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Agent-Based Models in Economics
In contrast to mainstream economics, complexity theory conceives the economy as a

complex system of heterogeneous interacting agents characterised by limited
information and bounded rationality. Agent-based models (ABMs) are the analytical
and computational tools developed by the proponents of this emerging methodology.
Aimed at students and scholars of contemporary economics, this book includes a
comprehensive toolkit for agent-based computational economics, now quickly
becoming the new way to study evolving economic systems. Leading scholars in the
field explain how ABMs can be applied fruitfully to many real-world economic
examples, and represent a great advancement over mainstream approaches. The essays
discuss the methodological bases of agent-based approaches and demonstrate
step-by-step how to build, simulate and analyse ABMs, and how to validate their
outputs empirically using the data. The contributors also present a wide set of model
applications to key economic topics, including the business cycle, labour markets and
economic growth.
d o m e n i c o d e l l i g at t i is Economics Professor at Catholic University, Milan,

Department of Economics and Finance. He is Director of the Complexity Lab in
Economics. His research interests focus on the role of financial factors (firms’ and
banks’ financial fragility) in business fluctuations. Together with Mauro Gallegati he
has provided important contributions to agent based macroeconomics (e.g., the book
Macroeconomics from the Bottom Up). He has published extensively in high ranking
journals and is editor of the Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination.
g i o r g i o fag i o l o is Professor of Economics at the Institute of Economics,

Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. His research interests include agent-based
computational economics; empirics and theory of economic networks; and the
statistical properties of microeconomic and macroeconomic dynamics. His papers
have been published in numerous journals including Science, the Journal of Economic
Geography, and the Journal of Applied Econometrics.
m au r o g a l l e g at i is Professor of Economics at the Università Politecnica delle
Marche, Ancona, and he has been a visiting professor in several Universities,
including Stanford, MIT and Columbia. He has published journal papers in numerous
subject areas including agent based economics, complexity, economic history,
nonlinear mathematics, and econophysics, and he sits on the editorial board of several
economic journals and book series.
m at t e o r i c h i a r d i is Senior Research Officer at the Institute for New Economic

Thinking, Martin Oxford School, University of Oxford; an assistant professor at the
University of Torino, an associate member of Nuffield College, Oxford; and an
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affiliate of Collegio Carlo Alberto, Torino. An internationally recognised scholar in
both agent-based and dynamic microsimulation modelling, he has also worked as a
consultant on labour market policies for the World Bank. He is Chief Editor of the
International Journal of Microsimulation, and project leader of JAS-mine, an open
source simulation platform for discrete event simulations (www.jas-mine.net).
a l b e r t o r u s s o is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Università Politecnica

delle Marche, Ancona. His research interests include agent based modelling and
complexity economics, inequality and macroeconomic dynamics, and financial
fragility and systemic risk. He has published in such recognized journals as
International Journal of Forecasting, the Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization, and the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. He also serves as
guest editor and referee for several international journals.
Agent-Based Models in Economics
A Toolkit
Edited by
D O M E N I C O D E L L I G AT T I
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
G I O R G I O FAG I O L O
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies
M AU RO G A L L E G AT I
Marche Polytechnic University
M AT T E O R I C H I A R D I
University of Torino
A L B E RTO RU S S O
Marche Polytechnic University
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DOI: 10.1017/9781108227278
© Cambridge University Press 2018
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
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First published 2018
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A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Delli Gatti, Domenico, editor.
Title: Agent-based models in economics : a toolkit / edited by
Domenico Delli Gatti [and four others].
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press, [2017] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017042298 | ISBN 9781108414999 (Hardback : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781108400046 (Paperback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Econometric models. | Economics–Mathematical models.
Classification: LCC HB141 .A3185 2017 | DDC 330.01/5195–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017042298
ISBN 978-1-108-41499-9 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-108-40004-6 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
To our heterogeneous most relevant ones.
An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by
gradually winning over and converting its opponents:
What does happen is that the opponents gradually die out.
(Max Planck)
Contents
List of Figures page xi

List of Tables xiii
List of Contributors xiv
Preface xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Hard Times for Dr Pangloss 1
1.2 The Complexity View 3
1.3 Heterogeneity in a Neoclassical World 4
1.4 Agent-Based Models (ABMs) 6
1.5 Plan of the Book 8
2 Agent-Based Computational Economics: What, Why, When 10

2.1 Introduction 10
2.2 Features of Agent-Based Models 11
2.2.1 Scope of Agent-Based Models 12
2.2.2 The Whole and Its Parts 13
2.2.3 The Dual Problem of the Micro-Macro Relationship 14
2.2.4 Adaptive vs. Rational Expectations 15
2.2.5 Additional Features of Agent-Based Models 17
2.3 The Development of ACE 20
2.3.1 Evolutionary Roots 20
2.3.2 The Santa Fe Perspective: The Economy as an
Evolving Complex System 21
2.3.3 AB Models as Dynamic Microsimulations 24
2.3.4 The Experimental Machine 25
2.4 Why Agents 27
vii
viii Contents
2.5 An Ante Litteram Agent-Based Model: Thomas Schelling’s

Segregation Model 29
2.6 Conclusions 32
3 Agent-Based Models as Recursive Systems 33

3.1 Introduction 33
3.2 Discrete-Event vs. Continuous Simulations and the
Management of Time 33
3.3 The Structure of an AB Model 37
3.4 Obtaining Results in AB Models 41
4 Rationality, Behavior, and Expectations 43

4.1 Introduction 43
4.2 Certainty 44
4.3 Uncertainty 45
4.3.1 Risk Neutrality 46
4.3.2 Risk Aversion 47
4.3.3 Optimal Choice in a Multi-Period Setting 50
4.4 Adaptation in Expectation Formation 55
4.5 Riding at Full Gallop through the History of Macroeconomics 56
4.5.1 The Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis 57
4.5.2 Expectations Enter the Scene 58
4.5.3 Adaptive Expectations 59
4.5.4 Rational Expectations 62
4.5.5 The New Neoclassical Synthesis 68
4.6 The Limits of Rational Expectations 71
4.7 Heterogeneous Expectations: A Very Simple Introduction 72
4.7.1 Heterogeneous-Biased Expectations 72
4.7.2 A Convenient Special Case: Two Types 74
4.7.3 Heterogeneous Adaptive Expectations 76
4.8 Heterogeneous Expectations in ABMs 76
4.9 Conclusions 79
5 Agents’ Behavior and Learning 81

5.1 Introduction 81
5.2 Full and Bounded Rationality 82
5.2.1 Empirical Microfoundations of Individual Behavior 85
5.2.2 Agents’ Behavior and Heuristics 90
Contents ix
5.3 Learning 93
5.3.1 Individual Learning 1: Statistical Learning 95
5.3.2 Individual Learning 2: Fitness Learning 97
5.3.3 Social Learning 105
5.3.4 Individual vs. Social Learning 107
5.4 Conclusions 108
6 Interaction 109
6.1 Introduction 109
6.2 Modeling Interactions 110
6.2.1 Local Exogenous Interaction 114
6.2.2 Endogenous Interaction 118
6.3 Networks: Basic Concepts and Properties 125
6.4 Static and Dynamic Networks 133
6.4.1 Static Networks 133
6.4.2 Dynamic Networks 137
6.5 Conclusions 141
7 The Agent-Based Experiment 143

