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CONTEMPORARY GULF STUDIES
SERIES EDITORS: STEVEN WRIGHT · ABDULLAH BAABOOD

Post-Brexit Europe
and UK
Policy Challenges Towards Iran
and the GCC States

Edited by Geoffrey Edwards ·


Abdullah Baabood · Diana Galeeva
Contemporary Gulf Studies

Series Editors
Steven Wright, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad bin
Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar
Abdullah Baabood, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda
University, Tokyo, Japan
Salient Features:

• The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the competing
interests of global powers and therefore publications in the series reflect
this complex environment.
• The series will see publication on the dynamic nature of how the Gulf
region has been undergoing enormous changes attracting regional and
international interests.
• The series is managed through Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University,
which has emerged as the leading institution within the Gulf region offering
graduate degrees in Gulf Studies at both masters and doctoral level.

Aims and Scope:

This series offer a platform from which scholarly work on the most pressing
issues within the Gulf region will be examined. The scope of the book series
will encompass work being done on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain,
Kuwait in addition to Iraq, Iran and Yemen. The series will focus on three types
of volumes: Single and jointly authored monograph; Thematic edited books;
Course text books. The scope of the series will include publications relating to
the countries of focus, in terms of the following themes which will allow for
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquiry on the Gulf region to flourish:

Politics and political development


Regional and international relations
Regional cooperation and integration
Defense and security
Economics and development
Food and water security
Energy and environment
Civil society and the private sector
Identity, migration, youth, gender and employment
Health and education
Media, literature, arts & culture

More information about this series at


http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15318
Geoffrey Edwards · Abdullah Baabood ·
Diana Galeeva
Editors

Post-Brexit Europe
and UK
Policy Challenges Towards Iran and the GCC States
Editors
Geoffrey Edwards Abdullah Baabood
Pembroke College School of International Liberal
Cambridge, UK Studies
Waseda University
Diana Galeeva Tokyo, Japan
St. Antony’s College
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK

ISSN 2662-320X ISSN 2662-3218 (electronic)


Contemporary Gulf Studies
ISBN 978-981-16-2873-3 ISBN 978-981-16-2874-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Cover image: Fernando Tatay, shutterstock.com


Cover design by eStudio Calamar

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Preface

Britain’s unprecedented withdrawal from the EU presents a unique chal-


lenge both to the UK and the EU in defining their policies towards
the countries of the Gulf, whether together, in friendly rivalry, or in less
constructive competition. The regional dynamics in the Middle East, espe-
cially the challenges to the regional security posted by Iranian behaviour,
and the world challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic that resulted
in human and economic losses, and the crush of oil crises in March 2020,
has increased the levels of uncertainty in which European policies will be
played out. Both individually and collectively European states and the UK
have been seeking to play a more critical role in the Gulf. Given Britain’s
historical role played in the Gulf, it is not surprising that it has been
seeking to reestablish itself as an influential actor, alongside and some-
times in competition with France. This relationship has developed while
both countries are aware of the more unpredictable role of the United
States and the growing interest of China and Russia in the region. It is
possible, however, that, due to the challenges the UK is likely to face in
the years following Brexit, it will lose its place in the region. Post-Brexit
Europe and UK: Policy Challenges towards Iran and the GCC States iden-
tifies and explores the most urgent questions associated with this ambi-
guity both in relation to Britain and other European states as well as to
the Gulf states themselves.
Providing a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis, this book will find
wide readership, especially among scholars and policy experts. Given the

v
vi PREFACE

uncertainty of the Brexit results for British and European politics, the
book’s focus on how Brexit affects to relations with Iran and the GCC
states will attract policymakers who follow these developments. Finally,
the book will be a valuable resource for course adoption in undergraduate
and post-graduate models which focus on British and European policies
towards the Middle East.

Oxford, UK Diana Galeeva


March 2021
Acknowledgements

The publication is the result of a workshop held at the Tenth Gulf


Research Meeting (GRM), 15–18 August, 2019, which was organised
by the Gulf Research Centre at the University of Cambridge. Our sincere
gratitude is reserved to the Gulf Research Centre for the opportunity to
conduct the workshop. In particular, we sincerely would like to thank
all the people who believed in this project, and give thanks for their
efforts and generous support for making the workshop possible (in alpha-
betical order): Aileen Byrne, Sanya Kapasi, Abdulaziz Sager and Oskar
Zeimelis. Finally, it would have not been possible to conduct the work-
shop and complete this publication without the valuable expertise, far-
reaching perspectives on the studied topics, hard work and dedication of
all contributors.

vii
Contents

Part I GCC and Post-Brexit Europe and UK


1 Introduction 3
Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva
2 Converging Diversification Concerns: Why
Are the Europeans and Gulf States Looking
for a Deepening of Relations? 13
Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney and Vişne Korkmaz
3 Rising Challenges to the US-Led Regional Security
Architecture in the European Union and Gulf 41
Shady Mansour and Yara Ahmed
4 EU–Gulf Relations in Post-Brexit Environment 69
Samuel Ramani

Part II Iran and Post-Brexit Europe and UK


5 UK–Iran Relations and Brexit 101
Nicole Grajewski
6 JCPoA’s Destiny: Europe Between the US and Iran:
For How Long? 131
Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina

ix
x CONTENTS

7 Assessing the Potential Impact of Brexit


on the E3/EU’s Iran Policy 153
Jacopo Scita
8 Afterword 181
Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva

Index 189
Notes on Contributors

Yara Yehia Ahmed is the Managing Editor and Political Researcher at


Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS), an Abu Dhabi-based
think tank. Yara has more than 5 years of experience in policy-oriented
research. Her Research interest is the international relations of the Gulf,
with special focus on GCC–EU relations. Yara holds a M.Sc. in Public
Policy from University College London.
Dr. Abdullah Baabood is Visiting Professor at Waseda University. He
holds a Master in Business Administration (M.B.A.), a Master in Inter-
national Relations (M.A.) and a Doctorate in International political
Economy (Ph.D.) at Cambridge University. He particularly focuses on
the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and their economic,
social and political development as well as external relations.
Dr. Geoffrey Edwards is Deputy Director Europe @POLIS; Reader
Emeritus in European Studies, University of Cambridge; Jean Monnet
chair in Political Science, Department of Politics and International
Studies, University of Cambridge; Emeritus Fellow, Pembroke College,
Cambridge.
Dr. Diana Galeeva is currently an Academic Visitor to St Antony’s
College (Oxford University), having previously also been a Scholar-in-
Residence at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. She completed her
Ph.D. at Durham University (UK), an M.A. at Exeter University (UK)
and B.A. at Kazan Federal University (Russia). Her research interests

xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

include International Relations theory, Gulf Cooperation Council states’


foreign policies, and Russia and the Middle East.
Nicole Grajewski is a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford in
the Department of Politics and International Relations, where her disser-
tation examines Russian and Iranian perspectives on international order.
She is also a predoctoral research fellow at the Belfer Center’s Interna-
tional Security Program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government
and an Associate Research Fellowship at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek.
Nicole received a M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies from the
University of Oxford and a B.A. in International Affairs, Security Policy
and Middle East Studies from George Washington University.
Prof. Dr. Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney is Professor of International Rela-
tions (IR) in İstanbul based Nişantaşı University and a member of
Turkey’s Presidential Security and Foreign Policies Council. She is Presi-
dent of CEMES, the Center of Mediterranean Security. She is a member
of IISS. Prof. Guney has been part of many second track diplomacy initia-
tives. Her research interests cover energy politics, security issues, current
world affairs, non-proliferation and disarmament, American, Russian and
Turkish foreign policy. She is commenting on national and international
broadcasting, writing analysis in daily newspapers and monthly political
journals on a regular basis. She has published numerous scholarly books
and articles, one of the latest is her edited book entitled New Geopolitical
Realities for Russia, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Lexington
Publishers (London, September 2019).
Prof. Dr. Vişne Korkmaz is Professor of International Relations (IR)
in İstanbul based Nişantaşı University. She is vice-director of CEMES,
Center of Mediterranean Security. Prof. Dr. Korkmaz has given lectures at
the National Defense University of the Turkish Republic on current affairs
and regional security issues in the Middle East, Russia and Caucasus. Her
research interests cover IR theories, FP theories, regional security and
security issues, Russian, American and Turkish foreign policy. She is the
author of several books and has published a number of scholarly papers,
chapters and articles on these issues, including newly launched chapters
“New Russian Mahanism Failed: Futile Geopolitical Dreams in the Black
Sea and Mediterranean” (with Nursin Guney) and “Russia and Turkey:
Interdependence in the Time of Hybrid Mahanism” (with Nursin and
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

