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 --

---

0
r.~
•• •

Preface xxv
•••
Acknowledgments XXVIII
•
About the Authors XXIX

CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1
CHAPTER 2 Communication and Anticipatory Socialization 30
CHAPTER 3 Communication and Organizational Encounter 57
CHAPTER 4 Communication and Management Theory 84
CHAPTER s Communication Channels and Structures 118

CHAPTER 6 Communication and Organizational Culture 152

CHAPTER 7 Communication with Organizational Members 182
CHAPTER s Communication and Leadership 209
CHAPTER 9 Communication and Decision-Making 239

CHAPTER 10 Communication and Conflict 263

CHAPTER 11 Communication, Power, and Resistance 289
CHAPTER 12 Communication and Work-Nonwork Issues 314

CHAPTER 13 Communication and the Changing Work Environment:

Technology, Diversity, and Globalization 339
CHAPTER 14 Communication During Career and Organizational Transitions 370
CHAPTER 1s Communication During Organizational Exit 396
References 423
Credits 454
Index 456
••
VII
 Preface xxv
•••
Acknowledgments XXVIII

•
About the Authors XXIX

Introduction 1
Defining Communication 3
Information Transfer 3
Shared Meaning 4
Transactional Meaning Creation 5
Applying the Three Definitions of Communication 5
Working Definition 6
Defining Organizations 7
A Legal Definition of Organizations 7
A Communicative Definition of Organizations 8
A Social Definition of Organizations 9

The Complexit y of Defining Communication

in Organizations 10
Strategic Ambiguity 10
Ethical Issue: Strategic Ambiguity 72

•••
VIII
Nonverbal Communication 12
Applying the Three Nonverbal Criteria 14
Communication Challenge: Office Design 76
Perspectives on Organizat ional Communication 16
A Post-Positivist Perspective 16
An Interpretive Perspective 18
A Critical Perspective 20
Applying the Three Organizational Perspectives 22
Other Perspectives 24

Application to Different Types of Organizations 26

Preview of the Book 27

Summary 29

Communication and Anticipatory

Socialization 30
Anticipatory Role Socializat ion 32
Family 32
Education 35
Communication Challenge: Realistic Expectations 36
Peers 37
Previous Experience 38
Communication Challenge: Comparing Workplaces 39
Media 40
Application 41
The "Real Job" Colloquialism 42
Ethical Issue: Deconstructing Our Labels 42
Anticipatory Role Socialization for Volunteers 43
Summary of Anticipatory Role Socialization 44

Anticipatory Organizational Socialization 45

Person-Job Fit 45

•
Contents IX
Competition 131
Specialization 132
Terri toriaIity 132
Lack of Incentive 132
Informal Communication 133
Issues w ith Informal Commun ication 134
Accuracy 134
Speed 134
Ethical Issue: Gossip's Messiness 135
Mid-Level Employee Participation 135
Accountability 135
The Competence Network 135
Integrative Communication Structures 136
Committees 136
Quality Circles 136
Project Teams 137
Limitations of Traditional Communication Channels Approach 137
Communication Networks 139
Collecting Network Data 140
Characteristics of Networks 142
Linkage Characteristics 142
Individual Roles 144
Communication Challenge: Reducing Employee Turnover
by Cultivating Network Density 145
Group-Level Characteristics 146
Organizational or System-Level Characteristics 146
Impact of Communication Networks 147
Limitations of Network Analysis 149
Nonprofit Organ izations and Volunteers 149

Summary 150

•••
Contents XIII
 Communication and Organizational
Culture 152
Defining Organizational Culture 154
Artifacts 154
Values 155
Assumptions 155
Interactions of Various Members 156

Structuration Theory and Culture 156

Communication Challenge: Communicating a New Value 159

Organizational Norms 160

Types of Norms 161
Communication Norms 161
Norm Development 162
Creating Conformity to Norms 163

Three Approaches to Culture 164

An Integrated Perspective 164
A Differentiated Perspective 165
A Fragmented Perspective 165
Applying Martin's Three Perspectives on Organizational Culture 166
A Critique of Applying the Three Perspectives 168

Ana lyzing Organizational Culture 169

Script (or Narrative) Analysis 169
Ritual Analysis 172
Metaphor Analysis 173
Ethical Issue: Enron's Metaphors 175
Reflective Comment Analysis 176
Ethnography 177
A Comparison of Five Methods of Cultural Analysis 179
Applying Three Research Perspectives to Organizational Culture 180

Summary 181

•
XIV Contents
Communication with Organizational
Members 182
Supervisor-Subord inate Com munication 185
Average Supervisor Communication Style 185
Interaction Patterns 785
Openness to Communication 785
Upward Distortion 786
Upward Influence 786
Semantic Information Distance 786
Communication Challenge: The Pelz Effect 187
Effective versus Ineffective Supervisors 787
Feedback 788
Systemic Factors 788
Communication Challenge: ''Living'' versus ''Having'' an Open-Door Policy 1BB
Differentiated Supervisor Communication Style 189
Partnership Relationships 789
Overseer Relationships 790
Middle-Group Relationships 797
Relationship Development 797
Outcomes of Supervisor-Subordinate Communication 192
Summary of Supervisor-Subordinate Communication 192

Peer Communication 193

Peer Social Support 194
Types of Peer Communication Relationships 194
Outcomes of Peer Communication 195
Workplace Friendships 195
Summary of Peer and Friendship Relations 196

Interaction of Supervisor and Peer Communication 197

Summary of Supervisor-Peer Relationship Interaction 198

Mentor(ing) Comm unication 198

Communication Challenge: Mentoring Communication 199

Contents xv
 Summary of Mentoring 200
Communication Challenge: Upside Down Mentoring? 201

Emotion Management in Interpersonal Interactions 201

The Nature of Emotions in Interactions 202
Ethical Issue: The Moral "Signaling" Function of Emotions 203
Types of Emotions 203
Emotion Management 205
Communication Challenge: Peer Communication
and Emotion Management 206

