methods using any means available to accomplish the
mission. Although all steps may not be required based on the situation, construction procedures generally
follow this sequence:
 Survey the site.
 Prepare the site.
 Incorporate drainage.
 Stabilize the soil.
 Maintain and repair the road.
7-28. An integral part of the construction phase is reporting. Reports from the unit conducting the
construction are used to measure and analyze performance, anticipate change and unforeseen requirements,
and resolve problems. The engineer staff officer ensures that the necessary reporting requirements are
contained in orders, plans, or SOPs. The engineer staff officer monitors the reports from subordinate units
and specific progress on road and trail construction. The engineer staff officer disseminates information
throughout the staff as appropriate to allow updates to running estimates and the mobility portion of the COP
to facilitate decisionmaking.

SITE SURVEY
7-29. When a route or general area has been selected for a new road or trail, a construction survey is
performed (as time and the situation allows) to obtain or verify the necessary information required to begin
construction. After completing a construction survey, the design information is transferred from paper to the
field by construction stakes. (See FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 for additional information.)
Construction surveys include—
 Reconnaissance survey.
 Preliminary survey.
 Final location survey.
 Construction layout survey.
7-30. The number of surveys conducted and the extent to which they are performed are largely dictated by
the time available, standard of construction desired, and experience level of personnel performing
construction tasks. Expedient roads may be constructed to initial standards with minimal preplanning and
construction control. However, extensive surveys may be conducted for a road built to temporary standards.
The quality and efficiency of construction are directly proportional to the number and extent of surveys and
other preconstruction activities.

Reconnaissance Survey
7-31. A reconnaissance survey provides a basis for site selection and provides information that supports
future surveys. If a site cannot be selected based on this survey, it will be selected in the preliminary survey.

Preliminary Survey
7-32. A preliminary survey is a detailed study of a location tentatively selected based on reconnaissance,
survey information, and recommendations. Surveyors run a traverse along a proposed route, record the
topography, and plot results. Several surveys may be needed if reconnaissance shows that more than one
route is feasible to meet the specified requirements for the road. If the best available route has not already
been determined, it is selected based on this survey.

Final Location Survey

7-33. A final location survey is conducted if time allows. Permanent benchmarks for vertical control and
well-marked points for horizontal control are established. This enables construction elements to accurately
locate and match specific design locations with those on-site.

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 Combat Roads and Trails

Construction Layout Survey

7-34. A construction layout survey is the final preconstruction activity that occurs before construction
begins. It provides alignments, grades, and locations that guide construction. To enable construction, exact
placement of the centerline is made, curves are laid out, remaining construction stakes are set (slope, grade,
and shoulder), necessary structures are staked out, and culvert sites are laid out. This survey continues until
construction is complete.

SITE PREPARATION
7-35. When earthwork estimation, equipment scheduling, and necessary construction surveys are complete
and worksite security is in place, construction begins by clearing, grubbing, and stripping. Clearing the land
involves removing and disposing of vegetation, rubbish, surface boulders embedded in the ground, and any
EH that may exist within the designated area. Grubbing consists of uprooting and removing roots and stumps.
Stripping involves removing and disposing of objectionable topsoil and sod. These three activities are done
primarily with heavy engineer equipment, power tools, explosives, and fire. The method of clearing depends
on the—
 Amount of area (path) to be cleared.
 Type and density of vegetation.
 Effects of terrain on equipment.
 Availability of equipment and personnel.
 Time available for completion.
 Enemy situation.
7-36. For best results, a combination of methods is used. (See FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 for
additional information on land clearing.)

Clearing and Grubbing

7-37. In most cases, engineer heavy equipment is the fastest and most efficient means of clearing and
grubbing. This equipment includes various models of bulldozers, the M9 ACE, the deployable universal
combat earthmover, the high-mobility engineer excavator, tractor-mounted clearing units, winches, and
power saws. Pioneer tools are also used in certain types of clearing. Planners must evaluate the limitations
on each type of equipment to be used based on the significance of obstacles in the area (such as the diameter
of trees and stumps) and the effects of terrain on equipment based on surface configuration (slope) and soil
conditions.

Stripping
7-38. Stripping consists of removing and disposing of the topsoil and sod, which would be objectionable as
a subgrade, a foundation under a fill, or as borrow material. Examples include organic soils, humus, peat,
and muck. In shallow fill sections of 2 feet or less, the unsuitable material must be removed to a depth great
enough to place at least 3 feet of suitable subgrade material in the fill. Stripping is done concurrently with
clearing and grubbing by using bulldozers, graders, scrapers, front end loaders, and sometimes shovels. It is
often helpful to stockpile suitable topsoil and sod for later use on bare areas for dust or erosion control or for
camouflage.

Using Explosives
7-39. Explosives are used to fell standing trees, to uproot entire trees and stumps, and to remove and dispose
of large boulders. Explosives are especially advantageous in terrain that impedes the use of heavy equipment;
however, the following disadvantages must be considered:
 Explosives generate loud noises, which can violate security.
 In loose soil, the initial charge may be entirely expended in compacting the soil under a tree or
stump, and a second charge may be required to remove it.

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Chapter 7

 Deep taproots are often only broken by explosives, and the taproots have to be removed
mechanically or by hand.
 Explosives generally take time to place, and they create large craters that require borrow
excavation and compaction to backfill.

Cut and Fill

7-40. Cut and fill activities are conducted when clearing, grubbing, and stripping are finished. Cut and fill
requirements are the biggest part of the earthwork in road construction. The goal of cut and fill work is to
bring the route elevation to design specifications. When creating a fill, the soil is compacted in layers (lifts)
to minimize settlement, increase shearing resistance, reduce seepage, and minimize volume change.
Compaction is achieved with self-propelled or towed rollers. Cut and fill and compaction efforts are intended
to achieve the final grade. When final grade is achieved, ditching is cut to control drainage runoff and the
road is crowned along its centerline. At this point, the road is ready for surfacing as required.
7-41. Expedient surfaces may be used as a temporary means to quickly cross small areas with extremely
poor soil conditions (swamps, quicksand, wetlands) when there is not enough time or resources for standard
road construction. Expedient road surfaces include cross-country tracks, Army tracks, chespaling, corduroy,
landing mat, chain-link wire mesh, plank roads, and snow or ice roads. (See TM 3-34.43/
MCRP 3-17.7H/NAVFAC MO 330/AFH 32-1034 for additional information on expedient surfacing
methods).

DRAINAGE
7-42. Delays caused by flooding, subgrade failure, and mud are avoided by employing an effective drainage
system. Properly planned, designed, constructed, and maintained drainage structures are essential to the
serviceability of roads and trails. Drainage structures should be developed in stages at the beginning of
clearing, grubbing, and stripping activities to ensure uninterrupted construction. In most instances, the impact
of surface water can be lessened by following the proper procedures for grading, compaction, and drainage.
(See FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 for information on drainage design.)
7-43. Natural drainage features are used as much as possible to ensure minimum disturbance of natural
grades and limit the necessary work involved. Where possible, grading should run downhill to improve
efficiency and to capitalize on natural drainage. During clearing and grubbing, existing or natural
watercourses must be kept cleared, and holes and depressions must be filled. Adequate drainage for the site
must be provided to ensure that water does not interfere with construction. Construction drainage measures
include—
 Ditches. The three main types of ditches used in road and trail construction are—
 Interceptor ditches. These are usually located on a hillside above a roadway or sidehill cut
to intercept runoff and direct the flow to a more desirable location.
 Side ditches. These are located along the roadside to collect runoff from the road and
adjacent areas and transport it to a culvert or diversion ditch.
 Diversion ditches. These redirect surface water heading toward the construction site, sending
it in a controlled manner to a more desirable location.
 Culverts. A culvert is an enclosed waterway used to pass water through a fill. A culvert is used
when the natural flow of surface water passes through a fill used for a road or trail. Natural
drainage channels should never be closed, even if they are currently dry. Culvert types and
construction procedures must be considered before starting road construction. (See
FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 for information on designing ditches and culverts.)

SOIL STABILIZATION
7-44. Soil stabilization can be critical to even short-duration combat roads and trails. Soil stabilization
improves strength, controls dust, and renders surfaces waterproof. Strength improvement increases the load-
carrying capability of the road. Dust control alleviates or eliminates dust generated by vehicle and aircraft
traffic. Soil waterproofing maintains the natural or constructed strength of a soil by preventing water from
entering it.

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 Combat Roads and Trails

Subgrade Stabilization
7-45. Subgrades can be stabilized mechanically by adding granular materials, chemically by adding
chemical admixtures (lime, Portland cement, fly ash), or with a stabilization expedient (sand grid, matting,
or geosynthetics). A stabilization expedient may provide significant time and cost savings as a substitute to
other means of stabilization or low-strength fill. Matting and sand grid are expedient methods for stabilizing
loose soils (such as sand for unsurfaced road construction). Geotextiles and other geosynthetics are primarily
used to reinforce weak subgrades, maintain the separation of soil layers, and control drainage through the
road design. Geosynthetics are the primary means of waterproofing soils when grading, compaction, and
drainage efforts are insufficient. The availability of these materials must be weighed with the considerable
time savings for use of expedients in combat construction.

Surfacing
7-46. Expedient surfacing methods are used to improve trafficability in areas that contain fine-grained soils
that are graded and drained. (See figure 7-1 and figure 7-2, page 7-10.) These improvements are designed to
satisfy immediate traffic needs and to provide a subgrade for follow-on layers of a pavement structure surface.
Although unsurfaced roads may be adequate for the anticipated traffic load, changes in terrain and weather
conditions may dictate the use of expedient surfacing techniques. Expedient surfaces should be covered with
a layer of fill material when possible to minimize wear from heavy armored vehicles. (See TM 3-34.63 for
additional information on expedient surfaces.) Specifications for use of these and other surfacing techniques
are provided in FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013. In many cases, an adequate wearing surface can be
obtained using soil stabilization techniques.

Figure 7-1. Expedient surface over mud (airfield matting)

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Chapter 7

Figure 7-2. Expedient surface over sand (sand grid)

ROAD MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

7-47. Once constructed and depending on how long the road or trail will be used, the staff must develop a
maintenance plan to prevent and correct damage and deterioration caused by normal use and weather effects.
The staff must also develop a repair plan to rapidly restore damages caused by abnormal use, accidents, threat
actions, and severe weather to ensure that the road or trail remains usable.
7-48. The staff establishes means to monitor and assess the conditions of roads and trails. This can include
periodic ground patrols by engineers or other elements that frequently use the road network (military police,
transporters, fly-overs by aviation assets [including unmanned aircraft systems]). Engineer road maintenance
and repair modules are organized with personnel, equipment, and supplies to accomplish rapid road repair
and maintenance in a specific area. As many modules as needed are organized to cover the total AO. The
traffic level and the limited durability of a road sometimes make it necessary to put the maintenance function
on a 24-hour-a-day basis in heavy traffic areas. A squad-size road maintenance and repair module equipped
with a dump truck, a grader, and hand tools can usually carry out all maintenance and minor repairs
encountered on a 5- to 15-mile stretch of road. This module or force package can be increased or decreased,
and more or fewer miles can be assigned to a module as the mission dictates. Security conditions may affect
the size and composition of these elements and the employment method.

Preventive Maintenance
7-49. The purpose of preventive maintenance and repair is to keep road surfaces in as usable and safe a
condition as possible. Prompt and adequate maintenance is important. Once deterioration or destruction of
the surface has started, it can progress very rapidly. A minor maintenance task that is postponed can result in
a major repair task. Principles of good maintenance are—
 Minimize interference with traffic. Maintenance and repair activities should avoid interfering
with the normal flow of traffic as much as possible or allow partial use of the route at a minimum.
Scheduled maintenance should be done when the traffic flow best allows (such as at night).
Emergency repairs should be performed immediately.
 Correct the root cause of a surface failure. Surface repairs on a defective subgrade are a wasted
effort. The cause of damage should be investigated and corrected before repairs are made; if not,
the damage is likely to reoccur.
 Establish priorities. Priorities for repairs are based on mission requirements, the commander’s
guidance, traffic volume, and risks resulting in the loss of a road or trail.

Drainage Maintenance
7-50. Defective or inadequate drainage can cause surface failures and deterioration. Ponding or delayed
runoff of surface water allows seepage unless the surface is tightly sealed. Surfaces must be inspected after
rainfall and areas marked for ponding. Correction is made by filling or raising local depressions and by
providing additional diversion ditches or culverts where needed.

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 Combat Roads and Trails

Surface Maintenance
7-51. Basic maintenance requirements for natural earth surfaces include shaping to maintain adequate
drainage and to keep a compact, reasonably smooth surface. Traffic areas and shoulders are kept free of
potholes, ruts, and similar irregularities. Light blading is done to prevent corrugation or washboarding. (See
figure 7-3 for earth surface road repair examples.) Dust abatement should also be incorporated when possible.

Figure 7-3. Combat roads and trails surface repair

Crater Repair
7-52. Extensive craters resulting from EHs (such as IEDs) should be repaired as soon as the situation allows,
minimizing the traffic impact (safety hazards) and preventing further damage to the road structure. An
explosion can displace or destabilize large portions of the subgrade, allowing surface water to penetrate and
further soften the subgrade. Subgrade stability must be restored to support traffic and prevent undue settling
of the surface. Gravel, rock, masonry debris, sandy soil, or other suitable stable materials can be used in
filling craters. (See the left side of figure 7-4.)

Figure 7-4. Crater repair methods

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Chapter 7

7-53. Material blown from the crater can also be a source of fill. In an emergency, material from the
shoulders of the road or trail may be borrowed and replaced later. When the situation permits, stockpiles or
material pits can be prepositioned at convenient sites to facilitate timely repairs. Alternate layers of filled
sandbags and tamped earth furnish good subgrade compaction where other suitable material or equipment is
not available. (See the right side of figure 7-4, page 7-11)

Gap Sustainment
7-54. Gap sustainment includes the maintenance and repairs needed to support bridging along a route, to
include repairing damaged abutments, reinforcing load-bearing members, and replacing damaged bridge
components. Gap sustainment should be included in maintenance and repair requirements for routes.

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 Chapter 8
Forward Aviation Combat Engineering
FACE includes the combat engineering tasks performed specifically to support the air
movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies within an operational area, especially
in complex terrain or when ground LOCs have been disrupted. FACE also includes
those tasks that support forward aviation operating facilities. It shortens the distance
between an aviation unit projected area of commitment and its sustainment area,
reducing turnaround times. FACE also enhances the availability and responsiveness of
aviation (primarily rotary-wing) assets.

OVERVIEW
8-1. FACE is a combat engineering mission; however, general engineering units may be required to
perform or augment combat engineers that are performing FACE missions, depending on the situation. The
BCT/RCT organic horizontal construction capabilities are limited and will likely necessitate augmentation
to meet the full range of aviation support requirements, especially the requirements that will likely be more
permanent as the phases of the operation progress. FACE includes the following tasks:
 Construct landing zones.
 Construct extraction zones.
 Construct, maintain, and repair landing strips.
 Construct, maintain, and repair forward aviation operating facilities.
8-2. FACE includes requirements for the hasty construction or rehabilitation of aviation facilities that
support fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft (manned and unmanned). It includes the requirements to improve
drop zones and extraction zones for airborne insertions and aerial (airdrop) delivery. FACE missions are
similar to the construction of combat roads and trails. Both are based on expedient horizontal construction
techniques and are considered combat engineering missions, although they can be conducted by units that
are designed to perform general engineering tasks.

LANDING ZONES
8-3. Landing zones allow aircraft to land and deliver troops, equipment, and logistics in support of mission
requirements. The combat engineering applied to landing zones can range from clearing trees from the rotor
zone to placing expedient-surface material to facilitate surface stability and to control dust.

EXTRACTION ZONES
8-4. Sustaining ground forces may require aerial resupply by means other than air landing and airdrops.
Extraction zones are specifically used to support low-altitude aerial deliveries that use the low-altitude
parachute extraction system. Extraction zones require relatively flat, stump-free terrain with measurements
similar to those specified for a C-130 landing strip. Since the fixed-wing transport aircraft, typically a C-130,
does not land when discharging its cargo, the ground strength requirements are based on the equipment being
discharged. Information on ground strength is provided in FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013. Extraction
zone criteria and marking requirements are described in FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013.

LANDING STRIPS
8-5. The landing strip (also referred to as a flight strip) is the portion of an airfield that includes the landing
area, the end zones, and the shoulder areas. A landing strip is designed, constructed, and maintained to

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Chapter 8

support the landing and takeoff of specified fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems. Landing
strips must be relatively flat with a surface capable of supporting fully loaded aircraft. Proper site selection
is essential in minimizing the engineering effort needed for meeting the design and construction criteria
prescribed in FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013.

HELP FORWARD AVIATION OPERATING FACILITIES

8-6. Combat engineers construct, maintain, and repair forward aviation operating facilities, which include
landing zones, initial heliports and helipads, and forward arming and refueling points. These aviation
facilities are positioned to extend the tactical reach of attack, lift, and reconnaissance aviation assets and
optimize the time on target. Maintenance includes the activities needed to correct deficiencies resulting from
normal use and deterioration due to weather and repair deals with restoration of damage due to abnormal use,
accidents, severe weather, and threat actions.

PLANNING
8-7. During mission analysis, the staff determines FACE requirements based on the mission, the
commander’s intent, the scheme of movement and maneuver, and the effects of the terrain. The FACE
requirements are also generated by the continuous application of the assured mobility framework and the
monitoring and assessment of changes in the situation, which are reflected in the mobility portion of the COP.

REQUIREMENTS
8-8. The number and location of required air landing facilities vary based on—
 Size of the force being employed.
 Schemes of maneuver and sustainment/logistics.
 Characteristics of the terrain in the operational area.
 Enemy situation.

8-9. Generally, at least one potential landing strip or landing zone is planned for each maneuver brigade or
regiment and battalion area, not including the facilities needed for the sustainment of organic and augmenting
Army/Marine Corps aviation elements. This helps to outline the engineer tasks that are necessary to open,
repair, or construct air landing facilities. In uncertain or hostile environments, plans should include repairing
major damages to airfield pavements and clearing airfield obstructions as part of the initial airfield seizure.
Planners designate the design (or controlling) aircraft for each airfield or landing zone to establish the
minimum design criteria and help define requirements. For example, designating an airfield as C-17 capable
(C-17 is the design or controlling aircraft) ensures that it will support C-17s, C-130s, and C-12As. Dust
control is an important part of airfield and landing zone requirements. Dust control requirements vary
between the Services and are different for each type of aircraft. (See FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013 for
specific requirements.) (See JP 3-34 for additional information on joint engineering support to airfield
construction.)
8-10. The senior engineer staff officer is responsible for coordinating the resources and requirements for
performing FACE within the headquarters and works through engineer channels to coordinate engineering
requirements with higher headquarters and subordinate units as necessary. Teleengineering (reachback) may
also be used for gaining technical engineering and construction advice. The engineer staff officer updates the
engineer running estimate and provides mobility input to the COP based on new information. The engineer
staff officer ensures that the appropriate tasks and detailed information needed by subordinate units to
construct air landing facilities are coordinated and included in orders, plans, or SOPs.

AVAILABLE RESOURCES
8-11. As part of mission analysis, planners evaluate available resources (manpower, equipment, and
materials) and assess capabilities for conducting FACE. Planners identify shortfalls (engineer forces and
special equipment and materiel) based on FACE requirements and initiate requests for augmentation as early
in the planning phase as possible to facilitate early movement, timely arrival, and the linkup of augmenting

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 Forward Aviation Combat Engineering

units. The senior engineer staff officer is responsible for prioritizing the engineer effort, identifying
engineering capability shortfalls, and generating the information needed to support requests for engineer
augmentation.

SITE SELECTION
8-12. Once a requirement for airfield, landing zone, or other aviation facility is identified, planners focus on
site selection. The site selection criteria for combat roads and trails also apply to airfields and landing zones.
Additionally, planners must also consider the prevailing wind and its impact on runway orientation. (See FM
3-99 and FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013 for additional information.)
8-13. Existing infrastructure should be used when possible. Existing airfields and heliports will usually be
suitable or require only minor repairs to meet the immediate mission requirements. Roads and sports fields
can generally support take offs and landings of rotary-wing aircraft and light fixed-wing aircraft.
8-14. Based on the site selection results, requirements for engineering capabilities (manpower, equipment,
and material) are refined, shortfalls are identified, and the necessary requests for augmentation are submitted
to higher headquarters.

Surface Configuration
8-15. Landing strips are constructed across long, gentle slopes for ease of drainage. The bottoms of valleys
or other depressed areas are avoided. Locations that require extensive clearing of flight way obstructions to
meet glide angle requirements are also avoided.
8-16. Slope directly affects the amount of earthwork required for cut and fill needed for runways. Sites
should be selected that fall within the acceptable limits for slope that will minimize earthwork requirements.
Slope also limits the suitability of landing zones. Generally, areas are considered suitable for landing zones
if they have less than 15 percent slope. Geospatial engineers (or Marine Corps geographic intelligence
specialists) can produce terrain visualization products that show the effects of slope and vegetation on landing
zones to help planners quickly template possible landing zones, the effects of cover and concealment, and
the availability of entry and exit routes. (See ATP 3-34.80.)

Soil Composition
8-17. Planners consider soil composition (soil type, drainage characteristics, and moisture content), its effect
on construction design (strength and stability), and the efforts that will be needed to remove any undesirable
soils before construction. (See TM 3-34.64/MCRP 3-17.7G for additional information on soil characteristics
and predicting soil behavior under varying conditions.) Sites should be in areas where the soil can be
compacted quickly and easily to the standards in FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013. Soil conditions should
also be evaluated to avoid areas that may contribute to brownout conditions for pilots.
8-18. Depending on the availability of existing geospatial data for the operational area, geospatial products
(such as surface material and construction resource overlays) may be available that depict areas that are
suitable for airfields based on soil composition and availability of construction materials. (See ATP 3-34.80.)
Terrain analysis can also yield useful information on the probability of encountering rock formations that can
impact construction efforts.

Reconnaissance
8-19. Combat engineer reconnaissance capabilities are integrated within the information collection plan to
facilitate the collection of technical information needed for selecting a site and preparing to perform FACE
missions. The engineer staff officer works with S-3/G-3 to ensure that the necessary engineer reconnaissance
assets and tasks are being incorporated into the information collection plan. The focus of reconnaissance in
support of FACE is described in FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4.
8-20. Depending on the enemy situation and the commander’s guidance, ground or aerial reconnaissance
and site investigation may not be possible. In those situations, planners must rely on GEOINT, which consists
of geospatial information, imagery, and imagery intelligence.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8-3

Chapter 8

8-21. For more permanent airfield or heliport construction, an assessment or survey team will typically be
required to conduct specific site investigations to collect the detailed technical information needed for
designing and constructing a new airfield as described in FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013. Site
investigation requires a thorough knowledge of soils engineering, hydrology, and technical design
requirements. A detailed site investigation will serve as the foundation behind the design of a new road or
the upgrade or repair of an existing road.

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
8-22. Initial airfields and heliports are designed and constructed to fulfill an immediate need based on the
mission requirements. Planners use the information contained in FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013 as a basis
for designing and constructing airfields and heliports that are tailored to the situation. Planners also consider
TTP that may be found in construction-related observations, lessons learned, and after action reviews from
previous operations.
8-23. Planners balance technical engineering design and construction considerations with the time available
for planning and the availability of resources (manpower, equipment, and materials) to generate options that
are optimized for effectiveness, while being as efficient as possible. Air landing facilities are designed and
constructed with the understanding that future improvements will be necessary to sustain continued use and
to accommodate different types and higher volumes of aircraft. Based on anticipated future needs and the
types of aircraft, plans are developed to implement progressive improvements to air landing facilities as time
becomes available and the situation allows. Requirements for those improvements are incorporated into
future planning, and shortfalls are submitted to higher headquarters as early as possible to allow coordination
for the necessary augmentation of capabilities or to identify a requirement for follow-on forces.

CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR

8-24. Initial airfield or hasty landing strip development might begin by establishing a drop zone, followed
by expansion to an extraction zone, and eventually transitioning to an expedient airfield using an unsurfaced
landing area or an area surfaced with landing matting or membrane.

CLEARING FLIGHT PATHS

8-25. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft requires that obstacles above the elevations specified by design criteria
be removed. These criteria vary according to the operating characteristics of the aircraft that use the aviation
facility. For example, most heliports require an approach zone with a 10:1 glide angle, whereas heavy cargo
aircraft in sustainment areas require a glide angle as flat as 50:1. To achieve the right glide angle, it may be
necessary to remove obstructions such as trees and power lines and do major earthwork on distant approaches
to the aviation facility. A similar clearance is also required on the sides of runways. (See
FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 for information on criteria for glide angles and approach zones for
airstrips and landing zones and removing obstructions.)

SITE PREPARATION
8-26. The site preparation activities for constructing combat roads and trails also apply to airfields and
landing zones. However, the areas to be cleared for airfields are usually larger than those in combat road and
trail construction. The disposal of unsuitable materials often requires more planning and longer hauls on
airfield projects than on road projects. To reduce disposal requirements, efforts should be made when possible
to reuse those cleared materials for other useful purposes (such as fill material in revetments around
hardstands).

DRAINAGE
8-27. Properly planned, designed, constructed, and maintained drainage facilities are essential to the
serviceability of forward aviation operating facilities. The same drainage considerations for combat roads
and trails apply to aviation facilities. However, airfields tend to present more drainage problems than roads.
The wide, paved (or unpaved) areas of airfields require water to be diverted completely around the field or

8-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Forward Aviation Combat Engineering

that long drainage structures should be built. In many instances, the requirements for drainage structures can
be reduced by grading the airstrip to facilitate natural drainage. (See FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013 for
detailed information on drainage design.) When possible, airstrips and extraction zones are constructed across
long, gentle slopes to ease efforts needed to divert water around the facility.

SURFACING
8-28. Initial airfields may be unsurfaced or expedient-surfaced depending on the situation, soil-bearing
characteristics, climate, amount and type of anticipated traffic, time available, availability of resources, and
expected duration. Surfacing must meet the allowable roughness criteria for each type of aircraft that will use
the facility. Soil stabilization improves strength, controls dust, and renders surfaces waterproof.
8-29. Typically, no additional construction effort besides clearing is expended for landing zones. Generally,
a grass or soil surface (preferably grass) with appropriate expedient treatment to permit use during adverse
weather conditions will suffice for initial helipads and heliports.
8-30. Landing mats and membranes are used as expedient surfaces for airfields and helipads. Landing mats
are used when the strength or smoothness of landing surfaces is not adequate. Membrane surfacing is used
where soil strength is adequate but may become too weak when wet. Membrane surfacing is placed under
landing mats in high-traffic areas (runways, taxiways) to provide a waterproof covering for the soil.
Membrane surfacing is used for dust control in aircraft traffic areas where chemical dust palliative is less
satisfactory or requires greater time or effort to use. The types, specifications, and emplacement of matting
material and placement techniques, anchoring, repair, and maintenance of surfacing membrane are described
in FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013.

AIRFIELD DAMAGE REPAIR

8-31. Airfield damage repair encompasses the actions required to repair airfield and landing zone surfaces
and infrastructure at a base or location seized from the enemy or offered for use by a host nation. It also
includes repairs required to sustain operations or to reestablish operations after enemy attack at an airfield.
(See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7.) Airfields can be subjected to damage by an increasingly capable and
complex array of destructive weapons, which includes cannon fire, rocket fire, small or large bombs, and
bomblets. An EH (such as UXO [SCATMINE, unexploded bomblet]), IED, a variety of potential barriers,
and other hindrances may challenge efforts to make airfields capable of supporting air traffic.
8-32. Combat engineers organic to the BCTs/RCTs will typically conduct the initial forcible-entry airfield
damage repair focused on runway clearance and surface repairs using sand grid. Marine wing support
squadrons possess the capability to perform airfield damage repair. Follow-on forces with general
engineering support will focus on repairing the infrastructure. (See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7.) Air Force
technical experts or airborne red horse units may be included as a part of the Army combat engineer element
that is participating in joint forcible entry to approve the aircraft surface, control aircraft landing and
departure, and serve as liaison to the airfield opening team. The airfield opening team will typically work
with general engineering elements to take the airfield to a higher standard of repair after the lodgment area
has been secured. (See UFC 3-270-07 for additional information on airfield damage repair.)
8-33. Rapid repair modules are organized with personnel, equipment, and supplies to accomplish rapid
runway repair and maintenance in a specific area. Maintenance and repair work to airfields must be
coordinated with tactical commanders and incur minimum interference to air and ground traffic. Much of
this work must be done at night or during inclement weather. Hazardous equipment must not be left on the
airfield. Areas under construction or repair must be clearly marked on the surface to be visible from the air.

AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE
8-34. The procedures and considerations for airfield (and heliport) maintenance are similar to those for road
maintenance and repair. Airfield maintenance is the routine prevention and correction of damage and
deterioration caused by normal use and exposure to the elements and aircraft traffic. Routine maintenance
includes inspections; maintenance and repair of expedient surfaces and dust and drainage control systems;
and snow, ice, and foreign object debris removal.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8-5

Chapter 8

8-35. The maintenance of forward aviation sites will be accomplished by combat engineers augment as
necessary, by other engineer units. The materials used for airfield maintenance are generally the same as
those used for airfield construction and repair. Marine wing support squadrons, which contain Marines
trained in expeditionary airfields and combat engineering, maintain tactical air facilities.

8-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart
This appendix complies with AR 25-30 which states that weights, distances,
quantities, and measurements contained in Army publications will be expressed in U.S.
standard and metric units. Table A-1 is a metric conversion chart for the measurements
used in this publication. For a complete listing of preferred metric units for general use,
see Fed-Std-376B.
Table A-1. Metric conversion chart
U.S. Units Multiplied By Equals Metric Units
Feet 0.304800000 Meters
Feet per hour 304.800000000 Millimeters per hour
Feet per second 0.304800000 Meters per second
Inches 2.540000000 Centimeters
Inches 0.025400000 Meters
Inches 25.400000000 Millimeters
Miles (nautical) 1.853200000 Kilometers
Miles (statute) 1.609300000 Kilometers
Miles per hour 1.609344000 Kilometers per hour
Miles per hour 1609.300000000 Meters per hour
Nautical miles per hour 1.000000000 Knots
Pounds 0.453590000 Kilograms
Tons 0.907000000 Metric tons
Yards 0.914000000 Meters
Metric Units Multiplied By Equals U.S. Units
Centimeters 0.393700000 Inches
Kilograms 2.204620000 Pounds
Kilometers 0.539600000 Miles (nautical)
Kilometers 0.621370000 Miles (statute)
Kilometers per hour 0.621371192 Miles per hour
Knots 1.000000000 Nautical miles per hour
Meters 3.280800000 Feet
Meters 39.370000000 Inches
Meters 1.093610000 Yards
Meters per second 2.237000000 Miles per hour
Meters per second 3.280800000 Feet per second
Metric tons 1.102311310 Tons
Millimeters 0.039370000 Inches
Millimeters per hour 0.003280800 Feet per hour
Legend:
U.S. United States

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 Appendix B
Lane and Bypass Marking
This appendix provides commanders with a standard system for lane and bypass
marking. It is built on a systematic, phased upgrade of lane marking. Each upgrade
conforms to tactical requirements for that phase of the attack, from initial obstacle
reduction to the passage of follow-on forces and the return traffic necessary to sustain
the force. Lane or bypass marking is a critical component of obstacle reduction.
Effective lane marking allows forces to quickly orient on and follow a lane, and quickly
pass through a reduced obstacle. Information on North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) lane-marking standards can be found in NATO STANAG 2036. NATO
standardization agreements can be accessed on the NATO Standardization Office
Public Web site.

LANE-MARKING SYSTEM
B-1. There two critical components to any lane-marking system—
 Lane-marking pattern. The location of markers indicating the entrance, lane, and exit.
 Lane-marking device. The type of hardware emplaced to mark the entrance, lane, and exit.
B-2. The lane-marking system outlined in this appendix centers on standardizing the marking pattern across
the Army and Marine Corps rather than standardizing the marking device. Standardizing the marking pattern
is critical to the offense. A common lane-marking pattern—
 Enables cross attachments and adjacent units to recognize lanes easily with minimal knowledge
of a particular unit tactical SOPs.
 Gives forces a standardized set of visual cues needed to pass through a lane safely while
maintaining momentum.
 Facilitates quick conversion to the lane-marking requirements of STANAG 2036 in which the
device, color, and pattern are standardized.
B-3. Until the Army and Marine Corps adopt a standard lane-marking device, commanders decide what
hardware to use. This gives units greater flexibility, allowing them to adopt a marking device that is tailored
for their unit type and mission (armored or light force, mounted or dismounted attack, limited visibility, and
thermal capability). Regardless of the device used, it must support the standard lane-marking pattern outlined
in this appendix. Commanders should consider the marking guidelines and examples in this appendix before
developing or adopting their own system. Commanders should determine and standardize the marking device
used within their units based on the availability of resources and analysis of the mission variables.

LANE-MARKING TERMS
B-4. Lane marking relies on a recognizable set of markers to indicate the viewer’s position relative to the
obstacle. The following common lane marks:
 Entrance funnel markers. These markers augment entrance markings. The V formed by the
funnel markers forces approaching platoons into a column formation and assists drivers and
vehicle commanders in making last-minute adjustments before entering the lane.
Entrance markers. These markers indicate the start of a lane through an obstacle. They signify
the friendly side boundary of the obstacle and the point where movement is restricted by the lane
width and path. Entrance markers also indicate the lane width. Therefore, it is critical for

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-1

Appendix B

a maneuvering force to distinguish the entrance point clearly, since it signifies the point where
passing vehicles can no longer adjust their movement in reaction to the situation (direct and
indirect fires) without jeopardizing the force. Entrance markers must be visually different from
handrail markers to help a force distinguish this critical point in the lane. The distance between
entrance markers must be the same as the width of the created lane. Entrance markers placed a
minimum of 16 feet apart indicate a lane capable of supporting mounted movement, while markers
placed a minimum of 3 feet apart indicate a dismounted lane. When obstacle boundaries are vague
or unknown (such as a buried minefield), the breach force uses its best judgment and marks the
entrance where obstacle reduction and lane proofing begin.
 Exit markers. These markers indicate the far side limit of a lane through an obstacle. For a
passing force, the exit marker signifies the point at which movement is no longer confined to the
lane path. Like entrance markers, exit markers must be distinguishably different from handrail
markers; however, the exit may be marked the same as the entrance. Exit markers are placed to
the left and right of an exit point and spaced the width of the reduced lane. This visual reference
is critical when only a left handrail is marked. The combination of entrance, left-handrail, and exit
markers gives the driver and the vehicle commander visual cues (entrance and exit points, lane
width, and path) to pass safely along a lane.
 Far-recognition markers. These markers are highly visible markers located between the final-
approach marker and the friendly unit. They are primarily used when passing battalion-size forces
through a lane where direct observation of the final-approach marker is denied due to distance,
visibility, or terrain. Far-recognition markers should be different from the final-approach marker.
Far-recognition markers indicate the point at which forces begin changing their formation to
posture for the passage. A single far-recognition marker may serve up to two lanes when located
650 to 1,300 feet apart. Once lanes are upgraded to two-way traffic, far-recognition markers are
required for each two-way lane. Far-recognition markers should be visually alterable so that they
can be distinguished from the far-recognition marker of an adjacent lane. This assists the command
and control of large formations when passing on several adjacent lanes. When a far-recognition
marker serves more than one lane, a guide or a TCP is colocated with the far-recognition marker
nearest the obstacle.
 Final-approach markers. These markers are highly visible, robust markers that augment the
visual signature of entrance funnel markers. Units must be able to see the entrance funnel or the
entrance funnel markers from the final-approach marker. The final-approach marker—
 Provides the assault force commander with a highly visible reference point toward which to
maneuver their formation.
 Signals the company team commanders to begin changing to a column formation.
 Handrail markers. These markers define the lane path through an obstacle and indicate the limits
of the lane width. At a minimum, mounted and dismounted lanes have a left handrail. Mounted
and dismounted forces moving through a lane should keep the left handrail immediately to the left
of the vehicle or person. The left handrail is considered on the left of the vehicle direction of travel
through the initial breach. The lane width is defined by the entrance markers. Therefore, when
only the left handrail is marked, drivers use entrance and handrail markers to gauge the lane width
and path. As the phases of the operation progress, lane marking may be upgraded to include right
handrails.

TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS AND GUIDES

B-5. A TCP or a guide consists of a two-man team with communications means that assists the commander
in controlling the movement of forces. When available, military police may be used to establish and operate
these posts. Initially, the commander may use other personnel as guides to operate critical far-recognition
markers until military police establish full TCPs. The employment of military police is based on an
assessment of the mission variables.

B-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

B-6. TCPs and guides provide the commander with a means to control traffic flow to appropriate lanes.
When there are multiple lanes branching off a single far-recognition marker, the TCP helps direct the
formation to various lanes. The TCP can also assist in modifying the traffic flow when lanes have been closed
for maintenance, for lane expansion, or by enemy SCATMINEs. The TCP or guide must give the commander
the azimuth and distance to the final-approach marker, the device used for the approach marker, and the level
of the lane-marking pattern. For light forces, guides may physically escort passing units from the far-
recognition marker to the lane entrance. In short, the TCP allows the commander to make last-minute changes
in the traffic flow, giving them increased flexibility to react to the enemy situation.
B-7. Another technique to facilitate the movement of the assault force to the POBs is for the assault force
to maneuver a reconnaissance element (such as a section) behind the breach force. This section observes the
breach effort, identifies lanes, and leads the assault force to lanes after the breach is complete.

LANE MARKING LEVELS AND PATTERNS

B-8. There are three levels of lane marking:
 Initial.
 Intermediate.
 Full (two way).
B-9. Each lane-marking level provides an increase in lane signature and capability. Lane requirements
change as a breach matures from the passage of the assault force to the passage of larger follow-on forces.
Initial lane-marking requirements are driven by the nature of the fight through the obstacle. Marking must be
rapid, providing only the bare minimum signature needed to safely pass small units (company teams,
platoons) that make up the assault force. This contrasts with lane requirements during later phases of an
attack, where larger units (battalion and above) are passed to subsequent objectives and lane signatures must
be more extensive and more visible. Two-way traffic becomes a priority for the simultaneous forward passage
of combat units and return traffic (ambulances, empty supply vehicles) necessary to sustain the force.
Increased traffic volume increases diverse forces and levels of driver experience. Lane-marking limits must
be clear to the most inexperienced driver or crewmember. Do not assume that the driver has knowledge of
the unit SOPs. A fully developed lane must support two-way traffic and be completely marked.
B-10. Commanders must be aware of how the lane needs of a force change so that they can anticipate lane-
marking and lane-capability requirements. Integrating the levels of lane marking into the overall breaching
plan ensures that a unit needs are satisfied. The forces necessary to mark and upgrade lanes must be allocated
and tasked with that mission. The scheme of movement and maneuver and scheme of sustainment/logistics
are the basis for analyzing lane requirements. The following paragraphs describe lane-marking patterns in
detail and provide guidelines on when a commander should upgrade lane marking and lane capability.

INITIAL
B-11. The breach force emplaces the initial lane-marking pattern immediately after the obstacle is reduced
and, if required, the lane is proofed. This is a signal to the assault force commander that the lane is ready for
traffic. Initial lane marking is kept to a minimum, focusing on the markings needed to pass immediate assault
forces (company teams and smaller) through the lane to seize the POP on the far side objective. Normally,
the assault force can observe the lane as it is being marked and does not need the greater visual signature of
mature lane marking. The initial lane-marking pattern contains—
 Entrance markers.
 Left-handrail markers.
 Exit markers.
 Entrance funnel markers.
 A final-approach marker.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-3

Appendix B

B-12. Figure B-1 shows the initial lane-marking pattern. Entrance, left-handrail, and exit markers are the
first markers that the breach force emplaces since these markers define the location and limits of the lane.
These markers should be emplaced as follows:
 Entrance markers are placed to the left and right of the reduced lane entrance point. They are
spaced the width of the lane (at least 15 feet for mounted lanes and 3 feet for dismounted lanes).
 Left-handrail markers are placed at the left limit of the lane along the entire path. They are placed
at 50-foot intervals for mounted forces and 15-foot intervals for dismounted forces. Commanders
can modify the intervals based on the terrain, the visibility, the lane length, and the lane path.
Additionally, commanders may choose to mark left and right handrails when the lane path is
lengthy or unclear (through a complex obstacle).
 Exit markers are placed to the left and right of the lane at the far side of the obstacle (at least 15
feet for mounted lanes and 3 feet for dismounted lanes).
B-13. After the entrance, left-handrail, and exit markers are placed, the breach force emplaces entrance
funnel markers and the final-approach marker. These markers enhance the visual signature of the lane
entrance for the assault force. If the assault force is in a position to observe the obstacle reduction, the
commander does not have to wait until entrance funnel markers and the final-approach marker are set to
commit the assault force. However, the breach force continues to install the necessary markers to improve
the lane signature for larger or subsequent follow-on forces maneuvering toward the lane. Entrance funnel
markers and the final-approach marker are emplaced as follows:
 Entrance funnel markers are placed at 50-foot intervals for mounted forces and 15-foot intervals
for dismounted forces. They are placed diagonal to the lane entrance to form a 45° V-shape as
shown in figure B-1.
 The final-approach marker is centered on the lane and placed at least 650 feet from the lane
entrance for mounted forces. For dismounted forces, the nature of the attack may preclude using
a final-approach marker initially. A final-approach marker should be placed 100 feet from the
entrance as soon as the mission allows. Commanders modify the recommended distance for the
final-approach marker based on the terrain and the visibility.

INTERMEDIATE
B-14. Upgrading initial lane marking to intermediate lane marking is triggered by one of the following two
events:
 Commitment of larger combat forces that are unable to directly observe the obstacle as it is
reduced.
 Rearward passage of sustainment/combat service support traffic (casualty evacuation and vehicle
recovery).
B-15. Intermediate lane marking has two goals:
 Increase the lane signature to assist in the passage of larger combat forces.
 Provide sufficient marking for two-way, single-lane traffic.
B-16. Intermediate lane marking builds on the initial lane-marking pattern by adding right-handrail markers,
exit funnel markers, far-recognition markers, and a far side final-approach marker. Figure B-2, page B-6,
shows an intermediate lane-marking pattern.
B-17. The commander sets the priority of marker emplacement based on the situation. If the scheme of
movement and maneuver requires the immediate passage of larger combat forces, right-handrail markers and
the far-recognition marker may be the priority. On the other hand, if it is necessary to ground evacuate
casualties or to recover vehicles, it may require emplacing right-handrail markers, exit funnel markers, and
the far side final-approach marker first. Intermediate lane marking gives the commander greater flexibility.
Establishing a network of guides becomes increasingly important to direct the flow of forward and returning
forces.

B-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

Legend:
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations

Figure B-1. Initial lane-marking pattern

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-5

Appendix B

Legend:
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations
TCP traffic control post

Figure B-2. Intermediate lane-marking pattern

B-18. Regardless of the reason for an upgrade, the first step is to emplace right-handrail markers. These
markers define the rightmost limit of the lane. They are placed the width of the lane as defined by entrance
and exit markers. The right handrail follows a path parallel to the left handrail through the obstacle. Right-
handrail markers are placed at the same interval as left-handrail markers.

B-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

B-19. Exit funnel markers and a far side final-approach marker are emplaced to mirror entrance markers.
For the forward passage of large combat forces, exit funnel markers prevent premature deployment of a
passing force into combat formation before it is safely outside the obstacle. Exit funnel markers also become
entrance funnel markers for rearward passing traffic, giving these forces the visual cues needed to align
themselves on the lane. Exit funnel markers are augmented by a far side final-approach marker to help
rearward passing forces clearly identify the lane from their side. The far side final-approach marker is
centered on the lane and placed 650 feet (100 feet for dismounted forces) from the exit (far side entrance).
B-20. A far-recognition marker completes the intermediate lane-marking pattern. It provides commanders
with a visual signature or a series of signatures on which to guide their movement toward the lane. When the
assault force is moving over a greater distance to the lanes, additional far-recognition markers may be
required. For mounted forces, the far-recognition marker nearest the obstacle is placed a maximum of 1,600
feet from the final-approach marker (the final-approach marker must be visible from the far-recognition
marker). Dismounted forces may require a system of guides instead of far-recognition markers for passing
combat forces. However, far-recognition markers must be emplaced as soon as possible to reduce guide
requirements for passing mounted sustainment/combat service support traffic. This gives the assault force
commander the space needed to transition to a column formation.
B-21. A commander collocates guides or TCPs at the far-recognition marker when the situation requires
more positive control over traffic flow. Normally, the need to increase traffic control comes at the same time
as the need for limited two-way traffic and intermediate lane marking. Commanders should plan for the use
of dedicated guides once they have upgraded to intermediate-level marking. Guides or TCPs become mission
critical during limited visibility or in restrictive terrain. They should also be used when a single far-
recognition marker feeds more than one lane. TCPs must be manned with a minimum of two Soldiers/Marines
and must have secure communications with the controlling headquarters. It is essential that Soldiers/Marines
acting as guides or TCPs know the—
 Azimuth and distance to the final-approach marker or the 8-digit grid coordinate of the final-
approach marker that is entered into the unit global positioning system receiver.
 Lane-marking pattern currently emplaced.
 Type of final-approach marker used.
 Traffic control plan and march order.
B-22. Guides must be kept up-to-date on the status of lane marking, maintenance, and closures.

FULL (TWO WAY)

B-23. Lane marking is upgraded to a full lane-marking pattern when the commander desires uninterrupted
two-way traffic flow. Expanding lanes to full lane marking is resource intensive and not part of a breach. A
full lane supports uninterrupted two-way traffic. The marking pattern is modified to give forces passing
forward or rearward the same visual signature.
B-24. Upgrading to a full lane-marking pattern is normally assigned to follow-on engineer forces, since it is
usually beyond the immediate capability of engineers with forward units. In special cases, the commander
may task engineers with forward units to expand and upgrade a lane from an intermediate to a full lane-
marking pattern. However, the trade-off is decreased support to forward units and delays associated with
changing task organization. The full lane-marking pattern is also used when marking a lane through friendly
obstacles along a MSR or a passage lane.
B-25. Upgrading intermediate lane marking to full lane marking begins by temporarily closing the lane,
rerouting traffic, and expanding the lane width. The lane is always expanded to the left in relation to the
direction of the attack. Engineers reduce and proof the obstacle beginning at the left handrail to give a total
minimum lane width of 32 feet (16 feet each way). The expansion width requirement is the same for armored
and light forces since both forces must be able to pass mounted sustainment/combat service support and
combat forces. When the lane is expanded by mechanical means, it is necessary to entirely remove the left-
handrail markers during expansion. When possible, these markers should be left alone to serve as a reference
point during lane expansion. If removed altogether, left-handrail markers must be replaced since they form
the left handrail for forward and rearward passing forces.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-7

Appendix B

B-26. When the lane width has been expanded to 32 feet, entrance, exit, right-handrail, funnel, and final-
approach markers are replaced on the return lane. All markings are the same as described in previous
paragraphs. Figure B-3 shows a full lane-marking pattern.

Legend:
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations
TCP traffic control post

Figure B-3. Full lane-marking pattern

B-27. The full lane-marking pattern has three entrance markers and three exit markers. Entrance and exit
markers are placed the width of forward and return lanes, and they are visually different from other markers.
Three entrance markers indicate a two-way traffic lane, and units should always use the rightmost lane.
Entrance and exit funnel markers are placed slightly different from previous marking patterns. In the full
lane-marking pattern, funnel markers extend out from the entrance and exit markers on the outside only.
Final-approach markers are placed 650 feet from, and centered on, entrances of forward and return lanes.
This helps forces identify entrance points from either direction. Far-recognition markers are placed a
maximum of 1,600 feet from forward and return final-approach markers. Again, distances may be modified
based on the terrain, visibility, and the mission.

B-8 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

LANE MARKING GUIDANCE

B-28. Table B-1 provides the commander with a summary of lane-marking levels, guidelines on unit
responsibilities, and events that trigger a lane-marking upgrade. The table focuses on the TF level breaching
mission; who refers to the unit responsible for lane marking, when describes events that trigger the need to
upgrade, and markers highlight a quick reference for lane-marking requirements.

Table B-1. Lane-marking levels, unit responsibilities, and trigger events

Initial Intermediate Full (Two Way)
Who TF breach force TF breach force Brigade breach force
Passing battalion- or Passing brigade- or battalion-
Reducing obstacles
company-size forces size forces
When Passing force that cannot see Requiring uninterrupted
Passing platoon- or company- the lane sustainment/combat service
size assault forces
Passing TF combat trains support traffic
Expand lane width to meet
two-way traffic of the two
Entrance Add right handrail
largest vehicles expected to
use the lane

Markers Exit Add exit funnel Adjust entrance/exit

Adjust left/right handrails to
Left handrail Add far side final approach
new width
Entrance funnel Add far recognition Add far recognition
Final approach Add guides or TCPs Add far side guides or TCPs
Legend:
TCP traffic control post
TF task force

MOVEMENT THROUGH THE LANE

B-29. Standard lane-marking patterns help the commander in the following two critical aspects when moving
a unit through a lane:
 Lane markers help the force posture its formation for efficient passage through the defile that is
caused by the lane through the obstacle.
 The combination of lane markers and TCPs gives the commander greater flexibility in the forward
and rearward movement of forces.
B-30. Far-recognition and final-approach markers in a standard lane-marking pattern help commanders
smoothly change assault and follow-on forces into a column formation before passing through the lane. In
most cases, the situation should allow the unit to move in a column formation from the outset; however, the
enemy situation and the terrain may demand that forces remain dispersed as long as possible. Far-recognition,
final-approach, and entrance funnel markers are used to trigger commanders to alter their formations.
B-31. Figure B-4, page B-10, shows how formations at various levels may change to efficiently pass through
lanes. A battalion TF initially moves from its assault position in a box, V, or wedge formation depending on
the number of lanes being used.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-9

Appendix B

Figure B-4. Formation changes based on lane markers

B-32. Initially, company teams and below may move in any combat formation. Once lead elements of the
battalion visually identify the far-recognition marker, company teams begin moving into a column formation
with platoons still deployed. Platoons—
 Change into a column formation with dispersal as they move from the far-recognition marker to
the final-approach marker.
 Change into a column formation as they move from the final-approach marker to entrance
markers, using the entrance funnel markers as guides.
 Redeploy once they pass through the exit or the exit funnels.
B-33. As the phases of the operation progress, commanders should upgrade lane marking and establish
traffic control as the situation allows. The combination of upgrading lanes from the initial marking pattern
and establishing TCPs gives the commander greater flexibility. Normally, TCPs are established at forward
and return far-recognition markers. Upgrading to full lane marking that is capable of supporting uninterrupted
two-way traffic is generally determined by the need to pass increased volumes of traffic.
B-34. Figure B-5 shows the flexibility that full lane marking and TCPs provide. In this example, friendly
forces have created two lanes. Lane 1 is a full lane, and Lane 2 is an intermediate lane. A far-recognition
marker on the near side and the far side can feed traffic to both lanes. Full lane marking and TCPs allow the
commander to continue pushing combat power forward on Lanes 1 and 2 simultaneously. At the same time,
the far side TCP directs all return traffic to Lane 1. Commanders should ensure that recovery vehicles are on
site to remove immobile and destroyed vehicles.

B-10 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

Legend:
TCP traffic control post

Figure B-5. Multiple lanes used at different levels

LANE MAINTENANCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRAFFIC

THROUGH LANES
B-35. Units must plan for lane maintenance. Lane maintenance includes widening lanes, upgrading lane
markings, ensuring that lanes remain open, and ensuring traffic control through the breach area. The
responsibility for lane maintenance should be specified in unit orders to ensure alignment with the scheme
of movement and maneuver.
B-36. The following shows how a unit defines responsibilities for lane maintenance and traffic control. In
this example, a TF or combined arms battalion (CAB) breach is being conducted by the 1-50th CAB. Team
A and team C provide suppressive fires as the support force, team E reduces tactical obstacles as the reduction
element of the breach force, Company B provides security at the breach site as the security element of the
breach force, and Company D seizes Objective Lion and Objective Tiger as the assault force. The 1st Armor
Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) intends to pass a second TF or CAB (1-55th CAB) through obstacles as the
first element of the follow-on forces once the first TF or CAB (1-50th CAB) has cleared a route through the
breach area. The initial lane requirement to pass Company D (the assault force) is one vehicular lane, but the
breach force breaches a second lane to pass follow-on forces (a second TF or CAB).
B-37. As the breaching activity progresses, the breach force creates two lanes in the tactical obstacles. The
breach force marks lanes with the initial lane-marking pattern and passes the assault force through the lanes.
(See figure B-6, page B-12.) At this stage of the breaching, the 1-50th CAB maintains lanes in the tactical
obstacles and controls movement of forces within the breach area.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-11

Appendix B

Legend:
BHL battle handover line
CAB combined arms battalion
OBJ objective
PL phase line

Figure B-6. Assault force passes through tactical obstacles

B-38. The assault force passes through the tactical obstacles and attacks to seize Objective Lion and
Objective Tiger. As the assault force attacks, it encounters protective obstacles and reduces and marks them.
Immediately after the assault force passes through the tactical obstacles, the 1st ABCT assumes responsibility
for lane maintenance in the tactical obstacles. The brigade also assumes responsibility of traffic control from
the beginning of the breach area through the tactical obstacles. This includes creating additional lanes,
ensuring that the lanes remain open, upgrading lane markings at the tactical obstacles, establishing TCPs,
and calling units forward into the breach area. The 1-50th CAB retains overall responsibility for the breach
area and maintaining lanes through the protective obstacles on Objective Lion. (See figure B-7.)

B-12 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

Legend:
BHL battle handover line
CAB combined arms battalion
HBCT heavy brigade combat team
OBJ objective
PL phase line

Figure B-7. BCT assumes control of lanes in tactical obstacles

B-39. Once the assault force has seized the objective and reported that it has established a clear route up to
the BHL (PL Maine), the 1st ABCT begins to pass the follow-on 1-55th CAB through the breach area. At
this point, the BCT controls traffic throughout the breach area. The 1-50th CAB retains responsibility for
maintaining lanes through the protective obstacles on Objective Lion. (See figure B-8, page B-14.)

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-13

Appendix B

Legend:
BHL battle handover line
obj objective
PL phase line
RP release point
SP start point

Figure B-8. Follow-on forces begin to pass through the breach area

B-40. As the follow-on forces cross the BHL, the breach is complete; however, the obstacles within the
breach area remain a constriction for other follow-on forces. At this point, the 1st ABCT is responsible for
maintaining the lanes and controlling traffic. The 1st ABCT begins to focus on establishing an MSR (if
appropriate) through the breach area using higher echelon engineer assets, which are task-organized to the
brigade. (See figure B-9.)

B-14 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

Legend:
BHL battle handover line
HBCT heavy brigade combat team
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RP release point
SP start point

Figure B-9. BCT assumes full control of the breach

LANE-MARKING DEVICES
B-41. The current marking systems are the minefield marking set, hand-emplaceable, M133 (National Stock
Number 9905-01-019-0140) and minefield marking set Number 2 (National Stock Number 9905-00-375-
9180).
B-42. Most lane marking in the field is done with nonstandard marking devices. Before adopting a
nonstandard marking device, commanders should consider the guidelines summarized in table B-2,
page B-16. Coordination must occur between forces that are tasked to mark lanes and forces that are expected
to use lanes to ensure that the marking material will work. For example, if a light force plans to create and
mark vehicle lanes with an infrared light, vehicle drivers with enhanced (thermal) night vision devices may
not be able to see the markings.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-15

Appendix B

Table B-2. Guidelines for lane-marking devices

Markers Mounted Forces Dismounted Forces
• Visible by track commander and • Visible by a dismounted Soldier/Marine
driver (buttoned up) from 150 feet. in prone position from 50 feet.
• Quick and easy to emplace • Lightweight, quick and easy to emplace
Handrail and
(minimizes need to expose (dismounted Soldier/Marine should be
funnel
Soldiers/Marines outside the able to carry enough markers for the
emplacement vehicle). lane and still be able to fire and
maneuver).
• Visible by track commander • Visible by dismounted Soldier/Marine
(buttoned up) from 300 feet. from 150 feet.
• Visually different from handrail and • Visually different from handrail and
funnel markers. funnel markers.
Entrance and exit
• Quick and easy to emplace (may • Lightweight, quick and easy to emplace.
require the Soldier/Marine to
dismount to emplace).
• Easily man-portable.
• Visible by track commander (not • Visible by a dismounted Soldier/Marine
Final-approach buttoned up) from 1,600 feet. (on March) from 300 feet.
and far- • Visually different from each other. • Visually different from each other.
recognition • Visually alterable to facilitate traffic • Visually alterable to facilitate traffic
control through multiple lanes. control through multiple lanes.

B-43. Figure B-10 shows some of the devices that units currently use; they are easily procured or fabricated.
This is not a complete listing; rather, it is intended to show commanders some of the options. Some general
requirements for lane marking are—
 Markers must be able to withstand the rigors of the terrain, the weather, and the operational
environment.
 Markers should be easy to modify when visibility is limited, with minimal addition of manpower
and equipment.
 Enhancements for limited visibility should be a constant source rather than a pulsating strobe.
Strobes do not make the marking pattern readily apparent, particularly when approaching from an
angle.

BYPASS MARKING
B-44. Bypasses are marked using the same lane-marking patterns, marking devices, and visual cues as a
lane. However, marking a bypass around an obstacle is much different from marking a lane through an
obstacle because the amount of room available for forces to maneuver must be determined. While lanes
through an obstacle are normally expanded to the left, bypasses are expanded away from the obstacle.
B-45. The width and marking of bypasses is based on guidance from the supported commander and mission
variable analysis. The width of a bypass is sized to allow forces to rapidly pass around the obstacle, without
unnecessarily restricting maneuver. The bypass is marked as necessary to show where it is safe to travel
despite visibility conditions. Right- and left-handrail markers must be visible and clearly discernable from
each other. The bypass is widened and bypass marking is improved to facilitate the movement and maneuver
of follow-on forces as time allows and the situation dictates. Units should also consider establishing mobile
guards on the friendly side of the obstacle to prevent vehicles and personnel from entering it. At some point,
military police may perform this role of direction to follow-on forces. All units on the battlefield should
possess marking material and be provided with the necessary detailed information (in orders or SOPs) to
effectively mark bypasses.

B-16 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Lane and Bypass Marking

Legend:
HEMMS hand-emplaced minefield marking set

Figure B-10. Nonstandard marking devices

COMPLEX OBSTACLES
B-46. When marking lanes through a complex obstacle, units can mark each obstacle independently or mark
the entire obstacle system at once. The depth of the obstacle system, the distance between the obstacles, and
the amount of marking material available determine which method is employed. Figure B-11, page B-18, and
figure B-12, page B-18, are examples of how complex obstacles may be marked. These examples use the
initial lane-marking pattern.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 B-17

Appendix B

Figure B-11. Marking a complex obstacle

Figure B-12. Marking a complex obstacle system

B-18 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Appendix C
Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment
This appendix is focused specifically on minefield reduction. Since adversaries will
use complex obstacles within their defenses, tactical bridging may also be needed to
cross gaps (AV ditches) in conjunction with minefield reduction as part of a combined
arms breaching. Information on hasty gap-crossing means (tactical bridging) is
discussed in appendix F. (See FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for information on EH
equipment used for clearing. See ATTP 3-06.11 for information on breaching
techniques related to urban terrain.) This appendix is organized by the tasks (detecting,
reporting, reducing, proofing, and marking) that directly support or are included in
obstacle reduction.

DETECTING
C-1. Detecting is the actual confirmation of the location of obstacles. It may be accomplished through
reconnaissance, or it may be unintentional (such as a vehicle running into a minefield). Detection is used in
conjunction with reconnaissance, breaching, and clearing missions. (See FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for
additional information on EH detection requirements.) There are four types of detection methods:
 Visual.
 Physical.
 Electronic.
 Mechanical.

VISUAL
C-2. Visual detection is part of combat operations. Personnel visually inspect the terrain for the following
obstacle indicators:
 Trip wires.
 Signs of road repair (new fill or paving, road patches, ditching, culvert work).
 Signs placed on trees, posts, or stakes. Threat forces mark their minefields to protect their own
forces.
 Dead animals.
 Damaged vehicles.
 Disturbances in previous tire tracks or tracks that stop unexplainably.
 Wires leading away from the side of the road. They may be firing wires that are partially buried.
 Odd features in the ground or patterns that are not present in nature. Plant growth may wilt or
change color, rain may wash away some of the cover, the cover may sink or crack around the
edges, or the material covering the mines may look like mounds of dirt.
 Local civilians avoiding certain places or routes. The local population is a good source of
information on the location of mines or booby traps within residential areas.
 Pieces of wood or other debris on or near a road that may indicate pressure or pressure-release
firing devices. These devices may be on the surface or partially buried.
 Patterns of objects that could be used as a sighting line. An enemy can use mines that are fired by
command, so road shoulders and areas close to the objects should be searched.
 Berms of loose soil that may indicate the presence of an AV ditch.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-1

Appendix C

PHYSICAL
C-3. Physical detection (probing) is very time-consuming. Primarily, physical detection is used in
conjunction with mine clearing and self-extraction. Mines detection by visual or electronic methods should
be confirmed by probing. Personnel should use the following procedures and techniques when probing for
mines (see FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D for additional information):
 Roll up your sleeves, and remove jewelry to increase sensitivity. Wear a protective helmet with
the chin strap buckled and a protective fragmentation vest.
 Stay close to the ground, and move into a prone position to reduce the effects of an accidental
blast. When moving into a prone position—
 Squat down without touching your knees to the ground.
 Scan forward up to 6 feet and to the sides up to 10 feet for mine indicators.
 Probe the area around your feet and as far forward as possible.
 Kneel on the ground after the area is found to be clear and continue probing forward until in
a prone position.
 Use sight and touch to detect trip wires, fuzes, and pressure prongs.
 Use a slender, nonmetallic object as a probe.
 Probe every 2 inches across a 3-foot front.
 Push the probe into the ground gently at an angle that is less than 45°.
 Apply just enough pressure on the probe to sink it slowly into the ground.
 Pick the soil away carefully with the tip of the probe. Remove the loose dirt by hand if the probe
encounters resistance and does not go into the ground freely. Take care to prevent detonating the
mine.
 Stop probing and use two fingers from each hand to carefully remove the surrounding soil when
a solid object is touched, and identify the object.
 Remove enough soil to show the mine type (if the object is a mine), and mark its location. Do not
attempt to remove or disarm the mine. Use explosives to destroy detected mines in place or use a
grappling hook and rope to cause mines to self-detonate. Do not use metal grappling hooks on
magnetic mines.

DANGER
Use extreme caution when probing. If the probe is pushed straight
down, the tip may detonate a pressure fuze.

C-4. Probing is extremely stressful and tedious. The senior leader must set a limit to the time a prober will
actually probe. To determine a reasonable time, the leader must consider weather conditions, the threat
situation, the unit stress level, and the prober’s fatigue level and state of mind. As a rule, 20 to 30 minutes is
the maximum amount of time that an individual can probe effectively.

ELECTRONIC
C-5. Electronic detection is effective for locating mines, but this method is time-consuming and exposes
personnel to enemy fire. In addition, suspected mines must be confirmed by probing.

Army-Navy/Portable Special Search-12 Mine Detector

C-6. The AN/PSS-12 (see figure C-1) can only detect metal, but most mines and booby traps have metal
components in their design. The detector can locate and identify some plastic or wooden mines by their slight
metallic signature. However, when employed in highly mineralized soils where the EH threat is of low-metal
content, detection becomes very difficult. The detector is handheld and identifies suspected mines by an
audio signal in the headphones.

C-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

C-7. Consideration must be given to the maximum amount of time an individual can operate the detector.
As a rule, 20 to 30 minutes at a time is the amount of time an individual can use the detector effectively. (See
FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D and TM 5-6665-298-10 for additional employment considerations.)

Figure C-1. AN/PSS-12 mine detector

ARMY-NAVY/PORTABLE SPECIAL SEARCH-14 MINE DETECTOR

C-8. The AN/PSS-14 is a single Soldier-operated handheld mine detector (see figure C-2, page C-4) that
integrates a state-of-the-art metal detector with compact ground-penetrating radar into a lightweight handheld
system (about 11 pounds with batteries). Only one standard issue Army battery (BB-390A/U) is used to
power the AN/PSS-14. The AN/PSS-14 is capable of detecting metallic and low-metallic AP and AVL mines
in on-road and off-road conditions. Sensor fusion and sophisticated algorithms reduce the false alarm rate
that current metal detectors experience in cluttered metal environments.
C-9. As in probing, consideration must be taken for the maximum amount of time an individual can operate
the detector. As a rule, 20 to 30 minutes is the maximum amount of time an individual can use the detector
effectively. (See FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D and TM 5-6665-373-12&P for more operational
considerations.)

CEIA COMPACT METAL DETECTOR VERSION 2.00

C-10. This lightweight metal detector can be used to detect small or large metal masses in all soil conditions
and nonmetallic conductive targets. It features a one-piece, compact, and handheld design. The metal detector
allows immediate operational status and ease of transport with lightweight, collapsible construct. It detects
magnetic and nonmagnetic metals through high-performance, ultra-sensitive technology. It ensures optimum
detection over all types of terrain with exclusive automatic soil compensation system, and it features
adjustable sensitivity over a wide range of values and a high discrimination capability for adjacent targets.

VALLON MINEHOUND VMR2

C-11. The Minehound VMR2 is a man-portable, dual-source technology, mine detector that enables the
accurate detection of low metallic content EHs. (See figure C-3, page C-4.)

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-3

Appendix C

Figure C-2. AN/PSS-14 mine detector

Figure C-3. VMR2 mine detector

C-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

Husky Mine Detection Vehicle

C-12. The Husky mine detection vehicle is a motorized, highly mobile, blast-protected wheeled vehicle
equipped with a metal detection system, target ink marking system, and towing pintle. The vehicle V-shaped
hull is made of armor that provides protection from ballistic and mine blast threats for drive train components.
C-13. The Husky Mounted Detection System supports the route reconnaissance and clearance family of
systems. The route reconnaissance and clearance unit is a task-organized force that conducts route
reconnaissance missions to maintain mobility and obtain information about critical terrain features, route
conditions, and enemy obstacles along high traffic routes. The Husky Mounted Detection System is integral
to the route clearance mission and provides enhanced capabilities to detect EHs along routes. The Husky
Mounted Detection System is mounted onto and only used by the Husky mine detection vehicle.

MECHANICAL
C-14. The mine clearing roller is a mechanical minefield-detection system. It is most effectively deployed
to lead columns on route movement, but it can be used to precede deployed tactical formations as well
(although more than one mine clearing roller is required for increased probability of detection). In column
movement, unit vehicles travel a narrow path and one or two mine rollers can effectively detect mines in the
path (multiple rollers are required to provide the necessary overlap when proofing the entire width of a route).

REPORTING
C-15. Information concerning enemy minefields is reported by the fastest means available. Spot reports are
the tactical commander’s most common source of minefield information. They originate from patrols that
have been sent on specific minefield reconnaissance missions or from units that have discovered mine
information in the course of their normal missions. The information is transmitted to higher headquarters.

REDUCING
C-16. Minefield reduction equipment is broken down into physical, mechanical, and explosive. Combat
engineers and the operators of reduction assets practice and become proficient in these reduction means. They
integrate them into the breaching drills of units they support. The team applies different TTP to breach drills
and prepares and rehearses them as part of mission plans and orders.

EXPLOSIVE
C-17. The different types of explosive obstacle reduction equipment are discussed below. (See
FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D and FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L for additional information.)

Mine Clearing Line Charge

C-18. The MICLIC is a rocket-propelled, explosive line charge. (See figure C-4, page C-6.) The MICLIC
uses overpressure to reduce minefields that contain single-impulse, pressure-activated AVL mines and
mechanically activated AP mines. The MICLIC is capable of clearing a path approximately 46 feet wide (23
feet on the left and 23 feet on the right of the linear charge) and approximately 300 feet long through a
minefield. The MICLIC has a 200-foot standoff distance from the launcher to the detonation point.
C-19. The surface danger zone for the MICLIC is shown in figure C-5, page C-6, and the fragmentation
zone is shown in figure C-6, page C-7. The MICLIC effectiveness is limited against prong AP mines,
magnetic mines (including some SCATMINEs), top attack mines, side attack mines, and mines containing
multiple-impulse or delay-time fuzes. After employing the MICLIC, proofing is conducted before passing
forces through the created lane. The MICLIC should only be used against mines and other EHs. It also has
little effect on other obstacles (log and concrete barriers, AV ditches, walls). The shock effect and the
psychological impact of the detonation make the MICLIC a useful weapon during close combat or in urban
areas.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-5

Appendix C

Figure C-4. MICLIC

Figure C-5. Surface danger zone for firing the MICLIC

C-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

Figure C-6. Area F and fragmentation zone for firing the MICLIC

C-20. The MICLIC can be mounted on different equipment platforms, to include rubber-tired trailers, AAVs
(the MK-154 system is referred to as a triple shot), ABVs, and AVLBs. (See figure C-7.)

Figure C-7. AAV with MK-154 linear mine clearing system

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-7

Appendix C

C-21. Using a fabricated I-beam, two MICLICs can be mounted on an AVLB from which the bridge has
been downloaded. This is called an armored vehicle-launched MICLIC. (See figure C-8.) (See
TM 9-1375-215-13&P for procedures for mounting the MICLIC on the AVLB.)

Figure C-8. Armored vehicle-launched MICLIC

C-22. Towing vehicles for the trailer-mounted MICLIC are typically an M113 armored personnel carrier, a
Bradley fighting vehicle, an M9 ACE, a 5-ton wheeled vehicle, and a 2-ton wheeled vehicle. The trailer limits
MICLIC mobility in rough terrain and degrades the maneuverability of the towing vehicle, thereby increasing
vulnerability. Since the MICLIC is critical to the breach, it is moved to the POB along easily trafficable,
covered, and concealed routes. This effectively prevents the towing vehicle from performing any other task
(firing or maneuvering) or serving as an engineer squad vehicle unless MICLIC employment is the only
mission of the squad. This is an important consideration when selecting the towing vehicle because it must
be solely dedicated to the mission.
C-23. The MICLIC can be fired from within an armored vehicle without exposing the operators to fires,
although the prefiring preparations must be done at a covered and concealed location near the POB. The
initiating cable is brought into the vehicle through the hatch (must be left ajar) or through the portal of the
periscope (has been removed). Therefore, the crew is not afforded CBRN protection/force protection. When
the MICLIC is fired from a wheeled vehicle, the crew must move to a covered position outside the back blast
area. The special-purpose cable on the firing control switch is long enough to allow adequate standoff.
C-24. The vehicle operator must be proficient in all aspects of preparing and deploying the MICLIC,
including the critical aspect of selecting the optimum POB. Although the engineer platoon leader or the
breach force commander directs the operator to the POB, ensuring that the operator can independently
accomplish the task will simplify the mission and greatly enhance its likelihood of success. The towing
vehicle and the operator must be selected well in advance and be dedicated solely to the task. The operator
must be included in rehearsals and planning sessions and, if possible, during leader reconnaissance. The
MICLIC crew and the breaching force must ensure that misfire or malfunction drills are addressed during the
unit rehearsal. Precombat inspections and checks are important in preventing MICLIC misfires.
C-25. Each MICLIC trailer transports and fires one charge, and then the MICLIC must be reloaded. The
armored vehicle-launched MICLIC and ABV can fire two MICLICs before reloading, while the AAV can
fire three MICLICs. The loaded-charge container weighs 2,830 pounds; a lifting device (5-ton wrecker, heavy
expanded mobility tactical truck) is needed. Reloading can be done by an experienced crew in about 20
minutes, and it entails loading a rocket on the rail and lifting a new charge container onto the launcher.
Reloading must be done in a covered and concealed location.
C-26. The exact limits and depth of an enemy minefield are seldom known before a breach. This is
particularly true when the situation is unclear and the minefield is encountered simultaneously with enemy
contact. The first and only indication of a minefield may be when a vehicle encounters a mine. The minefield
leading edge may still be an uncertainty because the vehicle could have hit a mine in an interior row. The
number of MICLICs needed to clear a single lane through a minefield depends on depth.

