Hermann Neubacher and Austrian Anschluss Movement 1918-40 PDF
Hermann Neubacher and Austrian Anschluss Movement 1918-40 PDF
Hermann Neubacher and Austrian Anschluss Movement 1918-40 PDF
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Hermann
and
Neubacher
Anschluss
Movement,
HARRY
THE
the
Austrian
1918-40
R. RITTER
a dream
the final chapter in the history ofthe idea ofGrossdeutschland,
ofthe most
born in 1848 and shared after 1867 by German-Austrians
and political opinions.
varied cultural backgrounds
Support for Ger?
the collapse ofthe Habsburg Monarchy
man union intensified following
in 1918, but was frustrated by the restrictions placed upon union by the
After 1919 sympathy for An?
treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain.1
schluss transcended party lines in the infant Austrian republic, and grew
rapidly than within Germany itself. For many members of the
"front generation,,,
young men who had served in the Habsburg army
of defeat with special intensity, the cause
and who felt the humiliation
more
force. Nowhere
became a life-shaping
trated than in the career of Hermann Neubacher.
of Anschluss
illus?
is best known
Neubacher
in the Balkans
during
in interwar
participant
skillful public
fashioned
is this better
World
speaker,
a successful career in Vienna
mayor
of Vienna.
and propagandist,
the An?
following
The Anschluss theme
Harry
R. Ritter
ties together
development
Neubacher
349
his early life a study
in the
town
the Akademischer
a nationalist
fraternity,
gymnastics
estry and joined
Turnverein. During the war he served in Italy, was cited four times for
bravery, and earned the rank of Oberleutnant. After the war he com?
pleted his studies, receiving the degree ofDoktor der Bodenkultur in 1920.3
the dictated peace settle?
Neubacher
Like most Austrians,
opposed
for the former Habsburg Slavs,
ment, which honored self-determination
and ItaHans, but denied it to the Germans. He soon became
Rumanians,
of Anschluss for Austria, a region which, he later
proponent
wrote, "we love as a Heimat, but never wanted as a state."4 Anschluss,
was a goal which all parties could support, a
he idealistically
believed,
the ideological
tensions dividing his homereconcile
cause which could
an ardent
land.
the "greater
German"
development,"
evitable.5 These beliefs became
devotion
to Anschluss
the foundation
for Neubacher's
steadfast
in the following
years.
Austrian independence,
Neubacher
was neutral
Although
neither attacking it nor strongly exerting himself
toward republicanism,
was a lost
in its defense. On one issue his position was clear: monarchism
to the
were subordinate
cause. Beyond
this, constitutional
questions
he opposed
of union
problem
on the assumption
was widely
undermine
mentarianism
by extremists.
3. Private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug. 20,1972; Caroline Neu?
bacher to the author, Vienna, Nov. 6, 1971; Die Presse (Vienna), July 3, 1960, p. 9.
4. Der Anschluss: Mitteilungen des Osterreichisch-DeutschenVolksbundes(Vienna), Sept.
21, 1929, p. 2.
5. Ibid., Nov. 15, 1927, p. 1.
Neubacher
350
Anschluss
Movement
In 1920 Neubacher
met two men who were to play important roles
in Austrian politics. In that year he married the daughter of Wilhelm
Loschnig, a minor Lower Austrian official and member ofthe Christian
Social Party. Through his wife's family, Neubacher met the future Aus?
trian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was a former student and close
friend of Herr Loschnig. In the following
years Dollfuss was a frequent
in
Neubacher
the
household
and
the two men became close
guest
acquaintances,
to differences
although
never
genuine friends.6
the church. Dollfuss,
regarding
the priesthood,
championed
political Catholicism,
shared the anticlericalism
while not doctrinaire,
manism.