7.2 Long-Run and Transient Equilibria 144
7.2.1 Definitions 144
7.2.2 Uniqueness and Multiplicity of Equilibria 146
7.2.3 Implications of Stationarity and Ergodicity 150
7.3 Sensitivity Analyis of Model Output 151
7.3.1 Settings for SA 152
7.3.2 Strategies for SA 152
7.3.3 SA and AB Modelling: Some Applications 156
7.3.4 A Simple Example: SA on a Bass Diffusion Model
with Local Interaction 156
7.4 Conclusions 161
8 Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models 163

8.2 The Methodological Basis of Empirical Validation 165
8.2.1 Tractability vs. Accuracy 166
8.2.2 Instrumentalism vs. Realism 167
8.2.3 Pluralism vs. Apriorism 167
8.2.4 The Identification Problem 168
x Contents
8.3 Input Validation of Agent-Based Models 169

8.4 Output Validation of Agent-Based Models 172
8.5 Qualitative Output Validation Technqiues 176
8.5.1 The Indirect Calibration Approach 178
8.5.2 The History-Friendly Approach 180
9 Estimation of Agent-Based Models 183

9.2 Taking the Model to the Data 185
9.2.1 Comparing Apples with Apples 185
9.2.2 Preliminary Tests 187
9.2.3 Simulation-Based Estimation 189
9.2.4 Consistency 191
9.2.5 Calibration vs. Estimation 192
9.3 Simulated Minimum Distance 195
9.3.1 The Method of Simulated Moments 195
9.3.2 Ergodicity and an Application to a Simple AB Model 203
9.4 Bayesian Estimation 210
9.4.1 Estimating the Likelihood 211
9.4.2 Sampling the Posterior Distribution 214
9.4.3 Approximate Bayesian Computation 216
9.4.4 ABC Estimation of the Segregation Model 219
9.5 Conclusions 221
10 Epilogue 222
Bibliography 224
Index 240
Figures
2.1 Excerpt from the Bulletin of the Santa Fe Institute, Vol. 1,

No. 1, June 1986. page 22
2.2 Netlogo implementation of Schelling’s segregation model. 31
3.1 The recursive nature of AB models. 37
4.1 RE solution of Equation 4.7. 53
4.2 AE: Effects of a permanent monetary shock. 61
4.3 AE: Effects of a temporary monetary shock. 63
4.4 RE: Effects of a monetary shock. 65
4.5 Persistence. 67
4.6 Effects of a supply shock in the NK-DSGE model. 70
4.7 Heterogeneous expectations. 74
6.1 A one-dimensional lattice with no boundaries and a
two-dimensional lattice with boundaries. 112
6.2 From a two-dimensional lattice with boundaries to a
two-dimensional lattice with no boundaries (torus). 112
6.3 Von Neumann vs. Moore neighborhoods in a two-dimensional
lattice. 113
6.4 The network structure of the economy in Delli Gatti et al.
(2006): downstream firms, upstream firms, and banks. 118
6.5 Network among 3 nodes. 127
6.6 Different networks’ topologies. 130
6.7 DDF of degree for incoming and outgoing links in 1999 and
2002. 131
6.8 Poisson random graph with 50 nodes below the phase
transition and at the phase transition. 135
6.9 (a) Regular graph with n = 25 nodes and z = 3. (b) Small
World graph with n = 25 nodes and z = 3 created by choosing
xi
xii Figures
at random a fraction p of edges in the graph and moving one

end of each to a new location, also chosen uniformly at random. 136
6.10 Network configuration and the decumulative distribution
function (DDF) of the in-degree. 140
6.11 The index of current winner, the percentage of incoming link
to current winner, and fitness of current winner. 141
7.1 The output of an emulator. The vertical axis measures the
model outcome y, the horizontal axis measures the model
inputs, for instance, a parameter θ . 155
7.2 OAT analysis: average cumulated adoption curves over 50
runs, obtained by varying p in the range [0 : 0.5 : 1], q in
[0 : 0.5 : 1] (central panel), and n in [1 : 1 : 30]. Reference
parameter configuration: (pqn) = (0.030.45), 1,000 agents. 158
7.3 OAT analysis: average time of adoption of the 50th percentile
over 50 runs, obtained by varying p in the range [0 : 0.5 : 1],
q in [0 : 0.5 : 1], and n in [1 : 1 : 30]. Reference parameter
configuration: (pqn) = (0.030.45), 1,000 agents. 160
9.1 Example plot of Weibull hazard functions. 196
9.2 Mean time to failure for Weibull model, λ = 1. Simulation
over 1,000 individuals. 198
9.3 Standard deviation of time to failure for Weibull model, λ = 1.
Simulation over 1,000 individuals. 199
9.4 Example plot of Weibull hazard functions. 202
9.5 Evolution of segregation in the Schelling model, different
random seeds. 205
9.6 Distribution of equilibrium segregation levels in the Schelling
model, different random seeds. 206
9.7 Individual choices in the Schelling model: minimum fraction
of same-colour neighbourhood wanted for different levels of
tolerance. 207
9.8 The effects of tolerance on segregation in the Schelling model. 208
9.9 Distribution of estimates in the Schelling model. 209
9.10 Price distribution in the long-run stationary state at the
pseudo-true value of the coefficient. 213
9.11 Posterior distributions in the Schelling model. 2,300,000 draws
from a Uniform prior in (0,0.45). 221
Tables
3.1 Discrete Event Simulations (DES) vs. Agent-Based (AB)

models. page 35
6.1 Adjacency matrix for the graph of Figure 6.5. 127
6.2 Adjacency matrix for a digraph. 128
7.1 Metamodelling: OLS regression on 1,000 different parameter
configurations, obtained by random sampling from uniform
distributions in the range p [0,0.2], q [0,0.8], n [1,30]. 161
9.1 Monte Carlo results for the estimation of a Weibull model by
MSM. 200
II, with an exponential auxiliary model. 201
II, with a log-logistic auxiliary model. 203
xiii
Contributors
Domenico Delli Gatti (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy)
is Professor of Economics at Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, from
which he received his PhD in 1987. His research interests focus on the role of
financial factors (firms’ and banks’ financial fragility) in business
fluctuations, a field he started exploring in collaboration with Hyman Minsky
in the late 1980s and revisited in a new light due to the research work carried
out with Joe Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald since the 1990s. He has been a
visiting scholar to several universities, including Stanford, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Columbia. He was previously the editor of the
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and is currently the editor of
the Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination. Recently he has
devoted his research effort to two areas of research: the first one concerns the
properties of multi-agent models characterised by “financial frictions”; the
second area concerns the properties of networks in borrowing-lending
relationships.
Giorgio Fagiolo (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy) is Full