C-8 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

C-27. If the depth is—

 Less than 300 feet, one MICLIC is required. (See figure C-9.) The minefield leading edge is
identified and, if possible, confirmed by reconnaissance. The MICLIC is deployed from a
minimum standoff distance of 200 feet from the minefield leading edge.
 More than 300 feet or of an uncertain depth, two or more MICLICs are required. (See
figure C-10). If the leading edge cannot be identified, the MICLIC is deployed 300 feet from the
possible edge or stricken vehicle. When the first MICLIC is detonated, a second MICLIC moves
80 feet into the first MICLIC path and fires its charge. This extends the lane an additional 285 feet.
Additional MICLICs are used for minefields of extreme depth, and each MICLIC moves down
the lane 80 feet (into the path created by the previous charge).

Figure C-9. MICLIC employment in a minefield

Legend:
MICLIC mine clearing line charge

Figure C-10. MICLIC employment

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-9

Appendix C

C-28. The neutralization of mines by blast depends on the peak pressure and the impulse. For the MICLIC,
the impulse is at a maximum of 10 feet from the line charge (on both sides) and decreases the closer it gets
toward the line charge to a minimum of 3 feet from the line charge. This decrease on impulse causes a skip
zone. (See figure C-11.) This does not mean that neutralization is equal to zero percent; it means that it is not
equal to 100 percent. Mines that are buried deeper than 4 inches and located 3 to 6 feet from the line charge
have a high probability of not being neutralized.

Figure C-11. MICLIC skip zones

Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System

C-29. The Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System is a two-person, portable system that is capable of
quickly creating a footpath through AP mines and wire entanglements from a 115-foot standoff position. (See
figure C-12.) The total system weighs 120 pounds and clears a path about 3 feet wide by 150 feet long. The
Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System is normally used by combat engineers and dismounted infantry.
The following are operational considerations for the Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System:
 Snow-covered ground degrades effectiveness.
 Trees, power lines, or other overhead obstructions interfere with the flight of the rocket or line
charge (within a 72-foot ceiling).
 Safe distances are 150 feet from the launch point and 250 feet from the last deployed grenade in
the prone position. From a covered position, the distance is 80 feet. The firing team has 23 seconds
to reach the safe distance before the line charge detonates.
 Operators must be skilled to ensure that line charges are overlapped when using an Antipersonnel
Obstacle Breaching System in sequence (to extend the length of the lane) to ensure that the entire
lane is cleared.

C-10 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

Figure C-12. Antipersonnel obstacle breaching system

Bangalore Torpedo
C-30. The bangalore torpedo is a manually emplaced, explosive-filled pipe that was designed as a wire-
breaching device. The bangalore torpedo is also effective against simple pressure-activated AP mines. (See
figure C-13.) The bangalore torpedo is issued as a demolition kit, and it consists of ten 5-foot tubes. Each
tube contains 8.8 pounds of high explosive, weighs 13 pounds, and clears a 3- by 50-foot lane.

Figure C-13. Bangalore torpedo

C-31. The bangalore torpedo is used by dismounted infantry and engineer Soldiers/Marines. The number of
sections needed is connected and the torpedo is pushed through the AP minefield before priming it. A detailed
reconnaissance is conducted before using the bangalore torpedo to ensure that trip wires have not been used.
The bangalore torpedo generates one short impulse and is not effective against pronged, double-impulse, or
pressure-resistant AP and AVL.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-11

Appendix C

C-32. Do not modify the bangalore torpedo. Cutting the bangalore torpedo in half or performing
modifications could cause the device to explode.

MECHANICAL
C-33. Mine clearing blades and mine clearing rollers are fielded as armor battalion countermine sets. For the
Marine Corps, each tank platoon has one mine clearing blade. Blades create lanes through minefields, while
rollers are used to detect minefields and proof lanes created by other means. Rollers are not a good primary
system for lane reduction because multiple mine detonations may destroy the roller system and the vehicle
pushing it. The roller is designed to resist four conventional mines (22.5 pounds high explosive) or three
SCATMINE strikes depending on the mine type.
C-34. The ACE and the up-armored dozer were not designed for reducing AVL minefields, and they should
only be used as a last resort for removing AP mines. Using the ACE and the up-armored dozer is extremely
time-consuming and hazardous to the crew and equipment. When using an ACE or an up-armored dozer to
clear a path through an AP minefield, the skim technique is used, starting 300 feet from the suspected leading
edge of the minefield. (See figure C-14.) There is no specified blade depth for the skim technique; the
operator must use judgment based on soil conditions and placement of the mines.

Figure C-14. Skim technique

C-35. The ACE and dozer blades are very effective against AV ditches and gaps. Normally, during a breach,
dozers will not be available due to their inability to keep pace with the attacking forces. Although a single
dozer or an ACE is capable of reducing an AV ditch, a technique that has been successfully used and has
decreased the time to reduce an AV ditch or gap is to use two ACEs or an ACE and a dozer team. When
using this technique, position one ACE parallel to the AV ditch and push dirt in front of the second ACE or
dozer that is oriented perpendicular to the AV ditch. Use an ACE to push dirt into the AV ditch. (See
appendix H for the tactical bridging used for crossing gaps that are part of a complex obstacle.)

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 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

Assault Breacher Vehicle

C-36. The ABV is a single-platform minefield breaching, clearing, proofing, and marking system built on
an M1A1 tank chassis that provides explosive and mechanical reduction capabilities. (See
figure C-15.) The ABV weighs approximately 63 tons and has a cruising speed of 29 miles per hour, which
is comparable with the M1A1 tank. The ABV is operated by a vehicle commander and driver. A .50-caliber
machine gun is externally mounted at the commander’s weapon station. The ABV is configured with two
MK-155 linear demolition charge launchers (two M58 linear demolition charges); an integrated lane-marking
system; a full-width mine plow; and combat dozer blade, surface mine plow, and rapid ordnance removal
system attachments. The linear demolition charge system contains two single-shot launchers. Each ABV can
clear a safe, continuous path up to 62 feet wide and 295 feet long through a minefield or wire obstacle. The
ABV is effective against single-impulse, pressure-fuzed, nonblast hardened AVL and mechanically actuated
AP mines. The full-width mine plow is designed to dampen and survive the blast of pressure-fuzed AVL
with an explosive weight equal to that of a U.S. M19 AVL. The ABV can effectively breach a lane up to 14.5
feet wide and 14 inches deep in loose sand and soft silt. The ABV can breach a lane up to 10 inches deep in
hard clay.

Figure C-15. ABV

C-37. The combat dozer blade is used for clearing nonexplosive obstacles and log cribs, concrete blocks,
tetrahedrons, dragon teeth, hedgehogs, rubble, debris, and urban roadblocks. (See figure C-16, page C-14.)
The surface mine plow is used for clearing SCATMINEs, unexploded bomblets, surface-laid mines, and
other surface munitions. The surface mine plow can clear a lane 13 feet, 7 inches wide. (See figure C-17,
page C-14.) The rapid ordnance removal system clears air- or artillery-delivered SCATMINEs, unexploded
bomblets, surface-laid mines, and surface munitions. The rapid ordnance removal system clears a lane
approximately 14 feet wide. (See figure C-18, page C-14.) The lane-marking system is mounted on the rear
corners of the ABV chassis and fires lane marker poles into the ground on either side of the reduced lane that
clearly denotes the edges with markers that are visible day and night.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-13

Appendix C

Figure C-16. Combat dozer blade

Figure C-17. Surface mine plow

Figure C-18. Rapid ordnance removal system

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 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

Mine Clearing Blade

C-38. The mine clearing blade is used to extract mines from the ground, cast them aside, and create a lane
(42 inches wide in front of each track) in a minefield. (See figure C-19.) It is effective against most types of
mines regardless of fuzing. The improved dog bone assembly detonates tilt-rod mines by exerting pressure
against the tilt-rod fuze. The improved dog bone assembly defeats magnetic mines by projecting a magnetic
signature. The mine clearing blade can be raised into a travel mode or lowered into a plowing mode with
controls located within the driver compartment. It consists of a blade arrangement with scarifying teeth to
extract mines, a moldboard to cast mines aside, and leveling skids to control the blade depth.

Figure C-19. Mine clearing blade

C-39. The mine clearing blade lifts and pushes mines, which are surface-laid or buried up to 12 inches deep,
to the side of track-width lanes. The blade has three depth settings (8, 10, and 12 inches). The blade creates
a 5-foot cleared path in front of each track. Figure C-20, page C-16, shows the inside clearance distances
between the tracks of common tracked vehicles in relation to the uncleared area left by the mine clearing
blade.
C-40. Mines armed with antihandling devices, magnetic fuzes, or seismic fuzes may be activated when they
are lifted by the blade. This action disables the blade. Mines lifted by the blade are left in the spoil on each
side of the furrowed path, and they remain a hazard until removed. Double-impulse mines that are lifted into
the spoil on the side can explode into the hull of the plowing vehicle.
C-41. The skid shoe for each blade exerts adequate pressure to activate most single-impulse mines, which
effectively clears a section of the centerline by explosive detonation. This action may disable the blade.
Multiple-impulse pressure fuzes encountered by the skid shoe are not defeated.
C-42. The mine clearing blade weighs about 3.5 tons and can be mounted on an M1 tank without special
preparation or modification of the tank. Mounting the mine clearing blade requires lift capability and takes
up to an hour, so this task must be conducted well in advance of the mission. Mounting the mine clearing
blade or transferring it to another tank under battlefield conditions is not easy.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-15

Appendix C

Legend:
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
ACE armored combat earthmover

Figure C-20. Mine clearing blade width compared to tracked-vehicle widths

C-43. Once the mine clearing blade is mounted, an electric motor raises and lowers the blade. When the
blade is raised, it minimally affects the M1 maneuverability and speed. This will not greatly impact the use
of the weapon system, except when the blade is operating. The mine clearing blade is also equipped with an
emergency, quick-disconnect feature.
C-44. The M1 tank crew should maintain a speed of 5 to 6 miles per hour while plowing, depending on soil
conditions. The tank cannot maneuver; it must continue in a straight path through the minefield to avoid
damaging the blade. The main gun must be traversed to the side during plowing because mine detonation
under the blade may cause the gun to be thrown violently into the air, damaging the tube. The area selected
for the lane must be relatively flat and free of rocks or other obstacles.
C-45. The operator begins plowing about 300 feet short of the suspected minefield and continues 300 feet
past the estimated end of the suspected minefield to ensure that the lane extends through the entire minefield.
Multiple vehicles using the lane will deepen the cut made by the mine clearing blade; pressure-fuzed mines
left in the uncleared strip will be dangerous. The uncleared strip should be cleared as soon as possible.
C-46. The following are considerations for the mine clearing blade (see FM 3-34.210/
MCRP 3-17.2D for additional information):
 Effectiveness is degraded when operating over 10 miles per hour and when operating in frozen
ground or deep snow. The mine clearing blade is not for use on hard-surfaced roads.
 About 100 feet of spoil should be built up before using the blade.

C-16 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

 Blades will plow through wire obstacles effectively; however, wire should be avoided since it
tends to cut the nylon lifting straps. The wire catches on the moldboard in front of the straps may
be effective in preventing this damage.
 Dismounted Soldiers/Marines moving through the lane cleared by the plow can encounter
pressure-fuzed AP mines that were missed by the device.
 A second plow should not be used to clear the center of the lane; this will push mines into the
area cleared by the first plow.
 Plow tanks are best positioned on the right side of formations since the drivers view through the
right periscope is degraded by the positioning of the power cable.
 The main gun should be traversed to the side to prevent damage in case a mine detonates when
plowing.
 Plowing should be performed in a straight line to keep the vehicle out of uncleared ground.
 The POB should be relatively flat and free of large rocks and other obstructions.

Mine Clearing Roller

C-47. The mine clearing roller consists of a roller assembly, a mounting kit, and a hand winch. (See
figure C-21.) The roller assembly weighs about 10 tons and consists of two push beams mounted to the front
of the tank. One mine clearing roller is authorized for each tank company.

Figure C-21. Mine clearing roller

C-48. Although mine rollers are primarily used for detection, they can also be used to defeat most single-
impulse, pressure-fuzed AVL and AP mines. The roller creates a 44-inch-wide cleared path in front of each
track.
C-49. Figure C-22, page C-18, shows the inside clearance distances between the tracks of common tracked
vehicles in relation to the uncleared area left by the mine clearing roller. An improved dog bone assembly
and a chain between the rollers defeats tilt-rod and magnetic mines. The improved dog bone assembly can
be fitted to the roller. The roller is designed to withstand multiple mine explosions before damage; however,
this depends on the size of the mines. Large blasts may destroy the roller or the vehicle or injure the crew.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-17

Appendix C

Legend:
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
ACE armored combat earthmover

Figure C-22. Mine clearing roller width compared to a tracked vehicle width

C-50. The following are considerations for mine rollers:

 Effectiveness of the mine roller is degraded when operating more than 10 miles per hour.
 Mine rollers leave a 72-inch swath between them that can contain pressure-fuzed mines, which
can impact follow-on vehicles with a different wheel base width.
 Mine rollers are not effective in areas with abrupt depressions where the rollers will be lifted off
the ground. Mine rollers are also limited in extremely soft soils or muddy conditions that impair
the ability of the wheels to rotate.
 Sharp turns and side slopes must be avoided to prevent the tank track from leaving the cleared
path.
 Each push beam or roller assembly is only capable of withstanding two detonations from AVL,
each containing up to 22 pounds of high explosive.
 The main gun should be traversed to the side when the mine roller is employed to prevent damage
from detonated mines.

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 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

C-51. The mine roller can be mounted on an M1 series tank that is modified with a permanently attached
mine roller mounting kit. Stryker and Buffalo version rollers are also available. Mounting the mine roller to
a tank is cumbersome, time-consuming, and very difficult under battlefield conditions. It will also require lift
capability. The roller tank is limited to a speed of 3 to 9 miles per hour. When used in a suspected minefield,
the mine clearing roller must travel in a relatively straight path. Tight turns may cause the roller to deviate
from the path of the track and leave the tank vulnerable to mines. Ground fluctuations, bumps, and berms
may cause the roller to lift from the ground and miss mines.
C-52. Due to the roller tank weight and width, units must use caution when crossing an AVLB. In this
situation, the curbing from the bridge is removed. To prevent damage to the bridge hydraulic line, the tank
driver uses a strap to lift the improved dog bone assembly and the chain when crossing the bridge. The main
gun must be traversed to the side when a mine encounter is possible or imminent. A mine blast can throw the
roller or parts of the roller violently into the air and damage the tube. The main gun should only be fired from
a temporary halt.
C-53. When the situation and the mission permit, mine clearing rollers are used with lead or security
elements of the breach force to detect the minefield leading edge. Mine rollers are also used to proof lanes in
obstacles that are reduced by other means (MICLIC, mine clearing blade). The mine roller may also be used
to lead a supported element traveling in a tactical formation other than a column, but it is less effective than
other methods because—
 A vehicle that is not directly behind the mine roller may encounter mines.
 The mine roller may travel well into or completely through a widely spaced minefield without
encountering a mine, thus giving the formation a false sense of security.
 A mine encountered by the mine roller may not be on the minefield leading edge.
 The mine roller vehicle is extremely vulnerable since it can only use its weapon system from a
temporary halt.
C-54. If mine rollers are to participate in a breach, they must be mounted before rehearsals. Unmounted mine
rollers that are not being used for the mission are carried in the unit formation on M916 tractor trailers. Rollers
require lift capability (such as an M88), a secure location, and 30 to 60 minutes to mount it onto a tank that
is fitted with a mounting kit.

Engineer Squad Vehicle

C-55. The engineer squad vehicle is a variant of the infantry carrier vehicle, which is a member of the Stryker
armored vehicle family. (See figure C-23, page C-20.) The engineer squad vehicle is air-deployable by a
C-130, and it is capable of sustained hard-surface speeds of 40 miles per hour, with a cruising range of 300
miles without refueling. The engineer squad vehicle carries a squad of eight, and it provides mobility and
limited countermobility support.
C-56. Obstacle neutralization systems integrated with the engineer squad vehicle include a full-width blade,
a lightweight roller, and a magnetic signature duplicator. The blade or the roller can be mounted to provide
limited mounted mobility support. The engineer squad vehicle is equipped with a remote weapon system
mount capable of accommodating the MK19 40-millimeter grenade launcher or the .50 caliber M2HB
machine gun, both of which are controlled from under armor. (See TM 9-2355-311-10-6-2 for additional
information on the engineer squad vehicle.)

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-19

Appendix C

Figure C-23. Engineer squad vehicle

Mine Clearing/Armor Protection Kit

C-57. The mine clearing/armor protection kit is mounted on a D7 dozer to perform AP minefield reduction
and lane widening. Proofing the lane must be conducted after the dozer has cleared the lane because some
AP mines may still be left in the lane. The kit consists of two parts—
 Mine clearing rake. The rake uses a tine that is mounted on a diagonal beam. The rake assembly
is designed to sift through the soil, lift out mines, and windrow buried and surface-laid mines to
the right of the vehicle. The system clears a 12-inch-deep path through a minefield. The rake has
a skid shoe that acts as a depth control guide for the operator.
 Armor protection. The armor protects the crew against mine blast, small-arms fire, and artillery
fire. Protection is also provided for the engine, the fuel tank, and exposed hydraulic cylinders and
lines. Ballistic glass blocks are provided at each vision port to permit unrestricted view and
operating of the vehicle and equipment.
C-58. The medium crawler tractor is a commercial off-the-shelf, diesel engine driven, militarized crawler
tractor. The medium crawler tractor is equipped with roll over protection structure, falling objects protective
structure, and hydraulically powered semi-U (straight) type blade with a minimum drawbar pull of 35,000
pounds. The tractor is equipped with all components necessary to enable the tractor to function with a 3-shank
ripper or a rear mounted winch and drawbar/towing coupler attachments. The medium crawler tractor has a
crew protection kit that is a plug-and-play armored cab capability, enables operations in hostile environments,
while protecting the operator from small arms fire. However, the medium crawler tractor is not equipped to
perform AP minefield reduction. No mine clearing rake for the medium crawler tractor exists at this time.

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover

C-59. The M9 ACE is capable of performing mobility tasks in support of light and heavy forces. (See
figure C-24.) These tasks include reducing gaps and AV ditches. Although an ACE can be used to reduce an
AP scatterable minefield, it should only be used as a last resort.

C-20 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Minefield Reduction Techniques and Equipment

Figure C-24. M9 ACE

PHYSICAL
C-60. While mechanical and explosive reduction procedures are normally preferred, a unit may have to use
physical procedures for the following reasons:
 Explosive and mechanical mobility assets are unavailable (not on hand, not mission capable).
 Explosive and mechanical mobility assets are ineffective against the type of obstacle or because
of terrain limitations.
 Stealth is required.
C-61. Physical procedures involve dismounted personnel (usually engineers) using simple explosives or
equipment to create a lane through an obstacle or to clear an obstacle. These procedures expose
Soldiers/Marines to fire and may be manpower and time intensive. (See ATTP 3-06.11 for information on
breaching techniques used for urban missions.)

Techniques
C-62. Physical procedures are generally effective against obstacles under all conditions; however, when
reducing surface-laid and buried minefields, the presence of antihandling devices and trip wires must always
be assumed until proven otherwise.

Surface-Laid Minefield
C-63. Soldiers/Marines first use grapnel hooks from covered positions to check for trip wires in the lane.
The limited range of the tossed hook requires the procedure to be repeated through the estimated depth of the
obstacle. A demolition team then moves through the lane. The team places a main line down the center of
the lane, ties the line from the explosive into the line main, and places blocks of explosive next to surface-
laid mines. After the mines are detonated, the team makes a visual check to ensure that all mines were cleared
before directing a proofing roller and other traffic through the lane. Team members of the demolition team
are assigned special tasks (grappler, detonating-cord man, demolitions man). Team members should be cross-
trained on all procedures. Demolitions are prepared for use before arriving at the POB. An engineer platoon
uses a series of squads through the minefield to clear a lane for a company team. The platoon must rehearse
reduction procedures until execution is flawless, quick, and technically safe. During reduction, the engineer
platoon will be exposed in the lane for 5 minutes or more depending on the mission, the minefield depth, and
the platoon level of training.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 C-21

Appendix C

Buried Minefield
C-64. Physically reducing a buried minefield is extremely difficult to perform as part of a breach. If mine
burrows are not easily seen, mine detectors and probes must be used to locate mines. Mines are then destroyed
by hand-emplaced charges. As an alternative, mines can be removed by using a grappling hook and, if
necessary, a tripod. (See figure C-25, page C-22.) Using a tripod provides vertical lift on a mine, making it
easier to pull the mine out of the hole.

Figure C-25. Tripod

C-65. The platoon leader organizes personnel into teams with distinct, rehearsed missions, including
grappling, detecting, marking, probing, and emplacing demolitions and detonating cord. The platoon is
exposed in the obstacle for long periods.

Grappling Hook
C-66. The grappling hook (also called a grapnel hook) is a multipurpose tool that is used for physical
obstacle reduction. Soldiers use it to detonate mines from a standoff position by activating trip wires and
antihandling devices. After the grapnel is used to clear trip wires in a lane, dismounted engineers can move
through the minefield, visually locate surface-laid mines, and prepare mines for demolition. In buried
minefields, Soldiers/Marines grapple and enter the minefield with mine detectors and probes. There are two
types of grappling hooks—
 Hand-thrown. A 200-foot or more length of lightweight rope is attached to the grapnel for hand
throwing. The throwing range is usually no more than 80 feet. The excess rope is used for the
standoff distance when the thrower begins grappling. The thrower tosses the grapnel and seeks
cover before the grapnel and rope touches the ground in case their impact detonates a mine. The
thrower then moves backward, reaches the end of the excess rope, takes cover, and begins
grappling. Once the grapnel is recovered, the thrower moves forward to the original position,
tosses the grapnel, and repeats the procedure at least twice. The thrower then moves to the end of
the grappled area and repeats this sequence through the depth of the minefield.
 Weapon-launched. A 500-foot or more length of lightweight rope is attached to a lightweight
grapnel that is designed to be fired from an M16A1 or M16A2 rifle using an M800 cartridge. The
grapnel is pushed onto the rifle muzzle with the opening of the retrieval-rope bag oriented toward
the minefield. The firer is located 80 feet from the minefield leading edge and aims the rifle muzzle
at a 30° to 40° angle for maximum range. Once launched, the grapnel travels 250 to 300 feet from
their position. After the weapon-launched grapnel hook has been fired, the firer secures the rope,
moves into a prone position 200 feet from the minefield, and begins to grapple. The weapon-
launched grapnel hook can be used only once to clear a minefield, but it can be reused up to 20
times for training because blanks are used to fire it.
C-67. Multiple grapplers can clear a lane of trip wires quickly and thoroughly, but they must time their
efforts and follow procedures simultaneously. A hit on a trip wire or a pressure fuze can destroy the hook
and the cord, so engineers should carry extras.

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 Amphibious Breaching Operations

Appendix D
Amphibious Breaching Operations
An amphibious breach is an adaptation of the deliberate breach. It is specifically
designed to overcome antilanding defenses to enable ship-to-shore maneuver during
the execution of an amphibious assault. An amphibious breach is conducted when no
other landing areas are suitable for the LF. Bypassing an integrated antilanding defense
or exploiting gaps in an enemy antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) barrier system is
preferred over conducting an amphibious breach when possible; however, the
commander must always consider whether a bypass would produce additional risks.
The amphibious breach is characterized by thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning,
extensive preparation and rehearsal, and a rapid buildup of combat power ashore.
Coordination and teamwork are essential. The amphibious breach is planned at the
amphibious task force (ATF) level and usually involves a MAGTF with a ground
combat element that consists of a battalion, regiment, or division sized maneuver force.
Integration of mine countermeasures (MCM) into the overall strategy for an
amphibious operation is the responsibility of the commander, amphibious task force
(CATF) and the commander, landing force (CLF). This appendix presents an
abbreviated description of topics that are addressed in greater detail in JP 3-02, JP 3-15,
MCRP 3-31.2A/NTTP 3-15.24, MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15, MCWP 3-31.5
/NTTP 3-02.1M, and MCWP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-02.2.

AMPHIBIOUS BREACH ENVIRONMENT

D-1. Antiaccess describes those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an
opposing force from entering an operational area. Area denial describes those actions and capabilities, usually
of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the
operational area. To overcome enemy A2/AD measures, the Navy/Marine Corps concept for operational
maneuver from the sea and over-the-horizon operations emphasizes maneuver, deception, speed, and
flexibility at sea and ashore. Enemy A2/AD measures can include employment of stationary minefields or
free floating naval mines with contact or influence fuses. Contact fuses require the targeted vessel to strike
against the mine, while influence fuses incorporate features that activate mine detonation based upon the
targeted vessel signature or magnetic, acoustic, and pressure characteristics. Due to the catastrophic damage
produced by the detonation of a single naval mine, extensive coordination between the CATF and CLF is
required to achieve success in this very challenging operational environment. Detailed intelligence
preparation of the battlespace is performed to account for the unique environmental aspects that affect
maneuver within the littoral region. Special consideration is applied toward evaluating factors that affect the
maneuver of naval vessels, landing craft, and AAVs. This evaluation can focus on tidal range, seasonal
weather, currents, bottom composition, patterns of commercial maritime traffic, and confirmed location of
existing natural or man-made hazards to navigation. Collectively these environmental factors, along with
intelligence regarding enemy A2/AD measures, are necessary to plan and synchronize execution of
minehunting, minesweeping, and amphibious breaching from the deep-water region of the ocean through the
landing beach.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 D-23

Appendix D

TYPES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

D-2. Amphibious operations take place across the range of military operations and are categorized into the
following types:
 Assaults.
 Raids.
 Demonstrations.
 Withdrawals.
 Amphibious support to other operations.
D-3. An amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious operation. It involves establishing a force
on a hostile or potentially hostile shore and requires the swift, uninterrupted buildup of combat power ashore.
Ship-to-shore movement is a critical element of the amphibious assault, and amphibious breaching operations
may be required. An amphibious raid is a swift incursion into, or a temporary occupation of, an objective
followed by a planned withdrawal. An amphibious demonstration is conducted to deceive the enemy by a
show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a COA unfavorable to the enemy. The
amphibious withdrawal involves the extraction of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or
potentially hostile shore. Amphibious support to other operations is a type of amphibious operation that
contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. Amphibious forces routinely conduct amphibious
support to other operations. This support can include a variety of missions such as; security cooperation,
foreign humanitarian assistance, defense support of civil authorities, noncombatant evacuation operations,
peace operations, recovery operations, and disaster relief.

Beach
D-4. The Navy/Marine Corps concept of operational maneuver from the sea and over-the-horizon
operations envisions coordinated air and surface assaults to exploit weaknesses or gaps in enemy defenses
ashore. An air assault force, transported by LF rotary and tilt-rotor aircraft, can be used to disrupt and fix the
enemy while a surface assault force, transported by AAVs and landing craft, rapidly attacks to penetrate
coastal defenses and link up with the air assault force. To overwhelm the enemy and improve the success of
the ATF main attack, simultaneous airborne and special operations force missions may also be conducted.
D-5. The CATF has overall responsibility for mine warfare within the sea areas of the amphibious
objective area (AOA). This includes the planning and execution of all facets of mine warfare (working
through the mine warfare command or mine countermeasures command as assigned) and providing the
logistics support and force protection for naval MCM assets. The CATF is also responsible for conducting
assault breaching operations from the surf zone and onto the beach, up to the line of demarcation (which is at
or landward of the high water mark). Assault breaching involves a fire support mission using bomber aircraft
to deliver precision guided munitions to neutralize identified mines and obstacles. The line of demarcation is
used as a fire support coordination measure to guide massed aircraft delivery of ordnance during the breach.
The line of demarcation is determined and mutually agreed upon by the CATF and CLF during the planning
phase of the amphibious assault. The CLF is responsible for employment of LF assets to breach and clear
minefields and bypass or reduce obstacles that are encountered landward of the line of demarcation.
Additionally, the CLF is responsible for employment of LF assets to proof assault lanes from the surf zone
to the seaward edge of the line of demarcation and to conduct follow-on clearance at the landing
beach/beaches.
D-6. Figure D-1 depicts amphibious breaching in support of an assault conducted by a single battalion
landing team (BLT). Naval MCM (surface, airborne, and underwater), assault breaching (by the Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) Assault Breaching System (JABS), and AAVs equipped with MCM kit (MK-154)
are illustrated in the littoral region that was selected for the BLT’s assault. Depending on analysis of mission
variables, the width of the assault lane from the shallow water region to the line of demarcation on the landing
beach may be 50 to 165 yards. During an amphibious assault, the BLT will typically use two assault lanes
for maneuver of displacement craft (AAVs, LCUs). A separate assault lane is used for the ship-to-shore
movement of nondisplacement craft (LCAC) into and out of the landing craft, air craft landing zone (CLZ).

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 Amphibious Breaching Operations

D-7. The CLZ is the position where landing waves, (consisting of up to three LCACs), offload vehicles,
equipment, cargo or personnel. The CLZ may be located on or slightly beyond the landing beach. Due to the
unique operating characteristics of the LCAC, the CLZ is usually situated several hundred yards away from
the displacement craft assault lanes.
D-8. In certain locations, a BLT may only use a single assault lane to maneuver displacement craft. The
tactical decision to use a single lane for displacement craft maneuver is usually driven by analysis of METT-T
variables and local conditions including; small sized landing beach, density and complexity of obstacles in
the littoral region, and clearance rates for MCM.

Legend:
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
CLZ craft landing zone
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
JABS Joint Attack Munition Assault Breaching System
LCAC landing craft, utility
LCU landing craft utility
MMS Marine mammal system
UUV unmanned underwater vehicle

Figure D-1. Amphibious breach

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 D-25

Appendix D

Water Depths
D-9. To ease command and control for MCM, zones have been established according to water depth. The
zones are—
 Deep water. This zone includes the area containing water depths greater than 200 feet. Within
this zone, the enemy is more likely to emplace moored mines and floating nonexplosive obstacles.
A moored mine consists of a contact or influence-operated mine with positive buoyancy. The mine
is held below the surface by a mooring attached to a sinker or anchor on the bottom.
 Shallow water. This zone includes the area containing water depth from 200 to 40 feet. Moored
contact mines and bottom or moored single and multiple influence mines will usually be found in
this zone. Floating nonexplosive obstacles may also be encountered in this zone.
 Very shallow. This zone includes the area containing water depth from 40 to 10 feet. Mines found
in this zone may include bottom or moored contact mines, bottom or moored single influence
mines, bottom multiple influence mines, and tilt rod mines positioned on the ground. Enemy
emplaced nonexplosive antilanding obstacles may also be found in this zone.
 Surf. This zone extends from the beach outward to a water depth of 10 feet. Bottom contact
mines, bottom influence mines, bottom pressure plate mines, tilt rod mines, moored contact,
moored influence, and anti-invasion mines are usually positioned in the surf zone. Mines
employed in this zone are typically mixed with natural and man-made nonexplosive obstacles to
improve their operational effectiveness by channelizing assault forces into enemy engagement
areas, delaying the operational tempo of the amphibious assault, inflicting casualties and
complicating the mine clearance problem for the naval assault force.

D-10. Water depth and bottom conditions are key factors. Water depths that increase rapidly with distance
from the beach limit the use and effectiveness of most bottom mines. Significant tidal streams cause mines
to roll or become buried. This environmental condition makes it more difficult to conduct minesweeping
against moored mines. Large tidal variations expose mines and other obstacles in potential CLZs and surf
zones, making these areas more difficult for the enemy to mine. Strong underwater currents can shift sand,
which can bury or uncover mines and obstacles and create sand bars several meters offshore from the landing
beach. Sand bars adversely affect ship-to-shore maneuver because they force landing craft (AAVs, LCUs)
out of the water sooner than tactically desired. Generally, AAVs have no trouble moving across sand bars.
Their mobility may be challenged however, if they are required to assault through a surf zone and beach that
contains a muddy or swampy bottom.

MINE COUNTERMEASURES
D-11. Mine countermeasures are all methods for preventing or reducing damage or danger from mines
(JP 3-15). MCM methods include proactive and enabling measures. Proactive MCM prevent the enemy from
laying mines. Enabling MCM are—
 Passive. Passive MCM include measures taken to minimize the mine threat without
attacking the mine itself.
 Active. Active MCM include physically clearing mines from an area. This is accomplished
by minehunting or minesweeping. Just as in MCM conducted on the land domain, an ATF
maneuvering through a coastal area that is suspected to contain naval mines should locate,
mark, and neutralize the mines that affect their maneuver.

D-12. Minehunting is the employment of sensor and neutralization systems, whether air, surface, or
subsurface, to locate and dispose of individual mines in a known field, or to verify the presence or absence
of mines in a given area (JP 3-15). Information about mine functioning is disseminated throughout the ATF
to make subsequent minehunting safer and more effective. Minehunting is conducted by Navy helicopters,
surface vessels and Navy EOD personnel using a variety of naval equipment. MCRP 3-31.2A/NTTP 3-
15.24, provides detailed information regarding this equipment, as well as the techniques used by the Navy
units that employ it. Naval special warfare task group personnel may also be used for minehunting
reconnaissance; however, these assets are very limited.

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 Amphibious Breaching Operations

D-13. Minesweeping is the technique of clearing mines using either mechanical sweeping to remove, disturb,
or otherwise neutralize the mine; explosive sweeping to cause sympathetic detonations, damage, or displace
the mine; or influence sweeping to produce either the acoustic or magnetic influence required to detonate the
mine (JP 3-15). Minesweeping can be conducted by Navy helicopters and surface vessels.

AMPHIBIOUS BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS

D-14. The breaching fundamentals (SOSRA) are applicable to an amphibious breaching operation but may
vary in degree, based on the tactical situation inside and adjacent to the AOA. As in a deliberate breach
conducted on land, the support, breach, and assault forces for an amphibious breaching operation are given
specific objectives and detailed control measures to coordinate the attack against the enemy antilanding
obstacle system and defensive positions. Due to their complexity, amphibious operations include unique
command and control considerations. Additional complexity is encountered when amphibious breaching is
required to support an amphibious assault.

