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1) John Mearsheimer's book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" puts forth the theory of offensive realism to explain international relations and power dynamics between states. 2) Offensive realism holds that great powers seek to maximize their share of power and influence in the international system out of security concerns, making conflict more likely. 3) Mearsheimer tests his theory against historical events and argues it provides the best framework for understanding why states act aggressively towards each other and constantly compete for power even after achieving regional dominance.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
87 views

BHJNK

1) John Mearsheimer's book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" puts forth the theory of offensive realism to explain international relations and power dynamics between states. 2) Offensive realism holds that great powers seek to maximize their share of power and influence in the international system out of security concerns, making conflict more likely. 3) Mearsheimer tests his theory against historical events and argues it provides the best framework for understanding why states act aggressively towards each other and constantly compete for power even after achieving regional dominance.

Uploaded by

Matthew Stein
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Anne Rathe 1

POLI 2057
Mr. Rohrer
4/20/12

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics Book Review

John Mearsheimer’s work in ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ follows the realist

thought of ‘offensive realism’ throughout history. In the book his theory on offensive realism is

a knew thought that branches out from Waltz’s realist theory and explains the reasons why there

is so much aggression between the great powers in our world today and in the past. In his theory

he sets out to explain to the reader how the great power strategies have developed what our

international system is today. Surrounding his theory he outlines what he thinks the true

definition of power is and how that plays a crucial role in how alliances have formed around our

world and the role it plays in war and peace.

Mearsheimer’s objective throughout the book is to persuade the audience that his theory

of offensive realism is well developed with substantial evidence and endeavors to cover every

aspect of the inner workings of the international system. In the book he states that with his theory

of offensive realism every great power in our world is vying for more power and for the position

of hegemony, which is their ultimate goal. The book sets out to break down the different

important aspects of the international system and how offensive realism best explains how great

powers are going to act when faced with war and peace. Mearsheimer outlines the book in a

progressive manner that starts off by explaining how the world believes that after the Cold War

there is a chance to attain perpetual peace across the global. However, Mearsheimer’s objective

with the book clearly states that this is not possible because of the ever-present security dilemma.

With that being said he claims “there are no status quo powers in the international system, save

for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals.”
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(2) With his theory of offensive realism he explains that great powers are never going to be

content with the what they have and that they will always want more which is why he believes

his theory is the best explanation for how the international system works.

The offensive realism theory that Mearsheimer has created endeavors to unveil the inner

workings of the international systems structure and how that is the crucial element in

understanding how states work. As stated above he talks about the ever-present security dilemma

and since great powers fear one another they are going to do everything they can to change the

balance of power in their favor until they reach the potential goal of being a hegemon. However

he clearly states that it is impossible for any great power to achieve global hegemony so this is

why the world will always be in a power competition. This following quote helps to shed more

light on this component of the theory: “Although its main goal would be containment, the distant

hegemon would also look for opportunities to undermine the threat and reestablish a rough

balance of power in the region, so that it could return home. In essence, regional hegemons act as

offshore balancers in other areas of the world, although they prefer to be the balancer of last

resort.” (141) His theory is largely based on three different components. The first component

deals with how the great powers interact with one another and how they will do anything to

anyone to gain the power they need to survive. With this first component he gives the example

that “ multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar

systems contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous

systems of them all.” (5) The second component in the theory is how testable is it in real world

international politics and how well it holds up with historical events. He revolves this part of the

theory around the events happening from the beginning of the French Revolution until the end of

the twentieth century. The last component is how he uses his theory to make predictions about
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POLI 2057
Mr. Rohrer
4/20/12
future international political events. He states that his theory is mainly a descriptive theory but

that it also is a prescriptive theory because it explains how states should act according to

offensive realism in order to survive. (11) The theory revolves around the different aspects of

power and what it really means. He talks about the two different types of power: latent

(population size and the economy) and actual power (which is military). He argues that military

power is the most important type of power one can have along with having sufficient land power

because the two coincide.

