Special Civil Actions Report

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA COLLEGE OF LAW
A.Y. 20122013 Term 1
GO2
PRELIMINARIES
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions. (Rule 1, Section 3(a)) Since a civil action in general is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong (Ibid) a special civil action is generally brought or filed for the same purpose. There are certain rules, however, that are applicable only to specific special civil actions (Ibid).
INTERPLEADER
RULE 62
C A L U G A Y
INTERPLEADER: DEFINITION
A special civil remedy whereby a person, who has property in his possession or an obligation to perform, either wholly or partially, but who claims no interest in the subject, or whose interest in whole or in part, is not disputed by others, goes to court and asks that conflicting claimants to the property or obligation be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to the same.
REQUISITES
a.) The plaintiff claims no interest in the subject matter or his claim is not disputed b.) There must be at least two or more conflicting claimants c.) The parties to be interpleaded must make effective claims d.) The subject matter must be one and the same
INTERPLEADER VS. INTERVENTION

Interpleader Intervention
Original Action Commenced by the filing of a complaint

Plaintiff has no interest in the subject matter of the action or has interest therein in whole or in part which is not disputed by the parties
Ancillary Action Commenced by a motion to intervene filed in a pending case

Proper in any of these situations: A person having a 1.) Legal interest in the matter in litigation 2.) interest in the success in either of the parties 3.) interest against both 4.) Situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the courts custody Defendants are original parties to the pending suits
Defendants are sued to interplead them
COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER

Filed by the person against whom the conflicting claims are made Should be filed within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either or the contending claimants. Otherwise, it may be barred by laches or undue delay The court issues an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead
MOTION TO DISMISS
-Within 15 days provided for filing an answer, each claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
-Impropriety of the interpleader action -Rule 16
-The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining period, but not less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial
ANSWER AND OTHER PLEADINGS

-When a claimant fails to plead within the time fixed, the court may on motion, declare him in default and thereof render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter -Counterclaims, crossclaims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings may be filed by the parties in an interpleader action
WACK WACK GOLF VS. WON MARCH 26, 1976

A defendant may file a counterclaim for interpleader against the plaintiff and a third party also claiming thru subject-matter of the suit. Note: The conflicting claimants, who are codefendants in the action, must serve copies of their answers not only on the plaintiff but also upon their co-defendants since the controversy actually exists among the co-defendants.
DETERMINATION
- The court shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their several claim. - Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights - The court determines WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT among the conflicting claimants
DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES, COST OF LITIGATION AND EXPENSES

Docket fees, cost and litigation expenses and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this rule shall serve as a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE
2011
STRADCOM CORPORATION VS. HON. DALMACIOSANTOS G.R. NO. 197311. AUGUST 23, 2011 EN BANC
Facts:
-DOTC entered into a build-own-operate agreement with Stradcom, involving IT facilities to be housed in the LTO main office in Quezon City. Pursuant to an Escrow Agreement, it is the LTO Chief's duty to issue a written order to the Land Bank of the Philippines to release and pay Stradcom. However, since November of 2010 until the present date, the LTO under Asec. Virginia Torres) has not approved any payment due to Stradcom.
In 2010, Asec. Torres sought an opinion from the OSG, which in its reply opined that there is an intra-corporate dispute within Stradcom: the Quiambao group (led by President Cezar T. Quiambao), and the Sumbilla group (led by Bonficacio Sumbilla). On the other hand, Stradcom claims that the intra-corporate dispute was merely concocted so that LTO would have an excuse in refusing payment even for obligations due to it.
Stradcom as represented by Quiambao, demanded from LTO the payment of the outstanding receivable of P662,345,610.47, but instead of acceding to Stradcom's demand, the LTO, through the OSG, filed a Complaint for Interpleader with the RTC of Quezon City. This complaint did not dispute the outstanding obligation due to Stradcom nor did it deny that Stradcom is the rightful payee, but alleged that there is an intra-corporate dispute within Stradcom and that its legitimate representatives should first be determined. On June 21, 2011, RTC Judge Santos denied Stradcoms motion to dismiss and directed the LTO to deposit to the RTC the subject current amount of LTOs contractual obligations to Stradcom. This led to the filing of this instant petition for certiorari, arguing that Judge Santos committed grave abuse of discretion when he directed such deposit with the RTC.
Issue:
Was the complaint for interpleader proper? YES

Held:
-Both the Quiambao group and the Sumbilla group lay claim as valid representatives of Stradcom. Necessarily, there is a need to resolve the underlying intra-corporate dispute between the two claimants. -As the branch of the RTC to which the case was raffled off is not a designated special commercial court, this Court deems it more appropriate that the interpleader case be raffled off to any of the designated special commercial courts in Quezon City RTC for resolution of the underlying intra-corporate dispute.
DECLARATORY RELIEF
RULE 63
S U C G A N G
S I S O N
REQUISITES
1. There must be a justiciable controversy; 2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3. The party seeking the relief must have a legal

interest in the controversy; and 4. That the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
SUBJECT MATTER IN RULE 63 IS EXCLUSIVE

A deed; A will A contract or other written instrument; A statute An executive order or regulation; An ordinance; or Any other governmental regulation.
Note: Court decisions are not included
THE COURT IS GIVEN THE DISCRETION TO ACT OR NOT TO ACT ON THE PETITION
In declaratory relief, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances.
TWO GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL

1. Where the decision on the petition would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or
2. Where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances as when the instrument or statute has already been breached.
INSTANCES WHERE NOT PROPER

To obtain judicial declaration of citizenship Resolve a political issue Seek relief on moot questions Where it would not terminate a controversy Filed after a breach of contract or statute Determination of hereditary rights
RULE 63 IS APPLICABLE IN:

Reformation of instrument Quiet title or remove clouds Consolidation of ownership
2010-2012
HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., AND ROMEO E. ESPERA VS. MAYOR SULPICIO S. ROCO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF NAGA CITY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF NAGA, AND PEAFRANCIA MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION G.R. NO. 174129 JULY 5, 2010
Facts: Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Injunction with prayer for TRO questioning Resolutions and Ordinance issued by the respondents, Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Naga City. The resolution states that the application of Mr. Robert L. Obiedo for a First Class Memorial Park is approved. While the other resolution approves the application of Mr. Obejdo for Development Permit (DP) for their proposed Eternal Gardens Memorial Park. While, the Ordinance provides that: No application for the establishment of a private cemetery shall be considered if the proposed private cemetery site is less than five (5) hectares. The RTC found that the prayer of petitioners was premature as the questioned resolutions and ordinance were merely promulgated to pave the way for the endorsement of the application of the private respondent to the HLURB. The Court of Appeals ruled that the petition is premature, as there can be no issue ripe for judicial determination when the matter is within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency, the HLURB.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS PREMATURE?
HELD: YES
HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., AND ROMEO E. ESPERA VS. MAYOR SULPICIO S. ROCO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF NAGA CITY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF NAGA, AND PEAFRANCIA MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION G.R. NO. 174129 JULY 5, 2010
Reason: It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: 1] the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2] the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3] there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4] there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5] the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6] adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. In this case, the issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination. Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and ordinance does it show that the public respondents acted on private respondents application with finality. What appears therefrom is that the application of private respondent for development permit has been endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for appropriate action, the latter being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.
JELBERT B. GALICTO, PETITIONER, VS. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
G.R. NO. 193978 FEBRUARY 28, 2012 Facts: On September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. Jelbert Galicto claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it is null and void for lack of legal basis. He asserts that EO7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President. It is contended, however, that the President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages in order to control the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives, etc. Hence, he filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of EO7.
ISSUE: WAS CERTIORARI A PROPER REMEDY?