SUPPORTING, ADVANCE FORCE, AND PREASSAULT OPERATIONS

D-15. Before the action phase of an amphibious operation is executed, the amphibious force commander
may seek to shape their operational environment through three complementary operations. Although these
operations are generally referred to in the context of an amphibious assault or raid, they may also be used to
shape the operational environment for amphibious support to other operations. The exact manner in which
these operations are conducted will depend on the type of amphibious operation. The force and the time in
which these operations are conducted typically define the operation. Shaping operations usually occur
sequentially but may occur simultaneously in some instances. These operations are, in order of occurrence—
 Supporting. Supporting operations are conducted by forces (other than those assigned to the
ATF) in support of the amphibious operation; they are ordered by a higher authority, at the request
of the CATF; and may set the conditions for the advance force to move into the operational area.
Supporting maritime operations may include establishing maritime superiority, emplacing naval
mines to restrict the enemy freedom of maneuver, the initiation of MCM operations within a sea
line of communications, deception, and hydrographic survey of potential landing beaches.
Meteorological and oceanographic data, including tailored imagery, may be obtained directly from
the Naval Oceanographic Office or via a joint or Service meteorological and oceanographic
forecast activity in support of naval forces. Supporting air operations, carried out by sea- and land-
based aircraft, may include establishing air superiority, reconnaissance, and the attack of land
targets that may impact the amphibious operation. Supporting activities conducted by special
operations forces may include military information support operations, civil affairs, special
reconnaissance, and direct action missions against enemy mine storage sites or mine laying
vessels.
 Advance force. Advance force operations are conducted in the operational area by a task-
organized element of the amphibious force, prior to the arrival of the entire amphibious force.
Advance forces are task-organized to perform tasks that may include MCM operations with
emphasis on the clearance of mines in the transport areas, fire support areas, and sea approaches
to the landing beaches; hydrographic reconnaissance of the landing beaches and seaward
approaches; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection against amphibious force
objectives, LF objectives, landing beaches, landing zones, drop zones, and high speed avenues of
approach into the landing area; and neutralization or destruction of high-value enemy assets.
 Preassault. Preassault operations are conducted by the amphibious force upon arrival in the
operational area and before the time of the assault or simultaneous activities, normally delineated
by H-hour and L-hour. Preassault activities may include employment of the assault breaching
system (JABS), demolition of visible obstacles, clearance of required naval mines, breaching of
any remaining seaward minefields and barriers within the assault lanes, overt marking of usable
channels, direct action missions, target acquisition and spotting for naval surface fire support
(NSFS) vessels, and initial terminal guidance for designated assault landings. Lane marking for
an amphibious assault is not as simple as marking breached lanes ashore. Ship-to-shore movement
is affected by winds, sea swells, tides, shifting currents, bottom conditions, and (however
remotely) sea ice. These factors do not always allow amphibious forces to move toward the beach

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 D-27

Appendix D

in a straight line; however, straight lanes are the goal. While not immune to shifting currents and
winds, landing craft and AAVs can use global positioning systems or other emerging technology
to navigate successfully to the shore. LFs can maneuver through a possible maze of obstacles
following grid coordinates to the beach. Physical marking measures include floating buoys or
strobe lights tethered to sinkers positioned on the sea bottom. The breach lane navigation system
is employed by Navy beach master units. The breach lane navigation system provides precise
guidance through lanes cleared in minefields for LCAC and amphibious assault craft in the final
1,000 yards through the surf zone and onto the landing beach.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

D-16. Command and control is a fundamental element of all military operations. This is especially true for
an amphibious assault that includes amphibious breaching. Unity of command is critical to synchronize MCM
(surface, airborne and underwater) activities with assault breaching, delivery of coordinated fires, ship-to-
shore movement, proofing and clearing actions performed by the LF ashore, and other joint force activities.
When an amphibious operation requires amphibious breaching, the CATF coordinates the development of
the breaching plan with the CLF and the MCM commander. The CATF is responsible for conducting assault
breaching from the surf zone to the line of demarcation. Target selection for the precise delivery of the aircraft
delivered JABS munitions shall be based on information obtained from national, operational, and tactical
intelligence assets.
D-17. The CLF is responsible for conducting minefield and obstacle breaching and clearing operations
inland from the line of demarcation, proofing assault lanes from the surf zone to the line of demarcation and
follow-on clearance operations on the beach. To support CATF development of the amphibious breaching
plan for the amphibious assault, the CLF will provide a breach force advisor. The breach force advisor is
typically a combat engineer officer supplied by the ground combat or command element. The breach force
advisor may be collocated with the primary control officer on the primary control ship (since the primary
control officer is responsible for coordinating ship-to-shore movement across a colored beach). Duties of the
breach force advisor can include advising the CLF and CATF on breaching matters, monitoring execution of
the breaching plan and assessing its impact on supporting the seizure of objectives ashore, and coordinating
handover of MCM/breaching efforts from the Navy to the LF.
D-18. The MCM commander (MCMC) is responsible to the CATF for planning and conducting all naval
MCM operations in the AOA, and will in most cases command all naval MCM forces in the AOA. Given the
size and complexity of the AOA, the MCM threat, and MCM forces, more than one MCMC may be assigned
to the AOA. Naval MCM forces will employ surface, airborne and underwater systems to detect, identify,
classify and neutralize naval and antilanding mines. MCMC will conduct JABS mission planning and provide
targeting information for assault breaching, via CATF and/or mine warfare commander, for strike targeting
prioritization and mission planning.
D-19. The mine warfare commander is the functional group commander for mine warfare and may be task
organized under the joint force maritime component commander, naval component commander, or
commander, amphibious force, or may be a supporting commander for CATF when MCMC and MCM forces
are operating in the AOA. This is especially true if offensive/defensive mining or JABS missions will take
in the AOA.

PHASES OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

D-20. The phases are planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action. Consideration for amphibious
breaching should be given in each phase.

Planning
D-21. Special planning relationships are observed to ensure naval and LF considerations are adequately
factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of the amphibious operation. The CATF and CLF are
coequal in planning matters. Planning decisions must be reached on a basis of common understanding of the
mission, objectives, TTP, and a free exchange of information.

D-28 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Amphibious Breaching Operations

D-22. Any differences between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to the establishing
authority. If a change in the mission occurs after commencement of operations or if an amphibious operation
is initiated from an afloat posture, coequal planning relationships (as described above or as specified in the
initiating directive) will apply to any subsequent planning. (See JP 3-02 for additional information regarding
the phases of an amphibious operation and command and control.)
D-23. The CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, is responsible for the preparation of the overall ship-
to-shore movement and landing plan. Early in the planning phase, detailed requirements should be provided
by the CATF to the MCMC to facilitate MCM planning. MCM considerations include the size of the AOA
in comparison to the available MCM assets and requirements to protect MCM operations against hostile
threats. Planners should be cognizant that enemy observation of friendly MCM operations may compromise
tactical surprise. The CLF is responsible for determining LF requirements for the ship-to-shore movement
and presenting them to the CATF. The CLF provides information on the availability of organic assets
(helicopters, tilt-rotor aircraft, and AAVs) to the CATF and prepares the documents contained in the LF
landing plan.
D-24. The success of an amphibious breaching operation depends heavily on intelligence. Planning should
begin with an estimate of the situation and an initial analysis of potential landing beaches. Developing the
collection plan is a collaborative effort between the Navy component intelligence staff officer (N-2) and the
LF equivalent (MAGTF G-2/S-2), with reconnaissance efforts concentrating on confirming the location of
enemy defensive positions and obstacles. The N-2 concentrates on obstacles from the sea to the line of
demarcation, while the MAGTF G-2/S-2 concentrates on obstacles from the line of demarcation to inland
objectives. COAs are developed using estimates of the enemy situation and capabilities. A scheme of
movement and maneuver for each COA is developed and briefed to the CATF and CLF.
D-25. After a COA is selected, members of the CATF and CLF staff refine initial planning documents and make
final preparations before the LF begins embarkation aboard amphibious vessels. Refinement of some planning
documents can continue until the time preassault activities are conducted in preparation for the assault. This allows
the flexibility to incorporate lessons learned during the rehearsal, exploit the effects produced by supporting or
advance force operations, and react to updated intelligence that is received while the ATF is moving toward the
AOA.

Task Organization
D-26. Based upon collaborative planning conducted with the CATF, the LF organizes into echelons for
embarkation aboard amphibious vessels and ship-to-shore movement. The echelons or landing waves consist
of task organized units that are transported ashore during the surface assault by landing craft or AAVs. The
first landing wave scheduled for arrival conducts proofing of the assault lanes that were breached by the
JABS. This wave may also perform supplemental breaching, expedient obstacle reduction and lane marking
as necessary. The remaining scheduled landing waves arrive at a specified time interval to deliver additional
combat power to the beach. The arrival of additional combat power sequenced over time permits the LF to
breach and clear minefields and bypass or reduce obstacles in support of tactical maneuver beyond the line
of demarcation and toward assigned inland objectives. It also permits the LF to upgrade the beach for
unloading of vehicles/equipment from landing craft and eventually for use as a logistics site. While
maneuvering beyond the line of demarcation the LF conducts breaching operations using the combat engineer
TTP described earlier in this publication. It positions organic combat engineer assets within ground maneuver
unit formations to allow each combined arms formation to conduct hasty minefield breaching and obstacle
reduction to support freedom of action and sustain operational tempo. Figure D-2, page D-8, provides a
typical LF task organization for maneuver beyond the line of demarcation. It depicts the subdivision of the
LF into a breaching task force and follow-on forces.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 D-29

Appendix D

D-27. The breaching task force is further subdivided into three forces—
 Support force. The support force is responsible for eliminating the enemy ability to interfere
with breaching operations ashore. This involves the synchronized application of NSFS, close air
support, offensive air support, electronic warfare and organic LF indirect and direct fires.
 Breach force. The breach force is responsible for breaching minefields, reducing obstacles
and marking lanes ashore to allow assaulting forces to maneuver to LF and ATF objectives located
inland from the landing beach/beaches.
 Assault force. The assault force is responsible for destroying or dislodging the enemy on the
far side of the obstacle or in between obstacle belts, to allow combat forces to continue the attack.
Fire support coordination is critical since the support and breach forces are firing on the enemy
while the assault force is maneuvering to destroy the enemy. The assault force must be of
sufficient size to eliminate the enemy or seize the designated far side objective.

Legend:
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
ABV armored breach vehicle
LAR light armored reconnaissance
MCM mine countermeasure
PLT platoon

Figure D-2. LF task organization for maneuver beyond the line of demarcation

D-30 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Amphibious Breaching Operations

EMBARKATION
D-28. Critical LF assets (including AAVs and combat engineer breaching, proofing, gap-crossing, and
obstacle reduction equipment) are loaded aboard amphibious warfare vessels so they can be off-loaded in the
scheduled waves of the surface assault. The location of these assets may need to be rearranged after they
have been loaded aboard the amphibious warfare vessel however, based on lessons learned from the rehearsal
or updated intelligence. The relocation of larger items (such as ABVs) can be very difficult due to the size
and weight of the item that must be relocated. To provide the flexibility to reposition larger, critical equipment
while the amphibious vessel is transiting to the AOA, large critical equipment items are usually mobile loaded
(preboated) into a dedicated landing craft (LCAC/LCU) that is parked inside the amphibious vessel well
deck.
D-29. In addition to combat loading personnel and equipment during the embarkation phase, the LF will
spread load supplies aboard the amphibious vessels of the ATF. Critical items, such as ammunition, fuel, and
water, are positioned in key areas of each ship to ensure rapid resupply of the LF during ship-to-shore
movement to the beach and maneuver beyond the line of demarcation. These supplies are readily available
as an on-call wave for immediate delivery to units ashore via landing craft or helicopter/tilt-rotor aircraft
transport. To expedite delivery, critical items are assembled into multi-commodity resupply packages that
are tailored to address the forecasted consumption rate required to support combat operations ashore.

REHEARSAL
D-30. Realistic rehearsals of an amphibious assault should integrate MCM operations working together in the
same water space with the other elements of the amphibious force. Live demolition for all MCM players
(including naval special warfare, Navy EOD, Marine reconnaissance, and combat engineers) instills
appreciation of the gravity of the mine threat and demonstrates the importance of MCM tactics and
operations. Realistic rehearsals will refine techniques and procedures wh i c h enable the CATF and CLF to
integrate all the tools available to support the projection of combat power ashore.

MOVEMENT
D-31. The vessels of the ATF will move from seaports of embarkation to the assigned operational area via
existing sea lines of communications. If the ATF encounters naval mines or water obstacles en route,
minesweeping will be conducted. If intelligence indicates mines may have been emplaced in a specific
location along the route, minehunting will be conducted to verify the presence of mines and destroy
them or the ATF may use an alternative route to avoid the mined area.

ACTION
D-32. During the action phase, coordinated fires (air and NSFS) and electronic warfare are used inside the
AOA to destroy or degrade the enemy ability to engage the aircraft that are conducting the assault breach or
repel the AAVs and landing craft that are executing the amphibious assault. Simultaneously, coordinated
attacks are conducted against preplanned enemy targets such as reserve forces, supply depots (especially
ammunition, fuel), strategic command centers and key leadership. These attacks can be performed by joint
forces conducting airborne or special operations.
D-33. If the LF uses an air assault force in conjunction with a surface-borne assault force, the air assault
force must be reinforced as soon as possible. It is important to ensure that the landing zones are cleared of
mines and obstacles before commencing air assault operations. The task organization of the air assault force
will include the early deployment of combat engineer units to clear mines and reduce obstacles that affect
the rapid build-up of combat power in the landing zones.
D-34. The LF deploys task-organized elements in scheduled waves onto the beach to accomplish high
priority tasks including; proofing lanes previously breached by JABS, securing and clearing the CLZ,
marking proofed lanes, conducting expedient obstacle reduction, UXO removal and performing supplemental
breaching to support maneuver beyond the line of demarcation. LF equipment, such as ABVs, AAVs with
MK-154 MICLICs, AVLBs, armored bulldozers, tanks with track width mine plows, is used to accomplish
these tasks. The CLF may have to provide AAVs with MK-154s to assist Navy MCM forces in clearing

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 D-31

Appendix D

seaward approaches (surf zone and beach) to CLZs. Upon arrival ashore, ground maneuver elements move
across the beach and beyond the line of demarcation toward assigned inland objectives.
D-35. The landing force support party (LFSP) commander immediately assumes responsibility for rapid
clearance of mines and obstacles upon arrival at the beach using LF engineers, Marine Corps and Navy EOD,
and other supporting elements as required. The LFSP commander coordinates beach and CLZ mine clearance
during rapid follow-on clearance and mine and obstacle clearance operations. The LFSP conducts counter-
obstacle operations to expand initial breaches and clear additional lanes required to increase throughput of
equipment and supplies to support the LF. The LFSP conducts obstacle clearing operations until relieved by
the logistics combat element. To sustain throughput across the landing beach, the LFSP is responsible for
salvage operations and traffic control in the surf zone and on the beach area. The Navy beachmaster unit
assists the LFSP in sustaining throughput by coordinating the arrival and departure of all landing craft at the
beach.
D-36. The MCMC has tactical control of the forces conducting MCM operations seaward of the surf zone
during the amphibious assault. The MCMC provides coordination of effort to establish surf zone breaching,
ingress, and egress route alignment. The MCMC maintains the flexibility to reposition MCM assets as
necessary to exploit the situation or adapt to changes in the plan of attack. The MCMC must provide
continuous mine clearance advisories to the ATF commander to minimize ship casualties due to naval mines.

CONTINUING THE ATTACK

D-37. After assaulting through the landing beach/beaches, the LF continues to maneuver inland to seize
assigned objectives. The enemy A2/AD obstacle system that was breached in the littoral region acts as a
chokepoint and danger area even after the enemy defensive positions have been destroyed and enemy forces
defending the beach/beaches have been dislodged. Lane marking is improved as soon as possible to ensure
the safety of follow-on force vehicles and personnel. To eliminate the chokepoint, remaining obstacles are
removed, expedient combat roads may be constructed and existing lanes are improved or widened.
Concurrently, Marine Corps and Navy EOD teams search for and neutralize explosive ordnance and UXO
that endanger the mobility of personnel and vehicles. Numerous large-scale amphibious assaults were
conducted during World War II. Many of the types of obstacles used for antilanding defenses then are still
used today.

D-32 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Appendix E
Crossing Means and Organizations
Crossing a gap can be accomplished numerous ways making use of various types of
equipment or available resources. Any method that is used, to include standard and
nonstandard bridging or nonbridging alternatives, is described as the crossing means.
This appendix describes those means that are most commonly used by Army and
Marine Corps forces. While not inclusive of all possible means that may be used to
cross a gap, it does include discussion of bridging and nonbridging means.

GENERAL
E-1. Crossing means are the equipment or materials (nonbridging) used to allow a force to cross a gap.
Gap-crossing equipment is specially designed to operate within certain limits, and commanders must
understand these limits if the force is to cross safely.
E-2. A safety parameter that affects operational use is the load capacity of rafts, bridges, and other
equipment. The data shown in table E-1, page E-2, reflects the normal capabilities for selected crossing
equipment. In exceptional circumstances, certain safety factors or margins allow an increase in the load.
These exceptional (risk) capacities have been deliberately omitted here because they are not intended for use
in operational planning. The standard or design capabilities are provided for normal crossings. The
exceptional category is intended for special situations, described by the terms caution crossing or risk
crossing.
E-3. In addition to the command decision required to employ caution and risk crossing loads, commanders
must consider the physical status of the equipment. Thus, CACs should obtain an assessment of the bridge
condition from an engineer familiar with the equipment. The commander weighs these factors with the
tactical requirements before directing an increase in the load, keeping in mind that the equipment may be lost
for future use. There is a significant difference between the risk involved in the crossing of a single vehicle
and the crossing of multiple vehicles over a bridge. Gap crossings have the following categories:
 Normal crossing. The vehicle classification number is equal to or less than the bridge. Vehicles
maintain 100-foot intervals on standard bridging, and the vehicle speed must not exceed 15 miles
per hour. Sudden stopping or acceleration is forbidden.
 Caution crossing. Vehicles with a classification exceeding the capacity of the bridge by 25
percent are allowed to cross under strict traffic control. The crossing requires that vehicles remain
on the centerline and maintain 165-foot intervals. The crossing requires that vehicles do not exceed
8 miles per hour, stop, accelerate, or shift gears.
 Risk crossing. May be made only on standard bridging and in the greatest emergencies. The
vehicle moves on the centerline and is the only vehicle on the bridge. The crossing requires that
vehicles do not exceed 3 miles per hour, stop, accelerate, or shift gears. The vehicle classification
number must not exceed the published risk classification for the bridge type being crossed. After
the crossing and before other traffic is permitted, a qualified engineer must reinspect the entire
bridge for damage.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-1

Appendix E

Table E-1. Selected nonvehicle crossing equipment characteristics

Assembly/ Remarks/
Equipment Allocation Transportation Capabilities
Propulsion Limitations
Inflatable • 30 per MRBC • The deflated • The boat can • Inflation time is • Two pumps and
assault boat • 8 combat size is 70 inch carry a 10 to 15 nine paddles are
(Zodiac) rubber recon- by 36 inch by maximum of 15 minutes with included with
naissance 26 inch. Soldiers/ pumps. each boat.
craft per • The deflated Marines or a • Paddle speed • OBMs must be
Marine Corps boat weighs total load is 5 fps. requested
bridge 432 pounds. capacity of separately (10 per
3,770 pounds of • Speed is 15
company fps with an MRBC).
equipment.
OBM.
• The boat can be
used with
paddles (9) or
maximum 80
horsepower
OBM.
Pneumatic, • 2 per EN CO • The boat is • The boat can • Inflation time is • The maximum
3-man recon- IBCT carried by carry three 5 minutes with current velocity is
naissance • 3 per EN CO backpack Soldiers/ a pump. 5 fps.
boat SBCT (1-man carry). Marines with • Paddle speed • One pump and
• The boat and equipment or is 3 fps. three paddles are
• 2 per CBT EN
backpack 675 pounds of required per boat.
CO ABCT
weigh 57 equipment.
• 6 per MRBC • The boat cannot
pounds. be used with an
OBM.
Bridge • 14 per MRBC • The boat is • The boat can • Launch time is • The draft is 22
erection boat • 21 per Marine carried by one carry a 3-man 5 minutes from inches for normal
Corps bridge CBT with an crew and 12 the cradle. operation, 26
company Improved Boat Soldiers/ inches when fully
Cradle (Army) Marines with loaded, and 48
weight 9,800 equipment or inches for a
pounds or MK 4,000 pounds of launch from the
48/18 or a equipment. cradle.
bridge trailer • The tow hook
(Marine Corps) provides safe
or one towing capacity
medium-lift of 4,410
helicopter. pounds.
• The boat • The boat can be
weighs 8,801 deployed with a
pounds. CH-47
helicopter.
Legend:
ABCT armor brigade combat team IBCT infantry brigade combat team
CBT common bridge transporter MRBC multirole bridge company
CO company OBM outboard motor
EN engineer SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
fps feet per second

DESCRIPTIONS OF CROSSING MEANS

E-4. This appendix provides a graphic of the equipment and equipment capability tables that should be
useful in selecting crossing means and planning. The tables located in this appendix provide unit allocations
based on authorizations and emplacement times that only consider the estimated construction times in a best-
case scenario.

E-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

E-5. The emplacement planning times in the tables were derived using well-trained crews in sterile
operational environments, with times starting with the first transporter in place at the crossing site and ending
when the bridge is open for traffic. When determining the resources necessary and time required, planners
must consider that many variables can impact the actual amount of bridging available and the emplacement
times. Challenges (unit training, experience, tactical situation in conjunction with the results of the gap
reconnaissance [gap width, gap bank conditions or slope, stream velocity, visibility, terrain, weather
conditions, accessibility]) must be considered during the mission analysis to assist in developing an accurate
timeline and execution matrix to support gap crossing.
E-6. Available crossing means dictate the manner of crossing activity and the force buildup rate on the far
side. Before the commander develops their tactics, they must understand how the available crossing means
may impact the ability to mass forces on the far side. The following are some of the crossing means that may
be used to cross a gap:
 Fording.
 Swimming.
 Amphibious vehicles.
 Helicopters.
 Boats.
 Rafts.
 Bridges.
 Other nonbridging means.

FORDING
E-7. Combat vehicles can ford shallow wet gaps that have a limited current velocity and stable beds.
Fording kits are available for some vehicles to increase fording depth (such as the deep-water fording kit for
the Marine Corps’ M1A1 tank). Fording is possible for current velocities that are less than 5 feet per second.
If fording a riverbed, the site must be firm and free of large rocks and other obstructions. Vehicle-operator
manuals contain specific depth capabilities and required adaptations. The AVLB and Wolverine can be used
to assist fording vehicles in deep water. (See table E-2.)
Table E-2. Fording and swimming capabilities of selected combat vehicles

Fording Ford
Equipment Depth1 Depth Swimming Data
(Feet) With Kit
M113 series 3.3 NA Nonswimmer
M2/M3 series 3.6 NA Nonswimmer
M1 series2 3.9 NA Nonswimmer
Stryker infantry carrier
3.3 NA Nonswimmer
vehicle series
Light armored vehicle Fully amphibious with 3 minutes of preparation
series3 NA NA
Swim speed of 6 mph in current up to 8 fps
Amphibious assault Fully amphibious
vehicle–7A1 series3 NA NA
Swim speed of 6 to 8 mph in current up to 8-fps
Expeditionary fighting Fully amphibious
vehicle series3 NA NA
Swim speed of 23 to 28 mph in sea state 34

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-3

Appendix E

Table E-2. Fording and swimming capabilities of selected combat vehicles

(continued)
1
Fording capability can vary based on various factors (current, bottom structure, bank slope).
2
M1 series (USMC) is capable of fording up to 8 feet with deep water fording kit.
3
Reflects the vehicles that are also capable of swimming and fording. Only the USMC is equipped with this
variant.
4
Wind 7-10 knots; gentle breeze, large wavelets, crests begin to break, scattered whitecaps, and light flags
extended.
Legend:
fps feet per second
mph miles per hour
NA not applicable
USMC United States Marine Corps

SWIMMING
E-8. Some combat vehicles can swim. (See table E-2, page E-3.) Entry and exit points must be clear of
obstructions and have slopes consistent with the vehicle capabilities. The current velocity sets limits. Crews
of amphibious vehicles prepare and inspect each vehicle before entering the water. Engineer assistance,
including recovery vehicles and standing cables, maximizes swimming opportunities.

Amphibious Vehicles
E-9. The LCAC is the primary vehicle used by the Marine Corps to land heavy vehicles, equipment,
personnel, and cargo in amphibious assaults. (See figure 5-1, page 5-5.)
E-10. The AAV is an armored assault amphibious full-tracked landing vehicle. (See figure 5-5, page 5-7.)
The vehicle carries troops in water from ship to shore through rough water and surf zone.
E-11. The light armored vehicle (LAV) is a lightly armored, 8-wheeled amphibious vehicle. The LAV
family of vehicles consists of seven fielded LAV configurations and one communications/intelligence-
configured asset on an LAV chassis. (See MCWP 3-14.1 for additional information.) The LAV-25 is the
baseline vehicle chassis, and it is primarily used for the combat and combat support roles. It is based on the
Mowag Piranha family of armored fighting vehicles used by the Marine Corps. Powered by a Detroit diesel
turbo-charged engine, they are 4-wheel drive (rear wheels) transferable to 8-wheel drive. These vehicles are
also amphibious, but they are limited to nonsurf bodies of water (no oceans). They can make 6.5 miles per
hour in calm waters of rivers or for fording streams. Typical land speeds are approximately 62 miles per hour
in 4- or 8-wheel drive, however fuel economy decreases in an 8-wheel drive. The vehicles operate on diesel
fuel and require three weights of lubricants to remain in running condition. They are equipped with an M242
25-millimeter chain gun (the same as on the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicle), two M240 7.62-millimeter
machine guns, and two 4-barrel launchers usually loaded with obscuration canisters. The crew is three and
four passengers with combat gear. (See figure E-1.)

HELICOPTERS
E-12. A primary crossing means for carrying dismounted infantry across a gap may be helicopters. Selected
types of helicopters may also be used to lift other crossing assets from sustainment areas to the gap and carry
essential equipment and supplies across it. (See table E-3 for characteristics of external loads for aircraft.)

E-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

Figure E-1. LAV

Table E-3. Typical external loads for helicopters

Equipment Weight in Pounds Remarks
Bridge erection boat The boats are lifted in the bow-and-stern
MK II-S 9,800 configuration without the cab and placed
directly on water surfaces.

Ribbon bridge bays The bays are placed directly on water

SRB surfaces.
Interior bays 12,000
Ramp bays 11,700
IRB
Interior and ramp bays 14,000
REBs bridge The bridge can be emplaced directly over
10,582
the gap.1
DSB pallets Maximum weight of a Transported to bridge site in palletized
single pallet load of load configuration. The DSB launcher
DSB: 23,090 (M1975) is not helicopter transportable.1
1
If using a helicopter lift, refer to TM 5-5420-280-10 for the REBs or TM 5-5420-279-10 for the DSB.
Legend:
DSB dry support bridge
IRB improved ribbon bridge
REBs rapidly emplaced bridge system
SRB standard ribbon bridge
TM technical manual

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-5

Appendix E

BOATS
E-13. Pneumatic assault boats are another crossing means for dismounted infantry and accompanying
elements. For light infantry, assault boats may be the only means required if air resupply is available. They
carry 12 assault troops and a two-man engineer crew in a silent or powered crossing with outboard motor.

RAFTS
E-14. Heavy rafts are often the initial crossing means for tanks and other fighting vehicles. They are faster
to assemble than bridges and can operate from multiple sites to reduce their vulnerability. The MRBC can
provide heavy rafting using the IRB. (See figure E-2; table E-4; table E-5; table E-6; table E-7, page E-8; and
table E-8, page E-9.) (See TM 5-5420-278-10 for additional information.)

Figure E-2. Ribbon raft

Table E-4. Launch restrictions

Characteristics Free Launch Controlled Launch High Bank Launch
Minimum depth of water required Ramp bay 44
302 301
in inches Interior bay 361
Bank-height restrictions in feet 0-5 0 5-28
Level the ground
Bank slope restrictions 0-30% 0-20% unless the front of the
truck is restrained.
1
The launch is based on a 10% slope with the transporter backed into the water. The required water depth for a 30% slope
with a 5-foot bank height is 72 inches. Interpolate between these values when needed.
2
This is the recommended water depth. The launch could technically be conducted in 17 inches of water.

E-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

Table E-5. Allocation of ribbon bridge

Per Multirole Bridge Marine Corps
Components
Company Bridge Company
Bridge platoons 2 1
Interior bays 30 12
Ramp bays 12 5
Bridge erection boats 14 21
Note. The longest ribbon bridge that can be constructed is 235 yards.

Table E-6. Ribbon raft design, standard ribbon bridge

Assembly Load Rafting Current Velocity in fps and MLC

Raft
Time in Space Method
Types
Minutes (feet) L/C 0-3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3 bays (2 40 40 35 30 25
L 45 45 45
ramps/1 8 22
C 45 45 35 25 15 10 0 0
interior)
4 bays (2 70 70 70 60 60 60 55 45
L
ramps/2 12 44
C 60 60 60 551 401 301 151 01
interiors)
5 bays (2 75 75 75 70 70 70 60 60
L
ramps/3 15 66
C 75 70 70 701 601 501 251 01
interiors)
6 bays (2 96/80 96/80 96/80 96/70 96/70 96/70 70/70 70/70
L (W/T)
ramps/4 20 88
C (W/T) 96/70 96/70 96/70 70/701 70/701 55/551 30/301 01
interiors)

1
Three BEBs are required for conventional rafting of 4-, 5-, or 6-bay rafts in current velocities greater than 1.5 mps.
Notes.
1. If the current velocity in the loading/unloading area is greater than 1.5 mps, then conventional rafting must be used.
2. Roadway width of a standard ribbon raft is 4.1 meters, and the draft of a fully loaded ribbon raft is 61 centimeters.
3. Vehicles should only be loaded on the interior bays.
4. Each raft requires a minimum of two BEBs for propulsion.
5. The assembly time of a raft increases by 50% at night.
6. Six-bay rafts have separate MLC ratings for wheeled and tracked vehicles.
7. Do not mix SRB and IRB bays for rafting operations.
Legend:
BEB bridge erection boat
C conventional
fps feet per second
IRB improved ribbon bridge
L longitudinal
MLC military load classification
mps meters per second
SRB standard ribbon bridge
T tracked
W wheeled

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-7

Appendix E

Table E-7. Ribbon raft design, IRB

Assembly Load Rafting Current Velocity in fps and MLC

Raft Types Time in Space Method
Minutes (feet) L/C 0.0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
4 bays (2
L 70 70 70 70 65 60
ramps 12 44
C 70 70 70 70 60 30
/2 interior)
5 bays (2
L 90 90 90 90 85 80
ramps 15 66
C 90 90 90 90 75 40
/3 interiors)
6 bays (2
L 105 105 105 105 100 95
ramps 20 88
C 105 105 105 105 100 60
/4 interiors)
7 bays (2
L 115 115 115 115 110 105
ramps 24 110
C 115 115 115 115 105 65
/5 interiors)
7 bays
multiple (2 L 140 140 140 140 135 130
ramps 24 110
C 140 140 140 140 125 80
/5 interiors)

Notes.
1. Assembly times do not include site preparation, travel times to and from the EEP, or other mitigating factors. Planners must
consider operational conditions and factors to develop actual emplacement timelines.
2. If the current velocity in the loading/unloading area is greater than 1.5 mps, then conventional rafting must be used.
3. The roadway width of an improved ribbon raft is 4.5 meters.
4. Water depth of less than 2 meters in combination with current speeds in excess of 1.2 mps will reduce MLC rating on the
above chart.
5. Each raft requires a minimum of two BEBs for propulsion.
6. The assembly time for a raft increases by 50% at night.
7. Three BEBs are required for conventional rafting of a 4-, 5-, 6-, or 7-bay rafts in current velocities greater than 1.5 mps.
Legend:
BEB bridge erection boat
C conventional
EEP engineer equipment park
fps feet per second
L longitudinal
MLC military load classification
mps meters per second

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 Crossing Means and Organizations

Table E-8. Raft crossing capabilities

River Width Minutes per Round Trips Number of Rafts
(feet) Round Trip per Hour per Centerline
246 7 8 1
328 8 7 1
410 9 6 1
492 10 6 2
610 11 5 2
738 12 5 2
861 14 4 3
964 16 3 3
1,148 18 3 4
1,312 20 3 5
1,476 22 2 5
1,640 24 2 5
1,968 26 2 6
2,296 29 2 6
2,824 32 1 6
2,952 35 1 6
3,280 38 1 6
3,808 41 1 6
3,936 45 1 6
Notes.
1. This table is valid for ribbon rafts in current velocities up to and
including 5 feet per second.
2. This data is based on the use of crews under ideal conditions.
3. Round-trip times include the times required to load and unload the raft.
4. Crossing times will take 50% longer at night.
5. If the river width falls between 2 columns, use the value found in the next
higher column.

BRIDGES
E-15. The following sections describe standard bridging assets for the three bridging categories:
 Tactical.
 Support.
 LOC.
E-16. These listed bridges are currently in the Army/Marine Corps inventory; are in the procurement, testing,
and fielding process; or are the most common bridges currently being purchased as commercial off-the-shelf
bridging.

Tactical Bridging
E-17. The M60 tank chassis-based AVLB can travel with maneuvering tactical formations and quickly
bridge a gap up to 60 feet for MLC 70 vehicles. It is unable to effectively maintain the tempo of M1/M2
equipped units. The launcher can launch the bridge without exposing bridge personnel to enemy fire and can
retrieve the bridge from either end. (See figure E-3, page E-10, and table E-9, page E-10). The AVLB is
organic to Marine Corps combat engineer battalions and Army mobility augmentation companies.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-9

Appendix E

Figure E-3. AVLB

Table E-9. Characteristics of the AVLB

Limitations/
Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class
Remarks
6 per MAC The AVLB— The AVLB— The total length of the None
• Is carried on a • Can be launched AVLB is 63 foot.
launcher (a modified in 2 to 5 minutes The AVLB is capable
M48A5 or an M60A1 by a buttoned up of holding a Class 60
chassis). 2-man crew. vehicle across—
• Weighs 29,500 • Can be retrieved • A 57-foot gap
pounds (bridge only). from either end. with unprepared
• The spare bridge is • Requires that abutments.
folded on a 25-ton one man be • A 60-foot gap
low-bed trailer with a exposed to with prepared
10-ton tractor (usually guide and abutments.
consolidated at corps connect while
or theater level). retrieving.
Note. For crossings on the AVLB that exceed MLC 60—
• Vehicles must not stop on the bridge.
• Vehicles must not turn or adjust their alignment on the bridge.
• The ground guide must have the vehicle lined up properly before it drives onto the bridge.
• The four center pins of the bridge must be in place to provide additional stability.
Legend:
AVLB armored vehicle-launched bridge
MAC mobility augmentation company (Army)/mobility assault company (Marine Corps)
MLC military load classification

E-18. The joint assault bridge (Army) (see figure E-4 and table E-10) and Wolverine (see figure E-5 and
table E-11, page E-12) will eventually replace the AVLB. The joint assault bridge and Wolverine are each
based on the M1-series Abrams tank chassis and modified to transport, launch, and retrieve an MLC 70
bridge. Because they are mounted on the M1 chassis, they are able to maintain the tempo of combat maneuver
organizations. Only selected Army mobility augmentation companies are equipped with the Wolverine.

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 Crossing Means and Organizations

Figure E-4. Joint assault bridge

Table E-10. Characteristics of the joint assault bridge

Limitations/
Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class
Remarks
6 per MAC The JAB— The JAB— • The total The JAB is
(will replace • Is carried on a launcher • Can be height of the currently being
AVLB) (a modified M1-series retrieved from JAB is 13.1 tested.
Abrams tank chassis). either end. feet.
• The spare bridge is • Requires that • The JAB is
folded on a 25-ton one man be capable of
low-bed trailer with a exposed to holding a
10-ton tractor (usually guide and Class 70
consolidated at corps or connect while vehicle across
theater level). retrieving. a 60-foot gap.
Legend:
AVLB armored vehicle-launched bridge
JAB joint assault bridge
MAC mobility augmentation company (Army)/mobility assault company (Marine Corps)

Figure E-5. Wolverine

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-11

Appendix E

Table E-11. Characteristics of the Wolverine

Limitations/
Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class
Remarks
6 per MAC (only 6 • Is carried on a • Can be • Can hold a • The launcher
selected MACs are launcher (a launched in Class 70 and bridge has
equipped with modified M1- less than 5 vehicle. a maximum
Wolverines) series Abrams minutes by a • Expands to a speed of 52
tank chassis). buttoned up total length of miles per hour.
• Weighs 12 2-man crew. 79 feet. • The Wolverine
tons (bridge • Can be can ford up to
only). retrieved from a depth of 4
either end. feet (without a
• Can be kit).
recovered in
less than 10
minutes.
Legend:
MAC mobility augmentation company (Army)/mobility assault company (Marine Corps)

Support Bridging
E-19. Support bridges (excluding float bridges) rest on the gap sides or riverbanks. They span dry gaps and
wet gaps. They have limited use for the initial assault because they are slower to emplace and vulnerable to
enemy action. Where appropriate, other standard or nonstandard bridging supplements or replaces float
bridges.
E-20. The REBs is a deployable and retrievable bridge that provides the SBCT with a gap-crossing
capability. (See figure E-6 and table E-12.) The REBs can be employed by two Soldiers/Marines within 10
minutes and is air-transportable by the C-130. The REBs has an MLC of 30 and is capable of crossing gaps
up to 42 feet wide. It is also capable of an MLC 40 caution crossing. The REBs is designed to serve as a
support bridge; however, it may be used as a tactical bridge as the situation and time permit.

