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ORCID15th ACM-EC 2014: Stanford, CA, USA
- Moshe Babaioff, Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014. ACM 2014, ISBN 978-1-4503-2565-3
Keynote address
- Matthew O. Jackson
:
Centrality, gossip, and diffusion of information in networks. 1
Session 1
- Nicolas S. Lambert, Michael Ostrovsky, Mikhail Panov:
Strategic trading in informationally complex environments. 3-4 - Peter I. Frazier, David Kempe, Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg:
Incentivizing exploration. 5-22 - Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling. 23-36 - Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms. 37-38
Session 2a
- Wei Chen, Di He, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin, Yixin Tao, Liwei Wang:
Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match. 39-56 - Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. 57-74 - Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key, David Kurokawa:
Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. 75-92 - Tri-Dung Nguyen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions. 93-110
Session 2b
- Matt V. Leduc:
A dynamic network game for the adoption of new technologies. 111 - Travis Martin, Grant Schoenebeck, Michael P. Wellman:
Characterizing strategic cascades on networks. 113-130 - MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, David L. Malec:
The polarizing effect of network influences. 131-148 - Siddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel, Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy:
Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in research. 149-166
Session 3a
- Gagan Goel, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme:
Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints. 167-184 - Paul Milgrom, Ilya Segal:
Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation. 185-186 - Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden:
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions. 187-204
Session 3b
- Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal:
Individual security and network design. 205-206 - Pavel Hubácek, Sunoo Park:
Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profit. 207-208 - Abraham Othman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein:
The complexity of fairness through equilibrium. 209-226
Session 4a
- Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus. 227-240 - Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Modularity and greed in double auctions. 241-258 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias:
Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions. 259-276 - Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu, Anna R. Karlin:
Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings. 277-294
Session 4b
- Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren:
Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach. 295-312 - Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
A local-dominance theory of voting equilibria. 313-330 - Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt:
Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. 331-332 - Sébastien Lahaie, Nisarg Shah:
Neutrality and geometry of mean voting. 333-350
Session 5a
- Itai Ashlagi, Peng Shi:
Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach. 351-352 - Guillaume Haeringer, Vincent Iehlé:
Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences. 353 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, Shayan Oveis Gharan:
Dynamic matching market design. 355 - John Joseph Horton:
Misdirected search effort in a matching market: causes, consequences and a partial solution. 357
Session 5b
- Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems. 359-376 - Yiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Removing arbitrage from wagering mechanisms. 377-394 - Jacob D. Abernethy, Sindhu Kutty, Sébastien Lahaie, Rahul Sami:
Information aggregation in exponential family markets. 395-412 - Jacob D. Abernethy, Rafael M. Frongillo, Xiaolong Li, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
A general volume-parameterized market making framework. 413-430
Session 6a
- Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert W. Irving, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information. 431-448 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski:
Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists. 449 - Nick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari, Yash Kanoria:
Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets. 451 - Piotr Krysta, David F. Manlove, Baharak Rastegari, Jinshan Zhang:
Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem. 453-470
Session 6b
- Daniel G. Goldstein, Randolph Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri:
The wisdom of smaller, smarter crowds. 471-488 - Euijin Choo, Ting Yu, Min Chi, Yan Sun:
Revealing and incorporating implicit communities to improve recommender systems. 489-506 - Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen, Ryan Prescott Adams:
Trick or treat: putting peer prediction to the test. 507-524 - Bo Cowgill, Eric Zitzewitz:
Corporate prediction markets: evidence from google, ford, and firm X. 525
Session 7a
- Frank P. Kelly, Peter B. Key, Neil S. Walton:
Incentivized optimal advert assignment via utility decomposition. 527 - Eric J. Friedman, Ali Ghodsi, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machines. 529-546 - Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren:
Time-inconsistent planning: a computational problem in behavioral economics. 547-564
Session 7b
- Zhan Shi, Gene Moo Lee, Andrew B. Whinston:
Towards a better measure of business proximity: topic modeling for analyzing M As. 565 - Thomas Blake, Dominic Coey:
Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: the role of test-control interference. 567-582 - Pavel Metrikov, Fernando Diaz, Sébastien Lahaie, Justin Rao:
Whole page optimization: how page elements interact with the position auction. 583-600
Session 8a
- Avinatan Hassidim, Yishay Mansour, Shai Vardi:
Local computation mechanism design. 601-616 - Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Reallocation mechanisms. 617 - Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu:
Knightian self uncertainty in the vcg mechanism for unrestricted combinatorial auctions. 619-620
Session 8b
- Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Extensive-form game abstraction with bounds. 621-638 - Paul W. Goldberg, Aaron Roth:
Bounds for the query complexity of approximate equilibria. 639-656 - John Fearnley, Rahul Savani:
Finding approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games via payoff queries. 657-674
Session 9
- Ariel D. Procaccia, Junxing Wang:
Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares. 675-692 - Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart:
Price of anarchy for auction revenue. 693-710 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
Mechanism design for data science. 711-712
Session 10a
- Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Sherwin Doroudi, Amy R. Ward, Adam Wierman:
Routing and staffing when servers are strategic. 713-714 - MohammadHossein Bateni, Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Sam Chiu-wai Wong:
Multiplicative bidding in online advertising. 715-732 - Kostas Bimpikis, Shayan Ehsani, Rahmi Ilkiliç:
Cournot competition in networked markets. 733
Session 10b
- Eli A. Meirom, Shie Mannor, Ariel Orda:
Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure. 735-752 - Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz:
Simple approximate equilibria in large games. 753-770 - Ryan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth:
Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games. 771-782
Session 11a
- Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme:
On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism. 783-800 - John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, Scott Duke Kominers:
Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalence. 801 - Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm:
Optimal impartial selection. 803-820
Session 11b
- Winter A. Mason, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts:
Long-run learning in games of cooperation. 821-838 - Chen Hajaj, David Sarne:
Strategic information platforms: selective disclosure and the price of "free". 839-856 - James R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Level-0 meta-models for predicting human behavior in games. 857-874
Keynote address by Kevin Leyton-Brown
- Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Pragmatic algorithmic game theory. 875-876
Session 12a
- Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Éva Tardos:
Mechanism with unique learnable equilibria. 877-894 - Yang Cai, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity. 895-910 - Moshe Babaioff, Eyal Winter:
Contract complexity. 911 - Arpita Ghosh, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal contest design for simple agents. 913-930
Session 12b
- Arpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett, Aaron Roth, Grant Schoenebeck:
Buying private data without verification. 931-948 - Kevin He, Xiaosheng Mu:
Differentially private and incentive compatible recommendation system for the adoption of network goods. 949-966 - Mihaela van der Schaar, Simpson Zhang:
A dynamic model of certification and reputation. 967-968 - Rachel Cummings, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman:
The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice. 969
Session 13
- Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Peysakhovich:
Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem. 971-986 - Christopher P. Chambers, Nicolas S. Lambert:
Dynamically eliciting unobservable information. 987-988 - Shipra Agrawal, Nikhil R. Devanur:
Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks. 989-1006
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