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Edited by Giancarlo Frosio
Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability
Edited by Giancarlo Frosio
Print Publication Date: May 2020 Subject: Law Online Publication Date: May 2020
Impression: 1
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Print Publication Date: May 2020 Subject: Law Online Publication Date: May 2020
line Intermediaries
IN pursuit of an answer to the online intermediary liability conundrum, The Oxford Hand
book of Online Intermediary Liability has gathered together multiple voices that have con
tributed greatly to this emerging debate in the last few years. I have encountered or
came to know about most of my co-authors a few years ago at the time of my residence at
the Stanford Center for Internet and Society where I served as the first Intermediary Lia
bility Fellow. The idea for this Handbook was the result of other projects that we have run
together, including the World Intermediary Liability Map, and the need to crystallize an
emerging field of research. This field of research has grown exponentially since this
Handbook was first envisioned. Online intermediary liability has now become a pervasive
issue on the agenda of governments, courts, civil society, and academia and in the last
few years legislation, case law, and initiatives dealing with the liability of online interme
diaries have followed at an astounding pace.
The role of online service providers (OSPs) is unprecedented in relation to their capacity
to influence users’ interactions in the infosphere.1 Online intermediaries mediate human
life in a virtual brave new world that reflects and augments our physical realm. ‘Internet
intermediaries are crucial for how most people use the Internet,’ Dan Jerker Svantesson
noted.2 Ubiquitous platforms dictate our daily routine: searching for information on
Google, getting a taxi on Uber, shopping on Amazon Fresh, making payments via PayPal,
collaborating on Google Docs, storing documents on Dropbox, taking up employment
through Upwork, discussing trendy topics on Twitter, sharing videos on YouTube, or post
ing pictures on Instagram. In particular, most creative expression today takes place over
communications networks owned by private companies. The decentralized, global nature
of the internet means that almost anyone can present an (p. x) idea, make an assertion,
post a photograph, or push to the world numerous other types of content. Billions of peo
ple possess multiple connected portable devices. People communicate their experiences
on the go through multimedia social networking services (e.g. Facebook, Instagram), on
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line file repositories (e.g. Flickr, Dropbox, Google Photos), and various kinds of video-
sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube, Vimeo, Dailymotion). According to Danny Friedmann, ‘in
China, en route to become the biggest economy in the world, at the end of 2017, it was
estimated that more than half of the population (772 million people) had access to the in
ternet. Goods are traded between businesses and consumers, between consumers, and
between businesses, at enormous online market platforms, such as those of the Alibaba
Group’.
The ‘information society’ with its 2.5 quintillion bytes of data created each day3 has slow
ly morphed into the ‘platform society’. But there is more to it. Perhaps unnoticed, our so
ciety has transformed into an ‘intermediated society’. Platforms and OSPs filter our net
worked life, shape our experiences, define our memories—and even remind us of a (se
lected) few of them. ‘They contribute to inform the space of opportunities in which indi
viduals and societies can flourish and evolve,’ Mariarosaria Taddeo stresses, ‘and eventu
ally impact how we understand reality and how we interact with each other and with the
environment’. The decisions made by these platforms increasingly shape contemporary
life. ‘As leading designers of online environments, OSPs make decisions that impact pri
vate and public lives, social welfare and individual wellbeing.’
Therefore, whether and when access providers and communications platforms like
(p. xi)
Google, Twitter, and Facebook are liable for their users’ online activities is a key factor
that affects innovation and fundamental rights. Transaction costs deriving from their lia
bility shape platforms’ decisions and policies, algorithms’ development, and, finally, the
architecture of the infosphere. Kylie Pappalardo and Nicolas Suzor clarify that ‘intermedi
ary liability matters because the rules of intermediary liability structure the internet.
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What internet users can and cannot see and do is largely dictated by the laws that apply
to the online service providers that mediate their experience’. According to Miquel
Peguera, ‘the way business models are conceived and developed closely hinges on the le
gal framework that governs their duties and that determines the conditions under which
they may or may not be sheltered from liability’, so that ‘intermediary liability ends up
shaping the availability of new digital services and affects citizens’ daily lives in multiple
ways’. Jaani Riordan reminds of the tension that lies in setting up liability against online
intermediaries:
If intermediary liability rules are too strict, they risk stifling new and useful ser
vices and restricting market participation to the largest platforms—those best able
to afford lawyers, compliance costs, and political lobbying. At the other extreme,
rules which immunise intermediaries against any need to act could make it impos
sible or impracticable for claimants to enforce their rights, encouraging the
spread of disinformation and other harmful material.
On one side, as Marco Ricolfi suggests, ‘the adoption of intermediary liability exacerbates
the difficulties in preserving freedom of innovation [and], in terms of competition policy, it
risks creating barriers to newcomers’. On the other side, Eduardo Bertoni stresses that
‘depending on the regulation that could be enacted, the impact on fundamental rights
might be positive or negative’. For Peguera, the way in which we arrange liability has ‘an
immediate effect on the exercise of fundamental rights on the Internet, particularly in
terms of freedom to access and impart information and in terms of privacy and data pro
tection’. According to Kristofer Erickson and Martin Kretschmer, ‘the legal regime of no
tice-and-takedown which has been in place for 20 years was conceived as a means of bal
ancing legitimate interests of media rightholders, platform innovators and online users’.
However, Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko add that:
once intermediaries are asked to do more in their new role of active … enforcers,
impartial enforcement can be at risk, raising the questions with regards to compli
ance, among others, with the fundamental rights of both Internet users and inter
mediaries themselves. This situation entails a serious risk of intermediary being
‘overzealous’ in order to avoid liability and to block access to content that is made
available in a perfectly legal manner.
OSPs are subjected to increasing pressure by governments and interest groups which are
seeking to control online content by making use of their technical capacities. In this
(p. xii) regard, Niva Elkin-Koren and Maayan Perel highlight that ‘they offer a natural
point of control for monitoring, filtering, blocking, and disabling access to content, which
makes them ideal partners for performing civil and criminal enforcement’. As Emily Laid
law develops:
Intermediaries occupy a critical regulatory role, because they have the capacity to
control the flow of information online in a way that others, including states, can
not. Thus, significant energy is devoted by lawmakers to strategizing how to cre
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ate laws that capitalize on intermediaries’ capacity to regulate to solve many prob
lems posed by internet use.
However, ‘intermediary obligations should not be confused with those of states’. This is
hardly the case nowadays. For example, as Nicolo Zingales notes, ‘intermediary liability
of OSPs is particularly relevant in the African continent because of the increasing pres
sure on intermediaries to fulfil broad and open-ended public policy mandates, and poten
tially affecting both technological progress and the creation of local content’. Multiple ju
risdictions follow the same path. As Bertrand de La Chapelle and Paul Fehlinger argue,
the intermediary liability debates are exacerbated by a looming risk of ‘a legal arms race,
in which states resort to an extensive interpretation of territoriality criteria over cross-
border data flows and services’.
In an ‘invisible handshake’ between public and private parties, faced with semiotic regu
lation on an unprecedented scale, enforcement looks once again for an ‘answer to the ma
chine in the machine’.4 Sophisticated algorithms and company policies enable and con
strain our actions. These algorithms take decisions reflecting policy’s assumptions and in
terests that have very significant consequences for society at large, yet there is limited
understanding of these processes. This is critical, Ben Wagner notes, as ‘understanding
the mechanism of implementation is key to understanding the nature of speech that is en
abled by it’. Sergei Hovyadinov notes how ‘the framework of intermediary liability estab
lished in the EU and the US 15–20 years ago is not sufficient anymore to fight illegal con
tent, especially terrorist, which because of the volume and the speed of its dissemination
calls for a more proactive approach, with elements of automation and proactive monitor
ing’. ‘Intermediary liability’, Hovyadinov continues, ‘is thus shifting from a reactive “no
tice-and-take down” regime to “intermediary accountability” [as Martin Husovec termed
it] based on new expectations from governments and civil society as to the role online
platforms should proactively perform’. Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko highlight
the ‘danger that intermediaries have recourse to automated systems, leading to a situa
tion where machines and algorithms would become the decision-makers of what is avail
able or not on the Internet’. Of course, ‘this privatisation of justice is highly problematic
in a democratic society, in particular with regard to the constitutional legal framework’.
Therefore, Niva Elkin-Koren and Maayan Perel conclude that (p. xiii) ‘with the rise of algo
rithmic enforcement, data driven economy, centralized architecture and market concen
tration, the new regulatory powers of online platforms are challenging the rule of law’.
To continue this dialogue on the role of online intermediaries in modern society, this
Handbook will present multiple scholarly perspectives on the major themes in intermedi
ary liability and platform governance.