Volunteers and Interpersonal Relationships 207

Summary 208

Communication and Leadership 209

Managerial or Group Leadership 212
Managerial Leadership as Traits 212
Models of Management Styles 213
Situational Models of Managerial Leadership 216
Contingency Models of Managerial Leading 217
External Communication Focus of Managers 219
Dialectical Theory and Managerial Leadership 220
Communication Challenge: African American Women
Executives' Leadership Communication 222
Managerial Leadership and Volunteers 222
Summary of Managerial Leadership 223

Organizational Leadership 223

Charismatic Leadership 224
Visionary Leadership 226
Transformational (versus Transactional) Leadership 228
Institutional Leadership 230
Framing Theory 232
Communication Challenge: Framing and Managerial Leadership 234

•
XVI Contents
Organizational Leadership of Volunteers 234
Ethical Issue: Leaders' Moral Talk Is Contagious (in a Good Way) 235

The Dark Side of Managerial and Organizational

Leadership 235

Comparing Managerial and Organizational Leadership 236

Summary 237

Communication and Decision-Making 239

A Prescriptive Model of Decision-Making 241
The Model 241
Communication Challenge: Improving Decision-Making
through Brainstorming 242

Descriptive Models of Decision-Making 243

Phase Models 243

Alternative Descriptive Models 246

The Spiral Model 247
Multiple Sequence Model 247
Communication Challenge: Leading Group Decisions 248
Vigilant Interaction Theory 248

Alternative Decision-Making Processes 250

Satisficing 251
Garbage Can Model 252
Retrospective Rationality 254
Ethical Issue: Retrospective Rationality 254
Faulty Decision-Making 255
Groupthink 256

Other Characteristics of Ineffective Decision-Making 258

Communication Challenge: Avoiding Groupthink
and Ineffective Decision-Making Practices 259

••
Cont ent s XVII
 Decision-Making in Volunteer Organizations 260

Summary 262

10 Communication and Conflict 263

Defining Conflict 265

Typologies of Conflict 267

Level of Conflicts 267
lntrapersonal Conflict 267
Interpersonal Conflicts 267
Intergroup Conflicts 268
lnterorganizational Conflicts 268
Content of Conflicts 268
Visibility of Conflicts 269
Application 269

Conflict as Dysfunctional and Functional 210

Conflict Styles 211
Bargaining and Negotiation in Conflict 275
Ethical Issue: Ethical Bargaining 275

Managing Conflict through Third Parties 276

Communication and Conflict with Abusive Coworkers 277

Workplace Bullying 278
Denning Workplace Bullying 278
Ethical Issue: Wanting to Belong and Participation in Social Bullying 279
Causes 280
Characteristics of Perpetrators 280
Characteristics of Targets 280
Environmental Factors 280
Effects of Bullying 281
Coping with Bullying 281
Addressing Bullying 282

•••
XVIII Contents
Sexual Harassment 283
Denning Sexual Harassment 283
Ethical Issue: Sender or Receiver Priority 283
Causes of Sexual Harassment 285
Effects of Sexual Harassment 285
Coping with Sexual Harassment 286
Addressing Sexual Harassment 286

Conflict in Nonprofit/Volunteer Settings 287

Summary 287

Communication, Power, and Resistance 289

Definitions 291
Power and Influence 291
Ideology (or Ideolog ies) 293
Surface and Deep Structure Power 294
Surface Level Power 295
Types of Power 295
Communication Challenge: Increasing Personal Power 298
Reasons for Power Relationships 298
Power as Resource Dependency 298
Power as Social Exchange 299
Power and Personal Characteristics 300

Deep Structure Power 301

Communication Challenge: Muting Voices of the Mistreated 304

Resistance to Power 305

Ethical Issue: Ethics and Decaf Resistance 307
Voice and Resistance 308
Ethical Issue: Boat Rocking and Whistleblowing 310

Power and Resistance in Nonprofits and Volunteers 311

Summary 313

•
Contents XIX
 Exit Interviews 408
Communication Challenge: Exit Interviews with College Interns 408

Involuntary Exit 410

Immediate or Summary Dismissal 410
Progressive Discipline 410
Ethical Issue: Fired Over Facebook 411
Communication Challenge: The EAGR Approach to Giving
Corrective Feedback 412

A Third Form of Exit 415

Exit and Volunteers 416
Summary 417
Epilogue 418
A Dark Side of Organizational Membership 419
Socialization and Individualization 420
Conclusion 422

References 423
Credits 454
Index 456

•
XXIV Contents
The inspiration to write this textbook was the result of a number of factors. Perhaps, at
its most basic, the textbook I (Michael) used for many years was out of print. It was time
to select a new one. That started me on a path of exploring options and conversations.
Ryan and I began talking about organizational communication textbooks and imagin-
ing what a textbook could be. We discovered we had a number of common goals for a
textbook. First, we wanted a textbook that included many of the major concepts and
theories of organizational communication but one that had an applied focus and taught
specific communication practices so that students could easily connect what they were
reading about to their current and future organizational experiences. Second, we
wanted it to integrate ethical issues throughout the book rather than examining ethics
in just one chapter (or none). Third, we were both dedicated to telling the story of
organizational communication as its own domain of study instead of merely adding
organizational communication on to management concepts. Finally, we wanted to
broaden the topic of the ''organization'' in organizational communication to include
public organizations, family-operated organizations, and nonprofit organizations in
addition to the more traditional focus on large for-profit businesses.
As a result, the chapters in the book contain a number of unique characteristics.
Each chapter begins with a brief scenario or case study that is used throughout the
chapter to make it easy to apply the concepts and theories to a specific example. The
scenarios include organizations that range from traditional for-profit businesses, such
as big box department stores and banks, to small family-owned businesses, social agen-
cies, and public libraries. The individuals in the scenarios have androgynous names in