Eda Guney), in New Geopolitical Realities for Russia, from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean, Lexington Publishers (London, September 2019).
Dr. Shady Abdel Wahab Mansour serves as Executive Editor-in-Chief
of Trending Events Periodical and Head of Security Studies Unit in
“Future for Advanced Research and Studies” (FARAS), Abu Dhabi. Previ-
ously, Dr. Shady worked at the “Information Decision and Support
Center” (IDSC), the Egyptian Cabinet’s think tank. Research inter-
ests include MENA political and security affairs with a special focus on
regional security and conflict management. Dr. Shady holds a Master and
Ph.D. degree in Comparative Politics from the Faculty of Economics and
Political Science, Cairo University.
Dr. Samuel Ramani completed his D.Phil. at the University of Oxford’s
Department of Politics and International Relations. Based out of St.
Antony’s College, his research focused on contemporary Russian foreign
policy, Russia-Middle East relations and the international relations of
the Persian Gulf. Samuel is a regular contributor to leading interna-
tional publications and think tanks, such as the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Foreign Policy, the Washington Post, the Middle
East Institute, The Diplomat and Al Monitor. He is a regular commen-
tator on Middle East affairs for Al Jazeera English and Arabic, the
BBC World Service, CNN International and France 24, and has briefed
the U.S. Department of State, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
NATO Intelligence Fusion Center and France’s Ministry of Defense on
international security issues.
Jacopo Scita is H.H. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah doctoral
fellow at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham
University. Jacopo’s doctoral project explores the role(s) borne by China
within Sino-Iranian relations from the 1979 Revolution to the 2015
JCPOA. His research interests include the international politics of the
Middle East, with a specific focus on Chinese interests in the region,
Iranian foreign policy and the analysis of nuclear policy in the MENA
region.
Dr. Alexander Shumilin holds Ph.D. in Political Science, Head of the
“Euro-Atlantic—Middle East” Center, Chief Researcher of the Depart-
ment of European Security at the Institute of Europe of the Russian
Academy of Sciences. Head of the Civilizational Conflicts Center at
the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of USA and Canada studies
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

(2002–2018), Consultant of the UN Department of Political and


Peacebuilding Affairs (2013–2014), external consultant to the Japanese
Government on the Middle East issues (2016), participated in interna-
tional conferences in the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, UAE,
Qatar, EU countries. Author of several monographs on the relationship
within the triangle Middle East-Russia–US/EU.
Dr. Inna Shumilina holds Ph.D. in Political Science. She is the senior
research fellow at the Institute for the USA & Canada studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. She is author of a number of scientific
papers and articles on the issues related to Political Islam in the Middle
East and its repercussions in the Western societies. She has participated
in international conferences in the United States, UAE, Qatar and EU
countries.
PART I

GCC and Post-Brexit Europe and UK


CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva

1.1 Introduction
The UK withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020.
Though the UK’s future relationship with the EU, both economically
and in terms of foreign and security policies remains uncertain. One
key unknown outcome of the UK’s withdrawal is its future relation-
ship with EU-level security resources and institutions, including the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security
and Defend Policy (CSDP). This comes at a time of possible significant
developments; especially for the latter with moves towards Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and closer collaboration on defence

G. Edwards
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
A. Baabood
School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: [email protected]
D. Galeeva (B)
St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3


Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary
Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_1
4 G. EDWARDS ET AL.

equipment through the European Defence Agency. If there is progress,


it means that the UK will not benefit from the advantages available to
the EU27, at the same time as it loses the voice ‘magnification’ that EU
membership has brought it. Moreover, a second unknown is the indi-
rect consequences for the UK’s ability to pursue any grandiose policies
independent of its erstwhile EU partners if the British economy suffers
adversely from leaving the European market.
Moves within the CSDP point also to a third unknown; the extent
to which the EU itself sees and acts on the potential of better relations
with the Gulf states. On the one hand, the economic relationship between
the EU and the GCC might have reached stalemate despite some efforts
by, for example, Chancellor Merkel to restart negotiations on a free trade
agreement during her visit to the Gulf in 2017. Meanwhile German bilat-
eral trade has been continuously improving. Both may well impact on the
UK’s ability to sign any advantageous free trade agreements with either
the GCC or individual Gulf states. On the other hand, France has for
some time been seeking to establish itself, via, for example, its base in
Abu Dhabi, as a key security actor in the region.
A fourth unknown is the role of the US in the region under the Biden
administration, and the relationships both the post-Brexit UK and the
EU27 may seek to establish with it. The UK has always been at great
pains to maintain its historical relationship with the US, which post Brexit
may be of even greater importance given the former President Trump’s
endorsement of the Brexit vote. This endorsement was symbolized in
the reciprocation of official visits in January 2017 (former UK’s Prime
Minister Ms. May’s visit to the US) and in July 2018 (President Trump’s
visit to the UK). However, the UK, alongside the rest of Europe, faced
a dilemma in its relationship with the Trump Administration. The former
President’s unpredictability, his clear dislike of multilateralism whether
expressed through NATO or the WTO, created tensions in the Atlantic
relationship. The former President himself may not rue the loss of the
UK as a diplomatic ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe but certainly
past Administrations have seen it as useful. The British government may
remain confident in the continuation of the ‘special relationship’ especially
in terms of intelligence sharing, and yet US policies create difficulties for
this relationship. One area of difficulty is uncertainty of the Biden admin-
istration further steps towards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPoA), and the US relations with Iran.
1 INTRODUCTION 5

The JCPoA epitomizes especially strongly contemporary tensions. As a


member of the EU3, the UK worked hard to develop a better relationship
with Iran. On the one hand, it was firm in supporting EU-level sanc-
tions as part of the comprehensive strategy that, on the other hand, also
included negotiations to bring Iran’s nuclear programme under control.
The success of that strategy lay in the JCPoA of 14 July 2015. Boris
Johnson, the current Prime Minister of the UK, during his Foreign Secre-
tary appointment remarked: ‘I hope this will mark the start of more
productive cooperation between our countries, enabling us to discuss
more directly issues such as human rights and Iran’s role in the region, as
well as ongoing implementation of the nuclear deal and the expansion of
the trading relationship between both our countries’ (Gov.uk 2016a). The
decision by then President Trump to pull out of the agreement in May
2018—despite, inter alia, Boris Johnson’s last minute efforts to persuade
the Trump administration to the contrary—left the UK government at
odds with the US and working with the EU27 in an effort, along with
Russia and China, to save the agreement.
The US decision places the UK in a particularly delicate position not
simply in its relationship with the US but also with Saudi Arabia. The
former British Prime Minister, Theresa May, during her visit to the Gulf
in December 2016 wanted ‘to assure you that I am clear-eyed about the
threat that Iran poses to the Gulf and the wider Middle East; and the
UK is fully committed to our strategic partnership with the Gulf and
working with you to counter that threat’ (Gov.uk 2016b). However, the
Iran deal had considerable economic and financial potential that has had
to be weighed against the existing significance of the relationship with
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain especially. Considering the challenges
to EU/US relations, and occurred tensions between the UK and Iran
in summer 2019, post-Brexit policies towards Iran remain particularly
uncertain.
The GCC states are crucial partners for the UK, sharing deep-rooted
relations in a number of contexts, including diplomacy, trade, mili-
tary/security cooperation, culture, education, and relations between the
royal families. Theresa May participated in the Gulf Cooperation Council
of 2016, and discussed relations between the GCC states, highlighting the
historical ties between the UK and the GCC; she stated her ambition ‘to
build new alliances but more importantly, to go even further in working
with old friends, like our allies here in the Gulf, who have stood alongside
6 G. EDWARDS ET AL.