Professor of Economics at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, where he
holds a tenured position in the Institute of Economics. He holds a bachelor’s
degree in mathematical statistics from the Sapienza University of Rome and a
PhD in economics from the European University Institute (Florence, Italy).
His main areas of scientific interest include agent-based computational
economics, complex networks, evolutionary games, industrial dynamics and
economic methodology (with particular emphasis on the scientific status of
agent-based computational economics, empirical validation of economic
models and their policy-related implications). His papers have been published
in Science, Journal of Economic Geography, Journal of Applied
xiv
List of Contributors xv
Econometrics, PLOS ONE, Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control,

Computational Economics, New Journal of Physics, Physical Review E,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulations, Global Environmental Change, and
Macroeconomic Dynamics – among others.
Mauro Gallegati (Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy) obtained

his PhD in Economics in 1989 from the University of Ancona with a thesis on
financial fragility, supervised by Hyman Minsky. He is currently Professor of
Economics at the Marche Polytechnic University. He has been a visiting
professor at several universities including Stanford, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Columbia. He is on the editorial board of several economic
journals and book series. His research includes business fluctuations,
nonlinear dynamics, models of financial fragility and heterogeneous
interacting agents. He is well known from his widely cited work with Bruce
Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, developing theory of asymmetric
information and heterogeneous agents and their applications. He has
published papers in the top journals on economics, economic history, history
of economic analysis, nonlinear mathematics, applied economics, complexity
and econophysics.
Matteo Richiardi (University of Turin, Italy) is a senior research officer at

the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Oxford Martin School, University
of Oxford; assistant professor at the University of Turin; associate member of
Nuffield College, Oxford; and affiliate of Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin. He
received an MSc in economics from University College London, and a PhD in
economics from the University of Turin. He is habilitated to full professor in
Italy. He has also worked as a consultant on labour market policies for the
World Bank. Richiardi is an internationally recognised scholar in both
agent-based and dynamic microsimulation modelling. His work involves both
methodological research on estimation and validation techniques, applications
to the analysis of distributional outcomes and the functioning of the labour
market and welfare systems. He is the chief editor of the International
Journal of Microsimulation, and project leader of JAS-mine, an open-source
simulation platform for discrete event simulations (www.jas-mine.net).
Alberto Russo (Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy) has been

Assistant Professor of Economics at Marche Polytechnic University since
December 2008. He obtained his PhD in economics from the University of
xvi List of Contributors
Pisa in 2005. He was a post-doc research fellow at the Scuola Normale

Superiore di Pisa from 2005 to 2007. His main research interests are
agent-based modelling and complexity economics, inequality and
macroeconomic dynamics, financial fragility and systemic risk, social classes
and distribution and experimental economics. He has published in recognised
journals, such as International Journal of Forecasting, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Journal of Economic Issues, Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Metroeconomica, among others. He serves as
guest editor, as well as referee, for international journals, organizes
international conferences and collaborates on Italian and European research
projects.
Preface
As Schumpeter pointed out long ago, conceptual frameworks, models and

policy prescriptions are embedded in the economist’s ‘preanalytic vision’ of
the economy. And preanalytic visions have been, and still are, very different in
the profession.
Nowadays the majority of the profession embraces the neoclassical
approach to economic behaviour, according to which agents are endowed with
substantial rationality, adopt optimal rules and interact indirectly through the
price vector on markets which are continuously in equilibrium. This approach
has been extraordinarily fruitful, as it has allowed economists to build models
that can be solved analytically and yield clear-cut policy implications. The
obvious case in point is Walras’s theory of General Equilibrium, beautifully
outlined in his Elements d’Economie Politique, and elegantly extended and
refined by Arrow and Debreu. Moreover, the approach has been remarkably
flexible. Appropriately designed variants of the neoclassical approach have
been applied to economies characterised by imperfect competition, imperfect
information, strategic interaction, and heterogeneous agents. The most
insightful of these theoretical developments have been incorporated in micro-
founded macroeconomic models of the New Neoclassical Synthesis that have
been all the rage during the years of the Great Moderation.
However, the capability of the neoclassical approach to encompass and
explain all the complex details of economic life has reached a limit. For
instance, it is now abundantly clear that the neoclassical approach is not well-
suited to describe the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession. In
models that follow the New Neoclassical Synthesis, in fact, a great recession
may be explained only by a large aggregate negative shock, whose probability
is extremely low (i.e., it is an extreme and rare event). This mechanism does
not clarify much of the crisis and does not help to devise appropriate remedies.
xvii
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xviii Preface
The current predicament, both in the real world and in the public debate,
resembles the early 1930s. The way out of the Great Depression required a
new economic theory and the Second World War.1 Luckily, in order to escape
the current predicament, we can dispense at least with the latter. We still need,
however, to reshape the way in which we think about the economy.
For several years now, a complexity approach has been developed which
conceives the economy as a complex system of heterogeneous interacting
agents characterised by limited information and bounded rationality. In this
view, a ‘crisis’ is a macroscopic phenomenon which spontaneously emerges
from the web of microscopic interactions. Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are
the analytical and computational tools necessary to explore the properties of a
complex economy.
Agent-based macroeconomics is still in its infancy, but it is undoubtedly a
very promising line of research. So far only a small minority in the economic
profession has adopted this approach. This may be due to the wait-and-
see attitude of those who want to see the approach well established in the
profession before embracing it. The hesitation, however, may also come from
methodological conservatism. For instance, while in other disciplines the
explanatory power of computer simulations is increasingly recognized, most
economists remain dismissive of any scientific work that is not based on strict
mathematical proof.2 With the passing of years, however, agent-based (AB)
tools have been refined. This book is a guide to the main issues which an
interested reader may encounter when approaching this field. We hope this will
help in nudging a new generation of curious minds to explore the fascinating
field of complexity.
We thank for comments, criticisms and insightful conversations Tiziana
Assenza, Leonardo Bargigli, Alessandro Caiani, Alberto Cardaci, Ermanno
Catullo, Eugenio Caverzasi, Annarita Colasante, Giovanni Dosi, Lisa Gian-
moena, Federico Giri, Jakob Grazzini, Bruce Greenwald, Ruggero Grilli, Alan
Kirman, Roberto Leombruni, Simone Landini, Domenico Massaro, Mauro
Napoletano, Antonio Palestrini, Luca Riccetti, Andrea Roventini, Joe Stiglitz,
Leigh Tesfatstion.
This book benefited from funding from the European Community’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013), INET, CRISIS, NESS, and
MATHEMACS.
1
The unemployment rate, which peaked at 1/4 of the labour force during the Great Depression,
went back to the long-run ‘normal’ of around 1/20 only after the end of the war. The huge
increase in government spending due to the war effort helped to absorb the unemployment
2
generated by the Great Depression.
A recent intriguing line of research aims at providing analytical solutions to multi-agent
systems adopting the apparatus of statistical mechanics, e.g., the Fokker-Planck equations.
See, for instance, M. Aoki (2011), Di Guilmi (2016).
1
Introduction
Domenico Delli Gatti and Mauro Gallegati
1.1 Hard Times for Dr Pangloss