Neubacher,
Pan-Ger-
A second,
young
chance
Vienna
between
developed
and children often
as officers
Between
spent summer
their temperaments,
although
had an outgoing personality and was a persuaone another: Neubacher
sive speaker and conversationalist;
was quiet, cautious,
Seyss-Inquart
in
his
with
others.
and reserved
Both shared the conviction
that
dealings
and Germany should unite.7
after the war Neubacher,
Dollfuss, and Seyss-Inquart joined a
secret nationalist fraternity called the Deutsche Gemeinschaft. The history
Austria
Soon
is known
to have included
Field Marshal
and Alfons
Karl Bardolff,
and the
Dopsch,
an
goals ofthe organization,
anti-Semitism
and the "red scare" of
ephemeral product of middle-class
the early twenties, included the cultivation
of "folk consciousness,"
the
of
for
Marxism
and
and
conquest
Ungeradetum (a euphemism
Jewry),
Anschluss. As fear of communism
diminished and economic
conditions
the organization
declined and finally died in 1930. Both
and
Dollfuss
Seyss-Inquart
played leading roles in the Deutsche Gemein-
improved,
Harry
R. Ritter
351
but Neubacher
was not an active
schaft during the middle twenties,
a link with fellow veterans and a place to
member.
The club provided
discuss the problem of German unity, but Neubacher
soon became skeptical of achieving
Anschluss via conspiratorial
tactics and conceived
a
more ambitious plan: the creation ofa nonpartisan
Anschluss organiza?
tion which embraced all the major parties, including
Social Democracy,
a sworn
mitted
social
revolution
tional
with
Germany,
in central
Europe. Unable
its leaders nevertheless
government,
of Vienna,
municipality
social
albeit
to form
controlled
an enduring
until 1934
na?
the
reform
Neubacher
Schutz-
servative
and nationalist
circles. Actually,
despite
Vienna
in some
close personal
gov?
con?
and pro-
352
Neubacher
Anschluss
Movement
fessional
enezer Howard's
of this undermined
was recognized
mocracy realize its plans for Vienna. Thus, Neubacher was able to combine middle-class
nationalism
and a cordial association with socialism,
a fact
of immeasurable
importance
as an Anschluss
propagandist.
In 1925 Neubacher
of two
played a leading role in the formation
in
related
Anschluss
the
Austro-German
Vienna,
closely
organizations
Action Society (Osterreichisch-Deutscher Arbeitsgemeinschaft) and the Aus?
tro-German
Volksbund). Both
People's League (Osterreichisch-Deutscher
as
offshoots
a Berlin organi?
ofthe
Deutsch-Osterreicher
Volksbund,
began
zation led by Paul Lobe, the Social Democratic
president ofthe German
Reichstag. Lobe's group had originally been established in late 1918 to
union on the basis of national self-determina?
lobby for Austro-German
tion. It never attained real numerical power, however,
and did not seek
to extend its influence to Austria until 1925, when Lobe gave his blessand other Viennese organizers.12
ing to Neubacher
Ofthe
two Viennese
groups
May 3,1925. It was composed
specialists (420 in 1930) who
the Action
R. Ritter
Harry
353
as a
People's League, founded on June 4, 1925, and conceived
mass
which
did
"not
discriminate
between
organization"
"nonpartisan
German
or religion,
friends and ene?
only between
ideology,
party affiliation,
was the architect ofthe People's League
mies o? Anschluss."14 Neubacher
an office he held until 1935. His program,
and became its president,
modeled
ofthe
one million
Berlin
group,
smaller, academically
members he hoped
was designed
oriented Action
to comple-
Society: by
world opinion
a plebiscite on the ques?
to influence
to sanction
tion of German
For a decade,
Neubacher's
name
was virtually
with the
synonymous
and
the
chief
organizer
speaker
which were its primary means of
People's League.
of numerous
public
influencing
opinion.
review
called
press
demonstrations,
In addition, he edited
a monthly
(later bimonthly)
Der Anschluss, which appeared between
1927 and
had
a
of
and
circulation
thousand.
The
national
about
1933
eight
peak
in
his
ofthe
was
even
located
Gesiba
office
People's League
headquarters
on the Wahringerstrasse
in Vienna. As a respected public figure with
in all the ideological
was able to fashion
connections
camps, Neubacher
the People's League into a meeting ground of sorts for Austria's warring
included representatives
of all parties ex?
factions; its original executive
and the Nazis. Among
the names that stand out
cept the Communists
of
the
Vienna
Paul Speiser and Bene?
are
those
councilman
city
today
professors Han Eibl (Chris?
