GP2 2SCP03

GlobalPlatform Card Technology
Secure Channel Protocol 03

Card Specification v 2.2 – Amendment D
Version 1.1.0.2
Public Review
May 2014
Document Reference: GPC_SPE_014
Copyright  2009-2014, GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patents or other intellectual
property rights (collectively, “IPR”) of which they may be aware which might be necessarily infringed by the implementation of
the specification or other work product set forth in this document, and to provide supporting documentation. The technology
provided or described herein is subject to updates, revisions, and extensions by GlobalPlatform. This documentation is currently
in draft form and is being reviewed and enhanced by the Committees and Working Groups of GlobalPlatform. Use of this
information is governed by the GlobalPlatform license agreement and any use inconsistent with that agreement is strictly
prohibited.
Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Public Review v1.1.0.2
THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHER WORK PRODUCT IS BEING OFFERED WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY
WHATSOEVER, AND IN PARTICULAR, ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT IS EXPRESSLY
DISCLAIMED. ANY IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHER WORK PRODUCT SHALL
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IMPLEMENTER OR THIRD PARTY FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY ARISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHER
WORK PRODUCT.
Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

The technology provided or described herein is subject to updates, revisions, and extensions by GlobalPlatform. Use of this
prohibited.
Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Public Review v1.1.0.2 3 / 35
Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 IPR Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 References ............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.3 Terminology and Definitions.................................................................................................................. 6
1.4 Abbreviations and Notations ................................................................................................................. 6
2 Revision History ..................................................................................................................... 8
3 Use Cases and Requirements ............................................................................................... 9
4 Specification Amendments .................................................................................................. 11
4.1 Algorithm ............................................................................................................................................. 11
4.1.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ......................................................................................... 11
4.1.2 Encryption/Decryption .................................................................................................................. 11
4.1.3 MACing ......................................................................................................................................... 11
4.1.4 AES Padding ................................................................................................................................ 11
4.1.5 Data Derivation Scheme .............................................................................................................. 12
5 Secure Channel Protocol Usage ......................................................................................... 13
5.1 Secure Communication Configuration ................................................................................................ 13
5.2 Mutual Authentication .......................................................................................................................... 13
5.3 Message Integrity ................................................................................................................................ 14
5.4 Message Data Confidentiality ............................................................................................................. 14
5.5 API and Security Level ........................................................................................................................ 15
5.6 Protocol Rules ..................................................................................................................................... 16
6 Cryptographic Keys ............................................................................................................. 17
6.1 AES Keys ............................................................................................................................................ 17
6.2 Cryptographic Usage .......................................................................................................................... 18
6.2.1 AES Session Keys ....................................................................................................................... 18
6.2.2 Challenges and Authentication Cryptograms............................................................................... 18
6.2.3 Message Integrity Using Explicit Secure Channel Initiation .........................................................19
6.2.4 APDU Command C-MAC Generation and Verification ................................................................ 20
6.2.5 APDU Response R-MAC Generation and Verification ................................................................ 21
6.2.6 APDU Command C-MAC and C-DECRYPTION Generation and Verification ............................23
6.2.7 APDU Response R-MAC and R-ENCRYPTION Generation and Verification .............................24
6.2.8 Key Sensitive Data Encryption Decryption .................................................................................. 25
7 Commands ............................................................................................................................ 26
7.1 Secure Channel Commands ............................................................................................................... 27
7.1.1 INITIALIZE UPDATE Command .................................................................................................. 27
7.1.2 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command .................................................................................... 28
7.1.3 BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Command........................................................................................... 29
7.1.4 END R-MAC SESSION Command .............................................................................................. 31
7.2 PUT KEY Command (AES Key-DEK) ................................................................................................. 33
7.2.1 Data Field Sent in the Command Message ................................................................................. 33
7.2.2 Key Check Value for AES Key ..................................................................................................... 33
7.3 STORE DATA (AES Key-DEK) ........................................................................................................... 34
8 AES for Card Content Management .................................................................................... 35
8.1 DAPs for AES ...................................................................................................................................... 35
8.2 Tokens for AES ................................................................................................................................... 35
8.3 Receipts for AES ................................................................................................................................. 35

prohibited.
4 / 35 Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Public Review v1.1.0.2
Figures
Figure 6-1: APDU C-MAC Generation ............................................................................................................. 20
Figure 6-2: APDU R-MAC Generation ............................................................................................................. 21
Figure 6-3: MAC Chaining ............................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 6-4: APDU Command Data Field Encryption ....................................................................................... 23
Figure 6-5: APDU Response Data Field Encryption ....................................................................................... 24
Figure 6-6: Sensitive Data Encryption ............................................................................................................. 25
Tables
Table 1-1: Normative References ...................................................................................................................... 5
Table 1-2: Abbreviations and Notations ............................................................................................................ 6
Table 2-1: Revision History ............................................................................................................................... 8
Table 4-1: Data Derivation Constants ............................................................................................................. 12
Table 5-1: Values of Parameter “i” .................................................................................................................. 13
Table 6-1: Security Domain Secure Channel Keys ......................................................................................... 17
Table 6-2: AES Key Derivation Elements ........................................................................................................ 18
Table 7-1: SCP03 Command Support ............................................................................................................. 26
Table 7-2: INITIALIZE UPDATE Response Message ..................................................................................... 27
Table 7-3: EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Reference Control Parameter P1 ..................................................28
Table 7-4: BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Command Message ............................................................................. 29
Table 7-5: BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Reference Control Parameter P1 .........................................................29
Table 7-6: BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Reference Control Parameter P2 .........................................................30
Table 7-7: END R-MAC SESSION Command Message................................................................................. 31
Table 7-8: END R-MAC SESSION Reference Control Parameter P2 ............................................................ 31
Table 7-9: Key Data Field (AES Key-DEC) – Basic ........................................................................................ 33
Table 7-10: AES Key Data Field – Basic ......................................................................................................... 33
Table 8-1: Hash Selection ............................................................................................................................... 35

prohibited.
1 Introduction
This document proposes a new secure channel protocol based on AES keys and specifies:
• A new mechanism to generate session keys.
• The schemes to be used with AES for C-MAC, R-MAC, command data field encryption and response
data field encryption.
• The format of PUT KEY for AES.
This new protocol is based on existing SCP01 and SCP02 protocols. It supports AES-based cryptography in
lieu of TDEA. The protocol protects bidirectional communication between the Host and the card
(decryption/MAC verification for incoming commands, encryption/MAC generation on card response).
In addition, the document defines the formats and requirements for DAPs, Tokens and Receipts if AES is
used for card content management activities.
1.1 IPR Disclaimer