xxv
 an effort to reduce gender stereotypes. Each chapter includes ethical issue boxes to help
students and instructors explore potential ethical issues related to the chapter's topics.
Each chapter includes communication challenges that allow instructors and students
to consider some of the practical issues related to applying the communication concepts
in the chapter. Each chapter also includes a section applying the concepts to nonprofit
and volunteer settings.
In addition to more common chapters regarding communication channels, organi-
zational culture, leadership, decision making, power, and conflict (among others), the
book also offers a number of unique chapters that we believe will help students better
understand their past, present, and future organizational experiences. For example, in
Chapter 2, we explore how our experiences influence our choices about careers and
places to work (Chapter 2: ''Communication and Anticipatory Socialization''). Most of
our students are currently experiencing these issues in their lives, whether they are
traditional college-aged students or nontraditional students finishing degrees. In an-
other chapter, we explore the experience of being an organizational newcomer (Chap-
ter 3: ''Communication and Organizational Encounter''). Most of our students are
preparing to enter new career-oriented jobs where these concepts will be particularly
relevant. In Chapter 12, we explore work-life balance issues (Chapter 12: ''Communica-
tion and Work-Nonwork Issues''). The popular press tells us that millennials are par-
ticularly concerned with these issues but so are students who are working full-time
while trying to finish their college degrees. In the final chapter, we explore leaving or-
ganizations (Chapter 15: ''Communication During Organizational Exit''). Although
retirement is a long way off for most of our students, they are preparing to leave their
university and current jobs. As a result, this chapter will be beneficial to them as well as
they consider how they will exit their current organizations.
We want to thank a few people specifically for the resulting book you are reading.
We want to thank Toni Magyar and the rest of the people at Oxford University Press for
making this book a reality. We want to thank the reviewers who gave us feedback on
the proposal and earlier drafts, both those listed in the following and those who choose
to remain anonymous. We want to thank the students from Michael's Fall 2015 and
Spring 2016 Organizational Communication classes who pre-tested earlier drafts of the
book in PDF format and provided valuable feedback. We would like to think that we
benefitted more from their feedback than they benefitted from receiving a free text-
book. We want to thank Carla Kramer who proofread all of the chapters for us during
the revision process. We also want to thank the various family members, friends, and

•
XXVI Preface
students who shared work experiences with us that gave us the material to make the
scenarios realistic.
We dedicate the book to students because it is our hope that the arrangement and
content of the book will benefit them, not just in their organizational communication
class but throughout their lives as well. We hope that they will be able to use what they
learn from this book in their future organizational experiences whether it be in their
careers or as volunteers.

Michael W. Kramer
Ryan S. Bisel

••
Preface XXVII
 Our sincere thanks are extended to reviewers of this text. They include the fallowing:
Mohammad A. Auwal, California State Ed Kellerman, University ofFlorida
University-Los Angeles William Kelvin, Kent State University
Carol-Lynn Bower, Arizona State University Lucyann Kerry, Chadron State College
Stephanie Dailey, Texas State University Kathleen Krone, University ofNebraska
Karl Babij, DeSales University Holly Kruse, Rogers State University
Jennie Donohue, Marist College David Lapakko, Augsburg College
Kenny Embry, Saint Leo University Jaesub Lee, University of Houston
Michelle Fetherston, Marquette University! Patricia J. Lehman, Goshen College
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Marla Lowenthal, University of San Francisco
Robin Frkal, Northeastern University! Theresa MacNeil, Florida Southern College
Assumption College Vernon Miller, Michigan State University
Jeremy Fyke, Belmont University Michael P. Pagano, Fairfield University
Angela N. Gist, University ofKansas Sarah Riforgiate, Kansas State University
LaKresha Graham, Rockhurst University Gary Shulman, Miami University
Meredith Harrigan, State University of Frances Smith, Murray State University
New York at Geneseo Kimberly Smith, University of Central
Jenna Haugen, University of Kentucky! Florida
University of Louisville Brandy Stamper, University of North Carolina
Carole Isom-Barnes, Queens University of at Charlotte
Charlotte Michael A. Stefanone, University at Buffalo
Lorelle B. Jabs, Seattle Pacific University Heather L. Walter, The University of Akron

•••
XXVIII
 I •

Michael W. Kramer (PhD, University of Texas) is Professor and Chair of the Depart-
ment of Communication at the University of Oklahoma. He has received multiple
teaching awards while teaching organizational and group communication to under-
graduate and graduate students for over 30 years at three institutions. His organiza-
tional research primarily focuses on employee transitions as part of the assimilation/
socialization process such as newcomer entry, transfers, exit, and corporate mergers.
His group research focuses on decision making, membership, and leadership. He has
used a range of qualitative and quantitative research methods from structural equa-
tion modeling to ethnography. He has published over 50 articles in refereed journals
such as Communication Monographs, Human Communication Research, Journal ofAp-
plied Communication Research, Management Communication Quarterly, Leadership
Quarterly, and Small Group Research, among others. He has written books on uncer-
tainty management and socialization, and recently has coedited three books on volun-
teers and nonprofit organizations. He and his wife enjoy attending theater performances.
He also enjoys performing on stage from time to time. He has been running long
enough that he is often a top finisher in local races against the few other runners left in
his age group.

Ryan S. Bisel (PhD, University of Kansas) is an Associate Professor of Organizational

Communication at the University of Oklahoma. His research interests include leader-
ship communication, organizational culture change, and behavioral ethics. Bisel and
his colleagues have developed original organizational communication concepts such

•
XXIX
 as the hierarchical mum effect, the workers' moral mum effect, ethical sensegiving,
supervisor moral talk contagion, and organizational moral learning. Bisel's research is
published in communication and management journals such as Management
Communication Quarterly, Communication Theory, International Journal of Business
Communication, Western Journal of Communication, Leadership Quarterly, Small
Group Research, and Human Relations. Bisel has also worked as a speaker, trainer, and
process consultant for organizations such as the Kansas Health Foundation, Douglas
County Visiting Nurses Association, and National Weather Association. Bisel enjoys
playing guitar, eating great foods, spending time with his wife, and playing ''ninjas''
with his two young children.

xxx About the Authors

CHAPTER 1
 As a part-time employee while attending a nearby university, Shane has worked the
morning shift from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. three or four mornings a week at the local public
library for over a year. Shane has always walked in the door between 8:55 and 9:00 a.m. even
if it meant sitting in the parking lot checking emails to arrive exactly on time. Recently, the
branch manager sent out the following memo to employees:

To: All employees

From: Pat Morris, Branch Manager
Date: February 25
RE: Work Policy

I have noticed recently that a few of our employees are arriving just in time to begin
their shift. This results in rushing around at the last minute. It can create problems for
those who are ready to leave because their replacement is not ready to begin. In the
end, our service to our customers is less professional than it should be.
As a reminder, we expect employees to arrive 15 minutes prior to their start time so that
they can be ready to start on time. This will result in improved relationships with other
workers, better service to our customers, and a more professional atmosphere overall.

