Dates are inconsistent

Dates are inconsistent

55 results sorted by ID

Possible spell-corrected query: smartcards
2024/1350 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-10-25
Update to the Sca25519 Library: Mitigating Tearing-based Side-channel Attacks
Lukasz Chmielewski, Lubomír Hrbáček
Implementation

This short note describes an update to the sca25519 library, an ECC implementation computing the X25519 key-exchange protocol on the Arm Cortex-M4 microcontroller. The sca25519 software came with extensive mitigations against various side-channel and fault attacks and was, to our best knowledge, the first to claim affordable protection against multiple classes of attacks that are motivated by distinct real-world application scenarios. This library is protected against various passive and...

2024/1301 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-08-20
Kalos: Hierarchical-auditable and Human-binding Authentication Scheme for Clinical Trial
Chang Chen, Zelong Wu, Guoyu Yang, Qi Chen, Wei Wang, Jin Li
Public-key cryptography

Clinical trials are crucial in the development of new medical treatment methods. To ensure the correctness of clinical trial results, medical institutes need to collect and process large volumes of participant data, which has prompted research on privacy preservation and data reliability. However, existing solutions struggle to resolve the trade-off between them due to the trust gap between the physical and digital worlds, limiting their practicality. To tackle the issues above, we present...

2023/1068 (PDF) Last updated: 2023-07-09
Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations
Ben Nassi, Ofek Vayner, Etay Iluz, Dudi Nassi, Or Hai Cohen, Jan Jancar, Daniel Genkin, Eran Tromer, Boris Zadov, Yuval Elovici
Attacks and cryptanalysis

Although power LEDs have been integrated in various devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated. In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form of cryptanalytic side-channel attack, in which secret keys are extracted by using a photodiode to measure the light emitted by a device’s power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in the light intensity during cryptographic operations. We analyze the...

2022/366 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-11-04
On the Algebraic Degree of Iterated Power Functions
Clémence Bouvier, Anne Canteaut, Léo Perrin
Secret-key cryptography

New symmetric primitives are being designed to address a novel set of design criteria. Instead of being executed on regular processors or smartcards, they are instead intended to be run in abstract settings such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proof systems. This implies in particular that these new primitives are described using operations over large finite fields. As the number of such primitives grows, it is important to better understand the properties of their underlying...

2021/910 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-07-01
SECDSA: Mobile signing and authentication under classical ``sole control''
Eric Verheul
Applications

The 2014 European eIDAS regulation regulates strong electronic authentication and legally binding electronic signatures. Both require user "sole control". Historically smartcards are used based on direct interaction between user and relying party. Here sole control is provided by giving users both physical possession and control of the cryptographic key used for signing/authentication through a PIN. Such **classical** sole control is required in the 1999 electronic signature directive by...

2021/028 (PDF) Last updated: 2021-01-12
A Side Journey to Titan
Victor LOMNE, Thomas ROCHE
Implementation

The Google Titan Security Key is a FIDO U2F hardware device proposed by Google (available since July 2018) as a two-factor authentication token to sign in to applications (e.g. your Google account). We present here a side-channel attack that targets the Google Titan Security Key’s secure element (the NXP A700X chip) by the observation of its local electromagnetic radiations during ECDSA signatures (the core cryptographic operation of the FIDO U2F protocol). This work shows that an attacker...

2020/876 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-07-12
Direct Sum Masking as a Countermeasure to Side-Channel and Fault Injection Attacks
Claude Carlet, Sylvain Guilley, Sihem Mesnager
Implementation

Internet of Things is developing at a very fast rate. In order to ensure security and privacy, end-devices (e.g. smartphones, smart sensors, or any connected smartcards) shall be protected both against cyber attacks (coming down from the network) and against physical attacks (arising from attacker low-level interaction with the device). In this context, proactive protections shall be put in place to mitigate information theft from either side-channel monitoring or active computation/data...

2020/855 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-07-12
Fooling primality tests on smartcards
Vladimir Sedlacek, Jan Jancar, Petr Svenda
Implementation

We analyse whether the smartcards of the JavaCard platform correctly validate primality of domain parameters. The work is inspired by the paper Prime and prejudice: primality testing under adversarial conditions, where the authors analysed many open-source libraries and constructed pseudoprimes fooling the primality testing functions. However, in the case of smartcards, often there is no way to invoke the primality test directly, so we trigger it by replacing (EC)DSA and (EC)DH prime domain...