(Grossdeutsch), Ernst Molden, an editor
of the liberal Neue Freie Presse, and Gustav Stolper, whose journal Der
osterreichische Volkswirt was one of the most influential
voices for Andikt Kautsky (Social Democrats),
tian Social) and Wilhelm
Bauer
university
Neubacher
354
schluss. Neubacher's
friend
Movement
Anschluss
Seyss-Inquart
was
treasurer
of the orga?
nization.16
for the loosely structured People's League was, however,
distributed among the ideological
unevenly
camps. Its strongest pillar,
at least prior to 1933, was Viennese
Until Hitler
Social Democracy.
Support
in Germany,
the Socialist Party and its affiliated trade
actively supported Anschluss, and the People's League enjoyed
their official endorsement.
Many leading Socialists spoke and wrote in
behalf ofthe organization,
among them Deutsch, Breitner, Otto Bauer,
came
to power
unions
contributed
Vienna's Socialist government
Moreover,
work.17 At
to
its
thousand
often
schillings
average
support
that the
Socialist influence was so conspicuous
demonstrations
early
anti-Marxist
zation
denounced
the organi?
were
Socialist movement
Less important
than the large, disciplined
nationalist parties such as the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei and the Landbund.
had close ties with these groups through nationalist societies
such as the Deutsche Klub, the gymnastics
fraternities, and the Deutsche
he was most at home in the nationalist
Gemeinschaft. By inclination
Neubacher
anti-Semitism,
camp, although he did not share the rigid anti-Marxism,
or Los von Rom fanaticism associated with its extremist wing. Many
roles in the People's League but, in
nationalist leaders played prominent
to
the long run, the nationalist parties were too weak and fragmented
contribute
financial
significantly
terms.
to the organization,
either
in numerical
or in
bacher's efforts, but influential traditionalists within the party feared the
of merger with the predominantly
Protestant and heavily
consequences
socialist German Republic. This faction broadcast its views in the Reichs16. Osterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund in Wien, Was will derOsterreichisch-Deutscher
Volksbund?(Vienna, 1926).
17. N. von Preradovich, Die Wilhelmstrasseund AnschlussOsterreichs1918-1933 (Bern,
1971), P- 183.
18. The Christian Social Reichspost,for example, reported the presence of uniformed
Schutzbundmembers at ceremonies honoring a visit by Paul Lobe to Vienna in 1925, and
wondered if, by "Anschluss," the People's League meant union with Germany or Soviet
Russia. ZAS, vol. 1: Reichspost(Vienna), Aug. 30 and 31, 1925.
Harry
R. Ritter
most
post, which was one of Neubacher's
the party?Seipel
and later Dollfuss?were
355
severe
critics.
ambivalent
The leaders
about
of
Anschluss
and reserved
the financial
backing
was partially offset by secret contributions
from Ger?
Between
and
both
the
and
the
Action
1925
1932
many.
People's League
Society received, usually via Lobe, substantial assistance from the Ger?
man ministries of interior and foreign affairs. The Reich ministry of in?
This weakness
for example,
allocated some
for
ple's League
"Deutschtumspflege"
however,
cally curtailed in 1931-32,
central Europe.20
terior,
fifteen
thousand
marks
to the Peo?
Anschluss
the
channels.21 Throughout
diplomacy
through international
he
Neu?
continued
to
of
Yet
force as self-defeating.
1930s
oppose the use
bacher embodied
within himself much ofthe ambivalence
characteris?
tic of interwar
on Anschluss reveal a
Austria, and his pronouncements
in his approach to the problem.
On the one
contradiction
hand, he appealed to reason, depicting German union as part of an irresistible global trend toward larger, more efficient geopolitical
units. On
fundamental
Neubacher
356
Anschluss
Movement
occasion, he even argued that Anschluss could serve as a model for other
states to follow toward the goal of European unity. As a propagandist,
however, his real effectiveness lay in the emotional appeal of his speeches
of French and
and editorials, which were replete with denunciations
and stressed that Anschluss was the necessary product
Czech diplomacy
unique history which bound Austria and Germany in a "commu?
nity of destiny."22 Thus, despite his essentially moderate approach to
rhetoric always
the Anschluss question, it cannot be said that Neubacher's
ofa
nourished
Between
strations,
tion with the Schubert
unity
and travelers
on the enthu?