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this GlobalPlatform specification or other
work product may be the subject of intellectual property rights (IPR) held by GlobalPlatform members or
others. For additional information regarding any such IPR that have been brought to the attention of
GlobalPlatform, please visit https://www.globalplatform.org/specificationsipdisclaimers.asp. GlobalPlatform
shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such IPR, and takes no position concerning the
possible existence or the evidence, validity, or scope of any such IPR.
1.2 References
Table 1-1: Normative References
Standard / Specification Description Ref

GlobalPlatform Card GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2.1 [GPCS]
Specification
GPCS Amendment A GlobalPlatform Card, Confidential Card Content [Amd A]
Management – Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment A
v1.0 including the latest errata and precisions
FIPS PUB 140-2 Security requirements for cryptographic modules [FIPS 140-2]
FIPS PUB 197 Federal Information Processing Standard 197, Advanced [FIPS 197]
Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001
FIPS PUB 201-1 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees [FIPS 201-1]
and Contractors, March 2006
ISO 9797-1 Information technology – Security Techniques - Message [ISO 9797-1]
Authentication Codes (MACs) -Part 1: Mechanisms using
a block cipher, 1999-12-15
ISO/IEC 8825-1 Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: [ISO 8825-1]
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)

prohibited.
Standard / Specification Description Ref

NIST SP 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using [NIST 800-108]
Pseudorandom Functions, November 2008
NIST SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: [NIST 800-38A]
Methods and Techniques, 2001
NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: [NIST 800-38B]
The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1: General [NIST 800-57]
revised (Revised) March, 2007
NIST SP 800-78-1 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal [NIST 800-78-1]
Identity Verification, August 2007
1.3 Terminology and Definitions

Terms used in this document are defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [GPCS].
1.4 Abbreviations and Notations

Selected abbreviations and notations used in this document are included in Table 1-2. Additional
abbreviations and notations are defined in [GPCS].
Table 1-2: Abbreviations and Notations
Abbreviation / Notation Meaning

2TDEA Two key Triple DEA
3TDEA Three key Triple DEA
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
C-DECRYPTION Command Decryption
C-MAC Command MAC (see note)
CMAC Cipher-based MAC (see note)
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm
DGI Data Grouping Identifier
FCI File Control Information
ICV Initial Chaining Vector
ISO International Organization for Standardization
KDF Key Derivation Function
Key-DEK Data Encryption Key
Lc Exact length of command data in a case 3 or case 4 command

prohibited.
Abbreviation / Notation Meaning

Le Maximum length of data expected in response to a case 2 or case 4
command
LV Length Value
MAC Message Authentication Code
PRF Pseudorandom Function
R-ENCRYPTION Response Encryption
R-MAC Response MAC
SCP Secure Channel Protocol
S-ENC Secure Channel command and response encryption key
S-MAC Secure Channel C-MAC session key
S-RMAC Secure Channel R-MAC session key
TDEA Triple DEA
TLV Tag Length Value
Note: C-MAC is the abbreviation used in [GPCS] for the MAC appended to command APDUs. This is not to
be confused with CMAC, which is the abbreviation for a MAC calculation scheme specified in NIST SP
800-38B [NIST 800-38B].

prohibited.
2 Revision History
Table 2-1: Revision History
Date Version Description

April 2009 1.0 Initial release
September 2009 1.1 Added Chapter 8: AES for Card Content Management.
March 2014 1.1.0.1 • Encrypting AES keys with an AES Key-DEK of same or higher strength
is now only a recommendation. This constraint has been released to
allow loading AES keys for DAP or Delegated Management through a
DES-based Secure Channel session (i.e. SCP02), and to allow for
more practical DES-to-AES migration strategies (including SCP02 to
SCP03 migration). This recommendation is moved from section 7.2 to
section 6.1 so that it applies both to the PUT KEY and the STORE
DATA command.
• Precision regarding the response status words for which no R-MAC
shall be returned (section 6.2.5).
• Precision for generation and verification of C-DECRYPTION (see
section 6.2.6) and R-ENCRYPTION (see section 6.2.7).
• Precision regarding the response to the BEGIN R-MAC Session
command when the Current Security Level already indicates R-MAC
(i.e. previously requested by the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
command) (section 7.1.3.6).
• Precision regarding the effect of the END R-MAC Session command in
case of processing error (section 7.1.4.1).
May 2014 1.1.0.2 Public Review.

prohibited.
3 Use Cases and Requirements

This document proposes a specification addendum to support the following requirements:
The Secure Channel is used to personalize cards at Issuance and during Post-Issuance. The mode of the
Secure Channel Protocol which uses pseudo-random card challenges allows the offline preparation of
personalization scripts while the card is not present and the processing of these scripts on the card without
an online connection to the entity that prepared the scripts.
When the personalization involves the loading of a cryptographic key, the transport key that secures the
transmission must be at least as strong as the key being transmitted.
To assist in the determination of suitable transport keys, the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has published a document called “Recommendation for Key Management”. This
document, freely available on the NIST website under the reference NIST 800-57 Part 1 [NIST 800-57], is a
mandatory standard for federal use in the United States of America, and is also endorsed by many other
governments around the world. It is referred to by the more widely known FIPS 201 [FIPS 201-1].
[NIST 800-57] provides the cryptographic strength of key based on its algorithm and its size.
It results that a 2TDEA key can be used as a transport key to encrypt another 2TDEA key, an RSA 1024 key,
or an ECC key with f=160-223, but cannot be used to encrypt the following keys:
• 3TDEA Length Keys
• RSA above 1024
• AES-128
• AES-192
• AES-256
• ECC (f=224 and above).
Furthermore, a 3TDEA key used as a transport key can only encrypt another 3TDEA key, an RSA 2048, or
an ECC key with f=224-255, but cannot be used to encrypt:
• RSA above 2048
• AES-128
• AES-192
• AES-256
• ECC (f=256 and above).
Since the above types of keys are starting to become available in the latest generation of Java Cards™, it
becomes important that GlobalPlatform provides a mechanism by which such key could be loaded into the
card.
NIST has also published another standard called “Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal
Identify Verification”. This document, also freely available on the NIST website under the reference NIST SP
800-78-1 [NIST 800-78-1], is a mandatory standard for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards for all
US Federal employees and contractors. It is referred to by the more widely known [FIPS 201-1]. According to
st
this standard, the time period to use RSA 1024 for digital signature expires on the 31 of December, 2008,
st
and the 2TDEA Keys cannot be used for card authentication after the 31 of December 2010.

