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MEASURING PEACE
Measuring Peace
Principles, Practices, and Politics
R I C H A R D CA P L A N
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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© Richard Caplan 2019
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2019
Impression: 1
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a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
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above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
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for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
For Daniel
Acknowledgements
This book has been (too) long in the making, and I am very grateful to
many individuals and institutions for their valuable input and sup-
port along the way.
I owe a very large debt of gratitude to the Folke Bernadotte
Academy, which took a keen interest in this project from its inception
and made significant contributions to it, intellectual as well as financial,
from beginning to end. The Folke Bernadotte Academy’s commitment
to scholarly research in the fields of peace- and state-building is truly
impressive.
Without the benefit of a British Academy fellowship, I would never
have found the time to undertake the initial research that started the
ball rolling. I am grateful to the Academy for taking a gamble on me.
The UK Department for International Development was very
generous in supporting the research that underpins Chapter 4 of
this book. They also took an active interest in the research itself and
made very valuable contributions to it.
Many of the ideas for this project originated with a consultancy I did
for the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) a
number of years ago on ‘measuring peace consolidation and managing
transitions’, which led to the production of an internal briefing paper
that I had the honour to present to the UN Peacebuilding Commission.
I was pleased that one of my recommendations—for the production of
a benchmarking handbook—was taken up by the PBSO, resulting in
the publication of Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations
Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking, expertly written by Sven Erik
Stave of Fafo. It has been exciting to see greater and more effective use
of benchmarking as an instrument of assessment throughout the UN
system, as I discuss in Chapter 3.
The ideas that emerged from my work with PBSO were explored
further in the context of two conferences I organized that brought
together scholars and practitioners at Wilton Park, the global forum
based at Wiston House in the bucolic British countryside of West
Sussex. The first conference, on exit strategies and peace consolida-
tion in state-building operations, was held on 13–15 March 2009. The
second conference, on measuring peace consolidation, was held on
viii Acknowledgements
15–17 October 2014. Both conferences allowed for an unfettered
exchange of ideas and experiences. I am grateful to Wilton Park
and its programme director Isobelle Jaques, in particular, for their
assistance in organizing the conferences. Financial support was pro-
vided by the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford;
the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies; the Norwegian
Peacebuilding Resource Centre; the Folke Bernadotte Academy; the
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; the British Academy;
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna;
and the Public Diplomacy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, Brussels. I am grateful to all of them for their generous
assistance.
I am also grateful to Linacre College Oxford for the grant I received
from the Lucy Halsall Fund in support of my overseas research
expenses.
For their very valuable research assistance, I am grateful to Nicholas
Barker, Kate Brooks, and Allard Duursma.
A number of individuals read all or parts of this manuscript and
I am extremely grateful to them for their input: Nicholas Barker, Alex
Bellamy, Jane Boulden, Frances Brown, John Gledhill, Anke Hoeffler,
Lucas Kello, Lara Olson, Michael von der Schulenburg, and Remco
Zwetsloot. I have also benefitted from the feedback I received from
presentations to the Oxford International Relations Colloquium and
the Oxford University Strategic Studies Group, and from conversa-
tions with many of my Oxford colleagues.
A version of the Introduction to this book appeared as ‘Measuring
Peace Consolidation’ in the British Academy’s Rethinking State Fra-
gility (London: British Academy, 2015). I am grateful to the British
Academy for granting me permission to use this material.
Chapter 4, co-written with Anke Hoeffler, appeared in modified
form in the European Journal of International Security (Vol. 2, No. 2,
July 2017). We are grateful to Cambridge University Press for grant-
ing us permission to adapt this article for inclusion in this volume.
We are also grateful to Lise Howard for the use of her UN peace-
keeping operations data and to Kate Roll for updating it. Chris Perry
gave very helpful advice on the use of the International Peace Institute
data on UN peacekeeping. Joakim Kreutz clarified the use of the
UCDP conflict termination data. The FHI 360 Education Policy
and Data Center provided data on horizontal inequality. Daniel
Gutknecht, Ron Smith, Måns Söderbom, the six case study authors,
Acknowledgements ix
and the participants in the project meeting in Oxford on 6 February
2015 all provided useful comments and suggestions.
Dominic Byatt at Oxford University Press has been as patient and
encouraging an editor as one could ever hope to have. I am grateful
for his support of this and earlier projects of mine. Olivia Wells
provided superb editorial assistance.
Finally, I thank my wife Luisa, for her forbearance especially, and
my son Daniel, to whom this book is dedicated. May he and his
generation know more peaceful times.
Contents
List of Figures xiii

List of Tables xv
List of Abbreviations xvii
Introduction 1
1. Conceptualizing Peace 13
2. From Conception to Practice 30
3. Assessing Progress 51
4. Factors of Post-Conflict Peace Stabilization 77
With Anke Hoeffler
5. Measuring Peace Consolidation 104
Conclusion 123
Select Bibliography 127

Index 145
List of Figures
1.1. Total armed conflict by type, 1946–2014 16

3.1. ISAF notional assessment summary slide for one
campaign task 65
4.1. Kaplan-Meier survival estimate 85
4.2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 86
4.3. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 87
List of Tables
0.1. Civil war onset and recurrence 3

1.1. Core features of assessing the state of peace or rivalry
between countries 23
4.1. Armed conflict outcomes, 1990–2013 84
4.2. Number of peace spells surviving 85
4.3. Duration of peace and past conflict characteristics 90
4.4. Duration of peace: territorial and ethnic conflicts
and income 92
4.5. Duration of peace and UNPKOs 95
4.6. UN peacekeeping operations 96
4.7. UNPKOs and peace settlements (case studies) 102
List of Abbreviations
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of

Disputes
ACD Armed Conflict Dataset
AU African Union
BNUB United Nations Office in Burundi
CAR Central African Republic
COW Correlates of War
DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DPA Department of Political Affairs
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FSI Fragile/Failed States Index
IEP Institute for Economics and Peace
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISAC ISAF Strategic Assessment Capability
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO non-governmental organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBC Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office
PCPI Post-Conflict Performance Indicator
PCRD Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PPI Positive Peace Index
PRIO Peace Research Institute, Oslo
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC Peace and Security Council
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN United Nations
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPKO United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Introduction
How can we know if the peace that has been established following a
civil war is a stable peace?
Much hinges on the answer to this question. Each year intergov-
ernmental organizations, donor governments, and non-governmental
organizations expend billions of dollars and deploy tens of thousands
of personnel in support of efforts to build peace in countries emerging
from violent conflict. The United Nations (UN) alone at the end of
2017 had nearly 93,000 uniformed personnel in the field and was
slated to spend some $6.8 billion on peacekeeping operations in that
financial year.1 Yet despite this considerable commitment of
resources, as well as the accumulation of extensive knowledge and
experience relevant to peacebuilding in the course of the past two
decades, external efforts to consolidate peace in conflict-affected
countries have met with mixed results.
The recurrence of violence in the Central African Republic (CAR)
in late 2012 is a case in point. CAR is one of six countries on the
agenda of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission, the UN body estab-
lished in 2005 with a mandate to support recovery efforts in countries
emerging from violent conflict.2 Civil war raged in CAR from 2004 to
2007 until a peace agreement, an amnesty, and the formation of a
national unity government laid the foundations for a durable peace,
1
United Nations, ‘Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to
United Nations Operations’, 31 December 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/
default/files/msr_31_dec_2017_0.pdf. For my use of the terms ‘peacebuilding’, ‘peace-
keeping’, and related terms, see the terminology section at the end of this chapter.
2
UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005) and UN General Assembly
Resolution 60/180 (2005), adopted concurrently on 20 December 2005, authorized
the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. CAR was put on the agenda of
the Peacebuilding Commission in 2008 at the request of the Bozizé government.
2 Measuring Peace
which the UN took measures to reinforce. Violent conflict re-erupted
after rebel forces, accusing the government of François Bozizé of
failing to abide by its commitments, staged a coup in December
2012. The fact that CAR suffered renewed armed hostilities on the
UN’s watch underscores the volatility of so-called post-conflict coun-
tries and the need to understand why peace may fail to consolidate
despite substantial international engagement.3
CAR is not an isolated case. Between 1946 and 2013, 105 countries
suffered civil wars of various magnitude. Of these, more than half
(fifty-nine countries) experienced a relapse into violent conflict—in
some cases more than once—after peace had been established.4 By
one estimate, on average 40 per cent of countries emerging from civil
war are likely to revert to violent conflict within a decade of the
cessation of hostilities.5 According to the World Bank, 90 per cent
of all civil wars that erupted in the first decade of the twenty-first
century were in countries that had previously experienced a civil war
since 1945 (see Table 0.1).6 Many of these countries have been recipi-
ents of extensive post-conflict recovery assistance on the part of the
international community.
Peace may fail for a variety of reasons, as we discuss below, but
many efforts to build peace have been hampered in one important
respect: by the lack of effective means of assessing progress towards
the achievement of a consolidated peace. As a consequence, peace-
builders are often navigating without a compass. International organ-
izations and donor governments routinely undertake monitoring and
evaluation of the specific programmes that they support in countries
recovering from violent conflict, often to determine if funds are being
3
For an assessment of the situation on the eve of renewed hostilities, see ‘Report of
the UN Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and on the
Activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in That Country’,
UN Doc. S/2012/956, 21 December 2012.
4
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute, Oslo, ‘UCDP/
PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014a, 1946–2013’.
5
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, ‘Post-Conflict Risks’, Journal
of Peace Research 45:4 (2008), 465. Different studies yield different estimates of
conflict relapse depending on the data, criteria, and methodology employed. These
differences are not significant for the purposes of the analysis presented in this book,
however. For a critical discussion of the varying estimates, see Astri Suhrke and Ingrid
Samset, ‘What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War’, International
Peacekeeping 14:2 (2007), 195–203.
6
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 3.
Introduction 3
Table 0.1. Civil war onset and recurrence
Decade Onset in countries with Onset in countries with Number