The Handbook discusses fundamental legal issues in online intermediary liability, while
also describing advances in intermediary liability theory and identifying recent policy
trends. Part I features an introductory chapter that will serve as a blueprint for the con
sistent development of other chapters as it sets out in advance the most relevant trends
according to which the structure of the book has been generated. Part II provides a taxon
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omy of internet platforms, a general discussion of a possible basis for liability, and a re
view of remedies. In addition, Part II introduces the discussion of the fundamental rights
implications of intermediary liability and considers the ethical ramifications of the role of
online intermediaries. Part III presents a jurisdictional overview of intermediary liability
safe harbours and highlights systemic fragmentation. In this respect, Part III will also fo
cus on enhanced responsibilities that multiple jurisdictions incresingly impose on online
intermediaries. Part IV provides an overview of domain-specific solutions, including inter
mediate liability for copyright, trade mark, unfair competition, and privacy infringement,
together with internet platforms’ speech-related obligations and liabilities. Part V reviews
intermediary liability enforcement strategies by focusing on emerging trends, including
proactive monitoring obligations, blocking orders, and the emergence of administrative
enforcement of online infringement. Part VI discusses an additional core emerging trend
in intermediary liability enforcement: voluntary measures and private enforcement of al
legedly illegal content online are shifting the discourse from intermediary liability to in
termediary responsibility or accountability. International private law issues are addressed
in Part VII with special emphasis on extraterritorial enforcement of intermediaries’ oblig
ations.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my co-authors for completing this truly
‘monumental’ study that contributes fundamentally to research in the field. Special
thanks also go to the team at Oxford University Press for giving us the opportunity to
publish this volume, helping to define the trajectory that it has finally taken, and for all
the editorial support. I would also like to thank my wife, Hong, and my parents, Nuccia
and Clemente, for their continuous support. Nothing would be possible without the happi
ness that my family gives to me.
June 2019
Notes:
(1) See Luciano Floridi, The Fourth Revolution—How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human
Reality (OUP 2014) (arguing that after the Copernican, Darwinian, and Freudian revolu
tions, humans are once again forced to rethink their role as they must now interact with
virtual entities and agent in a wholly new medium, the infosphere).
(2) The following considerations are the result of reflections collected via email exchange
with my co-authors in the last few months. The quoted passages are taken from this ex
change, which is on file with the author.
(4) Charles Clark, ‘The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine’ in Bernt Hugenholtz
(ed.), The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment (Kluwer Law Int’l 1999) 139 (dis
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cussing the application of digital right management systems to enforce copyright in
fringement online).
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Notes on Contributors
Edited by Giancarlo Frosio
Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability
Edited by Giancarlo Frosio
Print Publication Date: May 2020 Subject: Law Online Publication Date: May 2020
Christina Angelopoulos
Richard Arnold
Eduardo Bertoni
Annemarie Bridy
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is the Allan G. Shepard Professor of Law at the University of Idaho College of Law, an
Affiliate Scholar at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society (CIS),
and an Affiliated Fellow at the Yale Law School Information Society Project (ISP).
Email: [email protected].
Bertrand de La Chapelle
Alessandro Cogo
is Associate Professor at the University of Turin Law School and Director of the Mas
ter of Laws in Intellectual Property jointly organized by the World Intellectual Proper
ty Organization and the Turin University. Email: [email protected].
Graeme Dinwoodie
Niva Elkin-Koren
is a Professor of Law at the University of Haifa, Faculty of Law and a Faculty Asso
ciate at the Berkman Klein Center at Harvard University. She is the Founding Direc
tor of the Haifa Center for Law & Technology (HCLT), and a Co-director of the Center
for Cyber, Law and Policy. Email: [email protected].
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Kristofer Erickson
Paul Fehlinger
Giancarlo Frosio
Christophe Geiger
is Professor of Law and Director of the Research Department of the Centre for Inter
national Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) at Strasbourg University. Email:
[email protected].
Michael Geist
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is a Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa where he holds the Canada Re
search Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law and is a member of the Centre for
Law, Technology and Society. Email: [email protected].
Eric Goldman
is a Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law, where he is also Direc
tor of the school’s High Tech Law Institute. Email: [email protected].
Reto M. Hilty
is Managing Director at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in
Munich and Full Professor (ad personam) at the University of Zurich. Email:
[email protected].
Sergei Hovyadinov
Martin Husovec
is Assistant Professor at the University of Tilburg (Tilburg Institute for Law, Technolo
gy and Society & Tilburg Law and Economics Center) and Affiliate Scholar at Stan
ford Law School Center for Internet and Society. Email: [email protected].
Elena Izyumenko
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Martin Kretschmer
Aleksandra Kuczerawy
Emily Laidlaw
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is a Clinical Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine School of Law and
Director of the UCI Intellectual Property, Arts, and Technology Clinic. Email:
[email protected].
Tarlach McGonagle
is a Non-Residential Fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society and a PhD
from Pontifícia Universidade Católica of Rio de Janeiro. Email:
mailto:[email protected].
Sunimal Mendis
Valentina Moscon
is Senior Research Fellow in Intellectual Property and Competition Law at the Max
Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition. Email: [email protected].
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Frederick Mostert
is Professor of Intellectual Property at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s Col
lege and Research Fellow at the Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre. Email:
[email protected].
Kylie Pappalardo
Kyung-Sin Park
Miquel Peguera
Maayan Perel
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Marco Ricolfi
is Professor of Intellectual Property at the Turin Law School, Partner at the law firm
Tosetto, Weigmann e Associati, and Co-director of the Nexa Center on Internet and
Society of the Turin Polytechnic. Email: [email protected].
Jaani Riordan
Eleonora Rosati
is a Researcher and Lecturer at Leiden University’s eLaw Centre for Law and Digital
Technologies. Email: [email protected].
Martin Senftleben
Nicolas Suzor
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Mariarosaria Taddeo
is a Researcher Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute and Deputy Director of the
Digital Ethics Lab. Email: [email protected].
Ben Wagner
is an Assistant Professor and Director of the Privacy & Sustainable Computing Lab at
Vienna University of Economics and Business and a Senior Researcher of the Centre
of Internet & Human Rights (CIHR). Email: [email protected].
is an Associate Professor of Law at Insper Institute for Education and Research, São
Paulo, Brazil. E-mail: [email protected].
Nicolo Zingales
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stitute for Law, Technology and Society and the Tilburg Law and Economics Centre.
Email: [email protected].
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Print Publication Date: May 2020 Subject: Law, IT and Communications Law
Online Publication Date: May 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837138.013.1
Mapping intermediary liability online is a high call impelled by the fragmentation of inter
mediary liability legislation, regulation, and case law that, nonetheless, apply to global
ized online service providers operating across the world in an interdependent digital envi
ronment. The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability endeavours to substan
tially contribute to this mapping exercise, both from a subject-specific and jurisdictional
perspective, while highlighting emerging trends in a field of research that has been fast-
evolving and is today in a constant, quite unpredictable, flux. This chapter contextualizes
the mapping exercise undertaken by the contributors to the Handbook. It introduces the
findings of subsequent chapters and sews them together in an organic discourse to pro
vide a blueprint for the consistent development of those chapters as it sets out in advance
the most relevant trends according to which the structure of the Handbook has been gen
erated.
Keywords: intermediary liability, online, mapping, trends, international, subject-specific, enforcement, private or
dering, internet jurisdiction
INTERMEDIARY liability has emerged as a defining governance issue of our time. Howev
er, modern legal theory and policy struggle to define an adequate framework for the lia
bility and responsibility of online service providers (OSPs). In addition, market conditions,
against which the initial regulation was developed, have changed considerably since the
first appearance of online intermediaries almost two decades ago. These changes started
to be reflected in new policy approaches. Tinkering with this matter which is in constant
flux brought The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability into being. The Hand
book will crystallize the present theoretical understanding of the intermediary liability co
nundrum, map emerging regulatory trends, and qualify political and economic factors
that might explain them. In doing so, the Handbook will provide a comprehensive, author
itative, and ‘state-of-the-art’ discussion of intermediary liability by bringing together mul
tiple scholarly perspectives and promoting a global discourse through cross-jurisdictional
parallels. The Handbook thus serves as a privileged venue for observing emerging trends
in internet jurisdiction and innovation regulation, with special emphasis on enforcement
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strategies dealing with intermediate liability for copyright, trade mark, and privacy in
fringement, and the role of online platforms in moderating the speech they carry for
users, including obligations and liabilities for defamation, hate, and dangerous speech.
With globalized OSPs operating across the world in an interdependent digital environ
ment, inconsistencies across different regimes generate legal uncertainties that under
mine both users’ rights and business opportunities. To better understand the heterogene
ity of the international online intermediary liability regime and contribute to this impor
tant policy debate, the Handbook enlisted leading authorities with the goal of mapping
the field of online intermediary liability studies. This effort builds on the work of a prede
cessor, the World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), a repository for information
(p. 4) on international intermediary liability regimes hosted at the Stanford Center for In
ternet and Society (CIS), that I developed and launched with contributions from many of
the co-authors of this Handbook.1
The Handbook’s attempt to study intermediary liability and come to terms with a frag
mented legal framework builds on a vast array of other efforts. Besides the WILMap men
tioned earlier, mapping and comparative analysis exercises have been undertaken by the
Network of Centers,2 the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),3 and other
academic initiatives.4 Institutional efforts at the international level are on the rise. The
Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (NETmundial)
worked towards the establishment of global provisions on intermediary liability within a
charter of internet governance principles.5 The final text of the NETmundial Statement
included the principle that ‘[i]ntermediary liability limitations should be implemented in a
way that respects and promotes economic growth, innovation, creativity, and free flow of
information’.6 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is
sued recommendations on Principles for Internet Policy Making stating that, in develop
ing or revising their policies for the internet economy, the state members should consider
the limitation of intermediary liability as a high level principle.7 Also, the 2011 Joint Dec
laration of the three Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression contains statements
suggesting an ongoing search for a global regime for intermediary liability.8 The Repre
sentative on Freedom of the Media of the (p. 5) OSCE issued a Communiqué on Open
Journalism recognizing that ‘intermediaries have become one of the main platforms facili
tating access to media content as well as enhancing the interactive and participatory na
ture of Open Journalism’.9 Efforts to produce guidelines and general principles for inter
mediaries also emerged in civil society. In particular, the Manila Principles on Intermedi
ary Liability set out safeguards for content restriction on the internet with the goal of pro
tecting users’ rights, including ‘freedom of expression, freedom of association and the
right to privacy’.10 Other projects developed best practices that can be implemented by
intermediaries in their conditions of service with special emphasis on protecting funda
mental rights.11 For example, under the aegis of the Internet Governance Forum, the Dy
namic Coalition for Platform Responsibility aims to delineate a set of model contractual
provisions.12 The provisions should be compliant with the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Rem
edy’ Framework as endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council together with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.13 Ranking Digital Rights is an addi
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tional initiative that promotes best practice and transparency among online intermedi
aries.14 The project ranks internet and telecommunications companies according to their
moral behaviour in respecting users’ rights, including privacy and freedom of speech.