Austrians
optimistically
interpreted the growth of
Writing in 1930, Neubacher
as a sign of "successful settlement
of the [Anschluss]
his organization
and "hard-won
issue within greater Germany"
abroad of
recognition
of
the urgency of European economic
which
Austro-Gerintegration,
22. Ibid., Aug. 15, 1928, p. 2; Neue Freie Presse,July 20, 1928 (morning ed.), p. 6.
23. Der Anschluss,Nov. 12, 1928, p. 1; Dec. 15, 1928, p. 1; Jan. 26, 1929, p. 1.
24. Der Anschluss,Apr. 27, 1929, p. 1; Nov. 29, 1930, p. 1.
25. Preradovich, Der nationale Gedanke,p. 21; cf. Suval, The AnschlussQuestion, pp.
43-44-
Harry
R. Ritter
357
German
press. Although
clippings from French and east European news?
are
hostile. The Italian press is
numerous,
they are generally
papers
of clippings
and the paucity
from English and
sparsely represented,
American newspapers
testifies to the meager and partially negative im?
pact of Anschluss propaganda
of the People's
importance
achievement
on Anglo-American
The real
opinion.27
League, it would
appear, lies less in the
revision
of
goal?the
foreign opinion?than
of its primary
in the fact that it helped prepare Austria for an overly optimistic
reception ofthe customs union proposals of 1931.
The creation of an Austro-German
customs union, one of Neubacher's
was widely
discussed in the 1920s as an alternative
to
key demands,
French proposals for a "Danubian
federation"
of Habsburg
succession
on the
states, and in 1930 Vienna and Berlin secretly began negotiations
intensified his
noticeably
the
support
possible legal restric?
of 1922, which required Austria to
tions?such
as the Geneva Protocols
which might compromise
avoid economic
its independence
agreements
maintained
?Neubacher
that "there are no international
legal obstacles
question.
At about
for an economic
to the customs
Neubacher
358
Anschluss
Movement
its propaganda,
lectures and rallies in
sponsoring
every part of Austria.
On May 11, two months after the customs union debate began, the
intensified
League
world
viable. For
Austria was economically
independent
Anschluss had always been a question of survival; the failure
Neubacher,
ofthe Creditanstalt, coming precisely at the time ofthe customs union
maintained?that
to his decision
a member
ofthe
reformed
executive
ofthe
Creditanstalt.30
In March, Neubacher
published a pamphlet which revealed the ex?
tent of his personal bitterness and reflected a shift in his thinking about
Anschluss.
Entitled
cise in geopolitics
ural relationship"
Der Kampf um Mitteleuropa,31 the tract was an exerwhich purported to offer statistical proof ofthe "nat?
between Germany, Austria, and the other Habsburg
nounced
well, condemning
the failure ofthe
of Nations"
would
the League
was a senseless
soon fossilize
Anger
contradiction
that it
and die.
and frustration
by the desperate
ef-
Harry
forts of the Austrian
R. Ritter
to stabilize
359
the country's
economy.
secured an
1932, immediately
Austria in turn
loan of 300 million schillings, committing
Neubacher
this
to the Protocol
of Lausanne.
interpreted
agreement,
who
Dollfuss,
international
became
government
chancellor
which
experiments
prohibited
of international
an instrument
in May
in Austro-German
blackmail.
appeal to "self-help"
was
bacher
shifting from the
two months later,
movement;
rumored
efforts ofthe
praised
National
Socialist Party and the
of
the
Heimwehr move?
Styrian Heimatschutz,
right-wing
ment distinguished
by its support for German union, to draft a common
Such statements
also presaged the decline of
for
Anschluss.34
program
an offshoot
Heimatschutz.
360
Neubacher
Anschluss
Movement
was well
the Heimatschutz
Because
Party.
the activities of the NSDAP
had followed
Neubacher
program,
that he regarded Na?
for some time;38 there is no indication, however,
tional Socialism seriously before 1931. The Austrian Nazi Party, with
only a few thousand members in the late 1920s, was not even repre?
