Adopted Measures for Evaluation and Remediation of the

Damages Occurred in Darbandikhan Dam due to a Major

Earthquake
Kawa Z. Abdulrahman, Omed S. Q. Yousif, Younis Alshkane,
Kamal A. Rashed, Abdulrahman Khani,
Tareq Battal, Salar Kareem Hama
University of Sulaimani

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OUTLINES

• INTRODUCTION
• DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
• IS IT SAFE TO STORE WATER ABOVE ELEVATION 471.9 m?
• DAMAGES REPAIR
• CONLCLUSIONS

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INTRODUCTION

• Darbandikhan dam (128 m height) is a multi-purpose rock-fill dam (see

Figure 1) located on the Diyala river approximately 65 km south-east of
Sulaymaniyah city/Iraq, as shown in Figure 2.
• The construction of the dam was begun in 1956 and completed in Summer
1961. The total capacity of the Darbandikhan reservoir is 3.0 km3 at the
normal pool level (El. 485.00 m).

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DARBANDIKHAN DAM

Fig. 2: Darbandikhan Dam Cross section

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INTRODUCTION

Fig. 1: Darbandikhan
dam Location

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INTRODUCTION

• A strong earthquake (Mw=7.3) hit Darbandikhan dam on November 12, 2017.

• The earthquake caused deformation (cracks and settlement) in the dam body.
• Dam expert teams (Iraqi experts, world bank experts, UNDAC, university of
Sulaimani, etc.) visited the dam for inspection purposes.
• The inspections included a primary visual inspection, then a more detailed visual
and safety inspection.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

• The preliminary visual inspection stage commenced immediately after

the earthquake on the same night of the incident (see Figure 3).

• In this stage, the dam was visually inspected in order to explore the
extent of damages along with taking photos and recording videos.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

Fig. 3: Visual inspection just after

the earthquake.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

• On the day after the incident, after checking the safety of the spillway
and the bottom outlets, it was decided to lower the water level in the
reservoir in order to investigate the lower parts of the dam.
• The water level in the reservoir was then gradually lowered from the
elevation 471.9 m to the elevation 464 m, (i.e. 7.9 m), in about two
months.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

• The detailed safety inspections included the following actions:

1. Geodetic survey
2. Geophysical investigation
3. Test pits (Trenching)
4. Continuous Drilling in the clay core
5. Seepage rates and piezometer readings

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

1. Geodetic survey
• The maximum settlement (∆H) was 48 cm (∆H/H=0.38%).
• It is well within the range of the settlement values occurred in the
other dams that subjected to large earthquakes.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

2. Geophysical Investigation
 Two different methods were used; Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) and the
Multichannel Analysis of Surface Waves method.

 The geophysical investigators identified three anomalies (deformations) at

three locations with three different depths as shown in Figures (4) & (5).

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 DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

Fig. 4: Deformation
Zones

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

Figure 5 Radargrams of
the GPR profile of
locations D1, D2, and D3
at distance 3m, 10m, and
17m, respectively,
measured from the
spillway structure

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

3. Test pits (Trenching)

• Several test pits were dug at the crack’s locations (Figure 6), all the cracks on
the crest were superficial cracks except the transverse crack next to the
spillway, which extended through the clay core.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
3. Test pits (Trenching)

Figure 6: Cracks pattern

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 DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
3. Test pits (Trenching)

Figure 7: The crack at

the contact between
the spillway and the
embankment

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
4. Continuous Drilling in the clay core
• Three boreholes at three locations (D1, D2, and D3 shown in Figure 4) were
drilled using a continuous method of drilling.
• Visual inspection and in-situ test using a pocket penetrometer were then
carried out on the borehole logs.
• The results indicated that the consistency of the clay core is varied from stiff
clay to hard clay.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

4. Continuous Drilling in the clay core

• Furthermore, constant-head tests were carried out for determining the
hydraulic conductivity of clay core in which the boreholes D1, D2, and D3
excavated.
• According to the results, concentrated seepage did not happen.
• The obtained values of the hydraulic conductivity were close to the original
value of the hydraulic conductivity of the material in the dam core.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS

5. Seepage rates and piezometer readings

• One day after the major earthquake, the seepage in the left bank grouting
gallery increased rapidly from 1 l/min to about 2.1 l/min; about 110%
increased.
• Since then the increase (about 110%) has been persistent.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
5. Seepage rates and piezometer readings
Figure 8: Left abutment
grouting gallery seepage
vs pool elevation.

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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
5. Seepage rates and piezometer readings
• Figure 9 shows the change of seepage in the right gallery versus water elevation in
the reservoir.
• There are two consecutive sudden increases in the seepage amount in the right bank
gallery.
• The first seepage discharge has increased from 1.8 l/min to more than 5.5 l/min
suddenly due to the November 12, 2017 earthquake.
• The second increasing was from about 5 l/min to more than 9 l/s, which was due to
another earthquake of Mw of 6.0 on February 19, 2018.
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DAM SAFETY INSPECTIONS
5. Seepage rates and piezometer readings

Figure 9: Right abutment

gallery seepage versus pool
elevation.

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IS IT SAFE TO STORE WATER ABOVE ELEVATION 471.9 m?

• Due to the awareness and cautions about whether there were cracks in
the lower parts of the dam or not, the water level was not allowed to
rise above elevation 470 m during 2018.
• However, in 2019, based on the results obtained from the drilled
boreholes and on the promised information regarding the behavior of
Earth Core Rockfill Dams (ECRD) subjected to major earthquakes, it was
decided to gradually raise the water level in the reservoir.

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DAMAGES REPAIR
• The asphalt road, sidewalk, and electrical poles were first demolished and then
reconstructed as shown in Figure 10.
• At the spillway-embankment interface, it was decided to excavate the cracks to
depths where the cracks will disappear and reconstruct it again as shown in
Figure 11.
• Since it was found that the interface crack between the spillway wall and the
embankment part of the dam was just extending only few meters into the core
, it does not endanger the safety of the dam.
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DAM DAMAGES REPAIR

Figure 10: The

crest of the dam
before and after
removing the
damaged parts.

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DAM DAMAGES REPAIR

Figure 11:
Excavation
next to the
spillway wall.

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CONCLUSIONS
• Darbandikhan dam has experienced several damages and deformations
(settlement and cracks) due to a strong earthquake that occurred on
November 12, 2017 (Mw = 7.3).
• Although it suffered damages, the dam performed satisfactorily and
survived the earthquake.
• Since there was no evidence on existing cracks or weakened zones in the
dam core, the water level in Darbandikhan reservoir was risen to elevation
484.28 m (0.72 m below full reservoir level) by the end of May 2019.
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CONCLUSIONS
• Adequate design and construction of dams can help them pass through even large
earthquakes.
• The adopted measures used for evaluation and remediation of the earthquake-
induced damages in Darbandikhan dam were dependable for checking dam safety.

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