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CONTEMPORARY GULF STUDIES
SERIES EDITORS: STEVEN WRIGHT · ABDULLAH BAABOOD
Post-Brexit Europe
and UK
Policy Challenges Towards Iran
and the GCC States
Series Editors
Steven Wright, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad bin
Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar
Abdullah Baabood, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda
University, Tokyo, Japan
Salient Features:
• The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the competing
interests of global powers and therefore publications in the series reflect
this complex environment.
• The series will see publication on the dynamic nature of how the Gulf
region has been undergoing enormous changes attracting regional and
international interests.
• The series is managed through Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University,
which has emerged as the leading institution within the Gulf region offering
graduate degrees in Gulf Studies at both masters and doctoral level.
This series offer a platform from which scholarly work on the most pressing
issues within the Gulf region will be examined. The scope of the book series
will encompass work being done on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain,
Kuwait in addition to Iraq, Iran and Yemen. The series will focus on three types
of volumes: Single and jointly authored monograph; Thematic edited books;
Course text books. The scope of the series will include publications relating to
the countries of focus, in terms of the following themes which will allow for
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquiry on the Gulf region to flourish:
Post-Brexit Europe
and UK
Policy Challenges Towards Iran and the GCC States
Editors
Geoffrey Edwards Abdullah Baabood
Pembroke College School of International Liberal
Cambridge, UK Studies
Waseda University
Diana Galeeva Tokyo, Japan
St. Antony’s College
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Preface
v
vi PREFACE
uncertainty of the Brexit results for British and European politics, the
book’s focus on how Brexit affects to relations with Iran and the GCC
states will attract policymakers who follow these developments. Finally,
the book will be a valuable resource for course adoption in undergraduate
and post-graduate models which focus on British and European policies
towards the Middle East.
vii
Contents
ix
x CONTENTS
Index 189
Notes on Contributors
xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Eda Guney), in New Geopolitical Realities for Russia, from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean, Lexington Publishers (London, September 2019).
Dr. Shady Abdel Wahab Mansour serves as Executive Editor-in-Chief
of Trending Events Periodical and Head of Security Studies Unit in
“Future for Advanced Research and Studies” (FARAS), Abu Dhabi. Previ-
ously, Dr. Shady worked at the “Information Decision and Support
Center” (IDSC), the Egyptian Cabinet’s think tank. Research inter-
ests include MENA political and security affairs with a special focus on
regional security and conflict management. Dr. Shady holds a Master and
Ph.D. degree in Comparative Politics from the Faculty of Economics and
Political Science, Cairo University.
Dr. Samuel Ramani completed his D.Phil. at the University of Oxford’s
Department of Politics and International Relations. Based out of St.
Antony’s College, his research focused on contemporary Russian foreign
policy, Russia-Middle East relations and the international relations of
the Persian Gulf. Samuel is a regular contributor to leading interna-
tional publications and think tanks, such as the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Foreign Policy, the Washington Post, the Middle
East Institute, The Diplomat and Al Monitor. He is a regular commen-
tator on Middle East affairs for Al Jazeera English and Arabic, the
BBC World Service, CNN International and France 24, and has briefed
the U.S. Department of State, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
NATO Intelligence Fusion Center and France’s Ministry of Defense on
international security issues.
Jacopo Scita is H.H. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah doctoral
fellow at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham
University. Jacopo’s doctoral project explores the role(s) borne by China
within Sino-Iranian relations from the 1979 Revolution to the 2015
JCPOA. His research interests include the international politics of the
Middle East, with a specific focus on Chinese interests in the region,
Iranian foreign policy and the analysis of nuclear policy in the MENA
region.
Dr. Alexander Shumilin holds Ph.D. in Political Science, Head of the
“Euro-Atlantic—Middle East” Center, Chief Researcher of the Depart-
ment of European Security at the Institute of Europe of the Russian
Academy of Sciences. Head of the Civilizational Conflicts Center at
the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of USA and Canada studies
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The UK withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020.