High and persistent unemployment, over-indebtedness and financial instabil-
ity, bankruptcies, domino effects and the spreading of systemic risk: these
phenomena have taken center stage in light of the Global Financial Crisis.
By construction, the Neoclassical approach is much better suited to study
the features of the world of Dr Pangloss (Buiter, 1980) than the intricacies of
a complex, financially sophisticated economy. This point is well taken in the
introduction of a seminal paper by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist published
well before the Global Financial Crisis: ‘How does one go about incorporating
financial distress and similar concepts into macroeconomics? While it seems
that there has always been an empirical case for including credit-market
factors in the mainstream model, early writers found it difficult to bring such
apparently diverse and chaotic phenomena into their formal analyses. As a
result, advocacy of a role for these factors in aggregate dynamics fell for the
most part to economists outside the US academic mainstream, such as Hyman
Minsky, and to some forecasters and financial market practitioners.’ (Bernanke
et al., 1999, p. 1344).
This candid admission by three of the most distinguished macroeconomics
(one of them destined to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve for eight long
and turbulent years) – which, incidentally, provides a long overdue implicit
tribute to Hyman Minsky – also provides the research question for a model of
the financial accelerator which has started a non-negligible body of literature
in contemporary macroeconomics.
In order to put this development in macroeconomic thinking into context, it
is necessary to recall that any mainstream macroeconomic model is based on a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) skeleton, which can support
either a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model or a New Keynesian (NK) model.
1
2 Domenico Delli Gatti and Mauro Gallegati
The latter differs from the former because of the presence of imperfections,
the most important being imperfect competition and nominal rigidity. The
structural form of the standard NK-DSGE framework boils down to a three-
equation model consisting of an optimising IS equation, an NK Phillips curve
and a monetary policy rule based on changes in the interest rate.
The NK-DSGE framework is, of course, too simple and therefore inadequate
to analyse the emergence of a financial crisis and a major recession for the very
good reason that neither asset prices nor measures of agents, financial fragility
show up anywhere in the model. In order to make the model operational from
this viewpoint, financial frictions have been incorporated into the basic model
in one way or another.
In the last decade we have witnessed an explosion of models with these
types of frictions. The story that can be attached to this literature, however,
can be told in simple terms. A negative shock triggers a recession and yields
a reduction of firms’ internally generated funds. Borrowers need more funds,
but lenders are less willing to supply loans as the value of firms’ collateral is
also going down. Hence, firms might be forced to scale activity down. This in
turn will lead to lower cash flow, and to a further deceleration of activity.
The financial accelerator provides a mechanism of amplification of an
aggregate shock (i.e., a positive feedback or a self-reinforcing mechanism)
based on financial factors. By construction, however, it cannot be a model of
the origin of a financial crisis and the ensuing recession.
As in all DSGE models, in fact, in models characterised by financial
frictions a fluctuation is also determined by an aggregate shock (an impulse)
and is channeled to the economy by a propagation mechanism. Moreover,
the stability of the steady state makes fluctuations persistent but relatively
short lived. Therefore, a great recession may be explained only by a sizable
aggregate negative shock and is bound to disappear relatively soon. Recent
models incorporating financial frictions trace back the great recession to
a major negative shock (possibly of a new type: an ‘investment shock’, a
‘financial shock’ instead of the usual Total Factor Productivity shock) which
spreads through the economy and becomes persistent because of the financial
amplification, but is temporary so that the economy goes back to equilibrium
in due time.
This view of the Global Financial Crisis is not convincing. It does not
provide a plausible theory of its origin, since the crisis was not the conse-
quence of a global shock, but originated from a small segment of the US
financial system (the subprime loans market) and spread to the entire US
financial system and to the world economy. Moreover, it does not provide an
appropriate characterisation of the actual recovery, which has been unusually
Introduction 3
long and painful.1 In fact, during the recession, quantitative forecasts of future
GDP growth (also at a very short-time horizon) generated by these models
systematically overestimated actual GDP growth.
The financial accelerator story is intriguing, but is not enough to characterise
a major crisis. Models with financial frictions yield interesting results, but
their scope is necessarily limited because of the built-in features of the DSGE
framework. This framework, in fact, abstracts from the complex web of
financial and real relationships among heterogeneous agents that characterise
modern financially sophisticated economies and are at the root of the spreading
of financial fragility economywide. Contemporary macroeconomics, in other
words, has assumed away most of the features of the economy which are
relevant today.
1.2 The Complexity View

For several years now, a different approach has been developed which con-
ceives the macroeconomy as a complex system of heterogeneous agents
characterised by bounded rationality, endowed with a limited and incomplete
information set, interacting directly and indirectly with other agents and the
environment.
In a complex economy, an idiosyncratic shock – i.e., a shock to a specific
agent – can well be the source of an epidemic diffusion of financial distress. In
other words, idiosyncratic shocks do not cancel out in the aggregate, especially
if the macroeconomy is characterised by an underlying network structure and
the idiosyncratic shocks hit crucial nodes of the network. Therefore a recession
may not be caused only by an aggregate shock.
To be specific, in a credit network, the financial accelerator can lead to an
avalanche of bankruptcies due to the positive feedback of the bankruptcy of
a single agent on the net worth of the ‘neighbours’ linked to the bankrupt
agent by credit relationship. This is, of course, ruled out by construction in
a framework with a representative firm and a representative bank.
In order to deal with these issues, one has to start with a population
of heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity, therefore, is key in modelling the
phenomena which we want to investigate.
1
The idea of a ‘secular stagnation’ pioneered by L. Summers, which is gaining ground in the
profession, is based exactly on the unusual length and painfulness of the recovery from the
Great Recession.
1.3 Heterogeneity in a Neoclassical World