HELD: NO
JELBERT B. GALICTO, PETITIONER, VS. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
G.R. NO. 193978 FEBRUARY 28, 2012 Reason: No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7: Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS
RULE 64
R U B I O
PRELIMINARIES
This is a new rule and has as its basis the 1987 Constitution:
... Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Section 7, Article IX-A)
To implement this provision, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 64. [Riano (2009)]
...
This mode of review is starkly different from the mode applicable to the judgment, final order, or resolution of the Civil Service Commission. As the latters judgment cannot be assailed by a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court but by appeal i.e., by filing a verified petition for review to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43. (Republic Act No. 7902) [Ibid.]
NOTES
Under 3 of Rule 64, unlike Certiorari under Rule 65, where the period to file the petition is 60 days, the petition under this Rule shall be filed within 30 days from notice of judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. [Herrera (2006)].
...
General Rule: Failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the issuing Commission results in the dismissal of the petition. Exceptions:
To prevent a miscarriage of justice; When the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor; The decision or resolution is a nullity; The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate remedy. [ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.].
BASIC REQUIREMENTS
(1) The petition shall be verified and filed in 18 copies; (2) It must be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original/certified true copy of the decision under review; (3) It shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and the person(s) interested in sustaining the decision under review; (4) It shall state the facts with certainty, present clearly the issues involved, set forth the grounds and brief arguments relied upon for review;
...
(5) It shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed by the Rules; (6) It shall further be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof on the Commission concerned and the adverse party; (7) It shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping; and (8) It shall pray for judgment annulling or modifying the decision under review. [ 5, Rule 64]
OTHER MATTERS
If the mode of review is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner must anchor the petition, on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that the Commission concerned committed a grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction in a manner amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [Riano (2009)].
...
The order to comment, under 6 of Rule 64, in case the Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient in form and substance is equivalent to summons in ordinary civil action. However, the defendant who did not file his comment cannot be declared in default. Under 8 of Rule 64, the petitioner may apply for a restraining order or a preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court to stay the execution of judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
RULE 64 VIS--VIS RULE 65

Rule 64 Rule 65 Directed only to the judgments, Directed to any tribunal, board, or final orders, or resolutions of the officer, exercising judicial or quasiCOMELEC and COA. judicial functions. Must be filed within 30 days from Must be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment or notice of the judgment or resolution. resolution.
If Motion for Reconsideration is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period but which shall not be less than 5 days.
If Motion for Reconsideration is denied, the aggrieved party will have another 60 days counted from the notice of the denial within which to file the petition.
2009-2012
PATES V. COMELEC (2009)

FACTS: The Supreme Court dismissed Pates original petition under Rule 64 on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period i.e., tacking the period after receipt of the COMELEC decision with the period commencing after receipt of the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Expectedly, Pates filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking the fresh period rule enunciated by the SC in a number of cases beginning 2005. ISSUE: Whether or not the fresh period rule should apply to Rule 64 petitions?
...
HELD: No. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution expressly requires that the COMELECs rules of procedure should expedite the disposition of election cases. The reason is constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt determination of election results. This reason far outweighs convenience and uniformity.
LOKIN, JR. V. COMELEC (2012)

FACTS: After the COMELEC expunged their Certificate of Nomination as CIBAC party-list candidates, Lokin, Jr. and Planas filed a petition for certiorari, under 2 of Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65, before the Supreme Court. This petition, however, was filed beyond the reglementary period provided for in 3 of Rule 64. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be entertained because 2 of Rule 64 should be construed to refer to Rule 65?
...
HELD: No. While Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while 3 of Rule 64 expressly provides for only 30 days.
CERTIORARI
RULE 65, SECTION 1
C A L U A G
DEFINITION
writ issued from a superior court to any inferior court, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to be elevated up for review and correction the matters of law (Herrera, 260)
REQUISITES
a) directed against a tribunal board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function b) such tribunal board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction c) no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available in the ordinary course of law
[Maritime Company of the Philippines vs. Paredes 19 SCRA 804 (1993); Philnabank Employees Association vs. Estanislao, 227 SCRA 804 (1993)]
REQUISITES
Grave abuse of discretion mean power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (Philippine
National bank vs. Philippine Milling et.al, 26 SCRA 212)
REQUISITES
Adequate remedy means remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal
(Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 885, 11 C.J., p.113)
DISTINGUISHED FROM RULE 45

RULE 65
Petition for Certiorari Original Action; may be directed to an interlocutory order or a final judgment
RULE 45
Petition for review on Certiorari/ Appeal by certiorari
Based on prior action and directed on the review of judgment, award or final order on the merits Issue is as to whether the lower Based on questions of law court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion; questions of facts and law

RULE 65
Unless a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall have been issued, does not stay the challenged proceeding Filed within 60 days from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed or in case of a motion for reconsideration or new trial, 60 days from the notice of denial thereof
RULE 45
Stays judgment, award or order appealed from
Filed within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order or of the denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial

RULE 65
Parties are the aggrieved party as against the lower court or quasi judicial agency Motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent subject to exceptions Appellate court is in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power of review
RULE 45
Parties are the original parties to the action, lower court is not impleaded Motion for reconsideration is not required as a prior action Higher court is in exercise of its original jurisdiction under its power of control and supervision of lower courts
DISTINGUISHED FROM PROHIBITION CERTIORARI

Parties are the aggrieved party as against the lower court or quasi judicial agency Motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent subject to exceptions Appellate court is in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power of review
PROHIBITION
Parties are the original parties to the action, lower court is not impleaded Motion for reconsideration is not required as a prior action Higher court is in exercise of its original jurisdiction under its power of control and supervision of lower courts
2010-2012
RUDOLFO I. BELUSO, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY JUNE 22, 2010
GABRIELA filed a Complaint against Atty. Nelly Abao-Lee, Rudolfo I. Beluso, et al. for violation of Section 27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. COMELEC dismissed the Complaint for lack of probable cause to charge respondents, including petitioner Beluso. However, it found respondents errors to be arising from "sheer gross negligence," especially on the part of the three members of the PBOC of Capiz. It, thus, declared respondents to be perpetually barred from serving, in any capacity, in any canvassing board of the COMELEC in any future election. Beluso filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argued that he is not negligent; hence, the penalty of perpetual disqualification from serving in any canvassing board of the COMELEC was too harsh and unreasonable. COMELEC denied his motion for lack of merit. Thus, the instant petition for certiorari. Is the petition for Certiorari proper?
HELD
NO A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. Notably, the apparent thrust of Belusos petition is the alleged error on the part of the COMELEC in drawing its conclusions based on its findings and investigation.
HELD
Beluso alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in perpetually disqualifying him to serve in any canvassing board, yet failed to prove where the abuse existed. Thus, in reality, what Beluso was questioning is the COMELECs appreciation of evidence. At this point, however, it is not this Courts function to re-evaluate the findings of fact of the COMELEC, given its limited scope of its review power, which is properly confined only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA AND LUZVIMINDA CASTILLOVS. COURT OF APPEALS (4TH DIVISION) AND AMADO BRAVO, JR.
G.R. NO. 189151. JANUARY 25, 2012
SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA AND LUZVIMINDA CASTILLOVS. COURT OF APPEALS (4TH DIVISION) AND AMADO BRAVO, JR. JANUARY 25, 2012 The Law Firm of Lapea & Associates filed with the CA its formal entry of appearance as counsel for the petitioners, in view of the withdrawal of the former counsel, Atty. Panfilo Soriano. The CA issued a Resolution on January 30, 2009 requiring the filing of the Appellants Brief within 45 days from receipt. On April 8, 2009, respondent Amado Bravo, Jr. (the defendantappellee therein), filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated April 2, 2009 stating that the petitioners failed to file their Appellants Brief within the 45-day period granted to them by the CA in the Resolution dated January 30, 2009. Citing Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petitioners appeal. Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari. Is this action proper?
HELD
NO The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or a particular matter therein. Concomitant to the foregoing, the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would depend on whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the Order or Resolution issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
PALMA VS. GALVEZ MARCH 10, 2010

Petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC) and others, alleging that they committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country. Petitioner filed her Opposition to the motion to dismiss.
RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 contesting the decision of the RTC before the Supreme Court. Is the remedy taken by the petitioner correct?
HELD
YES A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. There is "grave abuse of discretion" when public respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD
RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these defendants is still pending. Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.
PROHIBITION
RULE 65, SECTION 2
C E L L E S
DEFINITION
It is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial, to desist from further proceedings. The writ may not issue for acts already accomplished as a general rule.
EXCEPTION OF ACTS FAIT ACCOMPLI

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Funa vs. Ermita, GR No. 184740. Feb. 11, 2010) Prohibition will lie to prevent the unlawful creation of a new province by those in the corridors of power who could avoid judicial intervention and review by merely speedily and stealthily completing the commission of such illegality. (Tan v. Comelec, GR No. 73155, July 11, 1986)
REQUISITES OF PROHIBITION
1. It must be directed against a tribunal, board, corporation, officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; 2. That it has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 3. There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
DISTINGUISHED FROM INJUNCTION

Prohibition Directed against a court, tribunal or a person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Injunction Directed against a party in the action.
Based on the ground that the court It does not involve jurisdiction of against whom the writ is sought the court. had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Always the main action.
It may be the main action itself or just a provisional remedy.
DISTINGUISHED FROM CERTIORARI

Prohibition It is directed not only to judicial or quasi-judicial but even to ministerial acts. Certiorari It seeks to annul a judicial or quasijudicial act.
It is directed to the court itself to restrain it from further proceeding with the case.
The purpose is to command the respondent to desist from further proceedings.
It is directed to the action of the court which is sought to be annulled.

