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ORCIDItai Ashlagi
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2020 – today
- 2024
[j27]Süleyman Kerimov
, Itai Ashlagi, Itai Gurvich:
Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret. Manag. Sci. 70(5): 2799-2822 (2024)- [i18]Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov, Omer Tamuz:
The Power of Two in Token Systems. CoRR abs/2405.12414 (2024) - 2023
- [j26]Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah:
Sequential Mechanisms with Ex Post Individual Rationality. Oper. Res. 71(1): 245-258 (2023) - [j25]Wanyi Dai Li, Itai Ashlagi, Irene Lo:
Simple and Approximately Optimal Contracts for Payment for Ecosystem Services. Manag. Sci. 69(12): 7821-7837 (2023) - [j24]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi, Chris Sholley:
Edge-Weighted Online Windowed Matching. Math. Oper. Res. 48(2): 999-1016 (2023) - [c39]Amel Awadelkarim, Arjun Seshadri, Itai Ashlagi, Irene Lo, Johan Ugander:
Rank-heterogeneous Preference Models for School Choice. KDD 2023: 47-56 - [c38]Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi:
Interviewing Matching in Random Markets. EC 2023: 65 - [c37]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Geng Zhao:
Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets. EC 2023: 122 - [i17]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Geng Zhao:
Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets. CoRR abs/2302.08599 (2023) - 2022
- [j23]Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, Kirankumar Shiragur:
Technical Note - Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets. Oper. Res. 70(5): 2784-2803 (2022) - [c36]Süleyman Kerimov, Itai Ashlagi, Itai Gurvich:
On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching. EC 2022: 61 - [c35]Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Irene Lo, Juliette Love, Katherine Mentzer, Lulabel Ruiz-Setz, Henry O'Connell:
Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District. EC 2022: 290-291 - 2021
- [j22]Itai Ashlagi, Alvin E. Roth:
Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective. Manag. Sci. 67(9): 5455-5478 (2021) - [c34]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi, Clayton Thomas, Geng Zhao:
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity. ITCS 2021: 46:1-46:16 - [c33]Jamie Kang, Faidra Monachou, Moran Koren, Itai Ashlagi:
Counterbalancing Learning and Strategic Incentives in Allocation Markets. NeurIPS 2021: 11184-11195 - [c32]Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Georgia Monachou, Afshin Nikzad:
Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design. EC 2021: 101-102 - [c31]Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi:
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. EC 2021: 134-135 - [i16]Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi:
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. CoRR abs/2106.01019 (2021) - [i15]Jamie Kang, Faidra Georgia Monachou, Moran Koren, Itai Ashlagi:
Counterbalancing Learning and Strategic Incentives in Allocation Markets. CoRR abs/2110.14865 (2021) - 2020
- [j21]Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli:
Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints. Oper. Res. 68(2): 467-479 (2020) - [j20]Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad:
What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design. J. Econ. Theory 190: 105120 (2020) - [j19]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, Peng Shi:
Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations. Manag. Sci. 66(5): 2163-2193 (2020) - [c30]Itai Ashlagi, Jacob D. Leshno, Pengyu Qian, Amin Saberi:
Queue Lengths as Constantly Adapting Prices: Allocative Efficiency Under Random Dynamics. EC 2020: 317-318 - [c29]Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, Kirankumar Shiragur:
Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets. WINE 2020: 475 - [i14]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Clayton Thomas, Geng Zhao:
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity. CoRR abs/2009.05124 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j18]Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Assaf Romm:
Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules. Games Econ. Behav. 115: 167-187 (2019) - [j17]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets. Oper. Res. 67(4): 927-949 (2019) - [c28]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi, Chris Sholley:
Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching. EC 2019: 729-742 - [c27]Faidra Georgia Monachou, Itai Ashlagi:
Discrimination in Online Markets: Effects of Social Bias on Learning from Reviews and Policy Design. NeurIPS 2019: 2142-2152 - [c26]Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli:
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints. SODA 2019: 229-240 - [c25]Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov:
Scrip Systems with Minimal Availability. WINE 2019: 335 - [i13]Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, Kirankumar Shiragur:
Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets. CoRR abs/1907.04485 (2019) - 2018
- [j16]Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski:
Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof. J. Econ. Theory 177: 405-425 (2018) - [i12]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi:
Maximizing Efficiency in Dynamic Matching Markets. CoRR abs/1803.01285 (2018) - [i11]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi, Chris Sholley:
Maximum Weight Online Matching with Deadlines. CoRR abs/1808.03526 (2018) - [i10]Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli:
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints. CoRR abs/1810.04331 (2018) - 2017