Nazi
German
leaders ofthe
Henceforth
of the Austrian
Neubacher
was intimately
involved
Nazi movement.39
36. Der Anschluss,Aug. 15, 1927, p. 1; Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2; Oct. 31, 1929, p. 1.
37. In light of Neubacher's remarks of May 11, 1938, in which he emphasized the
importance ofthe LausanneProtocol (July 1932) in reshaping his attitudes, it seems likely
that he joined the Heimatschutzin the summer or autumn of 1932. Seyss-Inquart testifled
at Nuremberg that he (Seyss) joined the organization in the autumn. ASW, NeubacherBlaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938; IMT, 16: 81.
38. U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression,10 vols. (Washington, D.C, 1946-48) (hereafter NCA), 2: 958, SeyssInquart to Himmler, Aug. 19, 1939, doc. 3271-PS.
39. ZAS, vol. 118: DerPanther (Graz), Apr. 29,1933; Rosar, DeutscheGemeinschaft,pp.
59-60. Neubacher did not officially receive a party number until May 1938. On relations
between the Styrian Heimatschutzand the NSDAP see Bruce Frederick Pauley, HahnenNationalsozialismus
schwanz und Hakenkreuz: SteirischerHeimatschutzund osterreichischer
1918-1934 (Vienna, 1972).
Harry
R. Ritter
361
As president
of the People's
of the
conscious
Neubacher,
League,
need to appeal to the widest possible audience, had never precisely deform which Anschluss should assume. As a parfined the constitutional
it became clear that his idea of
however,
ticipant in the Nazi movement,
was based on the idea of "home rule." Im?
Austrian self-determination
himself with the opponents
of Theo Habicht,
he identified
mediately
Hitler had named "Landesinspekteur"
for
the German citizen whom
in 1931. The leader of this opposition
faction was Anton Reinthaller, who broke with Habicht in the spring of 1933 over the issue of
of the Anschluss
favored a negotiated
settlement
terrorism. Reinthaller
to one of his followers,
stood for a synthesis of
question and, according
and the "greater national idea," hoping
Austrian "state consciousness"
to transform
into a national front composed
of the Panthe NSDAP
Austria
It is a mark ofthe
iden?
fluidity of Austrian politics that Neubacher's
with an attempt by Doll?
tification with Reinthaller's
group coincided
contacts with the
fuss to draw him into the government.
Neubacher's
made
Socialists, the Heimatschutz, and the moderate wing ofthe NSDAP
him a potentially
valuable ally for the government,
especially in Vienna,
In April
where he was associated with the popular housing program.
Dollfuss
offered
Neubacher
the
of
of state
1933
undersecretary
position
for labor. The chancellor's
of
the
Laupolicies, however?negotiation
in March
and subsequently
his suspension of parliament
a
men.
breach
between
the
two
Neubacher
refused
1933?had
opened
declared himself a member of
the post and at the same time, publicly
the national opposition.41
sanne Protocol,
This
attempts
National
walked
nearly
incident
was
one
of well-documented
of
with representatives
by Dollfuss to reach an understanding
For over a year he
Socialism
and the Anschluss movement.
a diplomatic
tightrope,
as much as the Austrian
of Mussolini
fearing the "protection"
Nazis and domination
by Berlin. Al?
Habicht were fruitless and led to the ban-
Dollfuss
kept
the back
door
open
to
362
Neubacher
Reinthaller's
Anschluss
Movement
other than
opposition,
hoping to find someone
to negotiate.
In the late spring of 1934, shortly
before he was murdered, Dollfuss entertained a proposal, sponsored by
to circumvent
Habicht and deal with the higher leadership
Neubacher,
in Berlin.42
ofthe NSDAP
Habicht
national
with
whom
Neubacher's
he discussed with Dollfuss in late May
strategy?which
or early June43?was
to
designed
capitalize on tensions within the Aus?
and to take advantage of recent international
trian Nazi movement
de?
Like
almost
of
Austrian
the
NSDAP
suf?
life,
every aspect
velopments.
fered from acute factionalism;
divided by a struggle between
since mid-1933
the movement
had been
Habicht (supported by a small SS organi?
zation) and the SA, led in Austria by Hermann Reschny. As early as
November
1933, Ernst Rohm, chief ofthe SA, began to take a personal
the civil war in Feb?
interest in the rivalry, which intensified following
contacts at the German embassy, Neubacher
ruary 1934.44 Through
knew that Habicht's credit in Berlin had begun to decline after February
and that, in deference to Mussolini, Hitler was adopting a more flexible
Austrian policy, based on a gradual settlement ofthe Anschluss question.
