Full download test bank at ebook textbookfull.

com

The Securitisation of Climate

Change and the Governmentalisation

CLICK LINK TO DOWLOAD

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-
securitisation-of-climate-change-and-the-
governmentalisation-of-security-franziskus-
von-lucke/

textbookfull
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Energy Policy and Security under Climate Change

Filippos Proedrou

https://textbookfull.com/product/energy-policy-and-security-
under-climate-change-filippos-proedrou/

Climate Change and the Role of Education Walter Leal

Filho

https://textbookfull.com/product/climate-change-and-the-role-of-
education-walter-leal-filho/

Climate Change Conflict and In Security 1st Edition

Panos Constantinides

https://textbookfull.com/product/climate-change-conflict-and-in-
security-1st-edition-panos-constantinides/

Sustainable Potato Production and the Impact of Climate

Change Sunil Londhe

https://textbookfull.com/product/sustainable-potato-production-
and-the-impact-of-climate-change-sunil-londhe/
Education and Climate Change: The Role of Universities
Fernando M. Reimers

https://textbookfull.com/product/education-and-climate-change-
the-role-of-universities-fernando-m-reimers/

Liberalism and the Challenge of Climate Change 1st

Edition Christopher Shaw

https://textbookfull.com/product/liberalism-and-the-challenge-of-
climate-change-1st-edition-christopher-shaw/

Sustainable Agriculture in the Era of Climate Change

Rajib Roychowdhury

https://textbookfull.com/product/sustainable-agriculture-in-the-
era-of-climate-change-rajib-roychowdhury/

Water and Land Security in Drylands Response to Climate

Change Evett

https://textbookfull.com/product/water-and-land-security-in-
drylands-response-to-climate-change-evett/

Biodiversity and Health in the Face of Climate Change

Melissa R. Marselle

https://textbookfull.com/product/biodiversity-and-health-in-the-
face-of-climate-change-melissa-r-marselle/
The Securitisation
of Climate Change and
the Governmentalisation
of Security
Franziskus von Lucke
New Security Challenges

Series Editor
George Christou
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK
The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in
their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand
responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy
community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective,
but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the
centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has
been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional
approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of secu-
rity, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental
security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing
political and research agenda.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14732
 Franziskus von Lucke

The Securitisation
of Climate Change
and the
Governmentalisation
of Security
Franziskus von Lucke
Institute of Political Science
University of Tübingen
Tübingen, Germany

New Security Challenges

ISBN 978-3-030-50905-7    ISBN 978-3-030-50906-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50906-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © metamorworks/Shutterstock

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the continuous support
of a number of people. The journey that eventually led to this book started
at the University of Hamburg in the seminars of Angela Oels, which gave
me a first glimpse into the rabbit hole of Foucauldian governmentality
studies and climate politics. Thus, many thanks to Angela Oels for the
inspiration, various interesting discussions and the fruitful collaboration in
the CliSAP excellence cluster. I am also very grateful for the support of
Antje Wiener and Michael Brzoska during my time at the University of
Hamburg.
The journey then continued at the University of Tübingen where I
want to particularly thank my PhD supervisor Thomas Diez who sup-
ported my theoretical ideas from the beginning and with whom I had
countless fruitful debates on governmentality, power, securitisation and
climate change. I am also obliged to my colleagues, the student assistants
and my fellow PhD students in Tübingen, with whom I had great discus-
sions, who helped to compile empirical data and who proofread the book.
Thus, many thanks go to Zehra Wellmann, Schielan Babat, Sandra Dürr,
Thea Güttler, Leonie Haueisen, Benno Keppner, Miriam Keppner,
Katharina Krause, Hanna Spanhel and Josefa Velten. Beyond the Tübingen
crowd, a special thanks to Stefan Elbe, whose ideas greatly inspired my
theoretical approach, and who gave me invaluable feedback on earlier ver-
sions of this book. I am also grateful for the input at workshops, confer-
ences and particularly in the Tübingen IR colloquium. In particular, I
want to thank Ingrid Boas, Olaf Corry, Rita Floyd, Stefano Guzzini,
Andreas Hasenclever, Markus Lederer, Matthias Leese, Matt McDonald,

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Aysem Mert, Delf Rothe and Jürgen Scheffran. Finally, I am indebted to

my interview partners in the US, Mexico, Germany and the UK who took
the time to openly discuss with me the climate security debates in their
respective countries.
Last but not least, a special thanks to my wife Sabrina von Lucke, to my
children as well as to my family and friends who had to endure me in times
of crisis, always took the time to listen to my ideas and continuously helped
me to keep up my motivation to continue this journey until the end.

Tübingen Franziskus von Lucke

29.02.2020
Praise for The Securitisation of Climate Change and
the Governmentalisation of Security

“In this important book, Franziskus von Lucke provides a theoretically sophisti-
cated and empirically rich account of the relationship between security and climate
change. Developing a Foucauldian-inspired account of securitization, the book
rejects blanket or universal claims about the climate change–security relationship,
instead insisting on the need to critically examine how the securitization of climate
change plays out in particular empirical contexts. Exploring the cases of the US,
Germany and Mexico, von Lucke points to distinctive dynamics of securitization
in these settings, with different implications for the practices these in turn encour-
age. Ultimately, this book constitutes an important addition to literature on the
relationship between climate change and security, while developing a distinct and
nuanced account of securitization that will be of interest to a wide range of schol-
ars of security in international relations.”
—Associate Professor Matt McDonald is a Reader in International Relations at
the University of Queensland, Australia

“In 2019 a number of states and other actors (notably the European Union) have
made climate emergency declarations. It is therefore more important than ever to
understand what the securitization of the climate means. That is: Who can securi-
tize? What security measures are likely/deemed legitimate by relevant audiences?
How does securitization affect the population within and outside a securitizing
state? And perhaps most importantly of all, will it succeed? Franziskus von Lucke’s
carefully researched book offers answers to all of these questions and many others
besides. von Lucke proceeds by examining with the US, Mexico and Germany,
three real-life empirical cases of climate securitization. Each one provides unique
insights that enable a fuller understanding of climate security. Accessibly written
this is a must read for scholars and practitioners alike.”
—Dr Rita Floyd, University of Birmingham, UK, author of The Morality of
Security: A theory of just Securitization, 2019

“With great empirical detail and conceptual clarity, the book compares discourses
and practices of climate security in different contexts. An essential reading for any-
one interested in international climate politics, securitization theory, governmen-
tality and the notion of power in International Relations.”
—Dr Delf Rothe, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg
at the University of Hamburg, Germany
 Contents

1 Introduction and Theoretical Framework  1

2 United States: Climate Change, National Security

and the Climatisation of the Defence Sector 59

3 Germany: Climate Change, Human Security

and Southern Populations117

4 Mexico: Analysing Securitisation in the Global South177

5 Revisiting the Securitisation of Climate Change

and the Governmentalisation of Security225

Index279

ix
 About the Author

Franziskus von Lucke is a researcher in International Relations at the

University of Tübingen. His research focuses on critical security studies,
climate politics and climate justice, and he has worked extensively on the
securitisation of climate change. His works have appeared in
Geopolitics, the Journal of International Relations and Development and in
the Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen.

xi
 List of Abbreviations

ASP American Security Project

BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und
Reaktorsicherheit – Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (German
Environmental Ministry) (temporarily renamed BMUB in 2013)
BMVg Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Federal Ministry of
Defence (Germany)
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und
Entwicklung – Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (Germany)
C2ES Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
CAN Climate Action Network
CAP Center for American Progress
CCC Centro de Colaboración Cívica – Civic Cooperation Centre
CCS Center for Climate & Security
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – Christian
Democratic Union of Germany
CEMDA Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental – Mexican Centre for
Environmental Law
CENAPRED Centro Nacional de Prevención de Desastres – National Centre
for Disaster Prevention
CENTCOM US Central Command
CFR Council on Foreign Relations
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICC Comisión Intersecretarial de Cambio Climático – Inter-­
Ministerial Commission for Climate Change

xiii
xiv List of Abbreviations

CISEN Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional – Centre for

Research and National Security
CMM Centro Mario Molina – Mario Molina Centre
CNAS Center for a New American Security
COP Conference of the Parties
CPI Climate Performance Index
CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies
CSS Critical Security Studies
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
ENCC Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático – National Strategy on
Climate Change
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FONDEN Fondo de Desastres Naturales de México – Mexican Natural
Disaster Fund
FOPREDEN Fondo para la Prevención de Desastres Naturales – Mexican
Federal Fund for the Prevention of Disasters
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit –
German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
(formerly GTZ)
GLOBE Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment
HDI Human Development Index
IfP-EW Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action
INE Instituto Nacional de Ecología – National Institute for Ecology
INECC Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático – National
Institute for Ecology and Climate Change
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MAB Military Advisory Board
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSS National Security Strategy
ODUSD-ES Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense –
Environmental Security
 List of Abbreviations  xv

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAN Partido Acción Nacional – National Action Party
PDCI Partners for Democratic Change International
PEACC Plan Estatal de Acción ante el Cambio Climático – State Level
Plan for Climate Action
PECC Programa Especial de Cambio Climático – Special Programme
on Climate Change
PIK Potsdam Institut für Klimafolgenforschung – Potsdam Institute
for Climate Impact Research
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional – Institutional
Revolutionary Party
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
SAGARPA Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y
Alimentación – Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock,
Rural Development, Fisheries and Food
SEGOB Secretaría de Gobernación – Mexican Home Office
SEMARNAT Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales –
Department of the Environment and Natural Resources
SERDP Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Social Democratic
Party of Germany
SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit – German Institute for
International and Security Affairs
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAM Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México – National
Autonomous University of Mexico
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
WBGU Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung für Globale
Umweltveränderungen – German Advisory Council on
Global Change
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Sovereign power 21