2020/728 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-06-17
Minerva: The curse of ECDSA nonces
Jan Jancar, Vladimir Sedlacek, Petr Svenda, Marek Sys
Public-key cryptography

We present our discovery of a group of side-channel vulnerabilities in implementations of the ECDSA signature algorithm in a widely used Atmel AT90SC FIPS 140-2 certified smartcard chip and five cryptographic libraries (libgcrypt, wolfSSL, MatrixSSL, SunEC/OpenJDK/Oracle JDK, Crypto++). Vulnerable implementations leak the bit-length of the scalar used in scalar multiplication via timing. Using leaked bit-length, we mount a lattice attack on a 256-bit curve, after observing enough signing...

2020/049 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-01-17
ISA Extensions for Finite Field Arithmetic - Accelerating Kyber and NewHope on RISC-V
Erdem Alkim, Hülya Evkan, Norman Lahr, Ruben Niederhagen, Richard Petri
Implementation

We present and evaluate a custom extension to the RISC-V instruction set for finite fields arithmetic. The result serves as a very compact approach to software-hardware co-design of PQC implementations in the context of small embedded processors such as smartcards. The extension provides instructions that implement finite field operations with subsequent reduction of the result. As small finite fields are used in various PQC schemes, such instructions can provide a considerable speedup for...

2018/934 (PDF) Last updated: 2018-10-02
Integrative Acceleration of First-Order Boolean Masking for Embedded IoT Devices
Yuichi Komano, Hideo Shimizu, Hideyuki Miyake
Implementation

Physical attacks, especially side-channel attacks, are threats to IoT devices which are located everywhere in the field. For these devices, the authentic functionality is important so that the IoT system becomes correct, and securing this functionality against side-channel attacks is one of our emerging issues. Toward that, Coron et al. gave an efficient arithmetic-to-Boolean mask conversion algorithm which enables us to protect cryptographic algorithms including arithmetic operations, such...

2018/868 (PDF) Last updated: 2018-09-22
S-Mbank: Secure Mobile Banking Authentication Scheme Using Signcryption, Pair Based Text Authentication, and Contactless Smartcard
Dea Saka Kurnia Putra, Mohamad Ali Sadikin, Susila Windarta
Applications

Nowadays, mobile banking becomes a popular tool which consumers can conduct financial transactions such as shopping, monitoring accounts balance, transferring funds and other payments. Consumers dependency on mobile needs, make people take a little bit more interest in mobile banking. The use of the one-time password which is sent to the user mobile phone by short message service (SMS) is a vulnerability which we want to solve with proposing a new scheme called S-Mbank. We replace the...

2017/1144 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-03-14
How Far Can We Reach? Breaking Masked AES Smartcard Implementation Using One Trace
Wei Cheng, Chao Zheng, Yuchen Cao, Yongbin Zhou, Hailong Zhang, Sylvain Guilley, Laurent Sauvage
Implementation

Rotating Sbox Masking (RSM) scheme is a highly efficient masking scheme proposed to protect cryptographic implementations from side channel attacks. It is a Low Entropy Masking Scheme and has attracted special attention for its low overhead but high performance. The two public targets of international academic competition DPA Contest v4 are both RSM-masked AES implementations, specifically, RSM-AES-256 for v4.1 and RSM-AES-128 for v4.2 respectively. The side channel security of RSM-AES-256...

2016/616 (PDF) Last updated: 2017-08-01
Statistical Fault Attacks on Nonce-Based Authenticated Encryption Schemes
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Thomas Korak, Victor Lomné, Florian Mendel
Secret-key cryptography

Since the first demonstration of fault attacks by Boneh et al. on RSA, a multitude of fault attack techniques on various cryptosystems have been proposed. Most of these techniques, like Differential Fault Analysis, Safe Error Attacks, and Collision Fault Analysis, have the requirement to process two inputs that are either identical or related, in order to generate pairs of correct/faulty ciphertexts. However, when targeting authenticated encryption schemes, this is in practice usually...

