1968 Legazpi - v. - Zurbano20240306 11 stzv6n

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25589. November 29, 1968.]
CITY OF LECAZPI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ROBERTO

ZURBANO, Judge of the CFI of Albay; ORESTES
MAGDARAOG, SOCORRO AMADOS, LOURDES ANTIVOLA,
RAFAELA YAN , CARLOS ARJONA, DOLOR BASALLOTE , Sr. ,
DOLOR BASALLOTE, Jr., and EDWIN BASALLOTE, respondents.
City Fiscal Aquilino P. Bonto for petitioner.

Judge Roberto Zurbano in his own behalf as respondent.
Miles L. Ludovice for other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW COURTS; JURISDICTION; INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

DETERMINE JURISDICTION OF COURT. — The jurisdiction of a court is
determined not by the aggregate but by the amount of each individual
claim. The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning joinder of causes of
action and permissive joinder of parties in whom or against whom any right
to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist are designed to save the parties unnecessary
work, trouble and expense, and not to enlarge the court's jurisdiction as
applied to the amount in controversy. This design is apparent from the
limitations expressed both in Section 5, Rule 2, Revised Rules of Court
subject to the Rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties, as
well as in Section 6, Rule 3, on permissive joinder of parties, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. The latter proviso, in effect, reiterates the
limitations expressed in Rule 2, Section 5.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER TO DEFINE
COURT'S JURISDICTION IN CONGRESS. — Section 2, Article VIII, of the
Constitution expressly vests in Congress "the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," so that in determining
whether or not a case lies within or without the jurisdiction of a court, the
statutory enactment is supreme.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY ACT; SECTION 88 SPECIFIES COURT'S
JURISDICTION OVER JOINED CLAIMS. — The latter portion of Section 88 of the
Judiciary Act must be the sole standard to be reckoned with in determining
the jurisdiction in civil actions where the claims or causes of action joined in
a single complaint are separately owned by or are due to different parties;
and it plainly states that the test for joined causes of action and parties shall
be the individual claims and not their aggregate. No resort to the Rules of
Court is permissible to circumvent the statutory prescription.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS NOT DESIGNED TO
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ENLARGE JURISDICTION. — Where the claims aggregated to an amount
beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court but each individual claim lay
within its jurisdiction, the aggregation could not be used to make up a
jurisdictional amount that would vest power in the Court of First Instance to
take cognizance of the case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. —
Where several persons joined as plaintiffs in filing an action for damages in
the Court of First Instance and the amount demanded by each of the
plaintiffs did not exceed P10,000 - except one whose claim was P10,500 —
the Court of First Instance was directed, on appeal, to dismiss the claims of
the plaintiffs whose claims did not exceed P10,000 since they are within the
jurisdiction of the proper municipal court, though they may be properly
joined therein in one single complaint.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay, in its Civil
Case No. 3032, overruling herein petitioner's motion to dismiss and holding
that said court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
Several persons had joined as plaintiffs in filing an action in the Court
of First Instance for damages against the City of Legazpi, and other
defendants (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Prudencio Barbudo, Antonio Arevalo and
Mauro Nebreja). The complaint charged that on 4 December 1964, a fire
truck, type 0-10, owned by the City of Legazpi, and driven by Prudencio
Barbudo, due to the imprudence and recklessness of said driver and of his
co-defendants, collided successively with a delivery truck of the Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co., then passenger bus No. 4516 which was in the act of overtaking
a parked sedan, and finally hit passenger bus No. PUB-4628. As a result, the
latter vehicle (PUB-4628) was practically demolished, and several of its
passengers were physically injured. Hence the suit, filed to recover alleged
damages due to the following:
Juan Marbella (owner of bus PUB-4628)P10,500.00
Orestes Magdaraog (passenger)2,500.00
Socorro Amados (passenger)4,500,00
Lourdes Antivola (passenger)2,500.00
Rafaela Yan (passenger)500.00
Carlos Arjona (passenger)500.00
Dolor and Edwin Basallote (passengers)1,000.00
Attorney's fees5,000.00
In due time, the City of Legazpi interposed a motion praying that, with
the exception of the claim of Juan Marbella, the complaint be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, because the amount demanded by each of the passenger
plaintiffs, including the ratable share in the attorney's fees, did not exceed