Table 1.2 Disciplinary power 24
Table 1.3 Governmental power 27
Table 1.4 Sovereign discourse 33
Table 1.5 Disciplinary discourse 35
Table 1.6 Governmental discourse 38
Table 5.1 Political impacts of climate security discourses 239

xvii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

Introduction
On June 22, 2018, at a European Union (EU) high-level event on
‘Climate, Peace and Security: The Time for Action’ High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini urged that act-
ing on climate change was to invest ‘in our own security’ (EEAS 2018).
Only a few weeks later, on July 11, 2018, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) once again discussed ‘climate-related security risks’ and
the Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed made clear that ‘cli-
mate change is a real threat and it is proceeding at a relentless pace’ (UNSC
2018). Finally, in January 2019 at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Greta Thunberg, who has become famous for her passionate and inexo-
rable climate activism and her role in starting the Fridays for Future move-
ment, warned that ‘our house is on fire’ and urged political leaders to
immediately adopt measures to stop climate change (Thunberg 2019a).
These three examples are all part of a longstanding political debate that
has highlighted the catastrophic consequences of climate change and
linked the issue to a range of security concerns (Brauch 2009; Rothe 2016;
Dyer 2018; Lippert 2019; McDonald 2013). This ‘securitisation process’
(Buzan et al. 1998) already began in the 1980s when climate change first
entered international politics and began to be discussed in relation to
broader environmental security concerns (Floyd 2010, p. 75; Hardt
2017). Since then, the debate has expanded continuously and made

© The Author(s) 2020 1

F. von Lucke, The Securitisation of Climate Change and the
Governmentalisation of Security, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50906-4_1
2 F. VON LUCKE

climate change the undisputed focal point when it comes to linking

changes in the environment to security concerns (Brzoska and Oels 2011,
p. 51). Politically, these debates have not been without consequences.
Even though the empirical and causal connection between climate change
and security or conflict is contested in the academic literature (Scheffran
et al. 2012b; Barnett 2000; Buhaug et al. 2014), the persistent linking of
the two has nevertheless established climate change as one of the defining
security problems of the twenty-first century in global politics (Chaturvedi
and Doyle 2015; Rothe 2016; Lippert 2019; Dyer 2018; Dalby 2013b).
Linking climate change with security thus has decisively transformed how
political practitioners handle these issues and has legitimised numerous
policies and practices (Floyd 2010; Diez et al. 2016; Oels 2012; UNGA
2009b; WBGU 2008; Scott and Ku 2018). However, despite the apparent
consensus that climate change is not only an environmental concern, eco-
nomic problem or a matter of justice but will very soon have tangible
security implications, activists, political practitioners and scientists differ
considerably when it comes to conceptions of security to make sense of
climate change.
Some have predominately pointed to its ‘national security’ conse-
quences, for example, direct threats to the territorial integrity of states and
the increase in violent conflicts. As a consequence, they have urged to
integrate climate change into the planning of traditional security institu-
tions to prepare for a future ravaged by climate-induced violent conflicts
(CNA 2007, p. 6; CNA Military Advisory Board 2014, p. 21; Chaturvedi
and Doyle 2015; Buxton et al. 2016; Briggs 2012). In stark contrast, oth-
ers have emphasised the repercussions of rising temperatures for ‘human
security’, meaning the general deterioration of living conditions of poor
populations mainly due to resource scarcity and an increase in extreme
weather events (WBGU 2008, p. 1; see also GTZ 2008b, p. 8; Scheffran
et al. 2012a). To handle the resulting problems, they have recommended
lowering the vulnerability of affected populations by transforming prob-
lematic behaviour, to scale up adaptation efforts and to increase develop-
ment aid (GTZ 2008a, p. 55; WBGU 2008, pp. 10, 115). Finally, many
have refrained from concrete threat constructions and have instead
depicted climate change as an overall ‘risk’ that will gradually affect count-
less variables and in turn pertain a whole range of risk groups and areas
around the world (adelphi 2012, p. 31; World Bank et al. 2013, pp. xviii,
xx; Corry 2012; Lippert 2019; Oels 2011; Rothe 2011b). From this point
of view, the appropriate response is to develop sophisticated risk
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 3

management schemes to increase the resilience of risk groups and areas in

order to eventually keep the overall risk at a tolerable level (Greenpeace
México 2010, p. 57; World Bank et al. 2013, p. xvii).
Thus, despite the agreement that climate change is somehow linked to
security problems, the exact nature of the threat, the affected referent
objects as well as the political and normative consequences of handling
climate change as security issue are far from clear. This is not only true for
the political debate but even more so for the academic literature, which
tries to make sense of the empirical ‘climate security nexus’ (Scheffran
et al. 2012a) and the political consequences of linking climate change to
security conceptions (Brauch 2009; Diez et al. 2016; Detraz and Betsill
2009; Corry 2012; McDonald 2013; Dyer 2018; Buxton et al. 2016;
Rothe 2016). The aim of this book is to contribute to these debates by
exploring how specific security representations of climate change have
influenced political debates, policies and practices. It thus focuses on how
to theoretically make sense of the diversity of security conceptions that are
associated with climate change; how different discourses of climate change
as security issue have come about in diverse contexts; whether and how
they make a difference in terms of political consequences and what norma-
tive implications this has.

The Evolution of the Climate Security Nexus in Academic

and Political Debates
Much of the alarming political debate on climate security is based on aca-
demic literature about the nexus between the environment, climate change
and security (Buhaug et al. 2014; Brauch and Scheffran 2012; Lee 2009;
Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Hardt 2017). This research to a considerable
extent draws on older works on environmental security and conflict origi-
nating in the 1980s and 1990s (Ullmann 1983, p. 134; Dalby 2009,
p. 14; Deudney 1990; Deudney and Matthew 1999; Pirages 1991). It also
stems from the theoretical debates about the ‘broadening’ (e.g. not only
states are considered as security threats) and ‘deepening’ (e.g. new episte-
mological foundations of thinking about security and the consideration of
new referent objects such as individuals) of traditional understandings of
state or military security (Ullmann 1983; Booth 1991; Krause and Williams
1996, 1997; Mathews 1989). Empirically, this research focused on the
questions whether and how environmental change could initiate or con-
tribute to social, political or ultimately violent conflict (Homer-Dixon
4 F. VON LUCKE

1991, 1994) as well as lead to hundreds of millions of environmental refu-

gees (Myers 1995). Notwithstanding the weak empirical evidence for any
of these claims (Hartmann 2010, p. 235; Greenpeace 2007; Oels and
Carvalho 2012), a range of different political actors eagerly adopted this
argumentation to advance their political agenda.
At the beginning of these debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
climate change was only discussed as one issue besides other environmen-
tal problems that were increasingly linked to security concerns and con-
flict. However, due to its global reach and overall magnitude, it soon
became one of the key dangers. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s,
several environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Oels
2012, p. 186; Myers 1995) picked up the security framing to raise atten-
tion for climate change. Amongst other factors, this contributed to impor-
tant breakthroughs in the international negotiations on climate change.
Examples are the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the commencement of the
yearly Conferences of the Parties (COP) in 1995 and the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which all, to some extent, were also legitimised
by referring to the threatening potential of climate change.
While environmental and climate security debates became less prevalent
towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the increasing scientific
evidence for the far-reaching implications of global warming epitomised in
the ever more detailed reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2001, 2007) restarted the debate in the mid-­2000s
(Brzoska and Oels 2011; Oels and von Lucke 2015). In contrast to the
earlier discussions, other environmental problems largely ceased to play an
important role, and climate change became the undisputed centre of this
novel environmental security debate. Academically, this led to a renewed
interest in questions about how environmental degradation and particu-
larly climate change contributed to violent conflict or migration (Scheffran
et al. 2012b; Barnett 2003; Barnett and Adger 2007; Scheffran et al.
2012a; Hsiang et al. 2013; Gleditsch 2012). While the findings of this
research were mixed (Scheffran et al. 2012c; Barnett and Adger 2005,
2007; Salehyan 2008; Gleditsch 2012), this did not prevent numerous
political actors from claiming that climate change indeed was one of the
main security challenges of our times and necessitated urgent action,
which entailed genuine climate mitigation, but also the development of
military counter-strategies.
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 5