The way in which financial frictions have been incorporated in current
macroeconomic models provides an example of a recurrent pattern in the
development of contemporary macroeconomics. Research issues brought to
the fore by new macroeconomic facts are incorporated into an analytical
edifice based on neoclassical foundations by means of appropriate twists of
some assumptions or by additional assumptions, as epicycles in Ptolemaic
astronomy. This is the way in which ‘normal science’ (in Kuhn’s wording)
adjusts to real macroeconomic developments. In this way, there is nothing truly
new under the sun.2
Heterogeneity has been incorporated in Neoclassical models since the early
1990s. This is an impressive achievement, as the Neoclassical approach is
utterly unsuitable for the study of this issue. In a Neoclassical Representative
Agent-Rational Expectations world, equilibrium prices depend on a relatively
small number of state variables and shocks. Forming Rational Expectations
of future prices in such an environment is a daunting but not impossible
task, as the Representative Agent in the model has the same information of
the modeller herself, the ‘true’ model of the economy included (at least in
reduced form).
Things are much more complicated in a multiagent setting. In this case,
equilibrium prices are in principle a function of the entire distribution of
agents (e.g., households’ wealth). Hence, to form expectations, agents need
to know the entire distribution at each point in time, i.e., the law of motion
of this distribution. An impossible task. This is the well known ‘curse
of dimensionality’.3 Neoclassical Heterogeneous Agents Models have been
developed in order to study the causes and consequences of income and wealth
inequality in a DSGE framework.4
These papers by Imrohoroglu, Hugget, Aiyagari essentially relax only
the Representative Agent assumption (and only as far as households are
concerned), but generally retain all the other conceptual building blocks of
2
As Max Planck put it: ‘Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when
3
successful, finds none.’
One possible way is to keep the number of agents low, i.e., to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem (two types of agents). An example, among many, is the NK-DSGE framework with
Limited Asset Market Participation, where households can be either free to access financial
markets or financially constrained. In the latter case, households cannot smooth consumption
4
by borrowing and lending.
These models are also known as Bewley models (according to the terminology proposed by
Ljungqvist, 2004) or Standard Incomplete Markets models (Heathcote, 2009). Notice that
Heterogeneous Agents and Incomplete Market go hand-in-hand, for reasons which will
become clear momentarily.
Introduction 5
DSGE models (intertemporal optimization, continuous market clearing and

general equilibrium).5
In Aiyagari (1994) households are heterogeneous because of idiosyncratic
shocks to earnings. If the markets were complete, these shocks would be
insurable and therefore they would not impinge on average or aggregate
consumption (they would wash out in the aggregate).6 Under these circum-
stances, the long-run or ‘equilibrium’ distribution of wealth would be both
indeterminate and irrelevant (because any distribution of wealth would yield
the same average behaviour).
If markets were incomplete, on the contrary, the possibility to insure
against idiosyncratic risk would be limited and therefore: (1) idiosyncratic
risk would impact on consumption (and macroeconomic performance), (2) the
equilibrium distribution of wealth would be determinate. In Aiyagari’s model
particularly, inequality yields precautionary savings which impact positively –
through investment – on growth.
Research in this field has been extended in at least three directions: (1)
the analysis of other sources of heterogeneity (besides idiosyncratic shocks
to earnings), e.g., innate characteristics; (2) the analysis of additional ways
to insure idiosyncratic shocks; (3) the impact on aggregate fluctuations (see
Heathcote, 2009). Focusing on the third line, we will single out the pioneering
paper by Krusell and Smith (Krusell and Smith, 1998) as typical of the
approach.
Krusell and Smith circumvent the curse of dimensionality in a very smart
way. They summarise the shape of the agents’ distribution by means of a
finite number of its moments. In this way they can abstract from the actual
distribution and be as precise as they wish in describing its shape: the larger
the number of moments considered, the more granular the description of the
distribution. For simplicity, they use only two moments: The first moment
(mean) captures the central tendency of the distribution; the second moment
(variance) captures the dispersion, one aspect of the degree of heterogeneity
characterising the distribution. When dispersion is low, the mean of the
distribution is almost sufficient to describe the distribution itself. Therefore
5
6
See Rios-Rull (1995) for a review of early work in this area.
Completeness and homothetic preferences imply a linear relationship between consumption
and wealth at the individual level, i.e., Engel curves are linear. In this case, perfect
approximation applies: average consumption will be a linear function of average wealth. Only
the first moment of the distribution of wealth is necessary to determine average (and aggregate)
consumption. Heterogeneity, as captured by the variance and higher moments of the
distribution, is irrelevant. Of course this is no longer true if the relationship between
consumption and wealth at the individual level is nonlinear. If the relationship were concave,
for instance, an increase in the dispersion of wealth would lead to lower consumption on
average – thanks to Jensen inequality – even if the mean were preserved.
higher moments of the distribution can be safely ignored and one can think
of the economy as if it were a Representative Agent world, identified with the
Average Agent.
Agents in a Krusell-Smith economy are ‘near rational’ as they optimise
using only the moments of the distribution. Forming near rational expectations
of future prices in such an environment is a daunting but not impossible task,
as equilibrium prices are functions only of the moments of the distribution
instead of the entire distribution.
In this model there is approximate aggregation: ‘in equilibrium all aggregate
variables . . . can be almost perfectly described as a function of two simple
statistics: the mean of the wealth distribution and the aggregate productivity
shock’ (Krusell and Smith, 1998, p. 869). Using only these measures, near-
rational agents are able to minimise the forecast errors (therefore higher
moments of the distribution do not affect the decision of the agents).
Moreover, Krusell and Smith show through simulations that macroeconomic
time series generated by the model are almost indistinguishable from those
generated by a Representative Agent model. Hence macroeconomic fluctuation
can be sufficiently described by fluctuation of the mean; higher moments
of the distribution do not add much to the picture. In other words, taking
heterogeneity on board does not add much to the accuracy of the model. Only
the first moment of the distribution has macroeconomic consequences. In a
sense, this is a very smart way of resurrecting the moribund Representative
Agent and the macroeconomic literature based on it.
However, as shown by Heathcote (2009), with reference to fiscal shocks,
there are indeed real-world circumstances in which heterogeneity has impor-
tant macroeconomic consequences, even in Neoclassical multiagent models.
1.4 Agent-Based Models (ABMs)

The research agenda of the Neoclassical multiagent literature is very specific,
dictated by the self-imposed guidelines on the way in which economic theoris-
ing should take form in the Neoclassical approach. Heterogeneity, therefore, is
key in these models, but is dealt with in a restricted, disciplined environment.
This may be considered a virtue of the approach, but can also be a limitation as
issues and problems which are indeed important ‘out there’ in the real world
are left out of the admissible set of issues and problems to be dealt with. Agent
Based Models (ABMs) have a completely different origin and a much more
flexible agenda. ABMs are the analytical and computational tools developed by
an interdisciplinary network of scientists – physicists, economists, computer
Introduction 7
scientists – to explore the properties of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS),