no previous conflicts (%) a previous conflict (%) of onsets
1960s 57 43 35
1970s 43 57 44
1980s 38 62 39
1990s 33 67 81
2000s 10 90 39
Source: World Bank 2011
used as intended or if programme activities have been implemented

as planned. Rarely, if ever, however, do these organizations and
governments conduct broader, strategic assessments to ascertain the
quality of the peace that they are helping to build and the contribu-
tion that their engagement is making (or not) to the consolidation
of peace.
This is not to suggest that peacebuilding actors make no effort to
take stock of progress overall. To the contrary, there are periodic
reports from the field by high representatives and their equivalents,
briefings to organizations’ member states and government minis-
ters, and expert independent analysis by research institutes, among
other barometers of change. While these assessments can be very
insightful, they are often ad hoc, impressionistic, or devised on the
basis of either inexplicit criteria or stated criteria—such as the
fulfilment of mandates—that are not necessarily suitable for deter-
mining how well a peacebuilding operation may be helping to meet
the requirements for a stable peace.
The key issue to consider, then, which this book will address, is
can we know—and if so, how can we know—if the foundations for
sustainable peace and development have been established so that the
UN and other multilateral organizations, donor governments, and
non-governmental organizations engaged in peacebuilding can
decide whether, when, and in what ways they can recalibrate their
engagement in these countries. While decisions of this kind will
always be political ones ultimately,7 a greater appreciation of the
quality of the peace that has been established would arguably enable
7
For examples, see Richard Caplan, ‘Policy Implications’, in Richard Caplan (ed.),
Exit Strategies and State Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 315–16.
4 Measuring Peace
international actors engaged in post-conflict recovery and development
to make better informed judgements about appropriate courses of
action. To build a secure peace, it will be argued here, it is important
to take the measure of peace.
MEASURING PEACE CONSOLIDATION
How can one assess the durability of a peace? The principal difficulty
in attempting to answer this question is that there are no hard
measures or indicators of a consolidated peace—in contrast, say, to
the indicators of a prosperous economy (e.g., growth in gross domes-
tic product) or a healthy population (e.g., declining infant mortality
rates), contentious though some of these indicators may be.8 The
ultimate test of a sustainable peace, in cases where third parties have
intervened, necessarily comes after the fact—that is, only when the
international community has drawn down significantly or exited.
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the continued presence
of international personnel, even just a token military presence, can
buoy a peace artificially. The presence of UN peacekeeping forces in
Liberia in 1997, for example, helped to keep the peace but it also gave
rise to mistaken impressions of the rootedness of that peace, which
the resumption of civil war less than two years later would dispel.9
One measure of sustainability, therefore, it has been suggested, is the
survival of a peace following the first election after peacekeeping
forces have departed.10 Yet while this is conceivably a reasonable
measure, it is obviously not a practical one for transitional planning
purposes. Third parties want to know that a peace is stable before
they exit.
8
See, for instance, the trenchant critique of gross domestic product as a measure
of economic well-being in Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi,
Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+
Commission+report.
9
See ‘Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia’, UN Doc. S/1997/712, 12 September 1997.
10
Barry Blechman, William J. Durch, Wendy Eaton, and Julie Werbel, Effective
Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace: Final Report (Washington,
DC: DFI International, September 1997), 8–9.
Introduction 5
There is a substantial body of scholarship concerned with civil wars
and peace maintenance but that scholarship offers only limited
insight into whether a post-conflict peace is durable. One area of
scholarship with apparent relevance to this question is concerned
with civil war onset. Scholars have identified a wide range of factors
in their efforts to explain the incidence of violent internal conflict.
Many of these factors can be grouped in terms of their primary
emphasis: on the motivation of combatants and their supporters, on
the feasibility of rebellion, and on the resilience of national institu-
tions. Motivation encompasses a wide range of often grievance-based
sub-factors, including ‘relative deprivation’ (Gurr 1970) and ‘hori-
zontal inequalities’ (Stewart 2008); ethnic insecurity (Posen 1993;
Walter and Snyder 1999); and political, social, and economic discrim-
ination (Brown 1996). Feasibility stresses the importance of oppor-
tunity over motivation, suggesting that rebellion is more likely to
occur where material conditions favour it, notably where the terrain
is mountainous, allowing rebels to hide; where valuable natural
resources are plentiful, allowing rebels to finance their activities
from trade; and where external security commitments to govern-
ments are weak, allowing rebels to challenge governments more easily
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2009). Resilience emphasizes
the vulnerability of the state to various internal and external pressures
(e.g., rising food prices, migration) and the capacity of states and their
institutions to cope effectively with these pressures (Zartman 1995;
Goldstone et al. 2010; World Bank 2011). These factors are not
necessarily mutually exclusive: a number of explanations for the
outbreak of civil war combine several of them.11
If one can identify the factors that underlie civil wars, it seems
reasonable to assume, then the basis for an enduring peace will
arguably reside in being able to address those factors satisfactorily—
by eliminating discrimination, for instance, or by building more
representative institutions—bearing in mind the difficulty of effecting
some of these changes. There are two problems with this approach.
The first problem is that there is no consensus among scholars as to
which causal factors matter or matter most. Indeed, as Charles Call
observes, there is ‘tremendous disparity among scholars about
11
For a review of the literature on civil war causation produced in the most recent
period of scholarship, see Lars-Erik Cederman and Manuel Vogt, ‘Dynamics and
Logics of Civil War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61:9 (2017), 1992–2016.
6 Measuring Peace
whether certain factors are important or not, and about the degree to
which they are important’.12 The identification of critical factors
alone, moreover, is not sufficient to account for why conflict occurs;
there needs also to be a credible and verifiable explanation of why
they matter, and scholars disagree about that, too. For instance,
scholars who agree that peacekeeping makes a positive contribution
to peacebuilding maintain variously that it succeeds because it miti-
gates the security dilemma among warring parties (Fortna 2004); or
because it reinforces negotiated settlements (Caplan and Hoeffler
2017); or because it constitutes a projection of soft power (Howard
2019). These differences matter for peacebuilding strategies.
The second problem with this approach to measuring peace con-
solidation is that it assumes that the causes of conflict onset and the
causes of conflict recurrence are one and the same. Call’s quantitative
analysis has shown, however, that while onset and recurrence share a
number of risk factors—including political instability, population
size, and reliance on natural resource (notably oil) exports—there
are also significant differences.13 For one thing, ‘wars are transforma-
tive’, as Susan Woodward has observed; the root causes of a conflict
may no longer pertain as a consequence of changes that the conflict
may have generated—changes that include major population dis-
placements and the emergence of new political or military elites.14
It is important, therefore, to treat civil war recurrence—and the
factors that give rise to it—as distinct phenomena.15
Another possible approach is to focus not on the causes of civil war
but on the causes of peace in the aftermath of civil war. What
measures have been most successful in maintaining the peace after
violent conflict and have they been applied to the cases in question?
Again, the range of possibilities—and the differences among
scholars—is considerable. Scholars have stressed the importance of
the nature of civil war terminations (Licklider 1993), third-party
security guarantees (Fortna 2004), security-sector reform (Toft
12
Charles T. Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War
Recurrence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 30.
13
Ibid., ch. 2.
14
Susan L. Woodward, ‘Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using
Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions’, Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding 1:2 (2007), 155.
15
Call, Why Peace Fails, 50–9, 65.
Introduction 7
2010), and inclusive political settlements (Call 2012), among other
measures.16 This approach would appear to be more promising in so
far as it draws its analysis from experiences of success. But as with the
previous approach, there is a lack of consensus among scholars and,
most important for our purposes, this approach does not reveal
enough about the quality of the peace that has been established in
any given case.
This book proposes a different approach. The argument made
here—a very simple argument—is that more rigorous assessments
of the robustness of peace are needed. These assessments require
clarity about the characteristics of, and the requirements for, a stable
peace in a given conflict situation and correspondingly strong know-
ledge about the conflict dynamics specific to that conflict situation.
The objectives (intended outcomes) of a peacebuilding operation
need to be re-evaluated continually. Do these objectives still support
the broad strategic goals of the operation? Are the assumptions that
underpin those objectives valid? Have new or unanticipated threats or
impediments to a stable peace emerged (e.g., external security chal-
lenges, new political developments) that require the articulation of
new or altered objectives? Has available implementing capacity—
internationally and nationally—changed and what implications does
this have for achieving a stable peace?17 Such assessments are feasible;
indeed, as we will see, they are being employed already by some
peacebuilding bodies but only to a limited extent. More rigorous
assessments of the robustness of peace, while by no means a panacea
for conflict recurrence, have the potential to make substantial contri-
butions to conflict prevention.
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
This is a book about measuring peace consolidation. It is not a