Amongst the first political actors that actively waged this debate were
security policy-focused think tanks in the United States (US), which par-
ticularly since 2007 have repeatedly drawn a connection between climate
change and national security (CNA 2007; Campbell et al. 2007; Campbell
2008). Beyond these, the former Vice President of the US and Democratic
presidential candidate Albert ‘Al’ Gore at various occasions highlighted
the far-reaching security implications of climate change (Gore 2007). On
the other side of the Atlantic, the German Advisory Council on Global
Changes (WBGU) published a widely received report on ‘Climate Change
as Security Risk’ (WBGU 2008), and the European Union (EU) as well
discussed the security implications of climate change in 2008 (Solana and
EU Commission 2008) and most recently in 2018 (EEAS 2018).
Moreover, several environmental and human rights NGOs began to
frame climate change as security issue (Greenpeace 2007, 2013; Christian
Aid 2006, 2007; Smith and Vivekananda 2007). On the global level, the
UN Secretary-General has published a widely noted report on the possi-
ble security implications of climate change (UNGA 2009a), and the
UNSC discussed the repercussions of climate change for ‘global peace
and security’ in 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2018 (UNSC 2007, 2011, 2013,
2018; Scott and Ku 2018) and in 2019 held a debate on climate change
as a ‘threat multiplier’ (UNSC 2019). Finally, even though not always
directly mentioning the word ‘security’, Greta Thunberg, Fridays for
Future, as well as other movements such as Extinction Rebellion have
repeatedly emphasised the catastrophic and existentially threatening con-
sequences of climate change. Instead of ‘climate change’, they hence
increasingly use terms such as ‘climate crisis’, ‘climate breakdown’, ‘cli-
mate apocalypse’ or ‘climate emergency’ (Fridays for Future Austria
2019; Thunberg 2019a, b; Extinction Rebellion 2019). While aiming at
conveying the far-reaching consequences of the issue and calling the pub-
lic and politicians to action, they also contribute to the continued securi-
tisation of climate change.
In general, while economic arguments (Stern 2006), justice concep-
tions (Caney 2006, 2010; Finley-Brook 2014) and growing scientific evi-
dences (IPCC 2007) also mattered, constructing climate change as
security issue has been central when it comes to raising attention and facili-
tating as well as accelerating political responses. One example is the 15th
Conference of the Parties (COP) summit in Copenhagen in 2009, which
received unparalleled attention in the media and public debates not least
because it took place during the peak of the global climate security debate
6 F. VON LUCKE

(Oels 2012; Methmann and Rothe 2012). The widespread political and
media attention for the various UNSC debates on climate change and its
implication for peace and security further illustrates this argument (Sindico
2007; Goldenberg 2011; Brössler 2019; Oels and von Lucke 2015; Scott
2015; Scott and Ku 2018). Beyond the international level, linking climate
change to security concerns also changed the domestic debates and influ-
enced a range of policies and political practices in various countries
(Brzoska 2012; Buxton et al. 2016; Rothe 2016). As the Chaps. 2, 3 and
4 of this book show in more detail, it helped to legitimise far-reaching
climate policies in Germany, facilitated an integration of climate change
into security policy in the US and transformed disaster management
approaches in Mexico.
Having said that, these widespread climate security debates did not result
in a consensus about what specific kind of security issue climate change is,
what the appropriate countermeasures could entail and whether linking cli-
mate change to security is to be welcomed from a normative perspective.
The academic literature on the climate security nexus is not of much help
here because even though it casts doubt on the connection between climate
change and security, it has not looked at the resulting political debates. This
raises the questions why and how climate security discourses (entailing dif-
ferent conceptions of security) have become so prominent in the political
debate notwithstanding their sometimes weak empirical foundations and
what political consequences this securitisation has had exactly (see, e.g.,
Floyd 2010; Trombetta 2011; Oels 2012; McDonald 2005, 2008, 2013;
Corry 2012; Dyer 2018; Rothe 2016; Lippert 2019).
According to the original securitisation theory, the Copenhagen School
(Buzan et al. 1998), security issues are socially constructed (Buzan et al.
1998, p. 24) and a successful securitisation establishes a political platform for
the legitimisation of extraordinary measures to counter a threat (Buzan et al.
1998, p. 21). While some might understand the yearly COPs or milestones
of the international climate regime such as Kyoto or the latest Paris
Agreement as extraordinary, most scholars agree that they do not go beyond
normal politics, particularly given their more than questionable effect on the
abatement of climate change (Oels and von Lucke 2015, p. 47; Gardiner
2004; Caney 2016; Buzan and Wæver 2009; Stripple 2002). The increasing
criticism by social movements and climate activists such as Greta Thunberg,
Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, which have become much
more vocal since 2016, further underline that the current handling of cli-
mate change is far from extraordinary. Theoretically, one conclusion
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7

hence could simply be that the securitisation of climate change has been
unsuccessful and inconsequential, at least from the perspective of the
Copenhagen School (Oswald Spring and Brauch 2011; Oels 2012). Yet,
notwithstanding the absence of a successful securitisation or extraordinary
responses in Copenhagen terms, many scholars have continued to analyse
the climate security debate from a broader securitisation perspective. Based
on the ‘stubborn persistence’ (Ciuta 2009, p. 312) of so many political prac-
titioners who keep calling climate change a security threat, these scholars
assume that there must be political advantages in doing so, on which the
original concept of securitisation does not focus (Brzoska 2009; McDonald
2012; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Corry 2012).
Thus, instead of a clear-cut threshold between politicisation or normal
politics and securitisation, this literature understands the process as a con-
tinuum (Diez et al. 2016, pp. 18–19; Oels and von Lucke 2015; Bigo and
Tsoukala 2008; Stritzel 2007; Vuori 2008). In order to assess the effects
of securitisation, it has largely focused on counterfactual reasoning and
measuring the degree of success based on policies which without the secu-
ritisation would not have been accepted or seen as legitimate in the politi-
cal debate (Trombetta 2008, p. 600). This has opened up a whole range
of research avenues in relation to (different) climate security debates. A
common finding is that there are multiple forms of securitisation in the
case of climate change that heavily depend on the broader context in
which they take place and that can have very different political conse-
quences (Diez et al. 2016; Grauvogel and Diez 2014; Detraz and Betsill
2009; McDonald 2013; Trombetta 2011; Oels 2011; Corry 2012). These
consequences are not necessarily extraordinary but nevertheless differ
considerably from how the issue was handled before the security dimen-
sion was considered. The debate thus has already come a long way in
overcoming some of the problems of the Copenhagen School when it
comes to analysing the securitisation of climate change. However, the
existing literature still has considerable blind spots, not only concerning
the theoretical conception of securitisation and its political consequences
but also in terms of its limited empirical focus.

The Missing Conceptualisation of Power and the Absence

of Detailed Case Studies
Concerning theory, a key shortcoming of the existing research is an insuf-
ficient problematisation of the role of power in securitisation processes.
8 F. VON LUCKE

Taking a closer look at the micro dynamics and actual practices of power
(Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Burgess 2011)
can help to theoretically substantiate several of the core findings of the
securitisation literature and thus benefit the development of a more coher-
ent understanding of securitisation in general. A closer look reveals that
power relations are involved in enabling securitisation in the first place by
forming the basis or context from which certain actors can legitimately
speak security, by working as catalyst for political attention and by agenda-­
setting (Burgess 2011, pp. 40–41; Hansen 2000, p. 303). Moreover, they
constrain the securitising actors’ choices concerning the security argu-
ments they can use (i.e. which stand a chance of resonating within a spe-
cific context) and hence lead to very different forms of securitisation
entailing a diverse set of security conceptions (Balzacq 2011a, p. 26;
Trombetta 2011, p. 141). Beyond that, different forms of power shape
the political consequences that specific security discourses can have by
transforming governance practices and making possible particular policies
and ruling out others (Trombetta 2011, p. 142; Balzacq 2011a, p. 16;
Elbe 2009, p. 15). Finally, understanding the underlying power dynamics
can also contribute to a more thorough and nuanced discussion of the
normative implications of securitisation (Elbe 2009, pp. 157–158; Floyd
2007a, 2011; Nyman and Burke 2016).
One of the crucial problems of the existing securitisation literature in
relation to power is that, on the one hand, the Copenhagen School and
some of its extensions have mainly operated with a state-centred top-down
conception of security. In many cases, this implies a traditional and one-­
dimensional understanding of political power (Trombetta 2008, p. 600,
2011, p. 139; Williams 2003). This does not adequately capture the much
more nuanced pathways of power in securitisation processes, as the exten-
sive debates about different forms of climate security exemplify. On the
other hand, alternative approaches to securitisation such as the Paris
School of (in)securitisation around Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans (Bigo
2002, 2008, 2009; Huysmans 2002, 2004) and the literature on risk
(Kessler 2012, p. 20; Aradau and van Munster 2007; Lobo-Guerrero
2007; Neal 2004; Hameiri 2008; Hameiri and Jones 2013) have gone
towards the other extreme. Here, securitisation is predominantly concep-
tualised as an ongoing and low-key process in which professionals of (in)
security slowly expand a never-ending state of exception (Bigo 2002,
p. 73; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). In between these two more extreme
poles on the power continuum are studies that have looked at different
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 9

‘frames’ or ‘discourses’ of climate security (McDonald 2013; Detraz and

Betsill 2009; von Lucke et al. 2014; Grauvogel and Diez 2014). These
works circumvent the problem of overestimating one particular under-
standing of security or power. However, they primarily derive these differ-
ent climate security discourses from the existing literature. In doing so,
they lack a deeper theoretically grounded problematisation of how exactly
different forms of political power lie at the heart of different securitisations
and enable different political consequences.
Another substantial gap in the literature on the securitisation of climate
change concerns its empirical scope and depth. Apart from notable excep-
tions (Detraz and Betsill 2009; McDonald 2012, 2013; Diez et al. 2016;
Rothe 2016; Floyd 2010), most works primarily make a theoretical point
(Corry 2012; Methmann and Rothe 2012; Oels 2011, 2012; Trombetta
2011), which has led them to chiefly rely on exemplary data without sub-
stantively contributing to our understanding of the climate security debate
and its political consequences in actual empirical cases. Moreover, they
often focus on the global debate on climate security and its implications
for the international climate negotiations (Oels 2011, 2012, 2013;
Methmann and Rothe 2012; Methmann 2011, 2014; Trombetta 2008,
2011; Corry 2012; Scott and Ku 2018), on security in the Anthropocene
(Dalby 2013a, 2014; Fagan 2017; Hardt 2017; Harrington and Shearing
2017), or on individual case studies (McDonald 2012), and here mainly
on the US (Floyd 2010; Brzoska 2009; Hartmann 2009; Fletcher 2009;
Harris 2002; Leiserowitz 2005; Nagel 2011; Richert 2009) or on specific
international institutions (Scott and Ku 2018; Lippert 2019). Only very
few studies compare different securitisation processes in diverse political
and cultural contexts (Diez et al. 2016; Rothe 2016), which is necessary
in order to understand the context-dependence and multiplicity of securi-
tisation and its political consequences. Closely connected, there is a
Western bias in the research on the securitisation of climate change, hence
it has largely neglected to study securitisation processes in the Global
South (Boas 2014; Bilgin 2010; von Lucke 2018). This is especially sur-
prising in the context of climate change, as most climate security discourses
as well as the estimates of the IPCC (2015, pp. 13, 50, 54) predict the first
and most severe effects to take place in (poor) Southern countries, beg-
ging the question whether the political effects of securitisation differ under
these circumstances.
Thus, there is considerable demand for detailed comparative empirical
studies that analyse the securitisation of climate change across different
10 F. VON LUCKE

political and cultural contexts. Such studies can help to move the debate
beyond the development of ever more sophisticated theoretical approaches
without actually applying them to empirical cases. It also strengthens our
understanding of the concrete political and institutional effects of linking
climate change to security conceptions.

