PROTECTION

BRIEF
DARFUR
REGION
OCTOBER 2023

Assessment of malnutrition cases among refugee and Sudanese children in Al Lait, North Darfur, where the situation remains dire amid
lack of humanitarian assistance and access. Photo: SAHARI
PROTECTION BRIEF > DARFUR REGION (OCTOBER 2023)

Key Trends & Figures

Over 470,250 people sought refuge from the conflict in countries neighbouring
Darfur.1 Since the outbreak of conflict on 15 April 2023, 1,086,510 people have fled Sudan
to other countries in the region. Of this number, over 40% have fled to countries
neighbouring Darfur and are likely to be predominately displaced from the Darfur States.
Chad has received 420,834 refugees from Sudan, the largest refugee caseload of any
neighbouring state. In addition, 18,545 people have sought safety in the Central African
Republic (CAR). While the majority are Sudanese refugees (13,844), the figure also
includes 4,701 CAR refugees compelled to return under adverse conditions. A further
30,250 Sudanese nationals have fled to South Sudan, predominately via Kosti in White
Nile State, including people from Darfur who were initially displaced internally. Finally,
4,179 people have fled north to Libya.2

1.7 million newly displaced people sheltering in Darfur.3 Prior to the outbreak of
conflict, the Darfur States already had a combined population of about 3,095,246 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and 185,174 refugees mainly from South Sudan, but also from
CAR and Chad. Since the conflict erupted, many IDPs (and some refugees) have been re-
displaced from camps and gathering sites while others have been newly displaced from
their homes. Initially, the population of those displaced due to the current conflict was
largest in West Darfur, where gathering sites that had hosted over 80,000 IDPs in El
Geneina were razed to the ground over April and May. The IDP population in West Darfur
peaked in mid-June 2023 at an estimated 301,055 people.

The killing of the Governor of West Darfur on 14 June precipitated a large-scale outflux of
people from West Darfur into Chad4 resulting in the number of internally displaced within
the State dropping significantly. In parallel, the number of IDPs across East, South, North
and Central Darfur has continued to rise unabated as armed clashes and other forms of
insecurity have continued. The IDP population is now largest in the relatively stable State
of East Darfur, which hosts over 500,000 IDPs including an estimated 317,870 people
displaced from Khartoum and 127,620 people displaced from South Darfur, as well as

1
Data available at Situation Sudan situation (unhcr.org), accessed on 2 October 2023.
2
Data concerning displacement to Libya extracted from DTM Sudan – Monthly Displacement Overview (01),
accessed on 2 October 2023.
3
Data concerning internal displacement extracted from regular reporting provided by IOM DTM. All reports and
datasets are publicly available at Sudan | Displacement Tracking Matrix (iom.int), accessed on 2 October 2023.
4
For reports on the death of the West Darfur Wali, see for example: Wali of West Darfur assassinated - Dabanga
Radio TV Online (dabangasudan.org); UN in Sudan condemns killing of West Darfur governor, raises alarm over
‘vortex of hate speech’ | UN News.

2 UNHCR / October 2023

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people from other areas. The overall number of IDPs is expected to grow, with ongoing
reports of movements from Nyala and Zalingei into other parts of Darfur, while at the same
time small-scale return movements are noted (e.g., back to Tawila in North Darfur).

So far, UNHCR has seen secondary displacements of refugees both within and from
outside Darfur States, specifically from Khartoum, Nyala, West Kordofan and East Darfur
to Al Lait locality in North Darfur totalling over 4,700 individuals to date. In East Darfur, a
total of 1,763 households or 7,262 individuals (majority from Khartoum with 4,814
individuals) have been reported. In South Darfur due to the evolving security situation in
Nyala town, urban refugees (the majority from CAR) have remotely reached out to UNHCR,
reporting movements of refugees from Nyala town to safer areas in El Obeid, Kosti, Ed
Daein, Madani and Port Sudan.

High number of civilians killed and injured across Darfur. While the true figure of
civilians killed and injured is unknown, also due to access limitations for protection partners,
an analysis of trends over time shows a significant spike in fatalities across Darfur5 since
the start of the conflict on April 15, as compared to period before. Reports received by the
Protection Sector in Darfur suggest that over 3,900 persons may have been killed and over
8,400 injured between 15 April and the end of August 2023. Reports indicate that a number
of those killed were targeted based on ethnicity or other affiliation6.

At least 29 cities, towns and villages fully or partially destroyed across Darfur. A
recurring characteristic of the fighting tin Darfur, both prior to and since 15 April, is the
deliberate destruction of civilian residential areas. Destruction is accomplished through a
combination of extensive looting, including even the doors and window frames from
buildings, followed by burning of the remaining structures. West and South Darfur States
have been particularly severely affected, with 13 locations in West Darfur and nine locations
in South Darfur fully or partially destroyed. North Darfur and Central Darfur appear to have
been less impacted to date, with five and two locations respectively reported to have been
fully or partially destroyed.

Widespread destruction, damage, looting and/or occupation of public buildings,

essential service provision facilities and other structures relied upon by the civilian
population. Access constraints and telecommunications breakdowns have inhibited
consistent reporting, and the data provided below is far from comprehensive; however, the

5
See for example various reports and statements from OHCHR including https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-
and-speeches/2023/06/comment-un-human-rights-spokesperson-ravina-shamdasani-raising, 24 June 2023,
accessed 8 October 2023.
6
See for example https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/06/comment-un-human-rights-
spokeperson-ravina-shamdasani

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139 civilian objects known to have been destroyed, damaged, looted or occupied across
Darfur to date provide an indication of the impacts of the widespread conflict on the civilian
population. Affected civilian objects include:

16 governance structures, 14 law enforcement facilities,

16 markets
including line ministry offices including police stations

21 health facilities, including 6 transport facilities, 52 educational facilities,

hospitals and clinics including airports including schools

Operational Context Analysis

When conflict broke out at the national level in Sudan on 15 April 2023, clashes between
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) quickly ensued
across North, South and Central Darfur, with intense fighting in and around the State
capitals of El Fasher, Nyala and Zalingei.

