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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 73
Volume 73, Number 1, September 2011
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu
, Elena Molis:
Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms. 1-16 - Elliot Anshelevich, F. Bruce Shepherd, Gordon T. Wilfong:
Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements. 17-38 - Murat Atlamaz, Caroline Berden, Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen:
Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems. 39-51 - Omer Biran, Françoise Forges:
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values. 52-64 - Daniel Cardona, Clara Ponsati:
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules. 65-75 - Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv, Thomas R. Palfrey:
Network architecture, salience and coordination. 76-90 - David J. Cooper, Mari Rege:
Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty. 91-110 - Jon X. Eguia:
Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation. 111-135 - Francesco Feri, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, Giovanni Ponti, Fernando Vega-Redondo:
Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game. 136-146 - Sotiris Georganas:
English auctions with resale: An experimental study. 147-166 - Antonio Guarino, Heike Harmgart, Steffen Huck:
Aggregate information cascades. 167-185 - Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz:
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. 186-199 - Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Timothy C. Salmon:
The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice. 200-214 - Willemien Kets, Garud Iyengar, Rajiv Sethi, Samuel Bowles:
Inequality and network structure. 215-226 - Akira Okada:
Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application. 227-235 - Maher Said:
Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers. 236-243 - Marta Serra-Garcia, Eric van Damme, Jan Potters:
Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness. 244-261 - Sebastian van Strien, Colin Sparrow:
Fictitious play in 3x3 games: Chaos and dithering behaviour. 262-286
- Yves Guéron, Thibaut Lamadon, Caroline D. Thomas:
On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors. 287-295 - Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti, Justin Leroux:
Choosing and sharing. 296-300
Volume 73, Number 2, November 2011
- Yaron Azrieli, Dan Levin:
Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions. 301-309 - Yaron Azrieli, Roee Teper:
Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information. 310-317 - Parimal Kanti Bag, Bibhas Saha:
Match-fixing under competitive odds. 318-344 - Salvador Barberà, Bernardo Moreno:
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result. 345-359 - Antonio Cabrales, Roberto Serrano:
Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms. 360-374 - Gorkem Celik, Michael Peters:
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism. 375-387 - Stefano Comino, Fabio M. Manenti, Antonio Nicolò:
Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations. 388-401 - Thomas de Haan, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof:
Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment. 402-428 - Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa:
Overconfidence and moral hazard. 429-451 - Abraham Diskin, Moshe Koppel, Dov Samet:
Generalized Raiffa solutions. 452-458 - Martin Dufwenberg, Simon Gächter, Heike Hennig-Schmidt:
The framing of games and the psychology of play. 459-478 - Gadi Fibich, Nir Gavish:
Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions. 479-495 - Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Fabio Michelucci:
Second best efficiency and the English auction. 496-506 - Harold Houba, Quan Wen:
Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences. 507-516 - Gerhard Jäger, Lars P. Metzger, Frank Riedel:
Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals. 517-537 - Stephanie Lau:
Investment incentives in bilateral trading. 538-552 - F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels:
Assignment markets with the same core. 553-563 - Dmitry Ryvkin:
The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups. 564-572 - Randolph Sloof, Joep Sonnemans:
The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment. 573-594 - Alexander Wolitzky:
Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts. 595-607
- Pak Hung Au, Keiichi Kawai:
Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales. 608-614 - Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko:
Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom. 615-621
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