prohibited.
According to the above standards, an AES key is more suitable for a transport key as:
• An AES-128 key can be used to encrypt 3TDEA Keys, RSA up to 3072, AES-128 and ECC with
f up to 383.
• An AES-192 key can be used in addition to encrypt RSA up to 7680, AES-192 and ECC with
f=384-511.
• An AES-256 key can be used in addition to encrypt RSA up to 15360, AES-256 and ECC with f=512+.
This should ensure the permanence of a secure channel based on AES from a crypto analysis standpoint for
several years.

prohibited.
4 Specification Amendments
4.1 Algorithm
4.1.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric cryptographic algorithm that requires the use of
the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt data. In its simplest form it uses a 16-byte key to encrypt a
16-byte block of data and the same 16-byte key to decrypt and retrieve the original clear text.
Two other versions of AES exist that involve 24-byte key and 32-byte key respectively. In these versions, the
clear text and the cipher text are still 16-byte long. The different “flavors” may be referred to as “AES-128”,
“AES-192”, and “AES-256”.
A specification of AES with its different versions may be found in “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
[FIPS 197].
This complies with FIPS PUB 140-2 ([FIPS 140-2]) Annex A (Symmetric Key Encryption – 1).
4.1.2 Encryption/Decryption
AES in CBC mode is used as specified in [NIST 800-38A]. The ICV to be used is defined in sections 6.2.6
and 6.2.7.
This complies with [FIPS 140-2] Annex A (Symmetric Key Encryption – 1).
4.1.3 MACing
CMAC as specified in [NIST 800-38B] is used for MAC calculations. Note that [NIST 800-38B] also specifies
the padding to be applied to the input.
This complies with [FIPS 140-2] Annex A (Message authentication – 3).
4.1.4 AES Padding
Unless specified otherwise, padding prior to performing an AES operation across a block of data is achieved
in the following manner:
• Append an '80' to the right of the data block;
• If the resultant data block length is a multiple of 16, no further padding is required;
• Append binary zeroes to the right of the data block until the data block length is a multiple of 16.
This padding complies with one of the padding schemes proposed in [NIST 800-38A].

prohibited.
4.1.5 Data Derivation Scheme
The following data derivation scheme is used to generate keys, pseudo-random card challenges or
cryptograms:
Data derivation shall use KDF in counter mode as specified in NIST SP 800-108 [NIST 800-108]. The PRF
used in the KDF shall be CMAC as specified in [NIST 800-38B], used with full 16 byte output length.
The “fixed input data” plus iteration counter shall be the concatenation of the following items in the given
sequence (note that [NIST 800-108] allows the reordering of input data fields as long as the order, coding
and length of each field is unambiguously defined):
• A 12 byte “label” consisting of 11 bytes with value '00' followed by a one byte derivation constant as
defined below.
• A one byte “separation indicator” with value '00'.
• A 2 byte integer “L” specifying the length in bits of the derived data (value '0040', '0080', '00C0', or
'0100').
• A 1 byte counter “i” as specified in the KDF (which may take the values '01' or '02'; value '02' is used
when “L” takes the values '00C0' and '0100', i.e. when the PRF of the KDF is to be called twice to
generate enough derived data).
• The “context” parameter of the KDF. Its content is further specified in the sections below applying the
data derivation scheme.
Definition of the derivation constant:
Table 4-1: Data Derivation Constants
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x authentication cryptogram generation
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - card cryptogram
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - host cryptogram
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 card challenge generation
0 0 0 0 0 1 x x key derivation
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 - derivation of S-ENC
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 - derivation of S-MAC
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 - derivation of S-RMAC
all other values RFU

prohibited.
5 Secure Channel Protocol Usage

5.1 Secure Communication Configuration
The following section defines the usage of Secure Channel Protocol '03'.
The 3 levels of security are supported as defined in section D.1.1 of GlobalPlatform Card Specification
[GPCS]:
• Mutual authentication
• Integrity and data origin authentication
• Confidentiality
In SCP03 the “i” parameter is formed as a bit map on one byte as follows:
Table 5-1: Values of Parameter “i”
X X X X RFU (set to 0)
0 Random card challenge
1 Pseudo-random card challenge
0 0 No R-MAC/R-ENCRYPTION support
0 1 R-MAC support / no R-ENCRYPTION support
1 1 R-MAC and R-ENCRYPTION support
X Reserved
Note: “i” is a sub identifier within an object identifier, and bit b8 is reserved for use in the structure of the
object identifier according to ISO/IEC 8825-1 [ISO 8825-1].
5.2 Mutual Authentication

Mutual authentication is achieved through the process of initiating a Secure Channel and provides assurance
to both the card and the off-card entity that they are communicating with an authenticated entity. If any step
in the mutual authentication process fails, the process shall be restarted, i.e. new challenges and Secure
Channel Session keys shall be generated
The process of initiating a Secure Channel is defined in [GPCS] section D.1.2. The mutual authentication
flow is described in Figure E-1: Explicit Secure Channel initiation Flow of [GPCS].

prohibited.
5.3 Message Integrity

The C-MAC is generated by applying the NIST CMAC calculation (using S-MAC session key generated
during the mutual authentication process) across the header and data field of an APDU command.
The card, on receipt of the message containing a C-MAC, using the same Secure Channel session key,
performs the same operation and by comparing its internally generated C-MAC with the C-MAC received
from the off-card entity is assured of the integrity of the full command.
If message data confidentiality has also been applied to the message, the C-MAC applies to the message
data field after encryption has been performed.
The integrity of the sequence of commands being transmitted to the card is achieved by using the 16 byte
C-MAC of a command as part of the input for the computation of the C-MAC of the next command. At any
point in time, the last 16 byte C-MAC computed is part of the channel state and is referred to as the “MAC
chaining value” further in this document. The first “MAC chaining value” is set to 16 bytes '00' (see
section 6.2.3). This chaining (see Figure 6-3) ensures the card that all commands in a sequence have been
received.
The integrity of the response is chained to the command sequence integrity by using the “MAC chaining
value” as input as well for the computation of the R-MAC on responses (see Figure 6-3).
5.4 Message Data Confidentiality