In North Darfur, fighting around El Fasher quickly subsided but the town remains divided,
and outlying localities such as Kutum and Tawila have borne the brunt of armed conflict.
Particularly in Central and South Darfur, conflict gradually spread to other localities, with
most now ostensibly under the control of the RSF and allied militias. Nyala, the capital city
of South Darfur State has remained the epicentre and theatre of fighting between the SAF
and the RSF for the control of the SAF 16th Brigade HQ. This resulted into a dire
humanitarian situation with continued deterioration of essential services. All State hospitals,
except for the Turkish hospital, are incapacitated with acute shortage of medical supplies
and emergency medications, no electricity, and no drinking water. The Turkish hospital has
also reported intermittent interruptions in service provision as well as severe shortage of
medical supplies including medicines. Nyala town residents are fleeing in large numbers to
other localities and parts of Darfur. Zalingei in Central Darfur has also seen intense
recurrent clashes over several months and consequent extreme hardship for the remaining
civilian population. Outside the State capital, the RSF has gained control of a number of
localities while it has remained generally calm in the areas held by the Abdul Wahid bloc
of the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A-AW) around the Jebbel Marras. In
many parts of the State, the conflict has had a significant impact on public infrastructure
and essential services, and rule of law and civilian protection mechanisms have largely
collapsed.

In West Darfur, one of the States worst affected by the 2003-2005 conflict and still reeling
from successive intercommunal conflicts over 2021 and 2022, local-level intercommunal
fighting in Tendelti and Forobaranga in March and April respectively had already put the
civilian population on edge. There was immediate recognition by political, tribal and other
community leaders of the specific risks the broader conflict in Sudan would pose in West
Darfur. Over the week following 15 April, many of those in positions of leadership, authority
and influence worked hard to mitigate risks of conflict, including through establishing or
reaffirming the role of structures and networks designed to mediate conflicts and other
measures. When conflict finally erupted in El Geneina on 24 April, it was not a surprise.
Within a month, the gathering sites inside El Geneina sheltering over 80,000 conflict
induced IDPs had all been razed to the ground. The violence gradually affected other
localities in the State such as Sirba, Foro Baranga and Habila.

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Heavy air strikes led to destruction and civilian fatalities in Nyala town, South Darfur on 13 September. Photo: UNHCR

The Darfur region is characterized by the complex interplay of multiple layers of historical
impacts of war, conquest and colonization, heightened and sharpened by the recurrent
conflicts that have roiled the region since the mid-1980s.7 A range of factors have shaped
these conflicts, including: the longstanding deprivation of the Darfur region relative to its
population size; competition for access to land and water between pastoralist groups,
between sedentary farming groups and between pastoralists and farmers; and competition
for political power between different tribes, tied to jurisdiction over territory. 8 While the
driving factors for each individual conflict may differ, they are typically manifested in a
predictable manner, with increasing organization of parties to the conflict along ethnic and
tribal lines as the conflict progresses. This has been the case even when the political
leadership of parties to the conflict has been ethnically diverse, as armed units on the
ground have still tended to be organized according to the local community or tribal affiliation
of its members.9 As a result, conflict patterns have generally reinforced the tribalization of
different political agendas and, in so doing, increased the risk of conflicts re-emerging. In
multiple cases, these consequences have been exacerbated by government policies that
effectively delegated the prosecution of military operations to tribal militias.10 The history of
the Darfur region demonstrates that even when the initial drivers of conflict are more
broadly political rather than tribal, it is almost inevitable that the delegation of military
operations to tribal militia groups will increase short and long-term risks of intercommunal
violence.

Six months on from the outbreak of conflict, the political landscape of the Darfur region has
been almost entirely upended with the region remaining contested by warring parties.
Governance structures, including state authorities led by State-level governors (or Walis),
Native Administrations, and other community and tribal leadership platforms and leaders,
have been disrupted by widespread displacement, key personnel have been killed and, in
some cases, replaced or reconstituted under contested conditions.

The governor of the Darfur region, Minni Minnawi, leader of a Juba Peace Agreement (JPA)
signatory armed group and political movement (Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni
Minnawi bloc, or SLM-MM), has led the engagement of SLM-MM in some clashes with RSF
in North Darfur, alongside a second JPA signatory group, Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), for the explicit purpose of ‘protecting civilians’ as per the provisions of the Juba
Peace Agreement. However, both groups, as well as the South Darfur-based Gathering of
Sudanese Liberation Forces (GSLF), remain officially neutral in the broader conflict.

7
Etefa, T. ‘Darfur: tracing the origins of the region’s strife and suffering’, 1 March 2020, [Darfur: tracing the origins
of the region's strife and suffering (theconversation.com)].
8
El-Gack, N. (2016). The Causes, consequences and implications of Darfur Conflict. In J. A. Jaworski (Ed.),
Advances in Sociology Research (First ed., pp. 125-144). Nova Science Publishers.
9
Smiles, J. The root causes of the Darfur conflict, contemp_v33_n1_a4.pdf (ufs.ac.za).
10
Flint, J. and de Waal, A, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (Zed Books, 2005).

UNHCR / October 2023 5

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In contrast, SLM-AW has taken a more forward-leaning posture and now claims to control
several areas around its traditional base in Jebel Marra, including localities in North, South
and Central Darfur, again for the purpose of ‘protecting civilians’. Notably, the Wali and
Security Committee of North Darfur have officially placed Tawila locality under SLM-AW
protection, which is important recognition of the authority and influence of this non-JPA
signatory armed group over the population in this area. Meanwhile, SLM’s Tambour bloc
(SLM-Tambour) based in Central Darfur has explicitly declared an allegiance with SAF, as
has Musa Hilal, the former leader of the Darfur Border Guards (a government-backed
paramilitary force), who maintains a following in North Darfur.

JPA signatory armed groups’ claims of neutrality can perhaps be best understood as an
effort to avoid escalation of the conflict and preserve space to operate as conflict dynamics
shift and evolve across the region. However, it has sometimes drawn criticism from civilian
populations feeling that more forceful intervention of JPA signatory armed groups may have
enhanced their protection from the conflict.11

In parallel to organized armed groups and movements, and perhaps in a reflection of the
formal positions of neutrality that many of those groups have taken in Darfur, there has
been widespread arming of civilians following calls of various military leaders and the
related emergence of less formalized armed groups and militia, as well as localized and
informal self-defence groups and initiatives. For example, in Zalingei locality of Central
Darfur, community members organized the digging of trenches and placement of
barricades at the entry points to neighbourhoods to prevent looting shortly after the conflict
broke out. Similarly, local communities in North Darfur have collaborated with security
forces in charge of specific quarters of El Fasher town to secure the protection of their
neighbourhoods more strongly. At other times, spontaneously created armed community
self-defence forces have emerged in response to security risks, such as in Sirba locality of
West Darfur, where Eringa tribesmen repelled attacks on Abu Suruj in July. Those attacks
were initially spearheaded by Arab militias aligned with RSF, and later received RSF
reinforcement.