Though the UK’s future relationship with the EU, both economically
and in terms of foreign and security policies remains uncertain. One
key unknown outcome of the UK’s withdrawal is its future relation-
ship with EU-level security resources and institutions, including the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security
and Defend Policy (CSDP). This comes at a time of possible significant
developments; especially for the latter with moves towards Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and closer collaboration on defence
G. Edwards
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
A. Baabood
School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: [email protected]
D. Galeeva (B)
St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
EU27 relations with the Gulf States may change or whether the tradi-
tions and the weight of their history reinforce the pre-existing patterns
of these relationships. Ongoing changes in the Gulf, the present disputes
and the trajectories economic reform will also influence these discussions.
Our analyses will also include the changing positions of the US, China and
Russia that are likely to impact on Europe’s interests. Finally, the book
explores outcomes of ongoing world challenges, such as the COVID-
19 pandemic and the crash of oil prices, to further examine Post-Brexit
Europe and UK policy challenges towards Iran and the GCC States.
Recognizing Brexit as a unique moment in the development of UK
and European politics that shifts foreign policy of the last 40 years, this
book adds value by focusing on relations between the post-Brexit UK
and the GCC and Iran. Most existing research into the aftermath of Brexit
focuses on the future of UK–EU relations, or considers UK foreign policy
elsewhere only generally. A very limited number of investigations explore
UK foreign policy in the Middle East, and especially the Gulf. Taking
into consideration the nature of their previous engagement in the Gulf,
this publication will open a discussion about whether it will be possible
for Britain to return to the Gulf as a global power, or if the UK’s future
foreign policy will not play such a key role.
deal) while reproaching Tehran and distancing itself from it. Iran, never-
theless, opted to show its muscle by increasingly pressuring Europe by
spectacularly reducing its commitments in the deal. The EU’s resistance
policy to Trump in Iran has had few chances to be successful. Many Euro-
pean politicians have been trying to draw up a compromise to ease the
tension with the US over the Iran issue while betting on Joe Biden’s pres-
idency. They believe, with Biden in the White House the chance to bring
the US back into the JCPoA would substantially increase. As well as the
new mediation role of the EU to bring the US and Iran closer could be
stronger.
By contract, Jacopo Scita, in Chapter 7, looks at the potential impact of
Brexit on the E3/EU’s Iran Policy and argues that the aim of the chapter
is not to predict the future of UK–Iran relations or of the Nuclear Deal.
Drawing on the role played by the E3 (Germany, France and the UK) in
first approaching Tehran in 2003 and setting the framework for the EU
involvement in Iran’s nuclear issue, the chapter argues that Brexit risks an
abrupt interruption of the constructive path that began in 2003. In partic-
ular, the paper suggests three macro problems that Brexit may generate
to the E3/EU agenda vis-à-vis the Iranian dossier: (1) the potential re-
emergence of mistrust and tensions between London and Tehran due
to the volatile history of British–Iranian relations; (2) the effects of the
growing transatlantic pressure on London’s effort to keep its Iran policy
harmonized with the E3/EU; (3) the potential impact of Brexit on the
process that has created and reinforced a distinctively European foreign
policy identity vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear question.
Finally, the book concludes with Chapter 8: Afterword. This chapter
written by editors, looks ahead and offers final notes on how Brexit
might affect relations between the UK, the GCC and Iran. This
chapter acknowledges that Britain’s international standing will certainly
be damaged immediately post-Brexit, however, offers positive scenarios
for long-term perspectives. The final chapter argues and concludes that
by developing foreign policies under the ‘Global Britain’ idea, the post-
Brexit Britain might develop further relations with the US, still keep
relations with the EU states and strengthen its relations with the rest
of the world. Under these partnerships the post-Brexit UK, along with
challenges, also receives opportunities for further engagements with the
Middle East states, especially developing further historical relations with
the GCC states.
1 INTRODUCTION 11
References
BBC News. (2018, 12 July), Donald Trump UK visit: What is going to happen
during the trip?, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44786706 Accessed 14
September 2020.
Gov.uk, Website. (2016a, September 5), UK upgrades diplomatic relations
with Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-upgrades-diplomatic-
relations-with-iran Accessed 30 October 2019.
Gov.uk, Website. (2016b, 7 December), PM: We are clear-eyed about the
threat from Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-we-are-clear-
eyed-about-threat-from-iran Accessed 30 October 2019.
Gov.uk, Website. (2016c, 7 December), Prime Minister’s speech to the Gulf Co-
operation Council 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-
ministers-speech-to-the-gulf-co-operation-council-2016 Accessed 30 October
2019.