Several initiatives have looked into notice-and-takedown procedures in order to highlight
possible chilling effects and propose solutions. Lumen—formerly Chilling Effects—
archives takedown notices to promote transparency and facilitate research into the take
down ecology.15 The Takedown Project is a collaborative effort housed at the University of
California, Berkeley School of Law and the American Assembly to study notice-and-take
down procedures.16 Again, the Internet and Jurisdiction project has been developing a
due process framework to deal more efficiently with transnational notice-and-takedown
requests, seizures, mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), and law enforcement coop
eration requests.17
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creasingly become obsolete. More granularity is needed and account should be taken of
actors performing multiple functions and services.
Chapter 5 wraps up the legal framework that has been in place for almost two decades by
looking at it through the lens of empirical evidence. Kristofer Erickson and Martin
Kretschmer provide a thoughtful study on the implication of empirical evidence for inter
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mediary liability policy, which builds on previous empirical projects such as the Copyright
Evidence Wiki, an open-access repository of findings relating to the effects of copyright.20
As ‘we appear to be in the midst of a paradigm shift in intermediary (p. 8) liability, moving
from an obligation to act once knowledge is obtained to an obligation to prevent harmful
content appearing’—Erickson and Kretschmer note—changes in the legal framework
should be based on hard empirical evidence that attaches those changes to positive exter
nalities for society, while addressing negative externalities that emerged under the previ
ous regimes. Empirical data—which Erickson and Kretschmer identify and discuss—such
as the volume of takedown requests, the accuracy of notices, the potential for over-en
forcement or abuse, transparency of the takedown process, and the costs of enforcement
borne by different parties, should be assessed in advance of policymaking. Legislative and
regulatory changes should then follow from an empirically-based policymaking process.
All in all, according to Erickson and Kretschmer, evidence suggests that the notice-and-
takedown regime works and its shortcomings should be ‘addressed through tweaking,
rather than overhauling, the safe harbour regime’. In addition, data gathering and trans
parency of algorithmic decision-making becomes a critical call for the platform society,
which increasingly becomes a ‘black box society’ where users’ lives are daily affected by
unaccountable privately-run algorithms.21 Algorithmic accountability will be further dis
cussed by Ben Wagner in Chapter 35.
After mapping fundamental categorizations in the field, Part II also highlights tensions
within the system, especially concerning the ethical implications of intermediary liability
regulation and frictions with fundamental rights. In Chapter 6, Mariarosaria Taddeo in
vestigates the ethical implications of intermediary liability by describing moral responsi
bilities of OSPs with respect to managing access to information and human rights. As de
signers of online environments, OSPs play a civic role in mature information societies.
This role brings about a responsibility for designing OSPs’ services according to what is
acceptable and socially preferable from a global perspective that can reconcile different
ethical views and stakeholders’ interests. In applying Floridi’s soft ethics to consider what
responsibilities the civic role of OSPs entails, Taddeo concludes that OSPs need to devel
op ethical foresight analyses to consider the impact of their practices and technologies
step-by-step and, if necessary, identify alternatives and risk-mitigating strategies. In
Chapter 7, Christophe Geiger, Elena Izyumenko, and I consider the tension between inter
mediary liability and fundamental rights with special emphasis on the European legal
framework. Competing fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, privacy, free
dom of business, and the right to property are entangled in the intermediary liability co
nundrum. Policymakers are still in search of a balanced and proportional fine-tuning of
online intermediaries’ regulation that can address the miscellaneous interests of all stake
holders involved, with special emphasis on users’ rights. In this context, the increasing
reliance on automated enforcement technologies, which will be the topic of further re
view in several chapters of the Handbook, might set in motion dystopian scenarios where
users’ fundamental rights are heavily undermined.
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In the mid-1990s, after an initial brief hesitation,22 legislators decided that online inter
mediaries, both access and hosting providers, should enjoy exemptions from liability for
wrongful activities committed by users through their services. The United States first in
troduced these safe harbours. In 1996, the Communications Decency Act exempted inter
mediaries from liability for the speech they carry.23 In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copy
right Act introduced specific intermediary liability safe harbours for copyright infringe
ment under more stringent requirements.24 Shortly after, the e-Commerce Directive im
posed on EU Member States the obligation to enact similar legal arrangements to protect
a range of online intermediaries from liability.25 Other jurisdictions have more recently
followed suit.26 In most cases, safe harbour legislation provides mere (p. 10) conduit,
caching, and hosting exemptions for intermediaries, together with the exclusion of a gen
eral obligation on online providers to monitor the information which they transmit or
store or actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.27
According to Eric Goldman, who provides an overview of the state of intermediaries’ im
munities in the United States in Chapter 8, even the traditionally strong enforcement of
online intermediaries’ safe harbours in section 230 of the Communication Decency Act
(CDA) shows signs of decay with critics claiming that the functional life of section 230 is
nearing its end and more regulation is necessary.28 Similarly, safe harbours for copyright
infringement provided for by the US DMCA have also been questioned.29 However, on the
other hand, trade agreements like the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USM
CA) or NAFTA 2.0 have exported the section 230 arrangement to other countries—Cana
da and Mexico—both making it a North American standard and limiting the power of Con
gress to undermine significantly section 230. In Chapter 9, Juan Carlos Lara Gálvez and
Alan Sears follow up by discussing the impact of free trade agreements (FTAs) on inter
net intermediary liability in Latin America. They note that even where FTAs have been
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adopted between the United States and Latin American countries, the implementation of
related intermediary liability provisions lags behind. So far, only Chile and Costa Rica
have implemented these provisions in their national laws. Notably, after the withdrawal of
the Unites States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the remaining parties reached
an agreement on an amended version of the TPP, which actually suspended the provisions
pertaining to online intermediaries’ safe harbours. In sum, Lara and Sears question
whether adopting the DMCA model is ideal for Latin American countries. In any event,
they note, there is no consensus in Latin America on whether this would be the best mod
el for balancing the rights of copyright holders and the general public, which explains the
resistance in implementing this regime nationally.
African countries have been discussing the introduction of a safe harbour regime for on
line intermediaries for quite some time. In Chapter 11, Nicolo Zingales reviews a global
attempt in several African jurisdictions to adjust the legal framework to the challenges
posed by the platform economy. In Intermediary Liability in Africa: Looking Back, Moving
Forward?, Zingales highlights how the African Union (AU) has attempted to drive harmo
nization on the basis of the South African Electronic Communications Act—the first and
most sophisticated intermediary liability legislation in the area.33 Ghana, Zambia, and
Uganda have enacted legislation heavily inspired by the South African model. Meanwhile,
AU-led interstate cooperation has raised awareness of human rights protection online, cy
bersecurity, and personal data protection, in particular with a dedicated AU
Convention.34 However, very limited intermediary liability legislation has been adopted in
the region. In this fragmented legal framework, cyber-policing obligations become entan
gled with immunities and the self- and co-regulation schemes that characterize the South
African Electronic Transactions Act, posing challenges to due process and other funda
mental rights, such as freedom of expression. According to Zingales, only the AU could
promote a shared notion of intermediary liability exemptions in the region.
An inconsistent approach that brings about legal uncertainty also characterizes the Aus
tralian law governing the liability of online intermediaries, according to Kylie Pappalardo
and Nicolas Suzor, who provide a comprehensive review of the current state of Australian
online intermediary liability law across different doctrines, such as laws of defamation,
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racial vilification, misleading and deceptive conduct, contempt of court, and copyright. In
Chapter 12, Pappalardo and Suzor show that the basis on which third parties are liable
for the actions of individuals online is confusing and, viewed as a whole, largely incoher
ent. Australian law lacks articulation of a clear distinction for circumstances in which in
termediaries will not be held liable, which results in a great deal of uncertainty. These
conflicts in flux within Australian doctrines that have been applied to online intermediary
liability have led to a push for greater online enforcement and intermediary regulation
based on the capacity of doing something to prevent harm rather than responsibility. Pap
palardo and Suzor posit that confusion between capacity and responsibility has a role in
much of the uncertainty in Australia intermediary liability regulation. One solution would
be for Australian courts to more strictly apply responsibility (p. 12) theory in tort law and
ascribe liability only after examining the intermediaries’ causal role in committing the
wrong, therefore establishing fault first and liability later.