Core Argument and Structure of the Book

The chief purpose of this book is thus to make sense of the multifaceted
securitisation of climate change in different contexts (Brauch 2009; Detraz
and Betsill 2009; Floyd 2010; McDonald 2013; Trombetta 2012; Oels
2012) while at the same time advancing the theoretical concept of securi-
tisation. For this purpose, it offers a novel take on securitisation theory by
focusing on the so far largely neglected role of power. The emphasis on
power helps to better capture and theoretically make sense of the ambigu-
ous and diverse variants of securitisation and the ever-changing concept of
security itself (Opitz 2008, p. 206; Elbe 2009, p. 76; Hardt 2017). It also
expands our understanding of the powerful political and normative conse-
quences of constructing non-traditional issues in terms of security.
While several extensions of the Copenhagen School and entirely new
approaches to securitisation have touched upon this issue, in order to fully
understand the role of power in securitisation processes, we need an alter-
native theoretical approach. As the second part of this chapter discusses in
more detail, a Foucauldian governmentality framework (Foucault 2006a,
b; Dean 2010; Dillon 2006) lends itself particularly well for this endeav-
our (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Elbe 2009, 2011; Oels 2011,
2012, 2013). It primarily rests on Michel Foucault’s governmentality lec-
tures (2006a, b), which claim that political rule, in general, has undergone
a decisive transformation. Thus, we can witness a ‘governmentalisation of
the state’ (Foucault 2006b, p. 163), which means that governance does
not only rest anymore on direct top-down interventions by the state (sov-
ereign power). Instead, it consists of a power triangle, which includes
‘productive’ forms of power (Foucault and Faubion 2002; Foucault and
Gordon 1980) such as disciplinary and governmental power that try to
control and transform the behaviour of individuals or to govern the popu-
lation through indirect risk management strategies (Foucault 2006b,
pp. 161–165). This transformation does not only apply to governance in
general, but at least since the 1980s, there is also a ‘governmentalisation
of security’ (Elbe 2009, p. 9; Oels 2011, 2012), entailing a
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 11

disentanglement of (successful) securitisation from exclusively extraordi-

nary measures and the growing importance of disciplinary and govern-
mental power in the realm of security. From this vantage point,
securitisation becomes a specific form of ‘security governance1’ that ren-
ders issues governable resting on different forms of power, which in turn
can be linked to contemporary security conceptions ranging from national
security, human security to risk (Elbe 2009, pp. 12, 14–18). Eventually,
the securitisation of political issues can bring about very specific and far-
reaching yet not necessarily extraordinary political consequences, depend-
ing on which power forms and security conceptions prevail.
Conceptualising securitisation as part of this governmentalisation of
security and hence as a specific way to exercise political power can help us
to better understand at least four interrelated aspects of the securitisation
process. Firstly, it establishes a theoretical framework for understanding
the continuous transformation of security and the parallelism of (and con-
nections between) different power forms. A governmentality perspective
thus sets the concept of securitisation into a wider historical and cultural
context, in which different security practices constantly struggle for politi-
cal relevance (Opitz 2008, p. 206; Elbe 2009, p. 12; Foucault 2006b,
p. 76). Secondly, it sheds light on the role of power in constituting the
subjects and objects of securitisation. Based on its more nuanced under-
standing of political power, such a framework goes beyond the analysis of
fixed securitising actors, referent objects and audiences and instead shows
how these are constantly created, legitimised or discredited within differ-
ent discourses of security (Burgess 2011, p. 40; Hansen 2000, p. 303).
Thirdly, the multifaceted and dynamic conceptualisation of power inher-
ent in the idea of the governmentalisation of security contributes to make
sense of the diversity of securitisations and the varying political conse-
quences. Depending on which power forms overweigh and how they are
combined and enacted in different political and cultural contexts, different
policies or practices seem legitimate or are discarded as irrelevant.
Securitisation is hence linked to the exercise of political power by helping
to put new issues onto the agenda, by acting as a catalyst for the political
debate and by directly influencing key policies and practices. Finally, a
governmentality perspective provides a theoretical frame of reference for
discussing the normative effects and desirability of securitisation in general

1
I understand governance in a wider sense as constituting and arranging actors around a
discursively constructed ‘governance-object’ (Methmann 2014, p. 10; Corry 2010).
12 F. VON LUCKE

and different discourses of climate security in particular (Nyman and

Burke 2016; Floyd 2011; McDonald 2011).
Beyond advancing this theoretical re-conceptualisation of securitisa-
tion, this book strengthens the detailed comparative research on the secu-
ritisation of climate change. Instead of analysing climate security discourses
at the global level, it thus focuses on three in-depth country case studies,
namely the US, Germany and Mexico. It thereby includes two developed
countries with often diametrically opposed policies on climate change and
different political cultures, in which the security implications of climate
change have been discussed very prominently. Yet, it also explores the so
far under-researched issue of securitisation in the Global South and in
countries that are predicted to be highly affected by the adverse effects of
climate change (Boas 2014; Bilgin 2010). Looking at the domestic debates
of these different countries instead of the international negotiations does
not only close a gap in the literature but also has methodological advan-
tages. It makes it easier to directly trace back how different climate secu-
rity discourses have legitimised and influenced specific policies and
practices and hence helps to overcome one of the core problems of gov-
ernmentality studies that often shy away from looking at the actual imple-
mentation of political programmes (Mckee 2009, pp. 473–474; Bröckling
et al. 2012, pp. 16–17). A further advantage of the comparative case study
design is that it allows studying the securitisation of climate change in
diverse cultural, political and economic environments and thus to inquire
how the broader contexts matter in enabling and shaping specific securiti-
sation processes.
Concerning methodology and the empirical data, the book rests on an
extensive qualitative discourse analysis of the most relevant reports, gov-
ernment documents and parliamentary debates on climate change (and
security) in the three countries between the late 1980s and 2015. In addi-
tion to analysing documents, a range of expert interviews with key politi-
cal practitioners in each country has helped to situate the findings in
country-specific political debates and to uncover important political net-
works. The comparative focus on different country cases and the compre-
hensive analysis of the empirical material allow coming to a detailed and
systematic understanding of how securitisation discourses emerge in spe-
cific political environments, how they function and how this eventually
translates into concrete policies and practices.
In order to advance the above-introduced theoretical and empirical
aims, the second part of this introductory chapter substantiates the
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 13

theoretical claims and develops the overall analytical framework. Mainly

building on Michel Foucault’s governmentality lectures (2006a, b) and
contemporary extensions of his work by Stefan Elbe (2009, 2011),
Mitchell Dean (2010) and Angela Oels (2011, 2012), the chapter devel-
ops three distinct climate security discourses which draw on different
forms of political power and are linked to different political effects.
Drawing on this theoretical framework, Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 analyse the cli-
mate security debates in the US, Germany and Mexico. Each chapter
briefly discusses the origins of the climate security debate in the respective
country and then analyses the evolution of different climate security dis-
courses in the period of investigation. Based on this analysis, the chapters
show how each unique combination of discourses and power forms has
legitimised specific political consequences. This includes the empower-
ment of a diverse set of actors as well as changed policies and practices in
key political sectors (environment, defence and security, development and
disaster management). Based on this detailed analysis, Chap. 5 draws
broader comparative conclusions about how securitisation functions in
general, the role of power and the normative implications of securitising
climate change.