The message data field is encrypted as specified in section 4.1.2 (using S-ENC Channel session key
generated during the mutual authentication process) across the entire data field of the command message to
be transmitted to the card, and if required also across the response transmitted from the card, regardless of
its contents (clear text data and/or already protected sensitive data).

prohibited.
5.5 API and Security Level

A card implementing SCP03 shall implement the SecureChannel interface of the API specified in [GPCS].
The following shall apply for the Security Level:
The Current Security Level of a communication not included in a Secure Channel Session shall be set to
NO_SECURITY_LEVEL.
For Secure Channel Protocol '03', the Current Security Level established in a Secure Channel Session is a
bitmap combination of the following values: AUTHENTICATED, C_MAC, R_MAC, C_DECRYPTION and
R_ENCRYPTION.
The Current Security Level shall be set as follows:
• NO_SECURITY_LEVEL when a Secure Channel Session is terminated or not yet fully initiated;
• AUTHENTICATED after a successful processing of an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command:
AUTHENTICATED shall be cleared once the Secure Channel Session is terminated;
• C_MAC after a successful processing of an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command with P1
indicating C-MAC (P1='x1' or 'x3'): C_MAC shall be cleared once the Secure Channel Session is
terminated. Note that C_MAC is always combined with AUTHENTICATED and simultaneously set and
cleared;
• C_DECRYPTION after a successful processing of an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command with P1
indicating Command Encryption (P1= 'x3'): C_DECRYPTION shall be cleared once the Secure
Channel Session is terminated. Note that C_DECRYPTION is always combined with
AUTHENTICATED and C_MAC and simultaneously set and cleared;
• R_MAC after a successful processing of an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command with P1
indicating R-MAC (P1='1x' or '3x'): R_MAC shall be cleared once the Secure Channel Session is
terminated. Note that in this case R_MAC is always combined with AUTHENTICATED and
simultaneously set and cleared. R_MAC may also be combined with C_MAC or C_DECRYPTION
(according to the P1 value of the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command) and simultaneously set and
cleared;
• R_ENCRYPTION after a successful processing of an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command with P1
indicating Response Encryption (P1= '3x'): R_ENCRYPTION shall be cleared once the Secure
Channel Session is terminated. Note that R_ENCRYPTION is always combined with
AUTHENTICATED and R_MAC and simultaneously set and cleared;
• R_MAC and no R_ENCRYPTION after a successful processing of a BEGIN R-MAC SESSION
command: R_MAC shall be cleared after a successful processing of an END R-MAC SESSION
command. Note that in this case R_MAC is combined with AUTHENTICATED and C_MAC or
AUTHENTICATED, C_MAC and C_DECRYPTION depending on the pre-existing Current Security
Level of the Secure Channel Session. R_MAC is set and cleared independently of AUTHENTICATED,
C_MAC or C_DECRYPTION.
• R_MAC and R_ENCRYPTION after a successful processing of a BEGIN R-MAC SESSION command:
R_MAC and R_ENCRYPTION shall be cleared after a successful processing of an END R-MAC
SESSION command. Note that in this case R_MAC and R_ENCRYPTION are combined with
AUTHENTICATED, C_MAC and C_DECRYPTION. R_MAC and R_ENCRYPTION are set and
cleared independently of AUTHENTICATED, C_MAC or C_DECRYPTION.

prohibited.
5.6 Protocol Rules

In accordance with the general rules described in Chapter 10 of [GPCS], the following protocol rules apply to
Secure Channel Protocol '03':
• The successful initiation of a Secure Channel Session shall set the Current Security Level to the
security level indicated in the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command: it is at least set to
AUTHENTICATED.
• The Current Security Level shall apply to the entire Secure Channel Session unless successfully
modified at the request of the Application;
• When the Current Security Level is set to NO_SECURITY_LEVEL:
o If the Secure Channel Session was aborted during the same Application Session, the incoming
command shall be rejected with a security error;
o Otherwise no security verification of the incoming command shall be performed. The Application
processing the command is responsible to apply its own security rules.
• If a Secure Channel Session is active (i.e. Current Security Level at least set to AUTHENTICATED),
the security of the incoming command shall be checked according to the Current Security Level
regardless of the command secure messaging indicator:
o When the security of the command does not match (nor exceeds) the Current Security Level, the
command shall be rejected with a security error, the Secure Channel Session aborted and the
Current Security Level reset to NO_SECURITY_LEVEL;
o If a security error is found, the command shall be rejected with a security error, the Secure Channel
Session aborted and the Current Security Level reset to NO_SECURITY_LEVEL;
o In all other cases, the Secure Channel Session shall remain active and the Current Security Level
unmodified. The Application is responsible for further processing the command.
• If a Secure Channel Session is aborted, it is still considered not terminated;
• The current Secure Channel Session shall be terminated (if aborted or still open) and the Current
Security Level reset to NO_SECURITY_LEVEL on either:
o Attempt to initiate a new Secure Channel Session (new INITIALIZE UPDATE command);
o Termination of the Application Session (e.g. new Application selection);
o Termination of the associated logical channel;
o Termination of the Card Session (card reset or power off);
o Explicit termination by the Application (e.g. invoking GlobalPlatform API).

prohibited.
6 Cryptographic Keys
6.1 AES Keys
Table 6-1: Security Domain Secure Channel Keys
Key Usage Length Remark

Static Secure Channel Encryption Generate session key for 16, 24, 32 Mandatory
Key Decryption/Encryption (AES) bytes
(Key-ENC)
Static Secure Channel Message Generate session key for Secure 16, 24, 32 Mandatory
Authentication Code Key Channel authentication and Secure bytes
(Key-MAC) Channel MAC Verification/Generation
(AES)
Data Encryption Key Sensitive Data Decryption (AES) 16, 24, 32 Mandatory
(Key-DEK) bytes
Session Secure Channel Encryption Used for data confidentiality Key-ENC Dynamically
Key length
(S-ENC)
Secure Channel Message Used for data and protocol integrity Key-MAC Dynamically
Authentication Code Key for length
Command
(S-MAC)
Secure Channel Message User for data and protocol integrity Key-MAC Dynamically
Authentication Code Key for length and
Response Conditional
(S-RMAC)
A Security Domain supporting Secure Channel Protocol '03', including the Issuer Security Domain, shall
have at least one complete key set containing a Key-ENC, a Key-MAC, and a Key-DEK key having the same
length. When loaded to the card, these keys should be encrypted with a key of same or higher strength. The
card issuer may require that this recommendation be enforced depending on its security policy.