In Chapter 13, Kyung-Sin Park compares the intermediary liability rules of six major Asian
countries including China, India, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia to demonstrate
that under the label of safe harbours lies, in fact, a liability trap.35 China and South Korea
adopted a rule that an intermediary is required to remove known unlawful content on the
penalty of liability and thereby set out to specify when the intermediaries will be held li
able, instead of when they will not be held liable, inadvertently creating a liability-impos
ing rule instead of a liability-exempting rule. India’s regulation, namely the 2011 Interme
diary Guidelines, generated a raft of obligations on intermediaries that threatened to con
vert the whole system into one imposing, rather than exempting from, liability. However,
such a threat may have had an impact on the jurisprudence that, by way of the 2013
Shreya Singhal decision,36 made the Indian system an extremely ‘safe harbour’ by requir
ing judicial review for taking down infringing content. Further, Indonesia’s draft safe har
bour regulation which was announced in December 2016 seems to move towards the
model of China and South Korea, while Malaysia’s copyright notice and takedown seems
to follow the US model closely but has a structure that allows the same misunderstanding
made by the Korean regulators. All in all, Park shows how all over Asia online intermedi
ary liability is on the rise, while safe harbours’ scope narrows proportionally.
In Chapter 14, Danny Friedmann expands on China and explains how the interplay of
multiple laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations have produced a system where
weak safe harbours for online intermediaries oscillate heavily towards enhanced liability,
given a very broad notion of ‘knowledge’ and the fact that an OSP without the ability to
control copyright or trade mark infringement can still be found liable. This liability-impos
ing rule ends up putting pressure on intermediaries to take down unlawful—and lawful—
content. This seems to imply that filtering standards for OSPs in China will be continuous
ly on the rise as well as their obligations to sanitize their networks against allegedly in
fringing content. This regulatory approach will be increasingly coupled with predictive ar
tificial intelligence (AI) analytics and deep learning that will allow massive data proces
sors, like Alibaba and Baidu, to become an omniscient tool against alleged infringement,
both intellectual property (IP) and speech related. However, in a move that is surprisingly
similar to that of other jurisdictions, especially the European Union, the Chinese regulato
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ry framework seems to push forward self-regulation and pressure for OSPs to take on
more responsibility, rather than a legislatively mandated duty of care.
In Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and Australia, the recent international policy de
bate has focused on the recalibration of safe harbours towards more liability for online in
termediaries. As part of its Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy, the European (p. 13)
Commission has narrowed the e-Commerce Directive’s horizontal liability limitations for
internet intermediaries and put in place a ‘fit for purpose’—or vertical—regulatory envi
ronment for platforms and online intermediaries.37 In Chapter 15, Maria Lillà Montagnani
discusses this development by looking into the emergence of A New Liability Regime for
Illegal Content in the Digital Single Market Strategy. The DSM Strategy deploys en
hanced obligations that websites and other internet intermediaries should have for deal
ing with unlawful third party content.38 Legislative developments, including the Copy
right in the DSM Directive,39 the amendments to the Audiovisual Media Service
Directive,40 and the Guidance on Unfair Commercial Practices,41 have vertically ‘en
hanced responsibility’42 among online platforms in Europe. These developments both aim
to achieve a fairer allocation of value generated by the distribution of copyright-protected
content by online platforms—to close the so-called value gap43—and lower transaction
costs of online enforcement by shifting the burden of sanitization of allegedly illegal
speech on online intermediaries rather than law enforcement agencies. In this context,
Montagnani highlights obvious inconsistencies between the new vertical regimes and the
horizontal safeguards for intermediary liability provided by the e-Commerce Directive.44
Fragmentation, enhanced responsibility, and statutory liability then emerge in tight con
nection with the expansion of private ordering and voluntary measures in Europe as
much as in other jurisdictions as earlier noted.
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Secondary liability for copyright infringement has increasingly moved centre stage and is
the driving issue on the agenda of recent reform proposals. In particular, recent EU copy
right reform has struggled to find consensus on new obligations for OSPs.45 The Euro
pean debate has revolved around the harmonization of national traditions of secondary li
ability and the alternative of construing online intermediaries as primarily liable for the
violation of the right of communication to the public. The latter option has finally been en
dorsed by the European Parliament,46 setting Europe apart from the dominant approach
in other jurisdictions. In Chapter 16, Christina Angelopoulos builds on her long-standing
research in this domain and reviews the lessons of European tort law for intermediary lia
bility in copyright in order to plot a path for Harmonizing Intermediary Copyright Liabili
ty in the EU: A Summary. Traditionally, Member States have relied on home-grown solu
tions in the absence of a complete EU framework for intermediary accessory copyright li
ability. Angelopoulos examines the approaches taken in three of the major tort law tradi
tions of Europe: the UK, France, and Germany. This examination shows the emergence of
three cross-jurisdictional approaches to intermediary liability, including intra-copyright
solutions, tort-based solutions, and (p. 15) injunction-based solutions. Existing projects on
the harmonization of European tort law, such as the Principles of European Tort Law
(PETL),47 may serve as a basis for building a framework for European intermediary liabili
ty in copyright. Angelopoulos proposes a negligence-based approach, which is informed
by existing EU and national copyright law and tort law according to the emerging doc
trine of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of fair balance among funda
mental rights.48
However, harmonization in this field is also taking place through an expansive notion of
communication to the public. Both CJEU case law49 and EU legislation50 have construed
some online intermediaries as directly liable for communicating infringing content to the
public. In Chapter 17, Eleonora Rosati looks into the Direct Liability of Intermediaries for
copyright infringement and disentangles the complexities of the recent CJEU case law
concerning the matter. In the light of recent legislation,51 direct liability reaches beyond
platforms that induce infringement by users—where the core business is piracy—as con
cluded by the CJEU in The Pirate Bay case.52 More broadly, it reaches user-generated con
tent platforms that organize and promote user-uploaded content for profit.53 In addition,
no safe harbours will be available to platforms that communicate to the public. Both these
points settled, Rosati wonders whether a distinction between primary harmonized liabili
ty and secondary unharmonized liability still makes sense. In sum, this expansive con
struction of the notion of direct liability for communication to the public of online plat
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forms reflects an ongoing move towards their enhanced accountability and liability, espe
cially in the EU.
In a highly volatile policy environment like that of the United States where market forces
constantly lobby the legislative power in order to obtain better conditions, the recent Eu
ropean developments might lead to reconsideration of the traditional balance of interests
and power embedded in section 512 of the DMCA in favour of stricter regulations for on
line intermediaries. Presently, although reform activity and ligation has slowed down in
the United States, Jack Lerner notes that there are considerable challenges that new en
trants to the user-generated content (UGC) market must face to comply with the require
ments of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.54 In discussing Secondary Copyright In
fringement Liability and User-Generated Content in the United States, Lerner highlights
that online intermediaries and UGC platforms are exposed to uncertainty by the construc
tion of the notion of inducement and wilful blindness, which leaves room for litigation
even if they respond to takedown notices expeditiously and actively seek to remove in
fringing content.
of the platform economy within it—has seen the widespread availability of counterfeit
goods that can be purchased and easily delivered anywhere in the world. More than copy
right, trade mark infringement can become a sensitive public order concern, especially
when it involves drugs or food the commercialization of which might put public health at
risk. According to Frederick Mostert, even though ‘the lack of uniform international
guidelines has made tackling counterfeits in a borderless digital environment even more
challenging’, there are common approaches emerging towards intermediary liability at
the international level for online trade mark infringement. In Chapter 19, Mostert out
lines three common tenets that can be distilled into a transnational principle of intermedi
ary liability: ‘[1] upon notice of a specific infringement, [2] an ISP is required to take all
proportionate and reasonable measures which a reasonable ISP would take in the same
circumstances [3] to address the specific instance of infringement brought to their atten
tion’. This emerging common international principle is then coupled with a ius gentium of
voluntary measures that results from voluntary cooperation between online intermedi
aries and rightholders to curb infringement. In this context, Mostert highlights the consis
tent deployment of voluntary removals, monitoring, algorithmic filtering, follow the mon
ey approaches, registry systems, advertising codes of practice preventing advertisements
on counterfeit websites, and educational campaigns.