book about evaluating peacebuilding success, on which there is
16
In fairness, not all of these scholars have been concerned with whether the
measures in question have been the most effective but, rather, with how effective they
have been.
17
These same considerations, I argue elsewhere, ought to inform transitional
planning for peace operations. See Caplan, Exit Strategies and State Building, ch. 17.
8 Measuring Peace
considerable scholarship.18 The two topics are closely related but
they are distinct. The first topic—the topic of this book—is concerned
with assessing the quality of peace; the second topic is concerned with
assessing peacebuilding performance. One measure of peacebuilding
performance may be the quality of the peace that it produces, and in
that sense the two topics are related, but it should be clear that they
are distinct.
This book is organized around five chapters. Chapter 1 examines
the concept at the heart of the book: peace. Every peacebuilding
strategy is predicated on a conception of peace, whether implicit or
explicit. It may be as basic as the absence of armed conflict—what is
known as a ‘negative peace’—or it may envision a more ambitious
outcome such as the reconciliation of warring parties and the restor-
ation of trust within war-torn societies—a ‘positive peace’. This
chapter will examine the range of conceptions of peace that have
been proposed by scholars. It will argue that peace is more varied and
heterogeneous a concept than either the scholarly literature or the
policy literature often acknowledges. Conceptualizations that reflect
the degrees of fragility/robustness of peace in post-conflict environ-
ments can provide the basis for sounder peacebuilding strategies.
Different conceptions of peace have different implications for
devising strategies of peacebuilding and peace maintenance. What it
takes to achieve a negative peace is very different from what is
required to achieve a positive peace. Chapter 2 explores how the
conceptual distinctions discussed in the previous chapter map onto
actual practice, with reference to the principal multilateral actors
engaged in peacebuilding: the UN, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the African Union, the World Bank, and leading non-governmental
18
Relevant works include Duane Bratt, ‘Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping
Operations’, International Peacekeeping 3:4 (1996), 64–81; Charles T. Call, ‘Knowing
Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success’, Civil Wars 10:2
(2008), 173–94; Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, ‘Evaluating Peace Operations’,
in Joachim A. Koops, Noorie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams (eds),
The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), ch. 5; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War
and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2006); Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Virginia Page Fortna, Does
Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008).
Introduction 9
organizations. What are the primary features of these organizations’
approaches to peacebuilding? How do they differ, if at all, in their
understandings of the characteristics of, and requirements for, a
stable peace?
Chapter 3 examines how international peacebuilding actors assess
progress towards peace consolidation, to the extent that they do.
Assessments are conducted both informally, for instance through
the periodic reporting of heads of missions and briefings to organ-
izations’ member states and government ministers, and more for-
mally, through benchmarking, conflict analysis, and early warning
indicators, among other practices. The chapter highlights innovative
approaches to strategic assessment that have yielded insights into the
robustness of peace in specific cases. The chapter also examines some
of the many indices and indicators of peace, stability, resilience, and
the like that are produced periodically by think tanks and research
institutes, including the Global Peace Index, the Peace and Conflict
Instability Ledger, the Failed (now Fragile) States Index, and the
Everyday Peace Indicators. For the most part, I argue, these indices
conceal more than they reveal about the quality of post-conflict peace,
but there are notable exceptions.
Chapter 4 draws on research that I have conducted jointly with my
colleague Anke Hoeffler, which seeks to identify factors that contrib-
ute to post-conflict peace stabilization. The research has two main
components: a quantitative analysis using duration (survival) ana-
lysis, and a qualitative analysis examining the peace consolidation
process in six conflict-affected countries. Duration analysis, a statis-
tical method, allows us to analyse the duration of peace. The hazard
rate—the rate at which peace ends—can be modelled as a function of
various co-variates, such as economic growth, aid, elections, military
personnel and expenditure, regional autonomy, etc. The data for this
purpose come from a wide range of sources, including data from UN
sources that has not previously been available to researchers. The
country case studies provide more detailed information on how some
countries achieved lasting peace while others failed. The country cases
that are included in this analysis are: Burundi, El Salvador, Liberia,
Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste (East Timor).
Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the analysis in the fore-
going chapters for international policy. What does this analysis tell us
about whether it may be possible, and if so how, to assess the quality
of peace? How can monitoring and assessment be improved? The
10 Measuring Peace
chapter argues for an ‘ethnographic approach’ to strategic assessment
that favours increased reliance on knowledge of local culture, local
history, and especially, the specific conflict dynamics at work in a
given conflict situation, particularly at the micro level. From this
approach it derives a number of recommended practices, including
early and continuous conflict analysis, the adoption of more precise
measures of post-conflict peace, and the incorporation of local per-
spectives into strategic assessment. The chapter closes with a discus-
sion of the obstacles to good practice (e.g., politicization of reporting)
and how these obstacles can be overcome.
A FEW WORDS ABOUT TERMINOLOGY
A few words about the terminology employed in this book are in

order. The notion of a stable peace (also referred to in this volume as a
secure, self-sustaining, robust, or consolidated peace) lies at the heart
of this study. Peace, as both a policy goal and as an object of academic
study, is an ‘essentially contested concept’ in W. B. Gallie’s sense of
the term: ‘concepts, the proper use of which inevitably involves
endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their
users’.19 Is peace characterized by the absence (total? partial?) of
armed conflict (defined how?) or does it exhibit (require?) additional
features such as broad shifts (elite? popular?) in attitude? There is no
consensus among scholars and practitioners as to the characteristics
of peace. This is because ambiguity is inherent in the concept of
peace.20 Different appreciations of the concept, however—including
from within conflict-affected communities—can have implications
for both analysis and policy.
For the purposes of this volume, a stable peace is understood to
mean a condition in which the recurrence of civil war is thought to
be unlikely. Where it is necessary to define a stable peace more
precisely (e.g., in Chapter 4), I do so; otherwise greater precision is
19
W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 56 (1956), 169.
20
Michael Lipson, ‘Performance under Ambiguity: International Organization
Performance in UN Peacekeeping’, Review of International Organizations 5:3
(2010), 249.
Introduction 11
not necessary but an awareness of the different meanings of the term
and their implications is. The notion of a stable peace does not tell us
anything about the quality of the peace, and the quality of the peace
can be relevant to the requirements for a stable peace. These require-
ments have both an empirical basis and a normative basis, as I discuss
in Chapter 5.
This study is concerned with measuring peace consolidation in
relation to civil wars or internal armed conflicts (the terms are used
interchangeably here), the most prevalent form of armed conflict in
the post-Cold War era.21 Civil wars are armed conflicts between the
government of a state and one or more opposition groups within that
state or among non-state groups only, although foreign powers may
also be involved (as with the armed conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo from 1996 or Syria from 2011). There are aca-
demic conventions governing the use of the term ‘civil wars’—and, by
extension, ‘peace’—that are concerned with the identity of the actors
involved (state, non-state) and the intensity of the conflict (number of
battle-related deaths). The primary reason for these conventions is to
facilitate comparability across different analyses—quantitative ana-
lyses especially. Where precision of terms is required—notably in
Chapter 4—the terms are defined precisely. Otherwise, when drawing
on cases for illustrative purposes only, this study may depart from
these academic conventions (e.g., where the intensity of the conflict
falls below the agreed threshold).
Peacebuilding is used in this study to refer to a range of activities
by governmental and non-governmental actors to preserve and
strengthen the peace following a cessation of major hostilities with
the aim of establishing a self-sustaining peace. UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was one of the first to introduce the term to
the diplomatic lexicon in An Agenda for Peace (1992), in which he
defined ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ as ‘action to identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to
avoid a relapse into conflict’.22 For the purposes of this study the term
will be used broadly to refer to the array of third-party interventions
21
Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflict, 1946–2013’, Journal of
Peace Research 51:4 (2014), 541–54.
22
‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping’,
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/241111,
17 June 1992, II.21.
12 Measuring Peace
that contribute to the consolidation of peace, thus blurring the rather
bureaucratic and programmatic distinctions that exist, within the
UN for instance, between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.23 In
many respects there is no practical distinction between the peace-
keeping and peacebuilding phases of an operation; the two can
overlap significantly.24 Indeed, the emerging view within the UN is
that peacebuilding is an approach that should inform all forms of UN
engagement—before, during, and after violent conflict—an approach
captured by the term ‘sustaining peace’.25 Peacebuilding also shares
certain functional properties in common with stabilization, a term
more narrowly associated with the use of military instruments. As
this study is concerned primarily with assessing the quality of peace,
such distinctions are not always significant for our purposes.
Finally, although the term post-conflict is employed here in con-
junction with peacebuilding, the term is something of a misnomer.26
No society is without conflict and even ‘peaceful’ societies may
experience episodes of violence associated with prior conflict.27 Con-
sider, for instance, the clashes over the use of the Confederate flag in
the United States more than 150 years after the formal end of the civil
war there.28 What matters is the degree of violence that a society
experiences. The use of the term is conventional, however, and serves
usefully to identify the particular phase or phases in the evolution of
violent conflict with which this book is concerned. Despite its short-
comings, therefore, the term will be used in reference to the period
following the cessation of armed conflict, variably defined.
We turn now to consideration of the term at the centre of this
study: peace.
23
For a discussion of how the concept is deployed by the UN, the European Union,
donor states, and rising powers, see Charles T. Call and Cedric de Coning,
‘Conclusion: Are Rising Powers Breaking the Peacebuilding Mold?’ in Call and De
Coning (eds), Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Breaking the Mold? (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), ch. 10.
24
Reconciliation efforts, for instance—a key component of peacebuilding—
often begin in the peacekeeping phase.
25
See UN Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016), 27 April 2016.
26
For a discussion of the post-conflict concept, see Chip Gagnon and Keith Brown
(eds), Post-Conflict Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
27
Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds), The Peace in Between: Post-War Violence
and Peacebuilding (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
28
‘Charleston Shooting: Confederate Flag at Heart of Growing Political Storm’,
Guardian, 20 June 2015.
Conceptualizing Peace
Peace is too important a goal to be without a firm conceptual

basis for both research and positive social action.
Royce Anderson1
What is peace? This is not, as it might seem, a pedantic question.
Rather, it is a question of fundamental practical importance. Clarify-
ing what is meant by peace is critical to measuring peace consolida-
tion. Without clarity about the characteristics of peace, it is difficult if
not impossible to assess progress towards achieving it. However,
because peace is an ‘essentially contested term’, there is no generally
agreed definition of it. Is it ‘merely’ the absence of violent conflict?
Does it require the transformation of society and relations within it?
Different actors may hold different views about its meaning. The
views of government elites may differ from those of rebel leaders or
international peacekeepers or donor governments. These various
views do not necessarily exist in harmony; indeed, they may be
mutually exclusive, which makes the challenge of measuring peace
consolidation in the aftermath of civil war all the more difficult.
Notwithstanding this lack of consensus, embedded within every
peacebuilding strategy, stated or otherwise, is a particular conception
of peace that informs that strategy. Thus, for instance, the Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe is guided in its
approach to what it calls ‘post-conflict rehabilitation’ by the notion
of ‘comprehensive security’. As a consequence, the organization takes
a broad approach to peacebuilding, extending beyond the cessation of
violent conflict to the ‘politico-military, economic and environmental,
1
Royce Anderson, ‘A Definition of Peace’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace
Psychology 10:2 (2004), 115.
14 Measuring Peace
and human aspects of security’.2 Many national military organizations,
by contrast, while mindful of the importance of a comprehensive
approach, tend to view peace more narrowly as the condition that
obtains with the termination of hostilities.3 How exactly, and to what
extent, conceptions of peace inform, guide, direct, or constrain the
practices of peacebuilding organizations requires some elaboration.
I examine that question in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I look at the
range of meanings that social scientists employ with their use of the
term ‘peace’ (and associated terms) as these meanings allow us to
construct a conceptual map on which we can situate the orientations
and activities of the various peacebuilding organizations. A conceptual
map also allows us to explore the possibility of developing more
differentiated understandings of peace that, I will argue, can in turn
be used to expand existing practices of assessing progress towards the
achievement of a consolidated peace. While some of the conceptions of
peace that I examine here, therefore, reflect the way that policy actors
actually use the term, many of the conceptions are suggestive of a richer
array of possibilities.
MINIMAL AND MAXIMAL CONCEPTIONS