2016/586 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-06-08
A Modular Treatment of Cryptographic APIs: The Symmetric-Key Case
Thomas Shrimpton, Martijn Stam, Bogdan Warinschi

Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to cryptographic tokens like smartcards and Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) provide users with commands to manage and use cryptographic keys stored on trusted hardware. Their design is mainly guided by industrial standards without clear security promises. In this paper we propose cryptographic models for the security of such APIs. The key feature of our approach is that it enables modular analysis. Specifically, we show that a secure cryptographic...

2016/217 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-02-29
Practical backward unlinkable revocation in FIDO, German e-ID, Idemix and U-Prove
Eric R. Verheul
Applications

FIDO, German e-ID, Idemix and U-Prove constitute privacy-enhanced public-key infrastructures allowing users to authenticate in an anonymous way. This however hampers timely revocation in a privacy friendly way. From a legal perspective, revocation typically should be effective within 24 hours after user reporting. It should also be backward unlinkable, i.e. user anonymity cannot be removed after revocation. We describe a new, generic revocation mechanism based on pairing based encryption and...

2016/201 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-02-25
From Stateful Hardware to Resettable Hardware Using Symmetric Assumptions
Nico Doettling, Daniel Kraschewski, Joern Mueller-Quade, Tobias Nilges
Cryptographic protocols

Universally composable multi-party computation is impossible without setup assumptions. Motivated by the ubiquitous use of secure hardware in many real world security applications, Katz (EUROCRYPT 2007) proposed a model of tamper-proof hardware as a UC-setup assumption. An important aspect of this model is whether the hardware token is allowed to hold a state or not. Real world examples of tamper-proof hardware that can hold a state are expensive hardware security modules commonly used in...

2015/963 (PDF) Last updated: 2015-10-06
When Organized Crime Applies Academic Results - A Forensic Analysis of an In-Card Listening Device
Houda Ferradi, Rémi Géraud, David Naccache, Assia Tria
Applications

This paper describes the forensic analysis of what the authors believe to be the most sophisticated smart card fraud encountered to date. In 2010, Murdoch et al. [7] described a man-in-the-middle attack against EMV cards. [7] demonstrated the attack using a general purpose FPGA board, noting that miniaturization is mostly a mechanical challenge, and well within the expertise of criminal gangs. This indeed happened in 2011, when about 40 sophisticated card forgeries surfaced in the...

2015/500 (PDF) Last updated: 2015-05-26
Fault Cryptanalysis of CHES 2014 Symmetric Infective Countermeasure
Alberto Battistello, Christophe Giraud
Secret-key cryptography

Fault injection has become over the years one of the most dangerous threats for embedded devices such as smartcards. It is thus mandatory for any embedded system to implement efficient protections against this hazard. Among the various countermeasures suggested so far, the idea of infective computation seems fascinating, probably due to its aggressive strategy. Originally conceived to protect asymmetric cryptosystems, infective computation has been recently adapted to symmetric systems. This...

2015/063 (PDF) Last updated: 2015-01-29
CamlCrush: A PKCS\#11 Filtering Proxy
R. Benadjila, T. Calderon, M. Daubignard
Applications

PKCS\#11 is a very popular cryptographic API: it is the standard used by many Hardware Security Modules, smartcards and software cryptographic tokens. Several attacks have been uncovered against PKCS\#11 at different levels: intrinsic logical flaws, cryptographic vulnerabilities or severe compliance issues. Since affected hardware remains widespread in computer infrastructures, we propose a user-centric and pragmatic approach for secure usage of vulnerable devices. We introduce \textit{Caml...

2014/927 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-11-12
Physical functions : the common factor of side-channel and fault attacks ?
Bruno Robisson, Hélène Le Bouder
Implementation

Security is a key component for information technologies and communication. Among the security threats, a very important one is certainly due to vulnerabilities of the integrated circuits that implement cryptographic algorithms. These electronic devices (such as smartcards) could fall into the hands of malicious people and then could be sub- ject to \physical attacks". These attacks are generally classified into two categories : fault and side-channel attacks. One of the main challenges to...