At the same
promising,
time, prospects
since the Austrian
for an agreement
with Dollfuss seemed
chancellor was himself involved in a des-
Rohm's
R. Ritter
Harry
363
released
events
that Neubacher's
the putsch?and
welcome
among
close
ties with
the SA?which
to Habicht
even
would
had he wanted
to become
in?
volved.
The putsch altered the situation in Austria. Hitler,
ciate himself from the affair, made it clear that?for
was to be no direct contact
in Austria.47
between
the Reich
anxious
to disasso-
the present?there
and the Nazi movement
be a new chance
north,
July
circumstances
before
25.
45. DGFP, 3: 47, Habicht to Hiiffer, June 18,1934, doc. 17; cf. Gehl, Austria, Germany
and the Anschlsss, p. 94; Ross, Hitler und Dollfuss, p. 299.
46. Otto Wachter and Rudolf Weydenhammer, two ofthe leading conspirators, later
wrote accounts ofthe putsch. Neither mentioned Neubacher in connection with the plot,
although Weydenhammer stated that he talked briefly with Neubacher in the vicinity of
the Ballhausplatz on the afternoon of July 25, while members ofthe SS Standarte89 were
occupying the chancellery. Rudolf Weydenhammer, "Bericht iiber die Erhebung der
Nationalsozialisten am 25. Juli 1934 in Wien," NSDAP Hauptarchiv, The Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, reel 33, folder 634, frames 2i2ff. (written
shortly after the Anschlussin 1938); Auerbach, "Eine nationalsozialistische Stimme," pp.
204-5; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft,pp. 74-75.
47. According to Hitler's deputy, Hess, "The Austrian NSDAP must decide where and
in what form they will build a new party by themselves.17DGFP, 3: 352-53, Hess to
Frauenfeld, Aug. 21, 1934, doc. 173.
Neubacher
364
Anschluss
Movement
formed
the Heimwehr
Reinthaller
of the government.
Under these circumstances
with the
a fresh effort to reach an accommodation
members
launched
faction.
hidden
thaller Action,"
between
which
Schuschnigg,
culminated
Starhemberg,
in an unsuccessful
and a delegation
forced Reinthaller
October
meeting
of the national
to renounce his
(including Neubacher),49
opposition
who assumed the task
claim to party leadership in favor of Neubacher,
of keeping the moderate position alive. A struggle for leadership ofthe
party ensued, the national opposition grouping itself around Neubacher,
the older members rallying behind Joseph Leopold, a senior party mem?
Austria. Leopold consistently opposed the evolutionary
and their successor, SeyssNeubacher,
by Reinthaller,
strategy
Inquart; reluctant to adapt his own ideas to the shifting policies of Ber?
lin, he ultimately became a black sheep in the party and was ordered out
ber from Lower
favored
of Austria by Hitler shortly before the Anschluss in 1938. He was a forand proved stronger than Neubacher,
nonetheless,
opponent,
who was handicapped
by his lack of seniority, his past association with
midable
48. NA, report by Prinz zu Erbach, "Bisherige Ergebnislosigkeit der Verstandigungsaktion Reinthaller," Oct. 18, 1934, T-77 (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW)
/900/5653797-805; NCA, 2: 962-63, Seyss-Inquart, "The Austrian Question, 19341938," Sept. 9, 1945, doc. 3254-PS; DGFP, 3: 334, memorandum by Huffer, Aug. 20,
1934, doc. 166.
49. NA, report by Prinz zu Erbach, Oct. 18, 1934, T-77/900/5653797-805; Ernst
Rudiger Starhemberg, Memoiren(Vienna, 1971), pp. 209-14. Secondary accounts ofthe
failure ofthe Reinthaller action are plentiful. See Gehl, Austria,Germanyandthe Anschluss,
p. 105.