prohibited.
6.2 Cryptographic Usage

6.2.1 AES Session Keys
AES session keys shall be generated every time a Secure Channel is initiated and are used in the mutual
authentication process. These same session keys may be used for subsequent commands if the Current
Security Level indicates that secure messaging is required.
Session keys are generated to ensure that a different set of keys is used for each Secure Channel Session.
The session keys are derived from the static Secure Channel keys. The encryption key S-ENC is derived
from Key-ENC. The Secure Channel MAC key S-MAC is derived from Key-MAC. Optionally (if the “i”
parameter indicates R-MAC support), the Secure Channel R-MAC key S-RMAC is derived from Key-MAC.
No AES session keys are generated for key and sensitive data encryption operations. That allows pre-
processed data loading and simplifies the personalization process.
Key derivation shall use the data derivation scheme defined in section 4.1.5 with the following settings:
Table 6-2: AES Key Derivation Elements
Derived Session Key Key KI used in PRF Derivation Constant (see Table 4-1)
S-ENC Key-ENC '04'
S-MAC Key-MAC '06'
S-RMAC Key-MAC '07'
The length of the session keys shall be reflected in the parameter “L” (i.e. '0080' for AES-128 keys, '00C0' for
AES-192 keys and '0100' for AES-256 keys).
The “context” parameter shall be set to the concatenation of the host challenge (8 bytes) and the card
challenge (8 bytes).
6.2.2 Challenges and Authentication Cryptograms
Both the card and the off-card entity (host) each generate a challenge and an authentication cryptogram.
The off-card entity verifies the card cryptogram and the card verifies the host cryptogram. The cryptogram
lengths shall be the same as the length of the challenges.

prohibited.
6.2.2.1 Card Challenge
As indicated in the “i” parameter (see Table 5-1), the card challenge shall either be random or pseudo-
random.
If the SCP03 for a Security Domain is configured for pseudo-random challenge generation, the card
challenge shall be calculated as follows:
• For each SCP03 keyset, the Security Domain shall have one sequence counter of three bytes length.
Whenever a keyset is created or the whole keyset is replaced by a single PUT KEY or STORE DATA
command, the sequence counter shall be set to zero.
• Whenever a challenge generation is triggered by an INITIALIZE UPDATE command, the sequence
counter shall be incremented and the new value shall be used in the calculation described below.
When the maximum value is reached, the INITIALIZE UPDATE command shall be rejected with
“conditions of use not satisfied”.
• The card challenge (8 bytes) is calculated using the data derivation scheme defined in section 4.1.5
with the static key Key-ENC and the derivation constant set to “card challenge generation” (i.e. '02').
The length of the challenge shall be reflected in the parameter “L” (i.e. '0040'). The “context”
parameter shall be set to the concatenation of the sequence counter (3 bytes) and the AID of the
application invoking the SecureChannel interface (5 to 16 bytes).
6.2.2.2 Card Authentication Cryptogram
The card cryptogram (8 bytes) is calculated using the data derivation scheme defined in section 4.1.5 with
the session key S-MAC and the derivation constant set to “card authentication cryptogram generation”. The
length of the cryptogram shall be reflected in the parameter “L” (i.e. '0040').
6.2.2.3 Host Authentication Cryptogram
The host cryptogram (8 bytes) is calculated using the data derivation scheme defined in section 4.1.5 with
the session key S-MAC and the derivation constant set to “host authentication cryptogram generation”. The
length of the cryptogram shall be reflected in the parameter “L” (i.e. '0040').
6.2.3 Message Integrity Using Explicit Secure Channel Initiation
SCP03 mandates the use of a MAC on the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
For the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command MAC verification, the “MAC chaining value” is set to 16
bytes '00'.
Once the cryptograms are successfully verified, the full 16 byte C-MAC of the previous command becomes
the “MAC chaining value” for the subsequent C-MAC verification / R-MAC generation.

prohibited.
6.2.4 APDU Command C-MAC Generation and Verification
A C-MAC is generated by an off-card entity: it uses the S-MAC key and is applied across the MAC chaining
value concatenated with the full APDU command being transmitted to the card including the header (5 bytes)
and the data field in the command message. (It does not include Le.)
Modification of the APDU command header and padding is required prior to the MAC operation being
performed.
The Secure channel shall support a MAC of 8 bytes length (even if the AES block length is 16 bytes). Hence
the 8 most significant bytes are considered.
The rules for APDU command header modification are as follows:
• The length of the command message (Lc) shall be incremented by 8 to indicate the inclusion of the
C-MAC in the data field of the command message.
• The class byte shall be modified for the generation or verification of the C-MAC: The logical channel
number shall be set to zero, bit 4 shall be set to 0 and bit 3 shall be set to 1 to indicate GlobalPlatform
proprietary secure messaging. If the Secure Channel Session is occurring on a Supplementary Logical
Channel, the class byte shall be modified after the C-MAC generation to indicate the logical channel
number. If logical channel number 4 to 19 is used, the GlobalPlatform proprietary secure messaging is
indicated by setting bit 6 to 1 – see [GPCS] Table 11-11 and Table 11-12. Conversely the logical
channel number card is discarded and, if required, the secure messaging indication is adjusted for the
verification. The logical channel number is not part of the integrity protection by the channel because
is it established independently and outside of the scope of the Secure Channel establishment.
Figure 6-1: APDU C-MAC Generation
MAC chaining value (16 bytes) '84' Ins P1 P2 Lc+ 8 Command Data field (length Lc)
CMAC calculation
S-MAC
(NIST SP 800-38B)
8 most 8 least
significant bytes significant bytes
C-MAC
New MAC chaining value
'84' Ins P1 P2 Lc+8 Command Data field C-MAC

prohibited.
6.2.5 APDU Response R-MAC Generation and Verification
No R-MAC shall be generated and no protection shall be applied to a response that includes an error status
word: in this case only the status word shall be returned in the response. All status words shall be interpreted
as error status words except '9000' and warning status words (i.e. '62xx' and '63xx').
The EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command/response doesn’t return R-MAC.
The R-MAC is made of the first 8 bytes of the CMAC computed on the message made of the MAC chaining
value, the response data field (if present) and the status bytes. The R-MAC calculation uses the S-RMAC
key.
The R-MAC calculation is illustrated in Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-2: APDU R-MAC Generation