2014/665 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-08-07
Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking: A Smartcard Friendly Computation Paradigm in a Code, with Builtin Protection against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks
Julien Bringer, Claude Carlet, Hervé Chabanne, Sylvain Guilley, Houssem Maghrebi
Implementation

Secure elements, such as smartcards or trusted platform modules (TPMs), must be protected against implementation-level attacks. Those include side-channel and fault injection attacks. We introduce ODSM, Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking, a new computation paradigm that achieves protection against those two kinds of attacks. A large vector space is structured as two supplementary orthogonal subspaces. One subspace (called a code $\mathcal{C}$) is used for the functional computation, while the...

2014/467 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-07-03
Ad-Hoc Secure Two-Party Computation on Mobile Devices using Hardware Tokens
Daniel Demmler, Thomas Schneider, Michael Zohner
Cryptographic protocols

Secure two-party computation allows two mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their private inputs without revealing anything but the result. An interesting target for deploying secure computation protocols are mobile devices as they contain a lot of sensitive user data. However, their resource restriction makes the deployment of secure computation protocols a challenging task. In this work, we optimize and implement the secure computation protocol by...

2014/436 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-06-12
Synthesis of Fault Attacks on Cryptographic Implementations
Gilles Barthe, Francois Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benjamin Gregoire, Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz
Implementation

Fault attacks are active attacks in which an adversary with physical access to a cryptographic device, for instance a smartcard, tampers with the execution of an algorithm to retrieve secret material. Since the seminal Bellcore attack on RSA signatures, there has been extensive work to discover new fault attacks against cryptographic schemes, and to develop countermeasures against such attacks. Originally focused on high-level algorithmic descriptions, these works increasingly focus on...

2014/348 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-05-19
A Simple Cast-as-Intended E-Voting Protocol by Using Secure Smart Cards
Helger Lipmaa
Applications

We propose a simple cast-as-intended remote e-voting protocol where the security is based on the use of secure (and trusted) smart cards that incorporate incard numeric keyboards and LCD displays, and can perform a limited number of cryptographic operations (like encryption, signing, and random number generation). The protocol, while very simple, is significantly more secure (in the sense of ``cast-as-intended'') and convenient to use than the e-voting protocol currently used in Norway. The...

2014/303 Last updated: 2014-05-26
On the security of Xu et al.'s authentication and key agreement scheme for telecare medicine information systems
SK Hafizul Islam

In 2014, Xu et al. proposed a two-factor mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for telecare medicine information system (TIMS) based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). However, it has been shown that Xu et al.'s scheme is not suitable for practical use as it is many problems. As a remedy, an improved scheme is proposed with better security and functionality attributes.

2013/554 (PDF) Last updated: 2015-06-21
Formally Proved Security of Assembly Code Against Power Analysis: A Case Study on Balanced Logic
Pablo Rauzy, Sylvain Guilley, Zakaria Najm
Implementation

In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during the computation) were not modeled. This failure is caused by formal methods' focus on models rather than implementations. In this paper we present formal methods and tools for designing protected code and proving its security against power analysis. These...

2012/417 (PDF) Last updated: 2012-08-01
Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware
Romain Bardou, Riccardo Focardi, Yusuke Kawamoto, Lorenzo Simionato, Graham Steel, Joe-Kai Tsay
Implementation

We show how to exploit the encrypted key import functions of a variety of different cryptographic devices to reveal the imported key. The attacks are padding oracle attacks, where error messages resulting from incorrectly padded plaintexts are used as a side channel. In the asymmetric encryption case, we modify and improve Bleichenbacher's attack on RSA PKCS#1v1.5 padding, giving new cryptanalysis that allows us to carry out the `million message attack' in a mean of 49 000 and median of 14...

2012/298 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-05-22
Anonymous Credentials Light
Foteini Baldimtsi, Anna Lysyanskaya

We define and propose an efficient and provably secure construction of blind signatures with attributes. Prior notions of blind signatures did not yield themselves to the construction of anonymous credential systems, not even if we drop the unlinkability requirement of anonymous credentials. Our new notion in contrast is a convenient building block for anonymous credential systems. The construction we propose is efficient: it requires just a few exponentiations in a prime-order group in...

2010/496 (PDF) Last updated: 2010-09-27
Efficient Attributes for Anonymous Credentials (Extended Version)
Jan Camenisch, Thomas Groß
Public-key cryptography

We extend the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya anonymous credential system such that selective disclosure of attributes becomes highly efficient. The resulting system significantly improves upon existing approaches, which suffer from a linear complexity in the total number of attributes. This limitation makes them unfit for many practical applications, such as electronic identity cards. Our system can incorporate an large number of binary and finite-set attributes without significant performance...