us for centuries’ (Gov.uk 2016c). Clearly the UK will be seeking agree-


ments on a basis that may give it an advantage over the EU27, although
the extent that is possible may well depend on the UK’s final agreement
with the EU.
The withdrawal agreement will also in part determine the extent to
which the post-Brexit UK will retain its attraction as both a global finan-
cial hub and an attraction for inward investment from the Gulf. While
there may be few challenges to the City of London as a financial centre
in the immediate future, there are predictions of a movement of financial
services towards other European centres. Whether the UK can remain the
‘eighth emirate’—to use the words of Tony Blair in 2006 and echoed by
Boris Johnson a decade later—may well be of crucial importance given
the levels of investment by the Gulf states, and not just the UAE. In part,
for the UK, the importance of continued investment lies in whether it can
persuade Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to invest beyond the London
property market. It is also a question of whether the ambitious visions and
plans of the Gulf states remain attractive to British capital, and of course,
Germany and the other EU countries are also following such plans closely.
Britain and the other EU member states have inevitably hedged their
bets in the crisis over Qatar. Given the need to attract inward invest-
ment from both sides in the Gulf dispute, most European states have been
supporting the mediation attempts of others, especially Kuwait. Further-
more, visits by the Saudi Crown Prince and the Qatari Emir to Paris,
London and Berlin resulted in new commitments for investment and
lucrative sales deals.
However, the sales of arms and military equipment, while increasingly
significance for both British and French manufacturers, have also exacer-
bated tensions for the war in Yemen and for human rights issues. In such
circumstances, the extent to which Brexit reinforces the importance of
Saudi purchases may create further embarrassment for the British govern-
ment. On the other hand, Britain’s move to increase its physical presence
in the Gulf has appealed to other sectors of the British polity; particu-
larly as this might align with France’s physical presence enhances French
support for the continuation of the concept of a Global France.
Taking all of these factors into account, this book considers how these
different tensions and unknowns may impact future relations between the
post-Brexit UK, the EU and the countries of the Gulf including Iran.
The authors of this book consider in different ways whether British and
1 INTRODUCTION 7

EU27 relations with the Gulf States may change or whether the tradi-
tions and the weight of their history reinforce the pre-existing patterns
of these relationships. Ongoing changes in the Gulf, the present disputes
and the trajectories economic reform will also influence these discussions.
Our analyses will also include the changing positions of the US, China and
Russia that are likely to impact on Europe’s interests. Finally, the book
explores outcomes of ongoing world challenges, such as the COVID-
19 pandemic and the crash of oil prices, to further examine Post-Brexit
Europe and UK policy challenges towards Iran and the GCC States.
Recognizing Brexit as a unique moment in the development of UK
and European politics that shifts foreign policy of the last 40 years, this
book adds value by focusing on relations between the post-Brexit UK
and the GCC and Iran. Most existing research into the aftermath of Brexit
focuses on the future of UK–EU relations, or considers UK foreign policy
elsewhere only generally. A very limited number of investigations explore
UK foreign policy in the Middle East, and especially the Gulf. Taking
into consideration the nature of their previous engagement in the Gulf,
this publication will open a discussion about whether it will be possible
for Britain to return to the Gulf as a global power, or if the UK’s future
foreign policy will not play such a key role.

1.2 The Structure of the Book


The book is split into Two Parts and contains Eight Chapters, including
the editor’s introduction. The First Part discusses Post-Brexit Europe and
the UK’s relations with the GCC States, while Part Two of the book
focuses on Post-Brexit Europe and UK–Iranian relations. In Chapter 2,
Nurşin Atesoglu Guney and Vişne Korkmaz evaluate structural and
conjunctural factors complicating the EU/European–GCC relationship,
despite the fact that diversified relations are an increasing need for
both sides and that they have many reasons to look to each other in
their search for diversification. The authors aim to underline that, apart
from existing structural difficulties in EU–GCC relations, new post-2011
factors have continued to create more complexities—if not difficulties and
obstacles—for the construction of inter-regional interdependence.
Chapter 3, written by Shady Mansour and Yara Ahmed, argues that the
European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council have had to deal with a
series of internal crises for the past couple of years that have negatively
influenced security cooperation. Yet despite the challenges, both regions
8 G. EDWARDS ET AL.

have been dedicating efforts to establish regional security institutions. The


chapter aims to analyse the extent of success of the American efforts to
lead the security architectures in Europe and the Middle East. Particularly,
this chapter proposes three interlinked arguments. First: the EU and some
Gulf states are attempting to establish an autonomous security structure
away from the US hegemony. Second: the US will resist these efforts,
and aim to maintain its hegemony over the regional security, especially as
both regions still lack the military capability that enables them to collec-
tively defend their region, without the American umbrella. Third: both
regions will try to avoid any clash with the US, while trying to develop
an autonomous security architecture.
In Chapter 4, Samuel Ramani, examines EU–Gulf relations in a post-
Brexit environment. The UK’s vote to withdraw from the European
Union (EU) in June 2016 (‘Brexit’) prompted speculation about a major
overhaul in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s relationship with
Europe. One popular hypothesis was that the UK and EU would emerge
as economic competitors in the post-Brexit order, which would force the
GCC to engage simultaneously with and balance its relationships with
the UK and EU. This scenario did not unfold, however, as EU–GCC and
UK–GCC free trade agreements were not ratified, and intra-European
discord created cleavages that often superseded the overarching UK–EU
divide. This chapter analyses Europe’s evolving relationship with the GCC
in the post-Brexit era. After briefly outlining the forays of major Euro-
pean powers, like France and Germany, into the GCC, this chapter will
explore two overarching phenomena, which define post-2016 EU–Gulf
relations. The first is the sustained dominance of bilateral, instead of EU-
GCC trade deals. The second is the hardened Franco-German divide on
diplomatic and security crises involving GCC countries. France has peri-
odically supported unilateral interventions by regional powers, such as the
UAE, while Germany has tried to de-escalate the Qatar, Libya and Yemen
crises. The chapter also explores future scenarios impacting Europe, such
as a marked expansion of British trade links with GCC countries, the
impact of US resistance to Chinese investment in the GCC on UK–Gulf
and EU–Gulf relations, and how the trajectory of intra-GCC cleavages
and a retrenchment of GCC countries from military interventions due to
low oil prices, might ease the Franco-German divide.
The Second Part of the book, which focuses particularly on Iran’s rela-
tions with Post-Brexit Europe and UK, starts with the chapter authored
1 INTRODUCTION 9