Developing an Analytical Framework to Study

(Powerful) Climate Security Discourses
As argued above, a Foucauldian power and governance focused approach
of securitisation can greatly add to our understanding of ongoing securiti-
sation processes in non-traditional sectors such as climate politics. With its
fine-grained analytics of political power, it helps to make sense of the
divergent political effects of different threat constructions beyond and
below extraordinary measures. At the same time, the original securitisa-
tion theory reminds us that invoking security conceptions and designating
something as a threat, be it to national or human security or as a diffuse
risk construction, transforms the political debate and makes possibly a
novel treatment of the issues at stake. It may not always elevate the issue
into high politics or legitimise non-democratic extraordinary measures.
Yet, based on the specific threat constructions and underlying power
forms, it enables new forms of governance (Dean 2010, pp. 266–267)
that without the security framing would not have been accepted as legiti-
mate or have had the same impact.
14 F. VON LUCKE

Starting out from the original ideas of Michel Foucault on governmen-

tality, but also inspired by the works of Stefan Elbe (2009), Angela Oels
(2011, 2012), Mitchell Dean (2010) and others, in this section I intro-
duce a specific reading of the governmentality approach and discuss its
relevance for securitisation theory. The origins of the governmentality
approach lie in Foucault’s research on political power and particularly in
his lectures at the College de France (Foucault 2006a, b) where he criti-
cises the Political Science research of that time for focusing too much on
repressive forms of power and government (Foucault 1983, p. 83; Oels
2010, p. 172; Lemke 2002, p. 51). The mainstream research mainly con-
ceptualised governance as top-down enterprise carried out by a sovereign
state without much interference of non-state actors or the governed enti-
ties themselves. And despite some nuanced research on power (Lukes
2005; Bachrach and Baratz 1962), the predominant, ‘juridico-political
discourse’ (1979, p. 88, 1983, p. 84) saw power as something that could
be possessed and wielded at will. Power was directly tied to the capacity of
specific actors to control the actions of others (Barnett and Duvall 2005)
and hence conceptualised as something constraining, dominating and
essentially bad, exercised from a top-down perspective over the governed
subjects without many possibilities to resist.
Against this mainstream perspective, Foucault developed his own,
much more diverse understanding of power. For Foucault, power can take
very different forms, for example, strategic games, structuring fields of
possibility and above all is ‘productive’ (Opitz 2008, p. 216). It thus
enables political developments and constitutes subject positions. It mainly
does so by being ingrained in what Foucault called the ‘discourse’ or later
on the ‘dispositive’ (Foucault 2003; Dean 2010, 2012; Jäger and Meier
2009; Aradau et al. 2014a, p. 64). A discourse is a power-knowledge
nexus that constitutes reality in a certain way, thus defining what is right
or wrong and who is empowered to speak the ‘truth’. It is only through
discourse that humans can access reality and knowledge. Thus, all reality
and truth are exposed to and shaped by power dynamics:

Power is a relationship between actors that produce knowledges and truths

that lead to individual and social practices that in turn tend to disseminate
those truths. Knowledge transmits and disseminates the effects of power
[…], while truth is a status given to certain knowledge by power. […] Truth
is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and
sustain it. (Foucault 1980, p. 133)
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 15

Power in Foucault’s sense is everywhere not only in instances of direct

influence or in the hands of seemingly powerful individuals. Instead, its
most central functions include the constitution of subject positions, desires
and truths in the first place. Moreover, by having the capacity to be pro-
ductive and empowering, power is not something essentially bad from
which people must be rescued. This clearly distinguishes the Foucauldian
understanding from mainstream views of power as an asymmetrical force
against which no resistance is possible—something which Foucault has
termed ‘domination’ (Lemke 2002, p. 53; Dean 2010, p. 58).
Based on this more nuanced concept of power, Foucault set out to
rethink the concept of governance. In his governmentality lectures, he
starts out from an extensive genealogical analysis of the term ‘to govern’
(Dean 2010, p. 3) and its underlying power forms since the ancient times
and tries to condense the dominant meaning of the term in different
epochs to capture its continuous transformation. In this analysis, not the
first appearance of the term is important but the point in time when peo-
ple begin to consciously deal with it, enabling the development of certain
tactics, strategies and modes of action (Foucault 2006b, p. 425). In order
to reconceptualise contemporary debates on governance and power,
Foucault takes the older, much broader meaning of the term ‘to govern’
as a starting point where governing is not restricted to the state, but also
applies to the governing of the family, the economy or even the self
(Foucault 2006b, p. 183). Thus, contrary to the mainstream understand-
ing, Foucault claims that the term only gradually has become so closely
tied to the idea of the state (Foucault 2006b, p. 135). He then combines
this broader meaning with the idea of different ‘mentalities’ underpinning
governance processes.
The basic question that Foucault tries to answer here was how it became
possible that in modern societies power and governance could concentrate
on the institution of the state (Lemke 2002, p. 58). In this view, gover-
nance in the form of the state is only one very specific way to exercise
power and the state itself becomes a specific ‘tactic’ of government.
Government or governmental power2 as a specific form of power does not

2
In Foucault’s writing, he uses the term ‘governmental management’, which, despite some
differences, sometimes is also equated with ‘bio power’ (Kelly 2009, p. 60; Foucault 2006b,
p. 161). However, for better comparability with the other power forms and in order to delin-
eate my approach from the existing literature, I use the term ‘governmental power’ through-
out this book.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
London; and yet, just now, he carried himself under a stiff curb, lest
he forget his war....
“And that’s the end of the man who lowered the fluids in the British
barometer, like a typhoon in the China Sea,” he observed in solitude.
“And the Japanese buried him in the Kameido, in cherry-blossom
time—buried him for money—the man who opened the veins of their
Empire!”
The work all done, Noreen Cardinegh met the deluge. The elements
had been forming for three days. She had sensed them vaguely in
sudden shivers of dread. Her soul was bared now to the primal
terror, the psychic terror, of the outcast, against which seasoned
valor quails.... By the window, she sat dry-eyed, in the midst of her
father’s possessions! From the street, over the hotel-gardens, came
to her ears the screaming of children. Japanese schoolboys were
passing, a procession of them. They were playing soldier—marching
very erect and proudly, with sticks for guns.
“My father did this!”... Upon such a sentence the whole dreadful
structure was built. Thoughts of her childhood had their significance
in the breaking of this horrid storm of war. Aye, and the little house in
Tyrone before her coming! It was there that the black shadow, falling
upon his country, crept into the brain of Jerry Cardinegh. The
shadow grew, was identified with her earliest memories. Into her
father’s mortal wound, inflicted by the passing of the sweetest
woman, the shadow had sunk with all its Tartarean blackness. She
saw it all now—the sinister, mysterious passion which had rivalled
even his love for her. The wars had deepened, blackened it. The last
visit to Ireland had turned it into hideous, tossing night. And this was
the beating storm—babes with sticks for guns, companies of soldiers
in the Fukiage, the wailing “Banzai Niphon” from Shimbashi station,
where the regiments entrained for the southern ports of mobilization;
and on the lower floor of the hotel, where still were gathering the
war-experts from all the earth.... The strength ran from her limbs,
and her heart cried out.
Japan, which she had loved, became like a haunted house to her;
yet she could not hope to find Routledge without some word
concerning him, and Tokyo was the natural base of her search
operations. All the correspondents going out with the different armies
were pledged to communicate with her any word they might receive
regarding him. The correspondents, unsecured to any of the four
armies, and destined to work from the outside—at Chifu,
Newchwang, Chemulpo, Shanhaikwan or Shanghai—even these
had promised her a cable-flash at the sight of Routledge. Through an
agent in New York she learned that the name “Routledge” was not
attached for work in the Orient to any newspaper on the Atlantic
seaboard; still, by cable she subscribed for the chief American
newspapers. Tokyo was her address.
She could not stay longer at the Imperial, which had become a sort
of civilian war headquarters. All was war in its corridors. In the
Minimasacuma-cho of the Shiba district, she took a small house,
establishing herself in the native style, but she could not escape the
agony. Japan was burning with war-lust from end to end; whetted of
tooth, talon-fingered, blood-mad. Her fighting force, one of the most
formidable masses that ever formed on the planet’s curve, was
landing in Korea and Liaotung. What meant the battle of the Yalu to
her; the tragedy of the Petropavlovsk, sunk off the tip of the fortress
with Makaroff, the great Verestchagin, and five hundred officers and
men? Not a distant calamity of foreign powers, but Tyrone—Shubar
Khan—Cardinegh—madness—treachery. What meant the constant
tension of Tokyo, singing in her ears like wires stretched tight—like
the high-pitched, blood-hungry song of insects in the night? It meant
the work of her own blood, her own accursed heritage.... She was
called to the Imperial often for the mails, but she avoided the
Englishmen there, and admitted none to the little house in Shiba.
Always, when there were white men about, she fancied a whispering
behind her; as, indeed, there was—the whispers that are incited by
the passing of an exquisite woman.
In the early days following her father’s death, Noreen was besieged
by men who appeared suddenly, quietly—men unknown in Japan—
who demanded with seeming authority all the documents in her
father’s effects which pertained to the treachery in India. These were
agents of the great British secret service—men of mystery to all save
those who threatened England’s inner wall. Noreen gave all that they
asked, convinced them of her sincerity. They impressed upon her the
needs of utter secrecy, and assured her that the name of Routledge
was being purified to the farthest ends of the service. It was
intimated, however, that this would require much time; as, indeed, it
had to fix the crime upon him. These men worked but little with
cables and mails.
So the wire-ends held her to Tokyo through Yalu and Nanshan to the
middle of June. She was returning from the Imperial at early evening
with a bundle of American newspapers. She knew by the hushed
streets that another battle was in progress; and she felt with the
people the dreadful tension of waiting, as she hurried swiftly along
the wide, dirt-paved Shiba road. Tokyo was all awake and ominously
still. A rickshaw-coolie darted out from a dark corner with his cart,
and accosted her in a low, persistent way. He wheeled his cart in
front of her, as he would not have dared with a native or a male
foreigner—and all in a silent, alien fashion. She could not sit still to
ride—pushed the rickshaw aside and sped on in the dusk. She was
ill, her throat parched with waiting, her face white with waiting. The
founts of her life were dry, her heart thralled with famine. Where was
he for this new battle?... She passed knots of women in the streets.
They talked softly as she passed and laughed at her, held up their
boy-babes and laughed. She knew something of the language, and
caught their whispering—the laughing, child-like women of Japan, in
whom transient foreigners delight. They breathed world-conquest
into the ears of their men-children; and were more horrible far in their
whispering and laughing, to Noreen now, than tigresses yammering
in the jungle-dark.
She faltered before the door of her house, afraid. The servants had
not yet lighted the lamps, and within it was darker than the street....
There, among the densest shadows, he sat—there, by the covered
easel in a low chair. He was smiling at her, a white and a weary
smile. His long, thin hands were locked above his head; his lean
limbs stretched out in tired fashion, the puttee leggings worn dull
from the saddle fenders; his chest gaunt, the leather-belt pulled tight.
Noreen sank to her knees before the empty chair, her face, her
arms, in the seat where the mist of a man had been!... How long she
remained there she never knew; but it was some time before light
when she was aroused by a far, faint roar beating toward her, across
the city. The roar quickened, broke into a great, throbbing, coherent
shout, and swept by like a hurricane, leaving a city awake and
thrown wide open to exultation. The battle of Telissu had been won.
Only defeats are mourned in Japan, not the slain of a victory. Dawn
broke, and Noreen looked out on an altered Tokyo—loathsome to
her as a gorging reptile.

