Evolutionary Epistemology of DT Campbell
Evolutionary Epistemology of DT Campbell
Evolutionary Epistemology of DT Campbell
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1 AUTHOR:
Nagireddy Neelakanteswar Reddy
Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar
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SEE PROFILE
EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY
OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY
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DONALD T CAMPBELL
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY
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UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD
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Declaration
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any other diploma or degree either in part or in full to this or to any other
university.
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Place: Hyderabad
Date: 29/12/2011
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UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD
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CERTIFICATE
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This is to certify that Mr. Nagireddy. Neelakanteswar Reddy has completed this
dissertation entitled Evolutionary Epistemology of Donald T Campbell under
my supervision and guidance for the period (August 2010 to December 2011)
prescribed under M. Phil ordinances of the university and it has not been submitted
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Place: Hyderabad
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Date: 29/12/2011
Coordinator
Centre for Neural and Cognitive Sciences
University of Hyderabad
Acknowledgements
First of all, I am extremely thankful to my supervisor, Prof. Prajit K Basu, for his sharp
remarks that were the selecting factors in my blind academic trials. I am also thankful for
his patience, kindness, personal care and the freedom he provided me with.
I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Cicilia Heyes, Dr. Franz Wuketits, Dr. Nathalie Gontier and
Dr. Adolf Heschl for sending me their works, which were relevant for my dissertation.
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I thank the staff of Indira Gandhi Memorial Library, University of Hyderabad, for providing
the best ambiance for peaceful studying.
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I thank the faculty members and the research students of the Centre for Neural and Cognitive
Sciences for providing me with an academically inspiring environment. I thank the centre for
providing me with the computing and word processing facility.
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I thank the administrative staff of the centre and of the various sections of the administration
of the University of Hyderabad for their kind cooperation.
- N. Neelakanteswar Reddy
Contents
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Certificate
Acknowledgements
Introduction
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1. Ontogenetic selection
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2. Blind-Variation-and-Selective-Retention scheme
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4. Downward Causation
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1. Perception
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Conclusion
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2. Creativity
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Introduction
Evolutionary epistemologists characterization of knowledge is based on two related
concepts. One group takes (phylogenetic) adaptation as knowledge while the other takes
(ontogenetic) knowledge as adaptation.
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connotation and those of knowledge gain. According to them, in the course of evolution,
species become more adaptive to the environment because of the natural selection;
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ecological niche to which these mechanisms and processes are adapted. (See Chapter 1,
Sec.2)
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epistemology is being criticized as epistemology in name only. Michael Bradie (1994),
as well as Paul Thagard (1980) point out that the analogy between evolution and
knowledge progression is spurious, as they employ different processes. For example,
evolution is not goal directed while knowledge gaining by an individual learner or the
scientific group is goal driven. Evolutionary epistemologies are also criticized as these
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are epistemologically irrelevant since these are not concerned with norms (Dretske,
1971).
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to be knowledge but also construe vice versa i.e., knowledge gain (whether in individual
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only materialist account of fit between organisms and their ecology, Campbell (1974)
believes that a general selection account is the only explanation for a fit between the
knowers beliefs and the known, if one wants to be a materialist, naturalist about the
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process of knowledge. Campbell (1974b), Popper (1968, 1972), Stephen Toulmin (1972),
David Hull (1988a,b) and Henry Plotkin (1994) and others applied selectionist metaphors
and models to explain the growth of knowledge; but some evolutionary epistemologists
like Michael Ruse (1986), Nicholas Rescher (1977) and Adolf Heschl (2001) eschew
selectionist accounts, although they agree that knowledge processes are based in and
constrained by evolutionary origins.
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Although selectionist account is well-argued for (e.g., Campbell, 1974b; Cziko,
1995; Heylighen, 2000) its validity is yet to be empirically verified (Hull, 1988). Plotkin
(1991) argues that Gerald Edelmans (1987) Neural Darwinism is the evidence for
selectionism and Hull, Langman and Glenn (2001) also provide evidence for a general
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selectionist account from the domains of immune system functioning and behaviour
analysis.
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the attempt to understand knowing via the use of metaphors drawn from evolutionary
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beliefs; for Descartes - the achievement of certainty; and for Russell - the problem of our
knowledge of the external world. But, evolutionary epistemologists had different
concerns: for Popper - the growth of knowledge and the continuity of animal and human
knowledge; and for Campbell - the growth of knowledge and the fit of belief and the
referent.
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Bartley (1987) identified a contradiction between justificationalism of traditional
epistemology and non-justificational nature of Darwinian theory of natural selection. As
evolutionary processes are nonjustificational, their analogue i.e., growth of knowledge is
also nonjustificational.1
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thereby is relying on ideas available in evolutionary biology (Plotkin, 1987). The scope
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Today, the enterprise of working out the details and the implications of the
hypothesis that complex thought processes evolved by natural selection along
with more physical structures and functions fall under the heading of
evolutionary epistemology. Its modern roots lie in the ruminations of both
philosophers about evolution (e.g. Popper 1968, 1972; Toulmin 1972) and
evolutionists about philosophy (e.g. Campbell 1960, 1974; Lorenz 1977,
1982), but evolutionary epistemology has since expanded to include not only
evolutionary biology and philosophy, but also cognitive psychology,
developmental neuroscience, and artificial life programming.
Some philosophers hope (and expect) that the principles of evolutionary
biology (augmented by theories in cognitive psychology and facts uncovered
in developmental neuroscience) will shed light on some of traditional
problems in epistemology. The underlying assumption is that Darwinian
natural selection led to our present ability to garner reliable facts about the
world. Philosophers look to biology to tell them how that occurred,
psychology to specify more exactly what those capacities are, and the
developmental sciences to sort out the degree to which nature determines our
thought processes and nurture shapes them. Armed with these data, they
would then presumably be in a better position to answer such questions as:
What exactly is knowledge? And how do we know when we have it?
Bradie (1989) criticizes Bartleys usage of the term justification or nonjustification to natural processes
like evolution.
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A characterization of evolutionary epistemology can be done by using the schema
provided by Bradie (1994) where he differentiates between ontogeny and phylogeny and,
evolution of epistemological mechanisms (EEM) and evolution of theories (EET).
Synthesizing this classification with Campbells (1997) division of evolutionary
epistemology.
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Knowledge of an individual
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(phylogenetic) products of (1) e.g., brain and sensory (2) e.g., shared norms of
mechanisms;
Kants
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evolution
priori categories
(ontogenetic)
processes (3) e.g., trial and error (4) e.g., selection processes
learning; Neural Darwinism
in science
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employing selection
Boxes (1) and (2) in the above table explain knowledge mechanisms - like brain
and sensory physiology - and innate (socially) shared norms and concepts as the products
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of evolution. Boxes (3) and (4) explain knowledge progression in the individual life-time
and they also portray that individuals learning and scientific progress employ abstract
selection processes.
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Most evolutionists agree with (1) and (2) positions which hold that our knowledge
mechanisms are products of evolution (e.g., Ruse, 1986; Rescher, 1977; Bradie, 1994;
Heschl, 2001), but there is less consensus on the (3) and (4) positions, which suggest that
knowledge progression is selectionist in nature. But, Campbell (1960, 1974b), Cziko
(1995), Hull, Langman and Glenn (2001) argued and gathered evidence for ontogenetic
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Epistemology of Mechanisms (EEM) and boxes (2) and (4) indicate Evolutionary
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and selectionism; Chapter 3 pictures how Campbell is elucidating his general selectionist
ideas to explain knowledge processes, particularly Perception and Creativity. My
dissertation concludes how Campbells naturalistic evolutionary epistemology is
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Hull argues for an abstract selectionist model, whereas Toulmin argues for a direct analogy between
evolution and science progression.
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generally accepted that an answer to the first question also alerts us to seek an answer to the
question of justification of beliefs. This is a quest for grounds for 'certainty of beliefs'. It is
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normative in character and seeks clarity for epistemological concepts, such as justification,
truth etc. It is normative because traditionally the enterprise is not just concerned with
description of beliefs, but it asks for the fulfilment of epistemological values like
'justification', 'truth', 'reliability' etc., so that the beliefs under consideration acquire the status
of knowledge. In the history of epistemology both rationalists like Descartes and
empiricists like Locke strived to develop a first philosophy, attainment of which can
guide our knowledge acquisition or pursuing science. But, Quine (1969) questioned this
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1985, 2002) study and describe the knowledge processes empirically, as they occur in the
world, without focusing on any or some of the epistemological value(s), mentioned above.