Arab tribes and militia groups are often assumed to be aligned with RSF but in South Darfur
intercommunal conflict between the Beni Halba and Salamat tribes has escalated due to
the latter’s refusal to publicly support RSF, drawing RSF-aligned fighters from both tribes
back to South Darfur from Central Darfur to join the tribal conflict. The mobilization of this
range of different groups, many of them armed, with varying levels of formality and
sometimes dramatically contrasting objectives heightens operating challenges for
humanitarian actors by complicating deconfliction efforts, increasing the volatility
of conflict dynamics, and exacerbating the risks of politicization of aid.

Since the outbreak of the conflict, the Darfur region has been heavily affected by the direct
impacts of the fighting, heightening security risks for civilians and the humanitarian actors
attempting to reach them with lifesaving aid and protection services. In particular, the
conflict-driven collapse of financial services systems and conflict-related damage to
telecommunications infrastructure and lack of access to fuel, has impeded the utilization of
key response modalities (such as cash assistance) as well as the provision of remote
services, technical support and capacity building to partners. The chart below summarizes
publicly available ACLED data on the prevalence of conflict incidents across the Darfur
States since the beginning of the conflict. (Note that the rate of incident reporting for
September may be artificially reduced due to lags in reporting.)

11
It is important to note that the deployment of a ‘joint protection force’ initially planned by the regional Wali Minni
Minnawi faced many delays and in one case in West Darfur pulled back from attempting to reach a contested
area after being ambushed by armed militia groups en route. The number of trained troops available to participate
in this force is also low relative to the geographic and population size of the areas in which they aim to have a
presence.

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While the data in the chart above accurately captures trends in conflict incidents, including
the substantial increase in conflict incidents in South Darfur during intense fighting in Nyala
in August, it is less able to demonstrate the prevailing and pervasive insecurity that persists
across the Darfur region even in the absence of clashes between parties to the conflict or
other aligned groups. It is this insecurity, as much as the ongoing conflict across the
Darfur region, that has created significant and ongoing constraints on humanitarian
access. Parallel efforts to re-establish humanitarian access to the Darfur States have been
pursued from the east (by road from Port Sudan via El Obeid and Kosti, through Ad Du’ayn
in East Darfur, to Nyala in South Darfur and then to El Fasher in North Darfur) and from the
west (by road from Adre in Chad to El Geneina in West Darfur, through to Zalingei in Central
Darfur). Both access routes have proven challenging to operationalize and have been
subject to unpredictable postponements and delays but nonetheless have enabled delivery
of life saving aid to some key locations, generally in and around state capitals. UNHCR
participated in the first interagency cross-border assessment missions in August, and
successfully transported relief supplies across the border into West Darfur for distributions
in early September.

Reaching conflict affected populations outside Darfur State capitals is likely to be

exponentially more difficult than reaching those within them, due to the distances
separating priority locations, the difficulty of achieving deconfliction with all relevant conflict
actors, and the need to mitigate risks (opportunistic criminality targeting aid convoys and
warehouses). All those factors are further complicated by the limited capacity of any actors
engaged in governance functions (whether on a de jure or de facto basis) to extend their
authority beyond the State capitals in which they are typically based.

These contextual challenges have compelled greater reliance on national and local
organizations with pre-established presence in conflict affected areas, as well as
community-based networks and other structures that were either previously supported by
humanitarian actors or developed organically as part of communities’ responses to the
conflict. That trend is likely to continue. While local actors are often extremely well
positioned to understand needs and identify solutions to logistical barriers, they are also
inevitably more intertwined with and affected by local and regional political and conflict
dynamics. Ultimately, the course of the conflict in Darfur will be heavily influenced by the
outcome of the fighting that continues to rage in Khartoum.

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UNHCR and protection partners undertaking a needs assessment for newly displaced individuals in Abu Shouk camp, North Darfur, fleeing Kutum and
Tawila, in July 2023. Photo: UNHCR

Protection Risks and Incidents

Severe protection risks face civilian populations including refugees and IDPs across Darfur,
ranging from the deliberate targeting of civilian areas and objects by parties to the conflict
to ethnically targeted individual killings, conflict related sexual violence, arbitrary detention,
deliberate efforts to block or impede those attempting to flee the conflict and depriving
those who have fled of the humanitarian aid that they need. Many unfolding incidents reflect
the failure of parties to the conflict to adhere to their obligations under international
humanitarian law, despite their stated commitment to those obligations, including in the
Jeddah Declaration.12 These risks are immeasurably compounded by rampant criminality
and a prevailing atmosphere of impunity, reflecting the collapse of justice mechanisms
across many areas in the Darfur region.

Intense fighting in civilian residential areas including use of heavy weaponry. SAF
and RSF bases are typically located inside or adjacent to residential areas. While these
bases are legitimate military targets for parties to the conflict, those parties are nonetheless
required to abide by the principle of precaution and proportionality and take all feasible
measures to protect civilian populations under their control from the dangers arising from
military operations. There are numerous examples of the parties’ failure to abide by this
principle. For example, on 22 June, fighting between RSF and SAF to achieve control over
the SAF base in Zalingei, Central Darfur, resulted in the shelling of an adjacent girls’ school
causing the deaths of five children and the wounding of nine others according to reports
received by UNHCR and partners from affected people in the area. Between 20 and 24
June in South Darfur, heavy clashes between RSF and SAF that centred on the SAF base
in Nyala town led to the deaths of at least nine civilians in adjacent residential areas
affected by mortars and stray bullets, also according to reports received by UNHCR and
partners from affected people in the area. The use of heavy artillery in densely populated
areas has been regularly reported, and most recently air strikes were conducted in Nyala
impacting residential areas as well.

Destruction of civilian infrastructure necessary to the survival of the civilian

population. In El Geneina, water points relied upon by the civilian population, including
those from different ethnic backgrounds, were reportedly deliberately destroyed or
rendered non-functional by armed groups and militias aligned with different parties to the
conflict, including at least four bore holes. Health care facilities serving different

12
The Jeddah Declaration was signed by parties to the conflict on 11 May 2023.

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communities were occupied, damaged and/or destroyed, including El Geneina Hospital

and Al Naseem Hospital. Reports suggested that medical staff attempting to operate ad
hoc clinics in private residences after the hospitals in El Geneina were rendered non-
functional were also deliberately targeted for attack. Zalingei Hospital in Central Darfur has
been targeted for looting and related damage on multiple occasions, depriving residents of
both Zalengei and surrounding areas of access to the only nearby referral hospital. Health
facilities in both North and South Darfur have also been reported damaged and looted
because of the conflict, including hospitals and smaller health facilities in some of the IDP
camps. In other areas of Darfur region, where entire neighbourhoods or settlements have
been burnt to the ground (including at least 13 locations in West Darfur, nine in South
Darfur, five in North Darfur and two in Central Darfur), it is also extremely likely that civilian
infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged; however, the precise impacts
remain difficult to verify where conflict is ongoing and/or humanitarian access remains
constrained.