by Nicole Grajewski. This examines the evolution of Iran’s bilateral rela-


tions with the UK and the impact of Brexit on UK–Iran relations.
Through its interpretivist approach, this chapter analyses the diplomatic
practices, domestic debates, and exogenous factors that have influenced
the evolution of the UK–Iran relationship. It employs a variety of Persian
and English language primary sources including archival documents, offi-
cial government statements, academic literature, and news reports in
order to elucidate the salient issues in the bilateral relationship and better
understand Brexit within the context of UK–Iran relations. The chapter
begins by providing a broad historical overview of the main domestic,
regional, and international factors that have shaped UK–Iran relations.
Next, it locates Iran’s perspectives on UK foreign policy, tracing the
salient cleavages in Iranian domestic debates about its relationship with
the UK over the past two decades. In particular, Tehran’s shifting assess-
ment of UK foreign policy from the 2016 Brexit referendum until 31
January 2020 concurrently illustrates the impact of the regional and inter-
national context in constituting and constructing Iranian foreign policy
towards Britain. Therefore, the chapter proceeds to more closely examine
the developments in the UK–Iran relations since the 2016 Brexit refer-
endum with an emphasis on tensions in the Persian Gulf, Trans-Atlantic
relations, and the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action. Finally, the chapter concludes with future projections about
Brexit’s potential influence on UK–Iran relations.
In Chapter 6, Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina examine the
Iranian nuclear deal and its potential outcomes. They argue that the US
administration’s pulling out of the agreement signed by P5 + 1 with
Iran in 2015 has not collapsed the «nuclear deal» (Joint Comprehen-
sive Plan of Action—JCPoA) even though undermining it substantially.
The EU countries, joined by Russia and China, condemned and resisted
the Trump decision. Nevertheless, the capabilities of the EU to salvage
the deal have been put into question. Europe itself has become a field
of political and economic wrestling between the US and its Middle East
allies (Gulf monarchies and Israel), on the one hand, and Iran, on the
other. The former tried to convince the Europeans to reject the deal in
the same way that the US did. The Iranian demarche of 8 May 2019—
the announced suspension of a part of its commitments under the 2015
accord in response to the re-imposed US sanctions—pushed Europeans
to gradually re-examine its previous attitude (one very favourable to the
10 G. EDWARDS ET AL.

deal) while reproaching Tehran and distancing itself from it. Iran, never-
theless, opted to show its muscle by increasingly pressuring Europe by
spectacularly reducing its commitments in the deal. The EU’s resistance
policy to Trump in Iran has had few chances to be successful. Many Euro-
pean politicians have been trying to draw up a compromise to ease the
tension with the US over the Iran issue while betting on Joe Biden’s pres-
idency. They believe, with Biden in the White House the chance to bring
the US back into the JCPoA would substantially increase. As well as the
new mediation role of the EU to bring the US and Iran closer could be
stronger.
By contract, Jacopo Scita, in Chapter 7, looks at the potential impact of
Brexit on the E3/EU’s Iran Policy and argues that the aim of the chapter
is not to predict the future of UK–Iran relations or of the Nuclear Deal.
Drawing on the role played by the E3 (Germany, France and the UK) in
first approaching Tehran in 2003 and setting the framework for the EU
involvement in Iran’s nuclear issue, the chapter argues that Brexit risks an
abrupt interruption of the constructive path that began in 2003. In partic-
ular, the paper suggests three macro problems that Brexit may generate
to the E3/EU agenda vis-à-vis the Iranian dossier: (1) the potential re-
emergence of mistrust and tensions between London and Tehran due
to the volatile history of British–Iranian relations; (2) the effects of the
growing transatlantic pressure on London’s effort to keep its Iran policy
harmonized with the E3/EU; (3) the potential impact of Brexit on the
process that has created and reinforced a distinctively European foreign
policy identity vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear question.
Finally, the book concludes with Chapter 8: Afterword. This chapter
written by editors, looks ahead and offers final notes on how Brexit
might affect relations between the UK, the GCC and Iran. This
chapter acknowledges that Britain’s international standing will certainly
be damaged immediately post-Brexit, however, offers positive scenarios
for long-term perspectives. The final chapter argues and concludes that
by developing foreign policies under the ‘Global Britain’ idea, the post-
Brexit Britain might develop further relations with the US, still keep
relations with the EU states and strengthen its relations with the rest
of the world. Under these partnerships the post-Brexit UK, along with
challenges, also receives opportunities for further engagements with the
Middle East states, especially developing further historical relations with
the GCC states.
1 INTRODUCTION 11

References
BBC News. (2018, 12 July), Donald Trump UK visit: What is going to happen
during the trip?, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44786706 Accessed 14
September 2020.
Gov.uk, Website. (2016a, September 5), UK upgrades diplomatic relations
with Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-upgrades-diplomatic-
relations-with-iran Accessed 30 October 2019.
Gov.uk, Website. (2016b, 7 December), PM: We are clear-eyed about the
threat from Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-we-are-clear-
eyed-about-threat-from-iran Accessed 30 October 2019.
Gov.uk, Website. (2016c, 7 December), Prime Minister’s speech to the Gulf Co-
operation Council 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-
ministers-speech-to-the-gulf-co-operation-council-2016 Accessed 30 October
2019.
Khan, Taimur. (2017, 1 May), German chancellor Merkel arrives in Abu Dhabi,
National, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/german-chancellor-
merkel-arrives-in-abu-dhabi-1.52396 Accessed 30 October 2019.
Storer, Jackie and Bateman, Tom. (2017, January 27), Theresa May in US, BBC
News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-38761165 Accessed 30
October 2019.
CHAPTER 2

Converging Diversification Concerns: Why


Are the Europeans and Gulf States Looking
for a Deepening of Relations?

Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney and Vişne Korkmaz

2.1 Introduction
For the last couple of years, both European and Gulf states have felt the
need to diversify their relations for different reasons derived from current
geopolitical and geoeconomic fluctuations in the corresponding regions.
Diversification is a strategy for the Gulf states to manage the risks and
costs embedded in their traditional policies like bandwagoning to the
US agenda. Diversification strategy is in harmony with the strategy of
omni-enmeshment which is adopted by the GCC states to have contact
and relations to great powers in the system as many as possible. For the
European states, diversification is also important to manage increasing
geopolitical and geoeconomical risks. From the European point of view,
creating and promoting stable inter-regional interdependencies is a way of
having solid diversified relations. However, diversification, especially when

N. A. Güney (B) · V. Korkmaz


Nişantaşı Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13


Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary
Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_2
14 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

it couples with bandwagoning and omni-enmeshment strategies and espe-


cially in an environment where inter-regional interdependencies are not
established extensively, may also carry its own risks. The most important
risk is the risk of reinforcing strategic competition to have relative advan-
tages and gain among the actors who have different priorities in the midst
of current geopolitical ambiguities in both Europe and the Gulf.
On the one side, Europe has been faced with the Russian assertive
policies both in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Brexit has led
to many other questions on the future of European security since the
capability gap between EU security apparatuses and NATO is widening
(Biscop 2020b). Even after Brexit, the EU27 has seemed to be divided
on important foreign and security issues, including the EU’s Mediter-
ranean strategy, relations with Turkey, and the future of Libya and
Lebanon (Biscop 2020b). This internal division coupled with global
ambitions of some European actors has led some EU members to rein-
force their appearance in the neighbouring regions. Trump’s policies of
ambiguity have also accelerated European concerns about the harmony in
the Trans-Atlantic/Western Alliance. Trump seems to be adopting more
protectionist and coercive economic policies—including in the fields of
energy and defence economy (Dueck 2020). Hence, new American poli-
cies challenge the special relationship between Russia and leading powers
of Europe like Germany, while also cracking inner-European harmony by
offering special relations with the new European states like Poland. At the
same time, Trump’s NATO rhetoric, his unilateralist tendency in decision
making even on the issues related to European security, like the future of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), or the future of American units in
Syria, and his diplomatic style based on a continuous and inconsistent
backwards–forwards approach has strengthened the European powers’
search for more independent manoeuvring space and room for strategic
existence in the Mediterranean- Middle East- Gulf Axis. Moreover, the
presence of real risks like a possible crisis in the Hormuz Strait or sudden
fluctuations in oil prices in the case of a Saudi Arabia- Iran confronta-
tion, also makes a strategic dialogue of European powers with the Gulf
states a necessity. The questions here are: (1) whether European states
will succeed in harmonizing their policies towards the Gulf states; and
(2) whether European states/the EU will succeed in balancing their
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 15