“You are intensely psychic, Miss Cardinegh,” the English doctor said.
“This ‘vision,’ as you call it, means nothing in itself—that is, so far as
concerns the man you say you saw—but it signifies that you are on
the verge of a nervous break-down. You must cease all worry and
work, eat plenty of meat, and take long walks. It’s all nerves, just
nerves.”
“No, it does not mean that your lover is dead,” said Asia, through the
lips of the old Buddhist priest who had buried her father. “Such things
happen this way. He may have been sleeping, dreaming of you,
when the strength of your heart’s desire rose to the point of calling
his form-body to your house for an instant. It might have happened
before in the daylight, and you did not know—save that you felt
restless possibly, and filled with strange anguish. Had there been
light, you would not have seen him.”
“But,” she faltered, “I have heard at the moment of death—such
things happen——”
“Yes, but he did not need to die to be called to you.”
Yet she was deathly afraid. It had been the same after the night of
her dream in Cheer Street—the night that Routledge had slipped
from a noose in Madras. If Noreen had known that!... It is well that
she did not, for she could have borne but little more.
Further weeks ground by. Only in the sense that she did not die,
Noreen lived, moving about her little house, in daylight and lamp-
light, without words, but with many fears. She tried to paint a little in
those wonderful summer days—days of flashing light, and nights all
lit with divinity—but between her eyes and the canvas, films of
memory forever swung: Routledge-san in Cheer Street; in the golden
stillness of the Seville; the little Paris studio; in the carriage from
Bookstalls to Charing Cross; in the snowy twilight on the Bund in
Shanghai—yes, and the mist of the man here by the easel!... Always
he was with her, in her heart and in her mind.
Not a word concerning Routledge, from the least or greatest of the
men who had promised to watch for him! Often it came to her now
that he had either allied himself with the Russians or avoided the war
entirely. Could it be that he had already followed the prophecy which
Mr. Jasper had repeated for her, and gone to join Rawder a last time
in the Leper Valley?... No one in Japan had ever heard of the Leper
Valley.
There was little mercy in the thought of him being with the Russians;
and yet such a service might have appealed to a man who desired to
remain apart from the English. If he were in Liaoyang or Mukden,
there was no hope of reaching him, until winter closed the campaign,
at least. Only a few hundred miles away, as the crow flies, and yet
Mukden and Liaoyang could be approached only from around the
world. The valley between two armies is impassable, indeed—
unwired, untracked, and watched so that a beetle cannot cross
unseen.... The general receives a dispatch at dawn containing the
probable movements of the enemy for this day. One of his spies in
the hostile camp which faces him, less than two miles away, has
secured the information and sent it in—not across the impassable
valley, but around the world.... If Routledge had known that the curse
had been lifted from him, would he not have rushed back to her? It
seemed so, but with the Russians, he would have been last to learn
what had befallen.
Just once—and it marked the blackest hour of that black summer in
Japan—the thought flooded upon her that Routledge knew, but
purposely remained apart; that he was big enough to make the great
sacrifice for her, but not to return to the woman whose heritage, in
turn, was the Hate of London. That hour became a life-long memory,
even though the thought was whipped and shamed and beaten
away.
It was late in July when certain sentences in an American newspaper
rose with a thrilling welcome to her eyes. There was an intimate
familiarity, even in the heading, which he might not have written, but
which reflected the movement and color of his work. It was in the
World-News of New York, and signed “A. V. Weed.”... A rather long
feature cable dated at Chifu shortly after the battle of Nanshan. A
number of Russian prisoners had been taken by the Japanese, and
with them was a certain Major Volbars, said to be the premier
swordsman of the Russian Empire. The Japanese heard of his fame;
and, as it appears, became at once eager to learn if Russian
civilization produced sword-arms equal to those of her own Samurai.
The prisoner was asked to meet one Watanabe, a young infantry
captain, and of that meeting the World-News published the following:
... Here was armistice, the nucleus of which was combat.
There was a smile upon the face of Watanabe, a snarling
smile, for his lips were drawn back, showing irregular
teeth, glistening white. His low brow was wrinkled and his
close-cropped, bristling hair looked dead-black in the vivid
noon. The hilt of his slim blade was polished like lacquer
from the nimble hands of his Samurai fathers. This was
Watanabe of Satsuma, whose wrist was a dynamo and
whose thrusts were sparks. The devil looked out from his
fighting-face.
Volbars compelled admiration—a conscienceless man,
from his eyes, but courageous. He was small, heavy-
shouldered, and quick of movement, with nervous eyes
and hands. His left cheek was slashed with many scars,
and his head inclined slightly to the right, through a certain
muscular contraction of the neck or shoulder. This master
of the archaic art had the love of his soldiers.
“In the name of God, let him take the attack, Major!”
Volbars’ second whispered. “His style may disconcert
you.”
The Russian waved the man away, and faced the
Japanese swordsman. His head seemed to lie upon his
right shoulder, and his cruel, sun-darkened face shone
with joy. His thick, gleaming white arm was bare. His
blade, which had opened the veins of a half-hundred
Europeans, screamed like a witch as the master-hand
tried it in thin air.
The weapons touched. The styles of the antagonists were
different, but genius met genius on its own high ground.
Each blade was a quiver of arrows, each instant of
survival due to devilish cunning or the grace of God. In
spite of his warning, Volbars took the attack and forced it
tigerishly. Some demon purpose was in his brain, for he
shot his volleys high. A marvelous minute passed, and a
fountain of crimson welled from Watanabe, where his neck
and shoulder met. The heavy breathing of the Russian
was heard now back among his fellow prisoners. The
Japanese, sheeted with blood from his wound, defended
himself silently. He was younger, lighter, superbly
conditioned.
The face of Volbars changed hideously. Sweat ran into his
eyes, where the desperation of fatigue was plain. His lips
were stiff white cords. Patches of grayish white shone in
his cheeks and temples.... For a second his shoulders
lifted; then an exultant gasp was heard from his dry throat.
That which had been the left eye in the face of Watanabe
burst like a bubble and ran down. Yet not for the fraction of
a second did the Japanese lose his guard. Though a
window of his throne-room was broken, the kingdom of his
courage still endured. The Russian second heard his man
gasp, “I’m spent. I can’t kill him!”
 The grin upon the awful face of the One-eyed became
more tense. He seized the aggressive, and the Japanese
lines greeted the change with a high-strung, ripping shout.
Watanabe bored in, stabbing like a viper, his head twisted
to spare his dark side. Volbars’ limbs were stricken of
power. He saw the end, as he was backed toward the
prisoners. A tuft of grass unsteadied him for a second—
and the Japanese lightning struck.
The sword of the Russian quivered to the earth and the
master fell upon it, his face against the ground, his naked
sword-arm shaking, the hand groping blindly for the
faithless hilt. Watanabe bowed to the prisoners, and
walked unassisted back to his own roaring lines. His
seconds followed closely, one of them wiping the sword of
the Samurai with a wisp of grass.... It appears that Volbars
had the audacity to attempt to blind his opponent before
killing him. It was like the battle of the Yalu. Volbars, as did
General Zassulitch, looked too lightly on the foe....
“A. V. Weed”—what blessings fell upon the name that moment!... He
was not with the Russians! Not in the Leper Valley! A cable to the
World-News that night brought a reply the next day, to the effect that
“A. V. Weed” had never been in touch with the office; that he was the
freest of free lances, and brought his messages from time to time to
one of the free cables outside the war-zone.... The free cable
nearest to Liaoyang—already granted to be the next scene of conflict
—was at Shanhaikwan, at the end of the Great Wall. Noreen
arranged for mail and dispatches to follow her, and went down the
Tokaido, overtaking at Nagasaki a ship which had sailed from
Yokohama three days before she left.
 TWENTIETH CHAPTER
ROUTLEDGE IS SEEN BY NOREEN CARDINEGH,
BUT AT AN EXCITING MOMENT IN WHICH SHE
DARE NOT CALL HIS NAME