Figure E-6. REBs

E-12 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

Table E-12. Characteristics of the REBs

Limitations/
Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class
Remarks
4 per • The bridge is carried • Can launch in • Can hold a • The bridge is
Engineer on an integrated less than 10 class 40 capable of
Company pallet or launch minutes with a vehicle. being lifted/
SBCT platform. two-man crew. • Can be used emplaced by
• The bridge and pallet • Can be to bridge a helicopter.
are carried together retrieved from maximum of • The pallet with
on the common either end. 42 foot the bridge is
bridge transporter. • Can be unprepared C-130
• Weighs 10,582 recovered in gap. transportable.1
pounds (bridge only). less than 10
• Weighs 20,856 minutes with a
pounds (bridge and two-man crew.
pallet).
1
To transport by C-130, the REBs must be placed on 463 L pallets.
Notes.
1. Emplacement times vary based on numerous factors (unit training, experience, site preparation).
2. Planners must consider these and other conditions and factors to develop actual emplacement timelines.
Legend:
REBs rapidly emplaced bridge system
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team

E-21. The MGB is a two-girder deck bridge. (See figure E-7.) The two longitudinal girders, with deck units
in between, provide a 13-foot wide roadway. Girders of top panels can form a shallow, single-story
configuration. This type of bridge is used for short spans that will carry light loads. A heavier double-story
configuration using top panels and triangular bottom panels is used for heavy loads or longer spans. Single-
story bridges can be constructed by 9 to 17 Soldiers/Marines. The normal building party for double-story
bridges is 25 Soldiers/Marines. (See table E-13, page E-14; table E-14, page E-14; and table E-15,
page E-15).

Figure E-7. MGB

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-13

Appendix E

Table E-13. Work party and construction time for the MGB on good sites
Construction Time
Bridging Activity Work Party (hours)
Day Night
4 and 5 bay SS (7.9 to 9.8 meters) 1 NCO and 8 personnel 1/2 3/4
6 through 12 bay SS (11.6 to 15.2 meters) 3/4 1
1 NCO and 16 personnel
9 through 12 bay SS 1 1 1/4
1 through 4 bay DS 3/4 1 1/4
5 through 8 bay DS 1 1 1/2
9 through 12 bay DS 1 1/2 2
1 NCO and 24 personnel
13 bay DS without LRS 1 1/2 2
14 through 18 bay DS without LRS 1 3/4 2 3/4
19 through 22 bay DS without LRS 2 3
13 bay DS with LRS 2 3
14 through 18 bay DS with LRS 2 NCOs and 32 personnel 2 3/4 4
16 through 22 bay DS with LRS 3 4 1/2
Notes.
1. Construction times vary based on numerous factors (unit training, experience, site preparation). Planners must consider
these and other conditions to develop actual emplacement timelines.
2. All times exclusive of work on approaches; add 20% for unskilled personnel, add 30% for inclement weather, and add
30% for adverse site conditions.
Legend:
DS double story
LRS link reinforcement set
NCO noncommissioned officer
SS single story

Table E-14. Single-story bridge length and

classification for the MGB
AR Gap Ranges Number Bridge Length
MLC
(meters) of Bays (meters)
3.7–7.1 4 7.9
70
5.6–9.0 5 9.8
7.4–10.8 40 6 11.6
9.2–12.6 7 13.4
30
11.0–14.4 8 15.2
12.9–16.3 24 9 17.1
14.7–18.1 20 10 18.9
16.5–19.9 11 20.7
16
18.4–21.8 12 22.6
Legend:
MLC military load classification
AR angle of repose

E-14 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

Table E-15. Classification for the MGB double story

Bridge Length 2E + MLC
AR Gap Ranges Number Without Link With Link
Feet Meters of Bays Reinforcement Reinforcement
6.4–9.0 37 11.0 1 –
8.2–10.8 43 12.8 2 –
10.0–12.6 49 14.6 3 –
11.9–14.5 55 16.5 4 –
13.7–16.3 61 18.3 5 –
15.5–18.1 67 20.1 6 –
17.3–19.9 73 21.9 7 –
19.2–21.8 79 23.8 8 –
21.0–23.6 85 25.6 9 –
22.8–25.4 91 27.4 10 –
24.7–27.3 97 29.3 11 –
70
26.5–29.1 103 31.1 12 –
28.3–30.9 109 32.9 13 60
30.2–32.8 115 34.8 14 50
32.0–34.1 121 36.6 15
40
33.8–36.4 127 38.4 16
35.6–38.2 133 40.2 17
30
37.5–40.1 139 42.1 18
39.3–41.9 145 43.9 19
24
41.1–43.7 151 45.7 20
43.0–45.1 157 47.6 21 20
44.8–46.2 163 49.4 22 16
Note. Emplacement times vary based on numerous factors (unit training, experience, site preparation).
Planners must consider these and other conditions to develop actual emplacement timelines.
Legend:
AR angle of repose
E end of bay
MLC military load classification

E-22. The bridge can be supported on unprepared and uneven ground without grillages. It is constructed on
one roller beam for single-story construction; two roller beams, 15 feet apart for double-story construction;
and on three roller beams when constructing a double-story bridge over 12 bays long. The ends of the roller
beams are supported on base plates and each can be adjusted in height. No leveling or other preparation of
the ground is required. Single-span bridges are launched using a centrally mounted launching nose.
E-23. A third configuration using the link reinforcement set is constructed when a long, high-class type of
bridge is required. The link reinforcement set deepens the girder and transfers the load throughout the length
of the bridge. This type of construction requires a building party of 34 Soldiers/Marines, and the bridge is
built on three roller beams. (See TM 3-34.21/MCRP 3-17.1A for additional information.)

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-15

Appendix E

E-24. The M18 DSB is being fielded as a replacement for the MGB in the MRBC. It is a mobile, rapidly
erected, modular component bridge that provides a 131-foot gap-crossing capability with a MLC of 70
tracked/96 wheeled. It has advantages over the MGB in that it can be erected in much less time with fewer
personnel and equipment. Each MRBC is capable of emplacing up to four 131-foot bridges or eight 65-foot
bridges with organic equipment. (See figure E-8 and table E-16.)

Figure E-8. M18 DSB

Table E-16. Characteristics of the M18 DSB

Limitations/
Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class
Remarks
4 per MRBC The DSB— The DSB— The DSB— The DSB—
• Launcher is a • 131-foot bridge • MLC for all • Maximum
separate vehicle, can be launched bridge approach ramp
M1975 LV. in 90 minutes configurations angle 1:9.
• One 131-foot with an 8-man 70T/96W. • All components
bridge is crew. • Can provide are LCU 2000 or
transported on • 131-foot bridge one 131-foot or larger
7 PLS pallets. can be retrieved two 65-foot transportable.
• Complete system in less than 150 bridges. • Approved for C-
transportability minutes with an 5 and C-17
requires 8-man crew. transport.
1–M1975 LV with • Can be retrieved • Zero gap
trailer, 3–M1977 from either end. capable bridge.
CBT with trailer.
Note. Emplacement times vary based on numerous factors (unit training, experience, site preparation). Planners must
consider these and other conditions to develop actual emplacement timelines.
Legend:
CBT common bridge transporter
DSB dry support bridge
LCU landing craft utility
LV launch vehicle
MLC military load classification
MRBC multirole bridge company
PLS palletized load system
T tracked
W wheeled

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 Crossing Means and Organizations

Support Bridging-Float Bridges

E-25. If there is a need for a wet-gap crossing beyond the capability of tactical bridging, in most cases, rafts
alone would not handle the total volume of traffic in the time necessary. Floating bridges are the primary
means to cross the force with their supplies, rapidly. The same units that provide heavy rafts also provide
float bridges. They often assemble bridges from the rafts used earlier.
E-26. The standard ribbon bridge and IRB are modular, aluminum-alloy, and continuous floating bridge
systems consisting of interior and ramp bays that are transported, launched, and retrieved by a
transporter/launcher vehicle. (See figure E-9; figure E-10; and table E-17, page E-18.) Bridge bays, which
are carried in a folded position, automatically open when entering the water to form a 22-foot section of
bridge.

Figure E-9. IRB

The number of interior bays=

Gap (meters) − 14
6.7

or

Gap (feet) − 45
22

Notes.
1. Two ramp bays are required for all ribbon bridges.
2. During daylight hours, a ribbon bridge can be constructed at a rate of 200 meters per
hour and during nighttime hours, at the rate of 133 meters per hour.
3. Two hundred vehicles per hour, with 30-meter spacing at 16 kilometers per hour, can cross the bridge.

Figure E-10. Ribbon bridge design

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-17

Appendix E

Table E-17. Boat requirements for ribbon bridge anchorage

Current Velocity in mps (fps) Number of Boats: Number of Bridge Bays
0 to 1.5 1:4
1.5 to 2.4 1:3
2.4 to 2.6 1:2
2.7 to 3.0 Anchorage system is necessary
Note. Temporary anchorage of ribbon bridges is normally accomplished by tying bridge erection boats to
the downstream side of the bridge. The number of boats required is shown in the table. For long-term
anchorage or if the water current dictates additional anchorage systems will be necessary.
Legend:
fps feet per second
mps meters per second

E-27. Ribbon equipment is designed for use primarily during the rafting and bridging phases of the deliberate
wet-gap crossing. Because ribbon bridges and rafts are significantly faster to construct with fewer personnel
than other floating bridges, they are heavily relied upon in this capacity. Site considerations are of primary
importance when ribbon equipment is to be used for rafting or bridging. The launch sites and actual bridge
or raft sites should be considered.
E-28. Ribbon bridges can be emplaced during daylight hours at the rate of 600 feet per hour. Assembly times
should be increased by 50 percent when construction is at night. These times are also based on the use of an
experienced bridge crew under ideal conditions. Like the other bridging emplacement times provided in this
publication, planners must consider challenges such as unit training, experience, and the tactical situation in
conjunction with the results of the gap reconnaissance (gap width, gap bank conditions and slope, stream
velocity, visibility, terrain, weather conditions, accessibility). Other unique planning considerations for float
bridging impacting emplacement times are simultaneous bay launch, distance to the engineer equipment park,
and the number of bridge erection boats supporting construction. All of these factors must be incorporated
into the mission analysis to make an actual determination of emplacement times.
E-29. The velocity of the river current can significantly impact float bridging. Ribbon equipment can be
used in currents of 0 to 10 feet per second. Rafting and bridging can become quite difficult in currents greater
than 5 feet per second unless the boat operators and bridge crewmembers have experience working in swift
currents. For raft sites on rivers with currents greater than 5 feet per second, the unloading site on the far side
should be located downstream of the loading site on the near side to allow for downstream drift.
E-30. The IRB is a modular floating bridge with integral superstructure and floating supports. (See
TM 5-5420-278-10 for additional information.) A complete IRB consists of a ramp bay at each bank and the
required number of interior bays to complete the bridge. Individual bays may be joined to form a raft for
rafting or ferry crossings. The IRB mission is to provide a continuous roadway or raft capable of crossing
assault or tactical vehicles over nonfordable wet gaps. An IRB has an MLC of 70 tracked or 96 wheeled.
E-31. The IRB is employed in the same general manner as the standard ribbon bridge. However, it will be
able to cross faster water with higher MLCs and with banks that are up to 6 feet high. The IRB bays are
modified ribbon bays. They possess better hydrodynamics, providing the capability of rafting or bridging
MLC 70 tracked traffic in currents up to 8 feet per second. The bays can be connected in 1 minute, and they
can be connected to the standard ribbon bays. The bays include positive flotation to increase the survivability
of the system. The ramp bays can be hydraulically articulated to 6 feet.

Line of Communications Bridging

E-32. A LOC bridge is generally constructed in areas free from the direct influence of enemy action. This
does not mean that protection/force protection against attacks by air and ground forces is not considered.
Their emplacement is not generally time constrained in a tactical sense.

E-18 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

E-33. Because of the load to be carried, potential length of service and the longer spans (usually) of LOC
bridges, a thorough reconnaissance, planning, and site preparation are essential. While several standard
bridging options are available for LOC bridges, consideration should be given to nonstandard construction.
Factors to consider include time and resources available, length of anticipated service, and conservation of
standard bridging assets.
E-34. The logistics support bridge uses equipment from the commercial off-the-shelf Compact 200 Panel
Bridge System together with special features to make it suitable for military applications. (See figure E-11
and table E-18, page E-20.) The system is composed of a small range of standard parts—
 Panels.
 Chord reinforcements.
 Transoms.
 Decks.
 Bracing members.
 Ramps.
 Grillages.
 Ground beams.
E-35. The modular design of the equipment means it can be constructed in a large number of different
configurations, allowing the system to be used for a wide range of loads and spans. The logistics support
bridge is a LOC bridge that can serve as a new bridge, replace a damaged bridge, or replace a support bridge
to upgrade routes for heavier traffic.
E-36. The system is capable of routinely carrying loads to MLC 80 tracked and MLC 110 wheeled, and the
system is designed to be left as a semipermanent bridge. To fulfill this requirement, the logistics support
bridge requires only minimal maintenance. The logistics support bridge overcomes limitations in width, span,
capacity, and fatigue life associated with many other systems. The logistics support bridge can be built by
hand, but where cranes and other mechanical handling equipment are available, the total number of man-
hours to build the bridge is substantially reduced. Bridge components can be transported using demountable
rack offload and pickup system, palletized load system flat racks, and International Organization of
Standardization containers.

Figure E-11. Logistics support bridge

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-19

Appendix E

Table E-18. Characteristics of the logistics support bridge

Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class Limitations/Remarks
Purchase The LSB can be The LSB can be • MLC 80T/110W; • Site preparation
only when transported by emplaced by 160-foot span; must be taken into
needed. numerous means hand or normal crossing account for
(40-foot flatbed mechanical • Single or multiple planning.
trailer, PLS flat means (crane). span bridges • Large amount of
racks, ISO time or personnel
• Roadway width of
containers, and 20- plus equipment
13.8 feet; 15.5
foot rigid trucks.) must be dedicated
feet between
trusses. to complete the
bridge.
Legend:
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LSB logistics support bridge
MLC military load classification
PLS palletized load system
T tracked
W wheeled

E-37. The ACROW 700XS (see figure E-12 and table E-19) is a commercial off-the-shelf system based on
a panel-type bridge design. The system is composed of a small range of standard parts: truss panels, chord
reinforcements, transoms, steel decks, bracing members, bridge ramps and foot walk ramps, support piers,
grillages, and ground beams. The modular design of the equipment means it can be constructed in a large
number of different configurations, allowing the system to be used for a wide range of loads and spans. The
ACROW 700XS is a LOC bridge that can serve as a new bridge, replace a damaged bridge, or replace a
support bridge to upgrade routes for heavier traffic.

Figure E-12. ACROW 700XS

E-20 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

Table E-19. Characteristics of the ACROW 700XS

Allocation Transportation Emplacement Capacity Class Limitations/Remarks
Purchase Can be transported The ACROW • MLC 120 • Site preparation
only when by numerous 700XS can be tracked/120 must be taken into
needed. means: emplaced by wheeled; 170- account for
• 40-foot flatbed hand or foot span; normal planning.
trailer mechanical crossing • Large amount of
• PLS flat racks means (crane, • Single or multiple time or personnel
forklift or other lift span bridges plus equipment
• ISO containers assets).
• Roadway width is must be dedicated
• 20-ton trucks to complete the
13.8 foot or 18
foot bridge.
Legend:
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MLC military load classification
PLS palletized load system

E-38. The ACROW 700XS is capable of routinely carrying loads to MLC 110 wheeled and tracked up to
spans of 250 feet. This system is designed to be left as a permanent or semipermanent bridge. To fulfill this
requirement, the ACROW 700XS requires only minimal maintenance. It is available in 14 feet and 18 feet
one-lane widths. It is also available on a commercial off-the-shelf basis in two- and three-lane widths. The
ACROW 700XS can be built by hand, but where cranes and other mechanical handling equipment are
available, the total number of man-hours to build the bridge is substantially reduced. Bridge components can
be transported using demountable rack offload and pickup system, palletized load system flat racks, and
International Organization of Standardization containers (International Organization of Standardization
containers are the most common).
E-39. The M2 Bailey bridge is a truss bridge manually assembled by connecting panels end to end. It is used
to replace support bridging, usually the MGB or DSB, but its primary purpose is to serve as a LOC bridge.
The Bailey bridge system is highly labor intensive but also highly versatile. In some cases, the Bailey bridge
is the only support bridge suitable for long spans and heavy loads because it can be assembled in multiple
heights and widths. The Bailey bridge is maintained in war stocks in the United States and outside the
continental United States. The bridge system can also be assembled as a railway bridge, providing a relatively
rapid repair capability. (See figure E-13 and table E-20, page E-22.)

Figure E-13. M2 Bailey bridge

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-21

Appendix E

Table E-20. Load classes for the M2 Bailey bridge

1
Limited by roadway width.
Legend:
C caution
DD double double
DS double single
N normal
R risk
SS single single
TD triple double
TS triple single
TT triple triple

E-40. In arctic regions and areas that experience seasonal winter weather, a consideration that cannot be
overlooked is ice bridging. Ice bridging is the use of a thick layer of ice over a wet gap (such as a lake or
river that forms a bridge). (See TM 3-34.22/MCRP 3-17.1B for additional information on how to design and
construct an ice bridge.)

E-22 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

E-41. Figure E-14; figure E-15; figure E-16, page E-24; table E-21, page E-24; table E-22, page E-24;
table E-23, page E-25; and table E-24, page E-25, provide the basic planning factors and tools when
considering this type of bridge.

𝑇𝑇 2 × 𝐶𝐶 × 𝑆𝑆
MLC (wheeled) =
25

T2 × C × S
MLC (tracked) =
20
where—
T = ice thickness in inches
C = color factor
S = strength factor
Legend:
MLC military load classification

Figure E-14. Determining load classes for ice

Legend:
C color factor
S strength factor

Figure E-15. Required ice thickness for wheeled vehicles

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-23

Appendix E

Legend:
C color factor
S strength factor

Figure E-16. Required ice thickness for tracked vehicles

Table E-21. Ice depth requirements

Ice Thickness Requirements (Inches)
Personnel Strong Medium Weak
C=1, S=1 C=0.8, S=0.8 C=0.7, S=0.6
On skis 1.5 2 3
In a file formation 3 4 5
with 7-foot intervals
On snowmobiles 3 4 5
Legend:
C color factor
S strength factor

Table E-22. Ice color factors

Factor Characteristics
C=1 Ice is clear (transparent)
C=0.9 Ice is semiclear
C=0.8 Ice is white
C=0.7 Ice is discolored (stained brown or
yellow)
Legend:
C color factor

E-24 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

Table E-23. Ice strength factors

Factor Characteristics
S=1 Ice is solid, and temperatures have remained at or below
freezing for the previous week.
S=0.9 Ice is solid, and temperatures have been above freezing during
the day but drop below freezing during the night.
S=0.8 Ice is solid, and water is running on the surface from runoff or
overflow.
S=0.7 Ice is not solid, and water or air pockets are found in between
layers of ice.
S=0.6 An air pocket is under the ice; the ice is not floating on the water
underneath.
Legend:
S strength factor

Table E-24. Ice thickness versus vehicle distance determination

Vehicle Class Required Ice Thickness Distance Between Vehicles
(Wheeled or Tracked) (Inches) (Feet)
1 4 36
2 6 50
3 7 60
4 8 70
5 9 75
10 13 110
15 16 130
20 19 150
25 20 170
30 23 180
35 24 200
40 26 215
50 28 235
60 31 260
70 33 280
80 36 300
Notes.
1. If the air temperature has been above freezing for more than 6 of the past 24 hours, multiply the
vehicle class by 1.3 to obtain the required ice thickness. If the air temperature stays above freezing
for 2 hours or more, the ice starts to lose strength and the table no longer represents safe conditions.
A rapid and unusually large temperature drop causes the ice to become brittle, and travel may not be
safe for a period of 24 hours.
2. For the distance required between two vehicles of different classes, use the distance required for
the higher class.
3. If you plan to park for extended periods, multiply the vehicle class by 2 to obtain the required ice
thickness and maintain at least the original distance requirements. Drill a hole through the ice near
the vehicle, and move if the ice begins to flood.
4. The ice must have water support. Be very careful close to the shore. Very often, the water level will
drop after freeze-up. When this happens, the ice close to the shore may no longer have water
support.
5. Cracks are either dry or wet. If cracks are dry, they do not penetrate ice cover and can be ignored.
If cracks are wet, multiply the vehicle class by 2 to obtain the required ice thickness and try to drive
straight across the cracks (avoid going parallel to wet cracks).

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-25

Appendix E

OTHER NONBRIDGING MEANS

E-42. The most common gap-crossing means not mentioned earlier include—
 Fascines. These materials can be used separately, together, or in conjunction with other crossing
means. Fascines can be made out of pipe, logs, or other locally procured materials. When these
materials are tied together and placed across a gap, they will reinforce the gap bottom. The
materials are readily available, easy to assemble and, if used across a wet gap, are less likely to
cause localized flooding.
 Culverts. Typically, culverts are used in conjunction with soil when crossing a wet gap. Like the
fascine, the culvert will allow the water to continue to flow underneath the crossing surface.
Culverts come in various sizes and are made of different materials. When using culverts,
consideration must be given to the amount of water flow and the carrying capacity of the culvert.
 Soil. When the situation, time, and equipment available permit, using soil alone is perhaps one of
the most rapid and effective methods to fill dry gaps. When using soil, compaction is a primary
concern. Heavy vehicles or volumes of traffic will eventually displace the soil, causing deep ruts
and resulting in a delayed crossing. Another consideration is the slope from the gap edge to the
fill material. Gentle slopes at the entry and exit points will also avoid ruts and facilitate continuous
traffic flow. Finally, filling the gap without leaving a culvert or some other means to permit water
flow may cause problems over time.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS BRIDGING UNITS

E-43. There are only a couple of U.S. units designated as bridging units. Those units and units in which
bridging systems are organically found are addressed in this section. This includes tactical and support
bridging.

MOBILITY AUGMENTATION COMPANY

E-44. The mobility augmentation company is the primary Army engineer unit that will support BCTs/RCTs
in tactical gap crossing. The company has two assault platoons. Each platoon has a tactical bridge squad with
three AVLBs each, and the platoon is capable of providing two tactical bridges. Each of the tactical bridging
squad three MLC 70 AVLBs is equipped with the appropriate personnel and communications equipment. In
addition to its tactical gap-crossing capability, the mobility augmentation company is also capable of
conducting mounted and dismounted breaches and emplacing obstacles in support of the maneuver
BCT/RCT. (See FM 3-34 for additional information.)

MULTIROLE BRIDGE COMPANY

E-45. The Army MRBC is organized with a company headquarters, two bridge platoons, and a support
platoon. Each bridge platoon has two bridge sections and a support section. The bridge sections contain the
primary equipment for float bridging crossing using the IRB. The support section contains the primary
equipment to provide support bridging to the force. The bridge sections can provide four 131-foot spans of
MLC 70 tracked/96 wheeled bridge, approximately 700 feet of MLC 70 tracked/96 wheeled (with standard
ribbon bridge at 5 to 6 feet per second) float bridge, or 6 rafts of MLC 70. The support section will have four
DSBs or two MGBs (two bridge sets, one link reinforcement set, one erection set, and two ramp sets). The
company has a maintenance section, equipment section, park section, and mess section. This allows the
company to function as a single entity during gap crossing. Additionally, the company can be task-organized
into several sections and spread across the BCT/RCT area. (See FM 3-34 for additional information.)

E-26 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Means and Organizations

MARINE CORPS BRIDGING

E-46. The Marine Corps currently has two Active and three Reserve component bridge companies. The
active component company resides in the 8th Engineer Support Battalion. The bridge company has three
MGB systems, each system containing two MGB sets, one link set, and one erection set. Those sets together
give the unit the ability to construct a 22-bay, link-reinforced bridge, which spans gap lengths of 147 feet to
151 feet. Additionally, they have three IRB sets, each set containing 12 interior bays and 5 ramp bays. The
unit is equipped with 21 MKII bridge erection boats to support gap crossing.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 E-27

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 Appendix F
Crossing Site Selection
Crossing site selection is one of the most important planning considerations for a
successful gap crossing. The crossing site must support the desired scheme of
movement and maneuver and available crossing means. This appendix provides
planners with some considerations to assist in evaluating potential crossing sites for a
gap-crossing mission.

GENERAL
F-1. Selection of crossing sites is primarily based on the—
 Existing situation and the anticipated scheme of movement and maneuver.
 Physical characteristics of the available sites, road networks, and surrounding terrain.
 Availability and capabilities of gap-crossing means.
 Availability of engineer support.
F-2. Conflicts between tactical and technical requirements frequently occur. Commanders evaluate the
factors bearing on the problem to determine the best overall solution.
F-3. Each gap-crossing means, except airlift (rotary-wing aircraft), requires a crossing site that includes
fording, assault boat, swimming, rafting, or bridging sites. Assault battalions use a fording site, an assault
boat site, or sometimes a swimming site as an assault site.
F-4. The desired scheme of movement and maneuver and available gap crossing means influence crossing
site selection. The division assigns a crossing area to each lead BCT/RCT. The BCT/RCT chooses the
crossing sites to use within its area. When a particular site is important to the division tactical concept (such
as for the movement of breakout forces), the division coordinates with the affected BCT/RCT to open that
bridge site or moves a bridge to that site once the BCT/RCT hands over the crossing area to the division.
F-5. BCT/RCT commanders select final crossing sites based on tactical intelligence and their desired
schemes of maneuver. The physical characteristics, required engineer support, and available crossing means
of each site influence the decision, but tactical requirements are the most important. A ground reconnaissance
refines and confirms information gathered from other sources. (See FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4 and
TC 5-210 for details for conducting and reporting site reconnaissance.)
F-6. The goal when selecting assault sites is to pick those that allow the lead battalions to cross unopposed
and seize far side objectives rapidly. If unsuccessful at finding undefended crossing sites, the lead battalions
must typically cross under enemy fire while overwatch units provide direct and indirect suppressive fires.
Assault sites may or may not coincide with rafting or bridging sites.
F-7. When selecting swimming sites, the goal is to pick those that permit fighting vehicles to rapidly enter,
swim across, and exit the water with minimum assistance.
F-8. The goal when selecting rafting and bridging sites is to pick those that support the greatest volume of
vehicle traffic consistent with the scheme of movement and maneuver. Rafting and bridging sites are usually
on or near major roads to minimize route preparation and maintenance. When the sites are located close
together, the bridging site should be upstream of the rafting site. This will avoid potential damage that may
be caused by disabled rafts drifting downstream into the bridge.
F-9. Regardless of the crossing means, each site may need engineer reconnaissance swimmers or an
engineer light diving team to cross early to reduce obstacles and develop exit points on the far side. Gap sides
or riverbanks, at otherwise suitable crossing sites, often need work for access to the gap (river). Most natural
soil becomes unstable under heavy traffic. This condition worsens as fording, swimming, and rafting

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 F-1

Appendix F

activities carry water onto the soil. The required engineer effort varies with soil type, crossing means, and
vehicle density. An engineer vehicle that is capable of maintaining the far side bank should be one of the first
vehicles across.
F-10. Natural conditions vary widely. Banks may require little preparation, or they may be so restrictive that
they limit feasible sites. Desirable site characteristics include—
 Minimum exposure to enemy direct-fire weapons.
 Covered and concealed access to the gap (river) edge.
 Firm and gently sloping banks that allow rapid entry and exit at multiple points.
F-11. Initial and subsequent entry points can vary. Available locations seldom have all the desired tactical
and technical characteristics. The best routes through the crossing area normally cross the gap at the
technically best crossing sites. The best technical sites may not be the best tactical sites because they are well
known and are heavily defended by the enemy. Forces initially crossing at less desirable locations are more
likely to avoid detection and gain surprise. Moving laterally along the far side, forces attack the flank or rear
of enemy units to seize the better crossing locations. Use of these sites allows rapid buildup of combat power.

PLANNING
F-12. Planners need information of potential crossing sites to evaluate their compatibility with proposed
crossing plans. Generally, planners need to know—
 Friendly and enemy capabilities and probable COAs.
 Site capacity for the crossing of troops, equipment, and supplies using various crossing means.
 Engineer support that is required to develop, improve, and maintain each site.
F-13. More specifically, planners need to know the—
 Condition of the bottom, banks, and water of the gap (river).
 Impact of forecasted or past seasonal weather conditions.
 Location of defensible terrain, covered and concealed areas, and natural or enemy-emplaced
obstacles on both sides of the gap.
 Amount of time and effort that is required to develop sites, assemble rafts, and construct bridges.
 Entry and exit routes and off-road trafficability.
 Location of road networks.
 Capabilities of friendly forces to deny observation, suppress fires, and provide site
protection/force protection.

REQUIREMENTS
F-14. The following paragraphs discuss some of the requirements for crossing sites. All of the requirements
should be considered in the planning process.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRAIN

F-15. Wet gaps that require a deliberate crossing, in front of a division or BCT/RCT, are usually rivers.
Rivers form unique obstacles. Generally, rivers are linear and extensive and normally cannot be bypassed.
Meandering bends in rivers provide far side defenders with opportunities for flanking fires and observation
of multiple crossing sites. After the attacking force crosses the river, the river remains an obstacle for follow-
on forces unless a permanent bridge has been emplaced or rafting/ferry assets are in place to provide a
crossing means.
F-16. A formation cannot typically cross a river (wet gap) wherever desired as compared to the options
available when crossing most dry gaps or breaching most tactical obstacles. Potential crossing sites may be
few, and they will be equally obvious to the attacker and the defender.
F-17. A gap (river) provides excellent observation and fields of fire to the attacker and the defender. The
gap (river) exposes the force on the water and makes it vulnerable while entering and leaving the water. The
gap (river) is also an aerial avenue of approach, allowing enemy aircraft low-level access to crossing.

F-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Crossing Site Selection

F-18. Force buildup on the far side is a race between the defender and the attacker. The gap (river) can be
an obstacle behind the initial assault force, allowing the enemy to pin and defeat it while preventing rapid
reinforcement.

THE FRIENDLY SHORE (NEAR SIDE)

F-19. Concealment is critical to the initial assault across the gap. The assault force must have concealed
access to the gap. The assault force must also have concealed attack positions close to the gap from which to
prepare assault boats. The overwatching unit prepares concealed positions along the friendly shore, taking
full advantage of vegetation and surface contours. Overwatching units must be in position to engage the most
likely enemy positions on the enemy shore.
F-20. Dominant terrain formed by hill masses or bluffs provides direct-fire overwatch positions. If the
dominant terrain is along the shore, it also covers attack positions, assembly areas, and staging areas. Air and
missile defense sites should be located on terrain that dominates aerial avenues of approach (one of which is
located along the gap). When selecting a crossing site, consider the following:
 Dismounted avenues of approach that allow silent and concealed movement of assault battalions
to the gap.
 Concealed attack positions that are very close to the gap along the dismounted avenue.
 Approaches from the attack positions to the wet gap that have gradual slopes and limited
vegetation to allow the assault force to carry inflated assault boats.
 Bank conditions that allow dismounted forces to carry assault boats to the water and engineers to
construct and operate rafts with little bank preparation.
 Road networks that feed the crossing sites and support the lateral movement of vehicles between
sites. These road networks must be well constructed to carry large amounts of heavy vehicle
traffic.
 Potential staging areas that can support large numbers of tracked and wheeled vehicles without
continual maintenance.
 Landing zones for embarkation of the assault force.

THE ENEMY SHORE (FAR SIDE)

F-21. A river meanders and forms salients and reentrant angles along the shore. A salient on the enemy shore
is desirable for the crossing area, because it allows friendly fires from a wide stretch of the near side to
concentrate against a small area on the far side. A salient on the enemy shore also limits the length of enemy
shore that must be cleared to eliminate direct-fire and observation. (See figure F-1, page F-4.)

Figure F-1. Salients and reentrants on the enemy shore

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 F-3

Appendix F

F-22. A terrain that permits direct or observed indirect fires onto crossing sites is key terrain. Friendly forces
must control it before the rafting or bridging phases begin. Merely attempting to suppress this key terrain will
probably not be effective.
F-23. Natural and man-made obstacles must be minimal between the river and the bridgehead objectives.
River valleys often have parallel canals, railroad embankments, flood-control structures, swamps, and ridges
that can impede more than the river itself. Obstacles perpendicular to the river can help isolate the bridgehead.
F-24. Exits from the river must be reasonably good without preparation. Initially, the bank should allow the
assault force to land and dismount from the assault boats. This requires shallow banks with limited vegetation.
The assault force also requires concealed dismounted avenues up from the river. Bank conditions must allow
vehicles to debark from rafts and move up from the river. If banks require earthwork, at least one unimproved
crossing site must allow the landing of earthmoving equipment. The most important far shore requirement is
a road network to carry high volumes of heavy vehicle traffic.

ENTRY AND EXIT ROUTES OR PATHS

F-25. A desired feature of all sites is readily accessible entry and exit routes or paths on either side of the
gap. The approaches to the banks are checked for their ability to support the requirements (width, slope, and
trafficability) of the wheeled and tracked vehicles of the crossing element. Covered and concealed approaches
enhance surprise and survivability; however, multiple routes, free from obstruction, will increase crossing
speed and flexibility. Exit bank conditions often take precedence over entry bank conditions until equipment
and troops can be crossed to develop and improve the site.

ROUTES AND APPROACHES

F-26. Depending on the type of crossing that is used, the following considerations must be given to routes
and approaches for:
 Fording. Dismounted forces may use approaches with steep slopes and heavy vegetation, while
vehicle fording requires paths or roads to approach fording sites.
 Assaulting or swimming. Assault boat crossings may use more rugged approaches than
amphibious vehicles.
 Rafting. Multiple approach routes to rafting sites permit the relocation of rafting upstream or
downstream.
 Bridging. Bridging sites require developed road networks to sustain the crossing capacity.
F-27. Depending on the vehicle that is used, the following considerations must be given to routes and
approaches for:
 Wheeled vehicles. In general, wheeled vehicles require 11.5-foot path widths and 11.5 feet of
overhead clearance. Dry, hard slopes of 33 percent can be negotiated; however, slopes less than
25 percent are desired.
 Tracked vehicles. Tracked vehicles require up to 13-foot path widths and 11.5 feet of overhead
clearance. Tanks can climb 60-percent slopes on dry, hard surfaces; however, slopes less than 50
percent are desired.

WAITING AREAS
F-28. Numerous waiting areas are required for equipment and troops preparing and protecting sites and for
troops and vehicles preparing or waiting to cross. These areas should be dispersed, provide cover and
concealment, and be accessible to a road network near the sites.

RIVER CONDITIONS
F-29. In general, currents less than 5 feet per second are desired. While narrow segments of the river
decrease equipment requirements and crossing and exposure times, the higher inherent current velocity may
offset any advantage gained. As the current velocity increases, it decreases the ribbon bridge ability to handle

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 Crossing Site Selection

heavy MLC vehicles. More boats will then be required to keep the bridge in place and allow heavy MLC
vehicles to cross.

Current
F-30. The water current velocity is a major limiting factor for wet-gap crossings. It imposes limits on floating
equipment (rubber assault boats, swimming armored vehicles, rafts, bridges). The current velocity determines
the amount of personnel and equipment each type of floating equipment can carry or if it can operate. The
water current affects the distance that the floating equipment will drift downstream. Commanders must select
an offset starting point upstream to reach a desired point on the far side or take additional time to fight the
current. High-current velocities make control of a heavy raft difficult; therefore, landings require skilled boat
operators, raft commanders, and more time.
F-31. The water current causes water pressure against floating bridges. The MRBCs use boats or an
anchorage system to resist this pressure. The higher the current, the more extensive the anchorage system
must be. Higher currents provide velocity to floating objects, which can damage or swamp floating
equipment.
F-32. The water current can be measured easily (for example, by timing a floating stick), but the water
current is normally not constant across the width of the river. Generally, the water current is faster in the
center than along the shore. It is also faster on the outside of a curve than on the inside of a curve. A factor
of 1.5 times the measured current should be used for planning purposes.