As Friedmann also explained earlier in Chapter 14, with special regard to Chinese online
conglomerates such as Alibaba, the development of this ius gentium of voluntary mea
sures is tightly connected to advancement in technological innovation such as AI and ma
chine learning. However, current technology can barely cope with trade mark infringe
ment, which is potentially even more challenging than copyright infringement. The issue
here is twofold. On one side, technology can be easily circumvented by sophisticated in
fringers. On the other side, ‘fair balance’ between trade mark protections and other fun
damental rights, such as freedom of competition, freedom of expression and information,
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and the right to privacy, can be hard to achieve through automated enforcement. Actually,
Chapter 20 magnifies the issue of balancing trade mark protection and social and cultural
values from a civil law perspective. Martin Senftleben reviews the CJEU case law on point
as well as European national jurisprudence concluding that there is a growing recogni
tion of necessary limitations in trade mark protection for providing breathing space for
commercial, artistic, and political freedom of expression. However, Senftleben also warns
against a Proliferation of Filter Obligations in Civil Law Jurisdictions, reinforcing the con
cerns already expressed in other chapters. Overblocking through filtering technologies
might easily defy all safeguards of free expression that recent jurisprudential develop
ments have carved into trade mark law. Although copyright filtering has recently been un
der the spotlight, over-enforcement of trade marks online should not be underplayed—
Senftleben noted—especially in the light of the heavily context-specific nature of trade
mark exclusive rights, which make file-matching technologies inefficient in trade mark
enforcement online.55 In this regard, at least in (p. 17) European civil law jurisdictions,
there are fragmented responses. Senftleben uses the example of Dutch courts imposing a
far-reaching filtering obligation only if the intermediary systematically and structurally
facilitates the infringing activities. In contrast, German jurisprudence has been less cau
tious in this domain by using the open-ended Störerhaftung doctrine to develop quite sub
stantial specific monitoring and filtering duties for online intermediaries, such as in the
eBay and Rapidshare cases.56 This jurisprudence will be also reassessed in Chapter 28 by
Sunimal Mendis and me when considering global emergence of judicially-imposed filter
ing and monitoring obligations.
The peculiarities of the common law perspective of intermediary liability and trade mark
infringement are discussed by Richard Arnold in Chapter 21. Arnold crystallizes the
teachings of UK case law in this domain, while situating this common law perspective
within EU trade mark law,57 the e-Commerce Directive,58 and the Enforcement
Directive.59 Arnold, as well as other contributors in this Handbook earlier,60 makes a fun
damental distinction between liability stemming from legal principles which are not par
ticular to intermediaries, including primary and accessory liability, and liability depend
ing on the application of principles which are specific to intermediaries, intermediary lia
bility proper. This second type of liability includes injunctions against intermediaries
whose services are used to infringe trade marks made available in national jurisdictions
by the implementation of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. Although other types of
injunctions against intermediaries are available, Arnold focuses on the increasing popu
larity of website-blocking injunctions, which have recently been ported from the copy
right domain, where they have more traditionally been deployed, to the trade mark do
main. The Cartier case was the first—and so far the only—European case applying a web
site-blocking injunction to trade mark infringement.61
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the functioning of the market, and the upcoming DSM in particular. Platforms like TripAd
visor might be considered traders as well as hosting providers with the potential cumula
tive applicability of the e-Commerce Directive safe harbours and the obligations govern
ing traders under the UPC Directive. Most likely, Moscon and Hilty conclude, the e-Com
merce Directive as a lex specialis will prevail on competing legal instruments and provide
exemption from liability. However, there is uncertainty regarding the standard of knowl
edge required for triggering takedown obligations or the obligation of preventing future
infringements or, again, whether injunctive relief similar to that of Article 11 of the En
forcement Directive can apply to UCPs. Obviously, then, liability, if exemptions do not ap
ply, is a matter of fragmented and unharmonized national tort laws that implement very
differently the general prohibition against UCPs contained in EU law. Given the global
ized nature of digital markets and their steady growth, multiplying potential violations by
online intermediaries, Moscon and Hilty conclude that the status quo is unsatisfactory
and specific alternatives for UCPs and trade secret violations in digital markets must be
developed.
Sanitization of allegedly infringing speech is yet another area where online intermedi
aries have a primary role. The ‘datafication’ and ‘platformization’ of society has reached
every sphere of life with platforms controlling the flow of a more abundant but fragment
ed information offer than the traditional mass media.63 Therefore, their long-lasting liabil
ity exemptions have been challenged almost everywhere, even in the United States,
where section 230 of the CDA, however, still holds as a comprehensive protection for on
line intermediaries for speech-related infringements. Elsewhere, the messenger can now
be more freely shot unless it acts responsibly enough and supports wronged parties and
law enforcement agencies in fighting illegal speech online. In Chapter 23, Emily Laidlaw
tackles this side of the intermediary liability conundrum, providing a common law per
spective on intermediary liability for defamation and dangerous and hate speech. Laidlaw
focuses on the Canadian system and other common law jurisdictions. After an introduc
tion to the common law and statutory legal context, Laidlaw puts forward a reform pro
posal for online defamation that goes under the name of Notice-and-Notice-Plus (NN+).
The discussion of this rather subject-specific proposal becomes an opportunity for explor
ing optimal intermediary liability models for the regulation of other kinds of harmful
speech, including fake news, terrorist content, and hate speech.
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a regulatory technique in Europe. As McGonagle notes, however, all the relevant Euro
pean codes of conduct are less voluntary than they seem, as rather than trusting the mar
ket with appropriate self-regulatory choices, they put forward a rather coercive approach.
In the information society, the role of private sector entities in gathering information for
and about users has long been a most critical issue. Therefore, intermediaries have be
come a main focus of privacy regulation, especially in jurisdictions with a strong tradition
of privacy protection such as Europe.65 In Chapter 25, Miquel Peguera discusses The
Right to be Forgotten in the European Union. As Peguera recounts, in a landmark case
the CJEU ruled that an internet search engine operator is responsible for processing per
sonal data which appear on web pages published by third parties.66 The Google Spain
ruling once again expands the obligations of online intermediaries, of which search en
gines are a subset. It brings about enhanced responsibility—and transaction costs—for
online intermediaries, while entrusting them with an adjudication role that entails a deli
cate balance between fundamental rights. That balance has been addressed quite satis
factorily by European institutions and national courts, setting precise guidance that pre
serves freedom of expression and public interest.67 However, also in this field, there still
remain concerns about whether any adjudication role should be entrusted to online inter
mediaries, although the scale of semiotic governance online leaves room for very few sus
tainable alternatives. At the same time, additional obligations of uncertain applicability,
such as the prohibition of processing of sensitive data that should theoretically apply to
all data controllers including those online intermediaries that qualify as such, might be so
invasive as to disrupt the business of online intermediaries. Peguera also discusses the
hotly debated issue of the geographical scope of the right to be forgotten; that is, its pos
sible extraterritorial global application to .com domains rather than European domains
only. Extraterritorial application of intermediary liability obligations is a critical issue that
goes beyond enforcement of the right to be forgotten and will be further discussed in Part
VI.
Multiple jurisdictions are trying to cope with ‘right to be forgotten’ demands, fol
(p. 20)
lowing the Google Spain ruling.68 The emergence of the right to be forgotten—and its ex
traterritorial application—follows in the footsteps of a global move towards data protec
tionism against the de facto market dominance of US internet conglomerates.69 There are
plenty of recent examples, including the CJEU’s Schrems decision and Russian Federal
Law No. 242-FZ. In Schrems, the CJEU ruled that the transatlantic Safe Harbour agree
ment—which lets US companies use a single standard for consumer privacy and data
storage in both the United States and Europe—is invalid;70 whereas Russia introduced
legislation requiring that the processing of the personal data of Russian citizens be con
ducted with the use of servers located in Russia.71 Eduardo Bertoni tackles the global im
pact of enhanced privacy obligation for online intermediaries in Chapter 26, where he dis
cusses the Right to be … Forgotten? Trends in Latin America after the Belén Rodriguez
Case and the Impact of the New European Rules. Several Latin American countries, in
cluding Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Peru, and Uruguay, have been heavily debating oblig
ations of online intermediaries in connection with the protection of users’ data and per
sonal information. The debate has further involved delisting obligations and proactive fil
Page 14 of 34
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tering generally. In the aftermath of the CJEU Google Spain decision, freedom of expres
sion and privacy advocates have been in confrontation in Latin America with proposals to
introduce the right to be forgotten or other delisting obligations often met with strong
civil society opposition. The Belén Rodriguez case in Argentina, for example, endorsed the
quite extreme view that no delisting obligation should be imposed on OSPs unless or
dered by a court or in a few specific cases of obviously infringing content.72 Bertoni, in
particular, warns about de-indexing obligations against search engines that would amount
to prior restraint to speech and not be compliant with the American Convention on Hu
man Rights.73 Again, as Bertoni reports, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expres
sion of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been quite straightforward
in rejecting delisting obligations à la Google Spain.74 Tensions between fundamental
rights and intermediary liability obligations define the essence of the intermediary liabili
ty conundrum online. In this context, fragmentation and inconsistencies abound. They are
actually steadily growing rather than receding. Obviously, fragmentation (p. 21) is multi
plied vertically across different subject matter and if common solutions are not rapidly
agreed, inconsistencies may soon become so irreconcilable that they will drive a process
of Balkanization that will break down the internet, as discussed in more detail in Part VI
of the Handbook.