The full-time employees, who were salaried, appreciated this reminder of the library's
"policy." They all arrived early anyway and were sometimes stuck waiting for a part-time em-
ployee to arrive when they were ready to leave. Shane and the other part-time employees
privately complained to each other about this new policy. They did not think that they needed
any time to prepare; they were ready to work when they arrived. In addition, expecting them
to come in 15 minutes early seemed unfair because they were not paid for that extra time.
In the end, the part-time employees did start coming to work earlier because they did not
want to risk losing their jobs. They came in earlier, although not always 15 minutes early. The
branch manager heard that the full-time employees were pleased with the result and noticed
that customers seemed to receive better service because of it.

2
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Philosophy
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: Philosophy

Author: Bertrand Russell

Release date: February 18, 2024 [eBook #72981]

Language: English

Original publication: United States: W. W. Norton & Company,

Inc, 1927

Credits: Aaron Adrignola and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file
was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY ***

PHILOSOPHY
 PHILOSOPHY
By

Bertrand Russell

NEW YORK
W · W · NORTON & COMPANY, INC.
Publishers
 Copyright, 1927,
BERTRAND RUSSELL

Published in Great Britain under the title “An Outline of Philosophy”

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE PUBLISHERS BY THE VAN REES PRESS
 CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. Philosophic Doubts 1

PART I
MAN FROM WITHOUT

II. Man and His Environment 16

III. The Process of Learning in Animals and Infants 29
IV. Language 43
V. Perception Objectively Regarded 58
VI. Memory Objectively Regarded 70
VII. Inference as a Habit 79
VIII. Knowledge Behaviouristically Considered 88

PART II
THE PHYSICAL WORLD

IX. The Structure of the Atom 97

X. Relativity 107
XI. Causal Laws in Physics 114
XII. Physics and Perception 123
 XIII. Physical and Perceptual Space 137
XIV. Perception and Physical Causal Laws 144
XV. The Nature of Our Knowledge of Physics 151

PART III
MAN FROM WITHIN

XVI. Self-observation 161

XVII. Images 176
XVIII. Imagination and Memory 187
XIX. The Introspective Analysis of Perception 201
XX. Consciousness? 210
XXI. Emotion, Desire, and Will 218
XXII. Ethics 225

PART IV
THE UNIVERSE

XXIII. Some Great Philosophies of the Past 236

XXIV. Truth and Falsehood 254
XXV. The Validity of Inference 266
XXVI. Events, Matter, and Mind 276
XXVII. Man’s Place in the Universe 292
PHILOSOPHY
 CHAPTER I
PHILOSOPHIC DOUBTS