Status
MAC chaining value (16 bytes) Response Data Field
Words
CMAC calculation
S-RMAC
(NIST SP 800-38B)
8 most 8 least
significant bytes significant bytes
R-MAC
Response Data Field R-MAC Status Words
The off-card entity shall perform the same CMAC calculation on the response and use the same R-MAC
session key employed by the card in order to verify the R-MAC.
The computed R-MAC becomes part of the response message.
Figure 6-3 illustrates the combined MAC chaining for command and responses.

prohibited.
Figure 6-3: MAC Chaining

16 bytes ‘00’ Command Data 1 MAC Chaining Value 1 Command Data 2 MAC Chaining Value 2 Command Data 3
S-MAC CMAC S-MAC CMAC S-MAC CMAC
MAC Chaining Value 1
8 bytes
8 bytes
8 bytes
...
Commands
Command Data 1 C-MAC 1 Command Data 2 C-MAC 2 Command Data 3 C-MAC 3
RDF SW RDF SW RDF SW

MAC Chaining Value 1 MAC Chaining Value 2 MAC Chaining Value 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
S-RMAC CMAC S-RMAC CMAC S-RMAC CMAC
[ 16 bytes ] [ 16 bytes ] [ 16 bytes ]

...
8 bytes 8 bytes 8 bytes
Responses
SW SW SW
RDF 1 R-MAC 1 RDF 2 R-MAC 2 RDF 3 R-MAC 3
1 2 3
Via the MAC changing value, consecutive commands are chained to each other, protecting their sequence.
Responses are linked to the respective command via the MAC changing value. As R-MAC uses a different
session key than C-MAC, the same MAC chaining value can be used for the response and the next
command. The scheme is adapted to the features of SCP03, where
• R-MAC is optional, and
• R-MAC may be switched on and off during a secure channel session (see BEGIN/END R-MAC
SESSION commands).

prohibited.
6.2.6 APDU Command C-MAC and C-DECRYPTION Generation and Verification
This section applies when both command confidentiality (C-DECRYPTION) and integrity (C-MAC) are
required.
Depending on the security level defined in the initiation of the Secure Channel, all subsequent APDU
commands within the Secure Channel may require secure messaging and such as use of a C-MAC
(integrity) and encryption (confidentiality).
For each APDU command sent within the secure channel session, the Off-Card Entity shall increment an
encryption counter:
• The encryption counter’s start value shall be set to 1 for the first command following a successful
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
• The encryption counter’s binary value shall be left padded with zeroes to form a full block.
• This block shall be encrypted with S-ENC to produce an ICV for command encryption. This scheme
fulfils the requirement described in [NIST 800-38A] for unpredictable ICVs when using CBC mode.
No encryption shall be applied to a command where there is no command data field. In this case, the
encryption counter shall still be incremented as described above, but the message shall be protected as
defined in section 6.2.4. Otherwise the Off-Card Entity performs the process detailed hereafter.
The Off-Card Entity first encrypts the Command Data field and then computes the C-MAC on the command
with the ciphered data field as described in section 6.2.4.
The command message encryption and decryption uses the Secure Channel encryption (S-ENC) session
key and the AES encryption in CBC Mode. Prior to encrypting the data, the data shall be padded as defined
in section 4.1.4. This padding becomes part of the data field.
The final Lc value (Lcc) is the sum of:
initial Lc + length of the padding + length of C-MAC
Figure 6-4: APDU Command Data Field Encryption
'84' Ins P1 P 2 Lc Command Data field – plain text
Command Data field – plain text '80' (00..00)
ICV AES-CBC S-ENC
Lcc = Lc + length of padding + L MAC
MAC chaining value Ins P1 P 2

'84' Lcc Ciphered Command Data field (length Lcc - 8)
(16 bytes)
C-MAC calculation as
defined in section 6.2.4 S-MAC
'84' INS P1 P2 Lcc Ciphered Command Data field C-MAC

prohibited.
6.2.7 APDU Response R-MAC and R-ENCRYPTION Generation and Verification
This section applies when both response confidentiality (R-ENCRYPTION) and integrity (R-MAC) are
required.
Depending on the security level defined in the initiation of the Secure Channel, all subsequent APDU
responses within the Secure Channel may require secure messaging and such as use of an R-MAC
(integrity) and encryption (confidentiality).
No encryption shall be applied to a response where there is no response data field: in this case the message
shall be protected as defined in section 6.2.5. Otherwise the Card performs the process detailed hereafter.
The Card first encrypts the Response Data field and then computes the R-MAC on the response with the
ciphered data field as described in section 6.2.5.
The response message encryption and decryption uses the Secure Channel encryption (S-ENC) session key
and the AES encryption in CBC Mode. Prior to encrypting the data, the data shall be padded as defined in
section 4.1.4. This padding becomes part of the data field.
The ICV shall be calculated as follows:
• The padded counter block used for the generation of the ICV for command encryption shall also be
used to generate the ICV for response encryption, however, with the following additional intermediate
step: Before encryption, the most significant byte of this block shall be set to '80'.
• This block shall be encrypted with S-ENC to produce an ICV for response encryption. This scheme
fulfils the requirements described in [NIST 800-38A] for unpredictable ICVs when using CBC mode.
The modification in the most significant byte guarantees that the ICVs for R-ENCRYPTION are
different from those used for C-DECRYPTION.
The final response APDU shall be the concatenation of the ciphered data, the R-MAC and the Status Word.
Figure 6-5: APDU Response Data Field Encryption
Response Data Field - Plain Text '80' (00..00)
ICV AES-CBC S-ENC
MAC chaining value Status