i.e., ‘systems comprising large numbers of coupled elements the properties
of which are modifiable as a result of environmental interactions . . . In general
CAS are highly nonlinear and are organised on many spatial and temporal
scales’ (1st workshop on CAS, Santa Fe, 1986).
In ABMs a multitude of objects, which are heterogeneous under differ-
ent profiles, interact with each other and the environment. The objects are
autonomous, i.e., there is no centralised (top-down) coordinating or controlling
mechanism. Therefore, ABMs cannot be solved analytically. The output of the
model must be computed and consists of simulated time series.
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is the application of agent-
based (AB) modelling to economics or: ‘The computational study of economic
processes modelled as dynamic systems of interacting agents’ (Tesfatsion and
Judd, 2006, p. 832). The economy, in fact, can be conceived of as a complex
adaptive system.
Behavioural equations may or may not be derived from optimization. AB
modellers generally prefer to assume that agents are characterised by bounded
rationality; they are ‘not global optimisers, they use simple rules (rules of
thumb) based on local information’ (Epstein, 2006a, p. 1588).7
No equilibrium condition is required (out-of-equilibrium dynamics). This
is, in a sense, a consequence of the assumption according to which there is
no top-down coordinating mechanism in ABMs. The Walrasian auctioneer,
who is gently nudging the agents towards an equilibrium position, is indeed a
metaphor of such a top-down coordinating mechanism. AB modellers, in fact,
generally prefer to assume that markets are systematically in disequilibrium.
In principle, however, at least some markets may converge to a statistical
equilibrium.
ABMs are built from the bottom-up. At the micro-level, the behaviour of
heterogeneous agents is captured by simple, often empirically based heuristics
which allow for adaptation, i.e., gradual change over time in response to
changing circumstances. Aggregate variables are determined by means of
summation or averaging across the population of heterogeneous agents. Instead
of untying the Gordian knot of aggregation, in ABMs this is cut by allowing
the computational tool to do the job. Due to interaction and nonlinearities,
statistical regularities emerge at the macroscopic level that cannot be inferred
from the primitives of individuals. These emergent properties are at the core
of macroeconomics in a complex setting. Generally, aggregate variables in
7
In principle, however, behavioural rules can be either grounded in bounded rationality (rules of
thumb) or can be derived from specific optimization problems (optimal rules).
macroeconomic ABMs (e.g., GDP) show a tendency to self-organise towards

a stable aggregate configuration occasionally punctuated by bursts of rapid
change. The self-organisation of the macroeconomy can be represented by a
statistical equilibrium in which the aggregate spontaneous order is compatible
with individual disequilibrium. The equilibrium of a system no longer requires
that every single element be in equilibrium by itself, but rather that the
statistical distributions describing aggregate phenomena be stable, i.e., in
‘a state of macroscopic equilibrium maintained by a large number of transitions
in opposite directions’ (Feller, 1957, p. 356). This is not general equilibrium in
the standard meaning, i.e., a state in which demand equals supply in each and
every market.
In a macroeconomic ABM – i.e., an ABM applied to the macroeconomy –
a ‘crisis’, i.e., a deep downturn followed by a long and painful recovery, is
a macroscopic phenomenon which spontaneously emerges from the web of
microscopic interactions. In a macro ABM, in other words, big shocks are not
necessary to explain big recessions, an appealing property indeed in light of
the Global Financial Crisis.
The real-world phenomena that are conceived of as rare ‘pathologies’ in
the Neoclassical view – high and persistent unemployment, over-indebtedness
and financial instability, bankruptcies, domino effects and the spreading of sys-
temic risk – turn out to be the spontaneous emerging macroscopic consequence
of complex interactions in a multiagent framework with heterogeneous agents.
1.5 Plan of the Book

The main aim of this book is to provide an introduction to Agent-Based
Modelling methodology with an emphasis on its application to macroeco-
nomics.
The book is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we answer the most basic
questions: What is an ABM? When is it necessary and/or appropiate to build
such a model? The chapter ends with a succinct overview of a very early
example of ABM: Schelling’s model of racial segregation.
In Chapter 3 we provide a formal characterisation of an ABM as a recursive
model. We put ABMs in the wider context of simulation models and introduce
notation and key concepts to describe the agents’ state and behavioural rules
in ABMs in rigorous terms.
Chapter 4 is devoted to a general overview of rationality, the determination
of behavioural rules and expectation formation in contemporary macroeco-
nomics, from Keynesian aggregative models to macroeconomic ABMs passing
Introduction 9
through monetarist, New Classical and New Keynesian models. This survey
allows us to put the AB methodology into context and paves the way to
the more detailed analysis of behavioural rules and learning processes in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 5, in fact, digs deeper into the definition and description of the
agent’s rationality and learning processes. Where do behavioural rules come
from? Agents in real economies are intentional subjects. In order to decide
on a line of action (a behavioural rule), in fact, they must form mental
representations of their environment and of the behaviour of other agents.
Behavioural rules in the real world, therefore, must be related to the cognitive
processes that guide actions. Learning is a key ingredient of these cognitive
processes.
Chapter 6 deals with the issue of interaction, which is key in ABMs. In
a sense, the chapter is an introductory overview of network theory, a rapidly
expanding field both in mainstream and complexity theory. ABMs, in fact, are
often based on an underlying network structure, e.g., of trading relationships,
credit relationships, supply chain, etc.
Chapter 7 explores the research outcome of an ABM, i.e., the model
behaviour. The AB researcher, in fact, sets up the ‘rules of the game’ – i.e.,
she builds the model – but does not know in advance the implications of those
rules, e.g., the statistical structure of the output of simulations. The chapter
presents techniques to gain understanding about the model behaviour – the
Data Generating Process implicit in the ABM – which are quite underexplored
in the AB literature. In a model which requires simulations, only inductive
knowledge about its behaviour can be gained, by repeatedly running the model
under different samples from the parameter space.
Chapter 8 is devoted to the empirical validation of ABMs. Empirically
validating an ABM means, broadly speaking, ‘taking the model to the data’,
essentially in the form of empirical and/or experimental data. Validation may
concern the model inputs and/or outputs. Input validation is essentially the
assessment of the ‘realism’ of the assumptions on which the model rests while
output validation is the assessment of the capability of the model to replicate
in artificial or simulated data the stylised facts of economic reality under
consideration. Output validation is a joint test on the structure of the model
and the values of the parameters. This means that input and output validation
are connected.
Chapters 9 deals with the issue of estimation of ABM parameters, an
intriguing new field which aims to align the empirical validation techniques
of ABMs to that of standard macroeconomic models where estimation tools
are readily available and relatively easy to implement.
2
Agent-Based Computational Economics:
What, Why, When
Matteo Richiardi
2.1 Introduction
What are agent-based (AB) models? In a nutshell, they are models (i.e.,
abstract representations of the reality) in which (i) a multitude of objects inter-
act with each other and with the environment, (ii) the objects are autonomous
(i.e., there is no central, or “top-down,” control over their behavior and, more
generally, on the dynamics of the system)1 , and (iii) the outcome of their
interaction is numerically computed. Since the objects are autonomous, they
are called agents. The application of agent-based modeling to economics is
called Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE). As Leigh Tesfatsion –
one of the leading researchers in the field and the “mother” of the ACE
acronym – defines it, ACE is
the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of
interacting agents (Tesfatsion, 2006).
In other terms, AB models are the tool traditionally employed by ACE

researchers to study economies as complex evolving systems, that is systems
composed by many interacting units evolving through time.
None of the features above, in isolation, define the methodology: the micro-
perspective implied by (i) and (ii) is roughly the same as the one adopted,
for instance, by game theory, where strategic interaction is investigated
analytically (though in game theory the number of individuals who populate
the models is generally very small). The computational approach, instead,
1
The Walrasian auctioneer, for instance, is a top-down device for ensuring market clearing.
Another example of top-down control is the consistency-of-expectations requirement typically
introduced by the modeler in order to allow for a meaningful equilibrium in neoclassical
models. More on this point on Section 2.2 below.
10
Agent-Based Computational Economics: What, Why, When 11
is typical of Computational General Equilibrium or Stock-Flow Consistent

models, which are, however, based on aggregate representations of the system.
In this introductory chapter we describe the features of AB models (Section
2.2), offering an overview of their historical development (Section 2.3),
discussing when they can be fruitfully employed and how they can be
combined with more traditional approaches (Section 2.4). As an example, we
describe one of the first and most prominent AB models, Thomas Schelling’s
Segregation model (Section 2.5). Conclusions follow.
2.2 Features of Agent-Based Models