OF PEACE
The most basic conception of peace is reflected in the binary distinc-

tion between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace. The Norwegian sociolo-
gist Johan Galtung introduced this now classical distinction in the
inaugural issue of Journal of Peace Research in 1964. Negative peace
refers to the ‘absence of violence, absence of war’, whereas positive
peace, as Galtung put it then, refers to the ‘integration of human
society’ such that conflict is not eliminated but ‘dynamics without
recourse to violence is built into the system’.4 A negative or ‘cold’
2
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Background Brief: OSCE
Activities and Advantages in the Field of Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, OSCE Doc. SEC.
GAL/76/11, 28 April 2011, 1.
3
Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Ending Wars and Building Peace:
International Responses to War-Torn Societies’, International Studies Perspectives 9:1
(2008), 4.
4
‘An Editorial’, Journal of Peace Research 1:1 (1964), 2. Galtung would later revise
his definition of positive peace to mean the ‘absence of structural violence’, likening it
Conceptualizing Peace 15
peace may exist between adversaries—as with the United States and
the Soviet Union during the Cold War—or between formerly warring
states—as with Egypt and Israel today—and it may even be a stable
peace,5 although few will question the relatively greater stability of the
positive peace that exists between post-war Germany and France, for
instance, and the sense of security it affords. Within conflict-affected
states it is more commonly thought that a transformation of relations
between the parties to the conflict—a positive or ‘warm’ peace—is
required, as might be achieved, for instance, through processes of
reconciliation and confidence-building.6 While a negative peace may
suffice in a post-civil war state, a positive peace, it is widely agreed,
affords communities greater prospects for preventing the recurrence
of violent conflict.7
A negative peace is a minimal conception of peace in so far as the
absence of armed conflict is the minimum condition for peace. Armed
conflict is, quite obviously, antithetical to peace. However, what
constitutes armed conflict, what distinguishes peace from war, how
armed conflicts differ from other forms of collective violence, and
how long a peace must endure to qualify as a peace (as opposed to a
mere suspension of hostilities) are not so obvious. These are just a few
of the key questions the answers to which are important for clarifying
what is meant more precisely by a negative peace.
A minimal conception of peace is reflected in the broad body of
statistical studies of armed conflicts. The two most widely utilized
data sets in this regard are those developed by the Correlates of War
Project (COW) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO).8 Both data sets measure
to ‘social justice’. See below and Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’,
Journal of Peace Research 6:3 (1974), 167–91.
5
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus 93:3 (1964),
881–909.
6
John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20, 82–3.
7
Johan Galtung, ‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some
Responses’, Journal of Peace Research 22:2 (1985), 141–58.
8
The Correlates of War Project, http://www.correlatesofwar.org; UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Database, https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO.
COW and UCDP/PRIO have developed a number of different databases. I am
concerned here with the more widely used databases, which contain data on episodes
of war/armed conflict, as defined below.
16 Measuring Peace
armed conflict; they do not measure peace, not even negative peace.
This might seem counterintuitive. After all, peace at a minimum, we
have just observed, is the absence of armed conflict. However, while
that may be true conceptually, the ‘absence of armed conflict’ as
inferred from these data sets exhibits a range of characteristics, not
all of which may be compatible with notions of peace, negative or
otherwise. The distinction will become apparent below.
COW and UCDP/PRIO utilize a classification system that is based
in part on the status of the parties to the conflict. COW in its present
incarnation (it has evolved since it was established in 1963) and
UCDP/PRIO employ similar categories of conflict: interstate wars,
where the parties to the conflict are recognized states; extra-state or
extra-systemic wars, which occur between a state and a non-state
group outside the state’s territory (e.g., colonial wars); and intra-
state or internal conflicts—now the most prevalent form of armed
conflict (see Figure 1.1)—which occur between the government of a
state and one or more internal opposition groups. COW has a fourth
category—non-state wars—which refers to armed conflicts between
or among non-state entities. UCDP/PRIO also has a fourth category—
internationalized internal armed conflicts—which occur between a
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Extrastate Interstate Internationalized Internal
Figure 1.1. Total armed conflict by type, 1946–2014

Source: Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015
state and one or more armed internal groups with intervention from
outside states, as with the Syrian civil war from 2011.9
Both COW and UCDP/PRIO employ thresholds of violence to
determine whether and when a war or an armed conflict has occurred
(the two terms represent different magnitudes of violence). Within
the COW typology, an intra-state war must result in ‘a minimum of
1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities’ in a given year to qualify as a
war.10 UCDP/PRIO uses a lower threshold: ‘at least 25 battle-related
deaths’ (military and civilian) in a given year.11 The use of a lower
threshold in the case of UCDP/PRIO reflects the attempt to capture
the broader phenomenon of ‘armed conflicts’, of which the large
majority are now intra-state conflicts. (Another approach would be
to establish thresholds based on per capita calculations, which would
highlight the relative magnitude of violence.)12 As well as excluding
from its principal data set conflicts in which the state is not a party
(‘non-state conflicts’), UCDP/PRIO also omits ‘one-sided violence’
that involves the unopposed killing of unarmed civilians, as occurs
with massacres.13 Neither data set, for that matter, takes account of
relatively new patterns of violence that elude conventional definitions
of collective violence but whose lethality may exceed that of conven-
tional armed conflicts, including gang warfare in Central America,
which has had some of the highest homicide rates in the world.14
9
Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, Resort to War: A Data
Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816–2007
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), ch. 2; Uppsala Conflict Data Program and
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, ‘UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook, Version 4-2014a’, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_
prio_armed_conflict_dataset. COW’s four primary categories are sub-divided further
into various sub-categories.
10
Meredith Reid Sarkees, ‘Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0: Definitions
and Variables’, 1–2, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war.
11
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo, ‘UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2014a’, 1.
12
See Nicholas Sambanis, ‘What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical
Complexities of an Operational Definition’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:6
(2004), 821–2.
13
UCDP/PRIO maintain separate data sets for these conflict dynamics for the
period since 1989.
14
In 2012, Honduras’s annual homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 population was
fifteen times greater than the average global annual homicide rate (6.2 per 100,000
population). Figures from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC Global
Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Context, Data (Vienna: UNODC, 2014) 21, 24.
18 Measuring Peace
Domestic violence—which has important but poorly understood
links to political violence—is not taken into consideration either.15
From a conceptual standpoint, then, for the vast number of studies
that rely on these data sets, peace is a negative peace—that is, the
absence of armed conflict as each data set defines armed conflict. If
relations between parties to a conflict are fraught, a state is nonethe-
less considered to be at peace provided that the threshold in battle-
related deaths has not been crossed in a given year. However, the
absence of armed conflict may not actually signify the achievement of
peace, not even a negative peace, as one might understand that term.
In the case of COW, if battle-related fatalities total 999 or less in one
year, this qualifies as peace. Indeed, a number of actual armed
conflicts persist below the threshold of both data sets in a given
year (in Papua New Guinea, Turkey, and Gaza, among other conflict
situations). Moreover, the absence of violence, where it does occur,
may merely reflect a period of preparation for the resumption of
larger-scale fighting. There is also the issue of the distribution of
violence (localized versus generalized) in a country and, as indicated
earlier, the relative impact of conflict intensity (the number of battle
deaths relative to the size of the population), neither of which is
captured by these data sets. In sum, these data sets imply a notion
of negative peace that is both underspecified and undifferentiated, for
which reason they do not allow us to measure the quality of the peace
precisely on the basis of them.
Negative peace is thought by some scholars to have only limited
utility for other reasons. Galtung, with aspirations for transformative
social action in mind, rejects this ‘narrow concept of peace’ on
normative grounds because, as he puts it, ‘if [killing] were all violence
is about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is rejected
when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders
would still be compatible with peace.’16 Negative peace also has its
detractors for reasons that are largely empirical: negative peace, as
we have seen, is thought to be an insufficient basis for a stable peace.
15
As Lansford and Dodge observe, ‘[V]iolence in one domain tends to generalize,
or spill over, into other domains. For example, war, homicide, assault, combative
sports, and severe punishment of criminals jointly characterize cultures of violence.’
Jennifer E. Lansford and Kenneth A. Dodge, ‘Cultural Norms for Adult Corporal
Punishment of Children and Societal Rates of Endorsement and Use of Violence’,
Parenting, Science and Practice 8:3 (2008), 257–70.
16
Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, 168.
The two objections are not unrelated: many (state) authorities who
support ‘highly unacceptable social orders’ lack legitimacy; their
regimes are unstable as a result and they are prone, therefore, to use
violence domestically to suppress dissent.17 Others simply view posi-
tive peace as a natural complement to negative peace, much the same
way as the World Health Organization in its constitution defines
health as ‘a state of complete physical, social and mental well-being,
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.18
A positive peace, then, may have intrinsic value and/or instrumen-
tal value—i.e., to ensure a stable peace. But what are the characteris-
tics of a positive peace? What state of affairs does it describe?
Galtung’s conception of a positive peace sets the bar very high:
employing an extended notion of violence, latterly understood
to occur ‘when human beings are being influenced so that their
actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential
realizations’.19 Galtung’s positive peace entails the elimination of
both direct personal violence and indirect structural violence, i.e.,
the norms, institutions, attitudes, and other features of societies
that inhibit the individuals within them from achieving their full
potential.20 Positive peace conceived in these terms, as we will see
in Chapter 2, exceeds what any peacebuilding strategy would nor-
mally seek to achieve. Galtung’s conception is useful, however, for
delineating the upper limits conceptually of major scholarly thinking
on this question.
Galtung’s conception of positive peace is ambitious, perhaps even
utopian,21 but it has intellectual merit in so far as it represents a
Weberian ‘ideal type’ response to the problem of violence, as Galtung
defines it. It is a useful analytical abstraction although it does not
(and arguably could not) exist, its chief weakness being that it is
17
Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2000).
18
Constitution of the World Health Organization, Basic Documents, 45th edition,
Supplement, October 2006.
19
Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, 168.
20
Galtung would later add ‘cultural violence’ as a third aspect of violence. See
Johan Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’, Journal of Peace Research 27:3 (1990), 291–305.
21
‘If peace requires the absence of [all] political and structural violence,’
Yan Xuetong observes, ‘it has never been experienced in human history, because
inequality, destitution, oppression and discrimination have existed in one form or
another in all societies through the ages.’ Yan Xuetong, ‘Defining Peace: Peace vs.
Security’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 16:1 (2004), 203.
20 Measuring Peace
underspecified and seemingly inexhaustible in its requirements.22
Unlike a reduction in the number of battle-related fatalities, it is
difficult if not impossible to determine whether human beings (all?
most?) are living at or beneath their potential. This weakness is shared
by other conceptions of positive peace to the extent that they too
are underspecified and, furthermore, may fail to distinguish what is
necessary from what is desirable with respect to the requirements
for a positive peace. There is a tendency, for instance, to conflate
peacebuilding with state-building, democratization, and other related
activities, resulting in a kind of conceptual inflation when all of the
associated goals and activities are subsumed beneath the single banner
of peacebuilding.23 Some of the desired outcomes—democratization,
for example—may not be necessary to achieve a stable peace; indeed,
they may even militate against a stable peace. In Burundi, for instance,
with the election of the country’s first Hutu president following multi-
party democratic elections held in June 1993, the country descended
into violence more deadly than all previous outbreaks of interethnic
violence combined since independence.24 This conflation of goals is a
problem that manifests itself, too, in peacebuilding practice, as we will
see in Chapter 2.
TOWARDS A MORE DIFFERENTIATED