P10,000.00 hence their claims were within the exclusive civil jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court. In support of its move, the City of Legazpi invoked
section 88 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. 296, as amended by R.A. 2613 and
3828):
"'Sec. 88.Original jurisdiction in civil cases. — In all civil actions,
including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two (now
Rules 57 and 58) of the Ru les of Court, arising in his municipality or
city, and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the
municipal judge and the judge of a city court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the value of the subject matter or amount
of the demand does not exceed ten thousand pesos, exclusive of
interests and costs. Where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims
or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned
by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.' (Italics supplied)"
The counsel for the plaintiffs objected. The court of First Instance
sustained the objection, and overruled the motion to dismiss, holding that
the case was within its jurisdiction, in view of Section 3 of Rules of Court 3,
now Revised Rule 2, Section 5, that provides:
"SEC. 5.Joinder of causes of action. — Subject to Rules
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties, a party may in
one pleading state, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party (a) if the said
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for demands for
money, or are of the same nature and character.
"In the cases falling under clause (a) of the preceding
paragraph, the action shall be filed in the inferior court unless any of
the causes joined falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, in which case it shall be filed in the latter court.
"In the cases falling under clause (b) the jurisdiction shall be
determined by the aggregate amount of the demands, if for money,
or by their nature and character, if otherwise."
applied in International Colleges vs. Argonza, 90 Phil. 470, and Soriano y Cia
vs. Jose, 86 Phil. 523.
Unable to secure reconsideration of the denial of its motion to dismiss,
the City of Legazpi appealed directly to this Court, insisting that the Court of
First Instance had no jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs, save that of
Juan Marbella.
The issue, therefore, is whether jurisdiction should be determined by
aggregate claims of all the injured passengers or by the amount of each
individual claim.
We rule for the appellant. We have ruled in A. Soriano y Cia vs. Jose, 86
Phil. 523, that the provisions of the Rules of Court, concerning joinder of
causes of action and permissive joinder of parties "in whom or against whom
any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist," are designed to save the parties
"unnecessary work, trouble and expense, . . . and not to enlarge the court's
jurisdiction as applied to the amount in controversy" (cas. cit. page 526).
This design is apparent from the limitations expressed both in Section 5 of
Revised Rule 2, "subject to the Rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties," as well as in Section 6, Rule 3, on permissive joinder of
parties, "except as otherwise provided in these Rules." The latter proviso, in
effect, reiterates the limitations expressed in Rule 2, Section 5.
And it could not be otherwise. The Constitution (Section 2, Article VIII)
expressly vested in Congress "the power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts", so that in determining whether or not
a case lies within or without the jurisdiction of a court, the statutory
enactment is supreme. The latter portion of Section 88 of the Judiciary Act
(previously quoted) must be, therefore, the sole standard to be reckoned
with, and it plainly states that the test for joined causes of action and parties
shall be the individual claims, and not their aggregate. No resort to the Rules
of Court is permissible to circumvent the statutory prescription.
Manifestly, the court below was misled by the fact that inInternational
Colleges vs. Argonza (supra) the claims aggregated to an amount beyond
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court; but each individual claim lay within its
jurisdiction, and we held that the aggregation could not be used to make up
a jurisdictional amount that would vest power in the Court of First Instance to
take cognizance of the case.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is annulled and set aside, except
as to plaintiff Juan Marbella. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to
dismiss the claims of the other plaintiffs since they are within the jurisdiction
of the proper municipal court, though they may properly be joined therein in
one single complaint. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-25589. November 29, 1968.]

CITY OF LECAZPI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ROBERTO

City Fiscal Aquilino P. Bonto for petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW COURTS; JURISDICTION; INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

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