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ORCID17th ACM-EC 2016: Maastricht, The Netherlands
- Vincent Conitzer, Dirk Bergemann, Yiling Chen:
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '16, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24-28, 2016. ACM 2016, ISBN 978-1-4503-3936-0
Session 1a
- Tim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers:
Ironing in the Dark. 1-18 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
A/B Testing of Auctions. 19-20 - Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
, Anna R. Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias:
The FedEx Problem. 21-22 - Robert D. Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner, E. Glen Weyl:
Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search. 23-24
Session 1b
- John P. Dickerson, David F. Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm, James Trimble:
Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange. 25-42 - Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li:
The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries. 43-60 - Ravi Jagadeesan:
Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor Market. 61-62 - Jan Christoph Schlegel:
Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms. 63
Best Paper and Best Dissertation Award Presentations
- Piotr Dworczak:
Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains. 65-66 - Ya'akov (Kobi) Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick:
Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All? 67-84
Session 2a
- Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer:
The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs. 85-102 - Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang:
Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items. 103-120 - Kyle Woodward:
Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information. 121 - Marek Pycia, Kyle Woodward:
Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods. 123
Session 2b
- Yossi Azar, Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour:
When Should an Expert Make a Prediction? 125-142 - Rachel Cummings, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets. 143-160 - Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, Sivaraman Balakrishnan:
Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming. 161-178 - Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes:
Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction. 179-196
Session 3a
- Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang:
Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information. 197-211 - Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah:
Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees. 213-214 - Ian A. Kash, Rafael M. Frongillo:
Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations. 215-232 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christos Tzamos:
Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue? 233-250 - Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner:
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements. 251-267
Session 3b
- Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb:
On Voting and Facility Location. 269-286 - Ashish Goel, David Timothy Lee:
Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads. 287-303 - Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang:
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. 305-322 - Ioannis Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be? 323-340 - Antoine Désir, Vineet Goyal, Danny Segev:
Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations Model. 341-342
Session 4a
- Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Manish Raghavan:
Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias. 343-360 - Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis:
Procrastination with Variable Present Bias. 361 - Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Mohamed Mostagir:
A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding. 363 - Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Tselekounis:
Blockchain Mining Games. 365-382
Session 4b
- Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. 383-400 - Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi:
Lottery Pricing Equilibria. 401-418 - Nathaniel Kell, Debmalya Panigrahi:
Online Budgeted Allocation with General Budgets. 419-436 - Yajun Wang, Sam Chiu-wai Wong:
Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover. 437-454
EC Plenary Talk and Kalai Prize Talk
- M. Keith Chen:
Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform. 455 - Tim Roughgarden:
Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy: Abstract of the Kalai Prize Talk. 457
Session 5a
- Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games. 459-476 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games. 477 - Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun-Ko, Chaitanya Swamy:
Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games. 479-496 - Haifeng Xu:
The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design. 497-514
Session 5b
- Quinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen, Haijun Zhu:
The Seasonality Of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field Test. 515-530 - Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko, Steven Tadelis:
Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay. 531-545 - Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich, David G. Rand:
The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types. 547-559 - Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao, Georgios Zervas:
Understanding Emerging Threats to Online Advertising. 561-578
Session 6a
- Shuchi Chawla, J. Benjamin Miller:
Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation. 579-596 - Hamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh, Umar Syed:
Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning Algorithms. 597-598 - Shipra Agrawal, Vashist Avadhanula, Vineet Goyal, Assaf Zeevi:
A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment Selection. 599-600 - Tim Roughgarden, Joshua R. Wang:
Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves. 601-616
Session 6b
- Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu:
General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations. 617-634 - Mehrdad Moharrami, Vijay G. Subramanian, Mingyan Liu, Marc Lelarge:
Impact of Community Structure on Cascades. 635-636 - Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. 637-654 - Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal, David E. N. Minarsch:
Dynamic Conflict on a Network. 655-656
Session 7a
- Maxime C. Cohen, Georgia Perakis, Robert S. Pindyck:
Pricing with Limited Knowledge of Demand. 657 - Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth:
The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models. 659 - Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games. 661 - Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe, Ruixin Qiang:
Persuasion with Limited Communication. 663-680
Session 7b
- Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman:
Computational Extensive-Form Games. 681-698 - Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer:
Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets. 699 - Ozan Candogan, Markos Epitropou, Rakesh V. Vohra:
Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach. 701-702 - Ioannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras:
Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction. 703-720
Session 8a
- Frank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem Amin, Michael P. Wellman:
Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks. 721-738 - Grant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook, Fang-Yi Yu:
Sybil Detection Using Latent Network Structure. 739-756 - Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract. 757 - Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston:
Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract]. 759
Session 8b
- Thayer Morrill:
Petty Envy When Assigning Objects. 761 - Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer:
"Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-proof Environment. 763-764 - Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets. 765 - Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad:
What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design. 767-768
Session 9a
- Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms. 769 - Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos, Manolis Zampetakis:
Mechanism Design with Selective Verification. 771-788 - Joosung Lee:
Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms. 789-790
Session 9b
- Richard Cole, Yixin Tao:
Large Market Games with Near Optimal Efficiency. 791-808 - Jacob D. Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie, Matus Telgarsky:
Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. 809 - Yiwei Chen, Vivek F. Farias:
On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers. 811
Session 10a
- Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. 813 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment. 815 - Maxime C. Cohen, Ilan Lobel, Renato Paes Leme:
Feature-based Dynamic Pricing. 817
Session 10b
- MohammadHossein Bateni, Yiwei Chen, Dragos Florin Ciocan, Vahab S. Mirrokni:
Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace. 819 - Nathan Kallus, Madeleine Udell:
Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment Choices. 821-837 - Vittorio Bilò, Cosimo Vinci:
Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games. 839-856
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