CONCEPTION OF PEACE
The terms negative peace and positive peace, we have seen, are each
broad in their scope. Within and between these two poles there lies a
wide range of ‘post-conflict’ conditions. Scholars have sought to
develop conceptually rigorous ways of describing the entire range of
22
Galtung’s conception of positive peace has attracted much criticism for this
reason. See, for instance, John Keane, Reflections on Violence (London: Verso, 1996)
and C. A. J. Coady, ‘The Idea of Violence’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 3:1 (1986),
3–19.
23
For a discussion of this problem, see Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds),
Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), chs 1, 15.
24
Michael Lund, ‘What Kind of Peace Is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions’, mimeo, January 2003, 17.
For a general analysis, see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight:
Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
post-conflict conditions and of measuring them. This section exam-
ines some of these efforts with an eye towards identifying ways of
enriching analysis of the quality of peace.
A number of scholars take issue with the ‘sharp categorical dis-
tinction between “war” and “peace”’, as Paul Richards describes it. He
urges analysts to think instead of peace ‘in terms of a continuum.’25 In
this vein, Royce Anderson takes as his starting point what he sees as
the two dimensions of peace—the absence of violence (negative
peace) and the presence of harmonious relations (positive peace) in
a conflict-affected society—the extent of which in each case, he
suggests, can be plotted along a continuum. These two dimensions,
moreover, manifest themselves as objective conditions and subjective
perceptions which, Anderson maintains, can both be measured.
‘Though peace can be partially measured by objective measures,’ he
observes, ‘comprehensive measures of peace should also include
subjective indicators that reflect people’s personal evaluations and
experience of peace.’26 Measuring the quality of the peace would
require developing indicators for each of Anderson’s four compo-
nents of peace: objective indicators of violence, subjective indicators
of violence, objective indicators of harmonious relations, and sub-
jective indicators of harmonious relations. The key prior question, of
course, is how narrowly or broadly are the terms ‘violence’ and
‘harmonious relations’ to be defined in a given context? I return to
this question when I consider ways of operationalizing the concep-
tions under discussion here. For our purposes now, however, what is
important to bear in mind is the utility of a conceptual continuum.
Nadine Ansorg, Felix Haass, and Julia Strasheim also imply a
continuum in their conceptualization of peace, which they define as
‘a continuous condition characterized by the absence of direct, phys-
ical violence between social or political groups, with all relevant actors
regarding the non-violent regulation of social and political conflict
as the “only game in town”’.27 Ansorg and colleagues adapt for this
25
Paul Richards, ‘New War: An Ethnographic Approach’, in Paul Richards (ed.),
No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Athens, OH/
Oxford: Ohio University Press/James Currey, 2005), 5.
26
Anderson, ‘A Definition of Peace’, 104.
27
Nadine Ansorg, Felix Haass, and Julia Strasheim, ‘Between Two “Peaces”?:
Bridging the Gap between Quantitative and Qualitative Conceptualizations in
Multi-Method Peace Research’, paper presented at the International Studies Associ-
ation Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3–6 April 2013, 7.
22 Measuring Peace
purpose Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan’s well-known definition of a
consolidated democracy: ‘a political situation in which, in a phrase,
democracy has become “the only game in town”’.28 In relation to a
consolidated peace, this would mean that no significant social or
political groups seek resort to violence to achieve their ends and
that the majority of the population believes that political differences
can be resolved and political change should be sought using only
peaceful means.
Ansorg and colleagues propose assessing the strength of peace at
three different levels of society: micro, meso, and macro. The micro
level concerns the attitudes and behaviour of the general population,
and the extent to which political violence is accepted/rejected or
employed by members of the general public. The meso level concerns
the attitudes and behaviour of groups and whether they support or
engage in the use of violence to challenge the government or to attack
other groups. A key indicator, in this regard, is the continued exist-
ence of armed opposition movements.29 The macro level is concerned
with the views and behaviour of political and bureaucratic elites and
whether they sanction the use of force in settling political differences.
In each case one can imagine a range of possible dispositions/behav-
iours that could generate a value for the quality of the peace for the
state as a whole. The assessment could be conducted on a regional
basis to capture variations within a state, which is extremely import-
ant given that intra-state conflicts are often highly localized (the post-
Mobutu conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo are a prime
example).30 This is not a dynamic analytical framework, however,
and therefore it would not by itself convey a sense of whether the
situation is improving, deteriorating, or remaining the same.
A more fully developed ‘peace scale’ is suggested by James Klein,
Gary Goertz, and Paul Diehl (see Table 1.1).31 Although developed
28
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.
29
Adrian Florea, ‘Where Do We Go from Here? Conceptual, Theoretical, and
Methodological Gaps in the Large-N Civil War Research Program’, International
Studies Review 14:1 (2012), 82, fn. 19.
30
Nils Weidmann, Jan Ketil Rød, and Lars-Erik Cederman, ‘Representing Ethnic
Groups in Space: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 47:4 (2010), 491–9.
31
James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, ‘The Peace Scale: Conceptualizing
and Operationalizing Non-Rivalry and Peace’, Conflict Management and Peace Science
25 (2008), 67–80.
Table 1.1. Core features of assessing the state of peace or rivalry between countries
Peace scale indicators
Indicator Rivalry Negative peace Positive peace
Rivalry Low-level conflict Negative peace Positive peace Pluralistic security

community
1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00
Conflict
1. War plans Present Present Absent Absent Joint war planning

2. Conflicts Frequent MIDs; Isolated MIDs; Absent No plausible counterfactual No plausible
variety of hostility Thompson rivalries; war scenarios counterfactual war
levels ICB crises scenarios
Communication and issues
3. Main issues in conflict Unresolved Unresolved Mitigated; some resolved; Resolved Resolved
some low salience
4. Communication Absent Absent Intergovernmental Intergovernmental and Institutionalized
highly developed mechanisms
transnational ties
Agreements, institutions, and diplomacy
5. Diplomacy No recognition; No recognition or Diplomatic recognition; Diplomatic relations Diplomatic

diplomatic hostility diplomatic hostility statements suggesting coordination
conflict
6. Area/level/number Agreement None None Peace negotiations and/or Nascent functional Extensive
agreements agreements; nascent institutionalized
integration functional agreements
Note: MIDs = militarized interstate disputes; ICB = international conflict behaviour