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Bradie and Harms (2008) conceive three possible configurations of the relationship
between naturalistic and traditional normative epistemologies. First, naturalistic epistemology
and traditional normative epistemology are construed as competitors i.e., both compete in
giving solutions for the same problems. A group of naturalistic epistemologists including
Riedl (1984) defends this position. Second, naturalistic epistemology is taken to be a
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philosophers including Munz (1993) take this position. Third, naturalistic epistemology is
complementary to normative epistemology i.e., naturalistic epistemology is concerned about
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description and empirical aspects of knowing and normative epistemology is concerned about
norms of knowing; and there can be mutual exchange of ideas. Several naturalistic
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At best, the evolutionary analyses serve to rule out normative approaches which
are either implausible or inconsistent with an evolutionary origin of human
understanding.
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comparative approaches consider that all organisms can show behavior that is cognitively
based (Gontier, 2006b) because every relation that an organism engages in with its
environment is regarded as a cognitive relation, a knowledge relation, this knowledge itself
being the result of the workings of natural selection (Gontier, 2006a, p.10). She says:
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E.E studies how knowledge about the environment is gained across different
species, and what knowledge-gaining mechanisms arise in biological organisms
through time enabling these organisms to cope with their environment. This
means that within E.E not only human cognition but all sorts of behavior that
organisms at all levels in biological evolution display (ranging from instinctive
bahavior to cultural behavior or even chemotaxis that is to say, communication
between cells) are regarded as devices that are put to use to gain knowledge.
(Gontier, 2006b)
Some thinkers like Maturana and Varela (1980), Heschl (1990, 2002) consider that Life =
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Cognition i.e., life itself is cognition. According to them, all living creatures have cognition,
irrespective of whether they have language or consciousness or even nervous system or not.
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Pamela Lyon (2006) argues that the study of Cognition should start from the principles of
biology, (applicable also to lower level organisms), as opposed to mere human case. She calls
it the biogenic approach to cognition as opposed to traditional anthropogenic approaches to
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cognition.
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view which is similar to or strongly compatible with the view mentioned above. Bradie
(1986) designates this type of view as E.E.M (Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms).
According to E.E.M, knowledge / cognition mechanisms like brain and sensory systems are
the products of biological evolution. As evolutionarily adapted capacities, these mechanisms
are generators and maintainers of reliable knowledge (Bradie and Harms, 2008). If these
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mechanisms were not reliable, species possessing them might have been extinct. Not just
these knowledge mechanisms are phylogenetically inherited, but they also embody
expectations / presumptions about the world. Kants categories like space, time, causation
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2. Analogies between biological evolution and the 'evolution' of scientific theories: This view
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evolution. According to this view, a lot of competing theories will be proposed to explain
phenomena in the world. But, only one or some of them are accepted by the scientists and all
others are eliminated. Popper (1959), Toulmin (1967, 1972, 1981), Hull (1988a,b) and
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three dimensional perceptions of objects, although image of the objects on the retina are two
dimensional.
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acquired immunity (Jerne, 1955; Burnet, 1957), trial and error learning (Thorndike, 1898;
Ashby, 1952; Pringle, 1951), Creativity (Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1998, 1999a,b) and
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brain development (Edelman, 1987; Changeux, 1985; Calvin, 1987; Gazzaniga, 1992;
Sperber, 2001). Darden and Cain (1989), and Hull, Glenn and Langman (2001) and others
argued for an abstract, generalized selectionist scheme. According to this generalization
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project, many processes, like the ones mentioned above, employ selectionist processes in
their operation i.e., there will be 'variation' of particular units and 'selection' by particular
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criteria and the iteration of this cycle in the process. This position avoids the position
suggested in 2 i.e., employing too close an analogy between science and biological evolution,
thereby carrying over many details to the former from the latter that are inappropriate.
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General selection theory focuses, e.g., while explaining trial-and-error learning, on blindness
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or non-prescience and variation of trials, and selection by reinforcement (Skinner, 1981) than
borrowing details of the genetics into selectionist abstract model of it1. In evolution, the unit
of selection is the phenotype and the unit of retention is the genotype, but in learning and
other knowledge processes we cannot find genotype and phenotype differentiation, although
selectionist scheme is applied. Early evolutionary epistemologists such as Simmel (1895) and
Baldwin (1909) have called this position as Selection theory. Gary Cziko (1995) provides
an extensive survey of the many exemplars of a general selection theory.
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5. Constructivist evolutionary epistemology: Wuketits (1997) argues for the need for a
constructivist approach in E.E and points out that Campbell himself contributed much to it,
by emphasizing on vicarious / internal selectors. Wuketits (1997) provides five basic
assumptions of this approach: (a) the cognitive capacities of any organism are limited; (b)
these limitations are mainly the result of organismic, functional constraints; (c) as active
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systems, organisms explore those aspects of reality that are relevant to their survival; (d) the
act of perception always includes an interpretation of the perceived object; (e) this
interpretation is based on the organism's own experience that is constrained by the
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evolutionary pathways of its species. Wuketits (1997, 2006), Riegler (2006), and Diettrich
(1994), among others, defend this position. In similar lines with it, Oeser and Seitelberger
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construction behavior (Lewontin 1982, 2000), organisms actively shape their own
environments and achieve fit between themselves and their environments. Campbell (1991)
and Bickhard and Campbell (2000) recognise the explanatory and modelling significance of
notions like non-equilibrium thermodynamics, dissipative structures, non-linear dynamics,
self-organizing systems, helon theory, and perhaps catastrophe and chaos theories in
epistemology which Campbell (1991) called as autopoietic evolutionary epistemology. He
says that both autopoietic and selectionist evolutionary epistemologies are required and they
are complementary. Hahlweg and Hooker (1989), Christensen and Hooker (1999) argue for
the complementarity of selectionist and systemic processes.
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Evolution as knowledge process: I think that the notion evolution itself is a knowledge /
cognition process (Wuketits, 1986; Lorenz, 1977; Plotkin, 1994) should also be viewed as
an important notion in evolutionary epistemology. Campbell (1959 and 1974b) treated
adaptive organic form - any process providing a stored program for an organisms adaptation
with external environments - as knowledge2. This means that the adaptations organisms
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acquire in the course of their evolution exhibit the knowledge of their environment, i.e., for
example, the stream-lined body shape of a dolphin exhibits the knowledge of
hydrodynamics and the shape of a horse's hoof shows the knowledge of the steppe it
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In biology, there is a distinction made between ontogeny and phylogeny. Phylogeny is about
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changes in the population of species i.e., changes occurring in the species through
generations. Ontogeny is concerned with an individual organisms life-span development.
The term evolution is traditionally used exclusively for phylogenetic changes i.e., change of
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have been implicated also at the level of ontogeny. Cziko (1995) called it as with-in
organisms' selection as opposed to (phylogenetic) among organisms' selection. Plotkin (1994)
called it (ontogenetic) secondary heuristic as opposed to (phylogenetic) primary heuristic.
Most cited example for this is the immune system (Edelman, 1987; Hull, Langman and
Glenn, 2001). This means that knowledge mechanisms, of an individual, like perception,
learning, creativity, and brain processes etc., employ 'selectionist' mechanisms in their
operation. Whereas phylogenetic selection makes species adapted across generations,
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Campbell (1959 and 1974b) treated the adaptive organic form as knowledge. But, his 1995 modification
refutes this, as he believed that it is an obstacle in making contact with the traditions of philosophical
epistemology. But, Plotkin (1997) argues for Campbells earlier position (in Campbell, 1997).
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ontogenetic selection mechanisms make individual organisms adapted in their own life times.
Gontier comments that with E.E natural selection got internalized (within the organism
itself), thereby raising questions about the units and levels of selection (Brandon, 1982;
Brandon and Burian, 1984; Gontier, 2010). In neo-Darwinism / Modern synthesis (Ayala,
1978; Maynard-Smith, 1993; Mayr, 1978), organisms (and thus genes) are conceived to be
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the units of selection and environment is the level of selection. If the brain is considered to
employ selection process (as advocated by Edelman, 1987), then, neural groups will be units
of selection and neural activity is the level of selection. Dawkins (1982, 1983, 2000) even
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argued that selection occurs within the genotype i.e., there is a competition among genes
within the genome. Okasha (2001) argues for group selection.3 According to this view it is
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the group of individuals that is the unit of selection rather than individuals. For example, in
social insects like ants and bees many sterile ones are present. Although they cannot
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reproduce they are pervasively present, implying their contribution to the nest or colony and
thus they were selected. Some social animals, for example birds, show altruism i.e., they face
danger to rescue other individuals of their group implying group level selection, than primacy
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of individuals selection.
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Complicated picture arises when E.E.T is considered, where theories are the units of selection and scientific
community is the level of selection.
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Chapter 2.1 elaborates this point
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Traditionally epistemology dealt with problems of 'knowing' i.e., truth, validity and
justification of knowledge. But, Campbell (1988) expanded the domain of epistemology to
cover psychological hypotheses as to how we know how we see, or learn, and sociological
hypotheses as to how we share and edit beliefs to achieve science and other socially shared
beliefs of possible validity. Thus, he is proposing a descriptive epistemology which:
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.... is first of all descriptive of how people go about it when they think they are
acquiring knowledge, or how animals go about perceiving and learning when we
think they are acquiring knowledge. At this level we are practicing psychology,
physiology, and sociology without necessarily engaging in epistemological
issues. But I also want descriptive epistemology to include the theory of how
these processes could produce truth or useful approximations to it. (Campbell,
1988, p.440)
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Campbell (1960, 1997) argues that between our ancestral virus-type organism and a
present era physicist, there is a tremendous 'knowledge gain' about the environment.5 We
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humans arrived at this place from a highly limited background only due to evolutionary
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In bulk, the knowledge gained between the virus-type ancestor and the physicist
has represented cumulated inductive achievements; stage by stage expansions of
knowledge beyond what could have been deductively derived from what had
been previously known. It has represented repeated `breakouts' from the limits of
available wisdom ... (Campbell, 1987a, p.92)
In the induction process new knowledge is acquired, but the premises do not guarantee the
truth or success of the new knowledge. Likewise, in evolution, new knowledge/adaptation
comes from the previous forms; but by blind mutations and recombination. Previous form
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does not guarantee the success of next generation's adaptation. It is the environmental
selection that decides the fate of the adapted form.
Simply put, Campbell observes that in the course of evolution of life on earth (from
unicellular ancestor to our present era), there is a growth of knowledge embodied by
organisms. All these occurred, as proposed by modern synthesis or neo-Darwinism of
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evolution, by natural selection among variant organisms and inheritance of selected variety
and cycle of this process in generations. Lamarckism is refuted and there is no adaptation
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instructed by the environment. Also, there is no designer of the evolution. So, all adaptations
in species evolution come from blind mutations and natural selection; thus this adaptive
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This is in line with the notion of evolution as knowledge process i.e., in the course
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of evolution there is increasing adaptation and organisms increasingly gain and embody
knowledge of the world in their behaviors and physiological structures. Campbell (1960)
called this knowledge gain in the course of evolution as cumulated inductive achievement.
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Campbell develops his epistemology basing, broadly, on two main aspects: (a)
Selectionism and (b) Anti-foundationalism.
Selectionism emphasises on trial-and-error nature of knowledge processes. Antifoundationalism proposes that our knowledge mechanisms are not perfect and the resultant
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Descriptive
Selectionism
basis:
Darwinism
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Analytic basis:
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Anti-foundationalism
between noumena-phenomena
dilemma
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Pallbo (1997) explained Menos dilemma, new knowledge is always due to selection among
variation. Platos Menos dilemma implies the problem of explanation of the source of
knowledge. If the knowledge is said to be based on older knowledge, it cannot be said as new
as it is already based in older knowledge. Plato resorts to saying that every knowledge is
based on older knowledge. But, we know that new knowledge is possible which goes beyond
older knowledge and it can be successfully explained by selectionist account.
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bodily structures which limit the infallibility and directness of knowledge. The knowledge
mechanisms are evolved from primitive organisms and they are adapted to past environments
rather than present environment. So, these mechanisms cause correct knowledge in some
environments while leading to erroneous knowledge in other environments.
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Hypothetical realism: Campbell (1988) says that he is some kind of a realist, some kind of a
critical, hypothetical, corrigible, scientific realist; he is against direct realism, naive realism,
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and epistemological complacency. His position is not essentially different from Popper's
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So, there is no first philosophy; but the tactic is to employ Quine's (1951) coherence strategy
of belief revision or holistic omni-fallibilist trust i.e., according to him we are like sailors who
must repair a rotting ship while it is afloat at sea. We depend on the relative soundness of all
of the other planks while we replace a particularly weak one. Each of the planks we now
depend on may have to be replaced in future. No one of them is a foundation, nor is a point of
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certainty, no one of them is incorrigible. Campbell (1969) says that even in a more analytic
activity, such as geometry, it is clear historically that the stability lies in the collective bulk of
the theorems, while the supposedly fundamental axioms being continually subject to
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revision.
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Thus, he accepted those analytic epistemologies as legitimate, which had identified human
knowledge being based in evolutionary beginnings and development from lower level
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organisms.
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Perspectivism / relativism: Campbell (1959) cites the notions of Bertalanffy (1955) and von
Uexkull (1920). According to their notions, various organisms (of a species) perceive or reify
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various aspects of their environments. It is to say that, even if two organisms are living in the
same ecology, their 'living world' may differ i.e. their perspectives of the same surroundings
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may vary.
Section 4.3: Normative aspects in Campbells epistemology
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reference. Knowledge progresses, but never reaches the absolute truth. Organisms main
purpose of gaining knowledge is to manipulate to adapt to the world. Their knowledge is
limited to survival relevance, but not for an ultimate truth. In a sense, pragmatic value
knowledge
acquisition.
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guides
But
Campbell
(1974b,
p.431)
rejects
utilitarian
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variations or modifications are blind, are random, are individually non appropriate, are not of
the order of corrections. But by chance there do occur those which provide better fit, and
these survive and are duplicated. Selectionism is to be accepted as it is the only possible and
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favour of hypothetical realism. According to him, the world directly (or vicariously)
participates in the belief formation or knowledge acquisition; knowledge is not just arbitrarily
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constructed. As Kant had clarified, there exists a gap between noumena and phenomena
(Campbell, 1987) and perspectivism about knowledge of the world is inevitable. Thus, direct
realism is impossible. This does not lead to ontological nihilism, which proposes that
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correspondence of knowledge and the world is impossible and knowledge is mere arbitrary
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construction. But Campbell argues against this position and proposes hypothetical realism,
which explains the coherence of knowledge in spite of the impossibility of correspondence.
Coherence is possible because of the co-selection (directly or vicariously) of knowledge by
referent i.e., the world and the innate or learnt reliable presumptions. Competence of
reference can be explained by hypothetical realism, in spite of impossibility of direct realism
(foundationalism) or ontological nihilism.
Campbell concludes that the knowledge gain is (a) not entailed i.e., not deducible
from previous one, (b) invented contingently (by exploiting coincidence), (c) not instructed,
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(d) not perfect i.e., it is corrigible and (e) indirect, mediated i.e., no direct realism or
clairvoyance is possible.
Chapter 2 explains how knowledge gain and fit between the organism and the world
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This chapter focuses on a selectionist account of knowledge i.e., the General Selection
Theory proposed by Donald T Campbell. Section 1 focuses on the rationale for selectionist
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they are hierarchized based on evolutionary history. Section 4 throws light on evolutionary
causation of knowledge mechanisms that organisms possess - i.e., downward causation
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through selection.
Popper (1959) argued that the central problem of epistemology has always been the problem
of growth of knowledge. He gave selective elimination (through conjectures and refutations)
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logic to explain expansion of knowledge and scientific discoveries. At any time, there will be
many theories to explain phenomena in the world. But, one of them will be preferred over
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others. This preference, Popper says, is due to survival of the fittest theory. A theory is
preferred or selected by exposing all the competing theories to real life application and
eliminating those theories which are falsified. Popper (1963) identified trial-and-error
learning by humans and animals as illustrating his basic logic of inference i.e., natural
selection. According to him, scientific progress and also human as well as animal trial-anderror learning (analogically) follow a process of evolution through natural selection.
Campbell took this inspiration, while proposing his General Selection Theory. It is allpurpose physicalist (a.k.a materialist, mechanist, naturalist) solution to puzzles of design
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(Campbell and Paller, 1989, p.232). For Darwin, the perceived 'fit' between animal form and
environmental opportunity was the design puzzle. For epistemologists, the design puzzle
will be the 'fit' between the belief and its referent. Campbell's General Selection theory is an
attempt to explain (a) the problem of growth of knowledge; and (b) puzzles of fit or
design in epistemology, naturalistically.
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In the natural / organic world, there is a design between the form of an organism and
the environment it lives in. For example, organisms hunting in the day time have eyes , which
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opportunistically use light rays reflected from the objects to perceive the objects; while some
nocturnal animals perceive objects through echolocation (i.e., by sending sound waves and
sensing the objects from these reflected waves). There are plenty of examples, in biology,
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illustrating the fit between the particular form and / or behavioral tendency that an organism
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or
watchmaker analogy; as a watchs complexity and function make one to posit the existence
of an intelligent watchmaker, the complexity and design found in the nature warrants one to
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attribute it to the causal role of a (intelligent) deity. This sort of argument still continues in
the name of intelligent design. If there is a complex design, there should be an intelligent
designer (i.e. the cause should be intelligent) to cause the design, which is too complex to be
formed by mere accident.
Darwin answered the design puzzle naturalistically. His theory of natural selection
(from plenty of variations) and accumulation of adaptations through inheritance through
many generations, can explain how fit has come about between organisms and their
environments. Natural selection, as such, does not cause the fit, but it does winnow-out the
31
unfit. Fit comes free, mechanically, without the intervention of any intelligent, purposeful
agency. As Dawkins (1996) pointed out, adaptation is not a one-step process, but a successive
cumulation through large eons of generations. So, complex adaptations can accumulate in the
course of time, although their beginnings were simple.
Campbell extends this Darwinian argument further, by saying that any fit e.g. the
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fit between an agents belief and the corresponding referent; the fit between theory and the
fact it purports to explain etc., also require a selectionist explanation. Darwin explained how
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adaptations i.e., the fit between organism and its environment are evolutionarily bestowed.
The explanations of E.E.M (Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms) theorists end here.
We have to go further. The fit between knowledge mechanisms and the world are neither
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due to God's will nor due to clairvoyant powers of omnipotent Dear Old Mother Natural
Selection. Our eyes are adaptive; but phylogenetic evolution is not sufficient to explain the
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Campbell (1997) compares this analysis to Goldman's (1986) causal theory, of justification of belief, which is
based on the reliability of belief forming processes. Goldman suggests that our visual beliefs are justified
because the visual mechanism is reliable, as also argued by the epistemologists who accept E.E.M. Also, that
visual belief is, at least, in part, justified if the referent of the belief has a causal role in the belief formation.
32
Plotkin (1994) argues that species face uncertain futures problem while evolving.
This has a parallel in epistemology - Humes induction problem. It says that, whatever is
true so far may turn out to be false in the future; so, we have no conclusively firm grounds to
believe our past or present beliefs. (Hume also said that our reliance on our beliefs is based
on animal faith, which can be said to be evolutionarily bestowed, making successful survival
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possible.)
But, Campbell is optimistic about the possibility of knowledge i.e., the fit between
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belief and the referent is possible. But, this is not the result of any innate foundational
mechanisms. As fit between organismic form and its environmental opportunity arises
through the natural selection, without the mediation of any prescient mechanism, the fit
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between beliefs and their respective referents can be attained without foundational
mechanisms but through selectionist mechanisms. Here, he is employing selectionist
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explanation at two levels. The first level is phylogenetic i.e. the natural selection that
occurred in ancestors provide present organisms with a general sort of wisdom (in the form
of anticipation / expectation) of 'useful' 'stabilities' of the environment and also the
or
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depends on already achieved wisdom. At the second level, the selection mechanisms occur
again in the phylogenetically inherited anticipatory wisdom and knowledge / cognition
operations. They include perception, trial-and-error learning and scientific enquiry etc., which
short cut the selection by the life and death winnowing of genetic variants. Adaptations in the
course of phylogenetic evolution occur across generations. But, some ontogenetic
adaptations, like learning, occur at the time course of individual life-span. So, these
mechanisms like learning make some adaptations possible within the short time span, than
phylogenetic eons.
33
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evolutionary biology.
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general logic of selectionist processes and it does not require importing every detail of
According to Campbell (1988, p.402), the basic selectionist dogma can be captured by
or
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2. In such a process there are three essentials features: (a) mechanisms for introducing
variation; (b) consistent selection processes; and (c) mechanisms for preserving and / or
propagating the selected variations. Note that in general the preservation and generation
mechanisms are inherently at odds, and each must be compromised.
34
4. In addition, such shortcut processes as mentioned in (3) contain, in their own operations a
blind-variation-and-selective-retention process at some level, substituting for overt locomotor
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Every case of knowledge gain requires employment of the BVSR mechanism, at some
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processes. Selection among mutant variants (of organisms) involves higher level selection
mechanism, under the constraints of which ontogenetic knowledge mechanisms employ
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lower level BVSR mechanisms. Through phylogenetic BVSR processes, organisms develop
internal models of the world by which these organisms can anticipate the regularities of the
world. The internal world models involved in ontogenetic knowledge processes themselves
or
undergo evolution, through phylogenetic BVSR processes. These internalized models about
the world also employ BVSR mechanisms and substitute for the locomotor BVSR
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variations (such as mutant organisms in organic evolution and trials in the trial-and-error
learning) emitted be independent of the environmental conditions of the occasion of their
occurrence; (b) the occurrence of trials individually be uncorrelated with the solution, in that
specific correct trials are no more likely to occur at any one point in a series of trials than
another, nor more than specific incorrect trials. (Our observation shows that learners make
intelligent, anticipatory responses; this means that the person is making use of already
35
achieved knowledge, perhaps of a general sort. The anticipatory responses of that person
represent prior general knowledge, transferred from previous learning or inherited as a
product of the mutation and selective survival process), (c) the notion that a variation
subsequent to an incorrect trial is a correction of the previous trial or makes use of the
direction of error of the previous one, be rejected. 2 (Insofar as mechanisms do seem to
operate in this fashion, there must be operating a substitutive process carrying on the blind
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The solution gets its status, as a solution, because it is reinforced by the external world (here,
the experimenter). So, the solution also was as blind (may not be random) as the other
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or
processes operate at a number of hierarchically organized loci or domains in nature, and that
all improvements in 'fit' between systems and their environments are attributable to the
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But, Popper (in Radnitzky and Bartley, 1987) emphasizes on feedback from error, in knowledge processes.
See Burtsev (2008) for differences between feedback logic and evolutionary logic; and how vicarious
selection process leads to learning without feedback.
4
Campbell got this inspiration from the works of Ashby (1952), Baldwin (1900), Pringle (1951). But, Bradie
(1994) questions the analogy between the BVSR scheme and trial-and-error learning.
3
36
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structures innate teaching mechanisms, and analyzed Kants (1781) a priori categories in this
line. Campbell (1987b) tried to give a neurological account of these anticipatory processes.
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Campbell (1956a,b) explains how vicarious knowledge processes like vision and
learning could have evolved. For example, a primitive protozoon does not have sensory
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mechanisms to perceive the surrounding world; its motor efforts are the only means of
knowing the world. It learns of an obstacle when it stumbles upon it and cannot go any
further. It distinguishes food from non-food only after ingesting things. But, this way of
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knowing is risky as it may stumble upon its predator or it may ingest a poisonous substance.
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37
Being indirect, vicarious knowledge processes may give imprecise knowledge. But,
this does not happen always as these vicarious mechanisms are endowed with wisdom of the
environment, in the course of evolution. Campbell explains how vision could have acquired
'presumptions' about the 'stabilities' of the world. On earth, objects that are impervious to
locomotion in general also reflect or diffuse certain electromagnetic waves. Both water and
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air are transparent, in coincident parallel with their locomotor penetrability. This persistent
ecological condition over the eons has made possible the development of organisms able to
anticipate the presence and location of solid objects through visual mechanism based upon
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the opaqueness of the object to light. The accidental encountering with and systematic
cumulations around this coincidence have provided in vision a wonderful substitute for blind
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motor exploration.
Campbell also points out that there is regularity in the world and this regularity is
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or
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Thus, organisms know the world (without 'direct' contact with it), by employing vicarious
knowledge mechanisms, which have evolutionarily (but coincidentally) acquired the
'assumptions' about the world. Although vicarious knowledge acquisition is 'indirect', this
acquisition process gives most of the time reliable knowledge, as it got well-winnowed
assumptions about the world, in the course of evolution.
The criteria of selection involved in biological evolution are external to the organism
or to the species. By the evolutionary stage at which learning is possible, much of this onceexternal criteria have been internalized as the sense receptors for pleasure and pain. These
38
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Campbell identified ten levels6 of knowledge processes, with BVSR operation at each
level. At each level some criteria are phylogenetically (and also from previous learning) set.
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These criteria select trials at the lower level. Campbell ordered these levels in the sequence of
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Each level (or node) has a characteristic B.V.S.R and each level has presumptions
about the nature of the world, acquired from phylogenetic evolution. These selectionist
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or
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increases i.e., selective role of the world decreases, (b) number of presumptions increases,
(c) cognitive economy increases, (d) phenomenal feeling of directness or intelligent
5
Heylighen (2000) provides three classes of selective criteria: (1) Objective criteria like distinctiveness,
invariance and controllability; (2) Subjective criteria like individual utility, coherence, complexity and novelty;
and (3) Intersubjective criteria such as formality, conformity, infectiousness or publicity, expressivity,
collective utility and authority.
6
Plotkin and Odling-Smee (1981) also give multiple-level account of selection processes.
39
response increases, (e) precision also increases. These are ordered, roughly, on the basis of
history of evolution of knowledge processes knowledge of primitive unicellular organisms
to knowledge at the level of humans science.
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1. Non-mnemonic problem solving: At this level, blind locomotions of the organism are the
trials, which are selected by local environment within which it is fumbling.
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Jennings (1906) has shown that the paramecium produces blind locomotor activity
until a nourishing or non-noxious environmental setting is found. This environmental
criterion selects the parameciums locomotions. But, paramecium does not have memory to
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retain this solution. When it is hungry again, it attempts locomotion and also ingestion in all
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The presuppositions organisms (here, the paramecium) are endowed with (from
phylogenetic evolution) at this level are, for example, that the environment has penetrable
or
and impenetrable portions and moving away from an impenetrable region can be beneficial,
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echolocation devices of porpoises, bats, and cave birds emit blind sweep of sound waves
which are selectively reflected by nearby objects; thus making these organisms know the
world without the need of direct bodily contact with the external world (which can be fatal in
certain environments). Sonar and radar also employ similar mechanisms. Campbell believes
40
that our vision is as indirect as echolocation, although it is phenomenally felt to be direct and
it lacks active broadcast of waves.
The presumption organisms have at this level: The objects in the environment, which
are opaque to sound waves emitted by organisms and light waves received by organisms, are
impenetrable. Also, there are presumptions leading to achievement of reifying and
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3. Habit and 4. Instinct: According to Campbell, habit and instinct have similar
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epistemological status. While the former involves trial-and-error during ontogeny; the latter
involves similar trial-and- error of whole mutant organisms during phylogeny.
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the service of these general reinforcers, specific objects and situations become learned goals
and sub-goals, learned selectors of more specific responses. And, the execution of habit and
instinct requires vision as a vicarious process. Presumption of organism at this level:
or
Approach or seek pleasurable objects and events; and avoid painful objects and events.
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5. Visually supported thought: At this level trial and error (potential) locomotions done
vicariously in thought are selected by the local environment which is also vicariously
represented by vision. The insightful problem solving in chimpanzees studied by Kohler
(1925) is interpreted by Campbell in this line. Here, trials are produced at the level of
thought and the selection criteria that do selection are the visual stimuli.
41
6. Mnemonically supported thought: At this level, blindly performed thought trials are
being selected by memory / knowledge criteria. Here, vision is not employed. Both, thought
trials and knowledge criteria are vicars / substitutes for external state of affairs.
For example, Poincare (1913) explained mathematical creativity 8 in this line. The
criterion of mathematical beauty selects from a blind permuting of ideas, usually
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unconscious.
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the observing animal learns from the model animal. But, this process is not direct as it seems.
As Baldwin (1906) analyzes this process, the learner acquires criterion image by observing,
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Presumptions involved at this level: for example, the observer believes that the model
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is also exploring the same world in which he is living and locomoting; the observer believes
that the model is capable of learning and also the world is learnable.
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8. Language: At this level Campbell explains the communication among social insects like
bees, ants and termites, comparing to human language. They communicate using dance
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patterns, sonic, supersonic or odor-trail means, in which the scout ant or bee communicate to
the follower with neither the illustrative locomotion nor the environment explored being
present, not even visually-vicariously present. Their communications exhibit the social
function of economy of cognition in a way quite analogous to human language. Human
language learning involves trial-and-error through ostension and it is nested in lower level
vision.9
8
9
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9. Cultural cumulation: Campbell provides some variation and selective retention processes
leading to advances or changes in technology and culture. They include: (a) selective survival
of complete social organizations, (b) selective borrowing of technology and culture from
other cultures, (c) differential imitation of a heterogeneity of models from within the culture,
(d) selective learning, (e) selective elevation of different persons to leadership and
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educational roles and so on. Campbell stresses that such selective criteria are highly
vicarious, and could readily become dysfunctional in a changing environment.
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10. Science: Campbell notes that science grows rapidly around laboratories, around
discoveries which make the testing of hypotheses easier, which provide sharp and consistent
selective systems. He explains ubiquitous 'simultaneous inventions' as exhibiting selective
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mechanisms in science. If many scientists are trying variations on the same corpus of current
scientific knowledge, and if their trials are being edited by the same stable external reality,
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then the selected variations are apt to be similar, the same discovery encountered
independently by numerous workers.
or
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combination he can think of, without attention to theory. (b) At the opposite extreme from
this blind laboratory exploration is Popper's view of the natural selection of scientific
theories, a trial and error of mathematical and logical models in competition with each other
in the adequacy with which they solve empirical puzzles, that is, in the adequacy with which
they fit the totality of scientific data and also meet the separate requirements of being theories
or solutions. (c) Intermediate is Toulmin's (1967) evolutionary model of scientific
development, which makes explicit analogue to population genetics and the concept of
evolution as a shift in the composition of gene pool shared by a population, rather than
43
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BVSR processes are scale-invariant i.e., they happen at all levels. These processes
are seen in both temporal scale i.e., phylogeny and ontogeny, and spatial scale i.e., cell,
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organism and society. These knowledge processes are not just hierarchical, but also nested.
For example, habit and instinct require vision for their execution; language learning and
imitation also require vision. Culture and science are nested in language and imitation. The
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higher level knowledge processes like science and culture are emergents from lower level
organ and organism systems, in the course of evolution; and these higher level emergents
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have causal role in selecting and changing lower level processes like vision and language.
Thus, we possess shared innate concepts, norms and values due to selective downward
or
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Campbell believes that the organisational levels of molecule, cell, tissue, organ,
organism, breeding population, species, in some instances social system are factual realities
rather than arbitrary conveniences of classification and each of the higher orders organises
the real units of the lower level.
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Allmost all natural and physical sciences are 'reductionist', including evolutionary
biology. They contend that higher level properties are caused by lower level elements. For
example, in biology, phenotypes are considered to be caused by lower level genotypes; and in
psychology, behavior is considered to be caused by brain dynamics. In reductionist scala
natura, causal flow is unidirectional.
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1. All processes at the higher levels are restrained by and act in conformity to the laws of
2. The teleonomic achievements at higher levels require for their implementation specific
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ed
Although Campbell agrees with these points, he says that they are not enough to
explain biological systems, which involve the operation of natural selection. Thus, he adds
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4. Downward causation: Where natural selection operates through life and death at a higher
level of organisation, the laws of the higher-level selection system determine in part the
distribution of lower-level events and substances. Description of an intermediate-level
phenomenon is not completed by describing its possibility and implementation in lower-level
45
terms. Its presence, prevalence or distribution (all needed for a complete explanation of
biological phenomena) will often require reference to laws at a higher level of organisation as
well. Paraphrasing point 1, all processes at the lower levels of a hierarchy are restrained by
and act in conformity to the laws of the higher levels. (Campbell, 1974a, p.180)
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(1988) suggested, Campbell is explaining adaptations, not just by proximal causes, but also
by distal or ultimate causes. In the course of evolution, emergent higher level processes come
Pr
into existence and these emergents have causal influence on lower level processes.
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anatomy of the jaws of a worker termite or ant. The hinge surfaces and the muscle
attachments agree with Archimedes' laws of levers, that is, with macromechanics. They are
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optimally designed to apply the maximum force at a useful distance from the hinge. A
modern engineer could make little, if any, improvement on their design for the uses of
gnawing wood, picking up seeds, etc., given the structural materials at hand. This is a kind of
or
conformity to physics, but a different kind than is involved in the molecular, atomic, strong
and weak coupling processes underlying the formation of the particular proteins of the
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muscle and shell of which the system is constructed. The laws of levers are one part of the
complex selective system operating at the level of whole organisms. Selection at that level
has optimised viability, and has thus optimised the form of parts of organisms, for the worker
termite and ant and for their solitary ancestors. We need the laws of levers, and organism
level selection (the reductionist's translation for 'organismic purpose'), to explain the
particular distribution of proteins found in the jaw and hence the DNA templates guiding
their production. (The occasional non-functional mutant forms of jaws conform just as
loyally to the laws of levers and biochemistry as do the more frequent functional forms.)
46
If we now consider the jaw of a soldier termite or ant, a still more striking case of
emergence and downward causation is encountered. In many of the highly dimorphic or
polymorphic species, the soldier jaws are so specialised for piercing enemy ants and termites
with huge multipronged antler-pincers that the soldier cannot feed itself and has to be fed by
workers. The soldier's jaws and the distribution of protein therein (and the particular
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ribonucleic acid chains that provide the templates for the proteins) require for their
explanation certain laws of sociology centering around division-of-labour social organisation.
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We have no grounds for anticipating that the microparticulate laws, even when
perfected, will eliminate the need for macrodetermination involving laws unique
to the higher levels of biological and social organization. (Campbell, 1990b, p.5)
He makes this point more plausible by explaining possibility of dysfunctional mutations. He
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points out that in the classic 50 years of drosophila research, many more harmful mutations
than beneficial ones were discovered. Also is the classic case of cave fish becoming blind
when vision loses its survival value, when mutations interfering with effective vision cease to
or
be eliminated. Mutations are quasi-entropic and they drift toward dysfunctionality in the
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Thus, in the course of evolution new realities like culture, society, science etc., emerge and
they become realities for themselves i.e., they have causal roles10. These realities through
natural selection causally influence lower level mechanisms like vision, language and
instincts. In the course of evolution, nested hierarchical knowledge processes come into
existence.
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or
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ed
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10
Bickhard and Campbell (2000) argue that emergents have causal properties;but, Kim (1992) doubts whether
emergents have causal efficacy.
48
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Here, thought is shown to employ vicarious selection, making adaptations with the world
Section 1: Perception
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intelligent.
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or
are sometimes prone to error. In the line of Descartes argument, we can say that an evil
demon using implanted electrodes could produce a perceptual belief in a perceiver, which
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(s)he takes as real. Campbell (in Campbell and Paller, 1989) cites examples like phantom
limbs and non-iconic, identical, neural transmission codes for warmth and cold as illustrating
illusion proneness of our perceptual systems.
Further, our perceptual neurology contains many monitor-modulate distortion
correctors (Campbell, 1987b) which modify sensory input on the basis of evolved
presumptions, improving the validity of perception in normal environments, but also
increasing the proneness to illusion, in atypical conditions. Campbell (1988) cites
1
49
Helmholtzs (Cohen and Elkana, 1977) list of imperfections of the eye and his concept of
unconscious inference as a correction to direct realism.
Evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms (E.E.M) version still leaves unexplained
how vision could operate so as to generate the competent (if incomplete) perceptual
achievement of a specific physical object. Selection theory is to be applied to this task also.
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Biological evolution cannot produce a clairvoyant visual process. All it can do is to assemble
indirect indicators and initially arbitrary 2 assumptions, all in the form of finite physical
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mechanisms.
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carrier - like the eye. This vehicle will have its own physical nature and limitations.
Perception, (like any other knowledge) at its realized best, is some compromise vehicular
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characteristics between referent attributes. But, we can never completely eliminate vehicular
restriction and bias for embodied knowledge.
Campbell (1997) developed some general principles: the vehicular substance that
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carries knowledge is unavoidably separate from and alien to the referents of that knowledge
the vehicle is a different substance with different structural characteristics. Complete
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According to Darwinists, physical mechanisms involved in vision can only originate by genetic mutations and
recombination. These mutations are random; so they are characterized as arbitrary.
50
Thus, for example, the way the eyes are physiologically constructed influences its
functioning.
Vision, e.g., is based on inferences based on contrasts in superficial reflections. Its
anatomy and physiology show nothing like direct transmission of knowledge of external
objects, but instead highly presumptive unconscious constructions. In Muller-Lyer illusion
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situation, we employ implicit presumptions of environmental relations built into the nervous
system by learning or genetic heredity, to the effect that obtuse and acute angles in the plane
of vision are most likely generated by rectangular solids (Segall et al. 1966; Stewart, 1973).
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The Duncker (1929) dot-and-frame illusion may be more convincing. In an otherwise totally
dark room is a large luminous frame with a luminous dot within. The frame is moved several
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inches to the right. The observer instead perceives the dot move several inches to the left. The
perceptual system has built-in preconscious decision trees that convert the evidence of
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relative motion into an inference of absolute motion. The presumption used here is: in case of
doubt, it is the small fragment of the visual field that has moved, and the large bulk that has
remained still. This is an excellent general rule, but wrong in the ecologically atypical setting
or
of Dunckers laboratory.
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Although we are prone to illusions, we correct it basing on other beliefs. For example,
if we experience Muller-Lyer illusion, we can correct that illusion by scaling each line with a
ruler. Here, we doubt our earlier belief, by trusting ruler scaling and some assumptions like
the lengths of the lines have remained relatively constant during the measurement process,
the ruler was rigid rather than elastic etc.
Campbell calls this as coherence strategy of belief revision, as explained by Quine
(1951). We trust the great bulk of our beliefs, while revising as few as possible. But, no belief
is incorrigible and foundational. Quines holistic omnifallibilist trust holds for the operation
51
of vision. A single photocell firing has a profound equivocality (over and above the
multiplicity of posited objects which might have generated it) due to static in the air and
nonsemantic firing in the nervous system. Our million fold photocell eyes have cross-footing
inhibitional winnowing which (on the basis of predominant immediate context) inhibit further
transmissions of solitary, out-of-step activations (Campbell, 1987b). The eye thus works even
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though any retinal cell activation may be in error on any one occasion.
Section 1.2: Perception and Locomotion
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In line with his General Selection Theory, Campbell, identifies learning or habit formation
and also its execution as involving trial-and-error, which is analogical to the Blind-Variation-
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learning theories of behaviorists like Hull, Skinner and Guthrie and Gestaltish theories of
Tolman and Meier involve a random trial and error component (Campbell, 1954). Campbell
notes:
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or
In terms of the rudiments of the general selective survival model, habit formation
would be based upon (a) random variation of emitted behavior, (b) selective
survival of certain variations, and (c) retention and duplication of surviving
variations. In terms of conceptual traditions in psychology, this translates into a
random trial-and-error learning model. (Campbell, 1956b, p. 332)
Organisms achieve behavioral fit with their environment through trial-and-error learning.
Campbell (1954) differentiates between body-consistent and object-consistent learning3. For
example, when a rat learns the maze; it does not learn fixed muscle movements, without the
consideration of maze characteristics. Even if the rat has learnt maze on plane surface, it can
exhibit same learning, while swimming in the maze also, which require different set of
3
According to Campbell (1956a), the learned response is to be essentially defined in terms of a shift in the
organism-environment relationship (such as objects moved, places reached, regions entered by an organism)
rather than a motor response defined in terms of organism or body parameters alone (like specific muscle
contractions or movements).
52
muscle movements. This adaptive fit in the execution of habits has been called molar by
Tolman (1932) and others. It represents acts, not movements, or advertent rather than
inadvertent responses in Guthrie's (1952) terminologies. Brunswick (1952) has designated it
as consisting of distal responses rather than proximal ones. Skinner (1938) called it operant
response.
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proposes blind trial-and-error again as an explanation here. For example, if a blind person has
learnt to walk in well-known house; (s)he can make fixed (body-consistent) responses to
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reach from one place to other. But, if the furniture in the room has changed place, then (s)he
cannot make fixed locomotions but change them by feedback of bodily collision or cane
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or
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It is probably the easiest to accept this point of view for an organ of vicarious exploration like
an insect's antenna, or the blind person's cane. The analogy of the radar screen as an aiming
device is of help. The radar beams scan the sky in a blind sweep, blind in that it is not
modified by any prior knowledge of the location of objects. When in this search a beam
reflects from a plane, a gun is then appropriately aimed. The trial and error of a radar beam
has substituted for a trial and error of expensive bullets. In a parallel way, a ship's radar
53
vicariously explores the waterways, by a trial and error of radar beams learning the location
of obstacles that might otherwise have been located by a trial and error of ship movements
and collisions.
It is an easy transition from the radar model to the bat's supersonic echo location - in
which sound waves emitted in all directions provide the substitute random trial-and-error
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process. Similarly, the lateral line organ of fishes seems to have the purpose of registering
waves of water pressure change in such a fashion as to locate objects in terms of the echo of
the fish's own swimming, and Pumphrey (1950) has suggested the radar and echo-location
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The case for vision is the most important, but cannot be made with the clarity and
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completion possible for the radar and echo-location examples, since the emitting process is
missing. However, the notion of vision as a surrogate trial-and-error process seems to be not
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only required by the formal model but supported by other considerations. If in visual search
the gross eye movements are not blindly searching, it is because other sources of information
such as touch, memory, or hearing have been employed to narrow the range of search. Hebb
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(1949) has assembled impressive data on the active searching movements that typically
characterize the simplest seeing process, and his facts belie the implicit notion of the passive,
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fixed-focus eye implicit in both Gestalt and conditioning theories. But even without
temporally extended scanning, the eye in a single glance provides spatial information which
can substitute for motor trial and error, which can lead to smooth, guided, object-consistent
responses. Campbell explains below how perception employs selection or trial-and-error:
... the radar beam presents in its ever-repeated scanning sweeps multiple
alternative loci for reflection. ........ The rods and the cones of a fixed-focus eye
can be regarded as the simultaneous presentation of a myriad of alternative loci
for possible excitation, blindly available in that their location or availability does
not anticipate the location of objects, except as this glance has been preceded by
other glances and other sources of information. We could build a radar device in
this manner, so that instead of one scanning beam of varying direction, it had a
million simultaneously operating beam emitters and receivers, all of fixed aim.
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...... The learning capacity of the radar lies in the range of directions in which it
sends its beams. The learning capacity of the eye lies in the range of possibilities
which it makes simultaneously available to selective excitation. Thus even
without the emitting mechanism of radar, major portions of the model seem
appropriate. Vision can be seen as providing data about the spatial environment
intersubstitutable with what might be learned by blind trial and error. It is to be
understood similarly in a deterministic way, with no appeals to prescience. It
retains the basic epistemology of trying a lot of things and seeing what works.
(Campbell, 1956b, p.336)
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Campbell analyses the concept of feedback, here. When a blind person makes objectconsistent responses, it is mainly through feedback from cane movements. In this case, the
emphasis is on the after-feedback of the results of the motor movements. But, in perceptual
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locomotion the responses are not guided by its own effect; but the locomotion is guided by
the results of a prior substitutive output and feedback. Campbell says:
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Thus the radar controlled anti-aircraft missile is not guided by feedback from the
projectile's location or outcome, but rather by the feedback from a prior output of
electromagnetic waves. The movement of the radar-guided ship is not controlled
by feedback of the ship's contacts and collisions with other objects, but rather by
the feedback of the contacts and collisions of the exploratory, substituting radar
beam. Perception is seen as controlling guided distal responses in this same trialin-advance way. (Campbell, 1956b, p. 337)
Thus, perception vicariously informs the organism, in equivalence to locomotor exploration.
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search of a vicariously (through memory) represented environment. And while the process is
instigated by the visible objects of the choice point, it is not conceived as a search of them, or
learning about them. In contrast, the notion of perception as substitute trial and error refers to
visual search as a guide to motor response, as a substitute for blind exploratory locomotion,
limited to the visually accessible environment. This process may go on in the execution of
well-learned habits or in the execution of instincts.
Here, Campbell attempts a marriage between the cognitivism of Gestaltism and the
trial-and-error learning of behaviorists. Kohler explained learning without motor trial-anderror as insight learning. But, Campbell explained it in behaviorist terms as vicarious visual
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trial-and-error learning. Thus, in higher animals with vicarious knowledge mechanisms like
vision and memory, environmental winnowing-out of locomotory trials is less direct
(although phenomenally, learning is felt to be direct).
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highlighted first by Quine (1960) in the setting of radical translation; Campbell extends it to
explain language learning. Campbell and Paller (1989) emphasise on ostension to explain
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shared reference. Ostension is unavoidably equivocal, as both Quine (1960) and Wittgenstein
(1953) have emphasized. But, shared reference through ostension is possible mainly because,
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ostension provides a selective restraint, whereby the referent, through perception, has some
likelihood of participating in the selection of the language learners guesses. In subsequent
ostensive instances, and the learners use of the term, the mentor or learner may recognize
or
that the learners hypothesis as to the words meaning is wrong and new guesses as to word
meaning can be generated. The occurrence of rational errors on the part of childrens
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language use is symptomatic of this trial- and-error process (Campbell, 1988). The
equivocality holds for children learning to speak (and protohumans inventing a language for
the first time) fully as much as for the radically uninformed translator.
Language learning is speeded up and made nearly error-free by the shared innate and
learned tendencies to reify middle-sized physical objects and boundable acts. For example,
without hesitation or awareness of alternatives, the child and the translator guesses that
gavagai means rabbit, rather than rabbit-aspect, rabbit-part, rabbit-moment, transient
sense data, direction of pointing etc., (during ostension or translation for a rabbit). The
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perceptual reification of independent objects and events will have been naturally selected for
the usefulness available when stable discreteness, manipulability, and reoccurrence are
typical, thus making possible approximately adaptive learning about them. It is around such
pervasively shared reifications that the foundations for usefully shared linguistic reference
can be built.
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Campbell contrasts with the views of Cassirer, Shapir and Whorf, who believe that
language learning comes first, and arbitrarily determines all of the perceptual entification of
the world. But, this view fails to explain achievement of shared reference (Campbell, 1989).
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For Campbell and Paller (1989) the way the world is (through innate reification) has edited
the ostensively transmissible vocabulary, leading to interpersonal sharing of competent
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Section 2: Creativity
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reference.
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knowledge processes' (1960), Campbell talks about creativity. What he developed here, is not
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exploratory locomotion. In the course of evolution, this locomotion is internalized within the
organism. Creative thought is such an internalized, vicarious knowledge process, in which
the trial-and-error locomotion in the environment is substituted by the trial-and-error thought
4
Simonton (1998, 1999a, b) supports Campbells selectionist account of creativity, while Gabora (2011)
criticizes this.
57
attempts or processes; and the environment is also substituted by the thought criteria.
Examples for the thought criteria include Poincares (1913) aesthetic criteria and the Gestalt
qualities of wholeness, symmetry and organized structure. Thus, creative thought is
substitutive 'natural selection' within the mind.
In the paper cited above, Campbell quotes and analyses the ideas of the following
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thinkers as proposing trial-and-error locomotion at the level of thought: Bain (1874), Souriau
(1881), Ashby (1952), Poincare (1908, 1913) etc.
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Explaining thought as trial-and-error, does not imply that the organism is passive;
instead active generation and checking of thought-trials, hypotheses, or molar responses is
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envisaged. Even though, the organism is active, no direct knowledge is possible to it;
insight is a phenomenal counter part of the successful completion of a perhaps unconscious
blind-variation cycle.
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(We attribute genius on the part of a person for his/her creative act, because of our deeply
rooted tendency toward causal perception). But, the creative output was actually one of the
blind trials the person performed and it is the environmental selective conditions that made
the difference between a hit and a miss.
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numerous and the more varied such trials, the greater the chance of success; (c) there are
individual differences in editing talent i.e., the precise application of a selective criterion
which weeds out the overwhelming bulk of inadequate trials. There are individual differences
or
in the number of selective criteria people possess; (d) there are individual differences in the
competence of retention, cumulation, and transmission of the encountered solutions.
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creativity. For example, (in presenting his case for adding heuristics to the program of the
Logic Theorist and to emphasise the inadequacy of blind trial and error), Simon (1957)
posed the challenge of British Museum Algorithm i.e., the possibility of a group of trained
chimpanzees typing at random producing by chance in the course of a million years all of the
books in the British Museum. Campbell defends accidentalist scheme by saying that the
objections to them are parallel to objections to the theory of natural selection in evolution. As
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far as natural selection is successful, the BVSR scheme in epistemology is also successful.
Campbell says:
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the tremendous number of nonproductive thought trials on the part of the total
intellectual community must not be underestimated. Think of what a small proportion of
thought becomes conscious, and of conscious thought what a small proportion gets
uttered, what a still smaller fragment gets published, and what a small proportion what is
published is used by the next intellectual generation. There is a tremendous wastefulness,
slowness, and a rarity of achievement.
In biological evolution and in thought, the number of variations explored is greatly
reduced by having selective criteria imposed at every step. Thus mutant variations on
nonadaptive variations of the previous generation are never tested even though many
wonderful combinations may be missed therefore. ... It is this strategy of cumulating
selected outcomes from a blind variation, and then exploring further blind variations only
for this highly select stem, that,.....,makes the improbable inevitable in organic evolution.
This strategy is unavoidable for organic evolution, but can obviously be relaxed in
thought processes and in machine problem solving. However, the Pandora's box of
permutations opened up by such relaxation can be used to infer that, in general, thoughttrials are selected or rejected within one or two removes of the established base from
which they start. In constructing our universal library we stop work on any volume as
soon as it is gibberish. (Campbell, 1987a, p.105)
Intelligent variations require an explanation for how these variations or hypotheses came to
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be wise-in-advance. That most hypotheses are wise, but, they reflect already achieved
knowledge or, at least, wise restrictions on the search space. Such wisdom does not, however,
explain further advances in knowledge. That hypotheses, even if not wise, are far from
or
random; but, wise or stupid, restraints on the search space do not explain novel solutions.
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Poincare, James, Jevons and the others (Campbell, 1960; 1974b) emphasize the profuse
mental generation of alternative concepts, mostly wrong.
Section 2.3: Computer Problem Solving
Like thinking, computer problem solving requires vicarious explorations of a vicarious
representation of the environment, with the exploratory trials being selected by criteria which
are vicarious representatives of solution requirements or external realities. For Campbell, if
discovery or expansions of knowledge are achieved, blind variation is requisite. Simon
(1957) rejects this and says that the problem solving of computers is not completely random
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or blind; but it employs intelligent guess based on heuristics. Campbell (1974b) answers
that the intelligent guess, insofar as it is appropriate, represents already achieved wisdom of
a more general sort, and as such, this intelligent guess does not in any sense explain an
innovative solution. Insofar as the intelligent guess is inappropriate, it limits areas of search
in which a solution might be found, and rules out classes of possible solutions. Insofar as the
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intelligent guess represents a partial general truth, some unusual solutions are ruled out.
Simons heuristics are such partial truths, and a computer which would generate its own
heuristics would have to do so by a blind trial and error of heuristic principles, selection from
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which would represent achieved general knowledge. Heuristics greatly reduce the total search
space, but without at all violating the requirement of blindness.
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Thus, all sorts of new knowledge gain employ the BVSR processes.
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Conclusion
Evolutionary epistemology is trying to do to epistemology, what Darwinian theory has done
to evolutionary biology. Darwinian natural selection theory explained fit between
organisms and their environments without the requirement of any teleological causal agency.
Likewise, evolutionary epistemology strongly argued that the fit between belief and referent
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i.e., the fit between knower and the known is to be explained in non-teleological terms. For
evolutionary epistemology, the concept, truth, in epistemology and the concept, fit, in
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selectionist theory which can account for the possibility of new knowledge that goes beyond
old knowledge without requirement of any foundational mechanisms.
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Kant has argued for the noumena - phenomena gap in knowledge, and evolutionary
biology has identified that the adaptation of an organism to its environment to be satisficing
rather than absolute. As Locke argued that our knowledge of the world is not directly gained,
but sensory mediation is required; likewise, in evolution there occur no direct adaptations as
contended by Lamarckism, but all adaptations are indirect, mediated by mutation and
selection processes. The role of the world in our knowledge processes is as a selector.
Those beliefs that are contradicting the true states of affairs are falsified and eliminated;
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likewise, in evolution, organisms that are not possessing environmentally suitable traits are
eliminated.
All these analogies brought out by Evolutionary epistemology of Campbell offer a
new understanding of Knowledge. Evolutionary epistemology has shown that all knowledge
is verisimilitudinal i.e., progressive and an approximate truth. But, this does not mean that
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knowledge is not a fit with the world. Evolutionary epistemology proposes perspectivism
and pragmatism which say that our knowledge is limited to that range of external states of
affairs which has survival significance and beyond that range, our knowledge processes has
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to employ trial-and-error. By pointing out the contingent and chance factors involved in the
fit between beliefs and the world, Campbell alerts us to non-foundationalism. Our
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knowledge is not founded in any infalliable method, but we have to use selectionist trial-and-
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that a system natural or artificial can increase the chance of fit with the world by
producing more varied and more numerous trials. Some of these trials are selected by the
world, leading to fit. The system at the next time is not required to produce varied and
numerous trials, if the world is internalized as a vicarious selector. Systems can be built
which embody Blind-Variation-and-Selective-Retention, vicarious selective criteria or value
criteria and nested hierarchical networks leading to successful execution of old knowledge
and also successful acquisition of new knowledge. He believed that his BVSR account is an
all-purpose explanation of fit that can explain the knowledge gain of lower organisms as
well as higher level processes like the knowledge acquiring in Science, and also the adaptive
63
fit of artificial systems. His scheme can explain intelligent, purposeful and goal-directed
behaviour mechanistically.
Campbells Cybernetic Behaviourism (Campbell, 1975) explains how intelligent
behavior comes about by employing blind selection processes. (Phylogenetic) evolution is not
goal-directed, but the internal selection is. Phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic learning
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set goals on the part of the organisms, fulfillment of which becomes organisms motive.
These goals are the representative of the external states of affairs and satisfying them
enhances survival. Thus, the world represented as internal criteria selects blind guesses the
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organism produces, all this process happening in the mind / thought. Higher level organisms
knowledge processes, at different levels, possess vicarious criteria comprising of a reference
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signal or template for the goal state. (These criteria may have phenomenological dimension
of pleasure or pain). These vicarious criteria are hierarchically arranged at all levels of
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knowledge processes. Each level employs selection process in which trials are selected by
these internal criteria and the result is feed-forwarded to the next higher level. Thus, this
higher level exploits the lower level output, making its responses purposive and intelligent. If
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the organism has to attain new knowledge at this level it has to employ the BVSR process, as
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the lower level BVSR mechanism can only provide old knowledge and new knowledge at
any level needs new BVSR process, although using lower level BVSRs wisdom.
All new knowledge is not blind, as previous learning might have helped. To clarify
this, Cziko (2001) identified three different types of behavioral knowledge (a) instinct, (b)
learned behavior and (3) invention. There is a range of constraint of phylogenetic evolution
among these instinct is mostly based in phylogenetic evolution, while learned behavior is
less constrained by phylogeny and invention is the least constrained. Instinct and learned
behavior provide wisdom for the new invention, making it less blind (but not clairvoyant).
Selectionist scheme is still employed as instincts came about by phylogenetic evolution i.e.,
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among-organism BVSR process; learned behavior has arisen from wisdom of instincts and
ontogenetic learning i.e., prior within-organism BVSR mechanism; and the current
invention received wisdom from instincts and experience of prior learning but goes beyond
them by employing the current BVSR process. The current and prior knowledge constrain
future inventions, but they also employ the BVSR process to lead to new knowledge.
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internalized social norms and share them with other fellow beings. These internalized
schemas, concepts or ratiomorphic anticipations constrain our learning and knowledge.
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Lorenz (1941, 1977) explained how Kants notion of a priori categories can be understood to
be evolutionarily based. Shepard (2001) talks about how regularities in the world are
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internalized in the knowledge processes, due to evolution. Cooper (2003) argues that human
reason and logic are evolutionarily based. Heschl (2002) strongly argues for phylogenetic
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Campbell identified at least four factors involved in the knowledge processes at the
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human level. These are internal selectors (Campbell, 1987b), referent (Campbell, 1993),
historicity (Campbell, 1997) and society/culture (Campbell, 1993). They are co-selectors i.e.,
they all have role as selectors in the BVSR knowledge process. The innate as well learned
presumptions embodied in neurological / bodily internal selectors, past and present social
downward causation and the present referent or the world etc., participate in the present trialand-error of knowledge process. Knowledge processes in all hierarchies are highly nested.
Campbells
Evolutionary
epistemology
sought
to
provide
non-teleological
explanation to all puzzles of fit, whether animals or humans, whether natural or artificial,
65
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66
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