In Chapter 27, Aleksandra Kuczerawy discusses From ‘Notice and Takedown’ to ‘Notice
and Stay Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression. Kuczerawy describes
enforcement mechanisms that are provided to allegedly wronged parties in multiple juris
dictions to seek a remedy directly from an OSP for an infringement that may have oc
curred through its networks. These are generally known as ‘notice-and-action’ (N&A)
mechanisms and—Kuczerawy explains—take many nuanced forms, including most com
monly ‘notice-and-take-down’, ‘notice-and-notice’, and ‘notice-and-stay-down’. By provid
ing for the removal or blocking of content, all these mechanism can interfere with the
right to freedom of expression. Therefore, Kuczerawy examines ‘how different types of
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N&A mechanisms amplify the risks to free expression and what safeguards they include
to prevent such risks from manifesting themselves’. From notice-and-take-down to notice-
and-notice and notice-and-stay-down, fundamental rights find themselves increasingly un
der pressure. The recent move away from the e-Commerce notice-and-stay-down model to
endorse notice-and-stay down and other filtering obligations in the new Directive on
Copyright in the DSM witnesses this intensification of the tension between online inter
mediary regulation and fundamental rights.75
and I develop this very point and take up from Kuczerawy’s more general discussion by
focusing on the widespread deployment of monitoring and filtering obligations through
voluntary, judicial, and legislative means. The recent EU copyright reform would de facto
force hosting providers to develop and deploy filtering systems, therefore monitoring
their networks.76 As we argue, the solution adopted by the new Directive follows in the
footsteps of a well-established path in recent intermediary liability policy: the demise of
the principle of ‘no monitoring obligations’. In the same vein, recent case law has im
posed proactive monitoring obligations on intermediaries for copyright infringement—
such as Allostreaming in France, Dafra in Brazil, RapidShare in Germany, or Baidu in Chi
na.77 Actually, the emerging enforcement of proactive filtering and monitoring obligations
has spanned the entire spectrum of intermediary liability subject matter, including other
IP rights,78 privacy,79 defamation, and hate/dangerous speech.80 In that context, notable
exceptions—such as the landmark Belén Rodriguez case that is discussed in detail in
Chapter 26—highlight again the fragmented international response to intermediary liabil
ity.81
Next, blocking orders against innocent third parties are an additional relevant trend in in
termediary liability. Blocking orders have become increasingly popular in Europe, espe
cially to contrast online copyright—and recently also trade mark—infringement.82 Their
validity under EU law was recently confirmed by the CJEU in the Telekabel decision.83
Outside the EU, website blocking of copyright-infringing sites has been authorized in
countries including Argentina, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, and
Turkey.84 In December 2014, Singapore effected an amendment to its Copyright Act to
enable rightholders to obtain website-blocking orders,85 and in 2015 Australia introduced
‘website blocking’ provisions to the Copyright Act.86 These (p. 23) measures have been en
acted with the aim of curbing IP infringement online, although negative effects on human
rights have been widely highlighted. In Chapter 29, Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyu
menko discuss Blocking Orders: Assessing Tensions with Human Rights and consider the
standards developed by the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR to sustain the diffi
cult coexistence between blocking orders and fundamental rights, including freedom of
expression and freedom to conduct a business. Although CJEU case law has recognized
users’ rights as enforceable against injunctions that might curb users’ freedom of expres
sion online,87 according to Geiger and Izyumenko, it also ‘shifted a considerable part of
the human-rights-sensitive enforcement choices on the intermediaries’. This is a subopti
mal solution from a human right perspective. It is forced on international courts, such as
the CJEU, by the need to find a proportional equilibrium between competing rights—giv
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In reviewing the proper balance between freedom to conduct business and blocking or
ders, Geiger and Izyumenko discuss the allocation of costs of enforcement; that is,
whether the rightholders or the online intermediaries should sustain the costs of block
ing. The issue is also discussed in Chapter 20. The UK Supreme Court in Cartier,88 a trade
mark infringement case, allocated the costs of blocking and delisting to rightholders, tak
ing the opposite view to the French Cour de cassation in the Allostreaming case,89 a copy
right infringement case. Both the UK and French Courts of Appeal had instead decided
that the costs of enforcement had to be equally divided between the two parties.90 Other
courts in Europe, such as the Irish Court of Appeal in the Sony Music case,91 although de
ciding on costs for setting up a graduate response scheme rather than website blocking,
came to a different ratio, imposing 80 per cent of the costs to the online intermediaries
and 20 per cent to the rightholders. EU law and CJEU jurisprudence say little in this re
gard and leave the decision to the national courts on the basis of their (p. 24) national
law.92 Of course, this is telling of considerable fragmentation in approaches to intermedi
ary liability. This is especially relevant as it occurs in matters as sensitive as the alloca
tion of costs of enforcement. Fragmentation in this context brings about legal uncertainty
and higher transaction costs that reflect on the sustainability of the business models of
online intermediaries in Europe.
However, blocking orders have also been widely used in many jurisdictions—in particular
by administrative authorities—in connection with amorphous notions of public order,
defamation, and morality. In this respect, the emergence of administrative enforcement of
online intermediary liability appears to be another well-marked trend in recent internet
governance. Multiple administrative bodies have been put in charge of enforcing a mis
cellaneous array of online infringements—primarily against intermediaries and often ab
sent any judicial supervision. Some administrative bodies—such as the Italian Communi
cation Authority (AGCOM), the Second Section of the Copyright Commission (CPI), and
the Greek Committee on Internet Violations of Intellectual Property (CIPIV)—have been
given powers to police copyright infringement online and issue blocking orders and other
decisions to selectively remove infringing digital works.93 In Chapter 30, Alessandro Cogo
and Marco Ricolfi dig deep into the legal and regulatory framework empowering these
administrative bodies by studying the Administrative Enforcement of Copyright Infringe
ment Online in Europe. Although administrative procedures are available both under in
ternational and EU law for the protection and enforcement of IP rights,94 they must con
form to the same principles and safeguards as those for judicial review. Cogo and Ricolfi
find—especially by analysing data resulting from the practical implementation of the Ital
ian administrative enforcement system—that transparency and due process rank very low
in these administrative enforcement systems.
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neous pieces of legislation and competent to keep a special registry or ‘blacklist’ of web
sites that violate the law.95 Chapter 33 provides more insight on the functioning of this
Russian agency. In South Korea, the Korea Communications Commission (p. 25) imple
ments deletion or blocking orders according to the request and standards of the Korea
Communications Standards Commission ‘as necessary for nurturing sound communica
tions ethics’.96 In Turkey, the law empowers the Presidency of Telecommunications (TIB)
to block a website or web page within four hours without any judicial decision for the vio
lation of a new category of crimes labelled as ‘violation of private life’ or privacy.97 In In
dia, section 69(A)(1) of the IT Act provides the government with the ‘power to issue direc
tions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource’,98
which is dealt by a special committee examining within seven days all requests received
for blocking access to online information.99 Many other national administrative authori
ties—such as the Supreme Council of Cyberspace in Iran or CONATEL in Venezuela—do
issue orders against ISPs regarding the legality, blocking, and removal of online content,
which do not involve—or involve very limited—judicial review.100 Concerned views have
been voiced against administratively issued blocking orders, which could undermine ba
sic due process guarantees.101
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European Commission stressed that ‘the responsibility of online platforms is a key and
cross-cutting issue’.106 This policy development puts special focus on intermediaries’ cor
porate social responsibilities and their role in implementing and fostering human
rights.107 However, emphasis on a responsible role for intermediaries in fostering human
rights has a flip side when multiple competing rights are at stake. Online intermediaries
are unequipped—and lack constitutional standing—for making decisions involving a pro
portional balancing of rights. As Calabresi–Coase’s ‘least-cost avoiders’,108 online inter
mediaries will inherently try to lower the transaction costs of adjudication and liability
and, in order to do so, might functionally err on the side of overblocking, in particular by
deploying automated algorithmic enforcement tools. Again, this policy trend leads to in
cremental fragmentation as enforcement is handled directly by miscellaneous private en
tities from multiple jurisdictions through proprietary automated means applying corpo
rate visions and disparate terms of service. Of course, there are also (p. 27) counter-pos
ing forces at work in the present internet governance struggle. As seen in Chapter 10, a
centripetal move towards digital constitutionalism for internet governance alleviates the
effects of the centrifugal platform responsibility discourse.109
This move from intermediary liability to platform responsibility has been occurring on
several levels—being apparent from the deployment of miscellaneous enforcement strate
gies that will be detailed in Part VI. Governments everywhere—and the European Com
mission in particular—push coordinated self-regulatory efforts by major online hosting
providers—including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Microsoft, Instagram, Snapchat, and
Dailymotion—to promote codes of conduct endorsing commitments to combat the spread
of illegal hate speech online,110 fight incitement to terrorism,111 prevent cyber-
bullying,112 or curb IP infringement online.113 Martin Husovec and I introduce this discus
sion in Chapter 31, where we describe several emerging legal trends reflecting this
change in perspectives, such as obviously voluntary agreements and codes of conduct,
but also other legal arrangements, including three-strikes schemes, online search manip
ulation, follow-the-money strategies, voluntary filtering and website blocking, and private
Domain Name System (DNS) content regulation. Under these agreements, schemes, and
enforcement strategies, access and hosting providers would be called on actively and
swiftly removing illegal materials, instead of reacting to complaints. Of course, some of
these enforcement tools are also discussed in many other chapters of the Handbook as
stand-alone items and from a legal liability rule perspective. However, as Husovec and I
note, ‘legal rules are often only basic expectations which are further developed through
market transactions, business decisions, and political pressure’, therefore the practical
responsibility landscape is wide-spanning, ‘ranging from legal entitlements to request as
sistance in enforcement to entirely voluntary private-ordering schemes’.