Water Measurements
F-33. The water depth influences all phases of a wet-gap crossing. If the water is shallow enough and the
riverbed will support traffic, fording is possible. If the force uses assault boats and the water becomes shallow
in the assault area, the force will have to wade and carry their equipment. Shallow water may also cause
difficulty for swimming vehicles, because the rapidly moving tracks can dig into a shallow bottom and ground
the vehicle. The water must be deep enough to float bridge boats and loaded rafts on their crossing centerlines
and deep enough in launch areas to launch boats and bridge bays. The water depth is not normally constant
across a wet gap. The water depth is generally deeper in the center and in high-velocity areas. A bottom
reconnaissance with divers or sounding from a reconnaissance boat is necessary to verify the depth.
F-34. The wet-gap width is a critical dimension for bridges (especially when it determines how much
equipment is necessary) and rafts. The distance a raft or assault boat must travel determines the round-trip
crossing time, which in turn determines the force buildup rate on the far side.

Water Changes
F-35. A swell is the wave motion found in large bodies of water and near the mouths of rivers. It is caused
by normal wave action in a larger body, from tidal action, or from wind forces across the water. A swell is a
serious consideration for swimming armored vehicles, although it is of lesser importance for assault boats,
heavy rafts, and bridges. Hydrographic data and local residents are sources of information on swells. Direct
observation has limited use as a swell changes over time with changing tide and weather conditions.
F-36. Tidal variation can cause significant problems. The water depth and current change with the tide and
allow missions only during certain times. Tidal variation is not the same every day; it depends on lunar and
solar positions and on the current velocity. Planners need tide tables to determine the actual variation, but
they are not always available for rivers. Another tidal phenomenon found in some estuaries is the tidal bore,
which is a dangerous wave that surges up the river as the tide enters. This reverse flow may require that float
bridges be anchored on both sides.
F-37. Wet gaps may be subject to sudden floods due to heavy rain or thawing upstream. This will cause
bank overflow, higher currents, deeper water, and significant floating debris. If the enemy possesses upstream
flood control structures or dams, it can cause these conditions also. Dry gaps may also become wet gaps
given certain weather conditions or as a result of the breaching of flood control devices or similar structures.

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Appendix F

Obstructions
F-38. The following obstructions may impede gap-crossing activity:
 Sand or mud. Most wet gaps contain sand or mud banks. They are characteristic of low-current
areas along the shore and on the inside of the curves of a river, but they can be anywhere. Since
they cause problems for swimming vehicles, assault boats, outboard motors, bridge boats, and
rafts, troops must find them through underwater reconnaissance or sounding.
 Rocks. Rocks damage propellers, boats, and floating bridges and ground rafts. They cause
swimming armored vehicles to swamp if the vehicle body or a track rides up on them high enough
to cant the vehicle and allow water into a hatch or engine intake. They can also cause a fording
vehicle to throw a track. Rocks are found by underwater reconnaissance or sounding.
 Natural obstructions and floating debris. These can range from sunken ships to wreckage and
snags. The current in large waterways can carry significant floating debris, which can seriously
damage boats and floating equipment. Usually, debris can be observed after flooding or rapidly
rising waters. Underwater reconnaissance or bottom-charting sonar is the only way to locate
underwater obstructions.
 Man-made obstacles. Man-made underwater obstacles can be steel or concrete tetrahedrons or
dragon teeth, wood piles, or mines. The enemy places them to deny a crossing area and designs
them to block or destroy boats and rafts. Underwater reconnaissance or bottom-charting sonar can
locate these obstacles.
 Vegetation. Vegetation in the water can snag or choke propellers and ducted impellers on
outboard motors and bridge boats. Normally, floating vegetation is not a significant problem.
Thick vegetation beds that can cause equipment problems are found in shallow water and normally
along the shore. As thick vegetation must extend to within 12 to 24 inches of the surface to hinder
equipment, it can normally be seen from the surface.
 Animals. Some water creatures may also conceivably become obstructions to crossing.

GAP SIDES AND BANKS

F-39. Ford banks may be steep and rugged for dismounted troops; however, vehicles require slopes less than
33 percent and firm soil conditions. Assault or swim banks may be steep when using assault boats for
dismounted troops. Amphibious vehicles may be able to enter over low, 3-foot vertical banks, but they require
sloped exits. Vertical banks of about 5.5 feet may be accommodated by ribbon raft ramps.

GAP BOTTOMS
F-40. Gap bottoms must be free from obstacles, firm, and uniform when fording. Gap bottoms or riverbeds
may be improved with rock fill or grading equipment. Guide stakes make the crossing of a river easier for
boat drivers. Assault or swim site bottoms must be free from obstructions that interfere with boats or the
tracks of amphibious vehicles. Rafting sites must be free from obstructions that could interfere with boating.
Bridges emplaced for lengthy periods (four hours or more) or in strong currents require suitable riverbeds for
anchorage. Engineer light diving teams (see ATP 3-34.84/MCRP 3-35.9A/
NTTP 3-07.7/AFTTP 3-2.75/CGTTP 3-95.17) may be used to—
 Conduct river bottom reconnaissance.
 Emplace shore and midstream anchorage for debris and antimine and antidiver nets to ensure the
success of the mission.

ENEMY SITUATION
F-41. Typically, the enemy will defend potential crossing sites. If located forward of the crossing site, the
enemy most likely intends to defeat the crossing force before it reaches the gap. When enemy forces are
positioned along the gap, it may be an attempt to protect the crossing sites and defeat the crossing force while
it is divided in the gap. Finally, the enemy usually defends from the rear of the gap if time or terrain prohibits
a forward defense. A security element may be positioned on the far side to disrupt the crossing force. In this
situation, the enemy force could be attempting to delay the crossing force to provide time to establish a
defense.

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 Crossing Site Selection

F-42. Sites masked from enemy observation enhance surprise and survivability. While use of existing sites
reduces preparation time, such use requires caution; the enemy may have emplaced obstacles and registered
artillery on the site.

FIELD CALCULATIONS
F-43. Some common relationships and field expedient calculations that are useful during a ground
reconnaissance include—
 Measuring the current velocity.
 Determining slopes and degrees.
 Measuring gap width.
 Calculating downstream drift.

MEASURING THE CURRENT VELOCITY

F-44. Correlating the desired maximum current velocity of 5 feet per second with a familiar comparative
unit of measure may help in estimating the current velocity. The quick-time march rate of 120 steps per
minute, with a 30-inch step, equates to 5 feet per second. Another approximate correlation of 5 feet per second
is 3.5 miles per hour.
F-45. Determining the current velocity is critical to effective and safe crossing. When it is high, more boats
are required to stabilize the bridge, particularly when anchorage is not used. A reasonable estimation involves
measuring a distance along the riverbank and noting the time a floating object takes to travel the same
distance. Dividing the distance by the time provides the current velocity. (See figure F-2, page F-8.)

Figure F-2. Measuring current velocity

DETERMINING SLOPES AND DEGREES

F-46. The slope of terrain is significant (for example, slopes of 7 percent or more slow movement and may
require vehicles to operate in a lower gear). Slope, usually expressed as a percentage, is the amount of change
in elevation (rise or fall) over a ground (horizontal) distance. (See figure F-3.)

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Appendix F

Note. The rise and the run are expressed in the same unit of measure (meters or feet).

Figure F-3. Terrain slope

F-47. The means to determine the percent of the slope include—

 Clinometers. These instruments measure the percent of the slope and are organic to most
engineer units down to the platoon level.
 Maps. In this method, first measure the horizontal distance along the desired path, then determine
the difference in elevation between the starting and ending points of the path. The next step is to
ensure that both figures are the same unit of measure (such as meters or feet). The final step is to
divide the elevation (rise) by the distance (run) and multiply the result by 100 to get the percent
of the slope. (See figure F-3.)
 Line of sight and pace. This method uses the eye-level height above ground (around 5.5 feet)
and the length of standard pace (usually 2.5 feet). While standing at the bottom of the slope, the
individual picks a spot on the slope while keeping their eyes level. The individual paces the
distance and repeats the procedure at each spot. Adding the vertical and horizontal distances
separately provides the total rise and run.
F-48. Slope may also be expressed in degrees; however, this provides angular measurements. The method
is not commonly used because the relationships are more complex than desired for field use. Table F-1 lists
some relationships of the percent of the slope to the degree of the slope.
Table F-1. Relationship of slopes to degrees
Slope Degrees
100% 45
60% 31
40% 22
20% 11

MEASURING GAP WIDTH

F-49. A field expedient means of measuring gap width is with a compass. While standing at the gap edge,
note the magnetic azimuth by sighting a point on the opposite side. Move laterally, up or down the edge of
the gap (upstream or downstream), until the azimuth reading to the fixed point on the opposite side is 45
degrees different from the original reading. The distance from the original point to the final point of
observation is equal to the gap width. (See figure F-4.)

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 Crossing Site Selection

Figure F-4. Gap width

CALCULATING DOWNSTREAM DRIFT

F-50. The current causes surface craft to drift downstream. The formula for calculating downstream drift is
different for each vehicle type. Amphibious vehicles and assault boats drift more than powered boats and
rafts; boats have a greater capability to negate the effect of the current velocity by applying more power.
F-51. Amphibious vehicles and nonpowered assault boats are generally limited to current velocities of
41 feet per second and 3 feet per second, respectively. (See figure F-5, page F-10.) When crossing with
amphibious vehicles and pneumatic boats, compensate for the effect of the current.

Note. All measurements must be in the same unit of measure (meters or feet).

Figure F-5. Amphibious drift

Example 1
F-52. Entry is usually made upstream of the desired exit point. The vehicle or boat is aligned, or aimed,
straight across the river, creating a head-on orientation that is perpendicular to the exit bank. However, the

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 F-9

Appendix F

current produces a sideslip, downstream forward movement. (See figure F-6.) This technique requires
operator training in continual adjustment to reach the objective point on the exit bank. This technique results
in a uniform crossing rate in the least amount of time, and it is usually the desired technique.

Figure F-6. Downstream sideslip

Example 2
F-53. If the operator continues to aim the vehicle at the desired exit point, the orientation of the craft at the
exit point will approximate an upstream heading. The craft path is an arc in proportion to the current velocity.
(See figure F-7.)

Figure F-7. Constant aim point

Example 3
F-54. To exit at a point directly across from the entry point requires an upstream heading to compensate for
the current velocity. (See figure F-8.)

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 Crossing Site Selection

Figure F-8. Constant heading

F-55. In all three examples, the craft speed relative to the current velocity is constant; assuming the engine
revolutions per minute or paddling rate remains constant. Terrain conditions may restrict the location of entry
and exit locations. Enemy situations may require alternate techniques. For example, when aiming at the
downstream exit point, the craft moves at a greater speed relative to the banks after entry than it does as it
nears the exit due to the current velocity. Use of this technique may be favored when the enemy has a better
observation of the entry bank rather than the exit bank. Watercrafts moving fast and at a changing rate are
more difficult to engage effectively.

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 Appendix G
Planning Factors for Gap Crossing
This appendix supplements the discussion on planning considerations for gap
crossings previously stated. It specifically discusses ERP and considerations for
contingency bridging.

ENGINEER REGULATING POINT

G-1. Traffic management may be one of the most vital components of a gap crossing. ERPs are used to
control traffic flow and optimize the ordered movement across the gap in an unhindered manner. This helps
to ensure the effective use of the crossing means. Engineer units, with the assistance of military police,
provide positive control and the necessary equipment to ensure that maneuver forces successfully and safely
cross the gap in a timely and synchronized manner, unhindered by obstacles.
G-2. ERPs and TCPs may be colocated to provide control for the gap crossing. The CAC uses TCPs to
facilitate moving units through the crossing area. The crossing area engineer establishes ERPs at the call
forward area (each crossing site requires an ERP at its own call forward area at a minimum) and, if enough
engineer assets are available, at the staging area and the far side holding area. (See figure G-1, page G-2, for
a layout of an ERP.)
G-3. The CAC uses additional ERPs only when specific site conditions make it necessary for crossing area
control. If conducting a wet-gap crossing, ERP personnel will need sufficient space to mark an area the size
of a raft (mock-up raft), brief crossing procedures, and conduct necessary inspections and rehearsals. A
hardstand (rest stop, parking lot) can serve this purpose, but the hardstand lacks the overhead concealment
usually desired. Some ERP functions may be done at separate ERPs to ensure a smooth and rapid flow of
vehicles to and across the gap. In this case, it is essential to maintain communications between ERPs.
G-4. Typically, an engineer squad operates an ERP. This maintains unit integrity and provides sufficient
personnel and equipment. The crossing site commander establishes direct communication with ERP
personnel to control raft load or individual vehicle movement. Depending on the location and purpose of the
ERP, it can be used for the following functions:
 Briefing crossing unit personnel on crossing procedures, including safety.
 Demonstrating ground guide signals.
 Inspecting equipment to ensure that it meets the load class capability of the crossing means.
 Organizing vehicles into raft loads or serials.
 Conducting rehearsals.
 Controlling vehicle movement.

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Appendix G

Note. Ensure that vehicles do not exceed the capacity of the crossing means. Provide drivers and vehicle commanders
with final instructions on speed and vehicle interval at the traffic control information and call forward point.
Legend:
NCO noncommissioned officer

Figure G-1. ERP layout

RAFTING
G-5. ERP personnel configure vehicles into raft loads and send them to the gap to coincide with the arrival
of an empty raft. Engineers brief crossing units before their arrival in the call forward area to make this
happen as rapidly as possible. The briefing covers the—
 Route and the route markings through the crossing site.
 Road speed and interval.
 Raft loading and unloading.
 Passenger locations while rafting across the gap.
 Vehicle configurations for the crossing.
 Actions to take for disabled vehicles and the maintenance collection point location.
 Hand and arm signals and signaling devices.
 Arm bands or other identification of guides and traffic controllers.
 Life jacket and other safety equipment issue, wear, and return.
 Holding area locations and alternate routes.
 Casualty collection point locations.
 Actions to take in the call forward area.
 Actions to take in case of enemy fire.
 Company regrouping in the far side holding area.

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 Planning Factors for Gap Crossing

G-6. An engineer from the squad operating the ERP can brief vehicle crews and rehearse the movement
signals with them. The staging area is an ideal place to do this, minimizing the time and effort spent
organizing a crossing unit in the call forward area. Otherwise, a separate ERP should handle this task.
G-7. The engineer squad leader positions to best control vehicle movement from the call forward area to
the gap-entry point. Communications are established with the crossing site commander. As a crossing unit
arrives, the assistant squad leader contacts the unit commander. The unit commander determines the order in
which the vehicles will cross. The assistant squad leader then configures individual vehicles into raft loads,
while ensuring that the vehicles do not exceed the weight limit or the maximum dimensions of the raft. A
space should be marked out in the exact dimensions of a raft (mock-up raft) for this purpose. An engineer
squad member guides the vehicles onto this mock-up raft, using the same procedure to be used at the raft
embarking point at the gap. At the same time, another engineer inspects the vehicles for the proper load
classification and dimensional clearances and chalks the raft load number on the vehicles. Once the vehicles
are cleared through the mock-up, an engineer squad leader releases individual raft loads to the gap as directed
by the crossing site commander. The following items are useful for running an ERP:
 Communication equipment.
 Engineer tape and stakes.
 Traffic markers.
 Flashlights with colored filters.
 Chemical lights.
 Signal flags.
 Chalk.
 Camouflage nets and poles.
 Night vision goggles.
 Sandbags.

BRIDGING
G-8. A bridge requires a continuous traffic flow to the gap. Units must be briefed and sent to the crossing
site quickly. To accomplish this, engineers brief at staging areas and check vehicle load classification and
dimensional clearances. The briefings include the following rules:
 Vehicles will maintain a maximum speed of 5 miles per hour while crossing the bridge.
 Vehicles will not stop on the bridge.
 Operators will not shift gears or make abrupt speed changes on the bridge.
 Vehicles will maintain the interval indicated by signs on the side of the road.
 Operators will follow the signals of engineers at ramps and intervals along the bridge.
G-9. ERPs or TCPs may be established along the routes to the crossing site to regulate traffic. A mock-up
bridge is not necessary at the ERP.

FORDING AND SWIMMING

G-10. For fording and swimming, ERP personnel provide the necessary briefings and vehicle inspections.
Units must consider vehicle capabilities and mitigating factors (reactive armor, payload, water current, exit
side slope) before attempting to swim. Crossing units are responsible for most preparations, but ERP
personnel can assist with tasks at the predip site (for equipment swimming) that is established nearby and
provide recovery assets.
G-11. A briefing on fording/swimming should include—
 The layout of entrance and exit markers.
 Swamping drills.
 A review of safety procedures.
 Rescue procedures.
 The actions to take in case of enemy fire.

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Appendix G

CONTINGENCY BRIDGING
G-12. Contingency bridging requires the same or a greater level of logistics support to engineers that are
required during combat. Combatant commanders tailor logistics support to engineers based on theater needs
with consideration given to civil use of bridges. Logistics efforts are integrated with host nation or local
resources and activities. Critical engineer logistics considerations include—
 The availability of construction equipment.
 A direct support maintenance capability.
 Repair parts supply.
 Class IV construction materials.
 Bridging equipment and materials.

SUPPORT BRIDGING
G-13. Ribbon bridge emplacement is intended to last no longer than 72 hours. Having the ribbon bridge
remain operable beyond that period presents extensive maintenance challenges. Equipment maintenance,
anchorage systems, constant changes in the water level, and the repair of approaches require an increased
level of consideration for long-term use of support bridging. Divers may also become necessary to support
long-term bridge use for removing debris or in situ maintenance of bays and anchorage.

MAINTENANCE
G-14. Because equipment remains in use during crossing, maintenance services become more difficult to
manage. Time must be made to allow boats and bays to be recovered from the water and completely serviced
and checked for unusual wear. The techniques discussed previously are applicable, but complete recovery of
the equipment and movement to the engineer equipment park (where the services are performed) must be
included. To accomplish maintenance services without jeopardizing bridging, boats and their replacements
must be carefully managed. This may require procuring more boats than authorized by the tables of
organization and equipment to permit continued crossing without disruption for maintenance. These and
other considerations must be addressed early in the planning process.
G-15. To check and service interior and end bays of the ribbon bridge, it must be broken apart and
replacement interior and end bays emplaced. Time for such actions should be incorporated into the bridge
crossing time line and maneuver units notified when the crossing site will be shut down temporarily.
Synchronization of alternating times for crossing sites to be closed for maintenance can proactively reroute
traffic flow and prevent major disturbances in movement across the gap. To expedite the time required to
replace bays needing maintenance and quickly allow traffic to resume crossing, engineers prepare
replacement bays and boats and stage them before closing the crossing site. Daily checks of the bridge
throughout phases of the operation, considerations of the current velocity and the amount of debris that may
affect the bridge, and maintaining vehicle speeds as they cross the bridge are critical to prevent damage to
the bay lower lock devices and roadway-to-bow portion latches.
G-16. Engineer divers provide critical support by providing inspection and repair of standard and
nonstandard bridging while the bridging is in place at the crossing sites. Divers conduct underwater and
surface reconnaissance of bridges to determine structural integrity and capacity. Divers may be used to repair
or reinforce bridge structures and neutralize underwater obstacles in and around the bridge. (See TM 3-34.83
for additional information.)

ANCHORAGE
G-17. All military bridges must be held in position by some anchorage system. Short-term anchorage is
normally used for support bridges, but if the bridge is required to remain operable for a longer period, the
anchorage must be upgraded to provide long-term support. (See TM 3-34.22/MCRP 3-17.1B and
TM 3-34.86/MCRP 3-17.7J for more detailed information about anchorage.)

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 Planning Factors for Gap Crossing

G-18. The design of any anchorage system is influenced by several factors, to include the—
 Width of the gap.
 Water velocity or currents.
 Depth and bottom conditions of the gap.
 Height and slope of gap banks.
 Conditions of the soil.
 Depth of the groundwater table.
 Availability of equipment.
 Potential enemy threats.
G-19. The ribbon bridge must be anchored if the bridge is used for long-term missions. During short-term
crossings, boats maintain the bridge stability against the current and keep the bridge from being damaged.
However, as time permits, an anchorage system must be emplaced to provide continuous stability and provide
relief for the number of boats required. Initially, the anchorage may consist of a combination of shore guys
and boats. This method can still allow the bridge to be broken and permit barge and river traffic access.
Eventually, a semipermanent anchorage system (such as an overhead cable system) should be emplaced to
keep the bridge secure.
G-20. The three basic components of long-term anchorage systems include approach guys, an upstream
anchorage system, and a downstream anchorage system. Approach guys are cables that prevent the bridge
from being pushed away from the shore as a result of the impact of vehicles driving onto the ramps of the
bridge. The upstream anchorage system holds the bridge in position against the force of the current. The
downstream anchorage system protects the floating bridge against reverse currents, tidal conditions, eddies,
and high winds or storms that might temporarily alter or reverse the natural flow of the water. The following
types of anchorage systems can be used for stabilizing a bridge.

Kedge Anchors
G-21. Kedge anchors lie in the streambed, and the kedge anchors are secured to the bridge bays with anchor
lines. They are designed to sink with the stock lying flat and the fluke positioned to dig into the bottom. On
hard bottoms, the kedge anchor is useless.

Shore Guys
G-22. Shore guys are cables attached from the bridges to deadman or similar holdfasts on the shore. Shore
guys can be upstream or downstream if the maximum anticipated current (or reverse current for downstream
systems) does not exceed 3 feet per second. Shore guys can be used for any length of floating bridge if a 45°
angle is maintained between the shore guy and the bridge centerline.

Kedge Anchors and Shore Guy Combination

G-23. A combination system may be used for upstream or downstream anchorage systems in currents less
than or equal to 5 feet per second. When constructing a combination system, attach kedge anchors to every
float and a shore guy to every sixth float.

Overhead Cable
G-24. An overhead cable system consists of one or more tower-supported cables spanning the gap parallel
to the bridge. Each end of the overhead cable is secured to the bank, preferably using a deadman. Bridle lines
are used to connect each bay of the bridge to the overhead cable. The cable functions like a cable used in a
suspension bridge, except that its final working position is inclined toward the bridge because of the force of
the current on the bridge. (See TC 5-210 for specific criteria on the design of an overhead cable anchorage
system, to include the cable design, tower design and placement, and deadman design.)

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Appendix G

PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
G-25. Floating bridges, particularly those that will remain in place for long periods, must be protected against
severe weather conditions and enemy destruction. If flood conditions or heavy debris hampers bridging,
removing interior bays will reduce the lateral pressure on the bridge and allow the debris to pass downstream.
If losing the bridge is imminent, release an end section and securely anchor the bridge parallel to the shore
until conditions permit resuming bridging. As the gap width increases, add more interior bays to the bridge
to compensate.
G-26. The enemy may attempt to destroy floating bridges in a variety of ways, including air attacks, land
attacks, underwater demolitions teams, floating mines, or assault boats. It is necessary to construct floating
protective devices to prevent waterborne forces from damaging or destroying the bridge. The three types of
floating protective systems are antimine boom, impact boom, and antiswimmer net.

Antimine Boom
G-27. This device is designed to stop any mines that are sent downstream toward the bridge. The antimine
boom is placed far upstream to protect the other protective devices and the bridge. It consists of a number of
logs or other large floating structures attached to a cable running across the gap. Concertina is normally
placed along the length of the boom.

Note. Before using timber logs or railroad ties, ensure that the timber logs or railroad ties are not
waterlogged and will float.

Impact Boom
G-28. The impact boom is designed to withstand the impact of large natural or man-made debris and stop
the enemy from attacking the bridge by boat. It is constructed by placing a series of floats and cables across
the gap. The cables absorb the impact of the debris or boat and restrain it until it can be removed or destroyed.

Antiswimmer Net
G-29. This net is used to stop swimmers or underwater demolition teams from reaching the bridge. The net
can be constructed by suspending a mesh or net barrier from an anchorage cable to the gap bottom. Concertina
may also be connected to the cable and the antiswimmer net to prevent swimmers from climbing over the
net. The net must be firmly affixed to the bottom or enemy divers can easily go under the net. The
antiswimmer net should be placed on the upstream and downstream sides of the bridge to prevent enemy
divers from reaching the bridge from either direction.
G-30. Army dive teams can assist in emplacing the protective devices and test them to ensure they are able
to prevent penetration of the bridge.

APPROACHES
G-31. Over a period, traffic flow at the same location will eventually wear the approaches down and make
them unusable. Engineers incorporate repair of the entry and exit banks and the approaches leading to the
crossing site into the crossing portion of the operation order or operation plan. Initially, the approaches may
be suitable to receive heavy traffic with little effect, but reinforcing the approaches must be done for long-
term traffic.
G-32. When inspecting approaches, consider the following:
 The steepness of the approaches.
 The ruts or gullies along the approaches, particularly in a floodplain area.
 The water level conditions and expected changes due to weather or seasonal conditions.
 The location of alternate approaches (alternate crossing sites) to allow for the repair of existing
approaches.

G-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Planning Factors for Gap Crossing

G-33. Matting and rock or gravel are the most suitable materials to use to support the approaches. Maneuver
units that will have to conduct long-term crossings should develop procedures to requisition and deliver these
materials to identified crossing site locations. Reconnaissance teams can locate local quarries where rock and
gravel can be obtained through coordination with the host nation.
G-34. Techniques for constructing bridge approach roads include using fabric as reinforcement across soft
soil. (See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7 for additional information.) An impervious, neoprene-coated, nylon-
woven membrane can be placed between a stone aggregate and the soft surface soil to allow the ground to
withstand heavy traffic. The most important feature that a reinforcing fabric membrane can offer is improving
soil stability and strength, which creates smaller deformations from vehicle traffic than soils acting alone.

LONG-TERM GAP-CROSSING CONSIDERATIONS

G-35. Gap crossing involves managing combat power, space, time, and terrain more than any other mobility
task. The controlling headquarters must be flexible enough to react to any changes in the tactical situation
and scheme of crossing. This is particularly difficult when involved with long-term missions in the same AO.
Management of the crossing site, enemy considerations, traffic control measures, and sustainment must be
synchronized for long-term activities and must not be based on less than a 72-hour period. (See appendix J
for additional information on gap-crossing considerations for special environments.)

Traffic Management
G-36. Traffic management remains the responsibility of the controlling headquarters. Activities may direct
that another unit take over the crossing mission and equipment as a whole or bring their own crossing
equipment and personnel to relieve the existing units and permit them to move forward with the maneuver
force. All aspects of the mission must be covered when handing over the crossing site to the gaining unit,
just as though they were conducting the crossing for the first time.
G-37. Military police support to traffic control is essential to help reduce exposure time and speed units
across the gap. Additionally, effective traffic control contributes to the flexibility of the crossing plan by
enabling commanders to change the sequence or timing or redirect units to other crossing sites. Military
police can switch units to different routes or hold them in waiting areas as the mission dictates. This is
accomplished using mobile patrols along primary routes, stationary vehicles at key points, or appropriate
signage along the route. This support assists in reducing congestion and speeding the crossing, thus enabling
the maneuver forces (and other forces) to maintain momentum. Finally, military police can establish
temporary collection points and holding areas to facilitate the collection, evacuation, and movement of
detainees (retrograde) and dislocated civilians so that they do not interfere with the movement of friendly
forces.
G-38. Staging and holding area control must be maintained. These areas must be located far enough away
from the gap to facilitate rerouting and the use of alternate roads to crossing sites. Staging and holding areas
on the far side must be developed to handle the traffic as vehicles travel back across. New routes may be
constructed and existing routes upgraded to improve traffic flow. Staging areas should be able to provide the
following:
 Cover and concealment.
 A sufficient area for vehicle and equipment dispersion.
 Easy accessibility.
 Sufficient trafficability to prevent delays caused by increased traffic flow within the AO.

Enemy Considerations
G-39. Use of a single crossing site over an extended period increases the possibility of enemy interdiction.
The possible use of CBRN weapons against friendly crossing activities impacts control measures. To prevent
friendly elements from becoming targets, forces must cross the gap as swiftly as possible to minimize the
concentration of forces on either side of the gap. The controlling headquarters may also vary the crossing site
location to reduce the likelihood of successful enemy interdiction.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 G-7

Appendix G

Sustainment
G-40. In a normal gap-crossing situation, the committed combat forces will be temporarily separated from
their support forces. For long-term gap crossing, increased traffic flow for the support vehicles must be
considered and controlled. Sufficient crossing sites and designated crossing times can ensure that priority is
given to field trains and ensure that timely resupply is not hindered. Local refueling points can facilitate
steady traffic flow to and through the crossing site. Recovery of nonmission capable equipment presents an
additional problem for recovery teams transporting the equipment back to the near side for direct support
maintenance. Additionally, recovery resources should continue to be provided at both sides of the crossing
sites so that they can quickly recover a vehicle unable to cross and prevent delays.

OVERBRIDGING
G-41. Overbridging is a method used to reinforce, provide emergency repair, or augment existing
bridges or bridge spans using standard bridging. In close combat, this is typically provided through the
employment of tactical bridging. Overbridging can be used in a variety of gap-crossing situations, but it is
typically used when time is critical or construction assets and resources are not readily available to make the
existing bridge reliable. When used to support combat maneuver, the AVLB, joint assault bridge, Wolverine,
and other tactical bridging are most frequently the assets available to the maneuver commander. The inherent
characteristics of each of these tactical bridges, including the fact that they do not require a gap for
emplacement (zero gap bridge), make them a viable option for placement in support of close combat and
other operations. Risk should be evaluated; however, when using these bridges to repair or replace damaged
spans. The bridge will not be supported by a pier or abutment. When time is not as critical, enemy contact is
less likely, support or LOC bridging is readily available, and the gap is beyond the span length of tactical
bridging; the MGB, logistics support bridge, Bailey, Acrow® 700XS, or similar systems may provide an
appropriate alternative.

G-8 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Appendix H
Retrograde Gap Crossing
This appendix describes gap crossings in support of retrograde. It only discusses those
tactics and techniques used by a division or BCT/RCT in a retrograde gap crossing that
differ from those used in an offensive crossing.

GENERAL
H-1. Retrograde is a type of defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (See
FM 3-90-1.) The goal of a retrograde gap crossing is to cross a gap while preserving the integrity of the force.
H-2. Gap crossings in support of retrograde are often conducted as a deliberate gap crossing. Like most
deliberate gap crossings, the retrograde is normally conducted at the division level. In most situations, an
engineer brigade should be part of the division and provide the division with the necessary command and
control to those subordinate engineer battalions and companies supporting this sort of gap crossing. If a
BCT/RCT is conducting a retrograde, it will likely depend on an engineer battalion headquarters to provide
similar command and control.
H-3. A retrograde crossing features centralized control at the division or BCT/RCT level. Detailed planning
and preparation of engineer assets are a critical consideration within the time available. A retrograde crossing
differs from an offensive crossing in several aspects:
 Both sides of the gap initially are under friendly control. Accordingly, detailed information
concerning the gap and the area over which the retrograde is conducted should be readily available
to the commander.
 Existing bridges and other crossing sites are available to the retrograde force to expedite the
crossing.
 Relative combat power may favor the enemy. Units conducting retrograde must retain a mobility
advantage over the enemy in this situation.
 Significant numbers of dislocated civilians, refugees, or detainees may compound the crossing,
and military police will be critical to mitigating their impact. (See ATP 3-34.40/
MCWP 3-17.7 and ATP 3-39.10 for additional information.)
H-4. The commander uses deception to conceal the extent of the mission and the actual crossing sites.
Obscurants, electronic deception, and dummy sites reduce the enemy capability to disrupt the crossing.
Security keeps the enemy from identifying the specific times and place of the crossing.
H-5. Control measures are also used in retrograde gap crossing. Some additional control measures (such as
a delay line) associated with retrograde may also need to be included. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional
information on retrograde.)

RETROGRADE TYPES
H-6. A retrograde may be forced by enemy action or by a higher headquarters. A well-planned, well-
organized, and aggressively executed retrograde provides opportunities for the division or BCT/RCT to
inflict heavy damage on enemy troops and equipment while continuing to maintain its fighting integrity. The
three types of retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional information.)

DELAYS
H-7. Units conduct delays when they are under pressure and want to trade space for time. The division or
BCT/RCT commander identifies the PLs for the primary delay line, the BHL, and the units required to fight

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 H-1

Appendix H

the delay and defensive battles. The senior engineer headquarters supporting the division (or the BCT/RCT),
in conjunction with the S-3/G-3 and the staff engineer officer, identifies crossing sites and required crossing
assets. The division staff coordinates for additional assets as needed.
H-8. Flexible planning allows the units conducting a retrograde gap crossing to adapt quickly to changes
during execution. Some important features of a flexible plan include—
 Multiple approach routes from battle positions to crossing sites.
 Lateral routes between crossing sites.
 Alternate crossing sites if enemy actions close primary sites.
 Crossing equipment held in reserve to replace losses or open alternate sites.
 Multiple means or methods for crossing.
 Preplanned EAs to block enemy advances.
H-9. A delay combined with a retrograde gap crossing has the following phases:
 Delay.
 Crossing.
 Defense.
H-10. Each phase is separate only in planning; they overlap during execution. Employing military crossing
equipment in the retrograde is essentially the reverse of the method used in a deliberate offensive gap
crossing. Figure H-1 relates the retrograde sequence to the crossing stages.

Delay Phase
H-11. The delay phase provides security for the main body and allows the delaying force to gain enough
time for the main body to accomplish its mission (cross the gap). For this reason, delaying forces take some
risk to ensure the security of the rest of the division as it withdraws across the gap. The delaying force must
deceive the enemy and keep it from the gap crossing sites, allowing the main body to cross and establish the
exit-side defense. While it may be impossible to deceive the enemy that a retrograde crossing is occurring, it
is possible to deny them the timing and specific locations and means that will allow the crossing to take place.
H-12. When conducting a delay that involves a gap crossing, the enemy must be denied the ability to place
direct and observed indirect fires into the crossing area. The commander may establish a delay line to
designate the outer limit of the area between the enemy and the gap, with special instructions to preclude
enemy direct and observed indirect fires into the crossing area. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
The delay line (or lines) may be time or event driven. An example of an event driven delay line would be
when a commander orders a delaying force to prevent penetration of the delay line until supporting engineers
have completed bridge construction and specific units (percentage of the force) have crossed the gap. If
available and practical, an aviation-heavy delay force may afford ease in the withdrawal of the delay force
due to its tactical mobility and inherent ability to cross the gap with less engineer support.
H-13. Forces not assigned tasks in the delay, including those forces with a mission to support crossing areas
or establish the defense on the exit side, execute a planned retirement or withdrawal and cross the gap as
rapidly as possible. To preclude early enemy detection of the retrograde, the forces follow a movement
control plan that supports the deception plan.
H-14. The delay phase continues until the battle is within communications and fire-support range of the exit-
side defense. The delaying force must be strong enough to hold the enemy until other forces establish the
defense. The defending force assumes responsibility for the battle as the delaying force completes a rearward
passage of lines through the defending force.

