EXTERNAL MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF

CONGO CRISIS: IMPLICATION FOR THE GREATER LAKE REGION.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one political body in continental Africa with a
disconcerting history of several civil wars and miscellaneous forms of skirmishes with
devastating internal and trans-borders consequences.
According to International Rescue Committee data from April 2003, an approximated 3.3
million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 1998 and 2003. About
eight African states were involved (Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
Chad and Sudan).
African (especially from South Africa and Botswana), American, Belgian, British, French
and European Union negotiators all went about as middle people in the contention.
The vast majority of the contention happened in Eastern Congo where more than 20
million people live. This locale has the most elevated demise rate of any conflict region at
present, with mortality rates for children under five ranging up to nearly 30 per cent a year in
areas of extreme insecurity.
At some stage in summer 2003, in the South Kivu Province, more than 5 000 women and
young children had reported being raped. In Eastern Congo, individuals have no entrance to
administrations of any kind- no clean water, health, education, transport or housing.
The international community - states, international organizations and NGOs - does not
appear to have reacted satisfactorily to this emergency.
Scarcely two weeks of turning into a sovereign in June 1960, DRC experienced a
uprising that catalyzed a chain of occasions that finished with an out and out civil war and an
attempted breakaway of mineral rich Katanga province. The first Congolese war moved off with
a force tussle between the Marxist Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph
Kasavubu.
Cold War Ideological contrasts were provoked to be the main driver of the fracas
between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. Through a high wired intrigue
between the Belgians, CIA, and the local defence forces Prime Minister Lumumba was arrested
and killed in mysterious circumstances.
The first Congolese civil war happened at the crest of the ideological war between the
West and East, with former Superpowers (United States of America and former Union Of Soviet
Socialists Republics) and their ideological club members pushing and pulling the strings through
proxies in the Congo and neighbouring countries (BBC News November 2012).
The Congolese early 60s war made history in complicated fronts: first, it was first of its
kind in a sovereign country in the continental Africa; and two, the war gave birth to the first
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission since the making of the worldwide body after the
Second World War in 1945.
Various narrations even hold that Prime Minister Lumumba was murdered while under
the authority of United Nations peacekeepers, a force he trusted much thereby throwing and any
speck of doubt about their sincerity and neutrality to the wind.
 After the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, President Kasavubu took hold of
power but was incapable to even out a country as large as the size of Western Europe with some
of the world largest deposit of mineral resources.
Congo is moreover blessed with rivers that can produce hydro power to the whole Africa
and beyond. Added to these abundant natural endowments is the enormous and talented populace
that has a large labour force for companies and agricultural sectors which employs more over
95% of the people in the Congo. Impacting and opposing powers were so overpowering for
President Kasavubu to handled or stabilise.
By 1965 the boat of Kasavubu’s leadership in the Congo capsized through a coup by one
Joseph Mobutu later Mobutu Sese Seko after his 1971 cultural transformation that saw changing
of the name of persons, towns and even the country. Democratic Republic of Congo was
sanctified with a new name called Zaire as well as cities like Kisangani and Lubumbashi. Gen.
Mobutu ruled the west Congo for 32yrs, a rule that was described by irredentism, predation,
clientism, restraint, and suppression of citizen’s fundamental human rights.
This study reviewed the European Union military intervention in summer 2003. On 12
June 2003, the European Union sent 2 000 troops to the north east of the DRC in Bunia.
This European Union mission was code-named 'Artemis'. Its aim was to give to the
stabilization of the security state of affairs and the enhancement of the humanitarian situation in
Bunia. This operation ended legitimately on 1 September 2003.
The Africa’s Great Lakes conflict has engrossed international and regional notice in
recent years in terms of news, academic analysis and humanitarian intervention concerns.
The attention has resulted from the complexities of the conflicts taking place and the
volatile political environment in the region.
The major determinant of the recent conflict and unsteadiness in the Great Lakes region
is the decay of the state and its instruments of rule of law in the Congo. For it is this decay that
has made it likely for smaller states the size of Congo’s smallest area, such as Uganda, or even of
a district, such as Rwanda, to take it upon themselves to inflict rulers in Kinshasa and to attack,
occupy and loot the territory of their giant neighbour.
According to Nzongola, such a circumstance would have been unbelievable if the
Congolese state institutions were functioning in a normal way as agencies of governance and
national security, rather than as Mafia-type organizations, serving the narrow minded hobbies of
Mobutu and his entourage, particularly his generals.
The Congo under a capable and responsible government could have halted the genocide
of 1994 in Rwanda, the second major determinant of instability in the region, or at least deterred
the genocidal forces from using Congolese territory to launch raids into Rwanda.
This disintegration of the Mobutu regime and the state decay connected with it made both
conceivable outcomes academic while Kabila’s sponsorship by Rwanda and Uganda made it
possible for these countries to feel entitled to determine the Congo’s destiny.
The power vacuum made by the state rot strengthened neighbors' determination to fish in
troubled waters and to maximize their resource extraction from the Congo.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Military intervention remains a petulant matter and Africa is no special case. The dispute centres
around three questions: who should intervene in the affairs of a independent state? On which
grounds should an intervention be based? In addition, how applicable is the principle of non-
interference in the age of globalisation where matters of sovereignty seem to have taken a
backseat and been replaced by human rights?
Despite past endeavors to tone down the sovereign forces of states through non-intercession
standards and the Just War Theory, mediation remains a test. The philanthropic contention or the
legitimate contentions of International Law additionally appear to have neglected to break the
discussion continuum. With Africa being at the focal point of post-Cold War military
intercessions, the mainland is accordingly not insusceptible to mediation problems – regardless
of the incomprehensible requirement for intercession. Keeping in mind the end goal to
accomplish peace and soundness, there is an apparently saw requirement for mediation. It can
likewise be brought up that the pervasiveness of contentions in Africa in the end require, or
could require, a military response and states as well as provincial and large-scale institutions
such as the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) all cater for this state of affairs.
Such an inevitability has a negative notoriety as in it needs to move around complex issues of
sway. However, in Africa, the armed conflicts, in a few cases, appear to require a cruel reaction.

Along these lines, by what means can African states advantage from the requirement for
intercession, yet maintain a strategic distance from the debates, for example, who ought to or
ought not to intercede, as saw in the Darfur situation?
In perspective of the previously stated it ought to be noted that this study intends to focus
primarily on military intervention, but it recognizes that concerns such as human rights and
morality have become gear in the interventionist debate. The AU, for example, claims the right
to intervene in member states under specific conditions. Subsequently, the level headed
discussion around power with respect to when intercession is real, and who ought to intercede,
remains a questioning inquiry, just on the grounds that there are examples where the AU and
states neglected to mediate or the intercession is not saw as authentic by distinctive gatherings. In
considering military intercession, certain decisions should be made, given that this marvel
remains a test in the international community in general and in Africa in particular. In light of
these perceptions, the hazardous way of intercession thusly stays notable in the interventionist
debate and calls for persistent scholarly attention. This is the case because those intervening for
humanitarian purposes for example, still oblige power to do, while the intercession is interested
in error, if not deception, by the host state.
Military intervention, political intervention and sanctions of an economic nature, aside
masquerade certain problems in international relations. It can be valued that comprehension the
advancement of military intervention epitomises endeavors at tending to the problems of power
and legalities encompassing intervention, in light of conflict situations so omnipresent in post-
Cold War Africa.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

As of 1998 until 2004, the DRC was going through a war and an intricate transition
period; the EU was developing both its military capabilities and an obvious interest in the
African continent.
The DRC war, which saw foreign, international and internal wars being fought at the
same time, lasted from 1998 until summer 2003, when a transitional power-sharing government
was set up.
 At the same time as the DRC crisis was unfolding, the EU was establishing military
structures, and teamwork between the two main European actors in Africa, the United Kingdom
and France, was legitimately increased.
This study is significant for the following reason:
 It is believed that the suggestion from this study will help the masses have more
knowledge on what external military intervention is all about.
 The result of this work will help in enlightening the effect of crisis so that people will
comprehend the good view of intervention
 The study will as well expose to the rescue committee and establishment that a significant
strategies is a somewhat than a strong or an appendage to the intervention. This will make
likely an enhanced beau fait with their co-dependent on one another, and therefore form a
formidable tactical team for proper protection.
 The study will also help the affected countries to play down the erroneous belief and
stereotyped view of their ability to tackle crisis
 Conclusively, it possibly will serve as a work of reference to future researchers in the
area.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of the current study is to evaluate the competence and effectiveness of the
existing mechanisms for conflict deterrence and management, and the extent to which the link
between Human Rights Norms and Conflict Prevention and Management may act as an
alternative approach to preventing and resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts.

Specifically, the study is intended to achieve the purpose with the following objectives:

 To appraise the adequacy and effectiveness of the currently existing EU and UN

approaches to conflict prevention and resolutions as has been applied in relation to the
Africa's great lakes generally and in the DRC conflicts in particular.
 To evaluate the extent to which, violations of human rights principles within the region
has been one of the main contributing factors for the frequent eruptions of internal violent
conflicts in the region. In this respect, the study is intended to review the various (local)
laws and regulations, particularly those relating to citizenship, to determine their
contribution to the eruption of conflicts in the religion;
 To research on the best ways in which the link between human rights and conflict
prevention and management will improve the capacity of the region for conflict
prevention, management and resolution.
 This study will as a result make out the various types of human rights the violation of
which are prone to triggering conflicts in the region; with a view to disputing that respect
for such rights will not only reduce the possibility of eruption of more conflicts, but will
also resolve the existing ones. Lastly, integration of human rights in current efforts to
build strong and reliable mechanisms for Peace and Conflicts Prevention and
management is highly recommended with the intention to enhance the state of security
and stability in the region and in the African continent at large.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Consequently, the following research questions will be addressed:

 What are the implications of this European Union intervention for cooperation among EU
states on military problems, future EU military interventions?
 How does the impact of human rights ensure effective conflict resolution in the African
Great Lakes Region?
 Why did the European Union intervene in the DRC?
 Are the currently existing EU and UN conflict prevention and management mechanisms
adequate and effective?
 How have human rights violations (abuses) contributed to the upsurge of conflicts in the
Africa’s Great Lakes Region?