2010/276 (PDF) Last updated: 2010-06-17
Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs
Kimmo Järvinen, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Thomas Schneider

The power of side-channel leakage attacks on cryptographic implementations is evident. Today's practical defenses are typically attack-specific countermeasures against certain classes of side-channel attacks. The demand for a more general solution has given rise to the recent theoretical research that aims to build provably leakage-resilient cryptography. This direction is, however, very new and still largely lacks practitioners' evaluation with regard to both efficiency and practical...

2010/194 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2010-04-09
Identity-Based Online/Offline Key Encapsulation and Encryption
Sherman S. M. Chow, Joseph K. Liu, Jianying Zhou
Public-key cryptography

An identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE) scheme splits the encryption process into two phases. The first phase performs most of the heavy computations, such as modular exponentiation or pairing over points on elliptic curve. The knowledge of the plaintext or the receiver's identity is not required until the second phase, where the ciphertext is produced by only light computations, such as integer addition/multiplication or hashing. This division of computations makes encryption...

2010/169 (PDF) Last updated: 2010-06-30
Dismantling SecureMemory, CryptoMemory and CryptoRF
Flavio D. Garcia, Peter van Rossum, Roel Verdult, Ronny Wichers Schreur

The Atmel chip families SecureMemory, CryptoMemory, and CryptoRF use a proprietary stream cipher to guarantee authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity. This paper describes the cipher in detail and points out several weaknesses. One is the fact that the three components of the cipher operate largely independently; another is that the intermediate output generated by two of those components is strongly correlated with the generated keystream. For SecureMemory, a single eavesdropped trace...

2009/422 (PDF) Last updated: 2009-09-21
Attacks on {RFID}-Based Electronic Voting Systems
Yossef Oren, Avishai Wool

Many secure systems, such as contactless credit cards and secure entrance systems, are built with contactless smart-card RFID technologies. In many cases these systems are claimed to be secure based on the assumption that readers and tags need to be in close proximity (about 5cm) in order to communicate. However, it is known that this proximity assumption is false: Relay attacks are a class of hardware-based attacks which compromise the safety of such systems by dramatically extending the...

2009/322 (PDF) Last updated: 2010-05-13
Certifying Assembly with Formal Cryptographic Proofs: the Case of BBS
Reynald Affeldt, David Nowak, Kiyoshi Yamada
Foundations

With today's dissemination of embedded systems manipulating sensitive data, it has become important to equip low-level programs with strong security guarantees. Unfortunately, security proofs as done by cryptographers are about algorithms, not about concrete implementations running on hardware. In this paper, we show how to extend security proofs to guarantee the security of assembly implementations of cryptographic primitives. Our approach is based on a framework in the Coq proof-assistant...

2009/036 (PDF) Last updated: 2009-03-08
Constructions of Truly Practical Secure Protocols using Standard Smartcards
Carmit Hazay, Yehuda Lindell
Cryptographic protocols

In this paper we show that using standard smartcards it is possible to construct truly practical secure protocols for a variety of tasks. Our protocols achieve full \emph{simulation-based security} in the presence of \emph{malicious adversaries}, and can be run on very large inputs. We present protocols for secure set intersection, oblivious database search and more. We have also implemented our set intersection protocol in order to show that it is truly practical: on sets of size 30,000...

2008/100 (PDF) Last updated: 2008-03-10
Accelerating the Scalar Multiplication on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems over Prime Fields
Patrick Longa
Public-key cryptography

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), independently introduced by Koblitz and Miller in the 80's, has attracted increasing attention in recent years due to its shorter key length requirement in comparison with other public-key cryptosystems such as RSA. Shorter key length means reduced power consumption and computing effort, and less storage requirement, factors that are fundamental in ubiquitous portable devices such as PDAs, cellphones, smartcards, and many others. To that end, a lot of...