dialogue with Tehran and the Gulf states especially considering the inde-
pendent factors (like Trump’s policies or inner-Gulf crisis) which affect
this triangle.
On the other side, the Gulf states search for a New Carter Doctrine
or Gulf’s NATO, in which the US’s extended deterrence functions in
a more strengthened fashion ended unsuccessfully (Brands et al. 2019).
Although the US has good relations individually with Gulf capitals,
both its attempted balancing in the inner-Gulf crisis as well as Trump’s
ambiguous policies related to Iran, Syria and Yemen has led Gulf coun-
tries to think about diversification more seriously. And the Gulf states,
like everyone else, are faced with many unknowns, like the results of
upcoming US presidential elections in November 2020. In the case of
a Biden presidency Gulf countries could be faced with a reinvention
of Obama’s Middle Eastern policies including his legacy on Iran (Ibish
2020).
Also, during the last couple of years, some of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC) states, such as the UAE, have found themselves
engaged—if not entrapped—at different levels of complex regional rival-
ries in not only the Middle East but also in the Mediterranean and Africa.
Hence the rise in defence purchases on the part of Gulf states. Indeed,
with their resources, money and energy, Gulf states have already started
to diversify their relations, for example forming a kind of special dialogue
with Moscow. Therefore, developing stronger relations with European
capitals who have technology, know-how and arms, keeps its impor-
tance. Besides gaining European support on certain geopolitical issues,
like restraining Iranian influence in the Gulf and Middle East and stability
of Hormuz, is valuable for the Gulf states.
The key question here is how the Gulf States will succeed in balancing
these diversified relations with European states without alienating Wash-
ington DC and Moscow, and without strengthening an intra- EU-27 or
EU-27 vs Britain rivalry (Stansfield et al. 2018) especially in the critical
sectors.
In this paper we will try to answer these questions after highlighting
possible cooperation areas between European powers and Gulf states. In
the first part of the paper we will focus on the question of why EU–
GCC relations have been described as complicated and, given the mixed
record since the 1988 Treaty despite of the fact that both sides have many
reasons to improve their mutual relationship. We aim to underline that
apart from existing structural difficulties in the EU–GCC relationship,
16 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

new post-2011 factors have continued to create more complications—if


not difficulties and obstacles—for the construction of inter-regional inter-
dependence. In the second part of the paper we will focus on how the
Trump era Gulf and Middle East policies and Brexit are affecting already
complex relations.

2.2 Back to the Origins of EU/European–GCC


Relations: A Complicated Story
For European states, especially EU members, GCC relations have been
described as complicated even before the Trump Administration’s Middle
East policy and Brexit, making the ground more complicated for inter-
regional cooperation between EU and GCC member states (Colombo
2019). This emphasis on complexity does, indeed, mirror the nature
of the EU–GCC relationship since it has both a positive and negative
element. The logic behind the positive dimension is clear: both Europe
and the Gulf are geopolitically important regions, and both have the
potential and actual capabilities to affect the geopolitical and geoeco-
nomical balance of power in the strategic landscape. Hence, it is not
surprising to see a flourishing cooperation between the two regions when
the economic and political needs of the respective parties are compatible.
This potential for cooperation was recognized in the 1988 Cooperation
Agreement which aimed to institutionalize cooperation in the fields of
energy, industry, trade, investment, agriculture, science, technology and
the environment. Over time, the energy sector has become the main
driver of the relations.
The Agreement, itself, was composed of interlocked economic and
normative (/political) components and aimed to construct an inter-
regional interdependence between Europe and the Gulf by strengthening
sectoral cooperation which was expected to be institutionalized one day
under a normative framework of the understanding of regional integration
(EU 2019). That is why one of the ambitious objectives of the Cooper-
ation Agreement was establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
between the GCC and the EU. By offering a model of regional integra-
tion, eventually became a Custom and Economic and Monetary Union,
and with regional agencies like Euratom, it was also no secret that the EU
has seen its position as representing a kind of inspirational reference point
for both construction of intra and inter-regional interdependencies since
the Agreement was in force (Colombo and Committeri 2014). However,
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 17

this normative framework and socialization dynamic to the negotiations


tied the hands of the Europeans because—and as expected—their ability
to use conditionality to persuade their Gulf partners has been limited
because the GCC has a different existential logic from the EU (Ayadi
and Gadi 2014). That is why the European states had to first wait for
the emergence of the GCC Custom Union, which was only finalized
after long negotiations and covert rivalries between the powers of the
Gulf. Following this, in 2008, the GCC side suspended FTA negotia-
tions with the EU when they saw that the distribution of power was
changing to the benefit of the Gulf and there was therefore no need to
make concessions while the Eurozone crisis paralyzed European politics
(Ayadi and Gadi 2014). This short story of the failed FTA is enough to
understand the kind of complexities that exist within the GCC and EU as
well as in GCC–EU relations themselves. First and foremost, both regions
have been divided—covertly or overtly—into different interests among
the member states, as well as different interests of different sectors within
the member states (Ayadi and Gadi 2014). But this is not the only factor
which prevents GCC and EU members from realizing the actual potential
of mutual, inter-regional cooperation which might have strengthened and
made more symmetrical inter-regional interdependence that in turn might
have had a more constructive impact on geopolitical and geoeconomical
balances in the world.
Within this framework we believe that since 2011 new factors have
been added to the underlying structural factors which have led the two
regions to grow apart.

2.3 Existing Structural Difficulties


The most important structural hindrance to the deepening of European–
Gulf relations is related to the limited nature of constructed relations
in which EU does not emerge as the security provider for the Gulf.
The GCC, for a long time—more concretely until post-2011 differ-
ences reached a level that triggered the intra-GCC crisis (Köse and
Ulutaş 2017)—had maintained itself as a special security institution that
gave leverage to the monarchies which assured regime security at home,
balanced differences in the distribution of power among the small and big
states of the Gulf, and legitimized the preference of individual states to
rely on the US’ external deterrence against present and future threats.
Some scholars argue that depending on the US as the main security
18 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

provider of the Gulf is not even a choice among alternatives, since there
is no other external power intending to play such a role (Ulrichsen 2019)
This is not because of the neglect of importance of the security of the
region for the stability of Levant, Europe and global energy markets but
because of the limits in the capabilities—especially naval capabilities—to
do so (Sim and Fulton 2019). Accordingly, for most of the EU, “east
of Suez” is not known as one of the traditional areas of power projection
since the UK is not being a member of the EU and France as a member of
Union do see this region as an area of activity but only of a limited nature.
Like the GCC states, EU members also seem to rely on the continuation
of a US strategic presence in the region in order to insure the security of
the Strait of Hormuz and fossil fuel exporting states.
Bilateral relations between GCC/GCC states and some EU member
states who can show their flag in terms of military capabilities (the UK
has a military base in Bahrain, France has one in the UAE, and Germany
is one of the arm exporters to the GCC members along with UK and
France) seem to develop more strongly, and in some occasions at the
expense of EU–GCC relations (Baabood and Edwards 2007). Indeed,
preferring bilateral deals instead of deepening cooperation with the EU is
in harmony with one of the general strategies of the GCC states, what we
call “omni- enmeshment with bandwagoning”.
The term “omni-enmeshment” refers to a strategy, named by Evelyn
Goh, to describe East and South East Asian regional states’ strategy that
is based on engaging with as many big powers as possible through their
involvement in regional institutions and through bilateral arrangements
between them and individual states of the region (Goh 2007). However,
GCC states do not try to include all the various major external powers
in the region’s strategic affairs on an unconditional basis. The first condi-
tion is related to the fact that the Gulf states’ understanding of balance of
power has been based on complex calculations derived from the necessity
of bandwagoning on the US agenda. Hence, practices and discourses of
omni-enmeshment in the region have had to go hand in hand with depen-
dency on US security guarantees. The second condition demands that
the omni-enmeshed states should be prepared to be involved in the Gulf
states regional agenda based on more and more struggle for influence and
rivalry with others (for example with Iran) in the Greater Middle East. All
in all, the omni-enmeshment strategy adopted by the Gulf states serves
both to diversify and balance the needs of these states, and that is why,
even on a bilateral basis, relations between GCC members and European
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 19