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS
Hypothesis is a tentative statement about the universe which may or may not be true. For the
purpose of this research work, the following hypothesis is considered.
• Is there a significant relationship between adequacy and effectiveness of the currently
existing European Union and UN approaches in relation to the prevention and resolutions of
DRC conflicts?
• Is there a significant relationship between violations of human rights principles and
eruptions of internal violent conflicts in the region?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

External military intervention in the democratic republic of Congo crisis: implication for the
greater lake region was the influence of this study with a major focus on outside military
intervention.

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The limitations for this study are as follows:
• The results are restricted by the instrument used.
• The results are self-reported in nature and some variables are based on respondent
opinions.
• The respondents may not have had enough knowledge to respond accurately.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
DRC has after some time created a considerable measure of enthusiasm from researchers
because of its ceaseless conflict. They make clear the assortment of armed groups with diverse
interests, the adventure of M-23(March 23 Movement) and the involvement of the UN Force
Intervention Brigade to conquer the most organized mutineer group in the constituency. These
researchers do notice however that the destruction of M-23 won't the only one acquire peace
some district of DRC.
Other Scholars maintain that the intricacy of the war in some area of DRC with its disheveled
web of actors pursuing an assortment of motivation can be overpowering and befuddling.
Throughout the years, connections have moved. Companions have gotten to be enemies,
adversaries have ended up companions, and political circumstances have changed, every now
and again adjusting the power equation in Africa’s Great Lakes Region.
Since the Congolese state does not have a restraining infrastructure over the method for
roughness in areas DR Congo, and elements of its armed forces repeatedly involve in abuses
alike to those of militias, the region is a fertile environment for the development and growth of
armed groups and warlord-ism. Accordingly, roughness is habitually exchanged for money,
political power, and control of natural resources and this circumstance has left DR Congo’s
North and South Kivu regions in an extended emergency. One of the most recent outgrowths of
the unreliability is the M23 dissident gathering, which abandoned from DRC Forces and is
currently battling against the Congolese national armed force. Each of these gatherings seeks
after its hobbies through an arrangement of associations with other furnished groups.
According to Jacob Goodman says that the importunate letdown of the peace process in the DR
Congo to date makes clear that a change in system is required to actualize and secure a steady
peace in DRC. The tenets of the diversion in the DR Congo, so settled following quite a while of
containing and assuaging belligerents, must be changed.
However, Kevin J Kelley says that the triumph over the M23 renegades is encouraging the
United Nations to take the same forceful methodology against other forces in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and perhaps to export the model of bellicose UN intervention to other areas
affected by conflicts in Africa. The Force Intervention Brigade permitted in 2013 by the UN
Security Council is seen as having assumed a definitive part in the annihilation of M23. The UN-
supported separation of 3,000 African troops was fielded taking after the three-year-long
disappointment of customarily receptive UN peacekeeping to settle the DRC.
Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills certifies that the evident downfall of the 18-month-old M23
resistance is improbable, all alone; to convey peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo,
where, without a noteworthy vicinity of the state, no less than 40 furnished gatherings work, and
an unending helpful emergency holds on.
Some competent Researchers have apprehension concerning MONUSCO’s (United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) holdup to start
military operations against FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda).
Contained by MONUSCO (and in wider UN circles) there are different conclusions on whether
the gathering ought to be handled or not. Two troop-contributing nations stand in strategic
columns with the administration in Kigali and seem hesitant to do support of chasing its chief
rivals.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The effectual defense of civilians in DRC conflicts is tranquil problematical notwithstanding the
United Nations Force Intervention Brigade operations which the United Nations is exhibited as
the most star dynamic and imaginative actor in developing practical approaches to conflict
resolution by peace operations. On the other hand, scholars put forward two opposing theories on
the contemporary United Nations military Interventions:
 The Political Realism Theory and
 The Liberalism Theory
Some scholars buy to the political realism theory has this theory maintains that the UN
contribution in protracted conflicts may increase hostility and prolong human anguish. The
political realism theory seems to be ill-bred of the political and military certainty on the ground
where civilians are in fact beleaguered in most of current conflicts. Conversely the UN Force
Intervention Brigade was principally conceived to defend civilians in DRC as the Government of
Congo and MONUSCO has botched. The Intervention Brigade operations figured out how to de-
raise the contention. In the event that United Nations had never mediated, which would have
been best agreeing Luttwak theory, the conditions in the DRC would have been almost certainly
shoddier.
However, the liberalism theory stresses the defense of human rights. Liberals opines that human
beings possess fundamental natural rights to freedom consisting in the right to do whatever they
think fit to preserve themselves, if they don't abuse the equivalent freedom of others unless their
own particular protection is debilitated. People moreover have the right to be treated and a duty
to treat others as moral subjects and not as objects or means only which liberalist protectors
believe that people share a few intrigues, which can make both household and global
participation conceivable. To bolster this contention, liberals cite the surfacing of international
organizations, such as the United Nations, as an instance of commonness of throughway
cooperation.
Michael Walzer, a main researcher of this strand, contends that military intervention can be
defended if all else fails and as a way to ensure civilians from human rights violations, such as
genocide and crimes against humanity and this reacts to the progressing development in
peacekeeping operations particularly in connection to the utilization of power orders for the
Protection of Civilians. The thought of inaction even with precise savagery focusing on ethnic or
religious groups is against the international community’s widespread philosophy of justice and
equality. United Nations military operations ought to be surrounded not as a privilege to mediate,
yet rather a responsibility to protect (R2P). It is hence the liberalism theory that stirs sanctioned
United Nations military enforcement operations distinctively consented to protect civilians.
The establishment in 2013 of the disgusting force (Intervention Brigade) in opposition to
negative forces perpetrating atrocities in DRC is a rejoinder to the widespread fighting against
civilians in the region.
On the other hand peace authorization can't tackle the basic issues in many ranges of potential
application. The insertion of powers to stop battle may be successful in making the continuation
of viciousness incomprehensible; it can't, all by itself, make the conditions for enduring peace,
which includes the political grasp of peace as more attractive than war. The insertion of outside
power may break the cycle of savagery and persuade the soldiers that imperviousness to the
peace authorities is more agonizing than consistence to a forced peace. Since these contentions
are ordinarily profoundly established and urgent, the stun impact of outside power may turn out
to be close to a break between rounds of battling. The underlying drivers of DRC conflict will
defiantly have to be addressed from a political angle.
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
The prospects and the challenges that the DRC is facing in expressions of provincial integration
are analyzed and compared to preceding periods as the DRC currently shows to be placing
greater emphasis on integration surrounded by the ‘core’ of the Central Africa Region and this is
not to say that the DRC is putting all its eggs in one basket by setting aside its dedication to other
territorial associations. It is imperative for the DRC to have the capacity to keep up close ties
with eastern and southern Africa both for monetary and political reasons. This development runs
close by with a progressing push to solidify the coordination forms in Africa.
Yet genuine shortcomings, for example, an absence of political administration and proper
establishments prevent the joining of the Central Africa nations. This area finishes up by
affirming the requirement for the foundation of an unmistakable, complete and lucid technique
from the DRC concerning provincial mix. A few improvements demonstrate that the DRC is at
present turning its consideration towards a northern/western combination – and in this way a
more "focal" mix.
In 2005, in the system of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) arrangement with the EU,
Kinshasa quit the eastern and southern African alliance which then comprised of 16 of the 19
COMESA part state

CONFLICTS AS A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

The conflicts in the DRC have been a noteworthy reason for worry at the national, local and
global levels, particularly because of the overwhelming loss of life and the huge misuse of
human rights arranged by warring groups against honest regular citizen populaces. In any case,
the impacts of the wars go a long ways past the immediate loss of human life and physical
wounds to people. There is a formative measurement of the wars that is basic for comprehension
the causes of wars and for outlining procedures to determine clashes, solidifying peace and
putting the nation back on the way of economical advancement. From one viewpoint, to some
degree, the disappointment of advancement has made a situation that is ready for wars and
clashes. The advancement systems sought after since freedom have neglected to create steady
change in the wellbeing of the Congolese individuals, while in the meantime empowering
gathering of personal wealth by the political and economic elites (Askin and Collins, 2013;
Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011). These arrangements have additionally empowered the rulers to
auction the nation's normal assets to outside business intrigues, hence building up a framework
that even today empowers worldwide monetary vested parties to apply significant control of the
DRC’s natural resources. Such a framework makes distance between the state and the Congolese
individuals, which is a formula for conflicts.

Then again, the incessant wars and clashes have undermined financial improvement. Today, the
nation is rising up out of an extended monetary withdrawal that was exacerbated by the wars.
Development has recuperated and quickened as of late on the back of rising generation and costs
of minerals, particularly copper and cobalt, and swelling has declined quickly to single-digit
levels because of forceful use pressure and conversion scale steadiness. Then again, the nation
still faces gigantic monetary and social difficulties with high neediness and unemployment rates;
and it is confronting the danger of missing the vast majority of the Millennium Development
Goals, while it has constrained financial space to execute star development and ace poor
development programs (IMF, 2014a)2. The DRC grades at the base among other developing
countries in human and social development (number 186 out of 187 countries and territories in
2012), with a human development directory of 0.304 compared to an average of 0.466 for
countries in the low human development group and 0.475 for Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2013,
DRC Country Profile). The wars have disturbed monetary movement in key divisions, for
example, agribusiness and industry because of instability, populace removal and decay of
physical foundation. They have additionally undermined the limit of State foundations and
administration, consequently keeping the nation from exploiting the enormous development
potential connected with its inconceivable common asset blessing and its key position in the
area. While wars in the DRC have brought about an immense human toll and substantial
expenses at the macroeconomic and sectoral levels, they have had just as if not all the more
annihilating circuitous impacts that are harder to secure. Without a doubt, while the immediate
impacts of wars draw in general society's consideration, their more striking consequences for the
wellbeing, social and mental wellbeing of the general population are regularly ignored. Passing’s
coming about because of the unfriendly results of wars regularly surpasses the immediate loss of
life by a few products (Coghlan et al., 2006). Additionally, the psychological effects of the
trauma caused by wars on children and women not only trade off the wellbeing of those
specifically influenced by roughness, additionally influence the whole society, and their effect
may keep going for eras. These more remarkable however profound and enduring impacts of
contentions are frequently insufficiently considered in the configuration and usage of projects
went for reconstructing the economy and society in the post-war period. Inability to address the
results of wars from an extensive point of view that incorporates the monetary, social, human
and mental measurements undermines the viability of contention determination and post-strife
reproduction programs.