2007/390 (PDF) Last updated: 2008-10-31
Implementing Cryptographic Pairings over Barreto-Naehrig Curves
Augusto Jun Devegili, Michael Scott, Ricardo Dahab
Implementation

In this paper we describe an efficient implementation of the Tate and Ate pairings using Barreto-Naehrig pairing-friendly curves, on both a standard 32-bit PC and on a 32-bit smartcard. First we introduce a sub-family of such curves with a particularly simple representation. Next we consider the issues that arise in the efficient implementation of field arithmetic in $\F_{p^{12}}$, which is crucial to good performance. Various optimisations are suggested, including a novel approach to the...

2007/134 (PDF) Last updated: 2007-04-18
Estimation of keys stored in CMOS cryptographic device after baking by using the charge shift
Osman Kocar
Applications

The threshold voltage VT of EEPROM cells is a very important technological parameter for storing data and keys in a cryptographic device like smartcards. Furthermore, main objective of this paper is to check whether it is possible to get the key stored in the EEPROM cell through measuring the current consumption of the cryptographic device during read key command for encryption before and after baking at a certain temperature. This stress (baking) of the charge in the floating gate of the...

2006/270 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-08-15
Formal Analysis and Systematic Construction of Two-factor Authentication Scheme
Guomin Yang, Duncan S. Wong, Huaxiong Wang, Xiaotie Deng
Cryptographic protocols

One of the most commonly used two-factor authentication mechanisms is based on smart card and user's password. Throughout the years, there have been many schemes proposed, but most of them have already been found flawed due to the lack of formal security analysis. On the cryptanalysis of this type of schemes, in this paper, we further review two recently proposed schemes and show that their security claims are invalid. To address the current issue, we propose a new and simplified property...

2006/192 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-06-20
DPA attacks on keys stored in CMOS cryptographic devices through the influence of the leakage behavior
Osman Kocar

Abstract: This paper describes the influences of the threshold voltage VT on the leakage behavior of the dice after a fabrication process. By measuring the current consumption (leakage) on a CMOS cryptographic device like smartcard security controller and using the DPA analysis it is possible to make the key visible which is used during a cryptographic operation. Therefore, in this paper not only the security risks by using the smartcard security controller will be shown where no DPA attacks...

2006/144 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-05-04
Implementing Cryptographic Pairings on Smartcards
Michael Scott, Neil Costigan, Wesam Abdulwahab
Implementation

Pairings on elliptic curves are fast coming of age as cryptographic primitives for deployment in new security applications, particularly in the context of implementations of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). In this paper we describe the implementation of various pairings on a contemporary 32-bit smart-card, the Philips Hi{P}er{S}mart\texttrademark , an instantiation of the MIPS-32 based Smart{MIPS}\texttrademark architecture. Three types of pairing are considered, first the standard Tate...

2006/052 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2006-02-14
Software mitigations to hedge AES against cache-based software side channel vulnerabilities
Ernie Brickell, Gary Graunke, Michael Neve, Jean-Pierre Seifert
Implementation

Hardware side channel vulnerabilities have been studied for many years in embedded silicon-security arena including SmartCards, SetTop-boxes, etc. However, because various recent security activities have goals of improving the software isolation properties of PC platforms, software side channels have become a subject of interest. Recent publications discussed cache-based software side channel vulnerabilities of AES and RSA. Thus, following the classical approach --- a new side channel...

2005/150 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2005-05-26
Secure Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairing
Benoit Chevallier-Mames, Jean-Sebastien Coron, Noel McCullagh, David Naccache, Michael Scott
Cryptographic protocols

In this paper we describe a simple protocol for securely delegating elliptic-curve pairings. A computationally limited device (typically a smart-card) will delegate the computation of the pairing e(A,B) to a more powerful device (for example a PC), in such a way that: 1. the powerful device learns nothing about the points being paired (A and B), nor about the pairing’s result e(A,B), 2. and the limited device is able to detect when the powerful device is cheating. We also describe more...

2005/052 (PDF) Last updated: 2005-02-25
Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless Smartcard Systems
Ziv Kfir, Avishai Wool
Applications

A contactless smartcard is a smartcard that can communicate with other devices without any physical connection, using Radio-Frequency Identifier (RFID) technology. Contactless smartcards are becoming increasingly popular, with applications like credit-cards, national-ID, passports, physical access. The security of such applications is clearly critical. A key feature of RFID-based systems is their very short range: typical systems are designed to operate at a range of ~10cm. In this study we...