Perhaps it might be expected that I should begin with a definition of

“philosophy”, but, rightly or wrongly, I do not propose to do so. The
definition of “philosophy” will vary according to the philosophy we
adopt; all that we can say to begin with is that there are certain
problems, which certain people find interesting, and which do not, at
least at present, belong to any of the special sciences. These
problems are all such as to raise doubts concerning what commonly
passes for knowledge; and if the doubts are to be answered, it can
only be by means of a special study, to which we give the name
“philosophy”. Therefore the first step in defining “philosophy” is the
indication of these problems and doubts, which is also the first step
in the actual study of philosophy. There are some among the
traditional problems of philosophy that do not seem to me to lend
themselves to intellectual treatment, because they transcend our
cognitive powers; such problems I shall not deal with. There are
others, however, as to which, even if a final solution is not possible
at present, yet much can be done to show the direction in which a
solution is to be sought, and the kind of solution that may in time
prove possible.
Philosophy arises from an unusually obstinate attempt to arrive
at real knowledge. What passes for knowledge in ordinary life suffers
from three defects: it is cocksure, vague, and self-contradictory. The
first step towards philosophy consists in becoming aware of these
defects, not in order to rest content with a lazy scepticism, but in
order to substitute an amended kind of knowledge which shall be
tentative, precise, and self-consistent. There is of course another
quality which we wish our knowledge to possess, namely
comprehensiveness: we wish the area of our knowledge to be as
wide as possible. But this is the business of science rather than of
philosophy. A man does not necessarily become a better philosopher
through knowing more scientific facts; it is principles and methods
and general conceptions that he should learn from science if
philosophy is what interests him. The philosopher’s work is, so to
speak, at the second remove from crude fact. Science tries to collect
facts into bundles by means of scientific laws; these laws, rather
than the original facts, are the raw material of philosophy.
Philosophy involves a criticism of scientific knowledge, not from a
point of view ultimately different from that of science, but from a
point of view less concerned with details and more concerned with
the harmony of the whole body of special sciences.
The special sciences have all grown up by the use of notions
derived from common sense, such as things and their qualities,
space, time, and causation. Science itself has shown that none of
these common-sense notions will quite serve for the explanation of
the world; but it is hardly the province of any special science to
undertake the necessary reconstruction of fundamentals. This must
be the business of philosophy. I want to say, to begin with, that I
believe it to be a business of very great importance. I believe that
the philosophical errors in common-sense beliefs not only produce
confusion in science, but also do harm in ethics and politics, in social
institutions, and in the conduct of everyday life. It will be no part of
my business, in this volume, to point out these practical effects of a
bad philosophy: my business will be purely intellectual. But if I am
right, the intellectual adventures which lie before us have effects in
many directions which seem, at first sight, quite remote from our
theme. The effect of our passions upon our beliefs forms a favourite
subject of modern psychologists; but the converse effect, that of our
beliefs upon our passions, also exists, though it is not such as an
old-fashioned intellectualist psychology would have supposed.
Although I shall not discuss it, we shall do well to bear it in mind, in
order to realise that our discussions may have bearings upon
matters lying outside the sphere of pure intellect.
I mentioned a moment ago three defects in common beliefs,
namely, that they are cocksure, vague, and self-contradictory. It is
the business of philosophy to correct these defects so far as it can,
without throwing over knowledge altogether. To be a good
philosopher, a man must have a strong desire to know, combined
with great caution in believing that he knows; he must also have
logical acumen and the habit of exact thinking. All these, of course,
are a matter of degree. Vagueness, in particular, belongs, in some
degree, to all human thinking; we can diminish it indefinitely, but we
can never abolish it wholly. Philosophy, accordingly, is a continuing
activity, not something in which we can achieve final perfection once
for all. In this respect, philosophy has suffered from its association
with theology. Theological dogmas are fixed, and are regarded by
the orthodox as incapable of improvement. Philosophers have too
often tried to produce similarly final systems: they have not been
content with the gradual approximations that satisfied men of
science. In this they seem to me to have been mistaken. Philosophy
should be piecemeal and provisional like science; final truth belongs
to heaven, not to this world.
The three defects which I have mentioned are interconnected,
and by becoming aware of any one we may be led to recognise the
other two. I will illustrate all three by a few examples.
Let us take first the belief in common objects, such as tables and
chairs and trees. We all feel quite sure about these in ordinary life,
and yet our reasons for confidence are really very inadequate. Naive
common sense supposes that they are what they appear to be, but
that is impossible, since they do not appear exactly alike to any two
simultaneous observers; at least, it is impossible if the object is a
single thing, the same for all observers. If we are going to admit
that the object is not what we see, we can no longer feel the same
assurance that there is an object; this is the first intrusion of doubt.
However, we shall speedily recover from this set-back, and say that
 1
of course the object is “really” what physics says it is. Now physics
says that a table or a chair is “really” an incredibly vast system of
electrons and protons in rapid motion, with empty space in between.
This is all very well. But the physicist, like the ordinary man, is
dependent upon his senses for the existence of the physical world. If
you go up to him solemnly and say, “would you be so kind as to tell
me, as a physicist, what a chair really is”, you will get a learned
answer. But if you say, without preamble: “Is there a chair there?”
he will say: “Of course there is; can’t you see it?” To this you ought
to reply in the negative. You ought to say, “No, I see certain patches
of colour, but I don’t see any electrons or protons, and you tell me
that they are what a chair consists of”. He may reply: “Yes, but a
large number of electrons and protons close together look like a
patch of colour”. What do you mean by “look like”? you will then ask.
He is ready with an answer. He means that light-waves start from
the electrons and protons (or, more probably, are reflected by them
from a source of light), reach the eye, have a series of effects upon
the rods and cones, the optic nerve, and the brain, and finally
produce a sensation. But he has never seen an eye or an optic nerve
or a brain, any more than he has seen a chair; he has only seen
patches of colour which, he says, are what eyes “look like.” That is
to say, he thinks that the sensation you have when (as you think)
you see a chair, has a series of causes, physical and psychological,
but all of them, on his own showing, lie essentially and forever
outside experience. Nevertheless, he pretends to base his science
upon observation. Obviously there is here a problem for the logician,
a problem belonging not to physics, but to quite another kind of
study. This is a first example of the way in which the pursuit of
precision destroys certainty.

1
I am not thinking here of the elementary
physics to be found in a school text-book; I am
thinking of modern theoretical physics, more
particularly as regards the structure of atoms, as
 to which I shall have more to say in later
chapters.