THE ROLE OF THE ICJ IN THE DRC CONFLICT

The historical backdrop of the procedures prompting the 2005 ICJ Judgment looking into the
issue Concerning Armed Exercises on the Territory of the Congo depict a long battle towards
getting to the universal equity framework.

On June 23 1999 the DRC documented in the Registry of the Court three Applications
organizing procedures against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, individually, for demonstrations of
furnished animosity executed in outrageous infringement of the United Nations Charter and of
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In its Applications, the DRC fought
that the attack of Congolese region by Burundian, troops on August 2, 1998 (an intrusion
asserted to have included battling in seven of the DRC regions) constituted an infringement of its
power and of its regional trustworthiness, and in addition a danger to peace and security in focal
Africa in general and in the Great Lakes region in particular. The DRC blamed the three States
for having endeavored to catch Kinshasa through Bas-Congo, keeping in mind the end goal to
oust the Government of National Salvation and kill President Laurent Desire Kabila, with the
object of setting up a Tutsi administration or an administration under Tutsi control. The DRC
additionally blamed these States for infringement of global philanthropic law and enormous
human rights infringement, and of the plundering of extensive quantities of open and private
establishments. It further asserted that the help given to the Congolese insubordinate gatherings
and the issue of boondocks security were minor appearances intended to empower the aggressors
to secure for themselves the benefits of the region attacked and to hold to recover the non
military personnel populace. The Democratic Republic of Congo consequently asked the Court
to declare that Burundi, agues countries are guilty of demonstrations of hostility; that they had
disregarded and kept on damaging the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 further
Protocols; that, by taking persuasive ownership of the Inga hydroelectric dam and purposely and
consistently bringing about gigantic electric force cuts, they made themselves in charge of
substantial misfortunes of life in the city of Kinshasa and the encompassing territories; and that,
in shooting down a Boeing 727 airplane on 9 October 1998, the property of the DRC Airlines,
and in this way creating the passing of 40 regular folks, they disregarded certain global
settlements identifying with common flight. The DRC further asked for the Court to pronounce
that the military of Burundi, should forthwith clear the region of the Congo; that the said States
ought to secure the quick and genuine withdrawal from Congolese region of their nationals, both
characteristic and lawful persons; and that the DRC is qualified for pay in admiration of all
demonstrations of plundering, annihilation, evacuation of property and persons and other
unlawful acts inferable from the States concerned. In its Application organizing procedures
against Uganda, the DRC conjured as a premise for the ward of the Court the presentations by
which both States have acknowledged the mandatory purview of the Court in connection to
whatever other State tolerating the same commitment.

THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES CONFLICT

Strife as such is an essential piece of human relations and can't be completely dispensed with or
controlled. A definitive point is to change the brutal articulation of contention into one
communicated through peaceful means. Struggle is a piece of social life and, regardless of the
possibility that one may wish to be in this way, no general public is without strife, aside from a
dead one. It has, truth be told been contended somewhere else that contentions do have positive
measurements as they may be changed into something inventive, consequently conjuring change.
On the other hand, the truth remains that regardless of how fundamental they may be, clashes,
and especially brutal ones, are constantly detestable and never great to social amicability in any
general public. The Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts present a one of a kind fierce circumstance,
prompting human enduring and social decimation all through the area. There is a general
perception that almost no learning exists on the best way to manage the Africa’s Great Lakes
conflicts. In spite of extraordinary advancement towards maintainable peace in the district,
sporadic viciousness proceeds in a portion of the nations of the area. The confusion in tending to
the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts is caused by the fact that the origins of the war and actors in it
keep changing considerably over time. The conflicts in the region have a dual character:
regardless of the fact that a large portion of the contentions have a particular nearby and/or
national dock, they are in the meantime fuelled by or fuelling provincial clashes. A territorial
methodology is thusly essential for both examination and administration of the contentions.
Henceforth, the Great Lakes region is illustrative case of the need to surrender the counterfeit
dichotomy in the middle of intra-and between state clashes. It is, too, a sample of a furnished
clash, in which a conceivable regulation of brutality needs to consider the interface in the middle
of auxiliary and direct roughness. Albeit positive advancements for solid peace have occurred
inside of the district, huge difficulties lie ahead, both for the formation of a maintainable peace,
and for legitimate use of the lessons gained from the contention, for future provincial solidness.
It turns out to be more evident that both a far reaching strife determination approach and viable
peace-building endeavors are required. Besides, the peace-building endeavors need to engage
local and neighborhood performing artists and must be actualized as ahead of schedule as could
be allowed so as to anticipate fierce clash acceleration, human rights infringement, and costly
post-struggle reproduction.

Various compositions and point by point reports on the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts are
abounding. It is however important to make an orderly and far reaching examination in light of
the fact that these contentions have frequently been investigated on an enlightening level, with
little reference to more extensive auxiliary and chronicled setting inside which they are arranged.
Besides, while putting on a show to stick to only reality, the greater part of the contention
investigations in the area uncover an unmistakable ideological inclination. The inclination shows
itself in an outlandish and intentional disregarding of the way that a considerable lot of the
contentions in the area are for the most part results of the western monetary and political
hobbies, emerging from pilgrim or neocolonial relations. Since 1960 there have been 11 out and
out wars in the DRC, five in Burundi and two in Rwanda, not overlooking the steady low force
fighting. An expected four million individuals have lost their lives as an immediate aftereffect of
these contentions and a further four million have been coercively dislodged. The 1994 Rwandan
genocide seems to have denoted an unequivocal crossroads in the historical backdrop of the
provincial and worldwide groups' way to deal with violations against mankind. The association
of more than eight African nations in the DRC war of 1998–2000, additionally flagged a
reasonable rupture of the standard of non-impedance in the inside undertakings of different
states.

WILLINGNESS OF THE UN AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

The keenness of the UN to instigate a plan like the FIB is in large part owing to the sturdy
political dedication of the neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region. The structure for
Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region, consented to by 11 nations in
February 2013, prepared for the UN to truly consider the FIB (initially imagined by the
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region) as a methodology to soften the example of
viciousness up DRC. Nations in the district perceive that insecurity in the locale can
antagonistically affect their own particular political and monetary strength. Altogether, the
considerably decreased territorial support of the M23 was basic to the achievement of the FIB
test. The ability of all the pertinent (universal and local) performing artists is especially essential
as it guaranteed an abnormal state of political attachment that did not as a matter of course exist
beforehand. The utilization of all around prepared and taught FARDC units (mostly Unités de
Reaction Rapide) that profit by working supply chains as far as gear, logistics, and nourishment
in conjunction with monstrous FIB backing had the effect. Likewise, M23 chose to take part in
an 'exemplary war' situating itself as an appropriate armed force as opposed to taking part in
guerrilla strategies. These viewpoints did not just help a quick military triumph in favor of the
administration/UN coalition additionally avoided significant compassionate outcomes. That the
Security Council was willing to take the political risk to explicitly authorize a high-tempo hostile
operation by the UN (what some peacekeeping specialists would term 'peace implementation')
was seen by numerous as a contributing component for the consequent accomplishment of the
FIB. The especially intense dialect of the determination additionally gave a shroud of
certification to the nations adding to the FIB that their unequivocal status to utilize power to
complete the order in its fullest sense was endorsed.
A basic condition for the FIB's prosperity was the part of the Forces armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The FARDC, contrasted with 2006, was in an obviously
better position (regarding preparing, capacities and political will) to do battle operations and to
secure and solidify additions made on the ground. The achievement of the FIB was likewise
molded on the way that MONUSCO is to a great degree very much resourced mission and had
the way to give empowering advantages for bolster the FIB.

THE DRC WAR AND A GROWING EU MILITARY ROLE AND INTEREST IN

AFRICA
Some years up to 2004 and beyond, as the DRC was going through a war and an easier said than
done evolution epoch, the EU was developing both its military capabilities and a clear
inquisitiveness in the African continent. The DRC war, which saw foreign, international and
internal wars being fought concurrently, lasted from years in anticipation of summer 2003, while
an in-between power-sharing government was established. Two years after the move government
was set up, the political relations among government authorities and the neighborhood
circumstance in the east of the DRC (in North and South Kivu and in the zone around Bunia)
remain extremely flimsy. There were solid differences between the President Joseph Kabila and
the Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the once-revolt Movement de Liberation du
Congo (MLC). In January 2005, the International Rescue Committee believed that Congo's war
was all the while killing 1000 individuals a day. Races are because of happen in June 2005, yet
they are liable to occur at a later date (either December 2005 or before June 2006, as indicated by
the Pretoria Peace Agreement of July 2003) as the security of the general population must be
guaranteed first.