The purpose is to annul or modify the judgment, order, resolution or proceedings of the public respondent.
DISTINGUISHED FROM MANDAMUS

Prohibition It is a negative remedy which forbids the doing of certain things which ought not to be done. The object is to prevent one from executing an act. Mandamus It is an affirmative remedy commanding certain things to be done. The object is to compel compliance with a function which the law prescribes as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
2010-2012
SAMAR II ELECTRIC VS. SELUDO, JR. APRIL 25, 2012

As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II), petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005. The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district elections.
Private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II In the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. The RTC judge sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition and barred the enforcing of the Resolution. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC. Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari. CA rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the assailed Orders of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. Whether the availability of an administrative remedy precludes the filing of a petition for prohibition?
HELD:
The Court agrees with petitioners contention that the availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a petition for prohibition before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Thus, respondents failure to file a complaint before the NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.
SPOUSES YUSAY VS. CA APRIL 6, 2011

The petitioners owned a parcel of land. Half of their land they used to rent out and is their only source of income. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution to authorizing to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing. The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution. The RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition However, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The CA concluded that the reversal of the decision by the RTC was not justified because the resolution deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary;
Whether the petition for prohibition will prosper in this case?
HELD
The Supreme Court denied the petition ruling that certiorari and prohibition were not available to the petitioners under the circumstances. Prohibition does not lie against expropriation. The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners.
HELD
Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.
FUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FEBRUARY 11, 2010

President Arroyo appointed respondent Bautista as Undersecretary of the DOTC. Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Bautista was designated as OIC, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. Respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary Should the petition for prohibition be dismissed on the ground that it is moot and academic?
HELD
No, as a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment or designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-in-charge of an attached agency will arise in every such appointment.
MANDAMUS
RULE 65, SECTION 3
H A U L O
DEFINITION
Is a writ issued in the name of the State, to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. (Herrera)
DEFINITION
Is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act required to be done:
a) When it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law b) It is also available when one unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
REQUISITES
a) The plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), 615 SCRA 666(2010)]
TWO PERTINENT PRINCIPLES

1. Mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal, board or office to comply with a purely ministerial duty. 2. Petitioner must establish a clear right to the relief sought and it is an imperative duty on the part of the respondent.
MINISTERIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM DISCRETIONARY
Ministerial Duty
Is that which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. Are acts to be performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his own judgment.
MINISTERIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM DISCRETIONARY
Discretionary Duty
Is that which by its nature requires exercise of judgment. A power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgments or conscience of others.
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
Mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual obligation, the proper remedy being an action for specific performance.
MANDAMUS VS. INJUNCTION

Mandamus Injunction
Special Civil Action

Directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or officer Purpose is for the tribunal, corporation, board or officer to perform a ministerial duty
Ordinary Civil Action

Directed against a litigant
Purpose is for the defendant either to refrain from an act or to perform not necessarily a ministerial duty.
MANDAMUS VS. QUO WARRANTO

Mandamus The suit is brought against the person who is responsible for excluding the petitioner from the office. Mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles, Quo Warranto The suit is brought against the holder of the office, who is the person claiming the office as against the petitioner. Quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. (Lota vs. CA, G.R. No. L-14803)
2010-2012
DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (2010)

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) filed a special civil action for mandamus to compel the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department. But a strong opposition alleged that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010 May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?
HELD
The Supreme Court find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
HELD
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. But its selection of the candidates who will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY

G.R. NO. 161282. FEBRUARY 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY (2011)

G.P. Sarmiento Trucking (GPS) agreed to transport 30 units of refrigerators from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc. (CII). On a collision, it caused damage to the appliances. FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), the insurer of the damaged refrigerators, paid CII, the insured. FGU, in turn, as subrogee, sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS. FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS. RTC ruled in favor of GPS and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. However, On August 6, 2002, the Supreme Court rendered a decision agreeing with the lower courts that GPS was not a common carrier but nevertheless held it liable under the doctrine of culpa contractual.
FGU filed a motion for execution with the RTC praying that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the August 6, 2002 judgment. GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Execution because it discovered that FGU sold the appliance to third parties thereby receiving the proceeds of the sale. GPS thinks that FGU should not be allowed to "doubly recover". FGU filed this petition for mandamus directly with Supreme Court. FGU argues that the decision is already final and executory. Thus, a writ of execution should issue. The lower court should not be allowed to hear the matter of turnover of the refrigerators to FGU because it was not an issue raised in the Answer of GPS. Whether FGU can compel the court to issue a writ of execution via mandamus for a case that has already attained final and executor status but pending the issue on actual turnover of the subject refrigerators .
HELD
Mandamus cannot be issued. The Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue of whether or not there was an actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited from the sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted from the judgment amount. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.
SPOUSES CACHOPERO VS. CELESTIAL (2012)

Rachel Celestial filed an ejectment case against the spouses Jesse and Bema Cachopero before the MTC. Celestial claimed she decided demolish the old house, however, the spouses refused to vacate the premises. This was settled with a Compromise Agreement. A portion of the house beyond Celestials lot was not demolished, thus, Celestial filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, with a prayer to cite the Deputy Sheriff in Contempt for not executing the Writ of Execution. MTC denied the motion. Celestial filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC praying that the MTC be ordered to issue an Alias Writ of Execution in the ejectment case and that the Sheriff be directed to enforce such Alias Writ of Execution.
Meanwhile Jesse had already instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, assailing the orders of the DENR, which denied his Miscellaneous Sales Application over a portion of the subject land. The RTC rendered a Resolution, dismissing Celestials petition for mandamus, on the ground that the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution depended on the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which involved the subject land that Jesse Cachopero had applied for. The RTC said that the foregoing circumstance is a supervening cause necessitating refusal to issue an alias writ of execution. Will Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to issue an alias Writ of Execution to execute a compromise agreement despite the separate pending special civil action filed by Jessee Cachopero assailing the orders of the DENR?
HELD
Yes. Mandamus applies as a remedy when the petitioners right is founded clearly in law and is not doubtful. Celestials petition for mandamus is anchored on her rights emanating from the Compromise Agreement she executed with the spouses. The terms of the agreement involved are clear. The spouses agreed to vacate Celestials lot and transfer the old house to the land at the back of Celestials lot. Unless the spouses can show that there is a supervening event, which occurred after the judgment of the MTC, and which brought about a material change in their situation vis--vis that of Celestial, the latter has the right to have the agreement executed, according to its terms.
QUO WARRANTO
RULE 66
I N U T Y A L
QUO WARRANTO
It literally means BY WHAT AUTHORITY It is a prerogative proceeding or writ issued by the court to determine the right to the use or exercise of an public office, position or franchise and to oust the person holding or exercising such public office, position or franchise if his right is unfounded or if he had forfeited. The action must be brought within 1 year after the cause of such ouster or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position arose.
AGAINST WHOM MAY THE ACTION BE BROUGHT

A person who usurps a public office, position or franchise A public officer who performs an act constituting forfeiture of a public office An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN QUO WARRANTO AND MANDAMUS

QUO WARRANTO MANDAMUS (2ND GROUND)
Design to try the right or title to the office, if the right or title to the office itself is disputed.
Brought against the holder of the office, not necessarily the one who excludes the petitioner.
Does not lie to try disputed titles but only to enforce legal duties.
Brought against the person who is responsible for excluding the petitioner from office.
JURISDICTION
Petitioner may be brought in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or where any of the respondent resides The petition may be brought in the Sandiganbayan in certain cases but when in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. When the action is commenced by the Solicitor General, the petition may be brought in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (section 7,Rule 66, Rules of Court)
QUO WARRANTO UNDER THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

Any voter contesting the election of any member of Congress, regional, provincial or city officer within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the election. If brought against a municipal official, the petition for quo warranto must be brought in the appropriate Regional Trial Court (Section 1 , Rule 26 Comelec Rules of Procedure) If brought against any barangay official, the petition must be broguht before the appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court ( Section 1, Rule 38, Comelec Rules of procedurel.)
...
Grounds: 1. ineligibility to the position or 2. disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
QUO WARRANTO IN AN ELECTIVE OFFICE

The governing law is the election law Grounds: Eligibility of the person elected. Petition is filed within the 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the election
QUO WARRANTO IN APPOINTIVE OFFICE

Provisions on Rules of Court Grounds: Legality of appointment It is brought within 1 year from the time the cause of ouster or the right of the petitioner to hold the office or position, arose SC,CA ,or RTC Petitioner is the person entitled to the person. Declare the petitioner entitled to the office
The petition is brought in the COMELEC, RTC, or MTC Petitioner may be any voter even if he is not entitled It will declare the candidate-elect as inelligible
WHO MAY COMMENCE...