H-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Retrograde Gap Crossing

Legend:
BHL battle handover line
JUL July
PL phase line

Figure H-1. Retrograde planning

Crossing Phase
H-15. In contrast to normal offensive crossing, friendly forces initially control retrograde crossing sites,
although they may be insufficient in number. The enemy usually knows where the logical crossing sites are
located. The enemy will likely attack these crossing sites early in the mission, but the enemy must not be
allowed to capture or control them. It may be possible to deceive the enemy as to the time periods particular
crossing sites will be in use. Obscuration may be one method of limiting the knowledge of the enemy.
Friendly forces should develop additional crossing sites, providing flexibility against potential loss of one or
more crossing sites during the mission and the flexibility to vary the crossing sites that are in use.
H-16. The commander should attempt to salvage tactical bridges and rafts for future use; however, it may
be necessary to use them for the final crossings and then destroy them to prevent capture. Nonstandard
bridging must be prepared for destruction, and it should also be protected against ground and air attacks. This
requires close coordination with the delaying force to prevent cutting off friendly forces and deny the seizure
of any intact crossing sites by the enemy. Destruction authority is identified early in the planning process.
H-17. The division tactical CP, commanded by one of the deputy commanders, is typically responsible for
command and control of the passage of the units through the crossing area.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 H-3

Appendix H

H-18. Traffic control up to and through the crossing area is a critical challenge in this type of crossing. For
this reason, movement plans must be detailed and synchronized with the retrograde. Control is exercised by
the CAC with assistance from the delaying force commander. The CAC controls movement within the
crossing area to include delaying forces that enter that area.
H-19. It is the responsibility of the CAC to ensure the continuous and orderly flow of the retrograde elements
across the gap. Their control includes the ERPs (ensures that vehicles are of the proper class and size) and
the waiting areas that feed vehicles through the crossing area. To assist the CAC, military police, and
engineers (if available) establish and operate TCPs. Crossing site commanders oversee the crossing means.
The CAC and their staff must synchronize the crossing plan with the commander’s tactical plan.
H-20. Normally, activity within the crossing area begins with two-way crossings by sustainment/combat
service support units evacuating nonessential supplies or restocking the delaying force. During the early
stages of the retrograde, the existing crossing means may be supplemented by tactical bridging. At a
minimum, additional tactical bridging assets must be planned and available. Some tactical bridging may be
emplaced to deceive the enemy of the actual crossing site locations.
H-21. Initially, the force crosses on nonstandard or floating bridges. It crosses on bridges as long as possible,
since this is the most rapid means and allows for the greatest volume of flow. Once the bridges become
vulnerable to capture, air attack, or observed indirect fires, they may need to be converted to rafts (if wet gap)
or removed. Vehicles continue to cross by using the rafts and swimming (if capable). The crossings are made
under the relative protection/force protection of the suppressive fires of the defending force direct- and
indirect-fire weapons.
H-22. The forces cross the gap in an orderly flow while conserving combat power. Even when the division
has to establish the crossing areas quickly, under adverse circumstances, it synchronizes crossing support
activities with those of the defense force that is preparing to close the routes in the crossing areas.
H-23. Crossing sites need the highest priority for air interdiction. This is particularly critical when the enemy
has air superiority or when air parity exists. The sequence for crossing air and missile defense units should
account for the need to provide continuous coverage of crossing sites.
H-24. Engineers required to support this type of mission that are not organic to the BCTs/RCTs will, at a
minimum, include bridge companies (mobility augmentation company or MRBC depending on gap size) and
other specialized engineer support (such as divers). They will begin preparing defensive positions of the exit
side of the crossing site. Mobility, countermobility, and survivability support will be essential to the success
of the mission on both sides of the gap. Engineer units performing these tasks will be organized under
engineer battalions and potentially engineer brigade headquarters for command and control to facilitate the
mission.

Defensive Phase
H-25. During this phase, the delaying and defending forces negate the ability of the enemy to bring direct or
observed indirect fire against the crossing area; deny it crossing sites upstream or downstream; and destroy
all attempts to cross the gap. In particular, this phase targets potential enemy crossing assets and denies the
use of existing crossing sites or means. The commander may consider retaining nonstandard bridges in
defense of the gap if future counterattacks back across the gap are anticipated. The commander may only
partially destroy bridges to ease their restoration in support of future offensive tasks, weighing this decision
against the potential that the enemy will use them.
H-26. Whether continuing the retrograde further or defending along the gap, the division or BCT/RCT
establishes a strong exit-bank defense. The defending force protects the delaying force as it crosses the gap
and conducts battle handover with the defending force. The rearward passage of lines is complicated by the
gap, the narrow and restricted crossing lanes, and the proximity of pursuing enemy forces.
H-27. Initially, the defending force may be small if the delay force initially requires most of the maneuver
forces. It would consist of those maneuver (and supporting) units not involved in the delay or conducting
withdrawal. Due to a lack of forces available to defend all points along the gap, the defending force depends
on rapid lateral movement to allow it to concentrate at vulnerable points along the defensive line of the gap
and to its flanks. In particular, the defending force orients on and protects the crossing sites against enemy

H-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Retrograde Gap Crossing

efforts to use or control those sites. Withdrawing combat forces should rapidly move to occupy their
preplanned defensive positions behind the gap, if necessary, to thicken the defense or move to designated
assembly areas behind the defensive line for reorganization and ultimate recommitment. The defending force
masses fires to support any of its elements in contact forward of the gap if it is planned for them to remain
forward of the gap by design.
H-28. The defending force accepts battle handover from the last of the delaying force along the BHL (PL
Giants shown in figure H-1, page H-3) and covers its crossing over what may be one or more nonstandard or
standard bridges that have normally been prepared for demolition. Defending forces along the gap prevent
the enemy from crossing at the site of demolished bridges or fording sites so that the last delaying elements
securing the enemy side of the crossing sites can be safely withdrawn. These last elements may be formed
around vehicles with swim or ford capabilities or be capable of being extracted by helicopters or other viable
and rapid means of crossing the gap without any bridges being in place. If available, Marine Corps
amphibious vehicles may be very useful in this role given their swimming capability.

WITHDRAWAL
H-29. A withdrawal differs from a delay; it is a task that the unit in contact disengages from an enemy force.
Withdrawals are executed when the commander desires to withdraw to control future tactical operations
without being forced to do so by enemy pressure. A withdrawal follows the same sequence as a delay. The
only difference is that the unit may or may not be in enemy contact.
H-30. During a withdrawal, the enemy may or may not pressure withdrawing units. Also, other friendly units
are not always necessary to assist in withdrawals. Care must be taken to ensure that the enemy does not try
to isolate and encircle units during gap crossing. If a unit has difficulty breaking with the enemy in a
withdrawal, it can request help from a higher level. The assisted withdrawal may take the form of another
unit becoming the stationary unit and allowing the unit, with difficulty, to conduct a rearward passage of
lines and subsequent gap crossing behind the protecting forces of the stationary unit. The exchange of
information on obstacles, indirect-fire targets, and routes in the AO must be coordinated before conducting
the passage of lines. The assisting unit provides mobility support along cleared routes and corridors in its AO
for the passing unit.
H-31. Engineers may need to conduct clearing before the passage begins and on a recurring basis until the
crossing is completed. The assisting unit also closes the lanes once passage is complete. The passing unit
must plan and organize the possible requirement to conduct in-stride breaching or gap crossing before
initiating the passage of lines. This should ensure responsive mobility if the enemy blocks routes during the
passage.

RETIREMENT
H-32. Retirements are rearward movements away from the enemy by a force not in contact. Typically, the
security forces of another unit cover their movement as they conduct a tactical road march. A retirement
follows the same sequence as a delay. Speed is important; therefore, engineers should focus on mobility for
the retiring unit and expect to perform tasks such as route clearance, route repair, and breaching of enemy
countermobility efforts.

DENIAL MEASURES
H-33. Denial measures are actions taken to hinder or deny the enemy use of resources or facilities. In
retrograde crossings, the commander includes bridges and crossing sites in their denial measures.
H-34. The law of war requires that denial measures, particularly against civilian resources (such as existing
bridges), be carefully considered and that execution authority to destroy the structure is maintained at the
highest level, consistent with the rules of engagement. A thorough understanding of the rules of engagement
and identification of the destruction authority are essential early in the planning process. Coordination
between the theater command and the host nation government is important in the policy development process.
The staff judge advocate of the division or the brigade judge advocate will advise their respective
commanders on these issues.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 H-5

Appendix H

H-35. A defending force commander is responsible for preparing existing bridging and other crossing means
(such as ferries) in their AO for destruction to prevent their use by the enemy if they cannot be withdrawn.
The timing of their destruction depends on their use in supporting the crossing mission. When the tactical
situation dictates that crossing sites are no longer needed, or the risk of capture outweighs their usefulness,
the defending force must destroy them. Authority for destruction must be clearly articulated in the operation
order.
H-36. Use of bridges in the retrograde requires a redundant means of bridge destruction and a robust
demolition guard with an engineer demolition party. (See FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L for additional
information.) Engineer light diving teams may be used to survey and emplace, prime, and detonate explosives
on bridge supports to deny enemy access during retrograde. Because of the severe consequences of a
premature decision to destroy a site, the division commander usually designates sites as reserve targets and
issues specific orders stating under what conditions and by whose authority this destruction can be achieved.
H-37. Engineers destroy military bridges that they cannot recover quickly. Bridge stocks will likely be in
short supply. If existing bridges are sufficient to support the retrograde, the engineers recover military bridges
as early as the situation and the operation order allows. In addition, the denial of major existing bridges can
be so important that the commander may choose to destroy them early to ensure that they are not captured
by the enemy and rely on military bridges to cross the remainder of their force. In a deliberate wet-gap
crossing, the IRB is preferred for this portion of the crossing because of its relative recovery speed. Engineers
recover LOC bridges well before the enemy arrives or destroy those left in place after the delay.

H-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Appendix I
Deliberate Wet-Gap Crossing
This appendix describes an example of a deliberate wet-gap (river) crossing from the
division and BCT/RCT perspective. It details the actions that are required by phase of
the crossing.

GENERAL
I-1. A division is normally the smallest organization that can conduct a deliberate wet-gap crossing. It is
usually an implied task in a larger mission given by the corps. A gap crossing may not be the objective. It
may only be part of the scheme of movement and maneuver and overall offensive action against the enemy.
The enemy will normally use the gap as a tactical obstacle system to slow and gain positional advantage
against the division advance. The intent of the division is to maintain its momentum through the crossing.
I-2. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC) will dictate the force allocation required during each phase of the operation.
Aside from the normal planning, detailed march tables are required for the rapid passage of units through the
crossing area into the bridgehead. Detailed plans are disseminated before the execution. Deliberate wet-gap
crossings normally restrict movement to four to six routes. This requires disciplined and controlled movement
to ensure that combat power builds in the bridgehead faster than the enemy can react.
I-3. An integral part of a wet-gap crossing is the deception plan. The corps will plan, resource, and control
all of the requirements to execute a believable deception so that the enemy does not know exactly where or
when the division will cross the wet gap.
I-4. To conduct the deliberate wet-gap crossing, the division requires an appropriate engineer TF or
brigade (or dedicated MEB) headquarters for command and control that includes bridging augmentation in
the form of MRBCs. In addition, the division may require augmentation from other combat engineers,
mobility augmentation companies, MACs, and dive teams. Additionally, military police from echelons above
BCT/RCT should augment the division to assist in regulating the traffic and conducting route security in the
crossing area. The corps also allocates CBRN units with obscuration capabilities to assist in gap crossing.
Finally, the corps will provide air and missile defense support to protect the bridgehead from air interdiction.

PHASES
I-5. An offensive, deliberate wet-gap crossing has five phases. They are distinct phases for planning, but
there is no pause between them in execution. The phases are—
 Advance to the gap (Phase I). The first phase is the attack to seize objectives that secure the near
side terrain, which offers favorable crossing sites and road networks and provides enough area to
stage crossing forces while preventing congestion and an undesirable massing of assets.
 Assault across the gap (Phase II). The second phase involves units assaulting across the gap to
seize the far side objective, eliminating direct fire into the crossing sites.
 Advance from the far side (Phase III). The third phase is the attack to secure the exit bank and
intermediate objectives that eliminates direct and observed indirect fires into the crossing area.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 I-1

Appendix I

 Secure the bridgehead line (Phase IV). The fourth phase includes the tasks necessary to secure
bridgehead objectives, defeating any enemy counterattacks. This gains the necessary time and
space for the buildup of forces for the attack out of the bridgehead.
 Continue the attack (Phase V). The fifth phase is the attack out of the bridgehead to defeat the
enemy at a subsequent or final objective. It is considered as a phase of the gap crossing because
the timing and initiation of this phase are typically dependent on the success of the other four
phases of the gap crossing.
I-6. Figure I-1 provides an overview of the deliberate gap crossing, showing the five phases and their
relationship to the crossing area.

Legend:
BL breach line
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RL release line

Figure I-1. Overview of a deliberate gap crossing

ADVANCE TO THE GAP (PHASE I)

I-7. The division attacks to seize near side terrain that includes favorable crossing sites and road networks.
The seizing of this terrain sets the conditions for the assault across the gap. Normally, the division advances
with two BCTs/RCTs abreast and a trailing BCT/RCT. The division tactical CP controls the efforts of the
lead BCTs/RCTs. Figure I-2 depicts the advance to the gap from a division perspective.

I-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Deliberate Wet-Gap Crossing

Legend:
AA assembly area
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RL release line
TAC tactical

Figure I-2. Advance to the gap

I-8. Well before the division reaches the river, a division reconnaissance element moves ahead of the main
body to conduct a reconnaissance of the near side and predetermined crossing sites. If the tactical situation
prohibits adequate early reconnaissance of the crossing sites, one or both of the lead BCTs/RCTs must
conduct the reconnaissance as they move forward. Engineer reconnaissance teams may need to be allocated
to the reconnaissance elements to assist in the reconnaissance of crossing sites. As the division arrives at the
gap, the lead BCT/RCT establishes security on the near side. The lead BCTs/RCTs develop hasty defensive
positions to protect the crossing area and cover the crossing sites with direct and indirect fires.
I-9. During the advance to the gap, the division main CP controls aviation, artillery fires, and other assets
in-depth to isolate the crossing area and far side objectives. It also sustains the division advance to the gap
by ensuring that key classes of supplies are prepositioned forward. Supply and maintenance priorities are
adjusted to include crossing means (bridging units and equipment) and the assured mobility forces (and any
other mission essential equipment) supporting the crossing.
I-10. The division tactical CP controls the lead BCTs/RCTs as they secure the near side and influences the
mission with division controlled assets, as appropriate. The respective BCT/RCT tactical CPs control the
fight of their subordinate units. Units travel in a formation that is mission variable driven and seize objectives
that secure the near side.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 I-3

Appendix I

I-11. Each lead BCT/RCT main CP functions as the BCT/RCT crossing area headquarters, and it is typically
supported by an engineer battalion headquarters to help develop the crossing plan and control the crossing
means within the BCT/RCT crossing area. The crossing area headquarters for each crossing area is
responsible for controlling units that provide the crossing means, traffic management, and obscuration. Once
the lead BCTs/RCTs have secured the near side, military police and engineers mark routes from the staging
area to the crossing sites; lay out staging, holding, and call forward areas; and set up ERPs and TCPs. The
BCT/RCT commanders, in coordination with the CAC, normally designate crossing sites and other critical
nodes (waiting areas, CPs) whose loss would seriously jeopardize the crossing as a CFZ.

ASSAULT ACROSS THE GAP (PHASE II)

I-12. The division main CP continues to control aviation, artillery fires, and other assets in-depth to isolate
the crossing area and far side objectives. The division main CP shifts fires to subsequent targets as units
advance. It coordinates with the corps for air and missile defense coverage to protect the crossing area from
enemy air interdiction. The gap creates lucrative targets at relatively fixed locations that are easily targeted
by enemy air. Therefore, approaches; holding, staging, and call forward areas; crossing sites; and other
critical nodes (such as CPs) along the gap are the highest priority for air and missile defense protection/force
protection during the crossing. Air and missile defense units occupy positions to engage aircraft with massed
fires before the aircraft can reach weapons release points.
I-13. The division tactical CP coordinates the actions of the BCTs/RCTs conducting the assault across the
gap. (See figure I-3.) The crossing sites are chosen based on available natural concealment, accessibility
(entrance and exit routes, favorable bank conditions), and sufficient space for waiting areas on the near side.
These sites also have defensible terrain on the far side of the gap to provide a secure base for continuing the
mission.
I-14. Each BCT/RCT tactical CP controls its own respective assault crossing elements, which normally
consist of dismounted infantry. Combat maneuver battalions conducting the assault across the gap move to
it under the direct control of their BCT/RCT commander. The BCT/RCT commander keeps the remainder of
the BCT/RCT back from the gap to avoid congestion. Elements not engaged in security or supporting the
crossing occupy assembly areas and prepare for movement across the gap.
I-15. Dismounted elements of the assault force cross the gap using assault boats (typically operated by
engineer units), swimming vehicles, or other methods to secure terrain for the reinforcing armored vehicles.
The assault across the gap may also include air assault elements. The dismounted assault forces are typically
supported by tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other direct-fire systems in support-by-fire positions.
Heavy rafts are prepared to transport tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the far side for reinforcing the
dismounted infantry. The M9 ACEs, dozers, and other necessary heavy equipment are transported to prepare
the far side exit sites. Rapid reinforcement of dismounted assault forces with armored vehicles may be so
critical, based on the mission variables, that it justifies using any expedient method to get the first few
armored vehicles across. This includes winching, towing, or pushing the first armored vehicles across
normally unsuitable places while engineers improve entry and exit points for the remaining armored vehicles.
In certain situations, tanks may be able to cross using fording equipment.
I-16. Each BCT/RCT main CP controls obscuration during crossing. When employed, the obscuration
blanket may cover several kilometers of the gap and gap approaches to conceal the actual crossing locations,
but it does not obscure the vision of the bridge crewmembers. The crossing area headquarters uses
obscuration generators, smoke pots, smoke munitions, and other obscuration means from the division. Each
BCT/RCT main CP controls the use of military police and engineer units to establish near side waiting areas,
mark routes to the crossing sites, and begin constructing heavy rafts and bridges in conjunction with the
division operation order.

I-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Deliberate Wet-Gap Crossing

Legend:
AA assembly area
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RL release line
TAC tactical

Figure I-3. Assault across the gap

I-17. The intent of this phase is to rapidly place sufficient combat power on the far side to eliminate enemy
direct fire onto the crossing sites and secure terrain for defensive positions and then attack positions.
BCTs/RCTs normally establish limits of advance and coordinated fire lines for the dismounted TFs
conducting the assault in conjunction with the division operation order. These lines establish a limit of
advance that encompasses the division far side objectives. Enemy indirect fire into the crossing area will
probably continue; however, each crossing site within the crossing area must be isolated from direct fire to
enable the construction and use of rafts. These rafts will then be used to transport armored vehicles for rapid
reinforcement of the dismounted infantry TF. Within the crossing area, secured defensive and attack positions
allow units to form into combat formations before continuing the attack.
I-18. Commanders may consider immediate construction of a bridge during this phase without ever
conducting rafting if this is viable. The advantage to this is that it may allow combat power to be massed on
the far side at a much faster rate. The risk that the commander takes in making this decision is that a large
amount of bridging assets are potentially exposed to enemy fire before the elimination of enemy direct and
indirect fires on the crossing area. This phase is completed once the far side objectives are secure. (See
figure I-3.)

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Appendix I

ADVANCE FROM THE FAR SIDE (PHASE III)

I-19. The division tactical CP continues to control actions to secure the far side until the BCTs/RCTs are
set in attack positions. The intent is to eliminate direct and observed indirect fires from the crossing area.
(See figure I-4.)

Legend:
AA assembly area
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RL release line
TAC tactical

Figure I-4. Advance from the far side

I-20. The division commander selects exit bank and intermediate objectives based on the mission variables.
The gap splits the attacking force, limiting massed direct fires beyond the exit bank. Therefore, these
objectives are usually smaller and not as far from the attack positions as the objectives used in other offensive
tasks.
I-21. The division tactical CP controls the coordinated attack of the lead BCTs/RCTs from the far side
attack positions to the bridgehead. The division main CP controls aviation and artillery fires in-depth to block
enemy counterattacks into the bridgehead in coordination with the division tactical CP.
I-22. The BCT/RCT main CPs prepare push packages of Class III and Class V supplies that will support
the attack out of the bridgehead. They also begin to push Class IV and Class V barrier materials for the hasty
defense during the last phase of gap crossing.
I-23. Each respective BCT/RCT main CP controls the movement of its follow-on TFs from the staging
areas across the gap to their attack positions on the far side. They control the upgrade of crossing sites from
assault boats to heavy rafts or bridging in conjunction with the division operation order to ensure that the
force buildup can support the advance from the exit bank to intermediate objectives. Military police and
engineers (if available) provide traffic control throughout the crossing area.

I-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Deliberate Wet-Gap Crossing

I-24. During this phase, limited two-way traffic begins to allow for the return of disabled equipment and
casualties by ground transportation. Each crossing area headquarters must account for this traffic within its
movement and traffic control plans.
I-25. Each respective BCT/RCT tactical CP, in coordination with the division tactical CP, controls the
movement out of the attack positions to the exit bank, intermediate, and bridgehead objectives. Exit bank
objectives are those positions that, when seized, eliminate enemy direct fire into the crossing sites.
Intermediate objectives are those positions from which the enemy can provide observation for indirect fires.
This enables the expansion of air and missile defense coverage, allowing more depth to engage aircraft in air
avenues of approach on the far side of the gap.
I-26. The TF that conducted the dismounted assault across the gap continues to cross armored and wheeled
vehicles and remount their dismounted Soldiers/Marines in preparation for continued offensive tasks.
I-27. The BCT/RCT commander establishes the order of raft loads based on the division crossing priorities.
Bridge companies run heavy raft sites and begin to construct ribbon bridges. Military police mark routes and
control holding areas on the far side to facilitate rapid transit within the crossing area.

SECURE THE BRIDGEHEAD LINE (PHASE IV)

I-28. The bridgehead must be defendable and large enough to accommodate forces that will break out to
continue offensive tasks and the lead BCTs/RCTs that seize it. The lead BCTs/RCTs attack to secure the
final objectives within the bridgehead to prevent the enemy from successfully counterattacking against forces
within the bridgehead line by rapidly building enough combat power to establish a hasty defense. The lead
BCTs/RCTs maintain continuous far side security to prevent bypassed enemy elements from infiltrating back
to the gap and disrupting activities at the crossing sites. (See figure I-5, page I-8.)
I-29. The division tactical CP controls the lead BCTs/RCTs as they secure the bridgehead objectives and
preparation is made to move the reserve BCT/RCT or other forces (breakout forces) into attack positions
within the bridgehead. Once the bridgehead objectives are secured, the lead BCT/RCT establishes a hasty
defense.
I-30. The BCT/RCT main CPs continue to monitor and improve the crossing sites and control the movement
of forces through the crossing area. Once the bridgehead line is secure, the division main CP directs the
movement of the breakout forces through the crossing area to assembly areas or attack positions (as
appropriate) within the bridgehead. During this phase, specific bridges and rafts are designed for full-time
return traffic. This ensures that ground resupply and the evacuation of casualties, detainees, and disabled
equipment can occur.
I-31. The division main CP controls aviation and artillery fires in-depth to screen the flanks and interdict
enemy formations as they move to counterattack. They also eliminate effective artillery fire within range of
the bridgehead and destroy other enemy artillery forces moving up to the fight.
I-32. The lead BCT/RCT elements that secure the bridgehead line must control the avenues of approach
into the bridgehead and have sufficient combat power to defeat counterattacks. After the bridgehead is secure,
the division commander commits the breakout force to assembly areas or attack positions within the
bridgehead. The bridgehead needs enough space (up to 12 to 19 miles in-depth) to accommodate the lead
BCTs/RCTs and the breakout force with their sustainment. The bridgehead line must also be far enough
forward to employ air and missile defense systems against hostile aircraft before they can engage crossing
sites.

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Appendix I

Legend:
AA assembly area
BL breach line
INT intermediate
OBJ objective
PL phase line
RL release line
RP release point
SP start point
TAC tactical

Figure I-5. Secure the bridgehead line

CONTINUE THE ATTACK (PHASE V)

I-33. Once the division has secured the bridgehead and the breakout force (could be from the division or
part of another division directed to conduct the breakout) is in its attack positions, the division gap crossing
is complete. The division crossing area engineer (typically the commander of an MEB or engineer brigade)
continues to control the division crossing area and the crossing means remaining in it. The division crossing
area engineer is prepared to support the crossing of follow-on forces or transfer control of the crossing area
to a higher or follow-on headquarters.
I-34. The breakout force must complete its passage before continuation of the offense. The lead BCTs/RCTs
must reorganize and prepare to follow the breakout force as the division or corps reserve. Security forces
from the corps must come forward to relieve the lead BCTs/RCTs from their bridgehead security mission.
The division tactical CP moves forward or rejoins the division main CP and focuses on the attack out of the
bridgehead and subsequent missions of the division.

I-8 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Appendix J
Gap-Crossing Considerations for Special Environments
This appendix describes situations that further complicate gap crossing and presents
some of the factors that must be considered during planning and execution. Special or
complex environments exhibit extreme or unusual terrain and weather characteristics.
The ones specifically included in this appendix include arctic and cold regions,
mountainous areas, desert and extremely hot areas, jungles and forests, CBRN
conditions, and situations involving a significant number of dislocated civilians.

ARCTIC AND COLD REGIONS

J-1. Cold regions of the world are characterized by deep snow, permafrost, seasonally frozen ground,
frozen lakes and rivers, glaciers, long periods of extremely cold temperatures, and extended periods of
daylight and darkness. These conditions can also be found in mountainous areas. Even areas with moderate
climates can experience severe winters, producing the same constraints on missions that are found in cold
regions.
J-2. Cold region operations are affected by wind and the possibility of thawing during warming periods.
An unexpected thaw causes a severe drop in the soil strength, which creates mud and drainage problems. Ice
or snow melt can cause significant water level and current changes in streams, rivers, and lakes potentially
causing flooding in low areas in short periods. Wind protection greatly decreases the effects of cold on
personnel and equipment. ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D provides detailed information on the considerations
associated with arctic and cold region operations.

TERRAIN
J-3. The following conditions may be encountered in arctic and cold regions:
 Deep snow. In many areas, there will be deep snow. This will impede mobility and make it
difficult to see true ground conditions.
 Permafrost. Permafrost is perennially frozen ground. The annual thaw depth, from 1 to 5 feet, is
called the active layer. Digging, even in summer, is nearly impossible. Because permafrost
restricts surface drainage, the active layer is often saturated with slow moving water. Surface
disturbance collects water if such a disturbance provides a channel in the direction of the
watershed. Surface water may wash away or otherwise alter the vegetation that binds the surface
and insulates the permafrost. In turn, this deepens the active layer and creates the effect of a
drainage ditch, which again increases the flow of water into the channel area. Under certain
watershed conditions, this cycle may convert a single vehicle track into a destructive ditch of
erosion, preventing vehicle movement.
 Hydrology. If the precipitation is low, streams may have relatively little volume. However,
melting snow in the warm months can produce sudden variations. Ice expansion, continued water
influx, and partial thaws can create pressure ridges in frozen bodies of water. These ridges, often
3 feet high, can be formidable obstacles for vehicles. Similarly, depending on the snow cover, ice
can be up to or greater than 2 meters thick if the snow cover is sparse and the lake is windswept
or only a fraction of a meter thick if the snow cover is extensive. Swamps, rivers, and lakes may
be a movement asset in the winter or a liability and an obstacle in the summer. Gap crossings are
predominate during the summer, but it must not be discounted during the winter.
 Vegetation. The vegetation could range from zero on the high arctic tundra to heavy in forests
(such as the forests of northern Canada or Norway). Forested areas may provide the engineer with

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 J-1

Appendix J

an abundance of natural materials for the construction of nonstandard bridges but restrict
movement on prepared routes.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

J-4. The climate provides some unique problems. In many cases of extreme cold or storms, personnel
survival becomes the preoccupying activity of military forces. The most common problem areas are
dehydration, exposure, frostbite, and reduced work rates. Good clothing, equipment, and training will ease
the problems, but Soldiers/Marines need to have access to a warming area, hot and high-calorie food, and a
shelter from severe weather to maintain long-term effectiveness.
J-5. The cold affects equipment in many ways; some considerations include—
 Petroleum, oils, and lubricants. Some types of petroleum, oils, and lubricants will gel at low
temperatures. Engines could be difficult to start and fuel consumption will be high due to the need
to keep engines running for warmth.
 Vehicles. Vehicles may have to be run continuously, resulting in excessive wear on the engine.
Parts may break due to increased brittleness of materials at low temperatures.
 Mobility. Mobility could be affected by snow, weather (whiteouts, storms), and ice.
 Effects on metals. Metals could become brittle at low temperatures.

GAP-CROSSING TECHNIQUES
J-6. The various gap-crossing techniques used in other environments are normally an option in cold
weather; however, caution must be used due to the extreme cold temperatures and challenges associated with
large formations of ice.

Standard Bridging
J-7. Regardless of whether standard (fixed) or nonstandard bridging is used, it is most desirable to
construct the bridges in one clear span. This is to prevent damage or destruction of the bridge due to heavy
water flow during runoff and the floating debris and ice associated with it.
J-8. Although not generally considered as an alternative, floating bridges (such as the IRB) are suitable for
use over large lakes and slow moving rivers, limited by freeze up. If extreme care is not taken and bridges
are not removed early enough, extensive damage can be expected if the bridge becomes frozen. Care must
be exercised to ensure that the equipment does not sustain damage by an overnight freeze up or floating ice
and debris in the spring.

Nonstandard Bridging
J-9. Although generally not desirable from the point of view of task duration, nonstandard bridging from
local resources and prefabricated components may be an alternative. It provides the engineer with the
flexibility to construct each bridge to suit the particular site requirements.
J-10. Ice bridging is an effective crossing technique but time consuming to complete. As indicated by the
name, it can only be constructed when conditions permit. Its purpose is to reinforce the already present ice
cover on large bodies of water, streams, and rivers, allowing the passage of heavier load classes that would
otherwise be supported by the existing ice. Care must be taken to ensure that the initial ice span is stable and
not simply a floating ice mass. (See TM 5-349.)

Nonbridging Techniques
J-11. Gap-crossing techniques that may be considered include—
 Culverts. Culverts may be an adequate means of crossing streams and rivers. The requirement
for bridging material is minimized, but conversely, it may necessitate the movement of resources
and heavy equipment to the construction site.
 Aerial ropeways/cableways. These crossing methods can be used if movement is limited to
personnel and equipment. They provide a quick and effective method of traversing a gap.

J-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Gap-Crossing Considerations for Special Environments

 Fords. Where permafrost is prevalent, the preparation of entrances and exits is extremely
difficult. The fords could deteriorate rapidly under traffic.
 Amphibious crossings. The use of amphibious crossings should not be overlooked. These
crossings are limited in the same manner as fords.

MOUNTAINOUS AREAS
J-12. Terrain is the primary factor that affects missions in mountainous regions. Mountains are commonly
classified as low or high, based on their elevation. Low mountains have an elevation of 1,000 to 3,000 feet.
Usually, high mountains have elevations exceeding 3,000 feet. Mountainous areas are characterized by
rugged and poorly trafficable terrain, steep slopes, and valleys. Movement is normally canalized along the
valleys and lateral, cross-country movement is difficult. In the mountains, areas can be barren of vegetation
while other parts are covered by thick forests. Rivers and watercourses are often deep and fast flowing. If a
river is slow moving, it is usually because it is a major river in a valley. The climate in mountainous areas
can vary widely, depending on the geographical location. Mountainous areas are often subject to heavy
precipitation, either in the form of rain or snow. Abrupt temperature changes or heavy precipitation,
particularly during short periods, can dramatically increase water current in mountain streams and rivers.
Army geospatial engineer teams that are organic down to the BCT/RCT level can provide geospatial
information and products to help the staff better understand the effects of terrain based on weather. (See FM
3-97.6 and TC 3-97.61 for detailed information on mountain operations.)

TERRAIN
J-13. The sharp relief of the mountains creates many dead ends, covered approaches, and extreme slopes.
The major characteristics of many mountainous areas include—
 Topography. The terrain is characterized by—
 Steep precipitous slopes and vertical crags.
 Valleys that canalize movement and can rapidly change in size and direction.
 Exaggerated slopes that makes movement difficult.
 Few roads that normally follow valleys.
 Hydrology. Deep, swift-running rivers and streams, especially after rain or during a thaw, could
scour abutments or piers. Special consideration may be required for drainage.
 Vegetation. At higher elevations, vegetation may be very scarce, affecting the availability of
resources for nonstandard bridging and soil stability. However, the forested areas may provide the
engineer with an abundance of natural materials for construction. These forests will also restrict
movement to prepared routes.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

J-14. Personnel operating in mountainous areas can be affected by the altitude, which can result in reduced
work rates or altitude sickness. Dismounted personnel also have to work harder climbing up and down the
slopes. Accident rates can increase due to small injuries, sprains, and bone breaks when moving and working
in the rough terrain. At certain times of the year, the threat from exposure (high winds, cold, rain) is severe.
These are considerations when planning a gap crossing.
J-15. Road widths and load capacity may limit the size and type of vehicles that can be used. Roads may
have to be used as one-way routes or with traffic control to allow safe two-way traffic. Moving up and down
steep roads can increase movement times, impact maintenance requirements on vehicles, and increase fuel
consumption. Off-road mobility may be difficult. Communications may be difficult due to interference by
the mountains.

GAP-CROSSING TECHNIQUES
J-16. Bridging techniques in mountainous and hilly areas are not unique. The means or construction may
have to be adapted to the realities of constricted sites, terrain, hydrology, and crossing sites. In some
instances, it may be necessary to airlift equipment and materials to the site. This would normally be done to

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Appendix J

bypass the traffic and speed up the movement of the bridging or gap-crossing materiel. Most available
crossing sites will have already been used by the local inhabitants or are part of the existing traffic network.

Standard Bridging
J-17. Most standard bridging will be laid as a single span. In some cases, MGBs could be constructed with
piers. Whether single or multispan, the potential for water damage must be considered as the water level
could change radically and rapidly. Multispan bridges will often use existing piers; if a pier must be
constructed, it must be well sited and protected against water and ice damage.
J-18. The standard ribbon bridge and the IRB will have limited use in mountainous terrain, other than across
rivers with slow currents. The engineer planner, in conjunction with the terrain team, should consider the
potential need for these bridges early, due to the significant challenges presented by the terrain.

Nonstandard Bridging
J-19. Any nonstandard bridge may prove useful in some areas, especially if locally procured materials are
readily available (such as a gap crossing in a forested area). Unless standard bridging is in short supply, it
may not be feasible to transport nonstandard bridging material over long distances. Nonstandard bridging is
relatively slow and most suitable for small gaps. It should be considered for lateral movement, freeing up
standard bridging for more time-sensitive gap crossings.

Nonbridging Techniques
J-20. Nonbridging Gap-crossing techniques that can be considered include—
 Culverts. Culverts may be an adequate means of crossing streams. The requirement for bridging
material is minimized, but conversely, it may necessitate the movement of resources and heavy
equipment to the construction site.
 Aerial ropeways. These crossing methods can be used if movement is limited to personnel and
equipment. They provide a quick and effective method of traversing a gap. In some mountainous
areas, the local inhabitants may have sites for aerial ropeways or personnel suspension bridges.
 Fords. The preparation of entrances and exits may be extremely difficult if the banks are rocky
or shear. Explosives and drilling may be required to make the cuts. If the bottom of the ford is
hard, then such a ford could be heavily used, paying attention to the water current and any changes
in the water level. The fording option should be considered, because some time and effort
expended to opening a ford could result in a low-maintenance, high-volume traffic route.
 Amphibious crossings. Considerations for amphibious crossing in mountainous and hilly terrain
include:
 Entrances and exits. Sheer and rocky banks to the watercourse could prevent the vehicles
from safely entering the water and prevent their exit.
 Water current. Fast currents may prevent an amphibious crossing.
 Assault boats. Assault boats are a potential crossing resource in mountainous and hilly
terrain, but they will be affected by water current. Proximity of rapids or falls must be taken
into account when deciding on the use of assault boats. Current outboard motors provided
with the assault boats may not be strong enough to move a fully laden boat upstream in strong
current.

DESERT AND EXTREMELY HOT AREAS

J-21. Deserts are extensive, arid, treeless environments that suffer from a severe lack of rainfall and possess
extreme daily temperature fluctuations. The terrain is sandy with boulder-strewn areas, mountains, dunes,
deeply eroded valleys, areas of rock and shale, and salt marshes. Any amount of precipitation can cause
sudden and significant increases in water flow, particularly in dried up lake beds, marshes, river channels,
gullies, or wadis. Camouflage, concealment, light, and noise disciplines are important considerations in desert
terrain. Target acquisition and observation are relatively easy in desert terrain. (See FM 90-3/FMFM 7-27
for additional information on the considerations associated with desert missions.)

