Navia vs.

Pardico

EDGARDO NAVIA,RUBEN DIO,and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf
and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 184467 : June 19, 2012

FACTS:

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The
arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son
Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them
to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric
wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the
security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of
amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened
violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the
case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it
failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners
constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be
deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his
alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben
and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m.
Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for
Bens disappearance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious
and effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.”

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings
inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security.
The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired
except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against
deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental
law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined
enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of
international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or
any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law.”

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements
that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof
that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by
substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity,
and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated
Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in
Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they
failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the
government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case
of a missing person.

DISMISSED

Castillo vs. Cruz

Castillo vs Cruz

GR 182165

Facts:

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz),
leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the
property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which
intended to utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent case
among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province.
Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was
already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by
the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing
him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,” entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC
Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners,
forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other
forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue:

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

Held:

On the 1st issue:

Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also
threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also
teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it
a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government
and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’
entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing
threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove
entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In
fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.

On the 2nd issue:

Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for
criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and
proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or
the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and
not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.

Noriel H. Rodriguez vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

G.R. No. 191805

November 15, 2011

FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its
members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.

On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy.
Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in
civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).

The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of
the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging
to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army. Members of
the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and
camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was
also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by members
of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.

Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went inside their house
and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.

On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following
them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.

On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas
Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009.

The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit,
Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.

Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from
suits (by virtue of her position as president).

Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the abduction and
torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the
petition.

CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and
Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack
of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.
ISSUE:

WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential immunity from
suit

WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas data cases.

HELD:

(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only applies during
her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”

“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s
tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right.”

Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.

The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their tenure (and
not term).

“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself
from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts
to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.

Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.

“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents,
by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”

“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing
the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings,
Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or
accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove
through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.”

SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect to
respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt.
Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of
merit.

Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base
in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico
Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were
also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the
petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed
for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of
Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD:

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his
or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the
petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance
of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

De Lima et.al vs. Gatdula Case Digest

G.R. No. 204528

Feb. 19, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila, directed
against petitioners.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and
ordered the petitioners to file an answer. He also set the case for hearing.

The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases
but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied since an Amparo case is
summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.

The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda.

RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for
namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.

The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 as
enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?

2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo?

3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?

4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?

5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was correct?

RULING:

1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo.

2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how
this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the
application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is
not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
seriously misplaced.

3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing
only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.

4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

5. No. The decision was not correct. This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since
the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of
Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.

6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A Petition for
Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause
grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

HELD:

(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
case;

(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached
affidavits.