Government through Solicitor General Public prosecutor Individual claiming to be entitled to the office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
CONTENTS OF PETITION AGAINST USURPATION

Name of person who claim to be entitled ; Averment of his right to office, position, or franchise; and Allegation that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. - All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position, or franchise may be made as RESPONDENTS NOTE: the petitioner must show that he is entitled to the office held by respondent, not merely that he has a preferential right to be appointed. - If the petitioners right to file the compliant is not proven, it is unnecessary for the court to pass upon the right of the defendant who has the perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his office.
RIGHT OF PERSONS ADJUDGED ENTITLED TO PUBLIC OFFICE

after taking the oath of office and executing any official beyond required by aw, he may take upon himself the execution of the office. He may demand from respondent all the books and papers appertaining to the office to which judgment relates. Bring action for damages against respondent sustained by him by reason of the usurpation. - it must be commenced within 1 year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioners right to the office in question.
2011
MORO V. DEL CASTILLO G.R. NO. 184980. MARCH 30, 2011

The Ombudsman charged respondent Generoso Reyes Del Castillo, Jr. (Del Castillo), then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center by virtue of GHQ AFP Special Order 91 (SO 91).
Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5, 2007. Following the lapse of his six-month suspension, Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post of GHQ Chief Accountant. But, he was unable to do so since Moro declined to yield the position. Consequently, Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against Moro with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City.
The court said that in quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.
Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
ARQUERO VS. CA G.R. NO. 168053. SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 6765, or "An Act Integrating Certain High Schools in the City of Puerto Princesa and in the Province of Palawan with the Palawan National School and Appropriating Funds Therefore." Under the said law, some of the schools in Puerto Princessa were converted into a national school.
The law also provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shall be headed by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (now the DepEd). However, no VSS was appointed and de la Cuesta was then designated as the OIC.
After the retirement of de la Cuesta, petitioner took over the position of principal of PNS. Subsequently, an order was issued by DepEd, directing that said schools be under the supervision of the superintendent of the division. The designation of petitioner was also withdrawn and Brillanted was made to replace her position.
Petitioner then filed a petition for quo warranto arguing that that the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure.
The court said that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence that she is entitled to the contested position. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. The private person suing must show a clear right to the contested position. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.
MENDOZA V. VILLAS G.R. NO. 187256. FEBRUARY 23, 2011.

In the 2007 barangay elections, Constancio Mendoza obtained the highest votes for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. Consequently, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed Mendoza as the dulyelected Punong Barangay.
Thus, the losing candidate, Thomas Pajanel, filed a petition for quo warranto with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Eventually, the MTC disqualified Mendoza and declared that Liwanag Herato, who obtained the highest number of votes for the position of Barangay Kagawad, was entitled to succeed him as Punong Barangay. Mendoza appealed the decision to the COMELEC.
A DILG Undersecretary informed Villas that Mendoza should occupy the post of Punong Barangay as there was no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the MTC Decision. Nevertheless, Municipal Administrator Edezer Aceron issued a letter to Marlon de Castro, the local branch manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), requesting that transactions entered into by Mendoza in behalf of Barangay Balatasan should not be honored
Thereafter, Mendoza and the Sangguniang Barangay of Balatasan filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages and Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with a Regional Trial Court (RTC). They prayed that the LBP be directed to release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render necessary, basic public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.
The Court held that the case was rendered moot and academic with the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections. This is because, whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. Mendozas term of office has expired with the conduct of last years local elections. As such, the special civil action before the RTC, where the assailed Orders were issued, can no longer prosper. Mendoza no longer has any legal standing to further pursue the case, rendering this petition moot and academic.
EXPRORIATION
RULE 67
C H A V E Z
DEFINITION
This is the procedure to be observed in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Eminent domain is the ultimate right of sovereign power to appropriate, not only public, but [even] the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty to public purposes. (Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, US 1837)
DEFINITION
Elements of the exercise of the power of eminent domain:

There is taking of private property;
E.g. The right of way easement perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights. (NPC v. Spouses Misericordia, G.R. No. 60077, 18 January 1991) E.g. Exproriation for the construction of irrigation systems to make water available for farmers
The taking must be for public use;
There must be just compensation.

The value must be that the date of taking, or the complaint for expropriation, whichever came first. (Section 4, Rule 67).
(Bernas, 2006, p.102)
EXPROPRIATION BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMET & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. (Republic v. Gingoyon, 2005)
2 STAGES IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

1ST STAGE: Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts. This stage is terminated by either an order of dismissal of the action or order of the condemnation declaring that expropriation is proper and legal. These orders are final and therefore appealable. (Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, 1989)

2nd STAGE: Determination of just compensation This is done with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing just compensation is also final and appealable. (Ibid). The Court may wholly or partially accept or reject the report of the commissioners, securing the rights of both parties in either case. Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the propriety or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first.

Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner, but also payment within reasonable time after taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. (Republic v. Lim, June 29, 2005)

FORMULA FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION JC = FMV + CD CB If CB is MORE than CD then, JC = FMV Just Compensation, Fair Market Value, Consequential Damages, Consequential Benefits
JURISDICTION OF EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of RTCs, regardless of the value of the subject property. (Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, 2003)
ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF UPON PROPERTY

The plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved upon: 1. Filing of complaint for expropriation 2. Service of notice to the defendant 3. Deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.

After deposit, the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to place the plaintiff in possession of the property and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. If personal property Provisionally ascertained by the Court
(Rule 67, Section 2)

If Real Property Assessed Value in tax return If LGU only 15% of the fair market value based on the tax declaration is required
REPUBLIC ACT 8974

Rep. Act No. 8974 inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. This requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ of possession may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized. (Republic v. Ginogoyon, 2005)
ORDER OF EXPRORIATION
It is issued by the court in which the complaint for expropriation is filed when: 1. Objections or defenses of the defendant have been overruled; or 2. The defendant raised no such defense or objection; or 3. No party appears to defend.
(Rule 67, Section 4)
JUDGMENT IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or purpose. (Rule 67, Section 13)
2012
HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PARC (2012)

On July 5, 2011, the SC denied the petition for review filed by HLI and affirmed the assailed PARC Resolutions with the modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. On November 22, 2011, the SC recalled and set aside the option thus granted to the original FWBs to remain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining that all the benefits and homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them.
On just compensation: Considering that the issue on just compensation has already been passed upon and denied by the Court in its November 22, 2011 Nonetheless, even if we entertain said motion and examine the arguments raised by HLI and Mallari, et al. one last time, the result will be the same.
On the reckoning period for just compensation Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. It was the PARC approval of HLIs stock option plan which should be considered as the effective date of taking as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands. [e]ven if it is the government which will pay the just compensation to HLI, this will also affect the FWBs as they will be paying higher amortizations to the government if the taking will be considered to have taken place only on January 2, 2006.
On who should determine just compensation: Even though the compensation due to HLI will still be preliminarily determined by DAR and LBP, subject to review by the RTC acting as a SAC, the fact that the reckoning point of taking is already fixed at a certain date should already hasten the proceedings and not further cause undue hardship on the parties, especially the qualified FWBs.
REPUBLIC VS. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN (2012)

NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. Consequently, it filed with a Regional Trial Court a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of land. Among the affected parcels of land was Lot No. 3080 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan (RBK). After due process, the RTC granted the complaint and ordered NIA, among others, to forward the payments intended for RBK to Tabaoda and Portia who have already acquired ownership over Lot No. 3080. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed the RTCs decision.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The members of the new committee even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas.
They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provides the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. The committee members based their recommendations on reliable data and considered various factors that affected the value of the land and the improvements.
FORECLOSURE
RULE 68 & ACT 3135
M E N D O Z A
E S P I N O S A
H E R N A N D E Z
KINDS
Judicial foreclosure, which is governed by Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. Extrajudicial foreclosure, governed by Act 3135.
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
Rule 68 only applies to judicial foreclosure. For purposes of venue, foreclosure is a real action because it is an action affecting interest in real property. Since it is a real action, the venue for such action is the place where the property is situated.
COMPLAINT FOR FORECLOSURE

The complaint must state: Date and due execution of the mortgage Assignments of the mortgage, if any Names and residences of both mortgagor and mortgagee Description of the mortgaged property Dates and other evidence secured by the mortgage Amount claimed to be unpaid Names and residences of all persons having interest on the property
JUDGMENT ON THE FORECLOSURE CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING

Ascertainment of the amount due to the plaintiff including interest and other charges Judgment of the sum found due Order that the amount found due to be paid within a period not less than 90 days but not more than 120 days from the entry of judgment Admonition that in default of such payment the property will be sold in public auction
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
Period mentioned in the judgment within which the mortgagor may start exercising his right to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the debt.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
It may be exercised even after the foreclosure sale provided it is made before the sale is confirmed by the order of the court.
SALE OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY

If the mortgagor fails to pay the sum due within the period (90-120 days), the mortgagee may file a motion for the sale of the mortgaged property.
The motion for the sale of the mortgaged property may be made ex parte.
SALE OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY

Statutory provisions regarding the publication of notice of the mortgage foreclosure must be strictly complied with.
The purpose of the notice is to inform the public as to the condition of the property and to secure bidders.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION VS. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

Equity of Redemption Right of the mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the debt within 90-120 days after the entry of judgment or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to confirmation Right of Redemption Right of the debtor, his successor in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold to redeem the property within 1 year from registration of the Sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION VS. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

Equity of Redemption Period is 90-120 days after entry of judgment or even after foreclosure but prior to confirmation; but if mortgagee is a bank, the mortgagor may exercise a right of redemption Right of Redemption Period is 1 year from date of registration of certificate of sale; but juridical persons shall have the right to redeem the property until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than 3 months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier
CONFIRMATION OF THE SALE

After the foreclosure sale has been effected, the mortgagee should file a motion for confirmation of the sale. This requires both notice and hearing. After the hearing, the court if it finds valid grounds for its confirmation shall issue and order confirming the foreclosure sale.
CONFIRMATION OF THE SALE

Effects
It shall divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and shall vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to right of redemption if allowed. Title vests in the purchaser upon a valid confirmation of the sale and retroacts to the date of the sale. Party entitled may secure a writ of possession, this shall be issued upon motion. The order of confirmation is appealable. The order will be final if there is failure to appeal within the period for appeal.
REGISTRATION
The buyer acquires title upon the finality of the confirmation of the sale. The certificate of sale cannot be registered without a final order confirming the sale.
JUDICIAL VS. EXTRAJUDICIAL

Judicial Governed by the Rules of Court Involves filing of an independent action There is an equity of redemption but no right of redemption. There could be a deficiency judgment rendered by the court. Extrajudicial Governed by Act 3135 No court intervention necessary. Right of redemption exists
There is no deficiency judgment because there is no judicial proceeding in the first place. But, recovery of deficiency is allowed.
Recovery of deficiency may be done by mere motion.
Recovery of deficiency is through an independent action.
2010
TECKLO V. RURAL BANK OF PAMPLONA, INC. G.R. NO. 171201. JUNE 18, 2010. CARPIO, J.
Facts: On 20 January 1994, spouses Co obtained from Rural Bank of Pamplona, Inc. a P100,000.00 loan due in three months or on 20 April 1994. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on a 262-square meter residential lot owned by spouses Co located in San Felipe, Naga City and covered by TCT). The mortgage was registered in the Register of Deeds of Naga City on 21 January 1994 and duly annotated on the TCT of the mortgaged property. One of the stipulations in the mortgage contract was that the mortgaged property would also answer for the future loans of the mortgagor. Pursuant to this provision, spouses Co obtained on 4 March 1994 a second loan from Rural Bank of Pamplona in the amount of P150,000.00 due in three months or on 2 June 1994. Spouses Tecklo, meanwhile instituted an action for collection of sum of money against spouses Co. In the said case, spouses Tecklo obtained a writ of attachment on the mortgaged property of spouses Co. The notice of attachment was annotated on the TCT of the mortgaged property.
When the two loans remained unpaid after becoming due and demandable, Rural Bank of Pamplona instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. In its petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, Rural Bank of Pamplona sought the satisfaction solely of the first loan although the second loan had also become due. At the public auction scheduled on 19 December 1994, Rural Bank of Pamplona offered the winning bid of P142,000.00, which did not include the second loan. The provisional certificate of sale to respondent bank was annotated on the TCT of the mortgaged property. Spouses Tecklo then exercised the right of redemption as successors-ininterest of the judgment debtor. Stepping into the shoes of spouses Co, spouses Tecklo tendered on 9 August 1995 the amount of P155,769.50, based on the computation made by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff. Rural Bank of Pamplona objected to the non-inclusion of the second loan.
Issue: Does the redemption amount include the second loan in the amount of P150,000.00 even if it was not included in Rural Bank of Pamplonas application for extrajudicial foreclosure? Held: No. Where the mortgagee failed to include the second loan in its application for extrajudicial foreclosure as well as in its bid at the public auction sale, it is deemed to have waived is lien on the mortgaged property with respect to the second loan. After the foreclosure of the mortgaged property, the mortgage is extinguished and the purchase at auction sale acquires the property free from such mortgage any deficiency amount after foreclosure cannot constitute a continuing lien on the foreclosed property, but must be collected by the mortgagee-creditor in an ordinary action for collection.
TECKLO V. RURAL BANK OF PAMPLONA, INC. G.R. NO. 171201. JUNE 18, 2010. CARPIO, J. In order to effect redemption, the judgment debtor or his successor -in-interest need only pay the purchaser at the public auction sale the redemption amount composed of (1) the price which the purchaser at the public auction sale paid for the property and (2) the amount of any assessment or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the property after the purchase, plus the applicable interest
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. NG G.R. NO. 187556. MAY 5, 2010 FIRST DIVISION; PONENTE, J. CARPIO-MORALES
Facts: On various occasions in 1997, James Ng and his brother Anthony obtained loans from petitioner amounting to Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of land situated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Respondents failed to settle their loan obligation, hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage before a notary public. The Notice of Auction Sale scheduled the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage was published in Metro Profile, a newspaper of general circulation. The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. As respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner filed on June 26, 2001, an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties and committing any act of dispossession that would defeat respondents right of ownership was issued. RTC then denied the issuance of writ of possession on the ground that there is no proof of notice of sale made for not less than twenty (20) days in at least three (3) public places. There is also no proof that Notary Public Atty. Stephen Z. Taala, who conducted the sale at public auction of the subject properties, collected filing fees and issued the corresponding official receipt, in addition to his expenses.
Issue: Should writ of possession be issued to petitioner? Held: Yes. It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession. Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding as in fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage. Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function. The defaulting mortgagor is not without any expedient remedy, however. For under Section 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, it can file with the court which issues the writ of possession a petition for cancellation of the writ within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession.
PARTITION
RULE 69
B A T O A N N G G H I N O G
Complaint for Partition
Appointment of 3 Commissioners
NO
Trial Order for Partition Partition by Agreement YES
Assign to a party Wiling to take some, & to pay the others The amount deemed equitable
Oath Filed In Court Notice to Parties
View, Examine Real Estate
Hearing
PartitionIf most Advantageous And equitable To all
O R
Order of Confirmation of Partition

Final order and accounting Appeal Accept Report and Order Judgment Judgment
Order for Sale at O Public R Auction
Accept Report in part And reject in part
Report of Proceedings
Recommit to Commissioners For further Report of Facts

Set Aside Report and Appoint New Commissioners
Objections, if any
Hearing Recording & Registration In the Registry of Deeds
WHAT IS PARTITION
It is the process of dividing and assigning property owned in common among the various co-owners thereof in proportion to their respective interests in said property. It is a judicial controversy between persons who being co- owners thereof, seek to secure a division for themselves of the common property giving to each one of them the part corresponding to each.
ORIGIN OF THE RULE ALLOWING PARTITION

Art. 494 (first paragraph): No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each coowner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
ORIGIN OF THE RULE ALLOWING PARTITION

Instances when a co-owner may not demand partition at any time
Art. 494 (2) There is an agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided for a certain period of time but not exceeding 10 years Art. 494 (3)/1083 When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not exceeding 20 years Art. 494 (4) When partition is prohibited by law Art. 495 When the property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended Art. 1084 When the condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand partition has not yet been fulfilled.
OBJECTIVE
To enable those who own property in common to put an end to the common ownership so as to vest in each a sole estate specific property or an allotment of land or tenements.
NATURE
Quasi in rem
One which is directed against particular persons but the purpose of which is to bar and bind not only said persons but any other person who claims any interest in the property or right subject of the suit
WHEN PARTITION CAN BE MADE

It is imprescriptible, but where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co- ownership, then acquisitive prescription sets in.
MODES OF PARTITION
Voluntarily or Compulsorily under the rules But even if the parties had resorted to judicial partition, they may still make an amicable partition of the property
CONTENTS OF THE COMPLAINT

Nature and extent of his title Adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded Join as defendants all other persons interested in the property
ISSUES/QUESTIONS
Whether plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property How should the property be divided
PARTIES TO BE NAMED
All co-owners, all persons interested may be joined as indispensable parties.
An exclusion or omission of one co- owner will cause the action for partition to not proceed.
PARTIES TO BE NAMED
Non-inclusion of a co-owner:
BEFORE JUDGMENT: Not a ground for motion to dismiss
Remedy is to file a motion to include the party