Source: Klein et al. 2008
24 Measuring Peace
for the purpose of assessing the quality of relations between states, it
has potentially useful application—in modified form—to intra-state
conflict dynamics. The authors construct a scale with rivalry at one
end (1.0), a pluralistic security community at the other end (0.0), and
low-level conflict (0.75), negative peace (0.5), and positive peace
(0.25) between the two poles. Corresponding to each of the five points
on the scale are a series of descriptive indicators that provide further
specification. While the terms are not all appropriate for intra-state
conflict, the table exemplifies the use of the notion of gradations or
degrees of peace.
The final conceptualization of peace considered here is reflected in
Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs’s notion of the
‘Peace Triangle’.32 Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs are interested in
the nature of the peace that prevails following a negotiated settlement
and observe, consistent with the foregoing discussion, that the char-
acter and quality of the peace can vary significantly. To capture this
variation, they distinguish post-settlement peaceful societies with
regard to three categories: issues, behaviour, and attitudes. The first
category, issues, is concerned with whether or not all (major) conflict
issues have been resolved. Many peace agreements defer resolution of
particularly difficult issues until a later date in the hope that the
experience of peace will build confidence between the parties and
thus facilitate resolution. Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs refer to this
as an unresolved peace. The Oslo Peace Accord (1993) between
Palestinians and Israelis, for instance, left many issues unresolved,
notably the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugee returns.
A peace may also be a restored peace, with, for example, the removal
of a tyrant or the defeat of rebel forces, or a peace may be a contested
peace when, for instance, victorious armed opposition groups turn
against one another.
The second leg of the Peace Triangle concerns conflict behaviour
after a peace agreement—whether one or another of the warring
parties continues to resort to violence (partial peace); whether some
but not all of a country is pacified with the signing of a peace
agreement (regional peace); and whether insecurity prevails as a result
of widespread criminal behaviour that perhaps stems directly from
32
Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, ‘Beyond the Absence of War:
The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies’, Review of International Studies
36:2 (2010), 367–90.
the war itself or feeds on adverse post-war conditions such as high
unemployment (insecure peace).
The final leg of the Peace Triangle concerns the relative presence or
absence of conflict attitudes in the period following a peace agree-
ment. A conflict-affected population may remain seriously divided
after an agreement (polarized peace), as was the case with Republicans
and Loyalists in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agree-
ment in 1998. There may also be a sense among groups that peace has
been established on an unfair basis, perhaps as the result of the failure
to prosecute war criminals (unjust peace). Or peace may be estab-
lished on the basis of a strong man coming to power who may not
enjoy broad popular legitimacy (fearful peace).
What these various initiatives all have in common is a recogni-
tion of the highly heterogeneous character of peace. They demon-
strate that peace is a much more complex concept than the simple
binary distinction between negative and positive peace would
suggest. They also point to, if not explicitly state, the value of
being able to conceptualize peace in such a way as to allow us to
make distinctions on the basis of both different kinds of peace and
different degrees of peace. The question is whether these conceptu-
alizations can also be operationalized and employed to help ascer-
tain whether a particular peace is a self-sustaining peace. We
examine this question in Chapter 5.
OTHER CONCEPTS
Scholars (and practitioners) employ other concepts that are closely

related to peace. These terms can be suggestive of ways of further
conceptualizing peace; they also provide perspective on the limita-
tions, apparent or real, of the term. For both reasons they have
potential value in relation to the practice of assessing the quality of
post-conflict peace.
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl do not propose new terminology so much
as take issue with the notion of a ‘stable peace’, which is a key concept
for the purposes of this study. They point out that stability can be
achieved at all points on the peace continuum, from the coldest negative
peace to the warmest positive peace. Stability is simply an equilibrium in
relations, which can be of fairly poor quality. ‘Stability,’ they conclude
26 Measuring Peace
for this reason, ‘is, of course, a very important theoretical and empirical
question, but not one that we should build into the concept of peace.’33
It is true that if stability in itself were the primary objective, then
the quality of peace in other respects might suffer. However, from an
analytical standpoint, surely it must be valuable to know how stable a
peace may be, whatever its character in other respects. (This may be
their point about stability being ‘a very important theoretical and
empirical question’.) To seek to ascertain if a peace is stable is not to
seek to establish a stable peace. On the other hand, a stable peace may
indeed be the objective, in which case whether it is a cold peace will
only be a function of its stability if stability can only be achieved at a
‘low level’ of peace. There may be circumstances in which that is the
case—for instance, if the costs associated with instability are high and
the pursuit of a warmer peace entails risks of instability that are
thought to be too great. Kosovo has arguably been such a case,
where Serbs and Albanians have been so deeply divided that to date
it has not been possible to pursue anything more than a cold (but
stable) peace in some parts of the territory. Once a modicum of
stability has been achieved, moreover, it may become possible to
enhance the peace over time if the political environment improves.34
Stability thus has its value and it does not necessarily debase the
quality of the peace.
Security and peace are closely related but distinct concepts. Secur-
ity exists in the absence of dangers and threats. It is a broader concept,
in relation to peace, that has broader functional applicability. One can
talk about ‘physical security’, ‘economic security’, ‘environmental
security’, ‘food security’, etc., as well as, more generally, ‘human
security’. The idea of human security represents a shift from the
state as the principal referent of security to the individuals within it.
As with the notion of positive peace, human security is vulnerable to
‘conceptual overstretch’—the extension of the concept so that it
applies to almost every conceivable danger or threat.35
33
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, ‘The Peace Scale’, 69.
34
This thinking is reflected in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry
of Defence, and Department for International Development’s Building Stability Frame-
work, 2016, which calls for building ‘fair power structures that broaden inclusion,
accountability and transparency over time’ (emphasis added).
35
S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the United
Nations: A Critical History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 228.
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KORPI
Niin, kyllä meidän täytyy auttaa häntä… vaikka miten…
1:NEN TYÖMIES
Ja mestari hänet väkisin pakotti, kun pois oli heti uhannut ajaa,
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Sanoiko hän niin?
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— Miten niin?
— Kuinka niin?
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Ajatelkaas, kun en ole lainkaan muistanut, että minulla on vielä

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Niin toverit Kaarlo puhuu totta! Jos me vain voisimme kestää vielä
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KAARLO odottaa jännittyneenä; sitten masentuu toisten

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1:NEN TYÖMIES hiljaa.
Voisihan tuota koettaa…
2:NEN TYÖMIES huokaisten.
Niin, niin…
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Kello onkin jo kohta kuusi; täytynee kai sitten lähteä…
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EMIL on pidättänyt Kaarloa, ja kun toiset ovat poistuneet, kysyy

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Missä ne mahtavat olla kortteeria — nuo rikkurit?
KAARLO
En tiedä, mitä sitten?
EMIL
Minä olen tässä päättänyt koota joitakin miehiä ja ajaa ne pois —

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KAARLO epäröiden.
Ei Emil, kyllä sinun isäsi sittenkin on oikeassa siinä, että

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EMIL yhä enemmän kiihtyen.
Hyötyä! Mutta minä en välitä hyödystä — en mistään! Koko elämä

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KAARLO sydämellisesti mutta lujasti.
Emil — sinä et saa ryhtyä mihinkään tuollaiseen! Sinun täytyy

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EMIL
Minä en enää ajattele mitään — en mitään! Kaikki on kuitenkin

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KAARLO keskeyttää painavasti.
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KAARLO
Älä puhu järjettömiä!
LIISA mutisten.
LIISA tulee; sanoo vihaisena ja levottomana.
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KAARLO hillityllä kiihkolla.
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Valhe! Toinen valhe! Mitä tämä merkitsee? Miksi valehtelitte?

Missä on
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LIISA mutisten.
Ei hän sairas ole…
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Te tiedätte sen — ja siis senkin missä hän on. Miksi ette sano sitä
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Älä Kaarlo! Älä Jumalan tähden… syytä… Mene nyt, kyllä saat
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Kaarlo.
KAARLO tuijottaa häntä hetken hurjan epätoivon valtaamana;

sitten syöksähtää ulos.
LIISA parahtaen.
Jumala! Mitä tämä on? Hänet on turmeltu ja minä, minä olen

syyllinen. —
Hän on ehkä… Voi, jospa hän on hukuttanut itsensä, niinkuin
Vaaralan
Sannikin… Jumala armahda… minua syntistä.
(Heittäytyy vaatekasalle ja purskahtaa katkeraan itkuun. —

Kyökistä kuuluu lasten ääniä: "Äiti tulkaa!" — Mutta Liisa ei kuule —
hänen ruumiinsa värisee ja vavahtelee kuin suonenvedossa.)
(Silloin avautuu ovi ja Anni astuu sisään kuin unissakävijä,

lysähtää hervottomasti lattialle istumaan ja tuijottaa eteensä
aivankuin näkemättä Liisaa.)
LIISA huomaa hänet ja kysyy käheästi.
Mitä, mitä… mitä lapsi raukka?