- [j15]Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Yash Kanoria:
Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange. Oper. Res. 65(6): 1446-1459 (2017) - [c24]Itai Ashlagi, Yossi Azar, Moses Charikar, Ashish Chiplunkar, Ofir Geri, Haim Kaplan, Rahul Makhijani, Yuyi Wang, Roger Wattenhofer:
Min-Cost Bipartite Perfect Matching with Delays. APPROX-RANDOM 2017: 1:1-1:20 - [c23]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, Peng Shi:
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets. EC 2017: 263 - 2016
- [j14]Itai Ashlagi, Peng Shi:
Optimal Allocation Without Money: An Engineering Approach. Manag. Sci. 62(4): 1078-1097 (2016) - [c22]Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah:
Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees. EC 2016: 213-214 - [c21]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets. EC 2016: 765 - [c20]Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad:
What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design. EC 2016: 767-768 - [i9]Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah:
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees. CoRR abs/1603.07229 (2016) - [i8]Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets. CoRR abs/1606.03626 (2016) - 2015
- [j13]Itai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange. Games Econ. Behav. 91: 284-296 (2015) - [j12]Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael Rees, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver:
Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted. Interfaces 45(1): 26-42 (2015) - [c19]Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Assaf Romm:
Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison. EC 2015: 755-756 - [c18]Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Yash Kanoria:
A dynamic model of barter exchange. SODA 2015: 1925-1933 - [i7]Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski:
Dating Strategies Are Not Obvious. CoRR abs/1511.00452 (2015) - 2014
- [j11]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim:
Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities. Oper. Res. 62(4): 713-732 (2014) - [j10]Itai Ashlagi, Peng Shi:
Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation. Oper. Res. 62(6): 1247-1264 (2014) - [c17]Itai Ashlagi, Peng Shi:
Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach. EC 2014: 351-352 - 2013
- [c16]Itai Ashlagi, Brendan Lucier, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Equilibria of Online Scheduling Algorithms. AAAI 2013: 67-73 - [c15]Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools. EC 2013: 25-26 - [c14]Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno:
Unbalanced random matching markets. EC 2013: 27-28 - [i6]Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous Pools. CoRR abs/1301.3509 (2013) - 2012
- [j9]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37(2): 244-258 (2012) - [j8]Itai Ashlagi, Emin Karagözoglu, Bettina Klaus:
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems. Math. Soc. Sci. 63(3): 228-233 (2012) - [j7]Itai Ashlagi, Shigehiro Serizawa:
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity. Soc. Choice Welf. 38(3): 531-542 (2012) - [j6]Itai Ashlagi, Flip Klijn:
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests. Soc. Choice Welf. 39(1): 23-33 (2012) - [i5]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Robust Learning Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1206.6826 (2012) - [i4]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation. CoRR abs/1207.1362 (2012) - 2011
- [j5]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Simultaneous Ad Auctions. Math. Oper. Res. 36(1): 1-13 (2011) - [c13]Itai Ashlagi, Alvin E. Roth:
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. EC 2011: 321-322 - [c12]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim:
Matching with couples revisited. EC 2011: 335-336 - 2010
- [c11]Itai Ashlagi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
Competing Schedulers. AAAI 2010: 691-696 - [c10]Itai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and match. EC 2010: 305-314 - [i3]Itai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and Match. CoRR abs/1006.1881 (2010) - [i2]Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim:
Matching with Couples Revisited. CoRR abs/1011.2121 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j4]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players. Artif. Intell. 173(15): 1441-1455 (2009) - [j3]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 2-21 (2009) - [j2]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exch. 8(1) (2009) - [c9]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC 2009: 169-176 - 2008
- [j1]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 33: 575-613 (2008) - [c8]Itai Ashlagi, Piotr Krysta, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Social Context Games. WINE 2008: 675-683 - 2007
- [c7]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games. AAAI 2007: 18-23 - [c6]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Routing games with an unknown set of active players. AAMAS 2007: 195 - [c5]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions. EC 2007: 279-287 - [c4]Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation. WINE 2007: 564-569 - 2006
- [c3]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Resource selection games with unknown number of players. AAMAS 2006: 819-825 - [c2]Itai Ashlagi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Dov Monderer:
Robust Learning Equilibrium. UAI 2006 - 2005
- [c1]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation. UAI 2005: 34-41 - [i1]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games. Computing and Markets 2005
Coauthor Index
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