Ciphered Response Data Field
(16 bytes) Word
R-MAC calculation as
S-RMAC
defined in section 6.2.5
Status
Ciphered Response Data Field R-MAC
Word

prohibited.
6.2.8 Key Sensitive Data Encryption Decryption
Key data encryption is used when transmitting key sensitive data to the card and is over and beyond the
security level required for the Secure Channel. For instance all AES keys transmitted to a card should be
encrypted.
The Data encryption process uses the static data encryption key (Key-DEK) and the encryption method as
described in section 4.1.2.
If the sensitive data to be encrypted are AES keys (16 or 32 byte long), for instance for a Put Key command,
then no padding is required for the data field prior to encryption as data block are multiple of 16 byte long.
For the 24-byte AES keys, padding of 8 arbitrary bytes shall be appended prior to encryption. For the
encryption of other keys see section 7.2. For other sensitive data, padding is application specific and is out of
the scope of this document.
The AES CBC encryption with ICV set to zero is performed across the key sensitive data and the result of
each encryption becomes part of the encrypted key data. This encrypted key data becomes part of the “clear
text” data field in the command message.
The on-card decryption of key data is the exact opposite of the above operation.
Figure 6-6: Sensitive Data Encryption
Data Field - Plain Text (n blocks of 16 bytes )
ICV AES-CBC Key-DEK
Ciphered Data (n blocks of 16 bytes)

prohibited.
7 Commands
The following table presents the commands involved in Secure Channel Initiation and R-MAC Session
Management.
Table 7-1: SCP03 Command Support
Command Secure Channel Initiation

INITIALIZE UPDATE 
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 
BEGIN R-MAC SESSION
END R-MAC SESSION
Ticks () denote that support of the command is mandatory.

Blank cells denote that the support of the command is optional.

prohibited.
7.1 Secure Channel Commands

7.1.1 INITIALIZE UPDATE Command
See [GPCS] section D.4.1 for the structure of the INITIALIZE UPDATE command.
If any of the mandatory keys listed in section 6.1 is missing in the targeted key set version, the INITIALIZE
UPDATE command shall fail with error condition “Referenced data not found” as defined in [GPCS].
7.1.1.1 Data Field Returned in the Response Message
The data field of the response message shall contain the concatenation without delimiters of the following
data elements:
Table 7-2: INITIALIZE UPDATE Response Message
Name Length Presence

Key diversification data 10 bytes Mandatory
Key information 3 bytes Mandatory
Card challenge 8 bytes Mandatory
Card cryptogram 8 bytes Mandatory
Sequence Counter 3 bytes Conditional
The key diversification data is data typically used by a backend system to derive the card static keys.
The key information includes the Key Version Number, the Secure Channel Protocol identifier, here '03', and
the Secure Channel Protocol “i” parameter used in initiating the Secure Channel Session.
The card challenge is an internally generated random or pseudo random number.
The card cryptogram is an authentication cryptogram.
Sequence Counter is only present when SCP03 is configured for pseudo-random challenge generation.

prohibited.
7.1.2 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command
Except for the Reference control parameter P1 the GlobalPlatform External Authenticate is compliant with
[GPCS] section D.4.2 for the structure of the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
7.1.2.1 Reference Control Parameter P1 – Security Level
The reference control parameter P1 defines the level of security for all secure messaging commands
following this EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command and within the Secure Channel Session.
Table 7-3: EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Reference Control Parameter P1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 C-DECRYPTION, R-ENCRYPTION, C-MAC, and R-MAC
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 C-DECRYPTION, C-MAC ,and R-MAC

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 C-MAC and R-MAC
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 C-DECRYPTION and C-MAC
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C-MAC
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No secure messaging expected

prohibited.
7.1.3 BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Command
7.1.3.1 Definition and Scope
The BEGIN R-MAC SESSION command is used to initiate additional response security. The BEGIN R-MAC
SESSION command may only be issued to the card within a secure channel. It may only be used to increase
the security of the responses and only if command messages use at least the same security level.
7.1.3.2 Command Message
The BEGIN R-MAC SESSION command message is coded according to the following table:
Table 7-4: BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Command Message
Code Value Meaning

CLA '80' - '87', Please refer to [GPCS] section 11.1.4
'C0' - 'CF', or
'E0' - 'EF'
INS '7A' BEGIN R-MAC SESSION
P1 'xx' Reference control parameter P1
P2 '01' Reference control parameter P2
Lc 'XX' Length of data field, if any
Data 'xx xx…' BEGIN R-MAC SESSION data and C-MAC, if needed
Le Not present
7.1.3.3 Reference Control Parameter P1
The reference control parameter P1 defines the level of security for all subsequent APDU response
messages following this BEGIN R-MAC SESSION command (it does not apply to this command).
Table 7-5: BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Reference Control Parameter P1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 R-ENCRYPTION and R-MAC
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 R-MAC
When P1 is set to '10' each APDU response message during the R-MAC session includes an R-MAC. This
setting may only be used if the secure channel session does not use R-MAC.
When P1 is set to '30' each APDU response message during the R-MAC session uses R-MAC and
R-ENCRYPTION. This setting may only be used if the secure channel session does not use
R-ENCRYPTION.

prohibited.
The reference control parameter P2 defines the beginning of the session for APDU response message
integrity.
Table 7-6: BEGIN R-MAC SESSION Reference Control Parameter P2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Begin R-MAC session
7.1.3.5 Data Field Sent in the Command Message
The data field of the BEGIN R-MAC SESSION contains an LV coded ‘data’ element and optionally a C-MAC.
The card does not interpret the ‘data’. However since it is included in R-MAC calculation, this gives the off-
card entity the possibility to include a challenge in the R-MAC.
If R-MAC was specified in the previous EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, then the response to the
BEGIN R-MAC Session shall contain an R-MAC. Otherwise, the data field of the response message is not
present.
7.1.3.7 Processing State Returned in the Response Message
A successful execution of the command shall be indicated by status bytes '90' '00'.
The card will respond with a '6985' status word without aborting the secure channel in the following cases:
• If R-ENCRYPTION was specified in the previous EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command;
• If P1 is set to '10' and R-MAC was specified in the previous EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command;
• If C-MAC was not specified in the previous EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command;
• If P1 is set to '30' and C-DECRYPTION was not specified in the previous EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE command.
This command may return a general error condition as listed in [GPCS] section 11.1.3, General Error
Conditions.

prohibited.
7.1.4 END R-MAC SESSION Command
7.1.4.1 Definition and Scope
The END R-MAC SESSION command is used to terminate the additional response security that was initiated
by the preceding BEGIN R-MAC SESSION. The Secure Channel session returns to its original security
settings. The END R-MAC SESSION command may be issued to the card at any time during an R-MAC
session. If this command contains a wrong C-MAC, the entire Secure Channel session shall be aborted. In
all other cases, if this command returns an error status word, the R-MAC session shall not be ended. The
R-MAC session shall be ended if the secure channel is closed or the card is reset.
7.1.4.2 Command Message
The END R-MAC SESSION command message is coded according to the following table:
Table 7-7: END R-MAC SESSION Command Message
Code Value Meaning