Khan, Taimur. (2017, 1 May), German chancellor Merkel arrives in Abu Dhabi,
National, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/german-chancellor-
merkel-arrives-in-abu-dhabi-1.52396 Accessed 30 October 2019.
Storer, Jackie and Bateman, Tom. (2017, January 27), Theresa May in US, BBC
News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-38761165 Accessed 30
October 2019.
CHAPTER 2
2.1 Introduction
For the last couple of years, both European and Gulf states have felt the
need to diversify their relations for different reasons derived from current
geopolitical and geoeconomic fluctuations in the corresponding regions.
Diversification is a strategy for the Gulf states to manage the risks and
costs embedded in their traditional policies like bandwagoning to the
US agenda. Diversification strategy is in harmony with the strategy of
omni-enmeshment which is adopted by the GCC states to have contact
and relations to great powers in the system as many as possible. For the
European states, diversification is also important to manage increasing
geopolitical and geoeconomical risks. From the European point of view,
creating and promoting stable inter-regional interdependencies is a way of
having solid diversified relations. However, diversification, especially when
dialogue with Tehran and the Gulf states especially considering the inde-
pendent factors (like Trump’s policies or inner-Gulf crisis) which affect
this triangle.
On the other side, the Gulf states search for a New Carter Doctrine
or Gulf’s NATO, in which the US’s extended deterrence functions in
a more strengthened fashion ended unsuccessfully (Brands et al. 2019).
Although the US has good relations individually with Gulf capitals,
both its attempted balancing in the inner-Gulf crisis as well as Trump’s
ambiguous policies related to Iran, Syria and Yemen has led Gulf coun-
tries to think about diversification more seriously. And the Gulf states,
like everyone else, are faced with many unknowns, like the results of
upcoming US presidential elections in November 2020. In the case of
a Biden presidency Gulf countries could be faced with a reinvention
of Obama’s Middle Eastern policies including his legacy on Iran (Ibish
2020).
Also, during the last couple of years, some of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC) states, such as the UAE, have found themselves
engaged—if not entrapped—at different levels of complex regional rival-
ries in not only the Middle East but also in the Mediterranean and Africa.
Hence the rise in defence purchases on the part of Gulf states. Indeed,
with their resources, money and energy, Gulf states have already started
to diversify their relations, for example forming a kind of special dialogue
with Moscow. Therefore, developing stronger relations with European
capitals who have technology, know-how and arms, keeps its impor-
tance. Besides gaining European support on certain geopolitical issues,
like restraining Iranian influence in the Gulf and Middle East and stability
of Hormuz, is valuable for the Gulf states.
The key question here is how the Gulf States will succeed in balancing
these diversified relations with European states without alienating Wash-
ington DC and Moscow, and without strengthening an intra- EU-27 or
EU-27 vs Britain rivalry (Stansfield et al. 2018) especially in the critical
sectors.
In this paper we will try to answer these questions after highlighting
possible cooperation areas between European powers and Gulf states. In
the first part of the paper we will focus on the question of why EU–
GCC relations have been described as complicated and, given the mixed
record since the 1988 Treaty despite of the fact that both sides have many
reasons to improve their mutual relationship. We aim to underline that
apart from existing structural difficulties in the EU–GCC relationship,
16 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ
provider of the Gulf is not even a choice among alternatives, since there
is no other external power intending to play such a role (Ulrichsen 2019)
This is not because of the neglect of importance of the security of the
region for the stability of Levant, Europe and global energy markets but
because of the limits in the capabilities—especially naval capabilities—to
do so (Sim and Fulton 2019). Accordingly, for most of the EU, “east
of Suez” is not known as one of the traditional areas of power projection
since the UK is not being a member of the EU and France as a member of
Union do see this region as an area of activity but only of a limited nature.
Like the GCC states, EU members also seem to rely on the continuation
of a US strategic presence in the region in order to insure the security of
the Strait of Hormuz and fossil fuel exporting states.
Bilateral relations between GCC/GCC states and some EU member
states who can show their flag in terms of military capabilities (the UK
has a military base in Bahrain, France has one in the UAE, and Germany
is one of the arm exporters to the GCC members along with UK and
France) seem to develop more strongly, and in some occasions at the
expense of EU–GCC relations (Baabood and Edwards 2007). Indeed,
preferring bilateral deals instead of deepening cooperation with the EU is
in harmony with one of the general strategies of the GCC states, what we
call “omni- enmeshment with bandwagoning”.