In the meantime as the DRC emergency was developing, the EU was building up military
structures, and collaboration between the two fundamental European on-screen characters in
Africa, the United Kingdom and France, was publicly greater than before. The Joint Declaration
on European Defence (4 December 1998) issued at the British-French Summit, Saint Malo,
stated that:
All together for the European Union to make choices and affirm military move where the
Alliance in general is not locked in, the Union must be given fitting structures and a limit for
examination of circumstances, wellsprings of knowledge, and an ability for important vital
arranging, without superfluous duplication, making note of the current resources of the WEU
[Western European Union] and the advancement of its relations with the EU. In such manner, the
European Union will likewise need plan of action to suitable military means (European
capacities pre-assigned inside of NATO's European column or national or multinational
European implies outside the NATO system).

UNITED NATIONS PEACE AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The UN's peacekeeping operation in the DRC, speaks to a conceivable end to the principle issue
confronting UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) approves UN
powers to utilize "every fundamental measure" to stay away from rough assaults from agitator
powers. Those measures incorporate a preventive, hostile assault by the UN to kill furnished
gatherings. This case in this manner constitutes a vital stride in the advancement of UN
peacekeeping and will be an experiment for guaranteeing that UN peace guardians don't get to be
casualties of furnished clash.

This determination gives two essential reflections upon two parts of UN peacekeeping sending
approach; to begin with, concerning the late organization of peacekeeping missions to delicate
states; second, the need to change peacekeeping operations based upon the difficulties and
complexities of outfitted clash. The past arrangements of UN peacekeeping missions were
helpless against agitator assaults, for example, the mission in Sierra Leone where 300 peace
managers were grabbed in 200037.

Notwithstanding, the UN FIB Intervention Brigade additionally has genuine ramifications while
in transit to address challenges in complex clash circumstances. If there should be an occurrence
of complete achievement, United Nations will be certain to apply the same answer for
comparative circumstances. On the off chance that the UN does not send a Force Intervention
Brigade on future missions where revolutionary gatherings represent a noteworthy risk to
security, the regular citizen populace (and in addition the UN peacekeeping unforeseen) may get
to be defenseless against assaults and the validity of the UN mission will endure. If there should
arise an occurrence of disappointment in Eastern DRC, the UN will need to give another choice
to supplant the adjustment of the locale. MONUSCO has been firmly scrutinized by Congolese
common society and in addition the Congolese government before the presentation of the UN
Intervention Brigade. MONUSCO tries now to coordinate intimately with the legislature when
the FARDC keep on being blamed for human right infringement. In spite of vital enrolled
advancement of FARDC as far as human rights misuse, MONUSCO can be considered as a
component of the contention as it is battling adjacent to the FARDC and can be connected to a
portion of the human rights infringement. The sort of exemption that profited some of FARDC
individuals must be immediately tended to for MONUSCO to stay away from such attribution.

THE STRATEGY OF SPONSORING REBEL MOVEMENTS IN THE REGION

The methodology of supporting agitator developments to destabilize adversary countries has

prompted developing frailty all through the Great Lakes region. Absence of trust between
political pioneers and permeable limits has formed another method for war in which the
objective is to oust an adversary administration instead of vanquishes a rival's domain. This is as
yet event on the grounds that political pioneers fear the end of their principle and utilize the
procedure of supporting radical developments to legitimize their nearby legislative issues and in
the meantime to debilitate neighboring nation's security framework. Contending systems of
organizations together among states and non-state revolt bunch's guerillas take their place in
distinctive nations and have fuelled interconnected conflicts in the African Great Lakes Region.
The dangers of administration destabilization make an intense security issue in every nation and
add to keeping up struggle environment in the locale. The wars that have softened out up the
Great Lakes region emanated from the lack of common understanding on peace and security
issues in the region.

THE EU MILITARY MISSION AND INTERVENTION IN THE DRC

EU Policies in the direction of the DRC: The circumstance in which was developed and the EU
has helped inexpensively with programmes of support and cooperation, developed a mediation
role in the DRC crisis, and acted militarily with the Military mission.
As far as help arrangement, notwithstanding the way that participation with Zaire was
suspended, the EC injected on average EUR40-50 million per year in the DRC. The Commission
assumed controls some portion of the elements of the legislature in infrastructural work, urban
advancement and compassionate guide," The Commission continued its immediate collaboration
with the DRC government. In any case, if one thinks about the measure of help given to the DRC
contrasted with that given to other African expresses, the EU did not appear to have much
enthusiasm for the DRC. To be sure, as indicated by an EU Commission record, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia all got more
funding than the DRC.
In the conciliatory field, the EU set up a European appointive unit and it likewise made an order
for a unique agent for the Great Lakes regions, Aldo Ajello, to work with the UN, the then OAU
(Organization of African Unity) and well-known African figures to address the DRC war.
Afterward, following some years, the EU fiscally supported the execution of the Lusaka truce
assertion and the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The EU additionally created joins with other global establishments. It underlined its eagerness to
collaborate with the OAU at the Africa-Europe Summit on 4 April 2000. In 2003, the EU made it
clear that it needed to work with the UN. This was made conceivable with the advancement of an
European emergency administration power. In July 2003, when the new DRC government was
made, Belgian, British and French outside priests, EU High Representative Javier Solana, and
the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes, Aldo Ajello, were available in the Great
Lakes Region.
The Joint Action making this operation went into power on 5 June 2003 and lapsed on 1
September 2003. France was responsible for assembling the military force on behalf of the
EU, and provided the majority of the approximately 1 000 troops. The troops involved were from
17 countries, 12 of them EU Member States. Belgium, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Austria, Germany, Brazil and South Africa took part in Military. Military was qualified as a
success, however one needs to shoulder at the top of the priority list that it had exceptionally
restricted points in time and in topographical area. It restored security in the locale and offered
uprooted persons some assistance with returning to their homes: taking after the operation, the
populaces in Bunia expanded from 40000 to 100000 individuals, markets were revived and a
fortified MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC) unforeseen was sent. However, the EU intervention
only lasted for months and was limited to some town: the intervention did not deal with brutality
outside zones.
On the other hand, artemis was well thought-out to be a unique EU military intervention as it was
the first time EU troops were deployed out of Europe and in particular autonomously from
NATO. With a specific end goal to comprehend why the EU all in all chose to send an
independent mission to the DRC, one need to utilize a procedure following system and meetings.
This area concentrates basically on the reasons why France, the United Kingdom and Germany
consented to an EU intervention, as they are the biggest military powers in the EU. This EU
military intervention could be clarified by maximal authenticity, as it was made on a most
minimized shared factor assent-ion whereby the EU states acted to demonstrate the EU's ability
to act alone, and not above all else to reply to a helpful emergency.
Presently, an EU military intervention in Africa is just conceivable under the accompanying
conditions: initially, when European agents trust that there is a political increase for them. EU
Member States' representatives assume regarding a 'money saving advantage' investigation: they
intercede on the off chance that it is to their greatest advantage to do as such. Second, when the
African state concerned is not in the zone of influence of either the United Kingdom or France.
The intervention is liable to be little in scale and constrained after some time, as EU capacities
are restricted. These conditions are those normal by maximal authenticity which expect that
performing artists mediate when it is to their greatest advantage to do as such and when dangers
constrained are in question.
CHAPTER THREE

The secondary was culled from the already existing works relating to the topic of research. The
sources are Journals, internet information, textbooks, seminar papers, serious work, speeches and
materials usually documented in the library, the Internet and archival, documents in order to
interpret the primary texts.

3.1 Africa Union/United Nations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts in Africa

Knowingly, it will be so unthinkable to speak of the United Nations without making reference to
the African Union (AU) (Chukwu, 2012). UN peacekeeping forces operated with the
peacekeepers of the AU, they worked as a joint effort in cooperation with the peacekeeping
operations of the United Nations peace (Luqman 2012).
The AU mission is a holding force of peace that operated also in Congo. It was founded years
back for the tenacity of peace-keeping operations related to the conflict in Congo. The troupe
was deployed to assist in humanitarian assistance, protect civilians, and to monitor the
humanitarian agreement that involves conflict (Omedè 2012)

When the AU was deployed to end the conflict in Congo since then it has remained a key player.
According Luqman & Omedè (2012), at first, the AU has provided support before international
waded into the crisis.

Following the signing of the Lusaka Treaty as of July 1999 concerning the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) and five regional states such as Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe in the seven month of 1999, the Safekeeping Council founded the United Nations
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) by resolution 1279 of November 30,
1999, first plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disconnection of forces and retain liaison
with all parties to Agreement ceasefire (Luqman 2012). Later in a series of resolutions, the
Council extended the mandate of MONUC for overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire
agreement and multiple related additional tasks (Omedè 2012).

First free and fair elections in the country in 46 years took place July 30, 2006, with voters
electing a 500-seat National Assembly (Luqman 2012). After a run-off election for the
presidency on 29 October, and the doggedness of a following legal challenge, President Joseph
Kabila (son of the late Laurent Kabila assassinated in 2001) was the winner. The entire electoral
process represented one of the most complex votes the UN had helped organize (Omedè 2012).
After the elections, MONUC remained on the ground and continued to implement a number of
political, military, rules of law tasks and capacity building as mandated by resolutions of the
Security Council, including trying resolving ongoing conflicts in a number of provinces of the
DRC (Chukwu, 2012). On 1 July 2010, the Security Council, in resolution 1925, MONUC gave
another name the to the Mission of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) to mirror the new level reached in the country
(Omedè 2012). The new mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its
mandate to, among others, the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights
activists under imminent threat of physical violence and support the Government of the DRC in
its stabilization and peace-building efforts. The Council decided that MONUSCO would
comprise, in addition to civil, judicial and penitentiary appropriate, a maximum of 19.815
soldiers, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and one thousand and fifty members of
formed police units (Luqman 2012). Yet to come reconfigurations of MONUSCO would be
indomitable as the status quo grew on the ground, including: the end of military operations in
North and South Kivu and Orientale provinces; improving the government's ability to effectively
protect the population; and the merging of State authority all the way through the terrain
(Luqman 2012).