ANNI koleasti, tolkuttomasti.
Niin, mitä, mitä nyt?
LIISA nousee, lähenee Annia, änkyttäen kauhean tuskan ja

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Lapseni, lapseni… Pieni tyttöseni! Mitä nyt… on?
ANNI heittäytyy suulleen ja vaikeroi sydäntäsärkevästi, käsiään

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Äiti, äiti — kun nyt saisi vain pian kuolla, kuolla — pian kuolla…
Esirippu,
Toinen näytös.
Toinen kuvaelma.
Sama paikka kuin edellisessä näytöksessä.
Anni kävelee väsyneesti miltei horjuen kamarin lattialla. Välillä hän

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Hänen harteillaan on repaleinen miehen takki, mutta hän värisee
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Hän seisahtuu hetkeksi, kietoo takin tiukemmin ympärilleen ja

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"Äiti, äiti….Kuulkaa äiti!" ja Liisan "Sst!" Pienokaisen vaikerrus on
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LIISA tulee kyökistä väännellen käsiään ja mutisee hiljaa, kuin

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Voi Jumala, Jumala… Mitä minä teen… mitä minä teen? Aune…
pikku
Aune…
ANNI säpsähtäen.
Mitä, onko… onko Aune kuollut…?
LIISA
Ei — mutta hän kuolee… Hän on niin kovin heikko. Nytkin makaa

taas siinä omituisessa horrostilassa.
(Kyökistä kuuluu taasen pyytäviä lasten ääniä: "Äiti! Antakaa

minulle jotain. Antakaa edes jotain ruokaa…")
LIISA menee ovelle ja puhuu tuskastuneella äänellä.
Olkaa nyt hiljaa! Ette saa herättää Aune parkaa… Nukkukaa nyt
vain kiltisti lapsiparat… Huomenna äiti hommaa teille jotain
syötävää…
ANNI kuin itsekseen.
Aune kuolee… silloin kaikki olisi ollut turhaa. Ja nyt hän jo saisi
huomenna maitoa.
(Alkaa taas kävellä.)
LIISA istahtaa pöydän ääreen; puhuu kuin itsekseen.
Täytyy istahtaa hiukan, kun Aune on vähän levossa. Kovin kauan

ne siellä kokouksessa viipyvät. Kun nyt saisi tietää, mitä siellä…
ANNI tolkuttomasti matkien.
Niin, kunhan viipyisivät, että tietäisi… että ymmärtäisi.
(Liisa katsoo häntä ymmärtämättä.)
ANTTI tulee ovelle; tyytymättömällä hiukan epäluuloisella äänellä.
Mitä varten täällä padassa on kuumaa vettä? Keittääkö äiti

jotakin?
Onko äiti saanut perunia jostakin?
LIISA hermostuneena.
Hiljaa Antti! Etkö sinä vaikene! Herätät vielä pienemmätkin. Ja

etkö sinä näe, että siinä on — vain kuumaa vettä… Mene nyt
nukkumaan. — (Poika menee, Liisa nousee ja lausuu tuskan
valtaamana.) — Voi, kun ne lapsukaiset nyt vihdoinkin nukkuisivat…
(Lähtee väsynein askelin pojan jälkeen.)
(Kyökkiin kuuluu taas lasten hiljaista nyyhkytystä, joka vaikenee

vähitellen. Anni istahtaa pöydän ääreen ja antaa päänsä vaipua
käsiensä varaan. Pitkään aikaan ei kuulu muuta kuin pakkasen
terävä paukahdus.)
LIISA tulee uudestaan sisään; pysähtyy tuijottavin katsein ja alkaa
hiljaa, tuskallisesti:
Anni… minä en ymmärrä enää… Aune parka hengittää niin

kummallisesti — en uskalla enää katsoa… (Ristien kätensä.) —
Herra Jumala, auta, auta meitä! Kun ne nyt lakon lopettaisivat siellä
kokouksessa, niin saisi vielä apua… lääkkeitä, maitoa… — (Painaa
kasvat käsiinsä, nyyhkyttäen tukahtuneesti. Anni seisahtuu ja katsoo
häntä omituisen tylsästi kuin käsittämättä mitään.)
LIISA
Ja isä vaan ei anna lopettaa lakkoa vieläkään. — (Vaikeroiden.) —

Hän on niin järkähtämätön ja kova… Ja pikku Aune parka kuolee
sen tähden.
ANNI havahtuen.
Äiti, mitä te sanotte? — (Värisevällä äänellä.) — Ettekö te muista,

ettei isä ole itse kahteen vuorokauteen maistanut mitään… edes
leivänmurua…?
LIISA hätkähtää; ojentaa Annia kohden kätensä kuin rukoillen ja

änkyttää tuskallisesti katuen.
Anni kulta, ethän usko, että niin ajattelin… minä en ymmärrä enää
mitään, en muista mitään… Sinä et tiedä, miten minuun koski, kun
eilen saatiin se leipä lainaksi… eikä isä ottanut sitä pientäkään
osaansa, vaikka pyysin… — (Värähtäen.) — Teki niin pahaa, kun
hän hymyili ja käski minun vain syödä, jotta Aune saisi vähänkin
maitoa… Ja sentään minä, katsos Anni… en muista, en ymmärrä…
Kaikki on minulle niin kovin sekavaa… sekavaa…
ANNI hyväillen äitinsä päätä.
Niin juuri, äitiparka — kaikki on nyt sekavaa…
LIISA kuin itsekseen.
Ja sittenkään ei isä kertaakaan ole valittanut omasta puolestaan…

Aina ajattelee vain toisia, kaikkia — koko työväenluokkaa… Ei
koskaan itseään! — Huomaamattaan innostuen. — Sellainen on isä!
ANNI samoin.
Niin — isä on oikea mies!
LIISA alkaa yskiä terävästi; kun se lopulta laukoo, pyyhkäsee hän

silmiään ja istahtaa nääntyneenä. Äänettömyys.
(Ulkona paukahtaa taas pakkanen. Liisa katsahtaa jäiseen

ikkunaan, hänen ruumistaan puistattaa ja hän koettaa kietoa vanhaa
shaaliaan paremmin ympärilleen.)
LIISA
Täällä on vielä kylmempi kuin kyökissä. — (Levottomasti.) —

Kylmä sekin on… mitenkä ne lapset taas tämänkin yön
tarkenevat…? — (Nousee ja poistuu väsynein askelin.)
ANNI
Ottakaa tämä takki lasten päälle.
LIISA ovella.
Pidä nyt vaan itse… ettet vilustu.

ANNI
Kyllä se siellä paremmin tarvitaan.
(Antaa takin Liisalle ja istahtaa yksin pöydän ääreen. Äkkiä

ponnahtaa kuin iskun satuttamana, hypähtää seisoalleen kasvot
vääristyneinä ja alkaa kävellä.)
LIISA hetken kuluttua; mutisee hätäisellä, käheällä äänellä.
Kun ne nyt tulisivat kokouksesta, että saisi edes tietää…

Kaikkivaltias Jumala, toimita sinä, että lakko loppuisi! Että minun
pieni tyttöseni saisi apua, että hän eläisi, eläisi…! Herra
Jumala… Jumala!
(Tuo tukehtunut ääni katkeaa, niinkuin näkymätön, voimakas

koura olisi tarttunut hänen kurkkuunsa.)
ANNI näyttää kovin kiihtyneeltä ja katkeralta; hän seisahtuu ja

aukaisee jo suunsa sanoakseen jotakin, mutta pudistaakin päätänsä
ja vaikenee.
LIISA kuin itsekseen.
Mutta jos se sinun tahtosi on, niin en…
ANNI katkerasti.
Mutta itsehän te äitiparka äsken sanoitte, että Aune on

kuolemaisillaan sentähden, kun ei ole saanut maitoa! Ja eikö siihen
ole syynä patruuna, joka saa satojatuhansia, ja kuitenkin tahtoo
alentaa palkat niin, ettemme voi elää? Kuinka te siis voitte ajatella,
että jumala tahtoisi kiduttaa Aune-paran hitaasti kuoliaaksi — kun
kerran patruuna on syyllinen! Te syytätte sillä jumalaa!
LIISA katsoo Annia kuin sekopäinen ja ähkyy oudolla, hätäisellä

äänellä.
Lapsi… lapsi… ole vaiti, vaiti, vaiti! Sinä sekoitat minut! Mitä…
kuinka…? Puhutko, puhutko sinä totta…? Onko se totta…?
ANNI kuin havahtuen, kiihkeästi.
On, on… nyt minä vasta huomaan, ymmärrän, mitä isä on

puhunut! Jos jumala kerran on rakkauden jumala, kaikkitietävä ja
kaikkivoipa, niin hän ei sallisi tällaisen vääryyden vallitsevan, hän ei
antaisi pienen, viattoman Aunen kuolla nälkään! — Olisiko hän
määrännyt lukemattomat pienokaiset kärsimään ja nääntymään
nälkään… Ei, ei! Voi äiti, en osaa sitä oikein sanoa — mutta nyt
tiedän, tunnen, ettei jumalaa ole, koska maailmassa on vain
vääryyttä, eikä kukaan auta…
LIISA kokonaan hämmentyen.
Ei, se ei voi olla niinkuin sinä sanot! Ei — jumalan kädestä minä

olen ottanut kaikki kärsimykset, vaivat, köyhyyden… — (Tarttuen
päähänsä.) — Olisi liian kauheata ajatella, että toiset ihmiset olisivat
siihen syypäitä. Minä tulisin hulluksi… Ei, ei, se on vihollisen kavalaa
kuisketta, viettelystä. Pastori puhui juuri viime sunnuntaina tästä
asiasta…
ANNI kuohahtaen.
Pastori, pastori! Onhan isä monta kertaa selittänyt, miksi

tuollatavoin sanotaan — ja uskotteko te enemmän pastoria kuin
isää? Luuletteko, että isä tahtoisi viedä meitä harhaan? Ja kyllä isä
sen ymmärtää yhtähyvin kuin meidän juoppo pastorikin…
LIISA tukkii korviansa; keskeyttää tuskallisesti.
Anni, Anni, ole vaiti, vaiti! Sinä et ymmärrä… isän on vihollinen jo

saanut valtaansa — ja nyt se uhkaa sinutkin viedä… Ethän ole
koskaan ennen noin puhunut…?
ANNI
En ole ennen ymmärtänyt… Koettakaa tekin, äiti, ajatella, niin

järkenne…
LIISA keskeyttää kiivaasti.
Ei, ei! Minä en tahdo… en tahdo! Sanassakin sanotaan, että

maailmallinen järki on meidän pahin vihollisemme… saatanan
kavaluutta… Minä huomasin sen äsken. Ei, ei! Meidän täytyy aina
rukoilla, että jumala masentaisi järkemme että hän antaisi voimaa
kärsimään ja nöyrästi ottamaan kaiken vastaan hänen tahdostaan.
Hän on hyvyydessään kyllä kerran kaikki palkitseva.
ANNI vavahtaa kuin olisi koskenut johonkin saastaiseen ja kysyy

hitaasti.
Mutta pitääkö minun sellainenkin vastaanottaa jumalan tahdosta?
LIISA kuin ajattelematta.
Kun ei kerran tapahdu mitään hänen tahdottaan, niin ei kai