The term “omni-enmeshment” refers to a strategy, named by Evelyn
Goh, to describe East and South East Asian regional states’ strategy that
is based on engaging with as many big powers as possible through their
involvement in regional institutions and through bilateral arrangements
between them and individual states of the region (Goh 2007). However,
GCC states do not try to include all the various major external powers
in the region’s strategic affairs on an unconditional basis. The first condi-
tion is related to the fact that the Gulf states’ understanding of balance of
power has been based on complex calculations derived from the necessity
of bandwagoning on the US agenda. Hence, practices and discourses of
omni-enmeshment in the region have had to go hand in hand with depen-
dency on US security guarantees. The second condition demands that
the omni-enmeshed states should be prepared to be involved in the Gulf
states regional agenda based on more and more struggle for influence and
rivalry with others (for example with Iran) in the Greater Middle East. All
in all, the omni-enmeshment strategy adopted by the Gulf states serves
both to diversify and balance the needs of these states, and that is why,
even on a bilateral basis, relations between GCC members and European
2 CONVERGING DIVERSIFICATION CONCERNS … 19
states continue to be entangled, even during periods when Europe felt the
necessity to diverge from the GCC agenda—for example, decreasing their
dependency on Arab oil and gas and recognizing new investment oppor-
tunities in the new regional markets like Iran. In such circumstances GCC
states have turned to Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi—and of course
Washington, DC—for support.
Although these structural factors create difficulties for strengthening
inter-regional cooperation between the EU and the Gulf, there are other
factors that keep the EU–GCC train on the right track. Apart from the
importance of Gulf energy imports for the EU, albeit slightly reduced
because the EU’s energy policy has been based on the objective of
reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and the extent of the region’s energy
reserves (almost 1/3 of the world’s crude oil, and 1/5 of the natural
gas), the GCC continues to be an important market for European prod-
ucts. For example, EU–GCC total trade in goods in 2017 amounted
to e143.7 billion. In 2017, EU exports to the GCC amounted to
e99.8 billion. In the meantime, EU imports from the GCC accounted
for only e43.8 billion, generating a significant trade surplus for the EU
(Porcnik 2020). Therefore, keeping GCC as the trade partner of the EU
is important and profitable for Brussels. However, this is not a one-way
road. Europe’s green and nuclear technology market especially in clean
energy and digitization of economies of Arab states (Bianco 2020) is also
gaining importance for the GCC states while in recent years the energy
sector has been changing both globally and in the Gulf.
One of the important trends in the global energy market is the rise
in demand for alternative energy resources in energy mixes. Though the
continued importance of fossil fuel cannot be underestimated, mainly
because of the Asianization of energy demand and the impact of new
technologies and inventions like the shale oil and gas revolution in North
America, this new search for alternative energy resources has had reper-
cussions for both the demand and supply side of the energy market. Gulf
region countries, as important resource-rich countries on the supply side,
are not excluded from these consequences. In the past decade, intended
and unintended interruptions, the invention of new technologies, and
actors’ preferences to explore the connection between the economic
market and political impact of economic pressures together accelerated
the volatility of oil and gas prices in global and regional markets. Hence,
elites in the Gulf countries, where revenues depend on the export of
oil and natural gas, are aware of the increasing sensitivity of consumers
20 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ
always been in the minds of the Gulf states. Hence, engaging with Euro-
pean states and the EU, to change Europe’s general attitude of a balanced
engagement with Iran and the GCC, and engaging with EU defence
markets to manage the risk of abandonment by the US has gained greater
importance especially after 2011.
The first signs of tension between UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
appeared before the embargo crisis but neither the US nor the Euro-
peans contributed positively to any mediation efforts. The EU seemed
rather to concentrate on individualistic and sometimes controversial inter-
ests of its member states in specific cases like in Egypt and Libya. Hence,
while European states continued to function as omni-enmeshed powers,
they could not use this time period when US–GCC relations were rather
chilled to increase their space for manoeuvre and influence over the GCC.