The basic units of AB models are the “agents.” In economics, agents can
be anything from individuals to social groups – like families or firms.
They may also be more complicated organizations (banks for instance), or
even industries or countries. Agents can be composed by other agents: the
only requirement being that they are perceived as a unit from the outside,
and that they do something – that is they have the ability to act – and possibly
react to external stimuli and interact with the environment and with other
agents.
The environment, which may include physical entities (like infrastructures,
geographical locations, etc.) and institutions (like markets, regulatory systems,
etc.) can also be modeled in terms of agents (a central bank, the order book of
a stock exchange, etc.), whenever the conditions outlined above are met. If not,
it should be thought of simply as a set of variables (say “weather” or “business
confidence”) characterizing the system as a whole or one of its parts. These
variables may be common knowledge among the agents or communicated
throughout the system by some specific agent – say the statistical office –
at specific times. From what we have said so far, it should be clear that
aggregate variables like consumption, savings, investment and disposable
income, which are the prime units of analysis of Keynesian macroeconomics,
cannot be modeled as agents in an AB framework as they are computed by
aggregating microeconomic agent quantities; the same applies to the fictitious
representation of a representative agent (RA), a cornerstone of neoclassical
economics. Therefore, ACE can in principle provide sound microfoundations
for traditional Keynesian macroeconomics, and sound aggregate results for the
neoclassical analysis based on individual optimization. The direct modeling
of a demand or a supply curve is also forbidden in an agent-based setting:
rather, these aggregate functions may (or may not) emerge as the outcome of
the decisions of the individual agents.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
576.
Tabari, i. c. lxxix.; Abulfeda, p. 35.
577.
Rabboth, fol. 302 b; Devarim Rabba, fol. 246, col. 2.
578.
Weil, pp. 188, 189.
579.
Weil, p. 190.
580.
Rabboth, fol. 302 b.
581.
Weil, pp. 190, 191.
582.
Lyra Anglicana, London, 1864, “The Burial of Moses.”
583.
Talmud, Tract. Sota, fol. 14 a.
584.
Tabari, i. p. 396.
585.
Talmud of Jerusalem; Tract. Terumoth.
586.
Josh. vii. 1-5.
587.
Tabari, i. p. 402.
588.
Koran, Sura ii. v. 55, 56.
589.
Tabari, p. 404.
590.
Tabari, p. 401.
591.
Ibid. p. 404.
592.
Berescheth Rabba.
593.
The Mussulmans say Khasqîl or Ezechiel.
594.
Judges i. 4.
595.
Tabari, i. p. 404.
596.
Eisenmenger, i. p. 395.
597.
Hist. Dynast. p. 24.
598.
Tabari, i. c. lxxxvii.
599.
D’Herbelot, Bibl. Orient., s. v. Aschmouil.
600.
Koran, Sura ii. v. 247, 248.
601.
Koran, Sura ii. v. 248.
602.
D’Herbelot, Bib. Orientale, t. i. p. 263.
603.
Tabari, i. p. 417.
604.
This incident, from the apocryphal gospels of the childhood of
Christ, shall be related in the Legendary Lives of New
Testament Characters.
605.
Weil, pp. 193-8.
606.
607.
Tabari, i. p. 418.
608.
Perhaps the passage in Psalm cvii. 35 may refer to this
miracle, unrecorded in Holy Scripture.
609.
Weil, pp. 200, 201.
610.
611. Weil, p. 203.
612.
Tabari, i. p. 421.
613.
Ibid.
614.
Tabari, i. p. 422; Weil, pp. 202-4; D’Herbelot, i. p. 362.
615.
Weil, pp. 205-8.
616.
Tabari, i. p. 423. The same story is told of the escape of S.
Felix of Nola, in the Decian persecution.
617.
Tabari, i. p. 429.
618.
Weil, p. 207.
619.
Tabari, i. p. 424.
620.
Ps. li. 5.
621.
Midrash, fol. 204, col. 1.
622.
Ps. cxviii. 22.
623.
See the story in the Legends of Adam.
624.
Zohar, in Bartolocci, i. fol. 85, col. 2.
625.
Jalkut, fol. 32, col. 2 (Parasch 2, numb. 134).
626.
Ibid. (Parasch. 2, numb. 127).
627.
1 Sam. xvii. 43.
628.
2 Sam. iii. 29.
629.
Zohar, in Bartolocci, i. fol. 99, col. 1.
630.
Talmud, Tract. Sanhedrim, fol. 107.
631.
1 Kings ii. 11.
632.
2 Sam. v. 5.
633.
Bartolocci, i. f. 100.
634.
1 Sam. xxiv. 4.
635.
Bartolocci, i. f. 122, col. 1.
636.
1 Kings i. 1.
637.
Bartolocci, i. f. 122, col. 2.
638.
Ps. lvii. 9; Bartolocci, i. fol. 125, col. 2.
639.
Talmud, Tract. Sota, fol. 10 b.
640.
Ps. xxii. 21.
641.
Midrash Tillim, fol. 21, col. 2.
642.
Eisenmenger, i. p. 409.
643.
Ps. xviii. 36.
644.
Ps. lv. 6.
645.
Ps. lxviii. 13.
646.
Talmud, Tract. Sanhedrim, fol. 95, col. 1.
647.
Tract. Sabbath, fol. 30, col. 2.
648.
Tabari, i. p. 426; Weil, p. 208.
649.
Weil, p. 207.
650.
Tabari, p. 428.
651.
The Arabs call her Saga.
652.
The story in the Talmud is almost the same, with this
difference: Bathsheba was washing herself behind a beehive,
then the beautiful bird perched on the hive, and David shot an
arrow at it and broke the hive, and exposed Bathsheba to view.
In the Rabbinic tale, David had asked for the gift of prophecy,
and God told him he must be tried. This he agreed to, and the
temptation to adultery was that sent him. (Talmud, Tract.
Sanhedrim, fol. 107, col. 2; Jalkut, fol. 22, col. 2.)
653.
Koran, Sura xxxviii.
654.
Weil, pp. 212, 213.
655.
Weil, pp. 213-224.
656.
Greek text, and Latin translation in Fabricius: Pseudigr. Vet.
Test. t. ii. pp. 905-7.
657.
‫ ;סגולות ורפואות‬Amst. 1703.
658.
Solomon was twelve years old when he succeeded David.
(Abulfeda, p. 43; Bartolocci, iv. p. 371.)
659.
Weil, pp. 225-231; Eisenmenger, p. 440, &c.
660.
Weil, pp. 231-4.
661.
The story of the building of the temple, with the assistance of
Schamir, has been already related by me in my “Curious Myths
of the Middle Ages.”
662.
The Rabbinic story and the Mussulman are precisely the same,
with the difference that Benaiah, the son of Jehoiada, instead
of the Jinns, lies in ambush and captures Sachr or Aschmedai
(Asmodeus). (Eisenmenger, i. 351-8.) As I have given the
Jewish version in my “Curious Myths of the Middle Ages,” I
give the Arab story here.
663.
Weil, pp. 234-7; Talmud, Tract. Gittin. fol. 68, cols. 1, 2.
664.
Jalkut Schimoni, fol. 90, col. 4.
665.
Tabari, i. p. 435.
666.
Tabari, i. p. 436.
667.
Koran, Sura xxvii.; Tabari, i. c. xcviii.; Weil, pp. 237-9.
668.
The Jews also believed in a purgatory; see Bartolocci, i. 342.
669.
Targum Scheni Esther, fol. 401, tells the same of the moorcock.
670.
This is the letter according to Rabbinic authors: “Greeting to
thee and to thine; from me, King Solomon. It is known to thee
that the holy, ever-blessed God has made me lord and king
over the wild beasts and birds of heaven, and over the devils,
and spirits, and ghosts of the night, and that all kings, from the
rising to the down-setting of the sun, come and greet me. If
thou also wilt come and salute me, then will I show thee great
honour above all the kings that lie prostrate before me. But if
thou wilt not come, and wilt not salute me, then will I send
kings, and soldiers, and horsemen against thee. And if thou
sayest in thine heart, ‘Hath King Solomon kings, and soldiers,
and horsemen?’ then know that the wild beasts are his kings,
and soldiers, and horsemen. And if thou sayest, ‘What, then,
are his horsemen?’ know that the birds of heaven are his
horsemen. His army are ghosts, and devils, and spectres of the
night; and they shall torment and slay you at night in your beds,
and the wild beasts will rend you in the fields, and the birds will
tear the flesh off you.” This letter, the Jews say, was sent to the
Queen of Sheba by a moorcock. (Targum Scheni Esther, fol.
401, 440.)
671.
According to another account, “that she had ass’s legs” (Weil,
p. 267). Tabari says, “hairy legs” (i. p. 441).
672.
Weil, pp. 246-267; Tabari, i. cc. 94, 95.
673.
Weil, pp. 267-9.
674.
Tabari, i. c. xcvi. p. 448.
675.
Weil, pp. 269-271; Tabari, pp. 450, 451.
676.
Koran, Sura xxxviii.
677.
Tabari, pp. 460, 461.
678.
In the Jewish legend, Asmodeus. In “Curiosities of Olden
Times” I have pointed out the connection between the story of
the disgrace of Solomon and that of Nebuchadnezzar,
Jovinian, Robert of Sicily, &c.
679.
Deut. xvii. 16, 17.
680.
Emek Nammelek, fol. 14; Gittin, fol. 68, col. 2; Eisenmenger, i.
pp. 358-60. The Anglo-Saxon story of Havelock the Dane
bears a strong resemblance to this part of the story of
Solomon.
681.
Eisenmenger, i. pp. 358-60; Weil, pp. 271-4; Tabari, c. 96.
682.
Weil, p. 274.
683.
Eisenmenger, i. 361.
684.
Tabari, p. 454.
685.
Koran, Sura xxxiv.; Tabari, c. 97; Weil, p. 279.
686.
Tabari, i. c. 84.
687.
Das Buch der Sagen und Legenden jüdischer Vorzeit, p. 45;
Stuttgart, 1845.
688.
Herbelot, Bibl. Orient., s. v. Zerib, iii. p. 607.
689.
Gemara, Avoda Sara, c. i. fol. 65.
690.
Anabasticon, iv. 2-12.
691.
Anabasticon, v. 1-14.
692.
Tract. Jebammoth, c. 4.
693.
Exod. xxxiii. 20.
694.
Isai. vi. 1.
695.
Deut. iv. 7.
696.
Isai. lv. 6.
697.
Tabari, i. c. 83.
698.
Bartolocci, i. p. 848.
699.
Sura, ii.
700.
Herbelot, Bibliothèque Orientale, iii. p. 89.
701.
Abulfaraj, p. 57.
702.
Hist. Eccles. lib. ix. cap. ult.
703.
Ibid., lib. xiv. c. 8.
Transcriber’s Notes:
Footnotes have been collected at the end of the text, and are
linked for ease of reference.
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Agent Based Models in Economics A