Equally, the typology of OSPs enlisted in voluntary online enforcement strategies broad
ens steadily beyond the traditional access and hosting providers. On the IP enforcement
side, payment blockades—notice-and-termination agreements between major righthold
ers and online payment processors—and ‘voluntary best practices agreements’ have been
applied widely.114 Both the European Commission and the US government have endorsed
a ‘follow-the-money’ approach seeking to ‘deprive those engaging in commercial infringe
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ments of the revenue streams (for example from consumer payments and advertising) em
anating from their illegal activities, and therefore act as a (p. 28) deterrent’.115 Payment
processors like MasterCard and Visa have been pressured to act as IP enforcers as well
as enforcers of speech-related infringements. Law enforcement agencies have tried to co
erce payment providers to stop providing service to websites like Backpage, for the adult
section it runs,116 or Wikileaks.
Annemarie Bridy focuses on one additional emerging enforcement strategy involving non-
conventional intermediaries in Addressing Infringement: Developments in Content Regu
lation in the United States and the DNS. In Chapter 32, Bridy describes how the reach of
privately ordered online content regulation is deepening by migrating downwards from
the application layer into the network’s technical infrastructure, specifically the Domain
Name System (DNS). Private agreements between DNS intermediaries and IP righthold
ers are based on a ‘pass-along’ provision in the ICANN-Registry Agreement stating that a
domain name can be suspended if the registrant is found to have engaged copyright or
trade mark infringement. On the basis of this clause in the ICANN-Registry Agreement,
registry operators and rightholders have set up ‘trusted notifier’ agreements to fast-track
domain name suspensions—and hence site blocking—when a ‘trusted notifier’ sends a
complaint to the registry operator. Bridy highlights lack of transparency and due process
in this privately-ordered form of enforcement, which is also heavily biased in favour of
complainants. Bridy also notices how the notice-and-action procedures institutionalized
by these IP-focused agreements are readily adaptable for use in censoring all types of
content.
Increased intermediary accountability has become a globalized trend that has been
emerging in numerous jurisdictions. In this regard, online intermediaries are not only
held liable for IP, privacy, or defamation infringements, but are also held responsible for
state security. Several countries enlist private business in the enforcement of state con
trols over the internet. In Chapter 33, Sergei Hovyadinov looks exactly at this expanded
scope of online intermediaries’ responsibility by presenting Intermediary Liability in Rus
sia and the Role of Private Business in the Enforcement of State Controls over the Inter
net. According to Hovyadinov, since 2011–12, the Russian government drastically
changed its stance on internet regulation. The rapid expansion of the internet in Russia—
and its potential for triggering social unrest—has led to the adoption of significant regula
tory restrictions on online content and anonymity. Regulation increasingly restricted the
type of information available online and allowed the state to collect user data and online
activity. As part of this development, telecom operators, web-hosting providers, and social
media platforms have become an integral part of the state’s internet control apparatus.
Hovyadinov reports—also thanks to interviews of sector operators in Russia—that,
‘[f]aced with new technical challenges, the Kremlin has enlisted competent and technical
ly capable internet actors … to help implement these restrictions and control the flow of
information.’ Actually, at approximately the same time, similar developments (p. 29) oc
curred in many jurisdictions besides Russia. Chapters 13 and 14 describes similar dynam
ics occurring in China and other Asian countries. Chapter 11 stresses the enlisting of
OSPs as cyber-police in African countries. Several chapters also report similar trends in
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the European regulatory framework. Although Hovyadinov notes that transparency and
public accountability of private involvement in internet regulation in Russia is especially
low, numerous governments, including western governments, rely on OSPs as their ‘on
line proxy agents’ to assist with the enforcement of IP rights, data protection, speech-re
lated infringements, and state security.
Privately-ordered content moderation defines the contours of the infosphere where social
interaction occurs for billions of people daily.117 The impact of online content moderation
on modern society is tremendous. Governments, along the lines of what Hovyadinov has
described in Chapter 33, rightholders, and miscellaneous user groups would like to shape
the gatekeeping functions of OSPs according to their agendas. In Guarding the
Guardians: Content Moderation by Online Intermediaries and the Rule of Law, Niva Elkin-
Koren and Maayan Perel continue the discourse undertaken in this Part by highlighting
challenges posed by content moderation to the rule of law. Elkin-Koren and Perel rein
force the point that private ordering ‘circumvents the constitutional safeguard of the sep
aration of powers’ and blurs the distinction between private interest and public responsi
bility. Chapter 34, then, introduces a critical point in the current debate on intermediary
liability online: socially relevant choices are delegated to automated enforcement run
though opaque algorithms. Algorithms’ transparency and accountability remains an issue
challenging semiotic regulation online.118 In addition, Elkin-Koren and Perel stress that
machine learning and data analytics allow OSPs to proactively predict and prevent illicit
use of content, bringing to life the omniscient platforms that Friedmann recalled in Chap
ter 14. Omniscient platforms that give a not-so-invisible handshake119 to government for
cybersecurity, surveillance, censorship, and general law-enforcement tasks through
opaque algorithms evoke threatening dystopian scenarios. Elkin-Koren and Perel suggest
that the solution to black box content moderation can be found in grassroots oversight
through ‘tinkering’,120 which would allow people to ‘systematically test and record how
online intermediaries respond to representatives, like-real content’ submitted to the plat
forms.
Apparently, there is an emerging strategy for regulation of online platforms leaning to
wards a globalized, ongoing move in the direction of privatization of law enforcement
(p. 30) online through algorithmic tools. Algorithmic enforcement makes this shift even
more unpredictable in terms of fair balancing between private and public interests and
human rights. In Chapter 35, Ben Wagner tries to shed some light on this murky issue by
discussing Algorithmic Accountability: Towards Accountable Systems. Given the early
stage of human engagement with AI, the essential basics and the precise nature of the
notion itself of algorithmic accountability are still under review. Basically, according to
Wagner, there is still a high level of uncertainty regarding ‘to whom’ and ‘for what’ algo
rithms should be accountable. An initial basic finding, which fits within Elkin-Koren and
Perel’s conclusions, is that algorithms should be at least accountable to users. In this re
spect, access to the source code might provide some accountability but users should be
enabled to understand what the algorithm is actually doing. In order to do so, Wagner
lists a number of technical, organizational, and regulatory challenges to ensuring access
to data. Considering intermediary liability and algorithmic accountability more closely,
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The term ‘fragmentation’ has surfaced several times in the last few pages. Rules govern
ing online intermediaries are complex and diverging in numerous jurisdictions. As is ap
parent from the preliminary mapping in this chapter, divergence has recently been ex
panding rather than becoming normalized. This phenomenon is perhaps tightly attached
to the protectionist impulses that characterize present international relationships and in
ternet governance. In Chapter 36, Dan Jerker Svantesson rates this ‘as the most impor
tant, and perhaps most urgent, underlying issue facing the internet—there is a fundamen
tal clash between the global, largely borderless, internet on the one hand, and the prac
tice of lawmaking and jurisdiction anchored in a territorial thinking’. In discussing Inter
net Jurisdiction and Intermediary Liability, Svantesson points at several issues, including
the validity of OSPs’ terms of service and law enforcement requests to (p. 31) access data
stored abroad, but the key development that threatens the global internet relates to the
geographical scope of online intermediaries’ liability and obligations. In particular, recent
case law and policymaking is faced with answering the riddle of the extraterritorial appli
cation of such obligations.
Extraterritorial enforcement recently made the headlines for the worldwide enforcement
of the ‘right to be forgotten’. Some European institutions endorse the view that delisting
should have an extraterritorial reach. On the territorial effect of delisting decisions, the
WP29 Guidelines noted that limiting delisting to EU domains cannot be considered a suf
ficient means to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the rul
ing. In practice, ‘this means that in any case de-listing should also be effective on all
relevant .com domains’.121 Recently—in accordance with the WP29 Guidelines—the Com
mission Nationale de l’informatique et des Libertés (CNiL), the French data protection
authority, ordered Google to apply the right to be forgotten on all domain names of
Google’s search engine, including the .com domain.122 The question raised by CNiL was
finally decided by two recent CJEU cases—with a second case dealing with global delist
ing of a defamatory post on Facebook. The CJEU concluded that EU law does not impose
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Bertrand de La Chapelle and Paul Fehlinger further develop this precarious state of inter
net affairs by noting that ‘[e]xtraterritorial extension of national jurisdiction is becoming
the realpolitik of internet regulation.’ In Jurisdiction on the Internet: From Legal Arms
Race to Transnational Cooperation, de La Chapelle and Fehlinger argue from a global in
ternet governance perspective that conflicts between jurisdictions online increase steadi
ly, challenging the Westphalian international system. Possibly, as the case law reviewed
by Svantesson and Geist has already shown, a legal arm race will escalate with countries
exerting digital sovereignty through an extensive interpretation of territoriality criteria
over cross-border data flows and services. For de La Chapelle and Fehlinger, the tradi
tional legal cooperation cannot cope with internet jurisdictional tensions, opening an un
certain path for the future of the global digital economy, human rights, cybersecurity, and
the technical internet infrastructure. The route to pursue would be that of an internation
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al agreement on the matter. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in sight and this is not
going to change any time soon. This institutional gap in internet governance—de La
Chapelle and Fehlinger stress—may be solved by launching innovative cooperation mech
anisms as transnational as the internet itself through the development of issue-based mul
tistakeholder policy networks for developing ‘scalable solutions for cross-border legal
challenges with regard to data flows, online content or domains’.