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 Gap-Crossing Considerations for Special Environments

TERRAIN
J-22. The major characteristics of deserts and extremely hot areas include—
 Hydrology. Precipitation in hot climates can range from zero (deserts) to intense (rain forests).
Depending on the location, dry gaps may turn into deep, fast streams and rivers, which can scour
abutments or piers. Special consideration may be required for drainage.
 Vegetation.
 In desert areas, vegetation may be very scarce, affecting the availability of resources for
nonstandard bridging and soil stability.
 In extremely hot areas that contain jungles or forests, there will be an abundance of natural
materials for the construction of nonstandard bridging, but movement is normally restricted
to prepared routes.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

J-23. The extreme heat in desert areas can be debilitating, resulting in heat casualties and reduced work
rates. The environment is also prone to diseases and disease-bearing insects and animals. Units must plan for
increased water requirements for drinking and hygiene.
J-24. The desert climate may affect equipment in many ways, to include the following:
 Temperatures and dryness are major causes of equipment failure. Wind action lifts and spreads
sand and dust, clogging and jamming anything that has moving parts. Vehicle maintenance will
have to take the hot weather and dust into account. This could include more frequent filter changes
and other increased maintenance.
 Soil compaction may be difficult or require additives due to the lack of moisture. If water is
required, this will be an extra burden on the water supply system.
 Blade edges may wear more rapidly in dry, abrasive soil and rocks.

GAP-CROSSING TECHNIQUES
J-25. Bridging in hot weather is generally conventional in nature; however, heavy reliance may be placed
on the tactical and support bridging assets as a means of maintaining the momentum of mechanized
formations.

Standard Bridging
J-26. There are no unique issues with standard bridging in this type of climate other than some problems
with clearances due to metal expansion.
J-27. The IRB could still be used in desert or hot weather environments and should not be automatically
discounted. The division or BCT/RCT geospatial engineer teams can provide information concerning most
potential watercourses that may have to be crossed in a particular AO. Floating bridge assets may prove
useful for lateral moves.

Nonstandard Bridging
J-28. In desert conditions, there will normally be a lack of natural resources to allow the construction of
nonstandard bridging. It is possible that there will be stockpiles of man-made resources (pipes, other
construction material) that could be used. The use of such nonstandard materials may require a review of the
design if materials are not used according to the Theater Construction Management System.
J-29. Nonstandard bridging should be used when possible to best use standard bridging resources. In
extremely hot areas with jungles or other forests there may be an abundance of natural resources, permitting
the construction of bridges or rafts. In most cases, nonstandard bridging construction requires more time than
standard bridging.

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Appendix J

Nonbridging Techniques
J-30. Gap-crossing techniques to be considered include—
 Culverts. Culverts may be an adequate means of crossing streams. They should be considered
for dry watercourses; water may flow down the channel during the period of use. A risk assessment
may be made to fill in a dry watercourse as a more rapid means of crossing. The requirement for
bridging material is minimized, but conversely, it may necessitate the movement of resources and
heavy equipment to the construction site.
 Aerial ropeways. These crossing methods can be used if movement is limited to personnel and
equipment. They provide a quick and effective method of traversing a gap.
 Fords. Fords should be used when feasible.
 Amphibious crossings. Amphibious crossings can be employed when available.

JUNGLES AND FORESTS

J-31. Almost a third of the earth tropical zone is an area of high temperature and humidity where the natural
vegetation is largely rain forest. This area includes deciduous forests, swamps, and tropical grasslands. Gap-
crossing tasks in the jungle occur more frequently than in other areas; however, they are less complex in
terms of manpower and equipment involved.
J-32. As with all environments, rainfall is a consideration for where and when bridging assets can be most
effectively employed. If gap crossing is necessary during periods of extended rainfall or a monsoon season,
careful attention must be given to water levels. The engineer will find that relying on improvised bridging
techniques and the use of available natural resources will play a key role in the success of a mission. (See
FM 90-5 for additional information.)

TERRAIN
J-33. Jungles are humid, tropic areas with a dense growth of trees and vegetation. The majority of jungle
covers extensive tracts of hilly country. Jungle regions sometimes include rugged mountains, frequently with
razorback ridges abruptly intersected by deep and steep-sided valleys.
J-34. Some mountain chains may reach 10,000 feet or more and extend above the tree line to areas where
temperatures drop below freezing at night. The jungle terrain can be further described as follows:
 Coastal areas. The coastlines of jungle and forest areas include a wide variety of terrain, from
open beaches to dense mangrove swamps that sometimes extend for a considerable distance
inland. The coastal belt behind the beaches may vary from flat alluvial plains to narrow strips with
foothills rising abruptly near the shore. In flat coastal regions and near deltas, the area is seldom
well drained, resulting in numerous slow-moving streams, many of which finally flow into
swamps with tidal effects often evident well inland.
 Plains. Where extensive plains are found, they are usually in the form of river basins, deltas, or
high plateaus. The rivers often vary widely according to the season and where monsoon conditions
prevail; they may rise quickly and flood easily. Rice cultivation is a major feature of low-lying
plains. It requires prolonged flooding and the construction of numerous dykes, which give the
landscape a patterned appearance and hinder movement.
 Soils. The soils of the jungle areas vary widely, but they seldom provide a good surface for
wheeled traffic, especially during rainy periods.
 Hydrology. The large rainfall in jungle areas produces swift-flowing streams in the hills often
bordered by steep rocky banks and with frequent rapids. These streams drain into sluggish and
meandering rivers in the plains, which flood quickly and often take a long time to drain.

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 Gap-Crossing Considerations for Special Environments

 Vegetation. The heavy rainfall and high temperatures encourage rapid and continuous growth
and a consequent profusion of vegetation. Vegetation can further be explained as—
 Primary jungle. Primary jungle is the original growth of full and profusely leaved trees,
which occurs naturally in lowland tropical areas where the annual rainfall averages 6.5 feet
or more. Movement on foot through the jungle is very difficult as there is a tangled mass of
tropical vegetation. The worst obstacles are streams or riverbanks where even more dense
undergrowth may occur. Movement of wheeled vehicles is difficult, if not impossible.
 Secondary jungle. When primary or deciduous forest is cleared and later abandoned, a
secondary growth, known as secondary jungle, occurs. Due to exposure to sunlight, the bare
areas are rapidly overgrown by weeds, grasses, ferns, canes, thorns, and shrubs that reach a
height of 6 to 10 feet within a year. Movement is very slow for Soldiers/Marines on foot and,
while tanks can sometimes crash their way through, the growth of woody species and the
presence of old felled logs, stumps, and protruding roots that often litter the ground, create
conditions virtually impossible for wheeled vehicles.
 Deciduous forest. Deciduous forest occurs in areas that have a dry season lasting three to six
months. The trees are not as dense or as tall as in the primary jungle and some sunlight filters
through the canopy, encouraging profuse undergrowth. In the wet season, movement is
generally more difficult than in the primary jungle because of the amount of undergrowth.
However, movement is easier in the dry season because the forest floor is firmer and trees are
more wildly spaced. Vehicles can seldom negotiate deciduous forest without considerable
effort.
 Swamps. Swamps are commonplace in tropical jungles in all low-lying areas where there is
water. They produce a formidable combination of terrain and vegetation through which
movement is difficult except to a limited extent by foot or small boat.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

J-35. High temperatures combined with high humidity can become debilitating, resulting in heat casualties
and reduced work rates. The environment is also prone to diseases and disease-bearing insects and animals.
Units must plan for increased water needs for drinking and hygiene.
J-36. Equipment is affected in many of the same ways as in a desert environment. Protection/force
protection against water may be a serious problem, especially during periods of monsoon rains. The rain may
cause increased problems with mobility of the vehicles and equipment.

GAP-CROSSING TECHNIQUES
J-37. The following paragraphs describe bridging techniques in jungles and forests.

Standard Bridging
J-38. The road network in some parts of this environment can be very restricted. This means that the location
of standard bridging assets (tactical, support, or LOC bridging) must be carefully planned. Standard bridging
is essential to allow the momentum to be maintained, but it has to be in the right place at the right time. The
use of aviation to lift bridging equipment should be considered to reduce the burden on the road network. It
will not eliminate it; however, certain pieces of equipment cannot be lifted by Army aviation. Since the bridge
is of little use if a road network is not connected to it, the demands for clearing dense growth and creating or
improving the roads will still exist. The use of aviation to lift bridge components may make it possible to
construct the bridge concurrently with the preparation of the roads to get to it.
J-39. Floating bridge and raft resources can be critically important during jungle missions. Most jungles are
cut by large rivers that drain all of the water that falls to form the jungle. Most of these waterways are too
large to cross with tactical bridging, leaving the standard ribbon bridge or the IRB as the only feasible way
to cross. Locally available craft should be exploited, when possible.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 J-7

Appendix J

Nonstandard Bridging
J-40. Nonstandard bridging may be the predominant means of moving personnel and materiel through the
jungle. The jungle should have an abundance of natural building material that can easily be incorporated into
bridging tasks. Using nonstandard bridging will free up standard bridging resources to maintain freedom of
maneuver.

Nonbridging Techniques
J-41. Gap-crossing techniques that can be considered are—
 Culverts. Culverts may be an adequate means of crossing streams. The requirement for bridging
material is minimized, but conversely, it may necessitate the movement of resources and heavy
equipment to the construction site.
 Aerial ropeways. These crossing methods can be used if movement is limited to personnel and
equipment. They provide a quick and effective method of traversing a gap.
 Fords. The preparation of entrances and exits may be extremely difficult. The fords deteriorate
rapidly under traffic and heavy rainfall.
 Amphibious crossings. The use of amphibious crossings should not be overlooked. These
crossings are limited in the same manner as fords.
 Expedient raft. It may be possible to construct rafts with local material or boats.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR

CONDITIONS
J-42. Central to the planning of gap crossing in a situation compounded by CBRN conditions is an
assessment of the operational risk. The threat of having to operate in a CBRN environment can come from
multiple sources. They can be unexpected and employed through a broad range of tactics from clandestine
missions to large-scale attacks. They may be intended to cause psychological distress or diversion, hinder
missions, or cause mass casualties and force withdrawal. Because gap crossing tends to canalize forces and
severely restrict maneuver within the crossing area, it is critical to identify and quantify the risk of a CBRN
attack on the crossing. (See FM 3-11.3/MCRP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56; FM 3-11.4
/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46; and FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26
/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for additional information on CBRN passive defense for additional information.)
J-43. If intelligence suggests that a significant risk of a potential CBRN attack exists for the crossing site,
planners should conduct a focused risk assessment to determine the priority trade-offs, assessing the tactical
requirements against the additional time and assets required to execute the crossing in anticipation (or as a
result) of a contaminated area. The likely increase in the number of designated crossing locations to allow
for clean and dirty crossing lanes may cause a significant increase in the assets and time required to
accomplish the crossing. Planners must weigh these realities against the trade-off of time, assets, and risk to
the force and a successful accomplishment of the mission. It must be understood that not all CBRN hazards
have the same impact on the mission because different hazards have different degrees of lethality and
persistence. If it is determined that a crossing is inevitable in a potentially contaminated area, planners should
consider the following in their subsequent planning:
 Contamination avoidance.
 Force protection measures.
 Decontamination.
 Additional crossing sites and lanes.

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE
J-44. Contamination avoidance includes those measures taken to avoid or minimize the effects of CBRN
attacks and reduce the effects of CBRN hazards. Contamination avoidance helps to avert the disruption to
gap crossing by preventing casualties, eliminating unnecessary time in protective posture, and minimizing
decontamination requirements. Commanders need information about contamination hazards and locations of
clean areas (gained through CBRN reconnaissance, warning, and reporting) to determine alternative COAs

J-8 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Gap-Crossing Considerations for Special Environments

or other potential crossing sites. (See FM 3-11.3/MCRP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56 for
additional information.)

PROTECTION/FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES

J-45. CBRN protection/force protection is a command responsibility: the commander directs actions to
ensure continued mission accomplishment. In the event of potential CBRN use or when it becomes essential
to conduct a crossing in a contaminated area, it is imperative that all personnel are trained and have access to
individual protective equipment. In addition to individual protective equipment, collective protective shelters
can be placed in selected areas to provide additional cover and protection/force protection to a group of
Soldiers/Marines, enabling them to lower their individual protective posture. Extensive planning and logistic
support are required to maintain these systems. (See FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27
/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46 for additional information.)

DECONTAMINATION
J-46. Decontamination sites must be incorporated into the planning of gap crossing. The principles of speed
(decontaminate only what is necessary), priority (decontaminate the most essential items first), and limited
area (decontamination as close to the site of contamination as possible to limit spread) should guide planning.
For example, if the far side is not a contaminated area, personnel and equipment should be decontaminated
before departing the near side and if the situation permits, before entering the crossing area. If
decontamination must occur within the crossing area, a water source (such as a river) will speed and improve
the quality of the decontamination process. CBRN staff decontamination expertise must be included in the
planning and decisionmaking for how and when the decontamination of bridging equipment and units
involved in moving through the gap crossing will occur. Decontamination is described as the process of
making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing
chemical or biological, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (See FM 3-11.5
/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for additional information.)

ADDITIONAL CROSSING SITES AND LANES

J-47. This is similar to provisions that may need to be made for the use of MSRs in a CBRN environment.
Selected routes (lanes) may be designed and maintained as clean while others are designated as dirty. A single
lane may be maintained as dirty with alternating one-way traffic, or it may be necessary to create a dirty lane
in each direction across the gap. Sustainment and maintenance of a clean lane (or series of lanes) would
require similar considerations of desired traffic flow and time available. Additional crossing sites and lanes
would require additional bridging or rafting assets, CBRN personnel, and military police.

DISLOCATED CIVILIANS OR REFUGEES

J-48. The presence of many dislocated civilians or refugees is an example of an added condition that can
significantly increase the complexity (control and capability) of a gap crossing. This condition is a
consideration during any mission where the population envisions a perceived or real threat (economic
hardship, social injustice, ethnic differences, objections to an organization or government, political unrest,
terrorist threats, or pursuit by an enemy army) or simply a better opportunity in another location. Retrograde
crossings may be the most likely to include large numbers of dislocated civilians or refugees to contend with.
J-49. Planners must ensure that they include COAs to deal with the civilians. Considerations impacting the
COA development could include the tactical situation, the numbers of civilians involved, the desire of U.S.
and host nation forces to safely support the movement of the civilians to the other side of the gap, the amount
of bridging and other supporting assets available, and time constraints. As the planning process continues, at
least two other considerations must be addressed. First, control of the civilians must be maintained to prevent
disruption of the crossing, destruction of assets, and the possibility of violence among the gathered civilians
or against multinational forces. Second, if the civilians will be allowed to cross, the crossing priority and
special accommodations that will be necessary to support their crossing must be determined.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 J-9

Appendix J

CONTROL
J-50. Any gap crossing has control issues and challenges, and the addition of civilians merely heightens the
requirement for control. Ideally, the movement of civilians can be included in the planning for the gap
crossing with only minimal additional control assets required to support additional capacity so that all needing
to cross can do so in an appropriate timeframe. When capacity cannot be increased, significant additional
control may be required for crossing success. This additional control will include additional engineer, military
police, and command and control assets (at a minimum). If the panic among civilians and the numbers are
great enough, combat forces may also be required to ensure that the crossing is accomplished in an orderly
fashion. The crossing of civilians will compete with the necessary crossing of military forces and equipment.
Large numbers of civilians and their property create a capacity and a control challenge.

CROSSING PRIORITY
J-51. When a gap-crossing site has additional personnel and perhaps unique sorts of equipment (that is,
wagons or even livestock needing to cross), the number and type of crossing lanes or the time available to
complete the crossing must be increased. Developing a crossing priority in a waiting area as far back as
feasible in the crossing area will assist in maintaining control and facilitate a more organized and speedy
crossing.

TECHNIQUES
J-52. Gap-crossing techniques to consider are—
 Fords. Fords should be used when feasible.
 Focused lanes. Keeping the civilian flow on designated crossing lanes will be essential. Military
bridging may not always allow for the rapid movement of civilians and their materiel or their
various modes of transportation. Expedient or locally procured products may be necessary to
augment the decking or roadway surface for one or more of the lanes.
 Amphibious crossings. Amphibious crossing means can be employed when they are available.
 Rotary-wing crossings. Depending on the number of civilians, their possessions, and the
availability of aircraft, helicopters may provide one of the most efficient method for crossing
selected categories of detainees or civilians. Capacity may be one of the greatest issues to resolve
when considering the use of rotary wing to transport in this sort of scenario.

J-10 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-90.4 is
the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other
terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD antiaccess and area denial
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
ABCT armor brigade combat team
ABV assault breacher vehicle
ACE armored combat earthmover
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AFH Air Force handbook
AFJPAM Air Force joint pamphet
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)
AN/PSS Army-Navy/portable special search
AO area of operations
AOA amphibious objective area
AP antipersonnel
AR Army regulation
ATF amphibious task force
ATP Army techniques publication
attn attention
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
AV antivehicle
AVL antivehicle landmine
AVLB armored vehicle-launched bridge
BCT brigade combat team
BHL battle handover line
BLT battalion landing team
CAB combined arms battalion
CAC crossing area commander
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CFZ critical friendly zone

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 Glossary-1

Glossary

CG Coast Guard
CGTTP Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures
CLF commander, landing force
CLZ craft landing zone
COA course of action
COMDTINST Commandant of the Coast Guard instruction
COP common operational picture
CP command post
DA Department of the Army
DC District of Columbia
DOD Department of Defense
DSB dry support bridge
EA engagement area
EH explosive hazard
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ERP engineer regulating point
ERT engineer reconnaissance team
ESV engineer squad vehicle
FACE forward aviation combat engineering
Fed federal
FM field manual
FMFM fleet Marine force manual
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
IED improvised explosive device
(Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield/(Marine Corps) intelligence
IPB preparation of the battlespace
IR Information requirement
IRB improved ribbon bridge
JABS Joint Attack Munition Assault Breaching System
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JP joint publication
LAV light armored vehicle
LCAC landing craft air cushion
LCU landing craft utility
LF landing force
LOC line of communications
LFSP landing force support party
MAC mobility assault company
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

Glossary-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Glossary

MCM mine countermeasures

MCMC mine countermeasures commander
MCO Marine Corps order
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available
METT-TC (Army) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations
MGB medium girder bridge
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
MLC military load classification
MO Missouri
MOD modification
MOUT military operations in urban terrain
MRBC multirole bridge company
MSCoE Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MSR main supply route
N-2 Navy component intelligence staff officer
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
No. number
NSFS naval surface fire support
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWP Navy warfare publication
O&M operations and maintenance
OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations instruction
OPSEC operations security
PL phase line
POB point of breach
POP point of penetration
RCT regimental combat team
REB rapidly emplaced bridge
REBs rapidly emplaced bridge system
RFI request for information
S-2 intelligence staff officer
S-3 operations staff officer
S-4 logistics staff officer
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 Glossary-3

Glossary

SCATMINE scatterable mine

SITEMP situation template
SOP standard operating procedure
SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault
STANAG standardization agreement
Std standard
TC training circular
TCP traffic control post
TF task force
TM technical manual
TRADOC United States Training and Doctrine Command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UFC Unified Facilities Criteria
UNTL universal Naval task list
U.S. United States
USA United States Army
USAES United States Army Engineer School
USCG United States Coast Guard
USMC United States Marine Corps
UXO unexploded explosive ordnance
VA Virginia

SECTION II – TERMS
*assured mobility
A framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to deploy,
move, and maneuver where and when desired, to achieve the commander’s intent.
*breach area
A defined area where a breach occurs
*breach
A synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver commander conducted to
allow maneuver through an obstacle.
*bridgehead
An area on the enemy side of the linear obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of
the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security of
crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack.
*bridgehead force
A force that assaults across a gap to secure the enemy side (the bridgehead) to allow the buildup and
passage of a breakout force during gap crossing.
*call forward area
1. (Army) In gap crossing, the final preparation waiting area within the crossing area. 2. (Marine
Corps) The area at the departure airfield where plane loads are assembled in a ready condition before
being directed to the loading ramp area. The joint inspection is conducted in this area.

Glossary-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Glossary

*clearing
A mobility task that involves the elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed
by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire.
*covert crossing
A planned crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that is intended to be undetected
*deliberate crossing
The crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that requires extensive planning and detailed
preparations.
*engineer regulating point
Checkpoint to ensure that vehicles do not exceed the capacity of the crossing means and to give drivers
final instructions on site-specific procedures and information, such as speed and vehicle interval. Also
called ERP.
*far side objective
A defined location oriented on the terrain or on an enemy force that an assaulting force seizes to
eliminate enemy direct fires to prevent the enemy from interfering with the reduction of obstacles and
allows follow-on forces to move securely through created lanes.
*gap
a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be bridged.
*gap crossing
The projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap).
*hasty crossing
The crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap using the crossing means at hand or those readily
available, and made without pausing for elaborate preparations.
*lane
A route through, over, or around an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides passage of a force.
*line of communications bridging
Bridges used to establish semipermanent or permanent support to road networks
* mobility tasks
Those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable freedom of movement
and maneuver.
*nonstandard bridging
Bridging that is purposely designed for a particular gap and typically built using commercial or locally
available materials.
*overbridging
A method used to reinforce, provide emergency repair, or augment existing bridges or bridge spans
using standard bridging.
*point of breach
The location at an obstacle where the creation of a lane is being attempted.
*point of penetration
The location, identified on the ground, where the commander concentrates their efforts at the enemy
weakest point to seize a foothold on the far side objective.
*proof
The verification that a lane is free of mines or explosive hazards and that the width and trafficability at
the point of breach are suitable for the passing force.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 Glossary-5

Glossary

*reduce
A mobility task to create and mark lanes through, over, or around an obstacle to allow the attacking
force to accomplish its mission.
*reduction area
A number of adjacent points of breach that are under the control of the breaching commander.
*standard bridging
Any bridging constructed using manufactured bridge systems and components that are designed to be
transportable, easily constructed, and recoverable for reuse.
*support bridging
Bridges used to establish semipermanent or permanent support to planned movements and road
networks.
*tactical bridging
Bridges employed under the threat of direct or indirect fire for the immediate mobility support of
combat maneuver forces in close combat and are intended to be used multiple times for short periods.
*waiting area
Locations on both banks (or sides) that are adjacent to the route or axis used for the concealment of
vehicles, troops, and equipment while an element is waiting to resume movement.

Glossary-6 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. Most Army publications are
available online at <www.apd.army.mil>. Most joint publications are available online at <www.dtic.mil
/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 7 December 2015.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY
Most Army publications are available online at <www.apd.army.mil>.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 1-03. The Army Universal Task List. 2 October 2015.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-09. Fires. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
AR 25-30. Army Publishing Program. 3 June 2015.
AR 530-1. Operations Security. 26 September 2014.
ATP 2-22.7. Geospatial Intelligence. 26 March 2015.
ATP 3-11.50. Battlefield Obscuration. 15 May 2014.
ATP 3-09.12. Field Artillery Target Acquisition. 24 July 2015.
ATP 3-34.80. Geospatial Engineering. 23 June 2014.
ATP 3-36. Electronic Warfare Techniques. 16 December 2014.
ATP 3-39.10. Police Operations. 26 January 2015.
ATP 3-39.12. Law Enforcement Investigations. 19 August 2013.
ATP 3-39.30. Security and Mobility Support. 30 October 2014.
ATP 3-60. Targeting. 7 May 2015.
ATP 3-90.37. Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. 29 July 2014.
ATP 4-15. Army Watercraft Operations. 3 April 2015.
ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 5 April 2013.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.
FM 3-04.111. Aviation Brigades. 7 December 2007.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 2 April 2014.
FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 26 August 2013.
FM 3-81. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. 21 April 2014.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 References-1

References

FM 3-90.5. The Combined Arms Battalion. 7 April 2008.

FM 3-96. Brigade Combat Team. 8 October 2015.
FM 3-97.6. Mountain Operations. 28 November 2000.
FM 3-99. Airborne and Air Assault Operations. 6 March 2015.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM 90-5. Jungle Operations. 16 August 1982.
TC 3-97.61. Military Mountaineering. 26 July 2012.
TC 5-210. Military Float Bridging Equipment. 27 December 1988.
TM 3-34.63. Paving and Surfacing Operations. 13 August 2013.
TM 3-34.83. Engineer Diving Operations. 2 August 2013.
TM 5-302-1. Army Facilities Components System: Design. 28 September 1973.
TM 5-302-2. Army Facilities Components System: Design. 28 September 1973.
TM 5-302-3. Army Facilities Components System: Design. 28 September 1973.
TM 5-302-4. Army Facilities Components System: Design. 28 September 1973.
TM 5-302-5. Army Facilities Components System: Design. 28 September 1973.
TM 5-349. Arctic Construction. 19 February 1962.
TM 5-5420-212-10-1. Operator’s Manual for Medium Girder Bridge Including Bridge Set.
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23 November 2015.
TM 5-5420-279-10. Operator Manual for Dry Support Bridge (DSB). 10 May 2004.
TM 5-5420-280-10. Operator’s Manual for Rapidly Emplaced Bridge (REB). 31 August 2006.
TM 5-6665-298-10. Operator’s Manual for Mine Detecting Set AN/PSS-12. 1 April 2002.
TM 5-6665-373-12&P. Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual (Including Repair Parts and Special
Tools List) for Detecting Set, Mine AN/PSS-14. 1 September 2006.
TM 9-2355-311-10-6-2. Operator’s Manual Volume 2 of 3 Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) Stryker.
30 May 2008.

JOINT
Most joint publications are available online at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-02. Amphibious Operations.18 July 2014.
JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 17 June 2011.
JP 3-17. Air Mobility Operations. 30 September 2013.
JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 30 June 2011.
JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 January 2013.

MARINE
MCWP 3-13. Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs). 17 February 2005.
MCWP 3-17. Engineering Operations. 14 February 2000.
MCWP 3-14.1. Light Armored Vehicle-25 Gunnery and Employment. 3 June 2011.
MCWP 3-34.1. Military Police Operations. 9 September 2010.
MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 24 August 2010.

References-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 References

MULTISERVICE
ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7. General Engineering. 25 February 2015.
ATP 3-34.84/MCRP 3-35.9A/NTTP 3-07.7/AFTTP 3-2.75/CGTTP 3-95.17. Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations. 13 February 2015.
ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations. 17 September 2014.
ATP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 6 May 2015.
ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D. Cold Region Operations. 28 January 2011.
FM 3-11.3/MCRP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance.
2 February 2006.
FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection. 2 June 2003.
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Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination.
4 April 2006.
FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008.
FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D. Explosive Hazards Operations. 27 March 2007.
FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L. Explosives and Demolitions. 11 July 2007.
FM 5-430-00-1/AFJPAM 32-8013. Planning and Design of Roads, Airfields, and Heliports in the
Theater of Operations–Road Design. Volume I. 26 August 1994.
FM 5-430-00-2/AFJPAM 32-8013, Volume II. Planning and Design of Roads, Airfields, and Heliports
in the Theater of Operations–Airfield and Heliport Design. Volume II. 29 September 1994.
FM 90-3/FMFM 7-27. Desert Operations. 24 August 1993.
MCRP 3-31.2A/NTTP 3-15.24. Mine Countermeasures in Support of Amphibious Operations. January
2008. <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/signpubs/r3312a.pdf>, accessed on 6 November 2015.
MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15. Naval Mine Warfare. Volume 1. September 2010.
MCWP 3-31.5/NTTP 3-02.1M. Ship-To-Shore Movement. May 2007.
MCWP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-02.2. Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations. May 2004.
OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO 3500.26A/USCG COMDTINST 3500.1B. Universal Naval Task List
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TM 3-34.21/MCRP 3-17.1A. Medium Girder Bridge. 10 November 2010.
TM 3-34.22/MCRP 3-17.1B. Military Nonstandard Fixed Bridging. 17 October 2013.
TM 3-34.43/MCRP 3-17.7H/NAVFAC MO 330/AFH 32-1034. Materials Testing. 3 April 2015.
TM 3-34.62/MCRP 3-17.71. Earthmoving Operations. 29 June 2012.
TM 3-34.64/MCRP 3-17.7G. Military Soils Engineering. 25 September 2012.
TM 3-34.86/MCRP 3-17.7J. Rigging Techniques, Procedures, and Applications. 16 July 2012.
TM 9-1375-215-13&P. Joint Technical Manual for MK 2 MOD 0, Mine Clearance System (Marine
Corps) and Mine Clearance Line Charge–MICLIC (Army) for Operator’s Unit and Direct
Support, Maintenance Manual with Components List, Repair parts and Special Tools List.
31 October 1997.

OTHER
DOD 5205.02M. DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual. 3 November 2008.

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 References-3

References

Fed-Std-376B. Preferred Metric Units for General Use by the Federal Government.
27 January 1993. <http://www.nist.gov/pml/wmd/metric/upload/fs376-b.pdf >, accessed on
6 November 2015.
STANAG 2036, Edition 6. Land Mine Laying, Marking, Recording and Reports Procedures.
27 January 2005. <https://nso.nato.int/protected/>, accessed on 6 November 2015.
Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
UFC 3-270-07. O&M: Airfield Damage Repair. 12 August 2002.
<https://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFC/ufc_3_270_07.pdf>, accessed on 6 November 2015.

PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.

REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at
<www.apd.army.mil>.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

WEB SITES
Army Knowledge Online, Doctrine and Training Publications Web site,
<https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>, accessed on 6 November 2015.
Army Publishing Directorate, Army Publishing Updates Web site,
<http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp>, accessed on 6 November 2015.
NATO Standardization Office Public Web site. <http://nso.nato.int/nso/>, accessed on
6 November 2015.

RECOMMENDED READINGS
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.
ATP 2-01. Plan Requirements and Assess Collection. 19 August 2014.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.
ATP 3-34.22. Engineer Operations–Brigade Combat Team and Below. 5 December 2014.
ATP 3-90.8. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations. 17 September 2014.
ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.
FM 2-0. Intelligence Operations. 15 April 2014.
FM 3-04.113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 7 December 2007.
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 1 July 2011.
FM 3-20.96. Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron. 12 March 2010.
FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 28 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
MCWP 3-12. Marine Corps Tank Employment. 21 March 2014.
MCWP 3-35.3. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). 26 April 1998.
TC 3-39.30. Military Police Leader’s Handbook. 11 August 2015.
TM 3-34.23. M2 Bailey Bridge. 13 August 2013.
TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A. Engineer Field Data. 17 October 2013.

References-4 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 Index
Entries are by page number.
A C E
airfield damage repair, 8-5 call forward area engineer regulating point, 4-6
amphibious assault vehicle, 5-6, definition, 4-10 definition, 4-11
5-7, C-7, C-8, D-4, D-8, D-9, E- clear engineer staff officer, 1-2, 1-10, 2-
4 definition, 6-1, 4 5, 2-11, 2-12, 3-9, 3-16, 4-16,
area clearance clearing operations 4-17, 4-19, 7-2, 7-6, 8-2, 8-3
planning, 6-13 area, 6-12 explosive hazards, ix
site layout, 6-14
combat road, 7-1 extraction zones, 8-1
armored combat earthmover, C-
combat trail, 7-1 F
12, C-20
command post, 4-12 far side objective
armored vehicle-launched bridge,
1-3, C-7, E-9 commander’s critical information definition, 3-2
requirements, 1-8 ferries, 5-3, 5-4
assault breacher vehicle, C-13
complex obstacle, 2-4, B-17 forward aviation combat
assembly area
definition, 4-11 composite risk management, 1-11 engineering, 8-1
assured mobility countermobility operations, 1-7, 2-
G
definition, 1-2 9
fundamentals, 1-2, 1-8 definition, 1-7 gap
definition, 1-3
attack position covert breach, 3-4
definition, 4-11 gap crossing, 4-1
covert crossing, 4-4
considerations, 4-2
definition, 4-4
B definition, 1-3
critical friendly zones, 1-9 fundamentals, 4-5
booby trap
definition, 2-4 crossing area phases, 4-12
definition, 4-9 technique, J-2
breach area, 3-3
definition, 3-2 crossing area commander, 4-10, gap-crossing
4-14 technique, J-5, J-9, J-11
breaching operation, 3-3
definition, 3-1 crossing means, 4-16, E-1, E-3, gap-crossing operation
fundamentals of, 3-7 E-4, E-27 arctic and cold weather, J-1
planning, 3-9, 3-14 crossing plan, 4-15, 4-20, 4-22 chemical, biological,
restrictive terrain, 3-7 radiological, or nuclear
crossing site conditions, J-9
tenets, 3-4 selection, 4-17
types of, 3-3 desert, J-5
crossing site commander, 4-11 forest, J-7
bridgehead jungle, J-7
crossing sites
definition, 4-7 mountainous areas, J-4
selection, 4-16
bridgehead forces types, 4-1
crossing timeline, 4-19
definition, 4-7
H
bridgehead line D
definition, 4-7 hasty breach
decisionmaking, 1-8, 1-11, 2-10,
definition, 3-4
bridges. See bridging. 2-12, 4-16, 7-6, J-10
hasty crossing
bridging deliberate breach, 3-3
definition, 4-2
in support of maneuver, 4-2 definition, 3-3
in support of movement, 5-1 holding area, 4-10
deliberate crossing, 4-1, 4-2, 4-7,
definition, 4-10
bridging types 4-14
nonstandard, 1-4, 5-3 definition, 4-1 I
standard, 1-4, 5-3 dislocated civilian, 1-9 in-stride breach, 3-4
bypass, B-16 diving team, 4-16, F-1, F-7, H-6 in-stride gap crossing, 4-4
dry support bridge, 4-2

8 March 2016 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 Index-1

Index

J definition, 1-1 reverse planning, 3-9

joint assault bridge, E-10 movement corridor ribbon bridge, G-4
definition, 1-2 river crossing, 1-3
L
N route clearance
landing craft air cushion, 5-5
natural obstacles, 2-2 methods, 6-10
landing zones, 8-1
lane nonstandard bridging S
definition, 3-1 definition, 1-4 scheme of movement and
marking, B-1 O maneuver, 2-8, 2-11
requirements, B-16 secure
obscuration, 3-7
line of communications bridging, definition, 3-8
5-1 obstacle
categories, 2-2 skip zone
definition, 1-4 definition, C-10
framework of, 2-1
logistics support bridge, E-19 slope, 2-3
obstacle intelligence, 2-5
M operational environment, 2-8 smoke, 3-8
maneuver operations process, 2-5 soil, 2-2
definition, 1-1 staging area, 4-10
overbridging
man-made obstacles, 2-3 definition, G-8 standard bridging
Marine Corps Planning Process, definition, 1-4
2-6
P
support bridging
medium girder bridge, E-13 planning process, 2-5 definition, 1-4
course of action analysis, 2-9
mine clearing blade, C-15 support-by-fire positions, I-4
course of action development,
mine countermeasures 2-8 suppress
definition, D-4 definition, 3-7
point of breach
minefield reduction, C-5, C-20 definition, 3-2 T
minehunting point of penetration tactical bridging
definition, D-4 definition, 3-2 definition, 1-4
minesweeping proof terrain, 2-1, 2-2
definition, D-4 definition, 3-1
terrain analysis, 7-2, 7-3, 8-3
mission analysis, 2-6, 3-14 R traffic control, G-7, H-4
mission, enemy, terrain and rafts, 5-3, 5-4 traffic control post
weather, troops and support
rapidly emplaced bridge system, definition, 4-11
available, and civil
considerations, I-1 E-12 V
mobility, 1-10 reduce, 3-2
vegetation, 2-2
definition, 1-2 definition, 3-8
mobility operations reduction W
definition, 1-3 definition, 3-1 waiting area
reduction area definition, 4-9
movement, 4-1
definition, 3-2 warfighting functions, 1-2
movement and maneuver
warfighting function, 1-1 retrograde crossing, H-1

Index-2 ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 8 March 2016

 ATP 3-90.4
8 March 2016

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1606001

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media
only (EMO).
PCN: 143 000163 00 PIN: 106185–000