AFTER JUDGMENT: Judgment is void because co-owners are indispensable parties
Right to intervene is not absolute and intervenor must show a legitimate and proper interest in the subject property
HOW TO PROCEED
When parents die and leave real property to the heirs. An heir may not want to own the property with his siblings because most co-owned properties are stagnant. There is no improvement because nobody can move.
No. 1 : If the heirs can agree on how to divide, they can simply enter in an agreement called Deed of Partition.
HOW TO PROCEED
If indivisible, or would be much impaired by its being divided, it may be adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided he shall pay the excess in cash
HOW TO PROCEED
No. 2 : If they cannot agree, file a case under Rule 69. File a complaint in RTC of the province where the property or a part thereof is situated. (Sec. 1)
Defendants shall be served with summons and shall file and serve their answers After the last pleading has been filed, pre-trial will follow Trial
HOW TO PROCEED
There are two phases involved upon filing of the complaint for partition:
First determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and if partition is proper. Second when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition; also deals with rendition of accounting itself and its court approval after parties are heard.
HOW TO PROCEED
First phase may end either:
In a declaration that partition is not proper; or
There is no co-ownership Partition is legally prohibited

Effect is dismissal of the complaint for partition
That partition is proper
Co-ownership exists
Order of partition
In either case, order made by the court is final may be appealed. (Sec. 2) A judgment declaring the existence of coownership is immediately appealable Multiple Appeals
HOW TO PROCEED
First phase
If parties agree, they can still effect partition amongst themselves
By proper instruments of conveyance Court shall confirm the agreed partition The partition, together with the order of confirmation shall be recorded in the registry of deeds
HOW TO PROCEED
Second phase
If parties cannot agree on the partition as ordered by the court appointment of commissioners (Sec. 3)
Three (3) competent and disinterested persons Commissioner shall take and subscribe an oath filed in court (Sec. 4)
Commissioners shall view and examine the real estate due notice to the parties to attend such viewing and examination (Sec. 4) Shall hear the parties and consider their preferences shall set apart to the parties their respective portions as will be most advantageous and equitable (Sec 4)
HOW TO PROCEED
Second phase
Shall also hear the parties on the issue of accounting of rent and profits of the property in the partition case as referred to in Sec. 8. Commissioners shall submit to the court a full and accurate report of all the proceedings as to the partition. (Sec. 6)
Parties are given 10 days to object on the findings in the report No proceeding before the commissioners shall pass title until sanctioned by the courts and rendered judgment on the same.
HOW TO PROCEED
Second phase
Court action on the commissioners report after the expiration of the 10 day period given to parties to object or after the parties have filed their objections (Sec. 7)
Accept the report and render judgment in accordance with such report; or Recommit the same to the commissioner for further report of facts; or Set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or Accept and reject the report in part and render judgment as shall be just and equitable
JUDGMENT
If actual partition is made:
Shall state definitely by metes and bounds and adequate description of the particular portion assigned to each party Effect of judgment is to vest in each party the portion of realty assigned to him
If whole property is assigned to one of the parties:

Provided such person pays the others the sums ordered by the court Judgment shall state such fact of assignment and payment to the others Judgment vests the whole property to the paying party free from interests of other parties
JUDGMENT
If property is sold to third persons based on Sec. 5
Judgment shall state the name of the purchaser(s) and definite description of the parcels sold Effect is to vest the realty to such purchaser(s)
Certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the registry of deeds where property is situated.
Expenses of recording taxed as cost of suit.
2011
LACBAYAN VS. SAMOY MARCH 21, 2011

Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy had an illicit relationship. When they eventually parted ways, both of them agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to Samoy. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy refused. Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the Quezon City RTC. Samoy denied Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from her. The SC ruled in the negative on the issue of whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership. It stated that until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
CO GIOK LUN VS. CO AUGUST 3, 2011

This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by two brothers, petitioner Co Giok Lun (Lun) and Co Bon Fieng (Fieng), the father of respondent Jose Co (Co). Petitioners, the legal heirs of Lun, filed a complaint for partition and damages against Co. RTC stated that the documentary evidence presented in court showed that the Gubat property is indeed under Fiengs name. However, the chain of events prior to the purchase of the property and the evidence submitted by the petitioners prove the presence of coownership.CA reversed. The SC said that a division of property cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of co-ownership is first established. The evidence of petitioners were insufficient or immaterial to warrant a positive finding of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that petitioners failed to substantiate with reasonable certainty that (1) Chaco gave Fieng a start-up capital of P8,000 to be used by Lun and Fieng in setting up a business, (2) that the Philippine Honest and Company was a partnership between Lun and Fieng, and (3) that the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 involving the Barcelona property is sufficient to establish coownership. Also, petitioners were not able to prove the existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest child as provided under Article 12 of the Civil Code.
FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER

RULE 70
C H U A
E S G U E R R A
INTERDICTAL seeks the recoverty of phyisical or material possession only
PUBLICIANA seeks the recovery of the right to possess
REINVIDICATORIA seeks the recovery of ownership, which necessarily includes the recovery of possession
a real action because it involves real property and are found on privity of real estate an action in personam because it is directed against particular persons; it imposes a responsibility or liability upon a person directly. - Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required. - Judgment is binding only upon parties impleaded or their successors in interest. an action quasi in rem because it is directed against particular persons; it subjects the interest of a named defendant over a particular property to an obligation or burdening it. -Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not required as long as jurisdiction over the res is acquired.
INTERDICTAL
PUBLICIANA
REINVIDICATORIA
a local action because it must be brought in a particular place where the subject property or a portion thereof is located, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
dispossession has not lasted for more than 1 year. dispossession has lasted for more than 1 year. Whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned in [Rule 70] he may maintain his action in the [RTC], and it is not necessary for him to wait until the exipration of [1 year] before commencing an action to be repossessed or declare to be the owner of the land. (Gumiran v. Gumiran) if raised question of illegal dispossession only and action is brought more than 1 year after dispossession. (Herrera) If raised of illegal dispossession and ownership over the property. (Herrera)
INTERDICTAL brought to the MTC.
PUBLICIANA
REINVIDICATORIA
brought to the RTC if property exceeds P 20,000 outside Metro Manila or P 50,000 within Metro Manila. Otherwise, brought to the MTC. ordinary civil proceedings.
summary proceedings.
VALDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
FORCIBLE ENTRY
Illegal from the very beginning, depriving the actual possessor of his possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Plaintiff must allege and prove his prior physical possession of the property. Demand to vacate is not required before the filing of the action. One year period within which to file the action is counted from the date of actual entry by the defendant.
The one year period if the entry was secured by stealth should be counted from date of learning of entry by stealth. (Feria) To deprive the lawful possessor of the benefit of the summary action simply because the stealthy intruder manages to conceal the trespass for more than one year would be to reward clandestine usurpation even if it is unlawful. (Vda. De Prieto v. Reyes)
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Legal in the beginning which subsequently becomes illegal because of the expiration or termination of the right to have possession. Such allegation is not required.
Demand to vacate is necessary as a rule. Counted from the date of the last demand.
in case of tacit renewal of the lease, from date of the notice to quit in case of occupancy under a temporary permit, from date of the revocation of the permit in case of occupancy on mere tolerance, from date of demand to vacate
ALLOWED & PROHIBITED PLEADINGS: EJECTMENT CASES SUMMARY IN NATURE

ALLOWED PLEADINGS Complaint Compulsory counterclaim Cross-claim pleaded in the answer Answer NOTE: All pleadings must be verified. (Sec. 5, Rule 70) PROHIBITED PLEADINGS Motion to dismiss the complaint Motion for bill of particulars Motion for new trial, reconsideration of a judgment or reopening of trial Petition for relief from judgment Motion for the extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper Memoranda Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlcutory order issued by the court Motion to declare the defendant in default Dilator motions for postponement
JURISDICTION
MTCs have exclusive jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of the rentals and damages. (Sec. 33(2), BP 129)
EFFECT OF CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP

The decision in an ejectment case does not bind the title to or ownership of the land or building. It does not also bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the property. (BalanonAnicete v. Balaon)
ABATEMENT OR PREVENT
The following are cases in the RTC which do not abate or prevent the filing of an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
An injunction suit filed in the RTC by the defendant in the ejectment suit; An action publiciana in another court between the same parties in the ejectment suit; An action for quieting of title involving the same property and the same parties; Suit for specific performance with damages like an action to compel the renewal of a lease contract; An accion reivindicatoria in another court between the same parties over the same property; An action for reformation of the instrument; or An action for annulment of sale or title between the same parties involving the same property (Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. CA)
WHO MAY INSTITUTE