Harry
R. Ritter
365
Austrian Marxism,
and his former connections
with the SA leadership
and the Styrian Heimatschutz.50 The struggle, which lasted well into the
spring of 1935, soon attracted a wider audience. As early as January 1935,
was the new Nazi leader, and
the press reported rumors that Neubacher
had been leaked by his enemies as a way
surmised that the information
of eliminating
him. In May a Vienna
chief ofthe illegal Nazis and Neubacher
as
named Leopold
newspaper
as the "grey eminence"
ofthe
to periods of imprisonment.52
cal activity and sentenced
This arrest ended Neubacher's
political activity in Austria for a period
he was released after the Austro-German
of three years. Although
agree?
an amnesty for political pris?
ment of July 11, 1936 (which included
oners),
Neubacher
position
moderate
with
renounced
his claim
I. G. Farben in Berlin.
movement
was renewed
in
and Leopold
(also released
but
Neubacher
was
not
involved.
Be?
the
1936 amnesty),
directly
by
tween January 1937 and March 1938 he worked for Farben as a specialaffairs of Austria and southeastern
ist in the economic
Europe and traveled widely in the Balkans, where he gained experience
which qualithe form
War II. He
for diplomatic
posts in the area during World
in
the
to
Anschluss
in 193 8.53
no
role
events
immediately
leading
played
in the Anschluss move?
involvement
The final chapter in Neubacher's
fied him
mayor of Vi?
began on March 13, 1938, when he was appointed
The
enna under Austria's new chancellor,
Seyss-Inquart.
appointment
with Social Democracy
was tactical; Neubacher's
and
past association
ment
its popular housing program made him one of the few figures in Nazi
circles qualified to exploit working-class
hostility toward the Schusch50. IMT, 34: 1-11, speech by Rainer, Mar. 11, 1942, doc. 4005-PS; IMT, 26: 349-51,
report by Rainer, July 6, 1939, doc. 812-PS. The struggle was complicated by a rivalry
between "old fighters" ofthe NSDAP and men who had entered the movement via the
Heimatschutz,who were never completely accepted.
51. ZAS, vol. 118: Telegraf am Mittag (Vienna), Jan. 15, 1935, and Der Osterreicher
(Vienna), May 3, 1935.
52. IMT, 34: 1-11, speech by Rainer, Mar. 11, 1942, doc. 4405-PS; IMT, 26: 349-51,
report by Rainer, July 6, 1939, doc. 812-PS; Langoth, Kampf um Osterreich,p. 202.
53. NMT, 7:1397-98, extracts from the minutes of Farben's Commercial Committee,
Mar. 23,1938, doc. 9289-NI; private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug.
20, 1972; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft,p. 264.
366
Neubacher
Anschluss
Movement
nigg regime and to prepare the city for the plebiscite of April 10 on the
question of union. To this end he revived the idea that the NSDAP was
a social revolutionary
party, pledging the Vienna workers a "socialism
ofthe deed" and promising an end to unemployment
by the end ofthe
year.54
Immediately,
vists dismissed
Neubacher
from
and, in numerous
bund members,
basing his appeal
Nazis had waged a revolutionary
Socialists
the clerical
and
dictator?
struggle against
he
Socialism as an alternative to capitalism,
National
ship. Depicting
of
Nazi
eco?
as
essential
rationalization
and
aspects
emphasized
planning
nomic policy. 55 On March 31 he unveiled plans for a housing program
modeled on that ofthe Social Democrats,
and public housing became a
major theme of his speeches for several months. During the summer he
proposals for public works in Vienna to create
and
employment
prepare Vienna for a new role as the Third Reich's
gateway to southeastern
Europe.56
also outlined
ambitious
since, next to
sincerity in these matters is indisputable
reform. Inihis
been
concern
had
Anschluss,
municipal
always
major
in
he
to
seems
have
been
successful
tially,
fairly
rallying support for the
in April the Times correspondent
NSDAP;
reported that "Of all the
Neubacher's
54- ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/1, Apr. 25, 1938. An illustrated booklet, Die
nationalsozialistischeRevolutionin Wien: Bildberichtiiberdie Wiener Ereignissevom 11 Marz
bis 10 April 1938 (Vienna, 1938), conveys the spirit ofthe propaganda campaign; Neu?
bacher wrote the introduction.