2005/029 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2005-09-02
A model and architecture for pseudo-random generation with applications to /dev/random
Boaz Barak, Shai Halevi

We present a formal model and a simple architecture for robust pseudorandom generation that ensures resilience in the face of an observer with partial knowledge/control of the generator's entropy source. Our model and architecture have the following properties: 1 Resilience: The generator's output looks random to an observer with no knowledge of the internal state. This holds even if that observer has complete control over data that is used to refresh the internal state. 2 Forward...

2004/197 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2004-08-12
SPA-based attack against the modular reduction within a partially secured RSA-CRT implementation
Helmut Kahl
Implementation

This note describes an SPA-based side channel attack against a CRT implementation of an RSA function. In contrast with Novak’s attack [8], it concentrates on the initial modular reduction. With the help of lattice reduction it applies even to implementations which use a common randomising technique to ensure resistance against certain side channel attacks.

2003/160 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2004-01-03
A More Secure and Efficacious TTS Signature Scheme
Jiun-Ming Chen, Bo-Yin Yang
Public-key cryptography

In 2002 the new genre of digital signature scheme TTS (Tame Transformation Signatures) is introduced along with a sample scheme TTS/2. TTS is from the family of multivariate cryptographic schemes to which the NESSIE primitive {SFLASH} also belongs. It is a realization of Moh's theory for digital signatures, based on Tame Transformations or Tame Maps. Properties of multivariate cryptosystems are determined mainly by their central maps. TTS uses Tame Maps as their central portion for even...

2003/013 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2003-01-22
Security Constraints on the Oswald-Aigner Exponentiation Algorithm
Colin D. Walter
Public-key cryptography

In smartcard encryption and signature applications, randomized algorithms can be used to increase tamper resistance against attacks based on averaging data-dependent power or EMR variations. Recently, Oswald and Aigner described such an algorithm suitable for point multiplication in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). With the assumption that an attacker can identify additions and doublings and distinguish them from each other during a single point multiplication, it is shown that the...

2003/010 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-01-16
Differential Fault Analysis on A.E.S.
P. Dusart, G. Letourneux, O. Vivolo
Secret-key cryptography

We explain how a differential fault analysis (DFA) works on AES 128, 192 or 256 bits.

2003/008 (PS) Last updated: 2003-05-14
DFA on AES
Christophe Giraud

In this paper we describe two different DFA attacks on the AES. The first one uses a fault model that induces a fault on only one bit of an intermediate result, hence allowing us to obtain the key by using 50 faulty ciphertexts for an AES-128. The second attack uses a more realistic fault model: we assume that we may induce a fault on a whole byte. For an AES-128, this second attack provides the key by using less than 250 faulty ciphertexts. Moreover, this attack has been successfully put...

2002/075 (PDF) Last updated: 2002-06-16
Fault based cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard
J. Blöemer, J. -P. Seifert
Secret-key cryptography

In this paper we describe several fault attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). First, using optical fault induction attacks as recently publicly presented by Skorobogatov and Anderson \cite{SA}, we present an implementation independent fault attack on AES. This attack is able to determine the complete $128$-bit secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smartcard by generating $128$ faulty cipher texts. Second, we present several implementation-dependent fault attacks on AES. These...

2002/073 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2002-06-07
Fault attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures
C. Aumüller, P. Bier, P. Hofreiter, W. Fischer, J. -P. Seifert
Implementation

This article describes concrete results and practically approved countermeasures concerning differential fault attacks on RSA using the CRT. It especially investigates smartcards with a RSA coprocessor where any hardware countermeasure to defeat such fault attacks have been switched off. This scenario has been chosen in order to completely analyze the resulting effects and errors occurring inside the hardware. Using the results of this kind of physical stress attack enables the development...

2000/015 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2001-09-20
Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks
Mihir Bellare, Marc Fischlin, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali
Cryptographic protocols

We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.

1997/013 (PS) Last updated: 1997-10-06
Visual Authentication and Identification
Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas.

The problems of authentication and identification have received wide interest in cryptographic research. However, there has been no satisfactory solution for the problem of authentication by a human recipient who does not use any trusted computational device. The problem of authentication arises for example in the context of smartcard--human interaction, in particular in the context of electronic wallets. The problem of identification is ubiquitous in communication over insecure...

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.