Noreen breathed sweeter with the shores of Japan behind. The

Pacific liner, Manchu, was crossing the Yellow Sea for Shanghai. An
evening in early August, and the tropic breeze came over the moon-
flecked water, from the spicy archipelagoes below. It was late, and
she was sitting alone, forward on the promenade-deck. The thought
thralled, possessed her completely, that she was drawing nearer,
nearer her soul’s mate. Might it not be given to her to keep the
covenant—to find him, though all others had failed?... There was a
high light over Asia for her inner eye, this memorable night of her
romance. The crush of Japan was gone, and in the great hour of
emancipation her love for Routledge, hardiest of perennials, burst
into a delicate glory of blossoming—countless blooms of devotion,
pure white; and in all honor she could not deny—rare fragrant
flowerings of passional crimson....
At Shanghai she sought the office of the North China News, to learn
what the war had done during her three days at sea. The Japanese
armies were panting—inside the passes which had recently
protected Liaoyang. Any day might begin the battle with which Japan
intended forever to end Russia’s hold in Liaotung peninsula. The
News stated blithely that there was no doubt of the war being over
by September.... There was another story in the files of early August,
and in the silent office the woman bent long over the sheet, huge as
a luncheon-cover. This was an Indian exchange with a Simla mark.
An English correspondent, wandering somewhere in the Hills, had
run across a white man travelling with an old Hindu lama. A weird
mad pair, the story said, half-starving, but they asked no alms.
Whither they were going, they would not say, nor from whence they
had come. The natives seemed to understand the wanderers, and
possibly filled the lama’s bowl. The feet of the white man were bare
and travel-bruised, his clothing a motley of Hindu and Chinese
garments. The article intimated that he was a “gone-wrong
missionary,” but its whole purport and excuse was to point out the
menace to British India from unattached white men, mad or
apparently mad, moving where they willed, in and out of restless
States, especially at such a time as now, when the activity of foreign
agents, etc., etc....
The article was rock-tight and bitter with the Dead Sea bitterness.
The pressure of the whole senile East was in it. The woman quivered
from a pain the prints had given her, and moved out of the darkened
office into the strange road, thick and yellow with heat.... Could this
be Rawder and his Hindu master?... It occurred to her suddenly that
the men of the newspaper might be able to tell her of the Leper
Valley. She turned back to the office, was admitted to the editor....
No, he had not heard of the Leper Valley. There were leper colonies
scattered variously throughout the interior. It might be one of them....
She thanked him and went away, leaving a problem to mystify many
sleepy, sultry days.... That night, Noreen engaged passage in a
coasting steamer for Tongu, and on the morning of the third day
thereafter boarded the Peking-Shanhaikwan train on the Chinese
Eastern.
Alone in a first-class compartment, she watched the snaky furrows of
maize throughout seven eternities of daylight, until her eyes stung
and her brain revolted at the desolate, fenceless levels of sun-
deadened brown. Out of a pent and restless doze, at last she found
that a twilight film had cooled the distance; she beheld the sea on
her right hand, and before her the Great Wall—that gray welt on the
Eastern world, conceived centuries before the Christ, rising into the
dim mountains and jutting down into the sea. In an inexplicable
moment of mental abstraction, as the train drew up to Shanhaikwan,
the soul of the weary woman whispered to her that she had seen it
all before.
At the Rest House, Noreen ventured to inquire of a certain agent of a
big British trading company if he knew any of the English or
American war-correspondents who had come recently to
Shanhaikwan to file their work on the uncensored cable. This man
was an unlovely Englishman poisoned by China and drink.... Oh,
yes, some of the men had come in from the field or from Wangcheng
with big stories, but had trouble getting back to their lines, it was
said.
“Have you heard—or do you know—if Mr. Routledge has been
here?”
His face filled with an added inflammation, and he mumbled
something which had to do with Routledge and the treachery in
India.
“Do you mean to say,” she demanded hopelessly, “that you—that
Shanhaikwan has not heard that Mr. Routledge had nothing to do
with the treachery in India—that another, Cardinegh of the Witness,
confessed the crime on his death-bed?”
The Englishman had not heard. He bent toward her with a quick,
aroused look and wanted to know all, but she fled to her room.... It
was not strange if Routledge failed to hear of his vindication, when
this British agent had not.... By the open window she sat for hours
staring at the Great Wall in the moonlight. She saw it climb through
the white sheen which lay upon the mountains, and saw it dip into
the twinkling sea, like a monster that has crawled down to drink.
There were intervals when Shanhaikwan was still as the depths of
the ocean. The whole landscape frightened her with its intimate
reality. The thought came again that this had once been her country,
that she had seen the Mongol builders murdered by the lash and the
toil.
The purest substance of tragedy evolved in her brain. There had
been something abhorrent in contact with the Englishman below.
She had seen a hate for Routledge like that before—at the Army and
Navy reception! And then, the sinister narrative of the white man in
India, as it had been set down by the English correspondent!... Could
this be “their bravest man”? Was he, too, attracting hatred and
suspicion in India, as a result of the excitement into which her
father’s work had thrown the English? Could not poor Rawder,
barefoot, travel-bruised, and wearing a motley of native garments, be
free from this world-havoc which was her heritage?... That instant in
the supremacy of pain she could not feel in her heart that Routledge
wanted her—or that he was in the world!... Could he be dead, or in
the Leper Valley? Had his mind gone back to dust—burned out by
these terrible currents of hatred?...
The pictured thought drew forth a stifled scream. The lamp in her
room was turned low, and the still, windless night was a pitiless
oppression. Crossing the room to open the door, in agony for air, she
passed the mirror and saw a dim reflection—white arms, white
throat, white face. She turned the knob.
The clink of glasses on a tin-tray reached her from below, with the
soft tread of a native servant; then from farther, the clink of billiard-
balls and a man’s voice, low but insinuating, its very repression an
added vileness:
“Dam’ me, but she was a stunning woman, a ripping woman—and
out after——”
She crashed the door shut and bolted it against the pestilence....
Had the powers of evil this night consummated a heinous mockery to
test her soul, because her soul was strong?... In terror and agony,
she knelt by the open window. The Wall was still there, sleeping in
the moonlight—the biggest man-made thing in the world, and the
quietest. It steadied her, and the stuff of martyrs came back.