Forcible entry a person deprived of possession of any land or building by: (FISTS)
force intimidation stealth threat Strategy
Unlawful detainer
a lessor, vendor, vendee or other person against whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld; or legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld.
TO WHOM FILED AGAINST

The action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against: (OTVF)
one in possession at the commencement of the action; tenant with right of possession may bring action against another tenant; vendor may bring action for ejectment against vendee upon failure to pay the instalments; forcible entry and unlawful detainer lie even against the very owner of property.
WHAT MUST BE ALLEGED

Unida v. heirs ambrosio urban (2005) The case cannot be considered as an unlawful detainer case, the "tolerance" claimed by respondents not being that contemplated by law in unlawful detainer cases; neither can the case be considered as one for forcible entry because the entry of petitioners was not alleged to have been by means of force, intimidation, threats, stealth or strategy. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
PRIOR DEMAND
If the unlawful detainer suit aroused from the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, prior demand is not needed. However, if after the lessee failed to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease, prior demand needed. Demand (Oral or in Writing) may be made by:
If prior demand is not complied with after 15 days (in case of land) and 5 days (in case of buildings), the lessor may now proceed against the lessee. A mere demand to pay is insufficient and demand to pay and to vacate must be alleged.
personally upon tenant; service of written notice of such demand upon person found in premises; posting in premises if no persons be found; or registered mail.
PRIOR DEMAND
Demand is important because in unlawful detainer the 1-year period is counted, generally, from the last demand received by the defendant and it must be filed within one year from such date. Upon failure to pay rent due or comply with the conditions of the lease, the lessor has two options:
specific performance - to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease violated rescission - to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate. (Cetus Development v. CA)
Prior demand is not needed when:

there is a stipulation dispensing with a demand. the ground for the suit is based on the expiration of the lease.
LEASE CONTRACTS ON MONTH-TO-MONTH BASIS DEFENDANT OCCUPIES PREMISES BY MERE TOLERANCE ACCEPTANCE OF ARREARS NOT A WAIVE
TACITA RECONDUCCION
Tacita reconduccion refers to the right of the lessee to continue enjoying the material or de facto possession of the thing leased within a period of time fixed by law. During its existence, the lessee can prevent the lessor from evicting him from the disputed premises. If at the expiration of the contract of lease the lessee continued to enjoy the leased property for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor, there is an implied new lease, not for the period in the original contract but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687. (Joven Yuki v. Wellington Co.) When there is tacita reconduccion, the lessee cannot be deemed as unlawfully withholding the property. Thus, there can be no unlawful detainer.
DEFENSE OF TENANCY
The elements of tenancy are:
the parties are the landowner and the tenant; he subject is agricultural land; there is consent by the landowner; he purpose is agricultural production; there is personal cultivation; and there is sharing of the harvest. The absence of one element does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant. (Ceneze v. Ramos)
If there is tenancy, the case will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Where tenancy is raised as a defense the court must conduct a preliminary hearing on the matter to determine the veracity of the allegations of tenancy. If during the hearing it is shown that tenancy is the real issue, and then the court shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
DEFENSE OF OWNERSHIP
The defense of ownership is the assertion by the defendant of ownership over disputed property and does not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction. When such defense is raised the court may resolve the issue of ownership but only on the following conditions:
When the issue of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue of ownership; The issue of ownership will only be answered to determine the issue of possession; and It will not bar an action between the same parties respecting titles to the land or building and as such the decision on ownership is merely provisional.
HOW TO OBTAIN POSSESSION DURING PENDENCY OF ACTION

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within 5 days from the filing of the complaint file a motion in the same action for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. This motion shall be resolved within 30 days from its filing. (Sec. 15, Rule 70) A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (Art. 539, NCC)
HOW TO OBTAIN POSSESSION DURING PENDENCY OF ACTION

In ejectment cases where an appeal is taken the remedy granted in Article 539, second paragraph, shall also apply if the highest court is satisfied that the lessees appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the lessors appeal is prima facie meritorious. The period of 10 days referred to in said article shall be counted from the time the appeal is perfected. (Regalado) An inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper cases. These would be:
Preliminary attachment, provided the principal action is within its jurisdiction; and Preliminary injunction.
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY
A judgment on a forcible entry and unlawful detainer action is immediately executory to avoid injustice to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is primarily ministerial. (Bugarin v. Palisoc) The rule mandating immediate execution in an ejectment case does not apply when it is the defendant that prevails. Under Sec. 19 of Rule 70, execution shall issue immediately upon motion (i)f judgment is rendered against the defendant. (Riano) The duty to issue the writ and immediate execution is ministerial compellable by mandamus. (Base v. Leviste)
HOW TO STAY EXECUTION

The immediate execution is stayed when the defendant:
perfects an appeal; files a supersedeas bond to pay for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. The Supesedeas Bond is equivalent to the unpaid rentals, dmages and costs which accured down to the time of judgment. (Chua v. CA) It covers the monetary judgment of the lower court and thus if there is no pronouncement as to the pecuniary liability of defendant, bond is not required. However, attorneys fees are not included. (Once v. Gonzales) deposits periodically with the RTC, during the pendency of the appeal, the adjudged amount of rent due under the contract or if there be no contract, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises. (Bulgarin v. Palisoc)
Pendency of another action is not a ground to prevent execution.
HOW TO STAY EXECUTION

RTC does not have jurisdiction to allow extension of time or to accept bonds in lieu of cash. Deposit out of time before or after the writ of execution is issued is not an excuse except when there is fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
WHO ARE BOUND

Parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard. Even if not properly impleaded, the following are bound by the judgment:
Sub lessee as against the lessee; Guest/successor in interest, members of the family of the lessee or his servants and employees; Trespassers, informal settlers, or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate judgment; and Privies of the defendant.
Judgment is still conclusive only with respect to the issue of possession of the premises but not with respect to ownership and other facts.
WHERE TO APPEAL
Judgment or final order of the court is appealable to appropriate Regional Trial Court. RTC decision against the defendant is immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal. However, note that under Rules on Summary proceeding, such effect of being immediately executor would apply may the judgment be either against the plaintiff or the defendant. (Sec. 21, Rules on Summary Proceeding) The mode of appeal is under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
2010-2012
ESTEL V. DIEGO, SR. JANUARY 16, 2012

The present petition originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. Respondents alleged that they entered into a contract of sale of a 306 square-meter parcel of land with petitioner. After receiving the amount of P17,000.00 as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the subject property to respondents. Respondents had been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot since then and that petitioner never disturbed, molested, annoyed nor vexed respondents with respect to their possession of the said property. Petitioner, together with her two grown-up sons and five other persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot, after which they entered its premises and then cut and destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Respondent Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that time.
MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf. MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City. RTC rendered its Decision affirming the assailed Decision of the MTCC. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA. CA promulgated its Decision which affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution. Whether the MTCC of Gingoog City had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition?
HELD
Since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is, thus, upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
HELD
Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality.
ANTAZO V. DOBLADA FEBRUARY 4, 2010