The physicist believes that he infers his electrons and protons

from what he perceives. But the inference is never clearly set forth
in a logical chain, and, if it were, it might not look sufficiently
plausible to warrant much confidence. In actual fact, the whole
development from common-sense objects to electrons and protons
has been governed by certain beliefs, seldom conscious, but existing
in every natural man. These beliefs are not unalterable, but they
grow and develop like a tree. We start by thinking that a chair is as
it appears to be, and is still there when we are not looking. But we
find, by a little reflection, that these two beliefs are incompatible. If
the chair is to persist independently of being seen by us, it must be
something other than the patch of colour we see, because this is
found to depend upon conditions extraneous to the chair, such as
how the light falls, whether we are wearing blue spectacles, and so
on. This forces the man of science to regard the “real” chair as the
cause (or an indispensable part of the cause) of our sensations when
we see the chair. Thus we are committed to causation as an a priori
belief without which we should have no reason for supposing that
there is a “real” chair at all. Also, for the sake of permanence we
bring in the notion of substance: the “real” chair is a substance, or
collection of substances, possessed of permanence and the power to
cause sensations. This metaphysical belief has operated, more or
less unconsciously, in the inference from sensations to electrons and
protons. The philosopher must drag such beliefs into the light of day,
and see whether they still survive. Often it will be found that they
die on exposure.
Let us now take up another point. The evidence for a physical
law, or for any scientific law, always involves both memory and
testimony. We have to rely both upon what we remember to have
observed on former occasions, and on what others say they have
observed. In the very beginnings of science, it may have been
possible sometimes to dispense with testimony; but very soon every
scientific investigation began to be built upon previously ascertained
results, and thus to depend upon what others had recorded. In fact,
without the corroboration of testimony we should hardly have had
much confidence in the existence of physical objects. Sometimes
people suffer from hallucinations, that is to say, they think they
perceive physical objects, but are not confirmed in this belief by the
testimony of others. In such cases, we decide that they are
mistaken. It is the similarity between the perceptions of different
people in similar situations that makes us feel confident of the
external causation of our perceptions; but for this, whatever naive
beliefs we might have had in physical objects would have been
dissipated long ago. Thus memory and testimony are essential to
science. Nevertheless, each of these is open to criticism by the
sceptic. Even if we succeed, more or less, in meeting his criticism,
we shall, if we are rational, be left with a less complete confidence in
our original beliefs than we had before. Once more, we shall become
less cocksure as we become more accurate.
Both memory and testimony lead us into the sphere of
psychology. I shall not at this stage discuss either beyond the point
at which it is clear that there are genuine philosophical problems to
be solved. I shall begin with memory.
Memory is a word which has a variety of meanings. The kind
that I am concerned with at the moment is the recollection of past
occurrences. This is so notoriously fallible that every experimenter
makes a record of the result of his experiment at the earliest
possible moment: he considers the inference from written words to
past events less likely to be mistaken than the direct beliefs which
constitute memory. But some time, though perhaps only a few
seconds, must elapse between the observation and the making of
the record, unless the record is so fragmentary that memory is
needed to interpret it. Thus we do not escape from the need of
trusting memory to some degree. Moreover, without memory we
should not think of interpreting records as applying to the past,
because we should not know that there was any past. Now, apart
from arguments as to the proved fallibility of memory, there is one
awkward consideration which the sceptic may urge. Remembering,
which occurs now, cannot possibly—he may say—prove that what is
remembered occurred at some other time, because the world might
have sprung into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, full
of acts of remembering which were entirely misleading. Opponents
of Darwin, such as Edmund Gosse’s father, urged a very similar
argument against evolution. The world, they said, was created in
4004 b.c., complete with fossils, which were inserted to try our faith.
The world was created suddenly, but was made such as it would
have been if it had evolved. There is no logical impossibility about
this view. And similarly there is no logical impossibility in the view
that the world was created five minutes ago, complete with
memories and records. This may seem an improbable hypothesis,
but it is not logically refutable.
Apart from this argument, which may be thought fantastic, there
are reasons of detail for being more or less distrustful of memory. It
is obvious that no direct confirmation of a belief about a past
occurrence is possible, because we cannot make the past recur. We
can find confirmation of an indirect kind in the revelations of others
and in contemporary records. The latter, as we have seen, involve
some degree of memory, but they may involve very little, for
instance when a shorthand report of a conversation or speech has
been made at the time. But even then, we do not escape wholly
from the need of memory extending over a longer stretch of time.
Suppose a wholly imaginary conversation were produced for some
criminal purpose, we should depend upon the memories of
witnesses to establish its fictitious character in a law-court. And all
memory which extends over a long period of time is very apt to be
mistaken; this is shown by the errors invariably found in
autobiographies. Any man who comes across letters which he wrote
many years ago can verify the manner in which his memory has
falsified past events. For these reasons, the fact that we cannot free
ourselves from dependence upon memory in building up knowledge
is, prima facie, a reason for regarding what passes for knowledge as
not quite certain. The whole of this subject of memory will be
considered more carefully in later chapters.
Testimony raises even more awkward problems. What makes
them so awkward is the fact that testimony is involved in building up
our knowledge of physics, and that, conversely, physics is required in
establishing the trustworthiness of testimony. Moreover, testimony
raises all the problems connected with the relation of mind and
matter. Some eminent philosophers, e.g. Leibniz, have constructed
systems according to which there would be no such thing as
testimony, and yet have accepted as true many things which cannot
be known without it. I do not think philosophy has quite done justice
to this problem, but a few words will, I think, show its gravity.
For our purposes, we may define testimony as noises heard, or
shapes seen, analogous to those which we should make if we
wished to convey an assertion, and believed by the hearer or seer to
be due to someone else’s desire to convey an assertion. Let us take
a concrete instance: I ask a policeman the way, and he says, “Fourth
turn to the right, third to the left.” That is to say, I hear these
sounds, and perhaps I see what I interpret as his lips moving. I
assume that he has a mind more or less like my own, and has
uttered these sounds with the same intention as I should have had if
I had uttered them, namely to convey information. In ordinary life,
all this is not, in any proper sense, an inference; it is a belief which
arises in us on the appropriate occasion. But if we are challenged,
we have to substitute inference for spontaneous belief, and the more
the inference is examined the more shaky it looks.
The inference that has to be made has two steps, one physical
and one psychological. The physical inference is of the sort we
considered a moment ago, in which we pass from a sensation to a
physical occurrence. We hear noises, and think they proceed from
the policeman’s body. We see moving shapes, and interpret them as
physical motions of his lips. This inference, as we saw earlier, is in
part justified by testimony; yet now we find that it has to be made
before we can have reason to believe that there is any such thing as
testimony. And this inference is certainly sometimes mistaken.
Lunatics hear voices which other people do not hear; instead of
crediting them with abnormally acute hearing, we lock them up. But
if we sometimes hear sentences which have not proceeded from a
body, why should this not always be the case? Perhaps our
imagination has conjured up all the things that we think others have
said to us. But this is part of the general problem of inferring
physical objects from sensations, which, difficult as it is, is not the
most difficult part of the logical puzzles concerning testimony. The
most difficult part is the inference from the policeman’s body to his
mind. I do not mean any special insult to policemen; I would say the
same of politicians and even of philosophers.
The inference to the policeman’s mind certainly may be wrong.
It is clear that a maker of wax-works could make a life-like
policeman and put a gramophone inside him, which would cause him
periodically to tell visitors the way to the most interesting part of the
exhibition at the entrance to which he would stand. They would
have just the sort of evidence of his being alive that is found
convincing in the case of other policemen. Descartes believed that
animals have no minds, but are merely complicated automata.
Eighteenth-century materialists extended this doctrine to men. But I
am not now concerned with materialism; my problem is a different
one. Even a materialist must admit that, when he talks, he means to
convey something, that is to say, he uses words as signs, not as
mere noises. It may be difficult to decide exactly what is meant by
this statement, but it is clear that it means something, and that it is
true of one’s own remarks. The question is: Are we sure that it is
true of the remarks we hear, as well as of those we make? Or are
the remarks we hear perhaps just like other noises, merely
meaningless disturbances of the air? The chief argument against this
is analogy: the remarks we hear are so like those we make that we
think they must have similar causes. But although we cannot
dispense with analogy as a form of inference, it is by no means
demonstrative, and not infrequently leads us astray. We are
therefore left, once more, with a prima facie reason for uncertainty
and doubt.
This question of what we mean ourselves when we speak brings
me to another problem, that of introspection. Many philosophers
have held that introspection gave the most indubitable of all
knowledge; others have held that there is no such thing as
introspection. Descartes, after trying to doubt everything, arrived at
“I think, therefore I am”, as a basis for the rest of knowledge. Dr.
John B. Watson the behaviourist holds, on the contrary, that we do
not think, but only talk. Dr. Watson, in real life, gives as much
evidence of thinking as anyone does, so if he is not convinced that
he thinks, we are all in a bad way. At any rate, the mere existence of
such an opinion as his, on the part of a competent philosopher, must
suffice to show that introspection is not so certain as some people
have thought. But let us examine this question a little more closely.
The difference between introspection and what we call
perception of external objects seems to me to be connected, not
with what is primary in our knowledge, but with what is inferred. We
think, at one time, that we are seeing a chair; at another, that we
are thinking about philosophy. The first we call perception of an
external object; the second we call introspection. Now we have
already found reason to doubt external perception, in the full-
blooded sense in which common-sense accepts it. I shall consider
later what there is that is indubitable and primitive in perception; for
the moment, I shall anticipate by saying that what is indubitable in
“seeing a chair” is the occurrence of a certain pattern of colours. But
this occurrence, we shall find, is connected with me just as much as
with the chair; no one except myself can see exactly the pattern that
I see. There is thus something subjective and private about what we
take to be external perception, but this is concealed by precarious
extensions into the physical world. I think introspection, on the
contrary, involves precarious extensions into the mental world: shorn
of these, it is not very different from external perception shorn of its
extensions. To make this clear, I shall try to show what we know to
be occurring when, as we say, we think about philosophy.
 Suppose, as the result of introspection, you arrive at a belief
which you express in the words: “I am now believing that mind is
different from matter”. What do you know, apart from inferences, in
such a case? First of all, you must cut out the word “I”: the person
who believes is an inference, not part of what you know
immediately. In the second place, you must be careful about the
word “believing”: I am not now concerned with what this word
should mean in logic or theory of knowledge; I am concerned with
what it can mean when used to describe a direct experience. In such
a case, it would seem that it can only describe a certain kind of
feeling. And as for the proposition you think you are believing,
namely, “mind is different from matter”, it is very difficult to say what
is really occurring when you think you believe it. It may be mere
words, pronounced, visualised, or in auditory or motor images. It
may be images of what the words “mean”, but in that case it will not
be at all an accurate representation of the logical content of the
proposition. You may have an image of a statue of Newton
“voyaging through strange seas of thought alone”, and another
image of a stone rolling downhill, combined with the words “how
different!” Or you may think of the difference between composing a
lecture and eating your dinner. It is only when you come to
expressing your thought in words that you approach logical
precision.
Both in introspection and in external perception, we try to
express what we know in words.
We come here, as in the question of testimony, upon the social
aspect of knowledge. The purpose of words is to give the same kind
of publicity to thought as is claimed for physical objects. A number
of people can hear a spoken word or see a written word, because
each is a physical occurrence. If I say to you, “mind is different from
matter”, there may be only a very slight resemblance between the
thought that I am trying to express and the thought which is
aroused in you, but these two thoughts have just this in common,
that they can be expressed by the same words. Similarly, there may
be great differences between what you and I see when, as we say,
we look at the same chair; nevertheless we can both express our
perceptions by the same words.
A thought and a perception are thus not so very different in their
own nature. If physics is true, they are different in their correlations:
when I see a chair, others have more or less similar perceptions, and
it is thought that these are all connected with light-waves coming
from the chair, whereas, when I think a thought, others may not be
thinking anything similar. But this applies also to feeling a toothache,
which would not usually be regarded as a case of introspection. On
the whole, therefore, there seems no reason to regard introspection
as a different kind of knowledge from external perception. But this
whole question will concern us again at a later stage.
As for the trustworthiness of introspection, there is again a
complete parallelism with the case of external perception. The actual
datum, in each case, is unimpeachable, but the extensions which we
make instinctively are questionable. Instead of saying, “I am
believing that mind is different from matter”, you ought to say,
“certain images are occurring in a certain relation to each other,
accompanied by a certain feeling”. No words exist for describing the
actual occurrence in all its particularity; all words, even proper
names, are general, with the possible exception of “this”, which is
ambiguous. When you translate the occurrence into words, you are
making generalisations and inferences, just as you are when you say
“there is a chair”. There is really no vital difference between the two
cases. In each case, what is really a datum is unutterable, and what
can be put into words involves inferences which may be mistaken.
When I say that “inferences” are involved, I am saying
something not quite accurate unless carefully interpreted. In “seeing
a chair”, for instance, we do not first apprehend a coloured pattern,
and then proceed to infer a chair: belief in the chair arises
spontaneously when we see the coloured pattern. But this belief has
causes not only in the present physical stimulus, but also partly in
past experience, partly in reflexes. In animals, reflexes play a very
large part; in human beings, experience is more important. The
infant learns slowly to correlate touch and sight, and to expect
others to see what he sees. The habits which are thus formed are
essential to our adult notion of an object such as a chair. The
perception of a chair by means of sight has a physical stimulus
which affects only sight directly, but stimulates ideas of solidity and
so on through early experience. The inference might be called
“physiological”. An inference of this sort is evidence of past
correlations, for instance between touch and sight, but may be
mistaken in the present instance; you may, for instance, mistake a
reflection in a large mirror for another room. Similarly in dreams we
make mistaken physiological inferences. We cannot therefore feel
certainty in regard to things which are in this sense inferred,
because, when we try to accept as many of them as possible, we are
nevertheless compelled to reject some for the sake of self-
consistency.
We arrived a moment ago at what we called “physiological
inference” as an essential ingredient in the common-sense notion of
a physical object. Physiological inference, in its simplest form, means
this: given a stimulus S, to which, by a reflex, we react by a bodily
movement R, and a stimulus S′ with a reaction R′, if the two stimuli
2
are frequently experienced together, S will in time produce R′. That
is to say, the body will act as if S′ were present. Physiological
inference is important in theory of knowledge, and I shall have much
to say about it at a later stage. For the present, I have mentioned it
partly to prevent it from being confused with logical inference, and
partly in order to introduce the problem of induction, about which
we must say a few preliminary words at this stage.