As is well-known, the intra-GCC crisis is not only related to the diver-
gences among the GCC members towards the different Arab Spring
movements, but to their different attitudes towards Iran. US under the
Obama administration seems to have hopes related to a more moderate
Iran in the post-JCPOA environment. Washington’s this optimistic expec-
tation about reengagement of Iran after 2015 nuclear deal brought
divergent position between Abu Dhabi and Riyad on the one hand, and
Doha and Muscat on the other hand naturally deepened the intra-GCC
gap. That is why Obama’s legacy in the Middle East, with his emphasis
on off-shore balancing and engagement with Iran on nuclear issues,has
been remembered bitterly in the Gulf. Since the Syrian conflict continued
to provide opportunities for Iran, Tehran’s activities in Lebanon have
strengthened via Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in
an almost lose-lose conflict in Yemen. Within this atmosphere, in the eyes
of some GCC states, JCPOA represents a kind of reward given to Tehran
because of all her efforts to change the balance of power in the region
to her advantage whereas European states think that JCPOA is a great
opportunity to solve dispute on Iranian nuclear programme.
However, there are also other reasons for the discontent of the Gulf
states. It is known that the JCPOA, which was rejected by Trump, has
certain ambiguities. For example, Iran’s ballistic missile programme is not
part of the deal, so this issue has continued to be of concern for the
GCC states especially when Iran- GCC rivalry in the Gulf and Levant
has been intensifying and while Iranian ballistic missile capabilities are
increasing (Bahgat 2019). Besides, the Deal negates a zero-enrichment
option for Iran, while the ambiguity related to the future of Iranian
nuclear programme, when 10–15 years of the deal elapses, continues to
affect the strategic thought of GCC states, who have their own nuclear
ambitions. Hence, the GCC states, specifically the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, started to demand from the P5 +1 —in other words the US—
what they have already offered to Iran -limited but 3.67 percentage of
24 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ
does not match with some of the GCC countries’ concerns about the
present fate of the 2015 Nuclear Deal- which is linked with the sanctions’
relief to the Tehran regime. From the perspective of sharing the global
oil market it might be preferable for some GCC OPEC countries to see
Tehran’s exports going down to zero. But on the other hand, they cannot
be confident of Iran having after assuming the negative effects of Trump’s
maximum pressure policy-be it economically or militarily- would at the
end chose to leave the JCPOA, which in turn may have to bring nega-
tive security results for the Gulf region and even throughout the whole
Middle East. In fact, in September 2019, the seeds of further instability
could be seen in the Iranian/Houthi proxy attack on the Saudi Arabian
oil sector—the ARAMCO attacks—causing a temporary rise in oil prices
before business went back to normal. However, the concern of the Gulf
as well as the West has not withered away because Tehran’s determina-
tion to destabilize the region via its capabilities remains as a response
to the maximum pressure policy of the US. Even militarization of US
pressure—killing of Soleimani and al-Muhandis in Iraq—did not hinder
Iranian retaliation in the form of missile attacks to US bases in Iraq at the
early days of 2020. Whether Iranian missile attacks were successful or not,
which is still a debatable question, this escalation and Tehran’s muscle-
flexing has led to an increased level of concern in the Gulf states. That
is why additional American military personnel have been sent to Saudi
Arabia to prevent any future attack while the Europeans have remained
militarily side-lined (Gibbons-Nef 2019).
In dealing with Tehran’s situation, regarding the fate of JCPOA and
the imposition of new sanctions by the Trump administration, Brussels
and the GCC may now be seen to be on diverging sides. The EU seems to
be attached to its political engagement policy with Iran via various diplo-
matic initiatives beyond INSTEX,for example Macron’s latest ambitious
but failed attempt of bringing Trump and Rouhani to the negotiation
table- to save the death of the JCPOA Deal (Al Jazeera 2019). Likewise
throughout 2020, in both joint statements of several European states,
such as UK, France and Germany, and in the official statements of Borell,
the EU’s foreign policy chief, the Europeans have continued to reject
the possibility of the imposition of snapback sanctions on Tehran by the
US, since Washington is no longer party to the Deal (Al Jazeera 2020).
However, some GCC states—foremost the KSA—seem to be puzzled
by increasing American extended deterrence guarantees -especially after
the latest attacks to ARAMCO oil sites and Iran’s missile attack to the
28 N. A. GÜNEY AND V. KORKMAZ
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