Given the role of online intermediaries in the digital interconnected society, their liability
for the speech and content they carry has become a primary policy concern. Much has
changed since the inception of the first online intermediaries—and their early regulation.
New challenges have renewed discussion of the scope of intermediaries’ (p. 33) duties
and obligations. The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability seeks to under
stand a confused international legal framework. The uncertainty that this confusion
brings about can hurt users by potentially scaring companies away from providing innov
ative new services in certain markets. Additionally, companies may unnecessarily limit
what users can do online, or engage in censorship by proxy to avoid uncertain retribution
under unfamiliar laws. National courts and authorities, on the other hand, may seek ex
traterritorial enforcement to prevent any access to infringing materials in their jurisdic
tion. This is telling of a disconnection between physical and digital governance of infor
mation and content that will hardly go away, at least for some time. As a result, in an ap
parently confused legal and theoretical landscape, there is a growing tendency towards
internet fragmentation, which is made even more obvious by unconcealed national ten
dencies towards data protectionism.
Notes:
(1) World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap) (a project designed and developed by Gi
ancarlo Frosio and hosted at Stanford CIS) <https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu> (WILMap).
(2) See Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society, ‘Liability of Online Intermediaries:
New Study by the Global Network of Internet and Society Centers’ (18 February 2015)
<https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/98684>.
(3) See Daniel Sang, ‘Comparative Analysis of National Approaches of the Liability of the
Internet Intermediaries’ (WIPO Study); Ignacio Garrote Fernández-Díez, ‘Comparative
Analysis on National Approaches to the Liability of Internet Intermediaries for Infringe
ment of Copyright and Related Rights’ (WIPO study).
(4) See e.g. for other mapping and comparative exercises, Graeme Dinwoodie (ed.), Se
condary Liability of Internet Service Providers (Springer 2017); Martin Husovec, Injunc
tions Against Intermediaries in the European Union: Accountable But not Liable? (CUP
2017); Jaani Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (OUP 2016); Christina An
gelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright: A Tort-Based Analysis (Wolters
Kluwer 2016); Christopher Heath and Anselm Kamperman Sanders (eds), Intellectual
Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries (Wolters Kluwer 2012).
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(5) See NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement (São Paulo, Brazil, 24 April 2014)
<http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-
Document.pdf>.
(6) ibid. 5.
(7) See OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Internet Policy Making’
C(2011)154 <http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?Instrumen
tID=270>. See also OECD, ‘The Economic and Social Role of Internet
Intermediaries’ (April 2010) <http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf>.
(8) See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘International
Mechanism for Promoting Freedom of Expression: Joint Declaration on Freedom of Ex
pression and the Internet by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opin
ion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Spe
cial Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to In
formation’ (2011) <http://www.osce.org/fom/78309?download =true>.
(9) ibid.
(11) See e.g. Jamila Venturini and others, Terms of Service and Human Rights: Analysing
Contracts of Online Platforms (Editora Revan 2016).
(12) See Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility: a Structural Element of the United
Nations Internet Governance Forum <http://platformresponsibility.info>.
(13) See United Nations, Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Guiding Princi
ples on Business Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and
Remedy” Framework’ (2011) A/HRC/RES/17/4.
(19) See OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries (2010) 9.
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(20) See ‘The Copyright Evidence Wiki: Empirical Evidence for Copyright Policy’, CREATe
Centre, University of Glasgow <http://CopyrightEvidence.org>.
(21) See Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Mon
ey and Information (HUP 2015).
(22) See Bruce Lehman, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:
The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (DIANE Publishing
1995) 114–24 <https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf> (noting ‘the
best policy is to hold the service provider liable … Service providers reap rewards for in
fringing activity. It is difficult to argue that they should not bear the responsibilities’).
(24) See the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 USC § 512 (DMCA).
(25) See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic com
merce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1.
(26) See e.g. Copyright Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) no. 154, Sch. 1 (Aus.);
Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c.20, s. 31.1 (Can.); Judicial Interpretation no. 20
of 17 December 2012 of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the
Application of Law in Hearing Civil Dispute Cases Involving Infringement of the Right of
Dissemination on Information Networks (Ch.); Federal Law no. 149-FZ of 27 July 2006 on
Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information (Rus.) and Federal
Law no. 187-FZ of 2 July 2013 amending Russian Civil Code, s. 1253.1. A repository in
cluding most of the safe harbour legislation enacted worldwide can be found at the
WILMap (n. 1).
(27) See e.g. Directive 2000/31/EC (n. 25) Arts 12–15; DMCA (n. 24) s. 512(c)(1)(A)–(C).
(28) See e.g. David Ardia, ‘Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act’ (2010) 43 Loyola L. Rev. 373.
(29) The United States Copyright Office is undertaking a public study to evaluate the im
pact and effectiveness of the safe harbour provisions. In particular, notice-and-stay-down
arrangements—rather than takedown—are under review in the United States as well as
elsewhere. See United States Copyright Office, Section 512 Study <http://copyright.gov/
policy/section512>.
(30) See Marco Civil da Internet, Federal Law no. 12.965 (23 April 2014) Art. 18 (Bra.)
(‘the Internet connection [access] provider shall not be subject to civil liability for content
generated by third party’).
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(32) See Dennis Redeker, Lex Gill, and Urs Gasser, ‘Towards digital constitutionalism?
Mapping attempts to craft an Internet Bill of Rights’ (2018) 80 Int’l Communication
Gazette 311.
(33) See Electronic Transactions and Communications Act (ECTA) (2001) XI.
(34) See African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection
(2014).
(35) The Hong Kong government introduced a Copyright Bill establishing a statutory safe
harbour for OSPs for copyright infringement, provided that they meet certain prescribed
conditions, including taking reasonable steps to limit or stop copyright infringement after
being notified. See Copyright Amendment Bill 2014, C2957, cl. 50 (HK) <http://
www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20141824/es32014182421.pdf>.
(37) See European Commission Communication, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Eu
rope’ (2015) COM(2015) 192 final, s. 3.3 (DSM Strategy).
(38) ibid. s. 3.3.2 (noting that ‘[r]ecent events have added to the public debate on whether
to enhance the overall level of protection from illegal material on the Internet’).
(39) See Directive 2019/790/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Direc
tives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC [2019] OJ L130/92.
(40) See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2010/13/EU
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services in view
of changing market realities’ (25 May 2016) COM(2016) 287 final.
(43) See European Commission Communication, ‘Online platforms and the Digital Single
Market—Opportunities and Challenges for Europe’ COM(2016) 288/2, 8.
(44) cf. Directive 2000/31/EC (n. 25) recital 48 (previously establishing that ‘[t]his Direc
tive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who
host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can
reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order to de
tect and prevent certain types of illegal activities’) (emphasis added).
Page 27 of 34
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JATKOA EDELLISEEN.
En koskaan ennen ollut sillä mielellä katsellut Isoa Väylää kuin nyt
katselin. Nyt vasta näin sen ensimmäisen kerran. Oli kuin olisi
Jumala sen edellisenä yönä luonut, laittanut virtaamaan tuohon
mökkini ikkunan alle suurena, mahtavana, luomispäivän riemua
kohisevana kyminä. Sen laineet lauloivat minulle luomisen valtavista
töistä, minun runoistani. Käyskelin kuin ensimmäinen Aadam
paratiisissa, sillä erotuksella vain, että minulla oli jalassa paksut
sarkahousut, vuotakengät ja ylläni punavalkoisen kirjava »iisländari».
Mutta — olin yksin maailmassa, yksin koko suuressa
luomakunnassa, mutta niin onnellisena, niin sydän riemua tulvillaan,
että toisinaan karjahtelin pelkästä olemisen autuudesta. Koko muu
maailma oli minulle kuin kuollut. En huomannut kirkonkylää, en
tuntenut ihmisiä, en kuullut karjan kellojen ääntä, kun se iltaisin
palasi laitumelta. Minä käyskelin Ison Väylän varrella paljain päin,
levittelin käsivarsiani ja huusin riemusta. Mitä minä välitin, jos joku
postinhakija pysähtyi minua kummissaan katselemaan. Minä
kuittasin hänet kääntämällä hänelle selkäni ja puhelin Isolle Väylälle:
»Se on sinun ansiosi, sinä mahtava virta! Sinä olet antanut minulle
esikuvan! Niinkuin sinä puhkaiset nämä korkeat hiekkamellat ja
uurrat itsellesi uoman meriäidin avaraan syliin, niin teen minäkin ja
puhkaisen tieni läpi vastusten suureen maailmaan! Ensimmäinen
Aadam tuli tunnetuksi siitä, että hän menetti paratiisin. Minä, Aatami
Kuuskoski, valloitan sen ihmiskunnalle takaisin — runoillani. Hih!
Eläköön!»
Iso Väylä! Sinä olet nähnyt minun riemuni, joka on tulvinut kuin
omat vetesi keväällä jäänlähdön aikana! Iso Väylä! Sinä olet nähnyt
minun tuskani, joka on ollut syvä kuin kadotuksen kuilu, mutta josta
olen noussut ylös uusin voimin, selkein otsin ja katse käännettynä
kohti korkeutta, missä ikuinen Tuomari asuu!
Sankarisielu.
Minä nauroin.