Granting momentous advancement has been made in the DRC since the creation of the UN
peacekeeping operation there and the situation in many parts of the country is stabilized, the
eastern part continued to be plagued recurrent waves of conflicts, chronic and serious
humanitarian crises of human rights defilements, including sexual and gender-based violence
(Luqman 2012). Contribute to cycles of violence have been the nonstop being there of foreign
and Congolese armed groups who take advantage of the power vacuum and security in the
eastern part of the motherland; the illegal taking advantage of resources; interference of
neighboring countries; the pervasive impunity; intercommunal strife; and the low capacity of the
army and the national police to effectively protect civilians and the country and ensure public
order (Omedè 2012).
Therefore, the soldiers of the AU peace have been able to protect a small part of the population
in Congo. His presence made little contribution in stabilizing the situation and provided the
policy space necessary for the AU led negotiations between the two parties in the conflict
(Williams, 2006). This organization as its remains incompetent, inefficient and lack the ability to
improve the security situation as it is degraded in the entire region (Human Rights Watch, 2006).
The African Union (AU) is not an entirely new organization, since, like its forerunner,
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), it is equally concerned about the search for peace and
development in Africa; research that began with the Pan African Movement and later led to the
formation of the OAU in the sixties. Thus, as a continental organization, the OAU sought to
liberate the African states from the yoke of domination and colonial exploitation. However,
although the OAU, to some extent, successful in this regard, it seems to have missed the
institutional structure and management capacity to engage in the peaceful prevention, resolution
and management of the myriad of inter-state conflicts and international that followed the
achievement of political independence by most African States (Mwanasali 2004: 13).
Essentially, the OAU Charter forbade him to intervene in conflicts intra state even in severe
circumstances. This has greatly affected his ability to solve political conflicts in Africa. This
inability of the OAU to resolve internal conflicts within the continent catalyzed persistent calls
for its transformation.

In 1999, African leaders met in Sirte, Libya to discuss the Charter of the OAU (Chukwu, 2012).
The meeting stressed the importance of strengthening solidarity between African countries and
revives the spirit of Pan-Africanism (Chukwu, 2012). To this end, the project of the African
Union (AU) in Sirte was born in September 1999 with the decision to draft a law of the
Constitution that is the Constitution. The law was subsequently signed in Lomé, Togo, July 11,
2000 (Murithi, 2009: 25).
The formation and existence of the AU, as a result, is a mien of Pan-Africanism, which in history
has expressed a desire for greater solidarity and cooperation to deal with national and global
challenges besetting the continent. Thus, unlike the OAU embraced a tacit policy of non-
obstruction and non-intercession in the undertakings of Member States and as such ignored the
suffering and oppression of African citizens by the oligarchs and African dictators that not only
exploit the resources of their country, but suppress freedom of expression and association, the
AU has formally adopted a more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and
institutions. For example, a Fund for the AU Peace and was put in place to ensure that there will
be enough resources to promote peace. Again, the Council of the AU Peace and Security was
established in 2004 by the Protocol on Peace and Security Council and the mandate to
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building on the continent (AU 2002: 13). Therefore,
complemented by the Panel of the Wise, the Mainland Early Cautioning System, the African
Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, the Council is the institution responsible for
conducting peace operations in Africa (Cilliers , Jakkie and Malan 2005: 19).

The Peace and Security Council is empowered to assess a potential crisis situation, send fact-
finding missions to hot spots, and to authorize and legitimize the AU intervention in internal
crisis situations. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU supports the right of the African
Union to intervene in a Member State compliant with a choice of the Assembly in deference of
serious situations such as war crimes, killing and crimes against humanity (Murithi, 2009: 27).
Moreover, Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act of the AU affirms the privilege of Member States
to demand mediation from the Union to restore peace and security (AU 2000: 10). Article 7,
paragraph (e) of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council, in details, stipulates that the
Council may recommend to the Assembly of State intervention leaders, on behalf of the
Unification, in a member State in reverence of critical circumstances (AU, 2003: 10). With the
adoption of these legal provisions, the continental organization, working with a named group of
states has the power to intervene in internal situations that could lead to the atrocities committed
against minority groups or communities at risk. This implies that the AU has the right and the
responsibility to protect. To ensure that it can meet this obligation, the Union created the Peace
and Security Council that his legal institution and charged (Peace and Security Council) to
collaborate, where appropriate, with the United Nations and the African sub-regional
organizations in the conduct of peacekeeping operations on the continent. To reinforce the
above, the AU Commission distributed the "Key Plan and Vision 2004-2007” which also
reiterated the importance of taking action to promote peace and security as a prerequisite for
governance and development. In short, establishing the right to intervene in the Constitutive Act
of the AU implies that African countries have agreed to leave their sovereignty to the AU to act
as a definitive underwriter and defender of the rights and well -being African peoples on the one
hand, and to exhibit spirit of non - indifference to war crimes and crimes against humanity in
Africa on the other.

3.2 Background to the Political Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) includes the largest part of the Congo River basin,
which covers an area of almost one million square kilometers (400,000 sq. Mi.). The large
central area at low altitude is a basin-shaped sloping plateau to the west and covered by
rainforest. This area is surrounded by mountainous terraces in the west, the plates merge into
savannas in the south and south-west, and dense grasslands extending beyond the Congo River in
the north (Clark 2004: 27).

The DRC is located on the equator, with a third of the country north and south two thirds. The
climate is hot and humid in the basin of the river and cool and dry in the southern highlands.
During the rainy season, storms are often violent, but rarely last more than a few hours. The
average annual rainfall for the whole country is about 107 centimeters (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:
6).

There are no fewer than 250 ethnic groups have been distinguished and named. Some of the
biggest groups are the Kongo, Luba and Anamongo. Although 700 local languages and dialects
are vocalized, the language variability is tie together both by the use of French and indigenous
languages Kikongo, Chiluba, Swahili and Lingala (Edgerton, 2002: 11).
The area was officially settled in 1885 as a personal possession of the Belgian King Leopold II
as the Congo Free State. In 1907, the administration shifted to the Belgian Government, which
renamed the country the Belgian Congo. After a series of riots and unrest, the Belgian Congo
was granted independence on June 30, 1960. Legislative elections in 1960 fashioned Patrice
Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president of the Democratic Republic of
Congo renamed. In the first year of independence, several events have destabilized the country:
the army mutinied; the governor of the province of Katanga secession attempt; the death of
Prime Minister Lumumba under mysterious circumstances; and Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu
(later Mobutu Sese Seko) takeover of the government which he later sold to President
Kasavubu. In the heat of all these events, a UN peacekeeping force was called in to restore
order. Subsequently, agitation and rebellion broke out and plagued the government until 1965,
when Mobutu became lieutenant general and commander of the national army again took
control of the country and declares him president for 5 years. Mobutu quickly centralized power
in his own hands and was unanimously elected as president in 1970.

To embark on an awareness campaign to culture, Mobutu renamed the country the Republic of
Zaire and required citizens to adopt African names. Peace and relative stability prevailed until
1977 and 1978 when Katangan rebels, organized in Angola, launched a series of invasions in the
Katanga region. The rebels were driven out with the help of Belgian paratroopers. As the Cold
War came to a close pressure, internal and external on Mobutu increased. In late 1989 and early
1990, Mobutu was weakened by a series of national events, increased international criticism of
the practices of the rights of man of his regime, and a vacillating economy. In April 1990,
Mobutu agreed to the principle of a multiparty system with elections and a constitution
(Hochschild, 1998: 9).
However, from the end of 1994, the war and the genocide in neighboring Rwanda spilled over to
Zaire. Rwandan Hutu militia force of this fled Rwanda following the ascension of a government
led by the Tutsi Hutu refugee camps used in eastern Zaire as bases for incursions against
Rwanda. In October 1996, Rwandan troops registered Zaire Simultaneously with the formation
of a military coalition led by Laurent Kabila known under the name Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). In order to exclude forced Mobutu AFDL,
backed by Rwanda and Uganda, began a military campaign Towards Kinshasa. Following the
failure of peace talks between Mobutu & Kabila in the fifth month (May) 1997 Mobutu left the
country. Laurent Kabila in Kinshasa on May 17, 1997 and declared _him_ President and
consolidated power around himself and the AFDL. Also He renamed the country the Democratic
Republic of Congo.

During the following year, relations between Kabila and his foreign allies deteriorated. In July
1998, Kabila ordered all foreign troops to leave the D.R.C. Some refused to leave. August 2,
fighting broke out throughout the country that Rwandan troops in the DRC "mutinied" and the
Rwandan and Ugandan troops entered the country costs. Two days later, Rwandan troops flew to
the Lower Congo, with the intention of marching on Kinshasa, ousting Kabila and replacement
_him_ with the rebel group backed by Rwanda called Expired newly formed the Rally for
Congolese Democracy (RCD). Rwandan campaign was disillusioned at the most recent minute
when Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian troops intervened on the facility name of the
Government of the DRC. Rwandans and the RCD withdraws eastern DRC, where they have
established de facto control over parts of eastern DRC and unremitting to combat the Congolese
army and its foreign allies (Melvern, 2004: 3).
In February 1999, Uganda has supported the formation of a rebel group called the Movement for
the Liberation of Congo (MLC), which attracted support among former Mobutuists and former
Zairian soldiers in Equateur province (Mobutu native province). Unruffled, Uganda and the
MLC proven control over the northern third of the DRC. At this stage, the DRC was divided de
facto into three segments - controlled by Laurent Kabila, one controlled by Rwanda, and
controlled by Uganda - and the parties had reached a military stalemate. In July 1999, a cease-
fire was proposed in Lusaka, Zambia, where all parties have signed at the end of August The
Lusaka Agreement called for a cease-fire, the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to peace,
the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the launch of an "inter-Congolese dialogue" to form a
government transition leading to elections. The parties to the Lusaka Agreement failed to fully
implement its provisions in 1999 and 2000. Laurent Kabila drew more international criticism for
blocking the full deployment of the UN troops, hindering progress towards an inter-Congolese
dialogue, and the removal of internal political activity (O'Hanlon 2001: 21).