2
E.g. if you hear a sharp noise and see a
bright light simultaneously often, in time the
noise without the light will cause your pupils to
contract.
 Induction raises perhaps the most difficult problem in the whole
theory of knowledge. Every scientific law is established by its means,
and yet it is difficult to see why we should believe it to be a valid
logical process. Induction, in its bare essence, consists of the
argument that, because A and B have been often found together
and never found apart, therefore, when A is found again, B will
probably also be found. This exists first as a “physiological
inference”, and as such is practised by animals. When we first begin
to reflect, we find ourselves making inductions in the physiological
sense, for instance, expecting the food we see to have a certain kind
of taste. Often we only become aware of this expectation through
having it disappointed, for instance if we take salt thinking it is
sugar. When mankind took to science, they tried to formulate logical
principles justifying this kind of inference. I shall discuss these
attempts in later chapters; for the present, I will only say that they
seem to me very unsuccessful. I am convinced that induction must
have validity of some kind in some degree, but the problem of
showing how or why it can be valid remains unsolved. Until it is
solved, the rational man will doubt whether his food will nourish him,
and whether the sun will rise tomorrow. I am not a rational man in
this sense, but for the moment I shall pretend to be. And even if we
cannot be completely rational, we should probably all be the better
for becoming somewhat more rational than we are. At the lowest
estimate, it will be an interesting adventure to see whither reason
will lead us.
The problems we have been raising are none of them new, but
they suffice to show that our everyday views of the world and of our
relations to it are unsatisfactory. We have been asking whether we
know this or that, but we have not yet asked what “knowing” is.
Perhaps we shall find that we have had wrong ideas as to knowing,
and that our difficulties grow less when we have more correct ideas
on this point. I think we shall do well to begin our philosophical
journey by an attempt to understand knowing considered as part of
the relation of man to his environment, forgetting, for the moment,
the fundamental doubts with which we have been concerned.
Perhaps modern science may enable us to see philosophical
problems in a new light. In that hope, let us examine the relation of
man to his environment with a view to arriving at a scientific view as
to what constitutes knowledge.
 PART I