Respondents Leonides Doblada et al. filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner spouses Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents have been in open and peaceful possession of a parcel of land. Respondents received a letter from petitioners informing them that the latter had bought the property. It was made to appear in the said letter that respondents forcibly took possession of the property from petitioners. Respondents replied that they could not have wrested possession of the property from petitioners, as they were in possession thereof and that petitioners evicted them.
Petitioners averred that respondents failed to show their right to recover possession of the property. But that, on the contrary, petitioners are the ones entitled to possess the property considering that they purchased it from a certain Carmencita S. Anciano, registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real property tax thereon. The records reveal that the subject property is part of the parcel of land owned by Eduardo Paralejas, respondents great grandfather. It was subsequently adjudictated to Carmencita S. Anciano, petitioners predecessor-in-interest who later sold it to the petitioners. Did Anciano transfer possession and ownership to the Spouses Antazo upon sale of the property?
HELD
No. Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring to "possession" flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him The Court is convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the property and that petitioners deprived them of such possession by means of force.
CONTEMPT
RULE 71
R I C O
DEFINITION
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. The power to declare a person in contempt of court is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as: a means to protect and preserve the dignity of court, the solemnity of proceedings, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacios refusal to comply with court orders.
FUNCTIONS OF CONTEMPT:
1. Vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptous conduct; and 2. Coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the Court.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT NATURE
CIVIL CONTEMPT
is directed against the consists in failing to do something ordered to be dignity and authority done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of a party. of the court or a judge acting judicially; Necessary Immaterial
INTENT
PURPOSE
to preserve the courts authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders (punishment)
to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order. (Remedial or compensatory)
Should be conducted Character of the Contempt Proceeding in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. PROSECUTOR State is the real prosecutor
Generally held to be remedial and civil in nature.
civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Proof beyond reasonable doubt.
burden of proof lies somewhere between the criminal reasonable doubt burden and the civil fair preponderance burden.
DIRECT
HOW COMMITTED It is committed in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same.
INDIRECT
It is an act done at a distance which tends to belittle, obstruct, or embarass the court and justice.
ACTS CONSTITUTING
1. Any of the following acts constitutes 1. Disobedience or resistance direct contempt: to a lawful writ, process, a. Misbehavior in the presence of or order or judgment of a court; so near a court as to obstruct or 2. Any abuse of or any unlawful interrupt the proceedings before interference with the the same; processes or proceedings of b. Disrespect toward the court; a court not constituting c. Offensive personalities toward direct contempt; others; 3. Any improper conduct d. Refusal to be sworn or to answer tending, directly or indirectly, as a witness, or to subscribe an to impede, obstruct, or affidavit or deposition when degrade the administration lawfully required to do so. of justice. 2. The acts of a party or a counsel which constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping constitute direct contempt.
DIRECT
PROCEEDING No formal proceeding is required to cite a person in contempt. The court may summarily adjudge one in direct contempt.
INDIRECT
1. There must be a charge in writing to be filed either: a. Through verified petition; or b. By order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio; 2. The respondent must be given the opportunity to appear and explain his conduct; 3. To be heard by himself or his counsel. If the act was committed against: 1. RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it the charge may be filed with such court. 1. Lower Court the charge may be filed with the RTC in which the lower court is sitting or in the lower court against which the contempt was allegedly committed. o The decision of the lower court is subject to appeal in the RTC. 2. Quasi- judicial functions the charge shall be filed in the RTC of the place wherein the contempt was committed.
WHERE TO FILE
If the act was committed against:
PENALTY
If the act was committed against: 1. RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank penalty is a fine not exceeding P30,000 6 1. Regional Trial Court months or both. or a court of equivalent 2. Lower Court fine not exceeding P500.00 or or higher rank imprisonment not exceeding one month or penalty is a fine not both. 3. Quasi- judicial functions penalty imposed exceeding P 2,000 or imprisonment not shall depend upon the provisions of the law exceeding ten (10) which authorizes a penalty for contempt days, or both. against such persons or entities. 4. Violation of a writ of injunction, TRO or a status 2. Lower Court quo order offender may be ordered to make penalty is a fine not complete restitution to the party involved or exceeding two such amount as may be proved. hundred pesos or imprisonment not When the contempt consists in REFUSAL or exceeding one (1) OMISSION to do an act which is yet in the power day, or both. oof the respondent to perfrom, he may be imprisoned by order of the court UNTIL he performs 3. If the act consists of it. the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet within the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it.
DIRECT
The person adjudged in direct
INDIRECT
REMEDY
contempt by any court may not appeal but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition directed against the court which adjudged him in direct contempt. - The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition. - The suspension shall take place only if the person adjudged in contempt files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment. - This bond is conditioned upon performance of the judgment should the petition be decided against him.
He may appeal from judgment or final order of the court in the same manner as in criminal cases. The appeal will not have the effect of suspending the judgment if the person adjuged in contempt does not file a bond in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken.
2010-2012
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. MARCELINO E. RODRIGUEZ G.R. NO. 160270 APRIL 23, 2010
On the basis of the declared value of US$6,000 of a cargo described as agricultural product, the shipment, which arrived at the Port of Subic was assessed customs duties and taxes. Upon examination, the subject shipment was found to contain rice. The importer of the cargo stated that there was a misshipment of cargo which actually contained rice. She then requested that the misshipment be upgraded from agricultural product to a shipment of rice, and at the same time manifested willingness to pay the appropriate duties and taxes. However, hold orders were issued.
A certification/letter was later issued by Fertony G. Marcelo, Officer-in-charge of he Cash Division of the Customs Subic Port, however, SBMA, through Seaport Department General Manager Augusto Canlas refused to allow the release of the rice shipment. Thus, a complaint for Injunction and Damages was filed with prayer for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner SBMA and Augusto L. Canlas, with the RTC of Olongapo City. The injunctive relief was granted. A copy of the complaint with summons together with the TRO was served by Sheriff upon the defendants/respondents on the same day.
When the Sheriffs went back to defendants/ respondents office to determine whether or not the TRO was followed, defendants/respondents Attys. Abella and Katalbas refused to honor the TRO, alleging that said Order was illegal. This led to the filing in the instant case a verified indirect contempt charge because of the defiance exhibited. The defendants/respondents alleged that they cannot be cited for contempt of court because they had legal basis to refuse to honor the TRO: that it is the Bureau of Customs that has jurisdiction, thus, the indirect contempt case has no leg to stand on.
INDIRECT CONTEMPT CONVICTION NOT PROPER

Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure includes, among the grounds for filing a case for indirect contempt, are the following: Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this rule; any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
The SBMA officers may be considered to have acted in good faith when they refused to follow the TRO issued by the RTC. The SBMA officers' refusal to follow the court order was not contumacious but due to the honest belief that jurisdiction over the subject shipment remained with the BOC because of the existing warrant of seizure and detention against said shipment. Thus, we hold that the RTC Order dated 21 November 2002 which found the SBMA officers guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the RTC's TRO should be invalidated.
ROXAS VS. TIPON G.R. NO. 160641-42, JUNE 20, 2012

Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. (HEVRI) is a registered corporation which operates Hidden Valley Springs Resort. F. U. Juan Corporation (FUJC) and Fernando U. Juan (Juan) are two of its stockholders who held 439,604 shares and one share, respectively. The respondents alleged that they were not allowed to inspect the accounts of HEVRI despite demand. Despite huge profits derived from the operation of the Hidden Valley Springs Resort, HEVRI has not declared nor paid dividends. Also, it was alleged that Roxas had grossly mismanaged HEVRI. On 10 November 1998, FUJC and Juan filed an Amended Petition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction and appointment of a receiver, for HEVRIs dissolution before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
During the hearing on the application for issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 26 July 2001, the RTC ordered an audit of the books of HEVRI. Petitioners contested the order of audit through a motion for reconsideration. On 4 October 2001, the RTC designated Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit the books of HEVRI. On 16 July 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining RTC from implementing the questioned orders. When petitioners refused to allow Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit their books, the RTC declared Guillermo Roxas, Ma. Eugenia Vallarta and Roxas in contempt of court and issued a warrant for their arrest on 19 August 2002. Said Order was also challenged before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73187. The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the indirect contempt proceedings. The Court of Appeals observed that Petitioners Guillermo Roxas, Ma. Eugenia Vallarta and Rafael Roxas were in fact given a chance to be heard in open court through an Order dated 14 June 2002.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied on 29 October 2003, hence the instant petition. Among other challenges, petitioners challenge the validity of the contempt order issued against them. Petitioners contend that the trial court did not motupropio initiate the contempt proceedings but it was prompted by private respondents through a motion for the issuance of a show cause order, thereby disregarding Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Private respondents justified that petitioners whimsical disregard of the authority of the trial court exemplified by the unreasonable and unjustified refusal to comply with the directed audit constitute indirect contempt of court.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER CITING THE PETITIONERS IS PROPER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF VERIFIED MOTION FROM THE RESPONDENTS?
Yes. It is valid because in this case, the Regional Trial Court initiated the contempt charges. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation. The asseverations made by petitioners to justify their refusal to allow inspection or audit were rejected by the trial court.
It may be noted that a person may be charged with indirect contempt by either of two alternative ways, namely: by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court against which the contemptuous act is committed.
The RTC initiated the contempt charge. In the Order dated 9 January 2002, petitioners were directed to appear in court and to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for their refusal to allow Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit the books of HEVRI. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration claiming that said order was the subject of a pending petition before the Court of Appeals and that they can only be cited for contempt by the filing of a verified petition. The RTC denied the motion and reiterated in its Order on 26 April 2002 explaining that it chose to initiate the contempt charge.
The RTC acted on the basis of the unjustified refusal of petitioners to abide by its lawful order. It is of no moment that private respondents may have filed several pleadings to urge the RTC to cite petitioners in contempt. Petitioners utterly violated an order issued by the trial court which act is considered contemptuous. Citing Leonidas v. Judge Supnet, the Surpreme Court ruled that independently of the motions filed by the opposing party, it was the MTC [in this case RTC] which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio.No verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect contempt are initiated in this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not affect the procedure adopted.

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA COLLEGE OF LAW

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