Indiscriminate and targeted conflict impacts on IDP camps and gathering sites. In
several instances, IDP camps and gathering sites sheltering populations already displaced
because of prior conflicts have been impacted by the conflict. In some cases, those impacts
appear to result from indiscriminate shooting or shelling, such as when eight IDPs in Otash
IDP camp in South Darfur were killed because of heavy shelling on 23 June. Over 200 IDPs
across three IDP camps in Central Darfur were reportedly killed due to intense fighting on
6 September. In other gravely concerning cases, IDP sites appear to have been
deliberately targeted by parties to the conflict and/or by armed groups operating in
alignment with them. Kassab IDP camp in Kutum, North Darfur was reportedly destroyed
and its entire population, approximately 22,000 individuals, secondarily displaced following
an attack on the camp on 3 June. Tawila town in North Darfur was also largely destroyed
over successive attacks taking place between 15 to 19 June. This led to the (secondary)
displacement of thousands of IDPs, forcing some to shelter in relatively unsafe villages
prone to militia attack and banditry. A particularly egregious example of this deliberate
targeting is the razing of all 86 IDP gathering sites in El Geneina town in the first month of
the conflict. IDPs affected by the burning down of the gathering sites reported being told to
‘get out’ of El Geneina. In early June, during clashes in North Darfur, Kassab IDP camp
was reportedly directly targeted by RSF and aligned Arab militias, resulting in the deaths
of 54 IDPs from the camp. Later, on 15 September, Hasahisa IDP camp was attacked,
resulting in the deaths of three IDPs and injuries to four others. By that point, the camp had
been besieged by RSF, leaving the injured IDPs with no means of accessing medical
treatment outside the camp. The targeting of IDPs has, in some instances, reflected the
attribution to them of affiliation with a party to the conflict. For example, on 16 June, 20 IDP
men and youth from El Salam IDP camp in South Darfur were reportedly arbitrarily detained
by RSF while travelling between the camp and Nyala town. Reports indicated that the
detainees were tied up, beaten, intimidated and coerced into ‘admitting’ to spying for SAF,
despite attempting to explain that they had been travelling to Nyala only to purchase basic
commodities and access medical services.

Constraints on civilians fleeing areas of armed conflict. Those attempting to escape

from areas of armed conflict across Darfur have frequently reported facing barriers to doing
so, including checkpoints on key routes as well as risks of criminality and intimidation by
armed persons. In June, following the attack on Tawila in North Darfur, armed men
engaged in looting and other harassment of those attempting to flee descended upon the
road between Tawila and El Fasher. As a result, only an estimated one in three of those
displaced from Tawila managed to reach El Fasher, with the remainder displacing to other
locations within Tawila locality where they had reduced access to life saving services and
assistance. Also in June, those seeking to flee the violence in El Geneina reportedly faced
multiple checkpoints on the road between El Geneina and the Chadian border, at which
men of ‘fighting age’ were ethnically profiled and granted or denied passage, based on
tribal membership. Many attempting the journey faced looting of their belongings, while
others were physically assaulted or killed. In July, Zalingei was reportedly surrounded by
RSF and allied militias, and an estimated 50 irregular checkpoints were reported to be
operating along the Zalingei-Nyala Road. These measures severely impeded civilian
movement out of Zalingei despite many wishing to escape the widespread looting and
ongoing conflict. In the same month, residents of Habila who were attempting to escape to

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Chad in the lead-up to the attacks on the town over 16-17 July reportedly faced aggressive
behaviour from members of the Arab damras along the route between Habila town and
Chad. This included imposition of ‘fines’ and confiscation of donkey carts and other
personal property, raising the costs of flight substantially and forcing households to
prioritize the flight of those family members they deemed most at risk in the event of conflict
(typically men). Also in July, both RSF and aligned militia groups reportedly blocked people
from Sirba attempting to flee across the border into Chad after the town was attacked,
resulting in the majority of IDPs from Sirba displacing to other areas of Sirba locality or to
Kulbus and Jebel Moon localities. There are several checkpoints in North Darfur,
particularly around Kutum and Kebkabiya where armed actors are restricting movement
and collecting fees and taxes from travellers. In September, travel between Nyala and other
localities of South Darfur was also restricted by the growing number of checkpoints along
key routes of travel. The checkpoints reportedly require substantial amounts of money to
be paid by drivers and passengers to secure passage, allegedly on the basis that these
‘fees’ are for the protection of travellers from criminal elements.

Protection threats facing civilians remaining in conflict-affected areas. The practice

of imposing ‘fees’, ‘fines’ or ‘taxes’ on those attempting to flee has been replicated to those
unable to flee, on the pretext of guaranteeing their security; however, reports indicate that
the payment of the ‘fees’ appears unlikely to result in protection from attack or other
protection violations. In Habila, the payment of protection ‘fees’ to members of adjacent
damras did delay attacks on the town but when the capacity of the residents to pay the fees
was exhausted, the town was almost immediately overrun. After the town was overrun, and
once a semblance of order was restored, remaining residents were required to pay ‘fees’
for the operation of RSF checkpoints at the entrances to the town on market days. Similarly,
‘taxes’ were imposed on civilian populations in the North Darfur settlements of Tawila,
Kutum and Kabkabiya in July, after the towns had experienced attacks and came under
the control of RSF. Checkpoints within towns also pose protection risks to non-displaced
conflict affected civilians, inhibiting freedom of movement and increasing risks of arbitrary
detention. This was the case in El Fasher, where stringent security checks and roadblocks
were established following clashes between RSF and SAF. The checkpoints reportedly
resulted in the arbitrary arrest and detention of numerous individuals, including IDPs, and
disrupted the transportation of goods between El Fasher and other towns, to the extent that
the main market in El Fasher was forced to almost entirely close down.

Similar constraints on freedom of movement and risks of arbitrary detention were reported
in South Darfur since July and were described as inhibiting access to basic services. The
operation of checkpoints also enables targeting of individuals based on their profile. In
August, reports from Central Darfur indicated the increasing detention of individuals by RSF
that appeared to be based on tribal affiliation or suspicion of supporting SAF. At least 60
individuals were reported to be in incommunicado detention in Central Darfur in August
alone. In September, in North Darfur, checkpoints operating on the road between the IDP
camps and the El Fasher market appeared to be targeting IDPs for arbitrary detention on
suspicion of affiliation with RSF. This targeting also reportedly led to increased reports of
detention of IDPs as well as other civilians in El Fasher.

There is also a situation of general insecurity, with rising crime reported in places such as
East Darfur, where IDPs and refugees in El Neem camp have reportedly experienced
indiscriminate shooting, armed robbery, intimidation, threats and kidnapping against the
backdrop of increased criminality in the state. On 10 August, unidentified armed men
threatened three IDP youth in El Neem camp, looting their mobile phones and injuring one.
On 17 September, unidentified armed men targeted an IDP man riding a donkey cart in Ad
Du’ayn town, looting seven jars of cooking oil and money from him. A total of three refugees
have been killed in farming areas and three IDPs have been kidnapped and released after
payment of a ransom. The lack of functioning justice mechanisms in the area has
contributed to the rise in criminality, as it effectively provides those engaged in criminal
activities with impunity, thereby exacerbating the protection risks faced by groups like IDPs
with already heightened vulnerability. Many urban areas are also facing a dire humanitarian
situation, such as Zalingei and Nyala, as most essential services have broken down and
limited humanitarian or commercial supplies have been able to reach those areas.

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Conflict related sexual violence. Undoubtedly, the number of those who have
experienced conflict related sexual violence across Darfur because of the ongoing conflict
greatly exceeds the number of cases that have been reported to date. Reporting is not only
inhibited by the conflict itself but also by lack of access to relevant services for survivors of
sexual violence, breakdowns in the telecommunications network, and fear of (further)
community stigma. To the extent that it has been possible to engage with communities on
the issue, feedback indicates a disturbing scale of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)
in conflict affected areas. Respondents engaged through assessments in El Geneina
indicates that survivors of CRSV are typically known to the community because incidents
were frequently perpetrated in front of family members or others. This practice appears to
have been designed to increase feelings of shame and humiliation among survivors, and
reports indicate that survivors have in some cases committed suicide as a result. In one
case that occurred in early June, a group of armed men reportedly intercepted three
minibuses taking passengers from El Fasher in North Darfur to Nyala in South Darfur. The
armed men looted the passengers’ money, mobile phones and clothing. They then
reportedly separated the male and female passengers and drove the women and girls to
another location. The armed men then reportedly raped all the women and girls at gun
point, before returning them to the group approximately 90 minutes later. In other cases,
CRSV has reportedly affected women and girls despite them being in the relative safety of
their homes. Over late July to early August when Habila, in West Darfur, was ‘overrun’ by
armed militia members, there were reports of five girls allegedly being abducted and raped
in separate incidents. In at least three of those cases, girls were reportedly abducted from
their homes. Cases of women being abducted have also been reported in Central Darfur.
Problematically, access to services for CRSV survivors has been severely curtailed in
many conflict-affected locations across Darfur. Refugee women and girls have become
more vulnerable as showed by several reported cases of GBV (rape, physical violence,
early marriage). In East Darfur, a total of 10 cases have been reported. In South Darfur,
two cases of abduction of women with intention to rape them were reported; the survivors
were reportedly rescued.

Children severely affected by direct and indirect impacts of conflict. Children have
felt a range of direct conflict impacts, including cases that constitute grave violations of
children’s rights such as killing and maiming, sexual violence and recruitment of children
into armed forces and groups. In addition, the high levels of displacement from conflict
affected areas across Darfur have contributed to an observed uptick in the number of cases
of unaccompanied and separated children. These children tend to be most visible in
marketplaces, where they are exposed to further risks of trafficking, child labour and other
abuses. The closure of schools, and the use of many school buildings as shelter for IDPs
in areas that have been less directly affected by the conflict means that children have
reduced opportunities to access or benefit from referrals to other social services, including
psychosocial support. Where it has been possible to conduct needs assessments, initial
results indicate that a considerable proportion of children are demonstrating needs for
psychosocial support including through experiencing nightmares, violent behaviour, and
increased recourse to risky coping mechanisms such as drug and alcohol.

UNHCR / October 2023 11

Newly displaced individuals, including children, in a gathering site in North Darfur, in July 2023. Photo: UNHCR
PROTECTION BRIEF > DARFUR REGION (OCTOBER 2023)

The situation of refugee children in the refugee camps and settlements is also of serious
concern. In North Darfur, 12 refugee girls were physically assaulted after Church services.
During the first clashes in El Fasher, two refugee children were seriously injured in Dinka
camp, while on 15 May, during the second clashes in El Fasher town, three refugee children
were reportedly raped as they fled to Dinka camp. Almost all schools in the refugee
settlements and camps as well as in urban areas have been closed due to the ongoing
conflict in the Darfur. The disruption of education and lack of access to life-saving services
have been aggravated by the current conflict, children and particularly girls have been
exposed to conflict-related sexual violence, distress, trauma and family separation. The
lived experience of the conflict and the flight has had a severe impact on the mental health
and psychological wellbeing of children. For example, in South Darfur, on 23 May, through
remote monitoring, UNHCR was informed that two refugee girls in Buram settlement were
abducted by masked perpetrators on motorcycles with intention to rape them. Refugees
immediately shouted and ran after them, securing their release. In the current disrupted
socio-economic situation, the risks of neglect and exploitation of refugee children are on
the rise, with risks of abduction into forced labour, recruitment into armed groups, and even
trafficking.

Dire conditions in camps and gathering sites for refugees and internally displaced
people. Particularly in the early weeks and months of the conflict when humanitarian
access was at its worst across Darfur, conditions faced by both refugees and protracted
and newly displaced IDPs in camps and gathering sites deteriorated sharply. The
conditions that IDPs experienced also reflected the broader destruction and disruption
wrought by the conflict, including the shutdown of markets in heavily conflict affected areas
which significantly reduced the capacity of IDPs to access food, resulting in measurable
increases in malnutrition and related health concerns. Reports from key informants on the
ground described the daily announcement of newly deceased IDP children’s names by
mosques in parts of El Geneina town, West Darfur, to which IDPs had fled only to find that
they had no or insufficient access to food, water and other essentials. Even in more stable
areas, the capacity of the host community to support large influxes of IDPs has been
stretched to breaking point. In Sileia, the capital of Jebel Moon locality in West Darfur, the
bulk of the IDP population is sheltering in five overcrowded schools. Lack of access to
sufficient food and decent shelter has reportedly resulted in high levels of malnutrition,
malaria and diarrhoea. The situation of newly arriving IDPs is also poor, given that only
limited humanitarian assistance has been provided to date, whilst other new IDP caseloads
have yet to be provided with any assistance at all. Where inter-agency assessments have
so far been conducted, urgent needs commonly identified include not just food but also
WASH, health and shelter. The absence of humanitarian assistance and livelihood
opportunities, coupled with the continued insecurity has led to economic instability. Crisis-
affected populations struggle to meet their basic needs such as food, shelter, healthcare,
further exacerbating their vulnerability. For example, in East Darfur, a high number of
women and girls have left the camps to urban areas, seeking livelihood opportunities. They
are susceptible to exploitation and sexual abuse, as desperation for income may make
them targets to unscrupulous individuals.

Refugees have been particularly badly affected. Refugees in Darfur have been exposed to
numerous protection risks since the start of the conflict. One of the immediate impacts has
been the suspension of registration by the office of the Commissioner for Refugees (COR),
leaving refugees at higher risk of exploitation and denial of access to services due to a lack
of documentation. Many refugees have reportedly faced challenges at checkpoints, often
being seen as foreign and thus as potentially affiliated to one side or another, causing a
risk of arbitrary detention. The number of refugees and asylum seekers with protection and
humanitarian needs in Darfur was already critical before the crisis, and the number of those
requiring humanitarian assistance has increased as the majority of the refugees are directly
affected by the conflict. Almost all essential services previously provided by humanitarians
and/or Government in refugee settlements and camps have been disrupted. This applies
to health and nutrition services, food assistance, WASH support and access to education,
as well as some protection services such as registration. Most partners have fully or
partially suspended operations. The lack of access to basic life-saving services including

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food, WASH, health care and nutrition, ES/NFIs, disruption of livelihood and scarcity of
necessities, restrictions of movements, GBV, lack of access to CMR and MHPSS services
as well as disruption of humanitarian aid, have contributed to the precarious situation of the
refugees in Darfur. Many refugees reliant on food assistance have been left without support
for months, for example in Um Shalaya refugee camp in Central Darfur where food
assistance has not been provided since late 2022. By and large refugees in Darfur have
gone without food distribution for the last 6 – 7 months, although many had already been
without food assistance for several months before the conflict. There is now severe
malnutrition reported (for example, lactating and expectant mothers in Al Lait) due to lack
of access to food and nutritional supplies, resulting into reported deaths including children.
In North Darfur alone, 169 deaths of refugees (children, lactating and expectant mothers)
due to severe malnutrition and other related diseases have been reported. Several
diseases outbreaks such as measles in refugee settlements and camps have also been
reported, whilst the clinics that do remain operational are running out of medical supplies.

Re-escalation of intercommunal tensions and violence. The conflict has enabled those
with intercommunal grievances to act on them, reigniting longstanding conflicts between
different groups in some areas and creating new conflicts in others. This has perhaps been
most clearly demonstrated in West Darfur, where intercommunal conflicts caused recurrent
violence in 2021 and 2022. In June 2023, the impacts of intercommunal violence in West
Darfur were stark. Multiple reports indicated a campaign of targeted attacks against
civilians based on their tribal background, allegedly conducted by Arab militia members
and some armed men in RSF uniforms. Targeted individuals most frequently included
those in positions of leadership or influence with Masalit tribal affiliations, but also lawyers,
human rights defenders and others. In some cases, reports indicate that those conducting
the attacks went from house-to-house in specific neighbourhoods, with the aim of
identifying and killing targeted individuals. In July, there were reports that lists compiled by
local actors in El Geneina ostensibly to facilitate provision of humanitarian aid had been
shared/ seen by members of armed forces and/or militia groups, who had then used the
information to locate and kill four people. On 12 September, a group of armed men attacked
an Arab damra near Anjemei village, south-east of El Geneina town, killing five males
(including three children) and injuring a sixth. While the perpetrators fled to Chad, there
were immediate concerns that the incident could spark an escalation of intercommunal
tensions with a range of tribes having communities on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border
(including Masalit and Zaghawa). Positively, Chadian authorities swiftly followed up and
apprehended the perpetrators. However, reports indicating that the perpetrators may have
been from among the Sudanese refugee population in Chad underline the ongoing risk that
incidents of this kind may provoke further escalation and potentially even a spill over of the
conflict.

In other areas of Darfur, intercommunal tensions and violence have also been triggered for
a range of reasons. South Darfur has been a site of intercommunal fighting between
different Arab tribes, linked to the refusal of the Salamat to publicly declare their support
for RSF (despite members of the Salamat tribe fighting with RSF). While the conflict has
largely been between the Salamat and Beni Halba tribes, some reports in September
indicated the involvement of Habaniya and Ta’aisha tribesmen in a potential expansion of
the conflict. On 23 September, it was reported that over 50 Salamat tribesmen were killed
in fighting near Kabbum, after Salamat fighters had burned the town to the ground the
previous week causing an unconfirmed number of casualties among the Beni Halba tribe.
The conflict has expanded to impact parts of Mukjar locality in Central Darfur, including
Boro and Wastani villages. In South Darfur, Nyala, Joint Protection Forces (JPF) were
deployed in some residential areas and marketplaces on 28 August. While the deployment
reportedly greatly enhanced freedom of movement for civilians and enabled the partial re-
opening of some markets by reducing looting and other criminal activities, it also became
a source of tension because residents of neighbourhoods predominately inhabited by Arab
tribes opposed this deployment. Their opposition illustrates the tendency of broader
political conflicts to take on tribal dimensions in Darfur, with Arab tribespeople concerned
that JPF elements will be largely composed of and be sympathetic and supportive of non-
Arab tribes in their area.

UNHCR / October 2023 13

 PROTECTION BRIEF > DARFUR REGION (OCTOBER 2023)

Health facilities in settlements in East Darfur continue to run amid a shortage of medicine and supplies. Photo: UNHCR

Harassment of farmers is also often indicative of rising intercommunal tensions with their
roots in competition over land use. Reports have indicated that harassment of farmers is
ongoing in several areas. In North Darfur there were reports of farmers, including women,
being subjected to harassment or assault when seeking access to farmland around Tawila,
whilst in September there were tensions reported in Zam Zam after a cattle rustling incident
led to skirmishes with local Arab tribesmen. Similar reports were received from the area
around Manawashi in South Darfur. The intercommunal character that often underlies this
type of harassment was clearest in reports from Garsila in Central Darfur, where Arab
tribesmen were reported to be preventing civilians from accessing their farmland in June,
allegedly with the support of RSF, and threatening to kill them should they do so. Farmers
described being instructed by Arab tribesmen to ‘forget’ their farms this year because the
land is really owned by Arabs. The risk of intercommunal disputes around land use will rise
towards the end of the year, as herders begin to release their livestock creating risks of
crop destruction.

Key Elements of the Protection

Response
Strengthening community-based approaches. The community has been at the frontline
of the response across Sudan, including in Darfur. While many of the Community Based
Protection Networks (CBPNs) supported by UNHCR and partners prior to the outbreak of
conflict have been disrupted by displacement and other conflict impacts, several continue
to function to some extent. Impressively, members of CBPNs who have been displaced to
Chad have continued working to identify and refer persons with specific needs and others
to specialized services, where possible. UNHCR and partners have also continued to rely
on CBPNs and other community-based structures for their contribution to ongoing
protection monitoring, which has been sustained throughout the conflict although often
conducted remotely. CBPNs including those amongst the refugee community retain a core
role in ensuring accountability to affected populations (AAP) as well as supporting the
sensitization of communities to risks of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and enabling
the reporting of SEA concerns.

Looking forward, the capacities of CBPNs will continue to be strengthened through

consolidating or re-forming disrupted structures, tailored capacity building for new and
existing members, and promoting linkages with Multi-Purpose Community Centres
(MPCCs) functioning as hubs for access to information, services and assistance in conflict

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affected areas. The MPCCs will enable the operation of Protection Desks, facilitating the
identification of persons with specific needs and providing access to information and
referrals to specialized services. In addition, the MPCCs will provide a venue for
implementation of a range of other activities through collaboration with partners, including
psychosocial support, legal counselling, and other services prioritized by community
members.

Protection monitoring: Using its wide network of remaining CBPNs as well as networks
of Key Informants and working as well in close coordination with its Protection Sector
partners, UNHCR has continued to engage in protection monitoring. Much of this has had
to be done through remote means. Where UNHCR and/or partners remained physically
present, in-person protection monitoring has also been conducted in East and North Darfur,
as well as intermittently in South Darfur. Remote protection monitoring has been possible
through our pre-existing network of Key Informants and CBPNs in all Darfur States.
Although some of the networks have been disrupted and some Key Informants displaced,
UNHCR remained in contact with 53 CBPNs and 232 Key Informants, with coverage of all
the ‘hotspot’ areas. In North Darfur UNHCR’s partner also successfully reconstituted a
number of CBPNs. In total, UNHCR and partners have reached over 90,000 persons
through community-level protection monitoring since 15 April. Results of monitoring have
been used to inform advocacy, as well as form the basis of referrals to service providers or
human rights actors to document potential human rights or IHL violations.

Provision of cash and NFI assistance to IDPs and refugees. Over 10,000 households
in North Darfur have received NFIs since 15 April. The NFIs were distributed to newly
displaced IDPs and (vulnerable) host communities in El Fasher (which has received many
new IDPs not only from locations within North Darfur such as Kutum, Tawila, but also from
South Darfur). Earlier on in the conflict, UNHCR had completed communal distributions of
NFIs and 4 generators in health centres that service both IDPs and host communities.
Through the cross-border mechanism with Chad, UNHCR has organized the transport and
distribution of 4,577 NFI kits to IDPs in the West Darfur localities of Kulbus and El Geneina
(including newly displaced IDPs in Ardamata), reaching a total of 22,855 individuals.
Assessments of additional locations in West and Central Darfur are planned during
October, in preparation for further distributions in October and November. In Nertiti, Golo,
Rokero towns, as well as Um Dukhun locality, in Central Darfur, cash assistance to support
protection outcomes is being provided, as well as provision of dignity kits to women and
girls affected by GBV. Further expansion of cash assistance to support protection
outcomes is also prioritized for implementation in the fourth quarter of 2023, in collaboration
with partners. In South Darfur, SORR has successfully concluded the rapid assessment for
the identification of persons with specific needs (PSNs) amongst the newly displaced IDPs
in Kalma, Otash and Dereige IDP camps for support with expected 5,000 plastic tarpaulins.

UNHCR / October 2023 15

Distribution of lifesaving assistance to displaced individuals in West Darfur through cross-border operations from Chad. Photo: SORR
PROTECTION BRIEF > DARFUR REGION (OCTOBER 2023)

Promoting social cohesion. In one location, El Neem IDP camp in East Darfur, UNHCR
through partners have organized sports activities in the form of football tournaments
between the host community and IDPs. This has promoted social cohesion and created
inclusiveness. In addition, this has improved the mental wellbeing of both communities, as
well as fostering a sense of belonging for the newly displaced IDPs. Such activities have
had to be suspended elsewhere but UNHCR will embed social cohesion activities into the
MPCCs it now plans to set-up in key locations.

Provision of legal assistance to refugees. Through a local partner UNHCR has

continued to provide legal assistance to refugees, including for those in detention.
However, the partner has had to suspend operations in several areas where refugees
reside due to the conflict.

Support to Persons with Specific Needs. UNHCR Protection partners partially

implemented activities in three out of the five States. This included identification of and
support to PSNs. Through partners in North, Central and East Darfur, over 2030 PSNs
(including protection cases) have been identified for tailored assistance support since 15
April, including from amongst new IDP populations. The assistance provided is either
individual protection assistance through partners or multi-purpose cash assistance. These
activities are at various stages of implementation, as UNHCR and partners seek to explore
modalities for cash distributions in coordination with the Cash Working Group for Darfur.

Prevention and response to GBV and Child Protection. In some locations, such in East
Darfur, UNHCR and partners have been able to continue to implement a broader range of
protection programmes, in particular for refugees, including responding to GBV and child
protection. GBV awareness sessions have been conducted in El Neem IDP camp as well
as in El Daein Locality, and partners have been able to respond to GBV cases in both
refugee and IDP areas. Elsewhere, UNHCR coordinates closely with the GBV and CP
Working Groups which remain active in some Darfur States such as parts of North Darfur
with continued limited provision of GBV and CP services in some locations.

Coordination, protection mainstreaming and advocacy. UNHCR continues to lead the

coordination of the Protection Sector in Darfur, facilitating regular meetings with sector
partners at the State level to encourage the exchange of information about the evolving
protection context, promoting the adoption of standardized tools and harmonized ways of
working, strengthening the functionality of referral pathways, and identifying emerging
protection trends in need of timely and coordinated responses. UNHCR also continues to
coordinate the refugee response through Refugee Working Groups, combining these with
Protection Sector WG meetings where appropriate to streamline partners’ need to attend
multiple forums. In addition, UNHCR provides support for the mainstreaming of protection
across the response through technical support for conflict sensitivity and ongoing
coordination with non-Protection sectors. Advocacy on protection of civilians in Darfur is
undertaken through the regular publication of Protection of Civilians Notes shared with key
stakeholders including the HCT, together with ad hoc advocacy actions conducted in
response to urgent protection threats identified through protection monitoring.

Challenges & Opportunities

Security risks, the rainy season, and other constraints on humanitarian access pose
significant challenges to scaling up UNHCR’s response in Darfur. To the extent that
humanitarian access has been regained, it remains largely focused on the delivery of
supplies for distribution to IDPs, refugees and other conflict affected people. This is of vital
importance in the context of the severe deprivation that people across Darfur have been
experiencing in the context of the ongoing conflict. However, resumption of core protection
services requires predictable physical presence of specialized staff alongside conflict
affected people. In some areas, humanitarian access has expanded sufficiently for some
UNHCR partners to achieve this level of physical presence, but a number of hotspot
locations so far remain inaccessible or impossible to access in a predictable and sustained

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manner. UNHCR is working to overcome these challenges through investment in access

routes into Darfur from both the east (from Kosti) and the west (from Chad). Cross-border
access routes into Darfur from Chad have already enabled access to West Darfur and are
anticipated to provide access into Central Darfur, and potentially North Darfur in the coming
months.

Disruption and unpredictability of telecommunications networks has also been a key

response impediment, making remote outreach to conflict affected locations difficult to
achieve and hampering efforts to gather information required for response planning
purposes. Recognizing that the re-establishment of physical presence of UNHCR and
partners may be difficult to achieve immediately in some locations, improving the
functionality of telecommunications networks is required to enable the speedy roll out of
remotely supported responses. In some locations in Darfur, improvements to
telecommunications infrastructure have been driven by local businessmen setting up
satellite internet access through portable, solar-powered satellite receiver sets. Adoption of
these types of modalities to ease communication with partners and CBPNs linked to
MPCCs would enhance capacity building efforts, enable provision of remote services and
support broader protection monitoring coverage.

Across Darfur, humanitarian infrastructure has been damaged and destroyed

including many of UNHCR’s and partners’ offices including COR, guesthouses and
warehouses. Rebuilding will take time and significant resources and cannot be undertaken
at scale until there are assurances that new facilities will be safe from looting and attack.
In the interim pending a security risk assessment and building on the access to Darfur
already achieved through the cross-border modality, UNHCR is also exploring the
establishment of integrated UN premises in El Geneina to enable the return of a static UN
presence to the Darfur region which would act as a staging point for missions into more
distant parts of West and Central (and potentially North) Darfur.

The response to the catastrophic protection impacts generated by the ongoing conflict in
Sudan is currently only 31% funded. Under-resourcing the response creates risks of
undermining the legitimacy of humanitarian action in the eyes of communities who will not
receive the protection services and assistance that they need. It also increases the
likelihood that provision of aid will become (further) politicized, as targeting is forced to
become narrower in the face of funding shortfalls. The challenges that have impeded the
protection response in the Darfur region to date, including the access impediments that
have necessitated the adoption of cross-border modalities, mean that activity costs may be
higher in the Darfur region compared to other areas of Sudan. Those higher costs are
justified by the humanitarian imperative of reaching those most in need of protection and
assistance. While local actors continue to operate at the frontline of the response,
localization should not be perceived as a cost-saving (or a risk transfer) measure. On the
contrary, localization requires appropriate resourcing, to ensure that partners are
appropriately supported. A comprehensive protection response must be delivered in Darfur
despite the challenges, to create a foundation for the longer-term development responses
that are also needed and to provide forcibly displaced people with hope for genuinely
durable solutions in the future.

UNHCR / October 2023 17

Looted UNHCR warehouse in El Geneina, West Darfur. Photo: UNHCR

PROTECTION BRIEF > DARFUR REGION (OCTOBER 2023)

Key Messages
Parties to the conflict are urged to:

• Ensure the adherence of all persons acting under their instructions, direction
or control to their core obligations under International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law.

• Refrain from attacks expected to cause excessive civilian harm relative to

the military objective sought, to facilitate civilians’ access to humanitarian
assistance and to enable the transport of wounded in need of medical care.

• Recall their obligation to ensure that civilians can leave areas of active
conflict safely, and to instruct, direct or influence armed elements in areas
under their control to refrain from impeding their movement and from
arbitrarily extracting ‘fees’ or ‘taxes’ while on the move.

• Immediately prohibit the engagement of all armed elements in areas under

their control in any form of sexual violence and investigate thoroughly any
reports received concerning the engagement of their personnel in sexual
violence. Ensure that those found to have committed acts of sexual violence
are appropriately sanctioned.

• Stop all recruitment and use of children in the conflict by issuing command
orders that no boy or girl should be involved in the conflict in any combat or
support role.

• Recall Sudan’s commitments under the Juba Peace Agreement including its
provisions on the protection of civilians and security arrangements.

The international community is requested to:

• Undertake all reasonable measures to restore peace and security in the

region, as well as provide for robust and adequately resourced protection of
civilian mechanisms.

• Accelerate efforts to secure sustained and enforceable ceasefire

undertakings in Darfur, alongside immediate humanitarian access, to
provide credible safeguards against potential (re-)occurrence of war crimes
or crimes against humanity and to establish robust mechanisms to monitor
the compliance of all parties to the conflict to core IHL and human rights
obligations and to hold them accountable for identified violations.

• Accelerate and place renewed emphasis on providing sustained

humanitarian access to conflict-affected populations and ensure access to
humanitarian assistance and protection services for all affected populations.

• Scale up the allocation of resources to enable the delivery of the protection

response for conflict-affected populations, specifically in the Darfur region
where access challenges and the destruction of humanitarian infrastructure
may increase resource requirements.

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PROTECTION BRIEF
DARFUR REGION
October 2023

UNHCR Sudan

data.unhcr.org/en/country/sdn
www.unhcr.org

www.unhcr.org

UNHCR / October 2023 19