MAN FROM WITHOUT

 CHAPTER II
MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT
If our scientific knowledge were full and complete, we should
understand ourselves and the world and our relation to the world. As
it is, our understanding of all three is fragmentary. For the present, it
is the third question, that of our relation to the world, that I wish to
consider, because this brings us nearest to the problems of
philosophy. We shall find that it will lead us back to the other two
questions, as to the world and as to ourselves, but that we shall
understand both these better if we have considered first how the
world acts upon us and how we act upon the world.
There are a number of sciences which deal with Man. We may
deal with him in natural history, as one among the animals, having a
certain place in evolution, and related to other animals in
ascertainable ways. We may deal with him in physiology, as a
structure capable of performing certain functions, and reacting to
the environment in ways of which some, at least, can be explained
by chemistry. We may study him in sociology, as a unit in various
organisms, such as the family and the state. And we may study him,
in psychology, as he appears to himself. This last gives what we may
call an internal view of man, as opposed to the other three, which
give an external view. That is to say, in psychology we use data
which can only be obtained when the observer and the observed are
the same person, whereas in the other ways of studying Man all our
data can be obtained by observing other people. There are different
ways of interpreting this distinction, and different views of its
importance, but there can be no doubt that there is such a
distinction. We can remember our own dreams, whereas we cannot
know the dreams of others unless they tell us about them. We know
when we have toothache, when our food tastes too salty, when we
are remembering some past occurrence, and so on. All these events
in our lives other people cannot know in the same direct way. In this
sense, we all have an inner life, open to our own inspection but to
no one else’s. This is no doubt the source of the traditional
distinction of mind and body: the body was supposed to be that part
of us which others could observe, and the mind that part which was
private to ourselves. The importance of the distinction has been
called in question in recent times, and I do not myself believe that it
has any fundamental philosophical significance. But historically it has
played a dominant part in determining the conceptions from which
men set out when they began to philosophise, and on this account,
if on no other, it deserves to be borne in mind.
Knowledge, traditionally, has been viewed from within, as
something which we observe in ourselves rather than as something
which we can see others displaying. When I say that it has been so
viewed, I mean that this has been the practice of philosophers; in
ordinary life, people have been more objective. In ordinary life,
knowledge is something which can be tested by examinations, that
is to say, it consists in a certain kind of response to a certain kind of
stimulus. This objective way of viewing knowledge is, to my mind,
much more fruitful than the way which has been customary in
philosophy. I mean that, if we wish to give a definition of “knowing”,
we ought to define it as a manner of reacting to the environment,
not as involving something (a “state of mind”) which only the person
who has the knowledge can observe. It is because I hold this view
that I think it best to begin with Man and his environment, rather
than with those matters in which the observer and the observed
must be the same person. Knowing, as I view it, is a characteristic
which may be displayed in our reactions to our environment; it is
therefore necessary first of all to consider the nature of these
reactions as they appear in science.
Let us take some everyday situation. Suppose you are watching
a race, and at the appropriate moment you say, “they’re off”. This
exclamation is a reaction to the environment, and is taken to show