55. Wiener Zeitung, Apr. 1, 1938, p. 4, and Apr. 8, 1938, p. 7; ASW, NeubacherBlaschke, no. 18/7, Oct. 10, 1938.
56. WienerZeitung, Apr. 1, 1938, p. 10; Neue Freie Presse,Aug. 1, 1938 (Monday ed.),
p. 3; FrankfurterZeitung, Dec. 9, 1938 (Reich ed.), Southeast Europe supplement, p. 9;
ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 12/6, July 16, 1938. Friedrich Heer, Der Glaube des
Adolf Hitler: AnatomieeinerpolitischenReligiositdt(Munich, 1968), p. 416, describes Neu?
bacher's interest in southeastern Europe as representative ofa "k.-k.-6sterreichisch-ostmarkischer Nationalsozialismus."
57. The Times (London), Apr. 2, 1938, p. 11.
Harry
R. Ritter
367
as criti?
58
in Aus?
order,"
self with
pushed
to the
entirely.
Neu?
gaden,
bacher
suffered
a similar
the new
to pre?
"bol?
the municipal
government,
tive."60 As the year wore
diminish,
of Vienna; Neubacher
remained in
but only as Biirckel's
"general representa?
on and Neubacher's
continued
to
authority
and "Reichstatthalter"
it became
opportunity
presented itself he accepted
nomic advisor to the German embassy
the Oil-Arms
negotiate
Agreement
a member of the Viennese government
Neubacher
368
Anschluss
Movement
the Nazi
whole
mirrors
the difficulties
which
beset interwar
Austria.
Political
life in the
first republic
In retrospect
Austrians
ideological
persuasion (or lack thereof) the majority of Austrians simply
refused to accept the idea that they were no longer the ruling nationality
ofa great empire, that they were no longer a "historic people." No one
expressed this feeling more clearly than Ignaz Seipel, twice chancellor of
the republic, when he called the Austrians a "big-state people" with a
mission yet to perform in the world.63 In the minds of most Austrians,
mission would be fiilfilled within the context of some
that ill-defined
form
of union
with
Germany.
in Vienna?Hermann
For many people?particularly
the
Neubacher,
in
the
a
career
became
late
of
bureaucrat,
1920s
symbol
impartial
oppo?
untenable situation. His Austro-German
sition to Austria's seemingly
People's League, more effectively
lated popular resentment
toward
which
forced
far below
Austria
her historical
to "accommodate
and national
herself
level"
to artificial
and transformed
boundaries
her into a
6i. NA, Neubacher to Wiehl, Apr. 17,1940, T-120/1170/471746; ASW, NeubacherBlaschke, no. 119, Mar. 9, 1940.
62. Der Anschluss,May 16, 1929, p. 1.
63. Sweet, "Seipel's Views," p. 323.
64. Der Anschluss, Oct. 31, 1929, p. 2.
Harry
R. Ritter
369
the greatness she had once enjoyed as the heart ofa cosof 1931-32 destroyed
empire. The decisions and agreements
mopolitan
Socialism in Ger?
the work he had begun, and the triumphs of National
ture for Austria
him with
confronted
leaders ofthe
a critical
"national
choice.
Like many of
Neubacher
was
opposition,"
opposed the use of force and favored
solutions to problems; but his uncompromis"legal" (i.e., bureaucratic)
will
for
Anschluss
made
him a potential ally of radicalism and, in the
ing
himself
at
he
the
end,
disposal of ultranationalism.65
placed
Neubacher
had always supported Anschluss in the name of self-deter?
a moderate
by temperament
mination,
Austrian
and he continued
autonomy
Third Reich. These
would
who
that
to do so after 1933 in the expectation
of the
within the framework
be honored
were illusory
cited as evidence ofthe
regularly
ers in Austria.
Such charges
of "Anschluss"
meaning
firmly established
prior to
the
1938, either in Austria or in Berlin. Under the circumstances,
idea that Austria might enjoy special status within a greater Germany
did not necessarily
seem in valid; indeed, it appears that only after his
enthusiastic reception in Linz on March 12 did the Fiihrer himself decide
precise
March
was never
their
they
" . . . Und