CLA '80' - '87', 'C0' - 'CF', or 'E0' - 'EF' Please refer to [GPCS] section 11.1.4
INS '78' END R-MAC SESSION
Lc 'xx' Length of data field, if any
Data 'xx xx…' C-MAC, if needed
Le '00'
Reference control parameter P1 shall always be set to '00'.
The reference control parameter P2 is coded according to the following table:
Table 7-8: END R-MAC SESSION Reference Control Parameter P2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 End R-MAC session & return R-MAC
7.1.4.5 Data Field Sent in the Command Message
The data field of the command message may optionally contain a C-MAC.
The data field of the response message contains the R-MAC of the current R-MAC session.

prohibited.
7.1.4.7 Processing State Returned in the Response Message
A successful execution of the command shall be indicated by status bytes '90' '00'.
This command may return a general error condition as listed in [GPCS] section 11.1.3. General Error
Conditions.

prohibited.
7.2 PUT KEY Command (AES Key-DEK)

This section applies if the Key-DEK used to decrypt the new key is an AES key.
The P1 and P2 parameters are formatted according to [GPCS].
7.2.1 Data Field Sent in the Command Message
The general key data field for keys or key components encrypted by an AES Key-DEK takes is specified in
Table 7-9, which provides a precision to [GPCS] Table 11-68.
If the length of the key or key component is not an integer multiple of the block length of 16 bytes, padding of
arbitrary bytes shall be appended prior to encryption to fill the last block. Ciphering shall be done as specified
in section 6.2.8.
Table 7-9: Key Data Field (AES Key-DEC) – Basic
Name Value Length

Key type see [GPCS] Table 11-68 1 byte
Length of key or key component data coding see [GPCS] Table 11-68 1-3 bytes
Key or key component Length of the key or key '01' – '80', or '81 80' – '81 FF', or 1-3 bytes
data component '82 01 00' – '82 FF FF'
Ciphered key or key 'xxxx…' N *16 bytes
component
Length of key check value see [GPCS] Table 11-68 1 byte
Key check value 'xxxx…' K bytes
If an AES key is encrypted by an AES Key-DEK, the key data field takes the format according to Table 7-10.
Table 7-10: AES Key Data Field – Basic
Name Value Length

Key type '88' 1 byte
Length of the AES key data '11' or '21' 1 byte
AES KEY DATA Length of the AES key '10' or '18' or '20' 1 byte
Ciphered AES key Ciphered AES key 16, 32 bytes
Key check value length '03' 1 byte
Key check value Computed according to section 7.2.2 3 bytes
The same precisions to the key or key component data shall apply for the extended key data field.
7.2.2 Key Check Value for AES Key
The key check value is calculated and checked by AES encrypting one block of 16 bytes with value '01' and
taking the three highest order bytes.

prohibited.
7.3 STORE DATA (AES Key-DEK)

This command shall be coded according to GPCS Amendment A [Amd A] section 4.10 with the following
precisions:
• The (static) Key-DEK shall be used for sensitive data encryption/decryption.
• If the length of the sensitive data is not an integer multiple of the block length of 16 bytes, padding of
arbitrary bytes shall be appended prior to encryption to fill the last block.
• The key check value for AES keys shall be calculated as specified in 7.2.2.

prohibited.
8 AES for Card Content Management

This section defines the provisions if AES is used for card content management activities.
8.1 DAPs for AES

If at least one of the DAPs present for a Load File uses AES, the strongest key among these keys shall
determine the requirements for the hash algorithm to be used for generating the Load File Data Block Hash.
As recommended by [NIST 800-57], the hash algorithm shall be selected according to the following table:
Table 8-1: Hash Selection
Strongest Key Hash Algorithm

AES-128 SHA-256 or SHA-384 or SHA-512
AES-192 SHA-384 or SHA-512
AES-256 SHA-512
If a Load File Data Block Signature (DAP) is generated with an AES key, CMAC as defined in section 4.1.3
shall be used in the Signature Calculation operation specified in [GPCS] section C.3. The length of the
signature shall be 16 bytes.
8.2 Tokens for AES

If a Token is generated with a symmetric key according to [Amd A] and Token generation uses an AES key,
CMAC as defined in section 4.1.3 shall be used in the Token Calculation operation specified in [GPCS]
section C.4. The length of the token shall be 16 bytes.
8.3 Receipts for AES

If a Receipt is generated with an AES key, CMAC as defined in section 4.1.3 shall be used in the Receipt
Calculation operation specified in [GPCS] section C.5. The length of the receipt shall be 16 bytes.

prohibited.

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GlobalPlatform Card Technology

Secure Channel Protocol 03

Copyright  2009-2014, GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

1.1 IPR Disclaimer

Standard / Specification Description Ref

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Standard / Specification Description Ref

1.3 Terminology and Definitions

1.4 Abbreviations and Notations

Table 1-2: Abbreviations and Notations

Abbreviation / Notation Meaning

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Abbreviation / Notation Meaning

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Date Version Description

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

3 Use Cases and Requirements

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

4.1.4 AES Padding

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

4.1.5 Data Derivation Scheme

Table 4-1: Data Derivation Constants

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

5 Secure Channel Protocol Usage

Table 5-1: Values of Parameter “i”

5.2 Mutual Authentication

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

5.3 Message Integrity

5.4 Message Data Confidentiality

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

5.5 API and Security Level

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

5.6 Protocol Rules

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Key Usage Length Remark

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

6.2 Cryptographic Usage

Table 6-2: AES Key Derivation Elements

6.2.2 Challenges and Authentication Cryptograms

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

6.2.2.1 Card Challenge

6.2.2.2 Card Authentication Cryptogram

6.2.2.3 Host Authentication Cryptogram

6.2.3 Message Integrity Using Explicit Secure Channel Initiation

SCP03 mandates the use of a MAC on the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

6.2.4 APDU Command C-MAC Generation and Verification

Figure 6-1: APDU C-MAC Generation

New MAC chaining value

'84' Ins P1 P2 Lc+8 Command Data field C-MAC

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

6.2.5 APDU Response R-MAC Generation and Verification

Figure 6-2: APDU R-MAC Generation

Response Data Field R-MAC Status Words

Copyright  2009-2014 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved.