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War
Post-war Europe was deeply affected by both the Cold War and European
integration. All too often the two processes have been studied entirely sepa-
rately, however. This edited volume therefore brings together contributions from
prominent historians in both of these fields. What emerges is the way in which
the East–West conflict and the emergence of organised cooperation in Europe
did become entangled with one another, despite the attempts of some govern-
ments deliberately to avoid any interplay between the two.
The period covered is one of major change in Western Europe involving both
de Gaulle’s rebellion against the structures of Atlantic and European cooperation
and Brandt’s radical new Ostpolitik. It was also a time when the British debate
about how to define their world role involved calculations about both their
approach to NATO and the EEC. From 1969 onward these changes had also to
be carried out against the backdrop of the American foreign policy of Nixon and
Kissinger.
This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics and
history, and International Relations in general.
In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of
the established truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of
the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt
to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the devel-
opment of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on publishing
expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly available
sources.
Notes on contributors ix
Acknowledgements x
List of abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
PIERS LUDLOW
Conclusions 174
PIERS LUDLOW
Bibliography 180
Index 190
Contributors
European integration and the Cold War have both played a significant role in
shaping the evolution of Europe since the Second World War. Each, in their
own different ways, did much to divide Europe and to unify it. The integration
process has from the outset drawn a sharp dividing line between those countries
which chose to participate in the ‘building of Europe’ and those which did not. It
also created strong bonds, economic, political and institutional, between the six,
then nine, ten, 12, 15 and now 27 countries which have been involved. Likewise
the Cold War underlined not merely the sharp distinction between Eastern and
Western Europe, between the communist and free worlds, but also a less clear-
cut but still important fracture between those European countries which
belonged to one bloc or the other and those neutrals which remained detached
from the East–West conflict. The Cold War too had a strong unifying effect,
establishing lasting ties between the countries of each Cold War alliance and
making much more solid and enduring the interconnections between Western
Europe and the undisputed leader of the Western world, the United States. Both
processes, moreover, were born, or at least institutionalised, in the same crucial
five years immediately following the end of the Second World War. In addition,
both were profoundly marked by many of the political heavyweights of the post-
war period. Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de
Gaulle, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles or John F.
Kennedy feature prominently in most accounts of both the integration of Europe
and the development of Western Europe during the Cold War.
Surprisingly, however, the history of each has tended to be studied and told
with next to no reference to the other. Much has thus been written about
Western Europe and the early Cold War,1 and an almost equal amount of ink has
been spilled in attempts to analyse the origins and early development of the
European integration process.2 But these two historiographies have tended to
develop in parallel with few obvious points of intersection. Cold War historians
have thus focused their attention on a narrative which stretches from the estab-
lishment of the blocs in the 1940s, through the high tension and confrontation of
the 1950s and early 1960s, the détente of the later 1960s and 1970s, the ‘second
Cold War’ of the early 1980s and the final collapse of the Cold War system
and of the Soviet bloc in 1989 to 1990. Historians of European integration
2 P. Ludlow
meanwhile have refined a story in which the frustrated hopes of those aspiring to
European unity in the 1940s were partially realised in the early 1950s, hard hit
by the collapse of the putative European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954,
dramatically revived in 1955 with the Messina Conference and the start of the
negotiations which were to lead to the creation of the European Economic
Community (EEC), consolidated by the Community’s early success, depressed
by the stagnation of the process during the 1970s and early 1980s, and revived
once more by the renewed surge forward of the integration process in the mid-
to late 1980s. These twin tales, moreover, have been expounded, debated and
critiqued in different journals and at different conferences.3 And they have been
introduced to students in simplified form in separate textbooks designed for
separate university courses.4
There are admittedly some partial exceptions to this rule. The most obvious,
perhaps, is constituted by some of the writing on the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Analysts of the Marshall Plan, for instance, have been able to point out that the
European Recovery Programme was not simply a Cold War milestone and a
crucial step towards the formation of a solidly Western US-led bloc, but also a
policy initiative intended by its creators to foster European unity and to encour-
age the economic integration of Western Europe.5 Likewise, studies of the EDC
have seldom been able to ignore its Cold War origins – it was born in response
to the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased urgency which this gave to
the issue of whether or not West Germany should be allowed to rearm – or to
overlook the enormous energy with which the United States championed the
project as both a crucial step towards strengthening Western Europe’s defences
against the Soviet threat and as major advance in the direction of that European
unity for which the US had called since 1947.6 Revealingly, however, both of
these examples of Cold War and integration cross-over are normally regarded as
failures. Thus most European historians, at least, would view the Marshall Plan
as a major economic success and as vital in establishing the Western bloc, but as
something of a flop as far as European unity is concerned. US attempts to force
the recipients of Marshall Aid to submit a single pan-European wish-list rather
than multiple national requests or to accept the appointment of a heavyweight
secretary general of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), able to bang heads together and oblige the different countries to coop-
erate, were systematically thwarted by European resistance.7 Over time the Mar-
shall Plan thus did more to cement bilateral links between Washington and each
of the major European capitals than it did to nurture multilateral European coop-
eration. And the institutions that were born out of the Marshall Plan – notably
the OEEC – came to be regarded by many of those responsible for establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the EEC as examples of
how not to integrate and as the archetype of ineffective intergovernmental struc-
tures doomed to paralysis.8 Similarly, the EDC became European integration’s
most celebrated failure – the project that momentarily threatened to bury the
whole endeavour.9 Here too, therefore, enthusiastic American backing seemed to
have been in vain and possibly even counter-productive. Dulles’ celebrated
Introduction 3
threat that the rejection of the EDC might trigger ‘an agonising reappraisal’ of
the US commitment to Europe proved totally futile, with French parliament-
arians choosing to call his bluff and vote down the ambitious treaty in August
1954. Overall, therefore, even the two main exceptions to the normally separate
narratives of integration and the Cold War in Europe seem only to justify the
normal detachment between the two fields. For on the rare occasions where the
two did interconnect, Cold War-inspired US pressure led the integration process
astray and failed to have a lasting impact. European integration, the implication
seems to be, has worked only when it has been carried out by Europeans for
European reasons rather than when it has been foisted upon Western Europe by
a well-meaning but over-enthusiastic superpower.
The gulf between the two fields has only been increased by recent trends in
the historiography of both European integration history and Cold War history.
The former, for instance, has been deeply marked by the emphasis placed by
Alan Milward and his followers on the economic causes of the integration
process. The notion that ECSC was the product of a particular crisis in the
French steel industry, or that the EEC constituted a Dutch-inspired attempt to
rescue the European nation state by consolidating and making irreversible the
intra-European trade boom of the 1950s, left little space for Cold War considera-
tions.10 The ‘Cold War’ indeed does not register in the index of either of
Milward’s influential two volumes on the origins of European integration.11
Likewise, the proliferation of detailed, archivally based studies of each indi-
vidual country’s path to the EEC has also tended to lessen the emphasis on the
Cold War as a motivation. For the central figures of many of these new studies
have been national civil servants, often based in either economic ministries or
those portions of the foreign ministry most concerned with commercial affairs,
who were much less involved professionally with the parallel evolution of the
Cold War than were the statesmen and parliamentarians who populated earlier,
less detailed accounts of integration’s origins.12 Cold War historians, meanwhile,
have responded in kind. Over the past two decades there has been a fairly sys-
tematic attempt to demonstrate that the Western European powers did matter in
a Cold War context and that events were not entirely determined by the super-
powers.13 But much of this emphasis on the power or even tyranny of the weak
has concentrated on the way individual European states were able to manipulate
and use Washington to their own ends.14 The emphasis has thus been bilateral
and transatlantic rather than multilateral and pan-European. With a few hon-
ourable exceptions, neither ‘new Cold War history’ nor the most recent writings
of integration experts have broken the pattern described above; many of its prod-
ucts have if anything made the separation more acute.15
This volume and the conference at Pembroke College, Oxford out of which it
emerged were designed to examine these parallel histories and to begin to assess
whether or not their lack of interconnection was justified. Those invited to
participate were historians who had shown interest in either Cold War history or
European integration history or occasionally both. Indeed, several of those who
attended belonged to that comparatively rare breed of scholar who had published
4 P. Ludlow
about both fields, although revealingly even they had most often done so in dif-
ferent volumes and in different articles rather than in single works.16 The players
on which they concentrated – France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands,
the United States and the Community institutions – were those deemed most
likely to have played significant roles in both the Cold War and the European
integration process. And the period upon which they were invited to focus – the
second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s – was one of some importance to
both the development of European integration and the Cold War, but equally
one where the interconnections between the two fields had not previously been
explored. It therefore constitutes a good testing ground for the hypothesis that
the separation between Cold War and European integration history described
above was artificial and too extreme.
The 1960s were an important period in the development of Western Europe.
Economically, the period was one during which the Continent’s remarkable
post-war rise seemed to continue.17 There were a few minor interruptions, and
the relatively sluggish British economy went on defying the wider trend.
Overall, however, the period was one of high growth rates, booming exports,
minimal unemployment and controllable inflation – a performance that did much
to cement in the minds of Western European policy-makers and citizens an
equation between European integration and economic success that would be
largely absent from those countries such as Britain that were only to join the
EEC in 1973, the very year when the economic bubble burst. Politically, mean-
while, the gradual rise of the political left after the dominance across Western
Europe of the centre-right during the 1950s seemed to be occurring in a con-
trolled and unthreatening manner – until 1968 at least. And in international
terms, the rapid liquidation in the early 1960s of Western Europe’s remaining
colonial empires meant that Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands no
longer found themselves besieged by world opinion and liable to criticism even
from their superpower ally about their imperial policies in the way that had been
the case throughout the latter half of the 1950s. The speed and dignity with
which each power left its former Asian, African and Caribbean holdings varied
significantly – but in all of the European colonial powers the sense of relief at
the end of empire seemed to outweigh any regret for diminished international
influence. Indeed, Gaullist France was probably not unique in believing that it
could operate more effectively on the world stage after it had lost its empire than
it had been able to when it still ruled directly over significant portions of Africa
and South-East Asia.18
Western Europe’s renewed self-confidence – fuelled by its economic success
and facilitated by colonial disengagement – did not however correspond to
increased centrality to global affairs. From a Cold War history perspective the
1960s are the decade when the centre of gravity of Cold War confrontation
shifted most decisively away from Europe and towards the Third World. This
reflected the fact that, while the European status quo was comparatively stable –
Trachtenberg talks of a European settlement having been reached by 196319 –
the battle over the international alignment of the newly independent states of
Introduction 5
Asia and Africa had only just been joined.20 The way in which headlines and
news reports about the situation in Vietnam or the state of Sino-Soviet relations
had all but replaced bulletins from Berlin or anxious speculation about the fate
of Trieste as the main daily reminders of the ongoing Cold War accurately sym-
bolised the change. Likewise, the manner in which the one clear Cold War crisis
which did occur in Europe in the latter half of the 1960s – the crushing of the
Prague Spring in August 1968 – was not allowed by either East or West to inter-
rupt more than momentarily the slow progress of détente, demonstrates the
extent to which each bloc had accepted, de facto if not de jure, the presence and
the geographical limits of the other.21
To a large extent this stabilisation of the European Cold War front was good
news for Western Europe. The fading fear of Soviet invasion or subversion cer-
tainly contributed to that sense of growing confidence and well-being noted
above. But it also significantly reduced the pressure on each European country
to march in tight formation behind the United States as far as their international
policy was concerned. By the mid-1960s not only had the countries of Western
Europe long since rid themselves of that financial dependence on the US which
had characterised the early Cold War but they were also self-confident enough to
feel that they could each devise their own distinctive approach to East–West
relations.22 This allowed the diversity of national approaches which will be
analysed in the chapters that follow. And it also carried with it the potential that
disagreements over Cold War policy could spill over and interconnect with that
other key area of intercourse between European countries, namely the develop-
ment of the EEC. Dissension in NATO might, in other words, contaminate the
successful process of European integration, thereby endangering Western coop-
eration over much more than just military or security matters.
The opening two chapters of the volume focus on France – the first Western
country to break ranks significantly in its approach to the Cold War. Georges-
Henri Soutou thus sets out to contrast the European and Cold War policies of the
two French Presidents to occupy the Elysée during the 1965 to 1973 period,
namely Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Both Presidents were suppos-
edly Gaullist. Pompidou indeed won the 1969 elections partly by presenting
himself as the candidate of continuity after de Gaulle’s surprise resignation
earlier that year.23 But as Soutou demonstrates, each had very different
approaches to the Cold War, to European integration and to the interconnections
between the two. Thus while de Gaulle’s whole strategy centred upon a belief
that the Cold War division of Europe could be overcome and that the Soviet
Union (or Russia as he preferred to call it) could be reintegrated into a pan-Euro-
pean system, Pompidou’s vision was much more cautious as far as East–West
relations were concerned. This underlying strategic gulf meant that each then
turned towards greater Western European cooperation (although neither liked
integration as such) in radically different circumstances. For de Gaulle it was a
fall-back option to be explored most energetically when the prospects for
détente were least encouraging – as they were in the early 1960s. For Pompidou,
by contrast, Western European cooperation became most attractive in the latter
6 P. Ludlow
half of his presidency when détente appeared to be in danger of advancing too
far too fast. Closer European cooperation might give France some degree of
control over Germany’s Eastern policies and somewhat lessen the danger of a
superpower condominium over Europe.
Garret Martin’s chapter, by contrast, adopts a rather different approach. For
instead of looking at how French policy developed over the whole of the period,
he focuses in some detail on one crucial eight-month period, from September
1967 to April 1968. This allows him to prove how tightly entwined were the dif-
ferent strands of French foreign policy. Thus the mounting frustrations of French
Eastern policy – which were ever more apparent during these months despite the
seeming success of de Gaulle’s state visit to Poland – were closely connected to
France’s growing isolation vis-à-vis its Western partners. And this last was in
turn accentuated by the way in which the French struggled to rally Germany and
the other EEC member states to its side in the ongoing debate about how global
monetary cooperation should be organised, while at the very same time seeking
to defy those same Community partners by blocking the widely supported
British bid for EEC membership. While Soutou explores the linkages between
the Cold War and European integration at the level of overall French strategy,
Martin thus reveals the ways in which the two fields could become entangled at
a tactical level.
In Chapters 3 and 4 the focus shifts to West Germany. The Federal Republic
had, for understandable reasons, been the most orthodox and reliable ally
throughout most of the early Cold War years. Both its approach to East–West
relations and its engagement with European integration had been everything that
the United States could have wished for during all but the last few months of the
lengthy period when Konrad Adenuaer remained Chancellor. Indeed, if misun-
derstandings or mistrust did arise between Washington and Bonn in this era, it
was normally because Adenuaer’s government proved itself plus royaliste que le
roi in its steadfastness towards the East and its enthusiasm for cooperation with
the West!24 And even Adenuaer’s brief final flirtation with de Gaulle, which did
ring alarm bells in Washington and cast momentary doubt over West Germany’s
reliability, seemed to have been decisively ended by Adenauer’s successor, the
ultra-loyal Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard.25 Much was to change, however, with the
rise of Willy Brandt, initially as Foreign Minister of the Grand Coalition govern-
ment which ruled the FRG from 1966 to 1969 and then, from September 1969,
as Chancellor of a centre-left government. Both chapters on Germany thus
centre their attention on the Brandt years.
The chapter by Wilfried Loth focuses on the crucial relationship between the
new German Chancellor and his French opposite number. Theirs was not a
particularly easy relationship: the Brandt-Pompidou pairing has not been treated
with the same sort of retrospective reverence in the burgeoning literature on le
couple franco-allemand as de Gaulle and Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing or François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl.26 As Loth shows,
however, they did make an effort to find areas where the two countries could
cooperate closely and were not totally without their successes. Importantly for
Introduction 7
this volume their dialogue encompassed both the evolving pattern of East–West
relations and the question of how the early successes of the EEC could be built
upon. Much of their attention was therefore directed towards the possibility of
building a more political Europe, one able to assert itself more clearly from the
United States over foreign policy matters in general and the direction of détente
in particular. Ironically, though, these discussions emphasised the extent to
which Germany and France had swapped positions by the late 1960s and early
1970s. In the Brandt era it was thus Germany that put forward the radical ideas
as much about transatlantic relations as about the approach to Eastern Europe,
while it was France that played the role of conservative brake on a partner prone
to over-ambition. Germany’s radicalism is explored still further in Andreas
Wilkens’ chapter. This traces the development of Ostpolitik back to Brandt’s
formative years as mayor of Berlin during the 1950s and early 1960s, before
explaining how the new approach to Eastern Europe and to the German Demo-
cratic Republic was implemented when the Social Democrats became the
dominant party of government in Germany in 1969. It also explores the extent to
which Brandt’s new Eastern policy was rooted in the earlier success of the
Federal Republic’s Westpolitik. On this Wilkens suggests some interesting
divergences between the ideas of the Chancellor and those of his closest aide
and collaborator, Egon Bahr.
Chapters 5 and 6 on Britain both concentrate on the years when the United
Kingdom found itself outside of the European Community but deeply preoccu-
pied with the question of how to get in. Helen Parr confronts the vexed question
of Community enlargement head-on in her chapter, identifying the reasons
behind Harold Wilson’s belated conversion to the idea of European integration
and elucidating how the Labour government hoped to avoid its bid to enter the
EEC being thwarted by de Gaulle in much the same manner as Harold Macmil-
lan’s 1961 membership application had been. Ultimately, of course, the French
President did bar Britain’s path once more. However, as Parr explains, the
General’s second veto turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory – a short-term success
that actually revealed more about de Gaulle’s weakness than it did about his
strength. En passant, Parr’s chapter also demonstrates that the question of EEC
membership was one of the aspects of early European integration where the
interconnections with the overarching Cold War were strongest and most clear.
James Ellison’s chapter is somewhat more Cold War-centred in its focus, but
again brings out the existence of links between the Cold War and the EEC. A
study in Anglo-American relations, the piece investigates the way in which
London and Washington coordinated their response to de Gaulle’s March 1966
decision to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military command.
Central to British and American strategies was their shared belief that Britain’s
capacity to establish itself as a rival pole of attraction to France and thereby
prevent the General’s actions from having the detrimental effects on Western
unity which both London and Washington feared was tightly wrapped up with
the UK’s attitude towards the EEC. The Wilson government’s realisation that it
needed to revive the issue of British EEC membership and move the country
8 P. Ludlow
closer to, and if possible into, the European Community was thus in part a
response to the crisis in NATO and to the wider challenge posed by de Gaulle.
Other aspects of the same basic strategy involved the resolution of the long-
standing question of how to give Germany some in uence over Western nuclear
strategy without allowing the Federal Republic to acquire nuclear weapons of its
own, the settling of the acrimonious wrangle between the United States, Britain
and Germany over the costs of allied troops stationed in Germany, and the
public demonstration of NATO s commitment to the pursuit of d tente. The
chapter hence underlines both the scale of the challenge which Gaullist France
was deemed to pose to the West and the multifaceted nature of the Anglo-
American response.
Jan van der Harst s contribution on Dutch foreign policy (Chapter 7) acts as a
salutary reminder that in neither NATO nor the EEC did the larger countries
have it entirely their own way. The Netherlands in particular emerged as a
doughty adversary of General de Gaulle and a determined defender of Atlanti-
cist orthodoxy. This re ected its profound belief that while European integration
was economically vital to a small trading nation, Dutch security interests were
much better looked after in a wider grouping including the United States and
Britain than they would be in any rival European entity. The Hague government
was thus strongly opposed to the premature development of a coordinated Euro-
pean foreign policy — in 1962 it had played a central role in blocking the so-
called Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle s most systematic attempt to create such foreign
policy coordination27 — and deeply suspicious of anything that might lessen the
ties between Europe and the US. In an interesting illustration, however, of the
potential in uence of public opinion and domestic political change over foreign
policy, van der Harst explains how several of the certainties of 1960s Dutch
foreign policy were overturned when the veteran foreign minister Joseph Luns
was replaced in 1971 by Norbert Schmelzer. The Netherlands moderated, for
instance, their hard-line stance towards d tente and became more supportive of
the idea that the soon-to-be-enlarged European Community could acquire some
involvement in the eld of foreign policy coordination. The presence of the
British, after all, was believed likely to minimise the chances of any dangerous
drift away from Atlantic alignment.
As Piers Ludlow explains in Chapter 8, the Community institutions them-
selves remained somewhat detached from the Cold War and the question of
East—West relations throughout the 1960s. Contacts were thus minimal between
the European Commission and a Soviet bloc which still regarded the integration
process as a vehicle for German revanchisme; the agenda of ministerial discus-
sions in the EEC Council of Ministers involved little which directly impinged
upon East—West relations; and there were both bureaucratic and tactical reasons
militating against any real linkage between the EEC s development and the
wider Cold War. Despite this, however, Ludlow maintains that there were a
number of more indirect connections between the integration process and the
East—West struggle. In particular, he argues that the whole environment within
which the early Community was able to ourish was profoundly shaped by the
Introduction 9
Cold War alliance between Europe and the United States. As a result it is
impossible fully to understand what went on in the Brussels institutions without
being aware of parallel developments in the Cold War.
Chapter 9 by Jussi Hanhimäki turns its attention to the United States.
America’s importance in the calculations of all of the European players exam-
ined in the book is obvious, but as Hanhimäki reminds us, Washington was less
centrally concerned with European affairs in the late 1960s and early 1970s than
it had been a decade or so before. The salience of Western European affairs in
American foreign policy had steadily diminished in a period where the key
issues preoccupying US policy-makers were the protracted war in Vietnam,
crises in the Middle East, and the exciting prospects of superpower détente and
triangular diplomacy. By the end of the period reviewed, the Watergate scandal
and the domestic failings of the Nixon administration constituted an additional
distraction. The US did, however, remain involved in Western Europe – its
largest trading partner as well as its main Cold War ally – and was therefore in a
position to react to de Gaulle, to co-opt Brandt’s opening to the East into its own
policy of détente, to support the enlargement of the EEC, and to engage, albeit
belatedly, with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Despite a number of transatlantic contretemps, notably Henry Kissinger’s ill-
fated attempt to designate 1973 as the Year of Europe, the United States con-
tinued to be a key actor in Western Europe, exercising a vital influence over
both the course of East–West relations and the development of the EEC. This
alone added a further layer of interconnection between the Cold War and Euro-
pean integration.
The final chapter will then bring together a number of preliminary conclu-
sions before briefly suggesting some of the issues upon which future research
might focus. Much more remains to be studied in this field. Serious international
history-writing about the late 1960s and early 1970s remains very much in its
infancy, and the long-standing divide between Cold War history and the history
of European integration is too well established and too profound to be entirely
bridged by just one edited volume. Overall, however, there is enough in the
chapters of this book to suggest that there were multiple points where the Cold
War and integration narratives did intersect and that when they did not their sep-
aration was often an act of deliberate policy which deserves to be studied and
explained rather than taken for granted. Even in an era of détente largely free
from the Cold War crises which had punctuated earlier decades, European coun-
tries worked and interacted on an international stage which they were obliged to
share with both of the superpowers and which had been deeply shaped by the
East–West struggle. Ignoring this fact is a step that no one writing a detailed
history of post-war Europe’s efforts to unite can afford to take.
Notes
1 See e.g. Graml (1985), Young (1991), Reynolds (1994), Trachtenberg (1999).
2 See e.g. Milward (1984), Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Deighton (1995).
10 P. Ludlow
3 Among the specialist journals in each field are Journal of Cold War Studies and Cold
War History and Journal of European Integration History and Journal of Common
Market Studies. The most complete series of conferences on European integration
history are those organised by the European Community Liaison Committee of
Historians. These have led, among others, to Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Serra
(1989), Deighton and Milward (1999), and Loth (2001).
4 On European integration history see e.g. Urwin (1995) and Stirk (2001); on the Cold
War, Crockatt (1994), Reynolds (2000), Soutou (2001).
5 See e.g. Hogan (1987).
6 On the EDC see Dumoulin (2000); on US policy towards German rearmament see
Large (1996).
7 See Milward (1984) and Esposito (1994).
8 See Snoy’s comments cited in Jaumin-Ponsar (1970, pp. 99–100).
9 See Quaroni’s assessment cited in Serra, E. ‘L’Italia e la conferenza di Messina’ in
Serra (1989, pp. 93–4).
10 Milward (1984), esp. pp. 362–420 for the former; Milward (1992) for the latter.
11 Ibid.
12 Bossuat (1996), Lynch (1997), Rhenisch (1999), Mahant (2004).
13 Reynolds (1994) is a good example of the genre.
14 See e.g. Esposito (1994).
15 Probably the clearest exceptions to the rule are Schwabe (2001) and Giauque (2002).
While both are useful, however, they do not go nearly far enough to undermine the
basic contention of this section.
16 Georges-Henri Soutou, Wilfried Loth and Jan van der Harst have all written about
both Cold War history and European integration history, albeit normally on separate
occasions.
17 Boltho (1982).
18 The sense of liberation felt by Gaullist France following the end of the Algerian
imbroglio comes across very clearly in Vaïsse (1998).
19 Trachtenberg (1999, pp. 352–402).
20 In general see Westad (2005).
21 See e.g. Hughes (2004).
22 The altered financial balance between Western Europe and the United States is a
central theme of both Zimmermann (2001) and Gavin (2004).
23 Roussel (1994, p. 282).
24 Adenauer’s nostalgia for the Cold War certainties of Dulles and mistrust of
Kennedy’s greater flexibility is a central theme of Schwarz (1991).
25 See Bange (1999), and Oppell (2002) and Granieri (2003).
26 See e.g. Bitsch (2001).
27 See Vanke (2001).
Bibliography