states continue to be entangled, even during periods when Europe felt the
necessity to diverge from the GCC agenda—for example, decreasing their
dependency on Arab oil and gas and recognizing new investment oppor-
tunities in the new regional markets like Iran. In such circumstances GCC
states have turned to Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi—and of course
Washington, DC—for support.
Although these structural factors create difficulties for strengthening
inter-regional cooperation between the EU and the Gulf, there are other
factors that keep the EU–GCC train on the right track. Apart from the
importance of Gulf energy imports for the EU, albeit slightly reduced
because the EU’s energy policy has been based on the objective of
reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and the extent of the region’s energy
reserves (almost 1/3 of the world’s crude oil, and 1/5 of the natural
gas), the GCC continues to be an important market for European prod-
ucts. For example, EU–GCC total trade in goods in 2017 amounted
to e143.7 billion. In 2017, EU exports to the GCC amounted to
e99.8 billion. In the meantime, EU imports from the GCC accounted
for only e43.8 billion, generating a significant trade surplus for the EU
(Porcnik 2020). Therefore, keeping GCC as the trade partner of the EU
is important and profitable for Brussels. However, this is not a one-way
road. Europe’s green and nuclear technology market especially in clean
energy and digitization of economies of Arab states (Bianco 2020) is also
gaining importance for the GCC states while in recent years the energy
sector has been changing both globally and in the Gulf.
One of the important trends in the global energy market is the rise
in demand for alternative energy resources in energy mixes. Though the
continued importance of fossil fuel cannot be underestimated, mainly
because of the Asianization of energy demand and the impact of new
technologies and inventions like the shale oil and gas revolution in North
America, this new search for alternative energy resources has had reper-
cussions for both the demand and supply side of the energy market. Gulf
region countries, as important resource-rich countries on the supply side,
are not excluded from these consequences. In the past decade, intended
and unintended interruptions, the invention of new technologies, and
actors’ preferences to explore the connection between the economic
market and political impact of economic pressures together accelerated
the volatility of oil and gas prices in global and regional markets. Hence,
elites in the Gulf countries, where revenues depend on the export of
oil and natural gas, are aware of the increasing sensitivity of consumers
20 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

and of consumers’ new appetite for the diversification of energy resources


away from fossil fuel on the one hand, and on the other hand the diver-
sification of sources as an insurance mechanism. This awareness in the
Gulf countries, as supplier countries that are connected to changes in
the market and to the impact of these changes on prices, is amplified
by news related to the projected depletion of fossil fuels in the region,
as well as the trend for excessive energy consumption in the GCC soci-
eties. According to some scholars though fossil fuels are destined to be
depleted, there is no cause for hurry in the Gulf if we look at the region’s
reserve to production ratio (El-Katiri 2013 and Nematollahi et al. 2016).
The region’s aggregate reserve to production ratio for oil has remained
relatively constant for the past ten years, despite a slight downward trend.
With current estimates predicting that reserves will last for 80 years, the
region is expected to produce oil comfortably into the next century at
current rates of production. It is also estimated that known conventional
Gulf reserves of natural gas will last for at least 157 years at current rates
of production, and substantially longer for some of the region’s largest
reserve holders, such as Qatar (El-Katiri 2013 and Nematollahi et al.
2016). However as recently witnessed increased hydrocarbon supply in
the market and intensified competition among the producers has led to
falling oil/LNG prices, and has affected energy revenues of the oil and
gas producers of the Gulf region (Gavlak 2020). Indeed, the negative
impact of the coronavirus crisis on the global markets has amplified the
negative impact of the oil price shock in the Gulf economies and revived
unpleasant memories of the late 1980s- early 1990s in another word, “the
lost decade” (Cahill 2020).
All these factors rang alarm bells for future economic security, in other
words, the regime security of the GCC monarchies, prompting them
to start very ambitious energy diversification programmes themselves,
including a search for renewable and nuclear energy technology in the
early 2000s (Güney and Korkmaz 2017). The EU has already started
its energy security programme based on a diversification of sources,
the search of alternative energy technologies, a strengthening of energy
efficiency and the reduction of fossil fuel consumption and GHG emis-
sions (European Commission 2013). Therefore EU has become a useful
source of know-how not only of renewable but also nuclear technology
and policy experience for the energy diversification programme of the
GCC states. This convergence gave fruits within a short period of time
and, following the joint GCC–EU MC meeting in 2010, the EU-GCC
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 21

Network for Clean Energy (renamed as EU-GCC Clean Energy Tech-


nology Network in 2017) was established with the aim of “maintaining
and strengthening the cooperation between the European Union and the
GCC in the area of sustainable ‘clean’ energy and energy efficiency at
the technological and political levels” (EU–GCC Clean Energy Network
2019).
It is true that, most of the GCC countries have already favoured
diversification of their energy mix, and in this way they aim to reduce
their dependency on oil revenues. However, they continue to depend
heavily on exporting oil and natural gas for economic development. As
mentioned before, this situation naturally makes them vulnerable to the
fluctuation in prices. According to Gawdat Bahgat, since most of the GCC
states have created sovereign wealth funds/oil funds (SWF)—such as the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976, the Kuwait Investment Authority
1953, the Qatar Investment Authority 2005 and the Saudi Public Invest-
ment Fund 1971—these may prove lifesavers, in the short term financial
crises, to stimulate GCC economies (Bahgat 2020). Bahgat also thinks
that once Covid-19 is contained and when finally the economic activities
around the world start to resume, then market forces will again balance
supply and demand—which is expected to have a positive impact on oil
prices (Bahgat 2020).
Energy security has not been the only non-traditional security concerns
for the GCC states. As recognized in 2012 Naval Drills in the Gulf,
GCC states showed their readiness to strengthen maritime security capa-
bilities along with air and naval capabilities. EU states—especially those
exporting defence and security technologies—are the potential partners
in this regard and the list is not limited to Germany, France, UK and
Italy but also includes Netherland and Spain (SPRI 2019). Moreover
the EU’s maritime security policies (European Commission 2020) have
provided a good framework to initiate cooperation although the parties
are not always on the same page especially on some issues such as passage
rights (Ronzitti 2014). Without doubt, GCC states’ wish to show their
flags in the seas of the Gulf as demonstrated by their membership to the
US initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the search for new
naval and air capabilities which are not only related to emerging concerns
about piracy, marine pollution, refugees, human and drug trafficking and
WMD terrorism. Balancing Iran, securing the Strait of Hormuz and guar-
anteeing an upper hand over the controversial islands like Abu Musa have
22 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

always been in the minds of the Gulf states. Hence, engaging with Euro-
pean states and the EU, to change Europe’s general attitude of a balanced
engagement with Iran and the GCC, and engaging with EU defence
markets to manage the risk of abandonment by the US has gained greater
importance especially after 2011.