In 2001, Laurent Kabila was murdered and supplanted by his son Joseph, who took office called
for multilateral peace talks to end the war. In February 2001, a peace agreement was brokered
between Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda leading to the apparent withdrawal of foreign troops. The
conflict was relaunched in January 2002 by ethnic clashes in the northeast, and Uganda and
Rwanda arrested withdrawal and instead sent more troops. Talks between Kabila and rebel
leaders led to the signing of a peace accord in which Kabila share power with former rebels. In
June 2003 all foreign armies except those of Rwanda had withdrawn from Congo. Much of the
conflict was focused on taking control of substantial natural resources in the nation state,
comprising diamonds, copper, zinc and coltan (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi / / africa country
profiles / 1076399 .stm Accessed 12/02/2011).

On July 30 2006 the Congo held its first multiparty elections since independence in 1960.
Afterwards Joseph Kabila took 45% of the ballots and his opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba took
20%. The disputed results of this election turned into a full-blown battle between supporters of
the two parties in the streets of the capital, Kinshasa, 20-22 August 2006. Sixteen people died
before police and mission of the UN MONUC took control of the city. A new election was held
October 29, 2006, Kabila won with 70% of votes. Bemba made several public statements saying
the election had "irregularities", although any neutral observer praised the elections (Miller,
2010: 4). December 6, 2006, Joseph Kabila was sworn in as president.

However, multiparty election and the subsequent return to civilian rule in the DRC despite the
fragility of the state government continued to incubate pocket conflicts and human rights
misuses. The Democratic Forces for the Liberty of Rwanda (FDLR) , in particular, continued to
threaten the Rwandan border and the Banyamulenge ; Rwanda supports the rebel RCD-Goma
against Kinshasa ; a rebel offensive in late October 2008 because of a refugee crisis in Ituri,
where MONUC has proved unable to contain the numerous militia and groups driving the Ituri
conflict . In the northeast, the LRA of Joseph Kony moved from their original bases in Uganda
(where they fought a 20 -year rebellion) in DR Congo in 2005 and set up camp in the Garamba
National Park. (Fessy , 2008: 19; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 7635719.stm.reclaimed on
12/02/2011 ) .
Therefore, the political conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo with the death toll
estimated at 5.4 million people is described as the deadliest conflict in the world since World
War II (Robinson, 2006: 14). In fact, until 2009, people in the Congo were still dying at a rate of
about 45,000 per month (Nicholas, 2010: 10). The numbers of deaths especially among minors
result from widespread disease and starvation was on the rise. In short, the long and brutal crisis
of Congo has caused tremendous suffering to civilians, with millions of them die directly or
indirectly, about 200,000 women raped (The Guardian, May 9, 2008). In fact, there have been
frequent reports of weapon bearers killing civilians, destruction of property, committed prevalent
sexual vehemence (http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/index.cfm?fuseaction page = 12 / 02/2011). In fact,
not a few people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been affected by the armed
conflict. A survey conducted in 2009 by the ICRC and Ipsos shows that three quarters (76%) of
respondents were affected and are still affected in some way, either personally or owing to
widespread consequences of armed conflict (http : // www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengo.nsfon
Accessed 02/03/2011). In 2009, Sinafasi Makelo, a representative of Mbuti pygmies, said the
UN Forum of Indigenous Peoples that during the war his people were hunted and eaten as though
they were game animals (http: // www. Timesonline. co.uk/tol / news / world /
articles402970.ece 02/03/2011. There is no doubt, based on the above information that the
political crisis in the DRC seriously infringes on the rights of people live there. In the following
sections, we will explore the efforts of the AU which is mandatory on the basis of the adoption
of the responsibility to protect, to protect the rights of people in the DRC.

3.3 Natural Resources, External Economic Interests and Political Crisis in the DRC

The DRC has a copiousness of natural wealth, together with a multitude of minerals such
as diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, cassiterite (tin ore), coltan and crude oil. To this effect, the
country accounts for around 17 percent of global production of rough diamonds (Cole, 2006: 26).
Again, the copper belt that runs through Katanga and Zambia encompasses 34 percent of the
world’s cobalt and 10 percent of the world’s copper. Moreover, 60-80 percent of global reserves
of coltan, used in the making of mobile phones, computers and other electronic equipment, can
be found in North and South Kivu. The D.R.C.'s formal economy is, therefore, dominated by the
mining sector since minerals account for the vast majority of the D.R.C’s ships and represent the
single largest source for foreign direct investment (FDI). The DRC is equally rich in agricultural
resources such as coffee, rubber, palm oil, cotton, cocoa, sugar, tea and so on (Cole, 2006: 24).

However, very little of the revenue from natural resource exploitation has been used to
contribute to the country's overall development. Instead, the immense economic resources have
not only fuelled political conflicts but have effectively brought the country at the centre of what
could be termed ‘African world war’ with government forces, supported by Angola, Namibia
and Zimbabwe, as against rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda (Shekhawat, 2009). Despite a
peace deal and the establishment of a provisional government in 2003, people in the east of the
country have remained in terror of marauding militia and the army with fighting essentially
fuelled by the country's vast mineral wealth and both sides in the fight taking advantage of the
anarchy to plunder natural resources. The mining, forestry and trading regions, therefore, became
increasingly militarized thereby escalating violence against the civilian population.

In this context, a reasonable number of foreign players were directly involved in the exploitation
of natural resources in the DRC. The rebel groups and armies from neighboring countries like
Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda and others have all participated, either through their Congolese
partners or connections, or directly involved in a part of the country. Set the feebleness and
corruption of the central administration, the wealth of the DRC was within the reach of any
violent group and determined enough to impose its will by force (Report of the UN Mapping
Project 2002: 3) .

Over time, the exploitation of natural resources has become increasingly attractive, not only
because it allowed these groups to finance their war efforts but also because, to a large number of
political leaders / military, it was a source of personal amelioration. Natural resources therefore
progressively became a driving force behind the war. The economic factor of increasing
importance, partly explains the shifting alliances between different armed groups during the
conflict (last www.un.org/News/dh/ / drcongo.htm. Accessed 20/02/2011). Civilians who tried to
resist the theft of their natural resources, or did not cooperate with the government, were under
attack. Whole villages were displaced to make way for mining, logging and armed groups
betrothed in exterminations, sexual violence and cruel and inhuman treatment in the process.
They also attacked and burned villages to seize coltan that had been crafted by locals extract. In
the province of North Kivu, for example, there was cannibalism by a group known as The
Erasers (“gums") who wanted to clear the land of people open to mining. Both sides of the war
between them considered "subhuman" (Times Online December 16 2004).
In June 2000 the United Nations formed a Board of Experts on the illegal mistreatment of
Congolese resources to examine the relationship between war and the exploitation of natural
resources. Reports published by the Panel stated that the countries involved in the war in Congo
have developed significant economic interests in the DRC that have complicated Congolese
government efforts to control its resources and mining. Although the original panel of experts
was dissolved when its term expired at the end of 2003, a separate UN group of experts
continued to address these issues because of apparent links between armed groups illegal in the
eastern DRC and the exploitation of natural resources. The Panel issued a report in December
2008 that documented how armed groups in the eastern DRC finance their activities through the
exploitation of natural resources and made certain proof of the collaboration and support of the
Rwandan authorities and the Government of the DRC in back up of these groups (www .un.org /
News / dh / latest / drcongo.htm. consulted on 20/02/2011).

In 2002, the UN Board of Experts on the Prohibited Misuse of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth came to the conclusion that all coltanmines in eastern DRC benefited either a
rebel group or foreign armies. According to experts of the panel:

Ample evidence indicates that Rwanda and Uganda were financing their military spending to
profit from the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. By some estimates, the income
provided Rwanda received 80 percent of all [Rwandan army] RPA expenditure in 1999. The
Ugandan army has also benefited from a much larger budget because of the benefits of the
wealth of the DRC ... from 1998 to 2002. a large part of the gold produced in the Ituri region of
the DRC has been exported by Uganda, then re-exported as if it had been produced in the
country - a similar model to that used for diamond exports. (Report of the UN Mapping Project,
2002: 767-68).

Continuing, the Panel's experts found that the prohibited mistreatment of the DRC's natural
resources and the accompanying political conflict and serious violations of human moralities and
global humanitarian law could not have occurred on a large scale there were no customers
willing to trade in these resources. Indeed, there has never been a shortage of foreign buyers
wishing to manage these products, despite the existence of reports denouncing the serious
violations of international law committed by their commercial and financial partners. Buyers
included not only traders in the DRC and neighboring countries, but also private establishments
registered in other nation state, comprising multinationals. rarely controlled foreign companies
source minerals, and sometimes paid armed groups directly: In a number of cases, foreign or
multinational companies were directly involved in negotiations with the perpetrators of serious
violations of human rights, paying armed groups or providing facilities or logistics to exploit
natural resources. (Report of the UN Mapping Project, 2002: 775).