sekään. Ehkä Jumalalla on siinäkin joku tarkoitus, jota emme voi
käsittää ja jonka hän vihdoin kääntää hyväksi… Se juuri antaa
voimaa kestämään…
ANNI hypähtää seisaalleen silmät salamoiden ja koko hänen

olemuksessaan kuohahtaa vaivoin hillitty katkeruus ja suuttumus.
Rakastatteko te jumalaa? Sanokaa nyt äiti, rakastatteko te

jumalaa vai lapsianne?
LIISA hämmentyen.
Tietysti rakastan jumalaa ja lapsiani…
ANNI tarttuu äitinsä käsiin, katsoen tätä läpitunkevasti ja hänen

sa»ansa putoilevat kuin nuijaniskut.
Valhe! Jos äiti voi rakastaa sellaista olentoa, jonka tahdosta hänen
pieni lapsensa kuolee nälkään ja toinen häväistään hirveällä tavalla
— niin ei hän silloin niitä lapsia hiluistakaan rakasta. Sanokaa nyt
suoraan, kumpaa te rakastatte?
LIISA ähkyen tuskallisesti.
Voi Anni, Anni, mitä sinä…?
ANNI raskaasti syyttäen.
Äiti, teidän täytyy kerran katsoa sydämeenne ja huomata mitä

jumalisuutenne on! Minusta tuntui ihan kamalalta, kuu te lohdutitte
itseänne sillä että minulle on tehty näin jumalan tahdosta! Ajatelkaa,
mitä minulle on tehty. Katsokaa sormenjälkiä kaulassani, katsokaa
revityitä vaatteitani ja, ja… ettekö ymmärrä, että elämäni on
loppunut… Voi äiti, enkö sentään ole sama, jota olette pienenä
palleroisena pidellyt sylissänne? Rakastatteko te häntä, jos samalla
rakastatte sitä, joka on määrännyt teidän lapsellenne näin kamalan
kohtalon?
LIISA voihkien tukehtuneesti.
Anni… vaikene, vaikene jumalan tähden!
ANNI armottomasti.
Minä olen aina vaiennut, mutta nyt en välitä mistään! Minä tahdon
nyt sanoa. Te ette ole koskaan tahtonut edes ajatella, jotta saisitte
pitää uskonne. Mutta se ei ole uskoa, vaan ulkokultaisuutta. Silloin
on niin hyvä heittää kaikki jumalan syyksi! Ajatelkaa vaan itseänne,
äiti. Kun pikku Armas sairastui ja kuoli, sanoitte te sen tapahtuneen
jumalan tahdosta — ja kuitenkin hän sairastui siitä, kun kylmettyi
kirkkomatkalla teidän varomattomuutenne tähden! Nyt, kun Aune on
kuolemaisillaan, ei patruuna ole vähääkään syypää, vaan jumala. Ja
maailman inhoittavin rikoskin on teidän mielestänne jumalan
määräämä, vaikka…
LIISA ojentaa rukoillen kätensä ja pälyilee kauhistunein katsein

ympärilleen kuin vangittu eläin; sitten toistelee tolkuttomasti.
Se on totta, totta… sinä puhut totta, Anni! Mitä, mitä minun pitää
tehdä? Herra jumala, minä olen suuri syntinen, auta minua! Anni,
tyttöseni… pieni lapsoseni… voitko vielä antaa anteeksi…?
ANNI heltyen.
Voi äiti, enhän minä… On vain niin kamalaa ajatella, että jumala
olisi niin määrännyt… Tarkoitan vain, että te edes tässä asiassa
ajattelisitte, kuka on syyllinen…
LIISA syvästi katuen.
Niin Anni — minä olen syyllinen! Minä olen ollut kuin sokea — nyt
vasta huomaan, että olen kurjin ihmisistä, että minun täytyy alottaa
kokonaan uutta elämää. Minä olen kyllä suullani tunnustanut, mutta
en ole ajatellut… Sekin on totta mitä sanot pikku Armaasta. Ja sitten
vielä tämä viimeinen. Voi Anni, minä koetin uskoa sen jumalan
tahdoksi, peittääkseni oman rikokseni, tukehuttaakseni omantuntoni
äänen…
ANNI hämmästyen.
Mitä äiti — mitä te tarkoitatte?
LIISA masentuneena, katuvasti.
Niin lapsi parka… minä olen syyllinen sinun elämäsi turmioon.

Sinä et olisi mennyt, jos minä…
ANNI keskeyttäen.
Mutta ettehän te kehoittanut minua menemään.
LIISA
En kylläkään, mutta en myöskään jyrkästi kieltänyt… Jos sen

olisin tehnyt, et sinä olisi mennyt… Mutta kun se siinä kirjeessä
lupasi huolehtia, ettei Aunen tarvitse puutetta kärsiä, niin…
ANNI tuskallisesti.
Älä nyt äiti, ei se sinun syysi ollut! Olisihan minun kuitenkin

täytynyt mennä, kun se uhkasi toimittaa Kaarlon heti huomispäivänä
Siperiaan… Ja kun luulin sen ihmiseksi, että kun oikein puhun, niin…
(Ääni katkeaa kuin tukehtuen.)
LIISA peittää kasvot käsiinsä ja nyyhkyttää tukahtuneesti.
Niin — siinä se suurin rikokseni onkin… Sillä minä aavistin, olin

miltei varma, ettet onnistu, kun luulit mestarin luopuvan
vainotoimenpiteistään, kun oikein selität meidän surkean tilamme…
Mutta sitten tuli mieleeni: jos se kuitenkin myöntyisi, niin saataisi heti
Aunelle maitoa ja kaikki tulisi hyväksi… Heti taas ymmärsin, ettei se
kuule rukouksia, ja ken joutuu sen kynsiin siellä tyhjässä tehtaassa,
niin sille käy huonosti… Ja sitten, sitten…
ANNI väristen.
Mitä äiti… mitä sitten…?
LIISA käheästi, katkonaisesti.
Niin, sitten tuli mieleeni: kyllä jumala häntä suojelee… Ja jos jotain
tapahtuu, niin se on silloin jumalan tahto, eikä sille voi mitään… Voi
minua… vaikka minä hämärästi tunsin, ettei jumala sekaannu
tuollaiseen asiaan, jolleivät ihmiset estä… niin koetin uskoa toista,
ajatella, että kaikki on jumalan kädessä… Niin kammottavan musta
minun sydämeni on… Voi minua kurjaa, mitä minä teen… mihin
menen…?
ANNI
Älkää nyt äiti… ei sitä voi enää auttaa… — (Kumartuu nyyhkyttäen

käsiensä varaan.)

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Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices,

and Politics Richard Caplan

Interviewing: Principles and Practices 15th Edition

Wildlife Management and Conservation: Contemporary

Digital Design: Principles and Practices 5th Edition

Interviewing: Principles and Practices 15th Edition,

Between Peace And War: 40th Anniversary Revised Edition

Politics of Peace Agreement Implementation Sajib Bala

Auditing: Principles and Practices 1st Edition Ashish

Process Equipment and Plant Design: Principles and

List of Figures xiii

Select Bibliography 127

1.1. Total armed conﬂict by type, 1946–2014 16

0.1. Civil war onset and recurrence 3

ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of

Table 0.1. Civil war onset and recurrence

Decade Onset in countries with Onset in countries with Number

Source: World Bank 2011

used as intended or if programme activities have been implemented

MEASURING PEACE CONSOLIDATION

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This is a book about measuring peace consolidation. It is not a

A FEW WORDS ABOUT TERMINOLOGY

A few words about the terminology employed in this book are in

Peace is too important a goal to be without a ﬁrm conceptual

MINIMAL AND MAXIMAL CONCEPTIONS

The most basic conception of peace is reﬂected in the binary distinc-

Extrastate Interstate Internationalized Internal

Figure 1.1. Total armed conﬂict by type, 1946–2014

TOWARDS A MORE DIFFERENTIATED

Peace scale indicators

Indicator Rivalry Negative peace Positive peace

Rivalry Low-level conﬂict Negative peace Positive peace Pluralistic security

1. War plans Present Present Absent Absent Joint war planning

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/3/2019, SPi

Communication and issues

Agreements, institutions, and diplomacy

5. Diplomacy No recognition; No recognition or Diplomatic recognition; Diplomatic relations Diplomatic

Note: MIDs = militarized interstate disputes; ICB = international conﬂict behaviour

Scholars (and practitioners) employ other concepts that are closely

Niin, kyllä meidän täytyy auttaa häntä… vaikka miten…

KAARLO keskeyttää kiihtyneenä.

Sanoiko hän niin?

Sanoi. Etkö sinä sitä kuullut?

KAARLO nousee huolestuneena.

En, en… Minun täytyy heti lähteä hänen jälkeensä — ei niin, en

Niin, se alkaa ihan heti… ja tässä on mennyt aika aivan suotta…

(Kaikki muuttuvat synkiksi ja äänettömiksi.)

Niin kyllä nyt synkältä näyttää.

Kyllä se pahin isku oli, kun ei enää saa edes leivänpuolikasta

Niin, kyllä nyt on nälkää kärsitty… — (Kiukkuisesti.) — Itse piru

Ei piru vaan hänen innokkain asiamiehensä — meidän

KAARLO katkerasti naurahtaen.

Niin, eihän korppi korpin silmää puhkaise! Kyllä ne saaliista

Kyllä ne sopivat ja sentähden pitäisi meidänkin yksimielisesti

KAARLO odottaa kuumeisella jännityksellä miesten vastausta;

Ei toverit! Kyllä pitäisi vielä kestää, koettaa jotenkin…

Ajatelkaas, kun en ole lainkaan muistanut, että minulla on vielä

Sinä olet muutenkin jo antanut kaikki — rahasi, vaatteesikin…