2.4 New Complexities After 2011


Between 2011 and 2016, GCC states passed through five difficult years
in terms of the level of fear of abandonment by the US. US security guar-
antees have never been institutionalized for the Gulf but based on the
original golden deal between Saudi Arabia and US in the 1950s (oil for
arms) and security practices and military deployments by the US in the
Gulf since 1991. That is why the risk of abandonment has always been
a possibility for the GCC states. It has become a more critical issue for
discussion not only because of the Gulf’s continued dependence on the
US and Washington’s unchanged interests in the Middle East but also
because of the existing balance of power in the region. Hence when the
Arab Spring movements began to have an impact in the MENA, GCC
states felt that this created not only a risk to the regime security at home
but could also alter the regional balance of power, to the advantage of
their rivals. While Western reactions towards the Egyptian revolution were
ambiguous and there was little reaction at all from the US as Mubarak
was toppled, they decided to take the control over the developments in
the region by directly involving in geopolitical and geoeconomic power
struggles in the MENA.
The GCC states’ impact on the course of “Arab Spring” inspired street
movements, varied from economic coercion to the legitimization or dele-
gitimization of existing regimes, from direct military intervention to using
proxies to shape developments in the region. But overall the Gulf coun-
tries’ impact, which was highly effective over the course of the events in
Libya, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, is obvious. Some GCC coun-
tries’ involvement to post-Arab Spring regional struggle proves that the
increase in the power capabilities of the GCC states in the beginning of
the 2000s was not a perception but a reality. Simultaneously, however,
this process has also shown that a strengthening of intra-GCC rivalry
as different states find different opportunities and risks in the changing
geopolitical landscape in the MENA.
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 23

The first signs of tension between UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
appeared before the embargo crisis but neither the US nor the Euro-
peans contributed positively to any mediation efforts. The EU seemed
rather to concentrate on individualistic and sometimes controversial inter-
ests of its member states in specific cases like in Egypt and Libya. Hence,
while European states continued to function as omni-enmeshed powers,
they could not use this time period when US–GCC relations were rather
chilled to increase their space for manoeuvre and influence over the GCC.
As is well-known, the intra-GCC crisis is not only related to the diver-
gences among the GCC members towards the different Arab Spring
movements, but to their different attitudes towards Iran. US under the
Obama administration seems to have hopes related to a more moderate
Iran in the post-JCPOA environment. Washington’s this optimistic expec-
tation about reengagement of Iran after 2015 nuclear deal brought
divergent position between Abu Dhabi and Riyad on the one hand, and
Doha and Muscat on the other hand naturally deepened the intra-GCC
gap. That is why Obama’s legacy in the Middle East, with his emphasis
on off-shore balancing and engagement with Iran on nuclear issues,has
been remembered bitterly in the Gulf. Since the Syrian conflict continued
to provide opportunities for Iran, Tehran’s activities in Lebanon have
strengthened via Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in
an almost lose-lose conflict in Yemen. Within this atmosphere, in the eyes
of some GCC states, JCPOA represents a kind of reward given to Tehran
because of all her efforts to change the balance of power in the region
to her advantage whereas European states think that JCPOA is a great
opportunity to solve dispute on Iranian nuclear programme.
However, there are also other reasons for the discontent of the Gulf
states. It is known that the JCPOA, which was rejected by Trump, has
certain ambiguities. For example, Iran’s ballistic missile programme is not
part of the deal, so this issue has continued to be of concern for the
GCC states especially when Iran- GCC rivalry in the Gulf and Levant
has been intensifying and while Iranian ballistic missile capabilities are
increasing (Bahgat 2019). Besides, the Deal negates a zero-enrichment
option for Iran, while the ambiguity related to the future of Iranian
nuclear programme, when 10–15 years of the deal elapses, continues to
affect the strategic thought of GCC states, who have their own nuclear
ambitions. Hence, the GCC states, specifically the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, started to demand from the P5 +1 —in other words the US—
what they have already offered to Iran -limited but 3.67 percentage of
24 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

indigenous enrichment right. At the same time, Riyad recognized that


it would be difficult to persuade US and her western friends anything
beyond the famous 1-2-3 deal with the UAE (Güney and Korkmaz
2017). While the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone idea in the Middle East
lost its attractiveness, and while Europeans were excited to have trade
relations with Iran (Fiedleri 2018) EU had few things to say to the GCC
and Riyad about these concerns. Therefore, the GCC states extended
their omni-enmeshment strategy to cover Russia who returned to the
Middle East/Mediterranean nexus through her military capabilities as in
Syria and her charm offensive based on her defence and energy know-how
market (foremost her air defence system and nuclear reactor technology).
Of course, Russia and the GCC states have many divergences related to
Russian support for the al-Assad Regime and Iran. Besides Russia, as one
of the important gas and oil exporters has emerged as a natural rival of
the GCC states, foremost for Riyad. But during the critical years, between
2015 and 2017, the GCC states that had difficulty with bandwagoning
onto the American agenda in the Middle East, especially on the issue of
Iran, chose to adapt a rather pragmatic approach to Moscow (Shumilin
and Shumilina 2017). This new GCC pragmatism underlines the impor-
tance of economic and financial factors to different degrees especially as
sometimes leverage in negotiations related to political disagreements, but
it has a limited nature since Russians have also developed warm relations
with Iran, Turkey and Israel. Nevertheless, during the last couple of years,
Russia has succeeded in becoming one of the new centres of attraction in
the GCC’s omni-enmeshment policy and so emerge as rivals of European
states to satisfy the GCC states’ diversification concerns.

2.5 Trump’s Era: Further


Complexities for EU–GCC Relations
As part of Trump’s anti-Iran strategy, new alignments were formed
between particular GCC countries including Saudi Arabia and UAE.
These alignments were converged with Israeli’s new periphery align-
ment schemes covering Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, (Southern) Cyprus
and Greece (Güney and Korkmaz 2020). Over time and dependent
on the level of US attention, the target of these axis-like- rapproche-
ment/partnership arrangements seemed to gain anti-Turkey colour espe-
cially in the Mediterranean (Güney and Korkmaz 2020), however, the
US focus has always related to the perception of the Iranian, and newly
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 25

emerged assertive Russian, threats in the region. However, US anti-


Iranian rhetoric and policies have not prevented the continuing divisions
among the six emirates of the Gulf on the Tehran issue. These divi-
sions reached their climax when the UAE and Saudi Arabia decided to
impose an embargo on Qatar, while criticizing not only Qatari-Iranian
ties but also Qatar’s involvement in the Levant and the instruments of this
involvement (Güney et al. 2021). In opposition to Washington’s newly
sponsored cooperation belt against Iran, Qatar maintained its close rela-
tions with Tehran along with Oman and Turkey. Doha has also so far
refused to ally with the Riyad-Abu Dhabi- Washington agenda in Syria.
The Qatari crisis in 2017 surely helped to sharpen intra-GCC divide
and until now this situation has not yet changed. Despite the Trump
administration’s efforts to return the GCC states relations back to normal,
many continue to believe that the deepening of the intra-Gulf crisis and
divergences within the GCC, which also negatively affects the GCC’s
functioning as well as its identity, is because of the Trump policies in the
Middle East. Although some member states of the EU notably Germany,
France and the UK are economically or militarily present in the GCC and
while the UK and France have military bases in the region “unlike USA
and Turkey” they failed to play an important role in both the eruption and
evolution of the last-intra-GCC, namely the Qatari, crisis (Baker and Cok
2020). More importantly the EU, although it has the institutional frame-
work and normative rhetoric related to peaceful resolution of conflicts,
did not make any positive contribution to the mediation efforts of some
regional states like Kuwait. Thus, the EU and important EU states seem
to be paralyzed while this crisis keeps creating new complexities for the
future of EU–GCC relations.
The unilateral withdrawal of the US from JCPOA on May 8, 2018
and the re-implementation of sanctions on Tehran has certainly been
welcomed by some of the GCC countries, most notably Saudi Arabia.
However, the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear Deal was met with
great concern by the EU. The EU High Commissioner, Mogherini, as
well as most of the big states of the EU—particularly Germany, France
and Great Britain, the so-called EU3—having felt the responsibility of
keeping the 2015 Nuclear Treaty intact, have sought to persuade Tehran
that they will do their best to maintain the sanctions relief that it has
gained with the JCPOA of 2015, as long as Iran abides with the deal.
They have launched certain measures in this regard to set up a trade
channel with Iran so that they can bypass US sanctions. At the meeting
26 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