CHAPTER FOUR

AU’s CHARTER AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE DRC

4.1 The structure of the AU’s Charter

According to data collected by Chukwu and well analyzed, shown that Pan-Africanism was an
expression of continental identity and unity among peoples whose ancestors are from Africa
(Chukwu, 2012). The Organization of African Unity (OAU), in fact, sought to free Africa from
all forms of colonialism. The OAU has been credited for its success in the eradication of
colonialism and apartheid in Africa. However, the continental organization, to some extent, did
not respond to the myriad economic problems facing the continent (Chukwu, 2012). In addition,
conflicts within and between states that followed independence has presented another challenge
to the OAU. Regarding conflict prevention, resolution and management, it has been argued that
the OAU had no institutional structure, capacity and management resources to manage a
peacekeeping operation and, first the continental body has limited its role in facilitating the
political negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration and on the other, it was prohibited
by the Charter to intervene in a member State, even in circumstances serious. The ban hurt the
organization's efforts to resolve conflicts in Africa (Ejiofor 1981: 149-51). It was the failure of
the OAU to address the problems of security and development of Africa, which led to its
transformation in 2002, the African Union (AU).
Therefore, it was a new start when, Tuesday, July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa, African
leaders have replaced the OAU to the AU (Newswatch, July 22, 2002, 44). Before this historic
event, several summits and summits were held. Chief among these was the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government summit held in Algiers in July 1999. The summit has accepted an
invitation from Colonel Ghadhafi Muamma 4th Extraordinary Summit in Sirte in September
1999. At the summit heads of State and government stated, inter alia, that:

 We, Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
meeting at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of our Assembly in Sirte, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya and the great people socialist 8-9 September 1999 in invitation of the Al Fateh
Revolution leader; Colonel Ghadhafi Muamma, and as agreed at the thirty-fifth regular
session of our Summit in Algiers, Algeria 12 to 14 July 1999.
 We discussed at length on ways and means of strengthening our interior establishment to
make it more operational so as to keep pace with the political, economic and social life
that takes place inside and outside of our continent.
 Having discussed frankly and extensively on how to proceed to strengthen the unity of
our continent and its peoples in the light of these proposals, and taking into account the
current situation on the continent. We agree to establish the African Union in accordance
with the fundamental intentions of the Charter of our Continental Organization and the
provision of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
However, it was agreed that the legal requirement for the adoption of the AU was carried out on
the deposit of the instrument of ratification of the Constitution by a two-thirds majority of the
member. Thus, at the 5th Extraordinary Session of the OAU / AEC Summit in Sirte, Libya 1-2
March 2001, a decision declaring the creation of the AU on the basis of the unanimous will of
the Member States was adopted. In April 26, 2001, Nigeria became the 36th Member State to
guarantee its mechanism of endorsement, fulfilling the requirement of two-thirds. Therefore, July
9, 2002; African Union was launched in Durban Stadium, South Africa, after the official launch
of the result of the union at the signing of the memorandum by the 53 Member States (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Africa Republic South, 2001 10).
So the AU should be more people-oriented unlike the OAU, which was described as "a club of
dictators" (The Post Express, July 14, 2002, 26) .The AU is also positioned to facilitate economic
and political integration on the continent. It is determined to promote peace and democracy,
protection of human rights and ensure good governance and the rule of law. Therefore, in the sub
-section next, we will consider the Charter of the AU and the legal frameworks that enable the
AU to intervene and resolve political conflicts in Africa.
4.2 AU’s Legal Frameworks that Empower the AU to Intervene and Resolve Political
Conflict in Africa
The OAU Charter has undermined efforts organizations to conflict resolution by providing non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states (Chukwu, 2012). The objectives and
principles of the Charter of the OAU were reactionary. They were a reaction to the situation in
Africa at the time.
The objectives are:

 To promote unity and solidarity of African States;

 To bring together and make stronger their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life
for the peoples of Africa;
 To protect their authority, their territorial veracity and independence;
 To remove all procedures of colonialism from Africa; and
 To support global cooperation; taking due account of the United Nations Charter and the
Worldwide Avowal of Human Rights. Besides the OAU was also guided by the
following principles.
 The independent fairness of all Member States;
 Non-meddling in the interior affairs of Member States;
 Respect for the sovereignty and territorial veracity of each State and for its
unchallengeable right to independent existence;
 Peaceful settlement of disputes by concession, intermediation, conciliation or arbitration.
 Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political homicide as well as seditious
activities on the part of neighboring States or any other state;
 The total dedication to the total liberty of the African territories still independent.
 The assertion of a non-alignment policy with respect to all blocks.
Article XIX of the Charter provides the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and
resolution.
Through the objectives and principles of the OAU organization can be described as a failure
(Chukwu, 2012). Even in the field of colonialism where it is credited, it could not eliminate
colonialism in all its forms because most, if not all, African countries are still dependent on their
colonial masters and other Western countries. The organization could not process the subversive
activities of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to the DRC (Chukwu, 2012).
Chukwu puts this way, the objectives and principles of the African Union is a departure from
that of the OAU. Article 3 (f) states that the objective of the Union is to encourage peace,
security and constancy on the continent. Article 4 (h) provides for the right of the Union to
intervene in a member state according to a choice of the Assembly in admiration of grave
circumstances, namely war crimes, massacre and crimes against humankind. Article 4 (e)
provides for the settlement or resolution of conflict by appropriate means as may be decided by
the Assembly. Thus, unlike the OAU, which did not interfere in the internal affairs of its member
states, the AU has the right to intervene in a member state according to a choice of the Assembly
in admiration of grave circumstances, namely war delinquencies, extermination and crimes
against humankind and, as such, is much more committed to promoting peace and democracy,
protecting human rights and ensuring good governance and the rule of law (Chukwu, 2012).
Again, unlike the OAU resolved fights via intercession, conciliation and arbitration, the UA uses
any means it deems appropriate to deal with the situation. The Constitution provides institutional
structure, management capacity and resources to conflict prevention, management and
resolution. The AU, we noted earlier has the legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of its
members. Article 4 (f) provides for the right of the Unification to intercede in a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in deference of serious circumstances, namely war
crimes, massacre and crimes against humanity . Member States under Article 4 (h) may also
request Union's intervention to restore peace and security (Chukwu, 2012).
In addition, the AU has a Security Council whose main objective is to maintain peace and
security in Africa and peace. The Protocol establishing the Council for Peace and Security
became operational December 26, 2003 and replaced the OAU mechanism for conflict
prevention, management and resolution. Thus, the Council of the AU Peace and Security has
since become a body which for the prevention, management and tenacity of clashes on the
continent permanent decision. It has also become a collective security and early warning
arrangement to allow rapid and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. To
this end, the Peace and Security Council is supported by the Charge, a committee of wise men, a
continental early cautionary system; an African Standby Force; and a special fund. The
implementation of the above is in accordance with Article 5 (2) of the Constitution which allows
the African Union to establish any other organ it deems necessary for the pursuit of the
objectives and principles of the Union (Article 3 and 4 of the constitutive Act).
Furthermore, according to Article 3 of the Protocol of the PSC, the Peace and Security Council
of the objectives; to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, to ensure the protection and
preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, and
the creation of conditions for development durable; to anticipate and prevent conflicts and where
conflicts arise (Chukwu, 2012). Indeed, the Peace and Security Council has the responsibility to
undertake appeasing and peace-building utilities for the doggedness of inter-state and intra; to
develop a common defense policy for the Union, in accordance with Article 4 (d) of the
Constitution, among others.
The Peace and Security Council shall be guided by the principles in the Constitution, the UN
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular, it must be guided by the
following principles

 Peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts;

 Rapid response to hold crunch circumstances so as to prevent them from developing into
open conflict;
 The right of the Unification to intercede in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, massacre and crimes
against humankind in accordance with Article 4 (h).
 The right of Member States to apply for EU intervention to restore peace and security, in
accordance with Article 4 ( j) . Please do look
Appendix II for the details
According to Chukwu, the Peace and Security Council, as set out in Article 6 also perform
functions in the following areas:
a) Safety Promotion of peace and stability in Africa;
b) Early warning and preventive diplomacy;
c) The restoration of peace, including use of good offices, mediation; conciliation and
investigation;
d) Operations and peace support interventions; accordance with Article 4 (h ) and ( j)
e) Strengthening peace and post-conflict reconstruction;
f) The humanitarian and disaster management;
a) Any other functions as may be decided by the Assembly (Article 6 of the PSC Protocol)
Other functions of the Peace and Security Council can do in collaboration with the President of
the Commission under Article 7 of the Protocol (see Appendix II).
The Panel of the wise and continental early warning system as provided for in Articles II and 12
respectively to support the efforts of the Council of Peace and Security (PSC) and those of the
President of the Commission in the field of conflict prevention. Again, Article 13 provides for
the creation of an African force composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian
and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment with
appropriate notice. The force, among others, performs functions in the following areas:
b) Observation and monitoring missions;
c) Other types of peacekeeping missions;
d) intervention in a member state in veneration of serious situations or at the request of a
Member State in order to restore peace and safety in agreement with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the
Constitution;
e) The preventive deployment;
f) The strengthening of peace, including disarmament and post-conflict demobilization;
g) humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in conflict areas
and efforts to deal with major natural disasters (Article 13 of the PSC Protocol) .These
operations will be financed by contributions from Member States according to their contributions
to the regular budget of the Union (Article 21 of the PSC Protocol). However, the PSC is to take
initiatives and action it deems suitable with respect to circumstances of potential battle, as well
as those who have already developed into open conflict (Chukwu, 2012). It is also expected to
take all necessary measures to prevent a conflict for which a settlement has already been reached
from escalating. To this end, the PSC is entitled to use its discretion to affect entry, whether by
the Council of collective action itself or through its Chairman and / or President of the
Commission, the wise group, and / or in collaboration with the regional mechanism (Article 9 of
the PSC Protocol).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the AU is structurally and legally positioned to prevent,
manage and resolve conflicts on the continent. In the next subsection, we will examine the
efforts made by the AU in the resolution of political conflicts in the DRC.

4.3 The Structure of AU’s Charter and its Resolution of Political Conflict in the DRC
In this section, we will focus on the AU and the Congo conflict in terms of whether the actual
continental organization intervened in political conflicts in the DRC based on the legal
frameworks of the Charter of the AU. This is due to our previous assertion that the AU is not an
entirely new organization, but the result of the transformation of the OAU. This change is partly
influenced by the inability of the OAU to deal with security problems. Therefore, it is considered
the most appropriate to consider at this stage place, the EU challenges in the DRC. To
understand the dynamics of the AU intervention in the DRC or otherwise, we will briefly trace
the OAU efforts to do so. This will allow us to juxtapose body's intervention and thus be able to
draw conclusions about whether the AU actually invoked legal frameworks as contained in its
charter to intervene.
Although the OAU has made efforts to resolve the political conflict in the DRC, a major
breakthrough in the peace talks came at the end of a meeting of the Organization in
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in 1999. The planned meeting a peace conference on December 27
and 28 in Lusaka, Zambia. On this basis, then Secretary General of the OAU expressed hope that
the cease-fire would be finalized by that date (Chukwu, 2012).
The Lusaka Agreement was a comprehensive peace agreement signed by the leaders of Congo,
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda, July 10, 1999, in the midst of difficult
negotiations. The Lusaka Agreement as is known, called for the creation of a Joint Military
Commission (JMC), together with legislatures of the signatories and a neutral chairman in the
week. The Commission's responsibilities was to investigate violations of the ceasefire and
mechanisms to disarm the militias in Congo in development; the Lusaka Agreement calls for the
withdrawal of foreign forces outside peacekeeping in nine months, according to a schedule to be
developed by the UN, the OAU and the JMC; under the Lusaka Agreement, the Congolese
government must enter into dialogue with the RCD and the MLC and national opposition groups
and civil society on the future of the DRC, within 45 days. According to the Lusaka Agreement
also, the United Nations Security Council, in collaboration with the OAU was to deploy a large
force to the Congo to ensure the implementation of the Agreement and to provide humanitarian
assistance to civilians. The Lusaka Agreement encountered serious obstacles. Because of these
obstacles, the agreement failed to resolve the political conflict in the DRC, and restore peace and
tranquility needed much. With the emergence of the AU, new efforts are being made to end the
political conflict in the DRC. Thus, in December 2004, the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union announced that it would seek larger role to help disarm Rwandan armed groups
based in the DRC. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister said: "The AU must commit to participate in
demilitarization and disarmament of these genocidal forces," the foreign minister also said that
they would ask the President of the AU and the chairman of the Committee to bring the
presidents of Rwanda and the DRC, as well as at a summit to defuse tensions development
(Antoine, 2005: 23). The author also argues that Rwanda has welcomed the idea of reviving the
UN troops by the troops of the African Union, if the Interahamwe (the genocidarians) was to be
surrounded, arrested, disarmed and repatriated Rwanda.
However, the 2006 elections marked the end of the transitional national government that
presided over the DRC since 2003, and a turning point in the history of the Congo (Chukwu,
2012). The election was the first time that the Congolese had the opportunity to choose their
leaders. The election would not have been successful deprived of the untiring efforts of the AU
to strengthen dialogue with the government on key legislation that eventually led to the cessation
of hostilities (Chukwu, 2012). The AU has also played an important role in the reform of the
security sector and disarmament (Chukwu, 2012). The transition would not have succeeded
without the establishment of a viable operation of the national army and a police force with a
presence throughout the country (Chukwu, 2012). The AU and the International Committee in
Support of the Transition (CIAT) in cooperation with the UN mission in Congo has been
working to develop an effective plan to complete the establishment of a unified army (Chukwu,
2012). They also worked in the field of disarmament of armed fighters. It is the efforts made by
the AU in these key areas that led to the relative peace which opened way for the 2006 election
Although the election was said to be successful, there is still a conflict in much of the eastern
part of the country (Chukwu, 2012). Subsequently, the AU is currently facing many challenges
which include: the restoration of security and the rule of law and humanitarian needs (Chukwu,
2012). To this end, the continental organization has made great efforts to resolve the political
conflict in the DRC through direct intervention and participation. However, despite the fact that
the AU, unlike the OAU, intervened in political conflicts in the DRC in order to get the problem
solved, the conflict has escalated rather than resolved (Chukwu, 2012). The reasons, as noted in
previous chapters of this work, mostly border on the fact that the DRC is rich in mineral
resources and as such has remained a battleground for the game of conflicting economic interests
of the powers Foreign (both in Africa and in the past) to have played a crucial role in conflict
resolution. This is why the intervention of the AU has neither restored security nor the rule of
law or to respond to humanitarian needs (Chukwu, 2012).
Based on the qualitative data presented above, we therefore accept and validate our third
hypothesis. Therefore, the structure of the AU Charter contains adequate legal frameworks that
enable the AU to resolve the political conflict in the DRC (Chukwu, 2012).
 CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary
According to Chukwu’s work, the study examined the relationship between the African Union
and the resolution of conflicts in Africa, focusing mainly on the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Specifically, however, the study examined whether the structures of capitalism depends
undermine the AU’s ability to resolve the political conflict in the DRC; if the dynamics of
foreign economic interest in the abundant mineral resources in the DRC encroachment on the
AU's efforts in resolving the political conflict in the DRC; and especially if the Charter of the
AU structure undermines his efforts in resolving the political conflict in the DRC.
Chukwu formulated questions to help him in his study and he puts it this way, on this basis,
therefore this research was motivated by the desire to provide satisfactory answers to the
following questions:
1. Do the structures of dependent capitalism undermine the ability of AU to resolve the
political conflict in the DRC?
2. Do the dynamics of external economic interest in abundant mineral resources in the DRC
impinge on the efforts of the AU in resolving the political conflict in the DRC?
3. Does the structure of the AU’s Charter contain adequate legal frameworks that empower
AU to resolve the political conflict in the DRC?
Additionally, Chukwu added that based on the research questions as indicated above, we have
also set out the specific objectives of this study ch include:
 To determine if the structures of capitalism depends undermine the AU's capacity to
resolve the political conflict in the DRC.
 To determine whether the dynamics of external economic interest in the abundant mineral
resources in the DRC encroaching on the AU's efforts in resolving the political conflict in
the DRC.
 To determine whether the structure of the AU Charter contains adequate legal
frameworks that enables the AU to resolve the political conflict in the DRC.
To adequately answer our research questions and as such achieve our goals, we anchored our
analysis on the theoretical perspective of political economy derived from the orthodox Marxist
political economy (Chukwu, 2012). The analysis of this particular theory utility's ability to reveal
the contradictions in the global movement of capital and global relations of production and
exchange to determine the condition and support the external behavior of states and its ability to
explain that the primacy of the material terms determines the behavior of the social group makes
the adoption and application of this theory to study this imperative (Chukwu, 2012). The theory
is also necessary because, in the study of development as a dynamic process of holistic change, it
argues that the problems of production and distribution of wealth should be located within the
broader historical context, including social variables, economic and political (Chukwu, 2012).
In an endeavour to arrive at a satisfactory answer to the research questions it was pertinent for
Chukwu to adduce the following hypotheses:
 The structures of dependent capitalism undermine the ability of AU to resolution the
political clash in the DRC.
 The dynamics of external economic interest in abundant mineral resources in the DRC
impinge on the efforts of the AU in resolving the political conflict in the DRC.
 The structure of the AU’s Charter contains adequate legal frameworks that empower AU
to resolve the political conflict in the DRC.
The study was based on secondary data sources and using the technique of observation, produces
qualitative and quantitative data. These were presented and analyzed accordingly. The study was
divided into five chapters. The first chapter contains the introduction and other classic
methodological requirements such as the problem statement, the purpose of the study, the
importance of the study. The second chapter has explored the UN Force Intervention Brigade as
well as the adventure of M-23(March 23 Movement) through literature review. The basic
features of the Africa’s great lakes conflict were also exposed to solidify the work. Theoretical
framework exclusion would have been unthinkable, therefore it was properly adopted to support
the entire work and offer a concrete platform for the study effectiveness. The prospects and the
challenges that the DRC is faced were encapsulated. The role of the ICJ in the DRC conflict was
integrated into work to view their functionality. Willingness of the UN and neighboring countries
were also explored. In chapter three, Africa Union/United Nations and the Resolve of Internal
Clashes in Africa have been studied. The fourth chapter examines whether the structure of the
AU Charter contains adequate legal frameworks which empowers the AU to resolve the political
conflict in the DRC. Chapter Five embodies summary of all the work, conclusions and
recommendations.

5.2 Conclusion

The study examined the relationship between the African Union and the resolution of conflicts in
Africa, focusing mainly on the Democratic Republic of Congo. To this end, the study found that
the structures of capitalism depends undermine the AU’s ability to resolve the political conflict
in the DRC. In addition, the study found that the dynamics of external economic interest in the
abundant mineral resources in the DRC encroaching on the AU's efforts in resolving the political
conflict in the DRC. Finally, the study also unraveled the structure of the AU charter contains
suitable legal framework which permits the AU to resolution the political conflict in the DRC.
In light of the foregoing conclusions, it was possible to put forward the following
recommendations for the implementation of the policy.

5.3 Recommendations
The study found that the structure of dependent capitalism, the economic dynamic external
interest of Congolese natural resources, and the Charter of the AU structure undermine the
efforts of the African Union in resolving the DRC's political crisis. Given the above, we
presented these recommendations:
One, the African Union must now take responsibility for resolving conflicts on the continent.
The continental body should avoid all interest and capacity to respond seriously and resolve the
ongoing political crisis in Africa as a precondition for governance and development.
Two, the countries of the Great Lakes region should find, through dialogue and a credible
political solution and a framework that addresses the legitimate grievances of the conflicting
groups. To this end, an inclusive political formula that will enable all sectors of the community
to fit in to and take part in the Congolese state should be found.
Three, there should be a conference on all African security in which all African heads of state or
their representatives met and establish an African machinery for conflict deterrence, management
and resolution.
Four, adequate measures must be taken by the Government to end impunity and vicious circle of
attacks and retaliation, as well as illegal mining of resources, particularly in the eastern part of
the DRC.
Five, the AU should take seriously the responsibility to protect citizens in the event of armed
attacks in the hemisphere. Therefore, the continental organization must at all times be prepared
to violate the so-called sovereignty of the state in case of need.
Finally, any resolution of the conflict in the DRC will be short lived if the other conflict areas in
the region are left unresolved. Therefore, assuming that the DRC crisis automatically resolves
the instability in the region is a mistake. The impact of many conflicts in the region requires not
piecemeal restore, but the simultaneous peace in the region. The AU and other regional
organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS
should seek a regional solution to regional problems on the continent.

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