The central concepts that Mearsheimer talks about in this book are his six concepts of

power and the pursuit of power. The first concept is about the reasoning’s behind why states

compete for power. This concept is based on five assumptions that when used together explain

why states act in an aggressive way. The second is about the amount of power states are trying to

achieve and if it is ever enough. Third concept asks what power really is. Fourth explains the

different type of strategies that are used by states in order to achieve power and maintain it. The

fifth concept revolves around the actual concept of war. The final concept asks when great

powers that are threatened use balancing and buck-passing.

The central argument that is throughout the book is that in order for states to survive they

need to think offensively and utilize their relative power and in doing so they will get closer to

their goal of become a hegemon. “States cannot depend on others for their own security. Each

state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own

survival.” (33) The best situation is to become the hegemon in the international system and when

that is achieved that is the only time that pursuit of power is halted. However, as Mearsheimer

states it is impossible to become a global hegemon so the best hope for great powers is to

become a regional hegemon. “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great
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powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not

want peers.” (41) The main fact is that all of the great powers fear each other in the international

system. This comes from the fact that the great powers all have military capability and will

utilize this against one another for survival and since they are in an anarchic state there is a lot of

imperfect information that causes them to be unsure of one another. The more power that a great

power has at its disposal, the more fear it causes in the other great powers. Mearsheimer states

that it is important to differentiate between potential and actual power because potential power is

mainly military power, which is made up of the states wealth and population size and actual

power is the forces that directly support the military power.

In testing his theory of offensive realism Mearsheimer tests the theory with historical

events in the past two centuries, specifically “citing territorial conquests of Japan and Germany

before 1945 and Soviet policies after 1917 as evidence.” (Kupchan) He states that in order for

him to prove that offensive realism does in fact work he had to demonstrate that “1) the history

of great-power politics involves primarily the clashing of revisionist states, and 2) the only status

quo powers that appear in the story are regional hegemons—i.e., states that have achieved the

pinnacle of power.” (168) He provides evidence that it is hard to find leaders of great powers that

are ok with the power that they currently have who also have the ability to incur more power. “In

sum, security considerations appear to have been the main driving force behind the aggressive

policies of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union.” (170) The theory tests how different

distributions of power such as balanced and unbalanced multipolar, and bipolar powers affected

war outcomes. His evidence showed that in the twenty first century “ Europe remains bipolar

(US as offshore balancer and Russia) and Northeast Asia is multipolar (China, Russia and US as

offshore balancer) but with no potential hegemon and relative weakness of China and Russia.”
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(Harvard 2) According to an essay done by Peter Gowan, he states that Mearsheimer uses the

thoughts of Thomas Hobbes to substantiate his claim of offensive realism even more by

explaining the power struggle within the great powers. Peter Gowan then claims that

Mearsheimer passes over the works done by Arno Mayer in Politics and Diplomacy of

Peacemaking (1967), this work makes the fact evident of “how deeply the calculations of the

victorious powers were affected by the fears of the Russian Revolution just as the great

expansion of American power after the Second World War was hugely facilitated by the

preoccupation of so many states with their domestic security in the face of communism;”

(Gowan). He then talks about exercises in social power politics involving the wars of Korea and

Vietnam.

Mearsheimer is a realist and follows along closely with the thoughts made by Waltz and

Morgenthau but he branches out from Waltz’s structural theory when he talks about the

distribution of power, international politics and foreign policy. The two realist theories that

Mearsheimer states as the ones that stand out from the rest are Morgenthau’s human nature

realism and Waltz’s defensive realism which both talk about the different areas of power and

why states pursue power which Mearsheimer’s theory revolves around. Mearsheimer’s theory is

opposite of Waltz’s especially when it comes to the possible theories on foreign policy because

of all of the different options that go on at the very state level and the fact that Waltz doesn’t

really talk about foreign policy in the structure of his theory because he doesn’t think that it plays

into the behaviors of individual states. Contrary to Mearsheimer’s theory, Waltz does not believe

that the great powers are naturally aggressive and that they are just trying to survive. In Waltz’s

theory he emphasizes that in international politics the great powers pay more attention to

balancing the powers among each other. He does however agree with Mearsheimer that the
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powers live in a state of anarchy but where he differs is in the thought that the great powers will

act defensively in order to not upset the existing balance of power. “The first concern of states is

to maintain their position in the system.” (20) Another area the Waltz’s theory of realism differs

from Mearsheimer’s is when he states that the great powers need to be careful and not acquire a

lot of power because when they have a lot of power behind them it causes the other powers to

rally up against them, which he then says that this will leave them in a worse off position than if

they had just been more worried about balancing the powers. Waltz believes in status quo powers

in the international system and that there is really no causes for war to happen because he thinks

nothing will be gained from war and that a states military power should be used more for defense

than offense. Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory like Waltz’s

but the point at where it differs is over the question of how much power states want. (21)

Mearsheimer’s realism is classified as neoclassical realism whereas Waltz’s theory is a seminal

neorealist theory (Toft) Morgenthau’s theory of human nature realism concentrates on the

assumption that “states are led by human beings who have a ‘will to power’ hardwired into them

at birth.”(19) Mearsheimer’s theory agrees that states will always want more power but he

disagrees with Morgenthau on the assumption that it is human nature that drives the want for

power and not that the states are living in an anarchical world.

Liberalism has an all-together different view from realist when it comes to international

relations. In the case of offensive realism Liberalist would say that with reason and increased

economies there will be no need for war and that great powers will be satisfied once they have

achieved this. They believe that states are the main actors in the international system and that

with some internal arrangement such as a democracy will end up being the best working political

system in which all states will become democracies and not want to go to war with one another.
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Liberalist have a very optimistic or utopian view on how the world politics works opposed to the

realist view which is more pessimistic especially offensive realist theories that believe that there

will always be a power struggle which leads to an ever present security dilemma. Realist

thoughts on state survival is challenged in two ways: “Proponents of globalization often argue

that states today are concerned more with achieving prosperity than with worrying about their

survival. Getting rich is the main goal of post-industrial states, maybe even the all-consuming

goal.”(370) Mearsheimer states that there are problems with this realist thought that his theory

explains the outcomes and why this occurs. “In particular, there is always the possibility that a

serious economic crisis in some important region, or in the world at large, will undermine the

prosperity that this theory needs to work.” (370) He gives the example of the United States and

the recent economic crisis and that even though the United States contained the crisis it isn’t to

say that it couldn’t happen again and end up spread across the world.

Overall Mearsheimer did what he set out to accomplish in his theory of offensive realism.

He explained his views on the security dilemma amongst the great powers around the world

throughout history and how his offensive realism theory in his opinion along with supporting

evidence best explains the power struggles that have existed over time. He also endeavored to

predict future outcome of great powers using his theoretical framework of realism thought. In

short he explained that the great powers would do everything in their power to survive and

achieve more power in order to one day be a hegemon.


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Bibliography

Gowan, Peter. "A Calculus of Power." New Left Review. New Left Review, July 2002. Web. 15

Apr. 2012. http://www.newleftreview.org/A2399

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). Harvard

University. Web. 15 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~plam/irnotes07/Mearsheimer2001.pdf>.This source is a

PDF from research done by someone at Harvard University. The site shows no author or

publishing information that I could find

Kupchan, Charles A. "Review of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics." The International

History Review (2003). Council on Foreign Relations. Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, Sept.

2003. Web. 15 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/world/review-tragedy-great-power-

politics/p6659>

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2003.

Print

Toft, Peter. "John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power." Journal

of International Relations and Development 8.4 (2005): 381-408. Palgrave Macmillan Journals.

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 2005. Web. 15 Apr. 2012.

http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/full/1800065a.html

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