of EU foreign and defence ministers in Bucharest, Romania in January


2019, the EU3 announced a “special purpose vehicle” (INSTEX). This
instrument has ended up being limited to use for providing only food,
medicine, and medical equipment from Europe to Iran (Divsallar and
Otte 2019). The Europeans, by the time they launched INSTEX, have
explained that they do not want Tehran to leave the 2015 Nuclear
Deal and return to uranium enrichment. Hence, INSTEX was planned
to be based in Paris and managed by a German banking expert with a
supervisory board expected to be run from the UK (Brzozowski 2020).
However, the planned INSTEX could not dissuade big European firms
from leaving the Iranian market due to the probability of facing US sanc-
tions and hence losing their share in the US market. Finally, the unwanted
reality has come true when Iran very recently proclaimed that Euro-
peans have not fulfilled their obligations related to the JCPOA whereas
Tehran continued to abide with the agreement. Hence, Iranian media
has reported recently that the Islamic Republic was seeking to pressure
European countries to come to terms with Tehran’s demands under the
JCPOA (Frantzman 2019). What is more interesting is that in mid-2019
Iran claimed that it is going to monitor European countries over the next
60 days to fulfil their commitments or Iran’s behaviour could become
unpredictable (Geranmayeh 2019). If EU and Iran could not come to a
point to satisfy each other soon the whole point of the agreement, that
was to prevent Iran from enriching its uranium above a limit of 3.67
per cent and to sell off any additional enriched uranium over 300 kg
together with other restrictions associated with 2015 Nuclear Deal, would
be missed and GCC states’ concerns related to nuclear Iran will erupt
again. As pointed out before, the GCC states concern regarding a nuclear
Iran contains the logic of “what Iran has, we should also have”, so we may
hear “nuclear dominos” rhetoric again in the Middle East.
Tehran has been under the maximum pressure economically since the
end of US waivers on the sale of its oil/petroleum to eight countries
together with other sanctions imposed by the Trump administration.
Therefore, she has been trying to bring a wedge between the US and
EU, as well as remaining members of the UNSC, and hence force them
to act against Washington’s efforts to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero. It
is natural to expect countries on the producing side of oil/petroleum in
the GCC to support Trump’s decision so that the threat emanating from
Tehran and its proxies’ financial support would be curtailed. However, on
the European side, the preference of keeping Tehran within the JACPOA
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 27

does not match with some of the GCC countries’ concerns about the
present fate of the 2015 Nuclear Deal- which is linked with the sanctions’
relief to the Tehran regime. From the perspective of sharing the global
oil market it might be preferable for some GCC OPEC countries to see
Tehran’s exports going down to zero. But on the other hand, they cannot
be confident of Iran having after assuming the negative effects of Trump’s
maximum pressure policy-be it economically or militarily- would at the
end chose to leave the JCPOA, which in turn may have to bring nega-
tive security results for the Gulf region and even throughout the whole
Middle East. In fact, in September 2019, the seeds of further instability
could be seen in the Iranian/Houthi proxy attack on the Saudi Arabian
oil sector—the ARAMCO attacks—causing a temporary rise in oil prices
before business went back to normal. However, the concern of the Gulf
as well as the West has not withered away because Tehran’s determina-
tion to destabilize the region via its capabilities remains as a response
to the maximum pressure policy of the US. Even militarization of US
pressure—killing of Soleimani and al-Muhandis in Iraq—did not hinder
Iranian retaliation in the form of missile attacks to US bases in Iraq at the
early days of 2020. Whether Iranian missile attacks were successful or not,
which is still a debatable question, this escalation and Tehran’s muscle-
flexing has led to an increased level of concern in the Gulf states. That
is why additional American military personnel have been sent to Saudi
Arabia to prevent any future attack while the Europeans have remained
militarily side-lined (Gibbons-Nef 2019).
In dealing with Tehran’s situation, regarding the fate of JCPOA and
the imposition of new sanctions by the Trump administration, Brussels
and the GCC may now be seen to be on diverging sides. The EU seems to
be attached to its political engagement policy with Iran via various diplo-
matic initiatives beyond INSTEX,for example Macron’s latest ambitious
but failed attempt of bringing Trump and Rouhani to the negotiation
table- to save the death of the JCPOA Deal (Al Jazeera 2019). Likewise
throughout 2020, in both joint statements of several European states,
such as UK, France and Germany, and in the official statements of Borell,
the EU’s foreign policy chief, the Europeans have continued to reject
the possibility of the imposition of snapback sanctions on Tehran by the
US, since Washington is no longer party to the Deal (Al Jazeera 2020).
However, some GCC states—foremost the KSA—seem to be puzzled
by increasing American extended deterrence guarantees -especially after
the latest attacks to ARAMCO oil sites and Iran’s missile attack to the
28 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ

American bases (Sofuoğlu 2020)—and have continued to seek additional


security assurances not only from the US but also from others. Hence
the present divergence between the EU and the GCC, over which instru-
ment (political/diplomatic vs military) should be used in dealing with
Iran, continues to blur the future cooperation between the two parties.
But, in the future we cannot be sure about how the two sides relations
regarding Iran may develop. This also depends on how the US and the
other nuclear haves in the UN as well as Iran may decide to act.
At the time of writing this paper, the Trump Administration continues
to back a policy of maximum pressure by containing partners and proxies
of the Tehran regime in the region. While the European states, and some-
times the EU, seem not to oppose Trump’s policies in this regard. For
example, the Syrian al-Assad regime complained about the EU’s exten-
sions of its unilateral coercive measures on Syria in parallel with the US
applying the Caesar Act (The Syrian Observer 2020). One of the objec-
tives of the US Caesar Act seems to weaken Hezbollah’s position—read
as Iran’s upper hand—in Lebanon and accordingly some experts argue
that the Trump and Macron Administrations are adopting the “bad cop-
good cop” approach to reshape political dynamics in Lebanon after the
Beirut blast (Abi-Habib and Chehayeb 2020). Although the EU remains
committed to the two state solution, a similar supportive approach is also
adapted by Europeans for Trump’s efforts to promote normalization of
relations between some Muslim countries including some GCC states—
like UAE—and Israel (Pollet 2020). However, this harmony between the
European and the American Administrations can be seen as an excep-
tion. In the time of writing this paper, many European leaders did not
hide that they are expecting a reset in Trans-Atlantic relations during the
Biden presidency (Balfor 2020). Besides, it is not a secret that Biden
emphasizes partnership and multilateralism in his foreign policy vision
(CFR 2020). Hence, one can argue that the Europeans are trying to
fill the vacuum in this transition period from one president to another
by proving that European friendship will be beneficial for the future US
Middle Eastern policy. It is also true that at the time of writing this paper
not only most of the Europeans but also Tehran hopes to see Trump
as a defeated party in the coming American elections. That is why Iran
is acting moderately in its maximum resistance policy in order not to
strengthen Trump’s hand. However, this moderate Iranian attitude just
before the November 2020 elections does not mean that Iran does or
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