The man in charge of the cable-office in Shanhaikwan told her the

next morning that a correspondent who signed himself “A. V. Weed”
had brought in a long message for New York, just after the Yalu
battle, but had not tarried even a night in town. “A tall, haggard
stranger with a low voice,” the man described him.... There was little
more to be learned, but this was life to her, and the first tangible
word, that he lived, since her father’s death. Noreen spent the day
walking alone on the beaches and through the foreign concession.
From the top of the Wall in the afternoon, she stared down at the
little walled city which grew out of the great masonry. There she
could see a bit of living China—all its drones and workers and
sections and galleries, as in a glass bee-hive. Big thoughts took the
breath from her. Europe seemed young and tawdry beside this. She
picked up one of the loose stones—touched the hem of the Wall’s
garment, as it were—and again she had but to close her eyes and
look back centuries into the youth of time, when the Wall was
building, to see the Mongols swarming like ants over the raw, half-
done thing.... There was a little French garrison in the town; and the
Sikh infantry, at target-practice on the beach, brought India back.
The day was not without fascination to her relieved mind.
The evening train from Peking brought a white man who added to
the stability of Shanhaikwan—Talliaferro of the Commonwealth. The
dry little man was greatly disturbed in heart. He had deliberately
given up his place with Oku’s second army, choosing to miss the
smoky back-thresh of future actions in the field, in order to get what
he could out on the free cable. Peter Pellen’s “Excalibur,” credited
with acumen, flying and submarine, had broken under the Japanese
pressure.
“Have you seen or heard of Mr. Routledge?” she whispered at
dinner.
“No,” he replied. “In the field we never got a whisper from him. The
Pan-Anglo man in Shanghai told me, however, that he thought
Routledge was playing the Chinese end—that is, living just outside
the war-zone and making sallies in, from time to time, when things
are piping hot. The reason he thought Routledge was working this
game was the fact that New York has sprung three or four great
stories which London has missed entirely. It’s all a guess, Miss
Cardinegh, but somebody is doing it, and it’s his kind of service—the
perilous, hard-riding kind. Nobody but a man on the Inside of Asia
would attempt it. There was an American, named Butzel, shot by the
Chinese on the Liao River ten days ago. He was not an accredited
correspondent, as I understand it, but was using the war for a living.
Butzel’s death was wired in from the interior somewhere, and they
had it back from New York in Shanghai when I was there. Did you
hear?”
“No.”
“It appears that Butzel planned to get into Liaoyang for the battle,”
Talliaferro went on, “whether the Japanese liked it or not. About the
place where the Taitse flows into the Liao, the river-pirates murdered
him——”
Talliaferro stopped, startled by the look in the face of the woman. Her
eyes were wide, almost electric with suffering, her face colorless.
The lamp-light heightened the effects; also her dress, which was of
black entire. Talliaferro noted such things. He always remembered
her hand that moment, as it was raised to check him, white, fragile,
emotional.
“What is it, Miss Cardinegh?” he asked quickly.
“I was thinking,” she replied steadily, “that Mr. Routledge is there in
all likelihood—‘playing the Chinese end,’ as you call it. I was thinking
that he might not have heard that he is vindicated—that he might be
murdered before he learned that my father had confessed.”
She hurried away before the dinner was half through, and Talliaferro
was left to dislike himself, for a short period, for bringing up the
Butzel murder.... Noreen sat again by the window in her room. The
story had frightened her, so that she felt the need of being alone to
think. The dreadfulness of the night before did not return, however....
The moon rose high to find the Wall again—every part of it, winding
in the mountains.... Was it not possible that Talliaferro was over-
conscious of the dangers of the Chinese end? Routledge had been
up there, possibly since the Yalu battle, and he had proved a master
in these single-handed services of his.... She had heard of
Talliaferro’s capacity to command the highest price, heard of him as
an editorial dictator and of his fine grasp on international affairs, but
her father had once remarked that the Excalibur “did not relish
dangling his body in the dirty area between two firing lines.”... There
was hope in her heart, and she slept.
“Please don’t apologize, Mr. Talliaferro,” she said the next morning,
when he met her sorrowfully. “It is I who should apologize. For a
moment you made me see vividly the dangers up yonder, but I put it
all away and had a real rest. Tell me about the field and Oku.”
Talliaferro was inclined to talk very little, as a rule, but he had
brooded deeply upon his failure in this service, and it was rather a
relief to speak—with Noreen Cardinegh to listen.
“At least, we have added to the gaiety of nations with our silence in
the field,” he said. “It has been the silence of the Great Wall yonder.
We knew nothing even of the main strategy, which was familiar to all
outside who cared to follow the war. Japanese officers were
assigned to overhear what we said to one another. They even
opened our personal mail. The field-telegraph was hot day and night
with the war-business, so that our messages were hung up for days,
even with the life cut out of them. And then when Oku drove into
action we were always back with the reserves—not that I think a
correspondent can do a battle classic for his cable-editor, simply
because he mingles first hand with shrapnel; but we had only the
sun and stars to go by as to which was north and south. Think of it,
and the man who writes a war-classic must have a conception of the
whole land and sea array, and an inner force of his own, to make his
sentences shine——”
She smiled a little and straightened her shoulders to breathe deeply
the good sea air. They were walking out toward the Wall.
“But suppose he has the big conception, as you say, and then goes
into the heart of the thing”—her voice became tense—“where the
poor brave brutes are coming together to die?”
“He’ll unquestionably do it better,” said Talliaferro, regarding her
blowing hair with satisfaction to the artistic sense he cultivated.
“Physical heroism is cheap—the cheapest utility of the nations—but
it is not without inspiration to watch.... We had neither—neither facts
nor blood with Oku.”
Long and weary were those August days in Shanhaikwan. Noreen
lived for the end of the battle, and with a prayer that it would end the
war and bring in—all the correspondents. Over and over she
mapped the war-country in her mind, with a lone horseman shutting
out her view of armies. There were moments at night in which she
felt that Routledge-san was not far away—even Liaoyang was less
than three hundred miles away.... Those last days of the month—
only a woman can bear such terrors of tension. Each night-train now
brought vagrant sentences from the field, bearing upon the
unparalleled sacrifices of men by the Japanese. Throughout August
thirty-first, Shanhaikwan waited expectantly for a decision from the
battle, but when the night-train was in the Russians were still
holding. Late in the afternoon of September first, Talliaferro sought
Miss Cardinegh bringing an exciting rumor that the Japanese had
won the battle and the city.
“There’s another thing,” he added. “The English agent of the trading
company here—the man of whom you don’t approve—has heard
from Bingley. He will be in from Wangcheng to-night, and something
big is up. Bingley has called for a horse to meet him at the train—a
fast horse. I’ll wager there’s an American correspondent on the train,
Miss Cardinegh, and that the ‘Horse-killer’ plans to beat him to the
cable-office in the half-mile from the station. He wouldn’t wire for a
horse if he were alone. Another matter. Borden, the American
Combined Press man here, looks to have something big under
cover. Altogether, I think there’ll be great stuff on the cable to-night.
The chief trouble is, there won’t be any core—to Bingley’s apple....
I’ll call for you in a half-hour—if I may—and we’ll walk down to the
train together.”
“Thank you. Of course,” she answered.... That half-hour pulled a big
tribute of nervous energy. Noreen did not know what to think, but she
fought back hope with all the strength which months of self-war had
given....
The train appeared at last through the gap in the Great Wall—
cleared torturingly slow in the twilight. Talliaferro directed her eyes to
two saddle-horses on the platform. Borden, the American, was in
touch with a China-boy who held a black stallion of notorious
prowess.... She hardly noted. The train held her eyes. Her throat was
dry—her heart stormed with emotion.... She did not scream.
Routledge hung far out from the platform—searching to locate his
mount. She covered her face in her parasol.... This was the end of a
race from the field with Bingley.... She choked back her heart’s cry,
lest it complicate.
Routledge sped past her—leaped with a laugh into the saddle of the
black stallion. His eye swept the crowd—but the yellow silk of the
parasol shielded her face. He spurred off toward the cable-office—
with Bingley thundering behind on a gray mount.... Not till then did
she dare to scream:
“Win! Ride to win, Routledge-san!”
Out of the shouting crowd, she ran after the horsemen—past the
Rest House, through the mud-huts of the native quarter.... On she
sped, the night filled with glory for her eyes.... Suddenly there was a
shot—then four more—from ahead. Fear bound her limbs, and she
struggled on—as in the horrid weights of an evil dream.
 TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER
ROUTLEDGE, BROODING UPON THE MIGHTY
SPECTACLE OF A JAPANESE BIVOUAC,
TRACES A WORLD-WAR TO THE LEAK IN ONE
MAN’S BRAIN

Parting from Noreen Cardinegh on the Bund at Shanghai,

Routledge walked back through the darkness to the German Inn far
out on the Hankow road. He was not conscious of the streets, nor of
time passed. Not a word he had spoken to the woman could he
remember, but all that she had said recurred again and again. He
was torn within. The wound was too deep for heavy pain at first—
that would come later with the drawing-together—but he was dazed,
weakened. He turned into the door of the hostelry and recalled that
he had nothing to do there. He had engaged passage on the
Sungkiang for Chifu that afternoon. His baggage was aboard, and
the ship lying on the water-front which he had left. He turned back,
without any particular emotion at his absentmindedness, but he
charged himself with an evil recklessness for tarrying on the Bund in
the afternoon.... Finacune had seen him, and Noreen....
Jerry Cardinegh was still alive—lost to wars, lost to friends, but still
alive. He was close to death, his brain probably already dead to big
things, and he had not told! Noreen would never know. Routledge
tried to be glad. All his praying, hiding, and suffering had been to
save her from knowing. His lips formed a meaningless declarative
sentence to the effect that he was glad; meaningless, because there
was no sanction in his heart. He was ill and very weary. He wished it
were time for the prophesied wound, and for Noreen to come to him.
He was not powerful enough that moment, walking back to the Bund,
to face the future, and hold the thought that he was to remain an
outcast....
“She will come to me when Jerry is dead,” he repeated, and for the
time he could not fight it.... He went aboard, forgetting dinner, and
dropped upon his berth. The Sungkiang put off, out into the river, and
long afterward lifted to the big swell in the offing. These were but
faint touches of consciousness. His mind held greater matters—the
strength of her hand, the breath, the fragrance, the vehemence, the
glory of the woman in the wintry dusk, as she rushed back to her
work—the tearing tragedy of parting; again the pitiless mountains of
separation....
Loose articles were banging about the floor; the pendent oil-lamp
creaked with the pitching of the ship. It was after midnight. Routledge
caught up the great frieze coat and went out on the main-deck. It
was a cold ruffian of a night, but it restored his strength.
She would keep her promise and come to him, when her father was
dead. He faced the thought now that she would never know the truth;
that Jerry Cardinegh would have spoken long since, if he could.... In
some deep dark place of the earth, she would find him; and some
British eye, ever keen, would see them together—the lady and the
outcast.... He would send her away—put on a martyrdom of frost and
steel—and send her away.... If he lied, saying that he wanted no
woman—she would go back.... But Noreen was to find him wounded,
fallen. Might he not, in delirium, utter the truth that her father failed to
confess? No, the human will could prevent that! He would go down
close to the very Gates with his lips locked.
“... I shall take care of your life for you—even in the Leper Valley!”
Routledge thought he must be mad to imagine those words. Her face
—as the words came to him—had been blotted out in the snow and
the dark; yet it was her voice, and the words rang through his soul.
She could not have seen Rawder nor the Hindu. They were lost in
Northern India. He knew nothing of Jasper having passed the hut in
Rydamphur that night, nor of his meeting with Noreen on ship-board.
The Leper Valley, hidden in the great mountains of Southern China,
was scarcely a name to the world. Could Noreen have heard the
name, and used it merely as a symbol of speech for the uttermost
parts of the earth? This was the only adjustment of the mystery upon
a material basis.
He fought it all out that night in the icy gale on the main-deck of the
Sungkiang, and entered upon the loneliest, harshest campaign and
the bleakest season of his life.... Often it came to him with a great,
almost an overpowering surge—the passion to look into the eyes of
Noreen Cardinegh again and to stand among men, but he fought it
with the grim, immutable fact that he had taken her father’s crime
and must keep it, stand by it, with his dearest efforts until the end. If
fate destined some time to lift the burden—that was resistless....
Except in bringing in his stories to the cables, he passed the spring
and summer in the deepest seclusion.
This he knew: if he were seen by any of his old friends among the
English, the word would be carried to Jerry Cardinegh, who, if still
alive, might be stirred to confession. To save Noreen from this was
the first point of his sacrifice. If her father were dead, unconfessed,
and word reached her that the outcast had been seen in a certain
part of Manchuria, she would come to share his hell-haunted-life—a
thought which his whole manhood shunned. Moreover, if he were
seen by the British, the sinister powerful fingers of the secret service
would stretch toward him; in which case, if nothing worse happened,
he would be driven from the terrain of war. Work was his only boon—
furious, unabating, world-rousing work. God so loved the world that
he gave unto poor forlorn man his work.... No more loitering on
Bunds or Foreign Concessions for Cosmo Routledge.
From various Chinese bases, he made flying incursions into the war-
belt for the World-News—a lonely, perilous, hard-shipping, and hard-
riding service, but astonishingly successful. It was his flash from
Chifu which told New York that the war was on before the
declaration. This was on the night of February eighth. A strong but
not a roaring west wind brought Togo’s firing across the gulf. He
chanced a message and verified it before dawn by an incoming
German ship, which had steamed past the fortress when the
Russian fleet was attacked.