Toolkit Domenico Delli Gatti

Agent-Based Models and Complexity Science in the Age of

Fuzzy Models in Economics Gorkhmaz Imanov

Equilibrium Models in Economics Purposes and Critical

Innovative Approaches in Agent-Based Modelling and

A Python Data Analyst’s Toolkit: Learn Python and

Towards a Competence Based View on Models and Modeling

Agent Based Modelling of Social Networks in Labour

Modern Approaches to Agent based Complex Automated

In contrast to mainstream economics, complexity theory conceives the economy as a

d o m e n i c o d e l l i g at t i is Economics Professor at Catholic University, Milan,

g i o r g i o fag i o l o is Professor of Economics at the Institute of Economics,

m at t e o r i c h i a r d i is Senior Research Officer at the Institute for New Economic

a l b e r t o r u s s o is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Università Politecnica

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

List of Figures page xi

2 Agent-Based Computational Economics: What, Why, When 10

2.5 An Ante Litteram Agent-Based Model: Thomas Schelling’s

3 Agent-Based Models as Recursive Systems 33

4 Rationality, Behavior, and Expectations 43

5 Agents’ Behavior and Learning 81

7 The Agent-Based Experiment 143

8 Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models 163

8.3 Input Validation of Agent-Based Models 169

9 Estimation of Agent-Based Models 183

2.1 Excerpt from the Bulletin of the Santa Fe Institute, Vol. 1,

at random a fraction p of edges in the graph and moving one

3.1 Discrete Event Simulations (DES) vs. Agent-Based (AB)

Giorgio Fagiolo (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy) is Full

Econometrics, PLOS ONE, Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control,

Mauro Gallegati (Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy) obtained

Matteo Richiardi (University of Turin, Italy) is a senior research officer at

Alberto Russo (Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy) has been

Pisa in 2005. He was a post-doc research fellow at the Scuola Normale

As Schumpeter pointed out long ago, conceptual frameworks, models and

1.1 Hard Times for Dr Pangloss

1.2 The Complexity View

1.3 Heterogeneity in a Neoclassical World

DSGE models (intertemporal optimization, continuous market clearing and

1.4 Agent-Based Models (ABMs)

scientists – to explore the properties of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS),

macroeconomic ABMs (e.g., GDP) show a tendency to self-organise towards

1.5 Plan of the Book

In other terms, AB models are the tool traditionally employed by ACE

is typical of Computational General Equilibrium or Stock-Flow Consistent

2.2 Features of Agent-Based Models

611. Weil, p. 203.

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